THE VISION OF ANGLO-AMERICA

T H E U S - U K A L L I A N C E AND T H E E M E R G I N G C O L D WAR, 1943-1946

Dr Ryan's innovative study demonstrates with great clarity the importance of the decline of British power in the creation of the Cold War. The author subjects to detailed analysis the concerted attempts made by the British wartime coalition to forge a perpetual merger with the USA in international affairs to arrest this global decline. He reveals for the first time the origins of this policy, the great efforts made towards its realisation, and the ultimate impossibility of its aims. The vision of a permanent Anglo-American combination is shown as central to British diplomatic activity during the latter stages of World War II, superordinate even to the concerted British attempt to engineer a shift in American-Soviet relations, from accommodation to confrontation. Checking Soviet expansion was to be simply the first, albeit vital item on the agenda of this new Anglo-American entity, and despite the ultimate failure of the overall policy, the British effort to alter American-Soviet affairs must be counted among the causes of the Cold War. An even more important factor, however, was Great Britain's decline in strength, which eliminated the possibility of triangularity in big power relations, leading to the polarity that prevails today. Dr Ryan uses the Polish and Greek crises of the mid-1940s as case histories to demonstrate his thesis that both the Churchill and Attlee governments recognised the need for the American connection and to provide examples of how they set about obtaining it.

THE VISION OF ANGLO-AMERICA

THE US-UK ALLIANCE AND THE EMERGING COLD WAR, 1943-1946

HENRY BUTTERFIELD RYAN

The right of the University of Cambridge to print and sell all manner of books was granted by Henry VIII in 1534. The University has printed and published continuously since 1584.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge London New York Sydney New Rochelle Melbourne

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1987 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1987 First paperback edition 2004 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data Ryan, Henry Butterfield. The vision of Anglo-America Bibliography. Includes index. 1. United States - Foreign relations - 1945-1953. 2. United States - Foreign relations - Great Britain. 3. Great Britain - Foreign relations - United States. 4. World War, 1939-1945 - Diplomatic history. 5. World politics - 1945-1955. 6. Great Britain - Foreign relations - 1936-1945. I. Title. E813.R93 1987 327'.09'044 87-9570 ISBN 0 521 32928 0 hardback ISBN 0 521 89284 8 paperback

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION PART I STRENGTHENING THE TIES: THE EFFORT AND THE PROBLEMS

page vi I 13 13
21

1 2 3 4
PART II

The need Problems with American public opinion The mixing process Economic issues

FOREIGN CRISES THAT DEMONSTRATE GREAT

BRITAIN'S PROBLEMS INTRODUCTION SECTION I THE POLISH CRISIS

39 54

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Background and build-up Involvement of Great Britain and the United States Yalta and after Truman: the new factor The gathering for the San Francisco Conference Between San Francisco and Potsdam Concluding thoughts on the Polish crisis
THE GREEK CRISIS

73 73
80

87 99
103

"3
117
121 121

SECTION 2

Background of the crisis 1944, the critical year The role of the press The crisis peaks America dives in

132 139 146 156 170 174 205 227

CONCLUSION NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have given me an enormous amount of help with this book, starting with Sir Harry Hinsley, who proffered invaluable advice and assistance while supervising the Cambridge dissertation on which it is based to a large degree and again when it became a book manuscript. I am particularly grateful also to Dr John Thompson and Dr David Reynolds who, being extraordinarily generous with their time, have provided excellent criticism of the entire manuscript and to the late Ms Elisabeth Barker and Dr Antony Polonsky for extremely useful observations on the chapters regarding the Greek and Polish crises, respectively. I have been most fortunate also to have had advice and suggestions from Professor D. C. Watt, Dr Zara Steiner, Dean Elspeth Rostow, Professor Warren Kimball, Dr Vojtech Mastny, Professor H. G. Nicholas and Professor William H. McNeill. I am also grateful to Sir Isaiah Berlin, Lord Gore-Booth, and the Hon. C M . Woodhouse for the interviews they gave me and to Professor Nicholas Hammond for his helpful correspondence. My thanks go as well to my wife Patricia Ryan for useful suggestions, proofreading, copy-editing and, above all, patience with that poorest of companions, the book-writing spouse. To Trinity College, Cambridge, whose generous assistance in so many ways has enabled me to do this study, I owe very special thanks indeed. I am also grateful to Professor Stanley Hoffmann and the staff of the West European Studies Center at Harvard for providing the original stimulus to investigate the questions with which this dissertation is concerned. Finally, to William Ryan, thanks for performing such chores as collating the various copies of the interminable drafts.

INTRODUCTION

Awaking one night 'with a sharp stab of almost physical pain', Winston Churchill realised that he might be dismissed as Prime Minister by Britain's voters in the summer of 1945. Brooding, he said ' The power to shape the future would be denied me. The knowledge and experience I had gathered, the authority and goodwill I had gained in so many countries, would vanish.' 1 But, in fact, even after his defeat at the polls, his influence on world affairs was far from spent. If his credit at home was limited for the time being, it remained vast in the United States, the largest unit of the English-speaking peoples, a community of which he often spoke, exaggerating its cohesiveness.2 The extent of his prestige in America was never clearer than when he delivered his 'Iron Curtain' speech in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. On that occasion he was not simply warning the world of the danger of communism or of Soviet imperialism, or trying to stimulate the West to more appropriate policies. He was continuing an effort made since he had become Prime Minister to join Great Britain and the United States, at least their military and foreign policy directorates, in a much closer union. By the time of his defeat the previous July he had not succeeded, and at Fulton he made a last attempt. Churchill and the government he headed were determined to maintain a relationship with the United States unique among modern sovereign powers. Specifically, their objectives, as will be demonstrated, were to maintain indefinitely the wartime merger of military commands, known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which would be the basic postwar mechanism for keeping the peace. They hoped also for similar coordination within the foreign ministries of the two countries. Because there was no existing binational structure for diplomacy, however, as there was for military commands, this objective never advanced as far as its military counterpart, but

Introduction

Churchill and his aides were clear about their desire to see it emerge. In short, the policy of Churchill's government, if successful, would have created in the international arena a new power, one made up of two nations. It could appropriately be called 'Anglo-America'. Churchill could even contemplate common citizenship and suggest it on several occasions. Is that to be taken seriously? Probably not, if one believes that diplomatic history should weigh only concrete objectives backed by government actions. Churchill himself was content to let common citizenship wait for 'destiny' as he said at Fulton. Nevertheless, his proposal indicates the kind of closeness he could foresee between the two nations, for leaders of great powers do not often make such suggestions, and to do so three times publicly, twice while in office, is a matter of political significance by itself, regardless of the fact that it was hyperbole. The significance was that Churchill was trying to create an atmosphere of familial closeness in which more specific aims were to be achieved, an atmosphere in which, he hoped, the military and diplomatic affairs of the two nations were to be linked. Perhaps it should be pointed out here that colonial affairs were most definitely not to be included. British officials knew very well that American views generally, certainly those of the Roosevelt Administration, tended to be hostile to the British and other European empires. But, of course, strictly speaking, from Whitehall's vantage point, colonial affairs were not foreign affairs. Certainly in Churchill's view they were not. Churchill hoped to preserve Great Britain as a major power and influence in world affairs, as a nation resembling the Britain of his youth. Some very close link with another major power was the only way to do that, which may have become clear to him even before the war. Certainly, by the mid-1940s, the period on which this study concentrates, there was no longer any question of it in his mind. Unless Britain made what might be compared to a marriage, it could not remain in big-power society, especially considering the new and greatly escalated standards for membership. Furthermore, there was only one suitable partner, the United States. Consequently, Churchill set out early in the war to form the tie, believing that what Great Britain could not be, Anglo-America could. As in any marriage, at least any modern one, each partner surrenders part of his and her sovereignty, but the couple, at least potentially, can have greater influence than either individual, and the weaker of the two, if older, cleverer and more experienced, can have great sway in the union.

Introduction

That is the position Churchill hoped Britain might attain following an intimate if often troubled wartime engagement, but, unfortunately for his plans, the wedding never took place. Churchill's efforts to create this new alignment with the United States should not be made to seem cynical. There is no reason to believe that he felt anything but good would accrue not only to Britain but to America and for that matter the entire world as a result of his plans. And if there was no other country but the United States to serve his purposes, one can imagine him pleased by that necessity, pleased because it was his mother's homeland, because it uses at least a version of his language (and he made much of this fact), and because so much of its taste and so many of its institutions, however much they may have strayed from the originals, had roots in his country. Although frequently critical of American policy, he was on the whole extremely favourably disposed to the United States. 'He will not listen to any criticism of America, her people or her army', said Lord Moran, his physician, who spent a great deal of time with Churchill during the war and afterwards.3 Some members of his government disagreed with his approach to America, feeling often that he was going too far. They included Leo Amery, P. J. Grigg, Lord Beaverbrook, and at times Anthony Eden, but they did not create serious obstacles, and, perhaps equally significant, Foreign Office personnel dealing with American affairs gave him solid support. Certainly there were many grumbles about the national attitudes and the international deportment of the United States, but usually less as a result of disagreement with the Prime Minister's policy than of frustration in trying to enact it. Furthermore, during that period of the Labour Government's tenure with which this book is concerned, approximately its first three-quarters of a year, it strove just as hard as its predecessor to align America with policies which it considered vital, and it made a major and successful effort in the case of Greece. If it put less emphasis on joint military and foreign policy directorates than did Churchill, it did want America by its side on specific issues. In Churchill's view, however, crises such as those in Greece and Poland in the mid-1940s were not in themselves the reasons for creating Anglo-America, but only proof of the need for it. Nor did he assume that the new power, once formed, was to fade when these particular problems were removed, but instead it should remain permanently to provide the
world with a Pax Britannica-Americana.

Churchill made his views in this regard very clear in an exchange

Introduction

of correspondence with Ernest Bevin in which he pointed strongly towards his famous 'Iron Curtain' speech, made about four months later. Bevin had asked both Churchill and Eden, who by then were in the Opposition, for their opinions regarding American requests to share British Commonwealth military bases, a matter of much discussion between the two governments during the latter half of 1945. Churchill replied: The long-term advantage to Britain and the Commonwealth is to have our affairs so interwoven with those of the United States in external and strategic matters, that any idea of war between the two countries is utterly impossible, and that in fact, however the matter may be worded, we stand or fall together. ... From this point of view, the more strategic points we hold in Joint occupation, the better. I have not studied particular islands and bases in detail on the map, but in principle there is no doubt that the Joint occupation greatly strengthens the power of the United States and the safety of Britain. Although the United States is far more powerful than the British Commonwealth, we must always insist upon coming in on equal terms. We should press the Joint occupation at all points in question rather than accept the exclusive possession by the United States. We have so much to give that I have little doubt that, for the sake of a general settlement, they would agree to Joint occupation throughout. I do not agree with the characteristic Halifax slant that we should melt it all down into a vague United Nations Trusteeship. This ignores the vital fact that a special and privileged relationship between Great Britain and the United States makes us both safe for ourselves and more influential as regards building up the safety of others through the international machine. The fact that the British Commonwealth and the United States were for strategic purposes one organism, would mean: (a) that we should be able to achieve more friendly and trustful relations with Soviet Russia, and (b) that we could build up the United Nations organization around us and above us with greater speed and success. ' Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.' Our duties to mankind and all States and nations remain paramount, and we shall discharge them all the better hand in hand. ... The future of the world depends upon the fraternal association of Great Britain and the Commonwealth with the United States. With

Introduction

that, there can be no war. Without it, there can be no peace. The fact that strategically the English-speaking world is bound together, will enable us to be all the better friends with Soviet Russia, and will win us the respect of that realistic State. ... The Joint Association of the Great British Commonwealth and the United States in the large number of islands and bases, will make it indispensable to preserve indefinitely the organization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.4

The task that Churchill undertook in regard to the United States during his first period as Prime Minister was not easy, particularly in the days of Franklin Roosevelt, who was reluctant to countenance closer and more permanent links than already existed with Great Britain. The President wanted his country to have a relationship with Russia which, if not as close as that with the UK, would certainly be much too familiar to permit Britain and the United States to be bound together as Churchill wished. For Roosevelt the postwar world would be a new one in terms of international politics, and fundamental to it would be an organisation based on an equilateral relationship between the US, the UK, and the USSR that would keep the peace. (His insistence that China be part of the group does not change the fact that it was the Big Three that were vital to his concept.) Churchill claimed that the Anglo-American relationship that he sought would be compatible with Roosevelt's world organisation. This indeed might have been possible, but only if the organisation had been quite different from the one that Roosevelt envisioned, becoming little more than a mask for Anglo-American hegemony. Throughout the war, the US Administration felt the traditional American fears of being outwitted by British diplomacy and manoeuvred into putting American strength to British purposes. Furthermore, Roosevelt and his key aides were worried that the degree of Anglo-American collaboration that the British seemed to want would appear to the Soviets to constitute a bloc directed against them, a revival of the cordon sanitaire of the post World War I era of which they so often complained. Consequently, to the American Administration, it seemed that Britain's means of playing a major power role could well endanger world peace. Conversely, to officials directing Britain's foreign policy, Roosevelt's triangularity in international affairs appeared misguided in regard to the Soviets and dangerous for the West. Moreover, it raised special problems for Britain because, in fact, Britain did not have the strength to maintain

Introduction

its corner of the triangle, and if isolated in its third of the relationship, would surely shrink to the second rank at least of international powers. Britain, however, faced an additional problem. Concurrent with Roosevelt's triangular policy was a growing spirit of national selfassertion in America, including a new eagerness to act politically and economically in the international environment and a willingness to compete with a Britain weakened by war. There was an irony in this from the US viewpoint, although American officials at the time seem not to have been aware of it - if Britain, reduced by various factors including American competition, could not maintain its international position, in effect maintain its corner of the triangle, there could, of course, be no triangle. Every time the United States, with all the advantages it enjoyed in the mid-1940s, competed vigorously with Great Britain, as it did in commercial and financial matters especially, it endangered its own grander design of international politics based on a three-power structure. There is, of course, no way to be sure what the postwar world would have been like had Britain maintained its strength and had the triangle been preserved. Nonetheless, it is possible that Americans would have found themselves caught up in any number of controversies with HMG - on colonial questions, for example, or commercial matters, or issues of military occupation, all areas of Anglo-American friction even during the war. Had Great Britain been able to back its positions more vigorously in the postwar era, the United States would probably have been willing to suffer a fair degree of Soviet national expansion of one kind or another in order to have Russia as an occasional ally against an equally strong and assertive Britain. Had Britain been in a more powerful position it, too, might have found Soviet activities toward the end of the war and in the postwar years irritating perhaps, but tolerable in a1 country that in these circumstances would be a potential ally when Americans were too aggressive about airlines, oil rights, military bases, imperial preferences, or colonies. In short, had British strength not declined, the confrontative attitudes and related events that we lump together and call the 'Cold War' might never have occurred. But regardless of what might have been, it is certain that in the mid-1940s British power, equal to that of the other two allies, was essential to an effective world peacekeeping organisation. Indeed, without it, the organisation, unable to base itself on a tripartite

Introduction

foundation, became impotent in the face of superpower rivalry. This is not to say that it would inevitably have achieved the aims of its founders had it not been for that rivalry. It is only to say that without a strong Britain there was surely no chance of the UNO becoming, as Roosevelt saw it, the centre in which the major powers would decide the great international questions. Confrontation with the Soviet Union was not purely accidental, nor did London shrink from it as Washington did in the days of Roosevelt. In fact, Churchill and the Foreign Office strove to convince both American officialdom and much of American society that a firm, reasonable, steady-minded confrontation of the Soviet Union was the only way to assure the peace. Attlee and Bevin continued the task when they took office in July 1945. Both governments worked long and hard to bring the United States to the position it finally assumed in March 1947 when Truman enunciated what has become known as the Truman Doctrine, the bedrock of American foreign policy in the post World War II era. That there were many domestic and international forces pushing the United States towards that position should not be permitted to obscure the fact that among these was the policy of the British Government. Britain itself, however, was soon forced to reduce sharply its participation in the confrontation. In February 1947, when Whitehall announced the need to withdraw a sizable amount of British support from Greece, it was clear that whatever the issues may have been before, there was now no longer any question that the overwhelmingly important factor in international politics was American-Soviet rivalry. The first part of this work tries to document both the British effort to create an Anglo-American bloc and the American resistance to it. The second part presents case histories derived from the crises in Greece and Poland in the mid-1940s, showing instances relating to the postwar world in which Britain needed, sought, and tried to apply United States power to back its diplomacy. My emphasis is upon British initiatives, hopes, and perceptions, and, as a consequence, my archival sources are British. I disclaim any intention of providing a comprehensive account of Anglo-American relations in the mid-1940s or even of attempting to outline all the most significant events. Rather I have tried to present material to illustrate the thesis that Great Britain, in order to

Introduction

maintain great-power influence at a time when its strength was on the wane, tried to form a new power, Anglo-America it might be called, in which Great Britain would play a key role. One of the tasks to be performed by Anglo-America, but only one, was to confront and confine Soviet influence. The overall Anglo-American relationship during the mid-1940s is an historical topic quite well explored by now. It has been the subject of two very good surveys in 1981, Ambiguous Partnership by Robert
Hathaway and The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War,

1944-1947 by Terry Anderson. Wm Roger Louis has done an excellent study of US-UK relations in regard to trust territories and their disposition after the war in Imperialism at Bay, which is well supplemented by John Sbrega's useful work, Anglo-American Relations
and Colonialism in East Asia, 1941-1945. Christopher Thorne has

explored the binational relationship, especially relative to the Pacific War, in his Allies of a Kind, a remarkable piece of scholarship somewhat marred in the view of this author by its strong, if often inter alia, anti-American bias. David Reynolds provides a superb study of Anglo-American diplomatic relations leading up to the period on which this study focusses in his prize-winning book, The Creation of the
Anglo-American Alliance, 19374.1, and Elisabeth Barker furnishes a

good survey of those relations in the latter half of the decade in The
British Between the Superpowers, 194550.

Important earlier works are those of H. C. Allen and H. G. Nicholas, listed in the bibliography under the heading 'British background and Anglo-American relations' (p. 215). Especially useful for students of US-UK interaction in the 1940s is Allen's Great Britain and the United States, chapters 18 and 19, although because it was published in 1954, before the pertinent archives were opened, it relies principally on memoirs. The two principal works by Nicholas
are Britain and the United States and The United States and Britain, also

relying basically on memoirs, diaries and other published materials. Coral Bell's The Debatable Alliance is another useful study for the 1940s, although, like the works of Allen and Nicholas, it ranges wider than that. Many of these books, as some of the titles indicate, find the alliance a troubled one. Hathaway concludes that by 1947 it had lost much of its significance for the Americans and that the British had slipped into a very inferior position in it, an assessment with which this author agrees.

Introduction

Anderson does not. He finds that British influence on US policy continued to be very strong, certainly until the formation of NATO, which he sees growing out of the Anglo-American alliance. He concludes, as some others have implied, that the British were satisfied with NATO because it was a check on Soviet expansion to the west. This book tries to show that restraining the Russians was only a secondary British objective. The author believes that certainly to Churchill and his aides in the 1940s, an arrangement like NATO would have been far from enough because it could not have fulfilled their primary objective, that of maintaining Great Britain in the first rank of power. To do that required a partnership - which in itself was an unfortunate necessity from their viewpoint - but surely nothing less than a partnership would suffice, and certainly not a multilateral aggregation under American command. Anyone interested in the US-UK wartime relationship from a diplomatic and political point of view must also give careful attention to Joseph Lash's Roosevelt and Churchill, ig^g-ig^i, a history built around the correspondence of the two leaders; to Warren Kimball's The Most Unsordid Act, a study of US aid to Great Britain before America was a belligerent; to Kimball's Churchill and Roosevelt: the Complete Correspondence, a recent annotated edition, and to Richard Gardner's Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, regarding the economic relations between the two allies. There are, of course, hundreds of other works - histories, monographs, memoirs, diaries - in which the AngloAmerican relationship figures, often to a major degree. I hope that I have listed at least the most significant in the bibliography. Those mentioned in this introduction are, I believe, the principal ones which deal fundamentally with the US-UK relationship. The Cold War is the other main area of historiography upon which this study impinges. Despite the flood of writing in that area, Britain's role has not received nearly the attention, and especially the systematic attention, that it deserves. In some cases, as in Robert Divine's Roosevelt and World War II, which discusses the Polish crisis of the 1940s at some length, Great Britain scarcely receives mention. In other cases, American writers, including Gabriel Kolko and Stephen Ambrose, eager to revise earlier, more self-satisfied American histories of the period, focus so finely on US actions and reactions that these become enormously magnified, while Great Britain's part recedes from view. A few writers, Robert Beitzell and Gaddis Smith, for example, have

io

Introduction

discussed the Anglo-American relationship in the mid-1940s in some detail, but have not, however, considered closely the way Britain tried to lead the United States to its Cold War positions. Brian Gardner and Gar Alperovitz have also reported Great Britain's Cold War role in a more than tangential way, while William H. McNeill, Herbert Feis and Adam B. Ulam have hinted at or touched upon British policy in this respect. Arthur L. Smith, Jr, points out that the British and the Russians were the first contestants in the Cold War, with the United States coming in later and soon predominating on the Western side.5 Nevertheless, the systematic effort of British statecraft and the importance of Great Britain's decline as a power in bringing about the superpower confrontation have received little study in one of the most heavily worked fields of historical inquiry. Furthermore, in nearly every history published prior to 1981 in which a British role in the early Cold War is mentioned, it is seen as the work, sometimes almost as the idiosyncrasy, of Winston Churchill. The part played by others, even by Eden, is almost totally obscured, and the institutionalised British effort to check the Soviets is invariably ignored. In 1981 Hathaway and Anderson, and in 1983 Elisabeth Barker, assisted by the opening of British archives for the period, certainly helped to rectify that situation, but they did not focus on the profoundly significant effects of Britain's decline or show how the motivations behind its American policies related to that decline. Therefore, this book is designed to do just that in the belief that an understanding of those phenomena is of extraordinary importance to an understanding of the political events of the 1940s and even of our own era. Indeed, the loss of British power and all that it brought in its train helped significantly to create the structure of international politics that largely prevails even today, yet it has never received the analysis it demands in the writing on either Anglo-American relations or Cold War origins. This work tries to show that it was through policies towards the United States that British leaders hoped to forestall their country's fate of becoming a secondary power. Consequently, it is a study mainly of British policy, as distinct from that of the US or the Soviet Union, but above all it is an explanation not offered heretofore of the reasons for Great Britain's American policy. A by-product of this investigation is that, in using two case studies, the crises in Greece and Poland in the 1940s, to prove the point, it produces a closer view of British policy in those cases and its effects

Introduction

11

on trans-Atlantic diplomacy than has been provided before, and that is a crucial dimension of those events. Admittedly, Anderson and Hathaway both consider this aspect in their more general treatments and John Iatrides regards the Anglo-American byplay of the Greek crisis to some extent in his Revolt in Athens. Nevertheless, this study provides the most detailed look to date at British policy and its effects on Anglo-American affairs in regard to those events. Many of the incidents reported in this work, especially in connexion with the Greek and Polish crises, have been discussed elsewhere, e.g. the long wrangling between the Western Allies and the Soviets about Poland or the complications of the British occupation of Greece. They are nevertheless reproduced here, not in a spirit of discovery regarding those events themselves, but in order to analyse them for new historical meaning, i.e. for their effects on British diplomacy towards the United States.

PART I STRENGTHENING THE TIES: THE EFFORT AND THE PROBLEMS

THE NEED

In the view of her political guardians in the mid-1940s Britain needed to marry and for the most worldly of reasons. She had lost approximately one quarter (7,300 million) of her prewar wealth (30,000 million) during the war. 1 She had been forced to undertake a total disinvestment of more than 4,000 million2 and although she had gold and dollar reserves valued at $1,800 million in July 1945, she also had overseas liabilities of approximately $13,000 million. 3 She had managed to hold imports to 62 % of the prewar total but had seen exports fall to 46%. 4 To quote H. G. Nicholas, 'It was as if all the resources and treasures which in the days of her pre-eminence had been built up by Victorian thrift and enterprise had now been flung, with a kind of calculated prodigality, upon the pyre of total war. ' 5 Recognising the wasting process in which the nation was caught, its leaders sought a partnership that might bring to Britain something of a restoration not just of treasure but of influence. Furthermore, it was clear during the war that, besides the drain of its assets, Britain faced a 'manpower famine'. 6 This boded ill for the future if great power status would require her to maintain armed forces on the scale of World War II or to provide major contingents to police the peace of the world. Britain's major deficiency was in ground forces with their high manpower component. During the war it had been able to raise fewer than 3 million soldiers, drawing not only on its own resources but on those of the entire Commonwealth and Empire. Total armed forces at their peak were approximately 5

14

Strengthening the ties

million, whereas in the United States they were over 12 million and in the Soviet Union over 11 million.7 On 7 February 1946, Lord President of the Council Herbert Morrison, reporting on a government economic survey, pointed out that ' on the basis of existing policies and programmes, there would be a man-power shortage of 1.3 million at the end of 1946. Service strengths would not exceed 1,200,000 and the labour force engaged on production for the Forces would not exceed 650,000 \ 8 If Britain needed a mate to stay in superpower society, it really had only one candidate, the United States. Certainly British leaders would not form close ties with the USSR even if the Soviets would countenance it, and during the period studied they never considered rapprochement and subsequent alliance with Germany or Japan. Furthermore, although the British Government favoured strengthening postwar France, there is no evidence that it ever returned to the notion of union which it embraced in 1940, nor would a postwar AngloFrench combination have seemed sufficient to elevate it to superpower status. Both Churchill and the Foreign Office considered encouraging various kinds of European regional groupings, although their ideas were often at odds, and the Prime Minister frequently felt the need to restrain Eden and his lieutenants in this matter.9 The Foreign Office, especially its Economic and Reconstruction Department, headed by Gladwyn Jebb and in charge of postwar planning, held hope that some sort of postwar coalition with Western European nations might benefit the UK. 10 Jebb's department seemed assured that such a coalition would be a source of stability, assuming that the Soviets could be convinced that it was not a hostile bloc. It could provide fewer assurances, however, that it would be a source of strength. Furthermore, the Chiefs of Staff told the Foreign Office in July 1944 that a Western European coalition would not provide a large measure of defence without incorporating all or part of Germany. That was not an enormously appealing idea in London in 1944, and it would have had even less charm in Moscow had it ever come to light there.11 In fact, that concept was so sensitive that Eden hoped that a report containing it would be put in ' some secure pigeon-hole', fearing especially that it might 'leak' to the Russians, who would surely interpret it as Western re-armament of Germany in order to check, or possibly attack, the Soviet Union.12

The need

15

Several months later, however, ignoring the Chiefs' comments about Germany, Eden returned to the charge. He told Churchill 'As I see it... a properly organised Western Europe can provide us with depth for defence and large resources of manpower which would greatly ease our burden and enable us to avoid a huge standing army which would cripple our economy.' His proposal called for Great Britain, France, and the smaller Western European countries 'to organise their defences... according to some common plan'. He added that Stalin would not be likely to oppose the scheme if he understood that it would be under the control of the 'World Organisation' and 'if it were made perfectly clear that it was directed against a resurgence of Germany'. 13 Whether Stalin or anyone else by November 1944, when this was written, would believe that Germany's containment was the only object of such an entente is surely open to doubt. Churchill took a generally negative view of these plans. He considered the smaller states of Western Europe to be 'liabilities rather than assets', to quote Woodward, 14 and told Eden in November 1944 not to bring the idea up with representatives of those countries. He saw the French as a possible source of strength but not for five or ten years and then only if they ' became notably friendly' to Great Britain and were prepared to act as a barrier against Russia. 15 (It is interesting to note that the Russian threat is clear, but never admitted, in the Foreign Office papers on this subject, whereas Churchill is characteristically explicit on the question.) If further relations with Europe were murky at best, Roosevelt's Administration helped cloud the scene further. It was suspicious of Whitehall's interest in possible European regional coalitions, afraid they would detract from a future world organisation and perhaps also that they might develop into a rival power bloc. Consequently, the idea was not very vigorously pursued during the period under survey.16 Furthermore, whatever its potential, continental Europe in the mid-1940s, certainly immediately after the war, scarcely appealed as a powerful partner. Moreover, both the degree and the political complexion of its eventual recovery were highly uncertain. In fairness to Eden and Jebb, their vision for Europe somewhat approximated what indeed came to pass with the creation of NATO although, unsure of American long-term intentions in Europe, they underestimated US predominance in the postwar West. As Barker puts it, Churchill's ' keen sense of the inevitability of US leadership

16

Strengthening the ties

was more acute than the wishful thinking of Eden and the Foreign Office about an independent British policy in Europe and beyond'.17 But could Great Britain's power role not be sustained by its Empire or Commonwealth? There were persons, even in the Government, who thought so,18 but it was a delusion. Prewar trade among Commonwealth countries, for example, while significant, was less than one third of the total trade for those countries,19 and after the war, trade with Europe and North America became much more important than that with each other.20 Meanwhile, Canada and the Pacific dominions came to look to America more than to Great Britain for protection. With the ties continually loosening, it is by no means clear that, even if Commonwealth members could have provided sufficient armed forces to back a British great power role, they would have been willing to do so. Even during the war, deployment of their troops proved troublesome. There were serious disputes over the use of Australian troops in the Middle East, and in 1942 the Australian Government called home those forces that remained in the North African campaign;21 Canada's Prime Minister did not want Canadian troops used in the controversial Greek occupation in 1944;22 New Zealand had to think twice before agreeing to let its troops be used in a Commonwealth force planned for the final assault on Japan, 23 and Eire never even broke relations with Italy and Germany.24 In each case, the dominion involved may have had excellent reasons for its action or lack of action, but the lesson regarding military strength must have been clear in Britain.25 Even in the area of logistics, the British tended to get better support elsewhere, mainly, of course, the United States, and on better terms. For if the United States was thought often to be less forthcoming than British officials hoped, at least it did not insist on payment and in sterling for the bulk of its Lend-Lease shipments, as did most of the Empire for supplies it provided.26 Furthermore, the colonies, as distinct from dominions, provided an especially weak reed for Britain to lean upon. During the war their situation was very much in flux, but it seemed certain that India, that most significant imperial property, and probably other areas as well, would require a much greater degree of independence after the hostilities ended. Jebb told Eden as early as October 1942 that Great Britain must have some powerful ally or allies, or cease to be a world power.27 It was an accurate assessment which defined a vexing problem - not

The need

17

Empire or Commonwealth or Europe could provide what Britain needed. Some historians trace the notion of a tie between Great Britain and the United States to the end of the nineteenth century. Louis Halle states that with the rise of German, Japanese and American navies altering the world balance of power, ' the British, seeing that they could no longer "go it alone", tried for an alliance with the United States that would combine the two navies in a partnership, failed, and concluded an alliance with Japan instead'. 28 H. C. Allen says at the time of the Spanish-American war ' Britons deliberately, persistently, energetically, and even with a sense of urgency, set out to win that friendship with the United States on which her foreign policy has ever since been fundamentally based', 29 and speaking of the first years of the twentieth century, H. G. Nicholas says, 'That Britain desired the reality, if not the form, of such an [Anglo-America] alliance was by now indubitable. ' 30 The notion of some sort of link with the United States reappeared in the 1940s and became a primary principle of British foreign policy during much of the decade. Other governmental objectives and actions occasionally ran counter to it, for example the military intervention in Greece, the opposition to Sforza in Italy, and the so-called 'percentages' agreement with the Soviet Union. At all times, however, an effort was made to reconcile these deviations with the policy of Anglo-American unity which, although strained from time to time, was never supplanted or invalidated. Furthermore, it was not only primary to the diplomacy of Churchill's Coalition Government, but was a major consideration for the Labour Government also, although receiving from it somewhat less emphasis as compared to multilateral diplomacy. The concept of a link with the United States as close as that suggested by Churchill at Fulton emerged when the Coalition Government was little more than a month old. It was first articulated on 27 June 1940 by Sir Stafford Cripps, then British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who put the proposal in the context of the faltering military campaign in Europe. 31 Just as France was about to come to terms with Germany, the British Government made it an offer of union and combined citizenship, hoping thereby to encourage it to continue to resist, perhaps from a base in North Africa.32 Nothing

18

Strengthening the ties

came of the idea. Surely, whatever else, it was too drastic a remedy too late in the day. Nonetheless, it apparently channelled thought in the British Government along the lines of union with some other power. When Gripps suggested union with the United States, he referred to the proposal to France, and he related Britain to the United States much as France would have related to Britain. In particular, Cripps recognised that the British Government might have to fly and govern from a new land as had been suggested for France. As the French Government would have settled in Africa, the British Government would join with the United States while settling in Canada, and would form an association with 'permanence greater' even than was contemplated with France. Cripps said that Great Britain would become part of an American power group 'under the influence of the USA' and added that 'the prestige and power of such a group would have an immediate effect on the war situation since it should be apparent to Hitler that he could never conquer such a union'. He admitted that 'no doubt the centre of gravity of the political life of the two countries would shift to the American continent, and Great Britain would become merely the European outpost of an Anglo-Saxon group largely concentrated in the West'. Nevertheless, he said, 'it may well be that before long such a policy will be shown to be the only practical and permanent method of saving Anglo-Saxon civilisation'. The comments on Cripps' suggestion as it progressed through the Foreign Office revealed broad sentiment for closer Anglo-American association. R. M. Makins of the Central Department, for example, said 'Events are pushing the United States and ourselves into closer association, and there is a good deal to be said for Sir S. Cripps' analysis.'J. Nichols, head of the Southern Department, commented that 'The evolutionary process indicated by Sir S. Cripps is probably an inevitable one, and for those who have always believed, as I have, that the future of the world depends on close Anglo-American co-operation [it] is not an unwelcome one', and R. A. Butler, Parliamentary Undersecretary, stated that 'The more we can work in with U.S. in a world, and not a European conception of Foreign Policy the better'. 33 But there were important sceptics, including J. Balfour, head of the American Department, and Paul Mason of the Dominions Intelligence Department, whose reservations included doubts that the Americans

The need
34

19

would be interested, whatever the merits of the plan. But what proved to be the most telling criticisms were made by T. N. Whitehead of the American Department35 whose observations became the basis of a polite rejection of the idea sent from Lord Halifax, then Foreign Secretary, to Cripps on 11 July 1940. It stated:
The Monroe Doctrine is not only a statement warning Europe off the American Continent. It is equally an expression of America's desire to be rid of European entanglements. The evolution of a rapprochement between the British Commonwealth and the United States cannot be accelerated and will be the result of patient labour over a period of time. In these circumstances I do not feel that there is any positive action which can immediately be taken. We must let the educative force of events work.36

But if gradualism was the order of the day, strong currents in the Foreign Office, including its top echelons, continued pushing towards a kind of Anglo-American combination, if still largely undefined. For example, Halifax told Lord Hankey, 'It may well be that...we shall find ourselves contemplating the possibility of some sort of special association with the U.S.A. on the lines suggested, and for the reasons given, in Gripps's telegrams', and, after stating again that the matter could not be rushed, he added, 'This does not mean that we ought not to bear it always in mind... I am sending a copy of these letters to the Prime Minister. '37 It is surely worth noting that final sentence, i.e., that this correspondence was brought to Churchill's attention. Meanwhile, on 18 July 1940, Halifax, arguing that Americans should have access to British air bases in the Atlantic, said, ' not only do we require all the help we can get in the present, but the future of our widely scattered Empire is likely to depend on the evolution of an effective and enduring collaboration between ourselves and the United States. This may be an obvious necessity for us, but for America it is a new and startling doctrine.' He went on to say, ' Our aim should surely be to assist America in the task of assuming a new and heavy responsibility for which so little in her tradition and history has prepared her. ' 38 Cripps' proposal and the stir it caused in the Foreign Office surely influenced Halifax's thinking when he wrote these remarks a few weeks later. Furthermore, even though he rejected Cripps' idea, Halifax deemed it of sufficient interest to be printed and circulated to the Cabinet on 8 August. Within a fortnight, Churchill would tell

20

Strengthening the ties

Parliament that granting the United States rights to bases in the Atlantic would result in the two countries being ' somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage'. He had no 'misgivings' about this, he said, and thought it inevitable in any event. 'Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll. Let it roll on full flood, inexorable, irresistible, benignant, to broader lands and better days. '39 In discussing early consideration in Whitehall of an Anglo-American combination, it is important to note (i) that the idea was quite deliberately rejected as an emergency wartime measure, unlike the plan for France from which it grew, and (2) that there is no evidence that it was a long-range device to permit Britain to confront menacing Soviets more effectively. Regarding the second point, certainly communism and Soviet expansion had been seen as threats by this time, but obviously, in 1940, neither constituted Britain's principal danger. For this reason perhaps, the Soviets are not mentioned in communications on this issue at that time, although later they will be indeed. The point is that a number of key British policy-makers seemed to have believed that British affairs should in some way be merged with those of the United States. It was no longer a scheme to survive an immediate German onslaught, nor was it a plan to repel a projected Soviet surge. It was a way for Britain to continue to be the kind of force in the world that they wanted it to be, something like the force that it had been, in short, a major power, or at least, if need be, an important part of a major new power. As the concept evolved in later years, this motivation became more obvious and indeed at times explicit, and surely to these men, never nagged by doubts about the value of their civilisation, there was no reason not to be explicit. The connexion was necessary to preserve a beneficent influence in international affairs the influence of a powerful Britain. Certainly not all of Britain's political leaders wanted to see the two countries more closely joined. Nonetheless, because of Churchill's firmness and power plus key support among his lieutenants, the concept became and remained a principal policy of the Coalition Government.

PROBLEMS WITH AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

It was crucial to British plans for lasting military and diplomatic links with the United States that American opinion be favourable to Great Britain and its policies. As early as the first quarter of 1942, however, reports had reached Whitehall that Americans were critical of Great Britain's war effort. The British Embassy in Washington in its political review for that year feared the worst for the Anglo-American honeymoon of the immediate post Pearl Harbor era, which in its prime included a flying visit from Churchill to Washington even before 1941 was out. Indeed, within three months of that trip, strong criticism was being heard of British performance in the war, criticism that focussed on Britain's military reverses and the quality of its officers. Furthermore, the suspicion was aired that the British Government was hoarding forces in the UK to defend the home islands rather than sending them to the fighting fronts and that it was conducting its war effort mainly in the interests of the Empire.1 Moreover, following Japan's attack on American positions in the Pacific, not only did Asia become the focus of popular attention in America, obscuring the earlier image of Great Britain struggling valiantly and alone, but the United States began to feel its own power superiority. The British Embassy in Washington said that in early 1942 'even outside the Isolationist ranks the view gained powerful support that the war should be largely American led and American managed'. 2 In May 1942, HMG began a special effort to offset these views by publicising its war effort both on the battle fronts and the home front.3 Indeed, Britain had engaged in this kind of public relations activity before, but previously the object had been to convince Americans to send war supplies at a time when they themselves were technically neutral. The new effort met obstacles even at home. Armed service departments were always reluctant to release useful data for fear of endangering national security, while ministers and their staffs engaged in long

22

Strengthening the ties

and sometimes acrimonious arguments about the best means of telling the story.4 Nonetheless, the story was told in various ways and through various media. For example, a series of pictorial graphs suitable for reproduction in newspapers and magazines were distributed in the US from 1942 until 1944.5 Principal themes were (1) British sacrifice of comforts in order to win the war, (2) the extent of British war production, (3) the extent of British support to the US (reverse Lend-Lease it was called), and (4) the extent and effect of British fighting, especially the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. The effects were uneven. Sometimes it seemed that Americans were responding, as when Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, said US opinion of the UK had risen especially as a result of the battle of El Alamein, plus the ' growing offensive power of the Royal Air Force'. In addition, he believed Americans had come to realise that Britain had already dealt successfully with problems that they themselves were being called upon to face, such as rationing and labour shortages.6 But more often the atmosphere seemed discouraging. Eden told Lord Halifax, then British Ambassador in America, that the Americans had 'a much exaggerated conception' of their military contribution. He said, 'They lie freely about this, e.g. figures of percentages of forces for Overlord and their share of sunken U boats, and we are too polite to put them right, or it may be difficult to do so without giving information to the enemy.' As a consequence, he said,' the Americans advocate the claims of Washington as the capital of the country making the major fighting effort, which it certainly is not'. 'The moral of all this', Eden said, 'would seem to be that we must blow our own military trumpet rather more, and this we have plans to do. ' 7 Halifax agreed, adding that the US press provided such lopsided coverage that readers got' a vivid impression that the Americans are fighting hard and a vague impression that there may be some British troops somewhere about'. He urged London to provide material to its officials in Washington about both Britain's casualties and its war production and also suggested that American war correspondents be attached to British units at the fronts. Finally, he recommended that when the time came for British troops to go to the Pacific, they should do so via the United States, being seen from coast to coast.8 Similar concern on Churchill's part was demonstrated when he told Halifax that he believed Britain's 'weight in the war is not unworthy of the Chinese "Titan"', mocking not only popular American

American public opinion

23

admiration for China but Roosevelt's determination to treat it as one of four great allies.9 Halifax in turn suggested that when the Prime Minister was at Quebec in September 1944 he make a battle-review broadcast in Canada regarding the performance of Canadian and British troops.10 Ostensibly simply for Canadian gratification, it would also be of'immense value' in the United States, he said. It was also felt at times that, besides extolling its own war effort, Britain should praise America's less. Minister of Information Brendan Bracken once stated that 'for nearly two years British Ministers, soldiers, newspapers and of course the BBC have been using lyrical language about the weapons and help we have been receiving from the United States'. The result, he claimed, was that 'a large number of Americans believe that our production is trifling and that America has borne the brunt of producing the weapons and planes used by the British'.11 Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1944 efforts were going forward in London to produce a government white paper illustrating Britain's contribution to the war. At the same time consideration, especially in the Ministry of Information, was being given to ways in which the paper might have greatest impact. Frank Darvall of the American Division proposed to the Director General, Cyril J. Radcliffe, that 'the whole resources of the ministry should be mobilised for the purpose, and a concentrated campaign to put the statistics across through every available medium given priority over almost everything else'.12 He suggested a popular pamphlet, displays, 'high brow and low brow' feature articles, 'a book or books', films, and 'mobilisation of all BBC services to give these facts and figures the maximum play when they appear, plus advance notice to the press that the figures are coming'. The Director General agreed. After Churchill presented the white paper to Parliament at the end of November, it was distributed around the world. In the United States care was taken to get it to key journalists and to other influential persons in government and private life.13 On 23 November Brendan Bracken described it to major London publishers to whom he sent advance copies as ' the most valuable source book for British publicity the Government has produced', 14 and afterwards he said, 'it had a fine reception in the press and on the radio throughout the world, and especially in the United States'. 15 The ministry's reference division, reporting on 'overseas publicity and distribution', said that in the United States 'staggering results were achieved, especially in

24

Strengthening the ties

New York'. The ministry, of course, was speaking of its own work, so there might have been a tendency to exaggerate, but quotes from papers and broadcasts substantiated its claims that American journalists were impressed and even 'shocked' at Britain's enormous sacrifices.16 But to keep Americans awed was a more difficult task. If the white paper dammed up cynicism or ignorance for a while, leaks soon began to appear. On 25 March 1945, for instance, the British Embassy in Washington called for figures comparing the number of American and British troops in Europe, data needed to counter a contention of Drew Pearson that there were 3 million Americans on the western front compared with 250,000 British. Or witness Eden's concern approximately five months after the release of the white paper. On 29 April while at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco he wired Churchill that he was ' seriously perturbed' at the small amount of press stories devoted to Great Britain's share in military operations. ' The net result is that I have found in conversation even with Senators and Government officials that unconsciously they assume that only the American and Russian armies are in the picture.' As a consequence, he said,' it is of the utmost importance from a political standpoint that we should use every effort to bring home to the Americans what we have done and are doing'. 17 When the war in Europe ended, Bracken urged publication of secret data on British casualties, production, etc. 'while the world [was] still thinking and talking about VE-day'. The object, he pointed out, was to add to the 'little general knowledge Americans have about the size of the British contribution to victory in relation to their own and to that of Russia'.18 Meanwhile, similar efforts had begun from another quarter. On 3 May 1945 Field Marshal Henry Maitland Wilson, then head of the Joint Staff Mission (the British delegation to the offices in Washington of the Combined Chiefs) and Harold Butler, head of the British Information Services in the United States, wired the Chiefs of Staff in London the following rather unusual message: 'It has been suggested to us by the United States Government that we should go all out to present to the American public as full a picture as possible of our effort in the War against Japan.' 1 9 This was obviously remarkably solicitous of the United States Government, and who exactly made the proposal and under what circumstances is not clear. Apparently he was a well-disposed official with enough rank to merit his remarks being cabled to

American public opinion

25

London, who may have been answering a British question to the effect: ' What can we do about American attitudes regarding our war effort?' In any event, Wilson and Butler asked especially that figures from the Burma campaign be made available for the first time, to which the Chiefs of Staff agreed, saying 'without prejudicing security ... this occasion should be exploited to the utmost in our publicity in the United States'. 20 Nevertheless, the months that followed saw endless discussions not only of security ramifications but of ways to break down the figures, among other things in terms of UK versus Commonwealth and Empire troops. All this was punctuated by urgent calls for speed from the British Information Services in the United States eager to combat the notion in America that Great Britain was slack in the Asian theatre. When the figures were finally assembled, however, it was 10 September, and the war was over. But proof perhaps that the bureaucratic mind is more creative than often assumed, an introduction was hastily written proclaiming that Japan's surrender now made it possible to reveal these data. Meanwhile, John S. Knight, publisher of the Chicago Daily News, had begun an exchange in mid-1945 with Lord Beaverbrook on the subject of Britain's contribution to the war effort.21 The first round consisted of an open letter from Knight to Beaverbrook printed in the Daily News on 14 July 1945 saying in effect that Americans did not think Great Britain was pulling its weight in the war against Japan. Knight's statement that' They are at a loss to understand why the mighty British Navy is not taking a more active part in the Pacific' must have been especially galling to Britons who knew of HMG's efforts, particularly at the Second Quebec Conference, to involve the British Navy in the Pacific war and of Admiral King's staunch determination to exclude it.22 In fact, General Douglas MacArthur, American Army Commander in that theatre, was equally opposed to placing British and Commonwealth troops among his forces. WThen coerced by top-level agreement at Potsdam to include them in plans for the final assault on Japan, he wrote a note to the British chiefs almost insulting in both its requirements and its obvious unwillingness to have their units in his ranks.23 Beaverbrook answered with a letter in his Daily Express showing the extent of the British effort in production, men at arms, and casualties, and pointing out how high the involvement and sacrifice of Great Britain was in percentage terms, rather than simply in numbers. Both letters were published in both papers.

26

Strengthening the ties

American doubts about Britain's war effort seemed not to be the only psychological barrier to closer relations. As the war continued and Americans' self-confidence grew, it became harder to convince them that they needed British strength. The Embassy noted even in 1942 that 'New conceptions of the postwar world tended to relegate Britain to a junior position.'24 From then on, throughout the war years and into the postwar era, fear of sliding or being nudged into second place in the alliance would haunt the British government, especially the Foreign Office. A major task for British officials would be to keep that from happening. Even though in terms of armed forces and economic strength their country was clearly out-matched, they hoped that knowledge, experience, and influence could make up the balance, along with strategic benefits offered by Britain's worldwide Empire and Commonwealth. The problem was to convince Americans of this. His Majesty's Government felt that Americans also needed convincing that Great Britain was, in Bracken's words, ' one of the greatest and most progressive industrial nations in the world'. 25 In mid-1943 it said that the aim of its publicity in the United States was ' to maintain before the public a clear picture of the British, both in their war effort and in their domestic affairs, as an advanced society of democratic peoples and an ally whose strength will be no less vital in the peace to come than it is in the partnership of war'. 26 In April 1943, Sir Ronald Campbell said it was necessary to show the US that it needed Great Britain and its Empire to ensure American security. Americans had not appreciated that fact, he thought, because they considered Great Britain to be either ' patronising or suppliant' and because of their ' confidence in their continental security'. He added that the British should project an image of efficiency, portraying themselves, when interests coincided, as' efficient collaborators', and when they did not, as 'honest competitors, the kind of up-to-date people a good American can do business with'. 27 Nevile Butler, head of the North American Department of the Foreign Office, demonstrated a related concern for imperial prestige when he wrote to Richard Law regarding British participation in a food conference to open in the United States in the spring of 1943. (Law, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, was to head the UK delegation.) The letter stated: Alan Dudley [a subordinate] is much impressed by the opportunity that the Food Conference offers for influencing American opinion concerning British Empire-American relations, and particularly for demonstrating

American public opinion

27

to the American public the strength and unity and resources which make the Empire a valuable partner in world affairs. He, therefore, thinks it most important that both before and during the Conference the British Empire delegations, and particularly that of the United Kingdom, should concern themselves not only with furthering the success of the Conference, but with trying to produce a favourable effect on American opinion from the viewpoint of the British Empire as a whole. I think myself that you will have the above very much in mind, but pass it on to you... 2 8 But the American attitude, viewed from Whitehall, showed signs of deteriorating rather than improving as time went on. T w o years later Law told Churchill: I see a great deal of evidence from the United States which suggests not only that the Americans tend to underrate our war effort, but also that they are tending to regard us as a factor of little account in world affairs in the future. They are beginning to feel that it is Russia, not we, who are the only partners equal to them in strength, and they even evince some admiration for what they call the ' toughness' of the Russians. It has always been quite clear that our future depends on there being a feeling of genuine partnership between the United States and ourselves. The situation as it is developing in Europe makes such a partnership even more necessary. I do not believe that it will be possible to realise an Anglo-American partnership in any real sense unless the American people can be made to understand, as they do not yet understand, the value of the contribution which we have made and can continue to make.29 Churchill wrote at the bottom of Law's minute: 'Noted. I do not fear these particular dangers.' A strange note surely, for Churchill had feared for the Anglo-American relationship before. Perhaps he distinguished, however, between the British being held at arm's length, as they had been by Roosevelt at the Teheran Conference and on subsequent occasions, and having their potential underestimated, which is essentially what was bothering Law. Yet as Law pointed out, if that potential was misunderstood, the Anglo-American partnership, so dear to Churchill, would probably never be realised. Moreover, if Churchill was optimistic, Law's pessimism more accurately reflected thinking in the Foreign Office and the Embassy in Washington. They grew ever more concerned with the 'junior partner' issue as the war in Europe and then in Asia came to a close and Americans became increasingly aware of their unparalleled might. The American attitude toward all of the Big Three nations was, in

28

Strengthening the ties

fact, roughly reflected in a Gallup Poll reported to London on 16 July 1945. Responding to a question asking which nation would be most influential in the postwar world, 6 3 % said the United States, 24% said Russia, and 5 % said Great Britain. John Balfour, new Minister at the Embassy, quoted this poll in a 12-page letter to Bevin on 9 August 1945 which was printed a fortnight later and distributed among Foreign Office officials.30 He said America was abandoning Roosevelt's 'grand design' for fighting the war and keeping the peace, i.e. 'coequal collaboration of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States', and added his suspicion that it was 'groping toward a new order of things' in which Great Britain, although the bastion of Western European security and the focal point of a far-flung oceanic system, would ' nevertheless be expected to take her place as junior partner in an orbit of power predominantly under American aegis'. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office continued to be bombarded with worrying reports about American attitudes, all saying more or less the same thing. For example, B. E. F. Gage, a member of the North American Department, attended the San Francisco Conference and then remained in the United States throughout much of the summer of 1945. On the basis of his talks with businessmen, journalists, and 'others', a group which he admitted was perhaps not 'entirely representative', he said he thought Americans believed: (1) The future of the world depended on 'two colossi', the Soviet Union and the United States. Britain was so weakened economically by war and her Commonwealth was so scattered that she could almost be overlooked in American policy. It was vital that the United States support the Commonwealth to enable it not only to survive, but to continue as a junior partner, thereby helping to counterbalance the Soviets. Britain was 'as full of tricks as a monkey' and would probably outsmart the United States and its inept State Department in commercial and political dealings, thus managing to drag Americans into things that were not in their interest. (British statesmen were already aware that many Americans, including officials, considered them perilously clever and crafty, a perception that posed constant problems in Whitehall.)31

(2) (3)

Whether or not these depressing assessments of American attitudes were correct, they poured into London, 'ad nauseam', as one official

American public opinion

29

put it, and clearly affected the Government's response regarding relations with America. On 20 November 1945, for example, the Washington Embassy's Information Office prepared a memorandum entitled ' confidential guidance... a general line which British officials in the US may find useful'. It stated:
Public Relations Line

The line set out in this paper may be summarised thus: With firmness and conviction we should show (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) that in peace as in war we are able, tough, determined and dependable; that the British Commonwealth and Empire will continue to be an essential worldwide system of strength and stability in a confused world; that we will overcome the severe but temporary difficulties resulting from our war sacrifices, and rebuild our leadership in production and world trade; that we are determined to set an example to the world in political democracy, individual freedom and social progress; that the aim of British foreign policy is to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom, through international understanding, goodwill and energetic cooperation in the United Nations Organisation and otherwise; that we seek a close working partnership with the United States, compatible with our responsibilities in the United Nations Organisation.32

(f)

Isolationism was another psychological hurdle on the way to closer ties. If its definition is imprecise, British officials concerned with American affairs used the word often and meant, whatever else, a reluctance on the part of the United States to become significantly involved in European politics.33 HMG, however, was determined that its trans-Atlantic ally should play a prominent role in the postwar world, especially in Europe, where British policy called for the containment of Soviet expansion and depended on the active support of the United States. In other areas, too, Britain's power and prestige were linked to the alliance, and here is a main point of interest for this study. For surely if Britain still possessed the relative strength it had in i860, let us say, its statesmen would have been much less distressed to see the United States lapse into a self-decreed isolation, thus allowing the British a freer hand in world affairs. While their

30

Strengthening the ties

passive ally turned its back on the world's politics, they could have restored some form of Pax Britannica, confronted the Soviets if need occurred, and in general held sway in the affairs at least of the West. Such, however, could not be the case for the Britain that in fact existed in the 1940s. Consequently, for the men conducting the UK's foreign policy and concerned with its status as a world power, it was clear that isolation for America meant decline for Great Britain, to say nothing of the collapse of important British policies, including that of checking the Soviets. Halifax spoke for most, if not all, of these officials when he mentioned 'the prime necessity' in all British planning of blocking an American return to isolationsim.34 An intense discussion of this subject took place in London in the summer of 1943, centring around Walter Lippmann's recently
published book, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. A copy

circulated in the upper echelons of the Foreign Office drawing a great deal of comment, almost all of which approved the theme while arguing with details.35 Lippmann urged the United States to bring its foreign policy into line with its extended commitments and called for a postwar alliance with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The Foreign Office thought highly not only of the suggested US-British alliance (less so presumably of the US-Soviet tie), but of the general call to end isolationism, a prerequisite to that alliance. Hence officials were gratified that Lippmann's book seemed to be receiving ample attention in the United States, including among government policymakers. The Embassy said that Republicans, including Wendell Willkie and Clare Booth Luce plus Senators Austin, Lodge, Wiley, and McNary supported the main 'alliance' thesis. It also predicted that the book, available in abridged form to from five to six million Reader's Digest subscribers, would 'have an important effect upon the development of [American] public opinion... towards foreign affairs'.36 Still, British statesmen, like many American counterparts, remained unconvinced that American isolationism was either dead or terminally ill and treaded warily when they suspected themselves in its presence. Reviewing the second quarter of 1943, the British Embassy in Washington stated that American public opinion ' continued to grow increasingly favourable to international commitments of one kind or another in all parts of the country with minor regional variations' but added, 'The isolationists are not dead or asleep, but merely lying doggo, realising the present unpopularity of full-blooded

