SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILE HOME COMMUNITY, Plaintiff, vs . BONNIE SHIPLEY, Defendant.

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Case No. UDDS1204130

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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE HON. DONALD R. ALVAREZ, JUDGE DEPARTMENT S-32 SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA Thursday, February 14, 2013

APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiff: HART, KING & COLDREN BY: ROBERT G. WILLIAMSON, JR. Attorney at Law 200 Sandpointe, 4th Floor Santa Ana, California 92707

For the Defendant:

NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON Attorney at Law 950 Roble Lane Santa Barbara, California

93103

Reported by:

VICTORIA E. VILLEGAS, CSR NO. 9843 Official Reporter

SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA; THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013 A.M. SESSION DEPARTMENT S-32 APPEARANCES: HART, KING
&

HON. DONALD R. ALVAREZ, JUDGE

COLDREN, BY ROBERT G.

WILLIAMSON, JR., Attorney at Law, for the Plaintiff; NANCY DUFFY MCCARRON, Attorney at Law, for the Defendant. (Victoria E. Villegas, Official Reporter, CSR No. 9843.) -000THE COURT: Stubblefield versus Shipley.

Could I have everybody's appearance, please? MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. Good morning, your Honor.

Robert Williamson appearing for the plaintiff and moving party. MS. MCCARRON: Nancy Duffy McCarron for the

defendant and also the moving party on these joint summary judgment motions. THE COURT: some argument before. Okay. This was here before. There was

The Court has considered that.

Does anybody have anything more from either side that they want to add not in your papers? MR. WILLIAMSON: may. There were several documents filed by the defendant, just got them a couple days ago, entitled "Supplemental Declaration of Nancy Duffy McCarron," "Supplemental Declaration of Bonnie Shipley," and what was called a
--

Yes.

Thank you, your Honor.

If I

believe titled nObjections and a Motion to Strike Errata." And if I could address those briefly, your Honor, because we didn't obviously have time to file a response to that. And in

light of this Court's admonition of not filing paperwork on this until - - I mean after January 31st, we didn't. But, briefly, on the document entitled "Objection and Notice" - - or "Motion to Strike Errata," there's no notice of motion, no supporting authorities. There's a lot of argument. It's

objectionable on several grounds. There's no authentication. There's no foundation, no showing of personal knowledge, speculation, and unfounded accusations. As to the declarations, we have evidentiary objections. And if it please the Court, I can either read them into the record as to the supplemental declarations of Shipley and McCarron or - THE COURT: You mean that was just filed? They haven't been filed. Their

MR. WILLIAMSON:

declarations were filed, I believe - - I mean I received them a couple days ago, but - THE COURT: I didn't think we were going to get

anymore filings on this. MR. WILLIAMSON: Well, I didn't think so either but what occurred is that on the - - first, we filed an errata to Mr. Freeman's declaration that was filed in support of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because there was a page missing from Mr. Freeman's declaration that was cited in our nonstatutory separate statement. And I think it was paragraphs eight through 14 were missing so we filed an errata with a missing page which precipitated all this other

paperwork by the defendant. THE COURT: I thought I was pretty clear that you

didn't need to have any additional filings in connection with this but - MR. WILLIAMSON: the errata. That's correct, your Honor. Except

Mr. Freeman's declaration had been filed on

January 22nd, and we just weren't aware that there was a page missing. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WILLIAMSON: And so we filed the missing page. THE COURT: Okay. So if I could submit to save time

MR. WILLIAMSON:

the written evidentiary objections to the supplemental declarations. Or, as I said, I could read those into the record. THE COURT: Well, why don't you submit them. Okay.

