Questions for USSR Assignment: Discuss the successes or failures of the first or the first 2 Five-Year-Plans.

lans. What are the peculiar features of Soviet Industrialization? In what ways does the 2nd Five-Year-Plan overcome the problems of the first? In what ways were party & state transformed during the 1930s? In what ways did Stalin depart from the policies of the 1920s?

What are the peculiar features of Soviet Industrialization? A. Background on Soviet Industrialization and how even the history is peculiar. B. Historiography on this will elaborate the different difficulties in industrialization and how in other places this may not have been as much of a problem, but the peculiar features of Soviet land itself presents problems, a. not to avoid the fact that the methods taken to industrialize in different eras was also lacking in certain concession. C. Touch on how Marx addressed the process of industrialization and how adherence to it may be seen in different measures of industrialization that were implemented. D. Explain the a. economic, b. political and c. social reasons for why industrialization was peculiar [Research and then build up this paragraph better, and then come to a conclusion that accurately answers the question of Soviet Industrialization.]

The USSR was a country that had long been isolated in terms of modernization, which therein allowed for the continuation of institutions under the tsarist regime into the 20th century. Though the Bolshevik revolution had achieved a transition of Tsarist Russia to the communist state of the USSR, industrialization was the most significant historical development that was required which had not yet come to fruition. As Stalin himself put, the USSR was the only country of the proletarian dictatorship and needed to develop an industrial economy in order to rebuff the capitalist encirclement1. However, the multiple phases through which the transpiration of Soviet industrialization were, in their own, peculiar to a degree. For the purpose of this essay, peculiar as a concept would need to suggest that not only was the process unusual, but because of the available capital and the policies necessary, the process was also exclusive to Soviet history. A most significant assumption to keep in mind is that industrialization while in other countries was largely caused by and led to the rise of the bourgeoisie class, in the USSR, it was a development imposed by the state. One must also observe the most critical peculiarity put forth by multiple scholars, about the intention of the Stalinist regime in the industrialization drive, that of whether the goal was to achieve industrialization by what means were available or if the intention was to construct a socialist state through industrialization in the image of Stalin. Many scholars and historians have described Soviet industrialization as having been truly revolutionary in scope, the impetus for which had been the drive for heavy industry. The focus on heavy industry essentially dictated not only pressing importance on engineering and metallurgy, but also the expansion of networks that would enable these processes i.e. railway construction, mining, dams construction, for the purpose of electric generation. Coalmines and steelworks were established, modernization of outdated factories in industrial centers like Moscow and Leningrad were conducted, there was also intense focus on Magnitogorsk and Stalinsk and in order to link these networks the railway was significantly expanded and canals were dug to link principal water bodies, such as the Volga. A most debated subject that adds to the peculiarity of Soviet industrialization is that of what exactly was the actual increase in industrial output in those rapid early years of the Stalinist regime. Due importance must be given to how expansion was not a recurrent feature, and moreover, hindrances were inevitable, not only because of lack of sustainability but because official policy often clashed with ground realities. The backwardness of the economic practices and the unfamiliarity of operating under such wide networks were stifling to progress. Moreover, the expansion of the administrative apparatus as a means of controlling of the activities resulted in the imperative implementation of force. There was an extremely high rate of investment in the various aspects of industrialization. Workers had to be fed and equipped and taken care of, but the lack of skills and apt in management which was apparent in the First Five-Year Plan led to a significant amount
1

From Joseph Stalin, "Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U., November 19,1928," in J.V Stalin, Works, vol. 11, 1928-March 1929 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), pp. 257-58, 261-63.