American public opinion

37

31

isolationism.' It went on to express doubts that Senators Taft, Bricker, and Wheeler, for example, were converted to internationalism despite statements they had made giving it various degrees of support. Even ten months later, on 3 July 1944, Eden would suggest to the cabinet 'that no more efforts be made to promote specifically European organisations', in part because they might appear to the Soviets as attempts to create a hostile bloc, but also because they might 'tend to encourage isolationism in the United States'. He apparently feared such efforts would enable isolationists to argue that Europe did not need, and perhaps did not even want, the United States involved in its affairs.38 In spring of 1944, however, a Gallup poll had shown that isolationist sentiment was much on the wane, at least judging from attitudes towards a possible international peacekeeping organisation. According to the findings, 72 % of Americans approved US membership in a 'new League of Nations or world peace council', their political party preference or geographic region seeming to make little difference. In the case of Democrats, 74 % approved, and in the case of Republicans, 70%. The Middle West, often considered a stronghold of isolationism, approved by 7 1 % , only 1% less than the national average. US Ambassador to Great Britain John Winant sent a newspaper account of this poll to Churchill who scribbled on it ' good' and then added whimsically ' but only on the condition China should be the head of it'. 39 American criticism of colonialism in general and the British Empire in particular was another hindrance to Whitehall's policy of closer links with the United States. The outstanding issue during the war years was that of Indian independence. For example, on 12 October 1942 Halifax wrote to Eden regarding a trip he had just taken to Pittsburgh and St. Louis. If these cities were proper indicators, he said, he found less 'anti-British' feeling in the United States than one assumed from the Washington atmosphere. Nevertheless he reported that many people, especially intellectuals, were, 'greatly disturbed about India', but viewing the situation 'with abysmal ignorance'. 40 Halifax, like other British statesmen, noted that Americans tended to equate India with the Philippines, where the United States Government had agreed to relinquish colonial control. Furthermore, they compared the issue on the subcontinent with their own experience, seeing India as 'an aspiring Colonial legislature struggling with

32

Strengthening the ties

reactionary Royal governors'. 'It is pretty difficult', he complained, ' to dilute this ignorance with knowledge. ' 41 Nonetheless, he tried. For example, he met in October 1942 with top-level journalists and publishers when, he reports, all but Henry Luce were willing to see the British side to at least some extent. The journalists concurred, he said, that British policy toward India, even the ' stiff' parts, would be ' reasonably well accepted' in the United States if something were added about the 'British purpose of assisting India to achieve her full destiny'. 'Do try', he urged Eden, 'to get something of this sort into any further statement that may be made. ' 42 In reply, Eden said that even Luce's recent attack on Britain in Life would do good on the whole because 'it was too extravagant to be credited ', 43 an opinion in which the Washington Embassy concurred. 44 Nonetheless, that attack - an open letter to the British people stating that the US was not fighting to maintain the Empire - was taken very seriously in London.45 His Majesty's Government paid a great deal of attention to the American press and radio and regarded Life as a major force in moulding American opinion. Another powerful voice was added to the criticism of Empire when in 1942 Wendell Willkie, Republican presidential candidate two years earlier, made an extensive trip that included much of Britain's overseas realm. Upon his return he was frequently and publicly critical of the British colonial system,46 and his book, One World, based on his trip, received attention in the highest levels of HMG. One of Churchill's aides, Sir Desmond Morton, read it at the Prime Minister's request and marked certain pages for Churchill's attention. In a covering note he told his chief that the book called for ' an American policy against all Empires' and was therefore 'subtly anti-British'. At the same time it pointed out 'equally subtly', Morton said, ' the great opportunities offered to the USA to exploit the Middle East, Africa, China and Russia to the commercial advantage of the USA. Political tutelage of backward peoples is wicked, but commercial exploitation without responsibility is to be encouraged. ' 47 Meanwhile, the British Embassy in Washington reported that the book was having 'phenomenal sales' and added the opinion that it gave the impression that America, ' rising to the height of its material and spiritual power', had a duty to expand its sway and to provide 'political deliverance' for the underprivileged nations. 48 In late 1942 British officials decided to make a concerted effort to change American opinion about the Empire. They organised a

American public opinion

33

project, treated with great confidentiality, that called for the establishment of an inter-ministry entity, headed by Richard Law and called 'The Committee on American Opinion and the British Empire.' 49 The secrecy of Law and his colleagues probably stemmed mostly from fear of being discovered propagandising in America for British, and especially Imperial, politics, which could have very negative repercussions. The Committee contacted Graham Spry, once Sir Stafford Cripps' personal assistant and at this time a member of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, which Cripps headed. It asked him to do a study of ' the many influences which have a bearing on British EmpireAmerican relations'.50 He was to work in both Britain and America, providing not only a report but ' a system of information capable of expansion and development', according to Alan Dudley, who added that 'The Committee's terms of reference require it not to "study... American feeling about the British Empire" but "to study and make recommendations concerning the best methods of stimulating favourable and moderating hostile feeling'". Despite this objective to 'stimulate' and 'moderate' feeling, Committee members carefully avoided mentioning that anything of the sort was part of their purpose. A draft letter from Sir David Scott, Assistant Undersecretary supervising the North American Department, to Sir Ronald Campbell in Washington demonstrated their inhibitions. We leave it to you to decide whether [Spry's] visit need to made known officially to the State Department, but if you decide that this should be done you will be able to refer to him as travelling on our behalf, without making any mention of the Committee. If it is necessary to do so I cannot see any objection to his admitting that he is interested in the effect of American opinion on the British Empire, but we should not wish it to be thought that he is attempting to find means of influencing American opinion. That indeed is not strictly his business.51 Someone, perhaps Scott himself, strengthened the denial in the last sentence, changing it to read, 'That indeed is not his objective', and so the letter was sent to Campbell. Campbell, in contrast, replied very frankly, discussing in a straightforward way approaches that might be taken to shape American opinion.52 Meanwhile, Scott, cautious as ever, forwarded copies of notes, reports, agendas, etc. of the Committee to the embassy on 21 April 1943 saying, 'You will appreciate that since these papers give

34

Strengthening the ties

an insight into the actual working of the Gommitte, and because of some of the topics on which they touch, we do not want them to be given any wide circulation even within official [British?] circles on your side of the Atlantic. ' 53 Spry raised another question. In a letter to Dudley on 7 May 1943 he said, 'It was originally, I believe, the view of the Law Committee that I should proceed to the United States under some "cover".' He added that his own preference, however, was to say, when required, that he had visited the United States a year earlier to look into the subject of India as a factor in US-UK relations, and now he was widening the scope of his study to include the Empire as a whole. Thus he could be frank without stating that he was reporting to the Committee, an approach the Foreign Office approved. 54 The original idea to form such a committee seems to have come not from Law or the Foreign Office at all, but from C. J. Radcliffe, Director General of the Ministry of Information. 55 Furthermore, he did not view it as a necessary step in a political courtship or as a means to help create a new Anglo-American combination, but as a strictly defensive undertaking. The idea, he said, was to gain for Britain ' recognition of our own right to hold to our own system and a recognition of its inherent value in the world. It should, indeed, be enough if the Americans would leave us alone. ' 56 A draft document describing the purpose and aims of the Committee was more diplomatic; it said the object was to study and recommend 'the best methods of bringing home to the American people everywhere the fact that the organisation and principles of the British Empire are such that on moral and material grounds the United States can and should cooperate with it'. It stated as an additional purpose, 'to encourage all Americans to regard the British Empire as a valuable and permanent partner in guiding world affairs on a basis of peace progress and order'. 57 This statement of intent seems to have been sent to certain officials abroad for comment as there is a copy from Alan Dudley to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, in the latter's private papers. Meanwhile, among the first evidences of American attitudes turned up by the Committee were opinion polls indicating that, whatever Americans felt about more specific issues such as colonialism, they liked Britain in general. One poll, taken before the US was in the war, asked, 'What foreign country do you "like best"?' Britain was the

American public opinion

35

preference of 55 % of the respondents, while no other country polled higher than 1 1 % . A report submitted by the Embassy in January 1943, which included this poll, added that 'recent studies' showed Great Britain to be the country 63 % wanted most to be associated with after the war. The Committee, however, warned that large numbers of descendants of Irish and German immigrants were 'anti-British', and that they totalled an estimated 25% of the American population. 58 The well-known feelings of Roosevelt and many of his advisers that colonial areas should be given independence re-emerged during Eden's visit to Washington in 1943, although the Foreign Secretary's unsympathetic reaction led Hopkins to predict that ' the British are going to be pretty sticky about their former possessions in the Far East'. 59 London, however, worried increasingly about American 'stickiness' in this regard, anticipating serious difficulties when the time came for colonial areas liberated by US troops to be returned to European metropolitan powers. Americans were fighting to guarantee all peoples the right of self-determination according to a widespread belief reinforced by a great deal of media and official comment. Therefore, if American fighting men died to free a Pacific island, what would the home attitude be if it were quietly handed back to a colonial power in Europe? British officials suspected it could be so negative that those possessions might, in fact, not be handed back. 60 There might very well be other reasons also to delay their return commercial or strategic, for example - but Whitehall recognised that the emotional question itself presented a sufficient problem to cause the American Administration to seek other solutions. Surely this concern added urgency to the efforts of Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, particularly at the second Quebec Conference, to get significant numbers of British forces into the Pacific war. 61 It was hoped that, if nothing else, they would provide Britain's entree to the postwar councils that would decide the future of the area. American attitudes towards India, as we have seen, nearly always worried British officials who sometimes even hoped the US Government would enter on their side against American journalists, of whom Drew Pearson was probably the most irritating. In September 1944 he wrote a column that particularly annoyed Churchill, criticising among othef things his alleged statement that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to India. Halifax, who had been urged by Whitehall

36

Strengthening the ties

and Number 1 o Downing St to get some correction of the article, told Churchill that he had 'repeatedly pressed Hull... regarding this mendacious mischief. He was always told however, that the matter was before the President, ' where it now is, and looks like remaining, unless you think it worth while to stir it up'. 62 Halifax suggested that Roosevelt make some corrective remark after the meeting they were holding at Quebec. But by then Churchill had changed his mind, and indicated preposterously that he had never given much thought to the matter. ' I have of course followed the Drew Pearson incident' he told Halifax, 'and I cannot think it is of the slightest importance.' Then, after calling Pearson a champion liar, he warned against worrying too much about 'minor jars'. 'In the United States there is so much free speech that one thing cancels out the other and the great machine crashes on. I do not propose to trouble the President on these points when everything is going so well in all directions', he said.63 Perhaps he was remembering Beaverbrook's advice given him less than a month earlier when, in a rage, he had drafted a telegram to Hopkins about a Pearson column on Greece. Beaverbrook's counsel then was much the same as Churchill's now to Halifax. He said, 'Drew Pearson is irresponsible, corrupt, and paid 200,000 dollars a year for telling lies about Britain. He thrives on denials and longs to be contradicted by the Prime Minister and the President.' 64 But Churchill's message to Halifax also said,' The President has been very good to me about India throughout these years and has respected my clearly expressed resolve not to admit external interference in our affairs.'65 Along this same line, when Eden was visiting Washington in March 1943, Hull asked him if there were ways in which 'we could help keep down anti-British sentiments' relative to India. Eden, according to Hull's account, stated that the United States Government had been so helpful in this regard that he had no suggestion to make. 66 Later, Truman, too, would get high marks from Halifax because once at a dinner at the British Embassy before he became President ' he spoke out about India with trenchant good sense and complained, if I remember rightly, of American ignorance and confusion on the subject in a manner which left nothing to be desired'. 67 It seemed to be the position taken by journalists more than by the US Government that bothered HMG. Implementing measures to change American opinions about the

American public opinion

37

Empire fell largely to the Ministry of Information, which devised films, pamphlets, newspaper feature stories etc. for the purpose. An example of its efforts was an illustrated brochure on the colonial war effort and entitled' 60 Million of Us'. According to Miss E. M. Ascroft, who was in charge of the brochure's production, 'This booklet is intended to show growing - and united - effort by the colonies towards winning the war... [dots in the original]. Solidarity of Empire behind Britain. Its market will be (a) Home Front, (b) America (c) The Colonies themselves. ' 68 The pamphlet had the double benefit in America of not only portraying the Empire sympathetically but of demonstrating its war effort. Another pamphlet, entitled 'Progress Towards Self-Government in the British Colonial Empire', was created at the request of the Ministry's American Division among others, with the British Information Services in New York as a principal 'client'. A ministry official said the goal of the publication was ' to substantiate generalisations about self-government being the goal of British Imperial policy', which it set out to do ' by means of an historical survey of the whole of the Colonial Empire with precise details as to actual constitutional advances which had taken place in individual territories since 1939' 69 Throughout the period under consideration, distaste in America for colonialism never ended, although with the rise of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, it did subside. In fact, when the British landed in Indonesia and came into conflict with guerrilla forces, there was criticism in the United States to be sure, but it was not comparable with that which arose when British soldiers occupied Greece.70 It seemed that even by the end of the war America was beginning to focus on other issues, probably in part because a weaker Britain could not hold its attention in either a positive or a negative way to the extent that a powerful Soviet Union could. To some in official British circles, however, new developments in the Big Three relationship represented an opportunity for Britain. In June 1946, for instance, Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council, said that when in Washington and New York, he received the impression that the British were' missing many American publicity opportunities, especially now that the intense unpopularity of the Russians and our attitude in India, Egypt and elsewhere are creating relatively the most favourable atmosphere which we have had there in time of peace'. He said he hoped that with impending additions

38

Strengthening the ties

to their ranks, Britain's diplomats in America could 'take the initiative and clear away bogies such as British Imperialism, which cost us so much in practical ways and which could be tackled now with real hope of success'.71 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, newly named Ambassador to the United States, and Ernest Bevin both agreed with Morrison and on 16 July Bevin stated in a paper of his own, ' On the information side I fully recognise the importance of taking advantage of the present atmosphere to drive home our case not only in the political but also in the economic field. '72 A fitting way perhaps to conclude a discussion of American anti-colonial attitudes is to point out that, ironically, as time went on and various features of the international scene changed, Americans themselves began to be viewed as imperialists in many parts of the world. Attlee remarked on the phenomenon to Francis Williams, somewhat savouringly, when he said 'The Americans found it hard to realise that in the eyes of Asia they had become almost a spear-head of imperialism. They'd always thought themselves so pure and clean.' 73

THE MIXING PROCESS

To create the new power, Anglo-America, it was necessary to get affairs of the United States and Great Britain 'mixed up', as Churchill put it, a phrase uttered frequently by British officials at the time. In January 1943 a blaze of comment in this regard went through the Foreign Office when an article by Walter Lippmann came to its attention saying that it and the State Department were further apart in their views than were the populations of their two countries. Gladwyn Jebb, head of the Economic and Reconstruction Department, had circulated the article with the comment, 'I'm all for the Foreign Office and the State Dept. getting "mixed up", and I think visits by Heads of Depts. on both sides ought to be arranged.' 1 Eden agreed, saying, 'we must improve contacts between FO and State Dept. at all levels. These are frankly deplorable at present.' He concurred with Jebb's suggestion for exchange visits, adding, 'I hope that this process can be set going now. ' 2 Within two months, Eden himself, in fact, went to Washington to begin the 'mixing' process. But running counter to that process was the American suspicion of things British and the related phenomenon of isolationism. Even if these currents were by then on the wane, the US Administration, as noted earlier, showed great respect for their troublemaking potential. Furthermore, implicit in plans to entwine the State Department and Foreign Office was the notion that they would mix principally in the field of postwar planning. This was a particularly sensitive area in America. Visions could easily be called up there of wily European statesmen duping naive Americans while selfishly dividing the world and planting seeds of new conflicts that would shed American blood. In October 1942 Halifax said of the proposed Eden visit that the American Administration might be 'a little bit shy of it at the moment' and that it may want 'to do a bit more education of the country' before 'embarking on practical postwar discussions with ourselves'.3 As this was being written the congressional elections of

40

Strengthening the ties

1942 were less than two weeks away, a matter, of course, of great concern to Roosevelt. (In the event, although proving a setback for him and the Democratic party, the elections seem not to have strengthened isolationism.)4 Halifax also believed that the President was anxious to avoid ' the impression that we and the United States are preparing joint postwar lay-outs in which we tell everybody else where they get off'.5 It was undoubtedly an accurate assessment, as Roosevelt made clear later, particularly regarding Russian sensitivities.6 There were also problems in London. Churchill himself was an obstacle at this point to anything that smacked of postwar planning. 7 He not only considered it premature but was reluctant to let it divert time and energy from the war. 8 Consequently, it was the 'mixing', not the planning, that the Foreign Office emphasised to convince him to propose the Eden trip to Roosevelt.9 And propose it he did. 'There is in my opinion', he told the President, 'a real need for our Foreign Office and your State Department to have a much more thorough and detailed understanding of each other's viewpoints than now exists. I should like to send Anthony Eden to you for this purpose.' 10 'An excellent thought', said Roosevelt; he would be 'delighted' to have Eden come to Washington. 11 By even discussing the postwar period with Eden, Roosevelt dealt another blow to that arch-enemy of British policy, American isolationism. The talks, however, were not all roses for Britain. For when Americans in this period spoke of the postwar world, they tended to see it free of colonialism, a vexing problem for HMG, whose policy required an internationalist America but one without an anti-colonial bias. At dinner one evening, during Eden's visit, Roosevelt suggested that the British give up Hong Kong as a gesture of 'good will', to which Eden replied that he had not heard any suggestions for similar American gestures.12 Besides his hostility to colonialism, the President's internationalism was frighteningly free-wheeling for Eden, as Roosevelt roamed mentally around the world reshaping nations and continents with what the Foreign Secretary characterised as ' cheerful fecklessness'. 'Though I enjoyed these conversations, the exercise of the President's charm and the play of his lively mind, they were also perplexing', Eden said, adding that Roosevelt 'seemed to see himself disposing of the fate of many lands, allied no less than enemy. He did all this with so much grace that it was not easy to dissent. Yet it was

The mixing process

41

too like a conjurer, skillfully juggling with balls of dynamite, whose nature he failed to understand. ' 13 A major meeting during the Foreign Secretary's visit took place on 27 March and included Eden, Roosevelt, Hull, Winant, Welles, and Hopkins. A session to consider postwar international arrangements, the first item on its agenda was the President's view of a future world peacekeeping organisation, followed by discussions on the administration of colonial territories, on plans for Germany after the war, and on other such major world issues.14 Meanwhile, if the American isolationists and Russian allies were quiet for the time being, the British Prime Minister was not. All this touring of postwar political horizons unsettled him thoroughly, fearing as he did that America's emergence from isolationism could be very disruptive if not managed carefully. Indeed, two months later in Washington he would present his own views on postwar world order including Anglo-American cooperation. Meanwhile, when he received Eden's report of the 27 March meeting, he said the Foreign Secretary's telegram illustrated the dangers in any attempt to decide such matters while the war was raging. ' A proposal to rank France lower than China even in matters affecting Europe and to subjugate all Europe after disarmament to the four Powers, would certainly cause lively discussion', he observed with delicate understatement, and went on to say, 'I feel sure that while listening politely you have given no countenance to such ideas. You were quite right to protest about France. ' 15 Churchill was concerned that Roosevelt envisioned an executive committee in the world organisation made up of ' the four powers' which ' would take all the more important decisions and wield police powers'.16 It would include China but not France. In fact, the role of China in these plans is interesting and double-faceted, at least if British analysis is accurate. On the one hand, the importance the US Administration gave to China was clearly irritating to British statesmen, certainly to Churchill. On the other, it might ultimately have been to their advantage. Eden said that he and other leading British diplomats had the 'strong impression that it is through their feeling for China that the President is seeking to lead his people to accept international responsibilities'. 17 But in spite of disagreements on specific issues, Eden reported himself impressed with Roosevelt's friendliness and the willingness he felt was made clear to form views in close consultation with the British Government. He also told both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet

42

Strengthening the ties

that Roosevelt, Hull, and Welles had reported a definite trend ' away from isolationism towards an understanding of the need for United States collaboration in international police work after the war'. 18 Meanwhile, whatever his attitude had been when Eden went to the United States, Churchill could at least speak about a postwar organisation two months later, and did so rather notably at a luncheon at the British Embassy in Washington. 19 He presented a variant of plans that had started circulating in the British Government, one that called for a World Council of the Big Three, plus China if the United States wished although he noted that it was not comparable to the others. Subordinate to this council would be three regional councils responsible for Europe, the Americas and the Pacific. He also envisaged various federations, e.g. the Danubian countries with Bavaria, the Low Countries with perhaps Denmark, and in addition suggested that Prussia and maybe Bavaria be removed from Germany, all matters that he was to speak of subsequently at Big Three meetings. At this luncheon he also brought out rather stunning proposals regarding BritishAmerican relations. Before American Vice President Henry Wallace, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tom Connally, and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, he suggested common American-British citizenship. The Americans seem almost not to have heard, at least judging from the absence of recorded reaction.20 Possibly they regarded the statement as a bit of hyperbole in a rush of friendliness, and perhaps to an extent that is what it was. But it was probably also an effort to create an atmosphere of familial cordiality in which close military and diplomatic links might be forged more easily. The Americans reacted with 'warm assent', says the British record, to a suggestion that 'Combined Staff conversations' should continue after the war and that the two governments should ensure ' that the main lines of [their] foreign policy ran closely together'. 21 Churchill would make these proposals again at Harvard the following September, then in the House of Commons in November 1945, and then at Fulton in March 1946. Meanwhile, at the luncheon, American officials agreed that approval for these measures should be sought during the war, not after it, when, with the crisis over, American opinion would probably be less susceptible to such notions. Doubts about these ideas, however, existed from the beginning.

The mixing process

43

Churchill noticed that Wallace 'seemed a little anxious lest other countries should think that Britain and the United States were trying to boss the world', although Roosevelt, he said, liked 'the ventilation of these ideas, especially the military aspect'. He told the Cabinet, 'We both thought it essential that the Anglo-American Combined Staff institution should be continued for a good long time after the war, at any rate until we can all be sure the world is safe. ' 22 It seems clear from Churchill's persistent calls for combined military capability and the emphasis he put on it that it was at the core of his vision of Anglo-America. But did Roosevelt really agree, or just let Churchill think that he did, which was so characteristic of the President? Certainly after the Teheran Conference, roughly five months later, it was Wallace's concerns which would typify the attitude of the American Administration, and the British would be well aware of it. In other words, Rooseveltian triangularity, designed to encourage the Soviets to continue in the war and to cooperate in the peace, would assert itself, to Churchill's irritation and to the detriment of his Anglo-American policies.23 The reaction of the press to Churchill's speech on 6 September 1943 at Harvard, where he first stated publicly his ideas for closer AngloAmerican cooperation, was generally favourable, similar to the reaction of the American officials at the Embassy luncheon. But whereas the US officials seem to have politely ignored his common citizenship proposition, the American press was generally critical of it.24 Indeed, this rather romantic proposal may have damaged, rather than helped, Churchill's overall and far more concrete schemes for closer US-UK ties. Meanwhile, reaction seemed divided on the proposal to continue the military alliance, some commentators accepting Churchill's thesis, others seeing it as a scheme to dominate foreign countries or to get the United States to support the aims of the British Empire.25 New problems for Britain were gathering on the trans-Atlantic horizon, springing from what might be called American national ego. If British officials could imagine an even broader, more permanent combination than the Combined Chiefs of Staff,26 Americans had gone as far as they were willing to go in great part because of an attitude that began to replace isolationism. It was a kind of national self-assertion that left no place for Great Britain in American plans and no willingness to blend American with British foreign and military policy to the degree that Whitehall wanted. The Embassy in

44

Strengthening the ties

Washington noted the change in mid-1943, when observing that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge J r epitomised young opinion in the Republican party, long a bastion of isolationism. The Embassy said that the senator represented an intelligent' tough-minded' nationalist 'realism', that included a clear conception of US vital interests, especially regarding raw materials and strategic bases. It added that the US was ' convinced that its combination of virtue and power entitle her to lead the world - a destiny which nothing and no one can prevent her from fulfilling to her own greater glory, and, incidentally, to the general benefit of mankind'. 27 British diplomats believed that this attitude was growing in America, and not just in the Republican party. Businessmen, officials, military officers, all showed the same tendency as they became increasingly aware of both the expanding and the potential strength of the United States. Surely it was to an extent an expression of this national ego that caused the American Administration to resist going to London and to try consistently to bring conferences and commissions to Washington. Reflecting British sensitivity to this self-centred American position, Eden said that Roosevelt's 'determination not to agree to a London meeting for any purpose, which he says is for electoral reasons, is almost insulting considering the number of times we have been to Washington'. 28 Obviously Eden realised there was more at play than Roosevelt was admitting, but, in fact, Roosevelt's excuse, 'electoral reasons', should not be dismissed totally. The British Embassy in Washington reported until Roosevelt's death how important it was to him and his Administration not to be perceived as taking direction from the British, always a damaging appearance in American politics. Furthermore, until the end of the war it was assumed by the Administration that isolationists could use ' anglophobia' to their advantage and that the Government must be constantly alert to deny them chances to do so.29 With this in mind, Halifax counselled London to take great care not only to avoid entering domestic American politics in any way but to make it obvious that it was not entering them. 30 'One thing that Harry Hopkins impressed upon me was the damage that we could do F.D.R. by appearing to express any preference' in the 1944 election,31 he told Eden early in that year. Churchill himself knew this well and emphasised to British and Commonwealth officials in Washington in September 1943, 'how important it was that British representatives in the United States should be careful, whatever

The mixing process

45

their personal feelings, not to take sides as between the Democrats and the Republicans or between the Administration and the Opposition'. 32 Despite ostensible indifference, however, the British Government preferred Roosevelt and wanted to avoid anything that might harm his chances and, above all, that might increase isolationism in America. Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister in Washington, reviewed all the candidates' attitudes and characteristics before the party nominations in 1944 and concluded that, with the possible exception of Willkie, Roosevelt was best for Great Britain. Meanwhile, he pointed out that during the campaign opposition attacks upon Administration policies would include attacks upon its relations with Great Britain, and consequently Britons would have to be extremely patient with America during the forthcoming election months. Public opinion, he added, no longer favoured isolation but was eager for the United States to 'play the part in world affairs which her interests require'. 33 From his reports, if nothing else, it was understood in London that American statesmen and politicians had good reasons to appear independent of Great Britain, and that this stance was in Britain's best interest. Nonetheless, the extent to which London was avoided as a meeting place did seem extreme considering that Britain was, after all, a major ally and that the topics to be discussed were grand war strategy and other international subjects quite removed from strictly American issues. One can understand how Eden could believe that there was more involved than US domestic politics and might begin to see signs of international rivalry. There was one major exception to the no-London policy: a meeting in September 1945 of foreign ministers. It was not easy to bring it to London. That required a hint of blackmail involving the apple of Roosevelt's eye, the future UNO, and the conference at San Francisco that would set it up. Eden said at Yalta that 'if he and M. Molotov went to the United States for this conference, he hoped that it would be possible to arrange for an early meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London'. 34 Churchill reiterated this implicit bargain the same day at a meeting with Stalin and Roosevelt, adding a complaint of his own about London being bypassed, and the proposal was accepted. 35 Offices of Anglo-American combined missions also tended to be located in the United States although the British pushed for London

46

Strengthening the ties

in some cases, especially that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.36 But here again American resistance carried the day, and, in fact, Britain's military delegation in Washington stated with apparent resignation, 'we believe that [the necessary] co-ordination can only take place in Washington, as we consider it unlikely that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would delegate sufficient responsibility to their representatives in London'. 37 One major combined organisation, however, the European Advisory Commission (EAC), was located in London. Created in late 1943, it was principally important for its spadework in regard to occupation arrangements for Germany and Austria. The extent of its planning for postwar Europe, however, disappointed Eden and many others in the Foreign Office, who believed that Roosevelt and the State Department deliberately weakened it because, out of Washington, it was out of direct American control.38 William Strang, Great Britain's EAC representative, agreed with that assessment but admitted that Roosevelt probably also feared that the Commission was making premature plans 'for a country which we do not yet occupy', as the President told Hull. Strang also implied that the American military authorities hindered the EAC because they saw it as a civilian invasion of'their preserves'.39 Halifax maintained that the US Administration's attitude stemmed from its wish to keep Washington the centre of war planning, even though EAC was in a literal sense planning not for war but for peace.40 According to Halifax, Edward Stettinius, Jr, then Undersecretary of State, speculated in May 1944 that Roosevelt downplayed the commission (1) because it was too far from US departments and experts, (2) because it could perhaps be led by Britain in ways that Roosevelt might not want and (3) because it might try to organise Europe along lines of UK policy. Halifax continued, 'The United Kingdom might thus figure in the eyes of European countries and the world as leaders in Europe of the Anglo-Saxon countries, something which he supposed the President might not wholly relish. ' 41 He linked the spirit of Stettinius' remark ' with the President's suggestion that he alone should issue a statement after D-day, instead of a tripartite statement'. 42 Whether or not Stettinius' analysis was correct, it was having its day in London. Meanwhile, when the Embassy in Washington suggested that it might be politic for Whitehall to permit 'major decisions on crucial points of American cooperation be taken in Washington', Eden agreed that this argument had merit, but said he

The mixing process

47

could not help contrasting it with the Administration's behaviour over the European Advisory Commission. 'The way in which they first agreed to have the Committee (sic) in London and then, according to Winant's own confession, seek to narrow its functions until it means very little is barely short of dishonest.' Writing to Halifax, he then summed up what was to a great extent the British predicament. Allowing decisions to be taken,' or at least consecrated', in Washington was Britain's best hope, 'as you put it very well yourself, to make an enduring reality of our present partnership in arms. Our indispensable means to this end will certainly be to go on sending good men to Washington, and to the various Conferences held in the U.S. It has paid well so far.' 43 The last words on this point might be left to Churchill who, whatever his regard for America, was a devoted Londoner. Yet by the end of the war, he had to admit that 'the centre of power is in Washington'. 44 Washington, of course, knew that also. Besides American nationalism, Roosevelt's insistence on an equilateral Big Three relationship was a major obstacle in creating an AngloAmerican power bloc. His Administration's concern with triangularity in international affairs and the consequent need to hold Great Britain at arm's length surfaced at least by the last quarter of 1942. A Foreign Office analysis said: The Administration seem to have moved a long way from the forthcoming attitude which they adopted towards Mr. Law and myself last August. They no longer seem to favour informal preliminary talks a deux on the major subjects for consideration: where they do not contemplate a multilateral approach, they seem to favour at least a quadrilateral approach, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, and U.K... .The State Department feel that in no circumstances must they expose themselves to the suspicion of getting too close to the British. At the same time there seems to be forming in their minds a Four Power leadership conception, the U.S.A. treating all the other three as exactly on a par, and feeling it incumbent upon them, if they say anything to one, to say the same thing to all.45 This is a marvellously clear description of the American attitude. Probably the US Administration was especially reluctant to enter serious talks before knowing the results of the congressional elections held in the first week of November and hesitated even to be seen consulting with the British for fear of strengthening the isolationists. US aloofness, rightly attributed to concern over Russian sensibilities,

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Strengthening the ties

may well have been heightened by concern over congressional sensibilities. Yet in spite of reports from its officials in Whitehall and Washington that the American Administration wanted equilateral relations with its main allies, the British Government, and especially Winston Churchill, tried before every major conference of the Big Three to have a top-level preliminary meeting exclusively with the Americans, always unsuccessfully, always following strained correspondence and always generating hard feelings between the two governments. Whatever other diplomatic and military reasons Churchill had for wanting these Anglo-American caucuses, he could not leave unchallenged the view that all the major allies had par value which would preclude the development of Anglo-America and bode the destruction of Britain as a great power. Although they understood American caution concerning bilateral arrangements that might worry the Soviets, some British officials thought late 1943, a midpoint between elections, was a good time to try for agreements. In a paper circulated to the War Cabinet the North American Department of the Foreign Office said:
We ought to take full advantage of the next two years, and especially of the coming year, to push on with any agreements, political, economic, or commercial, that we desire to make with the United States Government. In a remarkable degree the members of the present Administration are receptive and anxious to co-operate with us. Although we must expect President Roosevelt as the Presidential election looms ahead in 1944 to show growing caution in his international commitments, there is no indication that he and his self-confident Administration are feeling that their days are numbered and that they must go slow, and Mr. Welles has more than once recently invited us to early discussions.46

Officials in Whitehall undoubtedly had come to recognise that Congress was a factor in making Americans stand off from the British,47 but even as they did, fresh evidence appeared to remind them that international reactions were also important considerations. In February Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, told Sir Frederick Phillips, British Treasury representative in Washington, that US-UK agreement on postwar economic questions was essential but should not appear to other nations to be a. fait accompli.*8 Although Berle apparently did not say so on this occasion, the Administration later was explicit that principal among these 'other nations' was the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in a press conference after Eden's visit to Washington the following month, Roosevelt was at pains to allay fears

The mixing process

49

of an Anglo-American alliance directed against the Soviets. He said he wanted to make it very clear that the conversations were by no means confined to the United Kingdom and the United States. 'They are merely one small part of the long series of conferences between the United Nations...I hope and expect that we will be continuing discussions along these lines with the Russian government in the very near future, and with other members of the United Nations.' He claimed that the conversations constituted ' one method of working toward the unity of the United Nations, which is going along extremely well', and, in a finger-wagging mode, he added, ' Some people ought to take note of that. '49 The conflicting views on ganging up versus getting in step cast themselves into bold relief at the time of the Cairo-Teheran Conferences in late 1943 when it became unmistakably clear to Churchill, perhaps for the first time, that Roosevelt's view of the Anglo-American relationship and his own were very different.50 Even before the conferences, as early as June 1943, Churchill suspected that there might be trouble in Paradise for he had heard from Averell Harriman, then Roosevelt's special representative in London on Lend-Lease matters, the distressing news that the President planned to meet Stalin in Alaska a deux. Claiming that the enemy would score a propaganda victory if such a meeting excluded the British Commonwealth and Empire, Churchill urged instead a Big Three meeting at Scapa Flow to plan both war moves and the postwar settlement.51 He had not suggested conferring alone with Stalin, Roosevelt explained. Rather, he said, Joseph Davies, former ambassador to the USSR, visited there in May 1943 and talked to the Marshal, who assumed that he and Roosevelt would soon meet alone, without staffs, in what would be a preliminary meeting leading to a conference of the Big Three.52 Weak, one might think, as did Churchill. All Roosevelt had assured him was that, although a meeting alone with Stalin was planned, it was not at his suggestion. In fact, however, it was. 'Alone', incidentally, meant not only without the British but without a staff of military planners. This was to avoid 'military collisions' over Russian calls for an immediate assault on France and to avoid the appearance that the West was demanding a Soviet summer offensive. The President, however, would be accompanied by Hopkins and Harriman. What Roosevelt did not tell the Prime Minister was that he had sent Davies to Stalin as his special envoy to suggest, according to the editor of Hopkins' papers ' that the two

50

Strengthening the ties

of them should meet and straighten matters out'. He believed 'that he might be able to break the ice with Stalin more readily if Churchill were not present'. 53 Davies reported that Stalin was suspicious at first but then agreed to schedule a meeting in July. 54 Roosevelt hoped that Stalin would be frank with him about offensives against Japan and China and about the Balkans, Finland and Poland. He also wanted to explore Soviet 'post-war hopes and ambitions' much as Eden had done in Moscow the year before, he told Churchill, perhaps pointedly. He proposed that they meet soon afterward', suggesting the Hotel Frontenac in Quebec, which was in fact the location of their next meeting in August 1943. After that, 'in the autumn we should most definitely have a full dress meeting with the Russians', he said. 'That is why I think of a visit with Stalin as a preparatory talk on what you rightly call a lower level.' He then wondered about a suitable location for the ' full dress' meeting, which was the subject of reams of telegrams among the Big Three before Teheran was settled upon. Regarding Scapa Flow, Roosevelt reported that the 'Kremlin people' did not want Stalin to fly over Scandinavia and the North Sea, especially during months with almost no darkness.55 Suddenly and rather peculiarly Churchill gave in. Following angry correspondence with Stalin about the crisis in Poland, he said it 'certainly has its bearing on your proposal to meet him alone and I shall not seek to deter you if you can get him to come'. 56 He added that, 'On the contrary in view of [Stalin's] attitude I think it important that this contact should be established. ' 57 On 14 July 1943, however, in a distinct anti-climax, Roosevelt told Churchill that he had received' no further word from U J . ' 58 regarding the meeting, but suggesting, nevertheless, that he and the Prime Minister pursue their plans to get together in Canada. 59 Within a few months, however, of deploring the proposed encounter between Roosevelt and Stalin, Churchill was promoting yet another similar one between the President and himself despite their Canadian conference just held in August. Churchill wanted this conference not later than 10 November, shortly before meeting the Russians at Teheran, and suggested a North African venue. 60 Roosevelt refused; the necessities of military planning precluded it, he said, and added, ' For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow Conference [of Foreign Ministers] is in progress or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavourable results in Russia.'

The mixing process

51

Then, words that surely appalled his Britannic ally, ' At the moment it seems to me that consideration of our relations with Russia is of paramount importance and that a meeting after our special Conference with Uncle Joe would be in order rather than one in early November. ' 61 The next day a scowling Churchill replied, 'The Russians ought not to be vexed if the Americans and British closely concert the very great operations they have in hand for 1944 on fronts where no Russian troops will be present. Nor do I think we ought to meet Stalin, if ever the meeting can be arranged, without being agreed about Anglo-American operations as such.' 62 No two quotations could better characterise the positions of the two governments in regard to the triple alliance. In this case Churchill particularly wanted to discuss the Normandy front. Worried that he was committed to invasion by a specific date as a result of arrangements at Quebec, he wanted instead AngloAmerican agreement for a flexible timetable before meeting Stalin at Teheran. Failing to achieve this before the conference, he pursued the same objective there, again unsuccessfully. In fact, Roosevelt's opposition on this question in alliance with Stalin was particularly galling to Churchill, being held at arm's length in any case while the President tried to woo the Soviet leader. 63 Not long before he had told the President that 1944 would be full of perils, and ' the only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our High Staffs. If that were broken I should despair of the immediate future. ' 64 This last remark may well have reflected his apprehension about the turn Roosevelt's policy seemed to be taking. Two days later he said, ' all our troubles and toils are so much easier to face when we are side by side'. 65 Churchill made it clear that before Teheran he wanted: (1) preliminary sessions between himself and Roosevelt, (2) preliminary talks by their two military staffs, and (3) 'the triple and presently quadruple meeting at Cairo, where final decisions can be taken'. 66 He said, ' I and the British Staffs will await you in Cairo on 22nd', and continued, 'We think it necessary that the British and United States Staffs should consult together before any triple conference with the Russians takes place, and that when it takes place there should be a responsible Russian delegation and not a mere observer. ' 67 Eight days later he received shocking news. 'There seems to have been a most unfortunate misunderstanding', he wired Roosevelt after

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contact with Ambassador Clark Kerr in Moscow. 'I thought from your No. 410 that the British and American Staffs would have " many meetings" before being joined by the Russians or Chinese.'68 Now, however, he learned that Roosevelt had invited Molotov to arrive at Cairo on 22 November, the first day the joint Anglo-American staffs might have met a deux. He asked that Molotov's arrival be postponed until 25 November at the earliest. (Molotov, of course, did not come at all because the presence of the Chinese might have provoked Japan, not yet at war with the USSR.) Furthermore, as far as he had known until then, nothing had been settled about a meeting with Stalin, and so he added acidly, 'I am very glad to hear also from Ambassador Clark Kerr that you contemplate going on November 26 to Teheran [to meet alone with Stalin]. I rather wish you had been able to let me know direct.' Churchill was particularly unamused, not only at being bypassed with this information, but at its implications of tea for two, not three. Roosevelt's explanations sounded a bit like those of a husband coming home at three in the morning. He said that five days earlier he thought that Stalin would not even go to Teheran but had 'just' heard to the contrary. Then, making a clean breast of inviting Molotov to Cairo the first day the British and Americans could meet, he said ' I have held all along - as I know you have, that it would be a terrible mistake if Uncle J thought we had ganged up on him on military action.' Pointing out that the Chiefs of Staff talks would be only preliminary and thus uncompromised by the Soviet presence, he said, ' They will have no staff and no planners. Let us take them in on the high spots.'69 Eventually, Roosevelt prevailed, the meetings being held with nearly no top-level Anglo-American preliminaries. This period of a month or so before the Cairo-Teheran Conferences was crucial in the Anglo-American wartime relationship and had important implications for the postwar period as well, for it was then that the difference between Roosevelt and Churchill regarding the very fundamentals of international affairs was made clear to the Prime Minister and other top British officials. Nonetheless, a similar sequence of proposals and refusals was repeated before Yalta and again before Potsdam. Before Yalta, for example, when the correspondence was strikingly similar, there was the fruitless effort to get Stalin to travel abroad (this time he would not even go as far as Teheran), 70 the disappointment at Roosevelt's postponing again a visit to the UK, 71 and Churchill's unsuccessful urging for a prior

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53

meeting between the two of them. He had hoped for a week of meetings before Yalta, whereas in the event, the military leaders had four days together, and, as a result of Churchill's pleas, Stettinius and Eden had two, with Hopkins going to London for consultations a few days before that. 73 Roosevelt, Churchill and their entourages spent only part of a day and an evening together on Malta before proceeding to the Crimea. Moreover, little if anything seems to have been made of even this opportunity for pre-conference exchanges, a fact which brought a complaint from Eden when he told Hopkins 'pretty sharply' that no business was done at lunch or dinner the day Roosevelt and his party arrived, adding that they 'were going into a decisive conference and had so far neither agreed what [they] would discuss nor how to handle matters with a Bear who would certainly know his mind'. 74 It was, of course, clear to Eden that Roosevelt was punctiliously avoiding the slightest hint that an Anglo-American front vis-a-vis the Soviets might exist. What may not have been equally clear to him was that Roosevelt was determined to avoid not only the appearance of such a front but the substance. Eden did, however, recognise the President's suspicion of the British Empire and thought that this, plus his anxiety over seeming to 'gang up', was creating 'confusion in Anglo-American relations which profited the Soviets'.75

ECONOMIC ISSUES

Economic issues were among the most vexing of those that arose between the United States and Great Britain during the period under consideration. While not precluding the extraordinarily close bonds between the two countries that Churchill desired and that his government worked for, questions like those which developed over Lend-Lease versus Britain's sterling balances, civil aviation, and oil resources proved very divisive.1 In 1943, United States officials, moved mainly by the Treasury, began to question payments to Great Britain for raw materials, many of which went back to the UK as Lend-Lease manufactured items. In addition, the Americans maintained that the sole object of Lend-Lease was to provide Britain with war supplies when she lacked foreign exchange to buy them. By 1943, however, they calculated that Britain, partly as a result of Lend-Lease, had accumulated over one billion (1,000 million) dollars of exchange and consequently should pay for war materials until her exchange reserves dropped under the one billion level. The view was opposed in vain by Dean Acheson, then an Assistant Secretary of State, but supported by no less influential a group than Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr; Secretary of State Cordell Hull; then Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr, and Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley.2 British officials pointed out that a greater accumulation of foreign exchange would make an important difference in what they foresaw would be an economically difficult postwar period. 3 Meanwhile, they maintained that, although in 1943 Britain's exchange had increased, its short-term obligations had increased even more. 4 Acheson took the British position, suggesting that perhaps a ratio between UK assets and liabilities should be agreed upon and pointing out that Russia was believed to have nearly double Britain's amount of reserves with no corresponding liabilities, 'yet we have not therefore proposed to

Economic issues
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55

reduce Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union'. Nevertheless, Morgenthau had promised Congress Lend-Lease would be strictly an emergency measure activated only when the UK lacked exchange, with nothing being said then about Britain's other obligations or its postwar situation. Consequently, he argued against any broader interpretation now, and his department, along with other elements of the Administration, continued pressure on Britain to hold down its reserves, relenting only at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944.6 But other considerations besides promises to Congress made aid to Britain controversial. There were influential Americans, including Cordell Hull and Bernard Baruch, who would have used it frankly as a lever to pry away privileges for American business and capital.7 Conflicting views, which emerged clearly with the extension of Lend-Lease and later the grant of a postwar loan, have been considered in detail by Richard Gardner, and their implications discussed by D. C. Watt and others.8 I might simply reiterate Gardner's point that at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944 it was proposed that in stage II of the Lend-Lease programme (when Germany would be defeated but not Japan), Britain should receive, in addition to $3,500 million in munitions, another $3,000 million in other forms of aid, which admittedly would release British manpower for civilian occupations and increase the country's exports. Henry Stimson, American Secretary of War, considered the latter category an improper use of Lend-Lease, and Hull was ' infuriated' because Roosevelt had not tried to pry concessions on any number of pending issues as a quid pro quo. At Potsdam, however, Truman and his delegation presented Churchill with a revision of the Quebec position, stating that LendLease could be used only for munitions and, furthermore, only munitions to be used against the Japanese. The fact that Truman could not be dissuaded from this strict interpretation of the provisions for Lend-Lease provided a strong hint that it would also be cut off abruptly upon Japan's surrender, which in fact it was. Nonetheless, when this happened, it seems to have stunned the British Government.9 As R. S. Sayers points out, however, given the purpose of Lend-Lease and the Administration's assurances to Congress about the limitations of its use plus America's rush into demobilisation and reconversion, 'no other course was open to President Truman, nor had British representatives in Washington any right to expect any different issue'. Nevertheless, 'that the United States Government, after years of

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closer co-operation with the United Kingdom than had ever been known between Great Powers, should have taken such drastic measures unilaterally, without prior negotiation, left British Ministers and officials gasping for breath'. 10 Indeed, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton said, 'this very heavy blow was struck at us without warning and without discussion. We had expected at least some tapering off of Lend-Lease over the first few years of peace'. 11 When it became clear that even goods ' in the pipeline' were to be halted until payment was agreed upon, Attlee sent Truman a cable bristling with restrained anger and pointing out that Great Britain was in its difficult financial position 'because our war effort took a certain shape as part of the combined war plans'. What, in effect, he was complaining about was the need to establish terms before, rather than after, delivery. He concluded saying, 'We have realized that in some form or other we shall henceforward have to pay for the urgent supplies that we need from the United States. Therefore it is hardly necessary for me to assure you that if these supplies come forward to us as I have suggested, they will be paid for.'12 The villain, from HMG's point of view, seems to have been the US Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley, who told the British that pipeline goods could be carried away upon cash payment or 'charged' to account-payment over 30 years at 2%. The British, who already had a mission on the way to Washington, hoped to discuss these terms, in short, to 'bargain', but meanwhile, they wanted the goods to move. Eventually they did, on 6 September, more than two weeks after the British were notified of the cut-off; terms to be negotiated later.13 Indeed, the weeks immediately following the Japanese surrender, early days for the Labour Government, were a time of unusual stress between the British and American governments due greatly, although not entirely, to economic issues. Recognising this, Bevin told Cripps 'No-one regrets more than I do this tendency for the two countries to criticise one another', referring especially to caustic press reports. He added that ' if ever there was a time in which these two Powers should work in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation for the sake of the peace of the world, it is now'. 14 Most of the trouble, he thought, came from the United States.' The abrupt termination of Lend-Lease, after the terrific price we have paid in this country, undoubtedly came as a shock', he said, adding that he had done his best to tone down the resulting British press criticism. He also stated his opinion that

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there was 'tremendous pressure' on Great Britain 'to alter our way of life and economy to meet the desires of the worst elements of American capitalism', a point he did not elaborate. This was resented, he said, by British working people. ' I get it every time I meet them.' In the Foreign Office, Richard Law counselled cooperation with America's postwar economic goals. In September 1943, with Keynes at his side, he had conducted detailed, if only exploratory, talks in Washington on postwar economic problems including those stemming from article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement calling for reduction of obstacles to international trade. 15 He subsequently argued that Great Britain should agree to international controls on trade barriers, payments and currency valuations, and he also made it perfectly clear to the Cabinet, if it were not already, that Great Britain would have to be assisted economically after the war.16 Consequently, he urged it to reject plans for a series of postwar bilateral trade agreements as substitutes for joining a multilateral scheme put forward by the US. In addition, he discouraged hopes of building up trade separately within the Empire and Commonwealth, pointing out that this would constitute economic war on the United States and that, in fact, the dominions would not agree to it. 'In the first place we are going to need a measure of assistance from the United States if we are to surmount our immediate postwar problems. We shall have to get that assistance on terms which will not involve a repetition of the difficulties of the debt situation after the last war', Law said. But he added that ' a solution becomes impossible if we start off with an alignment of policy which runs directly counter to the American view of international economic relationships'.17 This point of view was by no means unanimously held in the Cabinet. Leo S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, was keenly interested in economic questions whether or not they bore on his specific Cabinet responsibilities. He constantly challenged the notion that free trade would promote British prosperity, urging Britain to control its own trade, investment and monetary policy and so far as possible ' that of the British Empire and Commonwealth as a whole \ 1 8 Consequently, he called for resistance to incipient American ideas that might result in an international monetary fund and/or free trade under international supervision.19 Beaverbrook, then Lord Privy Seal, also was an outspoken opponent and a prolific memorandum writer on economic issues. Attacking

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Law's position, he said Britain should not accept American proposals on multilateral trade or payments cooperation and stated his belief that sterling would be more widely used than dollars in the postwar era. He regarded the article VII discussions, which were pointing toward an international monetary fund, as an effort to return to the gold standard 'at a moment when the United States [had] all the gold, and Great Britain none of it', and maintained that sterling should be used for trade payments but not for currency regulation. 20 Indeed, Churchill himself was reluctant to give up imperial preferences ' unless or until we are in presence of a vast scheme of reducing trade barriers in which the United States is taking the lead'. 21 The question of a postwar loan to Britain also disturbed relations between the two countries, causing, among other things, a number of unpleasant comments in Congress and in some of the American press.22 Nonetheless, according to Gardner, 'a majority of newspapers and business organisations were for the loan, but it was proving difficult to arouse support in Congress and the public at large'. 23 Much of this, he believes, was indifference, but there was also opposition. For example, it was typically asked why Great Britain should have a loan at lower interest than was charged returning servicemen for housing loans.24 Regarding interest, John Maynard Keynes, the principal British official during most of the negotiations, advised Whitehall by September 1946, if not before, to give up its hopes of an interest-free loan. He added also that US officials were emphatic that Britain's case with Congress 'must depend on the advantages to the United States of liberalising and facilitating international trade'. They warned, Keynes said, 'that arguments based on our past sacrifices and especially on comparisons between ourselves and the United States would do no good and should be advanced, if at all, from the American side'. 25 By 20 November 1945, Halifax, cautious and exasperated, was nevertheless optimistic. 'The Americans continue to be most trying and on many points utterly unreasonable', he told Eden. 'We must therefore expect serious hitches'. Still, he believed that the situation was better than it might appear, with most of the ' trouble' coming from lower levels. ' If we combine patience with resolute firmness on essential points', he said, 'and if we do not die first, there are distinct possibilities of reaching a reasonably satisfactory solution.' 26 Meanwhile, a public opinion poll taken in autumn 1945 in

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Minnesota showed 69 % of the respondents opposed an interest-free loan, with only 16% in favour, confirming Keynes' premonitions. Another poll, however, taken among industry, labour, press and radio 'leaders' showed that 'on an average between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of those questioned approved of financial aid to Great Britain'. 27 The British Embassy pointed out that this was in 'marked contrast' with a recent Gallup poll of the general public, a fact it felt confirmed 'the existence of a wide gap' between 'informed opinion' and ' the man in the street'. 28 (The second poll, however, as reported, did not ask how respondents felt about an interest-free loan, as did the Minnesota poll, which might have changed the response significantly.) By the following spring, with things moving satisfactorily for the British, Hugh Dalton noted in his diary, ' The American loan is said to be in the bag. The Roman Catholic Church has been strongly supporting it to try to prevent Britain from going Communist. K. [Keynes] has brought back much evidence of this from the US.' 29 Although the loan, when finally negotiated, was not what British officials had originally hoped for, they were not altogether displeased. They seemed to feel that same ambivalent reaction Halifax expressed when he told Eden 'although the Americans have failed to come anywhere near our earliest hopes, they have made very genuine efforts to help and to have regard to our difficulties'.30 Bevin, however, ignoring Keynes' earlier advice, could not resist telling Senator Vandenberg while the proposal was in the US Congress for approval that he thought it was wrong that Great Britain should have to pay interest on a loan that was needed because of services in the cause of Allied victory. He also expressed Whitehall's preference for a drawing right on which the British could draw the minimum possible.31 The Senator asked what would happen if the loan was not approved. Britain would 'face it and win through just as we did in 1940', Bevin replied, but added pointedly that it would import fewer American goods while enduring two more years of rationing, according to his estimate. With the loan package sent to Congress, it seemed to Halifax a good time to flatter American sensitivities a bit, thereby easing its way through the legislative process. He had heard from a Congressman that many Americans were disappointed that Great Britain had never thanked the United States for Lend-Lease. Now was the moment, he thought, for a motion expressing Great Britain's gratitude to be

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carried in both houses of Parliament, assuming that i t ' could be fairly and gracefully done, and pretty unanimous', otherwise 'it would be better left unattempted'. It was in fact so left. It is an interesting measure of feeling in Britain at that moment that Attlee felt that neither grace nor unanimity would distinguish the proceeding. ' Unhelpful and injudicious speeches' might be made,' to which American press would give full publicity.' This, however, would be due 'to disappointment about the terms of the recent Financial Agreement', he thought, rather than lack of appreciation for Lend-Lease.32 When at last the loan was passed Dalton and many others breathed a sigh of relief because, among other things, less deference now needed to be paid to Britain's rich friend. 'The getting of the American loan', he said, 'has lifted heavy immediate anxieties. It has already made a subtle difference to one's whole attitude towards the Americans. One feels one can now speak much more frankly to them particularly when expressing disagreement. ' 33 There was a non-economic problem in seeking financial aid from America. It was one of political image-building, which had major implications for Great Britain's policy offending off junior partner status, i.e. it was difficult to emphasise Great Britain's need for this help while at the same time portraying her as a powerful potential partner. In short, were Americans to believe Britain was weak or strong? The answer, of course, was that they were to regard her as temporarily indisposed but fundamentally great and sound. Unfortunately, they seemed often to be missing this point. When William Batt, Vice Chairman of the US War Production Board, publicly described British industries as backward and British actions in Greece, India and Italy (all highly criticised in America) as resulting from a need for investments and markets, one Whitehall official said, 'We must do all that we can to offset this view which was prevalently held in business circles in the U.S. before the war and which has been partially confirmed by the knowledge, e.g. of our coal industry, that the Americans have gained since then. '34 Another said, 'We certainly have not been very successful so far in building up the picture of Britain as a strong partner. We shall just have to keep at it.' 35 Meanwhile, in some parts of the British Government it was felt that the story of British strength and reliability needed to be adapted for the colonies to prevent them from turning away from Britain and

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looking to America on economic issues. For although HMG wanted the Anglo-American partnership to include the colonies, it wanted colonial relations with America to be managed through London. In some parts of the Government, however, it was feared that direct American influence was an impending threat. A Ministry of Information paper said that in the postwar period: there will be a pressing need to project the world-leadership of Great Britain. This will need an intensive campaign directed towards showing that in the fields of spiritual idealism, social advancement, industrial relations and scientific and engineering skill, Great Britain retains its lead, but there will be many competitors to challenge this claim, and our case should never again be allowed to go by default, especially in the Colonies where Soviet ideology and/or American material prosperity have a powerful appeal.36 Dr P. N. S. Mansergh, charged with imperial affairs, sent this to K. G. Grubb, Controller of the Ministry, saying ' My view is that it is of very considerable interest. You will find references here and there to a similar paper on the dominions.' Evidently then, while working to promote in America the notion that Great Britain was a viable peacetime partner, the British Government was also concerned to some extent with countering the challenge of the American economy within its Empire. Worry over US economic competition was not confined to the Government. A survey taken in March 1945 by the British Institute of Public Opinion said, 'When the average Englishman looks ahead to postwar relations with America his principal concern is with economic relations. The greatest hopes are for economic exchange and material assistance, but at the same time, the greatest fears are of potentially disastrous economic competition with the United States.?37 Meanwhile, national competitiveness had found official endorsement in the US Treasury, where Harry Dexter White, for example, a key Morgenthau aide who wanted the US dominant in world finance, hoped to limit expansion of British gold and dollar holdings.38 Furthermore, Morgenthau himself believed that the United States should restructure Europe without giving the British or the Russians a voice in the matter, pointing out that they could make little effective objection considering their dependency upon the United States.