MR. WILLIAMSON: MS. MCCARRON:

Your Honor, I'm going to object to Counsel has for

this because they were sent three days ago.

the last seven months, every time there's a hearing, has come into this court at 2:00 or 3:00 in the afternoon and filed 500 pages and has no problem filing 900 pages with an ex parte notice. Counsel - - I served it three days ago. He had plenty

of time to get those objections and do them on the record. THE COURT: to an errata, why
--

If there was - - if everything was filed I'm a little bit confused why there needs

to be a whole lot of paperwork filed in connection with an errata that is just making a correction to something that's

already been filed. MS. MCCARRON: Honor? THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I've got a whole ton of stuff here. MS. MCCARRON: Okay. Well, you ordered that no more Did you read my objections, your

papers be filed. Okay. And they didn't care about your order because they know there's not going to be any negative consequences. So the next day they came in and they filed an errata. And now they're sliding in an extra piece of paper saying, oh, by the way, guys, this was missing. And this whole entire page is a completely new version of he said she said, what went on with the encounter on August 2nd between Shipley and Marvin that has never been offered before in seven months. And it's this whole new version that he would like That's why he waited till after

you to believe that happened.

the hearing so that you could read it right while you were going to do your ruling as the last thing. And my
--

and obviously we had a right to object

because these were a whole page of a purported version that we had no opportunity to object to or do anything because they weren't put in until after the last hearing. And when I saw

them I knew right away it was a fraud on the Court because the original declaration was paginated, as Word does when it prints a document, one, two, three, and Marvin had signed it. The new one coming in with the missing page is paginated one, two, three, three. Well, that jumps out as a third grader could figure out that one. Because if that page had been

included in the original declaration that was presented to the witness on January 21st, that signature would have ended up on page four, not page three. THE COURT: Okay. That's - - that's my point. And

MS. MCCARRON:

that's why we had to object because we have a due process right to get our objections on the record. And, you know, it really doesn't matter, your Honor, because this whole version of he said she said, it's completely irrelevant to the summary judgment motion because, as you know, only material facts - and counsel said at the last hearing, you remember, it's on the transcript, he said the facts are not in dispute. And I said the facts are not in dispute. here in dispute. There's no material facts

So all this side stuff that's put in here to

distract you, to confuse, to start a fire over here so you're trying to put that out and not concentrating. We would like to have a ruling today on summary judgment. THE COURT: You're going to get one. Good. Thank you, your Honor.

MS. MCCARRON:

MR. WILLIAMSON: THE COURT:

If I may?

Everybody through? For the record, your Honor, there's

MR. WILLIAMSON:

only been one version of Mr. Freeman's declaration. There's never been any other declaration filed by Mr. Freeman. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. We've got some requests The Court will grant

for judicial notice by the plaintiff.

the request for judicial notice regarding the filing of the complaint, that's Exhibit "Au,as well as the judicial

admissions contained in the defendant's answer, that's Exhibit

"B;" the defendant's declaration, Exhibit " D l " and defense

counsel's declaration, Exhibit "E." With regard to the legislative history of AB 556 and Civil Code 798.75, the Court - - those - - the legislative history is an official record.

I don't know that - - I guess I

People

can take judicial notice of that if it's needed.

routinely cite to the legislative record in certain types of cases where there's some ambiguity. I think that's the

request for judicial notice, Exhibits "F1I through I1L. " There's a request to - - Exhibit
"C,"

to take

judicial notice of a printout in California Department of Housing and Community Development. 1'11 deny that. I don't

think it's certified, at least not that I saw. I would deny request for judicial notice.

So Exhibit "C1'

And there's also a request to take judicial notice of the tax assessor's records. And those documents I think are attached to the
--

to a previous request for judicial 1'11 deny the request as to the Those documents are not

notice in a previous motion.

tax records and copies of checks.

certified and there's insufficient foundation for that. MS. MCCARRON: certified. Excuse me, your Honor. It was They

The tax assessor, that's the way they do it. So it was certified.

put two blue stamps on the top. THE COURT:

Well, okay. And let's see.

The other

thing is we have - - Court's intended is to deny the request for judicial notice of plaintiff's discovery responses. The defendant does not specify which request for admissions she's

seeking judicial notice of. it. And that's for that.

