The Reception of Leibniz's Philosophy in the Writings of Charles Bonnet (1720-- 1793)

OLIVIER RIEPPEL
Palgiontologisches Institut und Museum der Universitiit Ziirich Kiinstlergasse 16 8006 Ziirich, Switzerland

INTRODUCTION Charles Bonnet of Geneva, "natural philosopher" as he liked to call himself, is considered one of the fathers of modem biology in view of the stringent experimental approach that he proposed and exemplified in his early work on parthenogenesis in aphids, on regeneration in lower invertebrates, and on the function of plant leaves. But later in his life he became more and more involved in philosophical and metaphysical issues, adopting many aspects of Leibnizian philosophy. Bonnet had his first encounter with Leibniz's Theodicy during the winter of 1748:1 his immediate reaction was to dictate a manuscript entitled M~ditations sur l'univers to Pastor Bennelle, a friend of his, thus initiating a project that was to keep him busy for the next five years. Following some encouragement by his friend Albrecht von Hailer, this manuscript was to serve as the basis for two of Bonnet's books: Consid&ations sur les corps organ&& (1762) and Contemplation de la nature (1764). Indeed, he appeared to have adopted Leibnizianism to such an extent that he later felt the need to defend himself against charges of plagiarism raised against him by Abb6 Pierre Sigorgne and by the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn.2 This defense, part of which constitutes chapter 7 of Bonnet's famous Pallingdn&ie philosophique (1769), provides the material on which to base an investigation of how Leibniz's philosophy was modified and incorporated into biologi-

1. Raymond Savioz, M~moires autobiographiques de Charles Bonnet de Gendve (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1948), p. 100. 2. Raymond Savioz, ~La philosophie de Charles Bonnet de Gen~ve (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1948), p. 20; Jacques Marx, "Charles Bonnet contre les Lumi~res 1738--1850," Stud. Voltaire Eighteenth Cent., 156--157 (1976), 566--568,604--605.
Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 21, no. 1 (Spring 1988)pp. 119--145. 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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cal thinking by Charles Bonnet. His general strategy was to make Leibniz's metaphysics amenable to biology by providing it with a material -- that is, empirical, or even experimental -- basis. 3 There is little reason to assume that Leibnizianism was imposed on Bonnet by his early surroundings. Rather, it was Cartesian rationalism that prospered in the learned circles of Geneva during the first half of the eighteenth century, having been introduced by Jean-Robert Chouet (1642--1731), professor of philosophy at Geneva. 4 Chouet combined Cartesian rationalism with a pronounced inclination towards an experimental approach -- in his lectures, he used to demonstrate the effect of viper venom on pigeons and cats. 5 Bonnet studied philosophy under Gabriel Cramer (1704--1752), who shared the Genevan chair for mathematics with Giovanni L. Calandrini. Bonnet loved and admired Cramer and considered him as his principal guide through all matters of philosophy and natural history. Cramer himself was a student of Chouet; i n 1727 he had visited England where he became acquainted with the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, which further enhanced the empirical and sensualist outlook that he transmitted to his student. 6 Empiricism and sensualism were combined with elements of Cartesian mechanism in Cramer's thinking; this is evident in his reaction to Bonnet's initial work on regeneration. 7 Before having read Leibniz, Bonnet defended the doctrine of preexisting germs linked to an immortal animal soul against Cramer's inclination to view the polyp and other animals as automations. 8 Bonnet absorbed both empiricism and sensualism. The latter is particularly evident in his Essai analytique sur les facult~s de l'6me (1760), wherein he developed his theory of the "mixed-being" that is irreconcilable with Leibniz's theory of preestablished harmony (see below). His adoption of empiricism was reinforced by his discovery of Renr-Antoine Ferchault de Rraumer (1683--1757) as his second guide and much-admired "oracle." Bonnet had seen the first volume of Rraumur's Mdmoires p o u r servir d l'histoire des insectes (1734) in the study of Ami de la Rive, under whom he

3. Marx, "Bonnet eontre les Lumi~res,"pp. 82, 86. 4. Savioz,Philosophie de Charles Bonnet, pp. 5--6. 5. Pierre Revillod, Physiciens et naturalistes genevois (Geneva: Librairie Kundig, 1942), pp. 6--7. 6. Savioz,Philosophie de Charles Bonnet, p. 7. 7. Savioz,M~moires autobiographiques, p. 68. 8. Savioz, Philosophie de Charles Bonnet, p. 67; Marx, "Bonnet contre les Lumibres,"p. 200.

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had started to study law in 1736. 9 R6aumur always stressed the necessity of an empirical approach, which was to prevail over the adherence to a blind belief in general and immutable laws of nature. Such laws would always be prone to exceptions, as was demonstrated by the discovery of the regenerative powers in Hydra by Abraham Trembley (1710--1784), by the discovery of parthenogenesis in aphids by Bonnet, and by R6aumur's discovery of the particular m o d e of reproduction in the Hippoboscidae. 1 Thus it was only natural for Bonnet to reject Berkeley's idealism H and to read Malebranche, Swammerdam, and Malpighi -- but not in order to learn about the metaphysical issues touched upon by these authors. Rather, he was attracted to Malebranche's R e c h e r c h e de la v&itd by the comments this author offered on insects and by his defence of the doctrine of the e m b o f t e m e n t of preexistent germs; 12 Swammerdam's Biblia naturae he admired for the accuracy of the detailed anatomical descriptions, 13 and Malpighi seems to have attracted him for similar reasons. TM However, all of these authors also supported preformationism, or at least they could be understood in this sense, which implied an Augustinian Neoplatonism that these authors shared with Leibniz. This point may be illustrated by the contacts Leibniz had with Malebranche. ~5 Leibniz applauded Malebranche's philosophy, not because he accepted the latter's occasionalism, but because he interpreted Malebranche as a supporter of the same principle that was to form the basis of his own metaphysical system: p r a e d i c a t u m inest subjecto o m n i s verae propositionis. Augustinian Neoplatonism was to become apparent in Bonnet's later writings, particularly in his PalingOndsie. Due to his empirical outlook Bonnet was at first incapable even of understanding Leibniz's doctrine of the monads and his theory of preestablished harmony, thoughts that he found just as obscure as Malebranche's dictum that "man preceives everything in God. ''16 And yet it will be shown below that both concepts, the 9. Savioz,M~moires autobiographiques, p. 48. 10. Ren6-Antoine Ferchault de R6aumur, M~moires pour servir d l'histoire des insectes (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1734--42), III, 294, 324; VI, lv, 524, 569, 605. 11. Savioz,Mdmoires autobiographiques, p. 171. 12. Ibid., p. 93. 13. Ibid.,pp. 55--56. 14. Ibid., p. 56. 15. William H. Barber, Leibniz in France: From Arnauld to Voltaire: A Study in French Reactions to Leibnizianism, 1670--1760 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 18. 16. Savioz,M~moires autobiographiques, p. 100.