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American ascendancy in Europe, he felt, could begin with Allied invasion troops using US dollars rather than a special occupation currency or their various national currencies.39 Oil posed one of the most highly divisive economic issues between the two governments, working counter to Whitehall's policies for closer diplomatic and military cooperation. On 11 October 1942, Morgenthau, about to make a trip to Britain, wrote in his diary that Roosevelt ' had heard the English would not let other Nationals trade in certain territories', and had told him to 'ask some questions as to what they proposed to do about the various oil possessions and whether they would let the United States and other countries in there after the war'. He said, 'the President wants all of these Colonies, etcetera, open to all the world'. 40 In early 1944, some 15 months after Morgenthau made this diary entry, Roosevelt proposed a conference with the British on the use of international oil resources.41 British officials, except the Chiefs of Staff, whose position will be mentioned later, were universally wary of these talks. Beaverbrook, again to the fore, said in February 1944, 'the United States Administration is asking for a Conference on Middle Eastern Oil. This request should be put in a pigeon hole', and added, 'oil is the greatest single postwar asset remaining to us. We should refuse to divide our last asset with the Americans. ' 42 A few days later he warned Churchill that it was plain from the list of topics the Americans wanted discussed that' they intend to demand a large share of our oil interests in the Middle East'. 43 He urged that if the conference could not be avoided, at least Washington should be resisted as the venue because HMG would be 'subjected to intense pressure from American public opinion'. He believed that Harold Ickes, the United States Oil Administrator as well as Secretary of Interior, was spreading the 'false impression' throughout America that 95 % of Allied war supplies were derived from the US by quoting 100 octane figures only. ' Many other misleading figures are given for the purpose of spreading opinion hostile to our oil interests', he said. ' If we go there, we must make up our minds either to part with a valuable portion of our oil interest or to quarrel with the Administrator. And if we quarrel the American public will blame us.' Finally, taking a swing at Britain's Ambassador in Washington, never a Beaverbrook favourite, he said, ' Lord Halifax should be told that a Conference in Washington will prove fatal to our interests. It

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is clear that he has no idea of the issues involved. Nor does he realise the significance of Ickes' attitude to us. '44 Beaverbrook urged delay, which he believed would confer' immense benefits' on Britain. He pointed out that after the elections Ickes might be dropped from the Administration, Republican party political action might cause the conference to be postponed, and oil companies themselves might object, seeing it as the beginning of incipient government control of their activities. However, he said, ' If we are too far committed to a Washington Conference, then we must find means of breaking down on lack of information and inadequate details, e t c ' Although Beaverbrook emerged as the cabinet officer most directly involved with this issue, Eden, too, was very much concerned. He and others in the Foreign Office worried also that establishment by the United States Government of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, a state petroleum complex, would stimulate a desire to encroach on British Middle East oil concessions.45 Unlike Beaverbrook however, Eden, while admitting that there were risks, felt that the British were obliged to enter into the discussions that Washington proposed. He pointed out that they received a far greater volume of oil products from the United States than they themselves supplied. They also depended greatly on the United States for equipment for production, refining, and distribution, including pipelines and tanker tonnage. 'Without this equipment', he said, 'the development of our oil resources in the Middle East, which will be of great importance after the war, would soon be brought to a standstill. ' 46 Nonetheless, Eden hoped to keep the talks in the exploratory and technical realm. This, however, was far from Roosevelt's plan, which called for ministerial-level discussions which he himself would open in the White House with fullest publicity. 47 The British Embassy in Washington believed that Roosevelt's strategy was part of a campaign to show American voters that he had made a number of important achievements in planning for the postwar world. The Oil Conference would be one of a series of international meetings in roughly the year and a half before the 1944 election, including those on food, economic planning, a world security organisation and civil aviation. The Chiefs of Staff were mavericks among British officials on the oil question. They believed US expansion in Middle East fields should be welcomed because it would increase American strategic

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commitment there and provide Great Britain with a more dependable ally for defence of that region. The Chiefs named the potential aggressor when they told the Cabinet' We conclude that the advantage of obtaining an American counterweight to Russian pressure far outweighs any possible complication of our internal security problem, especially in Palestine,' 48 the latter being a reference to potentially troublesome American influence. The oil issue presents clearly the British dilemma which began at least with the fall of France and continued into the postwar period. The US was needed to stave off the threat first of the Axis and then of the Soviets, to say nothing of being needed as a permanent coalition partner to maintain Great Britain's great power status. But the US itself was a threat. In part, the danger came from left-liberal political figures including Roosevelt, Wallace, Morgenthau and others who disliked the idea of empire ideologically, and in part it came from centre-right forces which were internationalist and expansionist, bent on competing with the British and supplanting them commercially and strategically. These forces were represented by Admiral King; Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr; William Clayton (Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) and any number of energetic American businessmen. Furthermore, the two forces, the ideological and the opportunistic, could not always be easily separated. For example, there were persons like Hull who opposed empire if for nothing else than that it restricted free trade in which they had an ideological belief, but certainly on the other hand free trade would redound to America's economic benefit after the war. The British Chiefs of Staff raised another point in a paper for use by Great Britain's Oil Conference delegates, i.e. the US should have additional sources of oil, in the Middle East, for example, to slow the depletion rate of American home reserves, which they thought would be the most surely available in time of war. This idea is interesting in its implication that the British and Americans would be ' mixed up' in future war efforts and that American oil would undoubtedly be available to the British. Although the Chiefs had named the Russians as a threat when speaking to the Cabinet, they did not in the paper to the conference delegates, wherein the Soviets were thinly disguised as 'the threat from the North' and other oblique allusions. Delegates were told, however, not to think that the threat 'is considered real at the moment', and that, in fact, it might never materialise. They were also

Economic issues

65

warned, 'it would be highly dangerous if any hint that we were even considering this menace, let alone taking it seriously, were conveyed to the Americans in the course of your discussions with them'. Obviously the Chiefs were having naughty thoughts and knew it, but apparently couldn't stop having them. Why not express these concerns to the Americans? Most likely because that would increase American fears that the British wanted to ' gang up' on the Russians, and since the Americans in this case wanted to do what the Chiefs wished them to do, expand their oil interests in the Middle East, why make waves? The people who needed convincing were not the Americans but other sectors of the British Government. The discussion about the Oil Conference moved quickly to the head-of-government level, beginning one of the most irritated exchanges of the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence and one of the more threatening of the Anglo-American tiffs. On 20 February, Churchill took Beaverbrook's advice and asked Roosevelt to postpone the conference.49 Noting that the President planned to open it and the Secretary of State to head the American delegation, consequently assuring maximum attention, he stated, 'A wrangle about oil would be a poor prelude for the tremendous joint enterprise and sacrifice to which we have bound ourselves' (undoubtedly the Normandy invasion). He admitted that there was' apprehension in some quarters' in London ' that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the whole supply of our navy depends', and then stated his opinion that a high-level conference such as the Americans were planning should be carefully prepared. 50 He suggested instead 'official and technical talks', a stalling tactic urged by both Beaverbrook and Eden. Roosevelt would not give an inch. He would open the conference, he replied, which would be in Washington beginning in the Cabinet Room of the White House, with no limitations on what might be discussed. Noting British apprehension about American intentions in the Middle East, he took the offensive, saying 'on the other hand, I am disturbed about the rumour that the British wish to horn in on Saudi Arabian oil reserves'.51 Churchill fired back that the Cabinet would go as far as a technical inquiry on oil resources around the world but only on 'the official level in the first instance in order to ascertain the facts'. 52 He added that it wanted the sessions held in London and wanted to assure Parliament there would be no proposals to change ownership of oil

66

Strengthening the ties

interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. 'Your telegram dismisses all these points and if you will allow me to say so seemed to convey your decision in these matters.' HMG was ' very much disturbed' at the wide gulf opening between the two governments, he stated, and added that he would discuss the issue with appropriate ministers and then bring it up again in the Cabinet in a few days. He hoped Roosevelt would not make a public statement meanwhile, because he was not sure his government could 'endorse it'. Hence debates would begin in Parliament and things be said ' which would darken counsel and be resented on your side of the ocean'. 53 He concluded, 'I feel sure that to open up these matters with the maximum publicity without knowing where they will lead us might do real harm to Anglo-American relations.' Relenting a bit, Roosevelt answered that he was having the question studied but could not 'hold off the conversations much longer' and added assurances that 'we are not making sheep's eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran'. 54 For that Churchill thanked him and provided similar assurances regarding US interests in Saudi Arabia but issued the polite warning that, whereas Great Britain sought no advantages as a result of the war, she would not be deprived of anything that rightly belonged to her while he headed her government.55 A few days later he said HMG assumed that Roosevelt's statement about Iraq and Iran included British properties elsewhere, and consequently no longer objected to the talks being held outside London but insisted they be on the 'official and expert' level.56 Nevertheless, that he and the Cabinet were still edgy about American intentions became obvious when he said, 'As I am likely to be questioned in Parliament on the subject, I must reserve the right to make it clear that no question arises of any transfer of existing rights or properties in oil.' In the event, there were technical discussions, followed by high-level talks and eventually an agreement, signed by Beaverbrook for the British, providing for orderly exploration, production and marketing. In early 1945, however, after the agreement was duly sent to the US Senate, all of the sound and fury ended in a whimper when the Senate refused to ratify it. Nonetheless, questions about oil continued to create a counterpoint to Anglo-American harmony. By September 1945, although both countries had new governments, little had changed. Bevin stated, 'The Americans are commercially on the offensive in the Middle

Economic issues

67

East', and he also noted that the US export drive was being held up by the tight dollar situation, something which exasperated the Americans, he said, and which they wrongly blamed on the British. When wartime controls were lifted, for which the Americans were pressing, the US and UK would 'enter a period of commercial rivalry', Bevin said, 'and we should not make any concession that would assist American commercial penetration into a region which for generations had been an established market'. 57 How much Bevin sounds like Beaverbrook! The Civil Aviation Conference of 1944 was another example of commercial counterpoint to the Anglo-American theme. 58 There was, however, at least one important difference between the oil and the air conferences. The latter originated at British instigation, stemming from concern that, in the absence of controlling agreements, the Americans were taking steps to expand their international airlines in ways that would be detrimental to Britain after the war.59 Beaverbrook, again the key British official, suggested to Harry Hopkins as early as 18 October 1943 that there be 'a Conference to discuss operational agreements and also spheres of activity'. 60 Hopkins, however, replied, 'I do not believe the time is quite opportune', without explaining further.61 There the matter rested until 1 January 1944 when Beaverbrook told him the British planned to buy ' a tiny little air line' in Uruguay, a project inspired partially, as an aide put it,' to promote in US quarters a general feeling that the British are on the move and that the sooner something is done about it the better'. 62 Stressing the smallness of the airline was, apparently, part of the act, pretending to put the Americans at ease, but really hoping to worry them into taking action. Judging from Hopkins' reply, the ploy worked; at any rate, the American Government soon began giving serious attention to plans for an air conference.63 At this point, Churchill, hoping to stay out of the matter, told Beaverbrook, ' I am glad you are taking all this business off my hands,' adding his certainty that the latter would prevent HMG from getting 'unexpectedly into a serious row with the United States'. 64 'I have complete confidence', he said, 'that you will keep things sweet with the Americans through Harry Hopkins and let me know before serious trouble breaks out.' 65 Beaverbrook, however, was unable to prevent the 'serious row' that the Prime Minister feared or to keep his chief from becoming deeply embroiled in it.

68

Strengthening the ties

The conference opened in Chicago in November 1944 and soon deadlocked. Another round of top-level and sometimes angry telegrams crossed the Atlantic, with Roosevelt suggesting that Congress might reconsider Lend-Lease provisions if the British did not change their position.66 Essentially that position was that the market should be divided in a way that would give each country a fixed percentage as opposed to the American stance which would permit no such restrictions. Further questions arose about the right of foreign airlines to transport passengers between points in countries they transited, the Americans calling for greater freedom in this regard than the British wished. Churchill refused to budge. He hoped Lend-Lease would not be reduced from levels agreed upon at Quebec in September, 'but even if I thought that we were to be so penalized, I would not feel myself able to agree to a decision contrary to the merits, as we see them, on this matter'. 67 Eventually the talks broke down, or, in British official parlance, 'agreement did not prove possible at Chicago on the provisions necessary in a multilateral convention to govern relationships in air transport development'. 68 Meanwhile, there was an enormous amount of ill-feeling generated on both sides. The British Embassy in Washington, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information all complained, that, among other things, there had been a great deal of unfair US press treatment of their conference positions in particular and of Britain's economy and society in general. Furthermore, they believed that this treatment originated with American officials. C. J. Radcliffe said, ' ...we all recognise... the British case was very badly treated in the American Press and the American delegates, headed by Mr Berle, were reckless in their appeals to American publicity and other interests'. 69 By 1946 civil aviation was still an unresolved issue between the two countries, and American economic assistance was still being used as a lever by the United States Government. On 1 February 1946 the State Department informed Whitehall that it would be easier for American officials to get congressional approval for the UK loan agreement 'if the outstanding controversial issue of civil aviation could be settled or at least under negotiation when the agreements came before Congress'.70 The Cabinet subsequently bowed to US pressure and agreed to go to Bermuda, the proposed site for the new round of talks. Meanwhile, Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, urged HMG to concur in the US proposals, stating that

Economic issues

69

the American Government had gone as far as it could in accepting the British viewpoint and fearing that a breakdown in the talks would indeed jeopardise the loan.71 Halifax also counselled acquiescence on 'this inflammatory question' and reported that both Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, and William Clayton had urged this course in view of the loan. Finally on 11 February 1946, according to the minutes of the meeting, ' the Cabinet agreed that the United Kingdom delegation should be authorised to sign the Air Transport Agreement'. 72 Economic questions clearly created some of the greatest problems facing the formation of an Anglo-American bloc. They not only troubled the British, they caused a contradiction for the Roosevelt Administration which it never resolved, i.e., rugged American commercial competition, which the Administration fostered, might so weaken Britain that the three-power foundation Roosevelt believed necessary for a world peacekeeping organisation would become impossible. Truman's Administration competed with Great Britain as vigorously as Roosevelt's, perhaps more so, but, never as ideologically committed to the world organisation, it avoided the contradiction in which Roosevelt's was trapped.

PAR T II FOREIGN CRISES THA T DEMONSTRATE GREAT BRITAIN'S PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION

Having considered direct Anglo-American relations, let us now review Great Britain's policies in third countries to demonstrate how, even in those cases, American considerations were crucial. Examining two major crises in the mid-1940s, those in Poland and in Greece, we discover many of the phenomena revealed in our study of direct US-UK interaction. In both cases Britain was determined to have American support and in both it was clear that without it she was nearly helpless to achieve her foreign policy objectives. Whitehall's task was to convince its ally of the validity of British foreign policy goals and of the desirability of making them Anglo-American goals, deserving the application of American strength for their achievement. In these two case studies we also can trace a very significant change of American attitude and policy. During the Polish crisis, Churchill, Eden, and others in the British Government became strident in their warnings about Soviet intentions. American officials, responding to many pressures, of which this was one, began to change their views about the USSR, coming to fear that it might be more than just a mistrusting and truculent ally. If they did not yet generally regard it as an adversary, many had come nonetheless to believe that only great firmness would restrain its international ambitions. Their concern grew in the months following the uneasy resolution of the Polish crisis

72

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in July 1945 and focussed on various other issues, including the struggle in Greece. Here again the US Administration found itself under enormous pressure from London, especially from the Labour Government, this time to involve itself in Greek affairs. By mid-1947 the United States was indeed heavily involved, its leaders no longer viewing the Soviet Union as simply a difficult ally, but now as a potential enemy which they believed threatened Greece and many other areas as well. The Polish and Greek crises, then, spanned a period in which the United States moved from World War II to the Cold War. It did so in an atmosphere of constant British 'consciousness raising' about the Soviet threat and to a great extent along lines shaped by Whitehall, which had long sought American strength to back its policies. Having said, however, that British statesmen wanted America in tandem in the Greek, Polish, and other major international crises, one must modify that statement somewhat in the case of Greece. At first the British hoped to keep the Americans completely out of the situation, desiring only approval and, at one point, military transport. They feared that their ally would see Britain's involvement in Greece as more of Albion's objectionable imperialism and would only cause problems. Meanwhile, in the early days of the crisis they believed that they could handle the situation themselves. They were right that the Americans would be troublesome, wrong that they could handle things themselves. Gradually, reluctantly, but with increasing intensity they requested American assistance. Warily, America provided it. It was not until 1947, when she was as worried about Soviet expansion as British leaders had been all along, that she finally jumped into the Greek crisis with both feet. By then a new government in London, beset by enormous economic problems, was less taken with visions of Anglo-America and more willing to let America lead, accepting for Great Britain the junior partner role so long abhorred in Whitehall. It is doubtful that America by that time would have had it any other way.1 Let us now examine these two international crises, beginning with that in Poland.

SECTION 1 THE POLISH CRISIS

BACKGROUND AND BUILD-UP

Poland's fate after the German occupation ended became one of the major issues of contention between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and one of the earliest issues of that series of exacerbated diplomatic exchanges and military posturing that came to be called the Cold War. Indeed, the Polish crisis of the mid-1940s developed the themes and the tone of the East-West confrontation probably more than any other episode. The principal questions were the location first of Poland's eastern and then its western border as well as the composition of its provisional government, which would sit until national elections could be held. There are two reasons to examine the Polish issues. First, they demonstrate clearly Britain's dependence on American collaboration in order to achieve its diplomatic objectives. Second, a related but more specific point, they show the effort of Great Britain to stiffen American diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as the British worked concertedly to bring the US into line with their positions. Great Britain, Poland's ally and the home of its emigre government, became involved in Polish affairs from the earliest days of the war and, consequently, found itself frequently mediating between the emigres and the Russians. Washington, in general, stood aside from Polish affairs until 1945, although occasionally giving Whitehall support upon request. Those requests, beginning in 1942, were mostly for American good offices in repeated efforts to calm Polish-Soviet quarrels and maintain Allied solidarity. If one marvels that so much

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energy was expended on behalf of Poland, a relatively minor and already defeated power, it should be remembered that its righting forces were not trivial. There were some 380,000 guerrillas in Poland, members of the so-called 'Polish Home Army', probably the most effective underground force in the war, and approximately 230,000 men in uniform fighting with the Allies.1 Furthermore, Whitehall long nourished the hope that Poland's emigre government, rather than a Soviet-inspired substitute, would return to Warsaw after the war. As the Soviet armies moved towards and then into Poland, however, the issues became far more critical for Churchill and his Government. Fundamental questions of the West versus the Soviet Union began to emerge with Poland becoming a test case that served to highlight disagreements. It was then that Churchill particularly, but with full backing from the Foreign Office, recognised the need for America's weight in the contest and intensified efforts to bring US policy into concert with Whitehall's viewpoints. Roosevelt's Administration, however, had a strong aversion to this issue, knowing that it might bring strident demands from PolishAmericans for actions difficult to take and results impossible to achieve. Their disappointment, furthermore, might reflect itself in elections, including the presidential ones in 1944. Moreover, because both the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations wanted the Soviets to enter the Japanese war after Germany was defeated, they were reluctant to lock horns with them on other questions. Indeed, although Truman and his advisors did just that, as we shall see, in the troubled days of April 1945 at the time of the San Francisco Conference, they quickly returned to more conciliatory positions and maintained them until the war was over. Roosevelt had another reason to avoid confrontation. It was inimical to his strongly held notions of what the world should be like after the war. In his vision, global peace would be secured only by the great powers acting in harmony. A thumbnail sketch of Polish-Russian relations in this century will help make the events related in this section more intelligible. A centuries-old ethnic and national rivalry between the two peoples erupted after the First World War and again during the Second, and although in its twentieth-century manifestation it became part of the struggle for and against Bolshevism, it seemed mostly a contest of two

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75

nation states trying to expand at each other's expense. In the 1940s Great Britain was drawn into this rivalry because of its alliance with Poland, but especially because of its wish, by now traditional also, to restrain the western movement of Russian power and influence. Britain was continually abetted in this effort by the emigre Polish Government which frequently seemed to live in a world of political fantasy. The question of Poland's eastern boundary, which plagued the Allies during the Second World War, had been a bitter issue between Poland and the Soviet Union for years. Following the First World War, when Poland again became an independent nation, the Allied Supreme Council drew an eastern boundary for it, an unsatisfactory one to Polish leaders, who had far greater ambitions. They thereupon launched their armies on an eastward attack in 1919, driving as far as Kiev, which they captured, before being thrown back again nearly to Warsaw. At this point Lord Curzon, speaking for the Council, recommended to both sides the line that the Council had suggested earlier and which henceforth would be called the Curzon Line. This time the Soviets found it unacceptable, a decision they soon regretted because the Polish forces rallied and again drove the Red Army far to the east. A peace was finally concluded and a boundary, much less favourable to Russia than the Curzon Line, was determined at Riga in March 1921 and known as the Riga Line.2 In August 1939, on the occasion of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR, a secret protocol paved the way for division of Poland between those two countries. The partition was soon carried out as German troops moved in to occupy from the west on 31 August 1939 and Soviet troops from the east on 17 September. The line between the two zones, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Line, named after the Soviet and German foreign ministers who signed the non-aggression treaty, ran through central Poland in a way similar to the Curzon Line but deviating from it to the west, i.e., in Russia's favour, along what is roughly the northern quarter. 3 After the German invasion of Soviet territory in 1941 the Poles and the Soviets, through British mediation, resumed relations, a measure many Poles bitterly opposed and which caused three Polish cabinet ministers to resign.4 Again, the question of Poland's boundary was a main issue of contention, although nothing was resolved. The question remained stalemated and quiescent until Great Britain began to negotiate a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviets

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Foreign crises

in 1942. When the Poles saw the British were prepared to recognise Soviet territorial claims to the Baltic states, Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina, they at once feared a settlement might also be made regarding their own country with an eastern boundary far less favourable than the Riga Line. Meanwhile, the United States wanted to defer solution of any territorial issues until all could be considered in a multinational postwar conference. American officials feared that arrangements made in the heat of battle would perpetuate sphereof-influence solutions to international questions, alienating the populations involved and planting the seeds of future wars. The Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942 was finally signed without any territorial provisions to a great extent as a result of American pressure.5 Throughout long and arduous negotiations in the 1940s on Polish issues, involving at various times the Russians, Poles, British, and Americans, the question of the eastern frontier recurred constantly. The Polish Government stuck tenaciously to its Riga Line claim while the Russians countered with the Curzon Line. A subcategory of this argument concerned roughly the bottom quarter of the boundary, extending beneath the Curzon Line, which did not run entirely across Poland as it existed in the 1940s. At issue in the latter dispute was the oil-rich territory of Lwow and the city of the same name (also known by the Russian spelling Lvov and the Austrian designation, Lemberg). Gradually the idea of giving the Soviets territory to the Curzon Line while 'compensating' Poland with lands taken from Germany in the north and west gained currency and was, in fact, agreed upon informally at the Teheran Conference and formally at Yalta. Fearful that the compensation would never be made and, in any event, hoping for a Poland swollen by areas of Germany while maintaining the eastern boundary at the Riga Line, t|ie Poles stoutly resisted this solution.6 Nonetheless, it was the solution that would be applied and that would determine the dimensions of postwar Poland. Britain began its unenviable effort of pleading Poland's cause in Russia when in 1942 the Soviet Union arrested 180 Polish relief delegates who administered aid to dispossessed Poles in that country. The delegates were charged with espionage and sedition.7 Several months later, in January 1943, the USSR declared that anyone living east of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Line was a Soviet citizen, liable to Soviet conscription and ineligible to receive the aid that the govern-

Background and build-up

77

ments of Canada, Great Britain and the United States were sending to Polish refugees.8 Churchill, promising Polish Premier Wladyslaw Sikorski that his government would look into these matters, also recommended that he write to Roosevelt. Meanwhile, he instructed his ambassador in the USSR, Archibald Clark Kerr, to take the matter up with his American counterpart. 9 The Polish complaints continued into 1943, now speaking of beatings and imprisonment of Poles who would not accept Soviet passports.10 Acknowledging that 'at the present time my influence is not supported by a sufficient military contribution to the common cause to make any representations effective',11 Churchill took the advice of Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, to seek American support in asking Stalin to release Polish refugees.12 To a limited extent, the Americans responded to this appeal.13 Meanwhile, Churchill promised Stalin that he would control the strident anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Poles in London. 14 Whatever hopes the Westerners had for progress on Polish issues, however, were dashed by a stunning German announcement in April 1943 that in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, German troops had discovered mass graves of nearly 4,500 Polish officers almost surely murdered by the Soviets in the spring of 1940.15 When the Poles called for an international investigation, the Soviets said they were collaborating with Germany and threatened to break relations. Whitehall, under strong pressure from the Polish Government, worked furiously to avoid the break, although Churchill again pointed out that because of the comparative amount of fighting by Britain and the USSR, he was not in a strong position.16 It is interesting to note for present purposes that the Soviet Ambassador in London was told that a split on this issue would, among other things, do infinite mischief in the US with its six million people of Polish antecedents, an argument made more than once in these years with little apparent effect in the Kremlin. 17 In this case, Stalin sent Churchill a scathing message about the Polish Government and its acceptance of the German version of the Katyn massacre concluding, ' It is necessary to interrupt relations with this Government. ' 18 At the Foreign Office's suggestion, it and the State Department made coordinated approaches to the Kremlin to try to ameliorate the situation19 and, also at British instigation, the President wrote to Stalin. He expressed in the most reasonable of terms the hope that the Soviet leader would consider the break to be simply a ' suspension of

78

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conversation', and offered whatever help he might give, including taking any Poles Stalin wanted to send out of the USSR. He added that there were several million Poles in the US, many in the armed forces, and said that he worried that the break might cause problems with them.20 Churchill told Roosevelt, 'I like your telegram to Stalin very much and will read it to the Cabinet today. We must work together to heal this breach. So far it has been Goebbels' show.'21 Their efforts, however, were in vain. A cable from Clark Kerr was already dispatched informing Whitehall that the Polish Ambassador had been asked to leave Moscow within a fortnight.22 Churchill meanwhile had asked Stalin not to publicise his decision, which, he said, 'would do the greatest harm in the United States, where Poles are numerous and influential'.23 Stalin dismissed this consideration and, at the same time, intimated that the Polish Government as constituted should not expect to return to Poland, an early signal of the bitter struggles ahead.24 Still the United States tended to remain at the margins of the Polish-Soviet crisis while the British were getting into it up to their hips. At the same time that Whitehall urged moderation on the Poles, a near hopeless plea, Churchill himself edited their reply to the Soviet announcement of the break in relations. Twice taking out all references to Katyn, he scowled, ' there is no use prowling morbidly round the three year old graves of Smolensk', and said of the original Polish document, 'It is a declaration of mortal war.' 25 The United States deviated from its generally passive role when on 11 August 1943, again at British instigation, the American Ambassador along with his British counterpart met with Stalin to try to improve matters. Their efforts were unavailing.26 Despite this move, however, extreme caution was clearly America's order of the day. For example, in October of that year when the Allied Foreign Ministers met in Moscow, Hull would not join Eden in discussing Poland in any but the blandest terms, despite Eden's worry that Russo-Polish relations must be improved before the Soviet army reached Polish borders.27 Furthermore, approximately a month later, at Teheran, Roosevelt, working hard for closer relations with the Soviets, told Stalin that he agreed with him regarding the Curzon Line, but adding that he was unwilling yet to be involved in Polish issues because of the PolishAmericans who would be voting in less than a year.28 Churchill, too, made it clear that he agreed with the Curzon Line boundary, with compensation for the Poles coming from German territory after the Reich's defeat.

Background and build-up

79

Western concurrence with the Curzon Line would cause enormous hue and cry among emigre Poles after it was confirmed at Yalta and made public following that conference, the beginning of criticism which remains alive even today among Western commentators.29 Vojtech Mastny speculates that the Westerners may have agreed quietly to this boundary because of the 'spell of Stalin's personality'.30 Possibly so, but it is important to remember that historically the Curzon Line's bonafideswere as good as the Riga Line's, and in addition, the Poles were to be ' compensated' for ' loss' of eastern territory, if that is what it was, at the expense of the common enemy. Furthermore, Churchill was becoming increasingly irritated with the Polish leadership in London because of the problems it caused with the Soviet Union. The USSR was, after all, the ally most heavily engaged in fighting Britain's enemy, and one, in fact, which if not encouraged, might stop fighting at any convenient point beyond its western border, as Mastny reveals very clearly.31 Discussions of the conduct of Churchill and Roosevelt vis-a-vis Stalin at Teheran and later at Yalta often overlook the degree to which they were hostages, first, because of the enormous role Russia was playing in defeating Germany; second, because the Western allies, especially the US, wanted Soviet military help in the Far East after Germany surrendered, and third, in the case of the Yalta conference, because the USSR occupied so much of the territory in question. In short, these meetings are often discussed as though the issue was simply one of individuals being firm at the conference table, which ignores the fact that until the successful test of the atomic bomb in July 1945 the Soviet Union had a powerful military trump card.

INVOLVEMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

In 1944 the situation between the Soviets and the Poles became too exacerbated for the United States to maintain its detachment. Furthermore, as Britain was being sucked incessantly deeper into Polish affairs and assuming more and more the role of Poland's defender against Soviet encroachment, the British Government looked increasingly to the US for support. The next principal event for America in the Polish drama was the visit to the United States of Polish Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk in June 1944. The visit had been delayed for months at Churchill's insistence because he feared that the appearance of the Polish Government lobbying for US support would further irritate relations with the Kremlin. By June, he decided Polish-Soviet relations could hardly be worsened and that perhaps it would be useful for Moscow to see that the Poles had other champions besides his government. 1 In Washington the Polish Premier received little more than 'moral support', but Roosevelt did give him to understand that after the elections he would help Poland with its territorial problems. 2 Roosevelt, however, urged upon Mikolajczyk the necessity of changes in the Polish Government as called for by the Soviets, eliminating certain ministers who were particularly offensive to them. 3 Meanwhile, the President wrote Stalin asking that he receive Mikolajczyk in Moscow,4 to which Stalin equivocated because the Pole had made no 'step forward' regarding the emigre government or 'recognition of the Curzon Line'. 5 Roosevelt's message to Stalin caused a mild Anglo-American contretemps in that, as on previous occasions, he forgot to inform his allies. Harriman, who was asked to deliver the message, told Clark Kerr about it who told Eden. Eden found it 'disconcerting', believing that bilateral intervention by either the US or UK was 'unlikely to help the direct [Russo-Polish] conversations', and so told Churchill. Miffed, Churchill stored this in his memory and, although it took more

Great Britain and the United States than a week to find the proper occasion, eventually he told the President that he still had heard nothing about the exchange from Roosevelt himself.6 Nevertheless, Churchill and Eden continued efforts to arrange a Moscow trip for Mikolajczyk which, in fact, they achieved by the end of July, and again looked to the American Government for relatively limited support. They asked Roosevelt to cable Stalin his hopes for a united Polish Government, rather than two Polish Governments, one facing east and one west, as Whitehall feared might develop. The President sent the wire and, also at HMG's request, sent a message of encouragement to Mikolajczyk.7 The Polish premier met not only with Stalin and Molotov but with the Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation, often referred to as the Lublin Committee because it set itself up first in the Polish city, Lublin, to administer those areas of the country freed from the Germans. The Western Allies worried, and with good reason, that the Soviets intended to recognise it as the legitimate government of Poland. During its meeting with Mikolajczyk the Committee offered him the premiership of a united government and four portfolios for the London Poles. Mikolajczyk refused, but the negotiations continued. At this point one of the most traumatic events of the entire Polish-Soviet crisis took place: the rising in Warsaw on i August of the Polish Home Army.8 Occurring as the Russian army was approaching the city, it had been called for by Radio Moscow, but had not been coordinated with the Red Army, causing Stalin to call it a reckless undertaking. The Russians, checked by a German counter-attack, paused at the outskirts of the city while the Polish Home Army battled with the Wehrmacht until finally forced to surrender on 2 October. The American Government's initial response to the rising was quite limited, although pressure on it to help was applied predictably from three sources, Polish-American organisations, the Polish Government in London, and HMG. Of these, it was the British that seemed to have had the major influence but that is not to say much, because the American help that was forthcoming was very small, to a great extent limited by difficult logistics. During the struggle the Soviets, for the most part, did not supply the Poles, nor would they assist the other Allied powers in doing so by letting them land on Soviet airfields after dropping supplies,

81

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even though, after difficult negotiations, the Americans had already gained permission for aircraft from other missions to do so.9 With such an arrangement cargo airplanes flying from England or Italy could carry more supplies and less fuel, and crews could have a chance to rest before returning home. But above all, the flights could be accompanied by shorter-range fighter aircraft, and, therefore, could supply the Poles during daylight hours, providing much more accuracy. At the request of Great Britain, Harriman asked the Kremlin for landing rights, but was informed simply that the rising was an ' adventuristic affair and the Soviet Government could not lend its hand to it'. 10 He tried again and was again rebuffed. The US Administration then left to him whether or not to press the matter further but made clear that it was uneasy about doing so, fearing the effort might endanger the other shuttle arrangements already agreed upon. Hull told Harriman, 'we have sensed in the British instructions to Clark Kerr, which we received from their embassy here, a tendency to go considerably further than the President is prepared to go in attempting to force Soviet cooperation or participation in sending aid to the Underground'. 11 Nonetheless, Roosevelt found himself under considerable pressure from Churchill and also from Harriman to make further efforts to induce Stalin to help the Poles. Churchill, nudged by Eden to ' return to the charge', 12 sent the President all his correspondence with the Soviet leader on the subject, including a message reminding him that Radio Moscow had called for the rising. Harriman, whose attitude towards the Soviets seems to have been deeply affected by this episode, also wrote an impassioned message asking help for the rebellion. As a result Roosevelt did draft a short joint telegram from himself and the Prime Minister asking Stalin to relent, but to no avail.13 After a fruitless meeting between Molotov and the British and American ambassadors, the latest of a series, Churchill recommended that planes supplying Warsaw land on Russian fields with or without permission.14 Roosevelt balked at this; Churchill urged him to reconsider, and Roosevelt then replied, with a tone of relief, that the rising was over.15 His information, of course, was faulty; the fighting in Warsaw continued for more than a month. Meanwhile, a stiff note from the British Cabinet to Stalin finally gained permission for one shuttle flight in mid-September but no more. 16 In the first days of October, Polish resistance in Warsaw ended.17 Within only a few days of the end of the Warsaw rebellion, another

Great Britain and the United States event of major importance in both East-West and Anglo-American relations took place, i.e., the trip of Churchill and Eden to Moscow to discuss with Stalin various issues outstanding between the USSR and the Western powers, the meeting which resulted in the famous 'Percentages Agreement'. Mikolajczyk, whose July trip to Moscow had produced no results, particularly as it overlapped with the Warsaw rising, was now called back to take part in the discussions, the subjects of which were the same as always, settling borders and reconstituting the Polish Government.18 Again, after intense negotiating, no solution was reached. Nevertheless, Mikolajczyk later tried to convince the Polish Cabinet to accept Stalin's terms, i.e., a minority of government posts for the exiles, Curzon Line, no Lwow, no Konigsberg, but sizeable compensation in the north and west. He failed, resigned, and a new emigre government was formed under the less compromising socialist, Tomasz Arciszewski. Consequently, British plans to reach a solution for Poland before the Soviets imposed one unilaterally received a severe setback.19 With the 1944 elections won, the Roosevelt Administration was ready to become more active in Polish affairs, which from the point of view of Whitehall and of the London Poles were becoming increasingly critical. As the Americans became more involved they turned to the British for guidance, not a very common practice in American foreign policymaking during this period. Furthermore, as the months went on, the British availed themselves adroitly of this susceptibility, which increased during the early days of the Truman Administration. On 15 December 1944, Churchill made an extremely significant and controversial declaration in the House of Commons describing the role his government had played in the Russo-Polish crisis and explaining where matters stood at that moment.20 Besides being politely critical of the United States for its nearly neutral stance, he stated that, despite the Atlantic Charter, border arrangements mutually concurred in were acceptable even if concluded before the end of the war. At last he stimulated real movement on the Polish question by the American Government, but perhaps only because it was no longer worried about the domestic consequences of the issue. His comments, particularly those regarding the Charter, caused a flurry of criticism in the United States,21 although the US Government had, in fact, already said privately that mutually-agreed-upon border solutions were acceptable to it, even during the war.22 Churchill

83

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also told Parliament that he found 'great difficulty' in discussing Polish matters,' because the attitude of the United States has not been defined with the precision which His Majesty's Government have thought it wise to use'. 23 He was referring especially to plans to compensate Poland with German lands for those lost to Russia and the consequent population transfers. These remarks, and perhaps other information from London as well, caused Stettinius, then Secretary of State, to worry about the 'uncertainty' of Churchill's plans.24 At his suggestion Roosevelt contacted the Prime Minister, saying he had seen newspaper accounts of his talk in Parliament and asking 'what steps can we now take?' What were Mikolajczyk's chances of returning with sufficient authority to govern effectively, he asked, and what should they do if the Lublin Committee stated that it was the provisional government of Poland and Stalin recognised it as such? Did the Prime Minister think he should ask Stalin to postpone 'positive action on the Polish question' until the three of them could get together? 25 Churchill replied at once, not only approving of a message from the President to Stalin, but urging that it be sent that day in an effort to forestall imminent recognition of the Lublin group. 26 He said that although the British Government saw no immediate prospect for a return to power of Mikolajczyk, its favourite for exile premier, nevertheless it would continue to recognise the Polish Government in London and not the Lublin group. 27 Roosevelt had also sent Churchill a copy of a letter he had written to Mikolajczyk outlining American policy towards Poland, to which Churchill had no amendments to make, stating, in fact, that publication of the US position 'could do nothing but good'. 28 Essentially, the points of Roosevelt's policy were (1) the United States wanted Poland to be free, independent and democratic; (2) territorial questions should be left until the end of the war, but there Would be no objection from the US Government if the Polish border questions, including compensation from Germany, were settled before then by agreement among the Polish, Soviet and British Governments; (3) because transfers of minorities sometimes add to security and tranquillity, there would be no objection if the Polish Government and people felt such transfers should take place. In fact, the US Government, Roosevelt said, would assist in these realignments, although it was not clear if he was referring to eastern or western borders, or both. Furthermore, while the US could not guarantee specific frontiers, it was working

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85

to create a world security organisation which would assume such responsibility; (4) the United States would assist in economic reconstruction of Poland.29 Meanwhile, the State Department prepared this policy statement for distribution to the press and sent a copy to Stalin.30 Along with it went a plea from the President that he not recognise the Lublin Committee until the Big Three could meet because it would render 'discussions more difficult' and have 'great political implications'.31 Roosevelt said he hoped a meeting could be arranged immediately after his inauguration on 20 January 1945, in other words in slightly more than a month's time. The background of the State Department press release is interesting in terms of Anglo-American relations in this period. Shortly before it was released, Halifax wired London that Stettinius wanted 'to proceed in closest consultation with us, and asked whether we had any suggestions about the wording'. Both Halifax and the Cabinet recommended slight changes,32 but at the press conference in which the statement was distributed the Secretary was asked whether the British knew of it. 'He replied in the negative', reported Halifax. (Churchill circled 'negative' and in the margin of the message wrote, 'Is a fib.') 33 Halifax added, 'I hope you [Eden] will take the same line. Stettinius is anxious to emphasise that statement is a real declaration of American policy and was not (repeat not) dictated by us.' Referring to it not being dictated by HMG, Churchill wrote in the margin 'no thank God', apparently thinking as much about style as about politics, for the State Department, he believed, had 'reduced to a sorry jargon the simple wording which the President used'.34 Few British suggestions were, in fact, incorporated into the American statement. Whitehall particularly recommended making it clear that German territory was to go to Poland and that the native population there was likely to be transferred, facts that were not apparent in Washington's text. Churchill believed that the State Department was afraid to tell these things to the American public or to tell them that the big powers would guarantee Polish frontiers. Probably he was right. It may well have seemed to American officials that this had about it a rather strong whiff of Versailles and that American opinion needed to be 'prepared' for it, as Stettinius told Halifax. When the statement was produced, Churchill said, ' I have rarely seen a State document which more clearly bore the trace of many

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timid hands. It will not get the United States out of their difficulties. Apart from that, we have no reason to complain.' 35 Roosevelt meanwhile had told Stalin that the Prime Minister's remarks in Parliament had increased American interest in the Polish issue and said that his Administration was under strong pressure to make its position known.36 The United States Government initiated an unusual amount of consultation with the British on this matter, even if it took little of the advice proffered. The main advocate of this consultation seems to have been Stettinius, perhaps because he recognised that Great Britain had much more experience in the issues than the United States, perhaps as a gesture of goodwill at a time when AngloAmerican relations were very strained. (That they were so, of course, was in great part due to his own statement to the press of 5 December criticising British policy in liberated countries, which will be discussed later in this study.) Probably, however, Stettinius simply felt, more than Roosevelt's other key advisors, certainly more than Hull, that it was generally beneficial to consult and coordinate with the British. 37 Regardless, however, of what Anglo-American positions might have been, Moscow's course seemed to be set. In the last days of December, Stalin, charging the Polish Exile Government with encouraging terrorism and civil war in the rear of the Red Army, told London and Washington that he was ready to recognise the Lublin Committee.38 Roosevelt replied that he was 'disturbed and deeply disappointed' that the Kremlin would not wait ' a month' with this action until the Big Three met at Yalta where they could consider the matter. 39 Again, however, Western urging was to no avail. On 1 January the USSR recognised the Lublin Group, temporarily at least, as the de facto governing body of Poland.40

YALTA AND AFTER

The meeting at Yalta was a milestone in the affairs of the Allied powers in relation to Poland. The questions of both eastern and western boundaries came up for an enormous amount of discussion as did the issue of the future Polish Government. The eastern boundary was determined along lines the Soviets had long established. Poland was denied Konigsberg and Vilna (the latter city also had long been in question), and was deprived of the city and province of Lwow. North of Lwow, the Curzon Line applied. It is ironic perhaps that at this point settling the western boundaries became the more difficult problem, with the West wanting less for Poland, the Soviets more. Because both the Lublin Committee and the emigre government agreed that there should be no Germans in Polish territory, Churchill told the Commons that he estimated that six million Germans would have to be relocated if the Oder were to become the new border. Harriman calculated that 'several million more' would have to migrate if the Neisse River, as well as the Oder, formed the border, and worried about consequent demographic problems. Eden, whose calculations agreed roughly with those of Churchill and Harriman, said that more than eight million Germans would be uprooted by the Soviet-Lublin proposals.1 He, like Churchill, was worried about the stability of both Germany and Poland under these circumstances because of the economic and administrative problems involved, to say nothing of the humanitarian issues. But undoubtedly the Western Allies, especially the British, were worried also about the Russian advance into Western Europe that this could represent if Poland became a client state of the Soviet Union. In addition, the Russian zone in Germany might as a consequence extend further west.2 Despite long discussion, agreement could not be reached. The conference concluded only that Poland in principle would receive lands in the west as recompense for those lost in the east, but that

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the western boundary would not be determined until the peace conference. In fact, it was agreed to at the Potsdam Conference and, indeed, followed the line of the Oder and the lower Neisse Rivers, drawing into Poland the cities of Stettin and Breslau.3 Many hours at Yalta were spent haggling over a formula for a provisional government.4 In general during these negotiations, the Americans were much more passive and willing to compromise than the British, who struggled long and hard especially to provide what they regarded as equitable democratic representation in the Provisional Government and Allied supervision of elections when they should come to be held. As Clemens points out, Roosevelt often wanted to leave Polish questions to the foreign ministers, while Churchill 'bargained hard and alone'. 5 When Molotov suggested that the Lublin Committee (by then in Warsaw) be the core of the provisional government, it was the British who came up with the counter-proposal that was adopted. They suggested that a commission of the Big Three, consisting of Molotov, Clark Kerr and Harriman, select Polish delegates to consult with it, and together, commission and consultants, establish a provisional government representative of all Poles.6 Molotov warned, however, that the British formula 'would lead to endless and fruitless negotiations' and, of course, no one was in a better position than he to ensure the accuracy of that prediction. 7 In fact, those 'endless negotiations' had already begun at Yalta and with a friction that would characterise them for many months. Some of the earliest sparks flew over the issue of election observers. Molotov vigorously opposed any reference to them in the Conference declaration on Poland, and the US delegation eventually agreed with him, willing to settle for 'a vague oral promise', as Clemens puts it. 8 The British, however, staunchly opposed him. Eden, who always took one of the firmest positions vis-a-vis the Russians on Polish issues, as on many others, once proclaimed himself ready to break off discussions if the Soviets were not more accommodating. 9 The final communique, however, simply stated that ambassadors would report on the situation in Poland, but said nothing about observers. The British were to struggle with the Russians on this issue for five more months but never to prevail, in great measure because of limp support from the United States. Ambiguous language in the communique, a patchwork of strongly held and argued views, especially by British and Russian statesmen,

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allowed for endless haggling regarding the character of the unborn government. It said: The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. M. Molotov, Mr Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines.10 Needless to say, immediately before the conference pressure from the London Polish Government on both Americans and British increased, but to little avail. For example, Premier Arciszewski wrote Churchill on the eve of the meeting expressing the hope that he and Roosevelt would be firm with the Soviets and not recognise any jaits
accomplis.11

Following the meeting, denunciations of it by the Polish Government and by some of the Polish-American groups were strident. 12 Churchill, however, was optimistic although he told the Cabinet that everything depended on Stalin carrying out the agreement in good faith. 13 Yet he may have harboured a sullen belief that a pusillanimous United States kept him from making better bargains. By 20 February 1945, when Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand sent him a telegram criticising the Polish agreements, Churchill made this testy but interesting reply: You do not seem to realise that Great Britain and the British Commonwealth are very much weaker militarily than Soviet Russia and in the regions affected have no means, short of another general war, of enforcing their point of view. They are also far weaker than the United States, bothfinanciallyand militarily. We are not therefore in a position to give clear, cool, far-seeing, altruistic directions to the world. We have to do the best we can. We cannot go further in helping Poland than the United States is willing or can be persuaded to go.14 It should be noted that the US, while far less vigorous than Great Britain, was not totally passive. For example, Roosevelt still tried to get Lwow for the Poles long after Churchill had agreed that it should be Russian.15

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With the Yalta agreements, however, the United States Government underwent baptism by total immersion in the Polish crisis. Certainly it had demonstrated increasing interest in the months between the American elections and the conference, but nothing to compare with the involvement that began with Yalta. From the moment an American ambassador became one of three main agents in forming a provisional government, the US was plunged into the broil. Furthermore, because the wording of the agreement was subject to varying interpretation, it was almost certain that, in the absence of enormous goodwill between Russia and the West, the US representative, like his British counterpart, would become involved in long and contentious diplomacy. Moreover, it was at this point that the British Government began firm pressure on the Americans to come squarely to its side on the Polish issue. It was 'entitled to expect the full support of the USA' Churchill told the Cabinet, adding that the British 'must carry' the US Government with them, because they could do no more to help the Poles than the United States would help them to do.16 Meanwhile, he ordered to be sent to Roosevelt horrendous Polish Government accounts of Soviet arrests and ill treatment of its citizens.17 Much of the exacerbated diplomacy of the five months between the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences focussed on the following questions: (1) (2) (3) (4) Was unanimous approval of the Big Three required for a consultant to be accepted? Should the Lublin Committee have a voice in this selection and, if so, how great? Should the provisional government be built around a Lublin Committee core? Should British and American observers go to Poland to oversee conditions generally and/or to supervise eventual voting for a permanent government?18

By early March 1945 negotiations regarding the consultants were already deadlocked, and a flurry of triangular communication had begun between London and Washington and their representatives in Moscow.19 It included a stream of messages between Churchill and Roosevelt in which the Prime Minister pushed the President to be more forceful on Polish issues than he had been before or than Churchill thought Great Britain could be alone.