So it's ambiguous so I would deny

And then I will note with respect to defendant's objections, my intention is to overrule those objections. There's - - there was some indication or reference to evidentiary objections that were with the opposition to the prior summary judgment motion which was denied without prejudice on various procedural grounds. And the objections are not determinative of the outcome for the ruling on both of these cross motions for summary judgment. And so at least preliminarily that's where I'm at with all of the - - those items. MR. WILLIAMSON: A - THE COURT: The Court - - yes? May I speak to Exhibit "C," your

MR. WILLIAMSON:

Honor, the registration information from the California Department of Housing and Community Development? That is an

official record. And unless there's some issue about its authenticity or integrity, I believe a certified copy of that record is not necessary. THE COURT: Well - It can be secondary evidence of the

MR. WILLIAMSON:

official record. And those records are readily accessible online any way. THE COURT: correct and accurate. I know but online doesn't make it The Court - - without authentication or

lack of official certification, the Court can't take judicial notice of that, or will not. And the Court will note that the

Court should not take judicial notice of documents that contain unauthenticated statements with no indication of author, custodian, date, creation, purpose, reliability or veracity, Hartwell Corporation v. Superior Court 27 Cal.4th 256 at 279. That takes me then to the substance of the cross motions for summary judgment. And here
--

and this will be

probably for the benefit - - maybe for the benefit of both counsel. MR. WILLIAMSON: THE COURT: Can I be seated, your Honor?

Sure.

Ms. McCarron, if you'd like to be seated. MS. MCCARRON: THE COURT: Thank you.

The plaintiff argues that the

legislative history shows that the eviction procedure under Civil Code 798.75(c) is not governed by the rules pertaining to - - to a forcible detainer under Civil Code 1160 and 1172. The Court will note by the Senate Housing and Urban Affairs Committee record as it pertains to Civil Code 798.75(c), it provides for a summary eviction procedure and I quote, "This bill would provide that such persons could be considered unlawful occupants and subject to the summary eviction procedures applicable to other landlord-tenant relationships." And that's Senate Housing and Urban Affairs Committee AB 556, May 11, 1987. As noted by the Assembly Judiciary Committee, the terms "forcible detaineru was removed as it only pertained to occupants holding possession contrary to the previous occupants. Assembly Judicial (sic) Committee, Republican

Analysis, April 20, 1987.

Implicit in the statement is that

the eviction process was not meant to be limited to only those circumstances covered by Civil Code 1160. In the Court's view, the language of the statute and the legislative notes show that the summary eviction process authorized by the Civil Code 798.75(c) is defined by Civil Code 1160 and 1172. And the Court will note here as well that even though the - - there was some argument last time regarding the plaintiff can't prove forcible detainer, the Court will note here, making an observation, the complaint cites Civil Code Section 798.75 as the basis for the action. Even though

the caption on the complaint labels the action as one for a forcible detainer, the citation in the body of the complaint is Civil Code Section 798.75. In this view, the Court does not see how this position in the complaint is totally inconsistent with what is being argued in the summary judgment . The Court will note further, erroneous or confusing labels attached by the pleader are to be ignored if the complaint pleads facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. It is not what a paper is named but what it is that That's Saunders, S-a-u-n-d-e-r-s, v. -

fixes its character.

Cariss, C-a-r-i-s-s, 224 Cal.App.4th - - excuse me - - 224 Cal.App.3d 905. That was a case in the context of a demurrer. I'll just make that observation. The Court has also considered the argument that the plaintiff is citing to
--

or defense argument that plaintiff

is only citing to subdivision (c) and (d) of Civil Code 798.75

which is not entirely accurate. According to the defendant, subdivisions (a) and (b) make it clear that Civil Code 798.75 only applies in circumstances where ownership is transferred. The Court has considered and looked at those sections. However, it does not appear to the Court that Civil Code 798.75 applies only in the event of an escrow sale or transfer agreement involving a mobile home located in a park. The

operative subdivision at issue, Civil Code 798.75(c), is not limited in its application, only in the escrow, sale or transfer of a mobile home. It applies when an occupant of a

mobile home has no right of tenancy and is not otherwise entitled to occupy the mobile home pursuant to this chapter. That's Civil Code 798.75(c). This chapter refers to chapter 2.5 which is the Mobilehome Residence Law and includes such provisions as Civil Code 798.34 as applying to guests at mobile homes. The Court has considered as well defense argument that there's a non-waivable right to have a guest under Civil Code 798.34(b). The Court has considered - - well, also Civil Code 798.34(a). The Court has looked at that section and considered that. However, as noted in Matthew Bender,

