A

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

September 1981
141

Volume 9 Numbers 2 & 3

The

Larry

Arnhart

Rationality
and

of

Political Speech: Aristotle's Rhetoric

An Interpretation 155 Jan H. Blits Manliness

of

Friendship

in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar 169

Mary
Jerry

Nichols

The Winter's Tale:

The Triumph 191 207 Weinberger

of

Comedy

over

Tragedy
A

On Bacon's Advertisement

Touching Teaching

Holy

War

John Parsons, Jr.

On Sir William Temple's Political

and

Philosophical

229

Susan Power

John Locke:

Revolution, Resistance,
245

or

Opposition?

Barry
Philip

Cooper

The Politics
of

of

Performance: An Interpretation

Bolingbroke's Political
the

Theory Theory
in the

263

J. Kain

Labor,
Law
as

State,

and

Aesthetic

Writings

of

Schiller

279
301

Michael H. Mitias

the Basis of the State: Hegel

Stanley

Corngold

Dilthey's
A Poetics

Essay
of and

The Poetic Imagination:

Force

339

Kent A. Kirwan

Historicism

Statesmanship
of

in the Reform Argument 353

Richard

Woodrow Wilson
of

Velkley Grady Marty

Gadamer

and

Kant: The Critique

Modern Method

Aesthetic Consciousness in Truth

and

365

Robert C.

Bertrand de Jouvenel:

Order, Legitimacy,
385 397
William R.

and

the Model of Rousseau

Rawls

and

the Harried Mother

Jiirgen Gebhardt

Ideology

and

Reality:

The Ideologue's Persuasion in Modern Politics 415

Kenneth W. Thompson Science, Morality,
and

Transnationalism

Discussion
427

Peter T. Manicas

The Crisis
on

of

Contemporary
and

Political Theory:

Jacobson's Pride

Solace

Book Reviews
437
Patrick

Coby

by Harvey
439 Will

The Spirit of Liberalism, C. Mansfield, Jr.

Morrisey

Political Parties in the Eighties,

edited

by

Robert A. Goldwin

interpretation
Volume Q

JL

numbers 2 &

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Editors

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Interpretation

Libertyito Lbec\yCkssics
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LfoertyPtess ]Jperb/Cbssics
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THE RATIONALITY OF POLITICAL SPEECH: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC

Larry Arnhart
Idaho State

University

Is

rhetoric some

form

of rational

politics?

Or is it merely

a means

lacious

arguments and appeals sophistry?

discourse about the intelligible reality of for verbally manipulating men through fal to irrational impulses? In short, can rhetoric be
to inter
the

distinguished from One

might

pret, evaluate,
rule of reason about and

and

say that the rhetorician by his use deliberate about political action
political affairs.

of public speech maintains

somehow

in

Does
what

not rhetoric require political men to talk

thereby
what

to think about

they have done,

apprehend

are

doing,

or will

do?

Does "We

not rhetoric thus elevate politics

weigh we

by bringing

thought to bear upon action?

minds,"

it perfectly in our Pericles declared in his funeral oration, "not accounting words for a hindrance of action but that it is rather a hindrance to action to come to it without
undertake and

instruction But employ

that
can

before"

of words also

(Thucydides, Peloponnesian War II

darker
side.

40).

rhetoric emotional

has

Does

not

the rhetorician sometimes to move

appeals

and

deceptive

arguments

his listeners to
techniques

whatever position

he

wishes?

Indeed, does

not rhetoric consist of

side of

be

used as

other

words,

there

easily for the wrong as for the right surely is some justification for the
speakers

any issue? In
criticism of

ancient

rhetoric as

stronger.

permitting As Gorgias boasted,

to

make

the weaker argument appear to

be the

"Many

are the men who shape a men about

seems

false

argument 11).

and persuade and

have

things"

persuaded

many

So the
means

problem

is that,

while rhetoric

many in some

(Helen

respects to

be the

by
is

which reason guides political rational

action, it often seems to be an art of

extent that

deception that hinders

rhetoric question

deliberation. Furthermore, to the

of political rhetoric
political

the primary

mode
or

reasoning, how
a genuine

one of

decides this
will

as

to

whether

not

is

form

reasoning

determine the

place of reason

in

life.

The rationality of rhetoric becomes especially dubious if scientific demon stration is taken to be the sole model of valid reasoning. For it is obvious that
rhetorical argument cannot attain

the exactness and certainty that

is

possible

in

scientific

nal,

rhetoric must

inquiry. And therefore if only scientific demonstration is truly ratio be irrational. As a result, rhetoric becomes virtually indistin

guishable

from
the

sophistry.

For

since

there are no

rational standards

for

political

discourse,
deception

power of rhetoric must

depend

upon manipulation

through verbal

and not upon

any

pervasive

intelligibility

of the speech

itself. As

142

Interpretation

further consequence, the political itself becomes irrational. Since the ordinary discourse of citizens about political things has little to do with scientifically demonstrable knowledge, the political life of men must be understood to be
guided

by
as

opinions with

little foundation in
the rationality

reason.

But
realm

could one save

of political speech
as

and of

the

political

whole

by

viewing

rhetoric

between

science and sophistry?

This

could

occupying some middle ground be done if one could show that the

realm of reason extends

beyond the
argument

confines of scientific

demonstration,
truly
rational

and even

therefore that

rhetorical

can

be in

some

sense

though it lacks the certainty

one would restore the

and exactness of scientific

meaning

of rhetoric as rational

knowledge. In this way discourse.

And in fact this

would seem

to be the project that Aristotle sets for himself the

sophistical

in the Rhetoric. For he

practice

criticizes

rhetoricians,

whose common

is to

use

purely

emotional appeals

to distract their

listeners from the is essentially a proof. He explains

subject at

hand, for failing

reasoning
as

to

see

that the true art of rhetoric

mode of reasoning, although without the rigor of apodictic

rhetorical

tion of the enthymeme that

reasoning through enthymemes, and it is in his concep his theory of rhetoric is most fully embodied. My
rhetorical

claim, therefore, in this essay, is that Aristotle's

of the

theory is
on

an account
of

rationality
here.1

of political speech.

To

fully

substantiate

this interpretation

the Rhetoric would require a much more extensive

commentary

the text than

is

possible

But I

can at

least

state some of

the major points.

How Aristotle

uses

from

science on the one

of

hand

his theory of the enthymeme to differentiate rhetoric and from sophistry on the other, becomes clearer
persuasion, which
and

four tripartite distinctions. First, the enthymeme, differs both from instruction in the light
opinion,
absolute
which provides

is the

aim of

from

compulsion.

Second,

premises

truth, but

neither

for the enthymeme, does not conform to is it absolute falsehood. Third, the probability char inferences falls
somewhere

acteristic of most enthymematic

and mere randomness or chance.

Finally,

the

enthymeme

between necessity itself differs from a

shall comment

strict

demonstration but
on each of

without

being

a sophistical

fallacy. I

briefly

these points.

// That
men are

by

nature

both

rational and political

is

manifest

in the

natural

human capacity for speech. Men are naturally more political than gregarious animals, Aristotle says in the Politics (1253315-18), because human commu'Here I can only sketch the outline Political Reasoning: A Commentary
198 1
of an argument that
"Rhetoric"

I have developed in detail in Aristotle (DeKalb: Northern Illinois

at the

on

on

the

University
of

Press,

). I have

applied

Aristotle's

rhetorical
Rhetoric"

theory

to American rhetoric in an unpublished

paper, "The Federalist as Aristotelian

(presented

1979 Annual

Meeting

the

Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 18-21).

The
nity
rests upon a union

Rationality

of Political Speech

143

in discourse

and

thought. Other animals may signify to

pain

one another with

their voices their sensations of pleasure and

but

men

through rational speech

(Xoyog)

can share with one another their concepts of

expediency,

justice,
can

and

goodness.

Human beings

achieve

more

intimate

community among themselves than is possible for

human beings
speech.

other

creatures, because only

found their

association

on

mutual

understanding through

One
speech rational

might conclude

from this that

rhetoric

the artful practice of public

is the fundamental activity of politics, and that politics expresses the nature of men insofar as political activity is founded upon rhetoric. But Or is it
perhaps not

does only

rhetoric encompass the whole of politics?

a

important for

limited

realm of political

life? That Aristotle does

politics with rhetoric

is

clear

from. his

remarks at the end of the

simply identify Nicomachean

to make

Ethics. Speeches
men virtuous

or arguments

(XoyoC), he

explains,

are not sufficient

(i

17^4-1 i8ob28).

At best they

are effective with youths who

because
noble.

of some natural endowment or good moral

training have

love

of

the

Most men, especially in their youth, live by passion and the pleasures of the body, and hence they can be controlled by force but not by arguments. For
these people it
youth own.

is necessary
moral

to do those virtuous

coercively habituate them from their things that they would never choose to do on their
of a

that the laws

Thus the

training

community

requires

that the legislator apply

legal

compulsion where moral persuasion would

be futile.

It is

at

this point that Aristotle criticizes the sophists for showing their
politics

ignorance

of

by
1

(Nicomachean Ethics

i8iai2-i6).2

making it the same as, or lower than, rhetoric This is often taken to indicate that Aristotle

thought the sophistical view of politics to

one might

infer something

quite

be too cynical, but from the context different: the sophistical assumption that the

art of persuasion can govern all political

the true harshness of political

side of

activity manifests a naive blindness to life. Rhetorical reasoning displays the nobler
activity
governed

politics, that area

of political

by

persuasion and

through

speeches.

But

most men respond not

to persuasion

but to force,

therefore
through

the greater
repetition persuaded

part of politics must

be

concerned with

compelling men,

and

habituating them,

to do without thought what

to do. The success of rhetoric, Aristotle

be they implies, presupposes the

could never

the laws of an ethos in the community that makes people open to The taming of the most irrational impulses demands force rather than argument; but once the lowest part of the soul has been subdued, the

formation

by

persuasion.

rhetorician can appeal

to that part of the soul that can be persuaded

by

reason.

Rhetoric is therefore

subordinate

to politics since the multitude of men would

'Henceforth I

shall abbreviate

my

references

to Aristotle's works as

follows: Eudemian Ethics

(EE), Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Politics (P), Posterior Analytics (PoA), Prior Analytics (PrA), Rhetoric (R), Sophistical Refutations (SR), Topics (7).

144
never uated

Interpretation
be
amenable to rhetorical

reasoning

unless

they

were

first properly habit

affairs
makes since

by

the

laws.
introduces the
rule of reason

Hence
moves men

rhetoric

into human
yet

it

by

persuasion rather

than

by

force. And

Aristotle

it

clear

that rhetoric
persuasion

fails to

attain

the highest level of reasoning insofar

as rhetorical

falls

short of scientific or philosophic

instruction (R

1355322-29).

The ician
the

exact

knowledge rarely draw the

and complex

struction are must

effective

in

political speeches.

demonstrations necessary for scientific in To be persuasive, the rhetor

premises of

his

enthymemes not

from the first

of

principles of

particular

sciences, but from the common opinions

his

audience.

And he

must

simplify and abbreviate his line of reasoning so that ordinary citizens can grasp it quickly and easily (R 135738-23, 139^24-30, 1419318-19). Thus the
good rhetorician csn

persusde, but he csnnot instruct. the enthymeme are derived from

might seem
common

Since the false form for the

premises of

opinions,

and since opinion

surely differs from truth, it

snd regards

that the enthymeme is

of

reasoning,

therefore that all

rhetoric enter

is

sophistical.

But

in fact Aristotle

the common opinions that

the enthymeme ss

being

most

part neither

completely true nor completely fslse but 3t

least partislly true (R i357b2i-25, 1361325-27; NE i098b26-30, ii45bi-7; EE i2i6b28-35). Therefore, although this reliance on opinions does impose
certain

limits

on enthymematic

argumentstion, this does

of reasoning.

not prevent

the en
opin

thymeme from
ions"

being

a valid

form

Although the "reputable

(evdo^a) on any particulsr subject sre ususlly confused 3nd even ap parently contradictory, Aristotle assumes that in most cases they manifest at least a partial grasp of the truth and therefore that any serious inquiry into moral
or political subjects must start

from them. So

while

Aristotle treats
or

certain sub
ethical

jects

differently
since

in the Rhetoric than he does in the Politics

rhetoric

in his

treatises,
reflect

involves

opinions

in their

original

state

without

the

refinements

of philosophic

in

some

"happiness"

account of

examination, his expositions in the Rhetoric still fundamental manner those in his other works. For example, the (etidaiftovia) in the Rhetoric clearly reflects, even if
the philosophic understanding of
with
"happiness"

somewhat

dimly,

set

forth in the

Nicomachean Ethics (compare R 1360^5-19 see also P I323b2i-i32434, 1325^4-31).

NE I097b7-2i, U76b4-7;

Furthermore, in its dependence

guished common

on common opinions, sophistry.

rhetoric

is distin
not with

both from

science and
with

from

Each

science are

begins

opinions, but

the

primary truths that

fundamental
as

to the

science

(R 1358317-27, PoA 7ibi8-72a6, SR I723i2-i72b4). (But

even these scientific truths
of

shall

indicate later,
sense

depend ultimately
are

on some

common-

wh3t

understanding appear to be

things.) And sophistry

opinions

consists either of

srguing from

common

but

not,

or

appear

to follow necessarily from

common

opinions

making something when it does not (SR

of

The

Rationality

of Political Speech

145

i65a37-i65bi2, I76b29-i77a8).
cannot

Moreover,

the fact that sophistical arguments

be truly derived from

of

common

opinions confirms the epistemological

solidity

these opinions. the

One

of

limitations
part

of common

opinions,
case.

however, is

that

they usually
have
most cases

hold for the

probable

most not

but

not

in every

Therefore,

enthymemes

but
in

necessary validity,

since the conclusions are true 3chieve

in

but

not

all.
.

Enthymemes, then, rarely

one exception noted

the necessity of scientific

enthymeme

demonstrations The
on

by

Aristotle is the
1357324-34).

founded

"necesssry

sign"

(TEKjxfjQiov)

(R

That

enthymematic

reasoning usually involves probability rather than necessity does not make the reasoning invalid. For, according to Aristotle, both the things that happen 3lways or by necessity and those that happen as a rule or for the most psrt, csn be
objects of

knowledge.

Probability

must

be distinguished from chance,

be-

csuse unlike probable cannot

things those things th3t happen only rarely or

by

chance

be known (PoA 87^9-28). That is

rhetoric should rest upon probabilities

is

consistent with

the Aristoteli3n principle that one should demand only that

appropriate

degree
politics

of certitude th3t

to the subject matter. For like ethics and

the subject

of rhetoric with

man action can

be known

is human action, and the regularities of hu probability but not with absolute certainty (R truth,
since

1356314-17, 24-33,

i402b2i-37).

Since the its

premises aim

enthymeme rests upon opinion rather than absolute

and conclusion are probable rather

persuasion rather

than necessary, and since

enthymematic

its

final

is

than

instruction,

reasoning lacks

the rigor of scientific demonstration. And yet rhetorical argument

is

still a valid

form

of

reasoning,

and therefore

it

provides an alternative

to sophistry. Popular

grasp of reality that cannot be dismissed as are fit objects of reason because they presuppose false. Probabilities simply regularities in things, which are not random or by chance. And, finally, the
opinions manifest a commonsense
persuasion

for

which

the rhetorician strives requires an appeal to reason rather

than force.

But to

support

the

claim one

that Aristotle's Rhetoric

must answer

is

theory

of rhetoric as

truly
made

rational

discourse,
could

the serious objections that can be

to this interpretation. In particular, the

following
defective

four

points

deserve

at

tention.

(1) It

be

argued

that enthymemes cannot be valid

or otherwise

because Aris

totle defines them as incomplete more, even if the

syllogisms.

(2) Further
be
argued

enthymeme were a genuine

persuasion

syllogism, it

could still

that Aristotle's discussions of

through the character of the speaker

and through the passions of the audience would show the reliance of rhetoric on

irrational
parent as

appeals.

(3) Also,

since

Aristotle insists that

and since

rhetoric

includes ap
in

"proofs,"

well as genuine

he describes it

as a neutral

strument that

does

not

may be used on either side of any issue, one clearly distinguish rhetoric from sophistry. (4)

might

infer that he

Finally, Aristotle's

146
remarks seem

Interpretation
in Book Three
of the

Rhetoric

on

the style and arrangement of

not view rhetoric as
objections.

speeches

to be further

evidence that

he does

founded

on ra

tional argument. I shall reply to each of these

///

Aristotle's

enthymeme

is

true syllogism; and therefore it is not, as has

been commonly assumed, an incomplete syllogism. For if the enthymeme were to cite only one argument from the text an invalid or incomplete syllogism
why would Aristotle distinguish between apparent and true enthymemes declare that apparent enthymemes "are not enthymemes since they are
syllogisms"

and not

(R

139733)?

Aristotle
Tig)

refers

to the enthymeme as "a sort of

and some readers

syllogism

(ovKkoyio\iog
use of

(R 135539-10),
enthymeme

have tsken this

Tig

thst the

is

not 3

true

or complete syllogism.

But the

implying falsity of this

3S

interpretation is
25b2o-3i).

made evident

by

a passage

in the Prior Analytics (24aio-i6,

of

Here Aristotle

explains

that

his theory
3

the syllogism in the Prior

Analytics is

his theory of Posterior Analytics: "for demonstration is

more general than

"demonstration"

(cxnodeitig) in

the

kind

of syllogism

[ovkkoyia/xog
no reason to

rig], but

not

every

syllogism

is
Tig"

demonstration."

Since there is

believe that
tion"

"demonstration"

that the phrase ovkkoyiopLog

is anything less thsn 3 true syllogism, it is clear is intended only to indicate that a "demonstra
to be differentiated from other kinds (see also

is

one

kind
8).

of syllogism

Poetics

1 450a 1

Likewise,

the enthymeme can be one distinctive type of

which

syllogism without

being

syllogistically defective,

is born

out

by

Aris

totle's repeated references to the syllogistic character of the enthymeme

(see,
PoA

for example, R i362b29-30, 139439-11,

7131-11).
are

i40ob25-33; PrA

68b8-i4;

Since the

premises 3nd

therefore the conclusion of the enthymeme

founded
be

on common opinions 3nd are probable

but

not

absolutely certsin,
the enthymeme

the

enthymeme

differs from the

scientific

syllogism;

3nd since

must

simple enough

to be understood

by

the

ordinary man, it differs from

entails

the dialecticsl syllogism. But neither of these points

that the enthymeme

be

an

invalid

or

incomplete

syllogism.

Enthymematic reasoning is popular because by providing listeners with "quick it satisfies their natural desire for learning (R i400b25-33,
learning,"

i4iob6-35).
and obvious

For this reason, the

nor

enthymeme should

be

neither

too superficial
enough

too

long
it

and

complex.

It

should

be

simple

to be

quickly grasped, but

at

the same time it should give the

should

listeners the

pleasure of

learning
One is to

something
of

new:

be informative

without

being
of

esoteric.
learning"

the ways to mske the enthymeme an

instrument

"quick

abbreviate

it

by le3ving

unstated whatever

the listeners can

be

expected to

add on their own

of

(R 1356319,

1357317-23).

But this

practical rule

is

not part
3bbre-

the definition of the enthymeme; snd

furthermore,

even when

it is

The

Rationality

of Political Speech
syllogism as stated

147
thought
most

viated, the enthymeme is a complete

in

despite its

incompleteness

as stated

verbally (PoA

76b23-28).

Even in the

rigorously
well
3bbrevi3-

demonstrative ressoning, Aristotle suggests, premises thst are known need not be explicitly ststed (PoA 76b 1-23). Moreover,
tion of enthymemes

clear or

the

is

tribute to the love

unstated

of

lesrning

found in the

audience.

For

when a spesker

leaves

those steps in the reasoning thst the lis

shows them to

teners csn
arguments of

essily supply themselves, he

help

construct

the very

by

which

they

are

persusded; 3nd thus he

on

gives

them the sstisfaction

thinking

through the

reasoning

their own.

IV

Aristotle begins the Rhetoric

who on

by

condemning those

sophistical rhetoricians

rely exclusively thereby exciting preventing them from msking 3 rationsl judgment about the issues at hand. These speakers ignore the enthymeme, which is "the body of for rhet
proof"

the psssions of their listeners 3nd

oric.

But

when

Aristotle
bssed

sets out the three

"character"

includes
spesker)
"speech"

appesls snd or

on

(jzioTEigy (eOog) (that is, the

"proofs"

of

rhetoric, he
of the

"character"

"psssion"

"argument"

the psssions with

(jtddog) ss supplementsry to persussion through the itself (Xoyog); and in Book Two he carefully delineates which the rhetoricisn must desl. Thus Aristotle seems to
sudiences through their passions

throw into doubt the rationslity of rhetoricsl srgument

techniques

for moving

by introducing the S3me that he initially con

demns.

A
the

closer

ex3min3tion,

however,
with

will

show

th3t Aristotle's emphssis on

of

enthymeme

is

consonsnt

his treatment

the passions, because the

enthymeme combines reason 3nd p3ssion.

enthymeme

Since it is "the
the three

body

proof,"

of

the

is the

vehicle not

just for

"proofs"

one of

Xoyog

but

for

all

three

koyog,

edog,

andnadog(R

1354312-16, I354b20-2i,

I396b28-

139736,

I403a34-i403bi).

conclusion as a probable

Enthymemes may be used not only to est3blish a truth, but also to alter the emotions of the listeners or

to

develop

their confidence
rhetoricisns

in the
not

character of

the speaker. Aristotle

denounces

the

becsuse they 3ppeal to the passions of the in a defective msnner. Their solicit3tion of this because do but audience, they it were sn integral p3rt of 3n enthymematic scceptsble if would be the psssions
sophistical

srgument

pertinent

to the subject under exsmination,

but their

exclusive re

liance

on the psssions with no connection to

with

3ny form

of argument

only dis

tracts the listeners

things irrelevant to the matter 3t rmnd (R 1354313-15,

"belief"
"trust,"

3Since
tion with

nioric can

be translated

as

or

Aristotle's
as

use of this word

in

connec
of a

rhetoric

has been interpreted

But in fact Aristotle

by

some

commentators

rhetorical reasoning. syllogism

employs

the term to refer

suggesting the to any belief that

weakness

arises

from

or

from induction (see PrA 72a2o-72b4; T ioobi8-22; SR id^by, NE U39b32-34,

I323a34-i323b7).

H42ai8-2i;/>

148
1 354b 1

Interpretation

8-22,

135639-19).

The

sophist

excites

the psssions to

divert his lis

pas

teners from
sions of

rational

deliberation,

but the Aristotelisn speaker controls the

with them.

his listeners

by

reasoning

Aristotle

assumes

that the

passions are

in

some sense

rationsl, snd th3t 3

rhetoricisn can talk an

sudience

into

or out of a passion
response

by

convincing them
circumst3nces

that the

psssion

is

or

is

not

3>ressonsble

to the

3t

hand (R 1378320-31, i38ob30-33, 1382316-18, 1385329-35, 1387b! 8-21, I403a34-i403bi). Since a psssion is slwsys about something, since it 3lw3ys
refers

to some object, it is

ressonsble

if it

represents

its

unressonsble must alwsys

if it does

not.

Men's
3re:

psssions sre not slwsys

correctly or ressonable, but they

object

believe th3t they

they hsve
The
mere

ressons
psssions

for their
msy

psssions although

their reasons are not

slways good ones.

often 3rise require

from false

judgments
whether

about

reslity, but the

suffices

fsct thst

psssions

judgments,
his

true or

f3lse,

to show the

rationsl chsrscter of

the passions.

And

a rhetorician who understands this csn

le3rn to

chsnge

the psssions of

listeners

by changing their minds. It is the rationality of the passions that distinguishes them from purely bodily sensations 3nd sppetites. It would be ridiculous to judge 3n itch or 3
pang
order of

hunger
sbsurd

as

true or

false,

ressonable or

unreasonsble;

snd

it

would

be

equslly

to srgue

with a man who

felt

an

itch

or a sensstion of

hunger in

to convince him thst

his feelings
A

were unjustified.

But it is
to

not ridiculous

to judge 3 msn's

snger as reasonable or unreasonable or

try

to argue

with

him

when

his

anger

is

unjustified.

man's anger

depends

upon

his belief that

sens3-

anger

is

3 proper response appetites

to something thst hss occurred,

but

a msn's
or

tions or physicsl
iT.49a25-11.49b3).

do

not

require

that he

believe this

th3t (NE

The

passions are rationsl

in thst they

sre

founded

on

judgments

of wh3t

the world is

they

sre

like, but they sre less than perfectly reasonable to the extent that founded on shortsighted, psrtisl, bissed, or hastily formulated judg
passions often

ments.

Yet the fact that the

the

depend

on

should not obscure

fsct thst they do

require some sort of

defective ressoning ressoning, snd it is for controlling the listeners indi

reasoning.

this element of ressoning thst gives the rhetoricisn s lever

psssions.

Thst

enthymemes sre often

directed to the

emotions of the

cates agsin

the

difference between irrelevant to is

a practical

enthymematic and

demonstrative
since

Emotions

are

scientific

demonstration; but
sim

enthymemstic

argumentation

form

of

reasoning, its

is to

move men not

just

to think,

but

also

to act; and srgument cannot

move men

to action unless

it

somehow elicits

the

motivstionsl power of emotion.

V The interpretstion
of the enthymeme tti3t
srgument

I hsve

sdvanced

here suggests
epis-

that Aristotle considered rhetoricsl

to be

governed

by definite

The

Rationality
that

of Political Speech

149

temological standsrds. But his trestment of enthymemes includes 3 study of

"apparent

enthymemes"

is, fallacious

arguments

snd

there sre other

exsmples of the csre with which

niques of verbal power to

Aristotle instructs the

art of rhetoric

rhetorician

in the tech

deception. Indeed, the

is

said

to provide the

be

persussive on the opposite sides of

prevent this srt

from

being

used to sdvsnce

every question. So whst is to fslsehood snd injustice rather than

their opposites? In other words, whst

is to

keep

the Rhetoric from

being

hsndbook for
First
of

sophists?
rhetor

all, it may be answered that Aristotle recognizes th3t if the

well

ician is to be

armed, he must know all the tricks of sophistry so that he can defend himself. The Aristotelian rhetorician might even have to em properly ploy such tricks himself in those cases where otherwise bad means are justified

by

their advsncement of good ends (R 1355329-34,

would

I407332-I407b7).
example of

Pre-

sumsbly, Aristotle
tician: although
a

have the

rhetorician

follow the
those

the dialec
at

he

prefers to spesk
sble

only

with

who msint3in

discussion

high level, the dislectici3n is lous opponents by using their

the point of showing himself

to defend himself in debstes

with unscrupu

own sophisticsl wespons sgsinst more skillful with

them,

even

to

their wespons th3n

compare/?

they

sre

themselves (T 108333-37, i64b8-i5; SR I75a32-i75b3;

I407b7).4

1407332-

In

some

cases, Aristotle does instruct the rhetorician in srguing opposite

sides of sn

issue

depending
to be

upon which side

is

most

fsvorsble to his is

position st

the

moment.

But this is

not a sophistical

exercise, because in each esse there is

something
recognize

valid

said on

both

sides.

In

practicsl mstters there snd

sometimes
msn must

equslly strong
this

support

for opposing srguments, that,

although

the prudent

(see, for
be

exsmple, R I375a25-i376b3i).
the rhetorical srt in itself
rhetoric

It
and

should also

said

is

morally
sre

epistemologically the just. Even though there

prescribed sudience.

neutral

instrument,
sre no
ends

tends to serve the true snd

srt

intrinsic to the

itself,

ends

by

the

rhetoricsl situstion

the spesker, the subject mstter, snd the

good chsrscter sre more

Since

speskers who

display

persussive, the to hide

noble rhetorician

has

3n sdvsntsge over

the sophist,

who must attempt

his bad

character

(R 135636-13,
to the

137836-19).
subject

Also,
and

the sophisticsl speaker

is

restrained audience.

by

the nature of the

respect sre

matter

by

the opinions
case

of

the

With

subject more

m3tter,

it is generally the

that the

true snd the

opinions of

just

nsturally

easily

srgued and more

persuasive; and the

the audience generally

displsy

this S3me

tendency (R 1354321-26,
I409a35"

1355312-23,

36-38,

137^5-11,

I373b3-i3.

I39a4-i396bi9,
who

I409bi2,

i4iob9-35).

Thus, in

most

cases, 3 speaker

has something to
1402323-28, (see
Thucyd-

hide is

more vulnerable

than one who has not (R i397b23-25,

give a good speech

1 41 931 3-1 7).

It is difficult to

for

bsd

csuse

"Does Aristotle discuss

assumption of

the tricks of the

base to instruct

good men and thus

to dispel the

smug
with

bad

men

that good men must be naive?

see also

See R 1355329-34;

compare

R 137333

Xenophon, Anabasis II. vi. 24-26;

1313334-13^39.

150

Interpretation
War III 36-48). This is
not

ides, Peloponnesian
times the
seems

to

deny, however,
stronger. mske

that

some

wesker srgument csn

be

made not

to sppesr the

But
the

snd

this

to be Aristotle's point

is it

ususlly

essier to

stronger

argument appesr

to be the stronger,

especislly

when

it is skillfully

presented?

VI

Mstters

of style snd composition seem extraneous to

the

rationsl content

of rhetoric since

they

seem

unnecessary for the

mstters

substantive argument of

issues.

Indeed,

when

Aristotle takes up these

in Book Three, he begins

a concession

by

complsining thst s concern with such things is only audiences (R 1403^5-1404312, 141535-141632). But in his trestment
extent not
well

to corrupt

of

these elements of rhetoric, Aristotle stresses the

to

which

they
the

contribute to rationsl srgument. since

For Aristotle

good style

is

merely ornsmentstion,

the goodness of style is determined

of

by

how

it

S3tisfies

nstural

desire

listeners for

learning

through

ressoning

(R

I404bi-i3,

i408b22-29,

1409323-1409^2,

1410318-22,

i4i2b2i-32,

1414321-28).

ical style,
"quick

provides

Metsphor, for exsmple, the most important instrument of rhetor listeners, in 3 msnner simitar to the enthymeme, with
(R 140535-12, 33-37, i4iob6-35, I4i2b9-I2,
arrangement

lesrning"

18-28).

And

Aristotle insists that the best

substantive srgument as state

for

a speech

is

that which presents the

his

case and

clearly and directly as possible: a speaker should first then prove it (R 14T.4330-14T.4b18). The Aristotelian rheto
S3me end

rician strives
enthymemstic

for the

in his
clesr

style snd composition 3S not commonplsce snd

he does in his informstive but

ressoning

to

be

but

not recondite.

VII I hsve
argued show

that Aristotle views rhetoric as rationsl

discourse,

snd thst

he

wishes

sophistry,
scientific

of ressoning to be distinguished from ressoning is less exsct snd less certain than demonstration. Measured by the standards of strict, demonstrative

to

th3t rhetoric is s form

even

though rhetoricsl

usually qualify as genuine ressoning st all. But such argumentstion C3n be seen to be quite rationsl if it is judged sccording to the logicsl criteris of rhetoric. Aristotle's theory of rhetoric
rests on the sssumption thst one should evsluate political arguments

logic,

the political argumentation of citizens

does

not

according
or
exscti-

to their degrees of plausibility

tude.

without

demanding

absolute

certainty

sre sble to

Thus Aristotle's theory conforms to the logicsl practice of citizens, who judge the plausibility of arguments despite the fundamentsl uncerof all practical reasoning.
what would rhetoric

tsinty

But
protest

the modern political scientist say sbout sll this?

not 3 vslid

He

might

th3t

is surely

form

of

ressoning

since

it

vioktes even

The

Rationality

of Political Speech
rstionslity.5

151

the most elementsry rules of scientific

The fundsmentsl problem,

he

might

explain, is thst the

rhetoricisn's srguments csn

which

the commonsense political opinions from

common opinions are
at

be only 3S relisble ss he draws his premises, but

reflections clsim of political

best

uncertain

and

inexact
no

reslity

snd 3t

worst unexsmined prejudices

with

to truth.

In

con

trast to the rhetorici3n's

of common

dependence

on

the vsgue

3nd

deceptive impressions
might
appeal

sense, the contemporary

criteris of s
scientific

political

scientist

to the
of

epistemological political

methodology for

precise

standsrds

knowledge. But does

the modern scientific method provide s better

stsrting point for politicsl inquiry than does rhetoric? This question was first clesrly posed by Thomss Hobbes. For he
Aristotelisn
study, and in
political science and applied

rejected

the

scientific

method

to political

doing

so

he became the founder

of modern political science. psychological

Now

Hobbes did

admire

Aristotle's Rhetoric for its

insights; but he

certsinly denied Aristotle's clsim, which is essentisl for his rhetoricsl theory, thst common opinions csn be the foundstion of politicsl ressoning. Clsssicsl
political philosophers such as

Aristotle

could never

lesd

us

to genuine politicsl

knowledge, Hobbes
for

argued, because "in their

false."6

writings snd

discourse they tske

principles those opinions which sre

vulgsrly received,
of

whether true or
political

fslse;
and

being

for the

most

psrt

Instead

Hobbes 's

political science would st3rt with exsct principles

starting definitions

with

opinions,

snd

sxioms;

from these
provide
project

one would

deduce

a theoreticsl

framework thst

would

the certsinty snd precision

of geometry.

Thus did Hobbes initiate the

themselves.7

to which msny political scientists

political opinions as

Is there sny thing to be ssid the foundation

today hsve devoted in fsvor of Aristotle's relisnce

of political

on common one

knowledge? On the

hand,

Aristotle's theory

of rhetoric as s vslid

form

of politicsl

the assumption thst common opinions reflect a rational

reasoning depends on grasp of politicsl life.

But,

on

the other

hsnd, Aristotle
distorted

presents

those opinions 3S often

offering

confused, crude,

and

view of political

reslity, thus

fslling

short of

the

rigor, refinement,

3nd comprehensiveness

seems that political opinions are

necesssry for political philosophy. It the starting point for the Aristotelisn politicsl
point.

scientist, but

they

sre

only the stsrting

Thst is to S3y, the

respect thst

he

gives to those opinions does not require 3n uncriticsl scceptsnce. politicsl

Since the
com-

theorist seeks to move from opinion to

the contemporary
politicsl

knowledge, he
scientist,
rhetoric

will not

5From the
nothing
more

perspective

of

msy

appear to

be

See, for example, Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 18-21, 29-35, 41-42, 96-98, 115-17, 121, 124-25, 161, 172-73. 179-81; Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (New York: Academic Press, 1 97 1 ) pp. 1-2. "Elements of Law, 1. 13. 3. See John W. Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 16-42. "See, for example, Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
than the
manipulation of

irrationsl

symbols that

do

not reflect empirical reality.

152
pletely
sccept

Interpretation
the
3nswers given

in

politicsl

speech.

And
will

yet

even

in his

movement

beyond the
which

common politicsl

opinions, he
will

be

guided

by

the

questions

to

those opinions point: he

try

to give

sn adequate snswer

to the

questions

thst politicsl opinions snswer only

common opinions so

inadequately*

But if Aristotle finds

scend

defective thst he hss to tran

them, why does he not reject them from the stsrt in order to resson from scientific principles in the msnner sdvocsted by Hobbes? Aristotle might an
swer with two scientist

types of

arguments.

First,

the phenomens studied

nstursl scientist

by

the politicsl

differ from those

method.

studied all

by

the

in

wsys

thst

justify

difference in

Second,

reasoning,

even that of the natural

scientist,

depends ultimately upon the truth of our commonsense understanding of things. Because politicsl phenomens are contingent rather than necesssry, snd

becsuse they tist, Aristotle

thst would
gent

sre

essentislly

cognitive rather than

physic3l, the

politicsl scien msnner contin and

might srgue, must rely on commonsense opinions in 3 be insppropri3te for the nstursl scientist. Politicsl reslity is upon

becsuse it depends

humsn The

choices

thst change

from time to time

will

from
ple,

one situation to another.

n3ture of political

life

vary, for

exam

depending

upon

the type of

regime

in

existence: oligarchic politics

differs
to the

from democratic
organization snd

politics.

regime

is

s product of certain choices ss

the gosls

of politicsl rule.

To

understsnd

these choices, the

common opinions.

politicsl scientist must

study them

as

they

are msnifested

in

And it

would

be

s mistske to

try

to exsmine these things ss if

or

they

were

ss

unchangeable ss

the Pythsgoresn theorem

the

motion of

the plsnets. More

over,

politicsl

things sre not physicsl objects thst csn be studied through sense
politicsl scientist who

perception.

restricted

himself to

sense

dsts

would

never
when

see

snything

politicsl.

For
what

politicsl people an

phenomens

come

into

one psys sttention

to

think about politics as

sppesl

only indicated by
un

view

what

they say
But in the

about

it. Thus, again,

to politicsl opinions is

avoidable.

most

fundsmentsl respect,
upon

all

icsl

science

depends

commonsense

ressoning not just thst of polit opinions. This is so becsuse all

our commonsense awareness of conclusions

reasoning
of things.

rests upon presuppositions

drawn from
the

The

rules of

logic

govern

deduction

from

prem

ises, but these rules csnnot determine the truth or falsity of the first premises. Reasoning is grounded upon fundamentsl sssumptions thst csnnot be proven
becsuse they sre the source of sll proofs. A conclusion is demonstrated when it is shown to follow from certsin premises. And the premises msy themselves be
shown

to

follow

as conclusions

from

other premises.

But eventuslly

one must

"Here
Epilogue,"

and elsewhere

in Essays
and

on the

in these concluding remarks I have drawn ideas from Leo Strauss, "An Scientic Study of Politics, edited by Herbert J. Storing (New York:
1962),
pp.

Holt, Rinehart
ophie
Politics,"

Winston,

307-27; Wilhelm
and

Hennis, Politik

und praktische Philos-

(Berlin: Luchterhand, 1963), pp. 89-115; The Review of Politics, 39 (July, 1977),

Eugene F. Miller,

"Primary Questions

in

298-331.

The
reach principles

Rationality

of Political Speech

153

that are taken as true without proof, these

being

the starting
assumptions

points of reasoning.

Indeed,

are not the rules of

logic themselves

that cannot be

proven

logically?
unprov-

Even the

most rigorous empirical science cannot avoid reliance on

sble sssumptions.

tion thst one msy generalize

Scientific induction, for exsmple, rests on the presupposi from particular cases, which depends in turn on
that nature falls into recurrent patterns: one
must as

the

broader

assumption

sume

that the universe is governed

one moment to

by laws,

and that

these laws do not change

scientific

arbitrarily from

another.9

Thus does
This is

knowledge

pre

suppose a prescientific

knowledge
first

of things.

what

Aristotle

means when

he

says that to examine the

principles of

any science,

one must appeal

to the "common

opinions"

(evdo^a)
ioia37-ioib4).
seems to make

that are the source of the principles (T

great
twentieth-

iooai8-ioob22,

Werner Heisenberg, the

the same point
as
when

century physicist,
cepts of natural

he

observes:

"the

con

language, vaguely defined

knowledge than the

they

are, seem to be

more stable

in the

expansion of as an

precise

terms

of scientific

language,
This is
are

derived
the case

idealization from only limited groups of because, on the one hsnd, "the concepts of natural language
connection with

phenomena."

formed

by

the immediate
require

reality";
precise
lost."

but,

on the other

hand,
which

scientific

concepts

idealization

and

definition through

"the im

So Heisenberg concludes: "We know reality is that any understanding must be based finally upon the natural language because it is only there that we can be certain to touch reality, and hence we must be
mediate connection with

skeptical about
sential

any

skepticism with regard

to this natural

language

and

its

es

concepts."10

similar

line

of thought

is found in the

writings of

Alfred

North Whitehead. For

although

he helped to formulate

modern mathematical of

logic, he insisted: "Logic,

of

conceived as a superb

an adequate analysis

the advance

thought, is
Our

fake. It is

instrument, but it
reality is

requires a

background

of common

sense.""

commonsense awareness of

more reliable

than

any

epistem-

ological will

theory

could ever

depend

upon

how

well

be. In fact, the truth of any epistemological theory The it accounts for our reliance on common
sense.12

Hobbesian

political

scientist

may think he

csn

scquire

political

knowledge

9On the

assumptions

Physics,

2 vols.

necessary for modern science, see A. D'Abro, The Rise of the New (New York: Dover, 1951), I, 14-27. See also my article, "Language and Nature in
Investigations,"

Wittgenstein's Philosophical

Journal of Thought, 10 (July, 1975),

pp. 200-202.

194-99.

"'Physics
2nd ed.

and

""Immortality,"

Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead,
1951),
p. 700.

edited

by

Paul Arthur

Schilpp,
for

(La

Salle, 111.: Open Court,

is
a theme of

The importance

of

"common

sense"

mathematics

l2One
"common

should

keep

my unpublished paper, "Mathematics and the Problem of in mind here the long rhetorical tradition of speculation about the

Intelligibility."

nature of

See, for example, Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 556-68; and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 19-29.
sense."

1 54
through a
ence.

Interpretation
formal
method

that is

totally

abstracted

from

commonsense experi

But in

practice

his

choice of assumptions will always

be guided,
How

even

if he

unintentionally,
even

begin

by his own natural grasp of looking for political phenomena

like? As
with

political reality.

could

know

what politics was

if he is completely lost, he will where he wants to get to, it does Hobbesian political scientist knows
sensible

already Lewis Carroll's Alice, he must learn that never find his way; for if he does not know
not
matter

if he did

not

somehow

which

way he
admit.

goes.

But the

more

than

he

will

For like any

things

that directs
at the

human being, he begins with his scientific inquiry. He is

even

a natural awareness of political not

completely lost

after all.

He knows surprising

if only vaguely, where he wants to go; that he usually finds a way to get there. To fully understand the fundamental importance of
start,
ence

so

it is

not

commonsense experi

for

political

reasoning, one

must see

the limits

of

the Hobbesian method,

and one must recover the

Aristotelian tradition
part

of political science.

Aristotle's

Rhetoric is

an

essential

of that

tradition.

Aristotelian text, it brings into

view the common political opinions of

More clearly than any other human

political

beings

as

the primary ground of political knowledge. Although the

scientist must sophical

eventually

go

beyond those

opinions through a process of philo guidance.

refinement, he

must always

look to them for

continually turning his

political are

attention

to the political questions

For only by found in ordinary

things as

speech, can the student

of politics understand political

they

in themselves.

MANLINESS AND FRIENDSHIP IN

SHAKESPEARE'S JULIUS CAESAR

Jan H. Blits

University
The city of Rome had besides its proper few. It is believed by some to have been
["strength"

of Delaware

name another secret

"Valentia,"

one, known only to a

"Roma"

the Latin translation of

read

in Greek];

others think

it

"Amor"

("Roma"

was

backwards).
I

G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Part III, Section

Shakespeare's Julius Caesar

men who made republican glory.

examines the

lives

and souls of

the sort of

Rome the foremost

model of political greatness and

in the play have the strongest desire for worldly glory honor as the highest good, relentlessly strive to win it. They and, regarding look up to the things that make men strong and, having tremendous pride and
The
men we see

trust in their own "strength of

another of

spirit"

(I.iii.95),1

jealously
as

contend

with

one

controversy"

for outstanding distinctions. Their hearts are, (I.ii. 108). Loving victory, dominance,
equate manliness and

Cassius says, "hearts

and

honor, they
sums

charac

teristically
of

human

excellence.

Cassius

their

humanity

when,

bemoaning
the

Rome's

acquiescence

up their view to Caesar, he says,

But,
And

fathers'

woe

while! our

minds are

dead,

mothers'

we are govern'd with our

spirits;

Our

yoke and sufferance show us womanish.

(I.iii.82-84)
Rome is Even Portia,
woman's

a man's world.
Brutus'

No

one

in Caesar has
misogynist.

a good word

for

women.

noble

wife, is a

Even she,

ashamed of

her
nor

belong
in

heart, insists that the best human qualities If a woman like herself happens to to
women.2
sex"

neither come show

from

them,
she

she

does

so

spite of

her

sex.

She is "stronger than [her] her

correlation

(II. i. 296);

is

manly.

That

s womsn must somehow overcome

nsture

to show the

highest

virtue points or

to the close the

rising

sbove

common

or

men's

sctivities

snd smbitions

rising up merely humsn things. Throughout the plsy sre repestedly expressed in terms of standing,
msnliness snd
men"

in Caesar between

rising, climbing to new

snd and

heights, "soar[ing] (II.i.24) reaching "the upmost

expressed

sbove
while

the

view of

scorning everything
of

their defects and defests

'References
ed. are

in the contrsry terms

Caesar,
ed.

(I.i.74), below; bending, bowand

to the Arden

editions of

Julius

T. S. Dorsch,

Antony

and

Cleopatra, Ridley :II.i.292ff.; II.iv.6-9, 39-40. For

much as

M. R.

(London:

Methuen,

1964).
patriots'

the Roman
1

disparaging
156-159;
"ancestor(s)"

their maternal origins as

1 14, they IV.iii.118-122; V.iii. 67-71; V.iv.1-11. Note also that I.ii. 111, I.iii.80-84, II. i. 53-54, III.ii.51. For the fact that see Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, II. 43.
"man,"

revere their paternal origins, see I.ii.i 1

I.iii.80-84; II. i. 294-297;

"virtue"

always refers only to men: derives from the Latin word for

156

Interpretation
crouching,

ing, lying,
and

fawning, falling,

sinking,

kneeling,

shaking, trembling,

The manly is associsted with the firm, the brilliant, the cold, the independent, the high and the noble; the womanish, with the soft, the dull, the warm, the dependent, the low and the lowly. The manly is the outstanding; the
melting.3

womanish, the
womanish

obscure. neither.

does

The manly both contains and confers distinctions. The Like the body, it is the great equalizer. It tends to level
that the manly love
of

all

important

differences.4

Shakespeare

shows

distinction

engenders a charac

teristic attitude towards the world. It things thst thresten to

is

one of

resisting

and

overcoming

all

the

drag

s msn
part

down

or overshsdow

him. This fundsmental

attached

Roman
ness.

stance

is

reflected

in

by

the great importance

to wakeful

Early

on

the ides of

been "awake

night"

all

(II.i.88).

March, Brutus Indeed,

tells the other conspirators that

he has

Since Cassius first did I have

not slept.

whet me against

Caesar,

(11.

61-62)
of

His servant, Lucius, Brutus says, the

men"

can

"Enjoy

the

boy
232).

has

none of

honey-heavy the "busy

and
outside

dew

slumber

because,

as of

care[s]"

that occupy

"the brains

(11. 230,

But the

conspirators

Caesar

alike

have been kept

awake

by just

such cares.

Only

those

the political realm

belong
his

in bed.

Thus Brutus left "his Caesar

awske

sends

Lucius back to bed

to "go to
237ff.).
bed"

soon after
bed"

awakening him and, shortly

afterwards, tells

Portia, too,
(11.

when she complains of

having

wholesome
Cassius'

But he himself is

aroused

to act against

by

(11. 46ff.);
to
"prick"

cause

accusing him of sleeping and urging him to then, arguing that they need nothing but their Roman them to action, he spurs his co-conspirators on by associating
anonymous note snd
women"

"The melting

spirits of

in

contrast

to "uY insuppressive mettle of our

bed"
Ii4ff.).5

(11. returning "to his idle too far to say that from the Roman point of view nothing very happens in bed.6
with each man

spirits"

It is

not

going
ever

interesting

Brutus
manliness.

and

the others understand the private

at

world

to be destructive of
of Philputs

Sardis shortly before the decisive battle to succumb to is to succumb to necessity. Brutus finally ippi, sleep work aside and prepares for bed only becsuse "nsture must obey
(IV.iii.226). Nstural necessity, he

As he indicates

his

necessity

implies, is

not psrt of

his

nsture.

His

noble

3E.g., I. i. 72-75;

204-210; IV. ii. 23-27; IV. iii. 38-50,

I.ii. 99-136; II. i. 21-27, n8, 142, 167; III. i. 31-77, 122-137, 148-150, 66-69; V.i. 41-44; V.iii. 57-64.

4I.ii. 268-272; I.iii.80-84; II. i. 122, 292-297; IV. iv. 6-10, 39-40. 3See also I. iii. 164, II. i. 98-99; and cf. in context IV.iii.92ff. For Lucius, see further IV. iii. 235-271. And for Caesar's estimation of "such men as sleep see I.ii.i89f. Also, note II.ii.116-117.
a-nights,"

as the possibility of a Roman woman warrior like Antony's wife Fulvia is totally in Caesar (see Ant., I.ii. 85-91; II.i.40; II. ii. 42-44, 61-66, 94-98; also I.i.20, 28-32; I.ii.101 106), so too is Caesar's erotic interest in a woman like Cleopatra (see ibid., I. v. 29-31, suppressed

6Just

66-75; II. ii. 226-228; II. vi. 64-70; Ill.xiii. 1 16 1 17;

cf.

JC, I.ii.1-11.

Manliness
nsture

and

Friendship

in Julius Caesar
"look for
rest"

157
a time of

is to

oppose necessity.

So

while women snd children

rest"

(1. 261), Brutus "will

"murd'rous

niggard"

sleep

with

only "a little

opposes

(1.

227).

He
ob sur

slumber"

opposes scurity.

(1. 266) because he

Men like him

resist all

forms

of

any form of because to recline is to reclining

render one's

downward The in

pull

standing in the world. Their characteristic opposition to the earth's is well expressed by Alexander the Great's remark that, more
was not a
god.7

than anything else, sleep and sex reminded him he

specific character of prove

manly

virtue

is indicated

herself in the thigh to

plans confidence.

that she is strong enough to

by Portia, keep

who gashes

Brutus'

secret

believe, is
are

that men

The important difference between the sexes, are stronger than their bodies but women are
are weaker

she seems not.

to

Women
might rather

inconstant because they

than

bodily

fears

and

pains.8

One

therefore suppose that their characteristic trait is concern with necessary than with noble things. But Portia's
subsequent actions reveal wound

something
proof of

she

herself fails to is

see.

The

self-inflicted out

she calls

"strong

my

constancy"

(II. i. 299) turns

to be no proof at all. As soon as Brutus

leaves,
tor

she

overwhelmed and

by

anxious

(1. 301)

manly

endurance

fears for his welfare, and her strong quickly vanish. There are evidently death. Love for her husband

"patience"

worse makes

tures for her than

bodily
of

pains and even

her

more a woman than

the superiority to her

body

makes

her

a man.

If,

as she

says, "The heart

actions

woman"

is

"weak

thing"

(II. iv. 39-40), its weakness, her

seem

to show, stems not from fear but from affection, than herself.

from

loving

another more

While
such an

manliness no

doubt

sustains a

timocracy like

the Roman republic,

zens, bound together

honor-loving regime is often praised for fostering by a common ancestry and upbringing,
the
mutual claims
"man"

fraternity. Its
are

citi

free

and

equal;

they
or

respect

to rule that only manly virtue can

enforce.

It is

therefore

fitting

that
and

only
the most

is

mentioned

in Caesar

more often

than

"love"

in the play is that of the leaders of the republican faction. In fact, Brutus and Cassius call each other although Shakespeare never explains that they as many as eight
elaborated

"friendship"9

friendship

"brother"

times10

are and

brothers-in-law."
Cassius'

Shakespeare's

silence

is appropriately entirely
regime

misleading.

Brutus
the
and

fraternal form
nurtured
defending.12

of address seems

elective and a sign of

sort of
which

friendship
not as

by

the manly

under which

they live

they die

Their

friendship does,

I think,

epitomize the repub

lic, but

just

suggested or

usually

understood.

'Plutarch,
'"Man"

Alexander the

Great,

22.3.

Tor the importance of constancy, see Caesar's claim to (including its variants) appears 148 times;
"Rome"

divinity
51

at

III. i. 31-77,
"friend,"

esp. 58-73.

"love,"

times;

"Roman"

"Romans"

comparison,

occurs

38,

and

together

35 times.

Only

53 times. By Caesar's name is

"man."

mentioned more often

than 232, 236, 247, 303; see also

10IV.ii.37, 39; IV. iii. 95, 211, "See Plutarch, Brutus, 6.1-2.
i:Shakespeare's
silence also

II.i.70.

has the

effect of

concealing that Cassius is married, thus making

him

appear a

fully

spirited or public man.

158
The implications
the tensions
quarrel express

Interpretation
of

the Roman

view of virtue sre

Csssius'

strikingly

revesled when

inherent in Brutus

snd

friendship

surfsee

in

their

ugly
the

at

Sardis late in the

play.

Indeed,
principal

manliness

and

friendship

are

themes of the quarrel. Two

Cassius'

the

scene:

i) presuming

upon

expressed

threads, closely tied, love, Brutus

run through challenges

(esp. his and, in particular, demeans and taunts his proud anger him shames Cassius until IV. iii. 38-50); and 2) he refuses to confess any love contempt and will do self by announcing that he utterly despairs of
manliness
Brutus'

anything to have his love (11.

occurs not io6ff.).
makes

92-106).

Whst is

perhsps most

telling,

however,
(11.
still

during

the

quanel

itself but

during

their apparent

reconciliation

Cassius'

previous

conciliatory

efforts

notwithstanding, Brutus
and

him

solicit an explicit admission of

love

forces him to his

plead

for it,
the

moreover,

by

Brutus'

accepting

degrading

characterization of

anger as

effect of an

irritable, unmanly disposition (11.

39-50,

106-112).

Thus
asks,

Cassius,

apologizing for

having

gotten

angry in the first place,

love
enough

diffidently
me,

Have

not you

to

bear my

with

When that

rash

humour

which

mother gave me

Makes

me

forgetful?
"Yes,"

And Brutus sealing

answers

with

only

a meager

to

which

he quickly adds,

Cassius'

disgrace,
.

and

from henceforth

When

you are over-earnest with your

your mother

Brutus,
you so.

He'll think

chides, and leave

(11.

18-122)
Cassius'

Brutus
spirit.

confesses

He

shall

only to having excuse his

enough

love to

overlook

womanish

"over-earnestness"

because he

shall regard such

fits

Cassius'

of temper
proper

as

the chiding of

mother

rather than

the

spirited

anger

to a

man.

Men
than to

such as

Brutus

are ambitious

for love.

They

wish

to

be loved

rather

love because

tributes of esteem.

honored.13 Both are being loved closely resembles being Love between such men is therefore jealous; like honor, it is
love"

ardently sought snd only begrudgingly given. Unrequited "shows of (I.ii. 33,46) therefore amount to confessions of envy. A Roman, moreover, is
man's man.

He

admires

love. The
not

erotic

Antony is

manly disparaged

men and seeks

love from
in

men

he himself
and

could

by

his

own men

Antony

Cleopatra

simply because he flees battle to pursue Cleopatra but more generally because he fights bravely chiefly to impress a woman and win her love. As one
of

leader's led, / And we are women's vii. 69-70). The republican contest for love, however, is a contest in (Ant., III. manliness for the love of other msnly men. Moments before the qusrrel, Brutus,
officers

his

complains, "so

men"

our

snticipsting the heart

of

the quarrel, contrasts true and false

friends. The

differ-

"Aristotle,

Nicomachean Ethics, 1159313-15.

Manliness
ence

and

Friendship
Using

in Julius Caesar
a metaphor

159
war

turns wholly on manly strength.

from

to

describe

what constitutes a

fslse friend, he ssys,

But hollow men, like horses hot Make But
at

hand,
spur,

gallant show and promise of their mettle;

when

they

should endure the

and

bloody

They fall their crests, Sink in the trial.

False friends
are

like deceitful jades

(IV. ii. 23-27)

hollow

warriors.

They

lack the dauntless

of

strength

they

pretend
and

to have. The quarrel brings out the significance

this view of virtue

friendship:
friend
mesns

the

msnly

contest

for love issues

finally
of a

in

a struggle to crush a

by
to

win

unmsnning his proud hesrt. Love is victory in the defest snd shame
a contentious virtue.

not an end

in

itself, but

rather a

friend.14

Manliness is
the teeth of

It is

"virtue"

that "cannot live/ Out of

finally
than

(II.iii.n-12). Untempered, it is hungry, devouring, and self-consuming. Nothing could lower Cassius more in esteem
Brutus'

emulation"

by

one

his swallowing his repeated he loves; brsv'd by his

It does

abuse snd

brother"

openly confessing thst he is "Hsted (IV. iii. 95). But msnly love is spirited,

not sffectionate.

collapsing the distance between men into intimacy but rather at expanding that distance to the point where friendship finally becomes impossible, ss Csessr himself most vividly demonstrates. As
not aim at
msnliness

not

stop Rome's civil

at

is displayed primarily in battle, so the combat between warriors does the city's walls. It pervades their loves as well as their enmities.
strife seems to

be Roman

friendship

writ

large.

Antony,
confirms

the

major

counterexample,
one
can

the rule.

No

is in many ways the exception who doubt that his love is spirited and has an
victory in love is
altogether and

ambitious quality.

But his

sought-for at

different from

Brutus'. Just "nobleness

of

as

he declares

the outset of
embrace

Antony

Cleopatra that the

life"

is for lovers to

when such a mutual pair

And

such a twain can

do't, in

which

bind,

On
We
so

pain of stand

punishment, the

world

to weet

up peerless,

(I. i. 36-40)
wishes

too,
own

when

he thinks Cleopatra has killed herself for him, he

to end

his

life

so

that,

reunited

in

death, they

can win even greater

acknowledg

ment as a matchless pair:

I come, my queen: Eros! Where souls do couch on flowers,

Eros!

Stay
we'll

for me,
hand in

hand,

And

with our and

sprightly

port make shall want

the ghosts gaze:

Dido,
And
l4See
15Cf.
esp.

her Aeneas,
haunt be

troops,

all

the

ours.

(IV.xiv.50-54)15

IV. iii. 41-50.

mention of

Cassius'

Aeneas (I.ii.111-114).

160

Interpretation
wants

Antony
greatest

to out-love all other great lovers

world

and

be

recognized

as

the

lover the

imply

the defeat of all other

the defeat of

his

own

ever known. The achievement he imagines may heroic lovers, but his victory would in no sense be love (JC, lover. He does not seek to win another's

has

"hot"

IV.ii.19)
triumph

while

is

shared

coldly withholding his own. On the contrary, his envisaged by Cleopstrs snd is, moreover, their shsred glory ss s
wished-

singular couple. not even

their

for prospect that nothing at all, Indeed, it rests on the bodies, will ever again separate their souls. It is the victory of
and

the

utmost

devotion
neither

intimacy

between "a

pair."

mutual

Antony
dominate

resents

Caesar's domination like Cassius,

nor

seeks

to

hesrts like Brutus. Yet, while hsving grest love for Csessr, he never presumes sn equality with him. His ready submission may therefore seem to foreshadow the Empire where the Emperor has no equals and
other men's all citizens are reduced

to private men subject to his

will.16

But

Antony

loves

Caesar solely for his superlative nobility and not for his favors. To him, Caesar (III. i. 256-257). was "the noblest man / That ever lived in the tide of
times"

Antony's heart is ruled, as Cassius conectly fears, by "the ingrafted love he (II. i. 184), a love which Caesar's murder turns into the most bears to
Caesar"

savage

desire for

revenge.

It is

not

hard to

see that what

Antony
like

gives

to

Cleopatra,

or gives

up for her, is
islands"

meant

to measure his
that

love.17

Not only his

small change

giving her "realms "dropp'd from his battles he loses or,

and

and

so

bounteously
also,

they

are

pocket"

(V.ii.92), but

and even more

importantly,

the

more

exactly, the losses he actively pursues, the "Kingdoms

provinces" away"

desth

sll

(III. x. 7-8), and most of sll his self-inflicted he "kiss[es] love.ls this is meant to measure his overflowing The same is true of
vengeance

his ferocious

for Csesar's

assassination.
an act of

However
giving,

cruel

and even

inhumsn,
true!"

the vengesnce

is,

sbove

all,

not

of taking.

Its

indiscriminate savagery is intended to prove "That I did love thee, Caesar, O, 'tis (III. i. 194). It shows that he will spare nothing that he will even sink
to the level of a beast and scourge all human or humane

feeling

from the

innocent lavish
give

as as the guilty (III. i. 254-275) for his love. As different as they appear, Antony's terrible vengeance for Caesar is of a piece with his
well gifts and enormous sacrifices

for Cleopatra. It
"deer"

manifests a

heart that

will

Roman"

up everything dear for his (Ant., I.iii.84) is nothing if

contrast to
and

"strucken"

(III. i. 209). This "Herculean

not a

thoroughly immoderate lover.

Cassius is
one as

In
often

Antony, "lean

hungry"

and
playful.19

austere and

unerotic,

petty

envious,

and never

No

in Caesar

speaks of the

shame of unmanliness as much or as

vehemently

he. Yet, notwithstanding

1291.

16Paul A. Cantor,

Shakespeare'

Rome (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976)

grest to

"Ibid.,
love that
can

148-156.
of course

"Antony
"See
esp.

insists that his love is too

(I.i.15).

be

measured:

"There's

be

reckon'd"

beggary

in the

I.ii.

189-207.

See

also note 12 above.

Manliness
his
ardent wish to

and

Friendship

in Julius Caesar
manly, Cassius is the
snd

161

be entirely
of

spirited and always

leading
If

republican

example

the tension between

war"

msnliness

womsnliness.

Brutus is

lstely
and

"with himself

st

(I.ii. 45) because

at war with a

for Rome

Caesar, Cassius is
mixed s

always

his conflicting loves himself because of the

of

conflicting sides of his him towards others and

but

unstable nature

manly Cassius' temper is much more volatile unquestionably shrewder than Brutus, and his psssions far less restrained. Despite his strong self-contempt for any
real or

one

pulling him back

or away.

womanly side drawing Although he is

imagined trace

of

softness, his

sffection

is

stirred ss

easily
at

by

sorrow as

his manly resentment is provoked for others, even his equals. He

Cicero's murder; bears
sorrow

by

envy,

and

he

often shows solicitous care

alone

shows

deep feeling
who

the news of
man

and

in sharp

contrast to

Brutus,
of

boasts that "No

better"

and then

feigns ignorance

his

wife's

death to impress how

much

his Stoic endurance, he is willing to let takes to heart the "insupportable and touching
other men with
loss"

others see of

he

have "in
a

art"

as much

manly

patience as

Brutus to

endure

Portia's

Portia. Cassius may suicide "like

not

Roman,"

"But

nature,"

yet

my

he

realizes or perhaps

confesses, "could
than Brutus
Brutus'

bear it

so"

(IV. iii.

143-194).

If he

appears more concerned

with

manliness, he

does so, paradoxically, precisely because he lacks

friend"

manly

constancy and reserve. The man Cassius calls his "best Their

is his lieutenant Titinius (V. iii. 35).

in Caesar
of

friendship

is probably the
as

nearest

example

the sort the

republic claims
brothers'

to foster and Brutus suggests

when

he describes "hearts / Of

temper"

(III. i. 174-176).
will.

sharing "all kind love, good thoughts, snd Cassius and Titinius do indeed have mutual regard

reverence

and good

Yet their

friendship
in
the
a

is

not altogether unlike

Brutus

Cassius'

and

It too

demonstrates, men. Appropriately,

sents other's

though

different way, thst

Philippi

scene at

their deaths. Each kills

hoi.or-loving depicting their friendship also pre himself, blaming himself at least in part for the
msnliness separates

death. Their suicides, however, feel great sorrow and affection for his
Romanness (V. iii. 51-90), Cassius
out

are not the same.

Whereas Titinius

can

commander without

losing

pride

in his

cannot wish

to

die for love

the

of another with

feeling
to

shame at

his

own unmanliness.

During

Titinius'

ing

expressly to
where

love for him,

tell

asks

him to

battle, Cassius, appeal take his (Cassius') horse

friend
or

and ride
moments

he

can

whether certain troops are

enemy; and,

later, learning

that Titinius

has been

encircled

for joy, he jumps to the wrong

says

conclusion.

Deciding
so

horsemen shouting then to kill himself, he

by

in disgust, O,
To
coward

that

I am, to live

long,

see

my best friend ta'en before my face. (V. iii. 34-35)

Cassius'

The

quslities

sunounding
play.

death
and

are a

major

figures in the

Rashness

considered unmanly by fatalistic despair, born of

all

the

weari-

1 62
ness and melancholic
cowsrdice
things20

Interpretation
self-doubt, lead to his mistake,
act. and
and

his

own

imagined

determines his
suicide

Cassius'

it certainly is many Yet whatever else it is is an act of friendship. Because his manliness is partly
another man who soon returns

by its opposite, he can wish to die for the tribute in kind. But, importantly, Cassius
tempered

tries to stifle

his fond
to

wish.

the his unmanly qualities, he intends his suicide side of his nature that allows him to choose death thinking of anything but his honor. Ruled by his spirited heart, he kills himself, ultimately, more out of

Ashamed

of all

repudiate

manly
of

pride or shame than

love

or sorrow.

The

fundamentally

his

affection and pointed a

friendship by
up

with

Titinius is indicated both

by

Roman quality his suppression of his own

the way each man emulates the others brave death.

But it is
though

most of all

by

the more

bssic fsct thst

Csssius'

"best

friend,"

nobleman, is not his equal. Whatever closeness

there may be between them

depends As
so

decisively
Cassius'

on

the distance their

unmistakable

inequality

preserves.

suicide points shows of

to the limits of closeness among Roman men,

within a

Portia's

the limits of sharing the

Roman

marriage.

It

marks

the

unattainability
attempt of

intimacy

she

desires from

a virtuous marriage.

Portia's

to persuade Brutus to confide in her contains the play's only expression

erotic

intimate,
him

love.

Calling

herself "your self,

half,"

your

she tries to

"charm"

by By
all your vows of

my

once commended

beauty,

love,

and that great vow

Which did incorporate

and make us one.

(II. i. 271-274)

Love's desire
speak as

or goal seems

to inspire love's own special language. Lovers

if nothing at all separated them. Love not only makes or shows them equals, but even incorporates them and makes them indistinguishable parts of Yet Portia makes this plea upon her knees. She says she would not have
"one."

to kneel if Brutus

were gentle.

or presupposes mutual respect.

His customary gentleness, she suggests, implies We see for ourselves, however, that Brutus is in
than equals, and gentlest of all with
associates of

fact

much gentler with unequals

his

servant

boy, Lucius. Portia

reticence and
Brutus,"

nevertheless

his

recent

ungentleness

with

his

distance. "Within the bond

marriage,"

she

continues, "tell me,

Is it That

excepted
appertain

should

know Am I

no secrets your self

to

you?

But,
To

as

it were, in

sort or

limitation,
bed,
suburbs

keep

with you at

meals, comfort your

And talk to
2"Cassius'

you sometimes?

Dwell I but in the

lsst

words

(V. iii. 45-46), like

Brutus'

(V. v. 50-51),

acknowledge
matter of

Csesar's

personal

victory, in the former

case ss s matter of

revenge, in the latter ss a

love.

Manliness
Of

and

Friendship
harlot,
not

in Julius Caesar
no more,
wife.

163

your good pleasure?

Brutus'

If it be

Portia is

his

(11. 280-287)

But because
sort or

she

is "his

wife,"

Portia is indeed

Brutus'

"self /But,

as

it were, in
subsequent
wife,"

limitation."

And her

"suburbs"

metaphor of

as well as

her

self-inflicted wound

tells us why. "You are my true and honourable

Brutus

assures

her,
As dear to That
"dear"

me as are the sad

ruddy drops
(11. 288-290)

visit

my

heart.
Brutus'

him,21 Portia may be to but manly virtue rests on his valuing his heart more than his blood, his public life more than his marriage. As her
"suburbs"

own metaphor of

ironically
there. The

anticipates, Portia only

"visits"

Brutus'

heart;
what

she

does

"dwell"

not

love

of

fame

and

honor does.
would tell

Portia

wishes

her

conjugal plea would

succeed, that Brutus

of"

her

"by
as

the right and virtue of my place / 1 ought to know

(11.

269-270).
sex"

Yet,

her

having

already taken
she never

steps to prove

(1. 296)

indicates,
his

could never consider a woman

man

to win

confidence.

reslly expected his equal, she thinks she must prove herself a She realizes that, to the extent she is a woman,

herself "stronger than [her] it would. Recognizing that Brutus

Brutus

will never give

extent she proves

her his trust. She fails to realize, however, that, to the herself a man, he can no more unfold himself to her than to
weakness
proof can

any other man (cf. I.ii. 38-40). Since honor requires him to hide his from everyone he respects and whose respect he seeks, her manly
succeed no revesl

better than her

conjugsl pies.

Although Brutus

st

lsst

promises

to

his secrets, he in fsct lesves home just moments lster snd does not return Portia's self-inflicted wound succeeds only in before s
Csessr'
sssassination.22

shaming him to bear his troubles with prayer to be worthy of such a "noble
21Note that Brutus 22Brutus
reveal cannot never

greater

manly

patience.
23

It inspires his

wife"

(11.

302-303).

have

returned

actually says he loves Portia, though he speaks often of love. home after II. i. When he leaves with Ligarius, he says he
done"

will

his

plans

"to thee,
arrive

as we are

afterwards

they

together at

(II. i. 330-331); and soon going / To whom it must be Caesar's house to escort him to the Capitol (II.ii.lo8ff.). Yet

there

is

no

inconsistency
the

in Portia's

knowing

in II. iv

what she asks

to be told in II. i.

She knows

as

Brutus'

much when she asks

secret as she
conspirators

does later

when she almost

blurts it

out.

Whether

or not

she

has

overheard

(who leave

almost

immediately

before It

she

enters), it is clear

from

what

she

says

and

does in the

earlier scene

that she knows that what troubles

Brutus is
Brutus'

political and

involves him in dangerous

rest.

clandestine nighttime meetings.

would not require much wants to

for her to imagine the

secret; rather,
she

Shakespeare's point, I think, is

me your

not that

Portia
on

know

counsels"

wants

him to "Tell

(II. i. 298)

the grounds that she

is

worthy of his trust. 23For a contrary view of Portia and Brutus, Plays and Their Background (London: Macmillan

see

Mungo MacCallum,

Shakespeare'

Roman

Company, 1967) 235f., 272L, snd Allan Bloom, Shakespeare's Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1964) 101-103. See also Jay L. Halio, The Personalist, Vol. 48, No. I "Harmartia, Brutus, and the Failure of Personal
and
Confrontation,"

(Winter 1967)

51-52.

164
Portia does
not

Interpretation
really
of

understsnd

the virtue she tries to

emulste.

She hss
thst

too exslted s view

manliness

msnliness

to see its limitstions. that makes one

She

recognizes

involves the

sort of strength

superior

to

bodily

pains also

and

pleasures, but

not that at the same time and

for the

same reason

it

tends to make one superior to personal affection and sorrow. She

is drawn to
of

Brutus because
the same.

of

his

virtue and

imagines he

would

be drawn to her because

She does not,

Believing
to every

manliness
excellent

the highest virtue, she also believes it supports

or gives rise

human quality
that

as well.

or perhaps

cannot,
strives

see that the virtue she most admires resists the

for

noble

distinction,
own

it distances
a

men

sharing she desires as it from one another as it

and a

distances them from their

the

bodies. In both

literal

figurative sense,

distance between Portia

and

closely parallels her sudden her manly proof, is the piteous

"impatience"

Brutus leads to her death. Her suicide, which loss of constancy when Brutus leaves home after
culmination

of

the madness caused

by

her
over

extreme

for his

return

from the

wsr snd

her desperate

"grief"

the growing power of his

shows and

just how

much

Csessrisn foes (IV.iii.151-155). Her touching death her hsppiness and even her life depend on the closeness

well-being of the man she loves. Portia is the only character in Caesar to die solely for the love of another. Despite her real shame at the weakness of a woman's heart, hers is the only suicide not meant to prove manly strength. No
quite suicide

is less like Portia's than Brutus'. Everyone

a

understands

his,
or

properly, to have been

manly,

death-defying

act.24

By killing
honor
of

himself in

high Romsn
desth"

fsshion, Brutus deprives his

enemies of the

killing

cspturing him. In snother sense ss well, however, "no msn else hath honor by (V.v.57). Brutus, like Caesar, dies tasting his unshared glory. The his
very last time he
corpses:
mentions

Cassius is

when

he

comes upon

his

Titinius'

and

Are

yet two

Romans

living
ever

such as

these?

The last

of all the

Romans, fare
Rome

thee well!

It is impossible that

Should breed thy fellow. Friends, I owe To this dead man than you shall see me I
shall

moe pay.

tears

find time,

Cassius, I

shall

find time.

(V. iii. 98-103)

Acknowledging the way befitting what

Titinius in the

republican cause

has been lost, Brutus

always
stood

praises

Cassius in

the republic

same

breath. He

fellow citizens,

as sons of

him and them, in other words, as equals, as Rome (cf. V. iii. 63). For himself, however, Brutus
praises praises

had

for. He

24V.v.52ff.;
dead Cassius
the play.

cf.

V.i.98-113, V.iv.

"brave"

V.iii.58ff.). It is

passim, V. v. 23-25. By contrast, only Titinius calls the (V. iii. 80); despite everything, his death is seen by others as womanish (see

perhaps not

surprising

that no one mentions

Cassius in

the

last two

scenes of

Manliness
seeks preeminent mentions

and

Friendship

in Julius Caesar
Just
as

165
he
never again

distinction,

not republican equality.

(IV.iii.

189

Portia (even in soliloquy) after stoically bidding her farewell at Sardis 191), so he forgets Cassius entirely when, about to kill himself, he
the glory

envisions

he

shall win

for his life:

Countrymen,

My heart
I found

doth

joy

that yet
was

in

all

my life

no man

but he

true to me.

shall have glory by this losing day More than Octavius and Mark Antony

By

this vile conquest

you well at

shall attain unto.

Brutus'

So fare
Hath

once; for

tongue

almost ended

his life's history.

eyes; my bones
attain
would rest,

Night hangs

upon mine

That have but labour'd to

this hour.

(V.v. 33-42)
Brutus'

thoughts center on himself. He imagines his fame and glory as

his

alone,
and

neither

blurred

nor obscured sees

by

any fellow Roman. More

personal

importantly
somehow

surprisingly,

however, he

his

haps

even enhanced

by

his

country's collapse.

victory His "life's

undiminished and per

history"

stands above or apart

from Rome. Brutus had

of course claimed

to be

guided

only by his country's good. "I know had said of Caesar, "but for the

him,"

no personal cause

to spurn at

he

general"

ing, he had
friend
wss

argued, was a

personal

(II.i.n-12). Indeed, Caesar's slay sacrifice: "Not that I loved Caesar less,
as the sscrifice of s so
of

but that I loved Rome

proof of

more"

(III. ii. 22-23). Moreover,

public-spirited

desr

his

fully

virtue,

too wss

his declsred
slew

willingness

to kill himself if necessary for the good

Rome,"

best lover for the

death"

good of

he had
it

pledged at

my Caesar's funeral, "I have

turn

Rome: "as I

the same dagger for myself,

when

shall

please

(III. ii.

46-48)."

Yet,
is

when

Brutus does

finally

my country to need my his sword upon him

speaks

self, Rome's
personal not a word allusion

welfare

"joy"

"glory,"

snd

in

praise of

proudly of his but while in effect eulogizing himself, he ssys the republic or to lament its Indeed, his only
absent

from his thoughts. He

passing.26

to Rome is that he

shall

have

more

personal triumph eclipses

the "vile

conquest"

glory than her of Rome herself.

conquerors.27

His

Brutus
regards

sees

his
as

end as more

his death

far he

epitomizing and completing his than a last-ditch effort to salvage

virtuous some

life. He

honor from left to

defeat,

even while

understsnds suicide ss

the only honorable choice

25See

also

I.ii.8i-88.
Brutus'

he ssys in the corresponding speech in Plutarch "that not one of my friends hsth failed me at he begins, (Brutus, my Shakespeare's not complain of my fortune, but only for my country's sake. do and I need, my Plutarch, ed. W. W. Skeat (London: Macmillan and Company, 1875) 151. 27The last time Brutus mentions Rome is also the last time he mentions Cassius. 26Compare
silence

here

with whst

52.2-3):

"It

heart,"

rejoiceth

"

166
him (V.v. 23-25; manly love. Just
sake of see slso as

Interpretation
V.i.98-113). His

Lucilius

bravely

risks

is his crowning conquest in his own disgrace and death for the
end

Brutus'

defending
the
refusal of

Brutus'

likewise,

manly honor (V.iv. 12-25; "poor remains of

with

see also

V.v. 58-59), so,

when

friends"

to kill him
their

he
to

asks them to

fills his heart

joy

because he

understands

reluctance

28 personal loyalty and sacrifices spring from love (V.v. 1-42). Brutus believes the show of his loving admirers and friends serve to how, to the last, he is held in esteem by Rome. In more than the most obvious way, his death is Caesar's

fitting
and

revenge.

For in

Brutus'

own

eyes

the ultimate

measure

of

his fame
Rome"

glory is

not

his itself

public-spirited
him.29

men's personal

devotion to
as

devotion to his country but his country In the end, the virtue of the "Soul of
not patriotism.

(II. i. 32 1)

shows

manliness,

The Roman love

separates

of

distinc
not

tion, spurring him to only from his friends herself. Brutus does him "the
noblest

master other men's snd

hearts,

Brutus

finally

fsmily, but

even, or perhsps

especislly, from Rome

of course win

singulsr praise
all,"

and glory.

Antony,

who calls

Roman

of

them

says,
elements

His life So

was

gentle, and all the

mix'd

in

him,

that

Nature

might stand was a

up

And say to

all the world,

"This

man!"

(V.v. 69,73-75)

In

spite of of

Antony's

generous

praise,

or rather

precisely because
Even in "gentle

of the ambi

guity issue in the

Roman
none of

"a

man,"

the

untempered affirmstion of manliness seems

"mix'd"

ultimately to
Brutus,"

repudiation of one's

nature.

the

view of excellence encourages

the desire to have

all of the and

manly

and

the womanly

qualities.

Stressing hardness, distance,

and weakness.

assertiveness,

it teaches
avoid all scribes and
er"

men a willingness

to risk simple cruelty and callousness in order to

signs of

softness,
brothers'

dependence,
temper"

"hearts / Of

as own

shsring "sll

Brutus, we saw, de kind love, good thoughts,

quarrel with

reverence."

But his

sctions, psrticulsrly in the

his "broth

Cassius,
her

remind us

that while Rome was

founded
sacred

by

a pair of as

brothers,
not

even

own

traditional accounts

depict her
as

origins

lying

in

fraternity but
29This
Brutus"

fratricide.30

Moreover, just

Shakespesre

frequently

reminds us of

28MacCallum,
(V.v. 60)

271.

spirit of personalism allows

Octavius to take into

service those whom

he

says

"serv'd
to

he does

not

say, "serv'd Rome under

Brutus"

and who are recommended

even

him

on

the basis of their personal

devotion. Note that

of
Rome,"

Massala

speaks of

Brutus

master"

(V.v. 52, 64-67). For

and

discussion

the spirit of personalism in

Caesar,

see

"my Jan H. Blits,

as

"Caesarism
40-55-

the End of

Republican

The Journal of Politics, Vol. 43. No.

Brutus' Cassius'

1 (Feb.

1981)

30It is striking
"brother'

and

occur

in the

scene at

revesling that all eight of Sardis and in the

and

references to each other as

context of a contest of wills. second when

brother"

The first
Cassius'

occurs

in the opening words of their quarrel; the charge, demands to know how he should wrong "a

literally

Brutus, answering
not

angry his
enemies

if he does

wrong

even

Manliness
the literal mesning of

and

Friendship
so

in Julius Caesar
slso reminds us
wolf.32

167
thst those ssme

Brutus'

nsme,31

he

ssy Romulus wss nurtured by s sheShakespeare, I admires Roman virtue. In Caesar he shows that such excellence think, truly does indeed involve more than human strength. But Shakespeare's appreciation
sccounts
of

Romsn

manly virtue is by Rome's own traditional

no

means

unqualified.

His

portrayal

of

Rome, like
Romans

accounts of

her

foundations,

suggests that the

ultimately debase the human in

order to elevate the man.

(IV. ii. 37-39). The third

shames snd

reference

occurs

when

by acknowledging he is "Hated by the fourth not long sfter the qusrrel itself
(1. 211), tries (but

himself

one

Cassius, "aweary of the despairingly he loves; brsv'd by his (IV. iii. 95); when Csssius, commsnding "Hesr me, good
brother"

world,"

brother"

fails)

to counter

Brutus'

willful

plans and references

then is forced for the first time to defer explicitly to his seem,

overruling of his more prudent bsttle will (11. 223-224). The next two Just
a moment or so

by

contrast, to stress

reconciliation
brother"

and even amity.

lster,
our

Csssius, taking leave, begs his "dear

souls"

not

to let "such

division'

ever come

"'tween

again; and

(11.

232-236).

Brutus, assuring him thst everything is well, bids "Good night, Despite one's first impression, however, use of "good
Brutus'

brother"

good

brother"

does

not

reflect a restored of their quarrel phrase springs afford

a dozen lines after Cassius explicitly submits to his will, his use of the from the generosity of a conqueror, not the msnly esteem of sn equal. Brutus can to show Cassius greater friendliness and even praise him more highly than ever before

equslity or and less than

mutual respect

between him

snd

Cassius.

Coming

in the

general wake

(1. 231) precisely because Cassius, having been forced to friendship, can no longer threaten his domination. Indeed,
brother"

acknowledge

the

inequality

in their

Brutus'

valediction

comes

in direct

Cassius'

response to
ever call anyone
Brutus'

valediction

"Good night, my
accordance
with

lord"

"Good night, good (1. 236). At no

other time
references

does Cassius
"brother"

his

"lord."

In

to

both involve

issuing

Cassius military
moral

orders

this, the last two (11. 247, 303). The only

all

other time either man conspirators when conspiracy's

is

"brother"

spoken of as the other's

Brutus, forcing Cassius

III. i. 77.
the
connection

to bow to his

(II.i.70) directly precedes the meeting of domination, supplants him as the

leader.
esp. st

3lMost

l:I.ii.i-n; for

between the Lupercsl

race

and

the

story

of

Romulus,

see

Plutarch, Romulus 21.3-8,

and

Ovid. Fasti II.38iff.

THE WINTER'S TALE: THE TRIUMPH OF COMEDY OVER TRAGEDY

Mary Pollingue Nichols

Catholic

University

of America

At the
comic poet

end of

the

Symposium, Socrates
msn

tries to persuade a tragic poet

snd

snd a

thst the same

csn

drsmstize both tragedies becsuse

of

comedies

(223d).

Socrates'

sssertion seems psrsdoxicsl

the grest differences

between tragedy snd comedy ss we ordinsrily understsnd them. The choice of one of these drsmstic forms seems to imply s view of the humsn situstion snd

consequently of the function of the poet thst is st odds with the choice of the other. One csn see the different responses to life thst characterize the two
genres

by

contrasting the

masks associated with each one. wrote

Shakespeare, however,
that
contain elements of

both tragedies

and

comedies,

and even plays

both. The Winter's Tale is the

most obvious combina

tion of

tragedy and comedy: it has the appearance of two distinct dramas, a three-act tragedy followed by a two-act comedy. The two parts of the play are
separated

by

a sixteen-year

time span

and

involve two

sets of principal charac

ters. What is the difference between

compose

tragedy

and comedy?

How

can one man

both kinds

of plays?
can one

And,

given what

Shakespeare has done in The

a

Winter's Tale, how

nevertheless not

play contain both a tragedy and lose its unity? The answers to these questions
an analysis of and

comedy

and

and the whole

formed

by

the play come to light through

the action of

its

parts:

the tragedy, the transition to the comedy,

the comedy.

The

Tragedy
opens the

Archidamus, lord of Sicily, of

Archidamus does

a a

lord

of

Bohemia,
what

"great

difference"

play by reminding Camillo, a between Bohemia and Sicily. Although

not

indicate

he mesns, he
when

immediately

reveals

one

difference between Bohemia

the
present visit of

and

Sicily:

his

childhood
us,"

friend

and

Leontes, king of Sicily, returns king of Bohemia, Polixenes, "our

in
so embsrrsssed

entertainment shall shame

for "we

cannot with such magnificence

rare

I know

say"

not what

to

' (I. i. 8-1 3). Archidamus is

country's

failure to

mstch

Sicily's

msgnificent

sppears richer and more splendid

in its

court

courtly entertsinment. life than Bohemia. Archidamus its

visitors

by his Sicily
senses

drinks"

jokes that Bohemia

(unintelligent
us"

will give

"sleepy Sicily
desires

to

"that

[their]
us,

of our

insufficience)
In

may, though
sre

they

cannot praise snd to

as

little

accuse

(I. i.

13-15).

indulged

some extent

satisfied,
'All

while

in Bohemia they
to

are moderated, or perhaps

dulled.
Methuen,
1866).

citations

The Winter's Tale

are

to the Arden edition (London:

170
Camillo
moves

Interpretation
the conversation

from the

"insufficience"

of

Bohemia's

entertainments

to the incompleteness of the

kings'

friendship. Although the

of

kings
their

were

"train'd together in their

continued through

childhoods,"

because
gifts,

"royal

neces

friendship

"interchange

of

letters, loving

embas-

sies,"

rather than through personal contact

(I. i.

22-29).

Since Bohemia is

now

in childhood "cannot visiting his old friend, the affection "rooted betwixt (I. i. 23-24). For Camillo, time does not destroy but choose but branch
now"

them"

only arrests. What Camillo "the heavens continue their In Camillo's

presents as
loves"

necessary,
31-32).

however, he

soon prays

for:

(I. i.

commonplace

appeal

to
will

heaven, Shakespeare
initiate the
play's

warns

us

of

trouble: a quarrel between the

friends

action our

and

the

tragedy
called

of the

first

part of the play.

refer

The "great difference betwixt

quarrel

Bohemia

Sicily"

and your

can

to the

by

the names of their countries, as

between the kings, who are often well as to the differences between the

countries.

Shakespeare's
and
of

dissimilsrity impossibility

pun prepares us to reflect on the relationship between hostility. The tragedy of the first part of the play involves the friendship between dissimilar human beings.

Archidamus turns the conversation, rather abruptly, to the excellence of Leontes's son, Mamillius, "a gentleman of the greatest promise that ever came
(I. i. 35-36). (We see that Archidamus is revealing another into my difference between Bohemia and Sicily when we find out in the next scene that Polixenes
also
note"

has

son,

with

whom

Archidamus

must

also

be

familiar.)

Mamillius, Archidamus says, is "an

on crutches ere

comfort"

unspeakable

to

Sicily; Camillo

agrees that the child "physics the subject, makes old

he

was

born desire

yet

their life to see him a

an excellent

hearts fresh: they that went (I. i. 37-40).

man"

The

prospect of seeing the maturity of for living, Camillo believes, although

versstion

human

being

is

fit

reason
con-

one

be

otherwise unfortunate. of a

The

hss

moved

from the

anticipated completion

friendship
ends,

to the
we see

anticipated maturation of an excellent

a

human being. As the

and the

scene

disagreement between the lord live for,

men

of

Sicily

lord

of

Bohemia. Without
asserts.

anything to
amus,

would

be

content

to

die, Camillo

Archid

desire to live, they will invent a reason for living if they do not have one: "If the king had no son they would desire to live on crutches till he had (I. i. 44-45). Archidamus should know about for he comes from the country that boasts neither this, nor a
thinks that since men
one"

however,

"magnificence"

human

being by

"of the

promise."

greatest

the more moderate

gested

Bohemia. The

Sicily seems to have greater goods insufficiency of moderation might be

who

than

sug

the

fsct thst it is Polixenes

the old friendship. He is the visitor, and

period of nine months.

spparently initiates remains in Sicily for

the renewal of the rather

long

Political duties fear "of

what

now call chance

may

Polixenes home, but Leontes, ignoring Polixenes 's / Or breed upon [his] (I. i. 11-12), urges
absence"

him to stay

another week.

When Leontes

asks

his

wife

Hermione to try to

The Winter's Tale

persuade their

171

"too

coldly"

friend to stay, she reproaches her husband for charging Polixenes (I. ii. 29-30). Her rhetoric proves successful. She first suggests to
should srgue thst

her husband that he

edges

"All in Bohemia's

well."

She

acknowl

the validity of public

sre

demsnds

upon a ruler's private

made.

inclinations, but
son

she

denies that demsnds Polixenes to

return

now

being

Nor does love for his

move

home,
a

she

argues, for he does

not give this as a reason

for

leaving. Hermione
will allow

next attempts

to bargain: if Polixenes stays now, Hermione

Leontes

longer

visit

in Bohemia. Hermione's concession,

refuses

a move
own

that in a political situation might indicate weakness, is premised on her

rule of

Leontes. When Polixenes

(I. ii.

her compromise, Hermione threatens

to employ force: "Will you go yet? / Force me to

keep

you as a

prisoner, / Not

like
a

guest?"

51-53).

Because Polixenes

prefers to

be

a guest rather than

prisoner, he
moved

yields.

have

from

gentleness to

then to threats of
enes
with

simply political, she would from harshness, argument, to compromise, and force. But Hermione is obviously being plsyful, and Polix but her friend. Because
a

If Hermione's

rhetoric were

is

not

her

political opponent out of affection ss

friend desires to be desire to be for

with

his friends
and

for them, Polixenes

would

Hermione

Leontes

long

ss there were no

compelling

ressons

depart-

ing. When Hermione

sssumes

thst she hss overcome Polixenes 's ressons for

and to threaten, she is pretending that a he is naturally inclined to do. Hermione's because it implicitly appeals to Polixenes's

departing
friend
playful

and

proceeds

to bargain
what

must

be induced to do force
how

threat of

succeeds much

friendship:
threat of

indicating

Polixenes's

presence

is desired, Hermione's

force says, in effect, stay because I want you to stay. Although Polixenes placed his political duties above his private desires in planning to
return

home, he is

not always

immune to the

appeals

of

love

or

friendship.
or

Underlying
ship.

Hermione's

playful political rhetoric

is

a rhetoric of

love

friend

Her

speech masks what

is

playful and

loving

in

form that is

serious and

political.

Having charged less coldly than her husband, and succeeded where he failed, Hermione turns the conversation to the playful days of childhood that Polixenes and Leontes shared. Something that she notices in Polixenes appar
ently leads her to think that he is different from her husband: "Was not my lord But Polixenes does not see sny difference. The / The verier wag friends were slike in their childhood innocence ss well ss in their youth, when (I. ii. 71-73). were "higher rear'd with stronger their "wesk
o'

th'

two?"

spirits"

blood"

Because

of their

high spirits, Polixenes

cover

avers,

they

must admit

their guilt to

heaven. Perhaps to up his suggestion that he and his friend have yielded to sexual desires forbidden by God's law, Polixenes claims that the temptations
wives. But Polixenes has only entangled himself that implied has sex, lawful or unlawful, is sinful. Hermione further, for he ii. 67-68). We may suppose that vehemently objects to such an implication (I. Polixenes is grateful to Leontes for interrupting by inquiring whether Polixenes

that led them to sin were their

172
has been
persuaded

Interpretation
to stay. Because Leontes hss
not

been listening, he hss friend. He does

at

not

lesrned from Hermione how to

sppeal successfully to a into the conversation, however, sn exsmple of his own success and st the ssme time puts forwsrd sn spproval of love and
contrasts
with

bring
that

persuading,

marriage

sharply only once to better purpose than she just spoke in winning Polixenes over, Leontes says, namely, when she accepted Leontes's marriage proposal. At that time Leontes had some difficulty in winning her: "Three crabbed months
spoke

Polixenes's hint that

even

lawful

sex

is

sinful.

Hermione

had

sour'd

themselves to death / Ere I could make thee open

love"

thy
she

white

hand /

And clap thyself my (see V. iii. 36). Hermione

enes

(I. ii.

102-04).

He

was

the

lover,

the

beloved

agrees

that she twice spoke to good purpose and offers Polix

her hand. In

an aside

infidelity. His friend has

wife's not

made

Leontes abruptly and violently him a cuckold. Why else

speaks of would

Hermione's
yield

he

to his

entreaty to
own.

his

stay but not to his own? Perhaps even his son, Mamillius, is What has moved Leontes to such thoughts? Although his passion
the
to

seems

inexplicable,
to

his

inferiority

Hermione

insecurity underlying his jealousy might be fostered by an inferiority that we glimpse in comparing Her
with

mione's speech self suggests

Polixenes

Leontes's

cold

charge,

and that

Leontes him

in his description
unable

of

his

courtship.
of

When Leontes is

to hide his passion, Hermione asks the cause

his

"distraction"

(I. ii.

149).

He thought he

saw

himself

as

lad

when

he

looked

at

his son, he says, but he lies: his

son with
of

passion

involves his

inability

to see

himself in his
to subjects

because
said

any certainty. Although Mamillius might bring his great promise, he gives his father "some

comfort

comfort"

because he is
others, but he

to look like him (I. ii. 208). But it is women who say this,
might

and women will

makes

say anything (I. ii. 130-31). Mamillius his father anxious. for his distraction

bring

comfort to

Leontes's
of

excuse

changes the subject to the

kings'

love

their sons. Polixenes claims that

his

son

is
matter:

all

my exercise, my mirth, my

Now my

sworn

friend,

and then mine

enemy;

My
He
And

parasite, my soldier, statesman, all.

makes a
with

July's

day

short as

December;
in
me

his varying
would

childishness cures

Thoughts that

thick my blood

(I. ii. 166-71).

Polixenes's

son's

"varying
his father
blood"

childishness"

(or his ability to play

as

even contradic

tory parts)
would

gives

a new perception of

time and cures "Thoughts that

sad
and

thick

[his]

perhaps

thoughts the

fearful

ss

desth. In

moving his viewer from s Tale.

Winter'

ssdness to mirth,

child prefigures

the course of The

The Winter's Tale

Leontes

173

goes for a walk and meets Camillo. He assumes that his wife's is well known and that he has been made a laughingstock (I. ii. adultery 215-19). He insists that Csmillo poison Polixenes. Csmillo soon meets Polix

enes,

who

has just

encountered
of

Leontes

and noticed

how

upset

he is. Perhaps

conscious of

Leontes's lack
/
as

restraint, Camillo had

wears at

earlier warned

him, "with
and and

a countenance as clear
queen"

friendship

feasts

keep

with

Bohemia /

with

your

(I. ii.

343-45).

Leontes
grief

cannot
of a

conceal

his passion,

Polixenes

supposes that province

Leontes's

is that

man who

has lost

some

dearly

loved

(I. ii.

370-71).
and

When Camillo

warns

Polixenes
of
a

they

escape to

Hermione to feel the full force

she asks

Leontes's

passion.

Bohemia, they leave Not yet suspecting danger,

rather

Mamillius to tell her

tale. He chooses a sad tale

than a merry

one, for "a sad tale's best for

goblins"

winter"

(II. i.

25).

He

offers one of no control.

"sprites
it"

and

of

forces

or elements over which man

has

tells such tales

27-28).

frequently, for Hermione

observes

"you're

powerful at

He evidently (II. i.

is

on

By chance, a winter's tale, a sad tale, is appropriate now, for Leontes his way to imprison Hermione, and thus to initiate a series of events that
consequences.

have tragic

Enraged

by

Polixenes's
are

departure, Leontes is
against

certain

that

Polixenes, Cam
Just he
as

illo,

and

Hermione

plotting

his life

and crown. meant that

Leontes

assumed that commit

Polixenes's

admiration

for Hermione

would

try

to

him

entirely.

adultery with her, he now assumes that Polixenes will try to replace In assuming that Polixenes has no restraint, Leontes assumes that
counterpart

Polixenes is like himself. Leontes's Polixenes is the ironic

are alike.

his similarity to to Polixenes's belief that he and his friend

mistaken assumption about

Hermione

gives

birth to

daughter in

prison.

Her companion,

Lady

Paul
child"

ina,

takes the
40).

baby

to Leontes because he
or

"may

soften at

the sight of her

(II. ii.

Paulina's boldness
shown

hsrdness his

contrasts with

the gentleness that

undertakes the task
office

Hermione has
of

in

previous scenes.

Although Paulina
child

informing
best"

the

king
I'll

of the

birth

of

because "the

/ Becomes

woman

(II. ii. 31-32),

use

she expresses

her determination in forceful terms:

wit

the tongue I

have; if

flow from 't

As boldness from my bosom, let 't not be doubted (II. ii. 52-54). I shall do good

Psulina has Leontes

42-44).

deserved

reputation

for boldness:
lady"

after not

commands

"that

audacious

Paulina

he imprisoned Hermione, to come near him (II. ii.

Nevertheless Hermione lets Paulina take her

baby

to Leontes. Perhaps
and

she sees that

must

her

own gentleness

is insufficient to

move

Leontes

that she

rely

on

Paulina's boldness. Hermione's

earlier

threat of force was, after

all, only
mstters

playful.

worse.

iii. 26-27.) But Paulina's boldness only makes Leontes becomes more enraged. In the end Psulins leaves the
(See V

174

Interpretation
with

baby

Leontes,

who tricks

Paulina's husband, Antigonus, into agreeing to

public

abandon

the

baby

on some

deserted isle.
trial for adultery and treason.

In the third act, Hermione is brought to Leontes desires that her trial be
public so

that he may be "clear'd / Of

justice"

being
II. i.
self-

tyrannous, since we so openly / Proceed in 163-65). Leontes depends greatly on the good
esteem.

(III. ii. 4-6;

cf.

opinion of others

for his

From the
at

moment

he

suspected

adultery, Leontes has

shown a

fear

of

being

laughed

196-98).

(I. ii. 188-90; I. ii. 217-18; I. iii. 23-26; II. i. 50-52; II. i. Leontes wants neither to be ridiculed nor to be considered a tyrant.

Yet his

passion now

forces him to dismiss

as

all sensible

advice,

and

his "most
tyranny"

cruel usage of

[his]

(II. iii.

1 16-19).

Paulina says, "something savours / Of His desire not to be laughed at has turned him into s tyrant.
shows no concern over so

queen,"

Although Hermione
wsnt

to

maintsin

her honor. She desires to do

lsughed st, she does less for her own sske thsn for

being

her children's, for she pssses her honor onto them. Indeed, this honor is more vsluable to her than her life (III. ii. 42-45). When Leontes asks for her death,
she claims not
goods

to

consider

it

punishment, for she has been deprived

of

the

living: Leontes's favor, Mamillius (from whom she is now barred), her infant daughter, and her public dignity. She wonders "what blessings I have here alive / That I should fear to (III. ii. 107-08).
that made her life
worth
die?"

She

confirms

Camillo 's

opinion

that people

desire to live only if they have

sight of an excellent alive appear to

something human being to be that good, the

private or personal.

good

to live for. But

while

Camillo thought the

goods that

keep

Hermione

be

At the The
cile

news of

Mamillius's death, Hermione

asks

swoons and

is

carried out.

ing

Apollo's pardon, and states his intention to recon himself to Hermione. But Paulina enters screaming tyranny and announc Hermione's death. She informs Leontes that his crimes allow no forgive
chastened

Leontes

ness

(III. ii. 207-14).

Leontes has
nated: a spouse's

none of

the reasons for

living

that Hermione earlier

desig

favor, Mamillius, an infant daughter, or public dignity. As for Leontes's public dignity, Leontes will engrave the cause of his wife's and
son's

deaths

on

their gravestones "unto / Our shame

perpetual"

(III. ii.

236-38).

Leontes's

model

in Shakespeare's source, Pandosto,

to those sackless souls whose

wants

to "offer

[his] guilty
vigorous

blood

a sacrifice

lives

are

lost

by [his]

folly."2

Leontes, in
are now

to

die,

although

contrast, without any reasons for living, indicates tears and mourning will characterize his future (III. ii.

no

desire

238-43).

We

in

a position

to ask why the action of the

first

part of the

has

ended

in

sadness.

What

are the elements of a

tragedy?

Why

play did it happen?

We begin

with

two

men who are

trying

to

be

friends,

yet who are

different

and

2Robert Greene, Pandosto,

reprinted

in The Winter's Tale,

p.

198.

The Winter's Tale

do
not understand

175
did
not act as

that

they

are

different. If

each man

if the

other with

were

like him, there

surprised when acts ss

would

have been
msn,
snd

no quanel.

Polixenes is familiar

Hermione; he is
He is
Polixenes

a moderate

his

moderation permits

his fsmilisrity.
For the

Leontes

supposes thst

his

familiarity

implies impropriety.
own.

if his friend's judgment

without

would

be identicsl to his
would

immoderste Leontes,

he too he

supposes

be impossible, snd fsmilisrity impropriety thst his friend is like himself. If Polixenes were like Leontes,
mske

would not

unwittingly
and

Leontes

jeslous; if Leontes
alike or

were

like Polixenes,

Polixenes'

actions would not make

either

him jealous. There

would

be

no

tragedy
their

if Leontes

Polixenes

were

if they

fully

understood

differences. Other factors

snd contribute to the trsgedy.