of funding into the education of workers and specialists. Moreover, the procurement of materials for industrialization had to be apprehended, in great amounts, from the West, that too in the period when the Depression was taking shape. The labor force, which had previously faced underemployment, was now faced with an unprecedented mobilization of workers, population in urban and industrial centers had risen to 30 million by the end of the decade, and proportionately the working class population occupied a third of the industrial labor force. Much of the increase in the labor force was also made possible due to the peasantry, what is significant is that the urban migration between 1930-1931 was at its peak, at a time when living standards were drastically low. What may be inferred is that the persuasion and coercion implemented from the expanded State controls ensured that as the Party was closing in the provisional capitalist elements of the NEP period through measures like forced collectivization, the migration that followed urbanization would inevitable force a transition in economy. Largely all production-means were in state hands, thereby enabling central planning and focusing energies on priority areas par region, city, and plants. The element most salient in the initial years that was only to intensify is that of coercion and the use of force, the debate for which is yet unresolved. The analysis of the peculiar features of soviet industrialization may be done through various lenses; the most practical ones for this use may be those of economic, political and social. The transition from the high NEP to the phase of collectivization, which was the first stage of the industrialization drive, was one in which elements not dissimilar to the policy of Prodrazverstka were apparent, while conversely, this phase also witnessed the operation of state-controlled co-operatives in a mixed economy. The essence of collectivization was the procurement of produce at minimum cost2. Western estimates discern that the industrialization drive period between 1928-1940 witnessed a near increase of 10% a year and a trebling of industrial output, conversely, small-scale industry which pre-revolution occupied of industrial production, by 1937 had been reduced to 6%. Though the proportional estimates have been debated, the influx of foreign materials and specialists was imperative. While Soviet economists overestimate the imports, other Western historians argue that domestic production could not be so low comparatively. Soviet capital goods industries in terms of fuel and energy were vastly expanded in the 1930s, enabling a modern iron and steel industry to be developed, by which a modern armaments industry was developed for defense considerations. A significant feature of the industrialization drive was that while primary areas had largely been Ukraine, Central and Northwest Russia, the industrial sector now incorporated the Urals and Siberia. The First Five-Year Plan, while having focused on the rise of capital goods industries, also saw the decline of Soviet agricultural production. Livestock numbers fell, and the famine of 1933 had stagnated recovery. Though in 1937-39, agricultural production exceeded that of the 1928 levels, the overall production and consumption for population per head was lower than that of 1928, and though production had increased within the industrial
2

Alec Nove The Soviet Great Leap Forward: I. Collectivization An Economic History of the USSR, pg. 184

crops and the consumer goods sectors, the overall consumption had fallen by an estimated 7%, as cited by R.W. Davies. By 1933, the right to market grain independent of the state procurements was defined as only being possible whence the procurements for the entire republic had been fulfilled, though by this point, agriculture had deteriorated to its lowest3. Having observed the hindrances of the First Five-Year Plan, the effect of collectivization on agricultural deterioration, realistic policies were assumed in 1933, thus lowering the level of investment and resolving to, in the Second Five-Year Plan, completing the projects initiated through other measures, among which were to regulate economy. R.W. Davies and Oleg Khlevnyuk argued that in this period, the regime was attempting to end the procurement-rationing system, from which was to emerge between 1932-35, a normal system of Soviet trade. The evidence offered implies that while earlier the state regulated economy had imposed centrally directed rations, the return to a normal system enabled consumers to choose the goods they wanted to purchase, though prices were still regulated by the state. The end of rationing was rather disadvantageous for many urban citizens4. Therein supporting the notion that the Stalinist regime aimed to take the most advantageous measures to push industrialization. The Second Five-Year plan saw significant economic development, the recovery of agriculture, the rise in labor productivity and the GNP, and living standards for the population on average. However, in the period between 1932 and 1937, political developments on the international front forced the Soviet hand, military expenditure was prioritized and therein taxed the economy in the process of modernizing weapons. Moreover, in this period, official Soviet figures determine a collectivization of peasant households going from 62% at the beginning to 93% at the conclusion.5 Armament production matched the proliferation of forces, and the state imposed a regressive nature on the economy, one in which it was dominated by overaccumulation6 of capital for rearmament. The amount of goods or services that could be purchased was rising more than the sales of consumer goods altogether, consequently a balance was required leading to the rise of prices in the collective-farm free market, and in 1940-41, that of consumer good prices. These factors collectively strained the economy once more. A significant argument that highlights the peculiarities of Soviet industrialization is that of Robert Allens, who uses simulations to recreate the context under which the NEP and collectivization operated, as a means of discerning the rate of output. Allen argued that the state used soft-budget constraints for highly ambitious targets, essentially as a means of redesigning Soviet economy in the image of socialism. Soft budget constraints allowed
3