California Real Estate Law, Section 8 Practice, the guest is, however, required to comply with all park rules and regulations. That's Matthew Bender, California Real Estate Law
&

Practice Section 155.40. It seems to the Court that a

guest of the defendant here - - Ms. McCarron, I should say, must still follow the park rules, including age restrictions. That Is Civil Code 798.34(b).

The Court has considered as well the case of Otanez, 0-t-a-n-e-z, v. Blue Skies Mobile Home Park, and it looks like it's 1 Cal.App.4th 1521 for the proposition that an owner need not occupy the mobile home full time to qualify as a resident. Court has considered that. That action pertained to a mobile tenant against the owner for a violation of 798.3(a) (sic), prohibiting termination of utility service. I've considered

that as well. And the Court will note here that the holding in Otanez is based on the application of Civil Code 79 - excuse me - - 789.3(a) and the rationale behind that statute it's not based on Civil Code 798.75 or the language contained in the Community Guidelines. I think Civil Code 789.3(a) is

not a part of the Chapter 2.5, the Mobilehome Residence Law, so the Court does not view the Otanez case as controlling under these facts. I lay that as a legal framework and groundwork for the benefit of both counsel, but that takes me to where I'm at now with regard to both of the cross motions for summary judgment as follows: The Court believes it's - - and I've taken fairly extensive notes with this so I'm making it as clear as I can. It is undisputed that the defendant is under That's

the age of 55 and occupies Ms. McCarronls mobile home. undisputed fact four and eight. Mountain's Community

Guidelines for residency require that at least one occupant of a mobile home is a registered owner of the mobile home, has signed a lease with Mountain for a space to become a homeowner, and is age 55 or over. All other residents must be age 40 or over.
If a prospective sublessee or permanent guest

is under 55, but over age 40, the qualified age 55 homeowner at all times must regularly occupy the mobile home. Undisputed fact three. Even assuming that defendant is a guest, Civil Code 798.34(b) requires that all guests shall comply with the provisions of the rules and regulations of the mobile home park. The question here then is whether or not there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Ms. McCarron regularly occupies the mobile home as required under section ten of her lease. Plaintiff has provided evidence that during the past

six months Ms. McCarron stayed in the mobile home at space 333 for two or three days at a time and sometimes and at times for an entire week. That is undisputed fact number nine.

Defendant has provided Ms. McCarronls testimony that over the last six months she's been there at least one third of the time . In the Court's view, then, I think there is a triable issue as to whether or not Ms. McCarron regularly occupied the mobile home as required under the rules. So I

think we have a triable issue and that applies to both motions for summary judgment. And I don't see that we have from the defense side a sufficient showing has been made to meet the burden. My intended, as a result, is to deny both motions

based on undisputed facts one through 15, and defendant's undisputed facts one through four, and the supporting evidence thereto. That is the Court's intended with regard to that. That leaves us then with we have a further hearing February 27th on two motions to compel. And my intention

there is to rule on those motions.

And I'm going to set a So the next hearing That's

trial date and that's where we'll be.

we'll have then will be February 27th at 8:30 here. already been set.

So I guess that's - - would be - - yes? Thank you, your Honor. May I be

--

MR. WILLIAMSON:

heard on the one issue on the

on the Court's ruling with

regard to whether there's a material factual issue with regard to whether Ms. McCarron regularly occupies the mobile home? All the evidence that was submitted in that regard was from the defendant or from Ms. McCarron. Each in their

declaration, they each said "maybe there two or three times a week." "Maybe sometimes I stay a week." Other evidence that

was put in were from Ms. McCarronls deposition where she said,
I admit, I am in Santa Barbara a lot.

