ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1868), pp.

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Analysis ofHegel's Phenomenology. 99

to them toriness, they help themselves" and eat them and all nature celebrates, uoj which like them, these open mysteries, the truth of sensuous what demonstrate [v.] things is. But those who make such assertions, " this piece of paper which a dif is entirely ferent one from that above, yet they speak of " actual things," " external or sensuous "absolute individual objects," essence,"

nomenon lated nature

[p. 81] say, as above remarked* immediately a the converse of what they mean; phe which to arouse is perhaps reflection the best calcu

the concerning Certitude. They speak of the extant being of external objects, be determined which, more closely, may as as real ones, absolutely particular, individual personal, wholly things, each one of which has no longer its absolute that this extant Being has ab equivalent; of sensuous solute certitude and truth. this piece of paper upon rather have written) ; but they do not say If they really wanted what they mean. to say this piece of paper which they mean, the sensuous This which is meant, is un for that be language; in itself Uni They mean which I write (or

the unreasonable, that which is untrue, " meant."?If merely nothing more is said of something than that it is an actual then one has thing, an external objeet, said only the most general thing of it, and with this has been rather its expressed likeness ence.

&e.y i. e. they say of them only the Uni versal ; for this reason that which is called is nothing the unspeakable else than the

a This and moreover, thing is any one pleases. More closely as this is designated piece of paper,?so every piece of paper a this piece of paper, thing; thing which and I have still merely said the general.

with everything, than its differ If I say a particular thing, I say it rather as a universal, for each is a particular

(and they do,) this is impossible,since

which

But [p. 82] if I will not allow language

the divine imme possesses nature, to invert the meaning and thus not permit it to put in a word, but hasten to its assistance this piece of pa by exhibiting diately

approachable by longs to consciousness?the versal.

the actual attempt to ex During press it, it would rot; those who had com not complete menced its description-could it but would have to leave would

per, then I learn truth of sensuous

it to others who

that finally themselves acknowledge in describing what no they were engaged Hence although they mean longer existed.

what the by experience certitude is in fact; I is a Here of point it out as a Here which or in itself a other Here's; simple complex of many Here's, i. e. a and thus Universal, I apprehend it as it in truth is, and instead of knowing an Immediate, I perceive it.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.

The special object of the Phenomenology of consciousness was, by a development in its essential principle, to establish what was to Hegel the absolute cognition,?to demonstrate this to be but the and of consciousness. cognition highest step stage Hegel gives, in this work, a history of consciousness as it appears in time (hence the title), an evolution of the epochs of the growth of consciousness, on its way to philosophical knowledge." [Schwegler's Hist. Phil.?Stirling's Translation.] The called peared obscure work under consideration, usually the first original work of Hegel, ap " in 1807. Some the most think it at the same concrete in the various time, recognized forms that they have assumed in in a exhibiting the development sort of of the "

In it are unfolded in history of thought. their natural order all the apercus of pure and these are, science (pritna philosophia)

of Hegel's but by him works," self it is called his "Voyage of Discov The true student of philosophy must ery." regard it as the greatest work in the whole

the world; thus dramatic spectacle motives of human

Institutions of history. of cul civilization, phases psychological the genesis of ture, historical revolutions, so-called of the mind"?all "faculties these are shown the final cause, to have the realization their necessity in of spirit.

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100 Analysis ofHegel's Phenomenology.

That the which individual is potentially self-conscious? as Leibnitz the whole in its lowest soul, which, is a monad and even guided. method The mathematical method is not a for discovering truth, but only of truth communicating after it is seen. Again, the method of " schematizing in formalism," one merely classifies data obtained which from experience according to a ready-made a true system does not at arrive scheme, bottles of the any more than the labelled constitutes It is the dis such. apothecary ease prevalent dilet among philosophical on tanti, to use a few abstract categories all occasions them. The true method ter and holds it fast; the subject-mat first taking it accord it it allows obvious phase, after con seizes and subsume everything under

teaches,

stage of development universe?must become dissolve all and alchemy own infinitude.

reflects

objective see in the universe

so, must actually forms by aid of its only its

in a pop is embodied Such a conception ular form in the religious doctrine of cre ation. God creates man in his own image for his honor in order that and

can recognize to be is stated But Ego all

He creates man glory. that there may be a being him. Thus, the end of man of God. recognition the is the infinite person, the possible Hence, or Eter

too, God, or eternal subject who makes whatever. self-consciousness

ing to its most to show up its presuppositions one the other until we have the elements

the individual The nal Reason, Creator and the if it would

in recognizing God his own true being. recognizes is the essence of the creature, the former recognize its own essence.