By

Polixenes

convince

Leontes thst his

suspicions

retresting from Sicily, Csmillo sre justified. Their flight

seems wesk and unmsnly.

Leontes did thresten Csmillo's death. Paulina, how

with

ever, argues vehemently

cruel punishments

Leontes,

and

nevertheless

does

not

suffer

the

that he threatens (II. iii. 94-95; 113; 132-40). In

"loss"

contrast

to

her, Camillo appears too cautious. His lack of boldness outcome. On the other hand, part of the tragedy is the
princess, and

contributes
of

to the

the new that

for this Paulina's boldness is

Leontes in

responsible.

Paulina

claimed

soften his anger, but showing the princess to Leontes would be a bold move to when

Paulina leaves her

with

rage, she divorces boldness from s

occurs

ressonsble cslculstion of success.

Tragedy

because Camillo's
passion.

cautious

acts

and

Paulina's bold

ones

strengthen

Leontes's
of

Just

as

Camillo

should not

have left Hermione in the hsnds

princess

Leontes,

so

Psulins

should not

hsve left the

in his hsnds.
because Mamillius languishes
news.

Trsgedy

occurs also

and

dies,

and

Hermione

collapses when she endures even when

hears the

Their desire to live is

of the good

they

are

deprived

strong that it things for which they live.

not so

Too

12-17). It is not surprising that nobility leads to tragedy (III. iii. Leontes cannot see himself in his son. Mamillius's weak will is no doubt and goblins. A related to his propensity to tell frightening winter tales of sprites man a world man to hostile such beings is irrational and world inhabited
much

by

cannot make

his home. If

men are

necessarily
actions

separated

by

their

differences, if
and

friendship
appear

is impossible, if human
and

necessarily have

undesirable

even tragic consequences

because of their one-sidedness, then the world

man

does

irrational

hostile to

a condition

metaphorically

expressed

by

belief in fearful

sprites and goblins. not

Tragedy

occurs

least because

of

Leontes's
wife and

passion.

His

violent

jeal

loved by his Underlying a by ousy reveals his desire to be their love desire to be loved is a desire to be lovable, but Leontes can demand supposed injustice done the at anger His of it. with justice only if he is worthy love. At the core of their of him indicates that he believes he is in fact worthy

his friend.

176

Interpretation
a suppression

his passion, which is most obviously the cause of this tragedy, is of the disjunction between wish and reality. Leontes's actions is less than
perfect and result

deny

that

he

in

great

disorder.
with certain

A tragedy
often seem

occurs when

human beings

imperfections interact

with one another.

Their imperfections do
with

not always

indicate their vices, but

Men's differences, manifested in hostility. (Polixenes's modera lead them to and their virtues, misunderstanding tion and Leontes's inordinate desire for good things are examples, as well as
concomitant

their virtues.

Hermione's gentleness, Paulina's boldness, good things that men do harm them, and the
with

and

Camillo's caution.) Since the

good things about them are mixed

natural or

imperfections, there seems to be something in the order of things, whether divine, that is hostile to man. Two attitudes toward this situation, a
hard one,
are presented as

soft one and a

resigned

leading

to tragedy. One may be so

to the

does Mamillius. The

frustrating character of life that one loses one's will to live, as frightening sprites of his tales, inexplicable and threaten
the
actions of

ing,

appear

to

control

those most
and act as

dear to him. On the

other

hand,

one might rebel against the

if nothing mysterious will have sprites, any effect on one's life. Specifically, Leontes acts as if he can understand his wife, who is superior to him, and his friend, who is different from him. He
assumes

he

can

righteously

dispense justice understanding

not
also

upon

the guilty. He acts as if the

world permitted complete

and control.

In the last

part of the

play, comedy

appears possible

resignation and

rebellion, but

simply because there is a mean between because some men may not be subject to a

condition

that demands resignation or rebellion.

The Transition to the The last

scene of the

Comedy
fourth
act provide abandon

third act and the first scene of the

a transition to ment of chorus events.

the

play's comedy.

The former involves Antigonus 's

the second is a

the princess and his

who

death;

soliloquy

by
on

the deathless

Time,

informs

us of

the passage of sixteen years and its interim

provide reflection
man can

The two scenes, taken together,

and the

thereby help tragedy in The Winter's Tale.

natural order and

us to understand

how comedy

supersede

Antigonus is
A
storm

at

sea,

looking
of

for

a place

to abandon

Hermione's daughter.
storm reveals that the

threatens. While the

oppose the

mariner

believes that the

views

heavens
means

loss

Perdita, Antigonus

the storm as heaven's

to her

destruction. Natural

phenomena are presented as opaque guides to

heaven's

will.

abandons Perdita in Bohemia. A shepherd, who is trying to find his lost sheep before they are devoured by a wolf, finds the baby and takes it up "for (III. iii. 76). He believes that the gold he finds with the is
pity"

Antigonus

baby

fairy
are

gold, for "it

was

told

me

should

be

rich

by

fairies"

(III. iii.

116).

We

The Winter's Tale

moving from a world in which sprites fairies are thought to bring joy. The
"some
changeling"

177
frighten
for
men

and goblins

to one in which

shepherd also supposes that the

baby

is At

a child

left

by fsiries

in

exchsnge

some mortal one.

the same time that there arises the

who

possibility possibility

of a world of a

inhabited

by

fsiries

bring joy,

there

slso arises the

human

being

who somehow

transcends

ordinary humsn limits.

shepherd's

A clown, the
sea
and

son,

reports thst

that

Antigonus himself is
the clown, he called
unlike old

being

torn

Antigonus 's ship is destroyed st and eaten by a bear. When

the clown
would

Antigonus
The
clown

saw

for help, but

did

not

interfere.

is

his father,
child

who wishes

that he

have "been

by

to

have help'd the

of

man!"

(III. iii.

106-07).

Antigonus's
abandon:

misfortune reminds us

his

earlier wish

for the
Some

he is forced to

powerful spirit nurses!

instruct the kites

and

and ravens

To be thy

Wolves

Casting
Like

their savageness

bears they say, aside, have done

(II. iii. pity,
of 185-88).

offices of

pity
expected

But
not

bear, from

whom

Antigonus

mauls

him to death. He dies

hungry"

because

of nature's

malice, but because

never curst

clown

notes, bears "are

also

but

when

they

its indifference, for, as the are (III. iii. 128clown's

cowardice.3

29).

Antigonus dies
of

because

of

human vice, the

who

The

office

pity is

performed

by

the shepherd,

takes

Perdita "for in

pity."

Nature's indifference, human baseness, and human onus's destruction and the baby's salvation.
At the

goodness operate

Antig

beginning
bad,
a

amoral order good and

Act IV, the chorus Time reveals the existence of an that overlooks human events: Time is both joy and terror for the
of

the

force that both

makes and unfolds error

(IV. i.

1-2).

Not

only is Time indifferent to the virtue and the vice of those whom it affects, Time inclines equally to making error and bringing it to light. Time also claims an absolute power over man: "it is in my power / To o'erthrow law, and in one
custom"

self-born

hour / To
over and

plant and o'erwhelm

(IV. i.

7-10).

Time is

force

that

lords

limits the
that the

structures
audience never

nevertheless observes

resulting from human striving. Time would pass its time well by watching
worse spent than

the play, snd wishes thst

its time

be

in this

manner.

By

concluding us, inasmuch The

with an expression of goodwill

for
sn

all

as

Time began
of

by

proclaiming

its audience, Time indifference to msn. first

in the indifference
snd

surprises

beginning
the

the fourth

set repests msn

the end of the

psrt

of

the

plsy (the

the indifference of Time to

storm and

is

reflected

of nsture

besr)
is

to the msriners,

moves

the

shepherd

a reflection of

Perdita. The pity that Time's benevolence. The new beginning

Antigonus,

of the

play

generalizes

the end of the

to a call

tragedy in
when

that

it

provides

cosmic

3The
51-77)-

clown

later

responds

for

help

there

is

no risk to

his

own

life (IV. iii.

178
restatement

Interpretation
of
what

has happened

on

human level. The

which or

question

of

the

relationship between the two halves of the play, at Time appears, turns on the possibility of goodwill
where

juncture the

chorus

benevolence in

a world

destruction

and salvation occur at random.

The The
scene chorus

Comedy
the passage of sixteen years, sets the
of

Time, having
grown

chronicled

in Bohemia. Time tells Perdita "now

us of

Leontes's grief,
/ Equal
with

Polixenes's

son

Florizel,
24).

and of

in

wond'rin

grace

(IV. i.

We

look forward to the possibility that Perdita will fulfill the promise that Mamillius was thought to bear. If Time's effect has not been to heal all wounds, the
passage of

Time

nevertheless allows

for the birth

of new possibilities. unities

(See III.
order to

105-07.) Shakespeare violates the traditional dramatic present a fuller vision of human life.

i.

in

The play has begun again in another sense as well, for again someone is expressing a desire to leave someone who persuades him to stay. This time
Polixenes
return persuades

to

Sicily

Camillo to stay in Bohemia, although Camillo desires to to die at home and to comfort the penitent Leontes (IV ii. 5-9).
to leave

As Polixenes

earlier wanted

Sicily

for

political

reasons, he

now wants which

Camillo to stay for

political reasons:

"Thou, having

made me

businesses,
done"

none without thee can

sufficiently manage,
with

must either

stay to execute them

(IV

thyself,
13-17).
what
what

or

take away
we

thee the very service thou hast

reminded of

ii.

Because

have just been

Polixenes does is
mortal:

not reckon on. wants

Camillo

to go
permit

clearly completely depend on home because he foresees his death. But

He
should not so

time,

we can see more

for Polixenes it is
attempt

"death"

to

him to

return

to

Sicily

(IV. ii.

2).

His

to hold off change is reminiscent of

his description

of

his

own child

hood,
as

when

he thought "there

was no more

behind, / But
own

such a

day

to-morrow

(I. ii. 63-65). to-day, / And to be a boy Polixenes abruptly changes the subject to his
at
and

eternal"

son,

Florizel,

who

is

spending time

the cottage of a shepherd girl "Of most rare

agree

note"

(IV. ii.

43).

Polixenes
out what

disguised to the shepherd's cottage to find is going on. Meanwhile on s country rosd we meet the rogue Autolycus, very ragged, but singing s hsppy song. He gives s brief sccount of himself, snd therefore
to go
stsnds out not reflective characters.

Camillo

simply ss the only singer in the plsy but Autolycus used to wear fine clothes

as one of
and serve

its

most

Florizel,

but he has been dismissed. have His

According

misfortunes, for he has means

his song, he does not mourn over his to live still (IV. iii. 1-22). While he claims to
to
also appears that

joy

because he has life, it song

he has life because he has joy. is

more useful than

second

praises the virtues of

being

merry: mirth

sonow, because the merry

can accomplish

their goals more

quickly (IV. iii.

The Winter's Tale

119-22).
might

179
as a

Autolycus
unable to
playful

can obtain what

is necessary for life,

sorrow

despondent

man

be
a

do. We

see the truth of this statement confirmed when we

of

witness

rendition sees

its

converse:

is

not conducive

to life.

When Autolycus
pretends
clothes

the clown approaching, he grovels on the ground, and

to be a gentleman who has been

who

beaten,

and robbed of

his money

and

by Autolycus,
is

dressed him in his

to warrant

present rags.

Implying

that his

condition

death, he groans to the oncoming clown, "pluck but off these rags; and then, death, (IV. iii. 52-53). In this con dition Autolycus cries the classic tragic lament, "O that ever I was (IV
so miserable as
death" born!"

iii.

56).

He

reminds us of a

tragic

teaching

that

thing is
acts

not to

have

come

into existence,
conveyed

and the next

life is miserable, that the best best is, having come into

existence, to leave it as quickly as

out

possible.4

In his feigned

despair, Autolycus

playfully the truth

appears ss

tragedy

by Mamillius's death. Now, however, to be mocked snd to be used as an instrument to something

brings the
clown

cloak one's purposes.

Autolycus 's
picked.

pretense

close enough to

have his

pocket

Autolycus then looks forward to the sheep-shearing festival of which the clown spoke, where like a wolf he himself will shear the unsuspecting His sheep (IV iii. 1 15-18). Autolycus's name literally means "the wolf
itself."

pretense

court, it is having indeed Autolycus who has beaten, robbed, and dressed Autolycus in rags. The facts of Autolycus's story are true, but his reaction to those facts is a pretense.
assumes that out of

before the clown, however, is in Autolycus is responsible for

one sense not a pretense at all.

If

one

been thrown

Only

to the better man Autolycus to disgrace

or misfortune.

pretends

to

be is death
not

an

appropriate re

sponse
reasons

Autolycus does

justify

his life

by finding

does Leontes, whose name also is the name of a beast. The similarity between the two men, however, goes only so far. Autolycus's indifference to his petty vice finds no counterpart in Leontes's grief for

living

any

more than

for the

great

harm he has

caused.

While Leontes does

possibility. shepherd. relation

not consider

suicide, he
of

does not, like Autolycus, parody the the wolf is the antithesis of the good
When
we reflect on

The lion is the

king

beasts;

Autolycus's

same man might write

both
a

comedies and

tragedy, we can tragedies. A comedy in

of a would

to

see

how the Auto

noble

which

lycus

starred would

be

lowly

imitation

tragedy: a character

less

than one
grief.

finds in tragedy

acts in a way that of

bring

a nobler character to

Autolycus has lost the favor

and

the one he served, disgraced himself at

court,

disrupted his life; he has But he is joyous,

such
circumstsnces:

suffered a pallid version of what

Leontes

has

suffered.

and

distraught in
wants

ridicules the possibility of being he plsyfully pretends to be someone who

even

to

die in the face

the
mirth of

of

the

world's evil.

His joke
we

doubly
view

serves

life: the

humor

and

the joke

support

life, if

may

his joke in the

4See Sophocles, Oedipus

at

Colonus,

1224-26.

180
way in which he of life out of the
views

Interpretation
his merry song;
and

his joke brings him the

sustenance

clown's picked pockets.

Autolycus thus lacks the nobility

of a

tragic figure. Without the nobility, there is no pain;

can and

when we see comedies we

forget
laugh

or

blind

ourselves

to the suffering about which

and without

tragedy

reminds

us,

A forgetting would cause tragedian who of Autolycus's exploits could be written a abstracts comedy by from nobility. Such a comedy serves life, just as Autolycus's joy serves life.
at what with

tears.'

nobility

But

since

this kind

of

comedy blinds
on our

and therefore

deceives us, it is

a or

joke

on

us, just as Autolycus's joke is

the clown. Perhaps

being

deceived

blinded

is

a small price

to pay, if

knowing

necessarily brings
of

sonow and

defeat.6

Before the
and

guests anive at sees

't"

the sheep-shearing

festival,

we meet

Florizel

Perdita. Florizel

the festival as "a meeting

the petty gods, / And you

at ease with

[Perdita]
her
console

the queen on

(IV

iv.

3-5).

Perdita, in

contrast, is ill

goddess'

costume as well as with

the prince's country garb. Florizel tries to

them"

their

her with the thought that he merely imitates the gods, who "Humbling deities to love, have taken / The shapes of beasts upon (IV iv. 26-27). He then claims superiority to the gods, since "my desires / Run not
my lusts / Burn hotter than my When Perdita claims that Florizel will not be able to
mine

before

honour,

faith"

nor

(IV
resist

iv.

33-35).

his father's

opposition to their

marriage, Florizel

protests:

Or

not

Or I'll be thine, my fair, my father's. For I cannot be

nor

Mine own,
I be
not

anything to any, if
am most constant no

thine. To this I

Though

destiny

say

(IV. iv.

42-46).

Florizel

destiny
thing
Stsnd Perdita

resists not merely the authority of his father and king, but also that of itself. Whatever Florizel means by destiny, he does not mean some

powerful enough to
responds to

determine his life in

view of

Florizel's

destiny
8

with a prayer:

way contrary to his desires. "O lady Fortune, /

appears not to realize that

suspicious!"

you

(IV. iv.

51-52).

Florizel

by Leontes's lords for blaming Leontes for what he has done, be punish'd, that have minded you / Of what you should forget" (III. ii. Does Paulina's later contrivance of a resurrection scene serve as her penance?
rebuked

5Paulina,

acknowl

edges, "Let

me

225-26).

drinks" of poetry would be like Archidamus's that prevent awareness of "sleepy Camillo protests that such drinks are unnecessary (I. i. 11-18). 7Cf. Falstaff, who, dressed as a deer for his lovemaking, questions, "When gods have hot backs, what shall poor men The Merry Wives of Windsor, V. v. 11-12. See Aristophanes,
"insufficience." do?"

'This kind

Clouds, 1080-82. 8Soon at the sheep-shearing festival, Perdita

When the disguised Camillo
.

reminds others of

limits to human

achievement.

envisions
.

Perdits

as a shepherdess who cares

gazing"

he "would lesve grszing and only live by that blasts of Janusry / Would blow you through
men not

at and of the

through,"

for mankind, he claims her (IV. iv. 109-10). "You'd be so lean Perdita reproaches him. She reminds
of other

only

of

the

limitations

of chance

and

wills

men, but also of

necessities.

bodily

The Winter's Tale

fortune may turn
without

181
may
not

out

badly

for him, that

chance

be

force that,
"I bless

any activity
chance

on

his part,

will conform events

to his benefit or desires.

Perhaps the
time,"

that

brought him to Perdita

supports

his

confidence:

the

ground"

he says, "When my good falcon made her flight across / Thy father's (IV. iv. 14-16). Perdita immediately cautions, "Now Jove sfford you
chance

csuse!"

Florizel's faith in

is his

evinced

by

his lack

of

his father's difference

ence

certain opposition to

marriage

to Perdita (IV

any plan to counter iv. 412-14). The

of a

we see

between Florizel
court and
us'd
fear"

and

between life in

life in the
(IV

country.9

Perdita may be a reflection "Florizel's

17-18).

differ Perdita
son

greatne

says, "hath not been

of a

to

iv.

Because Florizel is the

him
no need

king,

she

means, necessity has imposed

upon

to limit his

desires. He is

accustomed to

Florizel
provoked

stands

getting whatever he wants. in contrast to Mamillius. While Mamillius told

attempts to remove
red with
o' mirth"

sad

tales that

fear,

Florizel

fear. When Perdita fears the future,

merry"

he

counsels not

her "let's be / The his

mirth

(IV. iv. 54), "be

"darken

th'

feast (IV. iv. 41-42;

part of the

see also

IV

(IV. iv. 46), iv. 24-25).

The

"mirth"

word
of

appeared son

in the tragic
165-71).

play only in Polixenes's

description

(I. ii.

be is

so not

because he

senses no restrictions on

Florizel is merry and urges others to his ability to fulfill his desires. It

surprising that he sees no cause for sadness. The sad tales of Mamillius portrayed a world in which frightening goblins affected men's actions.

Perdita, in her
sistent with

awareness of
she

human limitation,

resembles

her brother. Con

guests arrive

this awareness,
Perdits'

is

not

inclined to her for

rule.

When the

st

the

(IV

festival, iv. 62-70;

mistress

feast's

the feast presiding see also IV. iv. 71-72). Although Perdita begins to play the when rebuked by her stepfather, her silence soon allows others
s
stepfather chides

not

over

to make the decisions concerning the

entertainment

(IV. iv.

153-54; 2I4;

310-14;

341-42).
s primary act as mistress of the feast is distributing flowers to her When the disguised Polixenes and Camillo receive flowers that last

Perdita'

guests.

throughout the winter, Polixenes observes that Perdita appropriately

ages

"Fit[s]

our

/ With flowers

winter"

of

(IV. iv.

78-79).

True to character, Perdita

to his age.

derives from his

her
guests

remark a standard guest

by

which she

tries to distribute flowers to all

appropriate

each of

should

receive

flowers

Her

dispensation

flowers

will remind

the recipient of his relationship to time, that

is,

of

his

mortality. of

Perdita's distribution

the

fitting

soon encounters an obstacle.

Polixenes

'Shakespeare
with respect conversstion

makes no attempt

in The Winter's Tale to

and

to the nstural setting or with respect to the inhabitsnts.

in Greene's Pandosto between Dorastus Fswnia

praises

country life ss idyllic, either He omits sny rendering of the Fawnia (the counterparts of Florizel and
represent

country life in contradistinction to court life (p. 208). In the first scene in the Bohemian countryside, we see a bear who mauls Antigonus to death (III. iii. 57-58), and then a shepherd who complains of the vices of the young (III. iii. 58-68).

Perdita) in

which

182
and

Interpretation
Camillo deserve
not

the flowers

of winter are

but the flowers

"nature's

of

autumn, she
which she

asserts, but the fairest flowers

refuses

bastards,"

of autumn

because they are grown by crossbreeding, which she thinks repugnant to nature (IV. iv. 87-88). Because Perdita will distribute only what nature produces, she is doubly limited by nature: autumn flowers, appropriate
to cultivate

for Polixenes

and

Camillo, do
autumn

not

bloom in midsummer,

when

occurs; even if it were

Perdita

could not give them the

sheep-shearing fairest flowers

because

she will not crossbreed.

It is in human

fitting

that a ruler responds to

Perdita'

intimation that the

role of art

affairs

is illegitimate. If
of

art

is illegitimate, the laws

by

which rulers an art

govern and

the art

improves

nature's

statesmanship are also illegitimate. If there is products, Polixenes says,

Yet
But
nature

that

is

made

better

by

no mean

nature makes that mean: you

so, over that art,

Which That A

say

adds to nature,

is

an art

nature makes.

You see,

sweet

maid,

we

marry

gentler scion to the wildest

make conceive a of nobler race

stock,

And

bark

of

baser kind

By

bud

(IV. iv. 89-95).

about of art

It is ironic that Polixenes

condemn

upholds

in his

sons

case.10

a matchmaking practice he is While Polixenes sees the importance not

to

in

improving
improve

nonhuman

nature, he does
counterpart

appear to understand that

art can

men.

Unlike his

in Pandosto, Polixenes does

princess."

not attempt

to arrange a marriage

for his

son with a suitable

He

seems unaware

that the statesman must manage the passions.

chance to make

Perhaps like Florizel he trusts to Polixenes's theory

things work out well.

now says she agrees with of art and

Although Perdita
nature,
she

still refuses to will cultivate

cosmetic.

She

crossbreed, arguing that the improvement is only nature's bastards, she says, "No more than, were I
youth to

painted, I

would wish

/ This

Desire to breed

by

me"

(IV. iv.

101-03).
all art

say 'twere well, and only therefore / But even if one disapproves of

cosmetics, it does

not

follow that

For example, Perdita does

to gymnastics.

not show

is similarly worthy of disparagement. how her censure of cosmetics applies also

Appropriately, since Perdita 's disapproval of art allows no place for education, her excellence does not proceed from education (IV. iv. 58284). Later a servant announces that she could rule for everyone
everyone,
10J. H. P. Pafford,
passage
editor of

the Arden edition

of

The Winter's Tale,

points out the

(p. 94,

note

to lines 88-97).
own age and p.

irony

of this

"Egistus (Polixenes), realizing his

I have is to
worst,
see

his

son's age,

tells him that "the only care that

me

thee well

married"

(Pandosto,
best"

203).

"Thy
he

youth warneth

to prevent the

and mine age

to provide the

(p.

202).

Although his foresight

that
should

proves

does

ineffectual, Egistus
his
son's

understand that

he

should

be

a mstchmsker and

be

watchful over

passions.

The Winter's Tale

would

183
is the
product

love

and

follow her (V. i.

105-12).

Her

excellence

solely

of

nature,

and she could rule

everyone, it is said,

without art. resistance

That

we cannot

accept

the servant's assertion

son.

is

shown

by

Polixenes's

to her marriage

to

his

He

rejects

for his

son

the naturally beautiful in favor of the conven

years

tionally

sound.

Similarly,

sixteen

esrlier, he did

not

try

to

make

the

beautiful Hermione his

Perdits'

own

in defiance

of sll convention.

s
enes'

failure

to rule

Polixenes simply
cultivste
will not

fsilure to

persusde

Perdits to

by beauty is matched by Polix by srt the most beautiful flowers.

bastards, just
as

His

rhetoric will

is defective: Perdita
not,
at

cultivate nature's

Camillo

Perdita later
agsin with

respond

Polixenes's request, stay in Bohemia. And Florizel and to Polixenes's command that they never see each other iv.
426-42).

silence

(IV

They

will

immedistely disobey
is
sufficient to
weakness.

it. We
whether

wonder whether

Polixenes thinks that

threat of

speech alone

rule,

Hermione's

playful

force

pointed

to his own

Continuing
mer, because

her distribution, Perdita

and

gives

to some guests flowers of sum

103-08).

they

sre men of middle age

(IV. iv.
autumn

She

earlier

told

Polixenes that he

Camillo
order

should

have

flowers,

not winter ones as

he had suggested, in flowers

to match their

age.

At that

point the reason are not

for her

correction was ambiguous: either are not appropriate

Polixenes
old.

and

Camillo

old,

or winter

to the
must

Because

midsummer

flowers

belong

to

men of middle

age, Perdita

have

given autumn

flowers to Polixenes
autumn place

snd are

Csmillo

not

appropriate
winter

to the

becsuse they are of middle age but because old. Her distribution thus reserves a
must

flowers

for the dead:

flowers
of

be

appropriate

for the dead. Polixenes's belief that the last

the dead. The man who argues

flowers

the year

belong

to the

old neglects

that art should improve nature and therewith defends the possibility of human

achievement, perhaps defends the possibility so strongly because he forgets to

give a place to

death. He ignores

whatever might

limit his

powers.

In

spite of

the difference between Polixenes and

father.12
Perdita'

Florizel, Florizel is
old

the true son of his

calls to mind

s correction of the

flowers due to the

reckoning.

silently

what

the statesman omits

from his

When Perdita

comes
o'

to Florizel and the other youths, she wishes that she

day"

had "some flowers

1 13-14).

th'

spring, that might / Become your time of

(IV. iv.

To

all except

the middle-aged, to the group no member of which

appropriate

is

named, Perdita lacks the

she

flowers to
criterion

give.

Because it is midsummer,
absurd.

has only

midsummer

flowers; her

for distribution is

Only
a

the least important are

given

their due.
of

Shortly
claims

after

Perdita's distribution
turns out to

flowers,

servant

announces

singing peddler,
that the
183-88).

who

be

the disguised Autolycus.

The

servant

peddler's

If

all men's

singing resembles the pied piper's piping (IV. iv. ears do grow to Autolycus's tunes, as the servant says,
am"

,2Compsre Florizel's "whst I was, I

presented above.

(IV. iv. 465)

with the characterization of

Polixenes

184
he
would rule all men

Interpretation

by

means of

his

singing.

(We

are reminded of another

servant who

declares Perdita to be
powers

so

beautiful that

all men would

follow

her.)
that

But Autolycus's Autolycus / father

fall

short of

his

promise.

The

clown

suggests

continue

and

his singing for the clown and the shepherdesses, for "My (IV. the gentlemen are in sad talk, and we'll / not trouble
them"

iv.

310-13).

Others, therefore,

ballad"

are unaffected with not

sings

(IV. iv. 287);

preoccupied

by the "merry discovering his son's

him from

Autolycus
con

intentions

cerning Perdita, Polixenes does beauty nor Autolycus's music can

tentions.

listen to Autolycus. Neither Perdita's

concern over

relieve

Florizel's in

Autolycus "hsth
and

songs

for

sizes,"

msn or

womsn, of

sll

the servsnt ssys,

"no

milliner can so

fit his

gloves"

customers with

(IV. iv.

193-94).

Ac

cording to this description Autolycus can give to each

whst

is

fitting

the very

thing Perdits
does
man-made no

sttempted

to do. It

is

obvious st once that

Autolycus's distribution

not suffer

the limitation to

which

Perdita's is

subject.

Since he dispenses
servant gives us

ballads, he

need not wait the

bounty

of nature.

The
as

hint

whether

Autolycus fits ballads to his

age,
or

hearers'

souls,
of

Perdita tries to fit bodies. for her guests, payment for

Autolycus

flowers to her

guests'

to a specific condition
out
of

their

While Perdita distributes Autolycus distributes in his

hospitality
laces,

or

goodwill

own

interest. Not only does he demand

as

his ballads, but he deifies man-made

gathering,
so

sells such
articles

things

ribbons,

and clothing.

his singing, the servant informs the that his listeners desire to have them; his singing renders what he

by

means

of

sings about

lovable (IV. iv.

might

209-13).

Because Autolycus
a

uses

his ballads to
what

sell not not

his articles, he necessary his

songs
omnipotent:

be

said

to give his listeners

desire for

is

or appropriate

to them. In this regard,

however, Autolycus is

his merry songs cannot distract Polixenes from his sad talk, fail to make his merchandise attractive to Florizel and Perdita (IV. iv.
as

just

357-6i).

Only

the clown and the two shepherdesses want to purchase

request

Autolycus's

ballads. Before they

and

ballads,
with

an

reveals their relationships.

The

clown

interchange among the three of them has made love with one of the women
of

has

promised

to do the same

the other. Both women are awsre

the

situstion snd neither will

is jeslous

of

the other, nor

does
(IV

either seem to

hsve ill

for the The

clown.

They joke

sbout their situstion

iv.

233-50).

the third, after rejecting the first two Autolycus offers. The clown evidently seeks a ballad that combines joy and sorrow, for he loves "a ballad even too well if it be doleful
matter

clown

snd

the two women ssk for

ballads, buying

merrily set (IV. iv. 189-92).

down,

or a

very

pleasant

thing indeed

and

lamentably"

sung

fit the birth to money bags (IV. iv. 263-66). True to character, Autolycus here rebukes an excessive love of gain; Autolycus
outlandish predicaments that
crime.

The first two ballads In the

offered

involve

first,

a usurer's wife gives

The Winter's Tale

is only his
not
cheat,"

185

crime of

"petty highway

because

of

the punishments sttached to the greater

self-preservation.

that excessive

robbery (IV. iii. 27-30). His moderation is in the service of He sees only thst one is punished for immoderation, and desire may bring a reward: if the usurer's wife loves money

excessively she might prefer to give birth to money bags more than to children. Later Autolycus acknowledges that he is insufficiently a rogue, for he does not thrive as much as he might if others were ignorant of his knavery (V. ii. Autolycus's disguises succeed, Autolycus fails to disguise the fact that the undisguised Autolycus is a rogue (IV. ii. 13-14; 98; 103). By
113-23).
all

While

showing that Autolycus fails to thrive because he is is, Shakespeare playfully indicates that he disagrees
erate condemnation of

not more a rogue than with

he

Autolycus's immod

immoderation.
second

The
fish"

villain of she

Autolycus's

ballad is flesh

a woman

"turned into
her"

a cold

because

"would

not exchange

with one

that loved

(IV

iv.
of

176-82).
attempt

Autolycus
conquer

understands

the resistance to

bodily impulses,

kind

having any is only "a cold Again, Autolycus reveals himself in his ballad. He also reveals his listeners: they are moderate lovers of gain
to

nature,

as ridiculous rather
fish."

than tragic. Far from

dignity,
and

the

woman

do

not

lads Autolycus
shepherdesses

hesitate to "exchange flesh"; they follow the teachings of the bal wants to sing for them. The clown expresses his love for the

by

paying them

with

trinkets that peddlers sell, and the

shep
not

herdesses

are sstisfied with such

much

fsvors.

They

sre sll

selfish, but

they do

desire very in giving

357-6i).

for themselves. Shskespesre

emphssizes the

low

sspect of

the relstionship smong these characters

snd

receiving trifles

with

lster contrssting s love thst delights the love of Florizel and Perdita (IV. iv.

by

Perhaps because the

punishment of vice

clown

does

not see that

virtue of

these two bsllsds sbout the

own

sctuslly tesch the

his

vices, he
290).
parts
of

rejects

them
snd

(IV. iv. of s third, "Two msids wooing s Dorcas join Autolycus in singing, for the ballad has three

msn"

in fsvor

Mopss

two maids

each

speak

to a

man

who

has

promised

his love to
to the

each

them.

Singing

the third ballad evidently

with reference

clown and

the shepherdesses,

Autolycus
or

shows

them their own situation as merry rather than as reprehensible

without

dangerous. A triangle
what

jealousy
part of

and with

mirth, provides a contrast

a triangle with
us

to

is dramatized in the first

and without mirth.

The Winter's Tale:

jealousy
why
ters
of

The first two ballads together

help

to understand

a triangle

may be

without

jealousy

and

hence

without

tragedy. The charac

this triangle

neither want enough nor sacrifice enough

to involve them

selves

in

tragic situations.
and the characters about whom and

Autolycus
noble enough shepherdesses

to

whom

he

sings are not

for

tragedy. Shakespeare contrasts the love of the clown and the

of

but

also with

only with the tragic triangle of the first part the love of Florizel and Perdita, who are the main
not

the play,

characters of

186
The Winter's Tale's
comedy.

Interpretation
He thus indicates that low comedy is not the to tragedy. Aristotle said that tragedy involves better men,
or

only
while

alternative

comedy involves baser

the clown,
and

lower

men who are

Autolycus,
no

the shepherdesses
not.

ugly without giving fit Aristotle's description of In fact, they impress of the first part
us as

pain.13

comic

characters, but Florizel and Perdita do

being
men

less

noble than the characters of the

would

tragedy

of the play.

Shakespeare's comedy like Autolycus.

fit Aristotle's definition if it involved only

guests
are treated

After Autolycus exits, the

to a dance

by

countrymen

dressed up like satyrs. During the dance, Polixenes and the shepherd whisper about Florizel and Perdita. As a consequence of the conversation, Polixenes

decides that the

345).

affair

is "too far

gone"

and

"'tis time to

them"

part

(IV. iv.

Since the

tions of

has already informed Polixenes of Florizel's declara love for Perdita (IV iv. 170-78), he now evidently tells him of
shepherd

Florizel's intention to marry her. Not until his son confirms the shepherd's report does Polixenes's anger burst forth. Florizel's intention reveals that he
places

love

above

every

political concern.

Unlike Leontes, Polixenes

what no

can con

ceive of a man

loving

a woman without

attempting to possess her.

Not only does Florizel cally advantageous, but he

choose a wife without also tells

considering his disguised father that

sake of

is

politi are ser so

goods

for him
vice of

possessing Perdita (IV. iv. 372-79). When Florizel thus

worth

unless

it be for the

placing them
shows

in the

himself to be

different from his father, Polixenes reveals his identity and threatens the lovers. Like Leontes, he has difficulty in seeing himself in his son.
Polixenes's Leontes's
anger and

his threats

of

harsh

punishments are reminiscent of

anger and threats

in the first
snd

part of

the play. Here the potentisl for

tragedy
might

srises, since Florizel

out

Perdits

might

csrry

his threats if the lovers

remain adamant. and

be sepsrsted, or Polixenes As the earlier conflict

the present conflict

turned on the
turns on the

difference between Leontes

Polixenes,

difference between Polixenes and Florizel. Despite Polixenes's anger, however, it is Florizel who parallels Leontes. Both Leontes snd Florizel sre passionate and determined lovers who reject anything that runs counter to
their passions.

Moreover,
reason

as

the

jealous Leontes
of

will

not

listen to reason,

Florizel his iv.

refuses

to listen to the reason

"fancy."

If his The

does

479-80).

problem of

advised only by his he welcomes madness (IV. fancy, obey the last part of the play is why the events we not

Camillo

and will

be

witness

do

not result

in tragedy.

avoid his father's commands by running Camillo recommends that the couple go to Sicily. He plans Perdita, away to inform Polixenes of their destination and then go with him in thus
with

When Florizel determines to

pursuit,

fulfilling
not

his desire

to return

home. How this

will

help

Florizel

and

Perdita is
order to

clear.

Camillo decides that Florizel

should

disguise himself in

"Aristotle, Poetics, 144831-5

and 1449331-38.

The Winter's Tale

reach

187
on

the ship safely.

and on the

Autolycus enters, musing

of men.

the success of the the

of

sheep-

nothing"

shearing men have

gullibility

"Admiring

his song,

come close enough to

have their

pockets picked.

To Autolycus's

delight, Camillo proposes to exchange Florizel's courtly dress for Autolycus's rags. Autolycus, formerly in Florizel's service, now serves him again. And Autolycus, thrown out of court by Florizel, is now dressed in courtly garments

by

him. This

servant and master appear to

be in

need of each other.

Florizel has

recently declared his intention to risk all for love (IV. iv. 539-42). But Florizel also risks the lives of Perdita, the shepherd, and the clown, along with his own
(V. i. 151-52).
not seek gain

Autolycus,
runs

on

the

other

hand,

although a

lover

of

gain, does

if he his

must risk

102-03).

When he

life (IV. iii. 26-30; see also IV. iii. into Camillo and Florizel, he shakes in fear lest they
own of
M roguery (IV. iv. 628-30). We first encounter Florizel. Later, in the last act, once the recogni

his

have

overheard

boasting

Autolycus

after a quarrel with

tions and reunions occur, Autolycus persuades the shepherd and the clown to
give a good report of

him to Florizel (V. ii.

156-57).

Perhaps Autolycus him to forget his

He

and

Florizel

will

be

reconciled. counsellors

In the last act, Leontes's

sins

try

to persuade

past

for

which

he has his

paid

the penance

of sixteen years of sorrow. will

should

remarry,

they believe,
opposes

so that

his kingdom

have

an

heir (V. i.

27-29).

Paulina

remarriage

by

Hermione (V. i. 12-16;

34-35).

reminding him that he killed the flawless Leontes is definitely a changed man, for he
ruled by Paulina only because him. In speaking to him of the

is

now

easily

ruled

by

Paulina. However, he is

she exploits the passion and grief that control good of

his kingdom, his

after

counsellors are reasonable. and

Soon
nounces

Florizel

Perdita

arrive

at

the Sicilian court,

lord

an

Polixenes's
allow

approach. marriage

Florizel

appeals to

Leontes to try to i.
218-19).
I5

persuade

Polixenes to
"you

his

to Perdita. He appeals to Leontes's youth, when

now"

ow'd no more to time

/ Than I do

(V

In

contrast

to

Polixenes,
from

whose admiration of

beauty (e.g.,

IV. iv. 156-59) does

not

sway him

convention's

restraints, Florizel and Leontes ignore conventions of social

station when attracted

lowly
(V. i.

station

is

no

beauty. Not only does Leontes think that Perdita's impediment to her marriage to a prince, but he even desires

by

to have her for himself. Paulina

223-26).

must rebuke

him,

and remind

him

of

Hermione

Meanwhile Perdita's stepfather,

who

has

come

has been

apprehended

by

Polixenes. The

scene

along on Florizel's ship, is set for recognitions and

and daugh-

reunions, for the

l4The clown, in
order

shepherd will reveal

spite of

how he found Perdita. Father

to amend his

life,

or that

his simplicity, perceives that Autolycus must become courageous in his fear of death is his strongest passion (V. ii. 154-75). Does the
s coward

clown perceive

Autolycus's defect becsuse he too is

esrlier reminded

(III. iii. 96;

of youth.

126-28)?

When Florizel entered, Leontes is so reminded of Polixenes that he is tempted to "call [Florizel] brother, / As I did him, (V. i. 127-29). Does Leontes still not and speak of something wildly / By us perform'd in reminiscing about the errors of youth? perceive that Polixenes would not, like Leontes, delight l5Florizel Leontes
of other
before"

"sffections"

188
ter are united,
and

Interpretation
Florizel may now wed Perdita without opposition. The to Paulina's house to see a statue of Hermione that so apes
speak.

joyous assembly
nature put

goes

that one expects it to

Had the

sculptor

"himself eternity

and could

breath into his All

are

work,"

he "would beguile
the sight

nature of
of

her

custom"

(V. ii.

93-101).

filled

with wonder at

the statue. Leontes

believes

that

Hermione herself; he knows that to think the statue lives is mad to the "settled senses of the ness, but he prefers "the pleasure of that (V. iii. 71-73). (Here again we see a resemblance between the old king he
sees
madness" world"

of

Sicily

and

soon claims

that she can make the statue move. Leontes would

its future king, Perdita's husband. See IV. iv. 483-85.) Paulina have her do so,
powers"

or about apparently unconcerned whether she is assisted by "wicked some "lawful (V. iii. 89-98). When the statue moves, Leontes asserts
business"

"If this be magic, let it be an art lawful as (V. iii. 110-11). What he lawful coincident with declares is the means to the fulfillment of his desires.
Just
now as

eating"

he

earlier

declared lawful the

means

means

by

which

Hermione

would

die, he
alive.

declares lawful the

It is
soon clues

by

which she will

live.
and

clear that

there has been no statue

Hermione is

Collecting
gave

the poet has

laid,

we suppose

that some sleep-inducing

drug
she

her the

appearance of

death

and

that she has lived these sixteen years at

104-07).

Paulina's house (V. iii. 18-20; V. ii.

says, to see

She has

preserved would

herself,

Perdita, for the

oracle gave

hope that Perdita

be found. We
see

are reminded of the

beginning:

subjects on crutches would

desire to live to

Mamillius mature, so excellent a man he promised to be. Hermione, however, has had no way of knowing Perdita's excellence; she preserved herself to see her because
she

is "mine

own"

(V. iii.

123).

Paulina
wing
me

encourages everyone

to rejoice, while she, "an old turtle, / Will

to some wither'd
am

bough

and there

My

mate, that's

never

to be found this

again, / Lament till I

reminder of

lost"

(V. iii.
not at

132-35).

The play

would end with

death if Leontes had

this point proposed that Paulina marry

Camillo. Since these two

characters

have been be

implicitly
not

contrasted throughout

the play, their marriage appears to

good effect on each. as

a marriage of opposites appears plan

that

will

have

Leontes's

proposal

beforehand, but
husband it
until

a reaction

to

Paulina's

to

as something planned lament the death of her

her

own

death. Leontes

appears exasperated when

Paulina in
to stamp to Perdita's

troduces a sad note into the general rejoicing, and he acts

out

immediately
reaction

(V. iii.

135).

(His

reaction

resembles

Florizel's

warning that
note rather

the prospect of

may not turn out well for them.) While Leontes can replace death with the prospect of marriage so that the play ends on one than the other, marriage cannot forestall death, at lesst not for long.
events

While

joy

msy
more

promote

life,

there sre

limits. Leontes

csn rejuvenate

his

sub

jects little

thsn he csn resurrect the dead

kind
of resurrection

Mamillius.16

'"Paulina

enacts a

from the dead

observed

when she summons

Hermione down from

the platform or pedestal.

It has

often

been

that

Christianity

mskes

tragedy impossible

The Winter's Tale

The
raises
end of

189
the statue
of

the play,

by

means of

its

references to

Hermione,

the question of the power of art (V.

ii. 94-101; V. iii. 15-20; 65-68;

men, snd then csuse them to
not

no).

If

man can make perfect reproductions of

might

live, he
can

nullify the power of desth. Here srt is

are

iii. 19-20;

68), but human beings

deceiving

others

imitating nature (V. by suggesting that art

do

so.

Shakespeare, however, does what the imaginary sculptor and Psulina are supposed to be able to do, for he creates lifelike figures and makes them move and speak. Because Shakespeare's art is not a pretense, like Paulina's, his
imitation is
not a

mockery

of men.

But

what

kind

of nature

is Shakespeare
or at

imitating? The indifferent to

tragic man

nature embodied

in Mamillius's

winter tale

is hostile
The

least

man

a world of

faces is

characterized

joined because they sre acted who had some virtue, but
virtue. men

frightening by disunity: the good contradictory. Trsgedy occurred

who seemed excellence contradicts
might resign

sprites and goblins.

nature that

things cannot

be

con

when chsrscters

inter

necessarily to lack
others, the
themselves to this

an opposite

As

long

as one not

human
exist.

good

for

which rebel

strive

does

Men

fact,

against

it,

or make

themselves callous to it

by forgetting

it. As

we

have seen,

the

lead to tragedy, the last to the low comedy of Autolycus. Shakespeare's But play ends not with the disunity that prevails in the first part

first two

reactions

of the

play, but

with

the

unions and

the

reunions of

the characters. The dif

end.

ferences among the

rebellion,
or

characters

do

not appear

to be in conflict at the

Unity

appears as natural as

disunity. Man
with

can respond to nature not with resignation,

unions and

forgetting, but
own of

joy. Moreover, the

the reunions

that the poet shows on stage may

goodnesses

be

a reflection of a

unity

of the various

human

in his

soul.17

At the
tion of an

beginning
winter's

the play, Camillo

maintained

that seeing the comple

as

excellent

human

being

made

life

worth

living. Just

Shakespeare

finishes the

tale that Mamillius left unfinished, he may also point to

the fulfillment

of the

prophecy Camillo

made

about

Mamillius. Mamillius's

understanding of the meaning of a winter's tale

because it
Corinthians
removes

is

as one-sided as

Mamillius

the sting of desth.

15:

55-57.)

(See, for Here, however, Paulina can

at

example, Paul's Letter to the

"resurrect"

Corinthians, I

died. The Christian 'The

union of

imagery
over

the end of
and

Hermione only because she has not The Winter's Tale points to the contrast between

Christianity's triumph

tragedy

Shakespeare's.

in the complete human soul, for example, is reflected Paulins snd Csmillo, but slso in the reconcilistion of union in the on the political level only between Florizel and Autolycus and the marriage of Florizel and Perdita. Florizel is a man who iv. 42-46); he immoderately risks would resist even destiny itself in order to fulfill his desires (IV.
boldness
not

and moderation

his life
with

and even the

lives

of others.

Autolycus,

with

her

more elevated submission

to nature, serve as
Polixenes'

his strong desire for preservation, and Perdita, correctives to Florizel. But if either of these
and

characters

place:

simply ruled Florizel, the marriage Perdita might have submitted to

the
point

between Florizel

Perdita

might not

have taken
would

demands (IV. iv. 442-51),

and

Autolycus

not see

in risking

one's

life for the

woman who appeared

to him only as an encumbrance

(IV. iv. 678-80).

190
himself. He
winter's
winter. spent and

Interpretation
understands a winter's

tale to
not

be

a sad one, one appropriate to a

connote

day. But
winter's

a winter's

day

does

necessarily

the gloom of
well

day

is

a short

one,

or one when time

flies because it is

(I. ii.

169).

The

chorus

Time

provided

the transition between the

was transformed

tragedy

the comedy. The neutral or

speech

indifferent Time

by

the end of

his

suggested

men well

beneficent one, who wished man to spend his time well and that watching The Winter's Tale was the way to do it. Time wished as if he loved them. Perhaps the poet himself speaks at the end of
a

into

Time's

soliloquy.

Or

perhaps we are on

seeing the

poet remake

Time in his

own

image. His benevolent influence fluence

of

the affairs of men replaces the

possible

indifferent in

Time. His benevolence is

and

because

of

his

comprehensiveness.
Winter'

Comedy
blinds
us

tragedy
and

are not

rather, comedy triumphs over

to suffering

equally tragedy. We do is

commingled not

in The
a

Tale;

have

to the situation that necessitates

not universal.

low comedy that suffering, but a com

man can

edy that

asserts that this tragic condition

If

satisfy his
as great a

desires,

then life need not be a ceaseless striving, and death does not necessar
man unfulfilled.

ily

find

At least in this sense, death

would not

be

cause of sadness as

it

otherwise would

blindness

of

laughter but the first / We

assembly exits,

each of the cast

joy of looking

be. 18 Shakespeare's comedy brings not the insight. Midst the general rejoicing, the

forward to telling his

(V. iii.
152-53).

part

"in this

wide

gap
us

of time since

dissever'd"

were

Leontes

reminds

that the play has been about the differences that separated the chsrscters snd

thst now those

differences

no

longer dissever them.

Unity

appears

to

reign.

"But

see

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,

ni7bio-l5.

ON BACON'S ADVERTISEMENT TOUCHING A HOLY WAR

J. Weinberger
Michigan State

University

As I have

argued

elsewhere, the fragment Advertisement

Touching

Holy
the

War is the formal

remark

catalyst that unifies

Bacon's Great

Instauration.'

Bacon's
of

in the Epistle
provides

Dedicatory

about the completeness of the

division

sciences
whole.2

the clue to the completeness of his scientific project as a

noblest part of

While the

the new physics, medicine,

remained

in

complete, Bacon

presented

his

complete

tesching

sbout

the virtues snd risks

of scientific conquest

in his

secret and retired political

science, which is intro

duced in the New Atlantis. The New Atlantis is apparently incomplete because it presents a pattern of scientific perfection that lacks an open account of
political science.

But the New Atlantis is

complete

because it includes

teaching
as

about government that

is indirect

and secret

because it is dangerous
surface

and prob

lematic. The New Atlantis is

such

complete

beneath the
soul

it

opens

to the full
whole of

teaching
Bacon's

about the corpus.

its

virtues

only because and its parts

contained

in the

two dimensions becsuse esch text slwsys

them. Each text

Bacon's writing has three rather than hss two surfsces plus whst is benesth
and

is

open

to what is beneath it as a text

then again is open

to the

project

described in the Great Instauration

and

what

is beneath that into

description.
The Advertisement
at once catalyzes the parts of

Bacon's

corpus

completed whole and also participates

in that

whole.

Its

surface as a

text

opens

is beneath it only as it is tied to the New Atlantis as one part to another. Its surface consists in the dialogue as such and in the scientific fortune promised in the Great Instauration and introduced in the New Atlantis. If the

fully

to what

Advertisement treats

a mix of
active

"religious
then

considera

and civil

in

a mixed

"contemplative

way,"3

and

it

also

treats

civil

and

ecclesiastical

policy

as means

to

man's scientific

fortune. In the New Atlantis, the

the
provisional

provisional a means of

teaching
science science

about politics appears as

secrecy

which

is

to

its
the

end

and

which

is

abolished

by

the revelation

of

Bensalemite final secrecy

to the rest of the

world.

The final teaching

world.4

appears as the

required

by

problematic end of

science, and this secrecy

is

not abolished

by

the revelation of Bensalem to the

As the Advertisement is tied to the New

'For the details

70

of

the

Utopia: An Introduction to the

(September 1976), 866-72.

following argument see Reading of the New

ed. and

Atlantis,"

J. Weinberger, "Science and Rule in Bacon's American Political Science Review,

2The Works of Francis Bacon,

Heath, 14

vols.

(London: Longman
15.

Co.,

James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon etc., 1857-74), hereafter BW, VII, 13-14.

Advertisement, BW VII,
Weinberger,
pp.

880-85.

192

Interpretation
so

Atlantis,
wise

is it

analogous to

the New Atlantis in regard to formal incomplete

ness and posthumous

publication.5

We

must expect

that the Advertisement like

as

treats problems

of civil and ecclesiastical

policy both

to the means to

scientific conquest and ss

to the

finsl offspring
the

of msn's scientific

fortune.

Bacon describes the

mesnings of
"pious"

characters of

their nsmes.

Eusebius,

the moderate

or

"reverent",
is
noted

and

he is the

dialogue, but he does divine, hss s namesake of Eusebius,

not explain nsme

the

meaning
of

the

Bishop

Caesarea,
of

who

for his Ecclesiastical

History

and

for his lost

epitome

universal

"God's

reward."

"my

gift

is

God."

history. Gamaliel, the Protestant zealot, has a name meaning Zebedaeus, the Roman Catholic zealot, has a name meaning Martius, the military man, has a name of obvious meaning; it
Mars"

means

"sacred to

the god of war.

Eupolis,
of

the politique, has a name

comic

meaning "good rary

of

city"

and

is the

namesake of
victim

Eupolis the

poet, contempo
the

Aristophanes,
name

and

reputed

Alcibiades.

Finally, Pollio,
and

courtier, has a

meaning "one
namesake of

adorns"

who polishes or

suggesting "to
and writer of

bear rule"; he is the

Pollio the Roman

politician

history, tragedy,
armed

and erotic poems. opens when

The dialogue Pollio wittily

are

Pollio interrupts

Martius'

complaint

against

Christendom,

which

is

part of a

discussion

being

held

Eupolis'

st

house.
city"

remsrks

thst the persons who meet in the house of the "good

mske a good world.

friends, like
the

the

Eusebius, Gamaliel, Zebedaeus and Martius differ and yet four elements, and Eupolis, because he is temperate and

without

passion, is the fifth essence, the substance of the

whole and unites

heavenly

cosmos that
make

vaults

its

parts.

Eupolis

retorts that

if they five

up

the macrocosm, Pollio

is the

microcosm

because he

refers all

things to himself

both in

speech and

deed. Pollio does

not

deny

this characterization; rather, he

asks about those who act

are weaker

like him but

are not

frank. Eupolis

replies

that

they

but
of

discussion

dangerous than Pollio, and he invites Pollio to join their Christendom, for they welcome his opinion. Pollio professes
more
post-

the need to be stirred from his

travelling,

afternoon
when

drowsiness by

their

speeches, but then he

acknowledges this

offers to wake
and opines

the speeches

favor

that Pollio will think their to effect. But

they sleep. Eupolis discourses to be

interrupted
war."

dreams, being
speech will

good wishes without power

Pollio'

Martius'

affect

drowsiness because it
and

was the

"trumpet

of

Eupolis bids Martius to begin again, armed Christendom.

In
armed

Martius

repeats

his

complaint against

contrast to the unarmed

Christian

soldiers and the armed merchants, the propagate the

Christian

princes and potentates

have been loath to

faith

by

their arms.
of

Martius

mentions three exceptions to

this. The

first,

the noble
of

battle

Lepanto,

contrasts with the

far less

noble adventures of

Sabastian

5See De Augmentis, BW V,

79. cf.

Weinberger,

p.

871.

On Bacon's Advertisement
Portugal
aid and

Touching

Holy

War

193

Martius'

Sigismund the Transylvanian, but Martius lists them as equals. To memory, Pollio interrupts to mention the example of the extirpa
and
Pollio'

tion of the Valencian Moors. Martius has nothing to say about this example

is silent, but
Gamaliel

s second

interruption triggers
spproves of

a sectarian exchange
Martius'

between

and

Zebedseus. Gamsliel
his

omission of

because he
approved
sectarian

did

not approve

the action against the Moors.

politique

Zebedaeus,
military

course,
this

it. In

accordance with

nature, Eupolis
Martius'

moderates

quarrel

by directing

the subject back to

Martius'

speech.

Eupolis jus

tifies his suggested return to

and speech

subject

by

directed

at

have nothing to do with the extirpstion subjects, it cannot be sorted "aptly with the
continues to exhort
war against

subject saying that of the Moors becsuse, being

war."

Martius'

actions of

Martius
guing that
point, he
and a

his listeners to is

support religious war

by

ar

the infidels is also

war

not

to be equalled for secular

and

greatness and

terrene honor. Such a the examples

of

not

impossible,

to prove his

offers

the Castilians

who conquered

the

West Indies
asserts that

the

navigation and conquest of

Emmanuel

of

Portugal. Martius

these two

feats

were not motivated

by

the propagation of the Christian

faith,

but that they have enriched Christendom and have enlarged the boundaries of Spanish estate, and that in these feats the spiritual and temporal honor and good have been
conjoined. point

At this

Pollio interrupts Martius

of

a third time
who are

to

remind

him

of the

difference between kinds erty

who

infidels: those

like the brutes, "the prop

occupant,"

of which passeth with are civil

the

possession and goeth such

to the

and

those

people,

where

possibility
such

of possession

does

not obtain.

Martius

answers

that he knows of no that however

difference "amongst

reasonable

souls"

and argues

civil a people

is,

whatever

is in

order

for the

greatest good of a people

Martius
were

emphasizes savages

brute

justify any action taken against them. his point by doubting that the people of Peru or Mexico at all; these peoples were justly subdued, and yet it is
enough

is

to

possible to contrast the political and religious sophistication of the victims of

the Spaniards

with

the

barbsrous,
a

cruel

tyranny

of the

Turkish

empire.

Pollio interrupts Martius between idolaters

and

fourth time to
who

remind

him

of the

distinction
Again

the Turks

"do

acknowledge

God the

Father."

Martius has nothing to say, but Zebedseus interjects s reprehensive, stern his second interruption, Pollio warning to Pollio not to fall into heresy. As with silent while Martius confesses his makes no further comment or rebuttal. He is
zeal

for the
and

cause of a war against

the Turks

over

any

other

both in

point of

religion

honor. But Martius

weakness

admits

to mistrusting his
so

own

judgment be

cause

of

its

and

his zeal,
Eupolis

and

he

requests

the others who are

various war.

interpreters

of the

divine law to

speak about

the lawfulness of such a

moderation

The

moderate politique

compliments

Martius for his

and announces
Eupolis'

his intention to distribute the

as

parts of

the ensuing conference.

treat whether war

distribution is

follows: Zebedaeus

will

for

194
propagation of

Interpretation
the faith alone is

it is lawful; Gamaliel will treat whether such a war is obligatory for Christian princes and states; Eusebius will treat the comparative: whether such a war is to be preferred over

lawful,

and

in

what cases

extirpation of

heretics,

reconcilement of

schisms,

pursuit of either

lawful temporal
wait upon

rights

and

quarrels, and how far such a war should

mingled with

these
as

matters, be

them,

or

pass

them

by

and

give

law to them

inferior to itself; Pollio Eupolis

then resume

will

submit

the argument to the test of possibility;

will prove the enterprise of a

holy
and

war

his

speech that will persuade and agree

be possible; and Martius touch "means and

to
and

will

preparations."

The discussants
and

to this division

distribution,

they

agree to

to continue the discussion the

adjournment.

next

day. But the supposedly

order of speeches correct

drowsy

stop Pollio

interrupts the

Pollio 's final interruption disturbs the Eupolis. Pollio

acknowledges
unless

determined

by

Eupolis to be

for he believes that

a

Christendom is

ground

in thinking him a skeptic, and molded into a new paste,

willingness

holy

war

is impossible. But Pollio

the five discussants
mad and with

professes

his

to concur
and

with

the

hope

of

the good world, as it were

sober.6

to assert

that Athens is
ness

the

business."

To demonstrate his willing to comply with the positive consideration, he will "frankly contribute to He advises that if they would have a holy war, they must choose "fresh
years,"

only Democritus is

a pope of

between

fifty

and

sixty,

and must asks

have him

called

Urban. Eupolis
more serious.

says that

Pollio

speaks

well, but he the

that Pollio be a little

met

Bacon then informs

us that

discussants

the

following day

as

they had

agreed.

Pollio

made some

sporting speeches,

which are not pre

sented, to the effect that the

holy

war

Janissaries, Tartars,
reported speeches speeches.

and

Sultans. We

had already begun because he dreamt of reenter the dialogue as Msrtius begins the flsw in
Eupolis'

by

wsrning

of s possible of

distribution

of

the

Msrtius

and preparations of a

placing is to follow Pollio's and

order

objects to the

the parts. His speech about

means

holy

war.

Since this

means often affects opinions

debate sbout the possibility necessarily best because consideration of concerning possibility, Martius warns Pollio and
is
not

Eupolis'

Eupolis

discussion

peremptorily or conclusively until they have heard his he asks them to be prepared to reply to his speech. means, Bacon tells us that all commend Martius for his caution, and Eupolis,
of

not

to speak

and

following
Into the

Martius'

example,

question of

refines his distribution to account for an omission. lawfulness (distributed to Zebedaeus), Eupolis inserts the

following
ity
or

question: whether

holy

war

is to be it is to

pursued to the

displanting

and

extermination of peoples and whether

enforce

belief
the

and punish

infidel

only to

subdue peoples so as to open

forcefully

door for the "spiritual

sword,"

i.e., for

persuasion and
msde this

instruction

snd whst

is

fitting

for

souls snd
will

consciences.

Hsving

smendment, Eupolis explsins thst it

be

"Advertisement,

BW VII, 25,

n.

1.

On Bacon's Advertisement
Zebedaeus'

Touching
to

Holy
of

War

195

psrt of

speech and speech and

hands
ss

the

discourse

Zebedaeus,
the

whose speech

is the final
bined.

is

as

long

the preceding parts

dialogue

com

Zebedaeus

announces a sixfold plan

of all

his intention first for the is

to

"distinguish the Second

Third

cases"

for his speech, which is dictated by of lawfulness. First will be the

princes

question of whether

it is lawful for Christian

the faith.
will

to wage

unprovoked war

propagation of restore once

be the
be the

question of whether

it is

lawful to

Christian

countries to the
will

Christian faith, if this

non-Christian war.

question

a part of

the case of a

holy

war.

question of whether

it is

lawful to free Christians from

agsin

servitude to

infidels in

countries,

if this

question

is

a part of

the case of a

holy

Fourth

will

be the
places.

question of whether

it is lawful to

make war to purge and recover

holy
to
will

Fifth

will

be the
and

question
or

of whether

it is lawful to
on

make

war

revenge

blasphemy

cruelty

bloodshed inflicted
war

Christians. Sixth

be the

question of whether enforcements of not

holy

conscience,
others are

and

may be pursued to the expulsion of people or how it is to be moderated so that Christians do

"forget that
a seventh

men."

To this
not

sixfold plan of a

questions, Zebedaeus
"precedes"

adds

consideration.

It is

question, but it
Martius'

all

the

questions and was suggested

"in

manner"

a what

discharges them. In this last consideration,

considers

which

by

Zebedaeus

true charges against the

suppress

Turks, Zebedaeus
empire, though

will present

his

opinion

that a "war to religion,

the

[Turkish]

we set aside pauses and sn

the

cause of

were a

just

war."

Zebedaeus
agsinst

then proceeds to his speech. After

an

introductory
men's

blood by sscrificing msking warning war justice of a against the discusses the natural Zebedaeus in an unjust war, Turks. He opines that a war against the Turks is lawful according to the laws of

idol

or moloch of

Jesus

nature, nations,

and

the divine law. The justice of such a

warrant of

war will consist

in the feeble

merit of the cause, the

the

jurisdiction,
of

and

the

form

of prosecution.

He

will

ignore the
and so

civil and positive

law

the Romans because

they

are of

"engines,"

he

will

ignore the

opinions and writings of

many
of

the

late
His

Schoolmen. Zebedaeus then treats the

presentation principle of of

evidence

of

the law of nature.

the lsw
nstursl

of nsture

consists

the

right to govern,
obey.

which

solely is thst

of s

defense

Aristotle's born to

some creatures are as a truth

rule and others are

born to
can

Zebedaeus takes this

such

"as Aristotle

limiteth it": If there

exists

be found
beast
or

between
s

man and

between

inequality body and

esse

between
soul,

man and man as

such

inequslity
is
s proof

will

Zebedseus'

invest

right

of government.

The

whole of

speech

thst

slthough this

proportion seems sn

impossible

"and the

case

possible, and such as

for men, the judgment is true hath had and hath a being, both in partic is difficult

nations."

ular men and

Zebedaeus

acknowledges

that determination of the proposition

because beyond Aristotle's

and

simple standard of

intelligence,

courage,

honesty,
to who

probity

of will sre required

for government,

snd men never sgree ss

196
is
most

Interpretation
worthy snd not "in the
so most

fit to

rule.

Therefore, Zebedseus
"in the (even though

sccepts

Aristotle's
concludes

compsrstive"

view

but

privstive.

rather

Thus he

thst "where there is a that is

subdue

heap

of people

called a people or a

state)
to

altogether unable or
them."

indign to govern, it is just for a civil Before arguing the esse in its psrticulsrs, Zebedseus
to the role of s personsl

people sdds

thst

he does laws

not refer

tyranny but

rather

to cases where the

of a state are against

the laws of nature and nations.

of the existence of such cases

Zebedaeus divides his discussion

parts.

into three

subdued. nations

Firstly he will Secondly he

that

consider will

whether

there

are

such of the

nations

that can be
and

consider

the

breaches

laws

of nature

divest

a nation of all right to government.

Finally

he

will consider

whether

these breaches exist in any

government,

namely,

in the Ottoman

Empire.

With have
no

respect

to the first point, Zebedaeus asserts that there are nations that
govern and on

right to

that

ought

to be subdued. The

determination

of

these nations
of

is based
man's

the

original

donation
of

of government.

The foundation

dominion is

being

the

image

God,

that

is, his

possession of natural govern and

reason.

Only

if

this

divested. Original
poor men of

sin

image is totally or mostly defaced is the right to does not subvert the right to rule as some fanatics
argued.

the
and

Lyons have

Zebedaeus

quotes

God's

words to show

Noah

his

sons

to prove his point, and he quotes the

prophet

Hosea to

that there though

are governments that

God does

not avow

by

His

revealed argues

will,

even

they

are ordained

by

secret providence.

Zebedaeus do

that the prophet's to perverse and

words

do

not

refer

to evil governors or tyrants the words

and

but

rather

defective
"for the
now,

nations.

Furthermore,
of

not refer

to

idolatry

the Jews

then,

the

idolatry

of

idolatrous nations, the Heathen then and

all

are sins of a

far

differing

nature, in

regard of the special covenant and

clear manifestations wherein

tion."7

God did

contract and exhibit

himself to that
as

na

they differed from contemporary idolatrous peoples, who are among the nations in name which are no nations and which are outlawed and proscribed by the law of
nature and

The Israelites differed from the

Canaanites, then, just

nations,

or

the

immediate

commandment of

God.

Zebedaeus
tion of all men,

gives seven examples of such nations:

(i)

pirates,

who are

the

common enemies of man and against whom

there is

natural, tacit

confedera

(2)

rovers

by land, (3)

the

Assassins, (4)

the Anabaptists of

if they had done no actual mischief, and things to be lawful according to "the secret and variable

Munster,
of

even

peoples who
motions and

hold

all

instincts

spirit,"

the

in the

(5) instances like the fictional Amazons where all government is hands of women, (6) the Sultany of the Mamelukes and like instances
laws
of nature and

that are perversions of the

nations,

and

(7)

the people of the

West Indies. In
Ibid.,
32:21. 30-31.

all of

these cases, any nation,

Biblical
quotes are:

however far off, may

destroy

Zebedaeus'

Genesis 1:26; Genesis 9:2; Hosea 8:4; Deut.

On Bacon's Advertisement
them.

Touching

Holy

War

197

Regarding
were

the last example, Zebedaeus remarks to Martius that the West

Indians Indian

propagation of

properly subdued by the Spaniards even if the question of the the faith is set aside. This latter point is true because the West
of

practices

human
thst

sacrifice and

cannibalism,

which

are

breaches

of

nature's
st

law,

caused the

West Indisns to forfeit their territory. Zebedseus

sdds

this point,
toward"

however,

he is loath to

justify

"the

cruelties which were

first

used

the West Indians. Zebedaeus ends his list

of examples of nations

that are no nations with a general example. He argues that the example of
Hercules'

labors

shows the consent of all nations and ages

for the "extirpation

and

debellating
Zebedaeus

of

giants, monsters,

and

foreign

tyrants."

next sets

down arguments,
such

rather

than examples, to prove thst

subdued

there are states that are no states, which must

be

by

civil nations.

First,

men

are

bound to
of

subduing

action

by

implicit

confederations and
colonial
of

bounds. Examples
mother

such

confederations

and

bounds

are:

ties to

nations, the unity customs, and,

of common

language,

the sharing

fundamental
to speak

laws
of

and

finally,

common

humanity. Zebedaeus

refuses

the tie of common

others must one

false worship, but he says that Christians more than acknowledge "that no nations are wholly aliens and strangers to
and

another"

that

Christians

must not

be less humani

charitable

"than the

person
puto."s

introduced Zebedaeus

by

the

comic poet:

Homo

sum,

nihil a me alienum

asserts that such tacit confederations are active and against

"such

routs and shoals of people as

All

nations

must

suppress

have utterly degenerated from the laws of such peoples, and this is to be measured
measured

nature."

not

by
of

juridical
the law

principle.

Rather, it is to be
neighbor,
says that to

by

the law of love (New

of the common

Law),

of

love

of one's

and

the

law

origin

mankind.

Zebedaeus

deny

his

argument

is

almost

to be a schis

matic,

and with

his bellicose final remark,

the

dialogue

ends abruptly.

Like the New Atlantis, the

most

obtrusive

feature

of

the Advertisement

Touching A Holy War is its doubly indirect because it is

penetrate

spparent
an

incompleteness. The Advertisement is

a

incomplete dialogue. As

dialogue up

we can

the Advertisement only

by discerning
speech whole

a whole made

of parts

that

are not

Bacon's

words or views simply.

Although Bacon

causes

the characters
speak

to speak, their
their

speech

is

not

Bacon's But the

about

to the extent that

woven

they

from

characters

or

natures.

out

of

the separate parts

characters make

represents

Bacon's teaching
of

the highest
we are

matters.

The

up

an

image

the cosmic whole, as

told

by

the witty

Pollio,
view

and the

speeches treat a mix of the universal and the particular

religion and

Bacon tells

us

in the Epistle Dedicatory. The

parts:

whole of

Bacon's

policy as is fash

ioned from two

of the

the action of the dialogue and the possible completeness

work.

apparently incomplete
35.

"Advertisement, BW VII,

The

quote

is from Terence, The Self-Tormentor, 1.77.

198
A survey
meets of the

Interpretation
dialogue's
plan shows

it to be

more complete

than

first

the

eye.

Eupolis distributes the

speeches of

the discussion to the partici

Zebedaeus'

pants,

and of

the six speeches proposed, only two are

Eupolis'

provided:

long
and

but apparently truncated speech and Pollio's speech, which is out of place distribution of subjects is not left untreated in the very brief. But is his distribution
of speeches.

same proportion as

Of

seven

distributed

sub

jects,
The

all

but

one are mentioned and answered

by

the two speeches provided.

Zebedaeus'

question of

lawfulness is

question of a war against adumbrated

in its entirety by the Turks dischsrges "in s

covered even

speech.

The

msnner"

the six particulars

with

by Zebedaeus,
And

though it is not strictly concerned

the

"cause law.

religion."

of

such a war against

the Turks is consistent with natural

obligation of

Zebedaeus'

speech assimilates and argues

discharges the

Gamaliel,
of

for Zebedaeus
confederations.
polis'

that

war against

the Turks is

binding
of a

because

implicit
Eu

Pollio's

speech
war

testing
to

the possibility

task of proving

holy

be

possible are

discharged

holy by

war and

Pollio's

sum

Martius'

examples of mary speech and beyond its appointed task to assimilate

holy

war.

Pollio's brief

speech proceeds

Martius'

final

obligation.

Not only does

consist of a
new

Pollio

acknowledge
provides

tion, but he
and

possibility by the fundamental

his

participation

in the

positive considera

means and preparations.

These

the recommendations that Christendom be "ground and

paste"

molded

into

that a new pope named Urban must embody the principle of

a pope

fresh
be

ness or youth

youth, for

between led

fifty

and

sixty

years of age

does

not represent must

strictly

understood.

Thus Pollio's

suggestion

is that Christendom

completely
The only

changed and

by

the principle of youthful urbanity.

How, then, is
subject chsrscter who

the distribution of subjects and speeches still incomplete?

not not

discussed is "the
spesk,

comparative,"

assigned

to the only

does is

Eusebius,

the nonsectarian, moderate

divine

who

is

pious and who

named

for the

writer of ecclesissticsl snd universsl

history.

The incompleteness
snd speskers.
war

of subject mstter mstches

the

incompleteness

of speeches

As it stsnds, the Advertisement

presents sn argument about whether

holy
and

that covers the questions of

lawfulness
peoples

including
by

legality

extends

to

displanting

and

exterminating
It

obligatoriness,

possibility,

means and preparations.

presents this srgument

means of the speeches of

Pollio, Martius,
Gamaliel
and
Eusebius'

and

Zebedaeus

that assimilate the subjects and speeches of

Eupolis

and exclude

the subject and speech of

Eusebius.

subject

treats the mix of civil and religious considerations. It

of

treats the relative

importance

holy

war with respect

Eusebius'

to

immediate

and urgent

matters of civil and ecclesiastical policy.

and namesake.

subject matches

his

name

The

writer of ecclesiastical and universal

history

is

to treat the

distribution

of civil and ecclesiastical

duty

with respect

to men's obligations to
and

a universal cause. so whatever of

Formally,

the thematic center of the

dialogue is missing,

teaching

fills the gap left the dialogue.

by

Eusebius'

absence

constitutes the positive

On Bacon's Advertisement
The
action of the

Touching
Pollio

Holy
of a

War

199

dialogue

opens with
a

joining

a conference of men

of eminent

delivered
ence,
nor

quality interrupting holy war being Martius. We do not know the immediate reason for the confer by do we know why Pollio joined them from court. Including the initial
and speech

in favor

interruption,
round

we witness

five interruptions
of

by

Eupolis'

distribution
when

the speeches.

Pollio that lead up to and sur Pollio's second interruption comes

exhortation of

early in the dialogue

warfare and reminds result of squabble

he bresks into
of

Martius'

to

holy

or pious

Martius

the

"extirpation

the Moors of

Valencia."

The

Pollio's interruption is

a sectarian squabble and

Eupolis'

the moderation of thst

by

the moderate politique Eupolis.

Martius'

focus

of

the discussion back to

moderating returns the invective against the Turks. Eupolis

Msrtius'

speaks

for

Msrtius, filling
Martius'

the

gsp left

by

silence st

Pollio's remark,
the
nature of

and explains
martial

silence

by

referring to his

martial nature and

affairs,

which proscribe actions against unarmed civilians.

The first
politique and

action of

the

dialogue

produces an alliance

between the
not

moderate answer

the fervent soldier. But this alliance

as we

Pollio's question,
mention of

learn in the

sequel.

directly Immediately following

Indies, Pollio

does

Msrtius'

the savage Spanish conquest of the West

again

inter

rupts some

to remind Martius of the kinds of infidels. Some infidels sre civil and
are not

condone

the inhuman treatment

different from the brutes. Not only does Pollio's suggestion of the less than human humans, but
Martius'

reply

subverts even the

humane

alternative

implicit in Pollio's

suggested

dis

tinction. Whatever may

mention

have been the

of

reason was

for

Martius'

silence at
a

Pollio's
narrow

of the

Moors

Valencia, it
sorts with

not

from

squeamishly

understanding Pollio's second

of what

aptly

the actions of

war.
Martius'

and

third interruptions
and

exacerbate while

pious blood-

lust, and the alliance between Martius ian dispute, does not moderate

Eupolis,

Martius'

martisl zesl.

moderating a sectar Msrtius spproves of the

bloody Spsnish conquests of the West Indies, which sre described ss bsrbsrous even by the zeslous Zebedseus. The first snd second sctions of the dialogue sre interruptions by Pollio that pose questions of extreme modes and methods. These questions are answered indirectly in favor of extreme modes and meth ods, and in part they are so snswered by mesns of s link between moderstion
snd

militsry

zesl.

This link is

never

broken,
of

snd

it

points

to the sssimilstion of

moderstion

to zesl. After the

forging
of

their sllisnce, Eupolis the moderate

Martius'

politique makes no protest of moderation against

Eupolis'

extremism or
an

lack

of

moderstion.
tius'

first defense

Msrtius is

inadequate defense Pollio's third Indies.

sectarian

of

Mar

Eupolis'

nonexistent

moderation, and
whatever was

silence after victims of

interrup
done

tion implies that to the

done to the

the Spaniards can be

of

Turks,

who are worse

than the civilized

again raises

brutes

the

Zebedaeus'

Pollio's fourth interruption

passions.

When Martius has

monotheists

no answer

for Pollio's
warns

suggested

distinction between true

the danger of

and

idolaters, Zebedaeus

Pollio

of

heresy. The

200
time and location
Zebedaeus'

Interpretation
of

the dialogue

Paris in
no

16219

underscores

the unsaid threat

of

warning.

There is

discussion

or resolution of this
admits

theolog
a war

ical problem; rather, Pollio is against the Turks and asks for

silent while

Martius

his

zeal

for

help

in

determining

the lawfulness

of

the action their al

of

from

men

who

are

well

versed
Martius'

in the divine law. In

aid and makes

concert with

liance, Eupolis
speeches.

comes

to

the

central

distribution

the

The

structure snd movement of of speeches snd spurs

the dislogue consist

Martius'

of

the

Eupolis'

mix of

distribution

Pollio's

and

interruptions. Pollio's fourth

interruption

the movement of the dialogue to its climax, for he raises the

question of the

Turks'

difference from idolsters,

which causes

Msrtius to

men

tion lswfulness

snd

Eupolis to distribute the

speeches

And

Msrtius'

interruption the

following day

reminds

regsrding lawfulness. the speakers about how

then prompts Eupolis

seriously the matter of means must

to expand
Zebedaeus'

speech

be considered, to include the limits

which

of methods and means.

The

structure and movement of

the dialogue sre such thst Eusebius is expelled from

the dialogue. Pollio's final

interruption,

Eupolis'

which occurs after

distribu

tion,

gives the answer to

must

Martius'

subject of means and shows

how

Eusebius'

expulsion
promised

be

understood. war

by

holy

is,

Pollio thinks that the Christian universality along with philosopher's stone, the "rendez-vous
us

of cracked
a

brains."10

Bacon tells

why the

alchemist's

dream

and

the hope for

holy

war are alike as such a

meeting

place.

They

are alike

because "in their

propositions pretence or

the description of the means is ever more monstrous than the

end,"

which end

is
of

nevertheless

noble."

But in the be

case of

the

religious and civil

universality

ject (ecclesiastical

and universal

Christianity, history), the true

Eusebius'

which would

sub

means are

inseparable from
absence

the possible truth of the end, and there can be no true means.

Eusebius'

from the dialogue is

universal

be trusted,
modern

the

end

history including the miracle of revelation itself, completed or perfected history will replace the sacred history in dividing times and declaring of days, and the true universal history must be the story of man's
fortune,
be
which

Bacon's teaching about ecclesiastical and in the Advancement of Learning. Because no miracle can ever
consistent with

scientific

is

man's

voyage to

Bensalem

and

the conquest of

God's

hegemony.12

The

means to the noble end of

end of

alchemy

and universal

his
the

tory
light

can

mended

only if the

God's

providence

is

replaced rule.

by

perfection of science and man's consequent

Eusebius'

liberation from God's

of

In the
must

of

absence, Pollio's suggested reformation

Christendom

The Battle
BW VII,
35.

of

Lepanto is the
of

earliest
was

The Battle

Lepanto
24.

military adventure mentioned by Martius, Advertisement, fought in 157 1, fifty years before the time of the dialogue

according to Martius.

'"Advertisement,

BW VII,

"Advancement of Learning, BW III, 362, ^Weinberger, pp. 876-78.

289.

On
consist

Bacon'

Advertisement
or

Touching
by

Holy

War

201

in

a new

Catholicism

universality led

a new principle of youth.

This universality is
preserve

none other than the universal claim of science to save and

of man's scientific

the corruptible things. The universal principle

for

tune governs the pursuit and evaluation of civil and ecclesiastical policy, and

these matters are

tacitly
of

assimilated to the
Eupolis'

speeches

of

Martius, Pollio

and

Zebedaeus
speeches of

by

means

revision

of

his distribution. Together their

treat the means to the

new universsl

human fortune. Special treatment policy is

to

"the

comparative"

is

obviated

by

the supreme urgency of the scientific

project. clesr:

Whatever the
consists

civil or ecclesissticsl methods snd mesns

mstter, the

messure of

It

in the

necessary for

mankind's voyage

Bensalem.
Eusebius'

expulsion and

tacit replacement

by Eupolis, Martius, Pollio,

and

Zebedaeus

signifies more

than the replacement of divine providence and grace

also signifies

by
the

man's scientific

fortune. It

the expulsion of moderation from

as a

dialogue, for
Martius'

although

Eupolis is described

politique, his

moderation

is

allied to

moderate msn. without

zeal, only Eusebius is explicitly identified by Bacon Pollio's sporting chsrscterizstion of Eupolis ss "temperate
and
must

as a snd

passion"

be

seen
and

in the light
Martius'

of the whole

fashioned from

Eupolis'

distribution Given
must
of

and

Pollio's

Eusebius'

expulsion

guiding from the dialogue,

of the action of
Eupolis'

the dialogue.

politique moderation

be problematic,
new

and we must wonder at

the law that governs the practice

the

holy

war.

Without rejecting the barbarism Martius lates

and answers

the question of means and

easily accepts, Pollio assimi preparations distributed to Martius.

so

The unity of the dialogue is fashioned by Bacon's weaving of a unity of immoderate natures by means of the moderate politique and the lubricious
courtier.

For it is Eupolis, the

moderate

politique,

who connects

the opposing

characters

by

the distribution
the

of

tasks

and who mskes

the explicit addition of

the question
and

of

limits

of methods and

means,

and

it is Pollio, the

smooth

jocular courtier,

who prompts
with

interruption,
the problem

and, along
of

it meaning by his final distribution, Martius, guides the dialogue as a whole toward
the
gives

immoderate

methods and means.

The

movement of the sake of a new

dialogue
war,

discloses the
and the

moderation of sectarian passion

for the

holy

aim of this

holy

war

is

such

that the end justifies the means.

The

Advertisement is
as such

a set of speeches governed

by

the principle of moderation, the principle

but

it

argues

for the

abandonment of moderation as

governing

the

mesns

to

msnkind's

true universsl fortune. It comes ss no surprise thst the

and methods

discussion
the

of the law governing means immoderate divine Zebedaeus.

is treated in its entirety

by

Martius'

Although Pollio's
rations and

speech assimilates what

subject of means and prepa

in fact determines
would govern

their end must

be,

Zebedaeus'

speech

treats

the law that to

the

instances,

application, and

limits

of means.

It is

Zebedaeus that Eupolis distributes the fundamental

question

concerning

202
means,

Interpretation

i.e.,

the question of limits and

degrees, in
it is

this case, whether

holy

war

is to

Zebedaeus'

proceed

to the extermination of peoples. the

speech culminates

the

speeches and action of

dialogue,
Eusebius'

and so

completes

the reconstruction of

the good

world required

by

expulsion. speech

His

speech

imitates the

struc

ture of the

dialogue, for
The

Zebedaeus'

presented

by

a part of an articu

lated

whole.

general question and

the six particulars are subsumed

by

the

secular question of a wsr sgsinst nsture snd nstions rsther

the Turks thst csn the

be justified

by

the Isws of
ends

thsn

by

divine lsw. And the dislogue

Zebedaeus'

before

Zebedseus discusses the divine lsw. As Bacon lates the divine to the

wsr sgsinst

the Turks from the perspective of the

speech assimi and consequence of

weaves secular.

it into the dialogue, It repeats the movement

the

dislogue

ss s

moderation

whole; it expels the divine and obliterates the distinction between and immoderation with respect to means. Like the whole of the
outward moderation

dialogue,

Zebedaeus'

his

Eupolis'

subtle change of

con

cern about extermination and expulsion

to expulsion or enforcements of con

science, his warning

against

making

a moloch of

Jesus,

and

his disapproval

of

Spanish

barbarity

veils

the subversion of moderation implicit in

of

his

speech.

The
as a

omission of

the divine law is unsurprising in the light

consideration
with

the dialogue
with

whole.

Serious

of such scientific

law is incompatible fortune. But

of

the re

placement of
proposes

divine fortune law

although

Zebedaeus he
"as for the

to treat the

of nature and

the law

nations,

and although

suggests separate

treatments of them
speaks of

by beginning
a
war

his

speech with

law

nature,"

of

he

them together without articulating a distinction

between them. His

argument
of

justifying
nature, but

against

the

Turks begins
cases
so as

by
to

referring only to the law

exclude

when

he limits the

"personal

tyranny,"

he

speaks of cases where

"the constitution,
nations, he

cus

toms,
when

and

laws

of a state are against the

laws

nations.

of nature and

Finally,
speaks of

he lists the

examples of nations

in

name that are no

them as nations outlawed and proscribed

Zebedaeus'

by

the

laws

of nature and nations. of nature and

indifference

to the

difference between the laws

nations should come as no

the reader that he

the

will

surprise, for at the outset of his speech he informs ignore the evidence of Roman law and so the writings of
on

Schoolmen. It

wss

the

bssis

of

the Romsn lsw thst the distinction to rest.

between the lsws

prince of consists

of nsture snd nstions wss understood

According to

the

the

Schoolmen,

in the

difference between the laws of nature and nations difference between man and the brutes. Aquinas argues that the
the
to all animals, while the law of nations applies

law

of nature applies

only to
the evi

msn,

snd of

the evidence he gives to reflect this essentisl

"jurist."13

difference is

dence divine

the Romsn

In the

sbsence of

positive

law,

Zebedaeus'

speech suggests that

sny discussion of the eternal or the law governing meth

man and the

ods and means abstracts

from the

moral

distinction between
refers to

brutes;

"Summa Theologica,

II

II, Q.57, A,

3.

Aquinas

Ulpian, Digest, I, i,

[.

On Bacon's Advertisement
it
must not

Touching

Holy

War

203

be forgotten that the

sixth particular encompassed

question of

by

his delibera
methods

tion about a war against the

and means.
Zebedaeus'

Turks treats the

extraordinary

argument

in the

sequel confirms

his immoderate intention. His

Aristotle's discussion

argument consists of a subtle

slavery.14

but

crucial modification of

of
ment about

It is

of course

astonishing that Zebedaeus presents Aristotle's argu

slsvery (psrt of the discussion of the household) ss the srgument for the natural right to govern regarding men and nations without mentioning the distinction between natural and conventional slavery and without mentioning
the kinds of rule. But the subtle change that
where a man

is just

as

important. Aristotle
degree that
man

asserts

differs from

other men to the same

differs

from the brutes

or

the soul differs from the

body,
in
a

such a man must mode

be taken to
and never
such

be

slave.

But

whereas

Aristotle

argues

hypothetical

asserts men.

that there are such men, Zebedaeus argues clearly that there are
whereas

Thus

Aristotle

asserts that the slave must apprehend reason

in
the

other men

and so suggests an

immeasurable difference between

assertion.15

man and

brutes, Zebedaeus

On the contrary, for Zebedaeus, if men's natural reason is only mostly defaced, they may nevertheless be treated argument from the as if they have no rational According to
makes no such
souls.16

Zebedaeus'

law

of

nature, the

principle of

holy

war

is

unencumbered

by

the moral distinc

tion between man and the brutes. It

own

would appear

that Zebedaeus subverts his

warning that it not be forgotten that men are men. It could be said that our case is overstated because Zebedaeus
to be "understood in the
rather

presents

his

comparative"

argument

than as a universally
presents

applicable argument

for the

natural right

to

rule.

Thus he

his

argument

as the

basis

of a principle that applies

only

where people are

like brutes, i.e.,

heap"

only in the simple, extreme, and "altogether unable or indign to

of the natural

rare cases where a people

is "but

and

govern."

Zebedaeus admits that the question

and

right to

rule

is complex, difficult,
easy
cases

easy only in the

extreme

cases,

and

he limits the

possible

by

excluding the rule of personal

Zebedaeus'

tyranny. But the

remainder of

speech

demonstrates the

actual exis

tence of that the

such

easy cases,

and although the seven examples conform

to his claim

simple cases are

rare, the

last,

general example subverts

his

claim to

rarity and his The last example is

exclusion of personal tyranny.

a general example used

to demonstrate the existence of

nations which sre no nations and which

have

no

right to

govern

because

of their

defilement

of

the

original

donstion

of government, nstursl

resson, snd which

example

brutes. This lsst sre, therefore, morally indistinguishsble from the

l4Aristotle, Politics
"When Aristotle
statement of
statement

1252b

1-5,
that

I253b-I256a.

concludes

that there are some nstursl slaves,

would

he draws his does

conclusion

from

the

characteristics

determine
snd

a man to

be

a natural slave.
not

Of

course

the

does
pp.

not prove that such men

exist,

Aristotle's
30.

conclusion

follow.

l6Cf.

195-96, above;

Advertisement, BW VII,

204
demonstrates that the

Interpretation
seven examples are
and

to be included in the

general catego

ries

of

giants, monsters,

foreign

tyrants.

The

general example

blurs the
tyrants.

distinction between Zebedaeus

agrees

personal with

tyrants and peoples governed

by

personal

Martius'

charge"

"true
and

against

the

Turks,
it.

which

is

grounded on rather

the

tyranny

of the

Ottomans

the

subjugation of

their people
Zebedaeus'

than on breaches of

nature's

law

as

Zebedaeus

presents

argument of

is directed

against

those

who are

"utterly

degenerated from the laws

peoples'

nature,"

Turks,
and

who

but he includes among such "routs and Martius.17 are honorable foes according to
of

shoals

of

the

In the light

the tension between

of possible

Zebedaeus'

last,

general

example

his

moderate
men

limitation

cases, we must conclude that at the treated as brutes may well be

Martius'

least those

who

may be

considered and

many indeed. As
means,

a speech about the

Zebedaeus'

speech repeats and

law governing extraordinary methods and justifies licentious bloodlust.

Zebedaeus joins the sanguinary alliance between Martius and Eupolis regarding the kinds of infidels. His reading of the prophets shows him to be one of the "reasonable
souls"

who see no relevant

degrees

of

idolatry. For Zebedaeus, the

and the

only hesthen "then

relevant

difference is between the Jews

now."

"then"

idolstry

of

the

Zebedaeus'

snd
Martius'

argument against possible enemies.

the Turks includes and

enlarges the scope of

Zebedaeus
ate

of course can give no

contemporary
in

example of

God's immedi

commandment

against

particular people
people

that is no people.

Biblical
original

evidence that would

fit any

1621 must

The only be the evidence for the

a a

donation

of government coupled with

the

determination that in fact

people

is

no people and

is,

rather,

"rout

shoal"

and

indistinguishable from

herd

have dominion, but in quoting God's words to Noah, Zebedaeus modestly omits what follows. The animal larder.18 realm over which Noah's offspring rule is mankind's speech completes the fabric woven by Bacon from the speeches of Zebedaeus, Martius, Pollio and Eupolis. As the central part of this fabric,
of animals men

brutes. Over the

shall

Zebedaeus'

Zebedaeus'

speech characterizes and means

the

to be used in the replacement of the

limits governing the extraordinary methods divine promise with the prom
tells us what

ise

of

science.

Bacon's

subtle which

art

he,

rather

than

Zebedaeus,
against the

means

by

the

"manner"

in

Zebedaeus'

speech

discharges

the questions of

the divine

lawfulness
But

of

holy

war.

The

holy

war of

Christendom

Turks

represents the war of the new Catholicism of science against nature's

at

corruptibility.19

the same

time, it

represents the
32-36.

British policy that is to

"Cf. Advertisement, BW VII, 20, 22, 23, 28, '"Genesis 9:3-5.

"It

should

be

noted

that

Gamaliel,

the

Protestant zealot,

makes

but

one short speech and

that he plays

no part

in the

whole constructed of

the speeches of

Zebedaeus. Although Gamaliel is not expelled from the pears. We might wonder if he appears only because of his zeal and if Bacon thought Catholicism could teach better lessons about universal conquest than could Protestantism.

Eupolis, Martius, Pollio, and dialogue as is Eusebius, he almost disap

On Bacon's Advertisement
conquer astical

Touching
as

Holy

War

205

the world for science. The

must

Advertisement teaches
evaluated
can

that civil and ecclesi to man's scientific

moral

policy
and

be

pursued

and

means

fortune

that the limit of these means

man

include indifference to the

pursuit

distinction between
scientific

and
on

the brutes.
proper civil
of

The

and capture

of msn's and

fortune depends
movement,
and

and ecclesiastical

policy,

the
or

structure,

content

the

dialogue disclose the

policy
of

complex

problematic moderation

necessary for the

the new

new

the new universsl

wsr-

fsre. The
prepared

moderstion of

holy

warriors must always

be

open

to and

for the

opposite of moderation.
mediate work that

The Advertisement is the

comprehensive well.

functions
and

as a

key

to Bacon's
mediate as

teaching

about science and

man,

its teaching is

It

answers the most general and

important

question

touching

the nature of

must be prepared to possibility that the end justifies the means and that proper means may be incompatible with moderation. As was noted, the teaching of the Advertisement must be seen in the light of the New Atlantis, and so viewed it
means.

The

moderate partisan of man's scientific

fortune

embrace

the

illuminates the
of other

means

nations."20

whereby the revelation of Bensalem becomes "the good Evalustion of the moral teaching about means depends on the
man's scientific means

good promised

by Bensalem,

fortune. But the Advertisement

world, for
we also see a change

does

not

of worlds

only teach about the from old to new.

whole

to a

new

The
united

playfully dubbed

by

Pollio

as

the "good

world"

is the

old world

by Eupolis, the temperate, passionless, good city and comic poet. The city in this old world is formed by unreformed Christianity. This is why the good city in the old world is exclusive as defended by the conventional pro
of

priety
who

the comic poet and yet is passionlessly temperate and so able to unify

or embrace a world.

The

old world

has

a place

for Zebedaeus, the harsh

changes

zealot

favors
of

a universal on

Christian kingdom. Bacon

city.

the old world

of

by
as

the the

action

Pollio
man

Eupolis'

Although Eupolis thinks

Pollio

individual
new

opposed

to the cosmic whole,

replaces

Pollio,

the spokesman
as

for the

science

of

nature,

Eupolis,

the

fifth essence,

the unifying

principle of the new world. alone speaks of

As Pollio

represents

the promise of science and the new

possibility, he

represents the

final

and efficient csuse of

whole of which

Eupolis hss become

s sepsrste psrt.

The

new good world

is

unified

by

the one

who refers snd professes

thst he refers all things to

himself.
sub of

Pollio's
sumes

selfish cosmopolitanism composed of combines

history,
claim

eros,

and

tragedy

the Christian city that

the exclusive,

conventional

propriety

the

comic poet and

the soft inclusiveness of the

shows

to universal rule.
refer all

But Pollio's

plsyfulness

that

although

he may

things to

himself, he does
Pollio's lack

not always so profess.

Bacon

of course causes and shsres

of candor.

He informs
1 66.

us of

his

presence

by

narrating the

dia-

2Wew Atlantis, BW III,

206

Interpretation
and

logue, frank,
world and

he hides Pollio's
more
and

unreported speeches

from

us.

As Pollio is less than

so

he is

dangerous. The
then

parts of

the old

world molded

into the

new

by

Bacon

held together

by

Pollio

are religious and martial zeal

the

passionless

temperance of the

Christian

city.

As the Christian city

replaces

the

ancient

city

as

the horizon for viewing the whole and man's place

in the whole,
the
new

so

the Christian city must give way to the city as

determined

by
it

science of nature. open

But then the

city's moderation of

is

problematic

must

be

to

its

opposite.

Bensalem'

s outward moderation

the comic, which we never see

poet.

comedy is no longer the city: is grimly serious, and Pollio wears the guise of worn by Eupolis, who is named for the comic

The locus

The

new universal whole united

by

the principle of
see

humanism is dictum

open to

immoderation,
comedy.

eros,

and

tragedy,
to

and

we

this through Pollio's playful

comic

Zebedaeus'

Chremes'

reference

famous

causes us to

wonder about what experiences are

to be included among human affairs in the

slave returns

new world.

In Terence's comedy the

of

to his place, the debts owed

to the courtesan are paid, and the conventional virtue of the

as

family

is

reaffirmed

befits the justice

and

tragedy,

conventional

comedy does not ground so become superior to it, by revealing the grounds for the pious, propriety of the city. Nor does comedy become independent from
world

the city. In the new

tragedy

as

pure playfulness and

dialogue. Rather, Pollio

universal

Zebedaeus

in itself, like the rhyming puns of the Platonic present comedy in the service of man's
gods no

scientific

fortune. Since the free

longer

rule

in Bensalem,

and

since wisdom

there has nothing of

playfulness about

it,

we can understand

Bensalem's
that

scientific promise
and

only

by understanding

Bacon's implicit

argument

comedy

tragedy

are the same

because together they disclose the full

possibilities of perfected

human desire.

ON SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE'S POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHING

J. E.

Parsons,

Jr.

At first
teaching.

sight

it

might appear as

that Sir William Temple had no political

Temple was,

aim

to

demonstrate,

an

Epicurean,

and

Epicurus
Epicu-

taught that the apolitical

politics.

life is

superior to and nobler than the

life devoted to

However,

this objection can be answered in two wsys.

First,

resnism presupposes a general and comprehensive reflection on political

life,

as

in Lucretius, De rerum natura, the latter Temple fully led an Epicurean life only
retirement

part of after

Book V.

Second, Sir William

his
permanent
was a

1680,

following

from

politics at the age of

fifty-two. Prior

to that

time, Temple
English does

political advocate

and,

indeed,
portrait
a

sponsored a plan to alter the

of

constitu

tion.

Thus Macaulay's
and as

him

as

man a

inclined to "valitudinarian
neutral"1

effeminacy"

"not

mediator"

but

"merely

scant

justice
Tem

to Temple. What gave rise to this judgment is

ple's

a misacknowledgment of

Epicureanism

and the
a

accompanying
philosopher.2

view that

Temple

was

only

a states

everything Macaulay writes about Temple is to be dismissed, though it is chiefly in Temple's own works thst we find the vindicstion of his thought as well as that of his character and
man and not

not, first of all,

Yet

deeds.

Accordingly,
and
never

a certain

tension does exist between Temple the statesman

Temple the Epicurean

philosopher.

For

while

he

states

in his Memoirs: "I

had my Heart set upon any thing in publick Affairs, but the Happiness of and Greatness of the Crown; and in Order to that, the Union of Country, my he also states in his which alone I thought both could be both, by
Epicurean essay
These
no,
are

atchiev'd,

on gsrdens thst

his

privste

bent
ask

wss

for

s retired

life

snd thst

Questions that

Man
of

ought at

least to

himself,

whether and

he

asks others or

and to chuse

his Course
or

Life

rather at

by

his

own

Humour

Temper,

than

by
a

common

Accidents,
more

Advice
own

Fool knows

in his

Friends; House, than

of

least if the Spanish Proverb be true, That

Wise Man in
ends and
another's.3

We may
action are

observe

from this that the

support of

Temple
country,

proposes
and

for

political

nonpartisan, the

king

that the motive

works.

is

the advice of

friends,
of

as appears

from

several passages action and

in his

It is this

nonpartisanship statesmanship

the ends of

his

political

the fact that Temple's

than partisan

consisted

in

administration

and negotiation rather

politics that make

it

possible to

lessen the tension between the

statesman and

'T. B. Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays (Leipzig, Tauchnitz, 1850), III, 151, 236. :Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays, III, p. 160. 3Sir William Temple, Works, ed. Jonathan Swift (London, 1740), I, 351, 189, emphasis in
original.

208

Interpretation

the Epicurean philosopher in his character.

more

For,

while

Sir William Temple is

yet

public-spirited

ststesmsn

thsn s public-spirited philosopher,

the

latter

chsrscter

does

not sltogether escspe

him. In his

own words we

find the has been

ststement: a great

"I

can

truly

say, that

of all

the Paper I have

blotted,

which

deal in my Time, I have the Intention of some publick

contain

never written

Good."

any thing for the Publick without This statement might be considered to
political

in

compass the essence of

which

Temple's

Epicureanism, along

with

the

following, in

Temple

writes

concerning his

role as a negotiator and

peacemsker:

Peace is
or

a publick

Blessing,
or

without which no

Man is

safe
or

his Life: Neither Innocence

but in Danger
can give
us."

or

Laws

are a

Guard

in his Fortunes, his Liberty, Defence; no Possessions are

and

enjoyed

Fear,

which

equally lose the Pleasure

Ease

of all

that

Fortune

This quotation,
mediately
ple's
of

while

it

applies

immediately
peace

to peace abroad, also more

ss

covers

the situation of internal

threstened,

it

wss

in Tem

lifetime

by

incipient

civil wsr.

At in

no

time wss this truer thsn st the time

Temple's

self-enforced retirement

1680

during

the Popish Plot furor snd

the Exclusion Bill crisis. Rsther thsn accept the position of

Charles IPs cabinet, Temple opted for retirement, rather midst of the downfall of the Roman republic, who remained
with all

secretary of state in like Atticus in the

on good terms

both sides, but refused to be a partisan. Again, like leading his fsvorite modern Montaigne, suthor, Temple preferred a retired life to one exposed to continual dangers and temptstions to commit insalubrious deeds. As
the
men on

Montaigne

wrote during the civil wars of religion in France: "It is no smsll for one to feele himself preserved from the contagion of an age so pleasure, infected as ours. [And Montaigne mentions] this Epicurus, most agreeing
. . .

with

my manner. We turn accordingly to the directly Epicurean sayings to be found in Temple's writings. These are discovered in Miscellanea, Part III, "Heads de
. .

as essay upon the Different Conditions of Life and follows. (1) "A thinking Man can never live well, unless content to die"; (2) "The greatest Prince, possess 'd with Superstition and Fears of Death, more signed sn of common Fortune, and well constituted Mind"; (3) "A Man's Happiness, all in his own Opinion of himself and other between one Man and another; onely whether Things"; (4) "The Difference a Man governs his Passions, or his Passions Him"; (5) "We ought to abstain from those Pleasures, which upon Thought we conclude are likely to end in Pleasure."6 more Trouble or Pain, than begin in or they Joy
. . .

for

Fortune"

unhappy, than any private Man

Certain

comparable sayings are

disclosed in

the writings of

Epicurus

him-

4Temple, Works, I, 272-73. 'The Essays of Montaigne, trans. John Florio (Tudor Translations) (London, 1893), III, Temple, Works, I, 306-07.