Alec Nove The Soviet Great Leap Forward: I. Collectivization An Economic History of the USSR, pg. 185 4 Oleg Khlevnyuk and R. W. Davies The End of Rationing in the Soviet Union, 1934-1935 EuropeAsia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Jun., 1999), pp. 557-609 5 Sheila Fitzpatrick Stalins Revolutin The Russian Revolution, pg. 138 6 R.W. Davies Soviet economic development, 1928-1965 Soviet economic development from Lenin to Khrushchev, pg. 55

the pursuit of higher output by employing more workers than necessary, to the point that the marginal product of labor would equal the wage. What this suggests is that the level of production relative to the number of working employees is equal to their wage, a capitalist economy would have fewer employees and therein imposed a link between wage and the marginal product of labor, while the soft budget constraint7 was able to surpass this, as it was a component of a planned economy. Allen further argued that the rural-urban migration, which was so great a contributing factor for the industrialization drive was dependent largely on the expected wage for the migrants. In the USSR, there was little urban underemployment, the states measures were essentially to provide fruitful conditions for workers in industry, the soft-budget constraint was employed to facilitate this process. Allen however argues that the mechanism between capitalism in agriculture and state controlled industry in the NEP was the most beneficial economic policy for the USSR, collectivization however contributed little. Robert Allen essentially discerned that the market relationship between the cities and the countryside under NEP was an ideal situation for rapid industrialization, central planning in industry was a socialist maneuver itself as it advocated public ownership of industry, and was pragmatic in mobilizing an otherwise unemployed labor. However, Stalins collectivization of agriculture injected brutal policies, which therein added little to output under the guise of the expansion and consolidation of socialism to the countryside. The social factors of collectivization are recognized through the dichotomy between the peasantry, and the urban and working class. The forced collectivization of agriculture had forced a demographic shift in the USSR, the countryside was essentially being depopulated and migrants relocated themselves to urban centers and co-operatives. R.W. Davies noted the pre-industrialization low living standards in the countryside, though the paradox of rapid industrialization is such that the living standards in towns also declined following collectivization, essentially because the shift of countrysidedwellers to towns lowered the consumption rate of urban and rural population, however, personal consumption had improved on an average. In order to end underemployment, more members per household would take up jobs, therein lowering wages altogether due to the larger number of workers; women occupied 39% of the labor force by 1940. Social security provisions were maintained as they were since the 1920s, though they would become less available; moreover, workers in the collectives would be forced to rely on the collectives for their social security. However, between 1934-36, a gradual differentiation of living standards and wages occurred, dependent on the skill and productivity of individual workers. Conversely, education was stepped up in towns, its prioritization led to the widened availability of schooling; 12 million children were provided education in schools in 1928/9 while the level increased to 35 million by 1940/1. Higher education for industrial managers and adult education centers were also provided, therein increasing the rate of a literate population to 81% by 1939. Housing was also substantially invested in, however,
7

Robert Allen The Causes of Rapid Industrialization From Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution pgs. 167-171

it could not sustain the population and actually declined between 1926-1940. Moreover, little consideration was made to the countryside. The industrialization drive in this sense was detrimental to urban populations as the social upheaval8 associated to this period actually saw a rise from between 1926-1939 of the population from as much as 26-56 million. The social factors for peasants and those in the countryside were in their own different as forced collectivization combined households of the peasantry into around 250,000 collective farms. Peasants income came proportionally from the kolkhoz and every family had a personal plot; they were inherently reliant on the collectives efficiency for their livelihood, for prosperity individual effort on part of all members in the collectives would have to be high recurrently. The peasantry had traditionally been tied to their land inherently; in the wake of the forced requisitioning of the War Communism period they destroyed their own crops rather than concede to the Partys demands. What may be inferred is the condition of agriculture was far more a defining factor for the peasantry than any other class in the USSR; when forced collectivization had caused an agricultural deterioration in 1932 due to the quotas of grain and the materializing of excessive collectives, the famine of 1933 could hardly be viewed as unexpected. Alec Nove noted that the 1932 crisis had demoralized the peasants as the state-counter measures to the crisis had had a heavy cost of livestock and grain. Conversely the increased urban population had to endure a diet readjustment, however their food requirements were sustained, while the peasants ate less of everything9. The debate of the peculiarity of the Stalinist regime is present in this case; whether the straining of the peasantry was an essential measure of industrialization, or if it was a means of eliciting compliance for building the socialist state from within. Alec Nove points out that Stalin did not deny the alternative routes to industrialization; the existence of the voluntary principle from the NEP and even prior in the countryside had allowed the existence of an individual peasantry, though modest in their means. However, Stalin, like Lenin, was against the implanting of capitalism10 in agriculture as a means of facilitating industrialization, limiting the variety of decisions thereafter. Robert Service argued that the usage of propaganda was instrumental in maintaining a virtual uniform stance on industrialization, largely by alienating those who opposed the methods through inscribing them as Right Deviationists and Trotskyists. In 1932, Kaganovich, who supervised many of Stalins policies, instructed the Russian daily publication of Pravda to curse the opposition, Mensheviks and SRs among many others, and label them as advocates of capitalist restoration. Robert Service argued that Stalins regime could not have survived without the kind of reinforcing support from within the Party and those dispatched to the collectives11.