latter must recognize

before stituting quite a different object, us.* The three stages of an exhaustive systematic treatment are those of immedi and absolute mediation. ateness, mediation, i. of this journal, pp. 3-4; Vol. (See Vol. ii., p. 1.) to new beginners The difficulty of Hegel lies in their inability to mark the transi to the tions from one of these stages And not only do they fail to sepa these stages, but they fail to distin remarks (u exter guish even the discursive nal reflections,") with which he opens the other. rate subject, from the rigid scientific that follows. treatment

to this work, Hegel takes In the preface to advance the claims of what he occasion considers against cording entific strictly a mere First of philosophy, then prevalent. Thus, ac should be a sci to him, philosophy have a of truth and exposition the true method views systematic series of form; genial it should not be philosophemes.

are only beginnings. They principles are seeds ; their truth is their development The acorn is an oak into organic systems. untrue form. and hence in its abstract system he is careful advocating from in the true method to discriminate as for example, such, methods, adequate and Wolff that of Spinoza (the mathe method) and that of the disciples schematizing formalism). in is defective method

But while

from [f.] to [i.], inclusive, we have the im mediate stage ; from [k.] to [m.] the stage from [n.] to [s.], inclusive, of mediation; * We quote from an admirable article on Hegel, by J. E. Cabot, North American Re view, No. ccxix., p. 456: " The essence of Hegel's method consists in taking any statement, any fact that offers, at its own valuation, and treating it as if it were truth. In this way its inherent limitations are sure to show themselves, and not simply as er towards a more com ror, but as an advance " It is a favorite device of plete statement." to show how the paradoxes and self Hegel's contradictions which the understanding perpet but which it usually dodges ually encounters, and derides as metaphysical subtilties when called to notice them, are in reality the com* ing to light of what is wanting in its own statements, and needed tomake them true."

In the chapter of the translation before from [a.] to [e.]t inclu us, the paragraphs reflections; sive, contain only external

matical

of Schilling (a The mathematical that monstrator

is arbitrary ; the de its procedure " has in view the final quod con that and this erat" etc., and makes demon these and struction, postulates refers now to strates those preliminaries, an axiom and then to a definition?all cedure.

without

the necessity of the pro showing In the end, one perceives why the course he did, but demonstrator pursued the he sees too that itwas subjective choice that

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Analysis of He gel's Phenomenology. 101

mediation. Then follow?[t.] to [v.]?some more reflections to show where we are with our result. Let us examine : the content more minutely it is evident that we Since [a.] can the absolute Its first attitude must be that of [e.] the mere assertion of the simple existence

not comprehend a result without first con to the premises, we are obliged sidering that are ob neglect all forms of knowing

of the object without its as conditioning sertion as in the Ego by introducing to the truth of the as any way essential sertion. senses can The [f.] testify only of to them in time and space what is present ?the Now and the Here. Any assertion on their part, will be a of some predication content or other to the Here or the Now, " for example : " The Now is night." The Here is a tree." But experience shows at once that the individual contents of the Now and Here, do not abide. which the senses testify of,

viously inferential, and apply ourselves first seems or intui to what to be immediate tional Of course, we do knowing. it has been demonstrated until knowing not to

know, us, that such intuitional tirely sufficient.

is not en

It offers itself as the truest and [b.] most satisfactory mode of knowing. It seems to give us the very concrete reality itself. " it But, in fact, such certitude merely says is" and does not say aught of the definite distinctions object ject jects, and and give it belong to the An ob individuality. its relations to other ob cannot cognized relation im be limits which

The of the. [g.] subject and predicate sensuous assertion do not coincide. The are universals, Now and Here and of any particular them, we the time. truth content that is attributed to can with equal propriety deny or affirm it. The universal is and at the same negative each particular act of refutes all others and

is through and a relation

both affirmative

not draw inferences; they merely give But premises such as premises. they fur nish are not things, but mere elements of or determina abstractions things?mere tions. it is evident upon re [c] Moreover, flection that every immediate certitude in volves the distinction and determination of subject and object, and that such dis tinction and

a To immediately. cognize intuition be made plies that the sensuous a tool in the hands of a higher?a syn thetic mode of cognition. The senses can