24, 59.

Sir William Temple's Political

self,

and

Philosophical

Teaching

209

(i) "Become
a

accustomed

good snd evil consists

to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all in sensstion, but death is the deprivation of sensation.

And therefore

mortality of because it takes swsy the crsving for immortality"; (2) "But the many moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another yearn for it as a

right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but
at one respite

from the life

evils of

life. But the

wise man neither seeks

to escape life nor fears

nor

the cessation of
seem

life, for
the

neither

does life is

offend

him

does the

absence of

to be any evil";
satisfies

(3) "Self-sufficiency

is the

greatest of all

"Nothing
pleasure

man who

not satisfied with a

riches"; (4) little"; (5) "And since

reason we

is the first

good and natural

to us, for this very

we

do

not

choose greater

every discomfort

pleasure

but

sometimes

pass

over

many pleasures,

when

accrues to us as

the

result of

them.

comparing Temple with Epicurus himself on these five topics we discern the Epicurean propensity in Temple's way of thinking. may clearly Wentworth De Witt, an historian of Epicurean thought, points As Norman

Thus

by

out:

"From France the doctrines

period

of

Gassendi

were carried

to England
which

in the fall his

as

Restoration

and won a vogue

for Epicurean
In addition,
named or of

studies
"8

lasted for

about seventy-five

years, roughly from 1650 to 1725. this

period.

Temple's

writings of

into

almost

the

midpoint of

further indication
of

Epicureanism is thst the only philosopher follows: "Upon the Gardens of Epicurus;
1685.

in the title

his

writings

is

Gsrdening,"

an

essay

written

in

The
ence

result of

Temple's

adherence

to Epicureanism is his
after

oft-stated prefer

for

ancient over modern

learning. Temple,
to that
effect.9

all,

is

rather an ancient

in

temperament and philosophy than a modern, and for this reason

Mscsulay
that

dismisses

most

of

his

writings

Yet

when

we

remember

Jonathan Swift, the

ancient as opposed

protege of

Temple's last

years

in retirement,

was also an

to a modern, we may quite pardonably revise for ourselves

Macaulsy's

poor estimste of

Temple's intelligence. For it

the
side of

wss

justifisbly

possi

ble in Temple's time to

choose

the sncients

in the

sncients-moderns

toward the close of the seven controversy thst raged in France and England a teenth century. Nor was this merely literary argument; it also touched upon
political

science, as we shall see

in Temple's
us to

political

teaching.

At this point, it behooves

Virtue,"

examine

Temple's essay, "Of Heroick

as a suitable

introduction to his

political

teaching
York,

proper.10

As Temple

states

initially in

this essay:

"Among

all

the Endowments

of

Nature
pp.

or Improve-

'Epicurus: The Extant Remains,

trans. Cyril

Bailey
His

(New

1970),

85, 137, 89.

8Norman Wentworth De Witt. Epicurus

and

Philosophy

(Minneapolis:

University

of

Minnesota Press, 1954), P- 356'See Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays, III, 241-42. was written after Temple's political teaching proper (1672), it '"Although "Of Heroick lead sway from that teaching, because its theme is more can serve better to lead toward than
Virtue"

properly

prepolitical

than

postpolitical.

210
Art"

Interpretation
of

ments

by

which

men

have

excelled

and

distinguished themselves,

there are principally only two that have "the Honour of

and of

being
. .

called

Divine,

giving that Esteem

or

Appelation to

such and

as possessed

them in very

eminent

Degree;
another

which are

Heroick Virtue,

Poetry.
on

Temple treats
virtue rather

Poetry
an

in

essay,

and

it be

can

be

said

to

feed

heroic
Art,"

than

to supply its

place. of

It

should

noted

that Temple suggests that

heroic

virtue

is

"Endowment
most psrt.

Nature"

and not sn
means

"Improvement
virtue

of

the

This
and

that heroic

is

natural

poetry for natural in the virtue,

unlike

sense of
states

inborn

original,
to

not a product of convention. virtue

Now,

while

Temple

that it is

easier

define heroic

in terms

of effects and examples

than through definition proper,

arises

he does deliver this definition: that

native

such virtue

from "some

great

and

Excellency

of

Temper

or

Genius tran

Fortitude."12 scending the common Race of Mankind in Wisdom, Goodness and Such virtue is advantaged by noble birth, improved by special education, and

assisted

by

good

fortune,

so that

heroes

are

honored

and obeyed

during

their

lives it is

and

bewailed

and adored after

wisdom appears

to be of more significance than

death. In the definition that Temple offers, fortitude, as we shall see. For
"in the
or

wisdom whose greatness appeared

the Institutions of such

Laws, Orders
snd

in Excellency of Inventions Governments, as were of most Ease,

...

Safety
fellow

and

Advantsge to Civil
st

Society."13

Such tslents

politicsl

fsction

home

foreign

oppression

devoted to remedying in relieving both sbrosd,

were

snd

countrymen snd

foreigners from the

founders
and

violence of

tyranny.

Thus,
and

unlike as

in Machiavelli, these
a

great

legislators
are to

practiced

first

foremost
became
and

politicsl,

nontyrsnnical wisdom.

They

be divided into two

(who
to the Epicurean

groups that

in fact
kings

merge

into

one:

the

first inventors

of useful arts

perhaps

snd

the founders of civil society

according

doctrine)14

the first authors of any good and well-instituted civil government in any

coun

try,

who

may

also

be inventors lifted

of the arts.

By

means of these

discoveries safety

and and

institutions,

men were

above savage and

brutish lives

to the

convenience of civil

society, the enjoyment

of private

property, the

observance

of civil or religious orders, and

the obedience of wise laws.

By
and

such all

means,
of

further,
arts.

were

obtained

security, plenty, civility,

industry,

kinds

Such founders

were obeyed as princes and

lawgivers in their

own

times,
and

and were cslled

of

by
to

posterity

by

the nsme of heroes. Such were the founders

the four grest sncient empires:

Assyris, Persis, Greece (Mscedon),

and

Rome.
and

According

Temple, Saturn

Jupiter

were

originally kings
pagan pantheon.

of

Crete

later deified, supplying the

origins of the

Greek

Temple
and

traces the origins of all religions to

human

invention, excepting

Judaism

"Temple, Works, I,
nIbid. uIbid.

191.

l4See James H. Nichols, Jr., Epicurean Political

1976),
p.

Philosophy

(Ithaca: Cornell

University Press,

139.

Sir William Temple's Political

and

Philosophical
in
relation

Teaching
perhaps

211
for

Christianity,

which

he does

not mention except

to

Islam,

prudential reasons.

the
and

Cretan

Among the Greek heroes, Temple numbers Theseus, founder of Athens; king, Minos; snd Lycurgus, founder of Spsrta. Alexander the Great
grest csptains and

Caesar are, in Temple's sccount,

conquerors, but

not

authentic

heroes due to their

with

considered

defects. This distinction is enough, when Temple's demotion of Mahomet, to show his disagreement
moral

with

Machiavelli,

since

Temple does

not

honor "armed

prophets"

who

do

not

uphold

the highest standards of morality. Machiavelli honors founders for their

power and

authority rather than for their political wisdom. Temple states thst the heroes of the four grest monsrchies

Cyrus, for

exsmple,
can

hsving

been immortslized
Virtue"15

by

Xenophon

ss

"the truest Chsrscter that

and

be

given of

Heroick

(in the

Cyropaedeia)

their achievements

are what
and

inspire contemporary instruction of princes and provide the modern examples for political discourse

statesmen

in Europe

and reflection.

They

for Europeans, or descendants of Europeans. But they are not the only models of virtue in the world, nor are their regimes the only govern ments worthy of imitation. Then Temple describes the Chinese empire, the
are authoritative empire of

the

Incas,

the Goths

(including

the

Tartars),

and

finally

Islam.

Temple
the

mentions

"the Islamic Empire,

the Inca's
was

which seems

to have been in all points

fiercest

as that of

the gentlest, that of China the wisest, and

World."16

that of the Goths the bravest in the

Passing

for

a moment over

both

Islsm

snd

the

Incss,

we

find two

of the csrdinal

virtues,

courage and

wisdom,

incarnated in two different regimes, the Gothic and the Chinese. Temple, even more than Montesquieu, draws a distinction between absolute monarchy and
despotism.17

The former is the

absolute rule of

wisdom, or, at
the latter

least,
is the

of

long

experience

(understood

as practical

wisdom),

whereas

absolute

entirely base and arbitrary. The former charac terizes China, the latter Islam. What transforms the Chinese autocracy into the rule of embodied wisdom is that the Chinese emperor does not make a decision
rule of the ungoverned passions,
without

the

assent of

the

highly

educated

Confucian mandarinate,

and even

the

Tartar invaders

submitted themselves to this

enthusiastic

dianoetic form

of government.

In

Islam, due
rulers

to the

and fanatic origin of their religion, the Muslim

by nothing but religion. As for the Gothic limited monarch, leader in war and peace, its council of constitution with its this Constitution has been celebrated, as framed barons and its commons: ".
have their
whims constrained
.

with great

Wisdom
out

and

Equity,

and as the truest and and

justest Temper that has

"18

ever

been found

between Dominion

Liberty.

In addition, it fulfills

'Temple, Works, I, "Temple, Works, I,

194. 225.

"Cf. Montesquieu. On

the

Spirit of

the

Laws, XI,
of

9-

See Thomas L. Pangle, Montesquieu's

P- 70.

Philosophy

of Liberalism (Chicago:
220.

University

Chicago Press, 1973).

'"Temple, Works, I,

212
the political norm of
enough political

Interpretation
governing "all freedom consistent
all."

by
with

It

seems

that in order to

have

authority, the virtue needed in the

Gothic

regime of

bravery
popular

is courage, the hallmark of the ancient Britons. Because of the their sncestors the English enjoy s limited, mixed regime, which is in the
use of absolute

as monarchical

authority
whose

as

it is free in the

allowance of

liberties. The British

of

constitution

thus represents the ancient

Gothic
is
cour

balance
age.

king, lords,
states

and

commons,

As Temple

in the

summation of

guiding "Heroick Virtue":

corporate virtue

Now the true

Number
of

original

Greatness

of

strong is the Natural Strength

and able of

Bodies

of

any Kingdom or Nation may be their Native Subjects [the roots

all the rest

accounted of

by
.

the

courage]

This

Governments,
second

is Art, Discipline,

or

Institution.10

But

conquerors

are

founded the
constitution

orders and

in glory institutions of the

and

fame to those for

who

originally times,

various governments.

If the Gothic

is the best balsnced

snd most appropriate one

modern

the Chinese regime most approaches the Platonic paradigm of rule

wisdom.

by

embodied

It

seems

that Temple may be willing to derogate wisdom as the

of courage or
Kant,20

supreme virtue

in favor
and

resoluteness,
welfare of

distinctly

modern tenden

cy,

as

in Descartes

for the

his

own political regime.

Or it

is

rather perhaps

that

he

sees

the operative virtue for his plsce and time as

courage tempered
wisdom.

by

prudence snd as

unavoidsble, if

not preferable to rule

wisdom

by
in

At the very lesst, Temple does not divorce his chsrscterization of the Gothic constitution.
After
such sn

from

courage

introduction,
significant

we come to

Sir Willism Temple's

politicsl

tesching

proper as presented

in "An

Essay

upon

the Original and Nature of

Government."

It is

that the essay

starts with

was written

in

1672

during

Tem

ple's active political career.

It

the proposition that the nature of man the variation observed among men

is the

same

in

all times and places and that

is due to
arise

climate and
several

consequently
utterly

differing

humors
and
"

and

passions, from
of mankind.

which

the

customs, educations, opinions,

not

laws
.

Further,

if

revolutions

do

destroy
or

the state,

Time to its
permanent

natural

Constitution,

something

near

it commonly returns in it."21 The concept of a

and some
conceives

overturning

or revolution so prevalent

twentieth-century thought, is entirely

"revolution"

lacking

in Marx, Nietzsche, in Temple. Instead, he

of

as a return which

to the natural status quo

before the
out.

outbreak of civil exempts more

war,

the English upheaval of 1640-60

bears

Also, Temple
since

the historical part of

Scripture from his Operation

of

political

analysis,

"the

immediate

and evident

Divine Will

and

Providence is

a theme of

'Temple, Works, I,

230.

20See Descartes, Philosophical Letters (Oxford, 1970), p. 165; I. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbooks), p. 67.

2lTemple, Works, I,

95.

Sir William Temple's Political

Divines Temple
and not common observes
Men"

and

Philosophical

Teaching
not of

213

and

the subject "of our

Faith,

Reason."

in passing that the

under

geographicsl extremes of north snd south

hsve

despotism, but that the moderate climates are "used to more moderate Governments, running anciently into Commonwealths [i.e., and of later ages into Principalities bounded by laws, which differ republics]
slwsys

lived

less in Nature than in

a

Name."22

Unlike

some

moderns, Temple does

not

draw

so

sharp insight that in Europe the Gothic

republics and empires. government: autocratic
of rule of

distinction between

ancient and modern regimes, constitution

has

replaced

notwithstanding his the ancient form of

of

In addition, Temple discerns only two basic forms

despotism,

whether religious or

secular,

and

the regime

or six

law. Under these two heads may fall many more kinds than the five regimes enumerated by Plato, Aristotle or Polybius, according to whether

the despotic autocrat is mild or

or

fierce

and whether the rule of

selectively based, for exsmple. Further, the Provinces of the Netherlsnds snd in Polsnd fall

politicsl regimes

law is extensively in the United

by

under no category yet invented theorists, ancient or modern. The sncient Mediterranesn princedom, sccording to Temple, wss not s tyrsnny. The prince served as general-in-chief in war and in peace lived with political out armed guards as chief of

the

popular councils and assemblies.

Such

was

the the

monarchy Gothic constitution, thus revealing ern regimes. The commonwealths

volstile which

of

Macedon, for

example, and it in some

some or

ways approximated

continuity between
of sncient

ancient and mod

republics

times were more

thsn the ancient princedoms, and

frequently

revolved

into tyrannies,
oligarchy sup
condition with

sprang naturally from purely

popular regimes.

Where

an

pressed the multitude, the multitude often resorted to autocratic rule, contented

to see those
themselves.
political

they hated
A multitude,
and

and

feared before

now

in

an

equal

orders

Temple, is incapable of framing or founding institutions, though it is quite capable of conserving or

says

maintaining them when once formed. The founders of civil society are always individual princes, as in Machisvelli; but unlike Mschisvelli, Temple does not
accept the class analysis

of, say, the Roman polity, but rather, as

with

Aris

totle, the lose its republican

regime

analysis.23

liberty

For example, according to Temple, Rome began to only when the Roman regime could not ensure that

the

plebs

only

elect patricians to public office.

A
world a

good reason
was

that the

for the many commonwealths or republics of the ancient combined riches of these communities inclined toward
The
same
motive can

republican

regime.

be found in the

modern

world

inclining
this
ancient

the United Provinces of the Netherlands toward a republic, although

particular regime republic

exactly be described as the modern form of an due to the factor of Christianity. As Temple expresses his
cannot
95.

-Temple,

Works, I,

am

indebted for this distinction to

s

Machiavelli'

New Modes

and

Orders (Cornell

Harvey C. Mansfield, University Press).

Jr. See his

forthcoming

book

214
general point

Interpretation
where Men grow to great Possessions, they grow more Safety, snd therefore desire to be governed by Lsws and Magistrates Other own Choice, fearing all Armed and Arbitrary Power.

here:

"

intent

upon

of their reasons

for this

republican

trend are the smallness of cities, which makes it

easy for the people to gather together in assemblies, and the mutual commerce of men in small cities rendering their wits nimble and making them political
reasoners. and

The

opposite

of

the

republican

trend occurs in the extreme north

south where

the sparseness of population and the lack of cities, except

render

as

the residences of absolute rulers,

the people apt to accept

despotism

and its arbitrary decrees in the same manner as they accept the weather and the will of heaven. The poverty of such a people also inclines them in this

direction. In addition, the less moderate climates by excessive heat or cold, and for that reason men
servitude. geous

enervate grow

the spirits of men

tamer and more fit

for

In the
so

more

temperate regions men are more inspirited and coura

autocracy.

and

less liable to despotic

significance

of climate

in Temple, though found in

political

This theory part in

and

of

the political

Aristotle, fore
possible

shadows

Montesquieu's

theory

of

climate,25

it is just

that

Montesquieu may have read Temple on this subject. Certainly, Temple's theory here sccords with what we may call his political Epicureanism, according to which man is first of all a sensuous, earth-bound animal, though capsble of
subsequent guidsnce

by

resson. snd

Yet

even

between despotism itself is

the regime bssed on rule of

lsw, every

government

by

slwsys s restraint and

Temple

asserts

that sll rule is

Resort."26 Therefore, when men contend equslly sbsolute, "where it is in the lsst for liberty it is either for s chsnge of rulers or out of nostslgis for forms of

government

they have formerly been used to and now regret, forgetting the inconveniences, pressures, and complaints of their former regime. This inter
of

pretation of

revolutionary change clearly puts Temple among the conservatives his age, though unlike the more radical and less liberal Hobbes, he does not
the more or less limited
monarchies of

condemn all resistance or revolt against

his time. In this Temple is it

was

closer to the political

27

Marquis

of

Halifax than to Hobbes, for

Halifax,

sometime

confederate of

Temple's,

who

master

minded

the revolution of 1688.

If
the

political power rests with or

the people

and political

authority
always

rests with

few

the one, it is always opinion that

inclines

political power to respect

political authority.
are

"For Power, arising from Strength is

few.'m

in those that

governed, who are many: But

who are

that govern,

Authority, arising from Opinion, is in those This is the reason why "vast Numbers of Men

:4Temple, Works, I, 96. 25See Montesquieu, On the Spirit of the Laws, XV-XVII.
-Temple,

Works, I,

77.
Revisited,"

"See J. E. Parsons, Jr., "Halifax: The Complete Trimmer (September 1978), 66-94.

Interpretation. 7, No. 3

28Temple, Works, I,

97, emphasis in

original.

Sir William Temple's Political

submit

and

Philosophical

Teaching

215

their lives
of

be Force

Fortunes absolutely to the Will of because it "must or that constitutes "the true Ground and Founda Custom,
one"

and

Opinion"

tion of all

Government,
Hume the
wrote

and

that

which subjects

Power to

Authority."

Temple

shares with opinion.

view

that the authority of

all government rests on public of

Hume

in his

"Essay IV,
on

Of the First Principles

of

Government":

".

as

Force is

always

the

side

the governed, the governors have

on opinion

nothing to support them but opinion.

government

It is, therefore,

only that
most

is founded;

snd

this msxim extends to the most despotic and

popular."29

militsry governments, ss well ss the most free and most Hume.30 conviction, Temple may correctly be said to anticipate

In this

Temple

constituent parts.

dom,

authority in terms of its Natural political authority derives from the opinion of wis goodness, and valor, or courage in the persons who possess it. Temple
examines the origin of natural political
wisdom

defines

as

that which makes men

attain

judge

what

are

the best ends and

what sre

the best means to

a

them. Wisdom is more than mere prudence the proper judgment

of

because it has
and can

theoretical

dimension,

the best ends,

the

be termed noetically inclined phronesis. For Temple, as for Aristotle, ends are supplied by nature, but it still requires rational choice or delibera
between the best
Temple
alternative ends.

tion as to choice

This is

what

wisdom,

properly understood, does. Goodness is defined

by

as the

quality that

makes men prefer

their

duty
term

and promises
"honesty"

before their

passions or self-interest.

Temple

also uses the

as a synonym

virtues would
passions

be

sophrosyne or

of self-interest

goodness. The Greek term here among the temperance, because temperance tempers the through thumos. Valor or courage (andreia) is the

for

lowest

"

of

the virtues
want either

and

as

it

gives

Awe,

and promises

Protection to
makes

those who

Heart

or

Strength to defend themselves: This

the

Men among Women; and that of a Master-Buck in a numerous Authority "" Herd. Temple, it should be noted, leaves out justice as a constituent of natural political authority, and he seems to substitute duty for justice, a ten
of
.

dency
age

that

would anticipate

the pure

practical reason of

Kantian
not

morality.

We

should,

however,
wisdom

observe that Temple

here,

as

before, does

dissever

cour

from

but insists

on

their union.
political

Derivative from these three

virtues

constituting
ss

natural political

suthority sre three subsidisry

Wisdom"32

virtues.

"Eloquence,

it is

pssses

for

Mark

of

is the first. From

goodness or

honesty,
on

the derivative virtue

is

per

sonal

besuty. From

vslor or coursge

the derivstive
effect

conventionsl nobility. opinion of nstursl

These subsidisry

virtues

hsve

some

the

public

politicsl authority, but especislly if they resemble the originsls from which they subsidderive. A further source for suthority, which is grester thsn sny of the

29David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (Oxford University Press, 1963), 30Hume cites a writing of Temple's in his Essays, p. 423. note.

p. 29.

31Temple, Works, I.
*Ibid.

98.

216

Interpretation
virtues, is the
opinion of

isry
be

divine fsvor

or

the

sppesrance of piety.

Piety,

as

it is thought a way to the favor of God and

an effect of

good

fortune

as

it

seems either authority.

to

piety

or of prudence

and

courage,

produces

Also

secondarily, splendor of

living,

observance of of

obedience,

i.e., fealty,

and a rich or

equipage,

seem

to be the

reward

those virtues already

mentioned

the

effect of good

fortune. "From

all these

much strengthened and confirmed as

authority partly on differs from Burke in seeing at the origin

natural political

by nothing so Temple evidently founds prescription, anticipating Burke. Temple

Authority by
of civil

arises, but is

Custom."31

of prescription

founder In
obliged valor.

or

continuing from "time founders.

mind,"

out of

society not a gradual process but the discrete acts of a

order

to gain new authority and discard the old, revolutionaries are

public

to sttsin, in

opinion,
seized.

a reputation

for wisdom, goodness,

and

Thus

power must

be

This induces
obeyed or

a general

Change

of

Opinion, concerning

the

Person

or

Party
So

like to be in Effect
of

followed

by

the greatest or strongest part of the People.

...

as

Government may be esteemed to grow strong or weak, as the increase.34 these Qualities in those that Govern is seen to lessen or
all

general

Opinion

Power

must

be

seen

to follow authority in all civil societies, ss s nstural

motions

law,

just

as

in

natural

bodies, bodily

follow those

of

the mind, the many

always

pursuing what the few who are trusted begin or advise. Natural political authority, therefore, is the origin of all
and

regimes

among

men,

it

precedes contract as

the chief principle

of

government,

although the

principle of contract
Laws."

is

established

"by

the great Writers concerning Politicks

and

Here,

in his

reliance upon political

the principle of natural political author

more an ancient than a

ity, Temple
modern

shows

his

Epicureanism to be

doctrine. For

even

if

men are conceived

to come together to agree

contractually on any civil constitutions, they do so not as individuals but already as heads of families whom they represent. Thus the origin of natural authority is the suthority of the pstrisrchsl fsmily. In this tesching Temple leans toward Aristotle, according to whom the polity is composed of
political overgrown

families. But Temple does

animal,
and

not

agree

with

Aristotle that
a political

man

is

naturally
rean.

a political

in this

shows

himself to be

Epicu

Some

of

them [political

theorists] lay for

their

foundation,

that Men are sociable Crea

tures and naturally disposed to live in Numbers and Troops together.

are

Others,

that

they

naturally creatures of Prey, and in a State of War one upon another; so as to aVoid Confusion in the first Case, and Violence in the other, they found out the Necessity of agreeing upon some Orders and Roles, by which every Man gives up his common Right for some particular Possession, and his Power to hurt and spoil others for the Privilege
"Ibid.

"Temple, Works, I,

98-99.

Sir William Temple's Political

of not

and

Philosophical
upon such

Teaching

111

being

hurt

and spoiled

himself. And

the

Agreement
common
...

Contract,
make

with

the Consent to execute them

by

Strength

and

Orders, by mutual Endeavours, they

must

to be the Rise of all Civil Governments.

,

So that, if Mankind

be

ranged

to one of these Sorts [i.e.

man as a political
. .

animal,

or man as a warlike

beast]

I do

not

know. well

which

it

will

be.

any Government:

Or, if they

are

Nor do I know, if Men are like Sheep, why they like Wolves, how they can suffer it.35

need

Accordingly, Temple
homo homini lupus
apolitical of

rejects

both the

zoon politikon of

Aristotle
as

and

the

Hobbes. Men do

not come to sight

first

antisocial,

individuals, but
snd

as members of a

family. Temple's

rejection of

both

Aristotle

Hobbes

on

this point indicstes the unique character of his

political

although the absolute primacy of the family is not a teaching to for be found, example, in Lucretius. Man, according to Temple, is neither a political nor an antipolitical animal at first, but finds his way into political life

Epicureanism,

through the

family

more or

less

as a result of a series of accidents.

From the

family,
political

the first lawgivers of civil society spring, not

or

institution

founding

of a preeminent man or men.

by contract, but The foundation of

by

the

natural

authority is thus patriarchal, a doctrine thst the Msrquis of Hslifsx told Sir Willism Temple wss taking too far "that Principle of Paternal Dominion
. . .

for fear

of

destroying
exploded residual

the Rights of the

of

People,"36

so close

to him did it seem to

retsined

be to the
sccount

system

Sir Robert Filmer. If Temple

in his

the

truth of the Filmerian system, but under careful restraint,

prerogatives of

he did

not

do

so

to discredit the
whose

the people, but to vindicate the

constitu

Gothic constitution, in
tion. For the

balance he transposed the Restoration

provided

patriarchal

family

the

model of

the Gothic constitution,

the

patriarch

corresponding to the

king,

the legitimate sons and

commons.

heirs to the

barons

or

nobility, and the

servants

to the

The

Example,"

continued

its

own

being

through "Lesson and

religion gating primitive moral distinctions and teaching Opinion is thus the basis of suc adversity. in to a higher and a greater if long-lived, becomes a Pater ceeding patriarchal families, and the patriarch, Temple nstion. chief of s the specificslly relates the origin of the an patriae, patriarchal cient British nation to the family and its institution of
Nature" "Deference."

family forming and propa by "having Recourse

patriarchal

Incidentally, Temple interrupts his thority

of one

political

discussion to discuss "the Au

and

the Ancients in Matters of

Opinion,"

finds that it is

not clear such a

another."

"why

Age

of the

World

should

be

wiser

than

For if

distinction be drawn, it is

rather

the later

ages

that could claim

they enjoy
we see

more experience

"of the

more particular

superiority Life."37 Here Experiments of

more or

since

clearly that Temple's

political

Epicureanism belongs
snd

less to the
tout court

period of active politics

ending in 1680,

thst

his Epicuresnism
in

thst hails the superiority of the

sncients

to the moderns

lesrning

only,

33Temple, Works, I, 36Temple, Works, I, "Temple, Works, I,

99339101.

218
develops
explain ss a result of

Interpretation Temple's
politicsl retirement

from

politics after 1680. not

in psrt why his csrefully in thst Temple, unlike Lucretius, mskes the family the primal condi tion of man. We cannot therefore expect Temple's full philosophical teaching
to be
present at all points

Epicuresnism does

This may follow Lucretius very

in his life. It is only

as a result of

further

reflection

in

retirement

that Temple supported the Epicurean superiority of the ancients over

the moderns in learning.

Returning
patriarchal

to Temple's political

Epicureanism,

we see that

Temple traces

Family

seems

authority throughout all stages of a nation's political growth: "Thus to become a little Kingdom, and a Kingdom to be but a great
estate

Family."38

In the third

Temple

sees
"

the role

of contract:

In the

corre

sponding

family

structure

Temple

notes:

What is due to the Servants

by

Contract,
observed and

Temple is fit for them to enjoy, may be provided. how tyranny or despotism is the rule of a harsh, intemperate, willful,
or what
patriarch.

arbitrary

"And therefor Martial Law is

of a

of all

others

the most

absolute,
gain

and not

like the Government

soldiers

Father, but
of

Master."4"

Riches to for it be

hired

or

mercenary
of

is but "a Support

decayed

Authority,"

serves

the interest

the governors, instead of the governed, which ought to

and

the

same.

Thus Temple derives both despotism

patrisrchsl

the regime

of

the rule of

law from the

the latter as

fsmily,

the

former
But

seen as

its

decay

and

corruption,

its health

and

strength.

even

where

prevalent, the people control the ultimate power, which

arms.

mercenary armies are is their united force of

For "common
of

Pay

is

faint Principle

of

parison

Religion, Liberty, Honour, Revenge

every Soldier [of the people] have as much at to have spirited all the great Actions and Revolutions
should

and Action, in Com Necessity; which makes Heart as their Leaders, and seem or of

Courage

the

World."41

James II

have

considered

these words

of

Temple's, for in ignoring them, he

no army.

discovered to his loss that in the breach he had Temple defines

eldest son
eldest son natural an

important concept, as the right of an right, to succeed his father as head of a patriarchal family or state. If the fails to maintain his natural political authority or else dies before he
leaves
a child

can succeed and

in his place, his father "s

children

(now mature)

collectively have a natural right to elect a successor. Sometimes, as when the father comes to lose his authority and many of the better sons increase theirs,
the regime naturally turns into
contracted
an

aristocracy.

But if

such

government

is

into the hands

of a

few

who establish

it in their families

dynas-

ticslly, the regime is correctly termed sn oligsrchy. If the sons and heirs are impoverished and the servants by industry and virtue arrive at riches and
esteem, the
,sIbid.
nature of

the government

inclines

to a

democracy

or popular state.

3Temple, Works, I, "Temple, Works, I,

i[Ibid.

101. 102.

Sir William Temple's Political

Pure

and

Philosophical
and

Teaching

219

democracy

is

inherently

unstable of

itself

is

nearest

the condition of

confusion or
of one or a

anarchy

unless upheld or

directed

by

the natural political authority

without

few,
of s

though this may occur within republican forms

or nobility.
comes

the

designation

king

At last, Temple

to the main problem (which I have

contract

suggested

inheres in the third estate) of how to account for regimes, once we have considered natural political
"Governments founded Authority. Hobbesian between serving
. .

in the formation As Temple

of

authority. succeeded

writes:

upon

Contracts,
with

may have

those founded on
not

But the

model of

contract, according to
everyman

Temple, is
of

the

contract

of everyman

in the

state

nature, but
ob nat

princes

and

subjects

already

living

in

natural political authority.

Accordingly,

civil society and already Temple founds contract on

with

ural political political contract

authority,
as a

not

the other way around, as the

Hobbes. If

natural

authority

principle represents

teaching

of

the ancients and

that of the moderns, Temple appeals always to the more

reflections on

basic,

ancient

teaching in his
for his
and shows

the origin of civil society. Thus

he

provides a as

way

political

Epicureanism to
political

develop

into his later Epicureanism in his later

such,

how his

teaching

can eventuate

philosophical

teaching.

Temple observes,
evolution of

as we

hsve noted, the importance

of prescription

in the

for be

a right. more

rights. All custom, with length and force of time, grows to pass Temple svoids s natural law explanation of rights, and thus tends to
even qualifies

Burkean than Lockean. He

the act of a

the universal foundation of

adopt order and

cities

by

prince or princes:

When families

laws,

they do so as "either invented by the Wisdom of some one, or some few Men; and from the Evidence of their publick Utility received by all; or else intro Time."" Commonwealths were nothing more in their duced by Experience and
but free cities, adds Temple, though fsvorable circumstances have some times greatly increased such dominions. Such enlarged free cities "seem to be more Artificial, as those of a single Person the more Natural Government;
origin

being

forced to supply the Want of Authority by Wise Inventions, Orders and The natural political authority of a prince would seem to corre spond to what Machiavelli says of an old prince in an old state. One supposes
Institutions."44

that Temple has in mind here as the historical the case of Rome.

example of clever

institutions

Popular
opinion of

governments

and aristocracies

those

politicsl quslities

lack authority becsuse the public that inhere in rule can never be as great in
governments snd aristocracies seem

several persons as

in

s single one.

Populsr

to have been introduced

was

by

great

legislators like Lycurgus

or

founded

by

a confluence of refugees

in

different fashion.

Solon, but Venice Equally, the

42Temple, Works, I, 103, 43Temple, Works, I, 104,

Ibid.

emphasis sdded. emphssis sdded.

220

Interpretation

way to popular government is often facilitated by the regime throwing off some former tyranny or disliked form of government. Such popular regimes were Rome after the Tarquins and the United Provinces of the Netherlands after their
revolt

from Spain. Yet

none of these regimes can as we see

on natural political

authority,

the former and William of

with

relying in the ascendancy of Decius Brutus in Orange in the latter. Though monarchy is the regime
suthority, the form of government best

long

subsist without

the

most natural political

for every
snd

nstion

is the

one

longest

accepted snd suthorized

msnners of

by

custom snd

use,

by

mesns of which
sion.

the humors snd

the people find their essiest expres

Temple

adds the

following

consideration:

It may be that those

are

the best

governments

in

which

the best men govern. The forms of government are less the governors, "which may be the Sense of what

important than the

was said of old

persons of

(taking

wise and good

Men to be

meant

by Philosophers)
or

that

the best Governments were those where Kings

phers
Kings."45

were

Philosophers,
method

Philoso

Finally,
regimes and

we come

to

Temple's discussion
political

of the

best

for stabilizing
compares

forestalling

instability. To begin with, Temple

the best political structure to a pyramid, wide at the base and narrow at the
apex.
of

The

ground of all government

is the

consent of

the people or the majority

the people, which proceeds from reflection on the past, reverence of natural authority,
of
a sense of

political

the present ease, plenty and safety, opinion of the

future, fear
est

the present government, and hopes of another. Thus the broad

bottom is

a popular

majority,

and the narrowest

top

of

the pyramid is the

authority
and

of a single person.

government that alienates the

of the people narrows

affections, loses

the opinions, and crosses the

enlarges

interests

the natural bottom

the apex, to fall

of

so

that stability is impaired and the government is

almost certain governs

itself.

Monarchy
firmest

of

the best

kind, i.e.

where the prince

more

by

the affections, opinions, and interests of his people, mskes the safest and
government.

than

any which is

other

Monarchy

of

the worst

kind,

of an opposite nature

to what we

snd most unstsble of governments. of the general

hsve just described, is the Likewise, s republic, the more it

weskest psrtskes

humor

snd

bent

of

authority founded on the

the governors,

of some one

person, is

the people snd spires up to s head by the the best. Conversely, a republic that is not

general

humors

and

interests

of

the people,

but only

on

those of

is the

worst and most unstable. an

regime

that is

inverted
shake

pyramid

may

stand

for

some time

in

propi

tious circumstances,
eign violence will

but any

negligence of the governors or

domestic
conquest
of

and

for

severely

it. The

success of
and

foreign

generally
or

proceeds

from the
vicious

disesteem, dissatisfaction,
or effeminate nature.

indifference
examples
state

the people,

from their

Notable

strength of well-structured regimes are

the

Athenian

history during the Persian

of the

in

43Temple, Works, I,

105.

Sir William Temple's Political

wars, Rome at the time of the the

and

Philosophical

Teaching

221

Carthaginian wars, Venice's

self-defense sgsinst

Turks,

the recent republics of

Switzerland,

and others.

Examples

of

the

foreign

conquest of

badly

structured regimes are

Alexander's

conquest of

Per

sia, Rome's
to the

conquest of

the great Asian and Egyptian

kings,

the

fall

of

Rome

barbsrisns,

the conquest of Spsin

by

the

Moors,

snd of the ancient

Britons

by
of

the Saxons. Temple cites

especially the

wars of religion

in France

as unrest

caused

by narrowing the popular consensus. More recent examples of the fall badly structured regimes are the English Restoration of 1660 and the Dutch upheaval of 1672. Thus by dwelling on Dutch affairs, Temple concludes his
essay with the implication (which is clearer elsewhere) that the English do well to imitate the Dutch in certain of their policies. This
reflection would

brings to

a close

Temple's

political

teaching

proper.

Before

we turn to snd some

his

philosophical
of

implicstions

tesching, it is necesssry to consider his ststecrsft his politicsl Epicuresnism. A very characteristic
Epicuresnism is its inherent tolerstionism
Netherlands."

sspect of

Temple's

politicsl

or spirit

This teaching is presented in Temple's "Observations Upon the United Provinces of the
of toleration.

earliest published

work,

There Temple
religious

in Chapter V, "Of their persecution "designs all Mischiefs to

states

Religion,"

that forcible conversion or

a namely, "Violence, Oppres in short, the miserable Intemperance, Injustice, and, Cruelty, Rapine, sion, Effusion of Human Blood, and the Confusion of all Laws, Orders, and Virtues Such, apparently, was the effect of the policy of forcible recon among version to Roman Catholicism, so hated by the Dutch at the hands of Spain. Furthermore, as Temple definitively explains: "Belief is no more in a Man's Our religious beliefs according to Power, than his Stature, or his Feature.
Men."
. .

Nation,"

Christian teaching are to be ascribed to God's grace and not to our God having predestined some to the correct faith and others to an
one.

own

will,

erroneous own

In

either

case, the

choice

of religious

belief is

not

within

one's
of

power. perhaps

Accordingly, Temple

makes

a plea

for

religious toleration
of

beliefs,
or, in

excluding from his scheme only the toleration his time, of Roman Catholicism.
A Man that tells me, my Opinions [in religious matters] impertinent or unreasonable, because they differ from His,

the

intolerant,
or

are

absurd

ridiculous,
a

seems to

intend

Quarrel

instead

of a

Dispute.

Yet these

are

the

common

Civilities, in Religious Argument,

and mean always their
general

of sufficient and conceited

Men,

who

talk much of

Right Reason,

own;
guage

and make their private

Imagination the Measure of

and

Truth. But

such

Lan
at

determines

all

between us,

the Dispute

comes to an end

in three Words
and

last,

which

it

might as well

have

ended

in

at

first, That he is in the Right

am

in the

Wrong.47

Mankind

agrees upon and

the worldly

end of

religion,

which

is

our

happiness
and

here

and now,

hss
55. 56.

slways

supported

the virtues that

lead to

felicity

"Temple, Works, I, "Temple, Works, I,

222 tranquillity in
understand

Interpretation
private

life

as well as

the

manners and

dispositions that lead to

the peace, order, and safety of all civil societies. Temple professes not to

how

men could

have

obtained the reputation of

being

religious,

who

"come to put so grest s Weight upon those Points of Belief

which

Men

never

hsve have

agreed never

in,

and so

little

upon

those of Virtue and

shows

Morality, in

which

they

disagreed."48

Temple

the bias of his political

Epicureanism
the moral and

here for, like Locke,

civic aspect.

and

later, Jefferson, in his does, for

and

tolerationism he attenuates the

metaphysical and supernatural aspect of

Christianity

in favor

of

This Locke himself

.

example, in On the Reasonableness

work make

of

Christianity
at

Locke's Arianism
popular

Socinianism in this

it

clear

that
son

best Locke in his

in his Lockesn

politicsl

teaching is a Epicuresnism or hedonism is

civic

neo-Christian.49

neo-Christian.50

Similsrly, Jeffer If we

are

forced to

characterize

Temple's religion,

we would also

neo-Christian, like Locke, retaining the moral and at the expense of its metaphysical, supernatural

say that he was a teaching of the Evangel

teaching.51

We

now

turn to Temple's statecraft, or the acme of Temple's statecraft, in

partisan

his intervention in
nently the English
consider the

English

politics

with

his
to

attempt to

alter perma

constitution.

But before

we turn
of

effect

of

Temple's advocacy
summed

this, it is necessary first to the Dutch alliance on English

follows:

domestic

politics.

Macaulay

up

this result as

The ascendency of France was inseparably connected with the prevalence of tyranny in domestic affairs. The ascendency of Holland was as inseparably connected with the
prevalence of political

liberty

and of mutual

toleration among Protestant

was a

sects.52

In this

somewhat

in the
which

original

meaning

indirect sense, Temple of being a lover of

whig, a

conservative

liberal

privacy.

The Dutch alliance, for

he

strove so

their own properties at the Court. "Hbid.

long and so well, was a sign that Englishmen could enjoy leisure, freed from undue interference in their affairs by

"'For Locke's Socinisnism,

(Turin:

see

Einaudi,

i960),

pp.

370,

376.

gives the most

broadly

erudite and

C. A. Viano, John Locke: Dal razionalismo illuminismo On Viano, Peter H. Nidditch has this to say: "Viano's book instructive account, and is the most bslsnced snd best organized
all' whole."

in its coverage, among existing books on Locke's thought as a (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch [Oxford, 1975], p. ix.) 50As for Jefferson's Epicureanism or political hedonism, we have only to remember the phrase in the Declaration of Independence, "the pursuit of happiness coupled with Jefferson's avowal to Adsms: "I, too, am sn (quoted in Harry V. Jaffa, The Conditions of Freedom: Essays in Political Philosophy [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975] at p. 108). Jefferson's
"

Epicuresn"

neo-Christianity is expressed in his religious work The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth. "Hume writes (The History of England [Philadelphia, 1822] IV, 478-79): "The abuses, in the former age, arising from overstrained pretensions to piety had much propagated the spirit of

irreligion;
Besides
these

and

many

of

the

ingenious men,
profession
. . .

of

wits and

scholars,

by

this period, lie under the imputation of deism. Halifax [and] Temple are supposed to have adopted
186.

principles.''

"Macaulay, Critical

and

Historical Essays. Ill,

Sir William Temple's Political

We
next

and

Philosophical

Teaching

223

inquire into the

politics

significance of

Temple's direct intervention in

English domestic
end

in his

attempt to change the constitution and

bring

an

to the

most severe crisis of

the reign
of

of

Chsrles II,

the Exclusion Bill crisis

was

of 1679-81.

Briefly,
of

the bsckground

this intervention

the following. In
returned

the

beginning
at

1679, in the

midst of

the Popish plot

furor,

Temple

to

England

the order of

Chsrles II. The king, buffeted

on sll

sides, especislly

by

predominsntly whig parliament, attempted to persuade Temple to tske the post of secretary of state. Temple delayed and demurred at this step, and instead presented the king with s novel plan to avoid further
misgovernment and

the election of s

Temple's Council
and

allay the mounting grievances of psrliament snd people. to dissolve the presently existing fifty-member Privy supplant it with a new Privy Council of thirty members, by whose
plan was

advice alone more or

the

king

should

govern,

no

longer relying

on a small cabinet of

less

secret advisors. of

Fifteen

members of

the new council were to

be

great

officers

state,

pledged

support of
noblemen

the Crown. The other

and gentlemen structure
of

immense property holdings to the by fifteen were to be equally wealthy independent

their

the greatest weight in the country.

This
of

plan

follows from the

described

by

Temple

of

the Dutch Council

thirty
This

that mediated between the States General and the House of

Orange.53

attempt,

which was

in

effect a plan

to moderate the unstsble monarchy with a

wss

representative plutocratic

change

aristocracy in the Dutch msnner, the English constitution. As Macaulay suggests:

reslly

a move

to

We are strongly inclined to suspect that the appointment of the new Privy Council was really a much more remarkable event than has generally been supposed, and that what Temple had in view was to effect, under colour of a change of administration, a
permanent change

in the Constitution.

Temple's

plan was

to give the

Privy

Council King's in the

something
measures

of the constitution of a
are a

Parliament. Let the

nation

see that all the order

directed

by

Cabinet

composed of representatives of placemen

State, by
to

Cabinet

which

contains, not

every alone, but independent

and popular

noblemen and gentlemen who sacrifice

have large

estates and no a

salaries, and who are not stake, and the credit

likely
they

the

public welfare

in

which

they have

deep
of a

which

have

obtained with the

country, to the

pleasure

Court from

which

they

receive

nothing.54

Temple naturally expected a certain nucleus within the council, of which he was a member, to direct the king's policy. Otherwise, a thirty-member body would be too unwieldy in partisan politics. The intervention of such a body between

king

and parlisment

mesnt,

for

one

thing, thst the influence

the

of

French

money, directed

through

Chsrles II to the

notsbles of

kingdom,

would no

longer have
plan:

effect.

As the French

ambassador

Barillon

objected to

Temple's

"Ce

sont

des Etats [an

envisaged role

As for the Estates], non des Assembly extraorit would be an to Temple, of parliament, according only
of

conseils."

53See Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays, III, 216. 5"Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays. Ill, 205-06, 215.

224

Interpretation
check on

dinsry

the sctivities of the

Crown

and would tend

to fulfill the

kind

of position scheme

it held

during

the reign of Elizabeth I.

Unfortunately, Temple's
a

completely miscarried; if it had not, there is

likelihood that
commented:

no

revolution settlement would

have

occurred

in

1688.

Macaulay

Had this plan,

composed

with

some

modifications, been tried at an earlier period, in a more mind,

and

state of the public

by

better sovereign,

we are

by

no means
.

certain that
perfidious

it

might not

have

effected the purpose

and

for

which

it

was

designed.

The
the

levity

of the

King
the

the

ambition

of

the chiefs

of parties produced

instant,

entire, and

irremediable failure
on

of a plan which

nothing but firmness,

to
a

public

spirit, and self-denial,

part of all concerned

in it

could conduct

happy

issue.55

It

would

hardly

"Constitution,"

the new

be useful, at this juncture, to go into further detail on how as Temple cslled it, happened to fail. The important
received the

thing
tory.

to

remember

is that it
in

initial

support of

Lord Halifax the

"Trimmer,"

and so was

one sense at
again

least

nonpartisan as

This nonpartisanship
straw

reflects

something

of

between whig and Temple's political

Epicureanism,
the

last

a quality that links him in some ways to Halifax. Finally, ss in this affair, the king prorogued psrlisment without even men

tioning his intention

conduct

to the new council,

month

by

whose sdvice sgain

he hsd
Temple

pledged

to

the government only s

before. Once

was urged

to accept the post of secretary of state, but ultimately to no avail. In the en

suing
of

election

for psrlisment, Temple

was chosen member objection

from the

University
of

Cambridge,

though there arose some possible

to him on account

his he

espoussl of

tolerationism in his early essay on the Netherlands. In 1680

seat

Temple took his

refused

for the first

and

last time in the House

of

Commons. But
himself

to take sides in the Exclusion Bill

controversy
wss

and absented

from the House. He

soon afterward renounced all public

"Constitution"

life for

good.

Needless to ssy, Temple's icsl tesching proper. Politicsl society is

in full
and

sccord with

his

polit

pyramid,

the sltercstion between

king

snd parliament meant

that there was too

little

weight near the spex.

The
have

crestion of s politicsl

intermedisry
parliament,

between

king

and parliament would

functioned chy

as a second

while at

the same time

to continue with some stability.

Temple's advocacy
sccords with

of a

allowing the monar kind of representa

tive aristocracy would have shifted weight toward the

top

of the pyramid while

balsncing

the

especially as that the English It

It eminently prefigured in
whole.

his

politicsl

teaching

proper,

"Observations,"

where

Temple

suggests

implicitly
long
bent,

should

imitate Dutch institutions. Epicureanism

It
tout court of

now remains to consider the

Temple's
again

retirement

from

public

life

after 1680.

seems correct to

say

that this

retirement was

principslly
We

motivsted not

only

by

Temple's

philosophicsl

but

also

by

the conspicuous

failure

of

his

one and

partissn politics.

csn also

say that

whereas

only intervention in English Temple's projected revolution

"Macaulay, Critical

and

Historical Essays. Ill,

217. 219.

Sir William Temple's Political

and

Philosophical

Teaching

225
and

by
it

administration

failed becsuse
revolution

of

its

utter

nonpsrtissnship, his friend's

succeeded

political slly's

lster

in

1688

namely Halifax's

because

was

less

nonpartisan

significant

that Sir Willism

in succeeding to unite the Temple st least msde the

aristocracy.56

At any rate, it is

sttempt.

Returning
Conditions "The
of grestest

to Temple's "Hesds

designed for
find the

Life

Fortune,"

snd

we

esssy upon the Different following Epicuresn opinions:

sn

Advsntsge Men hsve

by

Riches sre, to Give, to

and

Build,

to

Plsnt,

snd mske pleasant

Scenes

of which

Pictures

Statues

make

the pleasantest

Psrt"; "A
sttains

himself."57

Man ought to be content, if he have nothing to reproach In addition, Temple never tires here of reiterating that a man never happiness unless he has learned to accept death and not fear it. But the
good

chief work

that

mskes

Temple

not

only

an

Epicurean but

also

in

a sense an
rejects

ancient

is "An

Essay

upon

the Ancient and Modern

Learning."

Temple

the characteristic claims of such moderns ss Descsrtes snd Hobbes to hsve

surpassed

the ancients in philosophy and political science, but as sn Epicuresn

Temple
seme of natural

slso

does

not accept

the clsim thst Plsto

snd

Aristotle

represent

the

philosophy Aristotle

and political science as such.

That is his

problem.

As for
Temple

philosophy, Temple even questions Epicurus on this point

and all

as well as

Plato
of

and

the

moderns.

An

unkind critic might accuse

misology snd deliberate here is still recognizsbly an

obscurantism on

this point. But Temple's position

embraces

ancient one

he

the view of the ancient

skeptics, like Sextus Empiricus: "But all the different Schemes of Nature that have been drawn of old, or of late, by Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Des Cartes,

Hobb[e]s,
Man.

or

any

other

thst I know of, seem to sgree but in one

thing,

which

is

the Wsnt of Demonstration or

. .

Satisfaction,

to any

thinking

and unpossessed

Temple

adds pertinently:

Yet in the Midst

of these and
seemed of

many

other such

Disputes

and

Contentions in their Natural

and upon

Philosophy, they
after the rather several

to

agree much

better in their Moral

their

Enquiries
be

Ultimate End

Man,
of

which was

his Happiness,

their

Contentions

seem'd to

in Words, than in the Sense

Authors
or

of

their

Opinions,

or

in

the true

Meaning
of

of their

Masters

their

Sects: All
of

concluded

that Happiness was the chief

Good,

and ought to
was

be the Ultimate End

Happiness.59

Man;

that as this was the

End

Wisdom,

so

Wisdom

the way to

From

what

follows

we can

here

assume

that Temple leaves out the modern

philosophers as

belonging

to

such s moral sgreement

sncient philosophers managed to manifest.

He

states was

smong themselves ss the that the conflict, for ex

superficial

ample, between the Epicureans

and the

Stoics

and

semantic,

Revisited,"

56See Parsons, "Halifax: The Complete Trimmer

pp.

66-94.

"Temple, Works, I, 5Temple, Works, I,

work of

306, 173,

308. emphasis

in

original.

This

and the

following

quotations occur

in

1685, "Upon the Gardens of

173.

Epicurus."

5Temple, Works, I,

226
rather

Interpretation
than

being

one of substance.

What this

argument

leads to is
truth.

a praise of

Epicurus

as the chief moral philosopher

to be credited
and

with

The Epicureans
when

were a

they

placed

fortunate in their Expression, Man's Happiness in the Tranquillity of Mind, and Indolence of
.

intelligible in their Notion,

wondered

Body. generally

I have
against

often

how

such

Epicurus,

by

the Ages that

sharp Invectives came to be made so followed him, whose Admirable Wit,

Felicity
of

of Expression, Excellence of Nature, Sweetness of Conversation, Temperance Life, and Constancy of Death, made him so beloved by his Friends, admired by his Athenians.60 Scholars, and honored by the

Temple himself is

not concerned about

in this he is
care of
well as

nonmodern and non-Christian

spreading the Epicurean teaching for, apparently, Epicurus can take

himself. "But Epicurus has found

so great

Advocates

of

his Virtue,

as

Learning

and

Inventions,

that there need no more; and the

Testimonies does

of

Diogenes Laertius depend

alone seem

too sincere and impartial to be disputed or

. .

want not

the Assistance of Modern Authors.

on such modern reason

It is

evident

that Temple

Epicureans

as

Gassendi for his

own moral

doctrine;

this is a

further

In "An

Essay

why Temple is genuinely upon the Ancient and Modern

an ancient.
Learning,"

Temple

advocates
and

the superiority of the ancients

history. It in

should

be

noted

in poetry, that he does

political science not

(including

ethics),

necessarily invoke their superiority

snswers the modern objection thst
"ancients"

natural science or metaphysics.

Temple

we see

fsrther than the

ancients

Greek ancients, than

establish

whom which

this point,

of the East before the supposing saw farther. Temple expends much effort to they is not very interesting but is necessitated by the

by

argument as

he

views

it. It may be that the

rely,
as we

ancients are superior on

to the modems
of

because they did but on their own

not always

do,

learned traditions
was

the past,

great native abilities.

Thus

learning
True,
in

less

cluttered

in the

ancient world and more open to native genius.

since the ancients there

medicine not

has been in astronomy the Copernican covery

great of

system and

Harvey's dis

the circulation of the

blood,

but these have

changes, especially in the

conduct of medicine. of

Most

of

necessarily led to the innovations

of the modern world are

due to the invention

the compass (and gunpowder).

Temple

even speculates

that since the first bloom of the Renaissance 150 years

a certain

before his time, there has been

So far have
we

decay

of

learning
we

and genius:

been from

improving

upon

those Advantages

have

received
and

from

the

Knowledge
us,
our

of the

Ancients,
seem to
which

that since the

late Restoration

of

first Flights

upon our

Wings,

have been the highest, has hindered us from rising

emphasis

and a sudden above certain

Learning Damp

to

Arts among have fallen

Heights.62

Temple, Works, I, Temple, Works, I, Temple, Works, I.

174,

in

original. original.

174, emphasis in
164.

Sir William Temple's Political

and

Philosophical

Teaching

227
un

Surely,
doubted

there is a certsin

fslling
and

off

in

political

philosophy from the

genius of

Machiavelli to the

more mechanical solutions of the political

problem advocated

by

Hobbes

if

not altogether or the

true across
view

Locke. That is to say, Temple's view here, the bosrd, is certsinly defensible. (It is not

"our"

view

Americsn

becsuse Americs hss its

for Greek

roots

in the Enlighten

ment.)

Next Temple

evinces s preference and

no

snd

Lstin

over the modern

Europesn languages because Latin

ern

Greek

are not corruptible

like the

mod

European languages

and

have

barbarisms in them.

Among

the eminent

modern

writers, Temple cites

most of whom

Machiavelli, Cervantes, Rabelais, Montaigne,

to the first bloom of the Renaissance. He
as

and

Bacon,
the

belong

regards

present writers of

France (such
example.

Moliere

and

Racine)

to

be

of as

lesser
signs

stature

than

Montaigne, for

A further

reason that

Temple

to the lapse of

learning in

his time is
and the

the quarrels and

of patronage of

various sects within

Christendom

lack

by the learning by great

or ought

disputes

kings

and princes.

For thinkers

and

writers, says

Temple, honor is

to

be

a much stronger principle than gain.

of

honor is
which

their

commanders.

Gain is the pay of common soldiers as Here Temple displays his aristocratic bias,
preference

is in full

accord

with

his

for the
on

ancients.

Finally, it is

unsocial pedants who

have

most made

inroads

the

commonwealth of modern

learning. The
at the court of

reverse of

this

is the

vein of

Charles II

and makes

ridiculing everything that prevailed it possible, as Temple says, for there to be hsve
ssid s

ministers of state who would rather

witty thing thsn hsve done

wise one.

Temple

concludes

his trsditionslism
of

with

the well-known sphorism of

so

Alfonso the Wise, Men

King
to

Arsgon: "That among

course

many Things
all the rest are

as are

by

possessed or pursued

in the

of

their

Lives,

Bawbles,

besides Old Wood

and

burn, Old Wine

to

drink, Old Friends

to converse with,

Old Books to

read.""

Temple, Works, I,

169,

emphasis

in

original.

JOHN LOCKE:

REVOLUTION, RESISTANCE, OR OPPOSITION?

M. Susan Power
Arkansas State

University

Summary
John Locke's theory of rebellion hss been studied by numerous scholsrs, but few hsve psused to consider his newly-founded rights to resistsnce and opposition. Here the controversy surrounding Locke's contributions to the American political tradition is considered in relationship to Locke's theories of resistance, opposition,
and rebellion. rebellion

The

author concludes that

the disagreement over Locke's

more

theory

of

has

obscured snd shrouded

his

important ideas

about resistance

and opposition.

/. Introduction

John Locke 's theory of rebellion has been most frequently viewed retrospec tively in a scholarly effort to evaluate his influence on the Revolutions of 1688 and
1776.

In the process,

some of

Locke's important

contributions

to political

theory

have been

obscured and

interesting,
freedom to
efforts
dence.1

lost. Locke's theory of rebellion is neither novel nor but his advocacy of the important rights of a loyal opposition and the
criticize governments

has been

neglected and

because

of our reiterated

to connect Locke with Thomas Jefferson

the Declaration of Indepen

commentators over the

In addition,

serious

disagreements

exist

between

nature and extent of

John Locke's influence

upon

the political thought of the

American revolutionary era. After my analysis of Locke's theories of resistance and opposition, I will attempt to illuminate the extent snd nsture of the controversy

surrounding Locke. The supporters of the view thst Locke hsd extensive influence tend to interpret him as an advocste of natural law and individual rights and
sssociste

itself is
Lockean

said

his philosophy with the Declsration of Independence. Thst document to be the foundation stone of our public philosophy. Other prothe thesis of his massive American influence
Whig-Liberal.2

writers support
viewed as a

largely

because he is

Recently,

some conservative

libertarians

'Carl Becker, Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York: Random House, 1942). Julian Boyd, The Declaration of Independence: The Evolution of the Text as Shown in Facsimiles of Various Drafts by Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press,
Press, 1978),
pp.

1945).
the American Revolution (New

2Morton White, The Philosophy of

York: Oxford

University
writers

5, 142, 161, 163, 192, 193, 287. White

theory
of self-evident

thinks the two most

important

influencing
nstursl

Locke and revolutionary thought were John

and natural

Jean Jacques Burlamaqui. Locke's influ truths,

whereas

ence contributed the rationalistic

Burlamaqui's theories

of

law

rights

were

most

important. White thinks the American framers did

not

contribute

losophy

of

or philosophical knowledge. White argues that the phi anything original to either moral rights presented in the Declaration is consistent with the exercise of extensive govern

mental power and asserts

in his supplementary

notes

that government

helps

men

to attain

rights. To

230
have
restored

Interpretation
Locke to
a position of great
climste.3

honor

as an alleged

intellectual leader of

the American philosophicsl

Curiously,
philosophy
persons

those

who

wish

to sssociste s strong individuslistic politicsl

view

with

the Americsn tradition

Locke

ss

the

founding father,
hand,
tend to

whether conservative or who

wish

liberal. The anti-Lockeans,

on the other or

be

to base

America

upon

either religious

communitarian

philosophies.4

Among the anti-Lockean writers to be reviewed later are those who

stand on

stress
and

majority rule, those who trace the historical development logical implications of his social contract hypothesis, and those who look at Locke's
religious attitudes.

Locke's
political

Some

seek a more radical origin

for the American bssed upon

snd

tradition

and others associate and

his

views with those of

Thomas Hobbes. s

If Locke 's influence

importance

as a political philosopher sre

the supposition thst he is the revolutionsry era's the

lesding nstursl rights thinker,

discovery

is

made

that Locke was neither a natural law theorist nor a strong

position vis-a-vis

supporter of

individual rights, then his

the American political

founding and the Declaration of Independence may have to be reconsidered. Three interesting possibilities arise: first, Locke may not have influenced the Declaration
because it is

document; second, Locke did influence the Declaration, but its writers misunderstood Locke; or third, Locke had little influence on the authors of the document, and later commentators have misun
a

traditionsl nstursl law

derstood both Locke If one does

natural
of

and his relationship to the Declaration. find any similarity among the Lockean views of majority rule, law and rights, and the American political tradition, the possibility remains not a

discovering

correspondence

between his

social

contract

device

and

the

American
rejected ment of

constitutional tradition.
unsound.

However,

several students of this problem

have

the claim as

John W. Gough

examines the

historical

develop

these theories in both Europe and America. He proves

medieval

twelfth-century
sive

they began in the investiture controversy and claims they became a perva
seventeenth
century.6

intellectual influence in the

He

says

the American

secure rights is compatible with positive governmental actions to obtain rights conceived as ends. Cf. Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Directions in American Political Thought (New York: Wiley, 1969), pp. 19, 20, 12. Dolbeare thinks Locke most influential because he says his philosophy represents

liberalism, individualism, and natural rights. 3Donald J. Devine, "John Locke: His Harmony between Liberty
(1978),
of
p.

Virtue."

and

Modern Age. 22

246. "John Locke is

one of the

few

major philosophers who can

be

used to provide a

snd moral foundstion for Americsn snd Western regimes orgsnized sround the concept liberty. Yet, in recent yesrs, revisionist interpreters from literally every perspective hsve main tained either that Locke is confused and, therefore, not able to provide a foundation for sny culture; hedonist." or, that Locke actually was s relativistic

theoreticsl

"Garry Wills, Inventing

N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978).
p.

America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence (Garden City,

Locke,"

5Bemard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of American Politics (Cambridge: Belknap, 1967), 36. Cf. Francis Edward Devine, "Absolute Democracy for Indefeasible Right: Hobbes versus Journal of Politics. 37 (1975), 767, 765, 763.
6J. W. Gough, The Social Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1957).
pp.

3, 81, 84, 83.

John Locke: Revolution, Resistance,

Puritan
refugees utilized the social contract

or

Opposition?

231

device

ss s mesns of

legitimizing their

conceptions of s church organization and

that these theories were widely used

throughout the
of

early

colonial period.

the contract

theory

to William

Moreover, A.J. Beitzinger traces the origins Ames, William Perkins, John Preston, and
studies of the socisl contract

Thomas

Hooker.7

Adding
his

up these historicsl

theory,
to

one comes

to the conclusion that any original or sole influence to be

of social contract symbol should

attributed

Locke because
concludes

be seriously doubted. If one that the determinste intellectual influence during the American revolu

tionary

period yesrs

derived from
before the

prior, indigenous development starting

st

lesst

hundred

Revolutionsry outbresk, then one should begin a study of

seventeenth-century American Puritsn
political
reli

the tradition with

gious

an examination of

idess

snd not with

John Locke.
concepts

There
have
an

are certain

key

in Locke 's

theory

that are alleged to

isomorphic relationship to the Declaration of Independence, and, thereby, to the basic propositions of the American political tradition. But we have assem bled
substantisl evidence

from

vsriety

of sources

thst Locke did not support

wss not originsl snd thst

trsditionsl natural
one of s

law,

that his social contract

theory
or

(rsther only

multiplicity
snd

of contemporary contrsctsrisn

theories),
may

his

views on

msjority rule Constitution.

psrlismentsry supremscy msy

a

not resemble

those in the

Proving

theoreticsl the

interrelstionship between Locke's idess and the

upon

American tradition
rebellion.

via

Declaration, hinges

the relevance of the right to

I,

therefore, direct the

snd

argument of

this essay to a detsiled textusl

which

snslysis of those portions of the sbout politicsl

Two Treatises in

Locke

explicstes

his idess

chsnge,

then compsre these with

key

passages

in the Declara little influence

that

tion. I

find the theoretical

the
conclusion
.

resemblances

between the two texts to be insignificant

and reach
upon

that Lockean theories of change had very

the Declaration A
of

careful

rereading
much-

of

Locke

s work

led

me

to reconsider the

importance
are

his theories

of resistance and opposition and

vaunted

to

conclude

they

vastly

more

important than his

theory

of rebellion.

//. Analysis of the Text

Locke's

analysis of revolution

is found in the last four

chapters of

the Two

Treatises: "Of Paternal, Political,

and

"Of Conquest"; "Of Tyranny"; and "Of The Dissolution of position on rebellion is based essentially upon the following
government or governor so sets ss

Despotical Power, Considered Together"; His

Government."

srgument: when s

to

come

into

conflict with eternsl and

lsw,

ss

is the

esse with

despots,
A

sbsolute

monarchs, conquerors,

usurpers, no obligation to

obey

remains.

stste of war

then exists, and a right to rebel, to resort to

force

comes

into operation. However, right to resistance,

Locke distinguishes between the right to rebellion

their distinctive characteristics

and the

and emphasizes

by

7A. J. Beitzinger, A History of American Political Thought (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972),
pp.

50, 116, 117.

232

Interpretation
them in different
chapters.

tresting

Tyranny is
are

differentiated from

despotism,

and of

he carefully lists
governments and

conditions

for the

exercise of the

right to

resist.

Dissolution

the right of opposition

discussed in the book's last

chapter.

Locke's discussion
discussion
with of

of rebellion occurs within the context of a of s

traditional

despotism. The idea

right to

oppose

tyranny did

not originste

him. For exsmple, St. Thomas Aquinss is

itself
with a or

no sdvocate of passive resistance:

If to
the

provide

king

be deposed

have his

king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that power restricted by the same multitude if, becoming a
It
must not

tyrant, he

abuses the royal power.

be thought that

such a multitude

is acting

unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be

kept,

since, in

ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully

as the office of aking

demands.8

Locke 's

consideration of the same subject centers upon

the definition and clarifica

tion of the
vague.

rights of rebellion

and resistance.

The discussion is orthodox,

brief,

and of

The topic is introduced

with an analysis of

despotism

and a

definition

tyranny in the book's concluding chapter. According to Locke, paternsl, political, Despotic power "is an Absolute, Arbitrary
another

and

despotic

powers are

different.

Power"

exercised of nature

by

one person over

to take

his life. Since the basic right

no contract

is the individual right to

can

self-preservation,

giving up

or

restricting this right

be
in

vslid.

Therefore, despotic power csnnot be

can never
"beastly,"

granted

by

nsture, compact,

or conquest and
such a

be moral, good rule. If any political ruler irrational fashion, he places himself into a
190-91. Cf. Quentin

attempts to act state of

ed.
war.9

No right to

"St. Thomas Aquinas, The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas

York:

Dino Gigongiari (New

of Modern Political Thought: Volume Two: The Age of Reformation (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 347^-8. Skinner writes a brilliant chapter on the right to resist as it was developed in the
pp. sixteenth century.

Hafner, 1953),

Skinner, The Foundations

At the

end of that chapter

he

concludes that

"It

would

be

a mistake,

however.

to think of the development of this modern

achievement of

'liberal'

theory

of constitutionalism concepts

the seventeenth century. As will

by

now

be clear, the

essentially as an in terms of which

Locke

and

his

successors

developed their

views on popular

had already been largely articulated and refined over a radical jurists as Salamonio, in the theological treatises
well as

sovereignty and the right of revolution century earlier in the legal writings of such
of such

Ockhamists

as

Almain

and

Mair,
a

as

in the

more

famous but derivative

writings of

the

Calvinist

revolutionaries.

genera

tion before Locke produced his classic defense of the people's right to resist and remove
nical

tyran

government, Oliver Cromwell

reassure

report) to

himself

about the

had already found it quite sufficient (according to Burnet's lawfulness of executing Charles I by engaging in 'a long dis
power, according to the principles
of

course'

about

'the

nature of the regal

Msrisna

Buchanan'

and

(Burnet, I,

76)."

p.

'John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Lasslet (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer sity Press, 1960; Mentor Books, 1965), p. 428. Cf. Stewart Edwards, "Political Philosophy BeLocke," limed: The Case of Political Studies, 17 (1969), 289. Edwards discusses Locke's stipulative definitions and reminds us that argumentation by assuming the points at dispute in a covering defini tion is merely postponing any discussion of those issues. In interpretation "The Second is yet another example, however imperfect, of the definitional mode of about
Edwards'
Treatise"

arguing

politics. point.

Edwards

claims

Locke

redefined

rebellion, whereas I take

different

position on that

John Locke: Revolution, Resistance,

exercise runs

or

Opposition?

233

despotic

the risk of
or

be gained by conquest in an unjust war. The despot being destroyed in the future by persons who have had their rights
power can

invaded
consent,
often

destroyed. No

matter that most governments are not

based

upon

and

that conquest or usurpation

a

frequently

establishes

despots;

by

majority.10

community never loses its original right to a The bssic ethical axiom involved is that promises
cannot create moral obligation or right.11 obedience.

de facto rulers, legislature approved

or

false

consent

extorted obligate

by
the

force

Only free consent can

a conquered

individual's

He

continues

by

saying that if

people are ever allowed

to participate in

decisions,
"12
others'

this ends absolute power, and

"as

soon as

any Compact enters,

rule.13

Slavery ceases.

An have
a

aggressor who unjustly invades legitimate right to The people government always retain the

rights in

an unjust war can never under a

who

have been forced to live

despotical
resort

to force until a form of

right to free themselves from it, and to government is established that meets with their

consent.

For

no

Government

can

have

a right to obedience

from

a people who

have
in
a

not

freely

consented to

it;

which

they

can never

be

supposed to

do,

till

they

are put

full

state of

Liberty
Laws,
also till

to choose their

Government due

and

Governors,
14
. . .

or at

to which

they have themselves or their Representatives,

their
property.

least till they have such standing given their free consent, and

they

are allowed

Locke
or

writes

that whether rulers have always to act

under

the

laws

of

their country
the

not,

they

can never

be

exempted

from the

obligations of eternal
"Conquest"

law,

laws

of

God
that

and nature.

Locke

concludes the chapter on

with

the statement

off a Power, which Force, and not Right hath set over anyone, though it hath the Rebellion, yet is no Offence before God, but is that, which he allows and countenances, though even Promises and Covenants, when obtained by Force, have

shaking
of

name

intervened.15

When

usurpation

occurs, such ss

when a person assumes prescribed

the exercise of any

portion of power

by

ways other

than those

by

the

laws

of

the commu

nity, there is no

obligation

to obey. Even if the form of government

usurper

is

not

changed,
and,

no obligation exists

because the

is

not

the

legally

authorized ruler

consequently,

not

the person the people had approved.

p.

Government

by despots,

'"Locke, Two Treatises,

433. Cf.

Sterling
be

Philosophy
on the

of John Locke (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962),

of

Power Lamprecht, The Moral and Political p. 149. "In spite of his insistence
revolutionist."

right

revolution, Locke
of

can

hardly

spoken of ss s

Cf. Martin Seliger,

Action,"

"Locke's

Theory

Revolutionary
qualification

Seliger

points

to the property

Western Political Quarterly, 16 (1963), 550, 568. upon voting as a limitation upon the majority that is to
position

approve of rebellions. revolutions.

He

concludes. that

the tenor of Locke's

is

against

supporting frequent

"Locke, 12Locke, 13Locke, '"Locke, "Locke,

Two Treatises, Two Treatises, Two Treatises, Two Treatises, Two Treatises,

p.
p.

440. 430.
432.

p.

pp. pp.

441-42.

443, 444. Cf.

p.

446.

234
absolute

Interpretation
monarchs, conquerors, and
no moral obligstion
usurpers

is

not

founded
crested.

upon a social con

tract; therefore,
law
exists.

to obedience is
a

rebellion against

these governments

is

not

wrong;

hence,

right to

rebellion consistent with eternal

St. Thomas, arguing from

altogether

different premises, "the

reaches the

same conclusion.

In

chapter
which

eighteen, Locke defines

can

tyranny
to."16

as

exercise of

Power beyond

Right,
when

nobody

have

Right
the

Tyrannical

government

happens

the

ruler makes

his will,

not

law,
his

the rule, when his actions do not

actions are motivated

preserve the citizen such ss

's property,

and when

by

"irregular
that the

passions,"

smbition, revenge,

snd covetousness.

Locke

ssys

difference between

a constitutional monarch and a tyrant

is that "a

king

makes the

laws the limit of his power and the good of the public the end of his
tyrant makes
all give
,

government; the

"17 Wherever the laws end, way to his own will and appetite. tyranny begins whether it involves one man or many and even if it concerns a mere

matter of

nity to
says

compel a subject

exceeding legal limits. If a ruler uses the military forces of the commu to do something that is not written in a law, then Locke
without an aggressive state of war writes of opposition and

the ruler, acting

himself into

legal authority, may be opposed since he has placed by using force to invade the rights of others
.

Here Locke
the

resistance,

not of rebellion.

He clearly

notes

difference because he has just

chapter.

concluded

his discussion

of the right to rebellion

in the preceding between

the law.

Importantly, Locke does

unacceptable system of government a

monarchy is an la Thomas Paine. He clearly distinguishes

not write that
and a

s constitutionsl monsrch with extensive prerogative powers who acts

passed

according to laws

by

Parliament

tyrant who makes his personal

will

Having thus defined tyrannical government and asserted s right to resist such
government, Locke
upon pauses

to consider the

limitations

and conditions to

be

placed

the

right of the subject

to resist illegal exertions of executive power. When he

is finished

listing
subject

these conditions, Locke's right of resistance is neither very

radical nor revolutionary.

For example,
that

no prince
an

individusl
ally.

"imsgine"

msy

may be resisted just because an injustice has been done to him person

Politics and instead of Government and Order leave nothing but Anarchy and Confusion. "18 According to Locke, the first condition for morally justified resistance is that the acts should have been done in
will unhinge and overturn all an unjust and unlawful way.

"This

Otherwise

resistance to

lawful

government

is to be

condemned.

Although the

fsvor

of

exempting the

king may be above criticism, and Locke does srgue in king from such sttscks, opposition msy be msde to acts
p.

Two Treatises, p. 448. Cf M. Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locke (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 317. 18Locke, Two Treatises, p. 449. Cf. John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 50. "It is not a book about how to construct govern ments or about just when it is desirable to resist, but a book about why under some circumstances men have a right to
.
resist."

16Locke, 17Locke,

Two Treatises,

446.

John Locke: Revolution, Resistance,

performed

or

Opposition?

235

by

"inferior officers.

"

The second condition for lawful resistance is that

such should not

be

made against the

king, but

against

his

ministers who

may be

they attempt to use unjust force. Since the king's authority is based upon the law, he csnnot grant to any of his ministers the law.19 power to act against the However, Locke extends to the monarch vast
powers under no

questioned, opposed, and resisted if

the prerogative power to act in certain circumstsnces where there sre

lsws, in

esses of
.

emergency,

snd

in

some

instsnees
right

even sgsinst

the specific

working The third

recourse

of ststues

condition

for the

exercise of the

of resistsnee

is thst if legsl

for the

obtsinment of redress

for injuries

or

dsmsges

exists under the

provisions of
relief.

the
an

Where

justification for using force to gain act of injustice does not do irreparable damage where life is not in
,

lsw,

then there can be no

danger,

then one should appeal to the

law. The fourth

condition

involved

wide

spread and repeated offenses.

.if

the unlawful acts

done

the remedy which is due

resisting, even in

by the Magistrate, be maintained (by the Power he has got) and by Law, be by the same Power obstructed; yet the Right of
Acts
of

such manifest

Tyranny,

will not

suddenly, or

on slight

occasions,

disturb

the

Government
unless

For Locke thinks that

dissatisfaction

with tyrannical acts

is

widespread and

intense,

that a

few

"heady

malcontents"

could not overthrow a government.

But if either these illegal Acts have extended to the

Majority of the People; or if the Mischief

such

Oppression has light only on Consequences seem to threaten all,

and

some
and

few,

but in

Cases,

Laws,
cannot

and with them their

they Estates, Liberties,

are persuaded

in their

and

Lives

are

Precedent, and Consciences, that their in danger, and perhaps their

as the used against

Religion too, how they

tell.21

will

be hindered from resisting illegal force

them, I

A long train of abuses tending in the direction of the establishment of tyranny is

not

exactly

the same

government

thing as saying into operation; that X is

will

that X
not

has

not succeeded

now, in
to the

fact,

in placing a tyrannical tyranny. But if the people arbitrary power, the king is the

see several examples of actions

tending

establishment of

Locke thinks they

"Locke,
ment.

be

persuaded

that the

ultimate objective of

use violence against

Two Treatises, pp. 450, 451 Cf. p. 452. Locke does defend the individual's right to both unlawful private acts and also private acts of violence against the govern
.

But his

prudential advice

is that individuals

who seek to use violence against a tyrannical

government "are sure to

ment puts

perish."

him into

a state of

Therefore, the war and, hence,

when

wise man waits until

the

use of

force

by

the govern

makes resistance against

the

established governors

legitimate.
The
time
use of

force is justified
Right to

others'

use of violence threatens one's

was put

life

and

leaves

no

to- appeal

the case to the courts. "The

loss

irrepsrsble;

which

to prevent, the Law of

Nature

gave me a

destroy him,
p.

who

had

himself into

a state of war with

me,

and

destruction."

threatened my

:"Locke, Two Treatises, 2lLocke, Two Treatises,

452. 452-53. Cf. Dunn, Political Thought,

pp.

pp.

178, 181-82, 186.

236
establishment of

Interpretation
tyranny. To summarize, the

four

conditions

for the

exercise of

the

right of resistance are:

(1) Real acts by the executive-ministerial officisls outside of the lsw; (2) Prolonged, frequent instsnces of sbuse; (3) Extension of injustices to the majority or to such individuals as present
a threat to

all;

and available through the established system

(4) No legal remedy

or
damages.22

for injuries

Locke's right
change persons
without

of

resistance, in the American system, enables the majority to

presidential

in the

office, in

Congress,

and

in the Supreme Court

provides

resorting to

revolution or

force. Our Constitution

snd stste

extraordinary
csn

majorities

in Congress

legislatures to issue
amendments.

authority for calls for a new

an

constitutionsl convention or to propose

individual

Hence,

Ameri

majority

would

have
,

no right

to rebel because these provisions exist.

Accord

ing to Locke 's premises

the law already provides a peaceful means to seek redress

for injuries. In addition, no individual or minority has, according to Locke, a right to resistance for this right belongs to the majority. He clearly thinks thst scsttered individual
apathetic ends acts of corruption or violations of

the law will not sufficiently arouse

an

majority to support resistance to a government. His right to resistance

up being conservative in effect because it requires support by the majority. Many modern radical or revolutionary movements attempt to build a case for
a system

the moral corruptness of

revolutions minorities.

based

upon

individual

acts of

injustice. Modern

are, Locke to the contrary, many times led and orgsnized by militsnt Nevertheless, Locke msy have correctly estimated the need for injus

think

tices to be extensive before majorities are willing to act. Those revolutionaries who they can move the masses because of injustices done to others or to isolated

individuals may be constantly frustrated in their efforts to arouse the apathetic. On the other hand, Locke may have underestimated the capacity of one misguided individual
minorities.

to

influence

others and also the power of

highly

organized,

militant

In the
provide made

next

chapter, Locke turns to the

problem of

how the majority is to

for
a

a new

legislature. He
when and

also considers

the issue of how changes are to be

in

cabinet,

if the

thst

chsnging

the government or

king refuses to mske them. Locke clesrly ststes dissolving the legislsture for sn election is not the

In the first sentence Locke maintains that dissolution of government is to be clearly distinguished from the dissolution of society, the political community, and its union derived from the social contract. The destruction of a society following conquest is different from the dissolution of
same
society.23

thing as the dissolution of

the

governments

from

within.

Locke is

writes that a government

is dissolved
it

when the

legislature is

not able

to carry out the

not

functions

assigned to

it in the

social contract.
and

To dissolve the "Locke, 23Locke,

Two
Two

government

the same

thing

as to overthrow

does

not

Treatises, Treatises,

p.

452.

pp.

455, 456, 466.

John Locke: Revolution, Resistance,

constitute rebellion
.

or

Opposition?

237

Changing the government by calling for elections and altering

in
which

the ministerial personnel would not produce a

Locke lists the follow from

ples

ways

the

revolutionsry change in the system. legislature is dissolved and the consequences that
Most
of

changes

in the

executive-legislative relationship.

his

exam

involve

"undue"

interference

by

the

chief executive

in the

affairs of the

legislature. This leads Locke to

suggest remedial action on the part of the

legisla

tive opposition, or psrty fsctions.

by

majority

rule.

It

exercises

Locke's supreme, sovereign legislature operates the power given in trust to the government for the
the preservation of
property.24

promotion of common good and

When

anyone other

thsn the

legislsture
to obey

suthorized

by

the majority makes a

law,

the people are not

obligated

and

a new

legislature.25

may take steps (unspecified, but including force) to establish The specific cases when the legislature is chsnged snd the
are:

government

dissolved

(1)
which

When

a single person replaces

the

will of

the
no

legislature

with

his will,

happens

when orders are executed prince

that

have

(2)
time;

When the

hinders the legislature from meeting

methods without

legislative authorization; at its appointed

the consent or contrary

(3) When
to the common

the prince alters election

interest

of

the people;

(4) When (5) When

the people are subjected to the executive neglects to

enforce

foreign domination; and the laws that have been

passed

by

the

legislature.26

Locke
In these
provide
and

concludes:

like cases,

when

the

Government is dissolved, the People

a new

are at

for themselves,

by

change of

Persons,

or

Form,

erecting or both as they

Legislative, differing from

shall

the other,
and

liberty to by the
prior

find it

most

for their safety

to the

good.27

Locke clearly indicates that he has in

to the establishment
of

mind resistance

legislature
warding

tyranny,

as a means of prevention, of

off

the

necessity for revolution. It is tyranny hss been achieved.

This is in
effect no more than to

altogether

wrong to wsit to urge resistance until

bid them first be slaves,

tell them

and then to take care of their

Liberty,
secure

when

their Chains

are on ,

from Tyranny, if there be

a

no means

they may to escape it,

act

like freemen

Men

can never

be
28

till

they

are

perfectly

under

it

Men have The

ture
or

right to

act

to

prevent tyranny.

second

category

of governmental
trust.29

dissolution is

when either

the

legisla
such

the

prince acts

contrary to its

If a breach

of trust should

happen,
and

as an attempt to establish absolutism, the

legislature forfeits its power,

then the

24Locke, 25Locke, 26Locke, "Locke, 28Locke, 29Locke,

Two Treatises, Two Treatises,

pp.
p.

375, 428. 456, 459.

456. 459.

Two Treatises, Two Treatises,

Two Treatises, Two Treatises,

pp. p.

p.
p.

460.
460.

238
people

Interpretation
have
a

right to

resume

their original liberty.

a new election).

legislature

(presumably by holding

They may establish a new The legislature abrogates its

or attempts
people.

trust when it invades the property rights of

individuals,
of

to act in an
executive

arbitrary way with the lives, liberties, destroys trust when it

. . .employs

or

fortunes

the

The

the

Force, Treasure,
his purposes;

and

Offices

of the

Society,

to corrupt the

Representatives,
to their

and gain

them to

or

openly

pre-engages the

Electors,

and prescribes

by Solicitation, Threats, Promises or otherwise won to his designs; and imploys them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand, what to Vote,
choice, such, whom he has
and what

to

Enact.30

Locke

objected

to the king's efforts to

and

construct a court

party, to influence the

outcome of

elections,

to use electoral tactics to influence the

and new model

legislature.
what

Thus to regulate Candidates and Electors,

to cut up the Government

the ways

of

Election,

is it but

by the Roots and poison the very fountain of publick

Security.31

Locke

opposed extensive participation

by the crown

in the incipient development

the
of

of political parties and

its

effort

to

extend executive-monarchical control over

emerging trust because the

own

power of

Parliament. He
was

claims these actions constituted a

breach

king

replacing the

will of elected representatives with

his

will,

snd

this he thought was

remedies

subversive of government.

However, he is vague

about the precise

institutional legislature
trust"?

mechanisms are to

for this dsnger. For exsmple, just what type of be provided to enable the people to obtain a new
this is necessitated

or to conduct sn election when and

by

"breach

of

Who is to determine, happened?

Locke
now proceeds

how is it to be

determined,

that such a breach has

to several arguments that defend

his

position sgainst
resist must

allegations that

it

would promote chronic

instability. First, the right to

resembles the

be

used with caution.

sentence that

clearly

Declaration

of

Inde

pendence

follows:
and

But if a
the

long train of Abuses, Prevarications,

visible to the
are

design

People,

and

they

cannot

Artifices, all tending the same way, make but feel, what they lie under, and see,

whither

they

endeavor to put the rule

Government
are so

was

going 'tis not to be wonder'd, that they would rouse themselves, and into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which at first erected; and without which, ancient Names, and specious Forms,
that

far from
the

being better,

they

are much

worse, than the state of

Nature,

or pure
off and

Anarchy;
more

inconveniences

being

all as great and as

near, but the remedy farther

difficult.32

This

sentence

includes

a second argument against the charge

that

Locke's

right of
govern-

resistance would

frequently
p. p.

turn into
461. 461.
463.

right of revolution, thus unhinging

30Locke, 3 'Locke, ,2Locke,

Two

Treatises, Treatises, Two Treatises,

Two

p.

John Locke: Revolution, Resistance,

ment.

or

Opposition?

239

Not

so

Locke

says.

Revolutions

will not

hsppen just because

of misman

agement.

It is

much more
run

dangerous to

expose

the people to the possibility of

tyranny, than it is to
criticize and man who

the risk of

instability derived from a right in the people to

acts.33

to oppose rulers bent on tyrsnnicsl

In addition, Locke

tries to use

force to

destroy
their

just

government other

crime, is a common enemy, snd a people, in

rebellion;
some

pest.34

On the

says any is guilty of the greatest hand, "it is lawful for the
all resistance

cases, to

resist

King."35

And finally,

is

not

from taking place. The context of the passage from which the fsmous quote is tsken is sn srgument for
either or prevent rebellion

indeed, it may

forestall

distinguishing resistsnce from rebellion

The third
elections condition out not

and of

revolution.36

for dissolution
a new

the government

and

the

calling

of new

turns

to be

third category, but rather a series of arguments

justifying the general need to give the people the power to change the composition of the legislature, snd presumsbly slso to slter the csbinet. According to Locke, his
"doctrine
of s power

in the

people

to

provide

for

s new

legislsture
use

"

will provide and

sgsinst rebellions

becsuse the

resl rebels are

those who

force to break

oppose state of
. . .those

laws.37

Lawless

rebels sgsinst

the enforcement of the

lsws,

who creste s

war,

sre most

likely

to be persons in plsces

of suthority.

again in opposition to the Laws, do Rebellare, that is, bring back War, and are properly Rebels: Which they who are in Power (by the pretence they have to Authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the Flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run who set

up force

again the state of

into

it.38

Moreover,
"design"

resistance estsblish

to

tyranny is

also

justified in the

case of a

conspiracy

or

to

tyrannical government.

...

the

neglect of

the

publick good
. .
.

is to be

taken as evidence of such a

design,

or at

least

sufficient cause of resistance ought

because he betrayed or forced his People

whose

liberty

he

39 carefully to have preserved.

The

statement provides

a wide scope

for definitions

of actions

that could be

violations of an unspecified public good.

In the last

paragraph of

the

book, Locke

writes

that so

long

as the governors

act within the terms of the social

contract, the legislative

or sovereign power

cannot return to the people. power to the sovereign.

By signing the contract, the people transfer all political But if definite limits for legislative sessions were men
only
463, 465.

tioned in the

original

contract, if the sovereign power had been made

pp.

"Locke, 34Locke, "Locke, '"Locke,

Two Treatises, Two Treatises, Two Treatises, Two Treatises,

p.
p. p.

467. 468.
468. Cf.
p.

453. Locke

trains"

also mentions

"long

in this discus

sion of tyranny.

"Locke, Two Treatises, "Locke, Two Treatises, 39Locke, Two Treatises,

p.

463.

p.
p.

464. 467.

240
temporary,
the people.
or

Interpretation
if the legislature forfeited its power, then
as supreme
supreme power returns

to

Acting
the

power, the people

erect a new
persons.40

hsve the right to

of

either continue or retain

the legislative
old

power

in themselves,
of new

form

government,

the

form

under

direction

///. Conclusions

John Locke 's theory variously

viewed as

of political change and the

right to

revolution

has been

However,
and extent

serious

justifying or provoking the English and Americsn revolutions. dissgreements exist among commentators concerning the nature of his influence upon revolutionary thought. This dispute has obscured
Locke 's theory
the
of revolution work was written.

the study

of

happened
mean

after

by placing it in a context of events that In addition, just what Locke's theory might
or
conservative.41

has become involved in the

political culture are

argument over whether the major premises of

American

liberal
of

In this

conclusion

will

Locke 's theory of rebellion was neither very novel nor theoretically interesting. All of the disputes between vsrious schools of intellectusl historians about has led

briefly

review several

interpreters

Locke

and

then assert that

"influence"

students of
attention

has been

Locke to pay too much attention to his theory of rebellion. Too little paid to his defense of opposition political parties snd the right to

be

s critic of s government without

being confused with a disloyal rebel

like to
view

Paradoxi
wide-

cally, many

readers of

Locke

would

him

as an advocate of

reaching,
avoid that

violent

revolutions,

whereas

Locke himself painstakingly

attempted

to

label.
line,"

According to one author who was impressed with Locke 's influence upon the American Revolution, his political philosophy determined the "party espe
cially Locke's sanctioning of European thinker in America
association with
rebellion.42

Locke is

said

to be the

most

influential

during

the revolutionary period because of his

the right to revolution that was

supposedly literally included in the

another

Declaration

by Thomas Jefferson.43 Carl Becker,

Locke's
works as

pro-Lockean,

concludes

that many Americans revered

gospel.44

Becker

also connects

Locke's

views with

the right to revolt. In an article on the concept of equality, that the

p.

Martin Diamond

writes

Declaration

was

simply
pp.

following

Locke.45

"Locke, Two Treatises,

477. Cf.

Seliger, Liberal Politics,

118, 175. Seliger

writes

that Locke did not recognize a right to revolt in the residents of

British

colonial territories and that

Locke specifically denied the colonists the right to break away from Britain in his Constitution. "'Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, and

Brace,

World,

1955).

42John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943), pp. 170, 171, 492. 43Dolbeare, Directions in American Political Thought (New York: John Wiley 1969) pp 19 20, 12. "Carl Becker, Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York: Random House, 1942), pp. 26, 27-28. 45Martin Diamond, "The American Ideas of Equality: The View from the Review
Founding,'

John Locke:
Donald J. Devine

Revolution, Resistance,

or

Opposition?

241

utilizes empirical

Locke 's ideas

Revolution.46

provided

the bssis

survey data to substantiate his hypothesis that for s consensus formulated sround the time of the do not
these views of Locke s theory.

There

sre seversl critics who and

sgree with

Both Willmoore Kendall Kendall

sees a

Leo Strauss have

studied

Locke's

political

idess. But in

similsrity between Locke and Article V of the Basic Symbols Kendall claims that the "official
question:

Constitution.47

literature''

cannot answer the

What is the American

to our official

political

tradition?
the course of the eighteenth

Now, according
literature

literature, America had, in

of

century, come under the

would tell
" ,

influence

Locke

as we see at once , so exponents of the official use of the term

"
nature,"

us, from the Virginians

the term "enter

"by

of the term

"inherent rights

of

into

a state of

society,

and of the term

"compact.

"

We

conclude at once

this much: If the Americans did indeed become Lockeans in the course of

the

mere shift can

decades preceding 1776, then there did indeed occur a shift in self-understanding, not a in rhetoric we cannot prove that the Virginians were not Lockeans, we
. .

.While

say, and say

with profound
us.48

conviction, that the

change cannot

be

proved out of the

document before

Kendall

also points out

that all of the rights included in the Virginia Bill of Rights to Locke's ever

were well

known

prior

taking up

pen

to

write.

One, he thinks,

could as well attribute the

formative

philosophicsl

influence to Thomas Hooker or

s profound student of natural
related

St. Thomas Aquinas

as

to John Locke. Leo

Strauss,

law,

writes

that if one carefully reads the Two Treatises and other

Lockean

texts,
law.49

one will

become
to

convinced that

Locke did

not support

traditional natural

According

Strauss, Locke

almost

totally failed

to support individual

rights.50

Several

other scholars question

about contracts.

the

assumption

that Locke 's views influenced

and

American ideas have

that the intellectual

Ewart Lewis, Carl Bridenbough,

of massive,

T. H. Breen

explored the possible

climate.51

influence

indigenous

religious

factors

on

we reposses

According Carl Bridenbough, "It is indeed high time the important truth that religion was a fundamental cause of the
to
pp.

Of Politics, finkel, The

38 (1976),

313-31. Cf. Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk,

and

Herbert
ed.

Gar-

Democratic Republic: An Introduction to American Government, 2nd

(Chicago:

Rand McNally, 1966). "Donald J. Devine, The Political Culture of the United States: The Influence of Member Values on Regime Maintenance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 3, 7, 47, 52, 58. ""Willmoore Kendall, Contra Mundum, ed. Nellie Kendall (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington

House, 1971),
Tradition

p.

425.
and

"'Willmoore Kendall

(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

George W. Carey, The Basic Symbols of the American Political University Press, 1970), p. 63.

"9Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicsgo: 50Leo Strauss, "Locke's Doctrine of Natural

University of Chicsgo Press, 1953),

American Political Science
or

p.

232.

Law,"

Review, 52

(1958),
versus

p.

490. Cf. Francis Edward Devine, "Absolute

Democracy

Indefensible Right: Hobbes

Tradition,"

Journal of Politics, 37 (1975), pp. 767, 759, 763. 5lEwart Lewis, "The Contributions of Medieval Thought to the American Political

Locke,"

American Political Science Review, 50 (1956).

242
American
Revolution."52

Interpretation T. H. Breen
concludes within

that there

is

long-neglected

historical development
with

of political

rights

the American tradition

beginning

Nathanial Ward's

Body of Liberties

(1641).53

An English scholar, John Dunn, takes

argument rests on

historical evidence,
one of the

and

strong anti-Lockean stance. His he notes Lockean influence upon the

a
"54

founding fathers is
claims

"enduring cliches of American historiography.

books did
not

He

that there

is

no evidence that any copies of the book were even transported

to this country prior to 1724. Dunn thinks that Locke's

greatly

influence
It
cannot

educated

Americans

prior

to the Revolution.
which

have been Locke's Two Treatises

no reason

taught them this tradition of behavior

because there is

to suppose that

many

people

had

read

it

with care

in the

colonies

by

1750.55

Gary

Wills in
the

approaches

problem

Inventing America: by analyzing

In
numerous places

Jefferson's Declaration of Independence the historical background of Jefferson's

,

political philosophy.

through the volume,

Wills
the

concludes that

Locke's
author.

political

He

asserts that

philosophy had little or no influence interpretations of it have become

upon

Declaration's
in mythology,
there

shrouded

hence his

intriguing

title,

Inventing
his

America.56

According

to

Wills,

is

no

indication Jefferson Lockean orthodoxy

Those
who think

read

the Second Treatise. There

thought.57

are no reasons

to assume that a

underlies

Jefferson had to derive his

natural right of revolution

parallels within

from Locke have Scottish

school

no
are

direct textual
everywhere.58

parallels

to draw on, but the

the

Wills thinks the Scottish

moral sense political

greatest

Francis Hutcheson had the Despite leads

influence

upon

philosophy of David Hume and Jefferson at the time he wrote

not
Locke's.59

the Declaration. Jefferson understood rights in Hutcheson s sense,

a general

similarity

frequently noted between the right to rebellion in

right of resistance and

the Two Treatises and the Declaration of Independence, my analysis of Locke s text
me to emphasize the

differences between the Lockean

the American case for revolution. The

cant when one considers the
system and

disparities

emerge as

increasingly

signifi

emerging differences between the British cabinet the American executive. Several students of Locke's philosophy have

"Carl Bridenbough, Mitre and Sceptre (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). p. xx. 5T. H- Breen, The Character of the Good Ruler: Puritan Political Ideas in New England

University Press, 1962), pp. 137, 160, 165. 5"John W. Yolton, John Locke: Problems and Perspectives: A Collection of New Essays bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 46, 50, 59.
"Yolton, John Locke, p. 79. 56Wills, Inventing America, pp. xix, xxiv. "Wills, Inventing America, pp. 174-75. 58Wills, Inventing America, p. 238. 59Wills, Inventing America, pp. 215, 217.

(New Haven: Oxford

(Cam

John Locke: Revolution, Resistance,

discovered that he
of

or

Opposition?
But the

243
authors

traditional, natural law the Declaration base their case for the right of revolution
was not a

philosopher.60

upon

the self-evident

truths of eternal and natural law.

concludes

Locke, in

an

instance

of a major

dissimilarity,

that so

long

as

the procedural and constitutional rules consented to

by

the majority of the people in the governmental contract are

ment

followed,

the govern

is

authorized

to act, and the citizens are morally obligated to obey. Resistance

against

despots,

absolute

social contract exists

if a

valid contract

monarchs, and usurpers is morally justified because no in these cases. But only resistance and opposition are justified has been formulated. exists,
acts

In

governments where a contract efforts

that mark a tyrant

involve,

the

Locke, by by legislature, acts contrary to the established laws, and violations of enacted statutes. On the other hand, the commission of acts or passage of laws in conflict with the laws of nature, or natural, civil, or political rights of individuals, with the
according to
the executive to
govern outside of passed

laws

single possible exception of the

right to

own

property,

are not

included

as grounds
on

for

rebellion.

The laws

of

Nature's God

are not on

this list. Locke's views

essentially different from the American revolutionary experi ence because they are not derived from natural law and because they sanction only limited resistance to government.
political change are

It is

probable

that the central

extension of

teaching on this

subject

in Locke 's book has little

even

to do with a further

the previously well-established,

traditional,

doctrine

of

rebellion.61

From

different perspective, Locke's

most significant

theological, God's

"Cf. Dunn, Political Thought, pp. 51, 121, 207, 213. Dunn's analysis of Locke stresses the normative sspects of his philosophy. He wrote, according to Dunn, a "theological
of existence

proclamation"

rights that

was a

logical deduction from Locke's

position

premises

resting

upon the acceptance of

moderate-to-

and

natural

theology.

was, therefore, that of a

or of

conservative

liberal. Locke

was not a supporter of capitalistic

Dunn thinks Locke's theory can best be explained assumptions. However, he does note that by no means
tarian social

property rights from within the framework

can

bourgeois Puritan

order.

religious

Locke be

called an advocate of egali

democracy

because he

accepted the

social,

economic

class

distinctions
read

of

his

era. of

There

are no arguments against

slavery in the book. Locke

can not

be

as a

forerunner

ideologically based movements sdvocsting socisl-economic revolution. 61Locke, Two Treatises, p. 460. Cf. Julisn H. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sov According to ereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. xi, 97, 105, Franklin, Locke's theory of resistance entails the right of the people to change the form of gov ernment following its dissolution. However, Franklin traces this theory of sovereignty to George
modem
113.'

Lswson's Politico theories,

and could set

sacra

et

civilis, published in 1657. The

was

important

and radical point of

these

according to

Franklin,

the assertion that the people (the community) was sovereign

the larger problem of this theory was its up any form of government it desired. But portent for future and frequent disruptions of stability. My argument is that although Locke does in passing mention this theory of revolution, he was more concerned with the rights of resistance and opposition within an established government. The whole tenor of Locke's argument here is to

defend his theory

of resistance against

its allegedly

radical

defects.

Locke, "To Tell People They may provide for themselves by or being delivered over to a Foreign erecting a new Legislative, when by Oppression, Artifice, expect Relief, when it is too late, them tell to is one is old may their they gone, only Power,

For, according

to the judicious

and the evil

is

past

Cure. This is in

effect no more

than to bid them first be on, tell them,

Slaves,
act

and then to

take

care of their

Liberty;

and when their

Chsins

are

they may

like Freemen.

244
achievement

Interpretation
becomes his
elaborate

defense

of the right to organize opposition of the

factions

or

parties.62

He

also

hopes for the development

right

of a party's

leaders, if the majority in Parliament, to control the policy-making function. In addition, Locke thinks that the crown 's ministers should be criticized because they
did
not come within

the scope

of the monarch's special privileges.

Locke

mentions

no changes

he

would

like to

see accomplished

in England's
of

governmental system

in the Two Treatises,

and

there

is

no

discussion

different

constitutional

forms in

the book. It becomes obvious that

ernmental systems was not

advocation of

his

major concern.
.

revolutionary changes in gov But Locke did contribute to the

effort to construct a concept of a constitutional

loyal opposition His book ctearly presupposes the

forms of seventeenth-century England that did not include a power in the majority of the legislature to call for elections or dismiss the executive. However, his rights of resistance and opposition would make such systemic
changes

necessary

should
.

they

come

to be

adopted as

important

privileges of

parliamentary
not advocate

politicians

Curiously Locke makes no comment in the book about bills of rights.

the right of a majority to
established government places the power to

He does

conduct a violent revolution against

if the

administration acts political right and

determine

any according to the law. Locke wrong in the majority of the

treasure the

supreme

legislature. Within the American

truths of
natural

constitutional tradition we political

self-evident

law

and

define

right

and

mental constitution not to

revolution and

be

changed

by

legislative

majority.

wrong in a funda Locke's theory of

to

his right to

resist are qualified.