R.W. Davies Soviet economic development, 1928-1965 Soviet economic development from Lenin to Khrushchev, pg. 47 9 Alec Nove The Soviet Great Leap Forward: I. Collectivization An Economic History of the USSR, pg. 177 10 Alec Nove The End of NEP An Economic History of the USSR, pg. 159 11 Robert Service Ascent to Supremacy Stalin: A Biography

The liquidation of the kulak class was a significant State imposed development initiated by Stalin in December 1929, as a means of eliminating all capitalist elements, but may be read more practically as either all hindrances to industrialization or all elements of competition for the State; this is sustained by the notion that formal criteria rarely counted for anything12. The liquidation involved the displacement of between 5 to 6 million people, 2 million of those were sent to remote regions of the USSR. Among them were merchants, private traders and the like, including former nobles. The formation of the Gulag in 1930 was to serve the purpose of incarcerating counter-revolutionaries; under Stalin it was expanded greatly and consisted of forced-labor camps, labor colonies, special settlements, where prisoners were forced to work and contribute to the industrialization drive. Moreover, they were forced to work on land of low fertility, and expected to live up to their delivery quotas. The Gulag was essentially referred to as a corrective facility, though R.W. Davies discerns that by the time WWII had materialized, 3.3 million prisoners were being held, while the number would escalate and include POWs following the end of the war. Essentially, society in the Stalinist regime faced the most brutal tactics in the process of being weaned off individual interests and contributing to the industrialization drive, while dissidents would be eradicated for their deviations or forced to contribute under sterner circumstances. Politically, the implementation of force is evident in that in order to facilitate industrialization, dissent had to be curbed. Many scholars have put forth the question of whether the Stalinist regime used force as a means of subduing the people, or whether it was an essential measure for the purpose of industrialization; it is through such analysis that the peculiar politics of Soviet industrialization may be viewed. The drive for industrialization was one born out of debates within the Party over what measures to take in economic regulation in order to initiate industrialization. The Great Debate was one in which prominent figures within the Party put forth ideas and inclinations of the requirements for Soviet industrialization. Figures like Preobrazhensky and Trotsky had made suggestions that the source from which to draw the greatest investment would be the peasantry, the former termed the appropriation policy as primitive accumulation of capital. Conversely, figures like Bukharin who occupied what is referred to as the Right Opposition, argued that in place of coercion one must exercise persuasion and encouragement to the peasantry. E.H. Carr argued that though the harvests of 1927 had been satisfactory, mood had changed to the extent that anxieties caused by the international situation raised fears of wars and invasion. In 1926, the grain collections were working better through the agricultural state-controlled cooperatives than from the state purchasing agencies i.e. the proto-type of the collectives were functioning better than the revamped grain requisitioning mechanism. Alec Nove argued that it is doubtful whether collectivization had always been on Stalins agenda, though what is factual is that decisions for the measures had not been codified until the autumn of 1929. The inspiration for collectivization however, may have come from the Urals-Siberian method first utilized in early 1928, in which higher quotas distributed to districts in the Urals and Siberia were put in the hands of the local administration, therein forcing the locals in those districts to
12