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Although he had been deeply involved in Polish matters for over two years, Churchill's interest now became pronounced. From the first, he and his government had worried about an expansion of Soviet influence in Europe, but at this point Churchill may very well have worried also about his own place in history and especially about his image in domestic British politics. With the end of the war in sight, certainly that with Germany, he knew that the Coalition Government soon would have to be dissolved and elections held in Britain. He had frequently explained Britain's entry into the war in terms of an obligation to Poland.20 However much he exaggerated the point, that notion was widespread in British political mythology of the time. Now he was going to have to fight an election while Poland, after six years of war, remained under foreign and totalitarian control. Consequently, if Poland were to be 'lost', let it not be without the stoutest fight possible. Let it never be said, surely not on election eve, that Churchill ended this drama with a return to Munich. Exactly such references to Munich had, in fact figured prominently in comments within the British Government about Poland. For example, in late 1943, when urging the Cabinet to concur in the Curzon Line with territorial and diplomatic compensation to be made to Poland, Eden said that the Poles had ' the Munich precedent very much in mind... We should make it crystal clear that this settlement differs from Munich. ' 21 Several months later Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, worrying about giving ground to the Soviets on Poland, exclaimed, 'What won't be said about "another Munich"!' 22 And following the Yalta Conference, Churchill optimistically told Cabinet members, 'Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin.' 23 Finally in June 1945, just before the British elections, the Foreign Office told Clark Kerr that it was essential that His Majesty's Government not be charged with 'having followed the Munich pattern'. 24 On 8 March Churchill had written at length to the President about the Polish question, highlighting the problem with the Soviets. Among other things, he believed Molotov was forcing the Lublin Committee on the Western Allies by trying to give it both a veto regarding the consultants and the authority to determine the scope of Allied observers in Poland. Furthermore, he suspected that the Soviet Foreign Minister was reluctant to accept as a consultant Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, whom the Western Leaders regarded as a voice of reason in Polish affairs.25

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Churchill told Roosevelt: The news from Moscow about Poland is... most disappointing. I must let you know that the government majorities here bear no relation to the strong undercurrent of opinion among all parties and classes and in our own hearts against a Soviet domination of Poland... Once it is seen that we have been deceived and that the well-known communist technique is being applied behind closed doors... a very grave situation in British public opinion will be reached... if we do not get things right now, it will soon be seen by the world that you and I by putting our signature to the Crimea settlement have under-written a fraudulent prospectus... I am sure the only way to stop Molotov's tactics is to send a personal message to Stalin and in that message I must make clear what are the essential things we must have in this business if I am to avoid telling Parliament that we have failed... I hope you will be ready to send Stalin a similar message containing the same minimum requirements. I shall not send any message until I hear from you.26 But Roosevelt was not ready yet for such a move. Never as hawkish as Churchill or, for that matter, as American representatives in Moscow, he told the Prime Minister that they should await the results of their ambassadors' efforts before sending their own messages.27 Churchill, disappointed by this reply, also felt that the positions the Americans planned to take with the Russians, especially calling for a political truce in Poland, were unrealistic and far too vague.28 Although the British eventually managed to strengthen and clarify American policy, Roosevelt continued to insist that negotiations be left to the ambassadors. Only when and if they failed should he and Churchill 'appeal to Marshal Stalin'. 29 Roosevelt feared that complaining directly to Stalin would disrupt the alliance, whereas Churchill maintained that it was the only way to solve its problems. He admitted to Roosevelt, however, that 'we can, of course, make no progress at Moscow without your aid', and thereupon reluctantly agreed to postpone addressing the Soviet leader. At the same time he expressed his concern about the adverse effect of Polish affairs on British public opinion.30 Meanwhile, Clark Kerr crafted a set of positions that he recommended for himself and Harriman, 31 suggesting that they both tell the Kremlin much more specifically than the Americans had planned exactly how the Western Allies saw the Polish problem and how they thought the negotiations should proceed.32 And, indeed, after close consultations between the State Department and the British Embassy

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in Washington, it was instructions modelled on these recommendations that finally went out to the two ambassadors. 33 Churchill, delighted at this minor British triumph, pointed out gratefully that' the United States have made a number of concessions to meet our views', 34 and in his satisfaction he worked out a small telegraphic joke with Eden, i.e., a postscript in his wire of approval to Roosevelt that said 'U Jay: O.Kay: U.Kay'. 35 He also asked Eden to send congratulations to Clark Kerr and Halifax, the expression of which is interesting for our purposes. The message to Halifax said, ' I am most grateful to you for all you have done in bringing the United States Government along', and to Clark Kerr, 'In securing agreement with United States Government we undoubtedly owe much to your successful discussions with United States Ambassador and to your admirable draft. ' 36 But at the end of all their toils with 'positions' and 'instructions', the Westerners got only the back of the Kremlin hand. The Soviet Government upheld steadfastly the supremacy of the Lublin Committee; it might be modified, but it would have to be the basis of a provisional government, and, furthermore, the Allies should consult with it when forming such a government.37 In addition, the Kremlin by now expressed 'amazement' that the British and Americans planned to send observers to Poland, although Stalin had approved such an idea in general at Yalta and Molotov had proposed it more specifically during the course of the negotiations in Moscow.38 Meanwhile, London and Washington had heard stunning news. Molotov would not be attending the San Francisco Conference, which was to be crucial in establishing the UN. 39 The State Department at once searched for ways to ease matters, including deferring the question of observers in Poland if need be, 40 but not Eden. The British Foreign Secretary's view is amusingly characterised in an exchange with Churchill. When Senator Vandenberg was reported to have warned the Lublin Committee not to persecuteToles loyal to the London Polish Government, Churchill scribbled ' pretty good' on the report.41 Eden replied, 'Yes, but he represents a Polish area. Would that Stettinius did.' 42 Determined to be tougher with the Kremlin, Eden first rapped Clark Kerr's knuckles for his patience with Molotov as the ambassador laboriously re-worked yet another set of Russian proposals that were considered to be preposterous in Whitehall. Then he pushed Churchill to call on the Americans for firmer stuff. The Foreign Secretary told Churchill, ' There should now be a message from you

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and President Roosevelt to Stalin... Finally, is it of any value to go to San Francisco in these conditions? How can we lay foundations of any new world order when Anglo-American relations with Russia are so completely lacking in confidence?'43 Eden may not have realized it, but he had found the perfect way to heighten American concern, a warning that the San Francisco Conference was endangered. Churchill, however, recognised it instantly and replied that the British should ask Americans 'whether they will now agree to a telegram from the President and me to Stalin'. He added, 'We cannot press the case against Russia beyond where we can carry the United States. Nothing is more likely to bring them into line with us than any idea of the San Francisco Conference being imperilled.' He asked Eden to draft a telegram along those lines which he could send to Roosevelt the next day, and said, 'when we come back at them now it must be both together'.44 The telegram not only laid out the Prime Minister's fears regarding parliamentary reaction and public opinion, but excoriated the Soviets to a degree that was new in these communications.45 'Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming parties to imposing on Poland, and on how much more of Eastern Europe, the Russian version of democracy,' he said, 'but I am convinced it is no use trying to argue this any further with Molotov. In view of this, is it not now the moment for a message from us both on Poland to Stalin?' Finally, he stressed the jarring fact that Molotov intended to be absent from the meeting at San Francisco. (Roosevelt had asked that he be present at least for the 'vital opening sessions' to preserve the appearance of unity inasmuch as all the sponsoring powers and most of the others would be sending Foreign Ministers. Stalin, however, dismissed these considerations, saying Molotov would have to attend a session of the Supreme Soviet at that time.)46 Knowing that the creation of the UN was the centrepiece of Roosevelt's diplomacy, Churchill asked pointedly whether great power unity were not required to avoid ' building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand'? Then in a separate message he outlined the Western case as he thought it might be put to Stalin.47 Churchill guessed correctly. His messages to the President drew the reply he had been seeking for the better part of a month. ' I agree with you...the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broad aspects of the Soviet attitude.' Roosevelt would send a draft.48 Churchill's idea of what he and the President should say to Stalin was, according to Eden, 'a good deal rougher in tone' than

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95

Roosevelt's. For even now, although agreeing to approach the Russian leader directly, Roosevelt took a milder view of the entire crisis. He told Churchill: You will recall that the agreement on Poland at Yalta was a compromise between the Soviet position that the Lublin Government should merely be ' enlarged' and our contention that we should start with a clean slate and assist in the formation of an entirely new Polish Government. The wording of the resulting agreement reflects this compromise but if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed, as clearly shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new Government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to go back on the Crimean decision.50 Nonetheless, Churchill was delighted to have Roosevelt's agreement to contact Stalin. He quickly approved the President's draft, although not before adding a few stiffening suggestions, particularly that no one of the three nations should veto another's candidates to consult on the formation of the Polish Government. 51 Roosevelt's message to Stalin is frequently cited as an example of his post-Yalta disillusionment with the Kremlin, but rarely considered in the context of Anglo-American as well as Soviet-American relations. It opened ' I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta.' 52 In very reasonable tones, it then expressed the points upon which the President felt misunderstanding existed and suggested solutions. These included a truce among political factions in Poland and agreement for British and American observers to go there. At the same time Churchill sent Stalin a rather more peppery message but to the same effect,53 meanwhile telling Roosevelt, ' I am delighted with our being in such perfect step. I have bunged off my 929 to the Bear. ' 54 Churchill's 929 expressed the disappointment of the Western governments at the deadlock in the Polish negotiations. He concluded by pointing out his concern over the public view of these events, saying that 'His Majesty's present advisers only hold office at the will of a universal suffrage parliament.' He added,' It is as a sincere friend of Russia that I make my personal appeal to you and your colleagues to come to a good understanding about Poland with the Western democracies and not to smite down the hands of comradeship in the future guidance of the world which we now extend. ' 55 Stalin did indeed seem to be smiting down the hands of comrade-

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ship, or at least of cooperation, offered by the West. If historians subsequently have become confident in their various explanations of why this was, it seems quite clear that the statesmen of the time in Britain and the United states were sincerely puzzled. Whether or not the Soviet Union was being unreasonable, whether or not it considered itself to be rejecting comradeship, it is important to note that in the West this is what it appeared inscrutably to be doing. Soviet policy at this moment and in subsequent weeks, at least, seemed, whatever its motivation, as though it almost might have been designed to alienate the British and American Governments and public. Regardless of the cables, Stalin refused to budge on almost any point. Above all, the Lublin Committee, which he was now calling the Provisional Polish Government, had to be the basis of any new regime. He made one concession. He would influence it to remove its objections to inviting Mikolajczyk to be a consultant. First, however, Mikolajczyk would have to declare publicly his support for the Yalta agreements, which he had once denounced because of their Russo-Polish border provisions and, also, state his desire for friendly SovietPolish relations. Stalin would not, however, countenance Allied observers in Poland, as the Allies, at British insistence, continued to propose.56 Meanwhile, it is perhaps useful to view some attitudes in the American Government at the time. Harriman believed that the reason Molotov cooled on the idea of sending observers to Poland was that Clark Kerr, on instructions from Churchill, proposed sending 'four or five trusted men' from Parliament.57 Harriman added, 'Molotov, quite naturally, I felt, asked what they were to do. Thus Molotov's suspicions have been aroused that the British have different objectives than he had originally in mind and I am not sure that we can get his agreement to send even one representative.' Like Harriman, the State Department disagreed with the British that this was the time to send a high level team to Poland, thinking the Soviets would simply balk at the idea and then refuse to let the ambassadors send even their own personal representatives. Churchill, however, may well have wanted a highly visible group of prominent parliamentarians for public relations and electoral reasons.58 The State Department told Harriman that it was disturbed at the attitude of the British Foreign Office, and said ' we do not agree that you should assume that Molotov is the advocate for the Lublin Poles and that you and Clark Kerr represent other Poles. Whatever

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Molotov's position may be in fact, we believe it important that the Commission should endeavor to operate as a unit. ' 59 It also made this viewpoint clear to Halifax, adding that the establishment of a satisfactory provisional government should be maintained as a separate issue from holding satisfactory elections. Furthermore, it thought that the parliamentary commission the British wanted to send went beyond the 'provisions of the Crimea communique' and that, in Bohlen's words, it was a mistake to 'jump the guns' in such a manner.60 When these words reached Whitehall, Christopher Warner, head of the Foreign Office's Northern Department, after discussing the matter with Deputy Undersecretary Orme Sargent, wrote ' It is of great importance to get the State Dept. to see these matters in the same light as we do and to ensure so far as possible Mr Harriman's support for Sir A. Clark Kerr. ' 61 Harriman, meanwhile, assured Washington that unity of purpose was his operating assumption in the commission meetings, but he noted that, although Molotov had ' outwardly accepted this position,... it now seems clear that he and the Lublin Poles are working together along lines agreed to when the latter were here in mid February'. 62 In this message he observed: Unfortunately Clark Kerr is handicapped by being directed at every turn by the Foreign Office based on information always a little late. Clark Kerr has kindly shown me all of his cables from the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister and it seems that Downing Street is viewing the work of the Commission more from the standpoint of the debate in the House of Commons than from the urgent need of making progress in implementing the Crimea agreement. A few days later Harriman cabled the State Department, recommending new approaches that might be taken in the discussions at Moscow but at the same time suggesting that, rather than bend too far 'if Molotov continues to be unreasonable', they allow the talks to break down.63 In this case, as in others, American representatives in the Soviet Union held a harder view of how to deal with that country than did their counterparts in Washington. This obviously was due at least in part to the daily frustrations of dealing with the Soviet Government evident in the messages and memoirs of Standley, Deane, and Harriman. The split that was now becoming pronounced between East and West not only diminished the chances of the triangularity the President hoped to create, but at the same time gave Great Britain a chance to appeal to the United States to act in harmony with it in the face

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of a common threat. Churchill saw the opportunity and tried to make the most of it. While Russian relations with the West were worsening at many points, he pleaded with the American Administration to push its troops as far east in Europe as possible, thus limiting the Soviet advance. 'A firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture by our two countries', he said, to show that 'there is a point beyond which we will not tolerate insult... If they are ever convinced that we are afraid of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed I should despair of our future relations with them and much else. '64 Roosevelt's answer is interesting because of its enigmatic quality and the impression it gives that perhaps he had been converted to Churchill's way of thinking. He agreed that 'We must not permit anybody to entertain a false impression that we are afraid. Our armies will in a very few days be in a position that will permit us to become "tougher" than has heretofore appeared advantageous to the war effort.'65 Warren F. Kimball, a specialist in the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence, says that this message was drafted by Roosevelt's aide, Admiral William Leahy, sent to the President at Warm Springs, Georgia, and returned for transmission to Churchill in less than one and one half hours. This, says Kimball, was ' hardly time enough for Roosevelt to have reconsidered and redirected the entire thrust of his wartime and postwar policy toward the Soviet Union', as this cable might seem to imply. He believes that the telegram refers only to a dispute between the Soviets and the Western Allies over peace talks at Bern.66 If, however, the President did indeed mean that the Western armies would soon be further east where their position could be used as Churchill wished, as a bargaining counter with the Russians, that viewpoint was never reflected in US actions. Until then, in order to ensure that the Soviets stayed in the war and cooperated with his plans for the peace, Roosevelt had eschewed any trace of adversary diplomacy, and, despite these words to Churchill, continued to do so until he died. Regardless of the Prime Minister's pleas, Eisenhower's forces did not plunge eastward to their maximum capacity. For example, they might have taken Berlin and Prague, but did not try to do so, in part to avoid the impression that they were racing the Soviets.67 Furthermore, they quickly returned west to previously agreed upon zones after Germany's surrender, as Truman continued Roosevelt's policy.

TRUMAN: THE NEW FACTOR

Churchill and the Foreign Office had established a bridgehead with Roosevelt. They had brought him at least to the point where he would express concern to Stalin over Soviet diplomacy. After Roosevelt's death, they attempted to go further with Truman who was nearly as new to foreign affairs as he was to the presidency. Highly impressed with the importance of the presidential office, he assumed it at a challenging time, Soviet intransigence from the Western point of view then being at a peak. He was far less vulnerable than Roosevelt to threats to the UNO, with which he had had little involvement by then and to which he showed much less personal or ideological dedication. 1 He was, however, convinced that Russian help would be needed in the Pacific war.2 This conviction did not prevent him from exploding violently at Molotov before the San Francisco Conference, but it did, perhaps along with other considerations, prevent him from heeding Churchill's persistent calls to push the Western armies eastward beyond the demands of military necessity. Nor would he agree to leave US forces in predesignated Soviet zones until political concessions were gained from the Russians, as Churchill suggested.3 In his memoirs, Truman said, ' Russian tactics and aims were, of course, of much concern to us, and I agreed with Churchill on the seriousness of the situation. But I could not agree to going back on our commitments. ' 4 At the time, referring to troop withdrawals, he told Churchill, ' I am advised that it would be highly disadvantageous to our relations with the Soviet [sic] to postpone action on this matter until our meeting in July.' 5 Churchill replied, 'Obviously we are obliged to conform to your decision'.6 Nevertheless, with Stettinius apparently eager to cooperate with Britain and Truman seemingly free from most of Roosevelt's fears in this regard, a major British effort at alignment with the US was made on the eve of the San Francisco Conference. The day after Roosevelt's death, Churchill told the Cabinet that

ioo

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HMG would now have to take the lead regarding Poland. As a consequence, he would draft a reply to Stalin's last message which was addressed to both him and the President.7 Churchill had scarcely made these remarks before two telegrams arrived from Truman, one with a draft reply to Stalin.8 Answering Churchill's expressions of condolence at Roosevelt's death, Truman acknowledged that there were 'urgent problems requiring our immediate and joint consideration', and said 'I have in mind the pressing and dangerous problem of Poland and the Soviet attitude toward the Moscow negotiations.' 9 While, in Truman's opinion, there was little ground for optimism, the President felt that he and Churchill 'should have another go at him'. Churchill told Eden ' I wished... to await a lead from the United States. It has now come and I am in general agreement with it.' 10 Whether or not he sincerely wanted such a lead may be debated, particularly considering how ready he had been to move to the forefront upon Roosevelt's death. Probably for him the ideal situation would have been to guide the way with the United States firmly behind him. However, Truman had taken the initiative in his first full day in office, and Churchill seemed delighted at both the President's cooperation and his willingness to put the Western case to Stalin. He instructed Eden, then in Washington, to concur in Truman's message to Stalin and agreed to put off, if necessary, a Parliamentary debate about Poland which would undoubtedly worsen relations with the USSR.11 He said, ' It would be the greatest mistake not to join in with the new regime at the earliest moment especially when they are so stiff and strong. ' 12 Just then a ray of hope flashed through the affairs of the Big Three. Upon FDR's death Stalin asked Harriman what he could do to help Truman, and the ambassador answered that he could send Molotov first to Washington and then to the San Francisco Conference.13 Stalin agreed to do so, to the enormous relief of the State Department and the White House, while Churchill grumbled that the Soviet leader was simply retracting a move he never should have made. 14 At almost the same time another event of signal importance occurred in the Polish crisis. It was learned that 16 prominent leaders of nearly all political parties in Poland had gone to the Soviet Union apparently for consultations.15 Eden and other top Foreign Office officials believed they had gone to negotiate with the Russians about a new Polish government, which might be acceptable, they thought, if Mikolajczyk and one or two others from London were included.

Truman

ioi

Eden said, however, 'we should require time to consider the matter and to consult the Americans, who, on form, would probably be disposed to accept any respectable compromise'. 16 In the meantime, the British, with the aid of Field Marshal Smuts, were pressing Mikolajczyk to develop a statement acceptable to Stalin, declaring friendly intentions toward the Soviet Union and concurrence with the Yalta accords.17 Towards the middle of April it was finally composed, but by that time Mikolajczyk was having premonitions about the fate of his 16 countrymen. He had received information that Wincenty Witos, formerly leader of his own Peasant Party and twice Prime Minister of Poland, had been taken from his home. He, therefore, asked the British and American authorities to do everything they could to discover if the 16 were engaged in talks with the Soviets or if they were, in fact, arrested. 18 Meanwhile, Stettinius believed that the whole Polish issue would be ameliorated when the Big Three foreign secretaries met in connection with the San Francisco Conference, and he suggested Churchill point this out in the House of Commons. Eden, who remained in the US from the time of Roosevelt's funeral until he left the conference approximately a month later, agreed, but told Stettinius 'that it would do the Russians no harm to know how deep was our concern at the failure of the Moscow Commission thus far to make progress on the basis of the Yalta decisions'. He told the American Secretary of State that the US and UK ' must keep a steady pressure on the Russians', and that there was ' no justification yet for optimism'. He agreed 'emphatically' with Churchill 'that we should not allow Molotov's tardy mission in any way to weaken our united pressure'. 19 Eden made sure that such opinions were registered wherever possible with the American Government at this crucial time in the formation of its thought and policy. Furthermore, he was once directly responsible for persuading the President to toughen the American line. As a result of his objections, the US reversed its position of agreeing to only three Polish consultants from London but five from Poland and giving the Soviets and/or the Lublin Committee the right to select the latter group. 20 Just before Molotov left the Soviet Union to go to the United States, the Kremlin made one of those stunning moves typical by now of its policy in the Polish matter. It announced that it was preparing to enter a treaty of mutual assistance with the Lublin Committee, thereby strengthening the latter's claims to be the legitimate govern-

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ment of Poland, while Moscow newspapers called for the Committee to go to San Francisco.21 Both Eden and Stettinius agreed that they could not let this move go unnoticed, and both wired their representatives in Moscow to express surprise and to ask that the treaty be deferred until they could discuss it with Molotov.22 Whatever the Soviet Government gained by this move, it clearly worsened its relations with the Western powers, seeming to deal them an almost gratuitous insult, perhaps less by the act itself than by its timing.

THE GATHERING FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

The months immediately after Yalta were among the most significant and sinister for subsequent EastWest relations, with tension peaking during the latter part of April, just before the San Francisco Conference. With the Soviets alienating the new US Administration and with reports of their stubbornness beginning to worry the American public, it was a perfect moment for the British to stress the need for Anglo-American solidarity, and they did it admirably. But before going further, we should note that Truman, almost surely uncertain still of the line his administration would take towards the Soviet Union, was, at this moment, subjected to an extraordinary barrage of hard-line advice, much of it from individuals who were in the United States for the conference. These included three especially Eden, who, as we have seen, took as tough a line towards the Kremlin as any Western statesman, Harriman and John Deane, head of the US military mission in the Soviet Union. The latter two, fresh from the frustrations of dealing with Soviet bureaucracy, called for the US to be reasonable but firm in relations with the USSR. Harriman, in fact, had become consistently less sympathetic towards the Soviet Union during the time he had been posted there, particularly since the Warsaw rising. During this pre-conference period there was a series of extremely important meetings in Washington with great significance for the future. The first was on 20 April between Harriman and Truman, and attended by Stettinius, Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary of State, and Charles Bohlen, then Assistant to the Secretary of State. Harriman presented Soviet policy in an extremely unfavourable light, saying that the Russians hoped to cooperate with the United States and Great Britain while also unilaterally extending control over neighbouring states. He thought American generosity and cooperation were misinterpreted in some quarters of the Soviet hierarchy, which saw them as indications that the United States would cause no trouble

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regardless of what the Soviet Union did. At the same time he believed that the Kremlin, needing American help in its postwar reconstruction, would not wish to break with the US. The West, he said, was faced with a 'barbarian invasion of Europe', including 'secret police' and 'extinction of free speech', but it still 'could arrive at a workable basis with the Russians'. The President intervened at one point to say that if that issue were not settled satisfactorily, American adherence to the UNO would not pass the Senate, which he intended to tell Molotov in words of one syllable. (One can only wonder what effect he thought this would have on Molotov.) Harriman asked if the US would go ahead with plans for the UNO even if the Soviet Union dropped out, to which Truman replied that without Russia there would not be much of a world organisation. Concluding the interview, the President said he was not abreast of all details of foreign affairs and would rely on Stettinius and the ambassadors to assist him, but he stated, as he had before at various times in their meeting, that he intended to be firm with the Soviet Government. 1 The next day Eden told Stettinius that 'everything turned on the Polish question', which 'must be discussed first'. 'Some progress', he said, 'was absolutely essential before San Francisco if the Conference was to be a success. ' 2 Stettinius assured him that the President would make this clear to Molotov in the first five minutes of his conversation. The two then agreed on a four-point strategy: (i) the Soviet Government should accept the points made in a ChurchillTruman joint message to Stalin,3 (2) the Westerners should press for news of the missing Poles, (3) they should insist on observers, and (4) they should demand that the Soviets desist from signing a treaty with the Lublin Committee. Even before Eden could report this talk to London, however, the Soviets had signed the treaty. 4 Although Truman did not make his feelings about Poland and the San Francisco Conference clear in his first five minutes with Molotov, he did before Molotov left Washington. The first meeting, on 22 April, was a rather stiff affair with both the President and the ambassador agreeing on the importance of cooperation, of a solution to the Polish problem and of adhering to the Yalta agreements. 5 Truman did, however, according to Stettinius, state bluntly his hope that the Polish issue be resolved during the foreign ministers' preconference talks in Washington, that issue being 'symbolic of the Allies' ability to work co-operatively'. 6 Truman had already told Eden, Stettinius, and Harriman that he

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thought it very important that the three foreign secretaries make headway regarding Poland, and, repeating himself within hours of Molotov's arrival, said to them that he intended to tell the Russian that 'in words of one syllable'. Success or failure at San Francisco, he said, much to Eden's satisfaction, depended largely on progress on the Polish question during the next 24 hours. He offered to do whatever he could to help the foreign secretaries. Eden, according to his report, told the President that he was glad that he planned to speak plainly and welcomed ' any step that would serve to impress on Molotov the importance of the issues at stake'. The foreign secretary then sent a cable to Churchill saying, ' the American attitude at the moment is firm and there is no doubt that Russian action in completing treaty at this moment with Warsaw Government has stiffened opinion here'. 7 During the meeting with Truman, Stettinius remarked that AngloAmerican relations had never been closer, and Truman replied that he intended to do everything in his power to continue that state of affairs. One could well argue that in view of his actions on nuclear energy, Lend-Lease, Palestine and other matters, he quickly forgot this resolution, but at the time it seemed genuine. At that moment Eden saw a God-given opportunity for an adroit application of British diplomacy and struck deftly at that old enemy of Britain's foreign policy, the American Government's fear of 'ganging-up'. This is how he reported his remarks to Churchill: We then reverted to Russian affairs, and I said that in time past there had been tendency to (grp. undec? think) that we and the Americans should be careful not to appear to be 'ganging up' against Russia. I thought, however, that with conditions as they were now, it was easy to exaggerate this danger, and that on big issues when our policies were really at one, we should get better results that way. Harriman interjected to say that he entirely agreed with my reading of the situation, and the President said that this was (? group omtd.) view also. We are going to have a tough negotiation with Molotov, but at least the latter should be confronted with a firm Anglo-American front.8 Churchill replied that he was in full accord with all that Eden was doing 'to stiffen the Americans and back them up to the hilt', and said, 'especially should they not be sensitive to a charge of "ganging u p " with us. Of course, we shall work together and assist each other when we are in close agreement on large moral issues like this. ' 9

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Following Molotov's arrival, two meetings on the Polish question, held on 22 and 23 April, produced no results. After the first, Eden told Stettinius that if they made no progress the next morning, he thought that the President should send for the three of them, receive their report 'and himself speak plainly to M. Molotov'. The President, he told London, had agreed. Furthermore, because the Soviet Government seemed to him 'cavalier' in its attitude, Eden recommended postponing the San Francisco Conference while the Big Three foreign secretaries 'hammer[ed] at the Polish issue in Washington'. Stettinius, he reported, 'saw the force of the argument and said he would consider it'. 10 After discussion with his aides the President determined to see Molotov on the evening of 23 April and, in Eden's words 'explain to him in blunt terms the effect of his attitude on future cooperation between the Great Powers... Americans appear to have some hope that this conversation may produce a more reasonable attitude by Russia.' Then, inasmuch as the Administration did not want to postpone the San Francisco Conference, Eden recommended that the British Government go along, 'for above all we must keep in step with the Americans'. 11 The date 23 April 1945 is sometimes considered pivotal in the Truman Administration and in the destinies of East and West for another reason. It is seen as the day that Truman determined in a meeting of high-level US officials to confront the Soviets.12 One should be careful, however, not to overemphasise the significance of that one meeting. As we have seen, Truman was indeed in a mood to be firm even before then and was being urged in that direction by the high-ranking, hard-line team of British and American diplomats that descended on Washington at the time. Nevertheless, he and his government did not become ever firmer with the Soviet Union from then on but tergiversated until 1947, when in March he asked Congress to fund aid to Greece and Turkey and in so doing pronounced what has become known as the Truman Doctrine. The notorious April 23rd meeting was held at 2:00 p.m. at the White House, and, besides the President, included Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal, Leahy, Marshall, King, James C. Dunn (Assistant Secretary of State), Harriman, Deane and Bohlen.13 According to Bohlen's record, Stettinius began the discussion by stating that 'a complete deadlock' had been reached on Poland and that the Soviets were clearly trying to force the United States and Britain to recognise a

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puppet government there. Truman said he felt ' our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one-way street and that could not continue; it was now or never. He intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco and if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell.' Stimson was the outstanding dove at the meeting, however uncharacteristic that role may have been for him. He knew little of the Polish matter, he admitted, but added that the Soviets in military questions had kept their word and often done more than promised. He said ' their ideas of independence and democracy in areas that they regarded as vital to the Soviet Union are different from ours', and believed it important to find out what they were 'driving at' in respect to Poland. 'The Russians', he said, 'perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security.' Marshall was inclined to agree and reminded the group of the need for Soviet assistance in the war with Japan. These two, however, were the only voices cautioning against a hostile approach to the Russians. That evening Truman had an extraordinary meeting with Molotov in which he did indeed talk to him in words of one syllable.14 He said that the US was disappointed with the Soviet position on Poland but nevertheless was determined to go ahead with the San Francisco Conference. Failure of the Allies to carry out the Yalta agreements on Poland, however, would cast doubt worldwide about the possibility of their postwar collaboration. He stressed that, to succeed, American policies needed public support and added, pointedly, that this included 'economic collaboration', alluding surely to postwar aid for the Soviet Union. He asked that the Soviets keep these factors in mind and that they agree to the British and American proposals which he and Churchill had sent Stalin. Although Molotov insisted that the Soviet Union desired to carry out the Yalta agreements, Truman disagreed and at one point stated 'with great firmness that an agreement had been reached on Poland and that it only remained for Marshal Stalin to carry it out in accordance with his word'. Molotov then suggested a solution be reached on the Yugoslav model, i.e., a Soviet-backed group forming the basis of the government with a minority of posts going to various other parties. Truman again replied that an agreement had already been reached on Poland, and now all that was needed was for the Soviets to carry it out. When Molotov stressed, as he had at his previous meeting with Truman, that Poland, being a neighbouring country, was of great interest to the Soviet

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Union, the President said he understood that but observed that friendship between their two countries could not be a one-way street. Truman, who had already given Molotov a message for Stalin, now concluded the interview by handing him a press release regarding the consultations of the foreign ministers. At that point, the official account ends. Truman, in his memoirs, however, while not mentioning the press release, adds two more sentences after his 'one-way street' remark, i.e., ' " I have never been talked to like that in my life", Molotov said. I told him, "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that.'" 1 5 The message to Stalin which Truman handed Molotov said the US and British Governments had gone as far as they could in meeting the Soviets and urged him to accept the proposals in the President's earlier joint message with Churchill.16 It went on to say that failure to carry out the Crimean decisions would shake confidence in the ability of the three allies to collaborate in the future. A summary of the Truman-Molotov conversation, with a copy of the message to Stalin and the press release, were sent the same day to the British Embassy which duly forwarded them to London. Stettinius told Eden that Truman's language had been even tougher than suggested by the summary, which was based on the notes of Bohlen, who was translating.17 Eden, of course, reported this to London as well as a conversation he had with Hopkins who, Eden said approvingly, was 'doing all he [could] to stiffen his people'.18 Churchill in turn told Truman that the Cabinet was in full agreement with his message to Stalin, and that he intended to tell Stalin so as well.19 Eden was in San Francisco whjn next he could communicate with the Prime Minister, at which time he said,' I entirely agree about the importance of stiffening the Americans in their attitude to Russia about Poland. Russian behaviour in today's Steering Committee of the Conference, which could hardly have been worse, is having an excellent educative effect upon all. ' 20 On 24 April, however, Stalin made it clear that regardless of Western notes and scoldings, there would be no change in the Soviet position, i.e., that the Lublin Committee should form the 'main part' of a new regime in Poland where a friendly government was as vital to the Soviet Union's security as a friendly one in Greece or Belgium was to Britain's. He said: I do not know whether there has been established in Greece a really representative government, and whether the government in Belgium is

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really democratic. The Soviet Union was not consulted when these governments were being established there. The Soviet Government did not lay claim to interference in these affairs as it understands the whole importance of Belgium and Greece for the security of Great Britain. It is not clear why, while the question on Poland is discussed it is not wanted to take into consideration the interests of the Soviet Union from the point of view of its security.21 He suggested again the Yugoslav model for Poland, which was again rejected by both Churchill and Truman, with Truman adding a refusal to invite representatives of the Lublin Committee to San Francisco as Molotov was suggesting.22 Pleased with this staunch American position, Churchill told Truman that his government, 'strongly approved of the lead he was taking on the Polish issues', and in his memoirs he recalled telling Eden that ' my appreciation is that the new President is not to be bullied by the Soviets'.23 But however much he admired Truman's firmness, Churchill continued his pressure, calling on the Americans now to join with his government in one of the most contentious issues of the Polish situation, the disappearance of the 16 Poles. Repeated inquiries to the Kremlin about them had brought no information, and now that there finally was news, it only caused further problems. Molotov had told Stettinius on 3 May that the Poles had been arrested. The following day at a foreign secretaries' meeting devoted exclusively to the fate of the detainees, Stettinius and Eden told Molotov that the talks on Poland would have to be discontinued ' until they had an opportunity to consult with their Governments and to receive a full explanation from the Soviet Government'. 24 Eden's memoirs give the impression that he took the lead in breaking off the talks and that Stettinius concurred, which, although not certain, is not improbable.25 Eden adds, ' I have never seen Molotov look so uncomfortable.' Churchill told the President that he was ' most concerned about the fate of the 15 (sic) Polish representatives', and said 'I think that you and I should consult together very carefully upon this matter.' He hoped that his foreign secretary on his way back to Britain could discuss it with Truman. 26 To Eden he said, 'the perfidy by which these Poles were enticed into a Russian conference and then held fast' if published on the authority of the Western Allies ' would produce a primary change in the entire structure of world forces. We must make sure our Russian allies understand what is at stake, but also we must make sure that the United States are with us. '27

11 o

Foreign crises

But immediately following the San Francisco round of discussions about Poland, with the talks called off in a storm of Western indignation, the Americans showed signs of weakening. Stettinius and Harriman suggested to Eden that Harriman and Clark Kerr stop off in London on their way back to Moscow. There, with Churchill and Mikolajczyk, they should try to agree on a form for a reorganised Polish government and on names of Poles to be included in it. The two ambassadors would then discuss the matter directly with Stalin. Harriman admitted the chances thus for agreement were slim but thought that the effort would at least narrow the differences between the two camps before the next Big Three meeting. 28 Eden was unenthusiastic, and, furthermore, he doubted that Mikolajczyk would be very interested while his friends languished in Russian gaols.29 In Whitehall also enthusiasm was restrained. Orme Sargent, Deputy Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, said that perhaps worst of all, 'the proposal [was] disquieting evidence of weakening on the part of Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Harriman 5 . 30 He thereupon prepared a powerful argument for Eden to use in talks with Truman, which Churchill sent off without changing a word. It began, 'American proposal... is futile if not dangerous', and predicted that the ambassadors would simply end up talking to Molotov whereupon, after some 'stone-walling' by him, the Americans would agree to something on the Yugoslav pattern. It said 'from the point of view of tactics, the suggestion is all wrong' and feared that news correspondents, who were already referring to it, ...may have done harm by giving the impression that we and the Americans are weakening... Please leave Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Harriman in no doubt of my [Churchill's] views and express them forcibly to President Truman on your way through Washington. The Embassy in Washington should also be guided by them in discussions with officials at the State Department.31 The period of the San Francisco Conference, also a time of initiation for a new American president, marked a high point in Washington's receptivity to British counsel, particularly to urgent appeals for solidarity and firmness towards the Soviets. With the two powers pulling so well in harness, it must have seemed to Churchill that his hopes for Anglo-America were closer to realisation than ever before, but in fact it was a fleeting moment. The current had changed, and the Americans quickly softened in regard to the Russians. It is difficult

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if not impossible to say why exactly. Perhaps the collapse of the Big Three talks on Poland at least removed Polish frustrations from the top position in US-Soviet relations, allowing the matter of defeating Japan to replace them. Perhaps the absence from America of such key hard-line figures as Eden, Harriman and Deane helps explain it. Whatever the cause, conditions in Washington with respect to the Soviet Union returned to normal, that is to concern about the sensitivities of the Russian allies and worry that they might not stay the course, which was now moved to Asia. Indeed, the heady days of late April and early May, days of close Anglo-American collaboration, of stern telegrams to the Soviet Union, of scolding Molotov in the White House and backing him against the boards at San Francisco, and finally of breaking off the Polish negotiations - these were the times that were truly irregular. This may have been one of those moments in history in which personalities, far more than policy considerations, determined events, and the key personality, the new one in the mix, was that of Harry Truman. It would be going beyond the scope of this study to try to analyse him to any significant extent in psychological terms. One might simply note, however, that, judging from his memoirs and other writings, especially his so-called 'autobiography', he was enormously impressed with the office of the President. Consequently, he must have been sensitive to the need to do it justice, particularly after it had just been held by one of the most important of presidents, something obvious even then. Furthermore, it must have seemed to him that he and his office were being insulted by the Soviets in connection particularly, but not exclusively, with issues arising over Poland, e.g., by apparent intransigence in the Moscow Commission, by underscoring recognition of the Lublin Committee on the very eve of the meetings in Washington and San Francisco, and by delaying an answer about the 16 Poles until finally revealing that they had been arrested. Truman seems not only to have been impatient, but to have gained a certain satisfaction from making crisp, clear decisions, whether they really came easily to him or not. Furthermore, he seems to have been very conscious of himself not only as President but in the daily process of performing the presidential role. Consequently, he may have been particularly responsive in late April and early May 1945 to pressure from the fabled colleagues and counsellors of Roosevelt - Churchill, Eden, Harriman, Deane, Forrestal - who were saying in effect, ' We

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mustn't let them get away with all this' and perhaps by implication, 'Are you, the President, going to let them get away with this?' The answer was, 'No, I'm going to talk to them in words of one syllable.' Truman, however, returned to efforts to mollify the Russians and continued them until Potsdam, when suddenly it seemed likely that the war could be won in the Far East without Soviet help. The Japanese were already extending peace feelers, and the atomic bomb had been successfully exploded in a test, indicating that it would probably succeed as a weapon. Still, Truman did not return to the position he took in April 1945 until he pronounced the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. American officials were inclining toward confrontation, but not dashing to it headlong. In short, April 1945, did not, as has sometimes been suggested, mark a turning point in American policy but rather a short-lived aberration in a RooseveltTruman policy flow that moved only slowly and irregularly towards the confrontation finally enunciated in March 1947.32 Meanwhile, on the Polish issue, as we shall see, the Western Allies eventually accommodated the Kremlin, and principally because of American pressure to do so.

10 BETWEEN SAN FRANCISCO AND POTSDAM

The American Administration seemed determined to have the issue of Poland's government solved before the Potsdam Meeting, scheduled for mid-July, and was much more willing than its British counterpart to make concessions to this end. Although there may have been little Churchill could do to slow the process, his efforts to 'stiffen' the US Government nevertheless reached a peak in the two-month period from mid-May to mid-July. Besides Poland, the issues on which he was prodding his American ally included Trieste, or more accurately the province of Venezia Giulia, and the eastward positioning of US and British troops. In the latter part of May, however, his campaign received a damaging blow when he learned that Truman might meet alone with Stalin before the next Big Three meeting. The idea was put to Churchill by Joseph Davies, a former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, and drew a powerful reaction, i.e., if Stalin and Truman met without him, he would not go to a subsequent conference of the three great Allies. When Truman heard this he denied ever intending to meet alone with Stalin except informally and in the context of a Big Three meeting.1 The episode must have been particularly irritating to Churchill, especially because he had proposed that he and Truman should have a meeting alone before the next conference of the three leaders. Truman refused for fear of appearing to ' gang up' on the Russians, just as Roosevelt had done with similar proposals before both the Teheran and Yalta Conferences. At nearly the same time that he sent Davies to London, Truman took the next major move on Poland by calling Harry Hopkins from retirement and suggesting he go to Moscow, see Stalin and try to straighten out all the questions that were vexing the alliance. The idea, apparently originating with Bohlen, appealed to Hopkins ' although he appeared too ill even to get out of bed and walk across

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" N " street'. After the briefest of instructions from the President, he was on his way, carrying with him the Administration's hopes that his association with Soviet leaders during easier moments in the alliance would be conducive to progress. Nothing about the mission, however, had been said to the British, a matter of some concern to the Foreign Office, wanting as it did a boycott of negotiations with the Soviets until the 16 Poles were released. In addition, Whitehall feared that the Americans might be content simply with 'papering over the cracks', as Woodward put it, in order to get an agreement, in which case there would be little that Great Britain by itself could do to compel the Russians to change their policy.3 Hopkins arrived in Moscow on 25 May and left on 7 June after talks with Stalin and Molotov about nearly every major question troubling east-west relations. These meetings have been discussed in a number of histories of the period and are recorded by Sherwood and by the State Department, 4 so there is no need to consider them here except as they figured in the Anglo-American interplay. During the Hopkins-Stalin talks, obstacles of many weeks' duration seemed to vanish. A list of Polish consultants on the new provisional government was quickly agreed upon, one Clark Kerr described as being about as good as could be hoped for.5 But if he was barely satisfied, Truman was delighted. He told Churchill 'Harry Hopkins has just sent me a most encouraging message about the Polish situation', and then he listed persons who might be invited to Moscow for consultations if the Prime Minister approved. Truman also wanted Mikolajczyk's approval and asked Churchill to use his influence to this end. Regarding the 16 Poles who were arrested, he said, most were charged only with operating illegal radio transmitters, and he added that Hopkins was pressing to get amnesty for them (unsuccessfully, as it turned out). 6 Churchill, caught up by Truman's enthusiasm, wired Hopkins saying, 'You are doing splendid work', and told Truman, 'Harry Hopkins has made very remarkable progress at Moscow and I am entirely in sympathy with what he has already achieved. ' 7 The Foreign Office, however, none too pleased with Hopkins' mission in any event, quickly dampened Churchill's spirits. R. I. Campbell, speaking for Eden, told the Prime Minister that ' no real progress' was involved ' towards securing a representative government in Poland which we can recognise, and which can ensure the holding of elections on a satisfactory basis... To secure this we shall certainly have to keep up the pressure. ' 8

San Francisco and Potsdam

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Halifax thereupon was instructed to tell the State Department that, without minimising Hopkins' 'admirable work', the Foreign Office felt little was accomplished until the Russians would allow a representative regime in Poland which would assure elections on a 'proper basis'. The Western powers must continue to press the Kremlin, the Foreign Office said, and must avoid giving the impression to either the Russians or to world opinion that 'the Polish question is solved'. 9 Churchill sent this same message to the President but with words of his own concurring in what Hopkins was doing. He added, however, that according to 'Yalta and its spirit', there should already have been a representative government in Poland, and he continued, 'I cannot feel therefore that we can regard this as more than a milestone in a long hill we ought never to have been asked to climb... Renewed hope and not rejoicing is all we can indulge in at the moment.' 10 Discouraging news, however, reached London on 6 June when Clark Kerr reported that only four new ministers would be brought into the new Polish government, according to what Stalin had told Hopkins.11 It was, in effect, the Yugoslav model with a vengeance, giving only about 15% of the government to non-Lublin Poles. Until then, it had been assumed by Western officials that the Yugoslav model meant that from one-third to two-fifths of the ministers would be persons outside the Lublin group. Law pointed out that, in addition, none of Mikolajczyk's 'improvements' on the list of names for consultants had been incorporated into those drawn up and submitted to the governments for approval, but said the worst feature 'from our own Parliamentary point of view' was the American willingness to resume discussions before the 16 Poles were released.12 But by then Churchill, too, had agreed to discussions on this basis. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office told Clark Kerr that by concurring in the list of consultants put forward by Stalin without further preliminary conditions the Western powers had made a 'marked retreat', and by agreeing that all invitations must have unanimous consent of Moscow Commission members they had in effect accepted the veto which the Soviets first proposed. It then told him to reject any prearranged formula or percentage and added the telling comment that the one absolutely essential requirement, if any settlement reached in Moscow is to be accepted by Parliament and public opinion here, is that His Majesty's Government should not lay themselves open to the charge of having followed the Munich pattern and imposed, for the sake of our

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relations with the Soviet Government, on an unwilling Polish people a settlement agreed upon in advance among the Great Powers.13 When Hopkins returned home he indicated that he had been handicapped by the fact that Truman had not discussed his mission in advance with Churchill. Why Truman did this is unclear, but possibly it was to avoid complicating the mission by having to reconcile diverse Allied counsel, especially as the US position was so much more conciliatory than the British. Hopkins, however, apparently felt uncomfortable about neither having a British representative at the meetings nor being in a position to deal directly with Churchill. ' I began to hear from Kerr that Churchill was obviously quite disturbed about the whole business', he reported,'but there was not very much he could say because it was probably to his political interest to get agreement on the Polish question before the British elections. ' 14 By early June, when Hopkins left Moscow, the Big Three governments had agreed on the Polish consultants. From then on things moved swiftly, and by 22 June Clark Kerr wired indicating that an agreement on a provisional Polish government had been reached. 15 Mikolajczyk became, with Wladyslaw Gomulka, one of two Deputy Premiers and also Minister of Agriculture. On 2 July, Truman told Churchill that, according to Harriman, the provisional regime had been established ' in conformity with the Crimean decision' and that the American Government would recognise it the next day. 'Any further delay', he said, 'would serve no useful purpose and might even prove embarrassing to both of us. I hope, therefore, you will agree to accord recognition simultaneously with us.' 16 The fact was that Churchill and the Foreign Office had hoped to withhold recognition until the provisional government had pledged to have free elections. However, they reluctantly concurred, and on 5 July 1945 both the US and UK recognised the new government.17

I I CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE POLISH CRISIS

Although the United States has often been seen as the key Western power in the Polish crisis, a close look at the Anglo-American dimension of the dispute shows that the US was, particularly in comparison with its British ally, quite a reluctant dragon. Furthermore, it becomes clear that during the Roosevelt years two very different philosophies of international politics, that of his Administration and that of Churchill's Government, competed with each other as the Western powers tried to deal with the Polish question. There is every reason to believe that Roosevelt, and probably Truman as well, would have allowed that question to be settled with much less confrontation and friction than actually resulted had they not been continually ' stiffened' by the British. Roosevelt would have done so if for no other reason than to preserve his vision of triangularity as the foundation of the postwar world. Truman would have done so simply to keep the Russians in the war, which was, of course, one of Roosevelt's motives also. For Churchill, however, convinced that the best hope for the future was a Pax Britannica-Americana, the Polish issue was part of the first serious challenge that the US-British consortium had to meet, the challenge of an overexpansive Soviet Union. Unfortunately for him, he was unable to keep his Atlantic partners in the breach until the end of the day. Their will to fight the battle in that place at that time was eroded by strong countervailing pressures. These included their perceptions of both the needs of the war in Asia and of the subsequent peace, a peace they sought to base on three-way cooperation. But another interesting question arises in regard to Churchill and Eden in relation to the Polish issue. Even when one acknowledges that they wanted to limit Russian influence in Europe, one still marvels at the fight they put up over Poland. The Soviet Union had strong interests there as Stimson recognised and told Truman, 1 and, furthermore, the Russians obviously had the power to make their will

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prevail. It would be a mistake to regard Stalin as completely insincere when he said he did not interfere when governments were being established in Belgium and Greece because he understood the importance of those matters to British security, and, therefore, he was not clear why the Western powers should not view the Soviet Union's interest in Poland in the same way.2 Of course, it would have been almost impossible for the Russians to affect events in Belgium in any case and possibly very difficult for them to do so in Greece, especially after the British sent troops there. That, however, only makes the parallelism more complete, because similarly there was nearly nothing the Western Allies could do about Poland but fulminate. Nonetheless, a position more accommodating to Soviet objectives was scarcely considered by the British Government. When in March 1944 Clark Kerr suggested that its policy was too hostile and that perhaps the British should try somehow to join the Russians and share the credit he believed they were gaining ' for supporting the new forces that are now stirring in Europe', Churchill said,' I don't like this stuff. He wd. give up anything to appease Stalin. ' 3 Again, a few days later when Churchill warned the Kremlin that Allied operations might be imperilled as a result of its intransigence and that Mikolajczyk's American trip in these circumstances might have very serious repercussions, Clark Kerr asked (in vain) that the threatening sound of this message be toned down before he delivered it.4 These calls for a more conciliatory approach also were squelched with that worst of epithets of the Churchill Government, 'appeasement'. Eden drafted a rather stiff telegram to the ambassador, contradicting his arguments for a friendlier policy, and Churchill added the sentence ' appeasement has had a good run', while also saying to Eden,' I wanted to tell you what an excellent telegram I think this is. ' 5 This effectively ended the soft line in the Coalition Government on the Polish issue. But the question remains: why were Churchill and Eden as uncompromising as they were? Undoubtedly they felt keenly the need both to restrict Russian power in Europe and to limit the spread of communist ideology, linked but separate phenomena, both abhorrent to them. But certainly they also felt the pressure of the elections, which even if not yet scheduled, could not long be put off. And here is another lacuna of Cold War historiography. Although the effect of the American elections on Roosevelt's policy towards Poland has frequently been pointed out, the effect of the British elections on the policy of

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Churchill and Eden has been virtually ignored, although it could well be argued that these elections were far more significant in the way matters developed.6 As we have seen, the concern of Churchill and Eden with public reaction to the Polish issue was clear in the documents that they wrote at the time and was certainly understood by American statesmen - Hopkins and Harriman, for example. Not the least of their problems was that a single state was gathering enormous power in Europe after Britain had fought for almost six years in great part to prevent just that. Furthermore, it seemed clear that the power was totalitarian, that very characteristic of the German regime which helped make it particularly loathsome to the British public. Finally, whereas Churchill frequently remarked that Great Britain had gone to war for Poland, that nation still remained under foreign domination. In addition, the eastern boundary that he agreed to at Yalta bore a striking resemblance to the MolotovRibbentrop Line of 1939, while Polish compensation in the west could be seen simply as an agreement that moved Soviet influence closer to London. Churchill and Eden, therefore, were keenly aware that charges of appeasement were in the wind, that in some quarters Yalta and Munich were being equated, and that Poland might become their Czechoslovakia. For politicians soon to fight an election with mainly wartime leadership and diplomatic achievements to point to, the Polish question could be vital.

SECTION 2 THE GREEK CRISIS

12 BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS

The Greek crisis of the 1940s provides a good perspective from which to view both Great Britain's dependency on the United States as the former tried to continue in a great power role and the ambivalence that resulted from that relationship. Because the story of the AngloGreek crisis has already been well told by other writers,1 one needs only to sketch it here to provide background for the Anglo-American relations of the period. First, however, one should consider what lay behind British interest in Greek affairs at that time, particularly because in subsequent years an enormous flow of rhetoric both attacking and defending Britain's involvement had tended to obscure its original purpose. Basically, the British motive was quite simple, i.e., to prevent Greece from coming under Soviet domination. Fears that the Russians, as they moved into eastern Europe, would gain important, if not predominant, influence in Greece and a foothold in the Mediterranean, thereby forming a potential threat to Britain's connections to the East, were key factors in Whitehall's policy. As early as January 1942 the Foreign Office saw the possibility, indeed probability, that defeat of the Axis would bring Eastern Europe under the political sway of the Soviet Union despite the fact that the Russians were at the moment reeling before a German onslaught. D. F. Howard, head of the Southern Department and responsible for Balkan affairs, expressed Whitehall's fears succinctly. 'If the Russians once get into the Balkans it will be a hard job to lever them out again', he said, adding ' the idea of an expeditionary force might now be

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2

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considered by the competent authorities'. In view of the deplorable military condition of the Allies, and especially the USSR, in January 1942, this is a remarkable suggestion, which only serves to highlight the degree of British concern. Foreign Office officials prescribed a two-fold plan: (1) Insertion of a Western army ' to drive... a wedge between the advancing Russians and the retiring Germans' when and if the Soviets gained the ascendancy, and (2) creation of a Balkan Federation 'to back it up politically'. 3 Stalin had been frank during Eden's trip to Moscow in 1941 about Soviet 'expansionist' plans, or perhaps 'hopes' is a better term, considering the date. These included annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina plus an alliance with Roumania permitting the Soviets to establish naval bases there. As one British official noted, the UK's position was an 'unpleasant dilemma'. On the one hand it was of vital interest to Britain's strategic needs that nothing be said or done to impair Anglo-Soviet relations; on the other it was in her ' ultimate interest' to lay plans ' to counter the expansionist moves by the Soviet Union' which were expected to take place when the war ended.4 In November of 1943, Eden, whose concern with this question was increasing, wrote, 'It would be against our own interests for Greece to be governed after the war by EAM', a communist-linked group with the largest guerrilla force (ELAS) in Greece and the core of Britain's troubles there. Eden believed, not unreasonably, that its leaders were 'likely to look to Russia' rather than the UK in the postwar period. Furthermore, he said that although the Russians regarded Greece as being within Britain's sphere of influence, that attitude 'might well change if EAM gained complete control in Greece'. 5 In June the following year Eden circulated a document to the Cabinet calling for a regime in postwar Greece that would look to Great Britain for support against Russia and thus help to check the spread of Soviet influence in the Balkans.6 In August 1944 he stressed to the Cabinet that Britain's interest in Greece lay in its strategic location in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. He said that given EAM tendencies plus possible predominance of Soviet influence in Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, ' an EAM government in Greece would almost inevitably look to Russia rather than to this country for support'. 7 It is, then, this overriding concern with Soviet penetration of

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Greece in one way or another that must be borne in mind as one views British actions there from 1943 to 1947. The Foreign Office expressed more anxiety over the situation than other sectors of the government, including even the Prime Minister's office, and constantly prodded Churchill and very reluctant Chiefs of Staff to take firm action. Before going further, however, one might note the remarkable extent to which attitudes that characterise what we call the Cold War, and particularly America in the Cold War, can be found in Britain's policy as its officials reacted to the Greek crisis. The very basis of British action was the same as that of the United States in many instances in succeeding decades, i.e., fear of expanding Soviet hegemony and influence by military or other means to the detriment of the West. Organisations linked with communist parties, such as EAM, were often regarded as preparing the way. In Greece, the means of coping with this situation included military confrontation, starting on a small scale and escalating, a pattern repeated more than once in later decades, most notably in Vietnam. Furthermore, in Greece as elsewhere, these means also included a wide range of economic and political measures - governments were to be reformed and liberalised, societies modernised, and economies vitalised in order to blunt the revolutionary appeal of the far left. Britain's initial cooperation with EAM/ELAS and later efforts to suppress them constituted one of the most controversial issues of the war. Both the political complexion and the objectives of EAM/ELAS have been the subject of enormous debate from the time the British began collaborating with them in 1941 until the present. The organisations have been portrayed as simply reformist and antimonarchy on the one hand and as communist fronts on the other. Probably the number of communists in the membership was small, but a group of party members held key positions in the leadership. They maintained relations with the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and through it with other communist parties in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union. Their Balkan comrades, however, were frequently more troublesome than supportive, nor were those in the Soviet Union ever particularly helpful.8 The extent to which the guerrilla bands really contributed to the fight against the Germans is still debated, but there is no question that they engaged in bloody battles between themselves with an eye to political control of Greece when the Germans withdrew. They were frequently dreaded by the civilian population, which not only

24

Foreign crises

provided men and supplies, and not always willingly, but also paid the price of fierce German reprisals for guerrilla acts of sabotage. 9 As early as March 1943 major reconsideration had been given in London to the question of supporting and supplying the guerrillas, especially ELAS, resulting among other things in a bitter wrangle between the Foreign Office and the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The latter was in charge of sabotage and paramilitary operations and was active in Greece.10 The military backed the SOE contention that the guerrillas, regardless of political views and connexions, were worthwhile allies against the Germans and should be encouraged and supplied by London.11 The Foreign Office, with Churchill's support, felt that, in the case of ELAS, the benefits scarcely outweighed the problems that would arise after that group was armed and strengthened from British stores.12 The latter point of view eventually prevailed, but not until November 1943 when agreement was finally reached to break with ELAS. Moreover, it would still be months before this policy took effect. In fact, although at various times HMG suspended arms shipments,13 it was not until October 1944, when the British occupied Athens and subsequently came into direct conflict with ELAS, that the break was completely made. The British sent troops into Greece only after long debate regarding first the duties and then the size of the force.14 By early December they were at war with EAM/ELAS and, most important from the Allied military point of view, they were requiring reinforcements from the campaign in Italy. 15 At that point the British Government ran into a storm of public criticism both in Britain and abroad, especially in the United States. Its actions were frequently seen as a high-handed right-wing effort to quash a heroic and popular guerrilla group with strong republican proclivities in order to force the country to accept a government headed by an unpopular king. Protests appeared not only in the press, but stemmed from individuals and organisations of many kinds, including British trade unions.16 To Whitehall's relief a truce was signed in February 1945, and a kind of peace came to Greece, broken frequently by excesses of both the right and the left. The King, who was at the centre of the storm, agreed to a regency, and relative quiet continued until the elections for an assembly on 31 March 1946. These elections, boycotted by EAM, returned a generally conservative government with a royalist premier, and a plebiscite held the following September resulted in an overwhelming call for the King to return. 17

Background of the crisis

125

The fighting, however, was far from over. Indeed, it had broken out on the eve of the March elections. Although at first not much more extensive than previous violations of the truce, it gradually escalated to a return of full-scale civil war that continued until nearly the end of 1949.18 In early 1943 the United States had become interested, if not greatly involved, in Greek affairs and in the issues vexing the British Government. Meanwhile, however, the British were in the main happy to have the Americans stay clear of the problem. When a combined US/UK command was once suggested for the Mediterranean, the Chiefs of Staff quickly pointed out that it would include the Balkans where operations could not be divorced from politics. The head of a unified command, they said, would receive political guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in other words from American as well as British officials, and day-to-day guidance would come from political advisers of both nationalities, a cause of'considerable delay and confusion'. Furthermore, the Greeks and Yugoslavs would play the British and Americans off against each other to their own advantage, the Chiefs said, but clearly the main problem was ' the opportunities thus afforded for American organisations, such as OSS and JICA, to operate in the Balkans', which 'would greatly increase the difficulties we already have in making rebel activities accord with the policies of His Majesty's Government'. 19 The Chiefs concluded their study by pointing out that there would be 'certain political disadvantages... if the US Government were to undertake an equal share of political direction in the Balkans and Turkey'. They suggested, therefore, that the British Chiefs of Staff and British advisers continue to be responsible for ' politcal guidance and civil affairs in these countries'. Their suggestion was accepted, and the British retained exclusive Allied responsibility for military affairs in Greece with little if any pressure from the Americans for change, although Washington was watching Greek political and military events with some interest. By late March 1943 the State Department had asked HMG several times for information on the political situation, especially unrest in Greek armed forces then stationed in Syria. The State Department, Halifax said, believed that the situation was more serious than it had first appeared and that it had more than military significance. He also said the Department believed that 'the British wished to keep the matter as secret as possible. ' 20

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The Foreign Office thereupon told the Americans that 'underground forces' and 'left wing politicians (in exile) in Cairo' were to blame for the disturbances. It also provided not only details of the Greek situation but of HMG's policy in regard to it, 21 a policy which, because of its strong support for the King, Halifax immediately realised would need to be carefully presented to critical American officialdom. Otherwise, it might create the impression that the UK was committed to a monarchy for Greece as a permanent solution. ' This would not I think be welcome to the Americans... apart from their normal republican prejudices they feel that such a policy would be contrary to the Atlantic Charter. ' 22 The US Government held very firm views on other aspects of the Greek situation, besides the question of the monarchy. For example, the State Department told Halifax it would 'be pleased to see the present Government broadened by the inclusion of appropriate political and resistance leaders from Greece itself, and then gave him such an excellent summary of the US position that it is worth quoting it at some length.
The United States Government believes that the principal Allied Governments should be careful to avoid any action which would create the impression that they intend to impose the King on the Greek people under the protection of an Allied invading force or that the Greek people can secure rewards of common victory only at the price of accepting the return of the monarchy. The United States Government would regard it as a great tragedy should any civil disturbance arise in Greece as a result of internal opposition to the return of the King in which it might be necessary for Allied troops to intervene. Consequently, while the United States Government wishes the Greek King and Government well in any efforts they make to obtain support of the Greek people and reinforce their authority in regard to Greek armed forces, it is not prepared to honour or actively to associate itself with measures designed to promote these purposes.23

Nonetheless, in spite of American anti-monarchical predilections, Whitehall presented its view that the King, having been a loyal ally against the Germans, merited full support. He was the constitutional head of the state, the British said, a fact which only the Greek people could change, and that for juridical and practical reasons, continuity in the Greek Government was desirable, which meant retaining the monarchy.24 Whitehall's message also stressed the usefulness to the Allies of dealing with a strong and properly constituted authority in

Background of the crisis

12 7

Greece and added its opinion that King George's presence at the head of a victorious army would help settle conditions in the country.25 It concluded, with a dash of cheek and unction, that 'owing to the long and profound tradition of friendship for England, the Greek people look to His Majesty's Government for guidance, and we cannot therefore adopt the non-committal attitude adopted by the United States Government'. Interestingly, it never so much as hinted that HMG was worried about a communist takeover of Greece, imperilling Britain's position in the Mediterranean. The Foreign Office knew that this was not a profitable line to take with the American Government, recognising that the threat of communist expansion was of less concern to Washington at this moment, with Roosevelt's hopes for a permanent Big Three, than it had been once (and would be again). Furthermore, at that time warnings of the Red threat left Americans particularly suspicious when mentioned in conjunction with British imperial interests. Nevertheless, the United States was demonstrating some interest in eastern Mediterranean affairs. A slightly perverse way of showing it occurred in March 1943, when a new US ambassador, A. C. Kirk, was named to the Greek Government with no one in Whitehall being consulted. This caused one British official engaged in Greek affairs to say, ' I think we can take it that the US Govt. have deliberately taken this action without consulting, or even informing us.' He speculated that this was ' part & parcel of the growing interest of the US in Mediterranean affairs and their growing tendency to take their part at the side of Britain as equal partners in SE Europe'. 26 In mid-June, E. R. Warner, a British official accredited to the Greek Government in Cairo, noted that ' during the last few months we have been more and more impressed by the growing American interest in Greek affairs, and the need for very close coordination between us and the American organisations concerned'. He said that his embassy inferred from a speech Roosevelt had recently made that the State Department was generally following the same policy as HMG. ' O n the other hand, irresponsible bodies such as OSS may be taking a different line.' Warner added that he and his colleagues were uneasy about ideas surfacing in the American press, especially the Greek-American press, about American participation in the military administration of the Balkans and asked the Embassy in Washington 'for periodic letters telling us what the American authorities and unofficial bodies are up to'. 27

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The British were preparing themselves for increased American interest in Greece but not yet trying to stimulate it, and, in fact, ' uneasy' about some of its implications, such as the sharing of military administration. Nevertheless, by August 1943 they had taken a major step - they had made a bid for American diplomatic backing. It happened after the Greek King learned that there were elements at home that wanted him to declare he would not return until recalled by a plebiscite. He told both Churchill and Roosevelt, then meeting together in Quebec, that he preferred to return with his troops, adding euphemistically that he could leave later if 'subsequent developments' made it 'politic' for him to do so.28 Eden and Churchill assured him that whatever his decision might be, the British Government would continue to give him its fullest support. 29 Meanwhile, Eden, urged on by Orme Sargent, suggested to Churchill that 'It would be most useful if you could induce the President to reply in similar terms.' 30 Consequently, Roosevelt, at Churchill's request, sent a similar message, although, due to the restraining influences of Hull and Assistant Secretary of State Adolfe Berle, it was far less personal or supportive of the monarchy. He said he hoped that all Greeks would accept the King's promise that following his return his present emigre government would resign and elections would be held as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the President hoped the Greeks would put their energies into winning the war. 31 Both the Churchill and Roosevelt letters were published, which was the object of the entire exercise, a king-boosting plan devised by the Greek Government and concurred in by British authorities. 32 A much more important gesture of American support for Britain's position was made in August 1943 at Churchill's behest. At that time Roosevelt approved of a British policy calling for the return of George II, to be followed, not preceded, by a plebiscite to determine the fate of the monarchy. This was at a time when many Greek political factions besides EAM insisted upon the plebiscite first.33 Furthermore, although Hull concurred in Roosevelt's endorsement, the position was contrary to the views of lower echelon State Department officers handling Greek affairs who felt that the prospect of a revived monarchy in Greece was fundamental to the political unrest among the population.34 State Department officers and Greeks alike knew that the 'government on the spot', as Harold Macmillan put it, could be expected to have 'tremendous power...to win a plebiscite'. 35 At the same time that the President was concurring with British

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policy, Washington was receiving messages from Kirk warning it to avoid British mistakes and to eschew interferences in the ' political life of foreign countries'.36 In addition, Berle reminded Hull that most Greek-Americans were 'violently anti-monarchist' and that the largest Greek newspaper in the US was campaigning in that sense. Consequently, the return of the King could become an American election issue, he said, and warned that the United States Government should be very cautious about committing itself to the British line. He suggested that Hull 'consider this a little further with the President and Mr Churchill' during Churchill's visit to the White House in September 1943. Peculiarly, Roosevelt stuck with HMG's policy even after Churchill and the Foreign Office had abandoned it, and therein lay the nub of an angry episode in US-UK relations, one that may well have prolonged the Greek crisis and also caused subsequent AngloAmerican affairs to become far more exacerbated than they would have been otherwise. Much of the British Government had always believed that King George's return to Greece should await, not precede, a popular mandate and that a regent should reign between the time the exiled Greek Government returned and the time a plebiscite on the monarchy could be held. After weeks of persuasion by SOE, the military leaders, the British Embassy to the Greek Government, and finally even the Foreign Office, Churchill was reluctantly brought around to this view, giving it his approval on 3 December 1943, the day after the Teheran Conference ended. The British and American leaders had returned to Cairo for several days of meetings amongst themselves following the three-power sessions at Teheran. There Eden asked authority to convince King George not to return to Greece until a plebiscite called him back and to make a public announcement to that effect. Eden proposed to say that this was really George's only means of getting back and that his agreement to it was the only way to unite the Greeks against the Germans.37 All of that may have been true, but undoubtedly the main object of the new policy was to undercut EAM/ELAS, who presented themselves as the principal champions of Greek republicanism. On a summary of Eden's proposals, Churchill wrote, 'approve tho w "regret"'. 38 Now it only remained to twist the King's arm; there was no way he could resist effectively. Or was there? A few days later there were inklings that the King

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could no longer be bullied. He had found a very powerful patron, and the UK policy was in tatters. On 16 December following a tete-a-tete with the Monarch, Roosevelt was 'cold', Eden said, and reprimanded him for the way he had been treating King George. On the way to the airport with Churchill the next morning, the President, who Churchill said was ' much wrought up', complained bitterly of the Foreign Secretary's conduct. 'He said that I was trying to deprive the King of his crown and that I had no right to do this', Eden said.39 Roosevelt apparently told George that he had not been consulted on Britain's new policy and urged that Monarch not to agree to it. Furthermore, Roosevelt scolded his new ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, for advising the King to accept Eden's advice. He told him not to associate himself thereafter with any effort to force the monarch to take action against his will, and said that George need make no declaration unless he so desired.40 By encouraging the King to follow his inclination and reject the regencyplebiscite plan, Roosevelt automatically encouraged Churchill to follow similar inclinations and renege on his earlier agreement. It was, therefore, more than 12 months before the plan went into effect, fateful months for Greece and for the Atlantic Allies. Whitehall was furious, and Eden quickly retorted to the charge that the President had not been informed. He had told Hopkins, MacVeagh and John Winant, American ambassador to St James's, of Britain's new policy.41 MacVeagh and Hopkins said they would recommend it to the President and, in fact, MacVeagh sent HMG a copy of his memorandum doing just that.42 Meanwhile, Jan Smuts, believing the return of the King was the best answer for Greece, gave George the same advice Roosevelt had given and then reported to the British that, as a consequence of Roosevelt's words, George had begun to think of the Americans as his friends and the British as his enemies.43 Roosevelt's motives in the episode are nearly unfathomable. He is reported as saying he had not been informed of the new British policy, which seems clearly false, but occasionally the word 'consulted' is used rather than 'informed', and this might be the crux of the matter. No one from the British Government seems to have ' consulted' with him personally on the question, not too surprising perhaps considering how he was holding them at arm's length during the days when they took his decision. Consequently, he may have been teaching them a lesson, i.e., they should consult with him before making a decision of

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this magnitude, particularly on a question in which they had personally involved him. After all, he had taken a position on the monarchy issue that was contrary to the opinion of much of the State Department only after a personal appeal from Churchill at Quebec. Therefore, it may have been particularly irksome to him to discover that his allies, after indicating their intentions only at a lower-level of government, had done an about-face and left him marching alone, carrying an out-moded British banner. Perhaps also part of the explanation lies with the Teheran Conference. Between the lines of its records as well as those of its bracketing conferences in Cairo are indications of enormous personal tensions, albeit stemming in great part from Roosevelt's own political policy of standing clearly apart from the British. Possibly some kind of residual irritation motivated him in his talks with the King of Greece, causing him to jab in effect at Eden particularly and perhaps also at Churchill. Or he may simply have been asserting an independent American position, continuing the point he had made at Teheran. It is, of course, also possible that Roosevelt was sincerely convinced that the King had the better case and was genuinely aggrieved.44 In October, after all, not two months earlier, he had told the Greek ambassador in Washington that King George had a right to return to Greece as Commander-in-Chief of his army. 45 In addition, he wrote to MacVeagh that' a tiny spot in the Mediterranean, like Greece, has its reputation enhanced if it has a constitutional monarch'. 46 Evidence is too slim to do more than speculate about Roosevelt's motives. The episode, however, has particular significance in that it was probably the main cause of the delay, until December 1944, of a change in British policy, during which time Churchill refused to countenance renewed suggestions for a regency and then a plebiscite.47 It is, of course, impossible to describe exactly what the effect on the Greek crisis would have been had the new policy been adopted in December 1943 rather than a year later. Nonetheless, the delay surely helped to solidify the position of EAM/ELAS, permitting its leadership, in MacVeagh's words, ' to spread those suspicions which have made so many genuine Greek patriots their collaborators in an armed attempt against the state'. 48 When that attempt was made in December 1944, British policy, ironically, came under enormous American criticism. As a result, the Roosevelt-George II affair caused far greater strain to be put on Anglo-American relations than there might otherwise have been.