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monads and the idea of preestablished harmony, influenced Bonnet as he composed his Paling~nOsie philosophique. What immediately attracted him to Leibniz's Theodicy was its treatment of the problem of free will and Leibniz's optimism. Bonnet certainly was predisposed to accept Leibniz's views on these matters by his religious education -- indeed, Calvinism with its strong emphasis on predestination is more compatible with Leibnizian metaphysics than is Catholicism, as is shown by the reaction of Antoine Arnauld (1612-- 1664) to Leibniz. 17Bonnet first encountered the Theodicy in the edition of Leibniz's works by Louis Dutens, printed in Geneva in 1748.18 He was impressed by the preface and by the contents of Part One, which he cited repeatedly. Bonnet must also have known Leibniz's famous letter to Pierre Varignon that received wide attention throughout Europe as it provoked the scandal of 1751 between Samuel K6nig, a Swiss disciple of Christian Wolff, and PierreLouis de Maupertuis, then president of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. 19 This letter provides a thorough exposition of the principle of continuity, including the proposition of equivalence of spatial and temporal continuity that was to form the basis of the Paling~n~sie. The letter also contains Leibniz's famous "prediction" of the existence of zoophytes as organized beings linking the plant and animal kingdoms within the scala naturae, a prediction that Bonnet found gloriously corroborated by Trembley's discovery of the polyp. 2 Cramer had edited two volumes of correspondence between Leibniz and Johann Bernoulli; 21 some of these letters, particularly those dating from the years 1698 and 1699, contain important remarks of Leibniz concerning his notion of the infinite -- a notion that Bonnet was to comment upon in the context of his preformation theory. Finally, Part Seven of the Paling~nOsie is based on the French edition of Leibniz's works, published by R. E. Raspe in 1765, which made the important Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain available for the first time. 22 A very valuable summary of Leibniz's views had been available since 1695 under the title Systdme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, published in the Journal des SavantsY The treatise touches upon most issues of Leibnizian 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. Barber,Leibniz in France,pp. 10--17. Marx,"Bonnetcontreles Lumi6res,"p. 80. Barber,Leibniz in France,pp. 144--145. Marx,"Bonnetcontreles Lumi6res,"p. 83. JoesphF. Scott,"Cramer,Gabriel,"Dict. Sci. Biog., 3: 460. Marx,"Bonnetcontre les Lumi6res,"p. 83. Barber,Leibniz in France.

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metaphysics that would have interested Bonnet: atomists as well as Cartesians are criticized, the most basic ideas that were later to reappear in the M o n a d o l o g y are mentioned, and his views on preformationism are expressed, citing Swammerdam, Malpighi, Leeuwenhoek, Hartsoeker, and Malebranche in their support. A note might be added on the question of whether Bonnet was influenced by contemporary supporters of Leibnizianism, in particular by Christian Wolff. There is no evidence that this was the case. The great epigenesist Caspar Friedrich Wolff was influenced by Christian W o l f f . 24 C. F. Wolff postulated a vis essentialis to account for the formation of an embryo, and thus adhered to a vitalistic position that might, in a roundabout way, derive from Leibnizian metaphysics. Bonnet first learnt about Wolff's writings in a letter from Albrecht von Hailer dated March 4, 1760. 25 He kept himself informed on the details of the Hailer-Wolff debate, but in his correspondence he always sided with his friend Hailer and hailed the latter's supposed refutation of the Wolffian theory on the formation of the blood vessels in the embryo, showing neglect or almost disdain for Wolff. Bonnet rejected the proposition of a v i s essentialis, which he considered as an occult force similar to Needham's f o r c e vdg~tatrice or Buffon's m o u l e s int~rie u r s . 26 In fact, he does not seem to have even understood Wolff's theory properly. He did not notice the fundamental difference between Maupertuis's and Wolff's notions of epigenesis, for he believed that both of them supported the atomistic model of growth of the embryo by the juxtaposition of parts. 27 However, Wolff did not base his theory of generation on atomism, as did Maupertuis and Buffon; rather, he followed Harvey's lead and considered one organ to represent the material basis for the development of the next one, the whole process of embryogenesis resembling the vegetation of a plant. 28 What Bonnet most violently objected to in Wolff's -- or any other -- theory of epigenesis was the idea that mater could be endowed with the property to guide 24. Shirley A. Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation: Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the Hailer-Wolff Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 103. 25. Otto Sonntag, The Correspondence between Albrecht yon Hailer and Charles Bonnet (Bern: Hans Huber, 1983), p. 193. 26. Charles Bonnet, "II Mrmoire sur la reproduction des members de la salamandre," in Oeuvres d'histoire naturelle et de philosophie de Charles Bonnet, 18 vols. (Neuch~tel:Samuel Fauche, 1779--83), XI, 136-- 137. 27. Sonntag, Correspondence, p. 410. 28. Caspar Friedrich Wolff, Theorie von der Generation (Berlin: Friedrich Wilhelm Bimstiel, 1764), pp. 188, 192,210--211.

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embryonic development, a property that Bonnet considered to be an attribute of divine providence. OPTIMISM "The optimism is the most precious aspect of Leibniz's philosophy," wrote Bonnet to his friend Albrecht von Hailer. 29 As Haller's illness grew m o r e and m o r e serious, Bonnet tried to console him: T o conceive of death as a d o o r to fortunate eternity, to conceive of death not as a termination of life but rather as the beginning of a new life, as a true transformation, means to deprive death of its sting. 3 This statement expresses the whole essence of the Paling~n~sie, a b o o k that was written to provide a scientific basis for the dogma of resurrection. Bonnet himself had repeatedly found consolation through his belief in a gracious and benevolent G o d - - first when he was struck by eye troubles that rendered microscopical work difficult, and temporarily impossible, for him, 3~ and again when his wife had an accident that forever deprived Bonnet of his hope of becoming a father. 32 Leibniz had based his optimism on the concept of the "best of all possible worlds." H e acknowledged that the world we live in is not perfectly good: G o d could not have created everything in a state of absolute perfection, for then the objects of creation would all have been indistinguishable from one another as well as from G o d himself. Imperfection must be the attribute of the created material world. Yet G o d had envisaged all possible worlds that could be created, with all the manifold consequences they would bear in time and space, and from these innumerable possible worlds his benevolence had chosen the best one for material creation. With his theory of "mixed-beings" (~tres-mixtes, to be discussed in m o r e detail below), Bonnet gave the idea of the "best of all possible worlds" a physical basis: "[Man] has been created for his future, and for a future which corresponds to his qualification as a

29. 30. 31. 32.

Sonntag, Correspondence, p. 929, letter dated March 26, 1771. Ibid.,p. 980, letter dated November 22, 1771. Savioz, M~moires autobiographiques, p. 84. Ibid.,p. 184.

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mixed-being. ''33 Man as a mixed-being is always inferior to the "free intelligences" of the celestial hierarchy, because in man the soul is tied to a material body that imposes restrictions on the perfection of the soul's perceptions. Man's fortune can never be absolute since his perceptions are always less than absolutely perfect, but his fortune is as great as it can possibly be. 34 God's benevolence has preordained man's perfection in the course of his palingenesis. Like Leibniz's monads, man (and with him all other organized beings) strives towards greater perfection, towards increased powers of intellectual perception. 35 God has "preordained from the beginning the means by which man will be elevated to the sphere of angels ''36 and will thus acquire the perfect perception of this world to which end he was in fact created. 37 T H E PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUITY AND T H E PERFECTIBILITY OF MIND AND BODY Bonnet had been a supporter of preformationism before reading Leibniz's Theodicy, and his discovery of parthenogenesis in aphids seemed a proof of the ovist position, which claimed that the preformed embryo was contained in the female egg. 38 Leibniz, at least in his later work, adhered to the animalculist tradition, which held that the embryo is preformed in the male spermatozoon. In spite of this difference, Bonnet was pleased to note Leibniz's support for preformationism, quoting the preface as well as section 90 of the Theodicy. 39 He used the Leibnizian principle of continuity to sanction the scientific status of preformation theory: Nature never proceeds by saltations. Everything has its sufficient reason, or its immediate cause. The actual state of an organized body is the consequence or the product of the

33. Charles Bonnet, La palingdn~sie philosophique, ou ld~es sur l'~tat pass~ et sur l'dtatfutur des dtres vivants (Geneva: C. Philibert and B. Chirol, 1769), I, 309; II, 115. 34. Ibid.,I, 267. 35. Ibid., II, 29. 36. Ibid., II, 56. 37. Ibid.,II, 50. 38. Savioz,M~moires autobiographiques, pp. 49, 55, 68, 80, 92--93. 39. Bonnet, Paling~ndsie, I, 273.