Sheila Fitzpatrick Insulted and Injured Everyday Stalinism pg. 122

impose heavier taxation on the kulaks of their region, essentially forcing members of the peasantry to comply to their liquidation. Because the economic crisis predicted by the Right opposition had not occurred, industrialization programs could be stepped up. However, in 1927, the year that the harvests should have yielded the most surplus instead amounted to less than half of 1926. This was due to currency inflation, which forced the kulak to reserve his grain, the safest currency of value. Whence the extraordinary measures had taken their toll on the peasantry and the kulaks, Bukharin addressed the situation as a return to war communism13, visible from the outbreaks in the countryside. Stalin began attacking Bukharin (who by 1938 would eventually be deported) and the Right Opposition in April of 1929 openly in the same month that the 16th Party conference had approved the optimal version of the five-year plan, in which a marked advance in collectivization14 was agreed on. While Rightists urged a gradual pace, many party activists had hated the capitalist-inclined NEP and were enthusiastic about being tasked with the socialist construction of the USSR. E.H. Carr discerned that the relaxation of policies in 1928/9, in comparison to the stringency of 1927/8, was detrimental to the pace of industrialization; 8.3 million tons of grain was collected in the relaxed period while 10.8 million was collected in the forced collection. Essentially, nobody delivered grain to the official agencies except under some degree of coercion or fear15. Stalins article Dizzy with Success16 in 1930, epitomized and glorified the collectivefarm movement, and rather labeled the success of collectivization on the voluntary character of the movement, and that it would not be successful if its establishment was forced. Alec Nove discerned from the article that Stalins advocacy for the Russian artel, which was a co-operative craftsmen association from pre-revolutionary Russia, and his call for a halt were implicit or perhaps even critical of the coercion principle. However, in the very next year, the collectivization was resumed with even greater vigor. Another feature surfaces now which enters the debate about the peculiarity of industrialization; kulaks earlier were ineligible to join collectives and forced to succumb to deportation, while presently, peasants outside the collectives were forced to work on inferior land with low arability, and burdened with extra taxes and deliveries. The implication offered by Alec Nove is that political motive on part of the regime was bent on making the potential dissidents examples by imposing crueler terms. The famine of 1933 was another example of such implications. Procurements had been so harshly pressured in 1931 that in order to sustain the industrialization drive grain actually had to be returned. Consequently, a relaxation of policies occurred, leading to grain hoarding, a disparity in pricing and collapse of discipline. Law in 1932 established a death penalty for food pilfering, leading to trials of saboteurs and degenerate communists.

13 14

E.H. Carr The Dilemma of Agriculture The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin, pg. 126 Alec Nove The End of NEP An Economic History of the USSR, pg. 156 15 E.H. Carr The Dilemma of Agriculture The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin, pg. 127 16 J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 12, pp. 197-205, Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1955. Transcribed by Kenneth Higham and Mike B.

Mass arrests occurred not only of rural communists and peasants, but also those of local party secretaries in the North Caucasus. The purges were by far the most significant political maneuver of the Stalinist regime which were able to quell dissent in the Third-Five-Year Plan, however had been in degrees of occurrence prior to what is referred to as the Great Terror of 1936-38. Robert Conquest noted that in the 17th Party Congress, nicknamed the Congress of Victors, of 1934, was to be the last noticeable critique of Stalins role in the regime. This new resistance countered the Stalinists, as they were opposed to his leadership in the regime, now that the successes of the First-Five Year Plan were identified. Therein, Stalin received the majority of negative votes, which in turn were in favor of a prominent Party boss, Sergei Kirov i.e. Stalins post as the General Secretariat of the Party was being removed. Though Kirov declined, Stalin was determined to legitimize his role in the Party, therein engineering the assassination of Kirov and some of his associates in the same year, after which many Party members, both within and external to the Politburo were arrested and executed. Dissent could not be tolerated in a time when international situations were escalating, Japans invasion of Manchuria, the emergence of the Nazi presence in the past year; the latter was discussed at the Congress of Victors, relative to fears of Western military intervention17. In order to curb this matter, the Stalinist regime used its essential forceful organ, the Military Collegium of the NKVD, in order to conduct the show trials of 1936-38. The composition of the NKVD was such that its economic base was through established labor camps, and in terms of state hierarchy, was able to monitor the behavior and loyalties of Party members, and was subservient only to the Politburo, at whose head was Stalin. The show trials were orchestrated through arbitrary prosecution procedures, for which the conclusions were predetermined and the victims largely from the Soviet elite. Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov put forth the argument that the quasi-legal procedures were enabled for the purpose of not deterring party loyalty altogether18. Moreover, a disparity in the number of death-sentenced prisoners is evident largely because the Collegium was overloaded with prisoners and therefore deferred its duties to other organs, moreover, the purges had become disarranged towards the conclusion of the period, and accounting for all activities had become unsustainable19. The quasi-legality sustained the apparent legality of the regime, as Robert Service discerned that while the impression of the Collegiums activities were such that they appeared to be deporting prisoners to the Siberian branches of the Gulag, they were really being sent to their executions20. The Great Purges epitomize the debate about the peculiarity of industrialization; moreover give rise to the subject of who was to be blamed, as Khrushchev would acknowledge after Stalins death that the persecutory acts had done incalculable damage to the nation. Robert Service is of the opinion that Stalin was the initiator and the sole orchestrator at large of the Great Terror, he did not need to be pushed by others21.
17 18