13 1944, THE CRITICAL YEAR

By 1944 the American Administration had still stayed aloof from Greek politics with the few execeptions mentioned, including, of course, the momentous one when Roosevelt met King George. Nevertheless, US officials in Cairo even by the end of 1943 had begun recommending greater American involvement, taking the line that only the US could handle Greek matters properly. The acting American military attache reported that ELAS and EDES, warring guerrilla bands, could be reconciled only if the King would announce that he would not return until a plebiscite had been held, which would require a change in British policy. (Just such a change had been aborted, of course, only a few days earlier by the President.) Even then, according to a State Department paper based on his report, only an American officer or an Allied mission headed by an American could effect a reconciliation in Greece. 1 MacVeagh, who held similar views, feared that the US would be tainted by 'association with British schemes' which sat uneasily, he thought, with what Americans considered to be an 'agreed-upon program for the postwar world'. These 'schemes', which aimed at 'the preservation of Empire connections', would eventually lead Britain into an unsuccessful conflict with the Soviet Union, something that could be avoided only if the Balkans were 'reconstructed as genuinely free and friendly to both sides'.' Only the United States can undertake this task', he said, adding that it should be known that' the United States was running the job'. He also feared that in order to win the war America might sacrifice the ideals for which it fought, and warned his government that if the US sold the people of the Balkans ' down the river to the British... the preponderance of power will certainly drag them to Russia's side'. 2 In December 1944, following the outbreak of fighting between the British and ELAS, MacVeagh made another plea for the United States to become more active in Greek affairs, suggesting this time

ig44-> the critical year

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that it do so in consort with others. Writing again to the President, he said that only an impartial agency could provide for the necessary political compromise and suggested a commission of the Big Three nations to mediate in the crisis.3 Stettinius quickly pointed out that Churchill would immediately veto the idea ' as he appears acutely to fear Russian penetration into Greece', and counselled the President to 'refuse any possible counter-proposal to intervene on a purely Anglo-American basis'.4 MacVeagh was left only to lament that earlier advice calling for US military intervention was not heeded. The United States 'would have disarmed and reformed the guerrillas', he said, without suspicion of its motives such as attached to the British. ' Now the British are paying for many follies, and we who are "not involved" will also pay, in the loss of prestige and good will which the Western Powers are going to suffer from Mr. Churchill's policies in Greece and Yugoslavia. ' 5 Meanwhile, 1944 had been a year of dramatic events in Greek affairs, the first being a mutiny beginning on 3 April among Greek armed forces stationed in Egypt which British troops were required to quell.6 Two days after the rebellion began, Prime Minister Tsouderos agreed to resign on the assumption that his long and close association with the King might hamper a solution.7 He also made clear his feeling that the military unrest stemmed from a firm belief in the ranks that the King should not return to Greece until called back by a plebiscite, a sentiment being skilfully exploited by EAM. In addition to disorders in certain Greek army units, the crews of five Greek naval vessels had called for a republic and for resignation of all members of the present government.8 Under these circumstances, Churchill determined to reduce the Greek armed presence in Egypt, where politics were heady and fighting men idle, by dispatching the more reliable army formations to Italy.9 Eight days later he wired to Reginald Leeper, British ambassador to the Greek Government, and to 'all principals concerned' that they should not worry too much about reports of' very bitter criticism in America and Russia' and 'on no account accept any assistance from American or Russian sources, otherwise than as especially enjoined by me'. 10 Clearly, Churchill was still determined that political affairs in Greece were not to be shared even with the Americans regardless of his desire for a special kind of Anglo-American alliance. Better for the British to struggle alone than to become involved with the Americans with their anti-imperial

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biases, and the crisis in Greece, relating as it did to the Mediterranean highway of Empire, was viewed in America to a great extent as an imperial crisis. Furthermore, he knew that if the Americans were involved, they would probably want to divide responsibility with the Soviets in the spirit of trilateral cooperation. Churchill told Roosevelt that the recent rebellion in the Greek armed forces had been fomented by 'Communists and left-wing elements in the Army and Navy and not primarily by the politicians \ n 'There is little doubt', he explained,' that the extremist elements who have long been working to subvert the allegiance of the Greek forces to their legitimate King and Government seized on this as a heaven sent opportunity for open and violent action.'12 But there was no suggestion that help was needed or desired. Roosevelt replied simply that he hoped that the British ' line of action' would bring the Greeks back into the camp of the Allies.13 In June 1944, however, an important change developed in British views on America's relationship with Greece. It followed a conference of various factions in the Greek dispute held in the Lebanon in May, approximately a month after the military rebellion had been put down. The conference seemed to produce a spirit of reconciliation and an assumption by all, including the new Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, that the King would not return until a plebiscite called upon him to do so. Furthermore, EAM was asked and agreed to take part in the new government. It was splendid but fleeting harmony, ending within two months, when in July EAM laid down further conditions for its participation.14 Meanwhile, Whitehall took an important new step. Seeing the 'healthy atmosphere' of the Lebanon deteriorating in Cairo, it asked the State Department ' whether they would instruct their ambassador to [the] Greek Government to collaborate closely with his United Kingdom colleague to maintain position'.15 The State Department was cautious, claiming that it had little direct information regarding the Lebanon Conference and that it did 'not wish to intervene in Greek internal affairs'. Furthermore, the US Government was ' particularly reluctant... to risk becoming involved in supporting interests of any faction or individuals'. It would, however, within these limitations, 'use its friendly influence to promote the cause of Greek unity'. MacVeagh was thereupon instructed to consult with Leeper regarding encouragement and assistance that might be offered the Greeks in settling their differences.16

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Here was a political watershed - Whitehall had called for American help with Greek affairs, and, equally significant, the Americans had accepted, although it would be some time before they would act in any but the most neutral manner. One Foreign Office official complained that lack of a 'positive line over Greece', did not accord very well 'with the high moral tone they adopt about spheres of influence'. He admitted however, that 'in practice the arrangement should not work too badly, for MacVeagh, though not very enterprising, is quite helpful, and we shall no doubt be able to get the US Gov's positive support on any specific point if we ask for it'. 17 Many persons, certainly many US officials at the time, would have disputed his assertion that an aversion to both spheres of influence and Balkan politics was inconsistent. The aloof American attitude, however, was much in the minds of Whitehall officials when in May Eden proposed that the Soviets and the British agree that the former would have predominant influence in Roumania and the latter in Greece.18 Surely this was an attempt to protect British interests in Greece before Soviet armies seized nearly total control of eastern Europe. The idea had very little appeal in Washington, however, and in a rather testy correspondence with Churchill, Roosevelt supported Hull, who was most reluctant to condone such an arrangement. ' In our opinion', the President said, 'this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters. ' 19 Roosevelt then declared his preference for consultative machinery to 'dispel misunderstandings', and inhibit tendencies towards 'exclusive spheres', a notion which Churchill scorned. 'Action is paralysed', he said, 'if everybody is to consult everybody else about everything before it is taken... A consultative committee would be a mere obstruction, always overridden in any case of emergency by direct exchanges between you and me, or either of us and Stalin. ' 20 Eventually the United States Government reluctantly agreed to the Roumania-Greece arrangement on the understanding that it be a question purely of military administration and of only 90 days' duration. 21 In fact, however, because of American reservations Stalin declined to negotiate further on the matter with the British. Nevertheless, the idea of such an agreement remained attractive to Churchill, Eden, and other British officials who watched with alarm as the Russians moved deeper into eastern Europe. Their anxiety peaked in September 1944, and urgent messages flew from Eden to

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Churchill, again in Quebec, calling for immediate military intervention in Greece while there was still time. Furthermore, a diplomatic move was desired as well if Greece was to be protected from Soviet influence. It was to avoid these emergency measures that Churchill had tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain an Allied offensive in the eastern Mediterranean, which, whatever its merits or drawbacks, would have established Western influence in the Balkans. Having failed to achieve that, the British Government by now had decided in principle to send troops to Greece, but that was no longer felt to be enough. Something on the lines of the Roumania-Greece arrangement suggested in May continued to appeal. Consequently, very shortly after the second Quebec Conference, Churchill and Eden met with Stalin in Moscow and negotiated a more complex version of that proposal, the celebrated 'percentages' agreement. The story of this agreement has been told numerous times, but is worth repeating briefly here because it has never been told from the vantage point of Anglo-American relations. Yet those relations played a significant part in the events surrounding the agreement and the agreement in turn affected the relationship, in general straining it. Churchill told Roosevelt that this meeting with Stalin was to have 'two great objects': first, 'to clinch his coming in against Japan' and second, 'to try to effect a friendly settlement with Poland', adding with a tone so casual that it approached deception, 'There are other points too about Greece and Yugoslavia which we could also discuss.'22 Greece and the Balkans, potentially troublesome points with the Americans, were, of course, among the main issues to be considered. Roosevelt and his aides were far from enthusiastic about the meeting. For one thing, they worried that Stalin would react badly to any doubt he might perceive on the part of the Westerners regarding his intention to help in Asia.23 For another, they feared that a sphere-of-influence arrangement in the Balkans was in the offing.24 Roosevelt declined Churchill's suggestion to send a special emissary, either Marshall or Stettinius, saying rather that he would ask Ambassador Harriman to be his observer. Churchill, apparently having second thoughts about American participation, thereupon became 'somewhat guarded', to quote the official history,25 and said he was sure Roosevelt would not want to preclude 'private tete-atetes' between him and Stalin.26 Obviously Churchill did not want

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to tell Roosevelt that he hoped to make an 'arrangement' with the Soviets about eastern Europe, probably sensing that this would have a sphere-of-influence tone that would sound no better in Washington than the similar proposal had several months earlier. Consequently, it is no surprise that the 'percentages' agreement was reached at a meeting which did not include Harriman, and although Churchill and Stalin joined in assuring Roosevelt that his ambassador would 'sit in as an observer at all meetings where business of importance was to be transacted', that pledge was made the day after the agreement was reached.27 It will be remembered that at this session Churchill, according to his own account, passed a piece of paper to Stalin with percentages marked on it to indicate the amount of influence the British and Soviets would have in various eastern European countries.28 Britain was to have 90% influence in Greece and the Soviets 90% in Roumania. They would share 50-50 in Yugoslavia and Hungary, while in Bulgaria the Soviet Union would have 75% and the British 25%. Obviously such fine measurements are absurd if taken too literally. Yet in a subsequent meeting of the foreign ministers during this visit, Eden and Molotov haggled over these quantities as though they were bargaining over a rug in a bazaar, with Molotov trying, eventually successfully, to trim Britain's figures. The final tally showed changes in Russia's favour in regard to Bulgaria and Hungary (USSR 80-UK 20 in both cases).29 Churchill, be it said, had hoped that a meeting of the Big Three could take place shortly after the second Quebec Conference. He made the trip to Moscow only after this proved impossible, Roosevelt being unwilling to participate until at least mid-November because of the presidential elections that month.30 According to Lord Moran, the Prime Minister, irritated by Roosevelt's attitude, growled that the Red Army was not going to stand still until after the US elections and then made his Moscow arrangements.31 The importance of the 'percentages' agreement in real political terms can probably never be determined exactly.32 The Soviets did not interfere on behalf of the Communist Party and E AM in Greece, perhaps to some degree because of it. According to Vojtech Mastny, one of the leading Western analysts of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, Stalin stood aloof because it was evident that the EAM would fail. Hence, he took the opportunity to gain credit with the British which he might use later ' in averting Western intercession on behalf

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of his own unruly clients'. Therefore, according to this interpretation, the Kremlin kept the agreement, but for cynical reasons. 33 On the other hand, it used the agreement to help justify the tight restrictions it imposed on the Western powers in eastern Europe, and for a time Churchill felt constrained in objecting because of it. 34 For example, having agreed in Moscow that the Soviets could have predominant influence in Roumania, he hesitated to protest what he thought was objectionable Soviet policy there, and so asked the Americans to do it instead.35 The irony in that could hardly have escaped Roosevelt, considering his reluctance about the Moscow meeting specifically and spheres-of-influence arrangements generally. In late 1944, less than two months after the conclusion of the percentages understanding, affairs in Greece became critical, and the British Government felt still more urgently the need for a show of solidarity from the United States. For example, Churchill, himself recently and reluctantly acquiescing (for the second time) in the regency-plebiscite idea, suggested that Roosevelt make a public statement, wishing success to Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens, the man soon to become regent.36 Then, on 26 December, little more than a year after Roosevelt's fateful meeting with King George of Greece, Churchill and Eden arrived in Athens, where at last the British Prime Minister was firmly convinced of the need for a regency and the advisability of Damaskinos' candidacy. Churchill wired Roosevelt their decision that the King not return until a plebiscite called him back, and added, ' I count on you to help us in this time of unusual difficulty. In particular I should like you to tell your Ambassador in Athens to make contact with us and to help all he can in accordance with the above principles', i.e., principles for which he said Great Britain was engaged in Greece, those of helping that country and seeking nothing 'in territory or advantages'. 37 Here was another significant advance in the Coalition Government's willingness to call its American ally into the Greek crisis, although its request was minor compared to the involvement the Labour Government would seek within the year. Roosevelt replied at once that he had asked MacVeagh to call on Churchill as soon as he could and that he himself was prepared to give all possible assistance.38

14 THE ROLE OF THE PRESS

Before discussing the height of the crisis, it may be useful to discontinue briefly our review of diplomatic events and consider the very important role of the press on both sides of the Atlantic, but especially in America. The diplomacy of the period is surely more easily understood if one is first aware of the atmosphere created largely by the communications media. Generally speaking, American journalists considered the British occupation of Greece and subsequent efforts to put down a rebellion led by the EAM as efforts to squelch legitimate Greek aspirations for a democracy without a monarch. Media criticism peaked within days of 3 December 1944, when fighting first broke out. Although Roosevelt's Administration for the most part maintained rather low-keyed support for British policy in Greece, it was put under considerable pressure by the strident criticism of American media. Consequently, on 5 December, the American Secretary of State criticised British policy in a statement to the press, a clear effort to distance the American Government from Britain's undertaking in Greece. Stettinius's statement is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, so it is sufficient here to say that it added fuel to the blaze of media criticism, helping it reach a high point and simultaneously sinking Anglo-American relations to one of the lowest levels of the war. Anti-British feeling generally in the United States seemed to British diplomats to be at its peak in December 1944 and January 1945, and centred principally on HMG's policy in Italy, Belgium and Greece. 1 It was more than coincidence that this was almost exactly the period in which UK troops were fighting the Greek rebels, for if Great Britain's feats of arms had been generally overlooked by the American media during World War II, this engagement was a notable exception. The gist of American press commentary regarding HMG's policy towards Greece can be illustrated by a few examples sent to London.

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The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10 December 1944, stated: The confidence which Commons expressed in Prime Minister Churchill by a 279-10-30 vote on the [issue of policies in Greece among other questions] proves only that a House which is representative of pre-war England is unwilling to relinquish him as the rallying point for the British will to win the war. It could not by any feat of imagination be taken to indicate popular support for the Churchill policies which were the occasion for a vote. The outspoken comment of British newspapers proves that exactly the reverse is true... Churchill's policy has resulted in civil war in Greece... The verdict of world opinion is clearly and overwhelmingly 'no confidence'.2 [The House of Commons vote is discussed in more detail on page 149 of this study.] The Arkansas Gazette, 10 December 1944, said, 'When Premier Churchill defends the use of British troops in Greece as an intervention against mob rule by murder gangs.. .he passes a judgement whose correctness it will be for future events to determine. 5 The article said that in 1776 American colonists were viwed by HMG as ' rebels against constituted authority' but added that' history exalts them as the founders of American freedom and independence'. 3 The liberal weekly The Nation on 24 December 1944 ran an article by Michael Clark declaring that 'In Greece, at this moment, the invasion, which was to have brought liberation, is bringing white terror instead. ' 4 By Christmas Eve 1944, just as Churchill and Eden were embarking for Athens to interview Damaskinos among other things, the British Embassy in Washington reported that, ' Depression about European politics has, if anything, deepened this week. Indignation with Britain has given way to a kind of disgruntled and disenchanted cynicism.' Americans, the embassy said, were coming to believe that power politics and spheres of influence were 'a constant element in the European scene, and that the sooner America realises this, the better for all concerned'. 5 All of this strengthened the isolationists and was worse for Britain because it came not from enemies but from disillusioned friends. An interesting analysis, it is from a weekly political summary almost surely drafted by Isaiah Berlin who produced these at that time. It is worth quoting at some length: Our principal supporters now consist of that small group of opinion,

Role of the press

14 1

reflected in such * centre' newspapers as the New York Times, Baltimore Sun, New York Herald Tribune, etc. which looks on Russian intentions with suspicion, (though without alarm), still feels much natural sympathy with the general outlook of the British Government and proceeds on the assumption that although there may be much to criticise in our Mediterranean policies, we are too old and valued an ally and understanding with us is too important vis-a-vis the USSR to be damned so harshly over a situation so confused. But beyond this small group of soft voiced moderates and supported by those friendly but troubled Washington officials who regret the public pandemonium in which Anglo-American relations, complicated as they must in the best of cases be, are being carried on, we seem to have little visible support in any camp... Although your speeches and Prime Minister's during past fortnight have been reported in the press, the public is not in a mood to absorb their substance, since it is preoccupied, not with specific rights and wrongs of the Greeks (although prevailing assumption is that those who side with Balkan kings are self-condemned) as much as with allegedly cold and calculating realism with which Britain and Russia are pursuing their national policies in Europe. This is viewed as showing a general temper so deeply out of sympathy with the American attitude which looks fervently to Atlantic Charter and Dumbarton Oaks as the only proper basis for building the future - and as proving therefore so great a spiritual distance between Europe and America, that that intimate collaboration between the Great Powers in building a new heaven and new earth, which some here perhaps unconsciously and unrealistically have been expecting, is now seen receding beyond the clouds. Veering as many persons in this country do between extremes of sentimental idealism and 'dynamic' materialism, they have been awakened from former of these states so harshly, that they are divided between a wistful hope that this may be but a temporary lapse on the part of the British Government which the British people themselves will presently bring to an end, and a relevant admission that it is they who had over-estimated goodwill of Europeans, and that the world is a far colder, bleaker, harsher place than they had led themselves to believe and that a mental readjustment must be made accordingly... ... In this country where criticism is usually shouted at the top of the voice it is often hard to tell when the surface is disturbed whether the waters are deeply moved. It does not follow from what is said above that the American people are about to swing sharply into Isolationism or to sustained opposition to British policy.6 In the midst of the American media fusillade, The Economist fired a resounding salvo on 30 December 1944. Rebuffing American criticism

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of British policy in general and towards Greece and one or two other areas in particular, it said in its lead article: What makes the American criticisms so intolerable is not merely that they are unjust, but that they come from a source that has done so little to earn the right to postures of superiority... when the criticism comes from a nation that was practising Cash-and-Carry during the Battle of Britain, whose consumption has risen through the war years, which is still without a national service act - then it is not to be borne. According to British officials Americans were sobered, surprised and irritated by the Economist article and by similar strong comments in The Times and The Yorkshire Post and wondered why the British were so touchy.7 As the embassy report pointed out, however, the British, despite their problems with the American press, were fortunate to have several very important journals on their side. On 23 January, for example, the New York Times correspondent in Athens wrote: With regard to the origin and conduct of the present disastrous struggle, the prevailing feeling here is that ELAS would have found it impossible to begin and sustain civil war had it not received arms, funds and propaganda backing from the Allies. What is referred to abroad as ' British intervention' with the imputation of some sinister motive, is construed here not only as a gesture for which the greatest thanks are due but as one which the British were in honor bound to make... Here there's an almost universal conviction that unless the sting is drawn from EAM and ELAS a repetition of last month's performance is inevitable... In this respect it is frequently pointed out that philanthropic foreign observers have no families obliged to live in Greece.8 Besides the three major Eastern papers mentioned in the British dispatch, some of the most important journalists also backed Whitehall's position in Greece. Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, and Raymond Gram Swing, for example, all defended British and criticised American policies. Lippmann, in fact, maintained that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to interim governments established to create conditions for free elections, and said American noninvolvement helped create political chaos. 9 These viewpoints were, among other things, indications that important segments of American opinion were beginning to parallel official British policy in calling for US involvement in international and particularly European affairs. The British cause in America was helped by the fact that ELAS

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continued fighting after the regency was established and after the King had agreed to remain in exile until recalled by a plebiscite. These developments gave 'a jolt to those who identified ELAS with the light and Messrs. Leeper and Scobie [British commander in Greece] with the forces of darkness', said Britain's Embassy in Washington.10 The embassy claimed also that 'The net effect is a consciousness that something is seriously but not irremedially amiss in Anglo-American relations, that the sooner both countries cease from abusing each other and consider their differences with patient understanding, the better for themselves and the world.' A week later it said the ' attacks of Economist and other British organs [were]... to some degree salutary' but warned that' further efforts in this direction may well boomerang'. 11 By the latter part of January the embassy reported a ' renewed sense of bi-partisan cooperation in the making of the peace, and the general and inevitable reaction to the orgy of recrimination between the American and British presses'.12 Meanwhile, in the days when the American press was most vociferous, in December 1944 and January 1945, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information were understandably disturbed and searching for ways to remedy the situation. Instructions went from Whitehall to Halifax which spoke of the 'violent press campaign' being conducted on the basis of' false premises, unfounded suspicions and unsupported prejudices in lieu of information', and called on him 'to take every possible step to check the flow of mischievous misrepresentations'.13 Halifax's job would not be easy. As he pointed out to Whitehall, 'Americanjournalists in the Middle East, returned officials of O.S.S. and others disagree with our estimate of size, importance and to some extent character of EAM and ELAS.' That difference in diagnosis, he said, meant 'that our version of facts, however fully presented and however often repeated, is largely disbelieved'. American comment, he observed, was to a great extent emotional, stemming from deepseated prejudices, 'intractable by argument', about spheres of influence, royalty and a perceived desire on the part of the British to restore vanquished monarchs.14 Meanwhile, the British press was being obstreperous also. According to Leeper, Reuter's account of the first day of the troubles, 3 December 1944, was ' emotional and inaccurate'. 15 He described British correspondents generally in Greece as 'third-rate', 'politically naive' and 'journalistically irresponsible'.16 Another member of the Foreign Office neatly sum-

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marised Whitehall's dilemma when he commented, ' It is too much to expect our people in America to be able to put the right line across when we cannot even do so here', 17 and indeed, the British press caused part of Halifax's problems. In June 1945, for example, he had to call upon London for information to counter an article from London's New Statesman, highly critical of Britain's policy in Greece, which was being quoted in the United States. 18 With the roar of American criticism continuing in 1945, the British Embassy in Washington embarked on an intensified public relations programme. Leading the assault was Michael Wright, Acting Counsellor. His activities in this area seem to have begun with a talk on British policy to a group of broadcasters in New York City which led to a radio interview. But perhaps more important, he began a series of meetings with radio commentators and newspaper columnists to encourage them to criticise, not British, but American policy for shirking responsibility in Greece, Yugoslavia and elsewhere. He also hoped, he said,' to dispel the legend that British foreign policy sought to build up a ring of reactionary governments as a counter to Russia'. He added with schoolboy pluck, ' It is a dangerous game for us here to inspire criticism of American policy. But risks have to be taken at times. I felt somebody must take the fences. ' 19 In addition to conferring with journalists, Wright gave a series of talks around the country. For example, he spoke to the Foreign Policy Association and the Association of University Women in Philadelphia, to the League of American Pen Women and a group of Republican congressmen in Washington, to the Rotary Club and the Council on Foreign Affairs in Detroit, plus many other groups from coast to coast. He said ' I rubbed in the facts about Greece as hard as I could on each occasion. ' 20 It is extremely difficult to evaluate the effect of a public or press relations effort, but if Wright accomplished what he claimed, his achievements were close to spectacular. Enclosing a wad of newspaper articles which supported British policy in Greece, for which he took some credit, Wright implied that he also influenced one article in Life, two by Joseph C. Harsch in the Christian Science Monitor, one by James Reston in the New York Times and a broadcast by Raymond Gram Swing, all on the subject of British policy in the Balkans, but especially Greece.21 They all called for American involvement, except for Reston who speculated that, in fact, a cautious shift in this direction was already taking place. Harsch was particularly critical of the United States Government for shunning responsibility and not taking

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a public stand with Great Britain, saying 'it was precisely this kind of dissociation from Allied actions which led to the open issues over Italy and Greece', (referring to the furore over Stettinius's press statement discussed in more detail in the next chapter).22 The Life article dated 5 February 1945 was a powerful call for US involvement in countries harmed by the war, particularly Greece. It said the British asked the Americans to join the occupation of that country (it is unclear what the authors have in mind here; one is tempted to say they are simply in error) and concluded 'Our government cannot criticize Churchill's policy, unless we are willing to help make it. And we have an interest in helping to make it. Yes, even way out there in the eastern Mediterranean. For Russia is also interested in the eastern Mediterranean. And Anglo-Russian relations are of vital concern to the US.' 2 3 But Wright's victory was only partial. On 15 July 1945, for example, PM, a New York paper consistently critical of British foreign policy, ran a story entitled 'Eyewitness report on reign of terror in Greece' with a subhead, 'Men and women anti-fascists jailed, tortured by the thousands.' The text described excessive overcrowding in gaols, torture of women, and mass arrests, and said, ' These are not ordinary criminals, but only people who disagree with the current policies of the pro-monarchist leaders... The public is largely unaware of it, but the torture continues today. '24 The PM story especially stung Churchill.' What can be done about this?' he asked Eden, 'Is there the slightest foundation for such tales? If so, what action will be taken? If not, how is the falsehood to be dealt with?' 25 Meanwhile, Halifax wired for 'guidance' urgently because the story was 'certain to attract attention' in the United States.26 The embassy in Athens called it a 'travesty' and, while admitting that prison conditions left much to be desired, thought nevertheless that PM must have relied on outdated information from 'the period immediately after the revolution'. It assured Churchill, however, that a prisons expert would be attached to the police and gendarmerie mission and that he would investigate conditions and suggest longterm reforms.27 As 1945 wore on, the media focussed on the other, more momentous events of that year, easing the strain that much of its commentary about Greece had caused the Atlantic Allies. Nevertheless, sporadic criticism of the British role continued until the Americans largely assumed that role in 1947.

15 THE CRISIS PEAKS

As we have seen, America's generally neutral official stance relative to Greek affairs became irksome in some British quarters especially in late 1944 and early 1945, particularly in conjunction with continual American criticism. Although the criticism was mostly in the public prints, some of it came from other sources, sometimes from officials. In the aftermath of the April 1944 mutiny, Leeper complained of being accused by many of intervening unduly in Greek affairs and said, 'the Americans here who refuse to accept any responsibility themselves make admirable armchair critics'. 1 Unmoved by his envoy's discomfort, Churchill had Eden tell Leeper not to worry about appearances but to put an end to the intrigues going on in Egypt among the Greeks in exile there. 2 Then, more significant for our study, Eden told the ambassador to keep ' in constant touch' with his United States and Soviet colleagues and to enlist their cooperation. 'As you know, the President has told the Prime Minister that our policy toward Greece has his full support, and we therefore have a right to expect that the United States Ambassador should back you up in accordance with this. ' 3 Eden probably refers to cautious remarks Roosevelt made about the mutiny and the British reaction. That these remarks, however, which simply hoped British policy would succeed, constituted 'full support' and implied diplomatic backstopping is surely debatable. 4 Nevertheless, one cannot fail to note how different these instructions of Eden's are from those Churchill sent to Leeper and all principals concerned a month earlier during the mutiny, which said 'on no account accept any assistance from American or Russian sources, otherwise than as especially enjoined by me'. 5 As the crisis in Greece continued during 1944, Whitehall put a more positive value on the collaboration of its allies, although it would, in fact, ask relatively little from the Americans for many months and a good deal less from the Soviets: simply that they not interfere.

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Leeper, however, remained apprehensive. Had the American and Soviet ambassadors to the Greek Government received instructions from their capitals to cooperate, he asked. If not, he said, they will remain inactive because 'they are both excessively timid gentlemen'.6 Timid or not, MacVeagh was at that time counselling Washington to continue its 'established policy which couples aloofness from internal politics with interest in the welfare of the whole nation', a position that had 'maintained great American influence in Greece'. He continued, ' Recently however it has become increasingly difficult to keep this policy clear in Greek eyes owing to our military solidarity with Britain and the consequent too easy assumption that all British policy in this region is also Anglo-American.'7 Unfortunately for Leeper's hopes, Washington seemed to be taking MacVeagh's advice, a matter which, as the crisis deepened, came to irritate Churchill as much as it did his ambassador. In Athens in December 1944 during the bleakest period of British involvement, Great Britain's Prime Minister seemed to MacVeagh ' to be resentful of American press criticism of his Greek policy and deeply disappointed over what he feels to be our Government's lack of understanding of his attitude and its failure to support him'. Asked if he wanted to send a message to the President, Churchill said ' Tell him that I hope he can help us in some way... all we want is to get out of this damn place. ' 8 Two weeks earlier, basing his remarks in part on a memorandum from Stettinius critical of British policy,9 Roosevelt had told Churchill of his friendship and concern but had added that because of' the state of public feeling' in America it was impossible to take a stand with Great Britain in Greece. Unable to offer help, he nonetheless offered advice, the first item of which must have stunned Churchill, remembering the President's talk with the King of Greece a year earlier. Roosevelt said, ' I wonder if Macmillan's efforts might not be greatly facilitated if the King himself would approve the establishment of a regency in Greece and would make a public declaration of his intention not to return unless called for by popular plebiscite.'10 In addition, the President suggested that the King assure the people that elections would be held at a fixed date and that all armed groups be dissolved leaving the British troops to preserve law and order. It may be needless to say that, as desiderata, all of this had already occurred to the British.11 Churchill's statement in his memoirs that the President's message 'did not give me any practical help', seems to be the least he might have said in the circumstances.12 At the time, however,

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he said ' I have felt it much that you were unable to give a word of explanation for our action but I understand your difficulties. ' 13 He pointed out, however, that Stettinius' press statement of 5 December had added to British burdens. The statement to which Churchill referred was the severest official American censure of Britain's role in Greece. Made two days after fighting between the British forces and ELAS broke out in Athens, it began with remarks clearly critical of British policy not in Greece but in Italy with its effort to keep Count Sforza from power. Stettinius said, except where military matters need be considered, 'the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair', and added, ' Since Italy is an area of combined responsibility, we have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian Governments that we expected the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside.' Then he stated that 'This policy would apply in an even more pronounced degree with regard to Governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories', a comment clearly directed towards the situations in Belgium and Greece.14 The statement had the full backing of the President, according to Halifax, relating a conversation with Stettinius, and was one that the Administration c felt obliged to make in the light of reports on the Sforza episode'.15 Apparently the American Administration felt that it was being bombarded by ' angry comment... from all sections of the country', to use Hathaway's phrase, because of what were interpreted to be attempts by its ally to stifle nascent democracy in liberated countries.16 More irritating still was the fact that much of this comment was triggered by Whitehall's effort to block Sforza, an effort made without consulting Washington. The Stettinius statement, however, was more than Churchill could tolerate, beset as he already was by criticism from 'the vast majority of the American press' as he put it. He added by way of comparison that 'during all the long weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens not one word of reproach came from Pravda or Isvestia'.11 Consequently, when Stettinius joined the ranks of the public critics, Churchill cabled Roosevelt in what, according to Sherwood, 'may well have been the most violent outburst of rage in all of their historic correspondence',18 although it seems also to express pique and pain at betrayal as much as anger. Churchill said he would have to make

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a statement in the House of Commons in view of Stettinius' pronouncement and told Roosevelt: I was much astonished at the acerbity of the State Department's communique to the public, and I shall do my best in my reply to avoid imitating it. I feel, however, entitled to remind you that on every single occasion in the course of this war I have loyally tried to support any statements to which you were personally committed... I was much hurt that a difference about Count Sforza should have been made the occasion for an attempt on the part of the State Department to administer a public rebuke to His Majesty's Government.19 Despite Churchill's implication that Stettinius had driven him to make a statement in the House of Commons, he very likely would have made one in any event, as Sherwood points out, because of a motion in the House regretting British intervention in Greece and other areas of Europe liberated from Axis forces.20 He made the statement on 8 December, saying, 'We are told that because we do not allow gangs of heavily-armed guerrillas to descend from the mountains and install themselves, with all the bloody terror and vigour of which they are capable, in power in great capitals that we are traitors to democracy.' 21 Saying that he repulsed this claim, he then called for a vote of confidence, which he received overwhelmingly: 279 supporting, 30 opposing.22 His speech made a profound but not altogether favourable impression in the United States.' Liberal circles criticise it as an abandonment of the Atlantic Charter, a reversion to "spheres of influence" and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries', Britain's Washington Embassy reported. 'The Atlantic Charter is, of course, regarded as an American conception, and "spheres of influence" as the system that has meant constant wars and rumours of wars in Europe', it added. 23 Nevertheless, Roosevelt sent Churchill a telegram warmly congratulating him on his victory in Parliament, and so used the occasion to alleviate the tension between the two governments. 24 By then, however, affairs had become further exacerbated by a rash act of the American Chief of Naval Operations. The day after Churchill's victory in the House of Commons, British officials were stunned to learn that Admiral King had ordered the Commander of the American Fleet in the Mediterranean to discontinue use of American vessels to supply British forces in Greece. Churchill, upon being

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informed of this, immediately called Hopkins at the White House but because of a poor connection could communicate only that he was, in Hopkins' words, 'very angry and stirred up about something' regarding Greece. The next day Hopkins learned of King's order, issued directly to the American Fleet Commander in the Mediterranean, bypassing both the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the British General Henry Maitland Wilson, Allied Commander in the area. Hopkins at once arranged with Leahy to have King withdraw the order, but that did not spare him ' a full-blown protest... in no uncertain terms' from Halifax. Using the British ambassador as an intermediary, however, Hopkins did dissuade Churchill from sending an angry protest to the President by arguing that it would only complicate the Greek question further. Meanwhile, according to his own account at any rate, Hopkins was not totally supine in the interview with Halifax. He told him that 'public opinion about the whole Greek business in this country was very bad and that we felt the British Government had messed the whole thing up pretty thoroughly'. 25 Great Britain's Greek policy was indeed becoming an embarrassment to its American ally, something Stettinius tried to make clear to Halifax. During what the latter called a 'heart to heart talk', Stettinius spoke plainly of worry among American officials and the public that Great Britain was interested only in re-establishing its own position and empire. Halifax responded with a direct jab, saying, in clear reference to the Secretary's 5 December press statement, that he did not think ' adoption of an attitude by [the] State Department of greater virtue than that of His Majesty's Government was helpful either to our mutual relations or in the long run to the development of American opinion, which [the] Administration wished to foster'.26 According to Halifax, this brought forth a 'friendly explosion', as Stettinius told him, ' Our fuss over Sforza had made it impossible for the United States Administration to say nothing, and he had been deeply hurt by messages impugning his attitude that the Prime Minister had sent to [the] President.' He said that he was Britain's best friend in America as shown by his work when he was in charge of Lend-Lease. Halifax claimed he 'pacified' Stettinius, saying that Churchill and Eden would never underestimate what he had done for the common cause but added, according to his report, that: On concrete political questions broad expressions of virtuous desire by State Department were not enough. On every ground I ventured to

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think that they would find the bold course of coming out to stand alongside us, unless they had something better to suggest (which he admitted they had not in the case of either Greece or Poland), would be found to be in the long run wisest and least troublesome for themselves not less than for us. Somewhat to my surprise Stettinius agreed with this and said that his own mind and the mind of his advisers in State Department was steadily moving in this direction and he hoped as opportunity offered to put this point of view to the President He [Stettinius] is warm hearted and, as you [Eden] know entirely friendly, but was genuinely upset by troubles into which he fell immediately on assuming office...and like many people in trouble sought greater comfort than the facts admitted.27 The nanny-ish tone of Halifax and the prodigal-son attitude of Stettinius are striking (both of which, of course, may be highlighted by Halifax's memory). Striking also, and more significant for our purposes, is Halifax's adroitness in seizing a fortuitous opportunity to deliver his government's line, i.e., America should show solidarity with Great Britain in foreign policy questions. Moreover, he delivered it to a new Secretary of State at a moment when he seemed to Halifax at least to be particularly unsure of himself. (Indeed, during his months as Secretary of State Stettinius would prove very susceptible to advice from British officials.) Furthermore, the Secretary's remarks demonstrated the growing acceptance of internationalism along lines compatible with British policy in circles that directed American foreign affairs. Perhaps the most significant statement of all, however, relative to Allied relations was made by Roosevelt, also in January 1945, in his State of the Union message to Congress. He urged not only internationalism but called for close cooperation with allies in both the war and in the peace to follow, a talk which HM Embassy in Washington described as 'long needed oil on troubled Anglo-American waters'. 28 Besides defending his policy publicly in Parliament and privately to the American Administration, Churchill felt that his Cabinet also should be clear about not only the bona fides of the operations in Greece but the degree of prior American approval. He explained that on 16 August 1944 he had informed Roosevelt of his intention to intervene in Greece and received Roosevelt's approval, a dialogue that he said was repeated at Quebec the following month. Furthermore, he stated, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave Wilson the necess-

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ary instructions to carry out the intervention. 'It was clear therefore', he concluded, 'that the United States Government had given their fullest authority to the plan of action proposed.' 29 Churchill then circulated the exchange of messages with Roosevelt of August 1944 in which the latter not only approved the plan but approved the use of American aircraft. He also gave the Cabinet the text of the Caserta agreement of 26 September 1944 by which Greek guerrillas, including EL AS, placed themselves under the orders of the Greek Government, hence of the Allied Command in the area, hence of the British. He then asked his colleagues in the Cabinet to bear these three documents in mind, saying 'they are the foundation for our movement into Greece'. 30 Despite approval at the top, the attitude of US officials on the spot was still irritating. During the first days of the battle in December 1944 when the British were outnumbered and hard-pressed, Leeper said the few Americans resident in Athens went out of their way to declare themselves neutral. They went about with stars and stripes on their sleeves and on the bonnets of their cars, all of which 'acted as a tonic to ELAS and was made abundant use of in their propaganda'. 31 In the same vein, Macmillan reported that the American ambassador, who in fact drew British rations, nonetheless refused British soldiers the use of his well for fear of compromising US neutrality.32 In Washington lower echelons caused problems also. State Department officials infuriated Churchill in March 1945 when they suggested that the British consult the Soviets before making certain changes in the Greek armed forces. In a snarling minute to Eden he said the State Department was about its usual practice of making unhelpful comments without taking any responsibility.33 But how much responsibility he wanted them to take is questionable. He still clearly wanted Britain to be the arbiter of political affairs in Greece. ' Cromer with the simple title of British Agent was master of Egypt for many years. There is no reason why Leeper should not exercise immense influence' he said. 'Our final control of the Greek Government is our threat to withdraw the troops. This we should certainly do if we are not listened to. ' 3 4 (That he would have done so, however, leaving the field to EAM/ELAS and the communist influence that he believed that implied, is highly doubtful.) Another source of American-made trouble was the underground organisation, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which irritated British foreign policymakers almost as much as did Britain's own

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SOE. To the Foreign Office, and especially its embassy in Athens, OSS was a bete noire, supporting the wrong elements in Greece, conniving with anti-British journalists in the US, and generally trying to hinder British policy in any way possible. And surely there was a fair share of anti-British feeling among the leaders of OSS operations in Greece, especially among Greek-American officials. It went beyond criticism simply of Britain's policy regarding the Greek monarchy to include derision of Britain and the Empire generally. MacVeagh took the situation seriously enough to ask the Commander of the US Army in the region to instruct OSS agents to 'keep their mouths shut' regarding America's allies unless they had something favourable to say.35 Feeling was so strong that Churchill cabled OSS chief General William Donovan to say that his service was 'doing everything in its power to throw our policy towards Greece into confusion',36 and also mentioned the problem to Roosevelt in Quebec the following month.37 Halifax, however, provided a calming counterpoint. He sent London the statement of a British official described as being in close touch with OSS and 'much the most competent person here' to comment on its attitude. The statement contradicted the notion that the American agency was conspiring against the British. No US department would go along fully with Britain on Greece, which was no secret to anyone, it said, and added that the State Department acquiesced in British policy primarily from consideration for HMG's military responsibility in the area. 38 C. M. Woodhouse, SOE commander in Greece, who, of course, could be expected to have different views from the Foreign Office on Greek affairs, expressed much the same opinion in an interview years later, describing OSS personnel in Greece as cooperative and helpful. He said that in the spring of 1944 a group of Greek-American officers, sympathetic to EAM/ELAS, who were part of his command but who had direct communications with OSS in Cairo, were surely reporting views contrary to the official line in Whitehall. Nonetheless, he said, he had no reason to complain about their operations, to the extent that he was apprised of them. He added that considering Britain's policy until the end of 1944 of supporting the King, ' Churchill and the Foreign Office were digging their own grave and didn't need much help from OSS.' 39 Still, many British officials continued to grumble about that organisation, in which they found an odious

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combination of American attitudes towards the British Empire with SOE-type attitudes towards the Greek guerrillas. At least once in this story of Anglo-American troubles in Greece there was a whiff of commercial rivalry. In March 1945 Churchill was considering removing Premier Nicholas Plastiras from office, in part because it would reflect well in British and American opinion, Plastiras being associated with brutal right-wing reprisals against leftists. It might also be useful, Churchill said, to hint to the Soviets when this was done that the purpose was to pursue a policy 'not unduly disagreeable to them'. Instead of going against the Russians in two theatres, Roumania and Greece, he said, 'we should work for a detente in both and concentrate on Poland'. 40 On 7 April Plastiras resigned, under strong pressure from London.41 He may have been dropped, however, for more than just public relations value or relief from his ineptitude. The British seem to have suspected him of conniving with Greek-American businessmen to provide commercial advantage for American interests in postwar Greece.42 Macmillan noted that the Americans, having shown 'an unfriendly neutrality at the time of danger', had afterwards changed their position and ' rather " taken up " Plastiras... Kind people say... because he was a republican. More suspicious folk say that they were trying to get concessions for postwar trade.' Mainly at issue was an agreement that would have given Pan American Airways a predominant position. 'Fortunately', said Macmillan, 'we heard of this and stopped it in time.' 43 Subsequently, HMG, while encouraging American aid to Greece, remained wary of arrangements leading to US commercial advantage. Meanwhile, however, British hopes and efforts to move American policy in the 'right direction' continued. In March 1945, D. S. Laskey of the Foreign Office expressed an opinion that other British officials were beginning to hold when he said, ' I think it would be useful for the embassy to maintain close contact with the State Dept. over Greek affairs, since I have not given up all hope that the US Gov. will associate themselves with our general policy in Greece', 44 and in June he stated the British position succinctly when he said, ' It seems to me that the more we can get the Americans to come in with us in Greek affairs, the better.' His colleagues agreed. 45 Indeed, British officials increasingly were making specific plans and suggestions for drawing the United States into Greek affairs rather than simply fulminating at American aloofness, as had been the pattern during the troubles

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of December 1944 and January 1945. They were assisted in this effort by a growing American impulse towards internationalism, as expressed in Roosevelt's State of the Union message to Congress in January 1945, mentioned earlier. He warned that perfectionism as a foreign policy could be as fatal as isolationism and called for both internationalist viewpoints and solidarity with allies.46

l 6 AMERICA DIVES IN

The year 1945 was unquestionably a watershed in Anglo-American affairs related to Greece. It was then that Whitehall dropped the mask entirely and admitted to itself, and, in effect, to its Atlantic ally, that without enormous American assistance it was powerless to make its policies prevail. It was then also that the United States Government accepted the challenge, stopped being principally an interested spectator, and became a major participant. Questions of American involvement centred mostly around economic assistance. In early 1945, immediately after a truce had been signed with the rebel forces, Macmillan suggested a joint Anglo-American economic and financial mission.1 It was his opinion that' it will be necessary for some time that the British Embassy and the United States Embassy should work in closest collaboration'. Eden and the rest of the Cabinet agreed that steps should be taken to bring this about. 2 Lending urgency to the whole question was the fact that the Allied relief effort, administered by military staffs, was on 1 April to be turned over to UNRRA. Both American and British economic advisers formed part of the existing relief organisation, and now their roles needed redefining. Leeper wanted the British representatives to remain and advise the Greek Government. MacVeagh recommended the opposite for the Americans in order to keep the US from getting entangled in local politics as the British had done. The US role should be as informal as possible, he said, and the State Department agreed. 3 Nevertheless, not long thereafter Whitehall received a wire from Roosevelt suggesting a joint economic mission. The President's idea, however, differed from Macmillan's in one very important respect: he envisaged a tri-national mission, including the Soviet Union, which 'might have a highly constructive effect on world opinion at this time', he said.4 Eden saw this at once as more of the same troublesome Rooseveltian triangularity that the British kept encountering. He said, 'It is clear

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that the motive of this proposal is primarily political. The President may feel that, having initiated intervention in the Russian controlled sphere in Roumania, he should also take some action in our Greek parish. ' 5 That American efforts to alter Soviet policy in Roumania were largely undertaken at British instigation may have been part of the equation Eden was formulating, even if he did not mention it. He also suggested that Roosevelt's proposal might be an indirect way of matching EAM, which had recently called for a Big Three commission to supervise Greek affairs. ' Whatever the motive of the proposal it seems important not to return too discouraging a reply', Eden said, 'we shall need American help in the economic rehabilitation of Greece, and the more we can involve them the better'. Note how far British policymakers had come from their original position of discouraging American activity in Greece. Having already sought US approval of British policies, they were now trying to get America deeply involved in Greek affairs, an effort which would continue and intensify. Eden, not surprisingly, disdained inclusion of the Soviets as 'a purely political gesture', although he admitted that a demonstration of three-power unity might indeed pre-empt EAM. But would the Soviets cooperate enough to affect world opinion as Roosevelt had hoped? Eden doubted it. Furthermore, wouldn't it be humiliating to ask them into Greece when they were doing all they could to exclude the Western Allies from Roumania and Bulgaria? The Americans, on the other hand, had to be brought in. The game could no longer be played the old way, with Great Britain carrying the ball and the United States mostly just watching and occasionally providing official encouragement from the sidelines. Bringing them in, however, was not a painless decision. When Eden put it to Churchill, the Prime Minister wrote on Eden's minute, 'I agree. But - We have to take all the risk, do all the work, shed all the blood and bear all the abuse including American abuse. Poor Old England. ' 6 Having agreed that the Americans should be included and the Russians excluded, Eden and Churchill, working together, tactfully rejected the President's proposal and put forward Macmillan's in its place, i.e., an Anglo-American committee of experts responsible to the two embassies. Roosevelt agreed readily enough that the time might not be right for a tripartite mission, relations with the Soviets being seriously strained by April 1945 as a result of contention on a number