He is

careful

hedge,

to list

conditions, to make specifications about extensive numbers of supporters and

before he supports any effort even to resist tyrannical He clearly differentiates between the right to revolution and the rights to resist, oppose, and criticize. Locke takes care to argue that the right to
successive examples of abuse governments.
resist

is

not

the same as the right to rebel. His point

nor rebellious.

is precisely

that critics are

neither

disloyal,

This, if farely
there be no

so, is

rather

Mockery
it,
till

than

Relief;
are

and men can never

be

secure

from Tyranny, if

means a

to escape

have

not

only

Right to

get out of

perfectly under it; And therefore it is, that they It is the prevention of tyranny that concerns it, but to prevent

they

it."

Locke here, not the right to construct a new government given the failure to prevent absolutism. 62Cf. C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1962),
proper

pp.

195, 252, 256, 257. MacPherson

of

thinks Locke's right to property is the

consent of the

key

to a

interpretation

his

political philosophy.

His

majority

was sll

the msjority of property holders. The socisl contract

involved transferring

in reality consent of individusl right to a

majority of property owners in order to protect their rights. "No individusl rights sre directly pro tected in Locke's Stste. The only protection the individusl has against arbitrary government is placed in the right of the majority in civil society to say when a government has broken its trust to act always in the public good and never
arbitrarily."

THE POLITICS OF PERFORMANCE:

AN INTERPRETATION OF

BOLINGBROKE'S POLITICAL THEORY

Barry Cooper

University

of Calgary

Introduction
A
mural

monument at

St. Mary's
composition:

Church, Battersea,

records what was

probably Bolingbroke's last

Here lies
HENRY
Sl

IOHN.

In the

reign of queen of

Anne,

secretary
In the days
of

war, secretary of state,

and viscount

Bolingbroke:
and

King

George I.

King
Anne

George II.

something His attachment to

exposed

more and

better.

queen

him to

long

and severe persecution: of mind.

at

he bore it
He
passed the

with

firmness

latter

part of

his time faction:

home,

the

enemy the friend

of no national party;
of no

distinguished
which

under the cloud of a proscription

not yet

has

been entirely taken off,

by
and

zeal to maintain the

restore

liberty,

to

the ancient prosperity,

Of GREAT BRITAIN.

he dyed the 175

1 2 of

december

1 aged 73.

Generations tentions,
"there
attitude,"

of

scholars

and

other

interested

parties

have taken issue

with

Bolingbroke's
and

estimation of

his

political of

his career, his firmness of mind, his political in principles. Professor Plumb's recent judgment that
personal

was a

fatal lack

integration between his Bagehot's

life

and

his

political

was

a gentle reminder of

more severe verdict a of

century

earlier:
and

"Three

years of eager unwise

power, and thirty-five

modern world earlier were

impotent regret, such, or something like it, will ever Alcibiades."1 the fate of an Contemporary opinions
equally
elegant and

sickly longing be in this cold

a

century

equally damaging.
Canadian Political
and

An

esrlier version of

this paper was presented at the 1976 meeting of the

Science Association. I

would

like to thank
comments.

Sidney Jackman,

J. G. A. Pocock, J. A. W. Gunn,

John Shingler for their helpful

130; Walter

'J. H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole, Vol. I, The

Bagehot, "Bolingbroke

Statesman,"

as

Making of a Statesman (London, 1956), in Works, ed. F. Morgan (Hartford,

p.

III,

221.

246
Yet Bolingbroke inspired for lack
better
of a

Interpretation
much affection as

well, and has

was
not

never suffered

biographer's

adulation.

Whether he

during
in

the days of the Hanoverians we need

something more and decide. He was some

to act

thing different: following his flight

to France he was

never again able

directly

politics

but had to be

content with

writing

and

actions of others.

cerity when letters to Swift, from exile, he

Parliament. In his
was

Historians have rightly been he claimed to have no regrets at

praised

skeptical of

the reflecting Bolingbroke's sin

upon politics.

leaving
whom

active

In his

Seneca,

he

claimed

to take as a

model, even while seeking to reverse his attainder that he might return to
published writings

he

maintained

that
and

while great pleasure

to be gained from
and

forming

"political

scheme"

meditating
cf.

upon

its

beauty

harmony,

greater pleasure awaits

the man "who speculates in order

to act, goes on and carries his scheme into

111:46).*

execution"

(11:360;

Cicero, Rep.

In this essay the analysis is confined to the activity that brought Boling broke lesser pleasures, his political writings. That is, we are concerned primar ily with the events of his later life. Even within this narrower compass, there is
no agreement on such specific matters as significance sus

for British best

political

holds that his

political

his relationship to Machiavelli, on his thought, or his consistency. A modest consen writings were bound to a specific set of circum in terms
of their author's

stances and are assumed

understood

motives,

which are

to be clear and distinct. Thus it is widely maintained that

his

political

opinions are of no particular

the product of

importance today, being at prejudice, resentment, and a bad character. Bolingbroke's

opinions as

once

time-bound and

Supposing, however,

that we consider

proceeding from deliberate choice, then we may learn from his deliberations something more than that he was a propagandist hungry for office and an enemy of Walpole. Bolingbroke
ment and not sought to persuade as

his

readers

in

part

by

an

intelligible

argu

Rhetoric

was

been alleged, important for Bolingbroke, but his

just,

has

often

by

the use of

lofty

phrases. extent

was not empty.

To the

that the substance and dialectic of his writing are coherent, it may

bring

to light

something permanent, of its composition. In

opinions,
one must

or at

least something that transcends the

to see these

contingencies political

order as

features

of

Bolingbroke's

grasp,

far

as one

can, Bolingbroke's

experience and esti

mation of political

events,

and

the peculiarities of his

fore,
yet

with

his

reflections on the nature and

argued

history

idiom. We begin, there of the British constitution,

artifice

for Bolingbroke devised to

that the British constitution was the most perfect

enable men such as

himself to

appear as actors upon

the political

stage.

Idea of Patriot King,

*References to Bolingbroke included in the text use the following abbreviations: P.K.. The ed. S. W. Jackman, Indianapolis, 1965; H.W., Historical Writings, ed. I.
1972; Roman numerals, The Works of Lord

Kramnick, Chicago,
London

Bolingbroke, 4

vols, reprint of the

edition of 1844.

The Politics of Performance

Constitutional
Bolingbroke's thoughts
on and

247

Political

History
as well as

the constitution,
maxim:

his

religious opin

ions,

were guided

by

this Ciceronian

"Opinionum
are

commenta

naturae

judicia

confirmat"

(Groundless

opinions

destroyed,

delet dies, but rational

judgments
sumed

of nature are confirmed

by time)

that the rationality of a political order

(11:42). That is, Bolingbroke as is demonstrated by its substantial first

principles
of

sameness

through the centuries. Its substantial sameness, in turn, may be dis

covered

by

the assiduous

application of rational

to the historical

evidence.

Bolingbroke

was untroubled

principle and

felt

no need and

to inquire
more

by deeply

the

circularity into the nature

his interpretative
Never

of reason.

theless,

as

Douglas

approach

brought

an end

to the purely

recently Pocock have argued, Bolingbroke's historiogenetic debates on the nature of

i).2

the constitution (De nat.

deor.

50.

Praise for the British

anced

constitution was

in terms

of

or

mixed

government

a commonplace
and

limited monarchy among Augustan

provided

and

bal

political

writers.

Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero,

and

Tacitus

the

ancient

texts,

Machiavelli Newtonian

Harrington the

modern ones.

mixed

regime, reflecting the

not

aesthetic of

balance,

was a means of

impeding, if
person,
a

arresting, the
the
or

endless cycles of political change. of

From traditional

observations on

tendency
many, to

"simple forms

government,"

of

comprised of one

few,

slide

toward arbitrary rule,

concluded

it hath been

compounded of
produce

very reasonably, that the best form of government must be one these three, and in which they are all so tempered, that each may
restrained

the good effects, and be

the

by

the

counter workings of much

the

other

two,

from producing

bad

effects that are natural to

it. Thus

is

evident

(II:

120).

By institutionalizing
regime was

moderation, the supreme political virtue, the mixed

overcome

held to have

the unreliability that

attaches

to a

depen

dence
for

superior

statesmanship and personal excellence even while allowing scope individuals should they chance to appear. The intrinsic reasonableness of the mixed regime was tied directly to the
upon excellence

special

of

British practice, the

constitution.

creation

and preservation
over

of what

came to
of

be

called

the Gothic

Tacitus despaired
the

the inability
of a mixed

the Roman

commonwealth

to live in

accord with

harmony

regime:

"But

what

the

refinements of

Roman policy

could not

do, hath been

of our

done in this island,

northern

upon

foundations laid
of

by

the rough simplicity

achieved

ancestors"

(II: 121). Because

the balance

by

the mixed
so

regime,

"our free
or

constitution

of government
after

hath been

preserved

long

inviolate,

hath been brought back,

having

suffered

violations, to its

Ancient Constitution Englishman

and

2David C. Douglas, English Scholars (London, 1939), and the Feudal Law (Cambridge, 1957),

pp. PP-

356ff.; J. G. A.
237S.

Pocock, The
of

Herbert Butterfield, The

Bolingbroke

with

His History, (n.p., Archon, 1970), pp. 2, 69, emphasized the continuity his common law predecessors and the later whig historians.

248
original

Interpretation
principles,
and

been

renewed and

improved too,

by

frequent

and salu

revolutions"

tary
effectiveness abuses and

(II:

119).

Thus

were combined and

in the Gothic
of mixed

constitution

the

of simple

regimes

the

harmony
and

ones,

while the

inconveniences

of either were avoided.

The
stitution

convergence of reasonableness allowed

Bolingbroke to vary his treatment

historical continuity in the con of its constituent parts,

sometimes on

arguing
of

sometimes on and

purely

speculative

grounds,

the evidence

combining the two. He devoted most of his attention to monarchy because, he said, "when monarchy is the essential form, it may be more easily and more usefully tempered with aristocracy or democra

history,

sometimes

by

cy,

or

both,

than either of

them,

when

they

are the

essentials,

can

be tempered

monarchy"

with

(P.K.:i~i). Thus, for example, in

with an argument

an

essay

on

the power of the

prince and

the freedom of the people, first published in The Craftsman in 1733,

Bolingbroke began
of

from historical

origins

"The

original state

he declared, "is justly described very different from what is now in all arbitrary governments. Kings were then no more than chiefs, or principal (1:511). In the Patriot King, how magistrates, in states republican and
free"

monarchy,"

ever, he

abandoned

"any
been,

nice

inquiry

into the be

original"

of

kingship

in favor

of

"something better,
tion ought to have

and more

worthy to

known,"

namely, "what this institu

reason"

whenever

it began, according to the

bound to be the

rule of

(P.K..9). Whatever the approach, the

result was

same:

There

was

"no foundation in fact kings

were

reason"

or

were absolute or governed

for any belief that contemporary or original by divine right. Such opinions and institutions
and

errors, arising wholly from historical accident

inevitably

resulting in

comic absurdities

(P.K.:n-i2). The duties

of subjects and

the right of kings

may both be
mind of

shown

"by

the constitution of

human

nature"

imprinted

by

the

God,
man

"the

same to

all"

all,

and

obligatory

alike on

and also

by

the laws

given

by

to man, "founded indeed on the same principles, but varied them to

by
of

different
may be

applications of reckoned

times, to characters,
circumstances"

and to a

number,

which

infinite,
is

of other
deduced,"

(P.K.a^).

By

the

law

reason, "a divine right in kings is to be

namely, to
and

govern well.

Good

government

conducive to office of

happiness,

"God has
to

made us

to desire
or

happiness"; thus, the dained of God, and

"person"

king

is "of divine

right,"

which

is to say but the

the persons of
and

kings "are

be

sacred.

reputed

The

of a

king

is his legal title

demands "legal divine

reverenc

man

deserves in the "that

no special respect since

the source of reverence

notion of a

is "national
in

not per

sonal"

(P.K.A4-15). Bolingbroke's
office of

right

kings,

or

rather,

king, is

therefore far removed from the

"absurd"

notions of

pedant"

annointed

James I (II:3off.). The image

rational essence of

kingship

thus

coincided with the ancient

republican and order

free. The

to maintain

in states his throne to the people, was raised to it in the constitution, and would keep it by good government.

of chiefs and principal magistrates

king

owed

The Politics of Performance

249

and

The aristocracy in a mixed regime was the locus of the men of splendor, its origins, according to Bolingbroke, were in nature itself. Society, he
with

said, began If there

families,

not

"savage

individuals"

or

"solitary

vagabonds":

was a

first

man and a

nurse and educate and women men about

confusion

themselves)

must

first woman, they and their children (for these could not have constituted the first society. If numbers of men
once, there might be some contests among the
some violence
might

sprang

out of the earth at

these primitive
might arise

ladies,

and

be employed, But
(IV: 146).

and

some same

in the immediate

hurry

of copulation.

after that the

instinct

which

had

caused variance would

have formed

societies

Nature

immediately by
however,
not perhaps

instinct instructed directed

humanity
instinct. It

in the way
was

of society.

Political order,
of

was not

by

the

consequence or at

agreement,
of

by

single

individuals, but by families,

Malmesbury's
wild acquire

least

by
A

heads

families. "Like the

a

philosopher of

men,

they

act as

if they had
passionate

right to

all

they

can

by

fraud

force"

or

(IV:i87).3

By

nature, it seems, drove mankind first to procreation and then to war. postulating natural sociability in the form of family, Bolingbroke, unlike the
of

philosopher conflict of

Malmesbury,

could

justify

the orders that emerged from the

families for

preeminence

(11:90).

Equally

significant was

that the

unit of action
endowed with

was the family, for it meant that aristocratic display could be the index of nature and nature's reason. But by confining nature aristocratic

to families and

competition, Bolingbroke introduced what Mans

problem,4

field has

called

the

grandfather

which

has the

greatest

importance for father. But

the stability of the too much

power

entire regime.

The father,
power of

as

head

of a

family, has entirely

is
also a

if he diminishes the
power son.

his

son who

he has too little

the son
of

if he is

unable

to control the affairs of

problem

his son,
obvious

including
political

his
but

The

grandfather

and

its

most

consequence

in Bolingbroke's day, the

special

conflict of generations within

the royal
and

family,

are

instances

of the general political problem of

stability

generation, to

which we shall return.

In considering the role of the commons, Bolingbroke resorted almost Britons are to us the Aborigines of wholly to historical evidence. "The ancient
our

island. We discover little

of them

through the gloom of antiquity, and

freemen"

we know, they were nothing beyond them. This, however, (II: 1 08). However savage they may have appeared to the already

we see

corrupted
liberties"

Romans, "Caesar
(H.W.:\i%).

himself

acknowledges

they fought boldly for

their

They

continued

to resist the Saxons and ended

conquered

by

to democratic

principles.

"The Danes

the crown, but

converting them they wore it

(H.W.:ijg). In
all

conquer

little;

and

the liberties of Saxon freemen

they

never

where men

3Not only did Hobbes's wild men rely on have lived by small families, to rob
reputed
"
.

their own strength and art,

and spoil one another
greater spoils

but also, "in

a

places,

has been

trade,

and so

far

from

being

against the law of nature, that the ed.

they

gained, the greater was

their honour.

"Harvey

M. Oakeshott (Oxford, n.d.), p. 109 (emphasis added). C. Mansfield, Jr., Statesmanship and Party Government (Chicago, 1965), p. 57.

Leviathan, XVII, 2,

250
short, "as far
as we can

Interpretation
look back, (II: 109).
a

lawless power,

a government

by

will,

never prevailed

in

Britain"

Even if it be
was

admitted

that William the Norman held the power of a

tyrant,

indeed

conqueror,

and not

that he simply asserted a legitimate claim to a

disputed

crown

by

trial of arms, "unlimited or absolute monarchy never existed

even

in Britain; no,

not

by

conquest.

The

rights

of

the

people

were

soon

re-asserted"

(II: no). There was, therefore, no British feudalism as distinct legal innovation; parliaments were never interrupted nor the rights of any estate disturbed. Bolingbroke ended this fabulous story of medieval England with a striking image:
Though the branches
remained

lost its beauty for a time; yet the root had taken strong hold in it; so that care and culture, and time were indeed required, and our ancestors were forced to water it, if I may use such an expression, with their blood; but with this care, and culture, and time,
were

lopped,

and the tree

untouched, was set in

good soil and

and

blood, it

shot

up

again with greater strength

than ever, that we might sit quiet and

happy

under the shade of

a tree of the same

it; for if the same form was not exactly restored in every part, kind, and as beautiful, and as luxuriant as the former, grew up from
beneath the ground, the history of the Gothic hidden. Yet it could be brought to light by Bolingbroke's
out of sight

the same root (IL141).

Like the root,

constitution was

interpretative

principles

to serve as evidence for the reasonableness of those

principles and confirm

the superiority of British to Roman policy. through the events of 1066, one could

If continuity
anticipate
tion"

was preserved

hardly
revolu

any

problems with more recent upheavals.

Thus the

"salutary
which

of 1688

had

as

its first

objective to reverse the trend

by

Parliament

had been

increasingly

subordinated
of

to the crown and to restore the old balance

which settled

(11:9). The Declaration

Rights,

the crown upon William and

new
con

Mary,
Magna

was regarded
Carta"

in this respect, Bolingbroke assured his readers, "as a (IL27). But more than the traditional myth of the Gothic

stitution was confirmed

by

the

Glorious Revolution. The

specifically,

conflict that precipi

tated

it

was over

"first

principles,"

religious principles.

The later

Stuarts had

moved against

the constitution

government"

of ecclesiastical and civil reaction

by asserting "extravagant principles (IF30), which led to civil war and, in

of

to

it,

the religious intolerance

parties,"

the

Restoration. The
so much

nation

was

divided into the "great

committed, as

whig
(IF54).

and

tory, "not
that

by

overt acts

by

the apprehensions which each of them entertained of the

intentions
even

of

the

other"

They

were

divided,

is,

over

first principles,

though
action.

they did
In the

not or could not

translate those principles wholeheartedly

parties

into

crisis over
of

James II, both

did

act

this time upon the

purged

common

principles

the constitution.

Their
upon

action

in

concert

the

reputations of

each,

which

had been laid

them

by

their opponents and had

survived as shadows of an earlier genuine

distinction
been

of

the two parties expired at this

division. Thus, "the proper and real (11:67). The religious issue had
era"

raised and

settled, and there

was no

further

reason

for

parties

to

exist.

The Politics of Performance

This interpretation
after 1688 was

25 1
the religious question

of

the relative
one must

insignificance
in this
context

of

expounded,

recall, from the

confident perspective of

deism,

belief
can

whose crucial attribute

is the certainty that first

so
as

principles

be clearly

and

exhaustively

presented

to command the

assent of all reasonable

men, whose reasonableness is evident in their espousal

of

true

(deist) first
have
reason

principles.
no warrant a

The less than

reasonable

may

freely

cling to their

opinions, but

to dim the light that shines upon others.

which meant
stage.5

Boling
reason

broke's
question
existed

favored
not

should

policy of toleration, intrude upon the public

the evidence
of

that the religious

again

But

once

in

harmony

with

history (properly

interpreted). That the Bolingbroke's

and no

religious question need not

have been

raised

to the heat of civil war in order to

praise

be
of

settled was proved

by
left

the policy of Elizabeth (1:2 16).

as romantic

Elizabeth has
of

often

been dismissed
as much

nonsense,6

doubt the

fidelity

his

portrait

to be desired as did his general account of

a gross

the Gothic constitution. Yet it was surely not

distortion to claim,

as

Bolingbroke did (H.W. -.236), that in beth's

reign saw the

respect of

the religious question Eliza

form

of

the constitution settled. Thus whatever depth it

acquired

through the resolution of post-Elizabethan problems, the settlement of

1688 could appear

readily
and

enough as a restoration.

More
principles

contentious was

Bolingbroke's

remark on

the exhaustion of political

in the whig

tory

parties.

Historians7

are

far from

agreed on

the

structure of political organizations

accuracy
and

of

his

views cannot allowed.

Bolingbroke's day, so the descriptive be determined unambiguously. Nevertheless, two

during

observations

may be

The first is that his

parties"

account of political
more

divisions
than

the demise of the "great

was
tory,"

considerably

complex

would

have been held

by

"typical

an epithet with which

he has been

5That
broke the his
own

the

young Bolingbroke
one need who saw

acted as a

"high-church

tory"

does

not contradict

this interpreta

tion. On the contrary,

political

only

make a quite commonsensical

distinction between
to

Boling
close

actor,

the usefulness of the religious issue and felt free to employ it for
thinker who confided

purposes, and the

a prudent

speculative

his true
he

views

none

but

few

friends,
could

thing
to

to

do considering the furor that

claims of

erupted when
was

his

religious opinions were

published.

In

order

manipulate religious sensibilities when

in

active politics,

Bolingbroke

is. therefore, one of Felix Rabb's Machiavellians (The English Face of Machiavelli, Toronto, 1964). Thus, for exam ple, his severe miscalculstion of the flexibility of the Old Pretender, for whom England was not

hardly

have believed the

Christianity

to be compelling. He

worth sound

giving up a mass, first principles.

resulted

in

part

from his low

estimate of

biblical

religion as a

basis for

6See, for example, H. T. Dickenson, Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The bridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 234ff.
7A
review of what

Bolingbroke (London, 1970), pp. 2635., or Isaac Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole (Cam
thesis"

may be

called the
and

"Walcott

and

its

critics

Horwitz, "Parties, Connections,

Parliamentary Politics,

1689-1714:

may be found in Review and

Henry

Revision,"

Journal of British Studies, 6 (1966), 45-69. See also Geoffrey Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne (London, 1967), pp. 1-9, and J. H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England,
"Executive

ment,"

1675-1725 (London, 1967), Ch. 5. A further refinement has been suggested by B. W. Hill, Monsrchy snd the Chsllenge to the Psrties, 1689-1832: Two Concepts of Govern Historical Journal, 13 (1970), 379-401.

252
burdened.8

Interpretation
The
second on

sions were
reasons

based

"a

is that, if we may real difference of

grant that

principles and

seventeenth-century divi (II: n), the

designs"

Owing

to the corruption
and

for their separation, according to Bolingbroke, of Charles II, "the appearance in

opposition

were not equivalent.

party"

of a court

was

maintained,

to

it

genuine a party:

Neither group was, properly speaking,

that subordinated
national

country party The court party

arose
was a

(IF41).

faction country

to personal interest
the

(IFn-13),
men"

while

the

was "the nation, speaking and and conduct of particular (IF40). The court faction in the discourse acting began the attack on the constitution and the nation, acting through its represen tatives, defended it. By common consent both were called parties, though their

party, "authorized

country,"

by

the

voice of

natures were

distinct is

and even opposite.

One may
British
the

summarize

Bolingbroke's

argument to this point as

regime.

follows: The

constitution

a mixed or

balanced

Such

a regime accords with

interpretative
the

principles

Bolingbroke
the

"reason."

called

When these

principles

are applied to

history

of

constitution

the

beauty

and goodness of

British

political order are apparent

(to

"reasonable"

all

persons).

The

preservation of

liberty,
the

which

is the

chief purpose of the

constitution,

and which accords with sustained

"natural"

competitiveness of

heads

of

families, has been

histori

cally

by

maintaining or, if necessary, restoring the motivating

the Gothic exemplar.

sentiments and

principles of

Specifically,

the recent religious upheavals,

which animated

the so-called great parties, whig and

tory, had been

settled

by

the events of 1688, which in turn was no more than a restoration of the
achieved

balance

by

Elizabeth. There was, therefore,

"parties."

no reasonable or

historical basis

for the

continuation of political

The New Corruption One

of

the unforeseen consequences of the Glorious Revolution was, in

the phrase of a modern

the religious question

wars of and

historian, the Financial Revolution.' The settlement of brought, through the triumph of British arms during the King William, prosperity (or the hope of prosperity) by way of trade,
new

the association of political

broke the

stability links between the army

use of

with credit and

investment. To especially

Boling
meant

and

trade,

and

the attitudes

engendered
corruption.

by

the successful new military and economical organizations, the term

"corruption"

His

was not confined

to the

more or

less

subtle use of

bribery, but
and

also

had

broader

and more a

technical meaning,

derived from Harrington

Machiavelli, indicating
One
of

disturbance

of

the

equipoise of the mixed regime.

the constituent elements would encroach

of

8J. H. Burns, "Bolingbroke

10

and the

Concept

Constitutional

Government,"

Political Studies,

(1962),

267.

9P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756 (London, 1967), esp. Chs. 1 and 2.

The Politics of Performance

upon

253
"simple"

the others,
precipitate

transforming
a of the

the constitution into

of an of

regime,
of

which

would

further decline because

excess

its

defining

at

tribute. In the
virtue.10

language

day, disruption

the

balance

was corruption of

Modern historians broke's

ideas in

and political scientists

have

seldom considered

Boling
inferior
com

arguments on their own merits.

general as

The former have tended to discount

were

if, in Namier's image, they

human
emotion."

but libretti

of

quality to the music of

mended even while

Political

scientists

have generally
support of

Bolingbroke for his insights into contemporary

social transformations

they

condemn

as romantic and

reactionary his
principles.

landed

estate rather

than financial wealth as the basis of political to argue on the

analyze

power.12

Yet

Boling
not

broke

claimed

basis

of

first

It is therefore
whether or not

unreasonable

to

his

arguments on those

grounds,
or

they
or

are

cleverly forged from within the acted upon in good faith. The
peacetime

"whig

canon,"

actually held

by him,

Apart standing army was a twofold source of from expense, which would be borne by the landowners, and the suspicion that the Hanoverians favored a large army in order to be able to look their continen
corruption.13

tal cousins in the eye, the maintenance of a standing army instead of a

was

militia

widely held to be the means by which tyrannically inclined kings delivered the coup de grace to a tottering but still free regime. The eclipse of liberty in
modern

Europe (II: 132)

example:

"standing

free

governments"

Rome (F304) served as a warning and an have been generally the instrument of overturning (H.W. -.516). At the same time, the existence of an army
and ancient

armies

'"For

a thorough account of the

background to the Augustan vocabulary,

and the

see

J. G. A. Pocock,

The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought

Atlantic Republican Tradition Practice

Opposition: The

(Princeton,
"A Case
of

1975),

esp.

notable exception versus

Chs. 13 and 14. is Quentin Skinner, "The Principles

Walpole,"

and

of

in Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb, ed. Neil McKendrick (London, 1974), pp. 93-128. In this article he insisted that, whatever the degree of truth in Namier's insight, it is equally important to
Bolingbroke

insist that

one cannot

sing Cosi fan Tutte to the

music of

Die Zauberflote, that

espousal

one

must

have

recourse to the principles espoused and the reasons political action.

for their

if

one

is to

explain actual

l2Unable
regarding 256). See

to account for the rationality or

moral
arguments

irrationality

of

morality, Kramnick was

forced to
168,
and

dismiss Bolingbroke's

as

errors

that detracted

from his Harringtonian insight

and
on

structural changes

also

in the economy and society (Bolingbroke J. G. A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays
1971),
p.

His Circle,

pp.

Political Thought

History

(New
a

York,

134-

l3For
"The Role

discussion

of the

debate
of

of

King

William III

Journal of British Studies, 5, No. 2 Journal of Modern History, the English Pamphleteers, 1697-1700, Concerning a Standing 18 (1946), 306-13; Pocock, Politics, Language and Time, pp. 122-29; J- R- Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1965); Skinner, "The Principles and Practice of Opposi
Army,"
tion,"

over the standing army see, inter alia: Lois G. Schwoerer, England in the Standing Army Controversy, (1966), 74~94; E. Arnold Miller, "Some Arguments Used by

1697-1699,"

pp.
Problem,"

117-20.

See
52

also

J. Hurstfield, "Political Corruption in Modern England: The Historian's

30.

History,

(1967),

254
meant

Interpretation
that well-paying commissions, carrying no obligations save attendance at

regimental

dinners,
course,

might
were

be bestowed

upon members of

Parliament. Not
sinecures.

all

officers,

of

placemen, and not all placemen held

archaic offices could also meant that

Never
and

theless, more money meant that filled with loyal supporters. It

through the countryside

be revived, endowed,
progress of grow more

the

during

elections might an

Politics, which had once been broke, become a trade.

Bolingbroke thought the

constantly honorable duty, had, according to personally

campaigning lavish.

Boling

new

tradesmen

contemptible and polit

ically
the

disastrous. "The landed

men are

the true

owners of our political vessle: passengers

moneyed

men, as such, are no more than

in

it"

(IL568). The

problem,
moved

as

Bolingbroke

themselves from
and was

topheavy
credit.

saw it, was that too many of the passengers had below decks to the bridge. The ship had become in danger of capsizing in spite of outriggers in the form of
moneyed men

These newly

were, in Bolingbroke's

colorful

phrases,
specula

"impudent,
but
not

rash, presumptuous, ungracious,

practice."

insolent,
not

and profligate

in

tion as well as

They

could

bribe but
while

seduce,

buy

but

not

gain, lie

deceive (IF356). As
the
constitution

result,

retaining "ancient

and

known

forms"

had become

under

their hands "a new and undefinable

monster;

composed of a

king

without monarchial

splendour,

a senate of nobles

without aristocratical
freedom"

independency,

and a senate of commons without demoand public

cratical

(H.W. :i49). Private

when wealth

virtue, science,

and wit

had

declined together
rule.

and not estate

became the token

of effective

Wealth

stimulated

desires, desires induced dependence

and

upon

him

who

slaked

them, dependence brought forth venality, servility,

of

cunning

without

responsibility.

Because

his

criticisms of the new economic and social

order,

Boling
Terms

broke has been

called a

conservative; because

of

his

objections to the new men

and
aesthetic."'4

it produced, his
such as

conservatism are of

has been little

use

called

"stylistic

"conservative"

in

political analysis.

It is true, however,

that Bolingbroke was an elegant man

oratory.

What may lurk behind

such a characterization and

both in his writing and, evidently, in his has sometimes been

was a

betrayed
really
with

by

the tone of

his critics, is that Bolingbroke

snob, that he
made evident

objected

to the dreadful lack of

breeding

that the new men

poor

every By they maltreated the in order the better to distinguish themselves. A gentleman, in contrast, would demean himself if he oppressed his inferiors. What, then, was Boling
word and

deed.

using their money as a club

broke's

answer

to this

bourgeois

prejudice

against

superiority

expressed

in

anything but one's bank balance? The opening of his "Letter on the Spirit
"snobbish"

Patriotism"

of

(1736)

contained a who

characteristically
"Kramnick,
Bolingbroke
and

remark.

There he differentiated "the vulgar,

p. 7.

His Circle,

The Politics of Performance

are

255
of

accidentally distinguished
and

by

titles of

king
who

and are

subject,

lord

and

vassal,

of nobleman

peasant;

and
of

the

few,

distinguished

by

nature so

essentially from the herd

species."

mankind, that, figure apart,

caprice or accident
or

they

seem

to

be

another

Of the first, "if

did

not raise

them often to
make

stations, wherein their stupidity, their vices,

misfortune,"

their

follies,

them a

public

they

would

be utterly
with

unnoticed.

Of the second, they

may indulge themselves
so their amusements

observe with with

distinction, they
business

admire

knowledge.

They

pleasure; but as their

industry
of their

is

not employed about

trifles,

are not made the

country.

lives. Such

men cannot pass unperceived

through a

If they

retire

from the world, their

retreat.

splendour accompanies part

them,

and enlightens

even the

obscurity of their indifferent (11:353-354).

"Reason,"

If they take

in

public

life,

the effect

is

never

Bolingbroke added,
in

would

"demonstrate,

that all

men are

di

rected,

by

the general constitution of human nature, to submit to government,

a particular manner

and that some men are ernment on

which

designed to take
depends"

care of

that gov
people

the common

happiness

(IF355). These

deserve

recognition
spirit.15

because

of

their personal

or particular

qualities, especially

virtue and

By

nature, the

men of splendor ought

to govern.

No less posterity that

an

all political men

authority than Walpole, who ought to have known, assured among his contemporaries had their price. By life in
order to gain

implication,

men entered political

wealth, not the honor of

being

recognized

for their

splendor nor

from

a sense of

duty
stood

that "the common the contrast

happiness"

depended

upon

their governance.

One may

sharpen

between the two for Walpole the

single public

men and particular

the principles

for

which

they

by

observing that

talent or character of a person was subordinated to a

and common

denominator,

price, whereas for Bolingbroke the

public realm was to serve

dor,

the receipt of

primarily as the setting for the appearance of splen individual recognition, and the capture of immortal fame. To
argument where

dismiss Bolingbroke's
within

as

snobbery is already to take

alone granted
distinction.16

one's

stand

Walpole 's world,

money

The distinc

tion granted

by

money,
also

however, is in
gain

terms of what one

has,

not who one

is.

Since

others

may

wealth,

what

is

recognized

indiscriminate,
of the new

universal, and eventually

was

anonymous.

is already common, The intelligible essence

corruption, then,
often used

that private economic cares had entered the

modem

"Bolingbroke

the two words synonymously to connote the

Machiavellian
s

notion of virtu and the ancient thymos.

"Thus, for

example, Professor

Gunn listed

one of

the dangers courted

honour,"

by

formed

and

articulate opposition as

"the

charge of a

trivial quest for personal

and

Factions No More: Attitudes

gland, Extracts from
separate

Party in Government Contemporary Sources (London,

to

in J. A. W. Gunn, ed., Opposition in Eighteenth Century En

pp.

1972),

10-11; Kramnick dismissed the

(P.AT.:72-84) as "the most ludicrous ex essay "The Private Life of a originally (Bolingbroke and His Circle, p. 168). ample of Bolingbroke's insistence on the theatrical For Bolingbroke, on the contrsry, the quest for personal honor was the essence of politics and
image"

Prince"

administrative

capacity

a mere pass through

the stage door.

256
realm of public political action.

Interpretation

Politics,

which above all meant a public per

subordinated

formance

by

men

of spirit

and

virtue, had become

to private

welfare sustained

by

secret service. of politics as performance was presented

Bolingbroke's defense
of a

in terms
the

defense

of

property for
a

and the

Gothic
above,

constitution.

The

great advantage of

Gothic constitution,
dom. The
condition

as we saw

was that

it

combined

stability

and

free free

political

action,

which was

the actualization of

dom,
was

was that one

be

property-holder,
stability.

and

the continuity of
of

family

property
respect

was one expression of social

The task

Parliament in this

to

preserve

the independence of propertied

estates and

thereby

assure the

possibility of a free constitution, its actuality depending as well on the requisite spirit. More generally, one could say that property provided for the needs of free men; once their needs were met they could act politically. On the other politically invisible, and they were the Government may or may not have been con majority ducted for their general good, but it was certainly transacted over their heads. Let us grant the validity of Bolingbroke's interpretation of seventeenth-century

hand,
vast

those

in bondage to

need were

of the population.

history and agree that the religious issue had been settled, if not by 1688, then by 1 7 14. Ceteris paribus, a return to mixed government was not a wholly unreasonable expectation. Certainly it was inconceivable, and not simply to
Bolingbroke,
Nor
changes

that

wealth

in the form

of

liquid

assets

could

ever

fulfill the

purpose of property. could

it do

so

within

mixed

regime.

However,

when

economic

liberated
of

increasing
enough

numbers of

the wealthy but minimally propertied

visibility.

members
would

the third estate,

they

attained political

This

of

itself

have been

to

disrupt the balance.

Strictly

speaking,

however, it

was not

the individual but his wealth that became visible. Thus politics were to
purpose of

be bent to the
new

parties"

activity had

was party. expired

accumulating wealth. The chosen instrument of this But according to Bolingbroke, the need for the "great with the religious issue. In fact, there is no constitutional As Professor Gunn recently
re

provision minded

for

parties within a mixed regime.

us,

If

parties were related to the

institutions

of mixed

government,

though

they

were

branches

of the

legislature

or orders

in the

state.

they came to look as If, on the other hand,

parties were

faithfully
were a

portrayed as

they

existed, it remained difficult to say convinc

government."

ingly

that

they

necessary

aspect of mixed

That is why the so-called court and country parties were described respec From the tively by Bolingbroke as a cabal and the true voice of the
nation.18

l7J. A. W. Gunn, "Influence, Parties

and

the

Constitution:

Changing Attitudes,

Historical Journal, 17 (1974), 305. Consider also his remarks in Factions No More, pp. 16, 95. Among the older works, only H. D. Fieldhouse, "Bolingbroke and the Idea of Non-Party Govern
ment,"

History, 23 (1938), 41-56, is

sensitive

to the problem, but he fails to account for it

satisfactorily.

''Mansfield convincingly argued, in a study of Burke, who was the first to present a compre hensive justification for it, that party government meant the rule of gentlemen in a popular, not

The Politics of Performance

perspective of a political actor within a mixed

257
parties were

regime,

little

more

than conspiracies to prevent

his

performance.
charges:
of

To
ization

summarize

Bolingbroke's

the

new corruption and

had
and

perverted

the purpose of politics

of

from the defense

means of

liberty
by

property

the actual

freedom

by

the splendid and admirable performances of

of

superior

men, to the accumulation

riches

means of the would

factious

plots of

mean-spirited and political order

cunning individuals. way that the the new interests

men

Any

remedy

have to

reestablish

in

such a

changes made

by

economic homogeniza-

tion of estates and

of wealth would

be leavened
This
was

by

distinc

tions to

which

splendid

were

by

nature entitled.

the task of

Bolingbroke's "patriot

prince,"

the original title of The Idea of a Patriot King.

The Patriot Prince

Unlike
tained

Machiavelli, Bolingbroke did

knew,"

not claim

that the Patriot

King
at

con

"everything he
much

theless, there is
and

concerning the "things of the in the Patriot King that alludes to topics treated
even
works.19

world."

Never

length

in detail in his

more occasional

The
his
of

significant

difference between
is that

the rhetoric of the Patriot

King

and that of

other political writings

history
and

was mined

for

examples guise of

illustrative

truths established

by

argument

did A

not

serve, in the

patriot

king

was a

king

tradition, as a separate source of meaning. and hence ordained of God. In Britain he was
people."

therefore, Bolingbroke remarked on the first page of the But as the British king was also an Patriot King, "appointed by the hereditary monarch, we are bound to wonder if there was any essential differ limited
monarch and

ence

between

sense there was none:

or not ascribed
institution"

hereditary and elective "They are sacred

to

monarchy.

In

one

decisive theoretical

alike,
or

and

this attribute is to be ascribed answer, the ends of their

them,

as

they

answer,

do

not

(P.A^.:i5). The

principles

by

which a

true or patriot

king

rules are

the same "whether he

comes

to the throne

by

immediate

electi

or remote

There is, in short, only

monarchies,

one

where men are

way to become king: not elected, families

the same

by

election, "for in

hereditary
inher
last first took

are."

Every

prince who

its the
it,"

crown

"comes to it
others added
tenure"

under

conditions under which electorate.

the

plus

any
the

hold

by

same

subsequently by the (P. K. -.32-33).

"The first

and the

mixed regime

(Statesmanship
akin to a

regime

is

more

Party Government, Chs. 6-9). To simplify somewhat, a popular democracy than to a mixed regime; it contains an aristocratic (or, as
and

Michels

pointed out

later,

an

oligarchic)

element,

but

one contained within an extraconstitutional

order rather than

being

a constituent part of

it.

was more systematic than occssionsl, assuming that The Idea of a Patriot King though this is s disputed point. That it is not as occasional as his writings that appeared first in

"We

are

controversy surrounding its publication suggests that Boling forced. For details, see Dickenson, Bolingbroke, pp. 290-94, and Frank T. Smallwood, "Bolingbroke versus Alexander Pope. The Publication of the Patriot Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, 65 (1974). 225-41periodicals

broke's hand

may be granted, was nudged, if

and the
not

King,"

258
The distinction between

Interpretation

elective and hereditary monarchy reflects the dis between theory and practice, or between nature and convention. Hered itary monarchy is a practical convention, a concession made necessary because of the instability of generation. It is true that heredity accords with "the very

tinction

nature"

constitution of our

as

saw, this was not a political principle but

beings born into families (P.K.:i6), yet, as we rather the natural basis for the general is introduced
indicated
as a principle of politics

society

of mankind.

When

heredity

it

necessarily becomes, by
convention. ciple of

the standards of that order, no more than a practical

earlier was

The

grandfather problem
when

inherent in the

prin

heredity; but

that principle

is

subordinated to

the political princi

ple

of

election,

problem

it disappears. Consider, for example, the specific practical that Bolingbroke most likely had in mind when writing the Patriot
actual

King. An
oath no

hereditary
were

monarch

had

violated the terms of

his

coronation

(whether these

the expressed terms or those

an appeal must
monarchies.

implied
to the

difference to Bolingbroke);
this might

be

made

by reason made founding princi

was

ples of all reasonable or

limited
most

Because the British monarchy

hereditary,

be his
be

expediently
this

attained

by directing

the attention of
of

the heir apparent and

constitution

noble contemporaries

toward the true meaning

the

(P.K.:4~5; H:304)- In

indirect way the

within

claims of a reasonable and

political order could monarchical regime.

made effective

a conventional

hereditary

Nevertheless it
in

was a compromise and

Bolingbroke knew

it to be

so.

Historical

experience

1688 and

17 14

confirmed

the vitality of the prin the

ciple of election as much as

the principle of
within

heredity,

whereas education of

heir

apparent meant

working

the limits

of convention.

Direct

recourse

might noted an

be had, however, to the

earlier, Bolingbroke's
state of nature.

natural or reasonable principle of election.

As in
to

original

families behaved toward

each other as

Hobbesian

To

obtain a patriot

king
in

without concessions

the conventions of
approximated.
sage:

heredity,

these

natural conditions would option

an all

Bolingbroke indicated this

.

have actually to be but neglected pas

"to

save or redeem a nation

than some great, some

which

extraordinary

from perdition, nothing less is necessary conjuncture of ill fortune, or of good, Various
"tumults"

may purge,

yet so as

by

fire."

as

Machiavelli

called

them

(Dis., F4), "may

beget

confusion"

universal
wicked

monarchy."

"but it may be the Either (P.K.:-]).

order of a

alternative

seemed

from which may arise order: tyranny, instead of the order of just to be "at the disposition of
fortune"

Tumults

and the

dangerous

and

stark alternatives

they

presented would
condi

sweep away the

to

convention or prejudice of

heredity

to reveal the natural

tions under which a new political order could be

founded

or an old one restored

its

proper principles.

Tumults

were

the natural end of corruption, dramatic

events to which a
fortune"

dramatic
task

response was required.

Meeting

this "disposition of
and

was the

of a single person

(cf. Dis., l:g): "He

he

alone can

The Politics of Performance

save a
patriot raised

259
of a

country

whose ruin

is

so

far

advanced"

(P.K.^-j). Thus has the idea

evocation.20

rightly been called an to the throne, "the panacea is

king

apocalyptic

As

soon

as

he is

not

from the guilt,

yet

miracle"

of this

"standing
submission

guilty, but

subjects will be delivered "if from the consequence, of their In short, the effects will be "love the honest, fear among the among (P.K.:3g). by
fall."
all"

applied."

His

One is

reminded

here

of

Machiavelli 's

own

apocalyptic

image

of

the
as

savior with a sword.

Bolingbroke followed his illustrious teacher into details

well, providing advice as to how the newly raised patriot

upon

king

should proceed

His argument, much more than s, was ad vanced in the spirit of a technician. First principles are known; they are plain and may be widely publicized; they accord with reason and hence with divine will (P.K..33; IF379). Thus, they need only be applied to fulfill all the require
reformation. ments of sound

his

Machiavelli'

policy, rationality,

and piety.

Resolution,
will

not

moderation, is

the chief virtue of a patriot

king.
of a patriot

Accordingly,

the first act

king
he

be "to

to call into the administration such the same principles on

the
which

men as

can assure

his court, and himself will serve on

purge

he intends to "perhaps

govern"

(P.K.:4i). Certain among

former

courtiers and ministers

justice,"

will

be

abandoned

by him;

not

to

party-fury but to
pay.
must

national

Clemency

makes

for

an

for they have injured their country and must amiable character, "but clemency, to be a virtue,
virtues."

have its bounds, like

with respect

other

Hence
too

a patriot

king

would exercise

clemency only too high to be

court.

to "a sort of
the

men

low to be

much

regarded,

and

neglected,"

quite

highborn incompetents
for the imperfections

who adorn
of

every
of

They heredity, yet

are no more than evidence

the principle

necessary for the maintenance of pageantry, "and this pageantry, (P. K. 42). like many other despicable things, ought not to be laid Granting the possibility that a patriot king may emerge either from tumults
or through conversion to an allegiance with

Bolingbroke's first principles, From his

analysis of

we

may
new

wonder what

kind

of regime

he

would establish.

the

corruption, two

aspects at

least

are

immediately

indicated. The first is that

of

a candidate

for

office would

"have

given proofs

before-hand

his patriotism,
general

as well as of

character"

his capacity, if he has either, sufficient to determine his (P. K. 43). Such people will be "of public virtue and real
patriotic men of principles of

capacity"

(P.K.:39),
with will

ability

called

to

power

in

order

to govern

in

accord

the first

the constitution.
parties

Second,
and

the regime of a patriot

king

be

without parties.

Where

divide

people

in

order to govern

them,
to to

the

patriot

king

"will

endeavour

to unite them,
at at

to

be himself the in in
his

centre of
order order

their

union:

govern

putting himself put himself will he his people, instead

of

the head of one party

the head

of

people

20Herbert M. Atherton, Political Prints in

Representation of Politics (Oxford,
1974),
p. PP-

the

141.

Age of Hogarth: A Study of the Ideographic 145; Archibald S. Foord, His Majesty's

Opposition,

1714-1830

(Oxford, 1964),

150.

260
govern,
or more

Interpretation
parties."

properly, to subdue

all

The true image

of a good

regime, "a free people, governed by a Patriot King, is that of a patriarchal family, where the head and all the members are united by one common interest,
spirit"

animated

by

one common

(P.K.:46-4j).

Upon broke's
might

statements such as those

patriotic

party

was

just quoted, it has been argued that Boling intended to be a final party. His regime, therefore, one-party regime. Moreover, it has become "one of that George III, a pupil of Bolingbroke's "pu

be

characterized as a of

the cliches
pils,"

English

history"21

tried to rule according to Bolingbroke's

another court cabal.
whose

teaching but

succeeded

only in

establishing
"political

It

was against

the cabal, or rather against the

school"

tracts supported it and whose inspiration was said to

wrote

have been Bolingbroke, that Burke

Present Discontents In terms
of

the Thoughts
of

on the

Cause of the
upon

the

history

ideas

and

their

influence

institutions,

this interpretation and the characterization derived from it are un

objectionable.

One might, however, add some further observations. We noted above that Bolingbroke found in history a confirmation
of

of the

"truths

reason"; in

discussing

the nature of

kingship

we saw there were

only

accidental or conventional

differences between

an elected and

hereditary

mon

arch;

and

in

discussing

the accession of a patriot

king, historical

contingencies

were proved capable of

those natural ones

creating conditions of election indistinguishable from described as obtaining at the origin of government. A regime

fortified ished

with

the guarantees of nature, reason, piety, and

historical tradition

would act with supreme self-confidence.

Ignorance

and

doubt had been ban

men adhere.

by

the brightness of first principles, to which all reasonable

need no

longer be cautious, for political order would be based upon truth, based, indeed, upon a few simple truths that may be learned by all but the exceedingly dim. The only conceivable disputes would concern faulty de
Rhetoric

ductions

of

policy from

principles.

them, men would "not only cease to do (P.K.:3ci), for only "public virtue and real that is, patriotic competence, would be rewarded. Spirit and industriousness exhaustively describe the personal qualities needed for political advancement
no corruption

Having

to tempt

evil, but learn to do

well"

capacity,"

under of

the

regime of a patriot

king. The

recognition of

ability is the

recognition

the actions of the

unique-in-the-

world person who actualizes

that ability.

Thus the

inadequacy

proper qualification and not their goods

obtain a place

recognizing wealth, particularly new wealth, as a visibility is overcome; henceforth individuals would be recognized. Nor is an ancient family sufficient to
for
political
council of a patriot

of

in the

king.

Family

is

akin to wealth
as a

in that it
person's

does

not

directly

express

the

worth of an

individual. Just

rich

21Sidney Jackman,

Man of Mercury,

p.

115. 5.

22Mansfield, Statesmanship and Party Government, Ch. Mercury, p. 141, and Pat Rogers, "Swift and Bolingbroke on 9, No. 2 (1969-70), 73-74.

But

see also

Jackman,

Man of

Faction,"

Journal of British Studies,

The Politics of Performance

wealth

261
so

is the

object of attraction and

he the
an

mere

possessor,

the

member of

an

The family united family by a common interest and moved by a common spirit. Strictly speaking, therefore, the patriarchal patriot king destroys nobility of family as an independent source
exemplar of
splendor.
patriot

ancient

and noble we

house is simply
governs after

king,

recall,

the image

of a patriarchal

of public political significance. and

The destruction of the political importance of demanded wealth, strictly family by Bolingbroke's theory, need not appear suddenly in practice. There is no necessity, for example, to exterminate the aristocracy or confiscate wealth, because wealth and the example of great
ancestors

may

well

inspire

admirable personal qualities to which the appropri

added

ate political spirit

may be

later.

Contrarily,

those who

rise

rapidly from
their per

low

estate

to political power or social prominence often bear

upon

sonal character

the vices of their parentage and mobility. Perhaps an

incompe
of

tent nobleman could

court.

have

a part

in the despicable but necessary pageantry

made

Several
gime.

comments

may be

Consider first the

sort of men who would govern.

than

nobility
may

or wealth are

to advise a

concerning Bolingbroke's intended re If men of ability rather patriot king, two things seem clear: On
and

the one
one

hand, they
anticipate

will owe

their position entirely to their own endeavors, and

the most rigorous competition

self-assertiveness;

on

the

other

hand, they
the

owe their position

entirely to the king's favor,

and one

may

anticipate
men of

utmost servility. prove

Only

through servility or civil service can the

ability
or of

their personal competence; only through

fierce

competition

can

the

competent show

their seriousness. The contradiction is resolved in the

of a patriot

person,

rather, in the idea

king

who combined combativeness on

behalf

his

subjects

with service

to them. In turn

they

confirmed

his

pre

eminence

by

their affection and obedience.

advised an

Machiavelli
while

innovator to
new spirit

maintain

infusing

the polity with a

existing institutions even (Dis.: F25), and Bolingbroke fol

lowed his forms

advice closely.

His

patriot

king

of government than restore the

apparently would do no more to the Gothic constitution. Yet Bolingbroke

that prosperity was not of

knew that

the economic changes were

and

irreversible,

itself to be despised,
seem that the

that the old regime

was gone.

In the end, it

would

substance of

the Gothic constitution, its stability of estates, was

model

less

essential
and

to Bolingbroke's

than

his belief in the

of which would

greatness of per

formance
patriot

the glory of recognition, both

be

ensured

by

the

king. If the priority of performance is kept in mind, there is no paradox involved in Bolingbroke's claim that the patriot king would both restore ancient introduce
new ones:

modes and orders and

king,"

"a

new people will

seem

to arise

with a new

a new people almost persuaded

"that they

are changed

into

different

beings"

(P.K.-.39). The novelty

of

the regime will appear wholly as a

result of the new spirit spread

by

the systematic and

ability,

which

would ensure

that only "simple

truths"

diligent activity of men of would be made public,

262
the
most obvious

Interpretation
"simple
truth"

or slogan

being

that the Gothic constitution

had

been

restored.

For Bolingbroke, the concerning the

train,"

essential purpose of politics was

to provide a stage

where great actors might receive

constitution of

their due. There

is, however,
the

the audience. Bolingbroke

some ambiguity distinguished between

of

the cunning man who

achieved

by

his "low
who

artifice"

flattery

his "merce
applause,

nary
and prefers
bought"

and

the true statesman

which

"thinks

of

fame

as well as of

that,

to be enjoyed must
was

be given, to that
a

(P.K..45). Bolingbroke
and

here adverting to

may be difference between

which

himself

Walpole. Walpole's politics,

which accorded recognition

to wealth,

ensured that a possessor of wealth would not

be

admired

for his

possessions and

for himself. His "left-handed

cunning"

wisdom called

would,

indeed,

oc

casion

anything but admiration for his person. Accordingly, Walpole's mer cenary train were greedy rather than competent. Bolingbroke's men of spirit, in contrast, would be admired for their personal and particular qualities, which
would shine politics

forth in their

splendid performances. sense

Walpole's

success meant

that

in Bolingbroke's
was a

had been destroyed. In the theatrical

who

image,

Walpole
patriot

lover

of

darkness

busied himself turning shabby

out

footlights. A
to its former

king, however,

would restore

the entire

playhouse

grandeur and allow a new season of patriotic performances

to begin.

Now,

we

have

argued

that the advisers of a

men

patriot

king

are serious and competent men of

ability.

Such

are

surely the best

ones to

action,

being

themselves moved

by

kindred

spirit.

judge the nobility of political Performances would be

held,

as

public.

it were, before theater critics rather than members of the general Bolingbroke's audience, therefore, were a natural aristocracy competent
to judge
arise.
and

enough

serious

enough

to take part in the

action

should

the

opportunity Upon one thing historians

mixture of great
and

of

Bolingbroke

and

his

age are agreed:

he

was a

insincerity. In the vocabulary used here, ability Bolingbroke himself was not a serious opponent of Walpole. Though his desire for recognition seemed bounded by no external virtues, perhaps within the
great

economy

of

his

"mercurial"

soul

his

much

discussed failure
man.

of nerve

was was

equivalent to moderation not a serious age. and

in the

soul of a

just

Then again,

perhaps

it

After all,
with

gentlemen

had

exchanged their swords

such as

for
no

canes

fought battles

books. A declared traitor

Bolingbroke

longer

lost his head, he lost his place in the Lords; a presumptive traitor such as Walpole was satirized, that is, he served as an occasion for the display of wit.

Perhaps, indeed,
was as

recognition received as

in the privacy

of salon or coffeehouse

satisfying

that gained in the theater of the world.

LABOR,

THE

STATE, AND AESTHETIC THEORY

IN THE WRITINGS OF SCHILLER

Philip J. Kain

University

of

California, Santa Cruz

also

This essay is be found in

attempt

concerned with other

Schiller, but it investigates

and

themes that can

of

writers, especially in Hegel

Marx. All

these

writers

labor

and

(and ultimately fail) to work out a particular ideal model for political institutions. This model was patterned after the ideal cultural Greece
and

conditions of ancient

based

upon modern aesthetic

concepts,

espe
model

cially the concept of a synthesis between sense and reason. It was a

designed to
This
and

overcome about

fragmentation for the

or alienation

in the

modern world of

that

had

been brought

by

the development of the division

complete

labor.

model calls

development
all
of

of

the individual's mental

physical

capacities.

Even in

labor,

the individual's powers and

capacities should

be

harmoniously
sort of

brought into

play.

The individual

should not

be

chained

to a

capacities are

activity in which only isolated powers and stunting developed. Labor should be transformed into an enjoyable activ
and

ity. Even the difference between labor

leisure

should

be

overcome.

principles and

Moreover, rational and sensuous capacities should be in harmony such that feeling, duty and inclination, are in agreement. Contrary to the views of Kant, inclination should spontaneously accord with duty.
The individual
should also

be nature,
control. overcome.

the state, or

be in unity with his object whether this object the product of labor. He should not be dominated, but in
the
split

Thus, for
would

example,

between
with

With the individual in control, have

a

state and society should be his faculties developed and in

harmony, he
Schiller

free,

contemplative

relationship to his

object

an

aesthetic relationship. sees the problems of the modern world

will argue elsewhere

them, but he fails. I

clearly and tries to solve that Hegel and Marx, following

Schiller, try
change

much

the

same approach
model.

to a

different
plays an

but ultimately give up the attempt and Despite the fact that this original model never
part

succeeds, it
of

important

in

and

thus can illuminate the development

and polit

late

eighteenth-

and

nineteenth-century thought concerning labor

ical institutions.

/ Schiller
a
asserts

that the

condition of modern man general

is

one of

fragmentation,
and

fragmentation that takes the

form

of a

separation

opposition

264
between
problem world. ancient

Interpretation
man's

intellectual

and sensuous

capacities.1

It is the

solution

to this

that constitutes the most pressing

search

and

fundamental

need of

the modern

Schiller begins his

for

a solution

by turning

to the culture of

Greece. There fragmentation had

of

not yet occurred.

"At that first fair

awakening

the powers of the mind, sense and intellect did not as yet rule

over strictly separate domains; for no dissension had as yet provoked them into frontiers."2 The age had not yet hostile partition and mutual demarcation of their arrived where we
potentialities."3

find "whole

classes of

men,

developing

but

one part of

their

The

ancient world was still a world of

unity; the

citizen was still

at

home with, in

control

of, his

state.

It had

not yet

become
with

alien.

The time had

not arrived where which are

the "governed cannot but receive

at

indifference the laws

to Schiller

scarcely, if
was

all, directed to them

ended

as

persons."4

What
was

it then that

this ideal harmony?

According

it

the development of the division of labor. As culture required more spe

concrete was

cialization, individual
whole. of men

life

was

sacrificed

to the abstract life of the

of

The individual

limited to

one

fragment

developed only a part of their the division of labor were: enjoyment

tion the

capacities.5

The

reality and whole classes most important results of

individual

no of

from labor6; in his occupa longer developed the harmony of his being, but merely
was separated

became the imprint

separated8;
and

his occupation7;

ranks and occupations were

rigorously
man's

the state became alien

(fremd)

to its

citizens.9

In general,

intellectual
on

and sensuous capacities were separated and each

began to

develop
has

its

own.

Schiller does brought

about.

recognize

certain

improvements that

this

separation

I do

not underrate the advantages which the

human

whole and weighed

in

the

balance

of

intellect,

can

today, boast in the face

race

considered as a
of what

is best

in the

ancient world.

measure

But it has to take up the challenge in serried ranks, and let whole itself against whole. What individual Modem could sally forth and engage,

man against man, with an

individual Athenian for the

prize of

humanity?10

be also found in F. Holderlin, Hyperion, trans. W. R. Trask Signet, 1965), p. 164; for the German see Samtliche Werke (Stuttgart: Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1958), III, 160-61. 2F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), p. 31; reference in all cases will also be made to Schillers Werke (SW) (Weimar: H. Bohlaus, 1962), XX, 321. 3Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322. "Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 37, and SW, XX, 324-25. 5Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322. 6Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 35, and SW, XX, 323.
view similar to this can

'A

(New York:

Tbid.

'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322-33. 'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 37, and SW, XX, 324. '"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322.

Labor,
An
antagonism

the

State,

and

Aesthetic
was

Theory

in Schiller

265
a progress

between faculties

the

in the development
was

of man's capacities could

only manner in which have been brought

a

about."

This In

the only way for the species to progress,

but the individual had to development

suffer.

the

long

run,

however,

this antagonism

brings

to each

faculty

that will eventually,

now on a

Schiller hopes, again result in a unity and harmony but higher level.12 His goal is to maintain the advantages of progress and

division

of

labor,

and at the same

world.13

time to regain the unity, spontaneity,

and

wholeness of

the ancient

// In his
artist.

consideration of naive

art, Schiller contrasts the

artist of art we

naive with

the sentimental
of

The

artist, the
and

the ancient world, is in actual possession

the ideal.

In him

in his

find

harmony

between

sense and

reason.14

He is

in unity with In the sentimental artist, the artist of the world, we no longer find unity except as an ideal to be realized. In the
still
nature.15

modern
modern

world,

man

can now express

himself only

as a moral unity,
and

i.e.,

spondence

between his
now

feeling

thought which

as striving after unity. The corre in his first condition actually took outside of

only ideally; it is no longer within him, but life.16 to be realized, no longer as a fact in his
place, exists

him,

as an

idea

Man
the

either possesses nature as

in the

ancient world or seeks

lost

nature as

in

modern.17

However,
infinite

the naive attains only a finite goal while the sentimental

strives

for

an

one.

Thus the be

sentimental

makes

for progress,

which

Schiller

says

is

preferable.18

The
of

goal

for Schiller
with

would

actual possession of the

unity

and

harmony
of

the naive together

the greatness of object and progress of the

s

sentimen-

"Schiller here follows Kant's "Idea for

Universsl

History."

On the influence
a

Ksnt's
I'ideal-

philosophy of history on Schiller see J. Tsminisux, La Nostalgie de la Grece isme allemand (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 25-32.

I'aube de

l:Schiller,
Ed.,
p. xiv.

Aesth. Ed.,
and

p.

41,

and

SW, XX,

326-27.

l3Wilkinson

Willoughby

make this point

in the introduction to

their edition of the

Aesth.

'"F. Schiller, Naive and Sentimental Poetry and On the Sublime, trans. J. A. Elias (New York: is patterned Ungar, 1966), p. in, and SW, XX, 436-37. Nietzsche's concept of the after Schiller's "naive"; see F. Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 43-45; for the German see Nietzsches Werke (Leipzig: Kroner, 1917), I,
"Apollinian"

32-33.

But Nietzsche
a

opposes

the view that Greece can be summed

up

under

just

one

the naive;

tension slresdy exists between two principles

the Apollinian and the

category like Dionysian.

''Schiller, N & S Poet., p. '"Schiller, N & S Poet.; p.

actual

104, ill,

and and

SW, XX, 431. SW, XX, 437. The

Hegel's

contrast

between the ideal

and

and the srt.

in

sentimental and

naive

art prefigures

categories of excelled

Romantic
plastic

Classical

Further, for Schiller,

imagination
p.
while

much

as

for Hegel, the Greeks

in the

arts

based

on the

the moderns excel

440.
p.
p.

in the
and and

poetic arts

that deal

with

ideals,

spirit; see

N & S Poet.,

115, andSVV,

XX,

''Schiller, N & S Poet., '"Schiller, N &S Poet.,

106, 113,

SW, XX, SW, XX,

432. 438.

266
tal.19

Interpretation
This
sort of synthesis would

be the

solution at the cultural

level to the

problem of

the

modern world. work out such

a synthesis.

In On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller attempts to Aesthetic education will reconcile the developed but

opposed

facul

ties

of

the individual. After the breakdown of the ancient world there arose two

opposed
pulses,20

drives. This
sense and

opposition must must

be

overcome.

Material

and

formal im beauty.

reason,

be

aufgehoben

into

third condition

If both impulses
of
each

are

in full

operation at

the same
a

time, then

the exclusiveness

will

be

cancelled.

Schiller

wants

reciprocal

action

between the

two drives
of the

such

that the

activity

of each reinforces yet sets achieves

limits to the activity

other,

and

in

which

each

its highest have

manifestation

precisely Letter
our

through the action of the

coordination.22

other.21

Here

we

reciprocal

subordination and

One

of

the

clearest examples of

this is given at the end of

14.

Schiller

says that

if

we embrace with passion someone who

deserves

contempt,

we

feel

pain at

the

compulsion of our nature.

When

we are

ill disposed

toward someone who comands our respect, we

our reason.

feel

pain over

the compulsion of

But

when someone

has

enlisted our affection and gained our respect,

person.23

all constraint

disappears

and we

love that

In the latter

case each

drive

aids

the other.

manifestation.

Far from interfering, Each becomes both an is

As

each

stimulates

the other to

its fullest

end and a means.

Here

actual possession

not opposed

to

striving

after

the

ideal; instead
or

the

two are reconciled.

within

long

as

we

confine

ourselves to

faculties

drives

the

individual,

we

can

simultaneously

then a synthesis occurs and the

say that if both drives are in full operation individual is in possession of drive is excluded,
a

beauty

aesthetic unity.

Since
the

neither

balance is

achieved

and made actual within

individual:

Each
and

of

these two primary

to

drives, from

the time it

is developed,

strives

inevitably,

according
will

its nature, towards satisfaction; but just because both

are necessary,

and yet strive toward opposite

ends, these two compulsions cancel each other out, and

.

the

maintains perfect

freedom between them

are active within

That is to say,

as soon as two

opposing fundamental drives

him, both lose

their compulsion, and the

opposition of the two necessities gives rise to freedom.2"

In the Aesthetic Education this tension

come.

and opposition seem

to be over

However,

as soon

as we

consider

Schiller's treatment

of the sublime

(which he ignores for the

reappears.

most part

in the Aesthetic

Education2-),

the tension

"Schiller, 20Schiller, 2lSchiller, 22Schiller, 23Schiller, 24Schiller,

N & S Poet., pp. 113, 175, and SW, XX, 439, 491. Aesth. Ed., pp. 79-81, and SW, XX, 344-46. Aesth. Ed., p. 95, and SW, XX, 352. Aesth. Ed.,
p.

8sn,
97,

Aesth. Ed., Aesth. Ed.,

p.

pp.

SW, XX, 347-48n. SW, XX, 354. 135-37, and SW, XX, 371-73.
and
and
beauty"

25R. D. Miller in his Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), p. 115, feels, he is not sure, that "energizing in the sixteenth and seventeenth Letters may be a disguised form of the sublime. W. Bohm in his Schillers Briefe uber dsthetische des

Erziehung

Labor,

the

State,

and

Aesthetic
Schiller

Theory

in Schiller
beautiful

267
with

In his essay, "On the

sublime.

Sublime,"

compares the
and reason.

the

Beauty

implies the unity

of sense

The

sublime

is the

opposition, the contradiction, of sense and

over

reason.26

It is the superiority

of reason

nature, reason's independence from the sensuous world, the

assertion of

the individual's

freedom in the face

of external of
beauty.27

says,

must

disappear before the ideal

force. The sublime, Schiller But on the other hand beauty

destiny.28

alone would never allow us

within

to discover our higher

Beauty
is

is freedom for the is

nature; the sublime

is freedom first

above nature.

Beauty

valuable
man.29

human

being;

the sublime is valuable for the pure daemon in

Beauty

associated with more

childhood,

our

and earliest

development. But

when we are

mature we must apprehend

the sublime

by

means of

reason.30

In these

passages rational

Schiller

prefigures

Hegel. The

aesthetic

is the human ideal, but the

not

is higher. But

unlike

Hegel, Schiller does try, if

modern world.

to reconcile, at
not choose

least to
the
ideals.31

make compatible
over

both ideals for the

as

He does

rational

the

aesthetic

Hegel

will.

Man

must

be

guided

by

both

Aesthetic unity leads to

as

and aids

the rational,

and

the rational takes

reconcile

place within a condition of aesthetic unity.

But this is

not

to

the two.

It is to leave them Although the

two

ideals.32

sublime
which

is

largely

ignored in the Aesthetic Education, there

is

one passage

in

Schiller

mentions

it. He

says

that

man must
''Noble"

"learn to
another aes

desire nobly, so that he may not need to will term that denotes the aesthetic condition. Thus Schiller
higher."34

sublimely."'3

is

appears to

favor

thetic morality over the morality of the sublime even though in a

says

footnote he
of the

that we

rate

the

sublime

"incomparably

This treatment

tension between the

noble and

the sublime, though very

brief, is

much

like that

except that in the Aesthetic Education Schiller in the essay "On the does not try to make the two compatible; rather he seems to choose the aes

Sublime,"

thetic (or the noble)

over

the

sublime.

Menschen (Halle/Salle: Niemeyer, 1927), sublime. Even if energizing beauty were

sufficient

pp.

15-17, 189,

argues

that energizing

beauty

is

not

the

relsted

to the sublime, Schiller does not deal with it in the tension between the beautiful and the

detail in the Aesthetic Education. To

we must turn

explore

sublime,

to the essay "On the

p.

Sublime."

26Schiller, On Subl.,
"Ibid. There
between the

199.

and

SW, XXI,

43grace and

exists a similar tension

between

dignity. Grace

requires a

harmony

moral and physical natures.

This is incompatible
with acts

with

dignity,

which requires opposi

tion and struggle between the two. Grace has to do

with a

in the

sphere of

human nsture,
and

dignity
and

F. Schiller, "On Grace and Philosophical in Schiller's Works (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1879),

Dignity,"

higher,

nobler

sphere;

see

in Essays Aesthetical
220-21,

pp.

SW, XX,

297-99.

28Schiller, On Subl., "Schiller, On Subl., "Schiller, On Subl., ''Schiller, On Subl.,

"Even Wilkinson

p.

199,

p.

210, and

pp. pp.

SW, XXI, 43SW, XXI, 52. 202-03, and SW, XXI, 210-11, and SW, XXI,
and

46.
52-53.

and

Willoughby, strong
p.
p.

proponents of

the unity of the Aesthetic

see

admit that the beautiful and the sublime are two

different ideals;

Education, Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. lix.

"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., 34Schiller, Aesth. Ed.,

169, and

i67n,

and

SW, XX, 388. SW, XX, 387^

268

Interpretation

Only beauty
pushing
sublime

is

an

aesthetic

synthesis

of sense and

reason, and only

by

aside

the

sublime

do

we

securely

preserve

the aesthetic condition.

The

toward

is the very opposite a moral ideal. There is

a a

striving away from the sensuous or natural wavering and a tension in Schiller's thought at

this level. As soon as the sublime

and

is

considered we whether

find

a tension

between it

beauty. Schiller
to choose

seems

undecided

to

try

to make the two com

patible or

beauty

over

the

sublime.

///

At the
argues

economic

level Schiller's
of

concern

is

with

labor
from

and classes.

He

that the

division

labor

separates

enjoyment

labor,

separates

ranks and not

occupations,
the

and makes

the individual's

occupation such

that he

does

develop

harmony
if

of

his

being
to

in

it.35

Reconciliation

will never occur

in the

modern world

man continues

be

confined

by

this sort of

fragmenting

activity.

An

animal

works, Schiller says,

when

the stimulus to

its activity is need,

life.36
play.37

but it

plays when the stimulus goal

is

sheer

plenitude, the

superabundance of

Schiller's

is to transform labor
seen most

and to make

it

more

like

This ideal is
ennoblement.

clearly in Schiller's discussion of recreation and Recreation is understood as a transition from an intense state to a for
man.38

state

that is

natural

It is

a condition utterance

in

which

there

would

be "an

unlimited our

capacity for every human powers with equal freedom is

an

...

the

ability

to experience all

powers

intense condition, between the

man and

and

any separation and isolation of these the ideal of recreation is the restoration of The
result

our whole nature after one-sided product of accord

tensions."39

is that

"Beauty is

the

mind and

the senses; it addresses itself at once

perceived and appreciated
freely."*'

to

all

the faculties of

can, therefore, be
all

under

the condition that

he employ

his

powers

fully
of

and

only It is im

portant to notice

that the

goal of recreation

is

not rest or cessation of activity.

The

goal of ennoblement

is the development

the

moral

individual, but

not abstractly.

Ennoblement
is

must

involve

activity.

These

are the goals. on

mind of most men

But the existing conditions are different. "The state of the one hand intensive and exhausting labor, on the
33-35,
and and

"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., 36Schiller, Aesth. Ed.,

pp. p.

207,

SW, XX, 321-22. SW, XX, 406.

"Schiller generally follows Kant's aesthetics, but not when considering labor. For Kant srt and play are directly opposed to work; see I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1966), p. 146, snd for the German see Kant's gesammelte Schriften (KGS) (Berlin:
G.
of the division of labor in general its drawbacks; see I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. T. K. Abbott (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), p. 4, and KGS,

Reimer,

1913),

V,

305.

Kant

also

thinks the development

beneficial. He does

not seem

to appreciate

IV,

388.

38Schiller, 39Schiller, ""Schiller,

N & S Poet., N & S Poet.,

N & S

p.
p.

169,

and

170, 171,

and
and

Poet.,

p.

SW, XX, SW, XX, SW, XX,

486. 486. 487.

Labor,
other

the

State,

and

Aesthetic

Theory

in Schiller

269
no

enervating position to formulate the He

would

indulgence."41

Thus the

man of

action, the
would make

laborer, is in
it too
cessation

goal of recreation suit

for he

physical.42

formulate it to Neither be
are

his

own

needs,

i.e.,
such

rest, calm,

of

activity.43

the contemplative classes in a position to formulate the

goal

of ennoblement. able

They

would

formulate it

that the man of action

life.44

would never

to realize it in the course of

men

daily
and

Since

men as

they
be

formulate these goals, changed. We need a qualitatively

exist are unfit

to

their conditions

must

new class

of men

which, without
without possible

toiling (arbeiten)
and

are active

(thdtig)
itself

and capable of

formulating
life
with

ideals

fanaticism;
limitations

a class that unites within

all the realities of

of events without

its least its

is borne

by

the

current

becoming
that

victim.

Only

such a class can preserve

the

beautiful unity

of

human

nature

is destroyed for the

of such

moment

by

any

particular

task

(Arbeit),

and

continuously

by

life

toil

(arbeitendes)
a negative

Arbeit is
overcome.

term here.
condition

The desirable
mean?

Work, toil, and exhausting labor are to be (Tdtigkeit). is denoted by the term
"activity"

What does this

Is activity

opposed to or

labor in the

sense that

it

means

the

exclusion or avoidance of

labor,

is it to be

understood as

the ideal form of

and

labor, labor
developing?
of

remade, qualitatively transformed into something enjoyable

the other

Further, is the "new class of two classes that includes all men,
characteristics of the other

men"

to be understood as a synthesis

or

is it

a small elite

that merely
most

combines
men?

certain

two classes but excludes

order

If

all men are

to be included in the new class, then in

will

to include the

laboring

class,

all

labor

have to be transformed. On the

other

hand, if

the

is only a small elite, then it will not be necessary that they labor; labor will be dropped, left to the laboring class, and the new class will be active in some other sense. Schiller's ideal, I shall argue, is to include all men
new class and

to

remake can

labor into

activity.

Nevertheless Schiller is
thus in fact ends up

unable

to explain
elite.46

how this
The
not to

be

accomplished and

with a small

goal

for both

classes

is

to

be

active.

The

goal of

the

laboring
to

class

is

be

rest or cessation of activity.

Neither

class can

be

permitted

formulate

the goal because the goal must fit both classes. The contemplative class espe

cially cannot be permitted to formulate the goal because the other class would life.47 Labor must be not be able to realize it in the tempestuous course of daily
remade

into

activity.

"'Schiller, "2Schiller, "'Schiller, ""Schiller,

45Ibid.

N & S Poet.,
N & S Poet.,

p.

170, 174, 170,

and
and

p.
p. p.

N & S Poet.,
N & S Poet.,

and
and

174,

SW, SW, SW, SW,

XX, XX, XX, XX,

487490.

486-87. 490.

"1 differ here from Lukacs who holds thst for Schiller it is not s the "new is an elite that avoids labor; actually his very ideal that His Age, trans. R. Anchor (London: Merlin, 1968), pp. 134-35.
class"

regrettable

fact but

rather

is

see

G. Lukscs, Goethe

and

47Schiller, N & S Poet.,

p.

174,

and

SW, XX,

490.

270
Labor in the

Interpretation
ancient world was a

ity, but

after

the development of

satisfying the division of

the means

and

developing

form

of activ

labor,
effort

Enjoyment
reward.

was

divorced from
chained

labour,

from the end, the

of

from the

Everlastingly

to a little fragment

the whole,

man

develops into

ear the monotonous sound of the wheel that nothing but a fragment; everlastingly in his he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of putting the stamp of

humanity

upon

his nature, he becomes the imprint

of

his

occupation

or

of

his

knowledge.48

specialized

This is the fundamental

overcome.

problem

of

the modern world,

the problem to be

But how is this to be done? Schiller says,

any
nature which possesses

In

general we call noble manner of

the gift of

transforming purely by

its

handling it,

even

the most

trifling

occupation, or the most petty objects

into something infinite. We call that form noble which impresses the stamp of autonomy upon anything which by its nature merely serves some purpose (is a mere means). A
noble nature

is

not content

to

be itself free; it

must set

free everything

around

it,

even

the

lifeless.49

The
the

emphasis

here is

on

transformation, The

qualitative

improvement,

and not on

exclusion or avoidance of

the sorts of activities that are means.

noble nature makes

But how
him That

successful

is this

explanation?

free"; he
in

"anything."

can transform

Would this include

"everything factory work?

around

seems rather

much greater

the character

doubtful. At any rate Schiller would have to go into the problem detail. Change in the quality of work stems completely from of the individual due to his aesthetic education, his wholeness,

spontaneity,
work.

and unity.

Nothing
the

is

said of change

in the

actual conditions of own character

If the only thing the individual has to rely

upon

is his

he

could

hardly

expect to make

those who must work

alone

in the

factory situation factory seem to be

satisfying
excluded.

or enjoyable.

Thus,
which seems

The ideal in
activity"50

leads to enjoyment, and enjoyment alone to "activity possible only for a few, and they will have to avoid labor. Schiller does not really expect anything more for his "new class of He tells us that he offers this concept "only as an which he "by no
idea,"

men."

means

from the ideal: furrow the

of

"'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 35, "they [the Greeks]

cheeks of mortals
. .

and

SW, XX,

323.

There is

a pssssge

thst

seems

to exclude work

transferred to Olympus

what was meant to

be

realized on earth

they banished from

the brow of the

blessed Gods all the earnestness and effort (Arbeit) which freed those ever contented beings from the bonds inseparable
and made

from any purpose, every duty, every care,

idleness

snd

indifferency

the

enviable portion

for the freest, most sublime state of Aesth. Ed., p. 109, and SW, XX, 359-60. But Schiller is not suggesting the exclusion of any activity or effort. The condition of the gods is not achieved by excluding anything, but by including everything. Their appearance is a synthesis of repose and activity. Thus if labor could be transformed into activity for men, the condition of the gods could be realized on earth. merely
a more sublime name

divinity

being,"

"'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., "Schiller, Aesth. Ed.,

p.
p.

16711,

and

191, and SW,

SW, XX, 386n. XX, 398.

Labor,

the

State,
a

and

Aesthetic

Theory

in Schiller

271

wish[es] to have taken as

fact."51

This is to
an

admit

that the aesthetic ideal has

failed to become actual; it

possessed

remains

it is

reduced to a
ideal.52

himself said, have

not

a moral

cannot actually be merely goal to be striven after; it becomes, as Schiller Striving after me ideal and actual possession of it
as

ideal. Since it

been

reconciled

here

they

seemed

to be for a moment at the level of

individual faculties in the Aesthetic

an aesthetic

Education."

Thus Schiller

slips

to a moral or rational model.

Only

for

a small elite

away from is it to be the activity

case that
separated

there will

be

no contemplation

divorced from activity,

and no

from

contemplation.

himself from the himself he

nature on

Freedom is achieved, Schiller argues, only when man is able to distance world such that he is free to contemplate it. To distance
must see

to

it that

nature no

longer dominates him. Man

be
active upon matter.

must make

his object; he
gives

must

form it. He

must

If he

works

it form, it can no longer rule him as a force.54 Thus man must be active, but in such a way that at the same time he is free to contemplate his object as well as his own activity. Here sense and reason (activity and contem

it,

plation)

would

be in harmony.
would

The ideal
activity. would

be to

overcome the split

able

between

mental

and physical

If, besides, Schiller had been

meant

to transform labor

into activity, this

have

that he

would

be

able

to overcome the split between labor

and

leisure. He
we

objects to this split strongly:

True,

dictate the limits

assigned to above

know that the outstanding individual will never let the limits of his occupation of his activity. But a mediocre talent will consume in the office

him the

whole of

his

meagre sum of

powers, and a

man

has to have

a mind

the ordinary

if,

without

detriment to his calling, he is

still

to have time for the

chosen pursuits of state

if

man's

his leisure. Moreover, it is rarely a recommendation in the eyes of the powers exceed the tasks he is set, or if the higher needs of man
office.55

constitute a rival

to the duties of his

objection

Notice that Schiller's

to the rigid

separation of

labor

and

leisure is

not

just in

the interest of a small talented class

who are not so talented. will not

But

until

but especially for the vast numbers labor is transformed into activity this split

be

overcome.
would

What

be

required

to transform labor

(Arbeit) into activity

(Tatig-

keii)l As Schiller himself

"Schiller, N & S Poet., XX,
412.
p.

says

it
and

would

require overcoming the division of

491.

175,

SW, XX,

See

also

Aesth. Ed.,

p.

219,

and

SW,

,;Schiller, N & S Poet.,

53See
sbove,
section

p.

ill,

snd

SW, XX,

437.

II.
p.

5"Schiller,

Aesth. Ed.,

185,

snd

SW, XX,
See little

395.

35Aesth. Ed., p. 37, Schiller says, "The germ deprives

rejected.
man of
exertion."

and

SW, XX,

324.

also

Aesth. Ed.,
to

p.

191,

and

SW, XX, 398,

in her

where

of

beauty is

as

likely

develop

where nature

niggardliness

Both

total

as where in her bounty she relieves him of any any quickening refreshment, lack of exertion (total leisure) and total lack of refreshment (total toil) sre

272
labor
of
and

Interpretation

its

fragmenting
a

effects.

There

are two
a

important forms

of

the

division

labor. The first is

which

hierarchical division,
a

division according to

classes or

castes,

usually includes
overcome

division between

mental and physical activity.

Schiller failed to
reconcile sion of

this aspect of the division of

and the

labor

when

he failed to
of

the

contemplative

laboring
work

classes.

The

second

form

divi

labor takes
a

place within

the

that

any

class or caste might perform.

There is
suggests

division

of

jobs, tasks,

occupations, and functions.

Schiller

never

doing

Marx's

away it is to leave the different functions is

not

with

these differences. His ideal seems to be much

as

like

they

stand

but to
of

see

to it that
whole,"56

the individual

"everlastingly
of

chained

to a single

fragment

the

i.e.,

to merely one function. One

overcomes specialization

by

individual to
complished?

aesthetic

perform a variety Schiller's only answer is that the individual must be education, that he learn to develop all of his powers and

different functions. How

could

permitting the this be ac

given an

capacities

harmoniously
limited to
ground of one

something the individual is unable to do when his activity is narrow occupation. The aesthetic condition, for Schiller, is the
and and all

the possibility of all human functions free to open, develop to the fullest all our powers disposed to all of them because they are us equally

activities57; it leaves us capacities,

and

it leaves

in harmony. It

reconciles

thought and activity and frees us for both. Schiller thinks that this subjective
change on

the part of the

individual
But

would again

be
this

enough to overcome
will

the

frag
who

menting are not involved in labor.

effects of specialization.

only

work

for

few

IV In the Aesthetic Education, Schiller's

alien character of

political

goal

is to

overcome

the

the modern state, to make it more like the ancient Greek state
of

before the development

to

the division of labor. In the ancient state, according

Schiller,
of

the spontaneous
whole.58

free

participation

of

individuals determined dominates

and excludes

the

form

the

In the is to

modern world

the state

the

individual.59

The

goal

overcome this split

society.60

between the

state and the

individ

ual,

or

between

state and

To
with

accomplish

this,

says

Schiller,
man

the individual must harmonize himself

universal.

the

ideal

man.

The ideal

is the species, the

This ideal is
represented

represented

by

the state. In the state the

p.

diversity

of

individuals is

"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., "Schiller, Aesth. Ed., 58Schiller, Aesth. Ed., 59Schiller, Aesth. Ed.,
^This
also

is the

SW, XX, 323. SW, XX, 379-80. p. 35, and SW, XX, 323. p. 37, and SW, XX, 324. view of R. Leroux, "Schiller theoricien de
35,
and
pp.

151-53. and

l'etat,"

Schiller to Humboldt. Both argue for the for the individual. But Humboldt maintains the duality between state Schiller the state is to be reabsorbed within society.
23. compares

(1938),

Leroux

greatest possible
and

Revue Germanique, 28 freedom

society,
whereas

for

Labor,
as a
unity.61

the

State,

and

Aesthetic

Theory

in Schiller

273

In

other

words, in the

modern state after

the development of the

division

of

labor
sum

and specialization you cannot of

harmonious

all

powers

and

find universality, wholeness, the capacities, in any individual, but only

in the
state.

collectively in the
compare

aggregate of

individuals,

Schiller

says

that if

we

the

modern state as a whole

we compare

to the Greek state, the

modern

rivals the

Greek. But if
modern

the modern

individual

to the

individual Greek, the inner

wholeness and

is

fragment.62

The

problem again

is

with

the

individual, his lack

of

harmony,

and

the solution offered is again to remake the individual. Aesthetic

of

education, the development of all the powers and capacities the spontaneity and
tion

the

individual,
because the

harmony

of sense and

reason,
will

will

bring

about reconcilia

between

man and state.

The individual
a

become the
in his

state63

individual

will no

longer be

fragment,

restricted

capacities and out

looks, incapable
the whole.
at

of

dealing
new

with

the general, universal, and varied concerns of

wholeness will no

Given this
of

individual,
also

longer be found solely

general and

the

level

the state; wholeness, the capacity of

will

determining

universal conditions

concerns,

belong
The

to individuals.

Given these developed

it is Schiller's
individuals'

view

that the state can now simply

state will
right.64

the representative, of the citizen. tion of the

and

only

provide and

be the interpreter, a clearer formula

the
general

sense of what

is

Duty
in

inclination,
man will

the

particular

interest,
will

will

be in harmony. Subjective
as an end

be

ennobled

to

objectivity.65

Man

be honored
and

himself.66

There

will

be

agree

ment

between the individual important to

about

the state because the state will the individual.

be determined

by

the individual. The

state will reflect note

It is
account
men

also

that for Schiller the state cannot on its own

bring

this harmony.
and

Instead, inner harmony

will

must

be

created state.

in

as

individuals

this in turn

be

reflected

in the ideal
man

No

reform will work and

in

politics until the

division in the inner

is healed. Sense

reason,
first.67

duty

and

inclination,

must

be

reconciled

through aesthetic educa

tion

In Letter 27 of the Aesthetic Education, Schiller speaks of three types of states. In the Natural or Dynamic state each man encounters others as a force.

Only

in this way is activity

will.

restricted and order

kept. Nature

curbs nature.

In

the Ethical or Rational that fetter their

state men

have duties;

men are opposed

by

rational

laws

The individual is

subjected

to the general will. In the

Aesthetic

state men confront each other as objects of

free

play.

The

will of

the

6lSchiller, "Schiller, "Schiller, "Schiller, "Schiller,

Aesth. Ed., Aesth. Ed., Aesth. Ed., Aesth. Ed.,

Aesth.

pp. p. p.

17-19, and
and and

SW, XX,
322.
316.

316.

33, 19,

p.
p.

21, and

Ed., "Schiller, Aesth. Ed., "Schiller, Aesth. Ed.,

21,
25,

and and and

SW, XX, SW, XX, SW, XX, SW, XX, SW, XX, SW, XX,

318.
318.

p.
p.

319.
328.

45.

274
whole need

Interpretation
is
carried out man

through the nature of the

society.

individual.68

In the Natural

state

drives

into

In the Rational

state

reason

implants him

social

principles

in him. In the Aesthetic state, the

ideal, beauty

gives

a social

character.69

Perhaps the relationship among these three sorts of states can be explained further in the following way. We might say that Kant had explained how society passes historically from the Natural state to the Rational state and then that Schiller explains how society can move beyond the Rational to the Aes
thetic state. Let us begin with Kant. In
attempted

his "Idea for

For

Universal

History"

he

to

reconcile nature and reason.

Kant,

we must assume

that nature

as a whole
natural

antagonism

is purposive, that reason is its goal. Society is developed through (what Kant calls man's unsocial sociability). This natural
man

antagonism raises powers and

from his Man is

slumber

and causes

him to

develop

all

his
and

capacities.

propelled

by

vainglory, lust for power,

avarice, but in time he

can come would

to be determined

by

reason.

Conflict itself

leads

men

to what

reason

have

commanded

from the beginning. A

changed

society

of men

driven together
a

by

natural need will on practical

eventually be
principles.70

into

a moral

whole, into

society based society

of
all powers

Society
society

moves

toward this end, toward a

the greatest

freedom,

the greatest morality,

can reach

the fullest development of

and capacities.

How

this end for Kant? He says that man must produce for himself anything that
goes

beyond the

mechanical

ordering

of

his

animal existence.
reason.71

Man

creates

for
We

himself his

own perfection

through his own

whole of

Kant

argues

that we must
reason.

assume a purposiveness must view

in the

nature,

i.e.,
with

that its goal is

history

as

if it

were purposive.
end.72

And

this assumption our intel

ligent activity can hasten the Thus as Schiller would express it, in the course of history social principles (reason) will replace natural impulse (need) as the basis of society. But Schil ler's
view of

the goal

of

principles are not enough.

ter, the Aesthetic

and
not

state.73

history goes a step beyond Kant's. Rational social History for Schiller must move on to social charac Inclination and duty, feeling and the moral law, nature
character means that the whole man,
with

reason,

must

be in harmony. Social

just his

rational

part, has been reconciled

the general concerns of the

""Schiller, Aesth. Ed.,

""Ibid.
70I. Kant, "Idea for
a

p.

215,

and

SW, XX,

410.

Universal
and

History"

in On History,

ed.

L. W. Beck (New York:

Bobbs-

Merrill, 1963),

pp.

15, 18,
Hist.,'

"Kant, 72Kant,
nism

"Univ. "Univ.

Hist.,"

KGS, VIII, 20-21, 24. pp. 13-14, and KGS, VIII, p. 22, and KGS, VIII, 27.
Kant's
this
notion of the
of

19-20.

"Schiller's connecting
(and the
of ancient

of

development

of

human

powers through antago

ultimate rational
as

direction

this

development)

with an aesthetic condition

like that

development is already prefigured by J. G. Herder, Reflections on the History of Mankind, trans. F. E. Manuel (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 82-87, 96-99; for the German see Sdmtliche Werke (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), XIV, 207-14, 225-28.
of

Greece

the goal

Labor,
whole.

the

State,

and

Aesthetic

Theory

in Schiller

275

Man's

relation

to man must not be coerced

the Aesthetic state the

state.

individual is

coerced neither

There is

no

longer

an opposition

by either nature or law. In by other men nor by the between duty and inclination, between
Dignity,"

man and

the state.
other

On the

hand, in

an earlier

essay, "On Grace

and

Schiller
consid

presents a political model ered.

that is different
state

from the

one we

have just

In this essay the ideal

will of one

is

monarchy

where all goes

(rational)
he

man, but where

each citizen could persuade

according to the himself that

governs and obeys

his

own

inclination.74

Here there is indeed

harmony

and

agreement

between

sense
as

(inclination

of

the citizens) and reason (the state), but

not of

the same sort

in the Aesthetic Education. In the Aesthetic Education

the state merely reflects,

individual is the
state

source of the

is merely the interpreter of the individual's will; the determination. In "On Grace and the
Dignity"

is the

source of the

determination;

sense and reason are not equals. nevertheless

can still

Sense
to

has been brought to

reason.

agree with

reason, but

it is

still subordinate

There is

no true synthesis

here. This

be

called a

Rational

state.

Even though

sense

is

not

forcefully

suppressed

by

reason, nevertheless

reason

Kantian morality than in the Aesthetic Education. Here the difference between man and state, state and
primary.

is

Schiller here is

still much closer to the

society has not been overcome. Which then is the goal? We can safely say that Schiller's mature thought is to be found in the Aesthetic Education where the
goal

is the Aesthetic

state.

However,

we might still state.

ask what

it is that

will

move us on

from the Rational to the Aesthetic

education of

the aesthetic

Schiller's only answer is the individual. It is true that such individuals would
itself to be actually best bring about the
change not would
with

bring

about

the possibility of an agreement between the individual and the

would

state, but

what

further

cause the

state

to

allow

determined Rational

by

the individual? Aesthetic education

of

would at

state

"On Grace
about

and

Dignity";

some

further does

be

necessary to

bring

the Aesthetic state. Schiller

deal

this.

His only solution is merely to change the subjective character of the individual; he does not speak of how to change the objective character of the state except

say that with these new individuals the change will follow through historical development. But further, Schiller is even pessimistic about changing the char acter of the individual. Where is the Aesthetic state to be found? Schiller's
to
answer

is that it is to be found only in

individuals:
a

few

chosen

circles, in the

hearts

of a

few

rare

But does

State

of such

Aesthetic Semblance really

exist?

And if so,

where

is it to

be found? As
to find
cles.
.

a need,

it

exists

it, like
75

the pure

in every finely tuned soul; as a realized fact, we are likely Church and the pure Republic, only in some few chosen cir

74Schiller, "Grace and "Schiller, Aesth. Ed.,

Dignity,"

pp.
p.

200-01,

and

SW, XX,

278-79.

219,

and

SW, XX,

412.

276
Thus the Aesthetic
state

Interpretation
becomes merely an ideal to be striven after, a moral Schiller himself put it. We will have to wait till the end of history. It
an

ideal,
is
a

as

wish,

impossibility in

the

modern

world.

This is

a moral or rational

model.

If the Aesthetic

state cannot

be

made actual

then there

is

no alternative

but to slip back Some critics

pears at all

to the Rational state.

maintain

that this sort of tension between two models

argues that

levels

of

Schiller's thought. Hans Lutz

one

reap Schiller through

(or rational)
or rational

out

his

writings

has two ideals

aesthetic, the other

confuses.

moral

which model

he continually wavers between and (influenced by the Kantian opposition

as

The

moral

of sense and

reason), Lutz charac

terizes

a three-stage

view,

progression

through three stages:

Nature

Taste Nature

Reason. The
Reason

aesthetic model,

Lutz

characterizes as a synthesis model:

Synthesis

(Beauty).76

The

clearest example of the three-stage view can

Manners,"

be found in Schiller's

where Schiller is still quite essay "On the Moral Utility of Aesthetic close to the Kantian morality. Normally, Schiller says, morality appears greater,
or at

least

more

in relief,

when

in the face

of powerful

the

individual

obeys reason.

In

such a case

it is

clear that

instincts to the contrary the individual does

This involves
conflict

the act because it is moral, not because it is

agreeable.77

between

sense and

reason, inclination
says

and

duty. The

rational and

the sensuous

man are at odds.

would

Thus,

Schiller,

whatever could moderate

this opposition

help

morality.78

inclination But taste

and

bring

And it is precisely beauty or taste that can moderate it into accord with reason. The feelings place themselves
law.79

on the same side as the moral

can never suffice

The individual has

an

inclination to duty.
can never

to make an action moral.

own.80

Morality

have
for

any

other

foundation than its Taste

to the commands of reason.

Taste is only Reason is the goal Reason.

Dignity"

a means of or end

removing here just as it

obstacles was

Kant. This is Nature

In Schiller's essay "On Grace

aesthetic model. ness of the abandon

and go even

we can

find

an example of

the

Here the

goal

is to

further in overcoming the harsh

security
that taste can to a certain
extent make

Kantian

morality.

Here the
In

noble soul can with a certain

itself to The

inclination.81

other words

an action moral. are equals.

make

Sense

and reason are

in

entire character

is

moral.

harmony here in the sense Here beauty is not merely a

and reason are

they

means to

nature

conform to reason.

Nature
von

equals

and

thus the

76H. Lutz, Schillers Anschauungen

[Berlin: 1928]),
pp.

Kultur

und

Natur (Germanische Studien, Vol. 60

170-72, 187, 197, 205.

"Schiller,
pp.

"The Moral

Utility of Aesthetic
28-29.
p.

Manners,"

in Essays Aesthetical and Philosophical,

126-27,

and

SW, XXI,
"Mor. "Mor.

78Schiller, "Schiller, 80Schiller, "'Schiller,

Util.,"

129, 132, 126,

snd snd and p.

Util.,"

p.
Util.,"

SW, XXI, SW, XXI,

30. 34.

"Mor. "Grace

p.

and

Dignity,"

SW, XXI, 28. 209, and SW, XX,

pp. 5-6.

287.

On the development

of

Schiller's

ethical views see

Leroux, "Schiller

theoricien,"

Labor,
synthesis of
secondary.

the

State,

and

Aesthetic

Theory
no

in Schiller

277
and nature

the

two, beauty, is the

is

end.

Reason is

longer primary

But the
and

synthesis model

not maintained

throughout the essay "On Grace

Dignity."

The

monarchical political model

just discussed is
model,

much closer

to

Nature
model

Taste

Reason than it is to the

synthesis

whereas

the

political

in the Aesthetic Education is clearly the synthesis model. It demanded equality between inclination (of the citizens) and reason (the state). The first
did
not

play

a subordinate

role,

and

the synthesis of the two was higher than

either, thus overcoming the opposition between state and society.

The

conflict

between Lutz's two in

models will also

and

illuminate the

tension

noticed earlier

between the beautiful

sublime
much

the sublime (although Lutz himself

sublime reason predomi

does

not

discuss the

detail). In the

nates over sense. sublime and

In the beautiful there is

a synthesis of sense and reason.

one point attempts

The

the beautiful are opposed. Schiller at

to make

these two ideals compatible and at another point chooses the latter over the
former.82

Lutz

argues

that even in the Aesthetic Education traces of the rational or

three-stage view persist. In Letter 3 he points out that the model is Natural
state

third character (or

conclusion while

Beauty)

Rational

state.

the

final

state.

Indeed

in Letter 27 of Natural state Letter 3 is by far the clearest

This is very different from Rational state Aesthetic

example of

the three-stage

model, Lutz claims to see it running throughout the Aesthetic Education. His view is that there are two strata in the Aesthetic Education: Nature Taste

Reason is found in Letters 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 16; and Nature Reason 83 Synthesis is found in Letters 4, 6, 7, 9, n-15, 17-27. But while we can find traces of the three-stage view in the Aesthetic

Education,
wavering
political

the tension that

appears

there cannot

be

or confusion

between Lutz's two

models.84

explained simply as a The tension in Schiller's

mature thought occurs when

he

considers the

institutions,

and as we

have
and

seen

possibility of realizing his ideal when he considers the issue of labor

The last two
of these

and classes, and of the

are

beautiful

the

sublime.

issues
of

for the

most part avoided

in the Aesthetic Education itself. At the level

consideration of

the individual
we

(leaving

out

any

the sublime) the synthesis, as

argued, appears

rather successful models

in the Aesthetic Education

Lutz's thesis
and

of a

wavering between two

82See above,
8"Wilkinson
section

illuminates Schiller's early development

II.
pp. 22iff.

83Lutz, Schillers Anschauungen,

and

Willoughby

argue

strongly for the unity

of the

Aesthetic Education. Conse

of

quently they

see

Lutz

as one of their main opponents.

They

accuse

Lutz

committing the

genetic

fallacy, i.e., using Schiller's earlier writings as a reliable guide to explaining the Aesthetic Education; Aesth. Ed., pp. xliii-iv. However, they do not discuss whether Lutz's view of a tension
of

between two
and

models

is

correct with respect

to Schiller's writings other than the Aesthetic Education

especially 85See above,

with respect

to his

earlier writings.

It

seems to me that

here Lutz is

correct.

section

II.

278

Interpretation
essay

the tension between the beautiful and the sublime (which develops in the

"On the

Sublime"

itself

and

in the

contrast

Education). But
a

at

the economic and

between this essay and the Aesthetic political level what we finally have is not

clearly desired is due, first, to the fact that he limits his goal to transforming only the individual and not the objective conditions of labor and political institutions, and second, to his pessimism and
wavering
or confusion
an

but

actual

failure to

achieve the

aesthetic model.

Schiller's failure to

achieve a synthesis

inability to explain how to transform more than a few individuals. Schiller, we might say, sees the problem clearly and sets it up nicely. His solution, however, cannot solve the difficult issues and so turns into a hope for
the future. Thus
we no

longer have

a solution

but only

an

ideal to

strive after.

But this is

what characterizes

the moral, the rational, the sentimental.

said

It is

not

an aesthetic

synthesis,

as

Schiller

himself.

LAW AS THE BASIS OF THE STATE: HEGEL Michael H. Mitias

Millsaps College

Although
vindicate

a number of scholars

Hegel from the

vindication

charge

have sought, in the past two decades, to that he espouses a totalitarian view of the
can

state, this

is,
he

so

far

as

see,

neither concrete nor

view

complete; for

there are critics who still maintain that his conservative, and that
than

is

illiberal,

undemocratic,

endows the state with a greater measure of

writes:

authority

it

should enjoy. and was

democracy
not a
gant and

Professor J. Plamenatz, e.g., also in several ways

"Hegel

was against

illiberal."