Therefore, sensuous certitude is refuted [h.]

in turn by them. seizes the and Language abiding, con No particular hence, the universal. tent of sensuous certitude can be commu nicated. is not true, is anything else that happens to be present to the senses, and the mentioned assertion does not tell which senses are meant. The senses them selves must be taken into consideration, for it is their presence that makes the Now The meaning is the essen night or day. tial condition which sertion. condition I must add " The Here is a tree" [i.] for the reason that the Here

is a mediation, determination and hence we have a relation and not a I say, " This ob simple immediate. When is implied : " because I ject is," a ground see it." But this implied ground will ren der it untrue the moment I look somewhere else. If I assert it on the that I ground saw it, or that some one else saw it, then I am asserting the troth upon other grounds sensuous immediate and certitude, a series of grounds complicated as memory, such language, definitions, of testimony, etc., etc. credibility need not, however, continue [d.] We these reflections; let us rather summon involve this certitude before us and note cedure. its pro than

gives truth to the as to the assertion this

and always be particular to state the subject who knows. the first attitude of the [k.] Therefore^ sensuous certitude toward its object must be changed. It has found that the object cannot be asserted purely, but that the as sertion must bring with it at the same time a voucher for the truth by adding the es sential the Ego who condition, namely, means the particular content asserted. It " is this "meaning that prevents our cer titude from inverting itself. this new [1.] Let us examine attitude

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102Analysis ofHegel's Phenomenology.

and which come of it: "The Now " " the Here is day ; which I see is a tree." But it is obvious at once see what will I see ular and the Finite The Me its other-being it is (alterum); and that on which it depends.

that we are still in difficulty, for we cannot " I." tell what we mean by Every observer " a and his is a subject or I," object is in Here and Now. [m.] and Here The Ego Now. is as In universal as the say fact, we cannot

and Not-Me the to together make is this totality. tality, and the Universal No object can be completely known until all its complications with other things are unravelled.

what we mean. that we wish tion seems

to escape us. It is evident that we have failed [n.] in our attempts thus far. But there is still one way left. We posited the objective as the essence at first, and then we posited now we can posit as essence; subjective this we their union as essence, and beyond to give up cannot go, but shall be obliged the cause and refuse all it fails. in the rela and both are truth to sensuous certitude if here

for itself, particular, intui to seize by a sensuous The

must The shallowest Knowing sen some to The this degree. accomplish can suous certitude (it must be allowed) or Time know only what ; Space occupies in Space or Time is extended but whatever be a compound Knowing sensuous having parts, and the is a seizing of such parts and hence a mediation. of the cer

must

in their synthesis, We find in this third attitude titude we No, and an answer know

to the question: Can ? This answer is : immediately are mediated

The truth is seized [o.] tion of the Ego to the object, in it. alike essential

if knowing, they are to be known in their truth. in A knowing of an object sensuously, and uniting of the volves a distinguishing above after, &c, immediate and below, right and left, before and and such a knowing is not an and we call it but a mediate, a taking through [some

for objects themselves hence require mediated

us now finally see whether Let [p.] of the relation can be the immediateness The point of time (the Now) or the the point of space (the Here), This in general, can be seized only through other points or This's which fix and define and that this, it is evident involve an knowing must I seize three stages : (1) activity having the object as This, but I cannot do it (2) it from the Not-this except by separating the former. From every sensuous of course must I am engaged in seizing preserved, [q. r. 8.] considered in and for itself.

per-ckftion,* thing else]. [t. u. v.]

Hegel concludes to the Mysteries by alluding remnants of religious rites Asia, ness ual wherein that and was celebrated the essence immortal, and does of man not Even that

which

this chapter were

of Western the conscious is supersens through like the act as

i. e. abides

mediation, food of the body. though they knew

perish animals sensuous

which while

also be my object in the process. (3) an object, I necessa Therefore, it) and seize rily transcend it (and cancel it in identity with another or higher total or lim its other-being ity which includes its. And hence, my act of seizing it (in gates a cognition) is a three-fold act which ne as well as posits or affirms the ob ject. The Universal is the unity of the partic

uous object would find the task intermina that new peculiarities ble, for the reason in it, through its changeable arise would them. nature, faster than he could describe The next chapter is a consideration of

things or true, but destructible are not permanent But one who should even). (or digestible a complete description of a sens undertake

Perception. * German= Wahrnehmung.

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