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of issues, but he would not accept an Anglo-American alternative. He said, ' This would look as though we, for our part, were disregarding the Yalta decision for tripartite action in liberated areas and might easily be interpreted as indicating that we consider the Yalta decisions as no longer valid.' He added that 'we must be careful not to do anything that would weaken the effectiveness of our efforts to get the Russians to honour those decisions on their side'. 7 This exchange epitomises the differing viewpoints of American and British leadership toward the Soviet Union's involvement in world affairs. It is also significant regarding the much discussed question of whether or not Roosevelt changed his mind about trying to cooperate with the Russians and just before his death became an advocate of confrontation. Certainly this telegram, sent four days before he died, would indicate there had been no significant change in his Administration's viewpoint. Roosevelt admitted that he had agreed to a Greek invitation to send an Anglo-American team of transportation experts, but only because that was ' a very specific situation' requiring a coordinated recommendation presumably for solving Greek transport problems). He said that the United States was giving maximum cooperation to UNRRA and then added, significantly for this study, 'the Greeks have approached us informally for help and we are anxious to give them what economic support we can'. His Government, he said, had suggested that a Greek mission come to Washington to present claims to American supply agencies, and he closed by proposing that Donald Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, go to Greece ' to make a survey of the needs and possibilities for me'. 8 This correspondence, redolent of Roosevelt's preference to do anything but march in step with HMG, reflected much of what irritated the British about his policies. He had suggested a tripartite arrangement with the Soviets, which the British rejected. But even when persuaded that this approach was inadvisable, he refused to accept the bilateral alternative offered, and proceeded to play a lone hand in Greece, i.e. suggesting that the Greeks send a mission to Washington and that Nelson in turn go to Greece. Here is the Anglo-American relationship of the mid-1940s in a nutshell. Churchill may well have been ruminating along these lines when he told Eden, ' I think it is rather hard that the Americans should come in and take the credit, as they no doubt will do. However, I do not wish to stand in the way of any economic help that can come to Greece. Therefore',

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he said, ' I would work towards the least formal and least impressive of the Missions or organisms the President now wishes to set up. ' 9 Cadogan expressed much the same feelings when he said, 'it may be rather galling to find that after we have done all the hard work the Americans take the credit by producing supplies for Greece. But I doubt whether there is any alternative'. 'Greece', he said, 'will certainly need considerable supplies over and above anything which U.N.R.R.A can bring in, and owing to our limited resources the bulk of these will have to come from the U.S.A.' Therefore, he concluded reluctantly that HMG should welcome the President's proposal to send Donald Nelson to Greece.10 Roosevelt's death, however, interrupted these considerations, and Churchill determined to let the matter lie until there was a 'chaser from the new President'. 11 Meanwhile, an Anglo-American disagreement soon arose concerning the elections to be held in Greece. The Varkiza agreement of January 1945, which created the truce, called first for a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy and then for an election for a constituent assembly, the course of events preferred by Churchill among others. When the State Department suggested the opposite order, Churchill adamantly refused, saying 'it is contrary to all my correspondence with President Roosevelt'. He considered the State Department's proposal to be nothing but a devious way ' to deny the Greek people a chance to say whether they will have the monarchy back or not'. 12 State Department officials in fact were frank in saying they thought the King would be returned by an early plebiscite. Considering conditions in Greece at that time, they believed republicans would vote for the monarchy simply to ward off the extreme left but later would attempt a coup d'etat. Consequently, the King's return via an early plebiscite would only lead to eventual instability, they argued, and proposed instead elections first, then a cooling off period, then the plebiscite.13 Faced with this irritating new American development, Churchill and the Foreign Office agreed upon a British line, i.e., it was a question for the Greeks to decide and, in fact, they had done so in the Varkiza Agreement.14 The controversy, however, had a short life, at least as an AngloAmerican dispute, because that month the Labour Party was voted into office, and Bevin, supported by Attlee, held the same view on the matter as the State Department. 15 The US Government meanwhile had agreed in June 1945, on the

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eve of the Potsdam Conference, to assist the British in supervising the elections the following year but, characteristically, suggested that the Soviets participate also in order to avoid the appearance that the Western powers were acting independently of them. 16 As one of Truman's major aims at Potsdam would be to confirm the Soviets' participation in the war against Japan, he obviously did not want to antagonise them over the Greek issue. They were invited but declined, stating that supervision was insulting to Greek sovereignty. Probably they were determined mainly to evade a precedent that could be applied in eastern European countries. 17 As we have seen, the force of events and circumstances forced the Coalition Government to call reluctantly, but nonetheless firmly, for American help in Greece by the end of its tenure. The Labour Government displayed no similar hesitation. Upon its arrival in office it clearly and frankly intended to involve the United States in Greek affairs and brought even more vigour to that effort than had the Coalition Government. Furthermore, it demonstrated none of the feeling shown by Churchill's Government that Britain was being done out of hard-won credit, perhaps because so many in the Labour party itself were highly critical of the intervention in Greece. 18 On the American side, the Truman Administration, following the Japanese surrender, seemed much less afraid than its predecessor of appearing to gang up on the Soviets. Moreover, the public, at least the press, became far less critical of the British position than it had been a year earlier, a result surely of other events demanding its attention, but also perhaps of the increasing American involvement and of growing concern over Soviet encroachment in eastern Europe. Furthermore, Americans responded favourably to the Labour Government's apparent lack of affection for the Greek monarchy. When in late 1945 Bevin and the King of the Hellenes exchanged irritated public statements about the timing of the plebiscite, HMG's image rose in the United States. Bevin's remarks belied the popular belief that the British Government was wedded to a pro-monarchist policy.19 Futhermore, the new government in Britain agreed with the Americans, at least with the State Department, that elections for an assembly should be held first and the plebiscite later, but above all, it insisted upon elections without delay.20 In this regard, it is interesting to note that however critical the American press had been earlier about Greek affairs, the dispatch of US observers to help

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oversee the Greek balloting was widely noted and approved. In addition, once an elected Greek government was installed in office, American support and approval began to be more forthcoming, which is perhaps in part, but not entirely, coincidental. With the civil war quieted down following the Varkiza Agreement, questions of aid and reconstruction began to occupy centre stage, and by early November 1945 the Labour Government was making new plans for an economic mission to Greece. In the course of these deliberations, Leeper asked the question that would occupy a great deal of attention as planning progressed, ' how will the Americans be brought into these proposals?' 22 Their participation seemed vital to him because he thought so many of the necessary imports and ' any financial assistance' would have to come from American sources, a point, however, on which there was not complete agreement. Regardless of the validity of Leeper's economic reasoning, the feeling persisted that HMG 'should try to bring the Americans in' for political reasons as well as those of technology, finance, or supply. 23 The political objective was to demonstrate Anglo-American solidarity, thereby giving more substance to the British position and undermining leftist opponents.24 When on 27 November 1945 Foreign Office and Treasury officials met to discuss the proposed economic mission, at least half of the discussion concerned American involvement.25 Furthermore, no secret was made of the fact that economic assistance was designed to prevent a communist takeover as it was in so many subsequent instances in the postwar period. The great difficulty of divorcing economic aid from day-to-day politics was also acknowledged, a realisation reinforced many times in the experiences of aid officials through the years.26 An important question, and one with Anglo-American implications, was what to do if the Greek Government would not accept the advice of the economic mission. British officials concluded that pressure could be applied three ways: (1) by threatening to withdraw political support from the Government, (2) by threatening to withhold specific UNRRA goods, an act which would call for close cooperation between the UNRRA Mission and the proposed Economic Advisory Mission, and (3) by refusing to grant financial assistance, although Britain had little to give. Here, officials at the meeting noted that' the U.S. Government might be able to do something and this is a strong argument for bringing the Americans in on the Advisory Mission'. 27

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Although the potential American role was thus explicitly stated in the third of these disciplinary alternatives, Americans figured in the second as well, inasmuch as their contribution and influence predominated in UNRRA. Furthermore, it seems clear from these remarks that increased American involvement in Greece, no matter how it began, was very likely to become political, as indeed it did, a pattern often repeated in succeeding decades. At this meeting, Hector McNeil, then Parliamentary Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, declared that UNRRA needed strengthening in Greece and that HMG should again try to convince the American Government to replace the head of it with someone more effective. Here was evidence, should any be needed, of the US Government's predominant position in that organisation for which it, of course, provided most of the funding.28 There was then discussion about whether it would be best to have separate US and UK missions or an integrated one. In view of the widespread American criticism of British policy in Greece, it was conceded that an integrated Anglo-American mission might be very difficult to run, depending greatly on the ability of the head of the mission. Separate missions, however, were considered even less satisfactory, and so in spite of the difficulties, a single Anglo-American entity was to be the goal. 'It would not be necessary to have complete integration', the record states. 'We might, for instance, offer the Americans the financial section if they would agree that we should provide the Head of the Mission and the supply section. '29 Major General George Clarke, former chief of an Allied mission to the Netherlands, was selected to head this one also because, according to the record, he had ' made an outstanding success of the military relief scheme for Holland and [had] the added advantage of having been
head of a combined Anglo-American mission'.30 It would be hard to make

clearer British plans, or at least hopes, for a bi-national effort. The officials planned that Clarke accompany McNeil on an exploratory trip to Greece as soon as possible and that meanwhile Whitehall would try 'to obtain an answer from the U.S. Government about the extent to which they would be prepared to help'. 31 Across the Atlantic things at last were beginning to move the way the British hoped that they would. The State Department counselled the White House to tell Attlee during his November 1945 visit that, although the US would not enter any military commitments in Greece, it would provide economic aid.32 Meanwhile, Bevin said, ' I very much hope that the

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Advisory Mission should be a joint Anglo-American one, and that the whole responsibility for it should not rest with His Majesty's Government', and asked his embassy to make this clear to American officials.33 Bevin left no doubt that he considered the Greek situation to be an international burden with which HMG would like, and had a right to expect, the US Government's help. This is an interesting view if one remembers the origins of the Greek involvement, i.e., protection of British Mediterranean interests, which could safely be described as imperial interests to a large degree, anathema to most Americans. At the beginning of the episode many officials, including Leeper and the Chiefs of Staff, hoped the Americans could be kept out. Many of them, like Churchill, although often irritated that the Americans criticised without helping very much, were not, in fact, seeking more assistance, only less criticism. In short, they were not calling for shared responsibility, although they did need some logistical help and occasionally wanted a display of solidarity, e.g., Roosevelt's messages supporting first the King and later the Regency. They assumed, and with good reason, that, despite the President's limited backing, America on both the official and popular level tended to be hostile to British policy in the Mediterranean, seeing it as an adjunct of colonialism. Bevin, however, assumed that American and British interests coincided in the Mediterranean, Palestine excepted, and indeed, during his first year in the Foreign Office many Americans were making similar assumptions. In fact, although attitudes in the US were in flux at the time the British were planning the economic mission to Greece, Truman's Administration was at least thinking about a firmer policy toward the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the protection from Soviet menace of western Europe's Mediterranean supply line was becoming an important policy consideration for the Americans as it had long been for the British. The first of a series of ship visits demonstrating American concern about affairs in that part of the world occurred in December 1945 when the cruiser USS Providence visited Greece among other Mediterranean locations. During the next year the battleship Missouri and aircraft carrier Franklin Delano Roosevelt also went there on flag-showing missions.34 Meanwhile, in the formative first year of the new US Administration, the Labour Government, like its predecessor, was trying to move the United States in the direction of a firmer Soviet policy. One way was by involving it in Greek affairs in order to help prevent communists,

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considered to be the stalking horses of Soviet influence, from gaining power there. Attlee and Bevin conducted this policy with a somewhat different style from that of Churchill and Eden and, furthermore, in those first months they acted less out of a belief that the Russians needed primarily to be confronted than had the Coalition statesmen. They still hoped, as Roosevelt had, to be able to reason together with the Soviets both directly and in a multilateral forum, although, much more than he, they were convinced of the necessity of firmness. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that their policies, like those of the American Administration, were in a formative period, not surprising considering the short time that they had been in power. One matter, however, upon which they were clear was the need to involve the US in Greece, an involvement that would eventually become a point of departure for a worldwide American policy of confrontation which would continue until the present. To return to the economic mission, the Americans were skittish. For one thing, they were unconvinced that it would be purely advisory and not executive, and so feared that they were being inveigled into a kind of imperial commitment. Consequently, Halifax told London that General Clarke should take the first opportunity to explain to MacVeagh his plan of campaign. ' MacVeagh and State Department seem to be still under the impression that we intend to put advisors into Greek Government Departments', he said, c a policy which they do not support. ' 35 And indeed the British did intend to do so. Despite contrary assurances to the Americans, a letter from Hector McNeil to General Clarke made it clear that the advisory glove covered an executive fist. Enclosed was a directive for the mission which outlined purely advisory functions but about which McNeil observed: This should not be regarded as a hard and fast document which will necessarily tie your hands...The Directive has been so phrased that there would be no harm in it being made public. I think it may be useful to you to have a document of this sort which you could show to the Greek government. If the Americans accept our invitation to take part in the Mission, it would, of course, be necessary to provide them also with the text of the Directive. It is for this reason that we have laid almost excessive emphasis on the advisory rather than the executive character of the Mission. In practice, however, the Foreign Secretary is most anxious that you should not allow this to limit the extent of your activities. If you are able to get action taken on your recommendations, you will no doubt need to exert considerable pressure on the Greek

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government. You should do so without hesitation up to the point where further pressure might be likely to bring about the Greek Government's fall or might impair Anglo-Greek relations. You could inform any of the senior members of your Mission in confidence that this is our view about the Mission's scope.36

Cynical? Realistic? Practical? The answer probably depends on one's persuasions, but the document clearly demonstrates the efforts British leaders felt were required to sugarcoat for the Americans the pill of political involvement in Greece. Meanwhile, the US Government had agreed in principle to grant Greece a loan of $25 million, but declined to be part of the economic mission, feeling that American technical experts should not go to Greece as part of an organised group. It preferred to send them individually upon request of the Greek Government and to have others stationed at the embassy in Athens available to help as needed.37 This news from the State Department was at once encouraging and disappointing, as Halifax showed when he said, 'Whilst, therefore State Department prefer not (repeat not) to join with us in proposed mission, it was made clear that the United States Government desire closest possible liaison between proposed British mission and their own experts.' According to Halifax, the State Department experts had been instructed to make their cooperation 'evident' in Greece, a hint that the American national ego was not being lost amidst self-effacing acts of charity in the shadow of the Union Jack. Nevertheless, as Halifax pointed out, 'Although we may regret United States Government's decision to act on parallel lines rather than jointly it is clear that the Americans want to cooperate with us to the full and are not (repeat not) simply aiming at running their own independent show. ' 38 Halifax also sent the text of a State Department note which stated that if 'energetic steps' were not taken to improve the country's economic situation, 'Greece will get no lasting benefit from United States Government's financial and material assistance.' It went on to say, 'An immediate improvement in the economic situation should also create an atmosphere favourable to the successful holding of national elections which, in turn, should bring about improvement in the political situation which is essential to recovery and stability.' 39 These views were remarkably similar on the subject of international aid to those of the Labour Government, views which also remained basic to developmental aid efforts in succeeding years. Prominent among these was (a) that internal changes often must be made in the

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recipient country for the help to be effective, and (b) that economic aid will create stability and democracy, which are self-reinforcing. Meanwhile, arrangements were made in both Washington and London to coordinate the announcement of the British economic mission and the American loan in order to indicate that the two efforts were to be run cooperatively. How much things had changed since Roosevelt's day! While efforts were being made to include Americans in economic assistance programmes, General W. D. Morgan, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, told the British Chiefs of Staff after visiting Greece that both the economic and military pictures were worrisome. Among other things, he said Albanians and Bulgarians were trying to foment disorder in border areas, probably the first steps in attempts to annex Greek territory. He felt that American economic and military assistance on an equal basis with Great Britain would not only lighten Britain's load but give Western officials ' added prestige and confidence for the future'.40 When speaking to American diplomat Alexander C. Kirk, then his political advisor, Morgan's assessments were even harsher. It was impossible for Britain to cope alone with Greek political problems, he said, and if the Americans would not lend assistance, including armed forces, he felt that the British should 'take their losses' and pull out. According to Kirk, Morgan said that Greece 'was menaced by the "Red Tide" in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania and that he would state bluntly to the British Chiefs of Staff that in his opinion as a soldier Great Britain could not carry on alone'. Morgan stated that Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, who had also visited Greece, concurred with his viewpoints.41 It is significant that a British leader of Morgan's stature had become almost strident by then in calling for American assistance, including military assistance. But perhaps even more significant was the entertainment of the view among leaders as, highly placed as Morgan and Brooke that Britain could not cope with the situation alone and might have to pull out. Certainly Morgan was to some degree rattling the Americans' cage in order to stimulate them to action, but these concerns grew rapidly, and within less than i \ years the British told the Americans that indeed they were in large measure 'pulling out'.

America dives in

167

The first postwar elections in Greece for a national government, so long a matter of bitter contention among so many parties, were held on 31 March 1946, with EAM boycotting the voting. As mentioned earlier, a new and conservative government was elected and royalist Constantine Tsaldaris became premier, but gradually Greece lapsed again into civil war.42 It is difficult to date the beginning of the new round, there having been incessant violence from the right and left throughout the period of the truce. Yet the escalation from 'incidents' to 'war' might be dated from a major clash on 30 March 1946, the eve of the balloting. Although for more than three months after that there was nothing 'worth calling a battle', as Woodhouse says,43 the violence gradually intensified as the year wore on, helping King George, who symbolised stability, win overwhelmingly when the plebiscite was held in September. Meanwhile, Tsaldaris in July 1946 presented Attlee with a plan for Greek reconstruction which assumed that the United States might again help with capital. He had spoken to Byrnes, he said, regarding assistance from the Export-Import Bank, and the Secretary of State seemed very sympathetic, even stating that if the bank were getting short of money he would ask Congress for more.44 Tsaldaris appealed again to Byrnes near the end of 1946, this time apparently concerned mainly with the worsening military situation. The Secretary of State, after talking to Truman, looked into the possibility of military loans via the 'Export-Import Bank, or any other source, but without success', as he put it, because 'as in the case of Turkey, we needed legislative authority to furnish any military assistance'.45 Tsaldaris also told Byrnes that the British had warned that 'they would soon be forced to withdraw their troops'.46 Indeed, discussion of the pros and the cons of a troop withdrawal had been a topic of intense discussion in London during the last quarter of 1946 and into early 1947. It involved particularly the Treasury, the Chiefs of Staff and, of course, the Foreign Office. On 20 November, Orme Sargent told Bevin that trouble from communist bands and from Greece's northern neighbours continued and that withdrawal of British troops would surely lead to communist domination there. 'On the other hand', he added, 'American interest in Greece and Turkey has begun, we hope, to take concrete form and we are about to embark on discussions with them on this subject.' He noted, however, that Byrnes had said that it would be politically

168

Foreign crises

very difficult for the US to give armed assistance to Greece, which contributed to the urgency of retaining the British forces.47 Towards the year's end no decision had been reached. There unquestionably was a growing feeling that the British commitment in Greece needed to be reduced, but that was not yet government policy, and until it was Bevin hesitated to bring the matter up with American officials.48 On 30 January 1947, however, he told the Cabinet that HMG should ascertain what share the United States might assume in providing economic and military aid to Greece. 49 Meanwhile, in Washington less than one month later State Department officials, believing the Soviets to be involved in the worsening Greek situation, began drafting a bill to send to Congress to provide for both a direct loan and transfer of military equipment. 50 In addition, on 21 February Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson signed a very significant memorandum to the Secretary, then George Marshall. Entitled 'Crisis and imminent possibility of collapse in Greece', it was based in part on a grim assessment by MacVeagh of the Greek economic and political situation. Acheson said, 'Under present arrangements Greece will receive neither adequate economic aid from the United States nor adequate military aid from Britain', and added, ' We recommend reconsideration of our policy and [a] decision to assist Greece with military equipment.' 51 On that same day, a few hours after Acheson had put his signature to this memorandum, Great Britain brought Anglo-American affairs in Greece to a climax when its embassy Washington delivered two notes to the State Department, one concerning Greece, the other Turkey, both saying that the UK would have to reduce significantly its assistance to those countries.52 The note on Greece, similar to that on Turkey, described the deplorable economic and security conditions prevailing in the country, and made it clear that if Greece were to continue to receive aid to counter these conditions it would have to come from the United States. The British effort to involve its Atlantic ally had been a long one, as we have seen, but by February 1947 gradualism was no longer a viable policy. A series of adverse economic factors for Great Britain had changed all that. These included inadequate exports, declining gold and dollar reserves, large overseas military commitments, a shortfall in coal production, and a winter of blizzards, ice and snow that halted transportation and closed industries. Pressed especially by Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, to curtail overseas

America dives in

169

commitments, thereby helping to alleviate the crisis, Whitehall agreed to reduce drastically its aid to Greece and Turkey and to so inform Washington. Large-scale American collaboration, which had long been necessary from the British point of view, now became urgent and in even greater measure. Britain's economy and its weather saw to that in the winter of 1946-7.53 In March 1947, approximately three weeks after receiving the British notes, Truman requested and subsequently received from Congress $400 million to provide both economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. In his address to Congress asking for this appropriation, he outlined his administration's intention ' to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'.54 This declaration, with its extremely vague and general terms but its clear intent to confront communist expansion, became known as the Truman Doctrine and remains basic to American foreign affairs.55 The policy premise it contained was quickly accepted in the United States not only by the Executive, but the Congress, most of the press and apparently much of the public. It is impossible to measure Great Britain's role in bringing this about by making the United States aware of its international 'responsibilities', as British officials perceived them, especially as Great Britain's input to this end was simply one of many. That does not, however, justify overlooking that input, as so much Cold War historiography has done. Within a larger British effort to align with America in military and diplomatic affairs, made especially in the Churchill years, was the more finite but very urgent issue of getting the United States involved in Greece, an involvement which called for a major change in American attitudes and policies. When Truman asked for and received authority and funds to aid Greece economically and militarily in March 1947, it was clear that the United States Government had come a long way in less than three years since June 1944 when the State Department told the Foreign Office it did not want to intervene in Greek affairs and was particularly reluctant to support any factions or individuals.56

CONCLUSION

Nine months after Winston Churchill stepped down as Great Britain's Prime Minister, he made the strongest call he had ever made for establishment of an Anglo-American coalition. Invited by President Truman to speak at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill said: Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of America. Fraternal Association requires... the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security... This would perhaps double the mobility of the American Navy and Air Force. It would greatly expand that of the British Empire forces and it might well lead, if and as the world calms down, to important financial savings... Eventually there may come, I feel eventually there will come, the principle of common citizenship, but that we may be content to leave to destiny, whose outstretched arm so many of us can already clearly see.1 Several months before that momentous speech Churchill had made similar remarks in the House of Commons and was to make them again in New York City a few days after it. Nevertheless, it was the talk at Fulton, known since as the 'Iron Curtain' speech, that drew worldwide attention. 2 Churchill's influence in the United States was enormous, greater than that of any other political figure after Roosevelt passed from the scene.3 Even though he was a foreigner, even though he was out of power in Great Britain, his words had a tremendous impact in the United States, as they did in many other parts of the world, including of course, the Soviet Union in a rather different way. In fact, it seems almost certain that Truman - who knew what his guest intended to

Conclusion

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say despite official statements to the contrary was using a very willing Churchill, with his vast prestige, to launch a trial balloon for a firmer policy towards the USSR. 4 Churchill called both for a link with America, beyond simply an alliance, and for a firmer policy towards the Soviet Union. Both notions became at once the subject of widespread adverse commentary in the United States.5 Very quickly, however, the idea of a firmer policy towards the Russians took hold and gained acceptance while that of fraternal association and joint citizenship dropped from sight. Furthermore, although the US-UK combined military command, central to Churchill's hopes, continued for several more years, it did so only nominally before being relinquished in favour of NATO. 6 By the time of the Fulton speech influential Americans both in and out of government worried much less about 'ganging up' on the Soviet Union that they had just a few months earlier, especially before the Japanese surrender. They were, however, too impressed with America's strength and virtue and too unimpressed with those of Great Britain to consider the kind of bloc Churchill was suggesting. Clearly that was a suggestion born of desperation as British power faded, one which overlooked many factors of American life and politics that militated against it. Among them was the fact that, despite close wartime cooperation in military and related matters, British affiliations were usually considered to be very compromising in American politics, something the British Embassy in Washington constantly emphasised. Apart from its coda at Fulton, the effort to institutionalise a military and foreign policy merger with the United States really ended with the passing of the Coalition Government. Although the British Chiefs of Staff hoped to preserve the combined command, even this was not a clear objective of the new Labour Government, however much it sought cooperation with the United States on specific foreign policy issues. Bringing America into the struggle against the expansion of communism and Soviet influence, however, was an objective of both the Coalition and the Labour Governments. Even here, however, there was an important difference between Churchill and his successors. The Labour Government in the early months of its tenure hoped that firmness with the Soviets would lead to cooperation with them within the framework of the United Nations Organisation. Although Churchill paid lip-service to

172

Conclusion

that organisation in deference to American belief in it, he placed his hopes for the future far more in the US-UK combination. The crises in Poland and Greece were two cases in which Great Britain exerted its influence to bring the United States to confront perceived communist threats. In Poland, the effort was made by the Coalition Government; in Greece, principally, although not entirely, by the Labour Government. (Perhaps it should be noted that these crises were not the only two in which that effort was made, those in Roumania and Venezia Giulia, for example, being others.) The Polish crisis is significant partially for the prolonged and heated diplomatic struggle that it entailed. One of the first and most difficult contests of the Cold War, it helped to shape many of the attitudes of the subsequent confrontations. It, like the Greek crisis, was a situation in which the British Government strove to involve a reluctant American ally in a challenge to communist expansion, in this case contending with the Soviet Union directly and to a degree that surely would not have been reached had the American Government been left to its own devices. The Greek crisis is significant partially because attitudes and policies that emerged during it were in many ways prototypical of those that have characterised the post-World War II era. In many instances during that period the United States has played the role that Britain played in Greece. Furthermore, much of the theory and action typical of US postwar foreign policy, including its international aid programmes, was first displayed in Greece, not by Americans, but by the British Labour Government. The crisis in Greece has additional significance because, in spite of original reluctance on the part of both the American and British Governments to involve the United States there, it was in Greece especially, and to a lesser extent in Turkey, that America entered the Cold War. Certainly it is as hard to determine the beginning of that ' war' with great precision as it is to define the nature of the conflict itself. Nevertheless, the Truman Doctrine and the grant of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey that Truman called for provide a realistic point at which to mark America's full-fledged entry into the international politics of confrontation. By the diminution of her power Great Britain inadvertently prevented Roosevelt's plans for the postwar world from being realised because the relative stability of his proposed three-legged peacekeeping structure was destroyed. Whether or not it might have

Conclusion

173

achieved its objectives is impossible to say, but certainly, with one leg gone, it was too unstable even to begin the job planned for it. Its ability to act as a governing force in international affairs was immediately destroyed by superpower polarity, which became one of the paramount principles of the post-World War II international environment.

NOTES

Introduction 1 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6, p. 583. 2 The British Embassy in Washington frequently reported Churchill's popularity in America. For example, see FO 371-51606, paper AN 656, weekly political summary, 10 Mar. 1946, and FO 371-51633, paper AN 1246, telegram, Halifax to FO, 8 Mar. 1946. 3 Moran, Winston Churchill, A Struggle for Survival, ig4D-ig6j, p. 57. 4 FO 800 (512). Bevin on 12 Nov. 1945 wrote asking Churchill and Eden their opinions regarding the bases. Churchill answered on 13 Nov. 1945. Bevin in turn replied to him on 17 Nov., saying 'I agree with you about joint bases. But the difficulty is that we have committed ourselves to the United Nations, and I must keep this aspect in mind.' 5 Beitzell, The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain and Russia, ig^i-ig^j. G. Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, ig^i-ig^. Gardner, The Wasted Hour. Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, ig4i-ig46. Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II. A. L. Smith, Jr, Churchill's Germany Army: Wartime Strategy and Cold War Politics, ig4j~ig4y. Ulam is clearest regarding the British effort, believing that it failed. See chapter 1, 'Stalin', passim.

/. The need 1 Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 178, citing 'Statistical material during the Washington negotiations', a source which may well have a bias towards pessimism, but should be generally reliable inasmuch as it was to be scrutinised by American economists during the loan negotiations. Gardner's work on Anglo-American economic relations is indispensable, although I believe at one point he has somewhat misinterpreted American perception of the British situation. He is perhaps correct in saying that American officials did not realise how much the war had undermined Britain's strength, but I do not believe they were too far from the mark. Probably there were different opinions from one official to another and one department to another, but by the end of the discussions for the IMF, the World Bank, Lend-Lease extension and the loan, those officials in Treasury and State who dealt with British questions must have been coming quite close to the truth. Morgenthau, for instance, in 1944 told Roosevelt 'Yes, England really is broke.' See Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 3, p. 308. Gardner feels that Secretary of State Byrnes, for example, proposed that Great Britain assume 50% of the $600 million 1947 deficit for the US/UK zone in

Notes to pages 13-16

175

2 3 4 5 6 7

Germany because he did not realise Britain's plight. He might have made the proposal, however, precisely because he did realise it. Bevin, predictably, said the UK couldn't afford this and Byrnes replied that in that case the US would pay more if the UK would switch zones with it. Inasmuch as his government preferred the zone allocated to the UK, it could be that Byrnes was simply being crafty and using Britain's economic plight as a lever to get its zone, unsuccessfully as it turned out. See Gardner, p. 344 and Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 196-7. Statistical Digest of the War, in the official 'History of the Second World War' series, p. 198 (Central Statistical Office). H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply, part of the official' History of Second World War' series, p. 459. Statistical Digest of the War, p. 162. For further evidence of Great Britain's declining resources, especially vis-a-vis other major powers, see Paul Kennedy's The Realities Behind Diplomacy, pp. 339-41. H. G. Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 106. 'Manpower famine' is the phrase used by J. D. Scott and R. Hughes in The Administration of War Production, part of the official ' History of the Second World War'. For their discussion of administrative aspects of the problem, see pp. 481-9. Information on British forces comes from H. M. D. Parker, Manpower, p. 484 and
Statistical Digest of the War, p. 8. John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 5, pp. 41, 49,

also has useful background on the subject. All are in the official 'History of the Second World War' series. The figure for US forces comes from US Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1946, and that for Soviet forces from

Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 403, who quotes Krushchev speaking to the Supreme Soviet as reported in Pravda, 14 Jan. i960. Accounts of Soviet strength
vary widely. Malcolm Mackintosh in Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces,

puts it as high as 19 million. 8 Cab. 128, vol. 5, C M . (46) 13th conclusions, 7 Feb. 1946. 9 Cab. 66, vol. 33, W.P. (43) 31, Eden memorandum, 16 Jan. 1943. Victor Rothwell in Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947 has a good discussion of Churchill and the Foreign Office in this regard. See his chapter entitled 'The German Problem', especially pp. 31-4. 10 For background, see Woodward, vol. 5, pp. 181-98. Barker also has a good discussion of this topic in Churchill and Eden at War, pp. 21117. 11 Woodward, vol. 5, p. 190. 12 Barker, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50, pp. 8-10. 13 PREM 4 (30/8) Churchill minute to Eden of 23 Nov. 1944 and Eden's reply of 29 Nov. 1944. 14 Woodward, vol. 5, p. 193. 15 Ibid., p. 194. 16 Anglo-American differences of view on this matter can be seen in the report of a diplomatic mission Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., then Undersecretary of State, led to London in April 1944. See FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, pp. 3-6. 17 Barker, Churchill and Eden at War, p. 217. 18 For example, Secretary for Dominion Affairs Viscount Cranborne. See Cab. 66, vol. 37, W.P. (43) 244, 15 June 1943. 19 League of Nations, Review of World Trade, 1938, p. 16, points out that, per British official calculations, inter-Commonwealth trade was 25.7% of all British Commonwealth trade in 1929 and 1931, 29.1% in 1932, 30.6% in 1936, and 31.4% in 1937. 20 Gardner, p. xiv. 21 J. M. A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 223-30 and Michael Howard, ibid., vol. 4, pp. 77-8.

7^

Notes to pages 16-22

22 Cab. 65, vol. 48, W.M. {44) 169th conclusions, minute 1, confidential annex, 16 Dec. 1944. 23 Cab. 79, no. 37, C.O.S. (45) 191st meeting, minute 1 and annexes I and II. 24 Statesman's Yearbook, 1945, p. 482. Eire's status might be considered equivocal after 1921. Statesman's Yearbook, 1943, called it 'a sovereign, independent state, but associated for certain purposes with the British Commonwealth of Nations'. Summaries of events in Eire, along with other dominions, went regularly to the Cabinet from the Dominions Office, however, throughout the war, indicating that HMG considered it a dominion. 25 The Commonwealth's continuing independence of British policy in the postwar
period is documented by Barker in The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50, pp.

26

27 28 29 30 31

57-60. She maintains that by the end of 1946 'hope had faded' that Great Britain could maintain Big Three status by rallying Commonwealth partners. This was the subject of an irritated public statement by Brendan Bracken in the latter part of the war. See INF. 1 /980 (X. 293/Part C). For a careful study of Commonwealth relations during the war, see Nicholas Mansergh's Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change, 19391952. Woodward, vol. 5, p. 5. The Cold War as History, p. 23. The Anglo-American Predicament, pp. 89-90. Chapter 6 of this book provides a very good history of Anglo-American interaction. The United States and Britain, p. 60. This entire book is a brief but excellent survey of Anglo-American diplomatic history. Cab. 66, vol. 10, W.P. (40) 310, 8 Aug. 1940 and FO 371-25206, paper W 8602. For an excellent study of Anglo-American relations in the late 1930s and early

1940s, see David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 193J-1941. 32 Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 1, pp. 276-82. See also

Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, p. 195. 33 All three minutes can be found in FO 371-25206, paper W 8602. 34 Ibid. 35 Mid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., letters, Hankey to Halifax, 11 July 1940, and Halifax's reply, 15 July 1940. 38 Ibid., memorandum to the cabinet, 18 July 1940. For background on the discussion, see Cab. 66, vol. 10, W.P. (40) 276, 18 July 1940. 39 Hansard, vol. 364, col. 1171, 20 Aug. 1940.
2. Problems with American public opinion

1 2 3 4

Hachey, pp. 61-5, political review for 1942, 26 June 1943. Ibid., p. 62. INF 1/948 (X.293, part A). Ibid., Carter to Sendall, minute, 4 Jan. 1943, for example. Here the Ministry of Information criticised Ministry of Production charts, which it said would only steep Americans in their prejudices, and wondered why it was not allowed to do the job, and do it properly, to begin with. 5 INF 2/50. 6 Hachey, p. 88, political review for second quarter 1943, 31 Aug. 1943. The Embassy's overall review of conditions in America was changed from an annual report to a quarterly one in 1943 both because the material to be covered was so extensive and to make the reports more current. The last yearly report was

Notes to pages 22-27

177

approximately six months late when the system of quarterly reporting was begun. See Hachey, p. xiv. Embassy assessments of opinion such as the one reported above were sometimes buttressed by polls but were also often impressionistic as here. 7 PREM 4 (27/9), p. 639, letter, 28 Jan. 1944. Perhaps in fairness it should be pointed out that a nationalistic view of the war effort was not an exclusively American characteristic. Probably it was universal, but at any rate the British partook of it. A Ministry of Information periodical entitled War in Pictures ran a story in the July 1943 issue entitled 'How the British Commonwealth Has Thwarted Hitler.' A subhead stated ' Since the war began the triumphs of the forces and peoples of the British Commonwealth under the leadership of Winston Churchill - triumphs repeated again and again - have broken the major strategy of the German High Command.' The text opened by saying, 'Acting in concert as one centralised Power - which, in fact, it is not - the British Commonwealth has during the course of this war outwitted the German High Command and outfought the German Army in such a way as to smash for ever the Teutonic dream of world conquest and domination.' Records indicate the publication was printed in 15 languages and distributed worldwide, including in enemy-occupied territory, but with about one-third of the copies going to Commonwealth and Empire nations. Its tone of single-handed combat with the German foe must have bemused the Soviets particularly inasmuch as this was about half a year after the battle of Stalingrad. See INF 2 (4), document 7. 8 PREM 4 (27/9), p. 638, letter to Eden, 11 Feb. 1944. 9 PREM 4 (84/1), p. 39, letter, 26 Jan. 1944. 10 Halifax papers, A4.410.4.11, letter, 9 Sept. 1944. 11 INF 1/873 (X.73, part B), telegram to Halifax, 23 Feb. 1943. 12 INF 1/949 (X.293, part B), minute, 19 Sept. 1944. 13 INF 1/980 (X.293, part C). 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. Letter to Sir Edward Campbell, 24 June 1945. 16 INF 1/980 (X.293, part C). 17 Ibid. 18 Cab. 66, vol. 65, W.P. (45) 316, 19 May 1945. 19 INF 1/981 (X.293, P a r t D ) 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 5, pp. 519-24. 23 Cab. 79, no. 37, C.O.S. (45) 194th meeting, minute 1, annex, 9 Aug. 1945. 24 Hachey, p. 62, a political review for 1942 by H.M. Embassy in Washington, dated 26 June 1943. 25 INF 1/873 (X.73, part B), telegram to Halifax, 23 Feb. 1943. 26 Hachey, p. 66, political review for 1942 by H.M. Embassy in Washington, dated 26 June 1943. 27 FO 371-34089, paper A 3480. 28 FO 371-34090, paper A 4440, 11 May 1943. The views of British officials reported in these pages regarding the image the UK should project in the US prevailed for many years and are probably close to the official position to this day. In a study published in 1976, Terry L. Deibel and Walter R. Roberts reported that the objectives then of the British Information Services in the US were 'to convince the American people that Britain is a reliable partner whose views should be taken into account in the formation of policy. British policy information thus can be viewed as a tool for the recovery, through influence on the United States, of some of the power in world affairs that Britian has lost in recent years. On the economic side the United States is vitally important as Britain's biggest market and investor; here

178

Notes to pages 2J-35

the British want Americans to see the United Kingdom as a country they would like to visit and buy from.' See Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions, p. 38. 29 PREM 4 (27/10), p. 836, minute, 11 May 1945. 30 FO 371-44557, paper AN 2560. 31 FO 371-44574, paper AN 2438, record of conversation, Gage^Hickerson, 20 July 194532 Attlee papers, Oxford, box 6, file O-P. 33 For example, see Cab. 66, Vol. 53, W.P. (44) 409, 25 July 1944, Eden's letter to Duff Cooper, 25 July 1944. 34 Halifax papers, A4.410.4.15, letter to Eden, 14 Dec. 1942. 35 FO 371-34181, paper A 6825. 36 Ibid. 37 Hachey, pp. 92-3, political review for second quarter 1943, 31 Aug. 1943. 38 Cab. 66, vol. 52, W.P. (44) 370, memorandum entitled 'Future World Organisation'. 39 PREM 4 (27/10), p. 1186, letter, 4 July 1944. 40 Halifax papers, A4.410.4.15. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., letter, Eden to Halifax, 15 Oct. 1942. 44 Hachey, p. 75, political review for 1942, 26 June 1943. 45 See, for example, FO 371-34114, paper A 852. The open letter appeared in the 12 Oct. 1942 edition of Life, p. 34. 46 PREM 4 (27/1), entire file. 47 PREM 7 (4), papers of Desmond Morton, minutes to Prime Minister, 1941-43, minute of 19 Apr. 1943. 48 Hachey, p. 96, political review for second quarter 1943, 31 Aug. 1943. 49 FO 371-34086, paper A 78. 50 FO 371-34089, paper A 3315, minute, 9 Apr. 1943. 51 Ibid., 22 Apr. 1943, emphasis in the original. 52 Ibid., paper A 3480, letter, 30 Apr. 1943. 53 Ibid. Presumably when he spoke of * official circles' he referred to the large British official establishment in America at that time, rather than American 'official circles'. It would probably go without saying that there should be no circulation within the American Government, much less wide circulation. This assumption is strengthened by his letter to Campbell noted earlier asking that no mention of the Committee be made to the State Dept. 54 FO 371-34090, paper A 4284. For background on Spry's earlier mission to the U.S., see R. J. Moore's Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-1945, especially pp. 130-2. 55 FO 371-34086, paper A 78, minutes of the first meeting, 30 Dec. 1942. 56 Ibid. 57 FO 800/300, p. 232. 58 FO 371-34086, paper A 1070. See also FO 371-34114, paper A 852 which contains a report by the US Office of War Information dated 16 Dec. 1942 and analyses in some detail American negative attitudes towards Great Britain. 59 FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, p. 34, memorandum, Hopkins to Roosevelt, 22 Mar. 1943. 60 FO 371-44536, AN 935, weekly political summary, 17 Mar. 1945 and Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 6, pp. 224, 229. 61 Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. 5, pp. 517-24. Anglo-American relations in the Pacific context are exhaustively studied in Christopher Thome's book, Allies of a Kind, although the work is rather marred by its relentless anti-American bias, Wm. Roger

Notes to pages 36-41

179

62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69

70

71 72 73

Louis has studied them also in his excellent Imperialism at Bay, which concentrates on the issue of trusteeship for dependent areas. PREM 4 (27/10), p. 1121, telegram, 12 Sept. 1944. Ibid., p. 1120, telegram, 15 Sept. 1944. Ibid., p. 1124, telegram, 25 Aug. 1944. Ibid., p. 1120, telegram, 15 Sept. 1944. FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, p. 28. Hull's chapter on India in vol. ii of his memoirs also expresses the view that the US Government tried not to worsen the Indian situation for HMG, disagreeing in private but not in public about British policy. PREM 4 (27/9), p. 578, telegram, 13 Apr. 1945. INF 1/245 ( G P - 365/J9> parts A and B). INF 1/665 (G.P. 491/18), minute of Professor Harlow of MOI Empire Information Service, 7 Dec. 1944. The purpose of Harlow's minute was to ask if the author might sign this pamphlet because, among other considerations, signed materials were more acceptable among ' school teachers and discussion group leaders [who were] intensely suspicious of Government "propaganda"'. FO 371-44539, papers AN 3744 and AN 3804, weekly political summaries of 9 and 15 Dec. 1945. Greece, of course, was not a colony, but American critics viewed the occupation and subsequent war with guerrillas as steps to promote imperial interests. PREM 8 (321), memorandum, 24 June 1946. Ibid., memorandum, 16 July 1946. Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 238.

3. The mixing process

1 2 3 4 FO 371-35330, paper U 460, minute, 10 Jan. 1943. Ibid., minute, 16 Jan. 1943. Halifax papers, A4.410.4.15, letter to Eden, 25 Oct. 1942. The British Embassy appraised the situation thus:' The Republican successes in the November elections directed the old isolationism, which had always been largely nationalist, into new channels of American imperialist and expansionist ideas. Many of the "last ditchers" offered specious praise of British imperialistic sentiment, as a justification for aggressive "Americanism"'. Hachey, p. 75. See also pp. 58-9 and Polenberg, War and Society, pp. 187-93 f r further analysis of the elections. Halifax papers, A4.410.4.15, letter to Eden, 29 Oct. 1942. FO 800/404, telegrams, 16 and 22 Feb. 1943. Halifax papers, A4.410.4.15, letter, Eden to Halifax, 15 Oct. 1942. FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, pp. 1-2, memorandum of conversation, Welles-Halifax, 30 Nov. 1942. FO 800/404, FO draft of a telegram for Churchill to send proposing the trip. In fact, he edited it almost out of existence, sending in effect his own message. PREM 3 (471), p. 463, telegram, 11 Feb. 1943. Ibid., p. 461, telegram, 12 Feb. 1943. Eden, p. 374. According to General Joseph Stilwell, Roosevelt continued to envisage a new status for Hong Kong despite Eden's put-down. The general states that FDR told him at the Teheran meeting in December 1943 that he had plans to make Hong Kong a free port, adding ' but let's raise the Chinese flag there first, and then Chiang can the next day make a grand gesture and make it a free port. That's the way to handle that!' See The Stilwell Papers, p. 237. Eden, p. 374. For Eden's full account of the dinner see pp. 372-4. There is also

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13

180

Notes to pages 41-46

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

an account in PREM 3 (355/4), p. 184 and in FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, p. 13, memorandum, Hopkins to Roosevelt, 15 Mar. 1943. On May 16, 1944, after talking with the President, Roosevelt's aide Jonathan Daniels recorded in his diary an impression similar to Eden's. Daniels wrote 'all throughout his conversation he indicated an almost boyish interest in geography, and I got the strange impression that in planning the future of the world he was like a boy playing trains with the world, setting up cities, planning free towns'. White House Witness, 1942-1945, p. 222. FO 800/404, Eden's report to Churchill, 28 Mar. 1943. Ibid., telegram, 30 Mar. 1943. Ibid. Eden's report to Churchill, 28 Mar. 1943. Ibid. This report is also quoted in Eden, p. 377. PREM 3 (355/4), p. 184, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 16 Mar. 1943. Cab. 66, vol. 37, W.P. (43) 233, 10 June 1943. Ibid. The luncheon took place on 22 May 1943 during an Anglo-American
conference. There is also an account in FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec

1943, pp. 166-72, but based on the British record cited here which Halifax sent to the White House. 21 Cab. 66, vol. 37, W.P. (43) 233, 10 June 1943. 22 Ibid., annex B. 23 For an account of Churchill's displeasure at these developments, see Moran, pp. 154-66, but especially p. 157. One can also sense some of his pique in his own description of the Teheran Conference in The Second World War, vol. 5, p. 331. In a light-hearted vignette about Teheran, Roosevelt told US Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, that what he and Stalin had agreed upon (regarding postwar Germany) 'came as a bombshell to the British'. See John O. Iatrides, ed., Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947, p- 396. 24 Cab. 66, vol. 40, W.P. (43) 398, 20 Sept. 1944. 25 Ibid. There was also at least one prominent British critic - William Strang, UK representative to the European Advisory Commission. He thought that Great Britain could not have 'a free foreign policy in Europe', which he, like Jebb and others in the Foreign Office, hoped for, so long as there was ' an American Supreme Allied Commander responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff'. See Barker, Churchill and Eden at War, p. 214. 26 Mark Stoler's The Politics of the Second Front is an interesting study that deals to a great extent with relations within the CCS. 27 Hachey, p. 96, political review for second quarter 1943, 31 Aug. 1943. 28 Eden, p. 405. For examples of Churchill's chagrin at Roosevelt's continual postponement of a promised visit to the UK, see his wires to Roosevelt before both the Second Quebec Conference and the Yalta Conference. PREM 3 (472), pp. 277, 276, 124, 120. 29 Hachey, passim, but pp. 115-16, for example. 30 Halifax papers A4.410.4.15, letter to Eden, 14 Feb. 1944. 31 PREM 4 (27/9), p. 636, letter, 14 Feb. 1944. 32 Cab. 66, vol. 41, W.P. (43) 430, 5 Oct. 1943. The quote is from the official record. 33 Hachey, pp. 113-16, political review for third quarter 1943, 27 Oct. 1943. 34 Cab. 66, vol. 63, W.P. (45) 157, 12 Mar. 1945. 35 Ibid. 36 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 469. 37 Gwyer, Grand Strategy, vol. 3, part 1, p. 383. 38 Regarding the Commission and its problems see F. P. King, 'British Policy, the European Advisory Commission, and the German Settlement (1943-45)', Ph.D.

Notes to pages 46-52

181

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1975. On this particular point, see especially pp. 101-16. Strang, Home and Abroad, pp. 208-9. Eden, p. 425. A line, probably from Churchill's pen, was drawn beside this sentence in a way that he frequently marked documents. PREM 4 (27/10), p. 1206. For Roosevelt's communication about a D-day statement see p. 1208. PREM 4 (27/9), p. 639, letter to Halifax, 28 Jan. 1944. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin ig^i-igqS, p. 553. FO 371-35330, paper U 453, minute, Ronald to Waley, 31 Jan. 1943. Ibid, paper U 460, 'United States Election Results, 1942'. Ibid., paper U 671, letter, 18 Feb. 1943. Ibid., paper U 821, telegram, Phillips to Treasury, 22 Feb. 1943. FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, p. 41. Louis Fischer has a perceptive description of the relations between the three Allied leaders at Teheran in his book The Life and Death of Stalin, pp. 186-200. It is based largely on a conversation Roosevelt had with Frances Perkins and recorded in her book The Roosevelt I Knew, pp. 82 5, plus records of other participants. PREM 3 (471), p. 349, telegram, 25 June 1943. Ibid., p. 339, telegram, 29 June 1943. Sherwood, p. 733. William Standley, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, also has an account of Davies' visit in his memoirs, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, p. 364-82. Characteristic of the entire volume, however, this account is a bit short on substance and long on the ceremonial and other peripheral aspects of the event, while also stressing Standley's pique at being bypassed. Davies carried a letter from Roosevelt to Stalin making it clear that Churchill was not wanted. For example, the President said Iceland would be a poor meeting place because of the difficult flights involved for them both and because that 'would make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time'. For the text of the letter, dated 5 May 1943, see The Roosevelt Letters, vol. 3, ed. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 464. Sherwood, p. 734. This was not the only meeting for which the Soviets vetoed the UK as a site. The October 1943 Foreign Ministers' Conference was another. See PREM 3 (471), p. 174. PREM 3 (471), p. 338, telegram, 29 June 1943. Ibid., p. 337, telegram, 29 June 1943. In their correspondence, Roosevelt and Churchill usually referred to Stalin as Uncle Joe or simply U J . PREM 3 (471), p. 283, telegram, 14July 1943. Stalin's silence was almost certainly due to displeasure at a second major delay in the invasion of France. Ibid., p. 107, telegram to Roosevelt, 20 Oct. 1943. Ibid., p. 100, telegram to Churchill, 22 Oct. 1943. Ibid., p. 96, telegram, 23 Oct. 1943. Churchill, vol. 5, p. 331 and Moran, p. 157. PREM 3 (471), p. 85, telegram to Roosevelt, 27 Oct. 1943. Ibid., p. 84, telegram, 29 Oct. 1943. Triple with China, quadruple with the Soviets. In the event, however, the Soviets would not attend a meeting with the Chinese for fear of alarming the Japanese. PREM 3 (471), p. 62, telegram, 3 Nov. 1943. Ibid., p. 37, telegram, 11 Nov. 1943.

182
69 70 71 72 73

Notes to pages 52-56

Ibid., p. 35, telegram, 12 Nov. 1943. In this regard, see for example PREM 3 (472), pp. 133, 124, 120, 97, 96. PREM 3 (472), pp. 124, 120. PREM 3 (473), pp. 438, 436, 435. Ibid., pp. 424, 422, 419. In p. 422, Churchill, urging the need for preliminary conferences, said, ' I do not see any other way of realising our hopes about World Organisation in five or six days. Even the Almighty took seven.' See also FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 3-40 ('Arrangements for the Conferences'). 74 Eden, p. 512. 75 Ibid., p. 513. In Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 William O. McCagg, J r argues that Lenin's theory that conflict between imperialist powers was inevitable and would redound to the benefit of socialism was re-emphasised in the Kremlin in 1944-5. He believes that the Soviets saw what they considered to be clear evidence of this at both the Teheran and Yalta conferences and successfully carried out their diplomacy accordingly, see pp. 149-67.

4. Economic issues 1 Richard Gardner's Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in its expanded (1969) edition, John Morton Blum's From the Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 3, ('Years of War, 1941-1945') and H. R. F. Harrod's The Life of John Maynard Keynes provide good background for a study of Anglo-American economic relations during the war and immediate postwar periods. David Rees has useful material in this regard in Harry Dexter White, A Study in Paradox, especially chapters 10, 14, 22, as does Gabriel Kolko in The Politics of War, pp. 280-313. 2 FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, pp. 48-107. See also Blum, pp. 131-9, and Gardner, pp. 174-5. 3 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 50, memorandum of conversation, Hull-Law, 20 July 1944, for example. 4 Hall, pp. 280-4, provides a good discussion of the entire reserve question and, in fact, furnishes a comprehensive study of the whole subject of American wartime aid to Britain. One should also consult R. S. Sayers, Financial Policy 1939-1945-, also part of the British 'Official History of the Second World War' series for his discussion of the reserve issue, pp. 427-37, and of Lend-Lease generally. 5 FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, p. 98, memorandum, 2 Nov. 1943. 6 Gardner, p. 175. Hall, pp. 284, 444-7. 7 Blum, pp. 322-3. 8 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, and Watt, Personalities and Policies, especially essay 3, 'American Aid to Britain and the Problem of Socialism, 1945-51.' 9 For Stimson's reservations, see Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 593. Hull's irritation at the Quebec agreements is evident in his memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 1613-22. Robert Dallek in Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, pp. 469-70, points out that Roosevelt was motivated by a desire for a strong postwar Britain. Gardner, pp. 180-7, p^sim. See also Hall, chapter xi, ' The Ending of War Supply from North America.' 10 Sayers, p. 480. See pp. 478-86 for a discussion of the ending of Lend-Lease. 11 High Tide and After: Memoirs, 1945-1960 (hereafter cited as Dal ton's memoirs), p. 68. 12 FO 800 (512), Telegram, 1 Sept. 1945. 13 Sayers, p. 478-82. 14 FO 800 (512) letter, 20 Sept. 1945.

Notes to pages 57-62

183

15 For a discussion of article VII of this agreement see Gardner, chapter iv, which is devoted to the subject. See also Harrod, pp. 555-75. 16 Cab. 66, vol. 46, W.P. (44) 81, 7 Feb. 1944. 17 Ibid. 18 Cab. 66, vol. 47, W.P. (44) 129, 23 Feb. 1944. 19 Ibid, and Cab. 66, vol. 47, W.P. (44) 138, 1 Mar. 1944, are good examples, but far from the only ones, of Amery's thinking on these issues. He bombarded the Cabinet with such papers. He was right, of course, that an international monetary fund would develop, although it did not do so from an exclusively American initiative. For background on the fund, see J. Keith Horsefield's three-volume study, The International Monetary Fund, ig4j-ig6j, especially volume 1. Despite the title, he begins the story in 1941. 20 Cab. 66, vol. 46, W.P. (44) 95, 9 Feb. 1944. For details on Beaverbrook's views regarding article VII see Beaverbrook papers, file D/150. 21 Cab. 66, vol. 47, W.P. (44) 145, 3 Mar. 1944. In this document Churchill outlined in bold face four points of one sentence each that he believed fundamental to article VII discussions. This was one of those points. It was a position he maintained consistently; it had been a major issue between him and American officials as early as 1941 when the Atlantic Charter was being written. Churchill's account of this event is in vol. 3 of his memoirs, pp. 385-8. That of his main antagonist, Sumner Welles, is in Welles' Where Are We Heading?, pp. 5-14. Probably the best account is Woodward's in vol. 2, pp. 200-2. Hull described the article VII negotiations in his memoirs, vol. 2, p. 1476. He said despite British pledges to abandon preferences after the war he believed Churchill was determined to keep them. 22 Watt, essay 3. T. G. Paterson also has a useful chapter in Soviet-American Confrontation that studies especially American official considerations regarding the loan. See pp. 159-73. Records of the British negotiating mission are in Cab 130/6 and 7. 23 Gardner, p. 237. 24 Ibid. 25 FO 800 (512), Telegram, Halifax to FO for Bevin and Dalton, 26 Sept. 1945. 26 Ibid, Telegram, 20 Nov. 1945. 27 FO 37I-44539> paper AN 3657. 28 Ibid. 29 Dalton Diaries, 12 April 1946. In his memoirs, Dalton describes the loan negotiations from Whitehall's vantage point, pp. 68-89. 30 Halifax Papers, A4.410.4.15, letter, 3 Dec. 1945. 31 FO 800 (513), Report of conversation, Bevin-Vandenberg-Foster Dulles, 24 Jan. 1946. 32 FO 800 (512), Telegram, Halifax to PM, 21 Dec. 1945 and FO 800 (513), Attlee's draft reply. 33 Halifax Papers, A4.410.4.15, letter, 1 Aug. 1946. 34 FO 371-44571, paper AN 271, minute by H. O. Clarke, 23 Jan. 1945. 35 Ibid., paper AN 359, minute by J. C. Donnelly, 6 Feb. 1945. 36 INF 1/945 (X/265/6A). 37 INF 1/327A. 38 Blum, p. 123. 39 Ibid., pp. 143-6. 40 Ibid, p. 127. 41 For documentary background from the American side, see FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, pp. 94-127. For a discussion based on official British sources, see Woodward vol. 4, pp. 388-402.