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preceding state, or to put it more correctly, the present state of an organized being is determined by the preceding state.4 Applied to organisms, this must mean that every stage of embryogenesis is contained in the preceding stage. The development of the embryo is an unbroken chain of events, depending on the continuity among the various parts that are being developed. The parts of the Tout organique cannot exist separately; rather, they are "so manifestly linked together and subordinated to one another, that the existence of some presupposes the existence of others.''41 From the principle of continuity thus followed the law of the correlation of the parts of an organism? 2 To his friend Albrecht von Hailer Bonnet wrote on October 11, 1770, commenting on Paul-Henri d'Holbach's Syst~me de la nature: " . . . it suffices to show you a hand and a foot in order for you to guess the whole.''43 The correlation of the parts of an organism logically results in the theory of preformation: "From all this I have drawn a general conclusion that I believe to be philosophical; namely, that the Touts organiques have been preformed from the beginning...
'~44

Bonnet used the concept of the correlation of the parts of an organism to support preformationism against the materialists of the French Enlightment who denied divine Providence and final causes in nature. Influenced by Gassendi's atomism, authors like Buffon, Maupertuis, and Diderot held that the embryo forms by the successive juxtaposition of parts; the guiding principle (causa formalis) of embryogenesis must be inherent in matter itself. For Bonnet, all parts of the organism had to coexist and hence had to be present from the very beginning of embryonic development. The embryo was designed by God who is the sufficient reason for its existence, and its development served the purpose of the actualization of God's idea. Some decades later, the reactionary Georges Cuvier, a late supporter of preformationism,45 successfully applied the law of the correlation of parts to the analysis of vertebrate fossils. 40. CharlesBonnet, Considerations sur les corps organis~s, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam:Marc-MichelRay, 1768), I, 4--5. 41. Bonnet,Paling~nOsie,I, 355. 42. Charles Bonnet, Contemplation de la nature (Amsterdam:Marc-Michel Ray, 1764), I, 154; see alsoibid.,p. xxiv. 43. Sonntag,Correspondence, p. 890. 44. Bonnet,Paling~n~sie,356. 45. William Coleman, Georges Cuvier, Zoologist (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1964), pp. 162--164.

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Continuity prevails not only within, but also between organisms. Leibniz's Monadology was derived from, and provided a metaphysical basis for, the ancient concept of the scala naturae that was rooted in Phythagorean philosophy.46 Leibniz based the scala naturae on the graded powers of perception of the monads. Bonnet had already outlined his concept of the Great Chain of Being in his Trait~ d'insectologie in 1745, that is, prior to reading Leibniz.47 In this Contemplation de la nature (1764), as well as in his Paling~ndsie philosophique (1769), it becomes evident that Bonnet thought of the scala naturae as a hierarchy of successive levels of perfection. Perfection was primarily viewed in terms of increasing corporeal complexity correlated with increasing powers of perception. In the ~tre-mixte (see below), the qualities of perception of the soul depend on the perfection of the body through which the soul obtains sensations from the outer world and through which the soul must act. Leibniz had understood perfection in a somewhat different, more metaphysical, sense, as meaning individuation. God had created the monads, each of which was accorded its individual potential of perception. These potential powers of perception were to develop -- that is, to become actualized -- in the course of time as a consequence of each monad's entelechy striving towards perfection. Development and perfection thus meant the successive actualization of the potential individuality that was accorded to each soul at the moment of its original creation. Bonnet tried to get away from pure metaphysics by linking the perfection of the soul to the perfection of the material body.48 He claimed to have developed his concept of the perfection of mixed-beings, viewed as an ascent through the successive levels of increasing complexity of the ladder of life, independently of Leibniz, and he based his claim on a comparison of his ideas with section 89 of the Theodicy. Yet Leibniz had expressed his optimism in other parts of the Theodicy in a sense that comes close to Bonnet's views on palingenesis -- for example, in section 341. 49 Whether construed independently or not, the notions of perfectibility of Leibniz and Bonnet share one basic similarity: both authors view development and consequent perfection from an Augustinian perspective, as the actualization of a preconceived divine idea or plan.
46. Marx, "Bonnet contre les Lumibres," pp. 358--359. 47. Charles Bonnet, Trait~ d'insectologie, ou Observations sur les pucerons (Paris: Durand Librairie, 1745). 48. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 287. 49. Ibid.,I, 271.

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Continuity dictates the correlation of parts. The organism, the microcosm, forms a Tout organique, a unified whole. If continuity also prevails between organisms -- that is, in the macrocosm -then the universe must likewise represent one unified whole, which in turn mirrors the one and only G o d of Creation: Philosophy provides us with the most dignified ideas about the universe. It is shown to represent a systematic or harmonious collection of all beings that have been created. It forms a single system because all of its parts are, so to speak, rooted within one another, and all converge to produce this Unique Whole that demonstrates so evidently the Unity and the Intelligence of the First Cause. 5 For Leibniz, each monad was an individual mirror of the whole universe, without the least void, while Bonnet admitted "a perfect parallelism of the astronomic with the organic system. ''51 This parallelism between microcosm and macrocosm becomes crucial if continuity, which determines spatial order, is also postulated to determine temporal order and vice versa, as it was by Leibniz in his letter to Varignon first published by Krnig in 1751.52 The individual state of perfection of an organism is potentially existing from the time of Creation, because it was then preformed by God. Yet the individual organism reaches its state of perfection only through its ontogenetic development or "evolution" in time, during which it passes through a series of revolutions or metamorphoses leading from one state of complexity to the next higher one. What is true for the microcosm must also hold for the macrocosm -- the actualization of the universe must have followed the same law of order. The logical consequence of this view is Bonnet's Paling~ndsie: a developing world, "evolving" along the scala naturae to ever-higher levels of perfection, paralleled by and mirrored in the ontogenetic development of individual organisms. 53 The scala naturae, which is a spatial principle of order 50. Ibid., I, 242--243; see also Charles Bonnet, "Principes philosophiques," in Oeuvres d'Histoire Naturelle et de Philosophie (see n. 26 above), XVIII, 250-251; and idem, Contemplation, I, 242; II, 74--77. For the later development of this concept into the idea of a "unit6 de plan de composition" in the early nineteenth century see Marx, "Bonnet contre les Lumi~res,"pp. 361--385. 51. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 262. 52. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Ueber das Kontinuit~itsprinzip," in Hauptschriflen zur Grundlegung der Philosophie, ed. Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1966), II, 76. 53. Bonnet, PalingOn~sie,I, 178--179.