I'm in Santa Barbara

more since 2010. Also, there was evidence undisputed put in of Ms. McCarronls testimony in her failed civil harassment action that said she was occupying the home for a week with her husband and Ms. Shipley. Which takes it completely out of
798.34

(b) because she is now living alone. But, in any event, it's clear and I think the

inference - - it's a permissible inference to be drawn from the Court that being in the mobile home two or three times a week, using it as a second residence which she does appear - - she's admitted that in other pleadings, that that is not regularly occupying the mobile home. That is consistent with the lease

provision Clause Ten or the Community Guidelines which are incorporated in the lease.
I would urge the Court to perhaps take another look

and say is there really a material issue of fact on that? Because we're not disputing for purposes of this motion that Ms. McCarron is there once in awhile, sometimes even stays there for a week, but that doesn't comport with her obligations under the lease or the Community Guidelines. And I think that's underscored, your Honor, by the Community Guideline, I believe it's Section 5 ( g ) which we cited. It

says that if the guests - - if the homeowner/person who signed the lease is not going to be there at all times, then a guest cannot occupy the mobile home. That provision is very, very

clear. And here we have admissions from the defendant and from Ms. McCarron that Ms. McCarron is not there all the time as contemplated by the rules and the lease. So I would urge

the Court to perhaps take a second look at the Community Guidelines in Section 5 and especially 5(g). THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WILLIAMSON: THE COURT:

Okay. May I be heard on that, your Honor? I

MS. MCCARRON: THE COURT:

I just think it's a disputed fact.

--

think it's a disputed fact as to the regular

as to the - -

the frequency or duration of Ms. McCarronrs presence there. And I just think it's a triable issue. disputed. So I just think it's

I think there's a triable issue. MS. MCCARRON: Your Honor, I'd like to be heard on

that because you did not address the issue. And I notice that you're quoting the little - - those little happy buzz words, permanent guest, and all of those that were created.

THE COURT:

I was just reading from the rules. You are reading from the new rules. They put

MS. MCCARRON: Guess what?

I didn't agree to those new rules.

those rules in in 2010, and those rules were made up by their attorney with specific intent to - - to evict me. And that's

not the rules that I signed when I came on in 2000. And I cited the case and it's Rancho San Bern- - - I'll find it if you give me a minute. It's in my papers. There's a case and It's

I have cited it in every paper for seven months now.

Ojai.

It was the park in Ojai. And the court - - it was the

same identical situation, the facts were identical. The woman was living in the mobile home park for many years, and she met a boyfriend. And she moved to Las Vegas with him, and they

came back and forth to visit all the time. They paid the utilities, kept up the gardening, and when she tried to put a friend in, then they said no. And the point is what the Court said is that you cannot make a new rule that is unconstitutional in that it's ex post facto in that it changes the whole concept of the agreement that the person made way back ten or 15 years ago when they moved in. You cannot make new rules that make you able to evict them based on the new rule because that was not negotiated when they moved in. When I moved in in '05 there was no little happy words about permanent guests and all of that. And - - and I know that they put these new rules in in 2010. And I know that under the statute they go into effect. you agree to them.
I did not.

If you sign them,

If you don't sign, they go in

effect in six months. However, in the statute it says that those rules must be reasonable. And the whole input - - import of that case
--

and it was exactly on that same issue, about the rules

being changed, and the Court said you cannot change a rule, and in that case what it was was a sublease. They said there's no subleasing. And - - and - - and the Court said no because when she signed the lease way back ten or 15 years ago when she first moved in, there was not this prohibition against sublease. And although you can make this prohibition to new residents that will agree to it when they move in, you cannot apply it to this lady who lived there many years ago that did not contemplate such a rigid rule was going to be applied to her at some point in the future. And that's exactly what happened here. When I moved in in '05, I specifically asked Betsy who was the boss, who was the manager at the time, I said if I get a boyfriend or somebody, am I going to be stopped from having the boyfriend move in? She said no. As a matter of fact, my boyfriend He's always here. And you are

stays overnight all the time. allowed to have a guest.