184

Notes to pages 62-72

42 Beaverbrook papers, D/421, document group 16, minute to Churchill, 8 Feb. 1944. It was also printed for Cabinet distribution. See Cab. 66, vol. 47, W.P. (44) 102, 11 Feb. 1944. 43 Beaverbrook papers, D/421, document group 17, minute, 14 Feb. 1944. 44 Ibid. 45 Cab. 66, vol. 47, W.P. (44) 119, 19 Feb. 1944. See also Woodward, vol. 4, pp. 388-90 regarding the Petroleum Reserves Corporation and its effect of increasing anxieties in Whitehall. 46 Cab. 66, vol. 47, W.P. (44) 119, 19 Feb. 1944. 47 Woodward, vol. 4, p. 394. 48 Cab. 66, vol. 48, W.P. (44) 187, 5 Apr. 1944. My emphasis. 49 PREM 3 (472), p. 572, telegram, 20 Feb. 1944. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., p. 554. 52 Ibid., p. 546. 53 The threat of an embarrassing parliamentary debate was used by Churchill more than once as a diplomatic ploy. 54 PREM 3 (472), p. 529, telegram, 3 Mar. 1944. 55 Ibid., p. 525. 56 Ibid., p. 519, telegram, 7 Mar. 1944. 57 Cab. 129, vol. 2, C.P. (45) 174, 17 Sept. 1945. 58 FRUS, 1944, vol. 2, has a thorough set of documents on this conference, pp. 355 613. 59 Beaverbrook papers, D/24.1, passim. 60 Ibid., D/260-1. 61 Ibid., D/260-1, telegram, 28 Oct. 1944. 62 Ibid., D/260-1, minute, GMT (George Malcolm Thomson) to Beaverbrook. 63 Ibid., D/260-1, 18 Jan. 1944. 64 Ibid., D/241, document group 5, minute, 2 Jan. 1944. 65 Churchill sent Beaverbrook two notes on this in one day. The quotes are from both. Beaverbrook, with this support from Churchill, remained in charge of the matter for the British, although not without engaging in some peevish correspondence with Eden in which he offered to abdicate in the latter's favour, an offer Eden declined. See Beaverbrook papers D/241, passim. 66 FRUS, 1944, vol. 2, p. 589, telegram, 24 Nov. 1944. 67 Ibid., p. 590, telegram to Roosevelt, 28 Nov. 1944. 68 Cab. 129, no. 3, C.A.C. (45) 3 of 3 Sept. 45, circulated to the Cabinet as C.P. (45) 221 of 11 Oct. 1945 along with C.P. (45) 222 of 12 Oct. 1945. 69 INF 1/701 (N.506). 70 Cab. 129, C.P. (46) 37, 1 Feb. 1946. 71 Cab. 129, C.P. (46) 39, 2 Feb. 1946. 72 Cab. 128, C M . (46) 14th conclusions. The Cabinet did, however, state that certain parts of the agreement, relating to leased bases, should only be initialled ad referendum until certain points could be cleared up. PART II Introduction 1 For another interpretation of Great Britain and the junior partner issue see T. H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-1947.

Notes to pages 74-77

5. Background and build-up

185

1 Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics, p. 45, quoting Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, Armia Podzienna (London, 1952), p. 144 regarding Home Army numbers. Oscar Halecki, ed., Poland, p. 152 is the source for the overseas forces. 2 The Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12, pp. 443, 8 ion. Two summaries of the history of the Curzon Line were circulated in HMG, one which the FO prepared for the Cabinet (see Cab. 66, vol. 46, W.P. (44) 84, 4 Feb. 1944) and another which Orme Sargent prepared for Churchill (see PREM 3, (355/4) p. 154)- For a detailed study of the Russo-Polish war of 1919-21 see Norman Davies' White Eagle, Red Star. Hans Roos also discusses the war and the implications for Poland in chapter 2 of A History of Modern Poland, and Hugh Seton-Watson deals with Polish domestic and foreign issues in Eastern Europe Between the Wars, igi&-ig4i. A thorough study of Polish political, social and economic questions is provided in Antony Polonsky's Politics in Independent Poland, ig2i-igsg. A useful, but more exclusively political work is Polish Politics in Transition by Edward D. Wynot, Jr., studying the period 1935-9. 3 Further German-Soviet discussions resulted in the actual demarcation between the two zones being moved somewhat to the east. For a detailed consideration of these events see A. Rossi, The Russo-German Alliance. 4 Polonsky, The Great Powers and the Polish Question, igp-ig^ (hereafter referred to as The Polish Question), p. 18. 5 Lynn Davis has an excellent discussion of this treaty and Anglo-American interaction in regard to it in The Cold War Begins, pp. 11-37. 6 PREM 3 (355/4), p. 163, memorandum by Cadogan, 24 Mar. 1944. 7 Standley and Ageton, p. 263. Background and pertinent documents on these questions are also included in Polonsky, The Polish Question, pp. 23-25. See Davis, pp. 38-42 for a discussion of Polish efforts to involve the United States as an ally in issues with the Soviet Union before 1943. Stanislaw Kot, Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union from Sept. 1941 until July 1942, describes his efforts in regard to the relief issue in Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia, passim, but pp. 163, 255-70, for example. 8 PREM 3 (354/8), p. 538, aide-memoire from the Polish Government, 1 Feb. 1943. It should be said that during a brief moment of good feeling between the Soviet and Polish governments the USSR also contributed to the aid of these refuges, granting 100 million roubles for the purpose in Dec. 1941. See Kot, pp. xxvii, 173. 9 PREM 3 (354/8), p. 553, telegram, FO to Moscow Embassy, 10 Feb. 1943. See also pp. 559 and 548 for Sikorski's letter to Churchill, 9 Feb. 1943, and Churchill's reply, 16 Feb. 1943. This exchange is also in the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum papers from the Polish premier's office (hereafter cited as PISM, PRM). See file PRM 95, doc. 12. 10 PREM 3 (354/8), pp. 525 and 521, aide-memoires, 23 and 19 Mar. 1943 respectively. 11 Ibid., pp. 509, 502, minutes to Cadogan of 3 Apr. 1945. The moment, as Cadogan recognised, was particularly inopportune because on 30 Mar. 1943 Churchill wired Stalin in the name of both Roosevelt and himself saying that convoys to Russia via the northern route would have to be interrupted until at least Sept. 1943 (there was apparently one exception in May). This was due to heavy German naval concentrations along the route plus the need to supply the invasion of Sicily. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, ig4i-ig4j, p. i, p. 111. 12 PREM 3 (354/8), p. 511, minute, 31 Mar. 1943. FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, p. 393, telegram to Roosevelt, 25 Apr. 1943.

186

Notes to pages 77-78

13 Davis, pp. 47-8, p. 48, n. 23. 14 The British found the need to moderate the dozen or so Polish publications in Great Britain an excruciating burden. These journals criticised not only the Soviets but often moderate Polish leaders like Sikorski. For example, one of these publications, entitled Walka, in February 1943 counted all the ways Sikorski had collaborated with the Soviets and then called for his removal, adding,. 'We must begin to mobilise the public opinion of the world in defence of Poland against the Soviets.' See FO 371-34564, paper C 2054. Government control of paper was a weapon HMG used to try to discipline this press, and at least one journal, Wiadomosoi Polskie, was closed by shutting off its supply. See FO 371-34590, paper C 15340, minute of D.Allen, 16 Dec. 1943, plus Cab. 65, vol. 41, W.M. (44) 15th conclusions, minute 1, 4 Feb. 1944, and 20th conclusions, minute 5, 14 Feb. 1944 and PREM 3 (355/15), p- 1371, telegram, FO to Moscow Embassy, 15 Feb. 1943. Soviet media could be as outrageous as their Polish counterparts. Soviet War Mews, a journal the Soviet Embassy distributed in Britain, often did battle with the Poles, once causing Churchill to complain in strongest terms to the Soviet Ambassador. See PREM 3 (354/8), p. 368, telegram, FO to Moscow Embassy, 30 Apr. 1943. On 26 Oct. 1943 Radio Moscow broadcast an article from a Soviet journal saying 'The tragi-comedy of the London Polish Government leads one to question the pretence this singular Government has for its existence.' See FO 371-34588, paper C 12750. 15 Although uncertainty exists about the exact number of victims, it apparently was between 4,000 and 4,500. J. K. Zawodny, who has probably done the most thorough and impartial study, puts the total at ' approximately 4,443' (see Death in the Forest, pp. ix, 24, 35, 95) but posits that the number may have been as high as 4,800. The victims were among some 15,000 soldiers who disappeared after the 1939 Russo-German attack on Poland. Although the Russians maintained that the Germans killed the Polish prisoners and vice versa, most western historians today find the evidence preponderantly pointing to the Soviets as the culprits, carrying out the executions in the spring of 1940 before the Nazis launched their attack on Russia. Polonsky, for example, says 'there seems today little doubt' that they were 'murdered by the Soviets' (see The Polish Question, p. 25). Zawodny concludes his chapter entitled 'Analysis of the evidence' with the statement, 'The Katyn Massacre was perpetrated by Soviet Security Police (N.K.V.D.) under the auspices of the Soviet Government' (see P- 95)Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, one-time Polish premier, claims a Red Army officer at the Soviet Embassy, London, told ' a group' that the executions were the result of a misunderstanding of an order from Stalin, The Pattern of Soviet Domination, pp.
41-2.

16 17 18 19 20 21

Much of the correspondence of the British Foreign Office and Number 10 Downing St. on this issue can be found in PREM 3 (353). Besides Zawodny's study of the event, the Polish Cultural Foundation has published a large amount of material about it in a work entitled The Crime of Katyn. Joseph Mackiewicz in The Katyn Wood Murders has useful information but without citations and with such a strong anti-Soviet bias that his study should be used with care. PREM 3 (354/8), p. 487, record of conversation, Churchill-Sikorski, 15 Apr. 1943. Ibid., pp. 465 to 534 passim. Ibid., p. 469. FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, pp. 390-95. Ibid., p. 395. PREM 3 (354/8), p. 414 contains a paraphrase copy sent to Churchill. The message was sent 26 Apr. 1943. PREM 3 (354/8), p. 413, telegram, 27 April, 1943.

Notes to pages 78-81

187

22 Ibid., p. 417, telegram, 26 April, 1943. 23 Cab. 66, vol. 36, W.P. (43) 175, 26 Apr. 1943. Churchill's telegram is dated 25 Apr. 194324 PREM 3 (354/9), p. 630, telegram to Churchill, 7 May 1943. 25 PREM 3 (354/8), p. 393, minute, Churchill to Eden, 28 Apr. 1943. Benjamin Colby describes what he sees as a deliberate effort by the British and American Governments to keep the public in the West from realising that it was the Russians who had perpetrated the Katyn massacre. See ' Twos a Famous Victory, pp. 65-78. 26 FRUS, 1943, vol. 3, pp. 461-7, aide-memoire Soviet FO to American Embassy, Moscow, 27 Sept. 1943. 27 Davis, pp. 46-9. In his memoirs Hull says that at Moscow he joined Eden in 'warmly urging resumption of diplomatic relations', which was not quite the way Eden remembered it. His memoirs describe Hull as 'most unwilling to make any move' and record him simply as delivering a homily on neighbourliness, which Hull records also. Eden derides it; Hull seems quite proud of it. The US record of this session tends to support Eden's version of the occasion. See Hull, pp. 1305-6; Eden, pp. 416-17; FRUS, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 667-8. 28 FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, p. 594, record of RooseveltStalin meeting, 1 Dec. 1943. 29 One of the most recent being Zbigniew Brzezinski's 'The Future of Yalta', Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 2, winter 1984/85. 30 Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, p. 131. 31 Ibid., p p . 73-84.

6. Involvement of Great Britain and the United States 1 Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 178-9. PREM 3 (355/9), p. 682, telegram, 7 Mar. 1944. Mikolajczyk's own account of his American visit can be found in PREM 3 (355/12), p. 932 and PISM, PRM 147 as well as in The Pattern of Soviet Domination, pp. 62-72. Records of major conversations can be found in FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, pp. 1274-89. Davis also has a good summary, pp. 103-9, and Jan Ciechanowski, Polish ambassador in Washington at the time, gives an account in his book Defeat in Victory, pp. 303-30. 2 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1280, memorandum, Stettinius to Hull, 12 June 1944. Ciechanowski, p. 320. PISM, PRM, 147. 3 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1280, memorandum, Stettinius to Hull, 12 June 1944. Ciechanowski, 318-19. 4 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1284, telegram, Hull to Harriman, 17 June 1944. 5 Ibid., p. 1289, telegram, Stalin to Roosevelt, 24 June, 1944. 6 The messages on this are in PREM 3 (355/12), pp. 937-41. 7 Woodward, vol. 3, p. 197. PREM 3 (355/12), pp. 854, 852, 851, Eden's draft and Churchill's telegram to Roosevelt, 26 July 1944. PREM 3 (355/12), p. 847, telegram, Roosevelt to Stalin, 27 July 1944. A paraphrased copy with slightly different wording can be found in FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1300. PREM 3 (355/12), p. 846, telegram, Roosevelt to Mikolajczyk, undated copy. 8 Although correspondence on the rising is spread throughout many British files, much of it from Number 10 Downing St and the top echelons of the Foreign Office is concentrated in PREM 3 (352/11,12 and 13). There is an excellent study of the rising and its background by Jan M. Ciechanowski (not to be confused with the Polish ambassador of the same name) entitled The Warsaw Rising of 1944, which in fact is also a good source of information on the Polish Government and resistance movement throughout the war and their relations with the Allies. Another good

188

Notes to pages 82-85

study of the subject and its background is George Bruce's The Warsaw Uprising. T. Bor-Komorowski, Commander of the Home Army at the time of the uprising, devotes half of his war memoirs, The Secret Army, to the subject, and Mikolajczyk has a chapter on it entitled * Betrayal'. There are also several cfirst-person' accounts. Fighting Warsaw by Stefan Korbonski, a leader of the Warsaw resistance, describes that movement from 1939-45, including, of course, the 1944 rising. Seventy Days by W. Zagorski is a diary of the rising by a participant, and Silent Is the Vistula by Irena Orska describes it from the standpoint of a woman member of the resistance. Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 202-21, gives a thorough account from the official British point of view with, however, a notable anti-Soviet bias. 9 See John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 107-25 for background. As chief of the American military mission to Moscow, Deane was the person primarily responsible for making these arrangements. 10 Woodward, vol. 3, p. 209. FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1374, telegram, Harriman to Hull, 15 Aug. 194411 Ibid., p. 1381, telegram, Hull to Harriman, 19 Aug. 1944. 12 Cab. 65, vol. 47, 108th conclusions, confidential annex, 18 Aug. 1944. 13 PREM 3 (472), pp. 262-3, and FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, pp. 1382-3 and 1385-6. 14 Ibid., pp. 249, 245, 228, 224. 15 Ibid., pp. 228, 224, telegrams exchanged on 4 and 5 Sept. 1944. 16 Polonsky, The Polish Question, p. 36. 17 Bor-Komorowski, p. 369. For further background on Allied interaction in regard to the Polish Home Army, see Cab. 65, vol. 45, W.M. (44) 1st conclusions, minute 3, 3 Jan. 1944; 7th conclusions, minute 2, 17 Jan. 1944; 16th conclusions, minute 3, 7 Feb. 1944, and vol. 47, 111th conclusions, minute 7, 28 Aug. 1944, all in the confidential annex. See also Deane, p. 138 who says Soviet Gen. Slavin told him the Russians planned to make it difficult for the British to supply Polish partisans who, he said, must be disarmed. In Dec. 1944 Eden wanted to remonstrate with Stalin about this, but Churchill said, ' I do not want to disturb Stalin until we are round the corner in Greece.' PREM 3 (352/11), pp. 279, 278, Eden/Churchill minutes, 13 and 14 Dec. 1944. See also PREM 3 (352/14A), pp. 845, 843, Ismay's minute to Churchill, 27 July 1944 and Churchill's reply, 28 July, 1944. 18 British records of the meeting are contained in PREM 3 (434/2). 19 For a discussion of these matters and pertinent documents see Polonsky, The Polish Question, pp. 36-7. 20 Eade, 1944, p. 297 or Hansard, vol. 406, cols. 1478-89. 21 Sherwood, p. 842. 22 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1248, telegram, Stettinius to Harriman, 10 Feb. 1944. 23 Eade, 1944, p. 297 or Hansard, vol. 406, col. i486. 24 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1344, n. 25. 25 PREM 3 (355/14), p. 1198, telegram, 15 Dec. 1944. 26 Ibid., p. 1196, telegram, 16 Dec. 1944. 27 FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1345, n. 26, telegram 16 Dec. 1944. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., p. 1334, for Roosevelt's letter to Mikolajczyk dated 17 Nov. 1944 30 Ibid., p. 1346, press release, 18 Dec. 1944. 31 Ibid., p. 1345, telegram Roosevelt to Stalin, 16 Dec. 1944. 32 PREM 3 (355/14), p. 1172, telegram, Halifax to FO, 17 Dec. 1944. Records of HMG's deliberations about this message can be found in PREM 3 (355/14), PP- 1157-7333 Ibid., p. 1171, telegram, Halifax to FO, 18 Dec. 1944. 34 Ibid., p. 1168, mmute to Eden, 18 Dec. 1944.

Notes to pages 86-8g

35 36 37 38 39 40 Ibid., p. 1157, telegram to Halifax, 19 Dec. 1944. FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, p. 1345, telegram, Roosevelt to Stalin, 16 Dec. 1944. Ibid., p. 1441, memorandum to Roosevelt, 27 Dec. 1944, for example. Ibid., p. 1442, telegram, 27 Dec. 1944. Ibid., p. 1444, telegram, 30 Dec. 1944. Ibid., p. 1445, telegram.

189

7. Yalta and after

1 PREM 3 (356/3), p. 74, minute to Churchill, 1 Feb. 1945. 2 For a discussion of Whitehall's views and concerns in regard to Poland's western borders see Rothwell pp. 44-9. 3 Wolfgang Wagner has done an extensive study of the western border question in his two-volume work The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line. Alfred M. de Zayas in his monograph, Nemesis at Potsdam, has documented the plight of the German inhabitants transferred from areas of Eastern and Central Europe following the Allied victory. He puts the total at approximately 16 million, more than 9 million as a result of Poland's westward expansion. See pp. xix, 11. 4 For the official British record of Yalta see Cab. 66, vol. 63 W.P. (45) 157, 12 March 1945 and PREM 3 (51/1-10). Additional official correspondence regarding the conference can be found in PREM 3 (356/3). The American records and correspondence are in a separate volume of FRUS entitled The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. Soviet records, mainly of heads-of-government sessions, are collected in
The Tehran, Yalta & Potsdam Conferences: Documents by Progress Publishers, Moscow.

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15

The meeting is also dealt with in many diaries and memoirs of persons who were there, e.g. Hopkins (Sherwood), Churchill, Eden, Byrnes, Leahy, Cadogan, Bohlen, Deane, Harriman, Stettinius (who wrote a useful book on the subject, Roosevelt and the Russians) and is treated in a vast number of Cold War histories. John Snell has edited a collection of essays by himself and three other historians entitled The Meaning of Yalta and Diane Clemens has produced a comprehensive study entitled Yalta, which gives a good account of the issues and the proceedings but tends towards uncritical acceptance of Soviet positions. There is also an excellent survey of the Polish issue not only at Yalta but during several weeks preceding and following the conference in Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 245-77. Finally, Athan G. Theoharis has an interesting study of the long-term effects of the conference within the United States entitled The Yalta Myths: an Issue in US Politics, 1945-1955Clemens, p. 205. Cab. 66, vol. 63, W.P. (45) 157, 12 Mar. 1945, conference record, p. 61. Ibid., annex i, p. 96. Ibid., p. 84. Clemens, p. 211. Cab. 66, vol. 63, W.P. (45) 157, 12 Mar. 1945, conference record, p. 80. FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 973. PREM 3 (356/16), p. 1435, letter, 3 Feb. 1945. For examples, see PISM, PRM 164, no. 14. PISM, PRM 171, no. 6, note, Ciechanowski to Grew, 15 Feb. 1945. PREM 3 (356/3), p. 33, private office to Martin, 13 Feb. 1945. FO 371-47579, paper N 1884/G, record of conversation, Churchill/Anders, 21 Feb. 1945. For Foreign Office views of the Polish reaction, see paper N 1776/G, 20 Feb. 1945. Generally, officials there thought the Poles' case was weak, but nevertheless Eden was concerned about its effect in Parliament. Woodward, vol. 3, p. 275-6. PREM 3 (356/4), p. 124. Churchill, vol. 6, pp. 320-1. Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 252-3.

i9

Notesto pages 90-93

16 Cab. 65, vol. 49, W.M. (45) 26th conclusions, minute 5, confidential annex. 17 PREM 3 (356/9), p. 822, telegram, FO to Moscow Embassy, 6 Mar. 1945. Although at times he seemed to take the side of the London Polish government, it should be clear that Churchill was far from being in its pocket. He once said about its officials 'They hope to break down the Crimea policy and bring about if possible a rift between the Soviets and the Western Democracies.' But he also said of Boleslaw Bierut, leader of the Polish Workers' Party (Communist) and head of the Lublin Committee, 'Bierut and Co. have an obvious interest in keeping the whole power in their hands. In fact both extreme sets of Poles will behave as badly as possible.' See PREM 3 (356/9), p. 844, telegram to Clark Kerr, 28 Feb. 1945. The word ' extreme' was an afterthought apparently, as it was written between the lines in the draft. 18 A good source for details on these negotiations is Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 245-77. 19 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 134-76, passim. 20 Churchill, vol. 6, p. 504, note, Churchill to Joseph Davies, 27 May, 1945, for example. 21 Cab. 66, vol. 43, W.P. (43) 528, 22 Nov. 1943. 22 The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (hereafter cited as Cadogan's Diaries), p. 609. 23 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace, p. 65, who cites Hugh Dalton's diary for 23 February 194524 PREM 3 (356/13), p. 1079, telegram, 9 June 1945, 25 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 152, telegram, Grew to Schoenfeld, 9 Mar. 1945. Cab. 65, vol. 49, W.M. (45) 26th conclusions, minute 5, confidential annex. 26 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 147, telegram, 8 Mar. 1945. 27 Ibid., p. 157, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 Mar. 1945. 28 Ibid., p. 150, telegram, Grew to Harriman, 8 Mar. 1945; p. 153, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Mar. 1945; p. 155, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 Mar. 1945. PREM 3 (356/9), p. 810, minute, 9 Mar. 1945. 29 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 158, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 12 Mar. 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), p. 366. 30 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 158, telegram to Roosevelt, 13 Mar. 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), p. 362. There was additional correspondence between the two on this subject. See FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 163 and 170 or PREM 3 (473) pp. 357 and 353 for an exchange of telegrams on 15 and 16 Mar. Finally Churchill, aware of how hard he was pushing Roosevelt, sent a fence-mending cable, hoping he was not becoming a bore, and reaffirming their friendship, which, he said, ' is the rock on which I build for the future of the world'. See PREM 3 (473), p. 350. 31 PREM 3 (356/9), p. 751, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 16 Mar. 1945. Text also in FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 170. 32 PREM 3 (356/9), p. 743, telegram, Halifax to FO, 17 Mar. 1945. 33 Ibid., p. 747, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 18 Mar. 1945. For text of final instructions see FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 172, telegram, Acheson to Harriman, 18 Mar. 1945. 34 PREM 3 (356/9), p. 738, minute to Eden, 19 Mar. 1945. 35 Ibid., p. 735, 19 Mar. 1945. 36 Ibid., pp. 733, 732, telegrams to Halifax and Clark Kerr, both 19 Mar. 1945. 37 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 176, telegram, Harriman to Sec. State, 23 Mar. 1945. 38 FRUS, 1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 779 and 789. 39 PREM 3 (473), p. 322, copies of messages between Roosevelt and Stalin repeated to Churchill, 29 Mar. 1945. 40 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 184, telegram, Grew to Harriman, 27 Mar. 1945.

Notes to pages 93-99

191

41 PREM 3 (356/9), p. 610, telegram, Halifax to FO, 11 Mar. 1945, and Churchill's minute. 42 Ibid., p. 609, minute, 13 Mar. 1945. 43 Ibid., p. 722, minute to Churchill, 24 Mar. 1945. 44 Ibid., p. 718, minute to Eden 24 Mar. 1945. 45 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 185, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 27 Mar. 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), p. 326. 46 PREM 3 (473), p. 322 (these are copies of the messages repeated to Churchill, 29 Mar. 1945). Roosevelt's telegram to Stalin was sent 24 Mar. and the reply 27 Mar. 194547 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 187, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 27 Mar. 1945. 48 Ibid., p. 189, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 29 Mar. 1945. 49 PREM 3 (356/9), p. 548, record of telephone message, Eden to Churchill, 30 Mar. 194550 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 189, telegram of 29 Mar. 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), p. 317. The 'two groups' Roosevelt refers to in addition to Lublin were the emigre government and all others. 51 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 190, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 30 Mar. 1945. 52 Ibid., p. 194, telegram, Roosevelt to Stalin, 1 Apr. 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (472), p. 314. 53 Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman (hereafter Stalin's Correspondence), part i, p. 310. Churchill sent a draft to Roosevelt before cabling Stalin. See FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 191. 54 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 316, telegram, 1 Apr. 1945. 55 Stalin's Correspondence, part 1, p. 310. 56 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 201 and 204, telegrams, Stalin to Roosevelt and Churchill respectively, both 7 Apr. 1945. Text of the latter is also in PREM 3 (473), p. 262. 57 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 141, telegram, Harriman to Sec. State, 4 Mar. 1945. 58 Ibid., p. 138, telegram, Grew to Harriman, 3 Mar. 1945. 59 Ibid. 60 FO 371-47581, paper N 2295/G, telegram, Halifax to FO, 3 Mar. 1945. 61 Ibid., minute, 5 Mar. 1945. 62 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 141, telegram, Harriman to Sec. State, 4 Mar. 1945. 63 Ibid., p. 145, telegram of 7 Mar. 1945. 64 PREM 3 (473), p. 285, telegram to Roosevelt, 5 Apr. 1945. 65 Ibid., p. 279, telegram, 6 Apr. 1945. 66 Warren F. Kimball, 'The Naked Reverse Right: Roosevelt, Churchill, and Eastern Europe from TOLSTOY to Yalta - and a Little Beyond', Diplomatic History, vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1985, p. 22. 67 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 436. Ismay, Memoirs, pp. 363-4. Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 331-3. Montgomery, like Churchill, felt it was a mistake not to take Berlin. Stephen E. Ambrose argues in favour of the American policy and also questions the ease with which the Western armies might have beaten the Russians to that city. See The Supreme Commander, pp. 627-48, 651-6. He also addresses the question more completely, while taking the same point of view, in a monograph entitled Eisenhower and Berlin, igtf: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe.

8. Truman: the new factor 1 Yergin says Truman told a friend in Oct. 1945 that world government might come in a thousand years but that in 1945 it was nothing but a theory. See pp. 140-1.

192

Notes to pages 99-104

Yergin is also interesting regarding Truman's first days in the presidency and his innocence of foreign affairs. See pp. 69-86 and especially pp. 70-1. Truman's inexperience in international matters is also shown clearly in chapters 2 and 3, vol. 1, of his memoirs in which he describes his efforts to inform himself about foreign policy as well as domestic issues. 2 Truman, vol. 1, pp. 256, 293, 349, 421. Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, (New York, 1948, hereafter cited as Sherwood), p. 901. 3 Churchill, vol. 6, pp. 448,498. Truman, vol. 1, pp. 76, 244, 245. PREM 3 (356/13), p. 1123, telegram to Truman, 4 June 1945. 4 Vol. 1, p. 332. 5 PREM 3 (473), p. 42, telegram, 12 June 1945. Eisenhower says in his memoirs that he and the War Dept. supported this view. See Crusade in Europe, pp. 517-18. 6 PREM 3 (473), p. 39, telegram, 14 June 1945. 7 Cab. 65, vol. 50, W.M. (45) 44th conclusions, 13 Apr. 1945. This can also be found in PREM 3 (356/5), p. 266. 8 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 219, or PREM 3 (473), p. 251, draft message, Truman to Stalin. 9 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 211, telegrams, 13 Apr. 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), pp. 257 and 254. Truman sent two telegrams to Churchill on this subject on the same day. 10 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 236, telegram to Eden, 15 Apr. 1945. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 217, minute to Cadogan, 14 Apr. 1945. See also Cadogan's Diaries, p. 728, entry for 14 Apr. 1945. 13 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 232, telegram, Clark Kerr to FO, 14 Apr. 1945. See also Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, pp. 441-3. 14 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 228, draft message to Eden, 15 Apr. 1945. 15 Because at first it was assumed that the number was 15, communications on the matter may say 15 or 16. 16 PREM 3 (352/7), p. 163, minute, Eden to Churchill, 19 Apr. 1945. 17 PREM 3 (356/5), passim, but especially pp. 257-63, 254, 196-7, 155, 151. 18 PREM 3 (356/7), p. 487, letter to Eden, 10 Apr. 1945. This entire file is concerned exclusively with the issue of the 16 Poles. 19 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 213, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 15 Apr. 1945. 20 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 203, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 14 Apr. 1945. For Stalin's reference to the three and five formula see FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 201 or PREM 3 (356/5), p. 297, letter to Roosevelt, 7 Apr. 1945. 21 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 164, telegram, Roberts to FO, 17 Apr. 1945. See also Harriman's telegram to Sec. State, FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 225, 16 Apr. 1945. 22 PREM 3 (356/5), p. 160, telegram, Eden to Roberts, 17 Apr. 1945, and FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 227, telegram, Sec. State to Kennan, 17 Apr. 1945.

9. The gathering for the San Francisco Conference 1 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5., p. 231, memorandum of conversation by Bohlen. Regarding Truman's skimpy knowledge of foreign affairs, he told Stettinius on 21 Apr., the day before his first meeting with Molotov, that he was 'very hazy' about Yalta. See The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius Jr., ig^j-ig^ (hereafter referred to as Stettinius' diaries), ed. T. M. Campbell and G. C. Herring, p. 325. 2 Stettinius' diaries, pp. 325, 327. 3 Essentially these points were that the 'Warsaw Government' (Lublin Committee) should not have a veto over nominees to be consultants; that certain Poles, whom

Notes to pages 104-iog

193

the message named, be invited; that invited Poles might suggest names of others to be invited; and that no formula be established for the Polish Provisional Government in advance of the consultations. For text see FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 220. 4 PREM 3 (356/10), p. 920, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 22 Apr. 1945. 5 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 235, memorandum of conversation by Bohlen. 6 Stettinius's diaries, p. 328. 7 PREM 3 (356/10), p. 918, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 22 Apr. 1945. 8 Ibid. The phrases in parentheses indicate garbled words in the telegram. 9 Ibid. p. 903. Churchill to Eden, 24 Apr. 1945. 10 Ibid., p. 913, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 23 Apr. 1945. 11 Ibid., p. 908, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 23 Apr. 1945. r 12 See Brian Gardner, The Wasted Hour, pp. 164-5 f example. Walter LaFeber calls it 'a decisive meeting', in America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1975, p. 18. 13 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 252, memorandum by Bohlen of the conversation. In discussing this meeting I have relied heavily on Bohlen's record and all the quotes are taken from it. 14 Ibid., p. 256, for a record of the meeting made by Bohlen, who attended it. Truman in his memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 96-9 seems to have used the Bohlen record almost verbatim, although he recounts a peppery closing to the meeting (mentioned later in this book) which is not included in either Bohlen's official record, cited here, or in Bohlen's account in his memoirs, Witness to History, 1929-1969, p. 213. 15 Truman, vol. 1, p. 99. 16 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 220. That message, delivered 18 Apr., stated in essence: That the US and UK agreed that three leaders from the Lublin Committee, now being called the Warsaw Government, might be among the consultants. That the Western Allies agreed that the Warsaw Government should play an important role in the provisional government. That the real issue was whether or not the Warsaw Government had a veto right in respect to consultants. That consultants from Warsaw might arrive first if that were desired (presumably by Moscow and Warsaw). That the consultants should be able to suggest other consultants who might be invited. That the US and UK could agree to no formulas for the provisional government before the consultations with the Poles, and that in no case would the Yugoslav precedent apply. In Yugoslavia Soviet-backed candidates had been granted a majority. It then asked Stalin to re-read coordinated US-UK messages of 1 April 1945, which expressed Western resistance to an augmented role for the Warsaw Government either in the consultations or in the eventual provisional government. (See FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 193, 194, for these messages.) 17 PREM 3 (356/10), p. 904, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 23 Apr. 1945. 18 Ibid., p. 907, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 23 Apr. 1945. 19 Ibid., p. 900, telegram, Churchill to Truman, 24 Apr. 1945. For Churchill's endorsement of the note Truman had sent Stalin via Molotov, see PREM 3 (356/10), p. 897, telegram, Churchill to Stalin, 24 Apr. 1945. 20 PREM 3 (356/10), p. 892, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 26 Apr. 1945. 21 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 263, telegram, Stalin to Truman, 24 Apr. 1945. 22 PREM 3 (356/10), pp. 885, 866, 862 and 870 for development of Churchill's telegram to Stalin, which included a lengthy statement of the Western positions. Churchill sent it for review to Sargent as Eden and Cadogan were both in San

194

Notes to pages iog-116

Francisco. He attached a note welcoming suggestions but saying * do not try to mar the symmetry and coherence of the message'. Sargent, perhaps taking the hint, replied 'Your message is we feel just what is wanted.' FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 280, for Truman's telegram to Stalin, 4 May 1945, and p. 272, for a record of a meeting of the foreign secretaries and their aides, 2 May 194523 PREM 4 (27/10), p. 894, 25 Apr. 1945. Truman, vol. 6, p. 429. 24 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 281, record of the meeting, 4 May 1945. 25 Eden, p. 536. 26 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 284, telegram, 5 May 1945. Note that Churchill was still under the impression that 15, not 16, persons were involved. 27 PREM 3 (356/2), p. 1007, telegram, 5 May 1945. 28 PREM 3 (356/16), p. 1278, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 9 May 1945. 29 Ibid. 30 PREM 3 (356/16), p. 1271, minute, 11 May 1945. 31 Ibid., p. 1273, telegram, 12 May 1945. 32 Norman Graebner carefully traces the hardening of the American position from 1945 to 1947 in his Cold War Diplomacy, pp. 7-60.

10. Between San Francisco and Potsdam Churchill, vol. 6, p. 501. Truman, vol. 1, p. 288. Sherwood, pp. 885-7. Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 215. Woodward, vol. 3, p. 546. He discusses the Hopkins trip on pp. 546-51. Sherwood, pp. 887-912, and FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, pp. 299-338 passim for the discussions of Polish topics. 5 PREM 3 (356/13), p. 1155, telegram to FO, 1 June 1945. 6 Ibid., p. 1157, telegram, 1 June 1945. Also in FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 314. In spite of Hopkins' efforts, 12 of the 16 were found guilty and given prison sentences ranging from four months to ten years. See Mikolajczyk, p. 145. 7 PREM 3 (356/13), pp. 1154 and 1149, telegrams, 2 June 1945. 8 Ibid., p. 1144, minute, 3 June 1945. Campbell, formerly Minister in Washington, was now HMG's representative to the European Advisory Commission. 9 Ibid., p. 1103, or FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 321, telegram, Churchill to Truman, 4 June 194510 PREM 3 (356/13), p. 1107, telegram, 4 June 1945. Also in FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 320. 11 PREM 3 (356/13), p. 1088, telegram, Clark Kerr to FO, 6 June 1945. 12 Ibid., p. 1085, minute to Churchill, 8 June 1945. 13 Ibid., p. 1079, telegram, FO to Moscow Embassy, 9 June 1945. 14 The quote is from a memorandum by Hopkins dated 13 June 1945. See Sherwood, p. 913. FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 337 also presents the sections of this memorandum dealing with the Polish question and Churchill's reactions. Hopkins' reasoning is questionable. Churchill probably had more to gain, and knew it, from staunchly defending Poland's interests as interpreted in the West than from resolving the issue along Russian lines. 15 PREM 3 (356/13), p. 1051. 16 PREM 3 (473), p. 8, telegram. 17 Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 555-6. Richard C. Lukas in Bitter Legacy provides a close account of Polish affairs, especially from July 1945 until the Polish elections in 1947. 1 2 3 4

Notes to pages iiy-122

/ / . Concluding thoughts on the Polish crisis

195

1 See p. 107 of this book. 2 See pp. 108-9 of this book. 3 PREM 3 (355/8), p. 693, telegram, Clark Kerr to FO, 1 Mar. 1944, and Churchill's minute. 4 Ibid., p. 682, telegram, Churchill to Moscow Embassy, 5 Mar. 1944, and p. 647, telegram, Clark Kerr to FO, 7 Mar. 1944. 5 Ibid., p. 646, Eden's draft and Churchill's addition, and pp. 641-40, Eden's telegram and Churchill's minute. 6 The effect of the British elections on the Polish issue had been addressed earlier by this author in a University of Cambridge Ph.D. dissertation in 1978, entitled 'The Vision of Anglo-America and the Origins of the Cold War: Some Aspects of British Foreign Policy, 1943-1946', and in a journal article developed from it. See Henry B. Ryan, 'Anglo-American Relations during the Polish Crisis in 1945', The
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 1984. The topic was

subsequently given further attention by Warren F. Kimball in ' The Naked Reverse Right: Roosevelt, Churchill, and Eastern Europe from TOLSTOY to Yalta - and a Little Beyond', Diplomatic History, vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1985. Otherwise, it seems to have been overlooked.
12. Background of the crisis

1 C. M. Woodhouse, who for many months commanded the British underground effort in Greece, has provided an outstanding account of the policies and actions of both the British and their opponents in The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949. Two other studies that together provide careful reviews of Anglo-Greek relations from
1941-47 are Procopis Papastratis' British Policy Towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941-1944, and George M. Alexander's The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, in British

Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 3, chapter xliii, presents a detailed view of British policymaking towards Greece at this time, while Bruce Robellet Kuniholm examines the crisis in a regional context in The Origins of the Cold War in the Near
East. Bickham Sweet-Escott's Greece: A Political and Economic Survey, 1939-1953

is a good, concise review of Greek affairs during this period, and Kenneth Young's
The Greek Passion: A Study in People and Politics provides another useful overview.

Two important studies which discuss American policy in relation to the crisis are
John Iatrides' Revolt in Athens and Lawrence S. Wittner's American Intervention in

2 3 4 5

Greece, 1943-1949. Subsequent citations will refer to these works by the authors' names only. Finally, a collection of papers from a meeting of the Modern Greek Studies Association edited by Iatrides and entitled Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis provides useful background on the full scope of Greek diplomatic relations and internal political affairs during the decade. FO 371-33133, paper R474, minute, 8 Jan. 1942. Ibid., Minutes, 7 and 8 Jan. 1942, are clear expressions of these views. The quotes are from E. M. Rose of the Foreign Office, Southern Department, dated 11 Jan. 1942 and found in these minutes. Ibid., minute, P. J. Dixon, Southern Department, 11 Jan. 1942. Cab. 66, vol. 43, WP (43) 518, 14 Nov. 1943. EAM's full name was the National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon), but it was known by its Greek initials. Its guerrilla force was the National Popular Liberation Army (Ethnikos Laikos Apelevtherotikos Stratos) also known by its Greek initials, EL AS.

196

Notes to pages

122-126

6 Eden, p. 460. 7 Cab. 66, vol. 53, WP (44) 433, 8 Aug. 1944. 8 These relationships are very thoroughly set out by Woodhouse in The Struggle for Greece and by McNeill in somewhat less detail in The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath. 9 McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, pp. 44-52, 68. See also the report of a British officer working with them, Major Bathgate, 3 June 1944, Cab. 66, vol. 50, WP (44), 295. See FO 371-37209, papers R 13431 and R 13432 for concern of British Ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper and General Wilson in this regard. On German reprisals see Woodward, vol. 3, p. 399n. I o For a thorough discussion of this dispute, although weighted on SOE's side, see especially Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece, especially chapters, 1, 5, 6, 7, 13, and the afterword. This book is the record of a conference at the University of London in 1973 by persons who were participants in and/or historians of British/Balkan affairs during World War II. Regarding the establishment of SOE in the Mediterranean area, see Bickham Sweet-Escott's Baker Street Irregular. II Cab. 79, no. 59, COS (43) 47th meeting (o), minute 2, 17 Mar. 1943. 12 Cab. 80, no. 68, COS (43) 128 (o) and 129 (o) both 15 Mar. 1943, and Cab. 79, no. 59, COS (43) 47th meeting (o), minute 2, 17 Mar. 1943. 13 FO 371-37208, paper R 11753, letter, Leeper to Sargent, 2 Nov. 1943. 14 The Chiefs of Staff were most reluctant to take on this policing responsibility, estimating that 80,000 men rather than 5,000, which Churchill and the Foreign Office first suggested, would be needed. The action actually began with approximately 12,000 men and soon escalated to 75,000, very close to the original Chiefs-of-StafF estimates. For the debate on this matter within HMG, see Cab. 79, no. 64, COS (43) 224 (o), minute 2, 23 Sept. 1943. Cab. 79, no. 65, COS (43) 234 (o), minute 8, 2 Oct. 1943. Cab. 79, no. 65, COS (43) 236th meeting, minute 4 and 5 and annex 1, 4 Oct. 1943. Cab. 79, no. 66, COS (43) 248th meeting, minute 7 and annexes I and II, 14 Oct. 1943. PREM 3 (210), passim. The 75,000 figure
is from Elisabeth Barker British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War,

p. 169, citing 'Report by SACMED to CCS, Greece, 1944-45 (HMSO, 1949)'. 15 For a detailed study of the outbreak of hostilities see Lars Baerentzen, 'The Demonstration in Syntagma Square on Sunday the 3rd of December, 1944', Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek, no. 2, 1978, p. 3. 16 For examples see FO 371-43717. Nearly the entire file consists of letters and press clippings in regard to the crisis in Greece. Although most are critical, it should be noted that some are laudatory. 17 In Woodhouse's review, a conservative one admittedly, the plebiscite results demonstrated that 'the majority of the Greek people saw the monarchy as the only bulwark against Communism'. See The Struggle for Greece, p. 192. Furthermore, George Papandreou, socialist and one-time premier, told the American ambassador in late 1944 that 'fear of Communism [seemed] to be reviving Royalist sentiment'. FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 137, telegram, MacVeagh to Sec. State, 10 Nov. 1944. 18 For a fuller disussion see Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, part three. 19 Cab. 79. no. 66, COS (43) 246th meeting, minute 18, 12 Oct. 1943. 20 FO 371-37216, paper R 2610/G, telegram, 22 Mar. 1943. 21 Ibid., telegram, 29 Mar. 1943. 22 FO 37i-37I95> P a P e r R 3O93/E> telegram, 3 Apr. 1943. 23 FO 371-37197, paper R 5865/G, Washington Embassy to FO, telegram, 6 July 1943. Halifax's remarks were based on a memorandum from the State Dept. dated 2 July 1943. See FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, p. 133.

Notes to pages 126-131

197

24 FO 371-37197, paper R 5865/G. This message, in the form of an aide-memoire, was delivered to the State Dept. 4 Aug. 1943. See FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, p. 137. 25 This is diametrically opposed to the view of the Chiefs of Staff which held that King George was unwelcome to a majority of the Greek people and to reinstate him would 'entail the employment of considerable military forces'. See Gab. 79, no. 64, COS (43) 224 (o), minute 2, 23 Sept. 1943. 26 FO 371-37239, paper R 4000, P. J. Dixon, minute, 5 May 1943. 27 FO 371-37235, paper R 5422, letter, E. R. Warner to Michael Wright, 15 June 194328 PREM 3 (211/4), p. 65, King's message contained in telegram, Eden to Sargent, 19 Aug. 1943. 29 Ibid., p. 70. 30 Ibid., p. 67, minute, 21 Aug. 1943. 31 Ibid., p. 40, letter, 6 Sept. 1943. For a more detailed account of the development of the British and American messages, see Papastratis, pp. 109-10. 32 Ibid., pp. 39, 38, telegrams, Eden to Churchill and vice versa, both 8 Sept. 1943. 33 For discussion of this position in the American Government, see FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, pp. 146-52. 34 Iatrides, p. 91. Hull, p. 1240. 35 Harold Macmillan, memoirs, vol. 2, The Blast of War, 1939-1945, p. 570. Macmillan was then British Minister of State resident in the Middle East. 36 FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, p. 146, telegram, Kirk to Sec. State, 22 Aug. 1943. 37 PREM 3 (211/15), p. 597, minute, Eden to Churchill, 2 Dec. 1943. 38 Ibid. 39 Eden, p. 430. See also Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece 1933-194"/', John O. Iatrides, ed. (MacVeagh's diaries and correspondence, hereafter cited as MacVeagh) p. 399-400, 403-4, 406-8. 40 FRUS, 1943, vol. 9, p. 157, telegram, MacVeagh to Sec. State, 12 Dec. 1943. 41 PREM 3 (211/15), pp. 597, 596, minutes to Churchill 2 and 5 Dec. 1943. 42 FO 371-37231, paper R 13507. See also MacVeagh, pp. 393-8, passim. 43 PREM 3 (211/15), p. 590, minute, Leeper to Eden, 7 Dec. 1943. For Smuts' advice, see PREM 3 (211/16), p. 1145, aide-memoire to George II, 20 Mar. 1944, and p. 1147, letter, George II to Smuts, 22 Mar. 1944. Smuts' concern with the matter is notable. As early as August 1943 the US Ambassador to the Greek Government had reported to Washington that Smuts was ' closely interested in Greek affairs in general and in the members of the royal family' (see FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, p. 143, telegram, Kirk to Sec. State, 19 Aug. 1943). A day later Smuts wired Churchill at Quebec urging support for the King's return subject perhaps to a later plebiscite, describing the alternative as 'a wave of disorder and wholesale communism'. This message was read at the meeting in which Roosevelt accepted the British policy that the King should return before a plebiscite was held. (See FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, pp. 147-8, memorandum of conversation, 22 Aug. 1943. For the text of Smuts's message see PREM 3 (211/4), p. 59, 20 Aug. 1943.) 44 Wittner, pp. 10-12, argues that FDR had a long-standing sympathy for the King and his position in this matter. 45 Iatrides, p. 92. He cites Department of State Diplomatic Records, 1942-5, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 868.01/412, memorandum, 13 Oct. 1943. 46 MacVeagh, p. 444, Roosevelt's letter to MacVeagh of Jan. 15, 1944. 47 For a more detailed discussion of these suggestions, see Elisabeth Barker, Churchill and Eden at War, pp. 186-98. 48 MacVeagh, p. 668, letter to Roosevelt, 15 Jan. 1945.

198 13. 1944, the critical year

Notes to pages 132-13*7

1 FRUS, 1943, vol. 4, p. 156, memorandum prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 10 Dec. 1943. 2 Iatrides, pp. 118-20, who cites Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, PSF, 'Greece: L. MacVeagh'. Letter to Roosevelt, 17 Feb. 1944. 3 Ibid., pp. 197-8. He cites Roosevelt's Papers, PSF, 'Greece: L. MacVeagh', letter to Roosevelt, 8 Dec. 1944. See also FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 145, telegram to Sec. State, 8 Dec. 1944. 4 FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 149, memorandum, Stettinius to Roosevelt, 13 Dec. 1944. 5 Iatrides, pp. 198-9. He cites Department of State Diplomatic Records, 1942-45, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 868.00/12-2044. 6 An enormous amount of cable traffic went between Cairo and Whitehall with the outbreak of the mutiny. Much of it can be found in PREM 3 (211/11) and (211/16). 7 PREM 3 (211/11), p. 408, telegram, Leeper to FO, 5 Apr. 1944. 8 Ibid., p. 437, telegram, Leeper to FO, 4 Apr. 1944. 9 Ibid., p. 421. The copy in the Public Record Office in London is undated, but it was almost certainly sent 6 Apr. 1944, judging from other messages of the same period. 10 Ibid., p. 282, 14 Apr. 1944. 11 PREM 3 (211/14), p. 572. These are the words of T. L. Rowan of Churchill's staff, 10 Apr. 1944. 12 Ibid., p. 550, telegram, 15 Apr. 1944, or FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 96, where it is dated 16 Apr., probably the day it was received. 13 FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 98, telegram, 17 Apr. 1944. The correspondence is also in Churchill, vol. 5, pp. 483-4, although his own telegram is condensed and that of Roosevelt dated 18 Apr., probably the day Churchill received it. 14 Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, pp. 86-8. 15 FO 371-43768, paper R 9305, telegram, Dominions Office to dominion governments, 16 June 1944. 16 Ibid., telegram, Halifax to FO, 12 June 1944. 17 Ibid., D. S. Laskey, minute, 13 June 1944. 18 FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 112, memorandum of conversation, Hull-Halifax, 30 May 1944, explains British reasoning and shows Hull's negative reaction. 19 Ibid., p. 117, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 June 1944. 20 Ibid., p. 118, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 11 June 1944. 21 Hull, pp. 1451-9. 22 PREM 3 (434/8), p. 7, telegram, 29 Sept. 1944. 23 PREM 3 (434/6), p. 17, telegram to Churchill, 30 Sept. 1944. 24 Sherwood, pp. 832-3. 25 Woodward, vol. 3, p. 149. 26 PREM 3 (434/8), p. 26, telegram to Roosevelt, 5 Oct. 1944. 27 FRUS, 1944, vol. 4, pp. 1007-8, joint telegram, Churchill and Stalin to Roosevelt, 10 Oct. 1944. 28 Churchill, vol. 6, p. 198. Churchill says he suggested burning the paper, but Stalin said 'No, you keep it', advice which the Prime Minister apparently took, for a photocopy can be found in PREM 3 (66/7), p. 1, although the hand it is written in looks suspiciously un-Churchillian. With it is a hand-written Russian translation. 29 PREM 3 (434/2), p. 63, record of the meeting of 10 Oct. 1944. Kuniholm, pp. 109-25.

Notes to pages 137-144

199

30 Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 148-9. 31 Moran, pp. 212-13. Hopkins recorded Churchill as saying the Russians were not going to wait until the returns were in from Michigan, South Dakota and Oregon. See Sherwood, p. 832. 32 Many authors have dealt with the percentages agreement and its significance. Lynn Davis gives one of the best accounts in The Cold War Begins, pp. 144-58 passim. 33 Mastny, p. 231. 34 Eden, p. 523. 35 FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 505, telegram to Roosevelt, 8 Mar. 1945. 36 Gab. 65, vol. 44, W.M. (44) 165th and 166th conclusions, confidential annex, 12 Dec. 1944. 37 Woodward, vol. 3, pp. 423-4. 38 Ibid. 14. The role of the press 1 FO 37i-44555> passim. 2 FO 371-48233, paper R 849. 3 Ibid. 4 Although for years The Nation was generally critical of British and later American policies in Greece, its correspondent in Southeastern Europe, Philip Jordan, took a different line. For example, on 8 Dec. 1945, pp. 624-6, he wrote, 'After having saved Greece - let's face it - from a violent revolution by a minority nearly a year ago, the British troops here may yet be called on to save it from an equally vicious coup by the right... If they were to go, there would be no freedom in Athens, which is today one of the freest cities in the world.' 5 FO 371-38551, paper R 4730, weekly political summary, 24 Dec. 1944. 6 Ibid. It can also be found in Washington Despatches 1941-1945, edited by H. G. Nicholas with an introduction by Isaiah Berlin. This is a collection of these weekly political reports from the British Embassy in Washington, most of which were written in first draft by Berlin. They are extraordinary documents, as one would expect, and invaluable for scholars of Anglo-American relations or simply of American history during that period. 7 FO 371-44535, paper AN 117, telegram, weekly political summary, 9 Jan. 1945. 8 FO 371-48235* P a per R 2755. 9 FO 371-44535, paper AN 117, telegram, weekly political summary, 9 Jan. 1945. 10 Ibid. n Ibid., paper AN 213, telegram, weekly political summary, 14 Jan. 1945. 12 Ibid., paper AN 301, telegram, weekly political summary, 21 Jan. 1945. 13 FO 371-43709, paper R 21149, telegram, FO to Washington Embassy, 16 Dec. 1944. 14 FO 371-43768, paper R 21170, telegram, Halifax to FO, 17 Dec. 1944. 15 FO 371-43736, paper R 19936, telegram, 4 Dec. 1944. Leeper, however, tended to underplay or underestimate the events of 3 December. Four days later he wired that' Exaggerated importance has been given to Sunday's demonstration as though the shots fired by the police had let loose civil war. Nothing could be more inexact.' See FO 371-43736, paper R 20196. It has since become obvious that the assessments of the journalists were far more accurate. 16 FO 371-43709, paper R 20989, telegram, 15 Dec. 1944. 17 Ibid.,, H. A. C. Rumbold, minute, 7 Jan. 1945. 18 FO 371-48238, paper R 10239, telegram, 13 June 1945.