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coeternal with the divine mind, becomes successively actualized in the course of time. PREFORMATION
The N o t i o n o f the Infinite

The theory of preformation, especially if couched in terms of

e m b o i t e m e n t as by Bonnet (see below), presupposes the possibility

of infinite smallness of organic beings. R6aumur, in the first volume of his Mdmoires p o u r servir d l'histoire des insectes, was concerned with the replacement of the superficial hairs in caterpillars during the moulting process. When considering the possibility of their preexistence within the hairs prior to moulting, he stated that "nature works as small as she wishes." 54 Bonnet quoted this statement repeatedly throughout his work. Leibniz, one of the founders of infinitesimal calculus, supported the infinite divisibility of all matter against the atomists' view, as Descartes had before him. In his letters to Johann Bernoulli, Leibniz defended preformation with the indication that "nature is not subject to ultimate limits." 55 Bonnet, on the other hand, could not so easily accept Leibniz's notion of the infinite. In chapter 7 of his Consid&ations sur les corps organis~s, based on his earlier manuscript Meditations sur l'univers, 56 he judged the infinite divisibility of matter a "geometrical truth but a physical error. ''57 He admitted, however, that man cannot know the ultimate limits of the divisibility of matter, due to the imperfection of human perception. 5s Referring to the work of Louis Bourguet, who refuted calculations that were designed to destroy the theory of e m b o i t e m e n t , 59 Bonnet stated: "Every material body is necessarily finite; all its parts necessarily have

54. R6aumur, M~moires pour servir d l'histoire des insectes, I, 181. 55. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Letter to Bernoulli, 20--30 September 1698," in Hauptsehriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie (see n. 52. above), II, 374. 56. Savioz, Mdmoires autobiographiques, pp. 101, 209; see also Bonnet, Considerations, I, vii, xi. 57. Bonnet, Considdrations, I, 88. 58. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie,I, 107. 59. Bonnet, Considerations, II, 230; see also Charles Bonnet, "M6moire sur les Germes," in Oeuvres d'historie naturelle et de philosophie (see n. 26 above), X, 4; and Louis Bourguet, Lettres philosophiques sur la formation des sels et des
crystaux et sur la g~n~ration et le m~eanisme organique des plantes et des animaux (Amsterdam: Francois l'Honor6, 1729), pp. 133--140.

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fixed limits: but these limits are unknown to US. ' ' 6 0 If the created body were infinite, would it not be like God? Bonnet had yet another reason to reject the notion of infinity with respect to the physical world. In his Paling~n~sie he claimed that the world had gone through an unknown number of revolutions, and hence that our globe was of unknown age. But admitting an infinite number of revolutions would imply an eternal world. The coexistence of the Creation with the eternal Creator - - that is, the eternity of the world - - was one of the Averroist theses condemned in the years 1270 and 1277. Bonnet would thus have touched upon an age-old controversy within Christian philosophy. 61 He decided to adhere to the more orthodox claim that all that has been materially created must have had a definite beginning in time. Consequently, an infinite number of earthly revolutions could not be admitted. 62
" E n v e l o p p e m e n t " versus " E m b o i t e m e n t "

In addition to the fact that Leibniz supported animalculism and Bonnet ovism, there were other differences in their views on preformation. Bonnet termed Leibniz's views a theory of e n v e l o p p e m e n t , to which he opposed his theory of e m b o f t e m e n t . After having hesitated a long time to choose between the theories of the universal dissemination versus the encapsulation within one another of the preformed germs, Bonnet decided in favour of e m b o f t e m e n t , "and I have given the reasons for this decision. ''63 One of the reasons was the supposed demonstration of e m b o f t e m e n t in the hen's egg by Albrecht von Haller. 64 Of importance were also Spallanzani's and Bonnet's own experiments and thoughts on regeneration in lower invertebrates and in salamanders. 65 Doubtlessly Bonnet was further influenced by 60. Bonnet, Considkrations, I, 88; see also Charles Bonnet, "Recueil de divers passages de Leibnitz," in Oeuvres d'histoire naturelle et de philosophie (see n. 26 above), XVIII, 22; and idem "Vue du Leibnitianisme," in ibid., XVIII, 85-86. 61. Marx ("Bonnet contre les Lumi~res," p. 94) stresses the fact that the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought postulated a definite end of the created world, which also renders an eternal cycleof revolutions impossible. 62. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 254. 63. Savioz,Mkmoires autobiographiques, p. 340. 64. Bonnet, Considerations, I, ix, 145--146; see also Sonntag, Correspondence, pp. 109--111. 65. Bonnet, ConsidOrations, II, 24, 37; see also Charles Bonnet, "Mrmoires sur la reproduction des membres de la salamandre aquatique," in Oeuvres d'histoire naturelle et dephilosophie (see n. 26 above), XI, 62--150.

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reading Malebranche, 66 Rraumur, 67 Malpighi,68 and Abb6 Pluche.69 Finally, the development of his views on palingenesis added further arguments in favour of emboftement (to be discussed below), although Bonnet still hesitated to endorse this doctrine in an introductory chapter to his Paling~n~sie. TM Starting with the work of Swammerdam, the theory of preformation was based on the analogy with insect metamorphosis, and it was also linked to metaphysical questions concerning the nature of generation and death. Bonnet had read the French translation of Swammerdam's Biblia naturae. 71 In this work, published posthumously, Swammerdam reiterated his views on metamorphosis, which, according to him, consisted of nothing more than the development and growth of preexistent structures. Extending this concept to the problem of generation and death, Swammerdam concluded that generation would represent, not the creation of something de novo, but simply the development of preexistent structures. Conversely, death does not imply the termination of existence; rather, it represents the metamorphosis to a future existence. There is no real death or generation in nature. For Swammerdam, metamorphosis became a natural metaphor for the dogma of resurrection. 72 The basic idea is an ancient one -- it was already expressed by Basilius Magnus in his Hexaemeron.
66. Savioz, M~moires autobiographiques, p. 92. 67. Ibid., p. 49: see also Renr-Antoine Ferchault de Rraumur, "Sur les diverses reproductions qui se font dans le 6crevisses, les omars, les crabes, etc., et entre autres sur celles de leur jambes et de leurs 6cailles," M~m. Acad. Roy. Sci. (1712), 226--245; Rraumur, Mdmoires pour servir d l'histoire des insectes, I, 181,359--360. 68. Savioz, MOmoires autobiographiques, p. 56; see also Bonnet, Considerations, I, 129. It is not claimed here that Malpighi supported the preformationist theory of emboftement; it is only stated that Bonnet understood him in this sense. 69. For a discussion of early influences on Bonnet see also Savioz, Philosophie de Charles Bonnet, pp. 21--22; and Marx, "Bonnet contre les Lumibres," pp. 57--58. 70. Bonnet, Paling~ndsie, I, 107. 71. Savioz, M~moires autobiographiques, p. 55. 72. Peter J. Bowler ("Preformation and Pre-Existence in the Seventeenth Century," Z Hist. Biol., 4 [1971], 221--224) gives a somewhat different interpretation of Swammerdam's work than the one adopted here. It is important to distinguish between preformation or preexistence of rudiments of the essential form or structure, and their successive development in the individual. Jan Swammerdam did adhere to an "epigenetic" -- i.e., successive -- development of preformed rudiments; he compares metamorphosis with the budding of plants (Bibel der Natur [Leipzig: J. F. Gladitsch, 1752], pp. 3, 90), a comparison to be used later by K. F. Wolff to illustrate his notion of epigenetic development. Yet