Again, "Though Hegel is

extrava political

totalitarian, in the bad sense, it cannot be denied that he makes false claims for the But why should philosophers and
state."'

thinkers persist
are

in characterizing Hegel's political theory as totalitarian? What the logical or ontological stumbling blocks which stand in the way of some Hegel's
conception of

thinkers to see
reason

the state for what it actually is? The

reluctance of most critics
on which

main

for this
and

difficulty is,

I believe, the
or

to elucidate

clearly
on

in detail the basis,

foundation,

the state

the one

submit,

hand, and the end of the state, on the other. is, for Hegel, law and its end is human freedom. If
mind

for Hegel rests, The basis of the state, I

we

approach
which

Hegel's theory with this basic intuition in have been levelled against it, especially the
undermined.

the negative charges

charge of

totalitarianism,

would

be

In this
critique of

paper

I shall,

first,

advance a

brief The

analysis of

Jacques Maritain's is to

Hegel's

conception of underlies

the

state.

purpose of this analysis

show

the

logic

which

the general charge that Hegel advocates a

shall

totalitarian view of the state.

Second, I

discuss the fundamental

elements a

Hegel's theory framework within which

of of about

the

state.

My

aim

in this discussion is to
evaluate

establish

we can shall

critically

the validity of Hegel's claim

not at all a supporter of

the

state.

Finally, I

argue that

Hegel is

totalitarianism. The

propositions which

I hope to

establish are:

(i)
but

the basis of

the state, for the state is

which

Hegel, is law;

what rules or

determines the life lives

of

the individual in

not an
citizen

agency, or power,

external

to the individual

law,

the law

the
as

consciously
of

recognizes and

as a rational and
under

free being. deter

Hence

member

the state the citizen exists

the conditions of
which

individuality
mines

and as the source of the authority, and the

viz., the state,

end of

his life
of

life

of

society in
as a

general.

(2) The
is

the state is the

freedom

its

members.

Accordingly (a)

the state

the medium

in

which

the

citizen achieves

his freedom

human individual;

(b)

the state cannot use the

citizen as a means to a selfish or particular

end; on the contrary, it attains its

'J. Plamenatz, Man

and

Society, Vol. II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963),

p. 264.

280
character qua state

Interpretation
only
when each citizen

is treated

as a

person,

i.e.,

as an end

in himself.

In his
attention
which

critique

of

Hegel's

conception

of the

state

J. Maritain focuses

primarily

on

those statements

and passages

in the

Philosophy

of Right

relate

to the ontological meaning of the state.

The theme freedom.

which

he

stresses

is:
or

(i)

the state is (for

on

Hegel)

the highest objectification of universal

reason,

spirit,

earth; it is the

concrete realization of

(2) Con

sequently

man attains

state, and outside

his freedom only as a citizen, i.e., qua member of the the state he cannot exist as an individual. Thus a person
as

becomes free in "and is it

not

so

far

he

recognizes

his

organic

asks, "that
reality?"2

being recognized by others individuality is born into its true

social

in

unity with the (a theme dear to

nature and

social

Whole,

Hegel),"

Maritain

its

supra-contingent realization of the

But the
the

Whole is

not

merely

a means

for the

freedom
or

of

individual, Maritain

observes; it is what determines his essence,

being. He
it."
. .

quotes the

interpretation: only in

following statements from Hegel to substantiate his "everything that man is, he owes to the State. He has his being "All the worth which the human being possesses all spiritual
.

reality, he

possesses

through the

State."

"Since the State is

mind

objectified, it

is only
genuine

as

one

of

its

members

that the individual himself has objectivity,

life."

(Ibid., pp. 163-64; see also Philoso Par. the state is the entelechy of the individual. 258) Accordingly phy of Right, I may feel unique and I may discover my individuality when I am recognized
and an ethical

individuality

by
I

the social

Whole, but
I
am

on certain conditions

"on the

condition

that in

return

recognize

the Whole for what it is

condition that
which

become

recognizable

(that is, my entelechy), and on the to all with no longer anything in me

each one

is

not exposed

to all and to myself

in the

uniqueness of

his

being
very

there no longer
Whole."

having
(Ibid.,

any
p.

soul or spiritual

interiority
(Ibid.,

other than the

soul of the

163) This view, Maritain holds, "is the very

totalitarianism."

formula,
We

the original
should

formula

of political

p.

164)

here

remember that the essential

feature

of

the totalitarian state

is that it does
citizen

not have a place for the individual. Thus if the being of the his values, habits, ideas, attitudes, world view, conscience, in short, his character is determined by the state his experience of subjective freedom
would

ends which

merely be a feeling and not he wills, and in whose

a genuine achievement of

realization

he

attains

freedom; for his real freedom,

does

the
are

dictated

by

the state. His subjective will and the will of the state "interpenetrate

each other

in

a superior

identity."

(Ibid.,

p.

165) The

state as

not anymore
em-

"impose itself from

without

by enslaving individuals

did the despotic

2J. Maritain, Moral

Philosophy

(New York: Charles Scribner's

Sons,

1964),

p.

163.

Law
pires of

as the

Basis of the State: Hegel

to

281
without

long

ago, but

subjects them

itself

all the

better

submitting defines

them to the
their
concrete

least

heteronomy
pp.

will."

(Ibid.,

because it is the very substance 164-65) The state is the law; it is also
categorical

and truth of what

duty. Kant's "abstract

imperium
of

imperative has been

replaced
over

by

the

concrete and

the State.

They

see

their duty. Its authority is

it is

by

themselves willing this authority that

p.

they fully
law

realize their and

them, free
moral

dom."

(Ibid.,

165) Thus in
abstract

Hegel, Maritain
replaced

observes, the legal

the

become

identical;

law is is

by
in

the

living

of the state.

One is
con

not, consequently,
science, to

compelled what

to reflect subjectively, or to appeal to his

a concrete moral situation.
instinct'

determine
when

right or good

All he

has to do in the

such a situation arises or

is

act

'from

or out of
nature'

habit,
moral

because this

instinct,
is

habit, is in

a sense a nature

'second

which

he

acquires

process of social growth. uttered

This

is the internalization

of

the

voice which

by
of

the state. Conscience should, then, be

proclaimed perhaps

banished from the life

the conscientious citizen. It is a trivial, and

bothersome,
what

voice, for

what counts as right or

just is dictated
character of

by

the state, and

is dictated

by

the state is instilled in the

the citizen as a

second nature.

This is exactly why

when one's conscience

disturbs him in the

the matter

face

of some order or practice or with an appeal genuine

by

the state he

should not pursue

critically

to a higher
sense

moral sentiment which

but

should

instead

act

according to the

moral

constitutes

this second

nature.

(Ibid.,

p.

166)

//

the state

If the preceding interpretation of the state, and of the relationship between and the individual, is correct, it would certainly follow that Hegel
form
of government;
essence of

espouses a totalitarian

for, if the

state, viewed as a kind

of

super-person, determines the

the citizen and provides him with the

principles and means of moral and political

self-determined

conduct, he
as a

would not exist as a

being, i.e.,

as an

individual, but

being

determined

by

the
of

state.

But,

the state

my discussion will according to Hegel is one-sided

as
analysis of

presently show, Maritain's interpretation

and erroneous;

it

also

fails to do
the state,

justice to his for Hegel,

its

structure and end.

The true In

character of

can

be

revealed

if

one

explores

its foundation
what

or

the essential
shall explore

elements which give

it its

identity
I

as a state.

follows I
state, I

these elements,
not even

and although

shall seek

to show that Hegel does not advocate,

shall

by implication,

a totalitarian conception of the

be

more

anxious to argue that constitutional law is, for him, the basis of the state. This basis is the ultimate ground on which the freedom and individuality of the
citizen rest.

What is the

essential nature of

the state, according to

Hegel? I
what

raise

this

question at the outset

for two

reasons:

(1)

unless we

fully

grasp

the state

282

Interpretation
it
as a political

is,

or what sustains of

institution,

we cannot attain a clear under

standing

key

concepts

like the

source of political

authority, social

justice,
main

obligations and privileges of

the state, freedom and

state

individuality,

patriotism,

etc.;

(2) Hegel's

analysis of the

reason which

led many

critics and

is intricate; this Hegelian scholars to

espouses.

intricacy

is the

varied and

conflicting
treat

interpretations
ment of

of what sort of political

theory he

Accordingly
from

a sound

any basic

category

should proceed

a reasonable analysis

of the concept of the state.

Hegel

makes a clear
an

distinction between 'civil

or an

society'

'state.'

and

'Civil

society'

is

association,

organization,

of men who are

concerned

with

the attainment and protection of their personal ends.

member

pre-eminently In this

society, Hegel writes, "each to him. But except in

is his
he

own end,

everything

else

is nothing

contact with others

cannot attain the whole compass of

his ends,

and

therefore these others are means to the end of the particular

182)3

member."

(Addition to Par.
public

The
a

cooperation of

others,
needed

however, is
to

not and re

enough;

authority,
of all

viz.,

government,

is

balance authority

harmonize the interests

stricts,
or

the

members of

the society. This

conditions, the

activities and aspirations of

the various members to their ends

promote peace and order amongst men establish

them. Thus

in the

actual pursuit of
wherein with

"a

system of complete

interdependence,
man

the
the

happiness, happiness,
realization

and

legal

status

of one

is interwoven
system

livelihood, livelihood,
of as

all."

and rights of of

(Par. 183) This

becomes the basis

regarded

the
the

individual
state
it."

happiness; it may be
based
on

"prima facie
as

external

state, the

need, the state

the

Understanding

(Ver-

stand)

envisages

(Ibid.)
a a

mature state common

Civil society is, then, a kind of state an external state; it is not yet in which the citizens are consciously and thoughtfully unified by
purpose and

destiny, but a system of social, economic, and legal erected institutions solely to further the well-being, i.e., life, rights, property, contracts, happiness, etc., of the people. In this society a person functions
primarily his
as a social and

economic,

not as a

political,
not as

being;

that

is, he

views

the government as something external to

will or mind.

him,

something
others,

expressive of

He

obeys

the law

and cooperates with

not out of a

sense of
of

duty,

or

for the

sake of

self-realization, but to

ensure the satisfaction

his

own

interests. (Cf. Par. 157) He does

of government

not participate

in the

political

process; indeed the business

is indifferent to him. His

go

end and

the end of government may seem at tends to think that the law restricts

first to

in

opposite

directions, for he

his activities and the extent of his personal but in Hegel satisfaction; fact, observes, the interest of the particular person and that of the law are reciprocal and condition each other: "while each of them
seems to

do just the

opposite to the other and supposes that

it

can exist

only

by

'Henceforth
of Right.

the number of the paragraphs and the

Additions

refer

to

Hegel's Philosophy

Law

as the

Basis of the State: Hegel

none the

283
other."

keeping
his

the

other at arm's

length,

less

each still conditions

,

the

(Addition to Par. 184) A

welfare.

people

person may think, e.g. that paying taxes is harmful to This way of thinking is erroneous, for the personal end of the cannot be promoted without taxes: a country that does not receive taxes

cannot provide services ment a person

to

its

citizens.

Hence in

furthering

the end of govern

furthers his

own end.

members of civil society exist as a unity, and the basis of this cooperation is with one another, on the one hand, and a government unity which dictates a general mode of behavior agreeable and applicable to all the

Thus the

society, on the other. This unity,

however, is feeble, for,

as we

have seen,

basic

principle of civil

his

own

society is the particular person, the person whose end is interest: "individuals in their capacity as burghers in this state are is their
own

private persons whose end

interest. This

end

is

mediated

through

the

universal which

thus appears as a means to its realization.

Consequently,
themselves

individuals
their

can attain their ends

knowing,

willing,

and

only in acting in a

so

far

as

they
way

themselves determine
and make

universal

links in this

chain

which characterizes civil

consciously
contract

and on

(Par. 187) Accordingly, the unity is a kind of partnership; it is not established society the basis of a political ideal but necessarily and on the basis
of social sort of

connexions."

of self-interest.

This is the

unity

which of

we

encounter

in the

social

theories of the state; here the basis

of

the

contract

Advocates

these theories
of

are able

to think

only

on the are

is need, service. level of Understand

to see only the
of

ing,

not

on

the level

Reason (Vernunft).

They

able

material, external

relations which are

necessary for the

being

the state. This

is why instead
theories

of

advancing theories of the the state proper

they

advanced

of civil society.

(Cf. Par. 187, Addition to Par. 182)

///

Civil Society, however, is not only a kind of state; it is also phase in the state as such. It is a constitutive element of the
moreover, the state
state when
viewed

an

aspect, a

state.

It

is,
a

as an empirical or external reality. are

It becomes

the

following

conditions

fulfilled. First,

when

itself thoughtfully, consciously, and purposefully conscious of an end in which it expresses the will of the society as a whole. The state, Hegel asserts, "knows what it wills and knows it in its universality, i.e., as something thought. Hence it works and acts by reference to consciously
structures adopted

it articulates, when it becomes

ends, known principles,

present

and

laws

which are not

merely implicit but

are of

actually

to consciousness;

and

further, it

acts with precise

knowledge

discovery

its actions have a bearing existing conditions and circumstances, inasmuch as (Par. 270) The highest achievement of the modern state is the on of the general will as the foundation of the state. Hegel gives credit
these."

to Rousseau for

introducing

this principle; his

contribution consists

in the fact

284
that,

Interpretation

"by

adducing the

will

as

the principle of the state, he is

and

principle which
which

has thought both for its form

not a

its content,

a principle

adducing a indeed
or

is thinking itself,
which

principle, like gregarious

as

instinct, for instance,

for he
views

divine authority, does

has thought

its form
"he

only."

(Par. 258) But Rousseau

the will as the

not provide an adequate account of

this principle,
regards

something particular,

determinate,

and

the

universal will not as

'general'

absolutely

rational

proceeds out of

in the will, but only as a this individual will as out of a conscious

element

will
will."

which

(Ibid.) But,
indepen
the

Hegel stresses, the basic

principle of

the state

must

be

objective and

dent

of

the

desires, interests,
conception

or whim of

its

members:

"we

must remember or

fundamental
ception,

that the objective

will

is rationality implicit
whether

in

con

whether

it be
or

recognized or not
not."

by individuals,
we

their whims

be

deliberately
or

for it

(Ibid.) When

uphold

the objectivity of the

universal will we

judgments

of

necessarily mean or the individuals are neglected

not

do

imply
or

that the

thoughts,
we shall

feelings,
presently itself
(Cf.

ignored. As

see, the

subjective will of

the individual

must

be consulted,

and of

it

asserts

through legal channels

in the

modification

and realization

the law.

Pars. 298-319) On more than

ment of

one occasion

Hegel

reminds us with

that a philosophical treat

'the

state'

should concern

itself

the concept, or

Idea,

of the

state,
states actual

not with
come

this or that state, nor with the conditions under

258 and

which given

into being. (Cf. Par.

Addition to the
model of what

same

paragraph) The

states of

the world do not provide a

the true essence of the state

is. On the contrary, if

we can state

we cast a quick glance at

the

history
in the

of

human society
caprice,

immediately
no

show

that any state is in some way defective or bad: "the

on earth and so

is

ideal

work of

art; it stands

sphere of

bad behavior may disfigure it in many chance, error, tion to Par. 258) Yet regardless of its degree of imperfection,
and

respect

and

(Addi

a state

is

such

only in

in its actual, historical being the Idea, or the principle of the state. This principle is rational, for it is essentially an activity of reason. But reason is a power which craves the universal whether in the
so as realizes realm of thought or

far

it

in the

realm of ethics.

"The basis

state,"

of the

Hegel

writes, "is the power

actualizing itself as civil becomes a state when it Second, society it when exists as an organism. Unlike civil society the
of reason

will."

(Addition to Par. 258)

achieves state

internal unity,

is

an organic unity.
preoccupied whole.

In it the individual does merely His destiny is intertwined

simple with

not view

himself

as

a particular

being

the satisfaction of his personal ends but as a member of the

with

the

is the true

content and aim of the

life."

destiny of the whole: "unification pure and individual, and the individual's destiny

(Ibid.) He is able to realize himself as an individual primarily because "the state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom; and it is an absolute end of reason that freedom should be (Addition to Par. 258) Consequently, since "the state is mind
of a universal
actual."

is the

living

Law
on earth

as the

Basis of the State: Hegel

there,"

285
it is the highest he knows it
or

and

realization of

and consciously realizing itself the ethical Idea on earth, it follows that

since

whether

not

the citizen cannot achieve

his freedom

except as a member of

the state, as a

member who aspires

for the

end which
or

the universal

will expresses.

I say "whether he knows it

mean

not"

because freedom, for Hegel, does

not

or

acting according to one's subjective desire, whim, inclination, opinion, feeling but according to what is true and right or good. Concrete freedom,
that the "state is the
freedom,"

and we should remember

attained when a person satisfies

actuality of concrete his subjective interests the way he

on

is

would attain

them

in the

family

or civil

society,

the one

hand,

and recognizes and wills

the universal in his experience, on the other

nizes seeks

when, in

other

words, he recog
when

that

he

can achieve

his true

and complete

end, viz.,

freedom,

he

the universal:

The
of

essence of modern state

is that the

universal

be bound up

with

the complete

freedom

its

particular members and with private well-being, that thus the

interests

of

family

and civil cannot

society

must concentrate

themselves on the state, although the universal end

be

advanced without the personal

knowledge

and will of

its

particular members, subjec

whose own rights must

be

maintained.

Thus the
and

universal must

be

furthered, but

tivity
these

on the other

hand

must attain

its full

living

moments subsist

in their

strength that the state

development. It is only when both can be regarded as articulated and

genuinely

organized.

(Addition to Par. 260)

Thus
as

unlike government

in

civil

society the

state

does

not stand as an

other,

or of

something external, to its members, for it is the unity,

end of

or

embodiment,

their rights and interests. If the

the individual is not

harmonious in

some

way
the

with

the end of the state, the state, Hegel

insists, "is left in

the air";

it

assumes the status of civil society.

laws

which are enacted

by

(Cf. Addition to Par. 265) Thus in obeying the state the citizen realizes his freedom, for the

law in

which

he

obeys
on

is

an expression of

his true end,

(Par. 261)

or will

it is his

own

law. This is based

proportion as

the assumption that the citizens "have duties to the state

it."

they have

rights against what

Now
will,

we

should ask:
supposed

is the

objective

principle, viz., the universal

actual

which

is

to be the basis of the state? How does it become

stressed

in the life in the

of

the state? Hegel repeatedly

mind.

that the Idea actualizes

itself

world as

The

sphere of

its

actualization with

is the

family

and civil

society.

It cannot, however, be identified

with

these two spheres as

empirically
as mind

given

orders, but

their

ideality,

with

the principles and values whose

actuality transforms them into 'the becomes actual in the various institutions
unity:

state.'

More concretely, the Idea

are the

which make

up the state as an organic institutions

of

"the laws regulating the

family

and civil

society
known

the

rational order which glimmers

in them. But the

and

ground and

final truth

of

these

objectiv

institutions is mind, their universal end Par. 261) These institutions constitute the

(Addition to

essential elements of

the constitution

286
of

Interpretation

the state. Thus a society becomes a state when it articulates its will

its

desires, ideals,
around

values,

etc.

consciously in it
recognizes

a constitution and organizes

its life
con

this

constitution.

Accordingly
.

a state

is

actual

when

it becomes

scious of

its

identity

and when

that this

identity

is

an expression of

its

will as a rational principle

The

point which we should

here

stress

is that the

institutions

which give content

to the constitution, namely, the principle accord

ing

to which the activities and privileges of society are organized, are "the
not

firm foundation
sentiment particular

only

of

the state but also of the

are

citizen's

trust in it and
since

towards it.

They

the pillars

of public

freedom

in them

freedom is

realized

and

rational,

and

therefore there

is

implicitly

present even

in them the

union of

freedom

necessity."

and

the medium within which the citizen realizes

what shapes

his

actual

(Par. 265) They are freedom. They are also

the

political sentiment of pass over

patriotism; "this

sentiment

is, in

general,

trust (which may

or

into

a greater or

lesser degree

of educated

insight),
i.e.,
does

the

consciousness

that my

contained and preserved

in

another's

interest, both substantative and (i.e., in the state's) interest

individual."

particular, is
and

end,

in the

other's relation

to me as an

(Par. 268) Thus

patriotism

not mean

offering

oneself as an exceptional sacrifice at

the altar of the state;

it

is

rather

the
and

feeling

and recognition
cannot realize

that one's end and the end of the state

are

identical
The
with

that one

his

destiny
only

except

in

so

far

as

he fulfills his

duties in the

various social

institutions
is
acquired

of which

he is its

a member.

patriotic sentiment
will of

when

the citizen
rational

identifies his

will

the

the state
of

qua

organism,

i.e.,

with

principle, viz., the

law. "The Idea

and

the

state,"

Hegel

writes

in Par. 259, "has immediate actuality

the
constitution or

is the individual
law."

state as a self-dependent organism

constitutional

Accordingly

as

an

organism the

state

constitution,
method

and

the constitution is the organization of

is essentially the the state; it is the

according to which the rights, duties, and activities of the citizens are distributed. Hegel distinguishes three basic powers within the state: "(a) the
power

to determine and establish the universal

of

the

Legislature; (b)
under

the

power

to subsume single cases and the spheres the

particularity

the

universal power of

Executive; (c)
decision
as

the power of subjectivity, as the the

Crown."

will

with

the

ultimate

(Par. 273) These powers, he argues,

as

must not

be

other, i.e., self-subsistent; for if this happens the state would gradually meet its end. We may distinguish them, but we cannot separate them from each other. Their unity is the ultimate unity of
viewed separate each

from

the
of

crucial to the being and integrity of the state is the realization in its life in other if, words, it lives according to the law which rationality expresses its will as a state. This is exactly why Hegel argues that the question,

state."

What is

which

form

of government such

meaningful, for

forms

is better, democracy, monarchy, etc.", is not quite themare "one-sided unless they can sustain in
objections to the

state.

"Hegel discusses in detail his Cf. Par. 277.

doctrine

of

the separation of

powers

in the

Law
selves

as

the Basis of the State: Hegel

287

the principle of

rationality."

matured

free subjectivity and know how to correspond with a (Addition to Par. 273) The test of the goodness of a state,
general plan

then, is life
of

not

merely the

whether or not

the constitution

in organizing its institutions but facilitates the realization of rational law in the
adopts

it

The constitution,
a

its citizens, thereby enhancing the attainment of freedom. (Cf. Par. 272) however, cannot be made, nor can it be given as a gift to
question

nation; hence the question,

why?

Because the

is to form the constitution?, is meaningless "presupposes that there is no constitution there, but
who
individuals."

only
of

an agglomeration of atomic

(Par. 273) But

an agglomeration

individuals, individuals who exist atomistically, discretely, ety, do not have a conception or consciousness of constitution.
of such a constitution self-hood as a state.

as

in

civil soci
can speak

They

only if they exist as But if they enjoy this Thus the question,

a state and are conscious of

their

consciousness
who

they

would eo

ipso

possess a constitution. reduces

is to frame the constitution?,

itself to:

who

is to

amend or alter the constitution?

Next,
permeating

the constitution cannot be offered as a gift to a nation, because it is

the mind of that nation: "the state, as the mind of a nation,

all relationships
within

is both the law

the constitu

the state and also at the same time the

manners and consciousness of

its

citizens."

(Par. 274)

Accordingly
is

tion articulates, embodies, the spiritual reality of a society as it has objectified

itself in

a given

historical

period:

"the

constitution of a people

of

the same

substance, the

same spirit as

its

art and

philosophy,

or at

least its imagination,

its thoughts, and its general culture not to mention the additional, external Thus a constitution influences of its climate, neighbors, and global
position."5

evolves with the evolution of a nation. a

This is why

when

Napoleon

gave

Spain

constitution, it did not work, for it was "more rational than what they had before"; it did not express their spiritual reality at that historical epoch. A society might feel a need for a better constitution, and it may enjoy the privilege
of

having

Socrates
and

as one of
of

its

citizens,

but

unless

the

people as a whole rise

to the value

dignity

Socrates'

moral

sentiment,

as well as

the depth of

his

rational character, this need

for

better,

more rational constitution remains

on the

level

of

wish, not

genuine

desire.

IV

The preceding discussion

of

of

the fundamental features of Hegel's concept

within which we can

the

state should provide a

framework

critically

evaluate

the charge that Hegel advocates, at least tion of the

state.

by implication,
is
not

totalitarian

concep

The

point of

this

evaluation

charge reveals a gross

concept of the state
-C.

misunderstanding

of

merely to show that such a the depth of Hegel's analysis of the

applying labels like authoritarian,

but

also to stress that

W. F. Hegel, Reason in History, tr.

(Liberal

by

R. S. Hartman from the Introduction to

Philosophy

of History

Arts,

1953), p. 59-

288
undemocratic, conservative,
useful

Interpretation

purpose, for
can

none of

these

illiberal, etc., to Hegel's view does not serve a labels, at least the way they have been used
position."6

by

Indeed Hegel himself adequately describe Hegel's shies away from such labels. His main concern, as I tried to show in the foregoing pages, is simply to analyze the essential nature, or basic principle, of
critics,
the state
what makes an organized

a member of such

society

achieve

society a state? Under what conditions can his human individuality, or freedom? We

have

seen

whether

that, to him, the form which the constitution should assume i.e., is not the crucial question; the im it is democracy, monarchy, etc.
is: in
what
of

portant question

way

can a

constitution,

when

it becomes

factor in
of

shaping the conduct

the citizens,

help

the growth of the

highest type

human character, the character that can determine its destiny, the character that can, in short, be good? I am here reminded by an important Pythagorean saying
which

Hegel
son

quotes:

"when

father inquired
a

about the replied:

best

method of edu a citizen of

cating his
152) This
values

in

ethical
laws.'

conduct,

Pythagorean has
also

'Make him

a state with good

passage calls

(The

phrase

been

others.)"

attributed to

(Par.

for the

remark that
medium

the

development

or attainment of

takes place in a concrete

of

laws,

custom, and, in general,

institutions. We cannot, whether we like it or not, ignore the role of these factors in the nourishment of the human character. Accordingly, if self-deter

i.e., freedom, is an activity in which one attains and realizes these should follow that an assessment of the goodness of the state cannot it values, be divorced from a consideration of the legal structure which underlies its vital
mination,

institutions,

or

laws.

Hegel clearly says that in analyzing the concept of the state he is not interested in examining historical or particular states, nor the conditions under which certain states conduct their activities, but the Idea of the state more
concretely, in how to
understand

the state as

do this abstractly but

the actual

with a critical

look

at

something rational. He does human nature, on the one hand,

on
a

not

and

history

of the states

throughout the world,

the other; for the point

political

in theorizing
e.g.,
a

about

the state is not to produce

beautiful

structure,

Utopia, but to discover the

of reason and

fundamental

principles

according to the
and with a

highest demands

morality

with an eye on
work

practice,

passion to articulate
can ennoble

those laws or values that can

life.7

effectively

and which

human

This

book, then, (Hegel

the state as

writes

in the

preface to the

Philosophy

of Right), containing
philosophy, it

as

it does the portray

science of the state,

is to be nothing

other than the endeavor to apprehend and

something

inherently

rational.

As

a work of

must

be it

poles apart

from

an attempt

to construct

a state as

it

ought to

be. The instruction

which

may contain cannot consist in teaching the how the state, the ethical universe, is to be
6See Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge 1Man and Society, p. 268.

state what

it

ought to

be; it

can

only

show

understood.

University Press,

1975),

pp. 374ff.

Law
The importance
such

as

the Basis of the State: Hegel

we

289
what

of

this emphasis in Hegel is that if

know

the state as
good

is,

and

if

we

know the

conditions under which man's

possible

highest

free
or

dom
reform

can

be attained, then it becomes

constitution. us

for

a state to

amend, alter,

its

Now let

focus

our attention on

this

ultimate good can

in theorizing
and

about

the state, viz., the conditions under which

consider more

freedom

be attained,

let

us

directly
say

the serious objection

which was raised against

Hegel's
we

theory, that
mean

is,

the claim that it is a totalitarian

of a

theory

of

the state. What do

theory Broadly speaking, we theory a citizen cannot exist as a self-determined being. He owes his life his ideas, values, character traits, in short, his des tiny to a power outside himself; this power is the state. Accordingly, a citizen
mean when we

that

it is totalitarian?

that according to this

is

absorbed

in the

whole

society; he is

a means

to the state. He exists and

which

lives to
stands.

make actual a general purpose or value

for

the state as a
gets

whole

Such

a citizen

eats, plays,

and goes to

school; he works,
policies,

married,

and makes a
what

family; he
ends,

votes, discourses

about public

and stands

for
He

he takes to be his rights

pursues

as a man and as a

citizen; he functions

as a social

being,

and performs

his

obligations to others and

to the

state.

may, in short, feel that he is the master of his life; but, in fact, he does not know that the self which he owns and enjoys is indirectly shaped, formed, by the various
powers or

institutions is
not

of the state.

He does not, in he
grows

other

words,

know that his

character

the result of his spontaneous and thoughtful ef

under which of
which

fort; for,
original as

once

more, the conditions

a certain

his behalf for him to be

formula

kind

'individual.'

up were planned on This is in substance the

attributes

of political

totalitarianism
charge

Maritain

to Hegel

a political

philosopher.

mode of analysis

Plamenatz,
Hegel
sensed

who

is serious, for Hegel's language and create an air or feeling in that direction. Some ilnnkers, like consciously sought to be sympathetic and to do justice to
This
comfortable with

could not

feel

if

we read

this passage

his theory. This discomfort is clearly from his Man and Society: "I would not deny
attained

that there is an

unpleasant

tone about the writings of a man who appears to

have believed that the Universal Mind had

philosophy.

full

self-knowledge

in his
And

His
to

manner

is

against

him; it

suggests a colossal arrogance. when

we

do

well

mistrust

the arrogant, especially

they
is

speak of

freedom."8

First,
mines

what

do

we mean

by
the

linguistic

expressions

like, "The
the citizen

state

deter

citizen,"

the

life,
the

or character, of

"The

citizen

a means to the state,

state,"

or to a goal adopted shaped

by

the

"The

character of

is

indirectly

primarily because if the state is by it is to a reasonable degree, and the life of the factor in citizen, a determining we should then enquire into the principle, or value, by which this determination
state,"

etc.?

raise this question

is

effected.

We

should also enquire

into the

sort of atmosphere which

at

the state
of

8I have discussed
ment,"

this question

in my essay "Another Look

Hegel's Concept

Punish

Hegel-Studien, Band 13,

1979.

290
provides
and

Interpretation
for the
education

(Bildung)

and growth of

the citizen. If such principle

conditions

do

not

allow

the essential powers of

human

nature

to grow

naturally, and this

creativity, we can

under

the conditions of reason, morality, and spontaneous

of

Hegel's theory of him, as I stressed, the fundamental say

without

certainly say that a state the state does not contain

this character is totalitarian.

But
to

such principle or

conditions,

for,

principle of

the state is law.

Indeed is

we can

hesitation that the

government which actual as

Hegel

advocates

a govern

ment of

law. This law becomes

only the
the

the constitution, and the

also the

latter deter

mines not

organization of the

society but
citizen

kind

of

institutions
maturity.

within which

chaiacter of

the

growing

is

nourished

into

Hegel

condemns

despotism,
means will as

the view that

force is,

or should

be,

the basis of
and

the state: "despotism

where

any
such,

state of affairs where

law has disappeared

the particular

whether of a monarch or a mob

counts as

law

or rather

takes the place of

law;

while

(ochlocracy), it is precisely in legal,

as the moment of

constitutional government

that sovereignty is to

be found

ideality
cf.

the

ideality

of

the particular spheres and

functions."

(Par.

278.

Also

Par. 258) The sovereignty

and

of

the state

is, according

powers which are

designated

by

the constitution: the

tive,

the Crown. It means the unity, the

Hegel, the ideality of the Legislature, the Execu inter-dependence, of these powers.
to

"Sovereignty,"

Hegel writes, "depends

the state are

on

the

fact that the

particular

functions

and powers of

not self-subsistent or

firmly

grounded either on their

own account or

in the
basis

particular will of

the individual

functionaries, but have

self."

their roots ultimately in the unity of the state as their single

(Par. 278)

The
of

source and

of

this unity is the constitution. When each of the powers

of the others

the state functions

independently
each other.

they

are

bound to

oppose and

consequently

destroy

This

would mean the end of the state.

Their

harmony,
ization
of

cooperation,

and

unity is, therefore, absolutely

essential to the real

monarch

the end of the state, viz., the freedom of the citizen. The

unity of these powers. This is why his signature is needed to implement any decision or action of the state; in his figure as the monarch he represents both the unity and sovereignty of the state, that is, its will as it is
symbolizes the actual expressed
can

in the
act,

constitution.
on

It is
of
a

perhaps
nation.

hard to
A

understand

how

one person

decide,

behalf

remark

here is in

order.

As

sovereign, the
constitution.

monarch

sums

whole his Accordingly decision is legitimate, valid, only in so far as it is identical with the constitu tion, or insofar as it expresses the essential spirit of the law. Thus he cannot

in his figure the ideal unity of the when he acts on behalf of the nation as a

state

qua

act

capriciously, subjectively,
a matter of

or

in the interest

of

"as
and

fact, he is bound by

the concrete
often

any other group or power: decisions of his counsellors,

more

if the

constitution

is stable, he has

no

to

do than

sign

his
on

name."

(Addition to Par. 279) I

quote this sentence

only to shed

further light

my

earlier claim that the government which

Hegel

advocates

is

a government of

Law

as the

Basis of the State: Hegel

actions,
or
go."

291
of

law, i.e.,
last
word

what

determines the

decisions,

or

institutions
of

the state is

in the final

analysis the
which

law. The T

will,'

signature,

the

monarch

is "the
as

beyond

it is impossible to

(Ibid.)
it

And inasmuch

it is
the
a

grounded

in,

and expressive of

of, the constitution

asserts the

supremacy

of

law in the life

moment

the state; it also signifies

the state

a moment of

self-consciousness,
and

in

which

becomes

conscious of

its

will

its capacity to

realize

this will actually, concretely: "in a well-organized monarchy, the objec

will.'"

belongs to law alone, and the monarch's part is merely to set to the T (Addition to Par. 280) The difficulty with Hegel's view, I may be told, is not merely his thesis that law is the basis of the state but rather his inability to show how the citizen
tive aspect

law the

subjective

can

be

a self-determined

being, i.e., free. The

institutions
the citizen,

citizen remains caught

up

within

the web of the state;

for if the

government as the actual of the

tion determines the values and tive

state,

and

reality if these

of the constitu
are

forma is

factors

of

the character

of

it

should

follow that this

character

shaped

by

extraneous

forces, by
for it to be

the sort of values which the state happens to

promote
mined.

in the life

of society.

character of

this sort

cannot

be

self-deter

And in

order

self-determined

it

must create

its

own

values,

habits,
person.

or general outlook upon

life; its life

or

must

be

an expression of will as a we

Accordingly,

what

guarantees,

safeguards, do

have that

a given

constitution provides

the conditions

par excellence

for the

realization of

free

dom? Or,

what criterion should

be

met

in

order

for

a constitution to create a

sociopolitical atmosphere

for the highest

realization of

freedom? I

raise

these

questions on
able

behalf

of the critic

only to stress that, unless a citizen is somehow

which

to create his own individual character amidst the complex framework of

and political

social

institutions
as

he

encounters as

he begins to become
society, he remains

conscious of

himself

person, he

remains a product of

deprived

of on

the opportunity to determine himself. Hegel is aware of this prob the

one

lem; for,
life
and
of

hand, he insists,

as we

have

seen

in

some

detail,

that the

fundamental

principle of

the state, viz., the constitution, which determines the

and

the society, must be objective

on

independent

of

caprice, arbitrariness,
of constitu

idiosyncratic interest, and,

the other

hand,

the

highest form

Indeed rationality is the ultimate criterion by which we goodness of a constitution. Thus a state is good, valid, inasmuch the evaluate as it is rational; such a state is a community of self-determined beings. But, (1)
tion must

be

rational.

what

do

we

mean when we

inasmuch
"A

as

it is

rational?

(2)

say a constitution is rational, or that it is good Under what conditions does the rationality of the
of the citizens?

constitution

become

actual

in the life

rational,"

state
of

is absolutely
substantial
will

Hegel writes, "inasmuch

as

it is the
self-

actuality

the

which

it

possesses

in the

particular

consciousness once that consciousness

has been

raised

to consciousness of the

(Par. 258) Thus

a constitution acquires the

character of

rationality if
will of

it

meets

three conditions.

First, it

should express

concretely the

the

292
people

Interpretation
their values,

interests, ideas,
and actual.

customs,

etc.

In this

expression

the will
spiri

becomes both intelligible into

It accordingly
which

reveals the

mind, the

tual substance, of the society as an organic unity. It is this translation of the

general will as ethical
mind qua

a concrete

way
state
will

of

life

led Hegel to
of

view

the constitution

in

character:

"the

is the actuality it knows

the ethical Idea. It is ethical

the substantial

manifest what

and revealed to
and

itself, knowing
as

and

thinking itself, accomplishing

257) As the ideal unity
of
constitution permeates all

insofar

it knows

it."

(Par.

the state, and as the the

principle of

its organization, the

which make

relationships and

institutions

up the
and

state.

These institutions
of

are rational

in

so

far

as

they

reflect the

meaning

interest

the

constitution.

should of

here
state

remark

that when Hegel considers the

general will as

the foundation

the

he in

effect erects the structure of

the
as

state on
will.

reason,

for,

to

him,
as

reason actualizes writes:

itself in the life

of the state

of a

society

In the

addition

to Par. 258 he

"the basis

is the

power of

reason

actualizing itself
a

will."

Second,
end

constitution

is

rational

insofar

as

it

expresses

man's

highest
actual."

freedom: "it is

an absolute end of reason

that freedom should be

(Addition to Par. 258) Thus

we cannot accept a constitution as

rational,

and

consequently tion for the attainment

urgent answer

we cannot accept

it

as

valid,

unless

it

creates a

satisfactory

condi
an

of

freedom. But the

concrete

question to which we are possible

of

seeking for
at

is: how is

freedom

in

a state with a rational

constitution?

Hegel is

alive

to the

importance

this question,

the

beginning
Rationality,
the
content

of

his

analysis of

the

concept of

the state he writes:

consists

taken

generally
the single.

and

in the abstract,

universal and

Rationality,

concrete

is concerned, in the unity of objective substantial will) and subjective freedom (i.e., freedom
volition of particular

in the state, consists (a) freedom (i.e., freedom of the

of everyone so

in the thoroughgoing unity of so far as its

universal or and

in his

knowing

in his
and

ends);

and

consequently,

(b)

far

as

its form is concerned,

self-determining (Par. 258)

need

action on

laws

and principles which are thoughts and so universal.

We

to

interpret this
A

passage citizen

carefully,
a state

for it is
an

crucial

to the

whole

argument of this essay.

in

is

individual; he is

a world of

thought, feeling, and action. He is able to seek ends that are peculiar to his character. He uniquely distinguishes himself by personal interests, ideas, hab

its,
he

values,

and character traits.

But he is

also a member of the

state;

as such,

seeks and realizes the

universal, viz., government,

law,

and custom

in his

life. This universal,

the people as
much
as a

whose

foundation is the constitution,

the baptism
of reason.

underlies the will of

whole; it embodies their

received

essential values and aspirations

inas
is

they have

Thus

citizen

who

his membership in the state is also conscious that qua universal the constitution is the embodiment of his true freedom, for it is an expression of his true will. The laws which it prescribes are not any more external, indifferent
conscious of commands which

he has to obey if he has to

achieve certain ends

but his

own

Law

as

the Basis of the State: Hegel

293

laws,
as

the laws

which express

his

will as a member of

the state:

"they

are not

something

alien

to the subject. On the contrary,

his
a

spirit

bears
of

witness

to them

to its own essence, the essence in which he

which

has

feeling
is
not

in

he lives

as

in his

own

element

which

his selfhood, and distinguished from

himself."

(Par. 147) This is why his freedom can be achieved only when he his in wills, action, to realize the system of laws which emanate from the
constitution.

breath
the

Put differently, the citizen determines himself, he achieves a freedom, when he acts on the basis of the laws which are upheld by constitution. Consequently, a citizen who fails to identify his personal, sub
of will with

jective

the objective

will

which embodies

the highest degree of ra

tionality does
that a

not realize

in his

action

his

complete

freedom. We

person who

ignores the
that

objective will cannot to some

cannot say degree be free.

Hegel
stract:

admits

that such a person can be

. .

free, but his freedom is

and

one-sided,

ab

"we

must remember contained

knowing

willing, or subjective freedom

(the only thing

in the

principle of the

one moment, and therefore a one-sided

individual will) comprises only moment, of the Idea of the rational will,
what

i.e.,
also

of

the

will which

is

rational

solely because

it is implicitly, that it

is

explicitly."

(Par. 258)

Third,
function
far
as

a constitution

is

rational when

the powers of the state cooperate and

as an organic unity.

"The

constitution,"

Hegel writes, "is

rational

in

so

the state

inwardly
of

differentiates

and

with

the nature of the concept. The result

determines its activity in accordance of this is that each of these powers is

each contains

in itself the totality ments and has them

sions of

the constitution, because

the other mo

effective

in itself,

and

because the moments,

whole."

the differentiation of the concept, simply abide in their

being expres ideality and

(Par. 272) I quote this pas nothing but a single individual basic condition for the rationality of sage in its entirety only to underscore a the state which Hegel repeatedly emphasized. He was sharply critical of those
constitute who

held that the

This

powers of

the state should be

on

divided, i.e.,
that

separate,

or

self-

subsistent. public power

view

is

advanced

the

assumption

division

promotes

freedom, but it does

is disharmonious
and

not, for it implies that in its very nature, each

hostile to the

others.

But if the

powers of

the state

function separately the end of the state is imminent. This is what happened in France during the Revolution; "the legislative power sometimes engulfed the the executive sometimes engulfed the legislative, and in so-called
'executive,'

such a case

it

must

be

stupid

to

formulate,
we must

e.g., the moral

demand for har

state; "each

mony."

(Addition to Par. 272) But

each performs a unique

distinguish these powers, Hegel

of the of

argues, for
them
must

function in the life

build itself

inwardly

into

a whole and contain

in itself the

other

moments.

When

we speak of

the distinct activities of these powers, we must

not

slip into the

that
each

monstrous error of so

pose

power

should

subsist

interpreting their distinction as to sup independently in abstraction from the

to

others. The truth

is that the

powers are

be distinguished only

as moments of

294
the concept. If instead

Interpretation

they

subsist

independently

in

abstraction

from

one an

other, then

it is

as clear as

day

that two independent units cannot constitute a to strife, whereby either the whole

unity but

must of course give rise

is de

stroyed or else

unity is

restored

by

force."

(Ibid.) This is
and

another

way

of

stating

the doctrine that the state is an organism

character separated

that the principle of this organic

when

is the

constitution. whole

from the

As in every organic structure, it loses its identity, its essence, and

whole

the part is

when all

the parts

function disharmoniously, separately, the

falls
or

apart.

Thus

a state exhib

its the

character of

rationality

when

its powers,

institutions, function
make

as an

interdependent unity
people actual

and when

in this

functioning they

the will of the

and, consequently, free.

V
A constitution, then, is
the people,
rational

if it (i) embodies, expresses, the

of

will of

(2)

promotes

the

freedom

the citizens, and

(3)

guarantees

the

unity

and

harmony

of

the powers and various institutions of the state. These

criteria,

our critic would

argue,

are

general;

they

explain

the sense

in

which a

constitution

is rational,
or

or what

it

means

for

a constitution

to be rational.
of a nation?

But,
What

how does the

concrete

criterion of

rationality apply actually in the life

should raise these or

attitude,

principle,

the state adopt towards the citizens in

pursuing their ends as

would go

human individuals? We

questions,

our critic of the

on, primarily because (I) the implicit,

remains

potential, rationality

constitution permeates

abstract, theoretical,

and

therefore

irrelevant,

unless

it

the practice, the

states of

laws,

which affect

the life of the citizens, and

quite

(II)
are

the various

the world are, as Hegel

means

is

aware,

imperfect; they
ought

not well-organized.
what

This

they

are not as rational as

they
for

to be.

So,
of

means views

and principles

should

be

adopted

in

order

state, the way

Hegel

it,

to grow in rationality and to maximize the highest degree

of

freedom in the lives

I. A truly
ought

its

citizens?

rational constitution should uphold

the principle that a citizen

as

to be accepted as a rational

being,

as a

person;

such, he should be
recognizes

treated as an end in
as a

himself,

never as a means.

(Cf.

Kant)

Hegel

this

fundamental

principle of

the state. From the standpoint of political

philos

ophy this means that the state must treat its members as persons. But a person is a being with rights, and he cannot attain his personality unless his rights are
respected and protected.
"Personality,"

writes

Hegel, "essentially involves

the

capacity for rights

the

and constitutes

the concept and the basis (itself abstract) of

system of abstract and

therefore formal right. Hence the imperative: 'Be a

persons.'"

person and respect others as ognize the rights of cause

its

citizens.

(Par. 36) A rational state It cannot, e.g., condone slavery

should rec
why?

Be

slavery rests on the premise that man is a being; consequently he can be owned the way we own objects. But man, Hegel
of

the

justification

'natural'

Law
argues,

as

the

Basis of the State: Hegel

but basis
mind,
and as mind

295

is
be

not a natural object

Therefore he
should

cannot

be

owned or used as a slave.

of

he is essentially free. (Cf. Par. 57) Again, a man

respected not on the on

origin,

but

the basis

of

his manhood,

his race, religion, nationality, or social on the basis of what makes him a man, in is
virtue of

i.e.,
not

human being: "A

a

man counts as a man

his

manhood
etc."

alone,

because he is One
of
of

Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian,

important rights
which crucial

(Par. 209)

the

most

to the attainment and

integrity
respect

personality
end

unless

personality is the right to property. One cannot enjoy a sense of his property is respected; hence it is the duty of the state to
of

the right

the citizen to his property: "a person has as

his

substantative

putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and soul from his will. This is the absolute right of appropriation which man has over all
the
of
'things.'"

right

(Par. 44) The

point which merits special attention

here is that

a state

is, for Hegel,

moral

under obligation to respect the

because in this way it

conviction,

safeguards their
conscience.

property of its citizens primarily freedom. This respect extends to one's

i.e.,
what

This

faculty

is

a personal

privilege; it "is

the disposition to
person

will what

determines

is right

end except

the citizen as a
and

(Par. 137) In this activity a obligatory in his life; none can realize this responsible individual, for he is the only one who
and end

is absolutely

good."

knows himself
conscience as

knows his

in life. This is why Hegel

where

characterizes

the "deepest inward solitude with oneself

restriction

ternal

and

every

has

disappeared."

everything ex (Addition to Par. 136) The will, it

should and

be remarked, is rational inasmuch as it seeks what is objectively right good, for in this seeking it raises itself from the level of particularity to that

of universality. conscience

Accordingly,
a

as

this unity

of

the particular and the universal,

violate."

"is

sanctuary

which

it

would

be

sacrilege

to

(Par. 137)

spect

Respect for property for religious belief. For if

and conscience

is, for Hegel, inseparable from re religion, or religious conviction, is genuine,

not undermine should

if it
and

expresses a end of

divine content, it does

state. of

but

promote

the

integrity
a

the

Thus the

state

protect

the church as

basic

institution in the life

instruction."

the nation. This means the church should

practice of

have the right

and

to property, because "the

its worship

consists

in ritual

doctrinal

(Par. 270) And "in addition, since religion is an integrating factor in the state, implanting a sense of unity in the depths of men's minds, the state a church is all that should even require all its citizens to belong to a church
can

be said, because

since the content of a man's

faith depends

on

his

private

ideas,
goes a a

the state cannot

interfere

it."

with

(Par. 270) This, it

seems to

me, is a

clear statement of principle

for the necessity of religious freedom. But Hegel insists that the state should not interfere in the details of further. He step other words, be tolerant even to a sect (e.g., the in it given religion; should,
the

Quakers,
members)

Anabaptists,
on

etc.), "a sect

grounds

(though,

of

course,

all

depends
even

on

its

which

religious

declines to

recognize

its direct

296
duties to the
no
state."

Interpretation

(Ibid.) Hegel introduces

all
unless

this limitation on the ground that

institution in the

state can

its duties to the state, for

end and

enjoy it performs these duties it

the rights it demands unless it performs

would obstruct

the

perform

unity of the state. This is why if the members of a sect decline to a basic duty to the state, e.g., if they refuse to enlist in the army and

defend the nation, they cannot have a claim to citizenship, though they may enjoy the civil rights which are guaranteed by the constitution.

One

can

discuss
a

other

rights in Hegel

for example, the right to ideas orally

and as

educa

tion,

to

choose

career, to express one's

in writing, to
to the

personal

safety, to fair treatment before the

aim

law,

etc.

essential

attainment of personality.

property, conscience,
state

and

in considering, though briefly, the right to My religious belief is only to show that, for Hegel, a
unless of a

is

not

truly

rational

in its laws its

citizens.

and

practice

it

safeguards

the

personality or individuality be an individual unless he is

constitution of

As

stressed

earlier,

no man can

self-determined,
places

i.e., free, being. Thus if

the

the state a

la Hegel

the highest value on human

individ

uality,
should

and

if the

state promotes this

such a

individuality

concretely in its practice, it

the state

follow that

constitution, or state, is rational.

II. Attainment

of

personality,

however, is incomplete

unless

provides a sociopolitical atmosphere within which state qua government

the citizens can prevent the

from

being

If the

citizen

is to

actualize

acting as a separate or independent agency. himself as a free being under the conditions of
or
or

rationality, morality, and spontaneous creativity, the laws

regulate

institutions
of

which

his

activities as an

unless the

state,

in society should be an expression actual, historical event, is the living its

people

his

will.

Thus

will of order

its people, for

a state

the citizen of
to be the

such a state cannot exist as an will of

individual. But in
must share

living

the people

in the

refinement and

realization of

their constitution.

Accordingly

if

what rules a state

is law,

and

if

this

law

embodies

the will of the people actually, we can that

certainly say

that the

state rules

itself

and

it is

self-determined.
of

Now, does Hegel's theory

share

the state provide the means for the the constitution? This

citizen

to
as

in the
with

refinement and realization of

question

sumes,

Hegel,

that the states of the world are

constant realization of the

imperfect,

and that their

destiny

consists

in the

highest

possible

degree

of

freedom. Thus,

is actively involved in the modification, enact ment, and actualization of the constitution, and unless he is responsive to the fact that the laws which determine his values and conduct emanate from his
unless a citizen

will, or that he

intends them, the state becomes alienated from, or external to, him. This may create the tendency or danger that those who enact and execute the laws may ignore his real will. If this happens the state ceases to be a state
proper; it degenerates into
a civil society.

The citizen, for Hegel,

participates

in the

political

process, that
and

is, in

the

modification and realization of

the law

in two ways,

directly

indirectly.

(A)

Law
He
participates

as the

Basis of the State: Hegel

297

indirectly by

estates whose members are elected

basic tasks: it modifies,

programs which affect

legislature, which is an assembly of by the people. This institution performs two i.e., determines, the laws of the state and structures the
means of the

the well-being of the society as a whole: "the

legislature

is

(a) with the laws as such in so far as they require fresh and extended determination; and (b) with the content of home affairs affecting the entire (Par. 298) It is, then, the legislature which determines the extent of the rights, duties, privileges of the people as individuals and as socio
concerned
state."

economic groups.

The legislature plays, moreover, two basic

or

roles

in the

actual

translation,

enactment, of the will of the people concretely. In the first place, it is a

what mediates

bridge; it is
in
the
other

between the

powers of the state.

(Cf. Par. 300) It is, both

acts,

words, the

institution

which solidifies

the unity of the state. For in

extent of action
of

determining
behalf
main of

the legal system it in effect

determines the

monarch and

the executive. As we have seen, the monarch

decides,

on

the state only in so far as the constitution allows. In a similar way the
of

function

the executive is to see to it that the laws

with

which are enacted

by

the legislature are applied

the utmost of skill,

honesty,

and proficiency.
which

(Cf. Par. 303) Thus the

express

greater

the efficiency in actualizing the laws

citizens.

the

will of

the people the greater is their freedom as

In the

second

place, the legislature has the sole goal and

duty

to modify

the laws of the state according to the actual the

people.

desires, interests,
recognized

or aspirations of

I say

'actual'

because the law

by

the state at a given

time

must express

the

will of

the people. This

constitution cannot

be

granted as a

is, for it is the rational articulation mean it cannot be changed. On the

growth and state:

is why Hegel insisted that the gift, constructed, or even copied. It simply of the will of the people. But this does not
contrary, it
must grow and

mature, and its

maturity

should reflect

the growth and maturity of the people as a

"the

constitution must

in

and

by

itself be the fixed for this

reason

and recognized ground must not

on which the

legislature stands,

and

it

first be

con ad and ex

structed. Thus the constitution is, but just as essentially it becomes, i.e., it vances and matures. This advance is an alteration which is imperceptible which

lacks the form

alteration."

of

(Addition to Par. 298) This

passage

is

tremely important, for it

that the

clarifies

Hegel's

position on political reform.

It

asserts

law,

or

constitution, of the state

is

not

final but

always

subject to

change or reform, and this

according to the criterion of rationality. In Par. 216

the view,

Hegel is sharply

critical of

his lifetime, that a legal code should reformed. A legal code, like other types
are

held mostly by German Scholars during be absolutely complete or that it cannot be

of

code, is

always

the

child of

its

age.

It would, I think, be interesting to remark here that although the Estates entrusted with the determination of the law this task is not, and should not,
exclusive

be

to them alone; the

excel

public servants and

the ministers of the mon

arch

may

well

in

their contribution to the attainment of this end:

"the

298
Estates
are

Interpretation
a
guarantee

of

the

general

welfare not

and

public

freedom. A little
deeper

reflection will show

that this guarantee

does

lie in their

particular power of a and more

insight, because
comprehensive

the

highest

civil servants nature of

necessarily have

insight into the

the state's organization and require

and welfare of

ments."

(Par. 301) The Estates further the freedom

the

society

primarily

by

the novel insight

public opinion

which

they may bring

be
a

to the political process and

constructive

by

allowing

and criticism to

factor in this
the nation as

process.

Accordingly they
and groups. sense and

mediate

between the

government and

individuals istrative

This is why they should "possess a political and admin temper, no less than a sense for the interests of individuals At the
same time the significance of their position

and particular groups.

is that,

in

common with

the organized executive,

they

are a middle

term, preventing

both the

extreme

isolation

of

the

power of

the crown,

which otherwise might

seem a mere of

arbitrary tyranny,

and also

the isolation

of

the particular
cf.

interests

Corporations."

the persons, societies, and

(Par. 302;

also

Par. 314)

Hegel repeatedly
assembly
must

emphasized moral

that as

plenipotentiaries and

the members of the

of

enjoy high

character

sense

devotion to the

well-being of the state. They must also be versatile in the business of the law. These features are the basis of the public trust in the Estates: "the important

thing, then, is that a member of the Estates shall have a character, insight, and will adequate to his task of concentrating on public business. In other words
there is no question of an individual's
point with

talking

as an abstract single person.

The

is

rather

that his

interests

are made good

in

an

assembly

whose

business is

the general interest. The electors require a guarantee that their

and secure

deputy

will

further

this general

interest."

(Addition to Par. 309) What counts,

whether

then, in the
not whether and

election of

the members of the Estates is

and

they

are qualified,

they directly universally by Par. 303, 308) Indeed Hegel shies away from universal suffrage and in troduces a system whereby deputies from the major socioeconomic groups are
are elected

the people. (Cf. ibid.

elected;

such

deputies have

a greater

grasp

of

the needs,

interests,
process

or circum

stances of

the various sectors of the society.

citizen participates

(B) The

directly
of

in the

political

by

voicing
and
on

publicly his private personal opinion state: "the formal subjective freedom

on matters

relating to the business of the

consists

individuals

in their

having

expressing

their own private

judgments,

opinions, and

recommendations

affairs of state.
opinion,'

in

which what

This freedom is collectively manifested as what is called "public is absolutely universal, the substantative and the true, its opposite, the purely particular and private opinions of the as it is expressed actually, public opinion is a mixture
the serious, the rational and the

is linked
Many."

with

(Par. 316) Thus,

and

of the

petty

irrational,
who

the

particular and

the universal. It is also expressed

by

individuals
This

differ in intelligence,

temper, interest,
sented to

or even motivation.

shows that public opinion

is

pre

the government in a disorganized way; but the state should

conduct

its

Law
business
under

as the

Basis of the State: Hegel

thoughtful
planning.

299

the conditions

of order and

Accordingly
is

it

should select

those ideas

or views which are most expressive of the rational

interest
or

of

the society as

a whole.

What is important in this

which of

selection

not who

how many express a given idea or view, but Great is he who can articulate the universal need

idea is

good or great.

the people: "the great man

of

the age is the one who can put into words the will of his age, tell

his

age

what

its

will

is,

and accomplish

it. What he does is the heart The

man

and the essence of

his age, he

who lacks sense enough to despise in gossip will never do anything (Addition to Par. 318) We may, accordingly, despise or respect public opinion. We may despise it in so far as it contains falsehood and idiosyncratic interest; and we

actualizes

his

age.

public opinion expressed

great."

may respect it in so far as it contains the true interest of the nation. As such it "is a repository not only of the genuine needs and correct tendencies of com mon life, but also, in the form of common sense (i.e., all-pervasive funda
mental ethical principles

disguised

as

prejudices),

of the

eternal, substantative
the whole consti

principles of

justice,

the true content and result of

legislation,

(Par. 317) tution, and the general position of the It is, I believe, reasonable to assert that the state is not, for Hegel, unquestioned authority; on the contrary, it derives its authority from the will
the people, not

state."

an

of

only

by

what

verbally for the

and

in writing,

and

directly, by voicing their opinion means of the legislature, but also indirectly by by
the people say
what

the wisdom of those citizens who possess the richest insight into
state as a whole. an

is best in

I do

not see at all

any

arrogant or pretentious claim

Hegel to

and power over

all-knowing its citizens. What

standard

state which assumes superior concerns

authority in knowledge Hegel pre-eminently is the need to

recognize a

higher
the

the

dignity

of

citizen as a person can

according to which (1) reform is possible and (2) be upheld. This standard is none other
voice

than the voice

of reason.

This

does

not, as

I stressed,

emanate

from

dogmatic,
analysis citizen

absolute

power; it is always checked and tested

of

by

the continued

satisfaction and

well-being

the human
and

personality.

Its

source

in the final
of

is: (1) thoughtful reflection as a human individual.

view of the

(2)

the happiness and

dignity

the

In

critics referred to qua

preceding discussion in its entirety I can say, contrary to the in the first part of this essay, that in Hegel's view the citizen
corner stone of people

individual is the
will

the state. The constitution which emanates

from the

of

the

is
of

the ultimate principle the state are organized.

activities and the

no

institutions

according to which the Within this organization

activity,

whether

it is legal, economic, religious, social, educational, etc., is

not uphold

valid or
citizen.

justified if it does

the personality or

individuality
'formed'

of

the

The latter cannot in any way be viewed as shaped or by the citizen which the grows is within rational. It structure for the state, essentially does not limit the development of the natural powers or forces which constitute

his

nature as a

human being. He

exists as a

free

person.

This freedom is

not a

300
privilege sort of

Interpretation
identified
with

capricious,

fitful,

or aimless

behavior, but
human

with

that

behavior
What is

which

is

conducive to the realization of the

which

element

in
of

his being. The

reason.

criterion valid

by

this realization can be effected

is the law

in the

state which

Hegel

supports

"derives its authority,

custom, really from

not at all

insight

and

from force, only to some extent from habit (Addition to Par. 316)
argument."

and

DILTHEY'S ESSAY THE POETIC IMAGINATION:

A POETICS OF FORCE

Stanley Corngold
Princeton

University
so-called cultivation

In

no other period

in the

history

of art

have

(Bildung)
as

and authentic

art confronted one another with as much repugnance and

disgust

today [1871].
Nietzsche

Politics is
position

a realm akin

to art

between the

spirit

and

insofar as, like art, it occupies a creatively mediating life, the idea and the reality, the desirable and the
and power.

necessary, conscience and

deed, morality

Thomas Mann

Since the late 1960s, Wilhelm

considerable reputation as subjectivity. work

Dilthey

has

enjoyed

theorist of the depth

and ontological wrote

in this country distinction

"one kind

a of
of

"In

our

lie-filled human
the
work

society,"

Dilthey,
of a

is

always

truthful

poet."

of

great
'objectivation'

This truthfulness lies

subjectivity (der to the inner

precisely in its character as "the faithful wahre Ausdruck eines Seelenlebens) The life
a work that

fidelity

of

the

work

may indeed
'

also

be that

of a
can

"religious

genius or a genuine

philosopher"

assures, moreover, that it

320).

be interpreted

"completely

and

objectively"

(V,
Writers
on

literature have thus been

swift

to embrace

Dilthey

as a thinker

fundamental to their discipline.

the self on the
understood as

Dilthey is

profiled

in that
activity.

aspect that

dignifies

basis

of expressive and

hermeneutic

His hermeneutics is

the objectivations
pretation of

promising the recovery of positive and abundant meaning from of the inner life, a practice precisely illustrated in the inter
texts
.

literary

It is therefore
work much

somewhat

ironical to discover that Dilthey's

most

important

explicitly devoted to poetics should, on closer inspection, be a brief as for the individual subjectivity as for the constitutive power of the indi life
many
of

vidual's social and political

the chief

"subjective"

components of
of social and

the poetic process

figuring

as representatives or
mean

doubles

institu
in

tional agencies. This is the thesis I

to develop.

Dilthey's involvement in
the institutional
specific
character of

politics

is

unmistakable.

It is generally
rhetoric,

evident and

the categories of

his

critical

it is

in the many indices of his fascination with the political struggles of Wilhelmine Germany. In the United States, the political dimension of his work
'Roman numerals in parentheses refer to volume numbers, Arabic numerals to page numbers, Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften, 18 vols., 1914-77- Vols. I-XII, Stuttgart: B. B. Teubner; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Vols. XIII-XVIII, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
of

302
is
almost

Interpretation
unknown, or at most it has been noticed in passing in a
existential and

philosophy

valued

for its

interpretative

pathos.

In
nized

Germany, however,
his

the question of Dilthey's politics has been scruti

both subtly

and polemically.

One debate turns

Life"

on

the support that

view of

Dil
as

they's alleged vitalism

"philosophy
of

of

and

his

history

"irrational
concerns

facticity"

is

supposed to

have lent to

fascism.2

related question and

the

uncertain

fervor

Dilthey's belief in the possibility

action.3

urgency

of social transformation and

historical

Finally,

the quiescent, concilia

serenity of his political and literary-historical conscious ness has been criticized. It led (it is alleged) to a century-long unquestioned installation of the literature of German Idealism in top position in the canon of

tory,

pseudo-Goethean

German The
putable

literary
reliance

history.4

consensus of these views

holds that
on

while

there

is indeed

an

indis
and

in Dilthey's

rhetoric

categories

drawn from

history

politics, his

tendency is to

undervalue

the possibility of rational political action.

Hans-Joachim Lieber, Josef Derbolav, and Bernd Peschken. The question, in my view, however, has not been decided. Frithjof Rodi and Christofer Zockler, for example, constitute an effective adThis is the thesis
of such writers as

Die

bluntness and vehemence by Georg Lukacs in Weg des Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. IX (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962). For Lukacs. Dilthey is the founder of the philosophy of Life regnant during the period of German imperialism an irrationalism propagated by a parasit
position was advanced with unacceptable

2This

Zerstorung

der Vernunft: Der

ical intelligentsia serving the interests of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. Hans-Joachim Lieber as serted this position, but with a good deal more tact and care, in two important articles: "Geschichte
und

Gesellschaft im Denken
and

Diltheys,"

Kolner Zeitschrift fiir Soziologie

und

und

(1965). 703-42;
Lieber's
cogently
Lieber,"

"Die deutsche Lebensphilosophie

"irrationalism"

ihre

Folgen,"

Sozialpsychologie, 17 Universitdtstage 1966,

Nationalsozialismus
charge that

und

Dilthey's

die deutsche Universitdt (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966), pp. 92-108. plsyed into the hsnds of the Nszis wss countered very
und

by

Frithjof Rodi in "Die Lebensphilosophie

philosophische

die Folgen: Zu

zwei

Aufsatzen

von

H.-J.

Zeitschrift fiir

Forschung

21

(1967), 600-12.

'Josef

Derbolsv discusses Dilthey's

subordinstion of practical energies

transformation, to theoretical
lichkeit,"

contemplativeness

in

"Dilthey

und

siming st das Problem der

und

real social GeschichtGlock-

ner

Rationalitdt, Phdnomenalitdt, Individualitdt, Festgabe fiir Hermann (Bonn: Bouvier, 1966), pp. 189-239.
4Bernd Peschken has described Dilthey's
einer germanistischen

in

Marie

conciliatory in Versuch

political consciousness as seriously vacuous and Ideologiekritik (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Ver-

lagsbuchhandlung,

1972).

Begrundung
spirit

der Hermeneutik
1975),

Christofer Zockler's study, Dilthey und die Hermeneutik: Diltheys und die Geschichte ihrer Rezeption (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche
speaks with

Verlagsbuchhandlung,
in
politics. materials

finer

nuances on

behalf

of

Dilthey's "oppositional

ist"

Zockler's

admirable

in

an effort

to define

study marshals a rich range of historical snd biogrsphicsl Dilthey's political understanding, but he suspends this venture for is
of greatest

the period after 1871, the period that

interest to

students of

Dilthey's

poetics.

My
other

own sense of

The Poetic Imagination has been

confirmed

for my thesis of the political Zockler's explicit paraphrase of his own argument: "It is the thesis of this study that in this tradition [of Dilthey-Gadamer-Habermas] no positive impulses for literary (p. 9). It simply does not follow from his work as I mean to make clear in theory are
me with corroborative evidence

by Zockler's work. It furnishes bearing of Dilthey's poetics. On the

hand I find

unintelligible

possible"

my

own
of

work,

study

by reproducing (some of) his scholarship for the very The Poetic Imagination.

purpose of

focusing

Dilthey's

Dilthey's
versary
position on

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

303

behalf

of a

rationalist, activist Dilfhey. All these writers,

about

meanwhile, are

richly

informative

little-known
of

aspects of

Dilthey's

polit

ical
able

culture and

little-stressed tendencies

in this

work

is that they leave

almost

his thought. Yet, what is remark unmentioned Dilthey's poetical chefto a

d'oeuvre, The Poetic Imagination: Contributions kraft des Dichters: Bausteine fiir eine Poetik,
should allow us

Poetics (Die A
close

Einbildungs-

to describe

with

the right

reading of this text complexity the involvement of Dil

1887).5

they's political consciousness

in his

poetic theory.

Ever

since

Georg Misch,

Dilthey's

most

faithful

disciple, declared in 1923

that "Poetics

along with the theory of history was the germ-cell of [Dilthey's] ideas about life and about the understanding of life: he continually nurtured it, continued to work on (V, ix), a good deal of commentary on Dilthey has
it"

centered

on

Dilthey's

poetics

and

especially

on

his

major

Imagination. This text

assigns

confirms

the interpreter's decision to

text, The Poetic focus on it. It

to poetic and philological analysis an exemplary

methodological charac

ter and hence presents the possibility of validating a science of the humanities.

This

claim

is based

on

the aptness of the

.

literary

object

for "causal investi

gation"

(Kausaluntersuchung) Dilthey
We

writes:

now possess observations on poetic creation and on aesthetic

receptivity (the two

are

related)

as well as accounts

[by

writers] of these processes. We can

on the outer

bring

the psycholog
of

ical insights thus

obtained to

bear

history

of

the

formation (Ausbildung)

literary
opens
causal

works.

In analyzing,

finally,

the

completed

transparent structure of these works

and thus

confirming and completing our insight into their genesis, a captivating prospect up in this domain. Here, perhaps, we could have our first success in achieving a
explanation poetic

(Kausalerklarung) from
analysis appear

generative

processes.

The

conditions

of

performing
achieve

to

make

it

possible

for it to become the first to intellectual-historical totality

(125).6

by

the

causal method

the

inner

explanation of an

(eines

geistig-geschichtlichen

Ganzen

nach

kausaler

Methode)

The

"totality"

named

here is that

of a single

literary

work.

This
tual

passage touches the

center of of

Dilthey's

concerns.

It bears its

on

intellec

history

from the
of

angle

the privileged kind of research that poetics

does

the depth

its

subject matter

(genesis),

the scope of

explanations

(causal relations), and the possibility it holds out of reliable results. Another passage often profiled in studies of Dilthey brings poetics to bear on intellectual

history

from

the angle of the privileged kind of product that

it treats. In The

Rise of Hermeneutics (Die

'This
geistige
work

Entstehung
103-241 of

der Hermeneutik, 1900),

of the

Dilthey

writes:

is found

on pp.

Vol. VI

Gesammelte Schriften,

subtitled
zur

Die

Welt:

Einleitung

in die Philosophic des Lebens,

zweite

Halfte: Abhandlungen

Poetik,

Ethik

und

Pddagogik,
a short

For

ed. Georg Misch, 2nd ed., 1957. First published in 1924. bibliography of the secondary literature, see note 13 infra.

'Arabic

numerals

in

parentheses without

Roman

numerals refer

to pages in Vol. VI.

304

Interpretation
for
our

the immeasurable importance of literature

geistigen and

understanding

of mental

life (des

Lebens) history lies in the fact that only in language does human inwardness find its complete, exhaustive and objectively intelligible expression. There
for fore the
remains

understanding has its center in the explication existence contained in writing (V, 319). human of
art of

or

interpretation of the

The first passage,

royal road

however,
of

makes explicit what

the second

does

not:

the

to the study

intellectual

tion on the distinct character of

second passage

history is specifically poetics, or literary language. It stresses, moreover,

"external,"

reflec
as

the

does not, the involvement of an potentially political dimension in the literary work; as such it is more faithful to Dilthey's poetics as
a whole.

The

passage projects a number of of

lines

of

inquiry, concerning

especially:

1. The implications
program of

the claim for the centrality of poetics within a

intellectual-historical research;
within

2. The importance
certain notion of

this claim of the power of poetics to exploit a

and practical

causality (Kausalitdt);

3. The

content of

this poetics, especially its

(cultural

and polit

ical)
with

consequences.

These issues
the intention

are

linked.

My

own remarks will move exhaustive

freely

between them

but

of

certainly doing opening them up for a discussion they have

not of stress

justice to these topics

not yet

had in the United

States. It is important to
poetics

from the outset, in the exemplary The

evidence

relation

of

to intellectual-historical understanding, its ultimately

contribution

practical

bearing,

its final

to social and political praxis.

for this

bearing

is both general,

within

the whole of Dilthey's work, and particular, in the essay

on poetics we are considering.

Consider, first,
which
ity"

the general evidence.

as a

In guiding the

enterprise

of the

Geisteswissenschaften

whole, poetics guides that

take as their object (zu ihrem Gegenstand

4).

"totality of the sciences haben) historical-social real

(here, take) is genuinely
experience.

(I,

read

this point strongly. The verb

"haben"

transitive and implies an active and selective manipulation of

manipulation

This

has

practical

force, involving, in Gadamer's

an
object."7

phrase, "the dissolu

tion of the life-bond the only way to

never tires world. of
make

the gaining of a distance to one's own

it into

And this,
we

our

history, which is own history, Dilthey

repeating, is the
power of our

history
entire

of

the social world.

experience

"Society is

our

With the
the

being,

sympathetically
we are aware of

(miterleben)
(I,
36-37)-

interplay

of social conditions.

From within,

the states and

forces

which

in

system

all

their restlessness constitute the social

To take

social

reality

as an object

is therefore to
2nd ed.

provoke a transformation

7Hans-Georg Gadamer,

Wahrheit undMethode,

(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965),

p. 5.

Dilthey's
in the investigator
theoretical.
as and

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

a change writes

305

his

experience

that is not in itself merely

"He

who

investigates

history,"

Dilthey, "is
ideal
of

the same

being

he

history"

who makes

(VII,

278).

There is

an

mastery, in its way

on

altogether

practical,
of

within

the "investigation
of

history,"

of

based
on

the

whole-

heartedness
ness

"the dissolution
of

the

life-bond"

(Gadamer)
that

the thorough the

of

an

act

self-distancing,

self-

alienation,

aims

at

"re-ex

states-of-mind"

periencing

of alien

(Dilthey).
others"

Indeed, "action is
317).

everywhere

presupposed

understanding of Historical investigation is, therefore,

understood

by

our

(V,

an act at once
of social

individual

and

social;

rightly

it is the exemplary form

praxis, for
of

our task

is

principally understanding (Begreifen) The producer and the product of such

and no

other

form

mastery (I,
structure of
of

5).

comprehension are themselves always

already
torical
strength

practical:

they
. .

precipitate more
as
.

historical life.
contains

"Every
a

his

life is finite
and

and

consequence

distribution

joyous

force,

which

similarly

releases

a new

distribution; hence,
is the
same

arise"

therefore, actions constantly The key sentence reads, "He

he
history."

(VII,

288).

who

investigates force
of

history

being

as

who

makes

The

polemical

this maxim becomes clear

when we recall

the

banality

that

ample,
charge

a certain

Machiavelli (not

is its target. In Goethe's play Egmont, for ex Niccolo) repeats to Margarete von Parma her

to him: "You see too

acts

Whoever
hand"

at

far, Machiavelli! You ought to be an historian. [i.e., makes history], must be concerned about the object closest (act I, scene 2). Dilthey's enterprise is aimed at complicating this con
different temporalities
proceeds

ception of the

informing
an action.

historical thought
This
action

and action.

Such thought

true,

with

the object

only through closest at hand

to make it
produced never

at once past

by

the labor of

but only in order longer immediate) and future (it will be re thought). What is humanly close at hand, moreover, is (it is
no a

is concerned, it is to put it at a distance,

simply present. As part of the social-historical order it is always already survivor; it exists as the objectivation, as the trace, of inner life past.
In this way objectivity in the historical
sciences

is

doubly

complex.

It is

complex as the science of an object

that,

as a

"scriptive

monument,"

can never

be

self-enclosed or self-identical.

It is complex, moreover, in
an action

being (liminally)
there

obtained make

only
to

as

the

consequence of an ascesis

difficult to learn to

but

at the

basis

of all

individual development. It is

an action that

fore

needs

be taught

and

for

which

the university is the traditional site.

Dilthey is speaking in his own voice when he writes of Humboldt's founding the University of Berlin as first, a "perhaps not as yet hoped-for sanctuary of
the
where all

(XII, 81);
scientific

and

second, as "a university in the highest

one great purpose
.

sense,"

institutions "cooperate in the

and new warmth
recent

of

arousing
states"

new

enthusiasm

for the

renascence of

the German
comments:

(XII, 80-81). A

writer,

Christofer Zockler, aptly

"Scientific freedom [i.e. objectivity] is

conceived as producible

only

by

reflec-

306
tion on

Interpretation its basis in

social

interests,

not as tied

to the fiction of

disinterested

neutrality."8

The immediate
requires social

point

is that the

act on which genuine

contributes

objectivity is founded

protection; in turn it

to the truthfulness and cohesion

of that society.

This idea is
kind

plain

in Dilthey's Introduction to the Historical

1883).

Sciences
out

(Einleitung

in die Geisteswissenschaften,
of contribution

Here

Dilthey

spells

the

specific

objectivity in the

social sciences can make

to the society that guarantees

it.
[similar to that
provided
who

It

appeared

necessary to

provide a service

by

scientists

writing

about

the basis

and method of

the

natural

sciences] to those

history, politics, jurisprudence

who standpoint of

or political

occupy themselves with economy, theology, literature and art. Those

are accustomed to approach them

devote themselves to these disciplines

the practical needs of society,

from the

from the
with

purpose of a professional educa

tion,
task.

which equips
.

the

leading helping

organs of

[The isolated professional, the technician] is

consciously
to shape

an organ

knowledge necessary for their instrument serving society, not it. This introduction means to simplify, for the
society
the
an of

politician and with

jurist,

the theologian and the pedagogue, the task the

principles and rules

becoming

acquainted

the

relation of

by

which

he is

guided to the comprehensive

reality of human society. Thus conceived, this task,

which

is founded

on the needs of practical

life,

con

fronts

a problem posed

by

the state of pure

[social] theory (I,

3-4;

emphasis added).

This "theoretical
social sciences.

problem"

is that

of

the interrelation and justification

of

the

Introduction (and

Dilthey is addressing in his in ours) is the mind that consciously produces and repro duces meaning in history. These expressions arise from a primary act of detachment9 and in turn precipitate new acts the "shaping acts of conscious
sum up: of we
selfmen."

To

the "structure

historical

life"

Translated into founds his

social

categories, Dilthey's introduction to the historical

addresses the

sciences,

as an educative

instrument,

Bildungsbiirger

the bour
powers of

geois who

sense of personal value on

his educability, his

self-cultivation.

In

documenting

the practical
made

implications for

Dilthey
I

of

the act of histor

ical understanding, I have

free

use of chronology.

move

back

and

forth

between the Reorganizers of Prussia (1807-1813) (Die Reorganisatoren des preufiischen Staates (1807-1813), 1872, in Vol. XII; the "Introduction to the in Vol. I; The Rise of Hermeneutics in Vol. V; the Plan for the Continuation of "The Construction of the Historical World in the HisHistorical
Sciences"

"Zockler, Dilthey
from Vol. I in the

und

die Hermeneutik,

p.

5.

The

passages cited

from Vol. XII

above and

paragraph

following
II); in
of

are also mentioned

"rupture."

by

Zockler

on pp. 4-5. always of

'Dilthey
self and

mitigates the violence of this

section

He

aims

to suggest a continuity

life (see infra,

person") serves
231).

self-reflection
of self

life

comes

knowingly
des Selbst]
represent

to itself. Hence what the

great poet experiences

another age

("a kind

splitting

[Spaltung

[or]

transformation into
an

finally

to produce forms that

objectively

the spirit of

historical

(166,

Dilthey's
Sciences"

Essay The

Poetic Imagination

307

torical

in der

Fortsetzung zum "Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt Geisteswissenschaften"), after 1910, in Vol. VII. Nobody reading these
detect in them the
of

(Plan der

pages could

conventional account of the

trajectory in Dil

they's

understanding

the act of
stages.

historical interpretation. This trajectory is

Life of Schleiermacher as a test inwardness (Inner-

frequently described
First, in
case

in three

the 1860s

Dilthey

conceived a

for

a method

that purported to

grasp

and represent the

lichkeit) of the historical subject, but he abandoned this project. It survives as a fragment, as testimony to the felt ineffectuality of his method and his goal. Second, the key term of his philosophy of historical in the 18 80s
"reading"

becomes "inner

experience"

(inner e Erfahrung). The term

of experience

is held

to incorporate a greater measure of constituted social and historical reality.

Third, Dilthey's late

need of

turn to the objective spirit is inspired

by
his

his continuing
suspiciousness

to defend against the objectivist scientific position and

a more powerful mode of

introspection. This turn toward Verstehen

the

these extreme positions is

fulfilled

by

the concepts of
and

mediating between Erlebnis (lived experi

ence)

and

(understanding),

involves

renewed

interest in

poetry.

This, then, is

"story."10

By
make a

moving

freely

through the range of Dilthey's

which what will

polemical

statement,

be

obvious.

texts, however, I mean to It is possible to find

throughout his works, no matter

claim

their source, propositions authorizing the

for the

intrinsically
archaic,

practical character of practical

historical

understanding. should
whose

This
while,

argument

for the
quaint.

character of thought

not,

mean and

seem

Read, for example, Foucault,

He
writes:

audacity

modernity
Thought is
or

are not

in

question.

no

longer theoretical. As

soon as

it functions it it
cannot

offends or reconciles, attracts

repels,

breaks, dissociates,
or

unites or reunites;
a

help
of

but liberate be done,

and enslave.

Even before prescribing, suggesting exhorting

merely sounding
an action

future, saying
thought,
act."

what must

even

before

an alarm,

at the

level

its existence, in its very

dawning, is in itself

a perilous

In registering the
understanding,

intrinsically
we

practical

character

of

Dilthey's historical

however,

do

not

problem runs throughout the whole

solve but merely identify a problem. The of his work, but is articulated nicely in a entire
sentence reads:

sentence we earlier abridged.

spirit

The

"These data
within

of

the

(geistige Tatsachen),

which

have developed
common

historically

the human

world and to

which, according to
of all

usage, we apply the term sciences of

man,

of

history,
above

society,

constitute

the reality which we

do

not

want

to

comprehend"

master

but

(zundchst)

to

(I,

5).

Zundchst

can

mean

l0See the
versus

similsr sccount of

Dilthey's intellectusl development in J.

Ksmerbeek, "Dilthey
Gesell-

Nietzsche,"

Studia Philosophica, Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen

(1950), 52-84. "Michel Foucsult, cited in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays by Michel Foucault, ed. Donsld F. Bouchsrd (Ithsca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. 1977), p. 5.
schaft, 10

308
"above
all,"

Interpretation
"principally," "chiefly,"

but it

can

also mean

merely "to begin

of practice ever

with"

or

"for

thing."

one

What is

Dilthey

saying?

Is the

dignity

tutes the

than, of historical thought, of comprehension? Is the truth value of instrumental action secondary? A passage in Vol. VII voluntary confirms this reading. There the energies of thought, action, and expressed
anything
more
or even as much

as, that act of self-detachment that consti

basis

"principally"

experience are contrasted.

Through the

power of a

decisive motive, the

act emerges

from the fullness

of

life into being.

one-sidedness.

However meditated, it

nonetheless expresses

Possibilities

which

lay

in this

being

are annihilated

by

only it. Thus the

a part of our act

detaches itself

from the background

which allow

clarification of the way in in it circumstances, purpose, means and life-context are connected, it does not a full-sided definition of that inwardness from which it sprang. Quite otherwise of the context of
without

life. And

the objectivation of experience !

[etc.] (VII,

206).

It is
sharpest

at this

juncture that Dilthey's

with

political critics on

the left have had their

quarrel

him. In

disputing
Hence it

the relative truth and authority of

expression and conceptual

thought versus instrumental activity,

cannot

Dilthey

speaks

mainly

on

behalf

of expression.

be the

practical component of
of an

understanding, however conceived,

which

is the

source

its dignity. The

act;

understanding
not mean

of alien states of mind value of

may be the basis for

but this does

act that

that the
or

experiencing

alien states of mind

lies in the
in

issues from it
There is, The
the time

even, paradoxically,

provokes

it.
of the sentence
question.
"provisionally,"

however,

another possible

reading

word zundchst
being,"

may indeed and describe

imply
a

nothing merely interim

more than project.

"for

The habitus

of this

thought is a familiar one from the German Idealist tradition. Schiller's Letters

Concerning
of

the

individuals
moral

must precede moral action

Aesthetic Education of Man states that the aesthetic cultivation in the sense that man is not yet ready

for

action.

When, however,

will

he be

ready?

This

consideration

is

principally postponed; at the same time it cannot allow the valorization of the aesthetic dimension over the moral, any more than it would allow in Dilthey
the valorization of even the most genuine

understanding
were

over practical

acts

(deeds)
assert

of mastery.

Only

if this

"interim"

reading

true could we

venture

to
to

the primacy of the practical act in

value and

Dilthey;
of

to do so, of course,
and,

is

diminish the intrinsic

aesthetic

importance

historical

by implication,
leads to

understanding.

The

sort of practical

bearing they

contain

comprehension and not

than

"mastering being

mastery or, indeed, only to what a modern writer calls [the 'relations between things'] by knowing them from outside rather
. .

in the

relationships."12

Such ambivalence,

however,

pervades all of

Dilthey's

work and so cannot

12Norman Holland, "Transactive Criticism: Re-creation through

Identity,"

Criticism,

18

(1976),

336.

Dilthey's
be
permitted at

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

It may
not

309
possible to assert

this point to arrest our analysis.

be

unequivocally that the mere

performed

decision

to perform aesthetic analysis

as

it is

in The Poetic Imagination

to assert

has itself

a measurable practical mean

ing. I

still mean

it,

and

to stress for the moment the less disputable

idea that the

performs

analysis

that

Dilthey
for

or,

by

his

own

account, any
which

aesthetician

has

a practical social meaning. prepared

This idea,
with

is

plain

in The Poetic

Imagination, is
The

by

an

analogy

the relation in Vol. I between

the cultural system of law and the external organization of law.

cultural system of and

law

comprises

individual

acts and theories

informed

by,
of

articulating,

authorizing legal
code

consciousness.

The

external organization

law is the legal

related.

mately

Dilthey

enforcing positive law. The two, however, are inti notes that both the cultural system of law and its ex
always and

ternal organization

"exist

only

side

by

side and with one another. and

To be sure, they

are not connected as cause

of of

(Ursache)

effect, but

each

has dif

the other as the condition

its

existence.

This

relation

is

one of the most

.

ficult

and

important forms

the causal
of an

(kausal)
way.

relation

(I,

55).
of

Rudolf

Makkreel,
in the

author

important full-length study

Dilthey,

comments on

this passage in a suggestive

above passage

It is

significant that

Dilthey

rejects the substantive

Ursache

and

uses the adjective

kausal in

introducing

a mode of coexistence
mind

the

human

studies.

What he may have had in

particularly important for is that Ursache can be etymologi-

cally
in

analyzed

causation

into Ur-sache, meaning primary fact. It is exactly this aspect of primacy that Dilthey finds inappropriate in the human studies and wants to exclude reciprocity
when which

from his

proposed notion of a

is kausal. Just
when

as

causality in the

strict

explanative sense was not applicable to

with states of

consciousness, so

psychology considering the

mere

relation of the

correlating ideal

neural processes and the actual

in the

other systematic

Geisteswissenschaften,
is the

we cannot
effect.13

simply

make one

the primary

fact (Ur-sache)

of which the other

be inclined, however, considering the context of Dilthey's reflections on law, to leave to one side the psychological parallel, and instead substitute for the word in Dilthey's sentence the more direct word
I
should
"causal"
"political."

l3Rudolf Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies (Princeton: Princeton Univ. 1975), p. 66. Makkreel's study contains an extensive discussion of The Poetic Imagination but gives no account of the political and historical consciousness elaborated in this work. This bearing is consistently absent from other works discussing The Poetic Imagination, as, e.g., Rene

Press,

Wellek's "Wilhelm Dilthey's Poetics

Theory,"

and

Literary

Wdchter
pp.

und

Huter, Festschrift fiir

and

Hermann J. Weigand (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957),

1974).

121-32;

Michael Heinen's

Die Konstitution der Asthetik in Wilhelm Diltheys Philosophie (Bonn: Bouvier

Verlag

Herbert

Kurt Muller-Vollmer, in Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Literature: A Grundmann, Study of Wilhelm Dilthey's Poetik (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), mentions an "historical conscious in Dilthey's poetics but never his concrete sense of political and institutional forces. Frithjof
ness"

Rodi's lucid
the

work, Morphologie und

Hermeneutik. Zur Methode

von

Berlin. Cologne, Mainz: W. Kohlhammer, 1969) briefly discusses

political character and effect of own approach,

writers who

Diltheys Asthetik (Stuttgart, have reflected on Lieber (cf.

note

Rodi's

however,

eschews all attention

Dilthey's work, like Lukacs to Dilthey's

and

2, supra).

political awareness and effect.

310
The interaction
of political

Interpretation
of

legal theorizing

and

enforcing

positive

law

occurs as a

play

forces.

Dilthey
into

remarks:

"Even the

consciousness of
will"

law is

not a

theoretical state-of-affairs

but

a state-of-affairs of

the

(I,

55).

"And the
articu

study lated

of the systems cannot

which

the

practical action of

society has been

it"

be

separated

influences
added).

all external actions of

from the study of the political body, since its will the individuals subject to (I, 52; emphasis
purposes"

The
tions

will

is

"context

of

bent

on objectivation

all

objectiva-

being, for Dilthey,

politics

at once texts and

institutions.14

Institutional force
of

hence

is the

key

(if

sometimes

inexplicitly

stated) direction

Dil

they's essay on poetics. The practice of poetic analysis bears vitally on the
cultural system of

literary

works, their

mode of

production,

and on the

"polit

ical

body."

If

nowadays

(in 1887),
the

writes

Dilthey,

poetics, the
of

cultural

system

of

literary

works,

and

external

organization

society have

cleaved

wide

apart, that is because

anarchy prevails in the wide domain of literature in all nations. Our [German] aesthetics, to be sure, is still alive here and there on the lecturer's rostrum but no longer in the
consciousness of the

leading

artists or

critics, and only there would it be

[truly]

alive.

When, ever since the French Revolution, the monstrous realities of London and Paris, in whose souls a new kind of poetry is circulating, attracted the attention of
writers as well as

the public, when

Dickens

and

Balzac began to it

compose the epic of

was all over

that

modem

life coursing through these cities,

and

at that moment

for the

principles of that poetics which once upon a time

in idyllic Weimar had been debated

art grows

by

Schiller, Goethe
else around us

Humboldt.

Thus today

democratic, like everything

(104-05).

The
and

vital task

is that

of

art."

This task falls to

(104).

"restoring the healthy relation of aesthetic thought "contemporary philosophy and the history of art and
force to the in the
academic

literature"

Now

"institutional"

we

will

grant

disciplines

of

philosophy

and

theorizing
it is

about

literary history, but poetics? This bearing

in this
essay.

"political"

force? And

political

force

to

is

explicit

passage
of

above,

although

inner contexts, texts and institutions, in Dilthey, is frequently only speculative. Yet Dilthey, in his essays, encourages us, by his example, to take up and valorize the inexplicit. In, for example, a closely linked sequel to The Poetic Imagination, the
not always so

The

political

bearing

essay called "The Three Stages of Modern Aesthetics and Its Task ("Die drei Epochen der modernen Asthetik und ihre heutige

Today"

Aufgabe,"

1892),

Dilthey

fashions

a polemic against

"experimental"

aesthetics.

He

concludes

by

attacking its "isolated

l4On the
"text,"

impressions,"

analysis of
cf.

noting that the

"driving

interest

word

considered
cation

his task
of

as that of

by

conceiving

the

Wahrheit und Methode. pp. 227ff., esp. p 227: "Dilthey providing the Geisteswissenschaften an epistemological justifi historical world as a text to be
deciphered."

Gadamer,

Dilthey's
behind
all reflection on art

Essay
. .is

The Poetic Imagination

the question of the
extent

311
art

function of

in the
can

intellectual economy of human life. To the

given a more

that this question

must expect with

be

rigorous

answer,"

from the
study

connection

of

he continues, "we the analysis of impressions

there is

it to

emerge

the historical-social

of art.

Here, too,

a point at which a circle

in the

efforts of

the

analysts of the

toward art, an

impression swiftly makes itself felt. Some sort of inner position idea of its inner significance, will guide their work, even where
presuppositions"

they have

no consciousness of such

(265-66). It is

impossible,

Dilthey is
meaning

saying, to

practice poetics without notion

bringing

of art.

This

is

a reflection of of

into play a notion of the the social and historical situation

of the aesthetician:

"The understanding
and
of consciousness

the world
can

(Weltverstdndnis)

which

['philosophical

thought'

'poetic creation']
and

have is determined

by

the
of

historical

situation

is

relative"

(232). But this line

so that

determinations is indeed
ment.

line

of

force

that

flows in both directions,

a

it is

also

impossible to

assign an

Ur-sache,

The

specific practice of aesthetics

in turn

primary cause, to its move modifies the "inner position

art"

toward

that guides it. That inner position (to cite Foucault again)
offends or
"

is,

as

thought, "no longer theoretical. It

reconciles,

attracts

or

repels,

breaks, dissociates,
understanding
of

unites,

or reunifies.

The

object of this action

is the
art"

the world that inspires it. And that understanding, that con
or consolidates

sciousness, thus revised, in turn transforms

the "function of
life."

in the historical situation, in the "intellectual economy of human Indeed, this circle of cooperating determinations is in its form the very trope of Diltheys thought and in its substance exemplary. Idea and

objectiva-

tion,

poetic

imagination

and

social

text,

are

moments

in that

reciprocal

ex

change

that

Dilthey

calls

Kausalitdt. The

pivotal

terms of the

human

order are

art and the

historical

situation grasped as

foci

econo

of an

"intellectual

This double
appear

privilege

in Dilthey's
structures

system

has

often

been

perceived.

"There

in the images

and

[of

art],"

writes

Peter Hiinermann, "the

of a

ruling figures in
milieu,
of

which

the

thought,
...

feeling
At the in

and

activity

generation,

this

age

are reflected.
change."15

same time

they
is

are

themselves

subject to

historical

The field

of this exchange
which

politics.

The

word

is to be

understood

in both the

wide sense

I have been using

sense,
to repeat this point

it,

as

equivalent

to

social and

historical

life,

and

in the

more concrete

as the are

regulation of

institutional forces. All institutions. We

objectivations

at once texts and

will therefore not

be surprised, then, to find

the
expression

in the

analytical practice of
. . .

Dilthey

himself
felt."

the

analyst of

"a

point at which a circle

makes

itself

Dilthey's
of

poetics

is informed

by

reasons, he political consciousness, even if, for a variety profile this consciousness in its more concrete form.

will not or cannot

My

own concern

is to fill in the

political context of

the "inner significance

19.

15Peter Hiinermann, Der Durchbruch

geschichtlichen

Denkens im

Jahrhundert (Freiburg,

Basel, Vienna: Herder,

1967), p. 151.

312
art"

Interpretation
that
guides

of

Dilthey's

own poetics.

stress

this

even

in

a work

preoccupied with subjectivity.

The

path

to a political reading of this essay

ostensibly lies

through a

renewed examination of

its

subjectivity.

The first
one.

obstacle to a political

reading

of

Dilthey's

poetics

is
of

a general

Stated

briefly,
post-

the very possibility

of a reciprocal

involvement

the terms

subjectivity
mantic and

and political power

Romantic texts,
are

idea that these terms

this
sur prejudice.

is generally discounted or overlooked in Ro intent are we on reading into these texts the antithetical, adversary. Writers are at work altering
so

Paul de

Man, for

example,

notes apropos of

Rousseau's Ecrits

V Abbe de Saint Pierre, "Consciousness of selfhood (se connaitre), whether individual or political, is itself dependent on a relationship of power and origi
this
relationship."16

nates with

This

example of

the correction of an intellectual-historical prejudice

is

not

haphazard;
Rousseau
contributed

the fortunes of

Dilthey

and

Rousseau

are

linked. The

conception of

as

promoting individual ineffable subjectivity is one to which Dilthey at one point in his career but to which he does not (or need not)

finally
explicit

contribute.

The

change

in Dilthey's understanding

of

Rousseau is

not Er-

but

occurs

through Dilthey's changing conception of the

category

lebnis ("lived

experience").

The term Erlebnis, surprisingly

course,
recent:

which not

is

crucial

coin current used

in

modern

it

was

contributes of

fundamentally

commonly to its naturalization. The

until the

1870s.

German, is Dilthey, of
recurs

word

in

his
The

biography
on main

Schleiermacher

(1870)
which of

and above all

in the first
with

version of

his essay

Goethe (1877), in

he

contrasts

Goethe

Rousseau.

event

in the

naturalization

the term

Erlebnis, especially in its

now almost obligatory association with literary expression, is Dilthey's volume Lived Experience and Poetry (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung); but this collec

tion of essays, with

its

powerful of

title, did

not appear until

1905.

In the 1877

version

the Goethe essay,

however,

the term Erlebnis

recurs, although not

Dilthey

uses

standpoint

with the meaning it has in Dilthey's later technical usage. it mainly to describe Rousseau's novel mode of writing from the of his inner experience. The key point is In this stage of
"inner."

Dilthey's

conception of and

Erlebnis,
mean

the meaning of the

word shifts

from

context who

to context,
comments
phrase.

it

can

wholly interior

construction.

Gadamer,

informatively Dilthey is describing

on as one

these matters, cites from this essay the

a certain

following
and

imaginative
of

construction of

Rousseau

defines it
together

Rousseau, "in light (zusammenphantasierte) as lived

that
spun
. .

his ignorance

of the world, spun

experience."17

But, Gadamer

notes,
sense

"An Erlebnis that has been

'erleben'

together does not fit in with the original

. . .

of

The

'erleben'

word

carries the aura of the

immediacy
256.

in

16Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1979), p. "Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 58. This entire discussion of the history Erlebnis is devoted to s discussion of this subject on pp. 56ff.
Gadamer'

of the word

Dilthey's
the way something real
asserts one experience

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

313
which one also

knows but
alleged

which

is grasped, as opposed to something is not corroborated by one's own

experience."18

An
the

original sense of

be entirely imaginary, then, does not fit in erleben, nor does it match any better "Dilthey's own
to
which

with

scientific

use

of the

term in his mature period, where Erlebnis means, precisely, the

immediate
tions."19

donnee,

is the basic

material

of all

imaginative

construc

Rousseau's influence
authenticating
standard of

on

European Romantic
of

writers

was

to make the
experience.

experience, especially

cognition, lived

But

by

understanding Dilthey's conceptions

moreover,
are
'Erlebnis'

our

of what such a standard can

of

have

meant

has been

shaped

Romanticism

and

lived

experience

conceptions

which,

neologism

firm. When Gadamer writes, for example, "The obviously invokes a critique of the rationalism of the
not

Enlightenment
Life,"

a word which

in the

wake of

Rousseau

validated

the concept

of not

he is repeating

a commonplace strengthened at certain moments

(but

uniformly)

by

Dilthey.20

This is the

notion

that there exists a fundamental

difference between,
on

on

the one

hand,

political consciousness and

the other, experience shaped

by

the requirements of a unique

activity and, inwardness.

What does it mean,

advocate of

finally,

when

Dilthey is

represented as theorist and

the category Erlebnis? In his mature

and

work

the term is projected as a

subject

totalizing category fusing Inner

and object.

Outer, preceding

the dissociation of

But it has

otherwise

tended (not without Dilthey's support) to be

understood as

We do

not

subjectivity pure and simple. have to return to 1877 to find the

feeling"

subjective sense of

Erlebnis.

In The Poetic Imagination itself, for example,

nis with

"that vitality which is enjoyed in aesthetic is only subsequently grasped sented in an image (Anschauung) (117).

Dilthey lines up the term Erleb and which, by virtue of "the

as

form

or

subsequently
who

repre

This Dilthey's into

an

terminological
retrograde

difficulty

is

analyzed

by

Frithjof Rodi,

identifies

"Cartesian"

Inner

and

spirit

in

which

tendency But, Rodi points out, this division is contrary to the Dilthey writes indeed, later on in the very text of The Poetic
Outer.21

to split apart the category of Erlebnis

Imagination Inner
and

that "The real core of poetry, 'spirit and

Erlebnis,
and

contains

a relation

of

garment,'

Outer,

inspiration

materialization, the sig

nificance of structure or of phonetic sequence and the

"

fleeting

psychic moment

(226). At

various

figurative visibility of the moments Erlebnis may mean,

'"Gadamer,

Wahrheit

und und und

Methode,

pp.

59,

57.

"Gadamer, ;"Gadamer, Wahrheit

2lFrithjof Rodi,
19.

Wahrheit

Methode,
Methode
,

p. 59.
p. 59.
Diltheys,"

"Grundziige

der Poetik Wilhelm

and

Beitrdge

zur

Theorie der Kunste im

a.

Jahrhundert,

ed.

H. Koopmann

J. A. Schmoll-Eisenwerfh (Frankfurt

Main: V.

Kloster-

mann, 1971),

pp. 79-8o.

314

Interpretation
experienced.

alternately, a state of mind or the event

This

vacillation

does

not

finally

trouble

Rodi; he is

certain

that

in reality, however, Dilthey Erlebnis, the interpenetration

pulsing inwardness
which still needs which

always
"Inner"

has before him,

"Outer."

as

of needs

and

With this
or

dynamic unity of [term] he means neither

the
experienced
of

still

to assume structure,

factuality

to be grasped in its significance. When he speaks

the two components of the interpenetration

two possibilities,
and

he does
two

("Inner"

not mean

"Outer"), but
life
and

modes of

their

interplay,

two

Both
of

"Erlebnis"

are called

and

equally can be differentiated only

inspiration.22

privileged

forms

of

the unity of

form.

by

the "direction of the process

phantasy"

as materialization and

This salvaging attempt does not work. It does not eliminate the but merely shifts it onto a plane of increased complexity. At first

division,
we were
"outer'

forced to distinguish between

Erlebnis (event

"inner"

an

Erlebnis (state
to

of

mind)

and an

experienced).

According

Rodi, however, Dilthey

always

means to name with Erlebnis a prereflexive unity of mind and event, an un varying interpenetration of Inner and Outer. This unity nonetheless occurs in two different modes. We are now faced with the distinction between an

"inner"

inner-outer Erlebnis
tion)
and

(phantasy)

"outer"

and an

inner-outer Erlebnis

(objectiva-

hence

divided

meaning.
him"

Rodi only
inner

cannot tell us which

what we

but meaning Dilthey "always has before "always have before the printed page. will namely, Dilthey
us"

frequently
life,
impulse
would

stress the subjective

dimension its

of

Erlebnis

as the

felt

intensity

of

and as a result underplays

the degree

of metamorphosis

the aesthetic

receives

in the

course of attempt

materialization.