200

Notes to pages

144-149

19 FO 371-44556, paper AN 929, letter, Wright to Broadmead, 26 Feb. 1945. See also Anderson, pp. 34-5. 20 FO 371-44556, paper AN 1165, letter to Butler, 12 Mar. 1945. 21 Ibid. 22 Copies of these articles or quotes from them can be found in FO 371-44556, paper AN 929. 23 Life, 5 Feb. 1945, p. 28. 24 FO 371-48239, paper R 12322 contains a copy of the article and a telegram giving excerpts. 25 Ibid., minute, 23 July 1945. 26 Ibid., paper R 12339, telegram to Athens repeated to FO, 20 July 1945. 27 Ibid., paper R 12397, telegram, Caccia to Washington, 23 July 1945. This scenario would be repeated more than once in the postwar period, often with American instead of British officials. It consists of a major paternalistic power supporting a conservative government for the sake of stability in circumstances of intense political division and being embarrassed by that government's police methods and treatment of prisoners. Examples can be found in US postwar relations with Cuba, Brazil, Vietnam, and El Salvador. 75. The crisis peaks PREM 3 (211/16), p. 866, telegram to FO, 26 May 1944. Ibid., p. 864, 28 May 1944. Ibid., p. 862, telegram, FO to Leeper, 28 May 1944. See pp. 133-4 of this book. Several months later Roosevelt would indeed give full support, as outlined on pp. 151-2. 5 PREM 3 (211/11), p. 283, telegram, 14 Apr. 1944. 6 PREM 3 (211/16), p. 864, telegram to FO, 28 May 1944. This is somewhat amusing in light of Churchill's note to Eden, mentioned above, telling him to encourage Leeper because, that note also said, * Leeper is a weak man but capable of acting vigorously if, and only if, he feels he has H.M.G. behind him.' 7 FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 106, telegram to Sec. State, 12 May 1944. 8 Ibid., p. 172, telegram to Sec. State, 27 Dec. 1944. 9 Ibid., p. 148, memorandum, 13 Dec. 1944. 10 Macmillanwas in Athens trying to help resolve the crisis, which had broken into warfare in the winter of 1944-5. See - ^ Blast of War, chapters 22 and 23. 11 FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, p. 150, telegram, 13 Dec. 1944. 12 Churchill, vol. 6, p. 262. 13 Roosevelt's and Churchill's telegrams can be found in FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 150-1, 154-5, 159-60. See also Churchill, vol. 6, pp. 261-5. 14 Sherwood, p. 838. For a good discussion of the Washington background of the Stettinius statement see Hathaway pp. 90-101. 15 FO 371-43768, paper R 21170, telegram, Halifax to FO, 17 Dec. 1944. See also Wittner, pp. 23-5, who says FDR 'convalescing in Warm Springs, Georgia... played no role in issuing' the statement and 'felt detached from the situation'. This may or may not contradict Halifax. 16 Hathaway, pp. 95-7. 17 Churchill, vol. 6, p. 255. 18 Sherwood, pp. 838-9. 19 PREM 3 (472), p. 60, telegram, 6 Dec. 1944. 20 Sherwood, p. 839. 1 2 3 4

Notes to pages 149~t54

201

21 Charles Eade, 'The Dawn of Liberation', Churchill's War Speeches, 1944, p. 277. 22 Sherwood, p. 839. 23 FO 371-38560, paper AN 4756, precis by Nevile Butler of 'American News Summary' for 16 Dec. 1944. 24 Cab. 65, vol. 48, W.M. (44) 164th conclusions, minute 2, confindential annex, 11 Dec. 1944. 25 Hopkins' account of these events is recorded in Sherwood, pp. 840-2. British records are in PREM 3 (212/5). See also, Cab. 79, no. 84, C.O.S. (44) 396th meeting (o), minute 10, 11 Dec. 1944 for a detailed account of the British military reaction to the King order. 26 PREM 4 (27/10), p. 991, telegram, Halifax to FO, 2 Jan. 1945. 27 Ibid. Eden said of Stettinius, 'He is not brilliant, but he is a good friend to our country and easy to work with.' See Eden, p. 529. 28 FO 371-44535, paper AN 213, weekly political summary, 14 Jan. 1945. For the text of Roosevelt's talk see New York Times, 7 Jan. 1945. 29 Cab. 65, vol. 48, W.M. (44) 162nd conclusions, confidential annex, 7 Dec. 1944. 30 Cab. 66, vol. 59, W.P. (44) 743, 19 Dec. 1944. The three documents are also published in FRUS, 1944, vol. 5, Churchill's telegram to Roosevelt, 17 Aug. 1944, pp. 132-3 and Roosevelt's reply, 26 Aug. 1944, pp. 133-4. Caserta agreement as summarised by A. C. Kirk, p. 135. 31 Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 112-13. MacVeagh corroborates this, presenting it as a security precaution rather than a political statement, i.e., anyone clearly identified as an American was less likely to be shot at. See MacVeagh, p. 658. 32 Barker, British Policy, p. 146, citing FO 371-43698, telegram, 13 Dec. 1944. 33 PREM 3 (213/17), p. 973, 30 Mar. 1945. 34 Ibid.,p. 1006, minute to Eden, 11 Mar. 1945. He elaborated on these views in a telegram to Leeper. See ibid., p. 1010, 11 Mar. 1945. 35 Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan, pp. 595-609, and MacVeagh, p. 429, 506. For an illuminating incident regarding a story by Drew Pearson, see PREM 3 (212/2), p. 184, telegram to FO, 19 Aug. 1944, PREM 4 (27/10), p. 1126 and p. 1124, telegram to Churchill, 25 Aug. 1944. See also PREM 4 (212/2), p. 183. 36 PREM 3 (212/2), p. 179, 24 Aug. 1944. 37 Ibid., p. 166, minute, Churchill to Martin, 24 Sept. 1944. 38 Ibid., p. 167, telegram, 8 Sept. 1944. See Wittner, pp. 15-17 for more details on OSS attitudes. 39 Woodhouse in an interview with the author, London, 28 June 1978. See also Woodhouse papers, box 1, folder 14, report entitled 'Situation in Greece -Jan. to May, 44', dated 26 May 1944. In item 19 Woodhouse stated his highly favourable opinion of OSS officers in Greece. Box 3 contains a typescript of memoirs by his American deputy, Gerald K. Wines. A less harmonious view is presented by R. Harris Smith in OSS, The Secret
History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. Strongly anti-British, Smith is

capable of saying, 'The British army took a respite of several months from the war against Hitler to suppress the revolt' in Greece, p. 128. Papastratis states that an OSS mission attached to the Central Committee of EAM remained a secret to the British from its inception in the spring of 1944 until July of that year. See p. 104. Woodhouse in a letter to this author confirmed that this mission was 'quite unknown' to him. 40 PREM 3 (213/17), p. 986, minute to Eden, 17 Mar. 1945. 41 FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, p. 122, telegram, Kirk to Sec. State, 22 Mar. 1945, and p. 122, n-55-

202
42 43 44 45 46

Notes to pages 154-161

PREM 3 (213/17), p. 1042. Macmillan, pp. 666-7. FO 371-48260, paper R 4665, minute, 19 Mar. 1945. FO 371-48361, paper R 9353, minute, 22 June 1945. FO 371-44535, paper AN 213, weekly political summary, 14 Jan. 1945. For the text of the message see New York Times, 7 Jan. 1945.

16. America dives in 1 PREM 3 (213/9), p. 352, minute, 14 Feb. 1945. 2 Ibid., p. 334, memorandum by Eden, 5 Mar. 1945, and p. 333, extract from conclusions of a Cabinet meeting on 12 Mar. 1945 [W.M. (45) 29th conclusions]. 3 FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 202-3, telegrams, MacVeagh to Sec. State, 14 Mar. 1945, and Grew to MacVeagh, 20 Mar. 1945. 4 PREM 3 (213/10), p. 383, or FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, p. 203, telegram to Churchill, 21 Mar. 1945. 5 PREM 3 (213/10), p. 376, minute, 31 Mar. 1945. 6 Ibid. This is the same theme, and ' Poor Old England' the same phrase that he used in his House of Commons speech on 8 December 1944 when talking of British policy in liberated Europe and in part rebutting Stettinius. See Eade, 1944, p. 273. 7 PREM 3 (213/10), p. 370, telegram to Churchill, 8 Apr. 1945. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., p. 369, minute, 8 Apr. 1945. 10 Ibid., p. 366, minute to Churchill, 14 Apr. 1945. 11 Ibid., p. 365, minute to Cadogan, 15 Apr. 1945. 12 PREM 3 (213/11), p. 402 for the State Dept. memorandum, and p. 401 for Churchill's minute to FO, 7 July 1945. 13 FO 371-48274, paper R 11516, telegram, Halifax to FO, 6 July 1945. 14 Ibid., paper R 11690/G, minute by Laskey and draft briefing paper for Terminal (Potsdam Conference); paper R 11881, Caccia to FO, 13 July 1945. 15 Cab. 128, vol. 1, CM (45) 21st conclusions, 14 Aug. 1945. FO 800 (468), FO statement on Greek elections. 16 PREM 3 (213/11), p. 487, telegram, Halifax to FO, 23 June 1945. 17 FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 126, 128, 134 for documents on this question. 18 At the height of the crisis the Party, during its annual conference in Dec. 1944, criticised the Government, albeit in mild terms. It then adopted a resolution, 2,455,000 votes to 137,000, saying it 'deeply regretfted] the tragic situation' in Greece and calling for an armistice 'without delay'. See The Times, 14 Dec. 1944, also FO 371-43709, paper R 20928. It did, however, support the Government's policy, to a great extent because of Bevin's efforts. For an account of his role in this regard see Alan Bullock's, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. 2, pp. 340-7. 19 FO 371-44539, paper AN 3657, telegram, weekly political summary, 2 Dec. 1945. For the text of King George's statement, which began the exchange, see FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, p. 179. For Bevin's reaction, see Cab. 128, vol. 2, CM. (45) 55th conclusions, minute 3 and 'no circulation record', 22 Nov. 1945. 20 Cab. 128, vol. 1, C M . (45) 21st conclusions, 14 Aug. 1945; Cab. 129, vol. 1, C.P. (45) 107, 11 Aug. 1945; Cab. 128, vol. 5, C M . (46) 23rd conclusions, 11 Mar. 1946. 21 FO 371-44539, paper AN 3921, telegram, weekly political summary, 30 Dec. 1945. 22 FO 371-48416, paper R 19058, telegram to FO, 9 Nov. 1945. 23 Ibid., A. D. Smyth, undated minute.

Notes to pages i6i-i6g

203

24 Ibid., minute, 14 Nov. 1945. 25 Ibid., paper R 20139, draft record of the meeting. 26 For a thorough study of the history and theory of American postwar economic aid programmes, see Robert Packenham's Liberal America and the Third World. 27 FO 371-48416, paper R 20139, draft record of the meeting. 28 The need for a more effective UNRRA chief in Greece was one of the few subjects on which MacVeagh agreed with the British. He so advised FDR in a letter on 15 Jan. 1945 and the State Dept. on 5 Nov. 1945. See MacVeagh, pp. 671, 688. He, however, felt that British influence was too strong in UNRRA's organisation in Greece, putting it in the service of'frank sphere-of-influence politics' and hoped it could be curtailed. Ibid., pp. 686-7. 29 FO 371-48416, paper R 20139, draft record of the meeting. 30 Ibid. My emphasis. 31 Ibid. 32 FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 263, 266, memoranda, Henderson to Sec. State, and Sec. State to President, respectively, both^io Nov. 1945. 33 FO 371-48416, paper R 20388. 34 Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, p. 351. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 213. For the background on the decision within the US Government to send one of these ships to the Mediterranean, see 'The Missouri visit to Turkey' by David J. Alvarez, Balkan Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, 1974. (The battleship went to Greece from Turkey.) 35 FO 371-48416, paper R 20457, telegram, 4 Dec. 1945. 36 Ibid., paper R 20906, 15 Dec. 1945. 37 FO 371-48289, paper R 21406, telegram, Halifax to FO, 22 Dec. 1945. 38 Ibid. See also FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, p. 291, 'Draft of proposed note to be telegraphed to American Ambassador, Athens, for presentation.' 39 FO 371-48289, paper R 21406, telegram, Halifax to FO, 22 Dec. 1945. 40 FO 371-48284, paper R 18735, telegram to COS, 4 Nov. 1945. 41 FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 251-2, telegram, Kirk to Sec. State, 2 Nov. 1945. 42 Alexander has a careful analysis of the vote. He concludes that had EAM participated, the left and right would have been so evenly divided that Parliament probably could not have formed a government. As it was, 'their abstention delivered power to extremists who could not govern wisely. Either way, the country was doomed to a resumption of civil war.' See pp. 184-7. 43 Woodhouse, p. 173. 44 PREM 8 (224), record of conversation, 10 July 1946. 45 Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, p. 385. 46 Ibid. See also Wittner, pp. 47-52. 47 FO 800 (468), minute. 48 Ibid. Telegrams, Min. of State to Foreign Sec, 3 Dec. and reply 4 Dec. 1946. 49 Cab. 128, vol. 9, C M . (47) 14th conclusions, minute 4, 30 Jan. 1947. 50 FRUS, 1947, vol. 5, p. 29, memorandum, Acheson to Sec. State, 21 Feb. 1947. See also Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 131, Kuniholm, pp. 399-410, and Wittner, chapter 3. 51 MacVeagh, pp. 712-13. FRUS, 1947, vol. 5, pp. 29-31. 52 For text of the notes, see FRUS, 1947, vol. 5, pp. 32-7. One might assume from Jones's Fifteen Weeks, once a widely used source in regard to these events, that the notes hit the State Department like thunderclaps. To scholars writing today, however, with the aid of more recently opened archives, it is clear that some such British move had been anticipated by the Department for weeks, if not months, before. 53 Both Anderson and Hathaway have useful discussions of these events. Hathaway

204

Notes to pages

i6g-iyi

provides good economic as well as political background, pp. 295-303. Anderson discusses the subject in a chapter devoted to the Greek crisis, starting in October 1944. See pp. 144-75. He includes an interesting historiographical discussion about whether the British notes were simply a calculated ploy to force the US into greater involvement in Greece and Turkey or whether they really were motivated by desperation born of the economic situation at home. Anderson, correctly in our opinion, holds to the latter judgement. See pp. 171-5. 54 For text see New York Times, 13 Mar. 1947. 55 For a discussion of some of the background of the declaration see Henry B. Ryan's 'The American Intellectual Tradition Reflected in the Truman Doctrine', The American Scholar, Spring, 1973, p. 294. 56 FO 371-43768, paper R 9305, telegram, Halifax to FO, 16 June 1944. In reading accounts of the switch from British to American assistance to Greece in 1947, one might get the impression that as the Americans marched in, the British marched out. It was not quite so neat. As seen here, Americans were already involved, and furthermore a British mission continued to work with them until 1952. In Leeper's words, Americans ' requested the British to retain a small body of troops and their military and police missions'. See When Greek Meets Greek, p. 231. American assistance did, however, clearly predominate following the signing by Truman of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill on 2 May 1947. Conclusion 1 Quoted from the New York Times, 6 Mar. 1946, which recorded and transcribed the talk. 2 For Churchill's remarks to the House of Commons, see Hansard''s Parliamentary Debates (London), vol. 415, cols. 1290-1300. For those in New York, see the New York Times, 17 Mar. 1946. 3 British officials believed that Churchill's popularity and influence in America were great. H. M. Embassy Washington said shortly after his defeat that Churchill had 'a very large American following' and said 'the exent to which Mr Churchill has gripped the American imagination is reflected in the nation wide cartoons and editorial tributes to what one paper called "This great Gladiator who bestrode the Continents like a Colossus!"' FO 371-44537, paper AN 2366, weekly political summary, 4 Aug. 1945. 4 See Henry B. Ryan, 'A New Look at Churchill's "Iron Curtain" Speech', The Historical Journal, 22, 4 (1979), for a discussion of the speech and the events surrounding it. Time magazine called the speech 'a magnificent trial balloon', a description with which J. L. Gaddis, to whom I am indebted for the quote, concurs. See The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-194.7, p. 307. 5 FO 371-51633, paper AN 1246, telegram, Halifax to FO. 6 The Combined Chiefs of Staff nominally continued until the beginning of NATO in 1949. See Anderson, p. 141, who sees this continuation as proof of the alliance's vitality. For another view, see Robert Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership, passim but especially pp. 264-70, who regards the continuation as essentially a formality.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Abbreviations used in citations are shown in parentheses/

ARCHIVES

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Central Statistical Office, HMG, Statistical Digest of the War, London, 1951. Chandler, Alfred Dupont (ed.), The Papers of Dwight Eisenhower: The War Tears, New York, 1968. Eade, Charles, ChurchiWs War Speeches, 7 vols., London, 1942-6. General Sikorski Historical Institute, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945, 2 vols., London, 1961, 1967.
Hachey, Thomas E., Confidential Dispatches: Analyses of America by the British Ambassador, 1939-1945, Evanston, 111., 1974. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. Jedrzejewicz, Waclaw, Poland in the British Parliament, 1939-1945, 3 vols., New

York, 1962.
Kimball, Warren F., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 3

vols., Princeton, 1984. League of Nations, Review of World Trade, 1938, Geneva, 1939. Loewenheim, F. L., Langley, H. D., Jonas, M., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their
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FRUS, 1945, vol. 2, 'General: Political and Economic Matters', Washington, 1967. FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, 'The Near East and Africa', Washington, 1969. FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, 'Europe', Washington, 1967. FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, 'The British Commonwealth, The Far East', Washington, 1969. FRUS, 1946, vol. 1, 'General: The United Nations', Wahsington, 1972. FRUS, 1946, vol. 5, 'The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe', Washington, 1969. FRUS, 1946, vol. 6, 'Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union', Washington, FRUS, 1946, vol. 7, 'The Near East and Africa', Washington, 1969. FRUS, 1947, vol. 5, 'The Near East and Africa', Washington, 1971. FRUS, Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, Washington, 1968. FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, Washington, 1970. FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, Washington, 1961. FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, 1955. FRUS, The Conference of Berlin {Potsdam) 1945, vols. 1 and 2, Washington, i960. 'International Economic Cooperation: Necessity for the British Loan', (Statement by Undersecretary Dean Acheson to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 13 Mar. 1946), Department of State Bulletin, 31 Mar. 1946, vol. 14, no. 352. 'The President Transmits US-UK Financial Agreement to Congress' (Text of President Truman's message), Department of State Bulletin, 10 Feb. 1946, vol. 14, no. 345. 'Recommendations on Greece and Turkey: Message of the President to the Congress' (Text of the 'Truman Doctrine') and 'Messages from the Greek Prime Minister and Leader of Parliamentary Opposition', Department of State Bulletin, 23 Mar. 1947, vol. 16, no. 403. '$25,000,000 Loan to Greek Government' (Text of note presented 12 Jan. 1946 to Greek Foreign Office and breakdown of uses of the funds), Department of State Bulletin, 20 Jan. 1946, vol. 14, no. 342. United States General Services Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1947, Washington, DC, 1961-3. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings - Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Congress, 1st Session. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings - Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Congress, 1st Session.

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Berlin, Isaiah, formerly of the British Information Services in New York and British Embassy in Washington. Gore-Booth, Lord, formerly of the British Embassy in Washington. Hammond, Nicholas, formerly Senior British Liaison Officer with ELAS, and later British Mission Commander. McNeill, William H., formerly Assistant Military Attache at the American Embassy in Athens. Nicholas, H. G., formerly of the American Division of the Ministry of Information and the British Embassy in Washington. Woodhouse, C. M., formerly head of the SOE mission in Greece.
ARTICLES

Acheson, Dean, 'The credit to Britain, the key to expanded trade', Department of State Bulletin, 20 Feb. 1946, vol. 14, no. 345. Alvarez, David J., 'The Missouri visit to Turkey: an alternative perspective on Gold War diplomacy', Balkan Studies, no. 2, 1974. Anonymous, ' International trade policy of the United States and the British Loan', Department of State Bulletin, 31 Mar. 1946, vol. 14, no. 352. Anstey, Caroline, 'The Projection of British Socialism: Foreign Office Publicity and American opinion, 1945-50', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 19, no. 3, July 1984. Baerentzen, Lars, 'The demonstration in Syntagma Square on Sunday the
3rd December, 1944', Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek, no. 2, 1978.

Balcos, Anastase, 'Guerrilla warfare', Military Review, March, 1958, vol. 37, no. 12, 49^54Bernstein, Barton J., 'The uneasy alliance: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the atomic bomb, 1940-1945', Western Political Quarterly, June 1976. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 'The Future of Yalta', Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 2.

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Campbell, A. E., 'The United States and Great Britain: uneasy allies' in Foot, Michael R. D., 'Was SOE any good?' in The Second World War, ed. Walter Laqueur, London, 1982. Garson, Robert, 'The Atlantic alliance, eastern Europe and the origins of the Cold War: from Pearl Harbor to Yalta' in Contrast and Connection:
Bicentennial Essays in Anglo-American History, ed. Harry C. Allen and Roger

Thompson, London, 1976. 'Greece since the Second World War: on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Truman Doctrine', Balkan Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 1967, entire volume dedicated to a symposium at the Univ. of Wisconsin, 10-12 April, 1967. Howard, Harry N., 'Greece and the United Nations, 1946-49: A Summary Account', The Department of State Bulletin, 19 Sept. 1949, vol. 21, no. 533. 'The development of a United States policy in the Near East, 1945-1951: an historical note', 2 parts, The Department of State Bulletin, 19 and 26 Nov. 1951, vol. 25, nos. 647-8. Jordan, Philip, 'Greece in purgatory', The Nation, 8 Dec. 1945, vol. 161, no. 23, 624-6. Kaiser, David E., 'Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Limits of Power: A Review Essay', International Security, vol. 10, no. 1, Summer 1985. Kennan, George, 'The sources of Soviet conduct', Foreign Affairs, July 1947. Kimball, Warren F., 'Churchill and Roosevelt, the personal equation', Prologue, Fall 1974. ' The naked reverse right: Roosevelt, Churchill, and eastern Europe from TOLSTOY to Yalta - and a little beyond', Diplomatic History, vol. 9, no. 1, Winter 1985. Kohler, Foy D., 'The relief of occupied Greece', The Department of State Bulletin, 17 Sept. 1944, vol. 11, no. 273. Lutz, F. A., 'International monetary mechanisms: the Keynes and White proposals', Essays in International Finance, July 1943 (Princeton). Mark, Eduard, 'American policy toward eastern Europe and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1946: an alternative interpretation', Journal of American History, vol. 68, no. 2, Sept. 1981. Mastny, Vojtech, 'Soviet war aims at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences
of 1943', Journal of Modern History, Sept. 1975.

'Stalin and the prospects of a separate peace in World War II', American
Historical Review, Dec. 1972.

'The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War', Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1976. McNeill, William H., 'The outbreak of fighting in Athens, December, 1944',
The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 8, no. 4, 1949, 252-61.

Miscamble, Wilson D., 'Anthony Eden and the Truman-Molotov conversations, April 1945', Diplomatic History, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring 1978, 167-80.

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Paterson, Thomas G.5 'Presidential foreign policy, public opinion, and Congress: the Truman years', Diplomatic History, vol. 3, no. 1, Winter 1979, 1-18. Poulos, Constantine, 'Greek tragedy', The Nation, 3 Nov. 1945, vol. 161, no. 18, 450-2. 'Report from Athens', The New Republic, 17 Mar. 1947, vol. 114, no. 11, 26-7. 'The lesson of Greece', The Nation, 27 Mar. 1948, vol. 166, no. 13, 343-5. Resis, Albert, 'The Churchill-Stalin secret "Percentages" agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944', The American Historical Review, Apr. 1978. Ryan, Henry B., 'The American intellectual tradition reflected in the Truman Doctrine', The American Scholar, Spring 1973. 'Anglo-American relations during the Polish Crisis in 1945', The Australian
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 30, no. 1, Winter 1984.

'A new look at Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech', The Historical Journal, vol. 22, no. 4, 1979. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr, 'Origins of the Cold War', Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1967. Siracusa, Joseph M., 'The Night Stalin and Churchill divided Europe: the view from Washington', The Review of Politics, July 1981. Sirevag, Torbjorn, 'The New Deal of War', American Studies in Scandinavia, no. 2, 19-75Stavrianos, L. S., 'The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): a study in resistance organization and administration', Journal of Modern History, March 1952, vol. 24. ' The immediate origins of the battle of Athens', The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 8, no. 4, 1949, 239-51. 'The mutiny in the Greek armed forces, April, 1944', The American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 9, no. 4, 1950, 302-11. 'The United States and Greece: the Truman Doctrine in historical
perspective' in Essays in History and International Relations, Dwight E. Lee

and George E. McReynolds, eds., Worcester, Mass., 1949. 'Vacuum in Greece', The New Republic, 24 Dec. 1945, vol. 113, no. 26, 863-5Tokayoki, I to, 'The Genesis of the Cold War: confrontation over Poland,
1941-1944' in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, edited by Yonosuke

Nagai and Akira Iriye, Tokyo, 1977. Varga, E., 'Anglo-American rivalry and partnership: a Marxist view',
Foreign Affairs, July, 1947.

Vinson, Fred M., and Acheson, Dean, 'The British Loan - what it means to us', The Department of State Bulletin, 20 Jan. 1946, vol. 14, no. 342. Wheeler, Mark, ' The SOE phenomenon' in The Second World War, edited by Walter Laqueur, London, 1982.

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Wilcox, Glair, 'The significance of the British Loan', Department of State Bulletin, 27 Jan. 1946, vol. 14, no. 343. Xydis, Stephen G., 'America, Britain, and the USSR in the Greek arena, 1944-1947', Political Science Quarterly, vol. 78, no. 4, 581-96. 'The secret Anglo-Soviet agreement on the Balkans of October 9, 1944', The Journal of Central European Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3, Oct. 1955, 248-71.

PH.D.

DISSERTATIONS

Hughes, Edgar John, ' Anglo-American Relations and the Formation of the United Nations Organisation', University of Cambridge, 1973. King, F. P., 'British Policy, the European Advisory Commission, and the German Settlement (1943-45)', University of Cambridge, 1975. Zurowski, M. A., 'British Policy Towards the Polish-Soviet Border Dispute, 1939-45', University of London, 1975.
BOOKS

(Although some of the books listed have wider scope, the sub-categories indicate the area in which each was principally useful for this study.) American background Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation, London, 1970. Barnet, Richard J., Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World, New York, 1968. Bartlett, C. J., The Rise and Fall of the Pax Americana: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, London, 1974. Berle, Beatrice Bishop and Jacobs, Travis Beal, Navigating the Rapids, igi8-igyi: From the Papers of Adolfe Berle, New York, 1973. Bernstein, Barton J., (ed.), Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, Chicago, 1970. Bishop, Jim, FDR's Last Tear: April 1944-April 1945, London, 1975. Blum, John Morton, From the Morgenthau Diaries: vol. 3, Years of War, 1941-1945, Boston, 1967. The Progressive Presidents: Roosevelt, Wilson, Roosevelt, Johnston, New York, 1980. V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II, Boston, 1976. Bohlen, Charles E., The Transformation of American Foreign Policy, London, 1970. Witness to History, 1929-1969, London, 1973. Byrnes, James F., All in One Lifetime, New York, 1956. Speaking Frankly, London, 1947.

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Campbell, Thomas M. and Herring, George C , (eds.), The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., ig4j-ig46, New York, 1975. Cave Brown, Anthony, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan, New York, 1982. Cochran, Bert, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency, New York, 1973. Colby, Benjamin, 'Twas a Famous Victory, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1974. Cole, Wayne S., Roosevelt and the Isolationists, igj2~4j, Lincoln, Nebraska,
1983-

Senator Gerald P. JVye and American Foreign Relations, Minneapolis, 1962. Connally, Tom, with Steinberg, Alfred, My name Is Tom Connolly, New York, 1954. Cornell University Faculty Members, Impact of the War on America, Ithaca, N.Y, 1942. Dallek, Robert, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, igj2-ig4j, Oxford, 1979. (ed.), The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II, New York, 1970. Daniels, Jonathan, The Man of Independence, Philadelphia, 1950. White House Witness, ig42-ig4$, New York, 1975. Divine, Robert A., Foreign Policy and US Presidential Elections, vol. 1, 1940-1948, New York, 1974. Roosevelt and World War II, Baltimore, 1969. Second Chance, The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II, New York, 1967. Dobney, Frederick J., (ed.), Selected Papers of Will Clayton, Baltimore, 1971. Donovan, Robert J., Tumultuous Tears: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, ig4g-ig53, New York, 1982. Gosnell, Harold F., Truman's Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman, Westport, Conn., 1980. Graebner, Norman, A., (ed.), An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1961. Halle, Louis J., American Foreign Policy, Theory and Reality, London, i960. Hamby, Alonzo L., Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism, New York, 1973. The Imperial Tears: The United States Since igjg, New York, 1976. Hartmann, Susan M., Truman and the 80th Congress, Columbia, Mo., 1971. Hillman, W., Mr. President: Personal Diaries, Private Letters, Papers, and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman, Thirty-second President of the United States of America, London, 1952. Hull, Cordell, Memoirs, vol. 2, London, 1948. Israel, Fred L., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections from the Tears I 939~I944-> Lincoln, Nebr., 1966. Jones, Joseph M., The Fifteen Weeks, New York, 1955. Kennan, George F., Memoirs, ig2j-ig^o, Boston, 1967. Kimball, Warren, (ed.), Franklin D. Roosevelt and the World Crisis, Lexington, Mass., 1973.

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Kirkendall, Richard Stewart, The Truman Period as a Research Field, Columbia, Mo., 1967. Kolko, Gabriel, Main Currents in Modern American History, New York, 1976. The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose, Boston, 1969Lash, Joseph P., Eleanor and Franklin, New York, 1971. Eleanor: The Tears Alone, New York, 1972. Leahy, William D., / Was There, London, 1950. Lundestad, Geir, The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947, New York, 1975. McLellan, David S., Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, New York, 1976. Millis, Walter, (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries, London, 1952. Morgenthau, HansJ., American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination, London, 1952. Published in New York in 1951 under the title In Defence of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy. Packenham, Robert A., Liberal America and the Third World, Princeton, 1973. Patton, George S., Jr, War as I Knew It, Boston, 1947. Perkins, Dexter, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 1932-43, Chicago, 1957. Perkins, Frances, The Roosevelt I Knew, New York, 1946. Phillips, Cabell, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession, New York, 1966. Polenberg, Richard, America at War: The Home Front, 1941-1943, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968. War and Society: The United States 1941-1943, Philadelphia, 1972. Robinson, Edgar Eugene, The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933-1943, Philadelphia, 1955They Votedfor Roosevelt: The Presidential Vote, 1 932-1 944, Stanford, 1947. Roosevelt, Elliott, As He Saw It, New York, 1946. Rose, Lisle A., Dubious Victory: The United States and the End of World War II, Kent, Ohio, 1973. Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History, New York, 1948. Published in London, 2 vols., 1948-9, with the title, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, an Intimate History. Smith, Gaddis, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1943, New York, 1965. Dean Acheson, New York, 1972. Smith, R. Harris, OSS, the Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, Berkeley, 1972. Stettinius, Edward R., Jr, Roosevelt and the Russians, London, 1950. Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy, McGeorge, On Active Service in Peace and War, New York, 1947.

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Truman, Harry S., The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman, ed. Robert H. Farrell, Boulder, Colo., 1980. Memoirs, 2 vols. (softcover ed.), New York, 1965. Truman, Margaret, Harry S. Truman, New York, 1973. Tucker, Robert W., The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, Baltimore, Tugwell, Rexford, G., The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt, New York, 1957. Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr (ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, Boston, 1952. Venkataramani, M. S., The Sunny Side of FDR, Athens, Ohio, 1973. Ward, Patricia Dawson, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945-1946, Kent, Ohio, 1979. White, Theodore, H. (ed.), The Stilwell Papers, London, 1949. Williams, William Appleman, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (rev. edn), New York, 1972. Young, Roland A., Congressional Politics in the Second World War, New York, 1956. British background and Anglo-American relations Allen, H. C , Great Britain and the United States, London, 1954. The Anglo-American Predicament, London, i960. The Anglo-American Relationship Since 1783, London, 1959. Anderson, Terry H., The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944-1947, Columbia, Mo., 1981. Aster, Sidney, Anthony Eden, London, 1976. Attlee, Clement R., As It Happened, London, 1954. Barker, Elisabeth, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50, Toronto, 1983. Churchill and Eden at War, London, 1978. Barnett, Correlli, The Collapse of British Power, London, 1972. Bartlett, C.J., The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defense Policy, 1945-70, London, 1971. Bell, Coral, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations, Oxford, 1964. Berlin, Isaiah, Mr Churchill in 1940, London, 1949. Birkenhead, Lord, Halifax, London, 1965. Blum, John Morton, From the Morgenthau Diaries: vol. 3, Tears of War, 1941-1945, Boston, 1967. Bullock, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vols. 2 and 3, London, 1967, 1983Calvocoressi, Peter, The British Experience, 1945-75, London, 1978.

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INDEX

Acheson, Dean 54, 69, 168 aid 161, 165-6, 172 Air Transport Agreement (1946) 69 Albania 166 Allied Supreme Council 75 Amery, Leo S. 3, 57, 183 n. 19 ' Anglo-America' 1-8, 17-20, 170-1 a military alliance? 43, 170, 171 and triangularity 5-6, 47-8 see also United Kingdom: relationship with US appeasement 118, 119 see also Munich Agreement Arciszewski, Tomasz 83, 89
Arkansas Gazette 140

article VII (Mutual Aid Agreement) 57,58 Atlantic Charter 83, 142, 149 atomic bomb 79, 112 Attlee, Clement and ' Anglo-America' 3 and Greece 3, 159, 162 and Lend-Lease 60 and US imperialism 38 and USSR 7, 164 Austin, Senator 30 Australia 16 Balfour,John 18, 28 Balkans, the 121-2
Baltimore Sun 141

Baruch, Bernard 55 Batt, William 60 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) 23 Beaverbrook, Lord and air transport 67, 184 n. 65 and ' Anglo-America' 3 and economic issues 57-8 and oil 62-3, 66 and image of UK in US 25

Belgium 108-9, I J 8 , 139, 148 Berle, Adolfe 68, 128, 129 Berlin 98, 191 n. 67 Berlin, Isaiah 140, 199 n. 6 Bermuda Agreement (1946) 68 Bessarabia 122 Bevin, Ernest and Greece 159, 160, 162-3, 167, 168, 202 n. 18 and image of UK in US 38 and US-UK relations 4, 56-7, 59, 66-7, 163, 174 n. 4, 175 n. 1 and USSR 7, 164 Bierut, Boleslaw 190 n. 17 'Big Three' 5, 42, 47 see also triangularity Bohlen, Charles E. 97, 103, 106, 113, 193 n. 14 Bor-Komorowski, T. 188 n. 8 border arrangements 83 see also Poland: boundaries Bracken, Brendan 23, 24, 26, 176 n. 26 Brazil 200 n. 27 Breslau 88 Bricker, Senator 31 British Information Services 25, 37, 177 n. 28 British Institute of Public Opinion 61 Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan 166 Bukovina 122 Bulgaria 122, 137, 157, 166 Butler, Harold 24, 25 Butler, Nevile 26 Butler, R. A. 18 Byrnes, James F. 167-8, 174-5 n. l Cadogan, Sir Alexander 77, 91, 159, 185 n. 11 Cairo Conference (1943) 131 Campbell, Sir Ronald 22, 26, 33, 45, 114, 194 n. 8

228 Canada 16 Caserta Agreement (September 1944) 152 Chamberlain, Neville 91

Chicago Daily News 25

Index
Agreement' 136-7; Poland 92, 94-5; pre-conference meetings 49-53, 181 n. 53 and Stalin 89, 91, 118 and Truman 99, 100, 108, 109, 113, 170-1 and US 1, 3, 47, 170-1; 'equilateral' world view of 48; isolationism of 31; joint military bases 4-5, 174 n. 4; image of UK in 22-3, 27; neutrality of UK in domestic politics 44-5; USSR policy 7, 71-2, 98, 105, 171 and USSR 7, 71-2, 98, 117-18, 135-8, 171-2; UK's limited influence over 77, 79, 89, 185 n. 11 and Western European coalition 14,15 'World Council' 42 at Yalta 79, 87-9 civil aviation 67-9 Civil Aviation Conference (1944) 67-8 Clark Kerr, Sir Archibald 38, 52, 115,
116,
118

Chiefs of Staff 171 and Greece 125, 163, 196 n. 14, 197 n. 25 and oil 63-5 on image of UK in US 25 and USSR 64-5 on Western European coalition 14 China 5, 41, 52
Christian Science Monitor 144

Churchill, Winston Spencer and air transport 67-8, 184 n. 65 and Allied advance into eastern Europe 98, 99, 113, 191 n. 67 and ' Anglo-America' 1-5, 15, 17, 19-20, 43, n o , 170-2 and Greece 123-60 passim, 163; the mutiny 133-4; the OSS 153; the plebiscite 128-31; press comment (US) 140, 145, 148; Stettinius' press statement 148-9; US support/approval 133-4, J3^ 151-2, 157, 158-9; USSR agreement on 135-6 Harvard speech 43 and imperial preferences 58, 183 n. 21 as instigator of Cold War 10 'Iron Curtain' speech 1, 2, 4, 170-1 and oil 65-6 and Parliament as diplomatic weapon, 66, 184 n. 53 and Pearson 35-6 and 'Percentages Agreement' 83, 136-8 and Poland 74, 77-101 passim, 104, 107-10, 114-19passim; composition of provisional government 90-6; an electoral issue? 91-2, 94, 95, 96, 115-16, 118-19; emigre (London) government 77, 79, 190 n. 17; Mikolajczyk's US visit 80-3; the 'missing 16' 109, 115, 194 n. 26; US support/approval 71-2, 74, 82, 90, 92-5, 117; at Yalta 79, 87-9 and 'Poor Old England' 157, 202 n. 6 and postwar planning 40, 41-2 and Roosevelt 43, 97-8, 131, 190 n. 30; Greece 148-9; 'Percentages

and Poland 77, 78, 88-9, 92-3, 96-7, 114 Clarke, Major General George 162, 164 Clayton, William 64, 69 Coalition Government 17, 20, 160, 171, 172 Cold War 6, 9-10, 72, 73, 123, 172 colonialism see Empire, British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) 1, 5, 42-3, 45-6, 151, 204 n. 6 Committee on American Opinion and the British Empire (Law Committee) 33-5 Commonwealth, British 4-5, 16, 176 n. 25 Connally, Tom 42 Cranborne, Viscount 175 n. 18 Crimea Settlement, see Yalta Conference Cripps, Sir Stafford 17, 18, 19 Cromer, Earl of 152 Crowley, Leo 54, 56 Cuba 200 n. 27 Curzon Line 75, 76, 78-9, 83, 87, 91 Curzon, Lord 75 Czechoslovakia 119
Daily Express 25

Dal ton, Hugh 56, 59, 60, 68-9, 168 Damaskinos (Archbishop of Athens) 138, 140

Index
Darvall, Frank 23 Davies, Joseph 49, 50, 113, 181 n. 53 Deane, John R. 97, 103, 106, 188 n. 9, 188 n. 17 Donovan, General William 153 Dudley, Alan 26, 33, 34 Dunn, James C. 106 EAC (European Advisory Commission) EAM (Ethnikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon - National Liberation Front) 122-4 passim, 137, 152, 157 and elections 124, 167, 203 n. 42 at the Lebanon Conference 134 and the mutiny 133 and the OSS 153, 201 n. 39 and Roosevelt-George II affair 131 Economic Advisory Mission (to Greece) 161 economic issues 54-69
Economist, The 141-2 46

229 Eire 16, 176 n. 24 Eisenhower, General Dwight D. 98, 192 n. 5 El Salvador 200 n. 27 EL AS (Ethnikos Laikos Apelevtherotikos Stratos - National Popular Liberation Army) 122-4 passim, 132, 142-3, 152
see also E A M

Empire, British 16, 26-7, 31-8 English-speaking peoples 1 European Advisory Commission (EAC) 46 European regional groupings 14-15 Export-Import Bank 167 Foreign Office (FO) and Air Conference 68 and CCS 180 n. 25 Economic and Reconstruction Department 14 and Greece 123-4, 126, 135, 143, 153 and Poland 91, 96, 97, 100, 114-16, 189 n. 12 and State Department 39-40, 77 and US triangularity 47 and US-UK alliance 3, 18-20 and USSR 7, 15, 20, 121-2, 123 Washington embassy 27, 29, 171, 176-7 n. 6, 199 n. 6; aid to UK 59; Air Conference 68; anglophobia 46; anti-colonialism 32; appraisal of 1942 elections 179 n. 4; on Churchill's prestige 204 n. 3; isolationism 30-1; and Lippmann's US Foreign Policy 30; on Poland 92-3; and Roosevelt's interest in oil 63; on Roosevelt's State of the Union message (1945) 151; on image of UK 22, 24, 26-9, 35; on involvement of UK in Greece 140-4 passim, 149; on US self-confidence 43-4 and Western European coalition, 14 Forrestal, James Vincent, 106 France 14, 15, 17-18, 41 Fraser, Peter, 89 free trade 57-8, 64 Fulton speech, see Churchill: 'Iron Curtain' speech gold standard 58 Gomulka, Wladyslaw 116

Eden, Anthony 88, 103 an alliance for the UK? 14-16 and ' Anglo-America' 3 and Beaverbrook 184 n. 65 and EAC 46-7 and Greece 122, 128-30, 135, 146, 156-7, 201 n. 27 as instigator of Cold War 10 and 'mixing' process 39 and oil 63 and 'Percentages Agreement' 83, 136-8 and Poland 78-94 passim, 100-6 passim, 114, 117-19; bilateral intervention 80; boundary negotiations 87, 91; Mikolajczyk's US visit 81; the 'missing 16' 109-10; the Moscow meeting (October 1943) 78, 187 n. 27; Warsaw Rising 82, 188 n. 17 and postwar planning 41, 46 and Roosevelt 40-1, 44 and US 4, 40-2, 174 n. 4; India policy of 36; isolationism of 31; image of UK in 22, 24, 32; USSR policy 105, 108 and the USSR 117-18 and Western European coalition H5 at Yalta 53, 88 EDES 132

230
Greece 72, 121-69, 172 aid for 156, 158-69 passim civil war 125, 167 elections 124, 159-61, 167, 203 n. 42 guerrillas 123-4; see also EAM; EL AS the mutiny (April 1944) 133 plebiscite 124, 128-34 ^owim press opinion (UK and US) of 127, 1 39-45 as Stalin's precedent 108-9, I J 8 UK involvement in 3, 7, 37, 121-69; cooperation with EAM and ELAS 123-4; economic mission to 156, 158-66 passim; and George II 126-30, 160; military intervention and withdrawal 124, 152, 166-8, 203 n. 52, 204 n. 56 US involvement in 125-69; economic aid 156, 158-66 passim, 167; military aid 167-9, 2O 4 n - 5^ US-UK commercial rivalry in 154 USSR involvement in 121-2, 135-8, 156-7, 160 Greek-Americans 129 Grew, Joseph C. 103 Grigg, P.J. 3 Grubb, K. G. 61 Halifax, Earl of and Greece 125-6, 148, 150-1, 153; economic mission to 164, 165; US press campaign 143, 145 and Pearson 35-6 and Poland 85, 93, 97 reports on US opinion 22-3, 30, 31-2, 36, 44, 46 and US-UK relations: an alliance? 4, 19; economic negotiations 58, 59-60, 62, 69; postwar planning 39, 40 Hankey, Lord 19 Harlow, Professor 179 n. 69 Harriman, Averell, 49, 100, 103-6 passim, 136-7 and Poland 82, 87, 88-9, 92-3, 96-7,
110

Index
House of Commons 140, 149 Howard, D. F. 121-2 Hull, Gordell 36, 41, 42, 64, 86, 179 n. 66 and Greece 128, 129, 135 and Poland 78, 82, 187 n. 27 and US-UK economic relations 54, 55, 183 n. 21 Hungary, 137 Ickes, Harold 42, 62, 63 imperialism, see Empire, British India 16, 31-2, 35-6 Indonesia 37 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 57, 58, 174 n. 1, 183 n. 19 internationalism, 151, 155 see also isolationism 'Iron Curtain' speech see Churchill isolationism 21, 29-31, 39-40, 41, 43-4, 155
Isvestia 148

Italy 139, 148 Japan 14, 52, 112 Jebb, Gladwyn 14, 15, 16, 39, 180 n. 25 Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency (JICA) 125 Jordan, Philip 199 n. 4 Katyn Forest massacre 77, 186 n. 15, 187 n. 25 Keynes, John Maynard 58, 59 Khrushchev, Nikita 175 n. 7 King, Admiral 25, 64, 106, 149-50 Kirk, Alexander C. 127, 129, 166 KKE (Greek Communist Party) 123 Knight, John S. 25 Konigsberg 83, 87 Korbonski, Stefan 188 n. 8 Kot, Stanislaw 185 n. 7 Labour Party/Government 3, 17, 56, 171 and aid 165, 172 and Greece 159-61, 163, 202 n. 18 Laskey, D. S. 154 Law Committee 33-5 Law, Richard 26-7, 33, 47, 57, 115 Leahy, Admiral William 98, 106, 150 Lebanon Conference (1944) 134 Leeper, Reginald 200 n. 6 and Greece 133, 134, 146-7, 152,

Harsch, Joseph C. 144-5 Hitler, Adolf 18 Hong Kong 40, 179 n. 12 Hopkins, Harry 35, 41, 44, 49, 53, 67 and Greece 130, 150, 199 n. 31 and Poland 108, 113-16, 194 n. 14 talks with Stalin (May-June 1945) 113-16

Index
Leeper, Reginald (cont.) 163; aid mission to 156, 161; press reports of 143, 199 n. 15 Lemberg (Lwow) 76, 83, 87, 89 Lend-Lease 16, 54-7, i74n. 1 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 182 n. 75 Life 32, 144, 145 Lippmann, Walter 30, 39, 142 Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, Jr 30, 44, 64 London 45-6 Lublin Committee 81 meeting with Mikolajczyk 81 and Poland's boundaries 87 as Poland's provisional government
88-97 passim,
IO

231 provisional government/elections 88-9, 91-7passim; the 'missing 16' 109 to San Francisco Conference 100 and Truman 99, 104-8 passim Molotov-Ribbentrop Line 75, 76, 119, 185 n. 3 Monroe Doctrine 19 Montgomery, Bernard Law, 191 n. 67 Moran, Lord 3, 137 Morgan, General W. D. 166 Morgenthau, Henry, Jr 54, 55, 61-2, 64, i74n. 1 Morrison, Herbert 14, 37-8 Morton, Sir Desmond 32 Moscow Commission, see Polish Commission Munich Agreement 91, 115-16, 119 Mutual Aid Agreement 57 Nation, The 140, 199 n. 4 Nelson, Donald 158, 159
New Statesman 144 New York Herald Tribune 141 New York Times 141, 142, 144

&~9>

I:

5>

192-3 n. 3, 193 n. 16 recognition 84, 86 USSR treaty with 101-2, 104 Luce, Clare Booth 30 Lvov, Lwow (Lemberg) 76, 83, 87, 89 Mac Arthur, General Douglas 25 Macmillan, Harold 128, 147, 152, 154, 197 n. 35, 200 n. 10 and UK-US mission to Greece 156, 157 McNary, Senator 30 McNeil, Hector 162, 164-5 MacVeagh, Lincoln: and Greece 130-5 passim, 138, 147, 168, 201 n. 31; and aid mission 156, 164, 203 n. 28; and OSS 153 Makins, R. M. 18 manpower 13-14 Mansergh, Dr P. N. S. 61 Marshall, George 106, 107, 168 Mason, Paul 18 Middle East 62-7 passim Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw 84, 91, 96, 100-1, n o , 116, 186 n. 15 in Hopkins-Stalin talks 114, 115 visit to Moscow 81, 83 visit to US 80, 118 Ministry of Information (UK) 23-4, 37, 61, 68, 143, 176 n. 4, 177 n. 7 Ministry of Production (UK) 176 n. 4 'mixing' process 39-53 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich and Cairo Conference 52 and ' Percentages Agreement' 137 and Poland 81, 82, 88-97 passim, 104-9 passim; composition of

New Zealand 16 Nichols, J. 18 NKVD (Soviet Security Police) 186 n. 15 Normandy front 51 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 9, 15, 171, 204 n. 6 Oder-Neisse Line 87, 88 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 125, 127, 152-4, 201 n. 39 oil 62-7 Oil Conference (1944) 63-6 opinion polls 34-5, 58-9, 61 see also public opinion Pacific dominions 16 Pan American Airways 154 Papandreou, George 134, 196 n. 17 Parliament 65-6, 184 n. 53
Pax Britannica-Americana 3,117

Pearson, Drew 24, 35-6 'Percentages Agreement' 83, 136-8 Philippines 31 Phillips, Frederick 48 Plastiras, Nicholas 154 PM 145 Poland 71-2, 73-119, 172

232
Poland (cont.) boundaries 75-6, 87-8 composition of provisional government 83, 88-96 passim, 114-16 elections 88, 90, 93, 96, 114-15, 116 emigre (London) government 73,
j 5-80 passim, 86

Index
Roman Catholic Church 59 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano and air transport 68 and 'anglophobia' 44 and China 41 and Churchill 43, 97-8, 131, 190 n. 30; and Greece, 148-9; 'Percentages Agreement' 136-7; and Poland 92, 94-5; pre-conference meetings 49-53, 181 n - 53 and colonialism 2, 40, 64 and EAC 46 and Eden 40-1, 44 and Greece 127-38passim; George II 128-32, 147; Stettinius' press statement 148, 200 n. 15; UK involvement 135, 138, 151-2; US-UK aid mission 156-8 and Hong Kong 179 n. 12 and India 36 internationalism 40-1, 151, 155, 180 n. 13 and Lend-Lease 55, 182 n. 9 and oil 62-6 passim and Poland 74, 77-8, 80-97 passim, 117; message to Stalin (April 1945) 94-6; statement (December 1944) 84-6; Warsaw Rising 82-3 postwar planning 40-1 and Stalin 49-53, 78, 79, 180 n. 23, 181 n. 53 State of the Union message (1945) 151,155 and triangularity 5-7, 43, 47, 97, 117, 156,172-3 and US-UK relationship 49, 52, 53, 69 and USSR 5, 43, 48-53, 74, 94-6, 98, and Western European coalition 15 'world organisation' 5, 7, 74, 94 Roumania 122, 135, 137, 138, 157, 172 Roumania-Greece arrangement 135-6 Russo-Polish war (1919-21) 75
St Louis Post-Dispatch 140

the 'missing 16' 100, 101, 109, i n , 114, 115, 194 n. 6 partition of 75, 185 n. 3 significance for Churchill and Eden 9 1 , " 7-19 UK involvement in 73-4, 75-80, 83-4, 87-101, 104, 109-10, 114-19; an electoral issue? 91-2, 95, 118-19; at Yalta 87-90 US involvement in 71-2, 73-4, 76, 77-90, 91-117; Roosevelt agrees to approach Stalin 94-5; policy statement (December 1944) 84-6; Truman's line 103-9, 110-16; at Yalta 87-90 and the USSR 74-90, 93, 95-6, 100, 101-2, 107-8, 117-18; Katyn Forest massacre 77, 186 n. 15, 187 n. 25; Warsaw Rising 81-2, 188 n. 17 at Yalta 87-9 see also Lublin Committee; Warsaw Rising Polish-Americans 77, 78, 81, 89 Polish Commission 96-7, 101, 115 Polish Committee of National Liberation, see Lublin Committee Polish Home Army 81 postwar planning 39-42, 46 Potsdam Conference 55, 88, 113 Prague 98 Pravda 148, 175 n. 7 press, the 22, 68, 139-45, l^ public opinion 21-38 Quebec Conference, Second (1944) 25, 35, 5 i , 5 5 Radcliffe, Cyril J. 23, 34, 68 Radio Moscow 80, 81, 186 n. 14
Readers' Digest 30

Reuter 143 Riga Line 75, 76, 79

San Francisco Conference (1945) 93, 94, 101, 106, 108, 110 Sargent, Orme 97, n o , 128, 167, 193-4 n - 22 Scobie, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald MacKenzie 143

Index
Scott, Sir David 33 Sforza, Count 148, 149, 150 Sikorski, Wladyslaw 77, 186 n. 14 Slavin, General 188 n. 17 Smuts, Field Marshal Jan Christiaan 101, 130, 197 n. 43 SOE (Special Operations Executive) 124, 153 Soviet War News 186 n. 14 Special Operations Executive (SOE) 124, 153 Spry, Graham 33-4 Stalin, Joseph 79, 95-6, 118, 122 and Churchill 89, 91, 118 and 'Percentages Agreement' 83, 136-8 and Poland 77-8, 81 passim, 91-7 passim, 100, 108-9, XI5> 188 n. 17 and Roosevelt 49-53, 78, 79, 95, 180 n. 23, 181 n. 53 and Truman 113 Standley, William 97, 181 n. 53 State Department and civil aviation 68 and the FO 39-40, 77 and Greece 125, 126, 128, 132, 134, 152; aid to 162, 164, 165, 168; the elections/plebiscite 159

233
triangularity 5-7, 43, 47-8, 97, 172-3 Trieste (Venezia Giulia) 113, 172 Truman, Harry S. 7, 69, 99, 103, and Allied advance into eastern Europe 99 and Churchill 99, 100, 108, 109, 113, 170-1 and foreign affairs 99, 191 n. 1, 192 n. 1 and Greece 160, 167, 169 and India 36 and Lend-Lease 55 and Molotov 99, 104-8 passim and Poland 74, 83, 100, 104-9, i n , 113 at Potsdam 160 and Stalin 113 and UK-US relations 105 and the UNO 99, 191 n. 1 and USSR 74, 99, 104-8, i n - 1 3 , 160, 171; at 23 April 1945 meeting 106-7 Truman Doctrine 7, 106, 112, 169, 172 Tsaldaris, Constantine 167 Tsouderos, Emmanuel 133 Turkey 167, 168, 169, 172 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) foreign exchange 54-5 and Germany 75 and Leninist theory 182 n. 75 manpower 14, 175 n. 7 and Poland, see Poland in Roosevelt's 'world organisation' and UK, see United Kingdom and US, see United States and Western European coalition 14, 15 at Yalta 79 United Kingdom an alliance, need for 13-20 and Cold War 10, 72, 123 colonial affairs 2, 31-8, 60-1 decline 2-3, 6-7, 13-14, 26, 29-30, 168-9, l72 elections (1945) 91, 118-19 foreign exchange 54-5 and Greece, see Greece as 'junior partner' 26, 60, 72 manpower 13-14, 175 n. 7
111-12

and Poland 84-5, 92-3, 96-7 and triangularity 47 sterling 58 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr 93, 151,

189 n. 4, 201 n. 27 and EAC 46 and Greece 133, 150-1 and Poland 84-6 passim, 101-7 passim,
109-10

press statement (5 December 1944) 86, 139, 145, 148-9 and the UK 86, 99, 105 and US-UK economic relations 54 and Western European coalition 175 n. 16 at Yalta 53 Stimson, Henry 42, 55, 106, 107, 117 Strang, William 46, 180 n. 25 Swing, Raymond Gram 142, 144 Syria 125-6 Taft, Senator 31 Teheran Conference (1943) 51, 76, 78, 79, 131 Times, The 142

5-6

234 United Kingdom (cont.) and Poland, see Poland public image 21-38; as 'first-rank' nation 26-9, 60-2; as imperialist power 318; in the war effort 21-6, 177-8 n. 28 relationship with US: an alliance? 1-2, 17-20,43, 170, 171; as ' Anglo-America' 1-3; common citizenship? 42, 43, 170, 171; the dilemma 5-7, 64, 69; economic relations 16, 54-69, 154, 174-5 n - 15 in Greece 72, 121, 168-9, 172 {et passim 121-69); and joint military bases 4-5; obstacles to: (isolationism) 29-31, (US nationalism) 43-7, (US press/ public opinion) 21-38, (US 'triangularity') 5-6, 47-53; in Poland 71-4, 117-19 (et passim 73-119); US policy towards USSR 7, 71-2, 97-8, 117, 169, 170-3 relationship with the USSR 7, 14, 29-30, 98; in Greece 121-3, 135-8, 163-4; in Poland 71-4, 117-19 (etpassim 74-119); Treaty (1942) 76; limited influence of UK 77, 79, 89 Washington embassy, see Foreign Office at Yalta 87-9 see also Foreign Office United Nations Organisation (UNO) 4, 7,93, 104, 171-2 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), 156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 203 n. 28 United States aid programmes, 165-6, 172, 200 n. 27 as 'Anglo-America' 1-3 'anglophobia' 43-7, 85 Churchill's prestige in 1, 170, 204 n. 3 and colonialism 2, 30-8 and EAC 46-7 and Europe's 'wily' diplomats 5, 28 and India 16, 31-2, 35-6, 179 n. 66 armed forces' eastward advance 98 loan to UK (1945-6) 58-60, 68 9; see also Lend-Lease manpower 14, 175 n. 7 Mediterranean policy 163 and Poland, see Poland

Index
the press 22, 68, 139-45, 160 public opinion 21-38, 45, 103; on UK as imperialist power 31-8; on UK as 'junior partner' 26-9; on UK's war effort 21-6; see also isolationism self-confidence 6, 26, 43-7 and territorial issues 76 and USSR 7, 48-9, 71-2, 97-8, 103-4, 11112, 123, 170-3; at 23 April 1945 meeting 106-7; at Yalta 79 and Western European coalition 15 at Yalta 79, 87-9 Vandenberg, Senator 59, 93 Varkiza Agreement (January 1945) 159,
161

Venezia Giulia 113, 172 Vietnam 123, 200 n. 27 Vilna 87 Wallace, Henry 42, 43, 64 Warner, Christopher 97 Warner, E. R. 127 Warsaw Government see Lublin Committee Warsaw Rising 81-2, 188 n. 17 Washington 47 Welles, Sumner 41, 42, 48, 142 Western European coalition 1415 Wheeler, Senator 31 White, Harry Dexter 61 Whitehead, T. N. 19 Wiley, Senator 30 Willkie, Wendell 30, 32, 45 Wilson, Field Marshal Henry Maitland 24, 25, 150, 151-2 Winant, John 31, 41, 47, 130 Witos, Wincenty 101 Woodhouse, C. M. 153, 167, 195 n. 1, 201 n. 39 World Bank 174 n. 1 Wright, Michael 144-5 Yalta Conference (1945) 76, 79, 87-97,
119

Yorkshire Post 142

'Yugoslav model' 107, 109, 115, 193 n. 16 Yugoslavia, 122, 137, 166