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Leibniz held (1) that animals must be accorded a soul, since they show signs of sensibility; (2) that every soul must always be linked to a body; and (3) that all souls, including those of animals, are immortal. If the Neoplatonic concept of metempsychosis (migration of the soul from one body to another) is rejected, preformation must follow as a logical consequence from these premises. Leibniz cited Swammerdam and claimed to follow the latter's views, as can be seen from the preface of his Theodicy. He writes there that death simply "wraps up" or "disguises" something that has been visible before, which means that the organism is reduced to a "physical point." Generation would constitute the reverse process. The soul thus remains attached to the same body throughout the cycle of death and resurrection. Bonnet admits 73 that prior to Haller's studies on the development of the chick he had entertained a view that came close to the theory of enveloppement, which he expounded in chapter 6 of his Considerations sur les corps organis~s. He envisaged the preformed germ as consisting of a folded net of "elementary fibers" that determine the organism's essential form and structure. Development and growth would result from the assimilation of nutritive particles ("molecules") into this net of elementary fibers. Bonnet later refined this model of development and growth under the influence of Haller's concept of the tela celltllosa, 74 using the development of molluscan shells and of bone as described by Hrrissant as a model. 75 Following the theory of enveloppement, death would represent the reversed process; the germ would return to its original condition of a folded net of elementary fibers.

Swammerdam stressed that the animal develops "from invisible yet essential origins present in the maternal body" (p. 115). He further noted that the pupa does not change to become a winged insect; rather, it is the same caterpillar, the same pupa that give rise to a winged animal by the successive development of parts or organs already present in the caterpillar (pp. 3--4). Applied to the problem of generation, this meant that "there is no generation in nature, but only a development, a growth of parts, and no change is involved" (p. 16). The denial of change is directed against atomistic models of generation. Similarly, insect metamorphosis does not imply the real death of larval stages and a new origin of the imago; rather, the larval stages never truly die, the imago is no animal formed de novo. Development or metamorphosis do not imply the origin of something new, but only the development of what already exists. Understood in this sense, Swammerdam accepts metamorphosis as an allegory of resurrection (p. 9). 73. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, 1,276--280. 74. Sonntag, Correspondence, pp. 81--83; see also Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 413. 75. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 405--414.

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In his Paling~nOsie, however, Bonnet had to reject the theory of enveloppement. The Paling~ndsie was meant to provide an empirical basis for the dogma of resurrection. Death and generation, when understood as metamorphoses in the sense of Leibniz, would indeed explain physical resurrection. Yet, if death meant simple enveloppement, how would resurrection be possible for a man who had lost his head and with it his memory and s o u l ? 76 Bonnet noted that the same objection had independently been raised against Leibniz by J. Bemoulli. 77 In view of these problems, Bonnet had to develop a new theory, following the doctrine of emboftement. H e now distinguished two types of preexistent germs. TM The first type serves the propagation of a given form of organisms during a given epoch of earth history: " . . . the Touts organiques have been originally preformed, and those of the same species have been encapsulated within one another so that they can develop from one another." 79 The development of an individual necessarily leads to its death, which results in its reduction "to powder. ''8 However, within the Tout organique another type of germ is encapsulated: the germ of restitution. It is an indestructible, "ethereal" body, enclosed within the brain of animals (within the corpus callosum of the human brain); it not only represents the true seat of the immortal soul, it also contains the new and perfected body that will develop at the time of resurrection. 81 Contrasting his theory of emboftement with the view held by Leibniz, Bonnet criticized the latter's concept of metamorphosis. 82 Leibniz, he charged, had not meditated enough on Swammerdam's writings and hence had thought that the butterfly would result from the development or evolution of the actually visible body of the caterpillar. Bonnet, however, maintained that it is another invisible body, encapsulated within the caterpillar, that will eventually evolve into a butterfly. The new organs of the butterfly are encapsulated within those of the caterpillar, as in a case, and will gradually emerge from it. This, Bonnet claimed, had been experi76. Ibid.,I, 280--281. 77. Bonnet, "Recueil de divers passages de Leibnitz," p. 37. 78. Savioz, Philosophie de Charles Bonnet; see also Lorin Anderson, Charles Bonnet and the Order of Nature (Dordrecht and London: D. Reidel, 1982). 79. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie,I, 356. 80. Bonnet, Contemplation, II, 22. 81. Charles Bonnet, Essai analytique sur les facult~s de l~me (Copenhagen: Fr~res CI. et Ant. Philibert, 1760), pp. 477--482; see also Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 176--177, 199, 285. 82. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie,I, 302.

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mentally demonstrated by R6aumur's studies on the moulting process of caterpillars. 83 Swammerdam's own writings are not unequivocal on this issue: the text of his Biblia naturae is compatible with both these views on metamorphosis (see comments on Swammerdam in n. 72 above). Preexistence of the Soul and the Problem of Transcreation Both Leibniz and Bonnet accepted the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul that must be combined with an organic body. If preformation in the sense of preexistence of the body is postulated, the soul must likewise preexist if no transmigration of the soul, or metempsychosis, is to occur. 84 Quoting section 90 of Leibniz's Theodicy, Bonnet expressed his pleasure at finding his views in accordance with those of the great metaphysician. 85 The preexistence of the soul had been deduced by Bonnet before he encountered the Theodicy, as becomes clear from the debate he had with Cramer in 1741. 86 In 1745, Bonnet corresponded with Caspar Kunz (-- Cuentz), a philosopher from St. Gallen, Switzerland, who had published a treatise in four volumes entitled Essai d'un syst~me nouveau concernant la nature des ~tres spirituels (Neuch~tel, 1742). 87 To Kunz's exposition of a purely mechanistic model of generation, Bonnet opposed his views on preformation. 88 The debate soon centered on the polyp (Hydra viridis) and its amazing capabilities of regeneration and multiplication, as described by Bonnet's cousin Abraham Trembley. The polyp was to serve as a test for the competing views on generation. Commenting on Trembley's experiments on the polyp, R6aumur had asked: "What kind of a soul would this be that, like the body, would lend itself to being cut up into pieces, and which would regenerate itself? ''89 -- a question also raised by Pierre Lyonet. 9 R6aumur's interest in the problem of regeneration goes back to the year 1712, when he published a paper on regeneration in crustaceans. 91 In this paper he not only compared generation with regeneration, he also envisaged the possibility of the existence of 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. Bonnet, Contemplation, I, 285--286. Bonnet, Paling~nOsie,I, 275. Ibid., I, 273. Marx,"Bonnet contre les Lumi6res,"p. 200. Ibid., pp. 201--202. Savioz,MOmoiresautobiographiques, pp. 68, 91. R6aumur, M~moirespour servir ~ l'histoire des insectes, VI, lxvii. Marx, "Bonnet contre les Lumi6res,"p. 410. R6aumur, "Sur les divers reproductions," pp. 226--245.