The

vacillation persists.

It

be important to
the vacillation.

to

determine in
The

each case

the position and the

logic

of

Yet this is

not the task at

hand

now.

main point at

this juncture is that

Dilthey's oscillating conception of Erlebnis has tended to be interpreted all on the side of inwardness. My concern is to evoke a horizon of understanding in
which

the material and,

can

finally,

the political component of the concept

of

Erlebnis The way in

be identified

and given

its due.

resistance

to this perspective

is,

entrenched

in the American

reception of

I have suggested, particularly Dilthey. I shall glance briefly at the

as

of American critics indeed in those whose philosophical sophistication and of knowledge precisely Dilthey is beyond any doubt and who, in other places, plainly register Dilthey's effort which

this obstacle appears in a number

to enlarge the

field

of

the

individual subjectivity in the direction

on

of an

"intel

lectual

economy."

Richard Palmer's essay

Dilthey

in his Hermeneutics: Interpretation

Theory
usual

Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer opens with the stress. writes Palmer, "began to see in hermeneutics the foun"Dilthey,"
Diltheys,'

in

22Rodi, "Grundziige der Poetik

p.

82.

Dilthey's

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

that
.

315
which

dations for the Geisteswissenschaften interpret

expressions of man's

is,

...

all

those disciplines
added].23

inner life

"

[emphasis
which

Dilthey's

critique of

Kant turns

on

justice to the inner,

added].24

Kant's category historical character

"feeling,"

did

not

"seem to do [emphasis

of

human

subjectivity"

Palmer's
ing," "will,"

mode of
"life"

and

to the

constituting Dilthey's full subject is then to add "feel What is left out of this addition knowing
subject.25

is the

social and political

of

dimension

a nonpsychological or not

merely

psycho

logical definition

interest.
account

You do
more

not

find in Palmer's

this sort

of

Diltheyan
. . .

sentence:

"Far

intricate,

more mysterious

than our own organism

Society

that

is,

the entire

historical-social reality confronts the individual as an object of scrutiny. In it the current of events flows unstoppably, while the particular individuals of which it consists appear on the stage of life and then take their leave. Thus the individual finds himself in it as an element in circulation with
other elements.
. . .

We

are

forced to

master

the

image

of social conditions

in

perpetually
through

active

value-judgments,

to restructure

it,

at

least conceptually,

incessant

will-power"

tence is Palmer's

paraphrase of

How adequate, then, to this sen Dilthey: "We [do not] experience life in the

(V,

36-37).

'power'

mechanical categories of will.

Such

resistances can

be

multiplied at

Fredric Jameson

responds

to the same crux

in Dilthey's thought
relation.

as

did
on

Frithjof Rodi, namely, that

start"

of

the subject-object
Hermeneutics,"

Commenting
to

Dilthey's essay "The Rise of in constituting the Erlebnis-like "false

a

Jameson

alludes

Dilthey's

act of an

junction

of an

understanding

monad

and

understood

understanding (Verstehen) as monad. Jameson

writes:
of Verstehen itself is not without its own shortcomings; and we may feel today that thus construed, the dilemma is insoluble; that where the subject is thus initially and irrevocably separated from its object, or the understanding monad from

Even the doctrine

well

the

monad

understood, no amount of theoretical or

descriptive

ingenuity

can put them

back

together again.

Any

successful

after the

fact, in

the

presence of an

understanding must in other words begin understanding or an interpretation already

theory

of

realized.27

How

well-founded on

Dilthey's text is this

of

statement?
on

Dilthey

is in fact

lot

closer to a

"successful theory

Jameson's

account than

Jameson is ready to admit. At the outset of the essay,

Dilthey

describes the

object

of intellectual-

2,Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory inSchleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger

and

Gadamer

(Evanston:

Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969),

pp. p. p. 100-01.

p. 98.

;4Pslmer, Hermeneutics. 25Palmer, Hermeneutics, 26Palmer, Hermeneutics,

:

102. 101.
Hermeneutics."

Fredric Jameson, "The Rise

of

New

Literary History, 3 (1972),

230.

316

Interpretation

historical understanding in such a way as precisely to extract from it its objectcharacter. He writes, "Human studies (Geisteswissenschaften) have indeed the
advantage over

the natural sciences that their object is not the phenomenon as it

is

given

to the senses,

[i.e.] is

no mere reflection

in

consciousness of

something

real, but is itself immediate inner reality and thus,

coherent structure

indeed,

as

a context or

(Zusammenhang) is
,

experienced

from

within"

(V, 317-18)

[translation

and emphasis mine].

Jameson's translation curiously

omits the word

"immediate."

plains

After reading this passage, how can one complain as Jameson com that Dilthey's theory of understanding fails to begin "after the fact, in

the presence of an understanding transparent as to

its

structure

already realized"? An interior is already (at least implicitly) understood.

"already-realized"

object

The In the

same nuance of

the

character of

the object to be
soon after. not quite supplies. which an

understood

is

present

in

another

formulation

of

Dilthey's

following

same

essay

Dilthey

supplies a

definition

of

understanding
as

but

the same one as

Jameson, in his slightly

of

tendentious

translation,

Jameson translates this definition

understanding

the "process

by

inside is

signs."

conferred on a complex of external writes

sensory

But

what

Dilthey
to

is, "We term understanding the process by know (erkennen) an inner dimension from signs which are

literally

which we come
given

to the senses
not

from the

outside"

(V,

318).
a

The conferring
an

"insideness"

of

is

done,
at

as

Jameson suggests, from

and power outside.

subjectivity,

interiority,
object,

which

in its

magnetism

draws in

and endows an external

meager and

halted

the

Coherent determinations inwardness

and

are not supplied

"insidable."

to the naked sign, whence it

acquires

becomes

in this exchange, it is done by the object; an signs; these signs come from the outside. This
earlier complement each other quite plain

If there is any conferring implied inner dimension is read off from

passage and the passage cited
way.

in

an

important

The

earlier passage made

"inside"

that the object

an

of

historical understanding is

always

already

the subject
passage

inner reality

defining
we

understanding,

immediately apprehensible to a subjectivity. In the Dilthey in turn supplies the sign-like outer ob

ject

"insideness"

an

What

that it virtually confers upon the cognizing consciousness. have here is not inconsistency but a fine adumbration of the

hermeneutic
exchange,

circle

or, if

you

prefer, that reciprocity

of

cooperation,

of mutual nexus.

which

defines Dilthey's
as an

conception of the causal

are

(kausal)

If

Dilthey's

shortcomings
on

historical thinker

grounded,

according to
we

Jameson,
see that

the alleged shortcomings of his psychological

hermeneutics,

the suspicion is premature. There is nothing in Dilthey's account of the the subject/object relation in historical
under

Inner/Outer, relation in Erlebnis;

standing
provoke

(Verstehen);

or

the cause/effect relation in

the charge of unhistorical subjective

causality (Kausalitat) to idealism. The alerted reader will

objectivity
and the political character of the

find that
of

Dilthey

has

insistently

marked out the social and political

the field in which the subject feels its

life

Dilthey's
mode

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

on

317
him.
of

by

which

the subject regulates the different claims that life makes

shapes

The
acts

political

model

even what

is

alleged

to be the

most

internal

inspirations. The field (in

politics of

the

"outer"

field (the

concrete political

strug

gles of a certain stage

in the

evolution of

German society) for

and the politics of as we

the inner
seen:

a word

"psychology")
Dilthey's

are

inextricably involved,
an

have

that

is
of

what underlies

repeated appeal

"historical psy

chology"

the human spirit.

The
ness

most comprehensive

term

for this imbrication

.

of politics and

inward

in

Dilthey

is

"causality"

(Kausalitdt)

Causality

evokes
either

cause/effect

model

that resists absolutely the attribution of

firstness to defines

term. Indeed it

is the
more

uniform operation of

this model of causality in the historical sciences that,

the historical sciences
are
spirit"

than the specification of a suitable object,

as such.

We

realize that

"data

of

the

(geistige

Tatsachen)

precisely

those

data that

submit the

"investigator"

to the

hermeneutic

circle.

In this

perspective

Dilthey

energizing has already anticipated

perplexities of the

Heideg

ger's potentiation of the some

understanding category activity of cognition; understanding is a constitutive category of Dasein (human being). Dilthey is still prepared to demark a zone of theoretical ac

of

as more than cognition or

tivity
of

that of performing natural science

which

is free from the

reciprocities

causality; but he does this mainly to signal the special depth of involve ment of the historical sciences in such models, in such a mode of being.

Part
of

of the obstacle

the cause/effect relation

in appreciating the originality of Dilthey's formulation in interpretive experience will hardly come as a
with us since

surprise; it is that it has been

as a surprise

Dilthey. It

would

evidently

come

any rate, as the token of an unsuspected modernity for writers on aesthetics in countries governed by a prevailing materialism. We read, for example, in a recent manual from East Germany, the following
or,
at

laudatory
The
"takes"

citation of a certain concept of

literary
reader's

reception.

concept of reception

is

shaped

from the

standpoint.

The

reader

himself

the

work

as the

object which

is his donnee. On
in

the other

hand,
itself

the concept of
also

"received"

effect stresses the angle of the work:

being

the work

takes the

reader,

operates an effect on

him. in
which

What

we

have before

us

is

not therefore a causal relation,

reader as effect reader.

the work occurs as the effects of the

of

cause and the events work

in the

or, conversely,

in

which

have their
in

cause

in the

It is

a question of a special
interpenetrate.28

form

reciprocity, a

relation

which

both

members

mutually that the North Pole

We have here the

second time.

feeling

is

being

discovered for the

Dilthey

was

there first.

28Manfred Naumann, ed., Gesellschaft, Literatur, Lesen (Berlin-Weimar, n.p., 1973), p. 87. Zur Geschichte des Verhdltnisses von Cited in Norbert Krenzlin, Das Werk "rein fiir

Phdnomenologie, Asthetik

und

Literaturwissenschaft (Berlin:

Akdemie-Verlag,

1979),

p. 71.

318

Interpretation
II

It is

now

time to look at the concrete

political

dimension

of

Dilthey's

exemplary text, The Poetic Imagination. We shall attend particularly to the figurative underlayer of Dilthey's language. His images again and again are of
political

interaction

and conflict.

Grasped in their

real

historical context, they

alone can
argument.

help

us understand

some of

the obscurity and conflict in

Dilthey's

The

presence can of

of

an

institutional

political

consciousness

in The Poetic
the work

Imagination

be felt from the

outset.

Almost

all readers will read

in Vol. VI

the Collected Writings.

1886

There,

the text

is

printed

immediately

following
dents

essay "Poetic Imagination and Einbildungskraft und Wahnsinn"), which was delivered to
the
at an

Madness"

("Dichterische
this essay

an audience of stu

academy for army doctors. The concluding thus appears on the page facing The Poetic Imagination
as

sentence of and reads our and

inescapably
Emperor in

its

epigraph:

whom

ment"

defend his majesty we honor an example (Vorbild) of all noble, humane (102). The Poetic Imagination then follows.

"May

God

preserve and

lofty

senti

What meaning for this work, if any, has Dilthey's gesture of political deference? One trembles a little from this sentence for the fate of the poetological
"example"

word

(Vorbild).

Presumably

the word means one

thing

when

it

is

written

to

characterize

the relation of poetics to all other

intellectual-historical
and all
might

disciplines,
humane
sance to

and another when

it is

spoken of

Kaiser Wilhelm I

"noble,
be
con

and

lofty
(1)
crown.

sentiment."

The Poetic Imagination, then,

contesting,
or view

ceived of as

extending,

(2)

(3) entirely bypassing

which

this obei

the

But if

we

incline to the third

position of all without once

those commentators who have

written on we

is evidently the The Poetic Imagination

ourselves

alluding to its

political character

find

from the

start

having

to

read against

the grain. From the outset the work is explicitly

a social

oriented

to the life of literature as

institution,

as a species of social praxis.

It is

misleading to the thrust of The Poetic Imagination to stress apropos of it, as does Makkreel, that "literature constitutes a cultural system where public insti
tutions are of minimal
narrower and more an

importance.

This is to

"institution"

conceive of
essay.

in

harmless

sense than

Dilthey

does in this

Literature is
acts of

institution for

Dilthey

because it institutes

relations of

force between

creation, enjoyment, and theorizing.

Threading

through these three kinds of

activity and most conspicuously in acts of enjoyment is the movement of desire. Where there is the recognition of aesthetic form, there is the acknowl edgment paid by desire to force. 29Makkreel, Dilthey, p. 81. Dilthey does make statements in the Introduction to the Histor ical Sciences, for example, in I, 158 that specifically diminish the institutional character of the arts. On the other hand, he speaks of the process which a style comes to dominate as a "question
force"

by

of

(Machtfrage)
in
other

pure and simple

(VI,

274): the process

by

which artistic

domination

arises

is

the same as

institutional

struggles.

Dilthey's
Peter Brooks
narratives.

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

force
of plots

319
in
verbal

makes

this point in writing about the

plots must

"As

well as

form,

have force: the force that

the confused

makes

the

connection of

an

incident powerful, that intentional structure which in turn

powerful
of

shapes

material of a

life into
can

generates new
which

insights

about

how life

be told. The
buried
past
language."30

fiction is that

is

able to restage the complex and

history
As
a

desire

as

it covertly
art,

reconstitutes

itself in the

present

theorist

of verbal

Dilthey

is

deeply

involved in

play

of

desire

force. This is especially the case forms alone, but on the genesis of literature
and genetic account of a

when

he writes,

not on

literary

as a social of

first

state

may be may be

understood as an
grasped

allegory
as

institution. For, if a norms; if the instantiation

of a native and
with

invariably

the

instantiation

natural,
political

hence force.

authentic

being; he

thus writes normatively and hence

The first
of

sign of

literature

as a social

institution
of

appears at the

very

outset

the essay:

Dilthey

writes about

the influence
with

traditional poetics on philo

logical
of

practice.31

He does so,

however,
"Crisis"

the awareness of a crisis in the life

at

the institution of literature.

separation.32

is linked

its

root

(xoiveiv)
of

with

the

concept of

separation and

When philology is named, it is named as divisiveness that has occurred within the institution

a sign of the

literature.
of

It is

named as

marking the separation within this institution

of

the agencies

production, reception,

theory (poetics),
of a

and

its
as

own analytic practice.

Dilthey
creative

conceives

future

poetics

joining

once

powerful

and

tradition of poetic
can

theory

that has fallen into anarchy and impotence.

The tradition Aristotelian

be

and

the German Idealist.

as the enterprise of

having functioned in two vital moments: the Dilthey specifically considers his program and (119) "supplementing furnishing a deeper
grasped as
foundation"

30Peter Brooks, "Fictions (1979), 80.

of

the Wolfman: Freud and Nsrrative

Understanding,"

diacritics, 9

"One
an

effect of

the

new poetics on philological practice would

temptation to found itself

on

linguistics. It

"historical for

psychology."

Dilthey

be to detach philology from any philology instead squarely on the basis of followed linguistics. Muller-Vollmer notes Dilthey's close
would place was

relation with nal

Lazarus

and

Steinthal:
and

Dilthey

"involved in

[their]

venture of

founding

jour

social

psychology

comparative

linguistics,

the well-known Zeitschrift fiir

Volker-

psychologie und

and contributed a number of articles to it (90). If philology in mid-nineteenth-century Germany can be fairly described as inspired by the methodology and specific findings of linguistics, then Dilthey's enterprise can be grasped as a reassertion of the of
resit-

Sprachwissenschaft"

(nonspeculative. nonexperimentsl) poetics over philology snd of the necessity of uating philology. The crucial difference between poetics and linguistics-based philology is based the same as those which can the fact that "the productive powers which form language are

priority

on

by

and

large be

grasped not

in the life

of mind.

Their

relation

to the language

process

(Sprachvorgang),

however, is
the

in any way

experienced

but is instead

arrived at

by

deduction. On this is founded

(125).

method"

relation of the method of

linguistics to
and

natural scientific and

,2See Deric Regin, Freedom

Dignity: The Historical

(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 28; and also in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971). De Man writes: takes place, by self- reflection, between what, in "We can speak of crisis when a original intent and whst hss irrevocsbly fsllen away from this with the is in conformity literature,
'separation'
source"

Philosophical Thought of Schiller Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays

(8).

320
to the theorem
and
of

Interpretation
Idealist
aesthetics associated with

the

names

Kant, Schiller,
the

Schopenhauer. This theorem in brief "shifts into

center-position

impor

tance of feelings for aesthetic

processes"

(119). But

as

both these

moments

the Aristotelian and the Idealist

writes

Dilthey, have

shaped

the practice and

self-understanding of philology, it follows that Dilthey's own psychological and historical poetics will also transform philological practice, if even in ways

it

cannot envisage precisely.

In Dilthey's narrative, Aristotelian

ature and

poetics
of

dominated the

practice of

liter
"the

philology

until

the second

half

the

eighteenth century.

It
to

was

tool of poets at work and the

dreaded
the

standard of critics through

Boileau,

Gottsched, and Lessing. It interpretation, critique and

The

was

most effective

auxiliary

of the philological

evaluation of

Greek

literature"

(103).
part of

hegemony

of

Aristotelian

poetics was usurped aesthetics.

in the latter

the

eighteenth
work of

century by Goethe and Schiller

and

German Idealist
and

This

aesthetics shaped the

the critical perspectives of

Humboldt,
in the

Schel-

ling, Hegel,
It

the

Schlegels;

and

finally
as

it utterly transformed
worked out

philology.
struggle
with

supplemented rational

hermeneutics
and the

it had been

be
that

tween Tridentine

Catholicism

Protestants
whose

and extended
rules

by

Emesti

aesthetically-founded procedure of
work.

hermeneutic

praxis

Schleiermacher,
based

Friedrich Schlegel, derived from the

principle of the

form

following the of a literary

reason, the
criticism

It

supplemented

those value-discriminations and a criticism

metrical and rhetorical

on

rules,

and

grammatical,

techniques

with

that aesthetic

which proceeded

from

the analysis of
and

form

and whose

important

results are evident

in

the

work of

Wolf, Lachmann

their successors.
of the old

Indeed this German

aesthetics accel still

erated

the fall in France

and

England

forms

and

influenced the first

tentative productions

of a new poetic age

(103).

This German

discovery

is

conceived

from the
said to

start

as

having
a

political

force,
and

as

hastening

the fall of older cultural and

aesthetics

institutional forms in France

have had
forms"

England. German Idealist

on two societies

is

impact
of

which, unlike

Germany, had
practice,

revolutions

revolutionary in every area

their

life

except

the aesthetic. If these fallen "older

to some extent

allude

to the older
of change effect

forms

of philological

we

see

that the political

par excellence
and

force

in

aesthetics
philology.

has (Or

once again put more

been illustrated

by its

upon

moderately, philology

the

immediate forms
essay for The
political

of artistic

production and consumption are throughout this

Dilthey
political

the objects of the political

force

of

aesthetics.)
aesthetics
adumbrate

implications
of

of

German Idealist
text. The
of

the

implications
and

Dilthey's
not the

own

future transformation level its figures.

of phil
aims

ology is one have a text

indeed

least

the real effects that his text

of

to

whose ambitions are graphic at the

of

Speaking
this system:

the

hegemony

of

"Through these two

princes of

German Idealist aesthetics, Dilthey writes of German poetry [Goethe and Schiller]
with

it dominated the

entire empire of

literature

the assistance of

Humboldt,

Dilthey's

Essay The
the

Poetic Imagination
and,

321
as

Moritz, Koerner, Schelling,

Fine Arts acting under German poetry at the turn
of still

Schlegels,
(103).

finally, Hegel

the

Ministers

them"

Dilthey

conjures an effective empire of

aristocracy worthy of first rank, served by a loyal bureaucracy of critical talents. The image calls up Dilthey's forever declared admiration for the unified nation-state ("the empire of literature").33 The image also alludes briefly and polemically to the view which Dilthey always abjured of Goethe as an antidemocrat, as the
reprehensible

of

the nineteenth century, with a ruling

tool of

"princes,"

notion that cost

of

Goethe his popularity in

century.34

Germany during other hand, was a single-minded student the latter's fortunes; hence he can write
the middle
political

decades

the nineteenth
of

Dilthey,

on

the

Goethe

even at

the lowest ebb of

ideal

was

based in the

Goethe's exemplary wholeness. in the text of Dilthey's inaugural lecture in Basel in 1867, where it figures as part of a canonization of the German philosophical tradition. The inaugural lecture, an important document in Dilthey's intellectual development, has often
been
examined as part of

A major component of his literal way on what he perceived as We find this view set out most authoritatively
most

"prince."

the suspicious scrutiny to which German critics have

consciousness and good

submitted

Dilthey's

political

faith. A
suggests

passage

from

Bernd Peschken's study is Peschken 's entire argument.

a good

example,

and also

the thrust of

After the North German Confederation

was

founded
at

Dilthey
ophy

proclaimed, in his inaugural lecture

"life-substance"

as the preliminary stage of Empire, Basel in 1867, the great [harmonious and
of

positive]
and

(Lebensinhalt) in

the sphere

the

history

of

[German]
German

philos

literature. He
which

seizes this moment to offer a total overview of

literary
valua

history, in

Classicism
year

including
of

its

political

dimension

is

given a core posi

tion. Because of the

1866, Classicism
view

acquires political relevance.

With this

tion as a starting point, a

consciousness and

life is

canonized

which

operates on the political

is itself
to

projected as political consciousness. and political consciousness

The

point of conver

gence of the notion of

Classicism

in Bismarck's Empire lies

in the

reluctance

admit conflict within

both

conceptual orders
political conflict

[emphasis

mine].

It

brings together fear

of

the institutionalization of

through a parliamen

tary hegemony
assumption that

as well as the resistance to

its

essence

anything problematical in Classicism on the is harmony. Political consciousness and the idea of Classi
on this

cism approach one another

from different sides, converging

of

ideology

of

Empire.35

Well

and good and

for 1867, but this reading

as nourished

Dilthey's
of the

concept of

harmony,

conciliation,

totality
who

by

the image
alia.

German

nation-state

"Cf. Zockler, Dilthey

"great men,
practice power.
can
'geniuses'

und

die Hermeneutik, inter only

cultivate

Dilthey

grasped, from 1852 on, that

also put

not

their

inner life but

this culture

into

only be

produced

by

a nation which experiences no obstacle to

and

the unfolding of its

The universality

of

Shakespeare

Cslderon

wss msde possible

nations" power'

of national

of their

(235). The inner

quote

only by the 'grest fullness is from Dilthey's 1867 inaugural lecture

1770-1800"

at

Basel, "The Literary and Philosophical Movement in Germany, 34Peschken, Versuch einer germanistischen Ideologiekritik, pp.
pp. 229-36.

1-49;

(V, 14). Zockler, Dilthey

und

die Hermeneutik,

"Peschken,

Versuch

einer germanistischen

Ideologiekritik.

p.

134.

322
obviously
cannot

Interpretation
be
allowed

to have the last

word.

We

need

only

consider

the
and

period of twenty-one years

between Dilthey's inaugural

address at

Basel

the writing of The Poetic Imagination. These years, politically speaking, are
years of uniform consolidation of

Empire,

of

the

bourgeois

political

consciousness, of a steadily

hegemony of a state over a increasing domination by na

guiding
all

tional authority. Yet Dilthey's text of 1887 will speak of the absence of national

consciousness,
aesthetic

of

the felt impertinence of German Classicism as a

of aesthetic

in

an

age

upheaval,

of

productivity that has lost

familiar bearings. He

speaks of a

time of crisis, of rift, of

fariousness,
in the form

that cries out

of an epic.

for the it has

creation of an as yet absent national single

Peschken's simple,
no temporal

link

of

dismaying multi ideology political and literary

and

awareness will not work:

dimension to it;
of

it is precisely

here that the decalage

not cohesion

widens utterly.

At the heart

Empire

but chaos,

not conciliation

but crisis,

not

Dilthey discovers harmony but collision

judgment implica
and

and

force. Let

us grant with

Peschken that in

Dilthey

acts of aesthetic

"acquire, indeed,
1867,
some

relevance,"

possess,

political

but the direction

what

tion of this relevance in 1887

is

quite

different from

Peschken found in German tradi

and objective

twenty

years earlier.

It is true that
tion

Dilthey

continues to

look for

guidance to the

defined in its basic directions

philosophy.

by Classicism in literature
same as

idealism in

This is

not

the

saying,

however,

that he

means

to import into the

present chaos the values of a certain single content obtained

from making a cut into the tradition at, say, 1800. Earlier I cited a passage from The Poetic Imagination: "Our (German) poetics is still alive here and
...

there on the
artists or

lecturer's
and

rostrum

but

no

longer in the
it be

consciousness of the
alive
. . .

leading
for

critics,

only there

would

[truly]

It is

all over

the principles of that poetics which once upon a time

in idyllic Weimar had

emphasis added).
. . ."?

been debated

by Schiller,
are we

Goethe

Humboldt"

and add

(104;

Read

ing Dilthey,

really inclined to

"nevertheless

We

shall see and what

the distinctions

of position

Dilthey

will

take toward what is valuable

word.

is dead in Classicism; it is the present that has the last writes Dilthey, "is precisely not what corresponds to
classic to the extent

"What is A

classi

certain rules.

work

is

that it gives human beings in the present complete

effect

satisfac

tion and extends

its

in

time"

space and

(236).
"empire"

are considering Dilthey's image of a princely Goethe, dominating, his Idealist aesthetic, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the of German literature. This image of the poet-prince has additional political impli
with

We

cations.

It

points

to that Liberal
own

bourgeois

perspective of the

1860s

consis

tently Dilthey's
geoisified

sector of

looked to the enlightened, progressive, the nobility for political leadership.36 The figure
which

bourof the

36Golo Mann, The

Penguin Books, 1974),
und 20.

History

of
a a.

pp.

297ff.,

Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt

1789 (Harmonds worth, Middlesex, England: Marian Jackson of Deutsche Geschichte des 19. Main: Buchergilde Gutenberg, 1958).
since

Germany

translation

by

Dilthey's

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

in the
metaphor.

323
not

Kaiser,
if

meanwhile,

goes

unnamed

It does

belong,

of

course, if the image

we are

only going to construct a rigorous analogy, so that the image at the same time projects Dilthey's own contemporary political ideal, it interestingly sup presses the Kaiser. The imperial figure does remain subliminally in play in the metaphor as the Zeitgeist, the historical spirit of Idealist poetics; but its only
subliminal status also alerts us
argument.

is

one

of an earlier state of affairs around 1800.

But

to an

important

assertion

appearing later in the

This is Dilthey's
people,"

sense of

the priority of the constitutive, individual

poetic-interpretive act over

age and a an

imperial spirit, the Zeitgeist. "The unity in an he writes, "which we characterize as the historical spirit of
the

age, first

arises

only through the

creative power and self-glorification

genius"

the

(230). This

key

passage establishes the

primacy
of

of genius

of (includ

ing

explicitly that

of the political

figure)
may

with respect

to the historical stage of the

consciousness, and also projects again a political ideal

enlightened aristocracy.

This

genius

or

may

not

be

an artist.

hegemony of Dilthey writes

recalcitrant

apropos of

the possible unity of an historical age through the "coordination of

genius of the ruler or of the statesman

its facts": "the

brings the

facts themselves into

their

coordination."

unity It is opposed to that

genius

of purpose

(Zweckeinheit) possible by virtue of [genius] of the artist or philosopher

scope and

in its direction but is like their

in its

grandeu

(230). Dil

they's argument for the scope and

reminiscence of

grandeur of act of

the

statesman

is

an

inescapable intact the

Bismarck,
grandeur

and
of

the

genius, that of national

unification.37

He

concedes

the

the statesman,

but

we

should
with

keep

nuance:

this grandeur is

conceded

to be

comparable

the

incontestable

authority In another

of poetic activity.
passage

Dilthey does
in
the
which

tend to efface the difference between po

etic and political activity.

This

circle of experience,

the

poet

operates,

is

no

different from that

out of

which

the

philosopher or

politician

creates.

The

youthful

letters

of

Frederick the
soul

Great, like
of a great

those of a

statesman of

today,

are

full

of elements could

likewise found in the

poet; and many [Given Dilthey's judgment on Schiller's poetry, the distinction

thoughts of

Schiller

be

those of a political orator.

and priority of genuine life-force (Lebendigkeit)
power and

poetry is
of

being

nonetheless

ironically

maintained.] A

powerful

soul, energy of

experiences of

the heart and of the world, generalizing

the

power to convince achievement of

(Kraft des Beweises) form the

common maternal soil of

intellectual
(128).

those very different kinds, among them, however,

of the poet

Dilthey's

main point

here is to

repeat

his insistence
charge of

on

the greater normality of

or

the poet: he
which

wishes

to free him from the

passivity

pathology

with

the Naturalist writers, especially, were regarded

action'

by

the philistines of

the

""Bismarck, "sovereign German Weltanschauung

on the

man

of

(VII, 142), (V,

offered

'intimated'

that objective
of national

ideslism
force'"

validity

basis

of a

'fullness

14).

Dilthey the hope of lending by Goethe an entirely new Zockler, Dilthey und die Herme

neutik, p. 235.

324
Berlin. This
poetry.

Interpretation
passage

does
of

not

jeopardize, however,

the special privilege of

This distinction

Dilthey's
rank of

position against cultural

priority has an exact (and important) counterpart in Treitschke in the debate in 1870 about the relative
service of

free

Dilthey
I

spoke on

activity and self-effacing activity in the behalf of free cultural

activity.38

the state.

return

finally
to

to the metaphor of the poet-prince.

Dilthey

accords

special place sible

philological

practice,
of the

which

here
and

serves as a

to

all other

"Ministers

Fine

Arts"

subministry indeed to the two princes, but

acces

otherwise uncertain of

its efficacy and authority apart from the influence of the imperial spirit, the Kaiser. It is in this place that the Bildungsbiirger, someone like Dilthey himself, finds his function, a region for practice in the effort to
shape

through metaphilological to secure

(poetological)

thought

another

Zeitgeist. This

one means

dation

on the

"eternal"

for philology, according to Dilthey, an independent foun psychological laws of poetic activity, laws intrinsically
subject.

favorable to the individual Gadamer observes,

time
moral

Dilthey's

own

philological

ventures, as

are guided

illustrate

more

by decisively

an

ideal

of scientific

rigor, but at the same

tact
. .

"genuine
the

individual
.

(seelisch)

culture which proves

survival of

presupposing a the romantic belief

in

individualism."39

Dilthey

concludes

the overture to his essay

by detailing

the effect of
adumbrates

German Idealist

aesthetics on philological practice.

In this way he

the kind of effect that he means his own aesthetics to have. The central cate

gory

of

this aesthetics is once again that of

such

feeling having

access to

its "own
Dil

truth";

as

it is

central

to "the processes of creation, metamorphosis of

aesthetics

images,
they,
set

composition"

and

(119). German

everywhere,

writes

into

causal

mood,

etat

This

was

(kausal) relation the Seelenzustand (psychic condition, state of soul, d'ame) which produces a literary work and the form which is peculiar to it. grosso modo the step forward, which indubitably defines and does honor
. . .

to the view taken of works in this epoch. As a consequence the philology and
of this time of

criticism

may be characterized as aesthetic. Formal analysis according to the method proceeding explanatively from a point within the inner life of the psyche was there after applied to the manifold forms of European literature. Thus there arose the great
. .

age of our

German philology,

criticism and aesthetics

(122).
of this

It is

impossible, Dilthey

continues, to overestimate the productivity

perspective,

which nonetheless carried within

it

at all

times its own decadence.

38Dilthey wrote to Treitschke,

historic to
sense"

in

reaction

to his militarist-nationalist position: "It does not seem

me

to declare in every

unified purpose of national

instance those interested in gathering together all forces in the defense to be patriots, wise men of vision, having genuine political

(Der junge Dilthey: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen

2nd ed.
"

Misch-Dilthey,
290.

And further:
(p.

und Tagebuchern, 1852-1870, ed. Clara [Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, i960]), p. The proposition is false that the defense system, as the expression of

self-preservation, has the

culture"

right,
und

until

it has

reached

its

saturation point, to

of

291).

Both

passages are cited

in Zockler,

Dilthey

und

injure every die Hermeneutik,

other system pp. 256-57.

"Gadamer,

Wahrheit

Methode,

p. 5.

Dilthey's
The
valuation of

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

325

form

as

expressive of or as

force swiftly became tion of a domain of

Romantic
"feeling"

a grievous overvaluation of

effectually embodying psychic form, as in Schiller's "adora

reality. at
.

pure

and

ideal forms detached from

in"

The
point

world of

beautiful illusion
in the

set

(122). It is irresistible
this shift in

this

to ask what, to

according to Dilthey,
classic

provokes

valorization

from
we are

"form"

theorem

of poetic

activity; but in this text

and

do

not

have

an answer.

Both

possibilities

the Classic

the Romantic

"simultaneous."

We

shall reserve an answer to speaks to

this question.

Christofer Zockler
notes:

Dilthey's

critique of

Romanticism
itself
of the

when

he
to

"Flight into the

of

past

is the

expedient which offers

increasingly

Dilthey because
pire.

the specific

[repressive] development

German Em

Flight is indeed the partly latent ideological transposition of the specific form of social of the cultivated German liberal-conservative bourgeois
'praxis'

(Bildungsbiirger)."A0
"flight"

But Dilthey's

critique of

that his

into the past,

such as

it is

into

Romanticism certainly establishes a life centered on understand

ing the objectivations of the past was a highly meditated and selective kind of flight, founded in fact on a certain ideal of objective truth. This ideal is called and but, more, "objective to a special by Dilthey not only
"positive"

degree"

means

to serve a philosophy of objective idealism and the Liberal ideology. For

objective

Dilthey,
objective

truth in

history
root

is to be found in the

idealism that took

'intimated'

perspective of only that in Germany, "prepared for in the German and meant

movement,
present."41

(vorgefuhlt) by Goethe,
from

to be realized in the

This

point emerges

a passage about

writings:

ing

"In him poetry intimated what philosophy first conceptually many years later the unity of life
the
realization of world-reason
and

Goethe from Dilthey's early succeeded in represent

and

the

ideal;

eternal sub

identity; jective,
"flight"

in

history."42

Schiller's idealism is
a

agonized,
a

voluntative

and

represents
and

possibility

offered

by

the past

different possibility for intolerable to Dilthey.

"Flight"

has its

own scale of pragmatic stress on

implications.

Dilthey's

the alleged

inauthenticity

of

Romanticism belongs to

familiar polemic, the terms

than

of which are

Dilthey
most

realizes.

Consult,
and

actually more dependent on Schiller for example, Schiller's critique of the Rousversion of

seauean
was

idyll in On Naive

Sentimental Poetry. A

this polemic

recently conspicuous in the 1960s in a work like Rene Girard's Novel.43 Desire and the Girard, too, identifies as Romantic the captivaDeceit, the desire for an inhuman bliss which, Girard tion by "metaphysical
desire,"

points

out, is covertly

mediated

by

another

text or another's

desire,
This

a mediation

to which,

however,

the author (if not the

und und

hero) is

blind.44

argument was

'"'Zockler, Dilthey

die Hermeneutik,

p. 260.
p. 223.

"'Zockler, Dilthey

die Hermeneutik,

42Misch-Dilthey, Der junge Dilthey, p. 5. 43Rene Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1965), a translation by Yvonne Freccero of Mensonge romantique et verite romanesque (Paris: Grasset, 1961). "Girsrd, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, pp. 294flf.

326
resisted and
writer

Interpretation

interestingly
life
of

inverted

by

Paul de Man,

who perceives about the

the

Romantic

Rousseau
of a

par excellence
"beauty"

as

entirely lucid

happiness,
of what alienation which

Girard is

calls

not

under any circumstances, let For de Man, Romantic "desire according to the the mystification of the Romantic writer but a mystification
Other."

impossibility of alone by the lights

that

writer

or writer's text social order of

expectable

from the
an

desire.45

precisely identified as normative in and To this blindness, unfairly alleged,

de Man
value of most

adds

alleged

the

organic version

symbol.46

(and associated) Romantic mystification about the Organicism means, for de Man, precisely the
of

literal

of

Dilthey's formulation

"the German

aesthetic":

that

there

is

Seelenzustand that in

each case produces a

within

literary

work as an agent
it.47

indeed reproducing itself says de Man, is systematically relation, causing

and a normative condition of poetic

the form peculiar to

This

recognized

by

Romantic

writers not as

activity, but as

an aberrant

thesis.

The

aberra

tion may

indeed be

constitutive.

Although it

is, in

a phrase

from Holderlin's ("blofie

Phano-

Hyperion,
mene

one of those
menschlichen

"mere

phenomena of

the human

spirit"

des

Gemuts"),**

yet

it is ineluctable,

no matter whether
"health"

the
or

thesis be grasped as auspicious or as

decadence.49

destructive,

as

promising

What
above

Dilthey

seems

to see,

Dilthey's

polemic against a certain

perceives

however, along with de Man, stands over and form of Romantic beatification of the
formula associating
and
mood with

beautiful.

Dilthey

that such a bipolar

an

form

admits of

and,

indeed, invites
If the

arbitrary (willkurlich)

potentially
germ of an

endless reversal of priorities.

"unhealthy"

causal

theory

carries

in it the

particularity of the artist, it carries in it equally, as Dilthey reminds us, the germ of a hypostasis of form. The point is that the devotion to form does not have to arise from a rejection of the formula
overvaluation of

the psychic

that sets
arise

form in the
within

relation of effect to mood as

from

the formula as the result of a

its cause, its origin. It can seductive if arbitrary weighting

the kind

of one pole of

the correlation. The task of a

more adequate poetics

toward which

Dilthey

is aiming
at

is to

undo the notion of a

"organic"

sheerly individual

cause,

a psychological

entity originating, in
without

an

continuous way, an

ideal

verbal

form;

and

the same time eliminate the notion of an the participation of an

ideal,
the

autonomous verbal

form thinkable The

goal

affect-charged within

individual
Romantic

psyche.

is

not

to

fortify

this or that position

circle of strict cause and effect

writers

but to
and
18.

get out of the circle were

in the right

way.

like Rousseau
p.

Holderlin

thoroughly
Theory

aware of the

45De Msn, Blindness and Insight, 46Psul de Man, "The Rhetoric of

Temporality,"

in Interpretation,

and

Practice,

ed.

Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1969), 47De Msn, Blindness and Insight, pp. 22-23.

esp. pp.

175-85.

i%Samtliche Werke,
"This is
an and

implication

Insight,

p.

ix

Friedrich BeiBner (Frsnkfurt: Insel, n.d.), p. 495. of de Man's texts, as, for example, Blindness "The Rhetoric of p. 188.
ed.

flowing out of many

and

Temporality,"

Dilthey's
mutual

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

formalist errors; they
text-like

327
are genuine pre and

involvement
Dilthey's

of expressivist and notion of a

cursors of

"universal"

Erlebnis,

its

articula

tion of

implicit meaning; but it may be insight on blindness that leads Dilthey to

An early
passage

part of

that voracious dependence of

obscure

his lights.
shows the

from Dilthey's diaries

aesthetics.

(1859)

direction

of

his

transcendence of

Idealist

Zockler

comments on this passage as

fol

lows (words in

quotation marks are

Dilthey's):
idealism. [The first dimension
of the

Dilthey

adduces

a second characteristic of
tradition"

"Kantian-Fichtean
categories,
notion

is "the distinct

consciousness of the power over the mind of

forms

of

that the cognitive subject

thought, schemata."] This second characteristic is linked to Fichte's is constituted by fundamental acts (Tathandlungen).

ego is activity; each thought is to be viewed as an element of this activity and not something static. Every system is to be explained from a movement of ideas."] Idealism tends to refer the activity of individuals to these original actions. It conceives of individual development on the pattern of the germ (Keim) "which shoots up

["The

as

out of
ments.

itself from

within"

and

which, from the outset, contains all determinative

mo

This principle, however, is

to explain a text

also the principle of the philological method which account of the circle of thoughts

means

by

"genetic
the

from

certain

inner

beginnings."

other

The activity ways, in texts, does

beginning,'

of

individual, however,
out of

who objectifies

himself, among
a context of

not

"shoot up

itself from within, but, rather, from

point'

[the 'inner
thought

'germ,'

the

the 'crucial

(springender

Punkt)]

(Gedankenzusammenhang) forms according

an).
outward."50

to

psychological

laws. It forms in has been

attaching itself to this point (es bildet sich ihm given to development from the interior

...

A too

exclusive role

We have here the "acquired

germ of that crucial

idea

of

The Poetic Imagination

the

context of the
which

life

mind"

of

(erworbener

Zusammenhang des
structured of social and

Seelenof

lebens)
one's

is the

concrete

individual totality, the

of what one can

history

Erlebnisse,
rest of

the repository

know

historical

life,
is is

the index of reality and the

mediator of all particular

intentions (167).

The

Dilthey's

argument against

the overvaluing of

beautiful fictions
He
repeats

more conventional within

the tradition of

anti-Romantic polemic.

that in the

psychological aesthetics of

Kant, Schiller,
moment

and

the

Romantics,
and

there
and

no provision

for

stabilizing the oscillating dialectical important in this

of a

valorization of

Inner

Outer

for

introducing

a progressive,

the category, namely, of

history. What is
against

finally
on

critique

is that

formalism
of

behalf

theory

of expressed of

Dilthey does not speak feeling as such, but on

"cause"

behalf

an puts

altogether

different

account

the affective
expression

of

form.

Gadamer

this

account

succinctly:

"In the

(or

objectivation:

das Ausgedriickte) is present in Ausdruck) in the effect. It is itself present in cause (Ursache) a different manner than is the What is the expression and is understood when the expression is
the
matter expressed

(or

objectified:

understood."51

"Zockler, Dilthey und die Hermeneutik, p. 232; Misch-Dilthey, Der junge Dilthey, "Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 211.

p. 93.

328

Interpretation
nor

therefore expressed is neither something Inner

thetic
enced
faculty,"

writes

Dilthey,
energy
thought"

"raises the

relation of

something Outer. "The aes Inner and Outer experi

over

in

us

to

living

and

disseminates

(verbreitet) it
insert
it is

that nature,

too,

which and

is dead to

(117). One

could

such a problematic

into

Being

Time. Then, in Heideggerian

that is thus disseminated or, simply, as in

'human
rather

conditions are experienced

language, Habermas, "the world": "as soon as (erlebtf [Dilthey], it is not human being but
of man

"Being-in-the-world"

the world, in which the

which

historical-social life
concern."52

is

expressed

(sich

aufiert),

is the

object of

To the

extent

that
and of

Dilthey
the

still

preserves
of

regressive as a

causal

logic (of
"cause"

Ursache I Wirkung)

hypostatizes "state

mind"

source, the

producing the form

literary work is essentially feeling yet, Dilthey stresses, intelligible, historically intelligent feeling, feeling saturated with value and discriminated life. Or put perhaps more rigorously, aesthetic feeling in Dilthey is bent first on value; thereafter, more insistently, and with important
general

implications for the historical sciences, it is bent

"Dilthey,"

on meaning.

(This is

writes Makkreel, "increas key contribution of Makkreel's study. regarded aesthetic for the ingly feeling hermeneutically meaning it But Dilthey is forever en route to abandoning the notion of a distinct psychic origin. This is shown, first, negatively, in the leavings of the laboring concept. Dilthey gives shifting and contradictory accounts, he valorizes arbitrarily dif ferent psychic entities will, feeling, mood, value as the prime element of
embodies.")53

the state-of-mind that

of

"originates"

literature. His

positive account of the notion movement of

the

"cause"

of

literature is
a

one more as a

faithful to the distinct

his thought.
share

Whatever is designated
character of

cause,

psychic

origin, has to

the

the "individual
to

representation,"

which

is nonself-identical,

"meta-

morphic."

According
By
the

Dilthey:

metamorphosis of

individual
a

representations atom of the

mean that the

of

individual
rather

represen
a process

tation,

the

image, is
under

not

constant

life

mind, but
affective

emerging changing individual image brings about heightened

representations

conditions.

The distribution

of
.

excitation of parts.

in the
Thus
.

intensity,
.

displacement
are agents,

do

not change

from

without

; rather,
as a

they

processes.

The

acquired context of the

metamorphosis.54

life

of mind

functions

regulating

apparatus with respect

to this

The The

"cause"

is

an agent

in

reciprocal

play, the

active element an

in

a structure. agent.

acquired context of psychic

life,

moreover, is itself

historical

"If

Knowledge

"Jiirgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), and Human Interests by Jeremy J. Schapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1 971).

trans, as

"Makkreel, Dilthey,
54The
S.
von passage comes
wechsel zwischen

p.

17.
a

from

letter
und

written

by Dilthey
p.

to Count Yorck in
von

July

1886. Briefed.

Wilhelm

Dilthey
p.

dem Grafen Paul Yorck

58.

Wartenburg,
is
cited

1877-1897,

der

Schulenberg

(Halle: Niemeyer, 1923),

136.

The

passage

in Muller-Voller,

Phenomenological Theory,

Dilthey's
now,"

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

329
states-of-

writes
mind

Dilthey, "the

task were given to us of

which

bring

about

the forms and are represented within

psychology that (123).

help"

showed us

how to

recognize

conceptualizing them, only a the historical nature of man could

Dilthey, historical life figures forth, is itself, the structure and context individuates, generates individuality: "Every individual Erlebnis occurs in relation to a (VII, 195). Literature, then, as the me
of

In

Erlebnisse Erlebnis
.

self"

dium

of

the objectivations of self, transcends contingent sensibility,

is

accessi

ble, finally, (Lebensgehalt)

to the social

only to
of

able to decipher the life-content individual expression; this means being particularly alert character, the governing "social function of (236).
an

"historical

psychology"

the

literature"

In profiling,

at

the conclusion

of

his essay, the

social character of

"indi
made

viduality,"

Germany
The
upon
war"

his starting point: the inhospitable to individual poetic activity.

Dilthey

returns to

cultural crisis

that

has

character of an

its literature
(230). As
sought a

quite as much as

historical epoch, Dilthey stresses, leaves its stamp "on the business of state and the conduct of

literary

text Dilthey's own essay is no exception. To a

degree

he has

of the spirit of modernity.

consciously to bring into his essay the widest possible awareness This spirit is itself the heightened consciousness of
are ways

historicity. But there

in

which

Dilthey's

consciousness of
as

his

own

history
work.

does

not coincide with or exhaust that

The

main element of

this unconscious that

makes

history history is the

it

operates upon

his
the

magnification of

term of
work

"power,"

"might,"

of saturated with

his

work an aesthetics of

force. His
and peace

is

the midcentury Liberal

ideology

"optimistic

able and at

the same time martial,

rhetorical and

violent."55

Dilthey is
modern

specifically aware of the radically changed Europe. The political seat of German classicism
seat of

political was

reality

of

"idyllic Wei

post-Revolutionary European consciousness is London and Paris. London and Paris are the sources of unsettling new realities, a super(104). These consciousness "in whose soul a new kind of poetry is
mar"; the
cities

circulatin

have had their

"since
we
novel"

epic

writers

in Dickens
a

and a

in Balzac

but

now

Germans have

capital,

new

his heirs, task has fallen to the

and

German

(240).
of

The hallmark
these cities is its

that literature

responsive

to the super-consciousness of
"anarchy"

"struggle"

expression of a

(240)

against

(104).

From

all ages and

from

all peoples, a

motley

crowd of

forms

presses rule.

in

upon us and

seems to dissolve every distinction among poetic genres the East a primordial, formless literature inundates us.
abandoned

and

every Especially from In this anarchy the artist is

by

the rule, the critic

is

thrown
value.

back

onto

his

personal

feeling

as the
. .

only
make

remaining standard and break the name

for

determining

The

public

dominates,

the masses

of the artist

(104).
p. 251.

55Golo Mann, History of Germany,

330
In Dilthey's
trace of the
equation of

Interpretation "mass
culture"

and

anarchy, there is more than a

standard position of

the German bourgeoisie after 1871. the broken revolution of 1848 the
after

Whereas in

the reactionary
saw

period

following

bourgeoisie
not escape

its enemy in the feudal classes,

masses a specter of

1871

it

considers

the masses of

workers

the chief threat against peace and that

projecting onto the he perceived

Dilthey "dark, brutal,

order.56

does

dreadful"

instability

everywhere.57

The present-day democratic spirit insistent penetrates art as it does "everything else around
cannot reanimate oned with what

and everywhere pervasive

us"

(105). The
when

modern writer

the aesthetic
are"

of an earlier

century,

"natures

who reck

they typifying (reprdsentative)

not

[emphasis mine]

could express

their certitude
our

in "a

ennobling in the form but in the force which speaks to

and
aesthetic

art

subsistent

beauty. Now in forms

ideal lies have be

to

movements

us

and

(105). In "forms
come

movements,"

and political categories

"wrestle"

indistinguishable. The force.

"struggle"

great artist must

and

know in the

and shape this

state

beset

by

cultural

anarchy is in

crisis.

Dilthey's text

speaks a

rhetoric of violence

that

characterizes all of

texts written

in

a time of

"time"

crisis,

habitual to
Our
spiritual

Germany
life is The

for

Dilthey's life if

we are

to believe Droysen:

deteriorating

rapidly; its

dignity, its idealism, its intellectual integrity

in popularity;
establishments

are vanishing. pupils will one

exact sciences grow

flourish

whose

day

form the independent

upper middle class as

farmers, industrialists,
At
present all

merchants,
on material

technicians, and so on; their issues. At the same time the

chaos,

education and outlook will concentrate

universities are

declining.

wholly is
rotten,

instability,
destructive.
the next.
Droysen'

ferment,

and

disorder. The

old values are

finished, debased,
one epoch of

beyond salvation,
.

and the new ones are as

yet

unformed, aimless, confused, merely

We live in

one of the great crises that

lead from

history

to

essay was written in 1854; the sentiment underlies The Poetic Imag ination. But there is in Dilthey's language a characteristically more fluid in
s

volvement of a

figurative

political rhetoric

in

a philosophical vocabulary.

It

be-

56See Zockler, Dilthey und die Hermeneutik, p. 228. 57"The analysis today of human existence fills us all with the
of

feeling
life

of

fragility,

of the might

the dark that

thing (VII,

drive, is life,

of

suffering from
where not

obscurities

(Dunkelheiten)

and

illusions,
srise

the finitude

in every
.

even

the loftiest forms of communsl

connected
.

from thst life

150).

"And is there

contsined

in

the will to power

everything brutsl, dresdful, destructive thst is the consciousness of community, of belonging, the joyous
with

participation

in the

power of

the

political

whole, experiences which

belong

to the highest human

values?"

(VII,
on

170).
side

the dreadful

Cited in Zockler, Dilthey und die Hermeneutik, p. 71. Dilthey's stress of life prompts Gadamer to define Dilthey's intellectual-historical project

as of

the effort, through

life"

knowledge,

to gain "protection and security, despite the unfathomability

(p.

226).
of

the 1870s and 1880s

origins

58Cited in Golo Mann, History of Germany, p. 209. The sense of crisis among intellectuals is due in part to the exacerbation of the chronic feeling of an absence
in the German
nation-state.

of

as genuine precursors of

What acts, the Empire?

whst

tradition, before Bismarck

could

be

pointed

to

Dilthey's
speaks

Essay The Poetic Imagination

331

program.

Dilthey's mediating spirit, his mood of hope, his offer of a constructive The thesis of the ultimately practical character of historical under

standing in
the

Dilthey
of

is

an articulation of

hope in the

political

field. "It is

one of

live tasks

philosophy,"

healthy
force,

relation

of

contemporary between aesthetic thinking and (104). The "gripping effects and
upheavals"

he writes, "to
art"

reconstitute

the
of

an

art, remember,

interplay

of political and of a po

philosophical rhetoric

defines the field

of

Dilthey's

struggle.

The task

etics centers

the general and urgent enterprise of the Geisteswissenschqften as

practice.59

the integration of cultural and political

The
exist

active and contemplative components of the artistic struggle art and

do

not

simply divided between

and

thought about art. The historical spirit of

movement

conflict pervades

the

historically

aware

consciousness

in the

very instant of its seizing hold of this spirit penetrates this consciousness in all its manifestations. Thus for all forms, the harmonious subject/object relation
conjured action.

up by the contemplative ideal Writes Dilthey:

no

exists

only

as

the goal of a struggle,

an

There is
not

human
or a

being

and no

thing

which could exist

for

me

as

help
of

something
or else
stricted

hindrance, importance, making

the goal of a
a claim

striving
my

or an

only as an object and involvement of the will,

and

on

consideration

inner

closeness

inspiring
of

resistance, distance

and strangeness.

The life-connection,

whether re

to a given moment or

long-lasting,
the

turns these human beings

and objects

for

me

into bearers
in this
me,

happiness,

an expansion of

my existence,
of

heightening

of

my power;

or

free-play they they diminish my power (VII,

connection restrict
131).60

my existence, they

exercise pressure on

The

destiny

of struggle

belongs

even

to the

empirical scientific conscious

ness with which the new aesthetics wishes ness whose rush

to ally

itself,

a perturbed conscious

trangement.

"The

into pseudo-objectivity threatens to increase division and es spirit of scientific investigation goes into action vis-a-vis
every kind
of

every object,
to catch a

penetrates

intellectual

operation and excites

the need

genuine glimpse of

What
of a

Dilthey

just

adumbrates

particularly stark the "historical nature of

this
perturbation

(105). reality through every sort of husk or is the degree to which science is itself in the grip form of that Variabilitat (108), which he paraphrases as
man."61

mask"

His

"scientific"

mainly through

text, as its rhetoric: it is

own

a at once

tract, testifies to iconic with, the vehi-

59An effort that, as Zockler notes, "occurred in connection with [Dilthey's] development homogeneous historical-political theory, in which all divergent moments are grasped in their relation to the process of origination and the law of motion of the nation organized by the state
of a
centered"

and

in this

manner are

(Dilthey

und

die Hermeneutik,
p.

pp. 239-40).

"'Cited in Habermas, Erkenntnis

und

Interesse,

192.

"'This
"importance

point about science in

social thought.

Dilthey

sees the period

Dilthey has to be nuanced; science is valorized as the discipline of following the French Revolution as marked by the increased
sciences"

of the social sciences vis-a-vis the natural

positivistic orientstion

(I,
p. 706.

4).

Hence Dilthey's

systematic

"repudiation of the

toward the

epistemological model of

the natural sciences

[read,

Comte]."

Gesellschaft,"

In Lieber, "Geschichte

und

332
cle

Interpretation
violence against which active

of, the

it

speaks.

Dilthey's

epistemological

theory

of

the necessarily
of

imaginative seeking to
against

reconstitution

(Nachbildung, Nacherleben)
and

the human object

overcome

difference

deferring

represents

an attempt at once to acknowledge and

to sublimate this restlessness.

cohesive-

But

Dilthey

speaks

violence, and for its antithesis: for

tradition.62

ness, conciliation, for the preservation of importunate, restless, divisive science into the

His task

will

be to bend

service of an
of

intellectual-histor
meth

ical
ods, The

enterprise with normative

functions.

Speaking
which

external, empirical

Dilthey

writes:

autonomous value of

literature,
its

the

function

demonstrated
mind

by

those empirical methods

confront

[i.e.,

those without
as

it has in society, can never be historical awareness]. If

a

intended to

own creations

only

self-estrangement of mind vis-a-vis

its

own creations would set

something objectively empirical, in (125-26).

Cognitive
mind

estrangement

exacerbates
onto

the historical process

by

which

critical

feels itself "thrown back

artist

its

feeling"

personal

(104), by

which

the

practicing

feels himself isolated from traditional norms,

of aesthetic speculation

yet captive of a

"misology"

the artist's hatred of reflection on art (105-06).

The function
"In every

has traditionally been

aesthetic reflection on

conservative.

productive

period of

literature

the goal

and

technique of particular
velopment of a
required a

forms

of artistic practice

firm

style

and a
. .

of

schooling of artists German Classical literature

of

essentially supported the de coherent (106). "Art persistently through aesthetic The great style
tradition"
reflection."

was

sustained and

by

the exercise of the "royal

without of

power"

the Weimar poets

their polemics

Goethe

Schiller, "not
against the

the terrorism of

the
and

Xenien,"

in hexameter
power"

likes

Kotzebue, Iffland,
now,
and a

Nicolai. But this "royal

is

nowhere manifest

better

image for the

Democrat

struggle of aesthetic wills without cultural and political tradition

suppression of

is the definitive

Kotzebue,

not

by

diatribe but

by

the knife of a

assassin.

Philology
of

figures in turn

as

the conservative Liberal wing of the

Ministry
and with

Aesthetics. "Its

merit,"

writes

Dilthey, "is

to

have

made

intelligible for the itself

the historical

first time the

coherence of the

literature

of a people

both

within

respect to the

life

spirit"

of the

national

(108). Penetrated

by

consciousness, it
and

now

finds itself

confronted sense

defined

poetic practices.

In this

only with historically conditioned it is no more privileged than the

an

general consciousness of a

society

entered

"into

historical

age,"

faced

with a

62Rene Wellek

notes with

ill-concealed distaste Dilthey's

state, in any case
life"

normative aesthetics of

equilibrium.

"Every
only in

work of art which seeks

to evoke permanent satisfaction must conclude with a

with a

situation of

equilibrium or with a pleasurable an

idea

which

lifts

us above
world-

reconciling final state, even if this state is (VI, 162-63). Cited on p. 122. This would be, for courting
conciliation
of

Peschken, the aesthetic reflex of a Peschken) in the political order. But

view

everywhere,

lamentably

(for

see

supra, the discussion

Dilthey's inaugural lecture.

Dilthey's
profusion of

Essay

The Poetic Imagination

("we
are surrounded

333
the entire past")

dead

shapes

from the forms

past

by

and

the shapeless energies and violent effects of the present.

The
profusion

struggle

of all

of consciousness

is for

general

law

within

of possibilities.

limited

and

It is precisely the troubled relation of historicallyhence contingent forms with "the general laws of poetry which
poetics"

leads philology necessarily to the The historical consciousness

principles of grasps the

(108).
the life of the mind,
processes

historicity

of

the psychological consciousness asks: "Can we

on

know how

founded

the nature of man and

hence

operative everywhere produce these various

groups of

poetry, divided

by

peoples and ages?

How is the

self-sameness of our

human essence, expressing itself in the uniformities culture) bound up with its variability, its historical It is
not

(inhering

in

systems

of

character?"

(108).

my task to
will

reproduce

in detail Dilthey's
poetics.

"solution,"

his full does

not

contribution

to an

historical-psychological
find it in the books

The

reader who

know German I have

at a wanted

of Midler- Vollmer and

Makkreel. What Dilthey's He

a effort

to stress is the
effort

political and

historical

context of
a

solution, his

to find access and hold fast to

coherent

human

substance

in

an age of

levelling,
object;

violence,
of

and

disruptive
and

science.

conceives

his
of

effort as a reciprocal

illumination
a

psychology
of

history

psychology
the spirit

the

"variable"

literary

history

the

permanent crisis of

perpetuating the struggle of individuals for form.

Dilthey's effort, finally, is

the matrix of poetic activity
worbener

plainest

in the

rhetoric with which

he identifies
mind"

the "acquired

context of

the life of

(er-

Zusammenhang des
"The

vidual mind:

acquired picture of
our

Seelenlebens). This category speaks of the indi reality in it regulates our understanding of
consciousness; the acquired
mode of weigh acquired

the impression just occupying

ing

value

distinctions in it determines the

in it
. .

feeling

of the

moment; the
the

mom

system of purposes of our will

governs

the

passions of

(168;

emphasis added). speaks of tradition. and

This category is diachronic: it behind; in [the order of] feeling

"Sensations leave traces

in the unfolding life acquired context of the life

arises

of mind, of

desire habits develop; gradually there between the sensation and the motion, an
(167). As
a

mind"

moreover,

more

than the individual history. At least

diachronic category it covers, in the case of the genius,

"the
of

acquired context of

the life

of mind

is determined
period,
and

by

the coordination
represents

the

constituent elements of an

[historical]

it therefore

coordination"

this

(231).

The

acquired context of

the life of mind

has, finally,
events:

the character of a

synchronic system: prehensive state of

"The

of things (Tatbestand) which befalls

things"

context or cohesion

this

is the

most com

experience

our mental

(167-68). This "state

of

includes the

social world.

We

recall:

"Society

is

our world.

With the

power of our entire

being

we experience

sympathetically

334
the

Interpretation
of social

interplay
"The

conditions,

...

the states

and

forces

constituting the
the social
period

system"

social world:

(I,

36-37).

Dilthey
the

stresses the systematic character of

coordination of

facts

which

constitute

an

[historical]

produces reciprocal effects and affinities, as a consequence of which

this coor

dination

can

be

system"

compared with a
"context"

(230).

The

psychological

of of reality.

the

individual is
at

therefore

principally

social and

historical index

Precisely

this

juncture,

writes

Dilthey,
of the

we

can connect the

historical

with

the

psychological.

We developed

a psychological

concept of the acquired context of the

writer.

life

of mind and related

it to the activity
refined

In the

great man this acquired context represents,

in the right,

way, the
age,"

existing structure of the coordinated facts [equally, "the historical spirit of the hence]: principles, value-distinctions and purposes. The genius then influences the
cesses which take place
mirror of

pro

the

age.

to

itself

and

to us

In this way the literary work becomes the Here the mystery is solved of how an age can become objective in the stories, actions and characters of its writers. The acquired

in

consciousness.

context of the

life

of mind

in

a great man

is causally

conditioned and

therefore repre

sents the coordination of the elements of the

life,

the thought, the striving of an age.

always the

[The
age

essential coherence of a

literary

work] is

breath

of an

historical

(231).

Dilthey's

call

for

German

genius who will produce the new

German
of

epic age.

is, therefore,
Without

a call

for the his

age

articulation

(Koordination)
period

of the

facts

his

such an act

is

not an

historical

but

a crisis.

If

we stress

the social, synchronic,

systematic character of

that reality "represented in the

genius,"

Dilthey
capable of

is

at

the same time calling for a context of political institutions

Madness,"

regulating the facts (which are forces) of the new age. In the essay "Poetic Imagination and Dilthey terms the acquired context of the

life

of mind a giant

"apparatus for order,

regulatio

restraint and

(95). In this

rhetoric

psychology, poetics, and politics are

new

inseparable.
is envisioning a psyche vast he is projecting, as
of coherence,
articulation of

In envisioning the
and enough

German epic,

Dilthey

orderly allegory of a psychic ideal of coherence, a political ideal which, in the present life of Germany, is altogether absent. That
an

to represent the violent new reality; and

Erlebnisse,

that "fusion of Inner and

not a

Outer,"

expressed

by

the genius in the

literary

work, is

politically

neutral substance

tured according to the norms of an

but is categorically struc (absent) political ideal. Moreover, through life

of mind

the objectivations of genius, the acquired context of the

enters the social world

literally
of

becomes the instituted life

mind"

presence of a social-historical

tradition hitherto absent.

acquired context of the

We grasp that the psychological category of is conceived under the aegis of

"the
time-

bound

political consciousness
of a

tervention

national-social
of political

shaping

context

confronting Empire and anarchy without the in tradition, without a mediating, consciously institutions. Renan's famous letter to Strauss in
about the

1870 noted

"the

frightening thing

German

victory:

Germany

showed

Dilthey's
only force
not

Essay
force

The Poetic Imagination

with no auspicious message.
"M

335

blank,

effective

Dilthey does
individuals

bring

that message. But his psychological poetics of creative

testifies to the

intensity

with which

he felt its

absence.

Paradoxes, Some Paralipomena, (i) Dilthey intends

lent
crisis

and

Conclusions

power"

to pacify by cultural knowledge and creation the vio his age, a predicament generated by an omnipresent "will to (VII, 170), but the reader will be troubled by Dilthey's reliance for
of cultural

healing
heroic

activity
(239).

on

the element

of

individual power, "the mighty,

Dilthey's
own text as the

personality"

(2) The

admiration

for

personal

force

penetrates

violence and arbitrariness with which

caused"

(when it

adheres to the notion of "mood-

literary form)

it

assigns
will.

tion, feeling, mood,

and

philosophy of self-assertion ities. The critic Heinen suffered this

with

priority alternately to such terms as imagina In an age of violent will, the dialectic in a itself proceeds by the arbitrary assertion of prior
perception. about as a

In his work,

which concludes

the

impossibility
takes

of

writing coherently

Dilthey, he

states:

"No

matter

what one

hold it

of as a refers

phy,

Dilthey
(3) The

always

starting point, to its a priori

beginning

in Dilthey's
with

philoso else

connection

something

without which

could not

exist."64

shift

from

an aesthetics of

tion)

to an aesthetics of production

spectatorship (as in belongs to the valorization

the

Kantian tradi

of personal

force.
is
the
social

(4) In

the "acquired context of the life of

of

mind,"

Dilthey's basic

vision

of a powerful

forces "ordering, restraining and repository the superior large individual. Outside him: the immediate life indwelling
chaos and anarchy.

regulating"

reality
order.

The task is to introduce into

chaos this agent of

This is

what

happens

(ideally)

when

the

work of art

is

projected

into the instituted

social

world:

the acquired context of the traditions.

life

of mind

actively becomes an

presence of national-social

(5) Evidently, Dilthey's

ful individual has
ambivalent

glorification of

the figure of the great and power

can

implications: it

be

read as

inviting
of

leader (Lukacs) generating

or as passionately encouraging the cultivation

the strong human talent

pure and simple.

This

ambivalence shifts through

the

whole of

Dilthey's essay,
a radical

parallel

ambiguities: and also a

the act of poetic creation

of what
of

is

"meta

morphosis"

of

life

typifying
would

The exemplary
travagant

new

literature language
shelters

speak

is already at hand in the real. an heroic German essence; it

social or

would also speak the

of social realism.

words, "The

individuality individuality

of

in the reality of any sort of human

than a

An (empty) politics of ex liberalism. In Lieber's historical

variation structure of the

is,

ac

'singular'

cording

to

Dilthey, nothing

more

general

63Golo Mann, History of Germany, p. 387. "Heinen. Die Konstitution der Asthetik, p.

10.

336
structure."65

Interpretation

the middle period

Rodi, however, counters (e.g., "Ideas on

eine

this sort of comment, founded

a

on

texts

of

Descriptive

and

Analytic

Psychology"

["Ideen fiber

beschreibende
see

und zergliedernde

Psychologie"]
singular

with

"a favor
as

ite thought
dependent
poets.
. .

of

Dilthey's: to
a certain

the act of grasping the

gift which at
"seer"

in

history

on

divinatory
of

bottom he I
to

conceded

only to does
the
not

His definition
that

the

poet-seer:

'By

understand us

the poet to

the

extent

he

represents

in

a manner ungraspable

one that

proceed

according to the leading-strings of logic

a context woven out of
destiny'."66

man,

individuation,

con

text that we call life

circumstances, human relations,

individual

depth, (6) For Lukacs, Dilthey

contributed

to the

creation of

Lebensphilosophie historical

as

the

ideology
on

of

the imperialistic

bourgeoisie:

as

antisocialistic

relativism, nihilism,

Consider,
in the

the

other

intuitionalism, irrationalism, phantasy, hand, Golo Mann's formulation of the German

870:

and mythification.

character

years

just

after 1

Germany
looks
at

the

picture

fatally
atrical

mixed

industrial progress, military trumpet blasts and politics. If one a distance without examining individual figures, one gains a impression: hard-boiled Realpolitik and oppressive piety, ostentatious the
produced

from

poses, self-righteous
overwhelmed change

nationalism

combined

with

materialism,

by

the success of the natural sciences,

mysticism.67

internal discord, and finally but yet prepared

suddenly to

into cheap

In

no

way does
or

a single element of

Dilthey's

"ideology"

in The Poetic Imagina

yet

tion

justify

further

a single

of

these tendencies:
of

and

it is this latter

constellation

that arises from the

ideology

the

imperialistic bourgeoisie!
unity,
pulsa

(7) The text of The Poetic Imagination enshrines the values of harmony, and coherence in its view of the literary work, (a) "Living
tions"

in the

creative will of

the author survive without diminution in the work,

125).

"saturate"

they
trated
tion"

the work

(VI,

(b) The
is
an

creative act

by

the acquired context of the life of mind, which

the work of genius

is thoroughly pene is itself a "representa

of reality.

of reality:

immediate

expression

Dilthey (Dilthey
status

stipulates no

distinction between interior

of

culture and

communicated

to the

the consumer-subject

life, (c) This reality is and is fully appropriated sanctify the uniformity by force
notions

stresses

the

likeness, too, between

the political
comfort

the act of production and the act of

of such of

reception).

Would
and

not

implications

quo

give

to the national

ideal

"blank

effective

force"? hand the

On the
Gadamer

other

paraphrases

literary work speaks to Dilthey this way: "Historical

heightened
Gesellschaft,"

the category of the self.

consciousness

is

not

so

much self-effacement as a

possession of

self."""

For

Dilthey
608.

it is

the

p. 726. 65Lieber, "Geschichte und "Briefwechsel Dilthey/Yorck, p. 183, cited in Rodi, 67Golo Mann, History of Germany, p. 387. 68Gadsmer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 221.

"Lebensphilosophie,"

Dilthey's
"highest
midst of
function"

Essay The Poetic

Imagination

337
the
person

of

literature "to

represent the

dignity

of

in the

its

determination"

(238). The Poetic Imagination

redefines

philology

Literary activity requires a cultivation of tact that must collide with the crudely levelling thrust of the "machine (I, 3) of imperial Germany. Dilthey seeks to animate a past centering on the monumental individuality of Goethe: he makes German Ideal
as
of
factory"

the science

the laws producing genuises.

ism

a political

ideal. A

perspective

stressing the imaginative creativity

of

psy (His "fu

chological

individuals is
we

(8) What
sion"

implicitly socially emancipative. remember of Dilthey is not his psychological

the imagination called

aesthetics.

insight into the

"association"

mechanisms of

and

and their potential correlation with the tropes of and

are

keen

fruitful, but they have been

will not

absorbed

metonymy and metaphor into Freud.) In general his

climate, in
which

poetics of

continuity

be

attractive

in

our own critical

the formal

elaboration of

the

literary

work

is

grasped as a sequence of nega

tions,
vive

as a

beginning

and not

the issue of an origin. What precisely does sur

embattled political

in The Poetic Imagination is the

tonality, the

sense of

a mind

oppressive and

genuinely attempting to come to terms through fallen social world.

cultural effort with an

HISTORICISM AND STATESMANSHIP

IN THE REFORM ARGUMENT OF WOODROW WILSON

Kent A. Kirwan
The

University

of Nebraska

at

Omaha

The dominant
the

paradigm

government"

"party
on

school

for reforming the American Constitution has been inaugurated by Woodrow Wilson, the political
the ill-fated 1950 APS A. report, to the works of
name

scientist.

From his Congressional Government to the 1937 Report of the President's

Committee
Toward
a

Administrative Management to

More Responsible Two

and,
most

Party System,

Schattschneider,
literature both
given

recently, Hardin (to

only

Burns, Bailey, few), a reform

tradition with a vast

literature has developed

within

the discipline. Yet in all the

pro and con on the reform

argument, almost no attention has been

to the standards or principles that led Wilson and still lead his progeny to

propose constitutional reform. reform argument could constitutional order.

If those

standards are
rather

problematic,

action upon

the
our

lead

us to

deform

than to reform (make

reform

better)

This essay

articulates

Wilson's
of

argument, elucidates

his standards,

and reflects upon

the adequacy

the reform prescription.

In opening Congressional Government, Wilson

1787, "is now our form of government rather in have a government characterized by separation
and

argues that the

Constitution of
In form
we

name

than in

reality."

of powers and a system of checks

sional supremacy.

reality "our present government is simply a scheme of congres The gap between form and reality is due to the operation of a It is the defect of the political "universal principle of institutional

balances; in

"

change."1

his day, Wilson continues, that it fails to see American government in light of this universal principle and to take its bearings from what change reveals.
science of

"Dominated
ence

...

by

those incomparable papers of the

of the

'Federalist,'"

political sci

takes its bearings from the forms

Constitution, "thereby obscuring

has
"

much of that

development
"

of constitutional practice which

since

taken place

"2
.

The "fundamental law

I
am

of 1

787 is

now

only

"literary theory.

The

"living reality

"

indebted to the National Endowment for the Humanities

complete

summer seminar program

for the

opportunity to
seminar on criticism.

this study and to Dr. John

Morality"

Hallowell, director of the 1976 N.E.H.

summer

"Politics
am also

and
grateful

at

Duke University, for his kind

Furman

assistance and constructive

very

to my teacher, the late Herbert J.

of

Chicago,
thoughtful

and

to my friend Ernest J. Walters

Storing of the University of University for their suggestions and

and

criticism.

'Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Cleveland

New York: World Publishing,

1956), p. 28. 2Wilson, Congressional Government,

p.

30.

340
is "the Constitution in
"to

Interpretation
operation."

Wilson thus American

announces

his intention to in the light

observe

the dominant facts and "phases

realism

"

of

government

of a strict

escape

from theories

and attach

himself to facts. "3

Observing
all

the

facts, Wilson finds

nation

that the center and source of all power

is

Congress. The constitutional balances but disappeared. The President

not and

of federalism and separation of powers

have

is

supreme over the we

states,

and

Congress The

supreme

over the

Court. In fact,
as

have

congressional government.
phenomenon.

But this
of are

fact is

to be

understood

temporary
over

growth

nationalism and congressional

ascendency

the

executive and

judiciary

both

seen as a stage

in the

progressive evolution of

American

government.

Thus

Wilson does
one

not escape

from

theory.

Rather, he

substitutes another

theory for the

he

rejects.

To

comprehend

this more clearly, we must consider Wilson's

historicism.

In reading world history, Wilson sees abroad evolutionary progress of growth from the autocratic regimes of the past to the democratic regimes of the present and

future. From
From

stage

to stage there is a gradual awakening of the mass of the people. there develops a the
public opinion

undisputed autocratic rule

that gradually

asserts
achieve

itself to the

point where

people choose

their own leaders and thus

self-government.4

But

democracy

is

not so much

the result of conscious

maturity.

statesmanship as it is a product of historical forces that gradually Of American democracy, he says:

was not created

bring a people to

It

by

mere aspirations or

by

new

faith; it

was

built up

by

slow custom.

Its

process was
effective

experience; its basis old wont, its meaning

as the

national organic oneness and

life. It came, like manhood,

and the

fruit

of youth.

An immature

people could not

have had it,

self-control.
character.5

maturity to which it was vouchsafed was the

Such

government as ours

is

form of conduct,

and

maturity of freedom and its only stable foundation is

Wilson

goes

on

to emphasize the

long training

period

required

for

national

self-direction and the virtues that genuine popular government presuppose:

"adult

self-reliance,

self-knowledge and
of

self-control."6

In light "the

his

view

that

democracy
see

is

a product of

history

rather than

conscious statesmanship,

racy

as

natural

why Wilson regards American democ growth of transplanted English politics. "7 Our history is but an
.

it is easy to

3Wilson, Congressional Government

4Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in

the

United States (New York: Columbia

Administration,"

University Press, 1908), p. 28; Woodrow Wilson,

Quarterly, 55 (December 1941), 488. 5Woodrow Wilson, "Character
Constitutional Government,
p.

"The

Study of

Political Science

of

Democracy

in the United

States,"

in An Old Master
116. See
also

and

Other Political Essays (New York: Charles

52.

Scribners'

Sons, 1893),

p.

Wilson,

6Wilson,

"Character,"

p.

117.
State,"

'Woodrow Wilson, "The Modern Democratic

vols., ed. Arthur S. Link

in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 17 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966-75), V, 67.

The Reform Argument of Woodrow Wilson

extension of

341
constitu

English

history,
A

our government

"an

adaptation of

English
not

tional
out

government."8

"truly organic

growth,"

America "began,

by carrying

simply carrying out a history inventing nothing, only "9 a specialized species of English government. The importance of this establishing viewpoint is brought home to us in the reform argument. British history and
politics serve as
provement over

any theory, but

by

the standard for

reform.

Whereas the Constitution

was an

im

the British government of George

our

III, "the

perfected

party

gov

ernment"

of

turn-of-the-century Britain is
means

destiny.

What this

is

clarified

by Wilson 's consideration of the evolution of the

an evolution

conditions of public

life in America. It is
There
are

from

an age of politics

to an

age of administration. of the was

four

stages of national growth.

First is the

period

founding: "the
were

questions which

faced

our statesmen while

"10

the Constitution

a-making
of

in the broadest

sense questions of politics. questions of politics

Second,
is the

with

the

establishment of

the

Constitution,
and

become transformed into

stage period of

questions

law. The third,

in

sense

decisive,
the

abolitionist agitation and

Civil War. The

change not

aim of the abolitionists

vindicate

revolutionary"; it "was to

to

Constitution."

"was essentially This stage

of the

begins

with

the Jacksonian period in which the

era gives

aristocratic

democracy

Federalist- Jefferson

way to the rule of the common man.

a

By

the

post-Civil War period, full-fledged popular government is government an expression of

it.11

fact

and congressional

Wilson understands the Civil War as the The Union is

not
nation."12

comple

tion of the

political and

legal

stages of growth.

only preserved, it
constitutional-

is

reborn:

"we have become in the fullest

at

organic sense a

Arriving

the fourth stage, Wilson sees the fundamental

political questions all

but

settled: of

capitally important business

administration

left to that unexciting but none the less everyday peaceful development and judicious
"we
are

to

whose execution

itself.

"13
. . .

In
,

delineating

every nation in its middle age has to address these four stages of historical development in the
age

United States Wilson makes clear that each

that with the the age
progressive

has its characteristic

have

questions and

settling of administration. The Constitution belongs to the

of those questions we

reached

the

dawn

of

age of politics, an age

in

which the essential principles of settled.

democracy
But

liberty
that

For example,

separation of powers was

and equality necessary to preserve

were not yet

liberty and to
has been

check the whims of the majority.

now

popular government

8 Woodrow

Wilson,

"Review

of

Green's A
p.

"Character,"

Woodrow Wilson, I, 374-75;

"Character,"

104;

in The Papers of of the English People, Constitutional Government, p. 42.

"

History

pp. 115, 105. 'Wilson, 10Wilson, Congressional Government, pp. 136-37. "Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People, 5 & Brothers, 1902), III, IV.
Union,"

vols.

(New York

and

London: Hsrper

12

Woodrow Wilson,

"Meaning of the
and

in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 6 vols.,

London: Harper &
p.

ed.

by

R. S. Baker

and

W. E. Dodd (New York

Brothers, 1925-27), III, 336;

Woodrow Wilson, The State (Boston: D. C.

Heath, 1890),
p.

480.

"Wilson,

Congressional Government,

141.

342
established not
anachronism

Interpretation
only in
principle

but in fact,

separation of powers
efficiency.14

is

harmful
while
of our

that obscures responsibility and excludes

Thus,

the

forms

political

Constitution remain, they no longer reflect the reality life. The need now is a form of government appropriate to the
of the

altered

conditions and questions of a new

age, the age of

administration.

We
there is

see

in Wilson that the

age of administration

is the

age of

democracy,

of

full-fledged

popular sovereignty.

With

popular

sovereignty

fully

self-conscious,

a new and widened conception of state

duty

that emphasizes positive

government

responsibility for the

social and economic welfare of

the people. This

in turn brings

about a greater need

for

good administration

for the implementation

of the popular will.

revolution

Concretely, Wilson is speaking

and

of

the effects of the

industrial

in America

the

reaction

to laissez-faire. The questions of the age of

administration are merce and

fundamentally
national

economic questions: the complexities of com

trade, debts, regulation of monopolistic corporations, and labor.15 resolving the discord between capital and In order that America be equipped for carrying the enormous burdens of the
age of

administration,

reform

is

necessary.

But the

achievement of good adminis

tration under the conditions of popular sovereignty

poses

is

problematic.

As Wilson

the

problem:

It is harder for

democracy

to organize

administration

than

for

monarchy.

pleteness of our most cherished political successes

in the

past embarrasses us.

The very com We have

enthroned public

opinion; and it is forbidden

us

to hope

during

its

reign

schooling balance in

of the sovereign government.

in

executive expertness or

in the

conditions of perfect

for any quick functional

made the task of

The very fact that we have realized popular rule in its fulness has difficult.16 organizing that rule just so much the more

Our Our

constitutional

health, it

appears, is

an obstacle

to our administrative health.

great advantages

source of our

in achieving the principles of liberty and equality are the disadvantages in attaining good administration. Yet if the march of
"

history toward "popular rule in its fulness is now realized, the essential principles all but finally settled, on the basis of what principles can the obstacle of popular
sovereignty be
the sovereign, on
appears
overcome?

That is, if there is

rule,
and

a conflict

between

popular rule and

organization

of popular

what grounds can at

that will be

to rest,

bottom,
concrete

on

will of the people is rightfully rightfully qualified? Wilson's reform implementing the principles of the science of

if the

administration.

The

difficulties

to which this enterprise is exposed will

become

apparent.

As Wilson
embodied

understands the government constructed

by the Founding Fathers

parts of

in the

Constitution,
of

it is

a static

Newtonian mechanism, the

'"Woodrow Wilson, "The Art

Governing,"

in The Papers of Woodrow

Wilson, V, 51-52.

15Wilson, 16Wilson,

"The "The

Study,"

pp.
Study."

483-85.

p.

491.

The Reform Argument of Woodrow Wilson

which are so

343

balanced against each other that it cannot act. In the

not

age of administra

tion,

we

follow

Newton but Darwin.

"Governments,"

living things and must operate as organic wholes

organs offset against each other as checks and upon

"

Wilson declares, "are for "no living thing can have its

live."

Rather, "its life is dependent

their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or

Progress,"

intelligence, their amicable community of purpose. "17 In The New Freedom, under the heading, "What is Wilson speaks of systematizing the foundations
of our
coordinated

polity to achieve "a single community, cooperative as in a perfected, beehive. "18 Now "the whole art of statesmanship is the art of bringing

the several parts of government

of particular common

into

effective cooperation

for the

accomplishment

objects."19

Statesmanship, then,
understood
an

appears to of

management, but management

viewed,"

in the light
unity that

be essentially "administration "the

"20

philosophically
maxims of political

that

is,

ideal

of

embodies

lasting

wisdom, the

permanent

truths of

political progress.

From the

vantage point of

problem of popular government

"administration philosophically the becomes that of establishing institutional ar

viewed,"

rangements

affording

an unhampered expression and an unhampered

implementa

tion of the popular will. The two

key

concepts of the reform argument are,

correspondingly, responsibility

and efficiency.

They

are, as Wilson understands

coin.

them,

not

in

conflict

but

rather

two sides of the same

operation"

Judging congressional

government or

the "constitution in
and

in the 1880s, Wilson finds it to be it is leaderless due to the

both irresponsible

inefficient.
and

Congress is irresponsible because it is leaderless,

continuing influence of separation of powers. Because power is still formally divided among the three branches, Congress is isolated, lacking the leadership

that,

under

favorable conditions, the

executive might provide.

Our party system,

the

organized on the

basis

of the

"old"

constitutional

system,

prevents

leadership

that might emerge

within

Congress. As things stand, Congress has

chairmen of

a multiple and

fragmented leadership consisting of the

in the
absence of
act

the standing committees who,

common purpose.

independently of each other and without party discipline, As a result of conducting its business by structured disintegra
system provided

tion

the committee

by

the rules

Congress is too
leaders"

complex

for

public understanding.

Without "a few

authoritative

who could represent

process.21

it to the nation, it is impossible for the people to follow the legislative Being unable to understand what Congress is doing, the people have difficulty in

holding
that it

it

accountable

blame. The

worst result of

because they do not know this "committee

of

where

to place either praise or

governm

prevents

debate

legislation

by

either

house

as a whole.

according to Wilson, is Such debate is

Constitutional Government, pp. 54-56. ,8Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), 19Wilson, Constitutional Government, p. 54.

17Wilson,

p.

44.

20Wilson, 21Wilson,

"The

Study."

pp.

493-94, 497.
p.

Congressional Government,

57.

344
essential

Interpretation
to inform
and educate public opinion.

Without the knowledge that

such

debate imparts, the people cannot act wisely in holding government responsible. Debate of a sort does take place within the secrecy of committee meetings, but it
informs only Congress,
not

the

people.

sense of educational oratory.

It is

"joust"

Moreover, it is not truly debate in Wilson 's of interests, not a contest of principles.

Truly

enlightening debate only issues from a contest of principles, and, further more, if the public is to pay attention, it must be a debate between party leaders with party fortunes at stake. In sum, says Wilson, "the more power is divided, the
more

irresponsible it becomes.

.It

is

ever

the little foxes that spoil the

grapes."22

Stated positively,
book."23

power concentrated

is

power

"easily

watched and

brought to

Congress is inefficient for the

concentrated or unified

same reason

that it is irresponsible:
foxes"

its lack

of

leadership. Because
"

of

this, "the little

are unable

to

act

in

concert with common purpose and

the result

is legislation that is "foolish in

policy

pieces and wise

in

spots

Government lacks

a coherent consistent public

(for example, the New Freedom).

Leadership

is

needed

to manage or give effi

ciency to our system of legislation. Efficiency is related to responsibility here because it "is the only just foundation for confidence in a public

officer."24

Leadership is equally necessary to

tion.

supply

power

to

Congress

to direct administra

As things stand,

congressional oversight of administration

is thoroughly
In

frustrated

by

separation of powers.

Furthermore,
of

the shortness of the terms of

and administration.

office obstruct

the efficient management

both legislation
powers are

sum,
ness
are

government

"lacks

strength

because its

divided, lacks

prompt

because its

authorities are

multiplied, lacks wieldiness because its

processes
and

roundabout, lacks efficiency because its responsibility is indistinct

direction."25

its

action without competent

Perhaps Wilson 's

ultimate criticism of congressional government

hampered
of of

by

the

forms

of

the

government

in this country have

creates offices ability.

Constitution may be found in the complaint that "the forms always been unfavorable to the easy elevation
authority."26

talent to a station of paramount

By dividing
of a

power as

it does, the free

Constitution
men

that are
prime

not

sufficiently

attractive

to the best men, the

a

of great

The
prize

ministership

government the

only

that will attract great

competitors."27

ruling party "is in Wilson

where

under

stands accession to

leadership to be a process of self-selection

spokesmen

the best

men

rise to the top through becoming authoritative

or orator-statesmen.

for their political parties,

the prime minister

By

so

concentrating

power

in the party
p.

leadership

and

"Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 497-98. "Wilson, "The 24Wilson, Congressional Government, 2SWilson, Congressional Government,
Study,"

77.

pp.

89, 171.

p. p. p.

206.
141. 147.

26

Wilson, Congressional Government,

"Wilson, Congressional Government,

The Reform Argument of Woodrow Wilson

cabinet

345
from the

Wilson is very
of the

much aware

that he departs
agrees with

fundamentally

teaching
shrank

Founding

Fathers. He

Walter Bagehot that

"they

from placing sovereign power anywhere. They feared that it would gener tyranny."28 ate For Wilson, power is not to be feared as long as it is kept responsible. His motto is: "Power and strict accountability for its use are the
essential constituents of good concentrated
government."29

Indeed,

as we

have seen,

power

"in

hand"

a single

is by that concentration made responsible because

it is easily watched by the people. Dividing power produces irresponsibility and risks the very paralysis of government. Furthermore, says Wilson of the wielder of great power, "the greater his power, the less likely is he to abuse it, the more is he
of nerved and sobered and elevated

by

it."30

Power

elevates the character

of centered

the officeholder

by

subjecting him "to the purifying influence

responsibility."31

Wilson

would

change

the American form of government through either

constitutional or extra-constitutional reforms. an organic

Both have the

the

objective of

gaining

form

of government characterized

by

principles of good administra of tenure, and compe

tion: unity, efficient management and organization, duration tence. Wilson's proposed constitutional amendments

uniform

tenure

for the

giving he saw achieving that "perfected party constituency-oriented He would replace our exemplified by the British

President, Senate,
for the
purpose

and

House,

and

cabinet members seats

in Congress are

government"

of

system.32

and

thus

decentralized,
calls
parties.

undisciplined,
with

and moderate

parties

(what Morton
and

Grodzins

"anti-parties")
The

leader-oriented centralized, be to
overcome

disciplined,

ideological

effect would

the constitutional system of

^binet government.

separation of powers and checks and

balances

or

to

insuiw'.-*

Wilson beyond the

1883).
open

also proposes reform of the administrative system,

moral reform of

the civil service reform movement (Pendleton

crack"

taking it above and Act,

He

would replace

the fragmented "multiple

at all

administrative system efficient civil service rationale

to

popular

interference

levels

with an

isolated,
von

modeled on

the Prussian

bureaucracy

under

Baron

Stein. The

for

reform is Wilson's famous distinction between politics and administration. Ad ministrative questions differ intrinsically from political questions. Whereas the people are competent

to decide questions of ends or broad policy,

they

are

handling dling scientific questions of administration or

a rustic mentation
of

"a clumsy nuisance,

the

delicate

machiner

when

it

comes to

han

means.33

The

aim

is

efficient

imple

popular

will,

an

aim

frustrated

by

popular

interference in

administration.

28Wilson, 29Wilson, 30Wilson,

3IWilson,

Congressional Government, Congressional Government, "The

Study,"

p. p.

202. 187 (Wilson's italics).

p?

498. 134

"Character,"

p.

(my

italics).
States,"

"Woodrow Wilson, "Cabinet Government in the United

in The Papers of Woodrow

Wilson, I, 493-510. "Wilson, "The

Study,"

p.

499.

346
Herbert

Interpretation

Storing

pyramid"

model.34

has aptly characterized Wilson 's proposed reform as a "two At the base of both pyramids is the body of the people.
gathered

The
the

will of the

majority is
the

up

by the majority political party.

made

At the top

of

pyramid of politics

will of

the majority is formulated into broad policy and,

after

debate in the legislative assembly,

law. Law is then introduced into the

top

of the pyramid of administration where

it is efficiently

and

economically
once govern

implemented
model ment

by

neutral, scientifically trained technicians. This

majoritarian

"input-output"

is completely

in

character.

There is the faith that

is

simplified and

its

power

concentrated, its responsibility to the people is

unproblematic.

There

are no structural checks will

by which either the expression or the

is hampered. Thus its animating principle is implementation of the majority the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and its operative principles are the principles
of administrative science.

//

It is it

now

argument.

necessary to make some qualifications concerning Wilson's reform In the first place, the argument is never carried to its full conclusion, and
.

abounds with contradictions

most

In Congressional Government,

where

the argument

find Wilson upholding bicameralism that he, complete, like the Founding Fathers, understands as a variant of separation of powers. Of the Senate, he says, "it is valuable in our democracy in proportion as it is undemo is
we nevertheless
cratic."

It "saves

us often

from

headlong

popular

tyranny."35

In Constitutional

Government, his last book, the

reform argument remains

but is

muted

by his much

clearer understanding and appreciation of the constitutional system. Whereas Congressional Government lacks a chapter on the judiciary, Constitutional Gov
ernment

has

one that could

have been

written

by

the authors of the Federalist.

There is

also considerable appears

a

Government, it

ambiguity concerning federalism. In Congressional casualty of the unifying centralizing forces of the

historical process; in Constitutional Government, it is defended as essential to the preservation of individual liberty, which in turn is the key to democratic selfgovernment.

Wilson

Liberty also states that "liberty

consists

is

ambiguous.

In "The

Study

Administration,"

of
movement than

no more consists

in easy functional
limbs

intelligence
move.

in the
"36

ease and vigor with which the

of a

strong

man vital

The

principles that rule within

.
. .

the man, or the constitution, are the

springs of

liberty.

terms of the adjustment of

Yet in Constitutional Government, forces or "easy functional

and

liberty

is defined in

movement."37

Liberty
ed.

as

34Herbert Storing, "Political Parties

the

Bureaucracy,"

in Political Parties U.S.A.,

"Government
of
Debate,"

R.

Goldman (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963),

pp. p.

143ff. 154. But

see also

35Wilson, Congressional Government,

Papers of Woodrow Wilson, II, 206,
majorities."

by

in The

where

Wilson denounces the idea

"the

tyranny

of partisan

pp. 495-96. 36Wilson, "The 37Wilson, Constitutional Government,

Study,"

p.

5.

The Reform Argument of Woodrow Wilson

adjustment corresponds

347
while

to Wilson's organic
source of

theory

of

politics,

liberty

as

self-reliant

individualism is the

that very friction or

faction underlying
the
"elitist"

the Madisonian view of American politics.

second qualification concerns what would

today be
he

called
speak

character of

Wilson 's

argument.

It is

more

precise, I think, to

in terms
toward

of his

"aristocratic

tendency."

The kind British

of government

points

us

is

an

administrative

state

in

service to popular of

feeling. Yet this is his

qualified

by

two

things:

his understanding
people.

government and

view of the character of the

American

In Congressional Government, Britain is described aristocracy he calls it a "limited

"38

as "a repub
"

lic

steadied

by

a reverenced

and pivoted upon a stable throne.

monarchy.

Indeed,
view of

in the

next sentence

Consider

next

his

monarchy:

What is the

valuable element

ideal form of government,

and power

could

in monarchy which causes men constantly to turn to it as to an it but be kept pure and wise? It is its cohesion, its readiness

to act,

its

concerted

its abounding loyalty to certain concrete things, to certain visible persons, organization, its perfect model of progressive order. Democracy abounds with it combine with its other elements of life
their own minds and their own
and strength

vitality; but how shall

governments

this

power of the

that know

aims?39

The

administrative excellence of

tion. The problem that needs to

is how to

combine

monarchy appears to be its leading recommenda it with democratic vitality. But there is more

be taken into

account.

The

leading theme of Wilson's reform writings

form
of government that

is

our need

for

statesmanship.

He

envisions above all a

and provide

will provide scope of

for statesmanship

the milieu for that self-selection

the best men to

permits

a position of paramount authority. rule of

The best political

the role of

order

is

one and

that

the

the best men.

says of

As

regards

leadership

representation

in

democracy, he

its leaders:

If they merely register the impulses, the unmeasured judgments of the people, they are mere automata and can serve no healthful purpose. They must choose. They must judge. They
must guide.

No

democracy
it thrive

can

live

without a

leisured
upon

class capable of

thinking
in the

on the

problems of government and

in

a position

to think

them

in the light of the

most catholic actual

learning:

nor can

without

giving to the thoughts

of such a class weight

conduct of

affairs.40

He then

goes on

to

argue that

leaders
not

must

have the

power of

tenure "to resist all

public

judgments"

hasty

public
"
.

but

the opportunity to

disobey "long, final

people

judgments
and their

This

reminds us

of Hamilton 's distinction between the

's

needs

inclinations.
emphasis on

This
38

the rule of the best men is paralleled

p.

by Wilson's doubts

Wilson, Congressional Government,

"Character,"

154.

39Wilson,
40Wilson,

pp.

136-37

(my

italics).

"The Modern Democratic

State,"

V, 85-86.

348

Interpretation

concerning the wisdom of the average citizen. While democracy is described as the best regime (which must in Wilson be distinguished from the best form of
government) because it is the freest regime,
moral character of
assessment. and

the freest

due to

progress

in the

mankind, there is also, throughout his writings, a more realistic

In "The

Study of

Administration,"

indeed,

in

virtue

is

called

into

question.

He

argues that

the very notion of progress "in government, as in virtue, the

hardest

of

hard things is to
selfish,

progress."

make

In the past, the

monarch people

"was

generally
selfish,

either

ignorant,

timid or a

fool."

At present, the
of

"are
con

ignorant, timid,

foolish."

stubborn, or

"The bulk

mankind,"

he

tinues, "is This

education.

rigidly

unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind

constant stress on the need of the people

votes."41

explains

Wilson's is

for

political

In sum, the
not

prime

minister, or

prime-minister
.

president,

in Wilson's

reform model

simply the

agent of the popular will

By ruling in conformity to
public

the people's highest aspirations, the leader aims at achiving the trust of the country, "he can not only lead

trust.

Gaining
"42

it but form it to his

problem of

own views.

Still, for
remains.

all these

qualifications, the central

government

Wilson's

reform

He

would

simplify

to make it accountable to the people on

the grounds of popular sovereignty. Yet he would also reorganize popular rule to
make

democracy

energetic and efficient on

the

basis

of the principles of adminis

trative science. Are the principles of popular government compatible with the
principles of good administration?

Wilson faces this As he

states

problem

in his

celebrated

essay, "The

Study

Administration."

of

it, "the

problem

is to

make

public opinion efficient without

The
Because
ment

whole thrust of
separation of

"43 suffering it to be meddlesome. Wilson's reform is to make public opinion

efficient.

already stated, is doing, the sovereign people naturally distrust it. The stated purpose of reform is thus "to create conditions of trustfulness by "the unmistakable placing
"

powers, for

reasons

obscures what govern

of responsibility.

'"^

This is
in

achieved

by simplifying
can

government
watched.

through

concen

tration

of all power

a single

hand that
what

be easily

Public

opinion

is

thus made efficient. It can know

wrongdoing.

Having
should

concentrated power powers

argues

that it

have "large

is going on and punish its servant for in a single hand, however, Wilson next and unhampered in adminis
discretion"
critic,"

tration. The role of public opinion is to be that of "authoritative

government at the

ballot box but not

interfering in its conduct.

controlling The people are told,

concerning their liberty, that "self government does

everything"

not consist

in

having a hand in
political undertaken

and
activity.45

that their political education should come

before their

In

word, Wilson presents us with a paradox: reform is

to

enable the sovereign people control

better to from

control their
what

government,
reform.

yet

the

scope of

is considerably

narrowed

it

was

before

41 42

pp. 492-93. Wilson, "The Wilson, Constitutional Government,

Study,"

p.

68.

43Wilson,
44

"The

Study,"

p.
Study,"

499.

Wilson, "The
"The

p.
Study,"

497. 498-99.

45Wilson,

pp.

The Reform Argument of Woodrow Wilson

The problem emerges. On the it
more accountable one

349

to

public opinion.

hand, Wilson reforms government to make On the other hand, he would make the
of public opinion.

administration

of government

independent
order

Administration
efficiently.

requires

such

independence in

to carry out the popular will

However,
public

to make American public opinion efficient is problematic. American

opinion, according to

Wilson, is free

and undisciplined.

To

make such a
government

public opinion efficient

is

not

only to increase opportunity to control

but

it, completely undermining the necessary for good administration. Thus, in order to provide the independence for good administration in the United States, it is necessary to
also

to increase opportunities to meddle with

conditions

introduce
popular

restraints on public opinion.

But

within

Wilson's framework
so.

of simple

sovereignty, there

are no grounds

for

doing

As already indicated, Wilson's rationale for limiting popular interference in public administration is the distinction between politics and administration. "Ad
questions"

ministrative questions are not political

but technical

questions.46

Ad

ministration
politics.

is thus politically neutral, a separable instrumental to But if administration is conceived as purely instrumental to popular will,
its neutrality
the
or

"apparatus"

how

can

independence from

popular will

be justified? Wilson

recognizes

problem of a

hierarchical, disciplined
to the
"policy"

administrative organization

"with he
on

sympathies

divorced from those be

responsible

of a progressive

free

people

spirited

but

argues

that it

will

of the government.

However,
should

the principle that "although politics sets the tasks for administration, it

not

be

suffered

to

manipulate

its

offices,"

Wilson

erects an autonomous civil

service responsible to no one

in

particular.47

Ironically then, Wilson establishes the

pyramid of politics and

basis for

a new separation of powers, one

between the

the

pyramid of administration.

Wilson
sovereignty

pays allegiance and

to two sets of principles, the principles of popular

.

the principles of good administration

His

aim

is

not

to sacrifice

popular rule and popular rule and

is

that he takes

liberty to good administration. Rather, it is to maintain liberty while gaining good administration. His problem the principles of popular rule and individual liberty as historically
individual individual The
age of politics

fixed

or guaranteed.

is

over.

In this light, the

problem

is to

organize popular rule so as

to

secure

the

unhampered expression and

implementa

tion of the

sovereign will.

But just here,

we

have seen,

an element

foreign to the

equation interposes itself: the quality of popular will. To secure the unhampered expression of popular will is to create conditions that, taking account of the free and undisciplined character of the

American people,
will.

undermine

the requirements that

promise

for efficiently implementing popular increase rather than decrease popular Thus Wilson faces
a conflict

They

are conditions

to

"meddling."

between

political principles

those

of monarchy

democracy Study of
and

that his

political

theory

takes as

finally

settled.