Now, when I signed that lease, had I known that, you know, 15 years - - or eight years later they were going to hire a law firm that was going to come up with a new set of rules to drive everybody out so that no one can have a girlfriend, a boyfriend, a sister, an aunt, a mother, they have to live alone like a prisoner so that they'll just walk out and turn over the mobile home and give it to them. Um, I - - if I had

contemplated that when I moved, I would never have signed that lease in 205. THE COURT: All we are talking about is summary judgment and unlawful detainer. I think there's triable

issues. And all I'm going to do is we're going to move it forward and we'll set a trial date. Okay. So that's - - we'll

let a jury decide who they want to believe. MS. MCCARRON: purchaser issue? THE COURT: SO - The purchaser issue, the purchaser But, your Honor, what about the

MS. MCCARRON: issue.

The code only applies to a purchaser. THE COURT:

I went through that already.

I went It is

through that in my analysis. You might have missed it.

not confined to a purchase transfer situation, is not, as I read it. So I was very clear. And I took painstaking time to

be very clear about that subject. Okay. So what I'm going to do is we're going to go ahead and confirm the current date of February 27th on the discovery issues. Then I'll be setting a trial date from there and we

can have a jury decide the case. MR. WILLIAMSON: Very well. THE COURT: Thank you, your Honor.

We will be in recess. Your Honor, one more thing. I had

MS. MCCARRON:

talked about the last time when you postponed this two weeks, I said, you know, that I thought maybe we would be out of here and I would not have to work on - - because this - - this motion, this is only part of it. This is the most recent

amended (indicating). It's about maybe a foot high and I have to be able to get my objections and everything and do this opposition. And now it's already February 24th - - I mean, I'm sorry - - it's February 14th and this motion is going to be heard on the 27th. So I would like to ask that we have some

kind of a continuance on that to give me an opportunity now to have to do all this work. hours of works. THE COURT: I thought everybody agreed to the date. No, no. At the last hearing, if you I mean, it's going to be a lot of

MS. MCCARRON:

recall, because you were supposed to rule on it then, and I brought that up as an issue. I said, your Honor, you know, I

want to avoid having to spend all this time - - this motion is a foot high - - having to do all this work to object to it. And you said you would deal with it at the time when we came back here. That's what the transcript, if you look it up, I specifically remember. And you said, well,

it'll say that.

we'll deal with that when you come back, and 1'11 give you plenty of time to get your opposition in. Well, that's not plenty of time. That's only a 14, 24, 13 days away. Your Honor?

MR. WILLIAMSON: THE COURT:

Okay. This Court

--

MR. WILLIAMSON: MS. MCCARRON: THE BAILIFF: MS. MCCARRON:

And - One at a time, Counsel. Okay. This Court on January 10th found

MR. WILLIAMSON:

that the motion to compel didn't - - had procedural defects.

Court ordered that amended motions be filed and be filed per code. Had to be filed on January 24th which it was, and

counsel was to respond per the code. And this is a summary proceeding and ordinarily you would have five days. But the

Court generously had granted normal, normal time within which to respond. THE COURT: Well, I think that's adequate time - MR. WILLIAMSON: More than that. THE COURT: More than adequate time to respond with a hearing not till the 27th. MR. WILLIAMSON: THE COURT: Yeah.

So I'll go ahead, keep it there for now.

--

And we just need to have these ruled on and have the matter have the matter tried. So - -

MR. WILLIAMSON: Very well. MS. MCCARRON: That is another thing I'd like to

object to, your Honor, because basically what they are doing is they're asking in this order, okay, for a second deposition. They're asking you to order us to all have to go back all the way down now to Santa Ana and, you know, I'm not even a party to this litigation. And neither is Steve Allen. And, you know, we're being - - and that - - and that - - and that's why it was revoked because the order Judge Schneider made was way off the wall. It ordered us to go all the way to

Santa Ana when we all know that depositions have to be taken within 75 miles of a person's residence. And now he is asking you to go against the rules. We all know that a person's only allowed to have one deposition. He's not just asking you to

make us order certain questions. He's saying order certain questions and have a follow-up to those questions and order all these people to have to drive all the way back down now to Santa Ana. Okay. I don't - That's
--

THE COURT:

MS. MCCARRON: THE COURT:

I don't recall - That's a four-hour drive for me, your

MS. MCCARRON: Honor. THE COURT: discovery motion.