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preformed "germs of regeneration" that would effect the repair of any lost extremities. Confronted with Trembley's polyp, Rraumur had recourse to his old ideas: The polyp cut into pieces would regenerate whole individuals by the development of germs of regeneration scattered throughout its body and containing a preexistent soul. This was the hypothesis adopted by Bonnet. 92 Related to the problem of the preexistent soul is the question of transcreation. This concept goes back to Aristotle and his hypothesis of a hierarchy of souls, which were believed to guide embryonic development. Each developing organism first goes through a vegetative phase of growth guided by the vegetative soul. The animal, or sensitive, soul assumes its guiding function in the developing animal as it becomes capable of perception and movement. The rational soul is a divine endowment restricted to man; its actualization during postembryonic development consequently requires God's interference, a process called transcreation. Leibniz adopted this concept as part of his preformationism. Following Leeuwenhoek, he considered the spermatic animalcules, even those of human males, to be true animals not endowed with a rational soul. If a human spermatozoon was conceived by a female and thus had the chance to develop -- that is, to metamorphose into a human being -- the endowment of its soul with rationality required God's interference: a transcreation took place. The hypothesis of transcreation helped to avoid a theological dilemma: only very few of all available sperms ever had the chance to evolve into a human being; since the remaining ones were considered to have no rational soul, there was no need to assume that God had violated the harmony of nature by creating an inexplicable superabundance of human souls .93 Bonnet quotes section 91 of Leibniz's Theodicy to document the latter's adherence to the doctrine of transcreation,94 but he does not note that in section 397 Leibniz developed an alternative theory to avoid transcreation. He called this new theory "traduction," but he does not seem to have followed it up in his other writings. Bonnet, on the other hand, had rejected transcreation in his Essai analytique already, since his view of nature as being governed by secondary causes only -- and hence as being accessible to empirical investigation -- was incompatible with the
92. Savioz, Mdmoires autobiographiques, p. 92; see also Bonnet, Considerations, II, 65--70; and idem, Contemplation, I, 254--255. 93. Jacques Roger, La science de la vie dans la pensde franfaise du XVI1F si~cle, 2nd ed. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1971), p. 369. 94. Bonnet, Paling~ndsie, I, 283--289.

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assumption of spontaneous divine interference. 95 Based on his theory of the ~tre-mixte, Bonnet considered the metamorphosis of the animal soul into a rational soul to be a process of perfection accompanying the perfection of the physical machinery, during ontogenesis 96 as well as during palingenesis 97 the two processes running in parallel. 98
_ _

"L'I~TRE-MIXTE" VERSUS T H E C O N C E P T O F PREESTABLISHED HARMONY Bonnet and Leibniz agreed that the soul must always be combined with an organic body. The question then arises how soul and body are interrelated and work together harmoniously. For Leibniz, the soul, or monad, was an immaterial "simple substance" and, as such, incapable of interacting with the material body. But how, then, can the soul receive any impressions from the outer world through the sense organs? How can the soul cause the body to act according to its intent? To solve this problem, Leibniz formulated his theory of preestablished harmony, according to which God had predetermined the order of perceptions and the actions of body and soul in such a way that the two would always find themselves in complete harmony while still being completely independent from one another: "Monads have no windows through which anything can enter or emerge. ''99 Soul and body are like two clocks that have been constructed and set into synchronous motion by God. Bonnet rejected the concept of preestablished harmony, considering it an "ingenious work of fiction, the main merit of which is its originality."1 He even thought that the doctrine of preestablished harmony was incompatible with the principle of continuity, 11 disrupting the continuity between body and soul that was to become the basis of Johann Caspar Lavater's (1741--1801) physiognomy. 12 He therefore opposed Leibniz's philosophy with the concept of the ~tre-mixte, which he developed in his Essai analytique sur les facultds de l'~me (1760) and further refined in 95. Bonnet, Essai analytique p. 491. 96. Bonnet, Palingdn~sie,I, 288. 97. Ibid.,I, 199. 98. Ibid.,I, 178--179,288--289. 99. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Monadology,"in Hauptschrifien zur GrundlegungderPhilosophie (see n. 52 above), II, 7, p. 436. 100. Bonnet, "Vue du Leibnitianisme,"p. 104. 101. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie,I, 295. 102. Marx,"Bonnet contre les Lumibres,"pp. 572--573.

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his Contemplation de la nature (1764) and in the Palingdn~sie philosophique (1769). The organism is a mixed-being c o m p o s e d of the immaterial soul and the organic or material body. Within this mixed-being, b o d y and soul can act on each other reciprocally. The objects of the outer world stimulate sense-specific nerve fibers that pass from their sense organ to the brain. The stimulus is transmitted to the brain, which thus receives "impressions from the outer world" 103 in the true sense of the word. The soul can then trace these impressions. Conversely, the soul can exert a "moving force" (force motrice) T M on the b o d y according to its intentions, although it remains unclear how it can do so:
I therefore consider the union of b o d y and soul, and their reciprocal influence on one another, as a p h e n o m e n o n of which I study the laws, but of which I profess to profoundly ignore the how. I confess not to know how m o v e m e n t can cause an idea and I also do not know how an idea can cause m o v e m e n t . . . . 105 Bonnet thus adopted the same kind of Newtonian attitude towards his theory of the ~tre-mixte that Albrecht von Hailer had adopted towards the problem of the irritability of the muscle fiber. 16 Although the true cause of the observed p h e n o m e n o n is unknown, it can nevertheless be admitted as an observable fact the laws of which can be studied. Soul and b o d y must somehow be connected by the "actions and modifications of the sensible fibers" 107 of the brain, which at the same time f o r m the material or physical basis of memory. M e m o r y in turn determines the personality of an organic being - - or, in other words, the personality of an organic being is c o m p o s e d of, and determined by, the impressions of the outer world that the body transmits to the soul via the sensible nerve fibers of the brain; 18 there is no need nor r o o m to evoke innate ideas. The personality will grow m o r e complex in proportion to the richness of its experience, and hence of its recollections.

103. Bonnet, Palingdn~sie,I, 177; see also idem, Contemplation,I, xl, 92. 104. Bonnet, Contemplation,I, xliii. 105. Bonnet, Essai analytique, p. 5. 106. Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation, p. 100; see also Bonnet, Contemplation, I, xvi; and idem, Paling~n~sie,I, 83. 107. Bonnet, Essai analytique, p. 459; see also Bonnet, Contemplation, I, xxxix--xl;and idem, Palingdndsie,I, 14, 177. 108. Bonnet, Essai analytique, pp. 457--458; see also idem, Palingdn~sie, I, 177.

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For Bonnet, the theory of the mixed-being had two important consequences: it helped to explain the perfection and perfectibility of the soul without recourse to transcreation, and it provided a physical basis for the Protestants' understanding of the Last Judgment without recourse to the Neoplatonic concept of metempsychosis. If the perceptions of the soul depend on the impressions transmitted to it by the body, then the level of perfection of the body and its sense organs will determine the level of perfection of the faculties of the soul. Just as during ontogeny the human body is gradually perfected, rising from an animal-like to a human condition, so the soul will likewise experience the same perfection, further reinforced by education; no transcreation needs to be invoked. 19 In parallel, if an animal is elevated to the level of humanity during its palingenesis, its soul will likewise be perfected and become rational on the basis of purely physical mechanisms, that is secondary causes. 11 The development of organic beings, their palingenesis, results in their perfection. 111 God's benevolence has provided the means of perfection by the preformation of germs of resurrection. Yet, how could man or any other organized being acquire any notion of God's benevolence, if he could not, with the help of memory, compare his state of perfection with former and less perfect conditions? How could man or any other organized being acknowledge God's recompense or punishment on the occasion of the Last Judgment, if he had no recollection of the deeds of his former life? 112 -- a question that is hard to reconcile with Leibniz's and Bonnet's view of a pervading divine predetermination of all life. H3 Leibniz wrote that it is the recognition of the self ("le moi," in Bonnet's terminology114), and its recollections, that render the personality susceptible of punishment or recompenseJ 15 For Bonnet, the sensation of progress -- of recompense, or of punishment -- was likewise connected to memory. His concept of the e m b o f t e m e n t of the germ of resurrection in the ~tremixte helped him to avoid any recourse to metempsychosis, which had been vigorously rejected by Leibniz and which Bonnet Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 287--289. Ibid., I, 199,204. Bonnet, Essai analytique, p. 469. Ibid., pp. 474--475; see also Bonnet, Paling~n~sie, I, 310--311. Marx,"Bonnet contre les Lumibres,"p. 132. Bonnet, Essai analytique, p. 457. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Metaphysische Abhandlung," in Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie (see n. 52 above), II, 183. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115.