Early

in "The

Administration,"

Wilson indicates that the "high

494.

warfare"

of political

46Wilson, "The 47Wilson, "The

Study,"

p.
Study,"

pp.

494, 499-501.

350
principles still on.

Interpretation
is
all

but

over.

By the end of the essay, however,

itself
reform argument as a

it is clear that the

war

is

The

age of administration reveals

on

as an age of politics.

Reflecting
aim

Wilson's

whole, it

seems clear

that his

is to

elevate

the American

achievement

of

freedom

by infusing
theory

it

with

aristocratic excellence.
with no standard government as a

Yet his
so.

political science or political

provides

him

for

doing

Rather, it leads him

to view the administration of

enactment of popular will.

Within
there is

such a

purely instrumental thing for the framework, excellence is transformed

or reduced

to administrative

efficiency.
no

Since efficiency is ultimately grounded in the will of the sovereign, ground for qualifying popular sovereignty by good administration. In a
management.

word, Wilsonian statesmanship fails to transcend the running is determined: we must

gain

As he

once

said,

knowledge

of what

is going forward.

This,

of

course,

reduces

calculated adaptation to

statesmanship to riding the wave of the future, to forces considered beyond human control. Prudence, the
excluded. narrowed

defining

virtue of

statesmanship, is

Rather than

being

the master art of

the best possible, statesmanship is

to management conceived as the

handmaiden

of

history. ///

The question of the adequacy of Wilson 's reform necessitates a full inquiry into the adequacy of our system of separation of powers and checks and balances. Such an inquiry cannot be undertaken here, but some basic questions can be raised.

Can

government

be kept

responsible

to the

people

by

a simple

dependence

on

the

people? control were

While admitting that "a dependence on the people is no doubt the primary on the James Madison argued that auxiliary precautions
government,"

necessary.48

Separation

of

powers,

viewed as an

invention

of prudence,

created

internal

checks on the use and abuse of governmental powers.

Whereas

Wilson believed that the debate

A large

engendered

by

a system of cabinet government

would enlighten popular choice and stimulate constant

were not so sanguine. of populace

vigilance, the founders

fragmented into

multiplicity

and

variety
of

interests

could

not,

Wilson's

expectations.

they believed, be actively sovereign in the manner Indeed, the natural tendency of the people would be
interest to
private

to

subordinate the public

interests. Consequently, they

need

the

help that separation of powers

Further,
tyranny.

supplies
not

in

holding

government responsible.

the

founders feared

only

governmental

tyranny but

also popular

A secondary aim of separation of powers, supportive of the coalition majority (Federalist no. 10), is to retard such tyranny. While Wilson recognizes the danger of popular tyranny, his proposed reform is majoritarian. His

doctrine
tion of

of popular

sovereignty

as

historically

completely inevitable rules out the very

ques

majority tyranny.

Wilson's analysis,
4*

focusing

on

the structure of separation of powers,

of

con-

Federalist

no.

51;

see also

the argument

Federalist

no.

49.

The Reform Argument of Woodrow Wilson

eludes that

351

the

founders were so fearful of the abuse of power that they dangerously

"

fragmented government, encouraging stalemate or what James McGregor Burns has called "the deadlock of democracy. Yet, clearly, competent government was
an aim of

the

founders.49

But it had to be harmonized

context of majority rule
.

with what

is

required
'

for the
to the

preservation of

liberty

in the

The founders

answer

incompetency
accomplish capable not

experienced under the

Articles

of

Confederation

was

essentially
power

twofold: the creation of a

basically

national government with

plenary

to

its

objects , and the creation of an

of

independent and powerful presidency legislature but,

the
even more

only

checking the

predominant

impor

tant,

of

supplying

energetic

leadership

to the polity as a

whole.

In Constitutional
potentialities of

Government, Wilson
the presidency.

achieves an appreciation of would recast

leadership

Still he

the president as

prime minister within

the

framework It is

of cabinet

government, raising again the

question of responsibility.

man

racy possible From this perspective, balanced

save us
view of

's capacity for justice, Reinhold Niebuhr teaches, that makes democ and man 's inclination to injustice that makes democracy
reform of
nature.

necessary.50

American

democracy

must proceed

from

human

Awareness

of man's

inclination to injustice
would establish

will

from the

counsels of
of man

that destructive idealism that

heaven

on earth. us

's capacity for justice, on the other hand, will not allow to despair from seeking an improved political order. Proceeding from the

Awareness

conclusion order that

that Wilson himself

never

fully

reached, we are led toward a political

Wilson 's
of

principles of

is potentially tyrannical. But proceeding from the tension between efficiency and responsibility, we are led to a reconsideration
politics of moderation.

founders'

the

49See especislly Federalist nos. 67-77. 50Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York, 1944), pp. x-xi. Niebuhr is spesking of democracy as thst form created by the federalists. See also John

Hallowell, The Moral

pp.

Foundations of Democracy (Chicago:

University

of

Chicsgo Press, 1954),

125-29.

GADAMER AND KANT: THE CRITIQUE OF MODERN

AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN TRUTH AND METHOD

Richard L. Velkley
Alfred

University
ancient and

One way of becoming aware of an thinking is through the critical discussion

discussion forms
quiry. an essential part of

of a modern and

nearly forgotten mode of familiar mode. Such

Hans-Georg
thinker or
of

Gadamer 's hermeneutical in

position

The interpretation
of

of a modern

transcending
questioning
occurs or

it, insofar
the

as the

interpretation

is already a kind it brings into being a manner

start

of of

and openness when

to questions that is akin to ancient dialectic. But this

not guided
at

only

inteipretation is

from the

by a fixed position
life; philosophy from a closed body

thesis of its own. Ancient philosophy

its

peak saw

the goal of philosophy to be

the sustained awareness of the

was of

fundamental
of

problems of

human
and

distinguished from flashes

or

insight,
other.

on

the one

hand,

knowledge
of

science,

hexis

the soul. This

knowledge to the soul, itself through the encounter

Philosophy was a way of life, a habit or keeping with an account of the relation of according to which knowing is an activity that strengthens
on

the

view was

in

with

that which
of

is knowable to the highest degree.

an end-point

Knowing
knowing;
not

is

always a

beginning

this can only be the case

further knowing, and not if the highest knowledge is

to

self-knowledge.1

This Socratic

discovery was equivalent to the insight that the cosmological order is

recalls

that which is knowable to the highest degree.

Gadamer
only
one
a motion

these views for us

when

he

writes

that understanding is not

toward a meaning, "but the accomplished understanding constitutes

freedom";2

the state of a new intellectual

this is because

when one

understands,
what

"knows

good and

's way "with useful in what one

one

what one understands , or

understands.

because

one

knows

is

All understanding
cannot

points toward

self-

understanding.

At the

same

time,

all

self-understanding
philosophy

occurs

through the effort to any genuine

to understand

another.

Such

a view of

be

alien

philosopher, that
philosopher.

is to say, to
of

a great modern philosopher as well as to an ancient

For insofar

as we can

discover the

essential problems of

thought

through the interpretation

sense

in

which

any great philosopher, we discover also that there is a in the West transcends the distinction between ancient philosophy would.bring to light for us a nearly forgotten understanding has been obscured by the modern methodological ideal of knowla

and modern.

Truth
of

and Method

truth,

which

This esssy is
of

Hans-Georg Gadamer,

slightly revised version of an held in November 1978

address

delivered

at a conference on the

Thought

at

Dickinson

College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

of

Aristotle, De Anima 429a29-b9.

2H.-G. Gsdamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975. A translation und Methode: Grundziige einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Tubingen, 1960), p. 231.
Wahrheit

354
edge.

Interpretation
An essential
part of this

it

emerges

in the

experience

recovery is the disclosure of the "question of truth as "3 The truth manifest in works of art has been of art.
the idea of

distorted in

modern

times

by

"aesthetics,
way
of

"

We

must make

the effort to

transcend this

idea,

which underlies a general

thinking

about art and

beauty,

and which we can call

the "aesthetic consciousness.

of aesthetics

"4

The foremost philosophical

Judgement,"

thinker behind the

must uncover

idea

is Kant. In
of

order to transcend aesthetics we

its basis in Kant's "Analytic

the Aesthetic

in his

Critique of This uncovering is not the same thing as a critique of Kant from some already established alternative point of view; we would not have to interpret Kant if we had already acquired an alternative to him, if indeed there is
simply
such a

Judgement.5

thing.

Gadamer 's hermeneutical interpretation

of

Kant's

account of

taste is a movement of
wherein

thinking

that would
"

bring

us

into the

region of problems can one

appear.

something like "aesthetics can emerge and wherein its limitations What I hope to do, in a very limited way, is to indicate a few points
from along the path of movement for oneself again at a later time. Method has,
of the
of

might remember might use

this thinking, which one

The main thesis of the paper is the following: The

of

philosophical aim of

hermeneutics recovering
and an

Truth

and

as one of
and

its

central

concerns, the
of

beautiful, therewith, understanding of human self- understanding, both for man

philosophical reflection. outside the range of

art,

as

the primary starting

point

as

moral-political

being

for

I think

one can call

this point of view,

a

which

is wholly

"aesthetics,"

thinking

called

beautiful. For Plato,

rather than material of

following Socrates,

the poets

Platonic understanding of the are our first educators. They,

with the cosmologists and of

the cosmologists and sophists, provide the philosopher with the

primary

reflection; the poets, as contrasted

sophists, have superior self-reflection. The Platonic view man, as he is known first to himself, is not a "natural

poetry

entails

that

individual"

but

being
as

formed

by

tradition,
poetry.

or

by

opinions about the gods

and

human things,
consciousness
at

expressed

in

As

we

shall

see, the

modern

aesthetic

is

inseparable from

moral

individualism;
the

the critique of aesthetics is

the same time

a critique of a certain modern morality. name mentioned

(The

name of

Plato

should not

here;

hermeneutical

critique of aesthetics

be the only closely follows

connection

Hegel's between

critique of

Kant

and of enlightenment

individualism.) The
The

aesthetics and moral

of

individualism is
the

expressed with unparalleled

manner

clarity
which

by

Kant in his "Critique

exposes

Aesthetic

Judgement."

in

Gadamer
paper.

this connection in Kant's thought is the main

proceed with

subject of

this

But before I

that

discussion,

must place the

hermeneutical
would

concept of

truth before us, in a preliminary way, for it is this concept that

Truth and Method, "First Part: The Question
of

3Gadamer,
Art,"

Truth

as

it Emerges in the Experience

Dimension,"

of

pp.

5-150.
pp.

"Gadamer, Truth and Method, "The Transcending of the Aesthetic 5Gadamer, Truth and Method, "The Subjectivisation of Aesthetics in
pp.

5-90.
Critique,"

the

Kantian

39-51.

Gadamer
disclose
a sense of

and

Kant
any
scientific account of the

355
truth

truth more

fundamental
know its

than

about man:
understand

the truth that is manifest in a tradition.

itself if it does
nature of the

not

own

philosophy starting point; hermeneutics

Science

or

cannot would

disclose the

necessary starting

point of self-reflection.

In

broaching the
upon a of

issue

of

the

hermeneutical
the

concept of

truth, I

wish to stress
all

two aspects of the

issue: (1) the hermeneutical

upon of

account of of a

the dependence of

thinking

tradition and

language

tradition; (2) the inevitable

distortion

the character truth

revelation of

issues, I

will

the primary spheres of the In opening up a prospect upon these indicate how the fundamental problem of Western philosophy or
and

tradition

language

as

by the

objective sciences.

metaphysics, the attempt to acquire a science of the whole, is the background to

hermeneutical An

questioning.

essential moment of

the hermeneutical

account of

truth in Truth and

Method is the hermeneutical

account of

human

existence

developed by Heidegger. human

"being-

He

established

the priority of the truth

revealed

in the

existence of

there"

to the truths of the objective sciences, that

sciences or
.

is,

to the a priori of the exact

ultimate sense of science

to the methodologies of human sciences The

concernful

must
must

be found in the

understanding

of man whose situation as a whole

grounded

be first

manifest

to

him, in its
be

urgency, as

in his finitude. Truth in in

advance

this primary

sense cannot

a construct or a criterion given

in the

human
ground

faculties; it is the openness of the problem of existence, is obscure. Truth is both manifest and obscure; truth is
"
.

whose ultimate

"being"

as a whole
"

that is behind the investigation of the sciences into "beings

a situation whose ground origin

Man is "thrown

into

is necessarily hidden to him; man has no insight into the He therefore can take no recourse to an eternal order of of his "being-there
"
.

nature or to a on

highest

being to make sense of this

"fact"

of existence.

Such

a move

the

part of

the philosophy can only obscure the fact that understanding occurs

is obscurity, that is, only finite beings can understand or philosophize; therefore such beings must understand themselves in the light of their own situation. The understanding of the human situation out of and through
only
where

this

that

situation

is

called

"hermeneutics

of

facticity. "6
of mortal

One

can argue that this account of

understanding in the light

such that the

human

existence was modified

later

because for him the tradition, as individual care

supra-

truth of

by Heidegger, being as manifest

events of

primary

standpoint

to man through
existence.

language,

art, and

individual anxiety in
can

historical

and

Being and Time

because

was

The primary stress on corrected. But again the point is

that understanding
addresses man,

only

occur

makes a claim upon

a primary truth is already manifest and him: This truth is the particular fate announced

6Gadamer, Truth and Method,

pp.

225-34.

356

Interpretation
in essence, it is tradition. This truth
and statesmen
manifest

by "being";

in the

great works of

artists, philosophers,

is the

sole

basis

we

have for

forming
the

our

self-understanding
mental

and

for raising
"

philosophical questions.
understanding.

It

provides not

funda

"pre-understanding
account of

that guides

Man does

think as an

isolated individual, developed this

prejudice,

as a natural

unit, as

a subject with

its

cogito.

Gadamer has
"

the

positive role of aspect of

traditional

"pre-understanding

or of

as a

fundamental

hermeneutics. Language, through

the

which

tradition speaks,

is

also what speaks when

individual speaks; but

"language"

here

means

primarily the

classical peaks of a

those of music and the

guage."

visual

arts, form the

most

tradition, for all great works, even fundamental stratum of "lan

"Tradition"

is

not equivalent are

(without qualification) to

"ordinary

lan

guage."

Tradition
are

and

language
"

the true whole of human thought and experi to the subject and the will, as well as to
said

ence;

they

"ontologically
Yet it
and

prior

scientific methodology.
ground

cannot

be

that there

is

an ultimate metaphysical
"event"

for tradition

language. These

manifest

themselves as the

of about

being;

that event is the openness of man's situation as a whole

can come

only way it
medium,
notion

about, through tradition

and

coming language as an

in the

unlimited

one

that is

never completable or

wholly

overtaken

by

the mind. The

of an unlimited and unlimitable medium of

thought in hermeneutical
"substance,"
"ground,"

philosophy takes the place of the limiting notions of in earlier philosophy. One difficulty that arises here: How
"idea"

or can an unlimited

medium come

to reflect on itself or criticize itself?

and

Heidegger
sciences

Gadamer have

reflected on

the ways in which the established

necessarily distort the character of truth as this historical event of man's becoming open to his elusive situation as a whole. Science as such must abstract

from the
the

whole

by bringing
not

a part of

"being"

that is the whole in which

it to the foreground; the elusive background, arise is necessarily concealed by

"beings"

science.

This is

to say that we must or can reject science; but we

must

become

aware of

the partiality it imposes on our understanding

and conceals

from itself.
and

What

science

has

never yet

adequately

realized

is this fact

about

itself

its

consequences.

grounds

Science necessarily makes its own presupposition, the tradition that less available to our understanding. This means we require the de it,
the hermeneutical insight into the essential

velopment of

fragility
been

of

tradition, its
no previous

tendency
moment at

to be

forgotten,
at

to be concealed,

by

science

itself. At

in history has the continuing

moment;
the same
so apparent. center of

existence of tradition

so problematic as

the

present

time,

the truth of the

fragility of truth has never

before been
At the
truth

by

science

the whole

the problem of the necessary distortion or concealment of is metaphysics, which has been the attempt to attain the science of itself. Metaphysics is the basis of all Western science. It is the essence of
character. and

science's concealing foreground of being,

That

essence consists
of

in the placing

of man

in the

in the concealing

the true whole of elusive

being, by

the subordination

of the whole

to the mastery of one part, the animal rationale. The

Gadamer
essence of

and

Kant

357
is humanism. Hermeneu
this tradition in the West
call

Greek

metaphysics at
not pretend

the basis

of our science

tical thought

does

to be able to

jump

over

toward the true whole of

of a new culture
represents example

being. It therefore rejects Nietzsche 's

for the

creation

through the assertion of the will to power; this demand only

the most extreme stage of humanism and metaphysics. Nietzsche's

shows us

how

our

thinking is

still

dependent

on metaphysics.

More

generally, the
of

dependence

of all

thought on

language
not

entails that the concealment

only of human existence. The whole itself is finite being. In beyond or behind metaphysics, hermeneutical going thought does not arrive at a comprehensive or infinite standpoint. It extends and

the whole is a

defining moment of existence,

deepens the
could

modern critique of metaphysics when

it discovers why

metaphysics
modern

genuinely "methodologism within that

"

never

attain

knowledge

of

the whole; it includes

critique.

By
thinking,
the

"methodologism"

one means
which

the central concern of a modern form

of

displaces

the metaphysical quest

from the

search

for

highest

cause of nature
"subject,"

to the quest

for the "clear

methodical

distinct"

and

or self-evident notions of
of the natural world as a whole.

Only

its mastery later does this displacement become known

which enable

as

"epistemology,

"

by

which

time its original meaning has become forgotten. For hermeneutical thought, the

history

of

philosophy, from metaphysics to mastery of nature, then to epistemol

ogy, is the

history of a progressive closing up of human openness to the whole.

some

Now I have
philosophical
sion of

basis for turning to the theme

of aesthetics as

developed

by

hermeneutics. The

critique of methodological

thinking is

an exten

the critique of metaphysics, and aesthetics

is

one

form

of methodological

thinking. Aesthetics as formulated

by Kant is a manifestation of the modern search

say it is the
search

for

a priori

knowledge;
of

one

could

for "epistemological
sublime.

foundations"

the

experience of
"

the beautiful and the

The

modern

search

for "the

a priori

is part of a larger project to emancipate human reason from

traditional authority,
project

as well as the

"enlightenment."

Every

authority of the natural whole. We call this form of enlightenment philosophy involves some from nature,
beauty.
with

kind
to

of

"methodological

whole abstraction"

or

from the "concrete

speak as a

Hegelian,
moral,
or

whether

this occurs in metaphysics, in the account of man

"Emancipation"

as social and
tion"

in the
are

account of

and

"abstrac

are

inseparable; both

incompatible

"openness to

being."

Aesthetics

is the

approach of emancipated reason

toward the phenomena of art and beauty.

emancipated and enlightened

Hermeneutics develops
the "aesthetic

a critique of

this

standpoint,

which characterizes our culture as a whole:

"

this whole outlook on

art can

be called
this

consciousness.

In its

most extreme and most relativistic an experience of

form,

consciousness reduces the as

beautiful to

the human consciousness

although

human We
.

shall see

that this was not Kant 's

intention,

his thought may

to the

point

in that direction. Kant

still ascribed a certain suprahuman significance

reveals

beautiful. Gadamer 's very dialectical discussion of Kant's aesthetic doctrine the experience of beauty, but at the same time, how Kant
"subjectivized"

358
regarded one

Interpretation
it
within a

teleological

framework,

albeit of a modern sort.

I believe that

discovers

a point of convergence of

the Kantian and hermeneutical accounts of

beauty, in that both seek to preserve a suprahuman dimension of the beautiful on the basis of a turning away from theoretical metaphysics. For Kant, that suprahu
man

dimension that is

manifest

in the human is freedom; for

and tradition are two ways of

philosophical

hermeneutics it is tradition. Freedom

the good, or the noble.
standings of

understanding
under
or revealed

One

might not

the noble, which do

say that they are both take their bearings by religious

of

"authentic"

accounts of the suprahuman, nor

by

theoretical metaphysics.

Therefore there is

an

Kant the teleology is of autonomy and find contentment in that achievement; it is

of

implicit teleology in each account a future world of rational beings

a

the beautiful. For

who

have

achieved

teleology
is

that points

toward a philosophy of history, while at the same time renouncing the possibility of

philosophy

history. The hermeneutical

no

account

of

tradition

not future-

oriented and

implies

doctrine

of

progress, and therefore implies no

"

theory

of

universal rational
of

humanity.

"History

or

"tradition

"

is only the

particular

history

the interpretation of the basis of a

or the noble

tradition, its
tradition

classical

humanity

for the
"

given

only.

basis; this basis defines Nevertheless, the Western

its Greek classical basis is peculiarly open to the problem of being or to the question of "What is. Hermeneutics is itself a development of this special
tradition with

Western tradition, with its basis in philosophy, is the theme of hermeneutics, if I am not mistaken. The beautiful plays
openness. special

The

mode of

being

of

a crucial role

in this tradition, its

own efforts.

as

the harbinger of the good, and as the first always,

and

manifestation of an order that exists

to which human reason may

ascend, through
science and

But this

order was called

into

question

by modern
in

the critique of metaphysics. The beautiful then comes to point toward

the mysterious order of human freedom and creativity; we see this

happening

Kant's thought. Out

sciousness,
"self."

of

this direction of
all

thinking

there arises the aesthetic con

which rejects

suprahuman order

behind the beautiful,

finding
to

instead that its source, if at all knowable, is human inwardness Has hermeneutical thought introduced a new alternative, disclose that the
mysterious and

or the creative which seeks

inaccessible origins

of tradition are the standard of

humanity in a tradition and the order behind the manifestness of beauty?

//

Having
into the

made

these

general remarks on

hermeneutics, let

us

inquire further
as

question:

What is the "aesthetic

consciousness"?

Gadamer describes it

the reduction of the significance of art and

enjoyment of a

beauty

to subjective

and private

faculties.

"

merely formal sort, or to the pleasure of "the free play of the The work of art loses its independent authority to educate us when it is
enjoyment; thus the aesthetic consciousness
relates

reduced to such private acts of

to its object, art, as

historical

relativism relates to

its object,

history or tradition.

Gadamer
think we

and

Kant
culture; it is in fact

359
almost not

easily

recognize

this phenomenon

of modern

the essence of what we mean

approach great art

by

"culture."

The

aesthetic consciousness

does

it, but as a self-willed spectator helter-skelter, in a display of universal openness to all human experiences. In fact, however, human experience, which is in the first place that of a traditional way of life, is left behind
of

humbly,

seeking to be formed by

the panoply of tastes and styles that are placed together

in favor
"cultural

of an abstraction
context"

called

"pure

content."

artistic

vain reference

to

its

own

does nothing to restore the original weight of the work of art to tradition. Above all else, the aesthetic consciousness does not seek instruction from art;
philosophical questions are replaced

philosophical

by

ques

tions of style
of

and

form. In the end, the

aesthetic consciousness cannot make sense

its

own

arbitrary
no

standpoint over and against

the work

of

art; its experiences

of

art,

having

discontinuous;
One
spread

authority there is no

outside of

its

own abstract

enjoyment,

are unrelated and

solid core of the

being

of this

consciousness,

either

in

history or tradition or in philosophy.

can consider the aesthetic consciousness as a paradigm case of a wide which

difficulty,

has been

called the emergence of modern subjectivism or on aesthetics point to a

individualism. Gadamer 's thoughts

this
modern stance.

Platonic

alternative

to

Classical-humanist

education

begins

with the education of

taste as an element in the moral-political formation of character that may culminate

in the study
of

of

philosophy; I

am of course

referring

above all to the

Platonic

prescription of music and gymnastic as

the first instruction of the future guardians

the best

city.7

Musical

education as

described in the Republic is

crucial to

the

harmonization
at

of the passions with reason , and

and

to the creation of a character that is

and moderate and gentle
aesthetic consciousness

the same time courageous

ready for spirited action,

in its

bearing

toward fellow citizens.

of

Very

clearly, the

spells the

demise

this ideal. This

consciousness replaces

the

first

concern of

man,

with education

for the
and

sake of virtue and the

quite

life

of

his

own

community, in

which

he

must

live

act, with
as

derivative

concerns.

Hermeneutics is
concerned with

concerned with our

being

formed

by

tradition, therefore it is

education as the continuing life of tradition; for this reason it is concerned with the human sciences. These have lost the understanding of their own proper element, which

loss

was effected

in the first

place

by the destruction of the original place of

meaning by the aesthetic consciousness. by Kant's "subjectivisation of taste.
"

taste

(including
was

here the art of rhetoric) within the whole of an education. In short,

and political
prepared

taste was deprived of moral

But this

most

decisively
the

Gadamer 's discussion Kantian thought

"

of aesthetics therefore revolves around

classical-humanist

the encounter of

with

tradition.
of a

Kant's description
scendental ,

of the

aesthetic

judgment takes the form

.

"tran

that
of

is

a priori ,

legitimation

of the principles of taste

Let us recall the

basic features

his

argument.

According

to

Kant,

the pleasure one takes in the

7Plato, The Republic, 376c-412b.

360
judgment
of

Interpretation
beautiful forms is wholly nonconceptual and subjective; it says the intrinsic character of the object judged. One could speak of a
abstraction"

nothing

about

"methodological
aesthetic

from the

nature of

the object in

describing

the

judgment. Our

concern a

itself;
with

that

is, in judging

in this judgment is in fact only with the judging certain form as beautiful we are only showing an form for the play of our rational faculties
to a definite concept; we

appreciation of the appropriateness of this

it. The form is

not related

judge

that it

is

purposive

for the activity of imagination in relation to the ideas of order in the understanding; the given form is pleasing because it instigates an activity of the imagination that is
both free
and orderly.

The

methodological abstraction of

"form
"

"

from the

object

is

here,

as elsewhere
" ,

in

similar abstractions of modern

thought,

made

for the

sake of
.

"freedom

or

in Kantian terms , for the

a given

sake of the

"purity

of aesthetic judgment at the same

are

Our judgment that

judgment that it

form is

purposive
rational

in this way, is
since the

time a

will

be

so

for every

being,
of

faculties

basically

the same in all rational beings. The judgment

universal of

taste refers the given form to a

taste; community by its nature normative: this thing should be judged as beautiful. The judgment of taste is, therefore, that a given subjective pleasure in a form is universally communicable, and therefore it
therefore the

judgment is

has

a priori

character,

although

it is

subjective.

Because the judgment

pleasure, it is
a

of taste

is

one of universal

kind

of

"common

sense,"

or sensus communis.

communicability of a For Kant it is the

.

only such common sense human beings have. Gadamer points out that this involves a drastic reduction of the meaning of sensus communis, as it came to Kant from the classical-humanist tradition. Among other examples cited, Gadamer 's is very tradition, the sensus communis is
citation of

Shaftesbury

helpful.8

For Shaftesbury,

steeped

in Platonic
good,
of

a sense of

humanity

and of the common

communal sympathies and traditional experiences, which

is

communicated on

the

level

of

feeling

in the

phenomena of taste and wit;

statesman to possess

this common sense,

for,

as a

it is among the virtues of a social virtue, it is closely related

to prudence. Kant's narrowing of the common sense to the aesthetic

judgment,

excluding from it the sense his moral doctrine and his

rational

of

sociality or humanity, is a decisive moment in both aesthetic doctrine. Morality as grounded in the pure

law

of

the categorical

imperative

sociality "methodological being. This

sociality,
ence of

or the related experience of taste.

abstraction,"

any foundation in natural Kantian morality involves another in this case, from natural dispositions of the human
must exclude

shows to us that

Kantian morality

entails a

denial

of man's natural

and

is in its

essence

highly individualistic in
or

a modern a

way; the

experi

loyalty

to a particular

community

tradition is for Kant

distraction from

the universal and cosmopolitan aim of true morality. The autonomy of the Kantian moral man must remind us of the of Rousseau's natural man self-sufficiency
realized at

the

level of society. And in fact Kant 's reduction of the

Truth
and

sensus communis

8Gadamer,

Method,

pp.

24-33.

Gadamer
to taste can

and

Kant

361

be

correlated with

theory,
(This

and with

his

simultaneous reception of

his turning away from the English moral sense Rousseau's account of man's
as

natural goodness and

asociality,

the

foundation for
to the

morality

of autonomy.

occurred of

in the

unpublished

Remarks

Observations,

etc.9) Kant's final

doctrine

the aesthetic judgment assigns to taste a negligible role in the education

of morality.

Taste

can

help to create a moral disposition through the refinement of

a small matter

the

inclinations, but this is

But Gadamer

in

morality based

upon

the disregard of

inclination.10

points out that not

this vast reduction of the moral significance of to the "aesthetic consciousness";

taste in Kant
point of

does

lead

immediately
.

for in
that

fact,

the moral significance Kant does acribe to taste is absolutely crucial

sense of taste

to the character of the judgment of taste But the moral

of natural

is

now not

sympathy
of artistic

or

sociality, but that

of

autonomy

or

freedom. This

alone

makes comprehensible

two crucial features of the aesthetic

relation

doctrine: the
the

relative of

demotion

beauty in

to natural

beauty,

and

understanding

fine

art as

the

art of genius.

///

Within the

scope of

this paper, it is possible only to touch upon matters that

are of great moment not altogether.

A few points

should

only for aesthetics but also for subsequent philosophy be mentioned. The overarching consideration here
a

is

compelling way: Kant's primary interest in the aesthetic judgment is teleological; his primary concern is a systematic one: to show
what and

Gadamer brings forth in

the unity of two forms of judgment, that of taste

natural
organisms.11

that

of

the purposiveness of
a given

The judgment

of taste

is teleological insofar as faculties

with

form is

judged

as purposive
and most

for

the

free play

of the

"purest"

disinterested

when

the given form

is

it. But that free play is natural one, for there is

artifice and

no element of human

interestedness,
pleasure of

no expression of

human

intention

in

natural

beauty,

as there must

be in

a work of art made

by

human beings for

human beings. The free

this purest judgment of taste is remarkably

analogous to the disinterested respect

for the

moral

law. Natural

beauty
has

seems to

bring

to light

and

to

promote man's

capacity for

free

pleasure akin

to moral
a

feeling;
regard

therefore it seems
rational

in the
.

phenomenon of apparent

beauty,

that nature

kind

of

for the

faculties This
"supersensible

regard, which can

be

no more than a

subjective postulate, points toward

the

ultimate
"

toward the reality

9

of a

substrate

unity of nature and freedom, behind the phenomenal. world that Sciences, 1902-), und Erhabenen,

Kant s Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin 1-192 (Bemerkungen

zu

and

New York: Prussian

Acsdemy

of

XX

pp.

den Beobachtungen iiber das Gefiihl des Schonen

1764-65).

"Tmmanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, (trans. J. H. Bernard of Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790. pp. 200-02. New York: Hafner, 1951), Sec. 60, "Of the Method of
Taste,"

"Gadamer, Truth

and

Method,

pp.

46-51.

362
may promote, in
tion of universal
ways

Interpretation
inscrutable to human understanding, the
a
ultimate realiza

freedom in

"moral

world."

beauty

to works of art in the analytic of

Therefore the priority of natural taste has a moral basis. But it, we must

remember, is not that of a morality based on

inclination,

on

sociality,

or on

tradition. It is not a morality with a basis in human nature, but in

something
within

suprahuman.

Man

encounters

freedom, which is both other to himself, and yet something

himself, in natural beauty. Certainly there are important theological impli cations behind this conception of something suprahuman shining through the
of nature. I think one should recall here, among other considera of nature and of natural freedom. Rousseau's apotheosis tions, The moral priority given to natural beauty within the analysis of the judgment

human experience

of

taste points toward the aesthetics of genius, which lie outside the confines of the taste
proper.

problem of

Genius,

as

the natural inspiration that gives the rule to art,

is the true
Genius

standard of good art

for Kant. Gadamer 's discussion

reveals the

systematic significance of this move gives expression to

from the discussion of taste to that of genius.

human

experiences of social

mores,

classical rules of

freedom, as natural and unmediated by the form, and religious symbolism. This
We admire the work of genius
to create the wholly new that
power

ideal of genius is certainly

because it
reveals

moral as well as aesthetic.

to us the mysterious

human

eludes our comprehension. celebration of

The

secular cult of

genius, coming after

Kant, is
argued

the

freedom as the

essence of man , or of man

's capacity to

make

himself
that

in Promethean

fashion, in defiance

of a suprahuman order.
and

Kant had

man's nature or completion

is unknowable,

thus had argued that freedom or

perfectibility is man's essence, the essence that eludes theoretical understanding. Insofar as the significance of beauty must lie in its revealing to man the reality of
freedom in the play
place given work of of

to natural

the faculties, we see the inner connection between the high beauty, and the celebration of genius in the sphere of art. The

art, which may have some conceptual content, points less toward the

does creativity itself, which is unconscious and unguided by rules The conceptual content of art brings a certain "compulsion or to the judging faculties which impinges upon their freedom In this account of the
reality
of
.

freedom,

than

"

"interest"

significance of art, we see the work of art, as a source

for

our

self-discovery
Erlebnis:

and

instruction, taking
development
an
of

second place to

the experiences of its free creator. The further

aesthetics of experience or of
art as

this approach

is the

immediate

expression of a subjective state of mind.

places taste as the central notion of

aesthetics; in this
speaking.

we

After Kant, genius dis have the emergence of the

"aesthetic

consciousness,"

strictly

Now to return to the theme of teleology in Kant. The teleological interest of Kant is in postulating the existence of finite rational beings, such as man, as the final purpose of the natural whole. Freedom is the true telos of nature; taken in

itself,
of

nature

has

no

telos.12

One

could

say that this

was the
of

only teleology Kant

World, i.e.,

I2Kant, Critique of Judgment, Sec. 84,

Creation
Itself,"

"Of the Final Purpose

the Existence of a

pp.

284-86.

Gadamer
saw

and

Kant

363

yet possible

after

the

destruction

of

the older cosmological

teleology by
restores restores

Newtonian

science.

Thus Gadamer

states that the

teleology

after

it had been destroyed

by

Critique of Judgment the Critique of Pure Reason: it

teleology not as theoretical metaphysics but as a subjective postulate for the sake of morality. The analytic of aesthetic judgment stands under this project. One could
argue that

Kant's
with

stress on the

freedom

or

"purity

'"

of aesthetic

judgment would be
not

in tension

his

moral-teleological
no

interest

were

this

interest

in

"freedom"

itself. In any case, this teleology kinds of natural beings to be the

longer

understands the

"perfection"

of

the

standard of

the beautiful.

Gadamer

writes that

Kant's

aesthetic achieves

"the dissolution

of ancient cosmological

assigned man

his

place

in the total
one can

structure of

being

thought, which and to each existent its goal of

perfection."13

In sum,

communis points

say that the new account of taste as the sensus to the destruction of two ways in which the classical-humanist

tradition had seen man: as a subordinate part of a

will qua

community that

supersedes

his

individual,

and as a subordinate part of a natural whole that supersedes

his

existence qua species.

IV

The

ultimate

goal

of

properly, is
works of of the

a reflection on which opens

Gadamer 's hermeneutical study, if I understand it truth, insofar as it is revealed in language, history, and

art,

beautiful. Here

one of the sources of illumination

up for us the prospect of recovering a metaphysical sense is Plato; and again, in these
beautiful"

concluding pages of Truth and Method wherein the "metaphysics of the is discussed, the other point of orientation is Kant.14 And now the
achievement of

positive

Kantian

aesthetics

if brought forth. Kant

understood

both that the

beautiful

cannot could

be

reduced

to the useful, and that the rationalistic aesthetics of

nature
of

perfection

not

grasp the
of

its transcendence. The

not

pre-Kantian

metaphysical

cosmology

the beautiful is

Gadamer 's

point of return.

We

cannot talk about the natural ground of the which manifests

beautiful; instead,
and

the beautiful
object.

is that There

itself; it is
beautiful

present

in its

appearance

in the beautiful its ideas

is

no chorismos

between the idea

of the

beautiful

manifestation.

This is the

advantage of the

when compared with

the good; for

of virtue never

manifest themselves with the

this is the meaning

of the

immediacy and certainty of beautiful things. Perhaps Platonic phrase that Gadamer quotes: in the attempt to lay
referred

hold kind

on

the

good

itself,

the good takes flight into the beautiful. And it

that the early Kant of the Remarks already

of

to,

speaks

is striking of the beautiful as a

"perfection

completed

in

itself"

that reminds us of the

moral

virtue, but is
us a

yet of

different from

it.15

If I

understand

self-sufficiency of Gadamer correctly, he is

back into the
whole

showing

way

integrating
Method,
p.

the experience of

beauty

I3Gadamer, Truth
15

and

47.
Hermeneutics,"

14Gadamer, Truth and Method,

"The Universal Aspect

of

pp.

431-47.

Kants Gesammelte Schriften, XX(Bermerkungen),

esp. pp.

118, 133-34, 167-68.

364
context of of

Interpretation
human

life; he is attempting to overcome,

"methodological

with

the

aid of certain

thinkers
"

abstraction"

the past, the

of

modern

through a consideration of the role of the beautiful within the

human "whole.

thought, primarily And

its

role

in this

context

the world, which cannot

is precisely that of giving us the initial points of orientation in be found through scientific procedure. The beautiful,

including

the morally the

world.

beautiful,

establishes

the initial

hierarchy
its

or

the

initial

structure of

The immediate

manifestness of the

beautiful is
"I6

what we see

first in the

world.

"The beautiful

charms

us, without

integrated

with

the whole of our orientations and

cannot

evaluations.

being immediately Being by nature a

"beginning,"

the beautiful

"interpretation."

Thus its

"immediacy,"

be merely contemplated; it demands on our part or its advantage, may contain a decep
should

tion: that

of

finality.
the hermeneutical concept of truth

The
As

connections with
"finite"

be

apparent.
of

living

and

beings,

we are never confronted with a

total

disclosure

"subject,"

"substance,"

or manifest

or with
"subject,"

in the

and not

any in a final

completed

whole; the

beautiful is
of

not

order or

hierarchy

things. The
which

beautiful is
to point

irreducible, but it is

also not a

unity
a

or a whole.

For its nature,

that

is

and

thus to be a beginning for us, also cannot be surpassed or subordinated

by

us

to anything

human life is
while not

limiting it. disclosed by it

The beautiful is
as always

beginning

is

never

surpassed;

beginning. Yet the

nature of

this motion,

perfectible, is

good.

Its

goodness consists not

in

measurable progress

in mastery (whether of self or nature), and thus quo), not in a modern sense of freedom. The beautiful brings forth the good in granting the realization of the ultimacy of the difference between life as character and death
even a progress ab
not

(not

as soul without

character; but
soul

character partakes of the unlimitedness of activity.

or

Whether

human

is

living

dead depends

on whether

its

"object"

has the Is the

character of the

beautiful,

or some other.

But this

amounts

to asking:

measure of the soul measure?

"fitting"

to it or alien to it? Does the soul know its own the only measure of

The

beautiful, itself immeasurable, is

freedom; for

this reason its nature is elusive, although the beautiful alone permits any precision to exist in the world. At this point, we see that hermeneutics is reaching its limit: it
must

become "psychology.
In any event, there

"

can

be

no position

further

removed

from the

aesthetic

consciousness than this one: that the

remain

thankful to

experiences that

beautiful is the harbinger of the good. We will Gadamer for opening to us again a way back to original were almost wholly forgotten.

16Gadamer,

Truth

and

Method,

p.

442.

BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL:

ORDER, LEGITIMACY,

AND THE MODEL OF ROUSSEAU

Robert C. Grady
Eastern Michigan

University

I. The Preoccupation of

Jouvenel'

Political Thought
out of

The
place on

political

thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel may seem quaint and

first

reading.

His
wise

writings are often greeted with cordial and

befuddlement:

the cordiality

due

obscure writer.

contemporary scure because

insightful author; the befuddlement given an Indeed, he is an obscure political theorist. A highly regarded more highly regarded in Europe than America he is not ob
a

unknown.

Nor is he

obscure

is the
of

gist of more

than one

assessment.1

because obscurantist, although this He is obscure, rather, because the sum

and to

his

major works appears

to be

diversified, disjointed,
romantic and

lack

a coherent and scien

thread

tying it together. One sees both tist, critic of income redistribution and
liberal.2
Jouvenel'

realist, idealist

advocate of

planning,

conservative and

s writings

first became

available

in the United States (1957). The Pure

stir

with

the

translation of On Power

(1948)

and

Sovereignty

Theory

of

Politics (1963) and The Art of Conjecture (1967) caused a American followers because they appeared to break with the
earlier

among his position in the

style"

books. Jouvenel has been

regarded as a

theorist

in the "grand
substantial

part of the revival

ment over

in

political

theory3

but there has been The

purposes of works

disagree

the meaning of his

position.

suggest

the unifying thought

in the

core

of

this essay are, first, to Jouvenel that have been

This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Foundations of Political Theory Group, August 29, 1974, Chicago, Illinois. The author is indebted to Dante Germino and Carl Slevin for their suggestions in completing the revision. World Politics, 2 (October 'See Robert A. Dahl, "Political Theory: Truth and
Consequences,"

89-102, and Leonard Woolf, review Quarterly, 29 (April-June 1958), 186-87.

1958),

of

Sovereignty by Bertrand de Jouvenel, Political

are:

2Jouvenel's

major

theoretical

contributions

On Power, trans. J. F. Huntington (Boston,

The Pure Theory of Politics (New 1948); Sovereignty, trans. J. F. Huntington (Chicago, 1957); trans. Nikita Lary (New York, Art The and Conjecture, Pure Theory; of Haven, 1963), hereafter,
1967),

hereafter, Conjecture. Pure Theory

in the United States but
not

was written

in English
Also

and was not reissued after the

first

printing.

The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge, 195 1 ), widely

circulated.

addressed

to a British audience, was two volumes of Fu-

available

available are

turibles: Studies

snd collections of essays

lsrgely forecssting sudience, in Conjecture (Geneva, 1963, 1965), SEDEIS in Arcadie: Essais sur le Mieux-Vivre Bulletin the from mainly
addressed

to the

(Paris,

1968)

and

Du Principat

et autres reflexions politiques

(Paris.

1972).

Other

of

Jouvenel's

major essays are cited

below,

passim.

Theory,"

'Dahl,
144-49.

"Political

p.

89; Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology (New York,

1976),

pp.

366
available to the of

Interpretation
American audience,
and

second, to indicate

several

implications
in

this interpretation.

Most interpretations
one or more of

of

Jouvenel

emphasize a

key

concept or approach

his

major

the works or

develop

works, but they either do not find the thread linking conflicting interpretations. The assessment by Roy Pierce

that portrays Jouvenel as moving the

from "the historical is

misleading.

and the philosophical

to

behavioral

operational"

and the
major shifts where

Informed

by

the

fact-value
basic

milieu, it implies

in his

postwar

thinking

and a progress accom

panying maturity,

in fact Jouvenel
on

remains preoccupied with some

questions, varying his emphasis formats.4 Thus the intellectual

these as he develops them in

different

"behavioral"

Politics is

authority in
work.5

follow-up to Sovereignty rather than

necessary

"philosophical"

the
a radical

(conceptual) The Pure Theory of (normative) analysis of

shift,
a point noted

in that

earlier

Alternatively, Carl Slevin's initial interpretation assessing many of the early works and occasional papers indicates that there are grounds for reading into Jouvenel a yearning for the days of the ancien regime and for portraying
Jouvenel
as no more written

than a conservative

-apologist

for the

status

quo.6

Thus in

Sovereignty,
early
the

in the face
can

of what appears

to be the disintegration of the

traditional social

ties,

be

read as an

reviews as a promotion of are

essay the "great

on

statism,

and

has been

read

man"

theory. Such

interpretations,
On Power in

however,

difficult to

sustain when

reading

Sovereignty
Jouvenel'

with

background.7

There is On Power
political

some

basis for them,

on

nonetheless:

s prewar works and

originated as responses and

to real-world problems
appears to

(e.g.,

unemployment,

conflict),
yet

early

he

have found

substantial appeal

in

the innovative

stabilizing

role

the great

man might play.

he has
as

rejected

the theories of the great man and

more explicit

But subsequently conservatism for its own sake

real world and

their implications became

major

to him both in the

and

in

his

theoretical

works.8

Sovereignty

The Pure

Theory
1966),

of Politics do

represent shifts

in

emphasis

from On Power,

which stresses a

breakdown

of

"Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought (New York,

tion st p. 186.

pp. 184-215. quota

theory in

5See Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 294-304. Likewise, Dahl ignores this the "grand to theory that cannot meet the "scientific functions
style"

point and relegates of political

theory,

truth"

rigorous criteria of

(pp.

89,

95-98).
of

Jouvenel,"

6Carl Slevin, "Social Change and Human Values: A Study of the Thought Political Studies, 19 (Msrch 1971), 49-62, st pp. 51-53.

Bertrand de

by Carl J. Friedrich, American Political Science Review, 53 (March 1959), Neal Wood, Political Science Quarterly, 73 (June 1958), 291-93. The author is indebted to Carl Slevin for this point and for correcting an error in an earlier draft of the psper (communicstion to the suthor). Slevin is completing an intellectual biography of Jouvenel. and his interviews with Jouvenel underscore these shifts. On conservatism and the great
the reviews

7See

183-85,

and

man, see respectively

(Fall-Winter 1961-62),
on

Jouvenel, "Rousseau the Pessimistic 83-96; Jouvenel, Pure Theory, p. x, fn.

Enterprise,"

Evolutionist,"

Yale French Studies,

36 (December

28

2. pp. 10, 71; and

his "Thoughts
1958),

Theory

of

Political

University

of Detroit Law Journal,

'43-53-

Bertrand de Jouvenel
legitimate authority
commensurate with the growth of state power.
shift

367
But
a shift of

in

emphasis

is

not a

in theoretical
engender

position.

In On Power the twins

are not

power and

immobilisme that

Caesarism

from the

ancien regime.

Instead they

prove essential

simply derailments to Jouvenel's notion of

and theoretical ven

authority in the subsequent works. His broad institutional ture with Futuribles is a consistent outgrowth of themes in

Sovereignty and The Pure Theory of Politics. The Futuribles work was construed by one of his American friends and reviewers, Willmoore Kendall, as an attempt at legpulling, but

it is overtly

predicated upon

the realization of

conditions

for "fruit
earlier

ful

cooperation"

or mutual

trust,

an end

in itself

as analyzed
authority.9

in these

works, and one that sets a standard

for

established

Jouvenel

perhaps a return

is returning to his prewar concern with real-world problems, but it is based on a developed theoretical position and not ad hoc.
The interpretations
noted above emphasize

the

dux-rex

dichotomy

of

Sovereignty

the tension between

as

requirements

for innovation

and stabilization

that are examined shortly

Jouvenel's

major contribution

to political theory.

However, they find divergent implications both to this works. These differences, due more to the differing normative
orientations of

concept and

to his

other

and conceptual

the

interpreters than to Jouvenel's ambiguities, indicate the

necessity of coming to terms with the central preoccupation of his political theory. We follow good advice when we follow Jouvenel's key to the interpre
tation of Rousseau: "The respect
read

due to the
names

author requires

that

his books be
Stated
to

in light

of what

he himself

as

his

central

conception."10

differently,

the

advice

is to follow
he
understood

time-honored

position:

to

attempt

understand a theorist as

himself.
major works
Rousseau."

Jouvenel has indicated that his thinking in the dominated by two contrasting figures: Hobbes and

has

come

to be

Thus he

charac-

'Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 10-1 1 297. The leg that was in fact pulled was that of Willmoore Kendall, review of Futuribles: Studies in Conjecture, ed. Bertrsnd de Jouvenel, American Political
.

Science Review,

58

(June 1964),

412.
of

'"Jouvenel,
Maurice Cranston

"Rousseau's
and

Theory

the Forms of

Government,"

Hobbes

and

Rousseau,

ed.

Richard S. Peters (Garden

Enterprise,"

City, N.Y.,

1972),

pp.

484-97.

at pp. 486-87.

pp. 151-52. This evidently was not the case in earlier "See Jouvenel, "Political (communication to the author). That many of the Slevin to works, including On Power, according Change and Human Values") remained central to the major works (Slevin, "Social themes early Rousseau and Hobbes paradigmatic statements of his suggests that Jouvenel subsequently found in own theoretical goals and

their antitheses.

See the

contrast of these

two

extremes

in his

"Jean-

Jacques

of the Encounter, 19 (December 1962). 35-43. "Bertrand de Jouvenel: and in his above Slevin cited the essay by two theorists is suggested in Contemporary Political Philosophers, ed. Anthony de Crespigny snd Efficiency snd Kenneth Minogue (New York, 1975), pp. 168-90. Their importsnce snd Jouvenel's themstic unity
Roussesu,"

at pp. 41-42.

The importance

Amenity,"

sre suggested slso

Political Philosophy These essays,

and

in Michael R. Dillon, "The Sensitive Citizen: Modernity and Authority in the Political Science Reviewer. 5 (Fall 1975), 1-46. of Bertrand de of the themes contained herein. Our essays differ, raise that of Pierce, many
Jouvenel,"

and pure assessing the concept of authority Jouvenel's incorporation of Rousseau. essay, the extent of

however, in

politics

and,

in the

case of the

Dillon

368

Interpretation
Hobbes
of

terizes the political philosophy of

as a

dogs."

the

training
I

of citizens

to the

training

philosophy that "assimilate[s] By contrast, Rousseau is "the

writer

admire and

love

others,"

above all

although or

it is

not a

love

affair

that

blinds Jouvenel to Rousseau's deficiencies

ambiguities.12

Jouvenel is
and

more major

than an intellectual plagiarist or explicator of another's

ideas,

his

works enter conceptual and normative areas rejected or unanticipated

by

Rous

seau. of

Jouvenel

attempts

to outline a model of politics

from

within

the context

the large-scale, industrialized nation-state; Rousseau, for the homogeneous

city-state

must

be

measured sees

notwithstanding that there is no turning back in history. Rousseau as a reactionary in the light of technological progress; in these
changes enormous possibilities

Jouvenel
tion"

for "fruitful

coopera

as well as grave

dangers. Hobbes
and

The dominance
ence of

of

Rousseau

suggests

that the thematic coher

Jouvenel's

political

thought within the major works can be understood

with

as an attempt

to come to terms

these two extremes. In

theme,

we stress

those aspects that constitute

of

explicating the main the rejection of Hobbes and the

acceptance of

Rousseau: the foundations Jouvenel's

political utilizes

foundations

of

thought.
within

These

legitimate authority comprise the can be elaborated by iden his

work.

tifying

the propositions
political

he

the logical sequences of

Systematic

theory begins

with

the establishment of certain

limiting

conditions: assumptions about

human

nature and the political.

Although the two

may be (human

interdependent, logically one attempts to graft politics onto reality nature). Therefore, the next section develops Jouvenel's image of man;
politics.

the one thereafter, his conception of

as

These

conditions

the assumptions necessary to assessing the

question of essay.

then may serve legitimate authority

that

is taken up in the remaining

sections of

this

//. The Social Context of Human Nature: Man Three

assumptions underlie

as

Compliant

Jouvenel's image
in

of

the social context of

human

nature.

First, individuals

undertake goal-directed activities and

order to achieve their

hence A

attempt to elicit reciprocal action from others

goals."

activity is that individuals can count on a degree of reliability regularity in their relevant environment, and thereby have the ability to forecast and master change. Paradoxically, however, goal-directed activity incondition of such
or

12See respectively, Jouvenel, Sovereignty,

On the
problems

pp. p.

231-46,

atp.

242,

and

Conjecture,
de

p.

80, fn.
les

1.

in Rousseau,
1947),
parmi

see

Sovereignty,

238; "Essai

sur

la

Rousseau,"

politique
sur

Du

control social
ments

(Geneva,
The

de I'inegalite

pp. 91-120; les hommes (Paris, 1965),

and

"Presentation,"

Discours
12-14;

I'origine

et

fonde-

esp. pp.

and

"Rousseau the Pessimistic

noted

Evolutionist."

positive

negative aspects

of

technological

"progress,"

below,

are

in Slevin, "Social Change and Human "Jouvenel, Pure Theory, parts I, pp. 4-13, II, III, cf. IV, ch. I. 3; Sovereignty, pp. 16-25. 35-39. 41-45. 57-6i, and ch. 4. Jouvenel states five axioms in Pure Theory, pp. 46-47. and the five axioms sre modified to fit the argument throughout these two works.
addressed

Values."

Bertrand de Jouvenel
creases change sought

369
decreases
one's

the unreliability of the environment and

since others

mastery

of

may

not

be In

amenable to the power exerted or

authority

in seeking

one's

goals.14

brief,
it
to

this assumption (and its contingencies)

appears

self-evident, particularly theorists

as

parallels the

familiar initial

conditions of
whom man

state of nature-contract

such as

Hobbes

and

Rousseau, for
a

is

acquisitive and constructed so as

seek the assistance of others. within

Obviously,
not
self-

however, how
evident,
Hobbes'

the

assumption

is incorporated

theory is

since s.

beyond this juncture Rousseau's

and

position parts will

How Hobbes Rousseau.

Rousseau diverge

help

company with illustrate Jouvenel's

link

with

While

mutual assistance

desire for

self-preservation

is useful, in the case of goal conflict, ego and the dominate Hobbes 's individual with the consequent
one"

"condition of war of every one against every

in

which each man

has the

"right to every thing; even to one another's body."15 Against this, Rousseau argues that Hobbes 's state of nature, where the right of the strongest and fear of

environment
regress

untimely death prevail, represents nothing more than human behavior in an into which man already has been socialized. Hobbes did not

far

enough

from the

social condition to

find

man as we must

imagine
has

him to be
relations.

(i.e.,
As

presume

a corrective

he is) in the to this, Rousseau

that

absence of social and authoritative postulates a state of nature that

two

stages: a pure state of nature and a modified

of nature

as

such

and

society.

In the

pure

form, form, man is

part a

way between
nonman: mere

state

brute;
of

product of sensate and physical

drives,

of appetite

(and "the

impulse

appetite
cattle.

is slavery"); born
not

with

compassion,

trait shared with horses and

moral.

Man is

really

man until

he becomes

To become

moral,

he
the

first

must

become social,

a condition that emerges

society.

in the

second stage of

state of

nature, in the transformation to

in coping with natural may be useful to them. Conflict,

disasters, but this

or

also allows

Men may be brought together them to learn that others

the exercise of the "right of the

liberty,"

stron

may then emerge unless men acquire "moral benefits (and the necessity to social existence)
thus regressing back through the
state

unless of

they learn
drives.

the

controlling their
concept are

By

of nature

farther than does

not

Hobbes,

Rousseau

can claim

that power and

fear

incidental,
The

essential,

man.16

characteristics of

'"Jouvenel, Pure Theory, II,

especially
as at

ch.

2-3; Sovereignty,

pp.

59-61.

condition of

reliability,

Pure Theory, pp. 4-10, is the immediate backdrop for Conjecture, see esp. pp. and initially Jouvenel dealt with the economic rather than the broader sociopolitical 52-53, 240-47; system: L'Economie dirigee (Paris, 1928). 'Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford, n. d.), ch. XIV, p. 85.

16See Jean-Jscques Roussesu, The First

and

Second Discourses,

ed.

Roger D. Mssters (New

Pref-

York,
sce,

1964), Discourse

on the

Origin

and

Foundations of Inequality
snd

(heresfter, Inequality),

pp.

92-97,

intro.,

pp.

101-03, the First

Rousseau, The Social Contract and Social Contract. I, i, p. 4, iii, pp. 6-7, viii,

i, 1,

o;

Second Psrts, passim, esp. pp. 128-34 and notes Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York, 1950),
pp.

18-19.
upon

(The

quotation

in

parentheses as

is ibid.,

I,

viii,

p.

19.) This

portrait

of

Rousseau draws

interpretations

such

Ernst

Cassirer's,

370

Interpretation
The distinction between Hobbes
and

Rousseau is important to Jouvenel's

reasoning,

position. requires

For Rousseau, the

stage of social commitment, of moral

that men legitimize the chains or conventions

into

which

they have
men

been

socialized.

For Hobbes, this

and

state

emerges

precisely because

are

naturally independent
to

asocial, in

need of socialization rather

than required

justify

their conventions through a mutual act of commitment (moral

liberty).

For the

present

it is the

condition of socialization alone

that is

important; in

subsequent sections

legitimizing ically valid and

sumptions

this, as against the natural man, has great implications for authority. While Jouvenel denies that the state of nature is empir
while

he begins explicitly assuming

a social

context, his as

closely

parallel

Rousseau's,
in the

whose two-stage state of nature can growth of

be

compared,

first,

to the

moment of

birth and, second, to the

next section.

the child,
state of

illustrations
maturity, is
where

used

below

and

The third stage, the

society:

the general will, or order and

the model of Hobbes must

be

abandoned

legitimacy for Jouvenel, totally. By developing his

is
similar

second and third assumptions from the context of convention or of socializa

tion, Jouvenel is
than the

permitted

to move toward a model of politics that

to

Rousseau's, away from

ical

the model of Hobbes's individualism. In short, rather

characteristics of natural

man, Jouvenel attempts to establish the

typ
in

patterns of social man.

The

second

assumption,
others

therefore, is

straightforward:

the attempt to

stigate actions
who are

from

does

not take place

in

a vacuum.

Indeed, individuals
a

the objects of

instigations

by

others

already have

propensity to

comply

with

them,

propensity

reinforced since

birth. Our

experiences encour

age us to expect an environment that seems

pliance

to become

more reliable as com

acter

follows instigations, less so with noncompliance. This compliant char of man is portrayed by Jouvenel with the least likely example: an isolated
one

individual. As
automobile

drives down
and

a road and sees a

flagman ahead,
with

one slows the

immediately
whether

thus begins to comply

a

the signal.

Only

after

discerning
does
accelerate,

the

flagman is

one slow

down

and

safety engineer, follow directions, stop and

after

policeman,

or a robber

produce

identification,
intention
referred

or

actions good

taken

deciding

whether

the actual

of the

harmful. Behind this example, and a point below, is that from the day of birth we tend to look positively upon
or and authorities
and

flagman is

to

commands

as

good
other

or

beneficial; only secondarily do

perhaps simplistic.
would

we

analyze

the

instigation
The

form

judgments.17

example

is simple,

Presumably
the

the driver's initial

reaction could
of previous

be to accelerate, but this

experience with

be

explainable

(negative)

flagmen, if

only on the basis driver had listened to

Judith Shklar's, which stress the two stages of the state of nature (the second, part "social") and the role of political socialization. "Jouvenel, Pure Theory, respectively, III, ch. I, and II, ch. 2-3, esp. pp. 45-50, 62-65. See Sovereignty, pp. 35-39; also pp. 57-61, 82-83, 260-63.
and
"natural,"

Jouvenel's

part

Bertrand de Jouvenel
news reports of

371

say, is

never

highwaymen operating in the area, or the like. Man, that is to isolated. He is social, and as he is social he has learned, or has

been

socialized

into, inclinations
be

of acquiescence

toward other actors and phe

nomena

that appear authoritative.

should

This

individual

remembered as

Otherdom relatively to the the basic datum of political The

"priority

of

science."18

compliant character of socialized

man, moreover,

calls

into

question

the

notion

of consent as

the source of

quent sections).

legitimate authority (a point developed in subse It implies that political analysis look not simply to the activity

of

individual response, but to the

functioning
own

of

instigators,

of

those who seek

to elicit actions and to

have their

instigations deemed

authoritative. compliance
or

A tendency to comply, however, is not tantamount to obedience, particularly if an attempt to extract obedience relies
uncertainty, or force. The third assumption,

largely

on

fear,

therefore, is that
may

an

individual in

stigating
or reject

action from another ackrowledges that the other

choose to accept

the elicitations as necessary or useful;

had the

second

party

no

choice, the first

he

would

be

part of

the

determinant environment, the givens, for

a normative claim one

which

party accounts in his The third assumption implies

activity.19

should

acknowl

edge,

ought

accept,

etc.

but it may
reliability.

serve as a

descriptive

proposition since

it

recognizes

the

reciprocal relationships

tion,
upon

and

environmental

between change, the human goal orienta For example, A's freedom is predicated

assume goals with

recognizing how his actions affect fi's activities toward him. A can that changes he makes will induce activity from B that may affect A's account for or reciprocate (e.g., compulsion by B) so that he
"ought"

be free, that L by deriving a sense of his own obligations toward B (and vice versa) from the terms of the relationship. Nevertheless,
B. A
can
,

the proposition does

establish a normative

standard

insofar
A
might

as

it becomes in
able to get

creasingly difficult to observe it. In a information necessary to forecast the

within

situation where

be

the

probable state of prohibited

(symbolizing

activities

the relevant environment)

but be

be perfectly free to act but be prohibited necessary to forecast B, the odds are so stacked against A that the
might
rendered
inoperative.20

from acting, or where A from gaining information

assumption

is

might account

for B,

or

comply

with

him (if that is the

context), but there is

no reason

to

assume

that A does so (or ought to do so) out

of a sense of obligation.

Thus

action

intended to be

binding

on an

individual is

binding
man

only through gaining his assent (i.e., Jouvenel's three limiting assumptions obviously portray tensions. While
or constraint

force

is insufficient).

is found in

relatively

structured

environment, one cannot always

foresee,

let

alone

control, that

structure:
p. 57. p.

'"Jouvenel, Pure Theory, "Jouvenel, Pure Theory,

developed. In

47,

where

the party without choice, as psrt of the

cf.

"givens,"

is

general see also pp.

4-13.

62-65,

Ill,

ch.

20See Jouvenel, "Authority: The Efficient

rich

Imperative,"

Sovereignty, pp. 62-70. Authority, NOMOS I, ed. Carl J.

2;

Fried-

(Cambridge, Mass.,

1958),

pp.

159-69. esp. pp. 160-61.

372
This
condition

Interpretation
is is
of course

fulfilled in

human

cluster pervaded

by

routines. on

[But basis
of

wjhenever

Alter departs from the

a perturbation

course

which

Ego

assigns

to

him

the

precedent, this

sary

to

Ego, is

made

up

of a

in Ego's Otherdom. The stability of Otherdom, neces general adherence of individuals to typical behaviours, the
an environment capable of

concatenation of which

forms

being

known.21

in his routine, yet every Alter acts as Ego. Hence "reconciliation of reliability with freedom and change poses the most difficult Politics."22 problems of These problems bring us to the heart of the political.
Ego
wishes

Alter to

remain

///. The Politics of Aggregation: Instigation

and

Compliance

The
since

political

relationship is
of man

a natural outgrowth of

the social relationship

component of

the

"moving

by

man"

is "the

smallest

identifiable
reciprocal

event."

any

political

Actions designed to instigate

performed aims

responses

from

may be additive, or gative. Aggregative action

others

only for
at some

some

"not

immediate goal, or 'once for action, but

all'

aggre at

the

establishment of some permanent

condition, to which the

bring

it

loyal."

about must continue

This

constitutes

group Jouvenel's notion

of men who of pure

politics.23

The

politics of
which

aggregation,
an

or pure

politics, begins
or

with

the politics of the

project.

founding,
wills of

requires

instigator

promoter

of a

particular

Similar to the

role of the

entrepreneur,
achieve

who seeks

to consolidate the forces (the

role of

others) necessary to

his goals, this is the

"emergent

authority."

Where

no competitors exist within

the same milieu, this phenom

enon

may be

considered

"established
of

authority."24

Though the

instigating
An

role

is

common

to both

forms

action, there is

significant

distinction between
aggrega

action that

is merely

additive and

the creation of

an aggregation.

tion provides benefits

a common milieu of

identity,

preservation and mutual

security in

knowing

that the safety of one

is linked to the security

of all, and so

21Jouvenel,
Conjecture,
15-16;

Pure Theory,

p.

63. Compare Ego to Primus in Sovereignty,

pp.

59-61;

and see

pp. 51-55.

22Jouvenel, Jouvenel, "Jouvenel,

Pure Theory, p. 51. See Sovereignty, pp. 119-30, ch. 9, esp. pp. 149-65, ch. Organizstion," "Order vs. On Freedom and Free Enterprise, ed. Mary Sennholz
at

(Princeton, 1956),
17-20, 296,
at

pp. 41-51, esp. pp. 50-51. Pure Theory, pp. 10, 30, 82, 99, uoff., 18-20; and "Authority: The Efficient

10;

Sovereignty,

p.

2, fn. I,

pp.

Imperative."

24The theme

of

enterpreneurship is
and also

central.

See Jouvenel, Pure Theory, I,

ch.

1,

III,

ch.

1-2,
1 and

IV,
ch.

ch.

1,

esp. pp.

105-08,

IV,

ch. 3.

The

parallel concept

in

Sovereignty

is

auctor: ch.

2,

esp. pp.

26-30.

the dux capacity

but

(rex). One may

merge

Emergent authority is always innovative authority must balance off innovation (dux) and stabilization into the other (see Sovereignty, pp. 53-55, 62-70), a point often ignored in
established

See

"Political

Enterprise."

commentaries that stress

dux

and rex.

For dux-rex
pp.

and parallel

concepts, such as authority

and

Authority, see ibid., pp. 21-23, 32-39. chs. 3-4, VI, ch. 1; On Power, pp. 83-85; and citations in
stress the

the

Theory, V, ch. I, pp. 131-45, preceding note. Germino, Slevin, and Pierce

97-104; Pure

dux-rex

notions.

Bertrand de Jouvenel
on

373

that are not had when separate to pursue an end

with one another

individuals artificially and tenuously league that, when realized, signals the dissolution of
and

the organization. At a minimum, an aggregation may provide some sense of

permanence

in the individual's environment,

on one's sense of

thus may allow for

greater

leeway
that

in acting

his

obligations than
within an

does

an organization a multitude of

is

additive and short term.

Moreover,

aggregation,

short

term or additive

initiatives

are possible

up to the point

where

these actions

challenge

the existence of the

aggregation.25

The aggregation, that

is,

must

have

some means of

maintaining itself. Two

conditions are

necessary to the

creation

of

the

permanent organization:

the establishment of order and the

legitimizing
goal of

of that order.

The first

requirement

indicates that

order-as-such

is the baseline
such as

any aggregation; that specific goals for organizing, property distribution

or

the method of

the form

of

limitations

placed upon natural

liberty,

are

logically
involves

and

character of a

normatively secondary goals, goals pertaining to the ideological particular regime. The question of order is straightforward. It
that
an aggregation

a principle of necessity:

provide means

of

self-

preservation.

Because

conflict

is

possible and most conflict permissible so

long

as

it does

not challenge

the constitutional status of established authority, polit

ical

organizations must

be

capable of

sorting
of

out

conflicts, regulating them, and

terminating
a principle

those that

challenge

the

political order

Jouvenel terms it the Law

itself. Without realizing such Conservative Exclusion, since the

action with a minimum of author and

required action

is to

minimize

disaggregative
would

itative

actions
war.26

organization

be impossible,

social

life

a constant

state of

The

second

requirement,

legitimacy, is

problematic.

Although Jouvenel

portrays the politics of

aggregation as

the politics of the voluntary association

individuals equally may reject or accept instigations that seek their compliance he nevertheless denies the validity of the social contract account of consent. theories are views of childless men who must have forgotten 'Social
"
contract'

their

own

lectual spontaneity
of wills

strong words, if all that makes this an "intel (stronger still) is the lack of an adequate account of the
These
are

necessary to generating the

pp.

contract.27

Spontaneity,
see

how-

25See Jouvenel, Sovereignty,

seau, Social Contract, II, i, p. 23. 26Jouvenel, Pure Theory, IV,

16-21, 33,

and ch.

7; Pure

Theory, III-IV. And

ch.

Rous

ch.

2,

esp. pp. 1

10-17,

cf.

IV,

3,

esp. pp.

118-23,

125-28.

Problem,"

See too Jouvenel, 368-72. On the symbolic

"The Chairmsn's
role of s crown

American Political Science

constitution

or a

Review, 55 (June 1961), in preserving order, see Sovereignty, Sovereignty,

pp. 26-29.

ch. 3, esp. pp. 43-48, and p. 259.

"Jouvenel. Pure Theory,

Rousseau Rousseau
comes closer
qualification

p. 45-

See

also

ibid.,

pp.

58-59. 71-73;
least"

to acknowledging the

entrepreneur

than Jouvenel indicates. In a significant

to the

presumed

"unanimity,

on one occasion at
passage

(Social

Contract, I,

v, p. 13)

recognizes

the instigator in a
person

enterpreneurial

role:

"The first

who,

having

closely paralleled by Jouvenel's notion of the fenced off a plot of ground, took it into his head
to believe

to say this is

mine and

found

people simple enough

him,

was

the true founder of civil

374
ever, is only
a

Interpretation
device for explaining away the original agreement and the who instigates the meeting itself, establishing its location His criticism to the side, Jouvenel acknowledges the intent of
theorists

entrepreneur, the one

and agenda.

social contract

if

not

the structure

of

their arguments:
a single

these great geniuses

of of their

had very

good reasons

for compressing into it is

day, "the day

if it is
untrue

creation"

that society was

myth of

imaginations, a made in a day, it is

possible.28

process which took a thousand years;

true that

made and unmade out

every day. And the

instantaneous
life is

creation enabled

them to

bring

in

sharpest relief the conditions

on which social

In rejecting the

substance

theory
upon view

as

the

product of

"childless

(rational consent) and form (spontaneity) of contract Jouvenel acknowledges the rationale
men,"

which

the contract

device is

utilized

and

that the social contract portrays society as

additionally indicates, in the "made and unmade every

day,"

that

emergent

authority is ever-present. That the "basic datum of political

a structure environment

science"

is the

continual presence of

individuals in

is

one thing. That this presence

of others

informs

their propensity to comply with the

instigations

is another, however.

We may

return

to an earlier context:

The child grows up in a shadow of towering adults. They have forces he lacks, the In his eyes, they are Great Powers. As such they are ability to do what he cannot. impressive: hence a propensity to obey them. [Moreover,] the Great Powers at whose feet the child plays are primarily helpful and beneficient. The infant places
...

itself in

real or

fancied jeopardy,
as accessible

calls

out,

and

is unfailingly

rescued.

persists as the child grows up.

regard

Such

experience accustoms

This relationship Man-in-formation to

Authority
the

to

his

calls, prompt to

intervene in his favour. However

parent and

essential power

difference between
governor
.

the superior power

of the

the

superior superior

of the

the notion of an attentive, responsive, and

other.

helpful

power tends to

be

transferred from one to the

"propensity."

This

goes

beyond

a mere

For

obedience to the
out of

law,

or to the

symbols of

"established

authority,"

is done

prescribes patterns of

behavior,

our

habit. When authority largely to propensity comply indicates a developed

has
a presumption

habit

of acquiescence.

That
of

all

"established

authority"

in its favor in the

minds

men, a presumption emerging since our first

or contract
when prior

theory

as

the standard for

day, seriously legitimacy. How can we

our consent we contrast

weakens consent

create

authority

to articulating the

basis for

the preserver of the status quo?

Thus, by
141).

already gravitate toward to our habit of obedience, our

setting"

society."

seau's

(Inequality, Second Part, Legislator.

p.

More

important,

as

"agenda

goes,

is Rous

1,

2*Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 11314, at p. 113. MJouvenel, Pure Theory, II, ch. 2-3, quotation at pp. 69-73. Also, Sovereignty, pp. 59-61.

pp.

49-50,

emphasis

added; and see

III,

ch.

Bertrand de Jouvenel
tacit acquiescence,

375
jiot

disobedience to the law,

consent

when

it is

inadvertent,

requires

extraordinary

reasons and

The

critical point

is that

relatively careful calculations of its potential costs. is never created out of a vacuum; the form the
in

consent

takes and the reasons used

justifying

it

are colored

to some degree

by

prior

habits

of

behavior

and patterns of acquiescence.

In light
consent,
process

of

Jouvenel's

portrait of the compliant

individual,

the

notion of

or of the social
which

contract, is best described

comes

as symbolic of

the actual

by

legitimacy

about; it is designed simply to formalize the

process of

gaining legitimacy. If (or emergent)

of

consent

is

always contingent upon prior

must

habits

of

acquiescence, then the standard

for

legitimacy

be found in the

actions

of established

authorities:

the guarantees of success the goals

proposed

they

put

forth
is

for the

longevity
source

the

aggregation and

to that end. The

not

function

of consent

may be

summarized as

follows:
the

the consent one gives

of

itself

the
a

instead

literally, of legitimacy derivative of that phenomenon. Moreover,

"authorizer"

given

authority but legitimate authority

(i.e., if it is present), it may be inferred that one is under an obligation to consent to legitimate authority, since a refusal of that consent would signal a rejection of the mutuality of the aggregation. The options of accepting or
rejecting legitimate authority
the popular
are similar

to the choices for Rousseau found in

Sparta,

age-of-gold models portrayed

by

Judith Shklar

and others of

and in Jouvenel's essays on Rousseau. Lacking the ideal autonomy of gold, individuals must come to terms with life in the

the age

aggregation.30

Jouvenel's

position

constitutes

rejection

of

the Hobbesian claim that

And why should it not? For authorization im plies that an individual, rationally and independent of his structured environ ment, consents to be governed; that his action overrides the effects of socializa
authorization creates authority.

tion

by

which

habits

of

deference

are

inculcated

and molded.

By

contrast, to

portray consent as an activity granted to legitimate authority is to emphasize an alternative proposition: the socialized and deferential individual is placed in a
continually measuring his compliance, which he may transform into commitment, in light of the actions of established authority. This much may
position of suffice

for the

origins and characteristics of

legitimacy. It does not,

of established

however,

account

for

what guarantees

the

legitimacy

authority, for what tied to order.

constitutes the sufficient conditions

for legitimacy.

Legitimacy is

But how? It is

one

thing

to say

that the socialized and deferential

individual

but he is socialized and deferen may transform compliance into commitment, not simply tial. In terms of Rousseau's initial question, how are our chains custom and of our and deference to habit of the chains of institutions but those
someone

believed to be

of superior

authority
chs.

to be legitimized? Although
190-98,
200-14.

he

mIbid.,

pp. 29-30, 35-39.

43-48, soff.;
and

6-9;

pp.

See Judith N. Shklar,

and

Gold,"

"Rousseau's Two Models: Sparta

1966), 25-51,
and

the Age of

Political Science Quarterly, 81 (March

the essays

by Shklar, McManners,
Rousseau,"

and

Masters in Hobbes

Rousseau. See

Jouvenel,

"Essai

sur

la

politique

de

pp.

16-21, 30-45, 91-98.

376
rejects the

Interpretation
form
of

the social contract theories of Hobbes and

Rousseau,

these

theorists,
issues
come
of

particularly Rousseau's rejection of Hobbes 's account, raise the order and legitimacy in precisely the form with which Jouvenel must
and

to terms.

IV. Order, Legitimacy,

and

Mutual Trust

The distinction between creating authority out of consent and consenting legitimate authority has a descriptive foundation in the relatively structured environment favoring individual compliance. But what are the implications of
to this distinction? There must tial

habits to

a tyrant would or

be criteria for measuring legitimacy, else deferen be indistinguishable from those to a democratic (or
which

beneficent)
We

ruler

to a

mob

has been

accredited through the appro

priate channels of are close

consent.3'

giving to Jouvenel's

view of

these criteria to utility:

if

we

follow Rousseau's

dictum that it is necessary to link

The
undertakings which

legitimacy
to the social that

bind is

us

are mutual; and their nature

without

such

in

body are obligatory only because they fulfilling them we cannot work for others

that all
who

working for ourselves. Why is it that the general will is always in the right, and continually will the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is not a man as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for does not think of
"each"
all?32

This is

not a notion of

acquisitiveness

utility that is to be evaluated by the presence (Hobbes). The notion suggests how mutual trust, the
separate

of

fear

or

condition

that allows for

gained.

individual initiatives

within

the aggregation, may be

provisional

proposition,

which must

be justified shortly, is the fol

aggregation-as-

lowing: to the degree that

such,
a mutual

established

for individual

self-interest

undertaking by initiatives that do

authority preserves the definition, and inculcates within it the

not

conditions of

threaten the interests

others,

authority is legitimate. Moreover, if mutual trust is the sufficient condition for individual freedom, the following proposition is implied: individuals can for
mulate

their obligations

based

on

the

benefits
and

each

receives

through mutual

cooperation within

the aggregation.
and
conflict.33

Ego

Alter in Otherdom then have little

basis for

Should the balance shift, however, to favor Ego constraining Alter in routines so that Ego may pursue other initiatives the conditions for mutual trust decline, taking with them the conditions for
mutual

fear

individual freedom. The is displaced

principle of mutual

trust, the

standard

for legitimacy,

by

different norm, that

of power or of mutual

fear.

3'Cf. Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 204-14. "Rousseau, Social Contract, II, iv, p. 29;

cf.

I,

vii,

p.

17, and

II,
9,

vi, pp. 34-35. See too

Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 263-75. "Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 22-24,

296-97;
position

52-53, 59-61, 115-38,

ch.

ch.

esp.

149-65,

and pp.

cf.

Pure Theory,
with

pp.

46-47, II,

2-3,

V,

ch.

I,

pp.

135-38.

Jouvenel has held

this

beginning

his early

work on economic

planning, L'Economie dirigee.

Bertrand de Jouvenel
Alter may have
a

377

for

long

periods

of

propensity to comply so habitual that it can be strained time, but compliance based on power alone ultimately
Thus to

degenerates into

a cycle of conflict.

Rousseau, Hobbes 's

strongest."

account of the

state of nature and not establish

the rationale it supplied for authorizing the sovereign does

legitimacy
only

but the "right

of

the

This is

a specious right

since all that matters

is that

one act so as to
"right"

become the
not,

strongest.
political. and

Organiza

tions that exist

by

virtue of this
not

are

indeed,

They

are

merely additive, benefits (once

created

for the

sake

of order-as-such

the

mutual

legitimized) it

provides, but for the

sake of

the stronger party. then

Jouvenel's

politics of aggregation and

benefits accruing to its legitimacy begins

by following the normative lines of Rousseau's critique: if power, or is all that is involved "nothing more than the capacity to make oneself one infer that in developing organization, there is no rationale for ex may
obeyed,"

cluding any test of one's capacity to extract legitimacy involves the negative proposition that the
multiply conflicting instigations
condition

obedience.34

In general, the

claim

for

exercise

of power

tends to

rather than

to exclude them as required

by

the

of order. The
that are

net effect of

the "right of the

strongest,"

therefore, is to
supportive

preclude aggregative
responses

activity

altogether since

the application of power produces

involuntary

or

constrained, short term in intent and

only

of additive action.

Hence the development

of an aggregation must
upon

be based

not upon

power, the ability to force compliance, but

actions.35

authority, the ability

to gain assent to one's

Yet because there

as

are tolerable

levels

distinct from

constitutional challenges

interest group struggle the relationship between authority's

of conflict

commands and the goals and

instigations
of

of an

individual

or

the

aggregation

is

always a

function
the

the expectations of the

subgroup within latter regarding

former.36

the claims and

goals and also

enforcement capacities of

the

The

following ity must rely

preceptive

more specific propositions are

thus in order.

First,

established author

mainly not upon the institutionalization of its command or the aura of its authority, but upon the generation and transmission of
among individuals
within

supportive attitudes
socialization and

the aggregation,

i.e.,

political

consensus.11

Consensus,

socialization, and the symbolic and

real

roles

of

established

require

further

scrutiny. and

authority are critical. The second proposition will Because legitimacy depends upon the activities of its ability to
generate support and consensus

established

authority

by

satis-

34Compare Rousseau, Social Contract, I, iii,

pp.

128-40, Second

Part,

pp.

177-78, to

and Inequality, Preface, pp. 96-97, First Part, Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 32; also Pure Theory, p. 125,
pp.

and

"Authority: The Efficient

"Imperative,"

159-61

"Jouvenel, Pure Theory. IV,

21-25, 2Q-34ff., ch. 5. pp.

ch. ch.

I and 3; slso

I,

ch.

I,

p.

10,

and

III,

ch.

1;

Sovereignty,

pp.

80-84,
pp.

6, Concl.
Sovereignty,
pp.

36Jouvenel, Sovereignty,
"This
pp.
pervades

1 15-17.

Jouvenel's

major works: pp.

38-48, 52-53, 56-61; Pure

49-51,

63,

135-38; On Power,

22, 24,

88-89,

105. 194-200, 299, 366ff.;

Theory, Conjecture, pp.

29-30,

245-47-

378

Interpretation
the conditions
and

fying
for

for

mutual

trust, this
the
who

proposition

is that the burden of proof

rests
upon

change

breakdowns

within

organization

established

authority, not upon

authority.

individuals,

tend to

be compliant,

or upon emergent

V. The Political Battle: Established To keeps in

cies emphasize pure politics

Authority

and the

General Will

as

men,"

being

aggregates of and not

"an activity that builds, consolidates and is to recognize that two opposing tenden
and consolidation and stabilization.
and

are

inevitable: initiation

change,

Although these tendencies "do

to tensions more or
one can which a

regularly merge,

they

therefore give rise

less

pronounced at

different

moments,

the
varies

degree to
the

which

say that established authority is legitimate balance between these tendencies is

Jouvenel
and

with

degree to

approximated.38

In the

following,

the

analyses of

Rousseau

are compared to

draw

out more explic

itly

their parallels on the questions of order and legitimacy.

Obviously, the
number of

process of aggregation would

become

more complex as

the

individuals involved in the

organizational

set,

each with separate

With every increase in organizational size, the difficulty of reconciling individual values with the organization as an end in itself, and hence the likelihood of success for emergent authorities within smaller milieus,
values, is
multiplied. would seem

to

increase,

much as

the

disparity
in the

between the

will of all and

the
the

general will
state.39

increases

with expansions

physical and numerical size of

"Every

extension of

the social tie

means

its relaxation; and, generally

acknowl

speaking,
edges

a small

State is

stronger

in

proportion than a great

the same token, one would expect that as this complexity does the probability for established authority itself to break down into the simple, but disaggregative, exercise of

Rousseau.

By

increases,

so too

power.40

On the
of

other

hand,

individual

wills or

complexity increase, so too do the number interests multiply. If it is not possible to have only one
as size and

interest that

unifies

the aggregation, a multiplicity or plurality

general will

is

preferable:

It is therefore essential, if the

should

is to be
that

able to express

itself,
as

that there

be

no partial

own thoughts.
possible and

society But if there

them
p.

within

the

State,

and

each citizen should

think

only his
many
as

are partial

societies, it is best

to

have

to

prevent

from

being

unequal."

38Jouvenel, Sovereignty,
39A basis for the
parallel

20; Pure

Theory,

p.

108.
and

between Jouvenel's language

Government,"

Rousseau's is developed in Roger in Hobbes

which
and

D. Masters, "The Structure of Rousseau's Political 401-36. See too Jouvenel's "Forms of "Political
Enterprise,"

Thought,"

Rousseau,

pp. and

pp.

490-97, on

Masters builds,

p. quotation point

153.

"The
p.

60. The

is

is from Rousseau, Social Contract, II. ix, p. 44; see also III, i, pp. 55-57, ii. theme of On Power. On the general problem of complexity snd disaggregative
ch.

tendencies, see Sovereignty, "Essai sur la politique de

2,

ch.

5 (pp. 80-82),
p.

pp.

94-104, 119-33, 260-75. See

ch.

16;

also

Rousseau,"

pp.

102-04, 127-32.

"'Rousseau, Social Contract, II, iii.

45-46,

27,

emphasis added.

III, i,

p.

57;

and cf.

II, ix,

pp.

III, ix,

p.

83,

and

IV, i,

p.

103.

Bertrand de Jouvenel
The
of
recognition of pluralism

379
as

is

central to

Jouvenel,

it is to Rousseau in light
estab

this qualification. A multiplicity of

come to

interests may continually force

lished authority to
and

terms with emergent authorities. But with

pluralism

the

blatant inequalities, the following is appropriate: the greater multiplicity, the lesser will be the perceived threat to individuals by other
the absence of
established

interests to the degree that

activities within

the aggregative

authority can contain framework. The difficulty,

of containment

or channel these

of

course, is the

establishment of an appropriate

level

for

multiple

interests

with

in the aggregation; that is, the capacity to reduce and the correlative increase of mutual trust. Central to this
authority,
not of

perceived

threats to interests

difficulty

is the theme that

politics

is

a process of exercise
are

building
an

aggregation

exercising power; that, indeed, power is disaggregative. In general, "political

. . .

within

forces"

"positive in
name of

isolation
an

and

constructive

in

tendency."

But

actions taken

in the

aggregation may have a negative effect regarding another political force. Each activity, therefore, is an exercise of power via-a-vis another authority

one

that is

established

for its membership,

political

emergent
is"

in the

context

of

the

aggregation.

What "the
of

battle

as

it really

amounts

to is the

emer

gence of a

variety

instigators,
boundaries

some with

words, some with

force,

and

their

containment within

the

of the

aggregation.42

For if established Should it

author

ity
of

can channel

the activity,

its capacity
position.

as stabilizer prevails.

fail, its
of

own actions appear as nonauthoritative exercises of

power,

unintended causes

direct

challenges

to its

What Jouvenel has

called the

"power

prevention"

is the ability of one authority to channel

The
power of

another without

destroying
a

one

another.43

prevention, that

is to say,

should result

in

balance

much

like the

general will of

Rousseau, whereby
same wills

the effects of the will of all

are neutralized:
cancel one

"take away from these

the

pluses and minuses

that

another, and the

of

general will remains as who

the sum of the

differences."44

The

emergence

instigators

do

succeed

against

established

authority,

however, is

an

indication that the activity

within

of

building

a consensual

basis for

plurality of When the tendencies toward disaggregation

gregation, the
established emergent
conflict

instigations

the

aggregation

has broken down.

outweigh

those toward ag
and

between succeeding
not

emergent

authority

authority indicates
or
relevant

the superiority of the values claimed

wills and claim mandates

declining by
action

authority

its ability to rally

for

though these may be

authority.

considerations

but the failure

of established

This failure

of the power of prevention

the breakdown of consensus

sort of situation upon which

and

the

success

of emergent

authority

is the

42Jouvenel, Sovereignty,

ch. of

(quoted

phrases at ch.

I,

pp.

20, 21); Pure Theory, III-IV.

Contestation,"

"Jouvenel, "The Means

155-74;
see also

Government

and

Opposition,

(January
pp.

1966),

Enterprise,"

"Political
pp.

p.

153,

and

"Authority: The Efficient

pp.

Imperative."

In general,
95-118,

Sovereignty,

80-82,

247-59; Pure
334-36.

Theory,

104-07; and On

Power,

157-93, 208-12, 215-371T., 262-64,

"Rousseau, Social Contract, II, iii,

p. 26.

380
Rousseau
shall
free."

Interpretation
in providing that "whoever refuses to obey the general will that he will be forced to be be compelled to do so by the whole body
reflects
. . .

The

provision

is

a metaphor

for the

proposition

"that

each citizen should

think only his own

thoughts,"

that the cancellation of the pluses and minuses

that characterize the will of all should take place within the
general
will.45

framework
appears to

of

the
ad

Different from Jouvenel, however, Rousseau

of emergent metaphor

be

dressing
thority.
people

the dangers

authority, not the demise of established au

extent

Moreover,
is
never

the

itself is dangerous, for to the

deceived"

that "the

corrupted, but it is
opinion

often

advantage of association

prevailing seeking authority for its ambiguity in Rousseau and is the

over

that

is

particular,"

"purely
gain.46

it may be used to the a faction or partial

appears

own

Indeed, it

to represent an

root of

the

"totalitarian-or-democratic"

controversy among his interpreters Rousseau. Yet he maintains consistently

throughout the Social Contract that the general will

is

never

"exterminated

or

corrupted"; instead "it is

subordinated

always

constant,

unalterable,

and

to other

wills which encroach upon

its
of

sphere."47

pure, but it is His point need not

be

ambiguous:

within the mutual

undertaking Jouvenel is

the aggregation

individuals

seek

to maintain, or will, the aggregation as an end in

itself. Failure
of emer

Rousseau's
gent

convergence with

straightforward.

authority is prima facie evidence that established authority has channeled it into activities that are not disaggregative. On the other hand, a declining
established

succeeding emergent author and has ity, indicates that established authority itself has been become seeking (additive) initiatives for its own gain. Rousseau
"deceived"

authority, converging in conflict

with

"particular,"

issues the warning that "the tie that binds the whole together begins to be when the will of the Prince abjures the general will and becomes
loosened"

"particular."48

The warning is reflected in Jouvenel, but incorporates the theme of the "pessimistic Rousseau. The decline
of established

more

evolutionist"

through

strongly still as he his reading of

a question
of of established

"how"; it is

a question of
more

"how

soon."

authority is not simply The failing, or deception, Thus it is

authority is all the can be run by men

there should

likely

since

"A

system of well-established predictable that

Authority
Authority,
compet

authority."

of mediocre

be

tendency

to recruit,

into anciently
of

established systems of

individuals
this

with

decreasing
its head

ability to
outside the

move people on

their own account. But in time

slowly

rots the collective rears

Authority
vii,
pp.

the system, while on the other

hand

ing

authority

system.49

"Rousseau, Social Contract, I,

pp. 92-94-

17-18,

II, iii,

pp. 26-27.

Cf. Jouvenel, Sovereignty,

46Rousseau, Social Contract, II, iii, pp. 26-27. Cf. Jouvenel, On Power, p. 226. "'Rousseau, Social Contract. IV, i, p. 103; see too Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 93-94, 164-65. 48Rousseau, Social Contract, III, i, pp. 58-59; cf. IV, i, p. 103. "'Rousseau, Pure Theory, p. 102 (both quotations plus the quoted phrase following this note);
also pp.

107-08,

123.

The

emphasis on csuse

the

inevitability

of

lished suthority ultimstely to

its downfsll is

chsrscteristic.

mediocrity rising to the top of See also pp. 105-06, and Soverestsb-

Bertrand de Jouvenel
This
might result

381
itself is
momentary.

in

"violent

change,"

but the

change

Declining
ful
emergent

established

authority

can.

authority cannot guarantee the aggregation; success The portrait that emerges from both Rousseau and
system

Jouvenel is

of a political

that

has the

potential

to

be homeostatic

or

self-correcting.

The fulcrum for this human

system

is the

politics of aggregation

inher

ent

necessity for social life; a desider atum for realizing individual initiatives. The politics of aggregation is the politics of the general will. The beginnings of an adequate political theory lie in in the
social context of

nature: a

the analysis

of

the effectual

and

the

symbolic

activities

of authorities:

the

stability
and

and

instability they
consensus

can

initiate,

the

mutual

trust

they

can

engender,

the link

between

their activities and the

individual initiatives

possible within

the

aggregation.

VI. The Orientation of Political As indicated previously, Jouvenel

as

Philosophy
the quest

establishes a condition

for

political order

the baseline
and

condition

for

politics

that takes priority over spe

cific

ideological, goals such as the form of liberty and regime pursues. This, in turn, supports the theme that the proper a equality criterion of legitimacy is the character of a regime rather than (e.g.) individual
secondary,
or
or popular consent.

Jouvenel's position, then,

could

be

construed as a return

to

philosophy.50

the tradition of classical political

"return."

It is not, however,

an unques

tioned

How
one gains

one gains

knowledge
of politics:

of an oak

tree may serve as a model for how

knowledge

Even if
acorns.

not all

acorns turn to oaks,

it is important to know

that all oaks arise

from

If

we notice only oaks, and not acorns, then we shall not understand

oaks."

The analogy summarizes the qualification: classical often looked to the oak tree and inferred a state
acorns

political

of

philosophy has too health, but ignores the

the origins of that state

a context

from

which

it

grows.

The analogy is taken

"preceptive,"

explicitly from
sical,
political

in

which

Jouvenel

analyzes

i.e.,

clas
ex

philosophy
world

as

powerless

in the face
positivist

of

both tyranny
science.

or

pediency
mistaken,

the

of

Alcibiades

and

political

It

is

however,

to infer that Jouvenel

"diswould recommend analysis of

eigntv, pp. 263-66.

tic

On the inevitsble decline of estsblished authority, see "Rousseau the Pessimis pp. 16-20, 78-86, 94-98. Evolutionist"; also "Essai sur la politique de between political knowledge and pop conflict the and I252b-I253b, 50See Aristotle, Politics
Rousseau,"

ular consent that chsracterizes

lic,
chs.

5l6e-52ia, 488b-e.
1-2.

Socratic dialogues and is put graphically in Repub many of Plato's and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, 111., 1952), Persecution Cf. Leo Strauss,

where the microscope provides an analogy for 5lJouvenel, Pure Theory, p. 13. See too p. 39, of disesse; without it, we are limited to causes the understand political science: with it, we may

from health. positing derangements

382
ease"

Interpretation
of

the acorn's growth and causes of

"health"

its derangement
the
oak

without regard

for

a normative

priority, the

or end of

tree,

since

he explicitly
pure poli

how "nefariously science in the absence of this

warns

suggestive"

concern.52

may be the teachings His conceptions of

of modern political politics

tics or the politics of aggregation to empirical analysis.

and of

legitimate authority
inferences

serve as guides

Altogether too easily, the analogy

reduction of political

and similar

can and

lead to the
politics,"

theory

to the study of
and

"psychopathology
personality.

to
seems ob

"authoritarian"

"democratic"

the analysis of

This, it
but

vious, is
the

not

Jouvenel's intent. The

as against

political actor

is

critical

stress

is

not on on

"individual"

politic."

the

norms of a metaphysical

"body
or

It is

the enterpreneur, the

natural

give-and-take

between
proves

emergent and established

authority
to the

and whether established

authority

functional

dysfunctional

maintenance of

the

body
the

politic, the aggregation. To focus on individual"normal" "democratic"

body

politic conflict under

assumption of a sociopsychological

or

body

politic can

imply

stressing the

deviance
will of

of

the individual.
to whom

Likewise,
dividuals
politics

this

focus implies

interpreting
as

the general

Rousseau,

Jouvenel has been paralleled, is dangerous,

and

totalitarian, requiring the

regimentation of

in

consistent with requirements of

the general will. Jouvenel tells us that

and

this is true in part because it can be reduced to these

entail

levels
"not

and

the dangers

they

for the individual.

of Politics, Pierce
on

Referring
observes of

to On

Power,
Signif

Sovereignty,

The Pure

Theory

that it is thus

an accident

that [these works] terminate with an

image

disaster."53

icantly,

in

each case the

disaster is brought

by

the social guardian, estab

lished authority, not by the citizen. The foundations of Jouvenel's

major points

political

thought contribute at least two

as others

to

political

theory.

First, Jouvenel
for

have

and as classical
context of

political philosophers regime

did
"level

reemphasizes
of

the proposition that the

political

the

is the

analysis"

proper

theory
or of

and not

individual
and of

consent,

which

is

always

the byproduct of
on or

a milieu

socialization,

indeed

not

individual

claims

deviance from

the regime.

The study

the character of the regime takes normative and analytical precedence over
studies of: personality (the authoritarian or democratic personality); the determinants of political behavior (political sociology); and the form regime norms
social

of

in

(political socialization) and the methods for articu stituting and supportive norms (public opinion) both of which lating consent, dissent, Jouvenel stresses but which are instrumental to the crucial
questions.54

Second,

and more

important, Jouvenel's
general
and

point of

departure indicates
is

that
to-

modern political

philosophy in

Rousseau specifically

not

context is Jouvenel, Pure Theory, I, ch. 1-3. "Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought, p. 1 86. The danger of politics is Jouvenel, Pure Theory, p. 29. MSee Jouvenel, Sovereignty, p. 294 adfinem, and above, note 42.

52This

stressed

in

Bertrand de Jouvenel

383

tally irreconcilable
ical philosophy

with classical political philosophy.

Indeed, if classical

polit

might

temper the extremes of modern political philosophy

positions, e.g., such as

Hobbes 's

modern political

philosophy blind

can contribute

a normative and conceptual preciseness

philosophy.

lacking

in

aspects of classical political

political philos
paradigmatic

Preoccupation

with

the best regime

must not

ophy to how regime case for proponents

sent

norms are

instituted

or articulated.

Thus if the

of classical

philosophy is Plato

who could visualize con

only in a mandate or plebiscitary capacity contributing to the collapse the ideal regime and to the ridicule of philosophy within the conventions
can

of of

society indicate the necessity of tion from which this must be

consent

aspects of modern political

philosophy from which Jouvenel builds accounting for consent and the conceptual orienta
approached.

Dissenting

from Hobbes,

and

from

(contract) theory, it indicates that consent is a rudimentary but not the sufficient, condition for legitimacy, that it can provide symbolization for legitimacy and regime demands, but that it is
within

necessary, the formal

articulated

context

in
the

which

norms

supportive

of authoritative

initiatives have focus.

been

established:

context upon which political

theory

must

RAWLS AND THE HARRIED MOTHER

William R. Marty
Memphis State

University

Folk Wisdom There is duction to It is the

answer

a piece of

folk

wisdom that provides a

much

advice about

contemporary discussion of how to ensure a fair division

surprisingly useful intro the problem of distributive justice.

of a pie or other

dessert. The

the pie
chosen

is simplicity itself: Let the sheer have the last piece. He will then slice as equally as possible, for the piece remaining for him, the piece not

by

the others,

is

likely

to

be the

smallest. children

Mothers have

used

this

technique to settle squabbles

between their

from time immemorial.

It works,

And they will continue to use it, because it works. But why does this technique work? Wherein lies its
suspects, because it is
grounded

wisdom?
of

one

in

a shrewd

understanding
others

human

nature:

We mostly
possible,

seek or choose alternatives

that favor ourselves, or, if that is not

not

alternatives

that at least

will uses

favor

over ourselves.

The
and

beauty
the

of

the technique is that

out

it

this

less than

noble

trait to

find

enshrine

justice. It turns

that the mother employs, quiet unself-consciously,

Modern.1

political

strategy

of a

Straussian

Like Hamilton

or

Madison,
they
pie

she are
as

devises

strategy that only

will

bend her

children's selfish

impulses

so that

rewarded

by doing

the right

thing, in this case,

by dividing

the

equally

as possible.

John Rawls Now let

us turn

from the folk

wisdom of

the harried mother to the most

discussed contemporary treatment

A

of

distributive
fairness"

justice,
he

that of John

Rawls. In

Theory

Justice,2

of
fairness."1

Rawls

gives a view of as

the nature of justice that

means

he

calls
what

"justice

as

By

"justice

that justice is

rational and equal men concerned as

to

advance

their own interests would choose

the basic
of

principles of

their association

Veil

Ignorance that

would conceal

if they were to choose from behind a from them their particular place in the
men need

society they
assumed

were about

to

create.

These

not, Rawls assures us, be

one

to be benevolent.

Instead,

mutual

disinterest in

another's

fate

'For

brief

statement of

the division between Ancients and

Moderns,

see

Leo Strauss, "What

Philosophy?"

is Political

in his What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (New York: Free

Press,
1971).

1959).

2John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Msss.: 'Rawls

states these

Belknsp

Press

of

Hsrvsrd Univ. Press,

pp.

ideas in their

simplest

form in A

Theory

of Justice,

11-22.

386
coupled with must

Interpretation
the Veil of Ignorance will serve the same
account
purpose."

Each,

after

all,

in the future society be cause, once the Veil of Ignorance is stripped away, he may find that the worst position is the one occupied by himself. Indeed, Rawls defines the Original
take into the
position of

every

person

Position in

which

these principles of justice are chosen as a situation in which

explains

the Maximin rule applies. As Rawls

tells us to rank alternatives

this

principle:

"The

maximin rule

by

their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt

the the

alternative
others."5

the worst outcome of which

more

is

superior

to the worst outcomes of

should

enemy"

a person operating behind the Veil of Ignorance for the design of a society as though his "worst were going to assign him his place in that The logic of the Rawlsian enterprise is simple enough. Men in the Original

Or,
,

simply,

choose

principles

society.6

Position, they
high
are
or

gathered together

choose rules

that

will

to set up the rules of their future association, will favor themselves as much as possible. However, since
a

meeting behind

Veil

of

Ignorance

and cannot

know

what

position,

low, they

that will

occupy in the society they are about to set up, the rule favor them the most, or at least threaten them the least (remember
will

Maximin), is likely to be a general rule of justice or fair division. He defines what they would choose, then, as the principles of justice, and unless Rawls is
seriously mistaken, these principles will accord with our deepest intuitions of justice (at least as these deepest intuitions are modified by reflection upon the
outcomes of

this

choice).7

Now

what

have
in

we

in the Rawlsian

enterprise?

We have, according to
subtle, wide-ranging,

distinguished

philosophers and

critics, "a powerful,

deep,
which

systematic work

since

grandeur."9

'Legislator'

has not seen its like philosophy the writings of John Stuart Mill, if We have a work of "magisterial We have "an achievement of the first Indeed, "Once again a has appeared in our But we have something else, too. We
political and moral
then."8
order."

midst."10

have the folk

wisdom of

how to divide

dessert

elevated

into the

paradigm of

justice, for

that is what Rawls's strategy is, the strategy of the mother with the squabbling children and the pie to be cut. Who, after all, is the designated pie cutter if he is not the Rawlsian Representative Man behind the Veil of Igno
rance?