Sheila Fitzpatrick Ending the Revolution The Russian Revolution, pg. 162 Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov Mass Terror and the Court: The Military Collegium of the USSR Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Jun., 2006) pg. 589 19 Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov Mass Terror and the Court: The Military Collegium of the USSR Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Jun., 2006) pg. 593 20 Robert Service The Great Terrorist Stalin: A Biography 21 Robert Service The Great Terrorist Stalin: A Biography

What can be observed most saliently in the industrialization drive is that the central planning and the policies as directed by the State had clashed significantly with the reality of the USSR at the time. Stalins ascent by the end of 1920s had enabled him to propel the collectivization and dekulakization movements which were desired by Party members and many communists, however, the deficiencies of the system had forced a natural dissent from such stringencies as means of survival. The states counter-measures to the dissidents and to the deficits of central planning eventually culminated with Stalin employing avante-garde measures in society, economy and in the Party as a means of pushing the industrialization drive. The use of collectivization was in essence to procure capital at controlled prices, establish a centrally directed labor force, for the collectivization of agriculture for rapid industrialization of heavy industry. In this process, the urban working class expanded due to how the orchestrated expansion of industry invited a mobilization of labor and provisions were made to improve their lifestyle. Conversely, the countryside saw a collectivization of peasant households that transformed agricultural economy, while the kulaks, for being the recognized capitalist Right-Deviationists, were barred from conceding to collectivization and were rather deported to labor camps on less favorable land. In the time directly after the Congress of Victors of 1934, Stalins role in the regime was cultivated by erasing and demonizing dissent and criticism. The peculiarity of soviet industrialization is thus that in commanding change in economy, the Stalinist regimes agenda was to construct the socialist state and society, however, in the process, the regulations of economy in relation to the setbacks, the imposed social upheaval of collectivization, and the firming of Stalins government all eventually produced a subdued society and a highly industrialized economy. The debate is unresolved over whether these peculiar measures were for the purpose of industrialization or for the reinforcing of the Stalinist regime, the former of which has been offered by some historians a degree of justification, however, the debate may be distilled in that while industrialization may have been the end goal to strengthen the state, economy, society and polity in the USSR were morphed through the methods and in the image of Stalin as a requisite.

Bibliography 1. Robert Allen The Causes of Rapid Industrialization From Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution pgs. 167-171 2. E.H. Carr The Dilemma of Agriculture The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin, pgs. 126-127 3. R.W. Davies Soviet economic development, 1928-1965 Soviet economic development from Lenin to Khrushchev, pgs. 47-55 4. Sheila Fitzpatrick Stalins Revolutin The Russian Revolution, pg. 138 5. Sheila Fitzpatrick Ending the Revolution The Russian Revolution, pg. 162 6. Sheila Fitzpatrick Insulted and Injured Everyday Stalinism pg. 122 7. Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov Mass Terror and the Court: The Military Collegium of the USSR Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Jun., 2006) pgs. 589-593 8. Oleg Khlevnyuk and R. W. Davies The End of Rationing in the Soviet Union, 1934-1935 Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Jun., 1999), pgs. 558-563 9. Alec Nove The End of NEP An Economic History of the USSR, pgs. 156-159 10. Alec Nove The Soviet Great Leap Forward: I. Collectivization An Economic History of the USSR, pgs. 177-185 11. Robert Service Ascent to Supremacy Stalin: A Biography 12. Robert Service The Great Terrorist Stalin: A Biography Consulted sources 1. From Joseph Stalin, "Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U., November 19,1928," in J.V Stalin, Works, vol. 11, 1928-March 1929 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), pp. 257-58, 261-63. URL: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1928stalin.html 2. J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 12, pp. 197-205, Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1955. Transcribed by Kenneth Higham and Mike B. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1930/03/02.htm