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rejected with reference to Pauline theology.116 If a caterpillar metamorphoses to form a butterfly, if an animal species moves up the ladder of perfection during its palingenesis, if man is resurrected and thereby acquires the new, glorious, and incorruptible body promised by Revelation, the soul cannot be postulated to migrate from the old body into the new one, because it would thereby lose all memory. The personality of the organism would be destroyed, because all memory is based on lasting physical impressions on the fibers of the brain of the former body. But if we assume that the brain of the butterfly is preexistent and encapsulated within that of the caterpillar, if we admit that the future and perfected body along with its brain are preexistent within the ethereal germ of resurrection that is also the seat of the immortal soul, then no metempsychosis needs to be evoked. The actual brain of animals and man would contain in an encapsulated manner the preexistent future brain and could therefore transmit the impressions of all memory onto the latter's fibers. If the new body develops, its brain will already bear the recollections of the former life? 17 The personality of the Tout organique is thus preserved. In the course of its palingenesis the immortal soul migrates up through the ladder of life 11s _ a view that implies an essentialistic species concept: 119 species are immutable entities, created and preformed from the beginning and defined by their immortal soul. Palingenesis does not entail the evolution of new species from antecedent ones. Rather, each species proceeds through the scala naturae as an entity, separated from all other such entities: " . . . each species is a unique Whole, forever persisting; but it is destined to appear, from one period to the next, in the guise of a new form, or of new modifications.''12 This is an all-important difference between Bonnet's views on palingenesis and modern evolutionism. On a psychological level, Bonnet completely avoided Leibniz's concept of preestablished harmony, but not so in his view of nature. The Palingdn~sie postulated a series of revolutions, each of which would destroy the surface of the globe and, with it, all living beings. The indestructible germs of restitution would develop into new and more perfected organisms when the surface of the globe
116. 117. 118. 119. 120. Marx, "Bonnet contre les Lumi~res," p. 90. Bonnet, Essai analytique, pp. 469--475. Bonnet, Contemplation, I, 227. Bonnet, Paling~ndsie, II, 128. Ibid., I, 258; see also Savioz, Philosophie de Charles Bonnet, p. 137.

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was restored. However, environmental conditions on earth had to change accordingly, since otherwise the new organisms would not be harmoniously adapted to their environment. God therefore had to predetermine not only the palingenesis of the organized beings, but also the concomitant changes of the world that harbors them. Organisms and environment had to change according to a plan of preestablished harmony: I thus conjecture that the germs of all organized beings have been preformed from the beginning and constructed according to defined relations to the various revolutions that our planet was to go through) 21 THE MONAD VERSUS T H E GERM Bonnet's empiricism rendered it difficult for him to come to grips with Leibniz's metaphysical concept of the monad222 As noted above, Leibniz considered the material object, which must have some given extension, as infinitely divisible. This holds for a piece of marble as well as for an organic body, if it were separated from its soul. 123 In contrast, the monad was considered to be a "simple substance," immaterial and hence indivisible and indestructible (except by an act of God). The monad is a strictly metaphysical entity, yet connected to a material body; 124 it represents the body's entelechy, or its "soul." 125 It is the essence of unity and individuality of the organic being, which is in a state of continuous movement, development, and change towards perfection. Bonnet, however, repeatedly misunderstood the monad in a materialistic sense: It is most obvious that every particular body is nothing but an assemblage of parts: these in turn are nothing but an assemblage of particles. If one presses this subdivision to its ultimate limits, one would have ended up with monads; instead, one has stopped with atoms. 126 121. Bonnet, Paling~n~sie,I, 253; see also Wolfgang Lef~vre,Die Entstehung der biologischen Evolutionstheorie (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1984), pp. 225,227. 122. Savioz,M~moires autobiographiques, p. 101. 123. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Letter to Arnauld, 28 November to 8 December 1686," in Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie (see n. 52 above), II, 209--212. 124. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Die Theodizee, ed. Morris Stockhammer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968), p. 41. 125. Leibniz, "Monadology," 63. 126. Bonnet, "Vue du Leibnitianisme,"p. 74; see also ibid., p. 67.

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Bonnet even used the concept of the monad to oppose the idea of an infinite divisibility of matter. 127 H e was aware that he had misinterpreted the metaphysical concept of the monad in a materialistic sense, 128 but this did not change the motivation underlying his misunderstanding, namely, the search for an empirical aspect of Leibnizian metaphysics: "He [Leibniz] does not, as I have done, guide the reader through the roads of observation and analysis." ~29 Bonnet may have developed his hypothesis of the "germ of restitution" on the basis of his materialistic conception of the monad. By its indestructibility, its indivisibility, and its creation from the beginning, the germ of resurrection shares some of the properties of the monad. A n d corresponding to Leibniz's metaphysical principle of individuation, or individual perfection, the germ of resurrection is the physical principle of perfection in the organic world. Bonnet designated the germ of resurrection as an "ethereal body, ''~3 stating that ether was for him a "real substance" admitted by " m o d e m philosophers." 131 The m o d e r n philosophers alluded to were Newton and Albrecht von Hailer. Newton's gravitational force was deemed an occult quality by Cartesians, since it acted on distant bodies and hence did not conform to the Cartesian laws of motion. Newton would not accept the charge of occultism, however, and maintained that the concept of gravity perfectly served to explain observational facts of nature even if its essence was not fully understood. In this context it is worthwhile to recall the Leibnizian pair of notions, "to explain" and "to understand. ''132 Gravitation served to explain the observable movements of heavenly bodies, even though the nature of the gravitational force was not understood. Newton later tried to remedy this situation with the introduction of a subtle "ethereal substance" or "spiritus," comparable to the "spiritus vini," an agent that penetrates all solid bodies and provides gravitation with a mechanistic basis. 133 H e also had recourse to "ether" in order to explain, inter alia, the function of the retina and the transmission 127. Ibid., pp. 85--86. 128. Ibid., p. 83 n. 3. 129. Bonnet, "Recueil de divers passages de Leibnitz," p. 15. 130. Bonnet, Essai analytique, p. 480; see also idem, Paling~n~sie, I, 176-177. 131. Bonnet, Essai analytique, p. 478. 132. Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der Aufkliirung (T/ibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1932), p. 110. 133. Wolfgang R6d, Geschichte der Philosophie, Band VII. Die Philosophie der Neuzeit 2, yon Newton bis Rousseau (Munich. C. H. Beck, 1984), pp. 21--26.