I don't recall the specifics of the

I am not focused on that right at the

moment because I have been dealing with this - - these cross motions for summary judgment. So - MS. MCCARRON: THE COURT: Okay.

- - whatever merits the discovery motions

have or don't have, I will deal with those appropriately on the 27th. MS. MCCARRON: Okay. One more thing, your Honor.

At the time that he first noticed - - at the time when we were arguing about this over in Judge Schneider's court, I was saying, hey, that's four hours away. We know what the rule is. You have to do it within 75 miles. And Mr. Williamson

here argued, oh, no, Ms. Duffy, because your residence is here at 4040 Piedmont Drive, and 4040 Piedmont Drive is less than 75 hours (sic), and this is your residence. Do you see how he wears two hats?
THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MCCARRON:

He's trying to get out on summary

judgment by saying it's not my residence, my real residence is Santa Barbara. And yet he was able to tweak Judge Schneider

into ordering me to drive to Santa (sic) based on the fact that 4040 Piedmont is my residence. Honor? What is my residence? Now, what is it, your

Why is the Court deciding my

residence is 4040 Piedmont when it orders me to appear at a deposition? And yet it's saying now we have an issue of fact of where is her residence? THE COURT: I haven't - It's a conflict. And I don't

MS. MCCARRON: THE COURT: know.

I haven't made any orders.

I have no idea about that. MS. MCCARRON: But - - but the Court is, your Honor.

And this taking of two positions, judicial estoppel precludes this. They gained an advantage by having me have to drive all

the way to Santa Ana for a deposition when I wasn't even a party. There was no jurisdiction over me. THE COURT: I'm satisfied that judicial estoppel

doesn't apply in this particular circumstance at this point. I'll deal with the issues in the discovery motion, the merits or lack of merits when I have had the chance to go back and reacquaint myself with those motions. MS. MCCARRON: Okay. And also what do I respond to And then I

because I got served with an amended version here?

have another version that's twice that high, the original version. Am I supposed to be - THE COURT: There should have only been the original

motions that were filed.

I don't know what else we are

talking about. MS. MCCARRON: Last time he gave me an amended

--

says amended, I'm reading it right here, amended supplemental statement, amended supplemental - THE COURT: I think that's because - Amended supplemental notice.

MS. MCCARRON: THE COURT:

I think that's because there were

procedural infirmities that existed in the original motion and I said I will give the plaintiff time to correct those - those deficiencies, and then I would give you an adequate opportunity once those are corrected to respond appropriately. Interpose whatever objections you think are appropriate. MS. MCCARRON: amended - THE COURT: Those - - I'm assuming those are the ones Okay. So am I responding to the

that the Court allowed the plaintiff to file to correct the procedural deficiency that existed in the original motion. MS. MCCARRON: Okay. So we're not going to have the

case where he says, well, she loses on this because we had it in the first motion and she didn't deal with that issue? THE COURT: These are part of the original motion.

Whatever motion is there, including the corrections, will be dealt with at the time of the hearing. Okay. We'll be in recess. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WILLIAMSON:

(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were concluded.) --000--

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO --000-STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, dba MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILE HOME COMMUNITY, Plaintiff, vs . BONNIE SHIPLEY, Defendant.
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Case No. UDDS1204130 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

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I, VICTORIA E. VILLEGAS, CSR, Official Reporter of the Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino, do hereby certify that foregoing pages, 1 through 22, to the best of my knowledge and belief, comprise a full, true and correct computer-aided transcript of the proceedings taken in the matter of the above-entitled cause held on Thursday, February 14, 2013. Dated at San Bernardino, California, this 19th day of February, 2013.

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CSR

Official Reporter, CSR NO .w9843