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of nervous impulses. Similarly, Albrecht von Hailer supported his teacher Hermann Boerhaave's concept of a subtle fluid or "spiritus" to explain the physiology of nerves, in contradistinction to Throphile de Bordeu who, like Swammerdam, believed the nerves to function analogously to vibrating strings. TM A note may also be added on Newton's inclination towards alchemy and on his interests in the fabrication and transmutation of gold. In alchemy, ether stood as a symbol for Mercurius as an immaterial spiritus of transformation or metamorphosis. 135 Ether thus appears as an appropriate substance from which to construct the germ of restitution, the principle of metamorphosis of the organic beings in the course of their paiingenesis. The congruence of Leibniz's concept of the monad and Bonnet's concept of the germ of resurrection is incomplete, however. The assumption of a reciprocal influence between body and soul in the ~tre-mixte is incompatible with the doctrine of preestablished harmony. Also, Bonnet strictly addressed the problem of organized beings only, excluding all considerations of inorganic matter. Leibniz's Monadology, on the other hand, was designed to deal with the problem of all kinds of appearances in this world, and hence it does not imply a dichotomy between organic and inorganic matter. MONADOLOGY VERSUS PALINGENESIS There is little doubt that the M o n a d o l o g y represents the culminating point of Leibniz's metaphysics, just as the Palingdndsie represents the climax of Bonnet's theorizing. Bonnet acknowledged his debt to Leibniz 136 but differed radically from his idol in his emphasis on empiricism and sensualism. What the two authors had in common was a basic optimism grounded in their firm belief in a benevolent Creator. In his Theodicy Leibniz asserted that the benevolent Creator, according to his own nature, has necessarily created the best of all possible worlds. This assertion implied that God had imagined a multiplicity of possible worlds from which he had chosen the best one for material creation. God had an idea, coetemal with his own 134. ThEophile de Bordeu, Recherches anatomiques sur la position des glandes et sur leur action (Paris: G.-F. Quillau P~re, 1751); Swammerdam,Bibel derNatur, p. 331. 135. Carl Gustav Jung, Studien iiber alchemistische Vorstellungen. Gesarnmelte Werke Band 13 (Oltenund Freiburgi.Br.:WalterVerlag, 1978), p. 235. 136. Bonnet,"VueduLeibnitianisme,"pp.104--105.

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being, of his Creation and of all its temporal consequences prior to its actualization. This is clearly reminiscent of Augustinian Neoplatonism. The development and correlated perfection of the monad means a process of individuation, or of successive actualization of the wholeness of the individual as it was preconceived by God at the time of its creation. The process is goal-directed and serves the fulfilment of God's purpose. Individual freedom means nothing but an active participation in the inescapable process of individuation. Leibniz's scheme is essentially static, which is why his optimism was ridiculed as being paradoxical -- for example, by Voltaire. Everything is preordained, and if development implies change, this change must, in a sense, be illusionary, since it corresponds to eternal divine ideas. Bonnet adopted the same kind of Augustinian Neoplatonism. His Paling~n~sie means nothing more than the actualization of the Creator's plan in the course of time: The multiple revolutions would have changed more and more the primitive form and structure of the organized beings, just as they would have changed the external and internal structure of the globe. I have said it before; I am easily convinced that it would be impossible for us to recognize a horse, a chicken, a snake, if we could see them in the first form they had at the time of their Creation.137 This statement is not meant to imply transformism in any true sense, meaning an open-ended process. Rather, the essence, the soul of all created species remains the same throughout. Organisms simply change their outward appearance, just as an insect may undergo a series of metamorphoses and yet remain the same individual. Both Leibniz and Bonnet linked Augustinian Neoplatonism with the doctrine of preformation and with the principle of continuity. According to this principle, each particular fact, and hence each organic being, is embedded in a nexus of causality. Preformationism permitted tracing the chain of causality that led to the existence and generation of organized beings, back to God as prima causa and sufficient reason of his Creation. Although organisms develop according to mechanistic principles, their form is imposed on matter by God -- a view stressed by Bonnet as an argument against contemporary materialists like Buffon,

137. Bonnet,Paling~ndsie,I, 258.

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Needham, Maupertuis, and d'Holbach, who endowed material atoms with the capacity to form viable organisms. If, as was claimed by these latter authors, organisms are formed by the juxtaposition of parts, and if the causa formalis is inherent in matter, then not only does true generation occur in nature, but there also results the possibility of the fortuitous replacement of one atom by another. The phenomena of hybridization and malformations were thought to be more easily explained on the basis of atomistic epigenesis than on the basis of preformationism, as stressed by Maupertuis in his V~nus physique (1745) and his Syst~me de la nature (1756). The idea of species transformation originated with atomistic theories of epigenesis, although the degree to which such transformations were thought to be possible depended on the type of form-generating principle that the various authors were proposing. Yet if the combination of atoms was thought to be governed by chance alone, as proposed by Maupertuis in Vdnus physique or by Diderot in his R~ve de d'Alernbert (1769), then there is in principle no limit to the mutability of organisms as long as a viable being results from generation. In the absence of an immaterial principle of form or organization, of a monad or a soul, the organism can change by means of a modified combination of atoms, and the species loses its essence. Each individual represents a potentially unique combination of parts, and a nominalistic species concept is the logical consequence. In this context it may be noted that the theory of pangenesis -construed by Darwin to explain the facts of heredity and variation -- was derived from atomistic theories of generation proposed by Buffon and Maupertuis, and it was linked to a nominalistic species concept. 138 In contrast, Augustinian Neoplatonism and the associated doctrine of preformation, whether presented in the guise of Leibniz's Monadology or in the form of Bonnet's Palingdn~sie, had a strong essentialistic background and therefore could not provide a starting point for the development of transformationist hypotheses. Yet even if atomistic theories of epigenesis helped to explain the transformation of species, they did not provide this process with a direction! Ever since Lamarck, the notion of progress had been associated with the theory of species transformation. In his Philosophie zoologique (1809), Lamarck proposed two theories of evolution: the first was a theory of adaptation by means of the inheritance of acquired characteristics; the second was a theory of 138. Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1982), pp. 693--694, 267.

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progress. ~39 The spontaneously generating monads are viewed as moving up the Great Chain of Being, driven by the action of allpervading "subtle fluids." Darwin had developed a monad theory in his early notebooks. In 1837 he noted in his B notebook: "If all men were dead, then monkeys make men. -- Men make angels." 140 This sentence, which is reminiscent of Bonnet's Paling~n~sie, documents an optimism, and a belief in progress, that was later to become a problem, for Darwin lacked a mechanism to explain it.141 And yet, one reads in the closing pages of his Origin of Species (1859): "And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection." Although Leibniz's Monadology and Bonnet's Paling~n~sie did not contribute to the development of theories on species tranSformation due to their essentialistic background, the optimism shared by these authors and developed in their writings does indeed appear to have contributed to the rise of evolutionism by providing the process of species transformation with a progressive direction towards perfection: it is an upward movement along the scala naturae, along the vertical stem of a Haeckelian phylogenetic tree. Charles Bonnet contributed to this development by his search for a physical basis for Leibniz's metaphysics. The Palingdn~sie philosophique relates the Monadology to natural phenomena: the monad has in some sense become an ethereal germ of restitution, and the graded powers of perception of the monads are reflected in the ascending levels of organic complexity of the &res-mixtes. The Leibnizian notion of individuation has become a process of actualization of increasing organic complexity, granting an amplification of intellectual powers.

139. Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr., The Spirit of System: Lamarck and Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). 140. Howard E. Gruber and Paul H. Barrett, Darwin on Man: A Psychological Study of Scientific Creativity. Together with Darwin's Early and Unpublished Notebooks (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974), pp. 158, 213. 141. Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).