He knows that he
know

will slice

the pie (in this case the social pie), but

he

does

not

what particular piece will

be

assigned to

him. He knows that it

and the others are

is

prudent

to act as though his worst enemy,

pp. pp.

knowing

how he

"Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 5Rawls, A Theory of Justice,

147-49.
152-53. 152.

6Rawls, A Theory
7See

of Justice,

p.

Rawls,"

the discussions of Reflective Equilibrium in A Theory of Justice, pp. 20ff. and 48-51. "Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 182. 'Benjamin Barber, "Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Measurement, and Politics in American Political Science Review, 69 (June 1975), 663.

'"John Chapman, "Rawls's

1975), 591. 593-

Theory

Justice,"

of

American Political Science Review,

69

(June

Rawls
motivated, has ensured that

and

the

Harried Mother
the

387
cer own

he

will get

tainly the smallest,

interest? He
size of

piece.

How
a

should
of

he

slice the pie to most

a

last remaining, hence almost favor his strategy

of

should

follow

strategy

Maximin,
And

maximizing the

the smallest share or slice, the slice that will go to the person in the least

advantaged

position, in this case, his

own.

what

the strategy of

the smallest share,

equally be only slightly (if any) smaller than the others. And that is precisely the answer first given by the. Rawlsian Representative Man choosing from behind the Veil of Ignorance. As Rawls puts it:

dividing
it

the

pie as

as possible.

strategy will do that? It is That way, even if he gets

will

Since it is
social

not reasonable

for him to

expect more than an equal share

agree

in the division

of

goods

[Why

would

the others

to give him more?], and since

it is

not

rational

for him to

agree to

less,

the sensible

thing for him

to do

is to

acknowledge as
principle

the first principle of justice one requiring

so obvious

an equal

distribution. Indeed, this

immediately."

is

that we would expect

right. pie

it

to occur to anyone

Rawls is

That is the division that

sheer
who

will

be

chosen

by

rational,

self-

interested,
recognize

knows he
solution.

will

get

the last slice.

Even

children

the logic of that

What Rawls has discover the

wisdom of and selfish

attempted

in his extraordinarily
pie.

complex exposition

is to

principles of

justice

how to
but

ensure a

by applying fair slicing of the

the technique

involved in the folk

outmaneuvered pie

And so, like that calculating cutter, the man behind the Veil is to be put

in the position, presumably against his will, of doing the right thing (finding justice), if for the wrong reasons (to maximize his own advantage). He will

find for

us a

is,

under the

genuinely just distribution, not because he prefers it, but because it himself.12 circumstances, the best he can do for
would appear

Rawls's strategy
not, then, deliver
why.

to

be

firmly

grounded

in the folk

wisdom

of the ages and the political strategy of the more realistic Moderns. Would a sound

it

theory

or view of

justice? It

would not.

Let

us show

Note first, however, that Rawls tells us that his final view of justice is a It is a balancing of his deepest intuitions of result of reflective
equilibrium.13

justice

against

the

view of

justice

given

by

his

social contract reaches

theory,

with each

being

adjusted

in light

of

the other until

are not

he

the most

satisfactory
matter of

equilibrium.

Our deepest intuitions

to be

ignored in the
be

justice. That
and clearest

being

so, let
of

us measure

his

conclusions against our own can

deepest

intuitions

justice

and see

if they

reconciled.

Two
method

examples should suffice

to show severe problems with the

Rawlsian
men

of

locating

the just distribution of goods. In the

first,

two

are

shipwrecked on an

island. One

works

hard. He

plows

the ground, plants seed,

"Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 12While Rawls has the men in

assume that men are

pp.

150-51-

the Original Position act according to self-interest,

he does

not

l3Rawls, A

by nature egoistic. Theory of Justice, pp.

See Rawls. A
20-21.

Theory

of Justice,

pp.

147-48.

388
weeds

Interpretation
his field,
chases

the birds away,

waters

the crop through the

heat

and

dryness

of summer,

builds

a shed to store

the grain through the blizzards of

the crop. winter, builds himself a cabin to survive the cold, and then harvests

The

other

man,

by
he

happenstance
sits

formerly
the

hit man,

acts

differently. Through
pleasant

the hot
and

summer

in the
of

shade of

tree,

swims

in the

lives

idly

off the

fat

the land for the

living

is easy,

and

lagoon, besides, when

he
sleeps and
-a

winter

comes, he

plans

to knock the other man on the

head

while

his grain, his shed, and his shelter. This man neither thereby earning his keep, nor has he the good in his heart.
take

makes

crop,

Now to whom, in this hypothetical situation, does that store of grain rightly belong? Our intuitive sense is clear. It belongs to the one who by his
planning, effort,
and sacrifice produced

it,

not

to the one who

sat

by

in deliber

ate and malicious

except

idleness in

anticipation

of

gaining the grain

without effort

for

one

foul deed. In this case,

other.

all the grain

and none

to the

But, apply
men

the Rawlsian technique

clearly belongs to the one, for locating the just

of

distribution: Take the two how

or

by

whom

the grain

from the island, strip them of any knowledge was produced (put them, that is, behind the Veil
on

of

Ignorance),

and

let them then,

and

the

basis

of rational

calculation will

of

self-

interest, divide the grain, equally for, as Rawls asks

should either give

how

will

they divide it? They

divide it
and

us, why

should either accept

less than half

why

up more than half? But let us, for the sake of further illumination, lift the Veil just Suppose now our two islanders are told that one produced the grain and
not.

little. did

one

How then know

would

they divide
produced

the

grain?

Still equally, because had not,

neither

would

who

had

the

grain and who of

neither could afford

to distribute it on the basis

and in any case, desert because that would

give a

fifty

percent chance of

would not survive

the winter.

getting the zero share, which would mean he In the example given, each islander would know

that one deserved the grain and one did not.

They
would

would

know that

an equal

distribution is

not a

just distribution. But that

are

have

no

influence

on their

decision because they

making

a rational calculation of their self-interest

in

dividing
scheme

the grain, not a rational assessment of what a just distribution of the

grain would

be. Since the two

except

are not the

same, the

result of the

Rawlsian

is not,

by

coincidence or

definition,

justice.

In the light
of

of the

the pie cutting.

about

how to

get

preceding example, let us consider again the paradigm The Rawlsian method certainly provides a shrewd strategy the pie cut equally, but is the result justice? That would justice requires, in
cases,
as the all

depend

on whether

cases,

or

in

particular cases, an equal

division. But in

some

does

not require or even allow an equal

illustrates, justice clearly preceding division. Rawls's distribution is faulty

example a number of of a

because it divorces distribution from

give a claim

things that can

legitimately

distribution. Thus allocation, a la Rawls, divorces distribution from contribution (who bought or brought the pie
to
a particular share

Rawls
makings?), effort (who
which

and the

Harried Mother

389

to choose

baked it?), risk (what if there are a number of pies from the one to divide, but one is booby-trapped so that it will
need

explode and

kill the sheer?),

and

(what if

some

among

whom

the pie is to be

divided

are

fat

well-fed, but

others are malnourished or starving?), skill or

excellence good

(what if two
and

come to the

party,

each

bringing

pie, but

one

is

a or

cook

the other is not, how then should the pies be

divided?),

responsibility

(again two cooks, but one exercises care to be clean and use sanitary ingredients while the other, sloppy in habits and careless in cooking, is likely to have a pie that will make people ill?). None of these
and performance

contribution, effort,
mance and

risk,

need,

skill, excellence, responsibility,

and

perfor

is dealt it

with

need

only if
won't

an equal consider
or a

adequately by the Rawlsian scheme, except perhaps need, distribution will meet the needs of all, which of
the medical problems of
people

course

requiring

clotting

factor for their blood

the average

kidney
be

machine.

Either

requires more expense than

on

income

share of even
would

the richest society

earth, hence in these

cases an equal

division

fatal division.
principle of

John Rawls
tion,"

does,

of

course, modify the "first

just distribu

but only on grounds that accept an equal division as the funda fair and only on terms by which it would be acceptable to division, mentally men who have a right to an equal division. Those terms, as seen by his Repre
equality,14

sentative

Man (or Men),

are

that

inequality

will

be

allowed

if it is to the benefit

of

all,

or more

specifically, if it is to the benefit of the least advantaged, that the

smallest shares allowed

is,
on

to those who
ple).15

will get

(this is termed the Difference Princi

Thus

some are

to be

to

have

more than

others, but only

condition

that this

improves, in

an absolute

sense, the

position of

the poorest

off.

Rawls

gives recognition

here to the

need

to provide incentives for produc to be distributed

can

tion, to the possibility that the size of the increased by rewarding productive effort or
the size of the pie
unequal
can of

social pie

be

contribution

(and,

conversely, that

be

reduced

distribution
the

the pie

giving such rewards). Hence, an that increases the size of the pie can be to the

by

not

advantage of

person or

group receiving the

smallest

slice,

if the fruits

of

that greater effort induced

poorest group.

by

unequal

shares

are themselves shared with

the

Does this
to allow

modification of

Rawls's first

principle of

inequality
again

as

long

as

it benefits

all and

distribution (equality), specifically the poorest or "least

advantaged,"

salvage

the justice of the Rawlsian scheme?

Well, let

us

see.

Consider

the case of the islanders. Under the original agreement, each

social pie.

is
of

to get half of the

wheat apiece.

Let

us assume that amounts

to

fifty

bushels both

Let

us also assume that

fifty

bushels is just

enough to get a man

make

through the

winter and

that chances of

survival and comfort would

additional wheat

desirable. Assume too that it is possible, through further work,

pp. 150-51. also pp. 75ff. and isoff.

"Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 15Rawls, A Theory of Justice,

p.

83. See

390
planning,
crease and

Interpretation
development
from
of

skills, for the

one who produced a our

his

production

ioo to 200

bushels. But

crop to in hard worker balks. He justice

and
self-

is unwilling (out
respect?) to
make

of spite? out of greed? out of a

sense of

this further

effort

if he

must

distribute this
(even

additional produc

tion on the same basis as his

the

original production

shares

for himself

and

hit

man).

Under these

circumstances

(the

refusal of

the producer to do the

best he

can under a simple

pooling

hit
the

man

to

allow an unequal gets a portion

of assets), it may be to the advantage of the distribution in favor of the producer so long as
extra

hit

man

of the

production.

So let

us

say that the

the first-year

producer

is

allowed two-thirds of

anything he

produces

above

base,

which

is divided
effort and

equally.

Under these terms the

producer will

get, if he

increases his
bushels he bushels (50 he

got the

first

percent of

planning so as to double his production, not the fifty (half of his production of 100 bushels), but 117 the base production of 100 bushels plus 67 percent of the
year

extra production of 100 since

will

bushels). The hit man,

now

the "least
agrees

advantaged

get

fewer bushels than the

still without

producer,16

to this unequal
an
was

distribution because he gets,

standard of

any

effort on

his part,

increased
getting.)

living. (He

now gets

83

bushels

rather

than the 50

he

Moreover,
now

this system contributes to his reform,

not

behaviorally

speaking.

He

decides

to

kill the

producer

because
his
part

83

bushels

a year with no effort on

of 100 or 200

is

of virtually a better deal than getting the

guaranteed

income

entire

crop

head

and

then
so

And

bushels for one year by knocking the producer on having to make his own crop in succeeding years. inequality rears its head. Is it just? Apparently so, according to
can

the

the
of

Rawlsian scheme, for this deal

be

agreed
while

to

from behind the Veil

Ignorance. (Given bushels

while

a choice of 50

bushels

the other also gets 50, or

as

83

the

other gets

117, the

rational

choice, excluding envy

Rawls

exhorts us

to, is to choose 83.) But is it just in any traditional sense of justice desert? Is it just according to our deepest intuitions of justice (one of the as measures by which Rawls proposes that we reach a reflective equilibrium)? Of
not, for the
producer

course and

is is

still entitled to what

he

produces
man

by

his

effort

planning,

which

is the

whole 200

bushels,

and

the hit

is

still entitled

to

all

he has produced,

which

still not a

kernel.17

Allowing inequality
of

in

order

to increase

incentives

and

thereby increase the

eliminate the radical

size

the social pie to be

can

distributed does not, then,

under

injustice that
Veil
of

be

produced
stripped

the Rawlsian
can

scheme.

Moreover,

once the

Ignorance is
be

away, it

be

surmised

that the

hardworking

producer will

unable

to see

man who

16One peculiarity of the Rawlsian view of justice is that, as Rawls uses the term, it is the hit does no work but gets a living through the efforts of another who must be termed the
advantaged"

"least

(i.e., he

gets the smaller one

share)

and not

the hard worker

of

who supports

both

himself

and

the idler.

What,

wonders, are the

"advantages"

the hard

worker?

nOn
other.

grounds of

humanity

the worker might not allow the other to die of starvstion,

but surely
to the

there is nothing

in justice thst

would require

him to give,

as a matter of

desert,

equal shares

Rawls
the justice
els and got

and

the Harried Mother

391
produced ioo

in

either or

the original arrangement,

by

which

he

bush

50,

its modification,
to get

by

which

he

worked

doubly

hard to

produce

200
will

bushels, only
be
unable

117
of

while

the other man on the island sits

idly

by. He
or

to see the justice

of either will

deal because surely tell

neither

is

just deal,

so our

"clearest intuitions
critics

justice"

us.

Nor do the
results

of

the Rawlsian scheme, who point out

as opposed to two

its

peculiar salvage

in multiparty distributions

party distributions, extremely

and shows

the scheme
cated and

by

their

modifications.

Take for

example the

sophisti

He compelling critique by Douglas Maximin principle disfranchises all but the least

Rae.18

clearly that Rawls's

can give

advantaged

intuitively
stead of

outrageous allocations rule of are

in

certain not

unlikely

circumstances.

In the

Rawls's

Maximin, Rae

proposes a rule of

"general

advantage

which means

"we

willing to
man

choose avoidable

be

accomplished without sacrifices

to the interests of any to 50 percent

inequalities only if this (This

stratum."19

can still

assumes

that the

idle hit

is

entitled

of

the base production,

thereby

accepting the basic and outrageous assumption.) Under this rule an

will

inequality
none

be

permitted

the disadvantage

of no

strata."20

only if it "is to the advantage of some strata yet to Some at least must gain by any inequality and
application of

lose. Aside from the fact that the

political

this

principle would seem

to

forbid nearly any

decision in

a wide range of matters

(apply it,

for

example, to the

possible alternatives possible under scheme gives

fundamental injustice

in the energy crisis), it does not solve the the Rawlsian scheme. Consider again our
man

island. Rawls's initial

equal shares with

the hit

the producer.

As

modified

something for nothing, indeed, by the Difference Principle and contributing

man nothing.

Maximin,
producer's

the hit

man can get even more while still means

Rae's
(The

modification

only

that, in
every

addition

to the hit

labor,

so must

other person on

getting his the island if more labored

share of the arrive.

base division is
(And
and

still an equal

division.) No
share of

mathematical
others'

formula for distribu

production

tion giving deliberate free riders a

a scheme that

is just.

does
or

reward

idlers is

well-designed

to produce more idlers

bitter resentment,
out the worst

falling

production,

by

others.

It is

a system

designed

to

bring

in

our natures and to reduce the size of the social pie.)

Rae has

rearranged an unjust manner of

deciding

allocations.

He certainly has

not corrected

it.

A Critique of Method The Rawlsian

method

(or strategy) for

finding justice,

while

ingenious,
can

cannot give an adequate account of the principles of

just distribution. Nor

of

can

'"Douglas Rae, "Maximin Justice and an Alternative Principle Political Science Review, 69 (June 1975). 630-47. p. 645. "Rae, "Maximin
Justice," Justice,"

General

Advantage,"

Ameri

20Rae,

"Maximin

p.

646.

392
modifications of

Interpretation
the scheme that accept his premises. The Rawlsian scheme

and

its

modifications

fail for the

First,
rather

the Rawlsian strategy for

following reasons. finding the just

equally.

distribution

presupposes

than proves his answer. The Rawlsian strategy, after all, is that of the
mother with the pie to

harried

be divided

But the

mother chooses

that

strategy from a wide range of possible strategies only because equal division. Had she wanted an unequal division, as in other
she

she wants an

circumstances

might, she

would

have

chosen

differently.

If, for

example, she had told her

children

that she would

divide

and well
others

they

performed

among them according to how faithfully their duties, and some had done their chores while
a pie

had not, then it

slices

would

have been

unjust
she

to

pick a

give equal

to all, and presumably

mother's

would not

strategy that would have done so. The

Rawlsian
shares

or

harried

strategy, then, is only

a good

for

all set

is

the goal, and

it

will

particular

of circumstances

calls

only produce a for an equal division. But the strategy

strategy if equal just distribution if that

itself,

which

what end applicable

is merely a tool for gaining a particular end, tells us nothing about should be sought or what justice requires. It is only a universally strategy if justice always requires an equal division, which a mo is
absurd.

ment's reflection will show

Analytically, then, division,

the Rawlsian
equal

strategy
not

for

finding

justice tells

us

how to

make people

want an

division,
not

whether we should make

them want an equal

always

and

certainly

that an

equal

division is

what

justice

requires.21

Second, the Rawlsian strategy for locating justice, like the mother's strat for egy getting an equal division of the pie, is a variant of the Modern strategy for getting people to do the right thing. That strategy relies upon self-interest

(carefully

guided

by

proper

(which is hard to behavior. Thus

produce

democracy

rather than upon nobility of character dangerous to depend upon) to get desirable relies, to a considerable degree, upon making it to and

institutions)

the self-interest of the politician to pay attention to the needs and

electorate

desires

of the

(by

periodic elections with

archy (or its

modern

legalized opposition), dictatorial equivalents) depends upon

while absolute mon

proper education

(or

revolutionary fervor) to produce nobility of character and a sense of noblesse oblige. For all our complaints about democracy, few of us would want to rely for
for
to

long
us.

on

the sense
safer

of noblesse oblige of others

to get them to do what is right

It is

to structure

institutions

so that

it is to the

others'

self-interest

pay

attention to us.

utilization of

Or so, at least, we Moderns believe. The outstanding this strategy is that of the founders of the American regime, and

the theoretical

defense

of

it is to be found in The Federalist Papers, especially

2,Rawls
it
there is
prior to
sn

mentions

the technique used

procedural

by
is

the mother to get an equal

as an example of

"perfect

justice"

"independent
his

criterion

for

what

the procedure which is to be

critique of

followed"

division of the pie. He cites (p. 85). He notes, however, that it presumes that fair division, a criterion defined separately from and
(p.

85). He does justice.

not notice

that this constitutes a

damning

own apparatus

for

defining

Rawls
numbers

and the

Harried Mother

393
mother and mother

10 and 51.

It is

upon

this strategy that both the harried

Rawls

depend,

the first successfully, the second unsuccessfully. The

apparatus

succeeds chooses

because her
But

does

make

it to the interest

of

the one who to

to choose

what she wants

chosen,

and what we must presume ought

be

chosen.

Veil

of

Rawls, despite his elaborate apparatus of Original Position, Ignorance, initial equality, and pursuit of self-interest, fails. He fails
upon which

because his structure,

he

relies

to give us an objective account of to the interest of those

who choose

justice, does
to choose a

not make

it

either possible or

truly just distribution.

rance

In particular, the Rawlsian structure fails because the same Veil of Igno that was designed to hide from those in the Original Position their place
society-to-be and

in the interest

in

order

to prevent them from rationalizing their

self-

they

must

calling it justice, also hides from them all the particular details that know if they are to know what a just distribution is. Thus it hides
who
produced

from them
makes

the grain on that island and

who earned about

who

did not,
who

which

it impossible for them to know

all

that grain and

efforts or

did not,
effort,

and

it hides from them individual

information

individual
about

lack

of

about

contributions or

lack thereof,

handicaps,
unless

choices, needs,
other

duties fulfilled,
what

or responsibilities not met. must

It hides from them, in

words,

precisely they among individuals has absolutely nothing to do with what those individuals choose or do or leave undone, and that is a patent absurdity that would make
the whole
concept of a

know to distribute

justly,

just distribution

just

or unjust

distribution

meaningless.

Consequently,
Analytically,

the Rawlsian scheme does not lead those in the Original Position (or us) to

justice

unless that

hit

man

deserves

as much as

the hard

worker.

the scheme cannot lead those in the Original Position to

justice because it

blinds them to

all

the individual

actions and choices

that are the foundation of a

just distribution. Analogically, Rawls has given us Justice blindfolded to make her impartial, but he has deprived her of the scales by which alone she can tell
what

justice among individuals requires. Finally, the Rawlsian scheme fails because it fails
strategy:

at

the very heart

of

the

Modern Position

It fails to structure the choices of those men in the Original

self-interest everything.

so

that it is to their
scheme

to choose the just distribution.

Failing
and

in this, the
merely

fails in

The

product of

its

choices

becomes

a careful

calculation

of self-interest

in

a situation of
purest

uncertainty
with

what that, as we have seen, has no relationship justice requires. Thus our two men of the island, put behind the Veil, will divide that grain equally. They will not make that decision because they think it
except

chance

the just distribution

decide that way, and be sides, how could they know the just distribution when blinded to the facts of instead they will make that who had produced the grain and who had not?
Rawls
commands

them not to

decision because it is the

knowledge
about who

safe and prudent

produced

division for them in the

absence of

had

that grain, and

they

will continue

to

insist

394
on an equal

Interpretation
division
even

in the face

of certain

knowledge that
none, as

one

had

produced and was entitled to all the grain and the other not

long

as

they do

know
are

who

the

producer was

(it

might

have been the other)

and as

long

as

they

guided,

as

Rawls has them guided,

by

prudent calculation of

self-

interest.

They

will choose what we can see

to be an

outrageously

unjust

distri

bution,

and what

they

can see

to be an outrageously

unjust

distribution, because

the structure Rawls has built does not make justice and self-interest coincide.

And so,
choose

making it to the self-interest of those in the Original Position to justice is the foundation upon which Rawls builds his claim that he has
since

found

an objective

way to
clear

give an account of what

justice requires, the

whole

Rawlsian

scheme collapses.

In truth, it is

that the fruit of the Rawlsian scheme is quite

one

different
of

from

what

Rawls imagines. Since

whether one

does

not

know from behind the Veil

Ignorance
good or

evil, it is not

is praiseworthy or blameworthy, producer or parasite, to one's interest to make those distinctions. The Rawlsian
combined with pursuit of

apparatus of
us

Veil

of

Ignorance,

self-interest,

makes

indifferent to had
It base. It

all

that previous theories of justice and previous generations of

men

considered

important. It

makes us

indifferent to

what

is fair

or

unfair,

noble or

makes us

indifferent to justice itself.

can

be

argued

that since men

in the Original Position

made a

deal to

divide things equally (or unequally according to the Difference Principle), then it is only just that they live up to the bargain. But such an argument only proves
that there

is

a moral presumption

in favor
to

into,
tion
and

not

that there
an

is any

reason

of living up to bargains freely entered believe that this particular bargain or

contract
of

describes

intrinsically

the producer on our

just distribution. Imagine, after all, the reac island when he discovers that he is the producer,
rest of

that he has

bound himself for the

a man of

the idler. If

he is

deal is

deal,"

his life to providing a living for extraordinarily strong character, he might say that "a but he certainly would not advise his children to take up that
reason

burden,

nor

is there any
and not

in justice for his

children to assume situation of

such a

burden. Rational

calculation

of self-interest even

in

uncertainty is
"social

contract."

merely that, Because

justice,
that,

if it leads to voluntary
"social

adoption of a

contract"

of

no

such

can

endure,

except

by

force,

unless

the contract can be seen, on both sides of the

Veil,

to be just. The

Rawlsian

contract

fails that test.

method

The Rawlsian
poses,
without

for

finding justice

fails because its

a

proving, that

an equal

division is
whether

same structure makes us even

indifferent to
us

structure presup fair division; because that justice is done; and because,
of the particular

if

we

cared, it hides from

all

knowledge

facts

on

which claims to a particular share must rest. our self-interest

and

justice,

The Rawlsian strategy makes it to division contrary to our deepest intuitions of contrary to previous teachings of justice. It can and does defend
to choose
a

Rawls
outrageously
justice.22

and

the

Harried Mother
as a

395

unjust

divisions. It simply fails

serious means of

locating

The Veil Removed: A Paradox Revealed

We have dealt,
apparatus

so

far,
what

with

three aspects of the Rawlsian scheme: the

and

for

deciding

justice is

the two conclusions about

or

what

constitutes a

just distribution

the Difference Principle.

Each
of

Two

other

features

inequality according to is theoretically inadequate. the Rawlsian scheme are striking. The first is the
either equal

division

one

principle of equal

liberty

(Rawls's first is to

principle of choose

justice),23

which assumes

that

the
and

dignity

and

glory

of man

freely

his

own values and other

life-style

to act accordingly, as

long

as those actions are

just. The

feature is his

assertion

that those who produce or contribute more are not, than others
effort or a clear

in justice, due favorable early

and a clear

greater reward

because that

production or contribution stems not

or

from voluntary
environment24

choice, but from genetic endowment

of man's

denial

contradiction

to the emphasis on

responsibility for his actions, freedom and liberty.

us

It is, in

fact,

a paradox.

Rawls tells

that

he

values

liberty

so

highly

that

it to utility or greater happiness, but he then adopts a view man's freedom and responsibility for his actions by at or lack of them to his genes or luck of birth and his achievements tributing Rawls puts himself and his theory into a hopeless bind. place. In the end, he
will not sacrifice of man

that

denies

If

a man

is free

and

is,

consequently,

responsible

for his

actions and choices and

(or

his inaction

and evasions),

then justice must

be individual if

the Rawlsian
at

theory

of

distribution (his

second principle of

justice) is destroyed
a man
and

its founda
as an

tion. But

if

a man's efforts
and

deserve

no

reward,

is to be treated

involuntary

determined

product of

genes, status,

early environment,

22The Rawlsian theory is

at

not a

least,
in
a

a notable

defense
But

of compassion

satisfactory account of justice. But it might be for the poor and helpless, or, as Rawls
system

argued

that it

is,

would say,

"the

least
sion

advantaged."

even

here the

fails. It fails because it

confuses

justice

and compas

way that will destroy both. It will destroy justice because, in the attempt to aid the poor, it obliterates all distinctions between the earned and the unearned, between producer and parasite, and to do that renders the concept of justice meaningless. It will destroy compassion because humsn
nsture revolts sgsinst and those who

siding
want

slike and

equally those

who are

helpless

and cannot

help

themselves

merely founders today not because people but because their sense of justice is

to ride on the efforts of others

are

on that shoals

the

welfare program

heartless (all

polls show

that most

favor

aid

to the needy),

outraged
protect

by

what

they
as

perceive as a widespread

taking
can

advantage of compassion.

To

both justice

and compassion, the

cheating and distinction between

the two

must

be

maintained:

to

obliterate

the

distinction,

only it may be noted, apply to the confusion of justice "Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 60.

corrupt our view of

justice

and

destroy

our sense of compsssion.

and the sense of

Rawls does, is a benefit to neither it (These ssme arguments,

fraternity.)

2"Rawls, A Theory

of Justice,

pp.

74, 104-

396
then there

Interpretation
is
no point

in making

equal

liberty

(which is

meaningless without

free

will and

ly,

the Rawlsian

individual responsibility) the first principle of justice. Paradoxical theory refutes itself. To defend either of its two basic principles
other.

requires proved

the destruction of the foundation of the

In the end, Rawls has

to be his own severest critic.

IDEOLOGY AND REALITY: THE IDEOLOGUE'S

PERSUASION IN MODERN POLITICS

JtJRGEN GEBHARDT

University
"When I
what
word,"

of Erlangen-Nuremberg

use a

Humpty Dumpty
it to
mean

said

in

a rather scornful
less."

tone, "it
is," is,"

means said

just

choose

neither

more

nor

"The
"The

question question

Alice,

"whether

you can make words mean

different

things."

said

Humpty

Dumpty,

"which is to be

all."

master

that's

Currently,
mean world.

the

words

philosophy, theory,

and

the

most

different things has

by

the

fiat

of

the

ideology have been made to Humpty Dumpties of our

the terms

The

confusion

reached the

point

where all

have become
symbolic

interchangeable: On the
creations are

one

hand,

we

find that is

types of

man's

arbitrarily

classified as

philosophies, theories,
extended

or

ideologies. On
of
symbol-

the other

hand,

the concept of
one
or

ideology

to

all

kinds

izations, disliked for

dacht,

the other reason, in order to deprive them

of

their status of reality; carried to extremes there is the allgemeine Ideologieverthe general suspicion of

symbolic expressions persons are allowed

sion on each

ideology that dissolves any truth whatsoever of into the sociology of knowledge. We may agree that all to define ideology, etc., as they please, vote in the profes
and establish an opinion of the

definition

majority
situation

as

the ruling

opinion while

recording the
procedure

dissenting
decision

opinions of

the respective

minorities

for

further

use.

This

would reduce the chaotic

a

that prevents

meaningful about

discussion

by

la

Humpty Dumpty,
clarifications of

without

bringing

any
own;

conceptual clarification.

Critical

the terms in ques

tion cannot mean the enumeration of definitions in order to add new ones of
one's
clarification can ask

that the

symbols

be

put

back into the

possible.

experien and

tial context of their genesis,

in

which context analysis

is

Content

engendering underlying the investigated. is not This to dismiss the respective sets of symbols may then be enterprise of critical clarification; irrelevant for the knowledge as of sociology
structure of the consciousness and the
experiences

it is to take
part

seriously as the form of man's ongoing investigation of his in the drama of being. The act of symbolization, however, does not take
symbols

place

in
of

a vacuum

but is to be located in the

respective

historical

context.

The

study

the

situation

that gave rise to a form of symbolism tells us

something

motivating experiences, insofar as each symbolization is an attempt at coping with fundamental problems of human existence in society and history. The history of symbolization is. therefore, to be considered the "history of
about the

the search for

emergent

truth about man's

be."

result of the search

standing"

may

It is

an

fundamental problems, whatever the "ongoing search for ever greater under
of the

in terms

of an experiential

differentiation

dimensions

of

reality

398
man participates stand

Interpretation

in,

as well as

the evidence of the possible refusal to under

"refusals that

are also made

with as

in the

mode of

symbolization."1

Symbols

are

not things to

be dealt

objects, but the human

medium of

interpreting
imperfec

experiences of order and

disorder,
fields
some

truth and untruth, perfection and

tion.

They testify
in

to

social of

of consciousness which are

bound together human

equivalent

experiences

underlying reality that

considerations steps:

makes

by being

partners

a common order.
general

Methodologically,
clarification suggest

for the

process

of

theoretical

the

following
man

First,

the term

ideology

is to be traced

to the original appearance of the symbolic ensemble of this term as part of the
self-explication of

Western

in the late

18th century.
and put

Second,
of

the content

and structure of periential

ideology
of

are

to be

analyzed

into the

respective ex

context

the historical process.

In the

course

this analysis a

clarification will

be

made of

the relationship of the symbolic form

the historical

event of

philosophy developed
an effort

by

the Greeks at the very

ideology to beginning
humanity.
of a

of our civilization

in

to come to an understanding of their

That understanding culminated in the Platonic-Aristotelian enterprise critical science of human order in society and history. Concerning this, it

must

be

emphasized

that methodologically the same

other symbolism:

ideology
of

and

any

holds true for philosophy It is to be perceived in the form

meaning.

as of

for its

appearance

in

history

in

order

to understand its authentic

In the

case

philosophy this is the

self-interpretation

more

structured

the reality we still live

important, since it is the symbolism that has in, it has provided the language symbols of

human

ical

questions about social order

up to today, and shaped the framework for all analyt in history. Philosophy, in this respect, is an
symbolizations

epochal

event

of

differentiation;
much

later in time

could

not

fall

behind it, however

pervert

they may

twist the original meaning of the symbols or

the structure of reality.

Third,
central

the summary of our findings

will

tenets of ideology.

This is in in

order

survey consisting of the to decide whether ideology is a

a practice

be

prototype of a modern symbolism

sequences

content and structure with specific con

for the

political

reality

when put

into

that can

be

used as

a paradigm
paradigm and poses

for

all symbolic variants of equivalent structure and content. with

This

fits in

Voegelin's

concept of modern gnostic mass-movement

ideology.2

the question of the gnostic nature of

The

gnostic

features
The

of modern are crucial

ideology,
for
an

which are still much

disputed

by

students of gnosticism,
of modernity.

understanding

of

Voegelin's interpretation

French ideologues were, in terms

of

Voegelin,

an

intellectual

movement which

has had "if

not

the

form,

at

least the

success of political

mass-movements."3

ern

'G. Sebba, "Order and Disorder of the Soul: Eric Voegelin's Philosophy of Review III (N.S.) Spring 1967, 2, 295. :E. Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism (Chicago 1968), pp. 83-88. 3Voegelin, Science, p. 84.

History,"

South

Ideology
From the intellectual
scientism other

and

Reality

399
modern

movement of

the ideologues important varieties of

have sprung up, which have shaped the modern mind more than any intellectual movement. It might be useful, therefore, to tie the tenets of
with

ideology

certain gnostic
of

and

magic4

traditions in the West in

movement
.

order

to

substantiate

the gnosticism

this

intellectual
one or

beyond

general

suspicion of gnosticism

(allgemeiner
which

Gnosisverdacht)
two
gnostic

Such
'the

suspicion regards

"any

system

as

Gnostic

shares

of

main over

traits of the
modern

ancient

world

feeling",
general.5

thus

throwing "a

blanket

con

sciousness"

In Voegelin's understanding the essential core is "the enterprise of returning the pneuma in man from its state of alienation in the cosmos to the divine pneuma of the Beyond through action based on knowl
edge."6

in

This statement, mainly inspired

by

the studies of Jonas and

Quispel,

sums

up the six characteristics

attitude,"7

"that,
at

taken

together,

reveal

the nature of the

gnostic nological

and

it is

at

least

as plausible as

the recent attempts at termi

of
1966.8

clarification

undertaken

the Messina Congress

want

With
that

respect

to the current state of Gnostic studies I

criterion or

to suggest

tentatively

the

decisive

is the

preordained self-redemptive act of gnosis practiced or

spiritually, ritually
of

socially
a

changing the nature of reality proper Gnostic soteriology is very

symbolism sketched

combining all three of them for the better.

complicated matter.

with

the purpose

But the rich

soteriolog-

ical

Lyon

always suggests an identical underlying pattern that Irenaeus of out quite correctly: since ignorance is the cause of want and
whole state which redemption of

passion,

being
want.

knowledge (gnosis) will dissolve the by ignorance. Gnosis, therefore, is the from his is
empirical

has

come

into

the inner or

pneu

matic man

existence,
of the

body
whole

and psyche and

being

derived from
The
re

Gnosis is the knowledge

gnosis
not

true

redemption.

deeming

only

an act of self-knowledge

but

an existential activity.

It is usually initiated
of

by

some extracosmic

force that

calls upon the

Gnostic, but
action

redeemer and redeemed are of the same

nature, merging in the

gnosis.9

divinizing

redeeming the Gnostic

own redeemer.

in the
The

psychodrama of

The

call makes the

Gnostic his
"For
a

ancient

Gnostic, however, is

a redeemed

one,

discussion
and

of the magic tradition see

Thought,"

Cari L. G. Shay, "The Transmutation

of

Alchemy
on

into Science
Gnosticism

Political

University

of

Oregon, Ph.D.,
p.

1974.

!S. McKnight, Gnosticism

and

and

Modernity,

19.

(Paper

presented

to the Conference

Modernity, May 1978.) 6E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge, 1974), p. 20. 'Voegelin, Science, p. 86. 8U. Bianchi, "Le origini dello Gnosticismo, Colloquio di Studies in the History of Religions (Supplements XoNumen, XII) Leiden,

Messina,"

13-18

April 1966

'Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, I, 21, 2 & 4; on the gnostic Gnostic Religion (Boston, 1958); H. M. Schenke, "Die neutestamentliche Christologie und der in: K. W. Troger (ed.), Gnosis und Neues Testament, Berlin 1973, 205-29; L. gnostische naturaliter salvandae, in: W. Eltester (ed.), Christentum und Gnosis (Berlin. Animae Schottroff,
Erloser,"

1967, XXIII-XXVI. soteriology see: H. Jonas, The

1969),

65-97;

and

especially the

new

study

of

K. Rudolph, Die Gnosis, (Gottingen,

1977),

130-84.

400
whose redemption

Interpretation
is

fully

achieved

in the
tion

provisional state of salvation

only after his death. But the modern Gnostic is to expect ultimate fulfillment of redemp
the

in history. In my opinion, though,

place within

distinguishing
view of

trait of modern

gnosticism consists of

the radical spatio-temporal

this salvational act

taking

the historical process.

Many

a modern gnostic

system, there
apocalypse

fore, interprets
insofar is
as and telos of an

the

historical

process

in terms

of an

innerworldly

the salvational act through man's own effort is the

imagined logic Gnostic

history. But it
nor

must

be

remembered

that not every modern

apocalyptic,

is every

apocalyptic a modern

Gnostic.

Fourth,

and

finally,

the process of clarification should be completed in a

of

way by putting the truth Does the ideologue have to deny and eclipse
genuine theoretical of experiences and

ideology

to the test
the

of reality:

a major part of

historical field

the

symbolizations of

that experience in order to safeguard

his

conception of man

in society

and

history?

1. The Historical Roots of Ideology

My
also

report

on

the French ideologues elaborates certain points made

by
and

Dante Germino drawn

on
Moravia.10

and

Hans Barth in their

contributions

to the subject. I

have

the materials in the

work of

Picavet,

van

Duzer, Kitchin

The term
an

ideology
of

was coined

by

Antoine Destutt de

Tracy

and ac

cepted

by

intellectual life

movement

that played a powerful role in the intellec

tual and political throne.

France from 1794 till Napoleon's rise to the imperial

group of persons made up the intellectual center of France setting up the French system of public education and bringing together the best minds of all fields of science in their Institut National. The removal of
some time this

For

the ideologues

from the

public scene nation.

did

not negate

their impact upon the public

consciousness of the

French

Socially, it

was a movement of a revolu

tionary intelligentsia consisting

the

of members of the non-capitalist

bourgeoisie,
that lived a
of

declining
landed

class of offlciers and the men of the

liberal

professions mingled

with

aristocrats of the rentier type.

It

was the social class

marginal and precarious existence within ancien regime and who

the ranks of the political class

the

became

most active

in the

revolution.

The

result was

that this class was

power

largely

able to change

its

declining

position

by

rising to

in postrevolutionary France. The ideologues

achievement of their class

proved true to this revolu as the

tionary

by

establishing themselves

intellectual

elite of the society.

"The National Institute

established

represented the
of

keystone

of the

institutions

which

had been

by

the

Convention

Public Education. The

professors of the central schools

ed.

(Frankfurt,

tion

10D. Germino, Beyond Ideology (New York, 1967); H. Barth, Wahrheit und Ideologic new 1974); Fr. Picavet, Les Ideologues (Paris, 1891); Charles H. Van Duzer, Contribu of the Ideologues to French Revolutionary Thought (Baltimore, 1935); J. Kitchin, La

Decade (1794-1807),

Paris,

1965; S.

Moravia, II

pensiero

degli Ideologues

(Florence,

1974).

Ideology
as well as those of all specialized
education'.""

and

Reality
its
members as

401
'leaders
of

schools could perceive

the central

Condillac and especially Condorcet, figures, beside Destutt de Tracy, were Cabanis, Volney, Broussais, Lancelin, Daunou, J. B. Say and such eminent scientists as Lamarck, Laplace and Ampere, and last but not least Napoleon. The Ideologistes, as they called
of the movement were

The Fathers

themselves,
propagate

acted

as

the class of men that were, as

age
of

Condorcet
human

once

said, to

the truth in order to ring in the

perfection.

The dis

symbolic

form

of

ideology

absorbed the various symbolic strands

spiritual,
the

intellectual,

political, and economic

that

dissociated themselves from

European order, separated them from their respective contexts, integrating and rearranged them into a new symbolism that turned out to be a coherent
old
conception of man

in

history

and society.

Thus,

the ideologistes could claim

that their speculation is the

new

truth of the new era of mankind as it was

introduced

by

the revolutionary calendar.

2. The Theoretical Analysis of

Ideologue'

the

Interpretation of Order
process,
one

In ideology, there becomes apparent,

alternative answer
civilization.

as a personal and social

to the ongoing process of differentiation permeating Western

the

This

process made

individual the final

response

spiritual and sociopolit

ical

unit of

human
of

existence.

This

to the challenge of

differentiating
and

experiences

the surrounding reality of God and man,

world

society,

history

and nature was given

in

a mode of symbolization

the components of

which are sketched out

briefly:

The first
ideologues

and

most

fundamental

principle

was

the view of history.

All
and

agreed on

Condorcet's

speculation of

human history. Condorcet

his

confreres were tormented a remote corner of the

by

Pascal's

experience of man who

finds himself

lost in
of

infinite

universe

wondering

about

the true value

question:

earth,

kingdoms,
man

cities, and himself.

infinite?'

But, in reply

to

Pascal's

'What is

in the

Condorcet formulated the

species

principle of the

indef

inite perfectibility

of the

human

in history: "If this indefinite law

of

perfect

ibility
as an

of our species
sur

is,

as

I believe,

a general

nature", Condorcet argues

in the Memoires

{'instruction publique, "man

a

must no

longer

regard

himself

individual limited to
the great

transitory

and

isolated

existence

...

he becomes

an active part of a

whole and

the cooperator in an eternal enterprise. In

momentary existence on a point of space, he can places, bind his fate "to that of the centuries, and be

by

his

work embrace all

still active

long

after

his
sur

memory has

vanished

from the

earth."12

The ideologue Cabanis in his lettre

"Picavet, Les Ideologues,

repr.

p.

81.

I2M. de Condorcet, OZuvres, A. Condorcet,

O'Connor, F. M. Arago (eds.) (Psris 1847-49,

Stuttgart,

1968),

VII,

183.

402
la
perfectibilite published

Interpretation
in the Decade,
existence obtains

from the "doctrine

of

the

perfectibility

of

the human species in relation to reason and

morality

whatever

meaning there is to human

"has
served well

in

history
The

and society.

This doctrine

for the basis

and encouragement

for the

works of the

Genius,

to the

attempts at

the

improved

mode of education.

research on the

better form

of gov

ernment and

the efforts of the searchers for

on the

always

been founded

belief that

man

truth, the moralists and the legislators have is perfectible; that he is it individually, that
Without this
given
shows

he is it especially

considered

collectively

or as the whole of a nation.

fact,

the continuing changes which

and the civilization, the
all would

history

us, the revolutions of empires, the

barbarity
the good

ignorance

and the progress of the mind, the evil and

inexplicable."13

in

effect

become equally
a progress

History

was

seen

as

in

civilization

towards the reduction of

common errors and prejudices and

the infinite perfection of the human mind.

progres

Condorcet's Esquisse d'un tableau historique des

called

de I

esprit

humain
in

for the

beginning
'

of

the tenth and final

epoch

of

the advancement to

absolute perfection

in the New Atlantis

of enlightened reason as envisioned of

his Fragment
progress of man.
zoon

sur

I Atlantide: destruction
and

inequality
nation and man

between the nations,

the
real

equality within one Condorcet constructs the

zoon politikon

the same

perfecting

of

rise of and

Western

to his full stature of the

noetikon,

initiated

by

philosophers, Jews and

historikon, originally inspired and Christians, and the accompanying develop

zoon

ment of natural science and

the rise of

politically

and

social organizations

into

a speculation of an unilinear a closed

of

economically powerful history, giving it a mean

towards a known telos
of

ing

of

its

own.

History becomes
of

process

described in terms

the purification

the

deficiencies
it

human lead to

existence

in

time,

leap
be

into
an

tion may

quality indefinite one, but in the last from

all existential evil.

a new

as yet not experienced.

The
will

progress of perfec a collective

analysis

state of salvation and

"I think I have

proved

the possibility
matter

indicated the

means of

resolving

the- perhaps most

important

for the

human race", Condorcet proclaimed, "that of its perfectibility considered in its general masses, which is to say rendering exactness of mind, independent and
sound of

reason,

enlightened

conscience,

and

habitual

submission to the principles

humanity
time

and

justice,

almost universal

qualities."14

And he indulges in

the

imaginative
present

anticipations of the
of

misery

with

fine things to come, consoling himself in the the "picture of the human race freed from all its

chains, released from the

happiness."

domination of chance and from that of the enemies of its progress, advancing with a firm and sure step in the path of truth, virtue and In this contemplation Condorcet lives
"in thought
with man restored

to the rights and

a paradise

dignity
that

of

his

nature.

There he truly lives

able to create,

in

communion with

his fellows, in

his

reason

has been

enhanced with the purest of pleasures

by

his love for

humanity."15

l3Lettre inconnue de Cabsnis

sur

la perfectibilite, in: Picavet, Les Ideologues,

p. 591.

'"Condorcet, QSuvres, VI, "Ibid., VI, 275-76.

595.

Ideology
In this
of the we observe of

and

Reality

403

Condorcet in the
from

act of

community

the redeemed which emerges

projecting the imaginary reality from a certain sequence of

evil.

stages, each of which

cet and

frees

man

some

earthly

Technically, Condor
The

the ideologues adhered to an apocalyptic structure of history.

speculation rested on connotations were

the rich apocalyptic tradition of the past but the symbolic

structure remained untouched.

eliminated, only the

The

old apocalypse envisioned

the transfiguration of reality, preeminently

of

the redemption of man,

people

by

the

intervention

God. This idea

always tempted

in

crisis

to take the works of redemption

into their

own

hands. The

self-redemptive

enterprises,

magic not

excluded,

of

sects and movements

testify

to this.

But the

penetration

many into the

ancient and medieval structure of

the

phenomenal world occasioned

by

the rise

of modern science changed

the situa

tion. The
tion

advance of

the mathematical and physical sciences and their ramifica

structure of ever present

into technology increasingly affected the social and political the western world. Knowledge became power in the sense that the
rational-utilitarian sector ness.

in society

expanded

rapidly in the
an

public conscious
power

over

The functional rationality of nature and by implication the reality

at

science promised
vision of

all-embracing

the possible manipulation of the

man.

entire

the discretion of the

knowing

If

science meant

tangible

and calculable

transformation of the world, why not put the new science to use
the transformation of human existence
order

to

accomplish

into the

state of transfigura

tion so longed for in

to achieve this transformation with a degree of

certainty that had unfortunately been missing up to then? This

solution required

the

combination of several

intellectual

operations.

Concerning
matized: ena

the

experience

of reality the

following

principles were

to be

dog

"(i)

the

assumption

that the

mathematized science of natural phenom

is

a model science

to

which all other sciences ought

to conform;

(2)

that all

realms of and

being

are accessible

to the

methods of

the sciences of phenomena;

(3)

that all reality which

or
. .

is

not accessible

to sciences of phenomena

is

either

irrelevant

illusionary."16

This

reduction of

reality to its In his

spatio-

temporal domain

by itself, however,

did

not make mathematics and physics an

instrument for redemption; it lent study

"in their
of

often resulted argues

in

a sound scepticism.

excel

Condorcet, Baker
of the

that

view

limited

nature and extent of scientific

knowledge Pascal

and the

philosophers were

virtually

at one.

In their

response

to these limits

they

could

hardly

have been

opposed."17

more

Pascal
"Physical
affliction. physical

maintained: not
console

science

will

me

for

the

ignorance

of

But the

science

of ethics will always console me

morality in the time of for the ignorance of the

sciences."18

Social Research 15 (1948) 4, 462. I6E. Voegelin, "The Origins of I7K. M. Baker, Condorcet (Chicago, 1975), pp. 9if-; see also K. Vondung, Condorcet, in: T. Schabert (ed.), Der Mensch als Schopfer der Welt, Munich, 1971, 11 1-40.

Scientism,"

I8B. Pascal, Pensees, New York, 1958, Section II, 67.

404

Interpretation
The ideological persuasion,

however,
facts

turned the

metaphysical

ignorance Condorcet
causes"19

of

the

physical sciences
'prudence'

into the foundation

at the

of the sciences of ethics.

has the in

"to stop

and accept

the ignorance of the

order

to attain the certainty, the utility, the power, and the progress of the

physical sciences

in

exchange

for the
The

metaphysical
new

failure to
of

penetrate to

the

essence of calculable

the physical

universe.

certainty

the science of man, the

duct

and

probability of the phenomenal world, happiness at the disposal of the reason

process

puts

human

knowledge,
eclaire,

con
mind

of the

truly

his

being
inner

the historical

become luminous to itself in the

emergence of the

reasonable man cleansed

from instinct

and passion. man

Thus,

the new univer

and passion and

sal science

is

motivated

by

the desire to

free

from instinct
destiny"

to restore the empire of reason. In an early version of the

introduction to the

Esquisse Condorcet "as

man

makes

known to

man

his "true

by

pointing

out

that

has

come

to master the physical reality through the power of the

natural

sciences, he is bound to eventually succeed in ordering his social world

sciences."

through that of the moral and political

upon

This idea, however, depends

the
social evils are

"important truth that

the consequence not of the nature of

man or which

the

necessary say the lack

relations of of

society but

of the

imperfections

of social

constitutions,

is to

enlightenment; that the vices and crimes that

man's

dishonor

history

and make

its study so painful arise neither in creates in him but from the errors and
human
one
mind

heart

nor

from the

needs that civilization

and

prejudices that the

ignorance

feebleness

of the

have multiplied,

and the

destruction

of which

has already begun

and must

day

be

completed

by

reason."20

The
much

central concern of

Condorcet, Condillac
of man

and

the ideologues was not so

observation and

comprehensive

science

based

on

empirical

statistical analysis of the

data

of social

life but the

new science sociale of the

the

term was first used

by

Garat

and

Condorcet in the discussions

Societe de

1789 the science of "social organisation as it should be, rationally developed from first principles of human nature as derived from sensationalist psychol
ogy."21

Cabanis

argues against metaphysics of

the

metaphysics of

the ancient scholastics and

of

states

"the true
on

is in
the

one word

the science

the methods as

it is

based

the

knowledge
And he

faculties

of man and as of

it fits

the nature of dif

on that of

ferent

objects."

continues:
of

instruction,
methods."22

the perfecting

"if the perfecting instruction depends

ideas depends
on

again

that one of the

the philo

There

was

to be created a new science of man

of

that, like

sophical

science

of politics

old,

was

simultaneously
The

conceived of as the

leading

science,

a science of all sciences. of

creation of such a science was

the very

intention

the ideologistes: A science that embodied the concept of

294.
p. 346.

"Condorcet, CEuvres, II,

"Ibid., p. 200. "Picavet, Les Ideologues,

20Quoted in Baker, Condorcet,

p. 592.

Ideology
the reduced

and

Reality
Platonic-Aristotelian
perverted

405
claim of ra
ma of

reality in

combination with the

tionally ordering
this science

man and

society,

now
of

however,

to redemptive

nipulation of men

turned into objects

instrumental

reason.

The foundation
with

brings the

science of man on an equal

footing
to the

the

natural

sciences and ushers mankind

into the

new era of

its

perfection.

Accordingly,
to change

the ideologistes could claim that

"Ideology

amounts

mission

the shape of the

cienne

In de Tracy's understanding, ideologic replaces "l'anmetaphysique", that asked for the beginning and end of everything and
world."23

addressed

itself to the is

question of origin and

destination

of

the world. The

or

goal

of metaphysics
masked as

relegated

into the

sphere of

imagination,

worse, is un

the useful lie of the rulers and their spiritual associates that

keep

the

suppressed people quiet.

This

antiphilosophical revolt that was at

the same time

anti-Christian, is first of all to be understood in the historical context of the

general

breakdown

of the great western symbolisms

that had

made

the Western

Civilization into
course of symbolic reified

an ordered and meaningful social

field

of consciousness.

In the
the
and

the imperial adventure that brought about this very

ensembles

civilization

had been

cut off

from their motivating

experiences

to

dominant dogmatisms

administered symbols

by

powerful orthodoxies

in the
the
the

service of public power.

Once the

explicating the
the

experience of

truth of substantive reality

zoon noetikon

such as

the

abbreviative notion of man crossroads.

being

have become opaque,

man was at

The

philos

ophers 's

way

was to attain the experiential restitution of the openness toward

all ranges of

reality in the

quest

for the
in

realissimum.

actualizes man's

substantive reason

recognition of

In this way philosophy the condition humaine.

The

alternative path

toward the libidinous mastery of reality might

a second

dissolve the

condition

humaine into

reality beyond the

existential

tension between

time and eternity, mortality and

and perfection.

immortality,

want and

abundance, imperfection

3
Ideologic
stepped

Gnosticism

and

Ideology
the applied science of

into the

place of metaphysics as

self-redemption:

it is

science

des

idees that applies the methods of the natural

sciences

to the

exploration

of the sources and

limits de

and

certainty

of

human
the

knowledge. The "connaissance de la

carriers
of

idees"

generation

nos scientific

which are

knowledge is fundamental to

all

other

disciplines. The
origins

science of and the

ideas, therefore, is
of the source

kind
of

of metascience.

It investigates the

laws

formations
the

ideas.

Only

the constant reduction of the

vouches

ideas to their
certainty
"The study
of

sensations

that condition them

for the

any

cognition of nature and man.

sensibilite physique

is

the

last term in the

which

one

arrives

at

in the

course of the
real

of the

phenomena of

life,

and
p.

methodological research of

their

chaining

"Quoted in Kitchin, Decade,

118.

406
up; it is
of the
moral also

Interpretation
the

last result,

or

the

most general principle which yields

the analysis

intellectual faculties

and the affections of the soul.

source."24

Thus,

the physical and the

become identical in their

Once the reality

sensibilite as

of spirit and substance

is

reduced

to the phenomenon of

the source of the truth and order of human existence, the

able

knowing
of

ideologue is

to instigate the right ideas to create

man

in the image

the that

selfstyled eclaire.

The ideologue

reduces man

to an apparatus

of sensations

is to be directed he talks
about

by

external social

determinants;
of

the 'just and reasonable

social
of

order'

means

system of

internalizing
in the

modes

of

being

and

succumbing to the forces

Ideologic is the
science

power

name
man.

scientific
we

knowledge.
the ex

of

the other-directed

In this

reach

istential

ideologues'

core of

the

psychomathematical

concept of

science, the

motivating
one

experience of establish

enlightenment, which might

analysis.

be

called gnosis.

There is
in

way to

truth:

Since Pappus had that, it

redefined analysis

order

to apply

it to the

solution of geometric

problems, it grew
was

increasingly
would

into

a general method of philosophical a science of sciences.

inquiry

hoped,

the

mathematical and

But the understanding of analysis in logical connotation of the

term."

ideology

lead up to went beyond

. . .

'Analysis'

was a

magic word

for the

Enlightenment."25

"The light

it,"

of

Lakanal
all

cried

out, "ex

pands

to

such a

capacity to penetrate everything that The Decade

proclaimed:

it like

the fluids tends the method of

incessantly

to

equalize."26

"It is only

by

analysis that we can enter with assurance

analysis can

the

mind attain

to positive

into the sanctuary of science. Only by knowledge."27 To Condillac analysis in

principle,
a

general was

"an

absolute methodological problems

out:

formula

which could
"28
.

be

uniformly applied to all Logique Condillac points

of metaphysics
well

and morals.

In La

"I know

that it is customary to distinguish

philosophical

different kinds
ical i.e.
analysis:

of analysis:

logical analysis,

analysis,

mathemat

but there is only one kind; and it is the same in all the sciences, because in all of them it leads from the known to the unknown by reasoning,

by

a series of

judgments that

imply

the one

in the

other."2"

In the Encyclo

pedic

the Abbe Yvon had already claimed a

new

definition

of analysis against

the

"schools."

"The

analysis and

consists

generating
pare

from

there

in going back to the origin of our ideas, in explicating the in making compositions or decompositions in order to com

them

from

all angles which can then reveal the relations

among

each other

It is the very
1956,

secret of

discovery.
philosophiques,"

2"P. J. G. Cabanis, "(Euvres

C. Lehec, I. Cazeneuve (eds.),

47.

II, Paris,

I,

142.

25I. F. Knight, The Geometric Spirit (New Haven, 1968), 26Quoted in Van Duzer, Contribution, p. 101. "Quoted ibid.; see also Kitchin, Decade, p. 123.

28Knight, Geometric Spirit,

p. 47.

29E. de Condillac, (Euvres philosophiques, G. le

Roy (ed.), I-III, Paris,

1947-1951, II,

407.

Ideology
"It is the enemy
ness and precision.

and

Reality

407

of vague principles and of

The

search

for truth is kind

of

not at all

everything that might be contrary to exact done with the assistance of general

propositions, but always

with a

calculus,

i.e., by composing
way
with

and

decomposing
one

the notions in order to compare them in the

most suitable

discoveries

has

in

mind.

Neither is it done

by definitions,
of each

which

but

by

explicating the generating follow in the

search

idea.

By

usually this detail

cause the one

disputes to multiply, sees that it is the only

one which
others."30

method

that could give evidence to our

one ought to

reasoning and, consequently, the only for truth and equally in the instruction of

Condorcet the
as a method of

mathematician and

distinguished between

mathematical analysis

discovery

the analysis of ideas as the method of unveiling

the

new

truth of human existence, occasionally merging them into one scien

tific method of

inquiry; but he

always considered the

latter

one prerequisite

to

the first one.

"Thus the

analysis of our sentiments made

it

possible

for

us

to

discover, in

the

develop
the

ment of our

faculty

of

experiencing

pleasure and

pain, the

origin of our moral

ideas;

resulting from these ideas, which determine the immuta ble and necessary laws of justice and injustice; and finally the reasons for directing our conduct in conformity with these laws, reasons founded on the very nature of our foundation
of the general truth

sensibility, on what could in essence

be

called our moral

constitution."31

Consequently
the

Garat

summed

against prejudice, superstition and

up the creed of ideology: analysis, directed blind tradition -that is in the words of Garat
would serve

obscure science of the old school

amelioration.32

the ends of revolution and

social

The

analytical spirit of enlightenment

is incarnated in the

knowing
d'

members of the
sociale

Institut National: The

as well as

voice of

the societe, the Journal

instruction

(1793)

its

sequel of
role

1795, the
new

Decade, both
society
elite,

of

philosophers'

which propagate

incessantly

the
governed

in the

institu

tionalized
as

in

an academic

system,

by
few

an enlightened

functioning
free
new an

the

custodian of public enlightenment and

the

guardian of

the public

dom.33

For the time

being
as

there were

only

enlightened prophets of social right

the

age

and, therefore,

Condorcet

pointed

out, "the

to

have

opinion on matters of

society is
which

confused with

the right to pronounce on the

give."34

truth of a proposition,
need

the lumieres alone can

enlightened

This

explains the
of

for

center

of the

knowing

ones

spreading the light

analysis throughout the

institutional

system of education

that operates upon the

minds of the people.

"The

ecoles normales, conceived as

the method of analysis, were

education.

directed especially to instruct in the keystone of the whole system of

as

Analysis

was

to be the language of all professors.

was

Analysis,

which

could alone refashion

human thought,

to become the universal

art.

instrument

30Encyclopedie, I, Paris, 1751, repr. Stuttgart, 1966, 3'Condorcet, CEuvres, VI, 183-84.
,2Van Duzer, Contribution,
p.

"Analyse",

401.

120.

i3Baker, Condorcet, p. 303. '"Condorcet, CEuvres. V, 203.

408
of all sciences.

Interpretation
Analysis had been
to
proven

by

its fruits in the field

world of morals and

of physical
society.""

science; it
suggest

was thenceforth

regenerate

the

the knowledge

of analysis

be

gnosis

insofar

as

it

redeems

from the

state

of alienation accord
with

in

passion

and

prejudice

caused

by ignorance,

and

is thus in
act of

Irenaeus'

paradigm

of gnostic redemption.

The salvatory
put

enlightenment gnosis of

can, in my opinion, tentatively be compared to the hermeticism. I do not want to argue that the ideologues
of

particular

them

selves

into the tradition

the

philosophic
done.36

hermetique

as so

temporary French illumines have

first
chemists.

The Encyclopedic
some of the

called

many Hermeticism
ones

of

the con

the science of the Alchemists and

rated

better

among the

the superiority Hermetics, however, was strongly repudiated. "Our science is communicative and friendly of evidence; the mysteres hermetiques can neither comply with its
exclusiveness and alleged method nor

The

of the science of

tempt

its

followers."37

The ideologue

Volney
of

argued against

the

illumines
evil,
and

and claimed

to possess
of

superior

knowledge

the sources of good and the mover of

the knowledge

the

laws

of

nature,

which would reveal

human destiny: Man "will know

can

what are

the causes of his sufferings and what

argument and

be the

remedies of analysis

them."38

The knowledge implied in this

arrived at

by

is

by

no means

different from the

in him

gnosis of

the

gnostic-

hermetic tracts. "Man

said

who

has

reason

should recognize recognized

himself, it is
arrived at

in the book

of

Poimandres?9

"He

who

has

himself has

the abundant
empirical

good."40

This

radical gnosis of

the self means the destruction of the

who was prior you

man

in favor

of

the inner

man

to the

beginning

of

things: "If
made of

then,

being

made of

life

and

light,

learn to know that

you are

them,

you will go

back into life (and be

devinized."42

light).""1

"This is the telos for

those who have got gnosis to

a

Some

of

the

hermetic tracts

betray

missionary impetus usually absent from Gnostic writings: The speaker of the book of Poimandres "having been taught the nature of all that is, and seen the
vision"

supreme

preached:

"O men, why have

you

given

yourselves

up to
turn

death,

when you

have

granted power to partake of with error, and

immortality? Turn around,

with

you who

have journeyed

joined company

ignorance;

To those away from the dark light; partake of immortality, leaving who wanted to be taught, he made himself a "guide to mankind teaching them
35

perdition."

Van Duzer, Contribution,

p.

no.
occultes

36See: A. Viatte, Les Sources

sophic)', 171.

du Romantisme (Paris,
repr.

1965).
art.

"Encyclopedie, XI, Neufchatel,

1765,

Stuttgart,

1967,

'Hermetique

(Philo

'"Quoted in Viatte, Sources occultes I, 308. '"Corpus Hermeticum, A. D. Nock, A. J. Festugiere (eds.), I-III, Paris i960, and: Hermetica, W. Scott (ed.), I-III, Oxford 1924-36, I, 21. I follow the respective reading of Troger and Scott's English version corrected by Festugiere's French and Troger's German translation.

""Corpus Hermeticum, I,

19.

"Ibid., I, "Ibid., I,

21.

26;

see also

XIII,

10 and 14.

Ideology
the

and

Reality
might

409
saved."43

doctrine, how

and

in

what

way they

be

This

rather

brief
the

reference

to the hermetic

gnosis

assumes the

Gnostic

nature

of some of

hermetic books. In this I follow

so

Troeger

who refers applies

he carefully
about

the gnosticism

not only Jonas, Festugiere and Yates but more I, IV, VI, VII and XIII as gnostic. u In his studies the criterion of Steve McKnight, who has some doubts of the Corpus: "To qualify as Gnostic, a document must

to tracts

have

at

its

core a concern with salvation

through

knowledge

and must see nous

or mens as

the essence of divine and human

nature."45

Another
'rational'

objection might point out that the analysis of the

'logical'

ideologues is
feeling.46

and

while gnosis

is

by

definition
of

an emotional act of

The

existential core of

analysis, the truth

the

sensibilite

physique,

blurs any
the

differences in this

respect:

Condillac

offers us

in his Traite des

His

sensations

key

to the motivating experiences

of analysis proper.

paradigmatic

homme

statue

is to
"I

repeat the process

of

homo

creans se

ipsum up to the

point of

reflechir sur elle-meme and

he

asks the reader

to join the process of enlighten

ment: statue single

it is very important to put oneself in the place of the that we are going to observe. We must begin to exist with it, have only a sense when it has only one; acquire only the ideas that it acquires,
give notice that

contract

only the habits that it

point of

contracts.

In

a word to

become

what

it

is."47

At

the
and

final

first I

again:

waking up, the moi exults: "I open my eyes towards the light I touch, I advance, I touch nothing but a luminous cloud. A chaos disentangles itself in front of my eyes. The sense of touch
see
...

decomposes the light in

some

way

distance, I
in
order

open

them the way

by

which

leads my they have to

.

eyes

as

far

as

certain

proceed

far

over the earth

to

elevate
. .

themselves to

heaven. In front
or

of

them

...

the universe

unfolds

itself

they

seem

to take away

to give existence to the whole

nature at

my liking. Just
me."48

by

moving my

eyelid

create or annihilate

everything

that surrounds

clinging to vague notions about the supranatural, and his ancient hermetic radically immanentist students, the ideologues, differ from the Gnostic in that they create man out of the primordial principle of sensibilite instead of the primordial pneuma of the protoman. They also do not have man

Condillac,

still

climb upward through the eight spheres of

heaven but let him

proceed

along

different

stages of

the historical process to attain the ultimate telos of gnosis.

*Hbid., I,

28-29.
Gnosis,"

in: Troger, Gnosis und Neues Testament, pp. *"K. W. Troger, "Die hermetische Corpus Hermeticum XIII (Berlin, 1971) and: im Gnosis und Mysterienglaube 97-119; see also A. J. Festugiere, La Revelation d'Hermes Trismegistes, I-IV (Paris, 1944-54.)

and:

"5McKnight, Gnosticism, p. 23. in: Forster (ed.), Die Gnosis, I II, Zurich, 1969-71, I, -jff.; "6See: W. Forster, Rudolph, Die Gnosis, 130-32. "'Condillac, QZuvres, I, 221. 4SIbid., I, 311; for a more detailed discussion see: T. Schabert, Natur und Revolution,
"Einleitung,"

(Munich,

1969),

75-96-

410
The language ion the
read

Interpretation
of this experience of

cosmogony,

however,
aspect

signifies

in my

opin we

common experiential core:

"When he had thus spoken,

changed a

forthwith",

in the Poimandres, "all things

in

before me,

and were

opened out

in

a moment.

And I beheld
and

boundless view; I

all was changed

into little

light,

a mild and

joyous light;
come

marvelled when

saw

it. And in kind

while, there had

and grim
.

to

be in

one part a saw the

downwardtending darkness,
change

terrible

And thereafter I

darkness

into

of

substance,

which was

unspeakably tossed about, and gave

came

forth

smoke as

watery from
stand

fire.
upon

But from the light there

and

forth

holy

logos

which

took

its

the watery substance;

I thought this logos

was

the voice of the

light."49

Now fix know it. And

your

thought upon the

light", Poimandres
gazed raised

spoke, "and learn to me, eye to eye, so

when

he had thus spoken, he

aspect.

long

upon

that I trembled at
reason

his

And

that the light

consisted of
.

my head again, I saw in my innumerable powers, and had come to be a

when

cosmos without

limits
in

And is

when

was

amazed, he

spoke again and said to

which

me, you

have
of

seen

your reason

the archetypical

form

is

prior

to the

beginning

things, draw the inference that the

and
soteriological

limitless."50
ideologues'

From this
persuasion

and

I many is essentially derived from a

another example

knowledge

of the

Gnostic

variety.

4. The
This brings
matter

Meaning

of Ideology
most crucial of

us

to the point which is

of man

theoretically

the

whole ego.

The dissolution

into the

atomic existence of

the libidinous

De Tracy's Moi, the

"an
abstract

vehicle of sensibilite, the source of all

humanity, is
entirety, it is the

idea

of the whole of all sentient parts which constitute an

this constitution; its extension in space is built up by all parts which sense all together and obey the same will; its extension in time is made up by all sensations which
result of

pertain to

the

it according to our knowledge. The idea of the Ego, the experienced regular of Queen's Ball may add, is composed of parts brought together in order to have sensations, as the idea of the ball consists in bringing together people in order to dance; in both cases,
all parts might

have been has been

renovated

successively, their

action might

have
the

been hindered, suspended, interrupted

same

at various

times, it is

still the same

ball

and

Ego,

unless the system

disbanded.""

Sensibilite being. "I

exist

constitutes the

moi, there is no

man

anymore, but just

sentient

solely

by

what

feel."

"My
What
off

existence and
used

ity

are

one

and

the same

matter."52

to

my physical sensibil be man, is reduced to a

experiences and

spatio-temporal

phenomenon.

Cut

from

all

transcending

and:

"Ibid., I, 4L; for Scott, I, 5b.

the more elaborate version of this cosmogonic vision see:

Festugiere, I,

5,

S0Ibid., I,

7.

''Quoted in Picavet, Ideologues, p. 312. 52D. de Tracy, Elemens d'ldeologie, I-V, Paris, 1824-26, I, 18,

288.

Ideology
chained

and

Reality
man

411
has
shrunken

to the

world of

tangible

thingness, ideological
parlance of

him

self

to the libidinous

ego

that, in the des idees

ideologic, is

agitated

passionate

self-interest,

pleonexia as

the philosophers used to say. De

as a part of

by Tracy

correctly defined his

the

science

zoology that

was

to replace

sciences morales et

politiques,

i.e.,

classical political science.

The degrada
to be

tion of man to a sentient

manipulated

being, (the

thoughts and actions of

gratified
of

which were

by

the means of

functional rationality)

the existential lust

of

power, the

most extreme gratification

being

the act

himself. But this intention

briefly. The ideologue's

raised a

vexing
so

problem

remaking man by man that I want to touch on

self'53

proclamation of

the 'contracted

gave

only his

libidinous Ego
that emerges
judgment"

public status.

He did

by

repressing his

authentic noetic self measure of

from the

illuminating
contains
more

experience of the
right

"unseen
of all

right

which

"alone

the

boundaries

classical words of more man

Solon. The from the

not want

the authentic self of

of nothingness.

man

things", to use the is suppressed the

the

suffers

experience

When, however,
will

shrunken self

does

to retreat anymore from its obsessive

to master

reality, the only way out is to press

of gnosis
self

by

all means

for the final

apocalyptic

leap

into imaginative transfigurations in

misery.

order

to redeem the contracted

succinctly:

from its
of

Marcuse

puts

this

alternative ever

"Behind the
productive

definition activity
that
of

the

subject

in terms in

of

the

transcending

and

the ego lies the image of the

a mode of
all

redemption of

the ego; the coming to

rest of all transcendence

being
of

that has absorbed all

becoming,
a
critical

is for
Our

and with
analysis

itself in has

otherness."54

reached

degree

generality that
refer

allows

of

d'ldeologie", summing up de Tracy. The Ideologic it seems, is representative for the mode of symbol ization of the historic event of Egophany (Voegelin) in modernity which re structured the world to the point of getting caught at its own contradictions in
of

the "Elemens

to

to the title of the main work

the 20th

century.

Dante Germino has already

complexes

suggested

the use of the concept

for

all
.

symbolic
.

of equivalent

structure

and content:

"Ideology is
episte-

used

to

refer

to a set

of

ideas

about

the ordering of society claiming the

prestige of

(phenomenal) science, based

aiming
at

on an of

immanentist,

reductionist

mology,

and

the transformation

the world through making it con

existence

form to

abstractions

My

analysis

divorced from the reality of human indicates some complementary insights.

component

in

society."55

The first
reduced

is the

historically
the

conditioned

split

between

man

to his libidinous Ego

the Cartesian

and

spatio-temporal world of

tion, i.e.,

schizophrenia

of egophany.

This

component

sense-percep is inter
the logical
Social

twined with

the

idea that

historically
Reality,"

evolving knowledge

of

in: M. Natsnson (ed.), Phenomenology ME. Voegelin, "The Eclipse of (The Schutz Alfred Hague, 1970), 187-94. for Volume Reality, Memorisl

and

MH. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation, p. 55D. Germino, Beyond Ideology, p. 51.

118.

412
structure of

Interpretation
the world
will

in due time

by

application of

lead to

logical

system of social order.

This

set of

functional rationality symbols is put into the historical telos that is

context of a secularized apocalypse.

History is
degree

viewed as an apocalyptic pro a

cess

moving toward

material and spiritual

perfection,
of

defined

by

scientific procedure and the

quest

sciences.

The ideological

for

order

certainty inherent in the exact beyond the condition humaine is not

reality

an explication of psychic experience of substantive

becoming
ever

luminous

in the is
an

consciousness of concrete men expression

actualizing their authentic self.

Rather, it
changing
man's

of

the libido dominandi that is employing

self-redemption which range

techniques

of gnostic praxis.

from

social

engineering to

revolutionary engagement in
apocalypse structure of

But,

and

this touches

on

the very core of

ideology,

deforming

himself to the
neither

contracted self

to be redeemed in the

of total

otherness

changes

the human condition nor the

the surrounding reality of which man is a part.

Therefore, ideology
activ

tends to turn its speculative imperialism into the politics of imperialism. In

politics

the contracted self

self-realization word of

ity

makes

becomes the imperial self; its self-redemptive an imperialist enterprise in domestic and

world-

politics.

The last

ideology in its different

the quality of

variants

is

always and

by

necessity the
well-ordered

subjugation of

life (i.e. the

of

public

happiness

of the

psyche), to the compulsory

forces

the

economic and

technolog
realm of

ical

process.

In

other

words,

ideology
of

turns the structure of human existence in

society

upside

down: It

causes the realm of

necessity to dominate the

to

substantive

reason.

This

is,

course,

not

deny

the contribution of the

applied sciences

to the possible accomplishment of the material

autarky

of man,

the prerequisite of any good life. But

it is to

emphasize

that the domain of

reality beyond life as such constitutes the humanity of man. Our reflections should have made clear by now that
considered a paradigm

ideology is
be

to be

that covers all modes of egophantic symbolizations. It

'left'
'right'

is, therefore,
totalitarianism

not

to be labeled
a special

or case

It

should

mentioned

that

is only
at

forceful
operate

attempt
on

self-redemption,
of whole
man

the

population

of ideology insofar as it is the most having organized terror and violence to societies for the sake of dissolving the

human
tionary.

condition and

recreating

in the image

of

the metaphysical

revolu

In the
test

course of our analysis

it has become
eclipse the

obvious that

ideology fails the

of

on reality.

Ideology

is forced to

dimensions

nonexistential,

nonmetric

reality that has been

the
whole range of

restituted

in the

post-Newtonian natural science

are unearthed

as well as

transcendent experiences that

by

the

humanistic

sciences

of man

in

recent

times.56

constantly

suppress the rich

field

of experiences and symbols that

Furthermore, ideology testify

who articulated

has to
to the

process of successful self-reflection of men

in

history

equiva-

56Voegelin, Eclipse,

pp.

186-88.

Ideology
lent
explications
of

and

Reality
of

413
the
off

reality.

The ideological degradation

historically
en

evolved symbols of

human has

self-interpretation
run

by

cutting them

from the

gendering
realize

experiences

its course,

since sensitive people

increasingly
experiences

that

wiping

out all

the symbols engendered

by

the classes of

of non-spatio-temporal

reality, means to

wipe out man

himself.
philosopher.

The
phizing This

alternative

to

ideology is, therefore,

exegesis of the

to turn

Philoso

means

the

meditative

depth

experience

in terms that
an

articulate

the structure and dimension of reality of

man

which man praxis

is

acting

part.

enables

to become competent in
that

rational

and

to formulate to enable

paradigms of political order man

fit the

exigencies of modern
of

society

to

lead the

good

life

within

the limits

human

condition.

SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND TRANSNATIONALISM

Kenneth
W. Thompson
of Virginia

University

Historians

.have

for

centuries
agree

debated

with one another over

of

the purpose of
on objective

historical inquiry. Some

the study

history

should

focus

reality; its aim should be to report what happened to people, institutions, and material factors in the life of a group or society. Others insist that historians
must address

the life of the mind, what people

social

how this influenced the

tion.

forces

and

believed, thought, and felt and human tendencies at work in civiliza

approaches

One

guide

in

distinguishing
past

between historical
of

is to

compare

historical writing
report and

and the

describe

history. Historians generally seek to philosophy events. Philosophers of history ordinarily undertake

one additional

task: they ask why events took place as they did, attempting to fathom their meaning and to formulate principles of history. It is not always possible to draw a sharp line between the two approaches, but the standards of

unlikely to correspond at all points with those of a philosopher. Although both Thucydides and Augustine formulated principles of history, only
an are

historian

the former
which

wrote narrative portrays

history. The historian is judged

by

the

accuracy

with

he

the past; the philosopher will

world view

be judged
present.

by

the value and

significance of

his

for understanding the

Religious Universalism

Augustine
of

of

Hippo

wrote as a philosopher of
name.

history

and religious thinker

the age that

still

bears his

According

to the historian Christopher

Dawson, "he

was, to a far

greater

barbarian war-lord,

a maker of
old world

degree than any emperor or general or history and a builder of the bridge which was to
new."

lead him from the

to the

(Quoted in St.

God,
pagan

edited

with

an

Introduction
p.

by

Vernon J. Bourke, Garden

was

Augustine, City of City, New

mother and

York: Image Books, 1958,

father in
of

1.) He

born to

Christian
354.

Roman

province

in North Africa in

For

nine years a

Manicheanism, he became a Catholic and was consecrated Bishop of Hippo, North Africa, in 395. He wrote 118 treatises including the most celebrated spiritual autobiography of all times, The Confessions, depicting his
follower
personal and religious struggles.
was a profound account of the

His

most comprehensive

work,

City

of God,

life, thought,

and strivings of ancient and

early

Christian
The

man.
world of

Augustine
410.

was shaken

by

the invasion of Rome

by

Alaric the
was

Goth

on

August 24,

For the first time in its

long history, Rome

in

conquered and ravished.

There followed

a stream of polemics

which pagan

416
writers charged

Interpretation
that the conquest had occurred
effects of
under a

Christian

emperor and
em

demonstrated the
pire.

debilitating Christianity, by propounding

weakened once seen

Christianity

on

the security of the

an ethic of self-denial and renunciation of

citizens'

worldly concerns, had state. Also, Rome had

pagan gods.

the

loyalty destiny
as

and commitment
with

to the

its

bound up

the worship of

When

Christianity

supplanted

paganism, the latter's gods proph

empire was

esied vengeance.
ment

The disaster that befell the

due to the

enfeeble-

by Christianity
Augustine

of the civic spirit and the

ansv/ered one of same

angering of the pagan gods. his critics, Volusianus, by pointing out that the

pagans
which

virtues, such as not repaying injury with injury, for being condemned. Moreover, Christian citizen-soldiers were not enjoined to lay down their arms or to refuse service to the state. It was not the Christianity of the emperors but internal decay that brought ruin to the empire. Pagan writers, including Sallust and Juvenal, had themselves written of the far-reaching effects on society of immorality and its other vices. The task

had taught the

Christians

were

confronting Rome was to arrest its internal corruption and instill in its citizens a regard for virtue. Augustine did not deny the existence of a once-prosperous
though pagan
plan.

Rome, but
of

saw

its

achievements as
of

Because

the civic

virtues

the pagans,

reflecting God's providential Rome attained a certain

broader canvas, Augustine wrote about the history of the two cities: the City of God and the city of this world. His classic work details the two histories and the tension existing between them. The whole
temporal efficiency.
a
world

On

from its beginnings has

as

its

unique

end

holy

everything has been made and from which the smallest individual take meaning and intelligibility. The City of God is God, the city of men by a distorted love of self:
There
are

society for which event and humblest

ruled

by

love

of

two

loves,
even

the one of

which

is holy, its

the other unholy; one social, the other

individualist;
other

one takes

heed

of

the common utility

own

because
ends,

of the

heavenly
of a

society, the

reduces

the commonweal to

because

proud

lust

of

domination;
prefers

the one
other

is

subject to

God,

the other sets

one

itself up

as a rival to

God;

the one

is serene, the
the other

tempestuous; the

peaceful, the other quarrelsome; the one

truthfulness to deceitful praises, the other is avid of praise; the one is

friendly,
other

jealous;
of

the one

desires for its

neighbor what

it

would

for itself, the

is

desirous

lording
its

it

over

the other to

own.

its neighbor; the one directs its effort to the neighbor's good, (Quoted from De genesi ad litteram 11.15, by Etienne Gilson in

Foreword to Augustine,

City

of God,

op. cit., p.

27.)
that of the republic
were no
was

If love

was

the

law

of the

City

of

God, however,
of

justice. However, "there could be true justice. Every society worthy

City of of the name is, therefore, either the City of God or defined in relation to the City of (ibid., p. 24). Illustrating the inescapable tension between the two cities, Augustine wrote in City of God
city
God"

no

injustice if there

2.21:
. .

"Rome

never was a republic

because true justice

never

had

a place

in it.
was

But accepting the republic of a kind

.

more probable

definition

of a

republic, I admit there

(ibid.,

p.

23).

Science, Morality,
It
was

and

Transnationalism
city, a republic,
religion

411
and an authentic not

the

question of

Rome's

status as a

society that
potential

preoccupied

Augustine. Primitive society but the

had dominated
ancient

family

was

earthly founded

universal on

family

and the

city.

The

the religious worship of the hearth (the

household fire),
honor the
same
or

and each

family

was a

spiritually
were

closed society.

Brotherhood

was not extended

to strangers who did not worship at the same sacred fire

nor

dead

ancestors.
man

Families

united as

by

more

than necessity,
church.

security,

affection; a
universal

loved his home

was

he

now

loves his

To

move

toward a

society, it

through

into
gods

cities.

grouping Other

them

necessary to overcome the separation of families, first into gentes or associations, then into tribes, and lastly
Zeus
gods. and

gods such as

Heracles

appeared

in the

hierarchy
existed

of

reigning
of all

above

household
its
sphere.

Societies

came

into

being

and

developed only

as religion expanded

universal

society

and true

unity

in the

City Physically

God

and on earth when

who

there was only a single God-created man.

single ancestor

men

have sprung from this

are

related;

morally "None of the

regardless of

all men recognize their common origins and

faithful,"

membership in one family. Professor Gilson writes, "could doubt that all men,
man created

race, color or appearance, have their origin in the first

by

God

and that this

mind

first

man was alone of

his kind. There

in

was no

doubt in St.
so

Augustine's

that

God himself had

created

the human race

was

that men

might understand

how pleasing unity,

embraced all

even

diversity,

to

God;

nor could

they doubt

unity."

that their unity was a

family
even

(Quoted ibid.,

Such unity
the rays
of

men,

the pygmies

p. 25.) (although Augustine

speculated about their

existence), the Sciopodes who protected themselves from

the shadow of one

the sun

by

foot,

and

the Cynocephali who had

barked. God, Augustine explained, beautified the world heads like dogs through many diverse mortal beings all descended from the stock of Adam.
and

Augustine's

universalism rested on

Christian brotherhood born

of a common

ancestor, but

realized

Or in Gilson's ideal The

words:

ultimately "St. Augustine did

not

in

a world not

society but in the City of God. bequeath to his successors the

ends"

of a universal

p. 32).

City
It

of

human city united in view of purely temporal (ibid., God existed to inspire men with an unquenchable desire to
a single

organize

the

earth

into

society

made

in the image
attempts

and

likeness

of a

heavenly
society

city.

mattered

less that

man's

feeble

to build

a universal

were

frustrated. The light

to illuminate

of universal

brotherhood

and of a perfect and virtue.

city

would continue

man's search

for concord, justice,

Scientific Transnationalism

To

reread and reflect on

Augustine's

classic writings

is to

understand

the

difference between his time and ours in the quest for morality. In place of Augustine's universalism based on religion, large regions of the world have
turned instead to
science.

They

have

answered yes

to the question of whether

science can save us.

Men

are engaged

in

a conscious revolt against

the

historic

418
restraints religion physical sciences

Interpretation
and

society have imposed

we

on

free inquiry.

They

see

in the

the sole possibility for progress and growth. In the modern

era,

until quite

throughs"

recently at least, than about "imitations

societies

have heard
Christ."

more about

"scientific break
revolution to

of

From the industrial

the present,

have tended to

pursue

the good life through material

advances made possible peoples

by

science and

technology. Equal opportunity

as evidenced

for

all

is linked

with

material

advancement,

by

economists'

telling
in

us that

higher incomes

and

increased

employment and

for

women will

draw

them into the

labor market,

assure greater

equality,

thus lower the birth rate

an overpopulated world.

Even

critics of science spokesmen

acknowledge, for example,

extreme

that the strident

debate between the be

for

free

enterprise and

extreme collectivism can

moderated

only through "the resources of an induc

(Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Real
means of

tive rather than a deductive social

science."

ism

and

such

Political Problems, New York: Scribner's, 1953, p. 3.) By inquiries, important policy decisions by competing social and

economic

systems can

be continuously

reviewed and amended

in the light

of new evi

dence. Yet science, particularly in its

problems, is
sion

application

to human and especially moral

plagued

by

persistent

illusions

and misconceptions.

The first illu

of all

is the

myth of

the existence of a true science of

social science

human behavior free

the wholly
and

presuppositions.
character of

Objective
approach

today is

given

imaginary

an

to autonomous,

incontrovertible,

self-evident

facts. In practice,
possibility of framework
certain of

responsible and open-minded scholars

have learned the im

giving any form

or rough outline

or

meaning to social research without some sort

their research.

for organizing

Ironically
and shape

enough,

underlying
of man

assumptions such as

the possibility of progress or the per

fectibility
clusions.

determine the focus

from the

of scientific

inquiry

its

con

second

illusion

results

concealment of the

failure

of all

those

conclusions to conform

to the facts. Modern culture, despite all its

egregious miscalculations.
rationalists all of

scientific

progress, is

caught

up in

The brave

new world of

the twentieth
predicted

century,

which

the eighteenth century proudly

if

men would

only disavow
stem

their other worldly

illusions, scarcely
a rationalist and

resembles Utopia. scientific approach

Such

contradictions and errors

inherent in

from the dual meaning of On the probably one hand, science as empiricism means humility before the facts; on the other hand, science as rationalism means the invoking of logical coherence as the
test of truth.

"scientific."

The two

connotations

may be in
obvious

conflict

because the test

of

rational coherence prompts men coherent scheme.

to

deny

facts if they fall from

outside of a

Another

fallacy
save

of

present-day

social science results

the position of

the observer who is a participant as well. The natural scientist in his

laboratory

has

no

mission

uncovering the truth

about

his

work.

The

vision of the

Science, Morality,
social
and

and

Transnationalism
national

419

scientist,
own

however, is beclouded by ideological taint,

social and economic status.

loyalty,

his

individual

He

cannot and

be

fully objective,
own

for he

grounds

his

observations on

his

place

in

history
a

his

individual

membership in a given society with all its passions, interests,

agent of

and group.

Not

and endless

detached mind, but the self capacity for rationalization is the

the social-scientific method.

arises

A fourth illusion
that
misunderstand

from

modern concepts of causation and prediction

of

the complexity
possible

causation

and

the

play

of contingent as

forces. Prediction is
argued:

in terms

of rough

probabilities, but

Niebuhr has infinite juncture. It

we

"In both

nature and

history

each new

thing is only

one of an

number of possibilities which might

have

emerged at that particular

is for this

reason

that, though
the future
p.

we can

trace a series of causes in retrospect,

accuracy."

can never predict no.

with

(Christianity
has its

and

Society,

vol.

10,
a

2,

Spring
may

1945,

4.)

History
in

recurrences and cyclical

trends, but

particular event

leader,

the effects of bad weather, an accident, or an unforeseen

channel

history

unexpected ways.

Finally,
fruit
ception of

the most persistent illusion holds that science is the profoundest

of culture

because it is
as

culture's

latest

expression.

Auguste Comte's

con

moving from a religious to a metaphysical to a scientific age is partly true insofar as it describes an historical trend. The value judgment that the latest attainments of the culture are wisest and best, however, is of

history

doubtful validity,
ambiguous science

particularly its corollary that the human situation is because of a scientific lag or a residual ignorance that merely has not yet corrected. What may indeed be required is a movement
and

from
or a

science

to philosophy to

correct

the

movement

from philosophy to science,

that

recovery of the wisdom of philosophy and the humility and magnanimity in religion's finest hours has accompanied transcendent religion. Science suffers most, however, from its curious mixture of a fatuous op

timism about the future and lack of concern

not yet
susceptible

for the

urgencies

of the

day
once

to the scientific

method.

About the

latter,

Niebuhr
war, we

prophesied

that

if

we should ever

fall into the

abyss of an atomic

could

be

quite certain

that on the eve of the

conflict some psychological association scientist

would

bestow

a medal upon an

outstanding

for

having
p.

found the

key

to the

problem of

eliminating
and

aggression

from human life. (Niebuhr, "The Blind

14,

Leaders,"

Christianity

Society,

vol.

Spring

1949,

6.) Regarding
from

science's optimism,

Niebuhr

expressed

grave doubts that statesmen who were

scientific could consider such problems as

universal mind

the control of atomic energy

bias. Statesmen pay the standpoint of a not because do scientists than heed to the national interest more consistently certain political and constitu they are less intelligent, but because they carry freed
of all national

tional

responsibilities

to the public

they

serve.

Yet science, whatever its illusions, its false optimism, and its unconcern for immediate problems that lie beyond scientific control, has transformed the

420
globe and man's
world.

Interpretation
understanding of it. Thanks to science, we live in a shrinking Worldwide revolutions in transportation, communications, and war have
on science.

depended
conduct

Presidents
successive

and

secretaries

of state

on

global

missions

diplomacy

in

foreign

capitals not

because they

are wiser or

more

resourceful, but because jet airplane travel has

made nations close neigh

bors.
the

Early-warning and peace enforcement systems rest on science. Science is a world united not by moral catalyst for bringing one world into being
brotherhood
or an awareness of man's com

consensus or a universal sense of

mon origins

by St. Augustine), but by an extensive network of relationships around the world. More than that, science that is interdependent
(as discussed
rational and objective offers a
which

firmer basis for

universalism

than

does morality,

is dominated

by

subjectivity

and emotions.

Even
values

moral principles will

eventually be brought
of

under scientific

control, for

to the scientist in the

postbehavioral era of social sciences constitute

nothing
not on

more than special

kinds

facts. American

social

scientists

proceed and

the basis of hunches or

of scientific

intuition, but
gation

through methodologies

paraphernalia

investi

that provide "powerful

insights"

that earlier studies and writings had

lacked.

Present-day

scholars are not armchair

thinkers, but

are men and women

who refuse

to accept what cannot be tested and proven in the

about a

laboratory

of

life.

Science,
values

according to this viewpoint, has brought

superstition and myth to

transvaluation of

from

facts

and proven realities and truth.

Transnationalism Reconsidered

Leading
diplomats
pilots or or

American

scholars explain

transnational

relations

by

saying that
whether

the world of foreign policy

has been transformed

by

"frontier

crossers,"

tourists, financiers or multinational students. While the numbers of frontier

Interdependence

corporation

executives, airline
what

crossers

merely illustrate

is

happening

to change the world, their increase is quantifiable

need no

and measurable on specula or

by

scientific techniques.

longer be based

thought, but can be tested by the number of telephone calls passing between Great Britain and Poland or Nigeria and Ghana. The
tive
of worldwide communications

letters

explosion

importance
sociations,
are

of

the nation-state

testifies, social scientists tell us, to the lessening if not its demise. Moreover, transnational as
international bodies,
who

which are

for the

most part nongovernmental

bringing

about

the erosion of national loyalties.

as

Citizens

formerly

thought of themselves
of a worldwide

Englishmen

or

Nigerians

now see

themselves as part

community of interlocking groups and peoples. In the educa tional world, from student life with holiday study programs in foreign countries to professors intermingling in conferences with other professors one year in

Boston,
the

the
of

flow

in Tokyo, and thereafter in Nairobi, Santiago, or Montreal, ideas has become worldwide. Finally, foreign policy problems that
next

once

could

be

considered

wholly

within a national

or regional

context now

Science, Morality,
present

and

Transnationalism
globe.

421
of state

themselves everywhere around the

Secretaries

describe

this phenomenon

interest have

Vietnam,
the

and

by periphery way of moving to the center; they cite the examples of Korea, Iran. It is apparently no longer possible to think strategically in
noting that
on the

issues

of a nation's sphere of

language

of vital

interests

when the threat to

everywhere

in the world,
and

given the realities of the

are required

international security crops up cold war. Problems are

solutions are to

interconnected

linkages

if

lasting

be found.
con

Transnationalism,
cerns.

not

rationalism, has come to dominate foreign policy

The

critics of

this all-pervasive and controlling viewpoint of international three of the premises and assumptions of the transnational
ask whether

relations question all approach.

First, they

the

hunger for

measurement of

the quantifiers
not

and

their conclusions about the facts of international contacts are

self-evident and visible on

quite

obviously
ence

the surface, and

whether

through

indiffer

to

meanings

less

subject

to quantification some scientific interpretations

one can

may
than

not

be
a

more

misleading than helpful. No

doubt that

certain

peoples

growing number of countries have more contact with one another did they fifty or one hundred years ago. The factors responsible are increasing population, greater incomes and wealth, and undoubted improve
in
ments

in the technical

means of as

to see what

is important

sending communications. Quantifiers who tend what can be counted and measured, point to such
to

technical and material changes and their immediate consequences without ex

amining
and the

nonmaterial and

intangible

attachments

persistent national more

loyalties
and

intensity

of parochial values and

beliefs. Because

Canadians

Americans in business
that
anti-Americanism

and education talk more often

by

phone

hardly
past.

proves

is dead in Canada,
neighbors

or

that Americans as a whole are any

north

less

suspicious

of

their

to the

than

in the

If inter

dependence is to be
text within which

viewed

realistically, the political and take place ought not

communications

foreign policy con be ignored. It is possible

periods of

to demonstrate that contacts oftentimes increase tense national rivalry;

can

during

the most in
and

for example,
increase

communications

between Soviet it

Ameri

leaders

by

"hot

line"

at moments of
of peace

deepening crisis.

Transnational

ism is

not always

a concomitant

and order;

generates conflict as

often as

harmony.
of transnationalism

Critics
nationalism

further

note

that the debate over the

and raises

decline

of

is

a repetition of an

historic controversy,
of

issues that

were

fought

out

in the first three decades

the twentieth century

world.

by

opposing
scientists,

schools of thought with

in the liberal democratic

contempt

The

new social

for history, ignore the fact that certain trans more in evidence before 19 14. During the such as Michael Faraday attended interna scientists Napoleonic Wars, British tional congresses in Paris, the capital of the enemy. Travel by train without
their
undisguised

national practices were

if anything

passports

or visas was possible

anywhere

in Europe,

except

in the Ottoman

422
Empire. European diplomats

Interpretation
served

the foreign offices

of successive

European
plethora

countries, and Swiss mercenaries fought for

of

various national armies.

books

and studies written show

in the

period

between the two

world wars were

intended to "Other

that

nationalism was on

the wane, prompting Hitler to write,

people's

illusions

opportu

about power were

my

great

The

aca

demician's illusion then

and segmental relations

and now rests

in

part on

the belief that

groups

few limited
national

between

specialized

national

across

boundaries is

representative of political and social relations as a whole.

Yet the majority of the world's peoples do not partake in such relations. They live out their lives not only within nation-states but also in tribal and vil lage
groups.

Frequently

their mindset

is

shaped

by

such a

factor

as

the

limita

tion of reading material;

restricted

to a

daily

for example, 95 percent of the Chinese people were reading diet of the writings of Chairman Mao until Mao's
increased
and were

death. Within

such a state mental restrictions mental prohibitions exist

rarely dimin

ished. Similar
ment,

throughout the world communist move

and communist leaders in countries such as Italy probably support NATO only because they fear for their security with the passing of Tito in neighboring Yugoslavia. The communist international, which is a long-standing example of

Tito
on

and

transnationalism, has lost much of its force because men such as Ceausescu depend for their power more on national constituencies than
problem multina
govern

ideological unity with Moscow. The world's crises, moreover, in areas in which interdependence matters most, are triggered not by the
corporations

tional
ments.

that symbolize transnationalism but

oil

by

national

The
of

global

crisis

beginning

in 1973

was

brought

about

by

the

demands

the
as

oil-producing nations,
countries.

working through intergovernmental

the sale of
national re

bodies
sources

such

OPEC, for higher

rates of return on

to the industrial

Consumer

states

have tried to

counter these

demands through opposing intergovernmental coalitions except when countries such as France, Japan, and England have decided to go it alone. National pol icies

by

national governments motivated

by
as

national reasons on

both the

con prob

sumer and producer sides

have

constituted the main source of the

such

lem. (See the

School
of

writings

of scholars

S. Northedge

of

energy the London

corporations

Economics in the Journal of International Studies.) Multinational have been thrust aside when vital national interests were involved.
critics ask whether

Finally,

the most costly

not occurred when national

interests have been

blunders in foreign policy have subordinated and pushed into

the background as the

fered its

greatest

basis of foreign policy decisions. America may have suf defeat in Vietnam because it imagined that the Indochina
explained as an

problem could
cow

be

international conspiracy
enjoyed

controlled

by

Mos

or

Peking
of

rather

than as a

long-standing

nationalist conflict and a revolt

against al)

foreign domination. Hanoi its

from both

communist allies at the same time as

military it

and material assistance played

them off

against

one another with consummate skill.

Transnationalism

and

the ending of

national

Science, Morality,
rivalries,
medieval

and

Transnationalism
affected

423

some

European

commentators

say, have

American thought in

the mid-twentieth century much as the

hope

of

the

Second

Coming

affected

Europe. Woodrow Wilson

went

empty-handed

to the Paris Peace

Conference, having
terests, footrule

no well-thought-out plan

to protect American national

in

leading
of

Lloyd George to say that Wilson "tried to apply the his ideals to the gnarled and knotty trunks of European
came

straight

nationalism

As World War II
national

to an end, American
which all

leaders believed that

a new

inter

organization

in

the nations would cooperate would assure

of power of of

that traditional means such as the

pansionism were no

balance

controlling

national ex

longer

required.

Such failures

the transnational outlook

to provide guidance for wise

prophets and pundits pause of

foreign policy decisions should at least give when they invoke transnationalism as a guarantee
to immediate policy choices,
profound

the end of national rivalries.

The fatal flaw

ironically

of transnationalism as a guide

enough given

its

scientific

pretensions, is its

disregard

of

facts

and realities.

Riding

what

they

consider the wave of the

no need

future,

the trans

national social scientists

apparently feel
of

to attend to visible and stub

one of the

born facts. I. L. Claude innumerable

the

University
on

of

Virginia, reviewing
observes,

publications of

the Council on Foreign Relations in its multimillion

project

dollar, foundation-financed
starting from the transformed, along icance
with premise

the

1980s,

"The author,

that international relations

have been

fundamentally
continuities

makes no effort one

to balance his analysis

by

considering

changes;
latter."

is simply invited to
of

assume and

the overpowering signif

of the

(Review

Modernization

Transformation in Inter

national

Relations
vol.

by
no.

Edward L. Morse

by
p.

I. L. Claude, Political Science

716.) The
commonsense

Quarterly,
edge that

92,

4, Winter 1977-78,

knowl

force has

not

been eradicated, say, in

and the
stigma

wars of national out-of-date

liberation is

conveniently overlooked,
those
phalian thinking.

of

being

is imputed to letters

who analyze national

rivalries

by

Westcharacterizing their approach as

and more scientific

Apparently

it is better

to count

and weigh parcels

relationships.

passing between any two

countries than to analyze political

The concealing or obscuring of the facts is nowhere more conspicuous than in discussions of transnational groupings or political and economic communities socialof nation-states. Integration theory in world politics, which has a strong
scientific

bias, has
when

demonstrated

a genuine puzzle
constructed proached

both to integrationists
the viable
rather examples

surprising disregard for facts. What remains and their critics is how theories can be
are so sparse.

as a

fact

than an aspiration, case

example of

When integration is ap studies dwindle to the one

significant

if

quite

limited

the European community. Integration in

Eastern Europe

hardly

corresponds practice

to the model of

free

and

tions; it

would appear within

in

merely to be
given

another name

voluntary associa for Soviet imperial

ism. Even

Western Europe,

the slow pace and stubborn roadblocks

424
thrown

Interpretation
up

by

the

founding

states

(France is but

one

example), true

integration Out

remains a side

hope for the future

nationalism

more

than a present, all-determining reality.

and

Europe,
many

in Africa

Asia,

which

lead to the

multiplication

of so

new states

that the world's number has tripled since 1945, points

to the very opposite conclusion of that propounded

tionhood

by

the integrationists. Na

there,

long

delayed

by

the dominance of the colonial powers,

has

as

sumed a more passionate and emotional character

than in most other parts of

the world, as those

who

have

sought to establish cooperative relations are

only

too well aware. Nor are there

any

significant signs of

the waning of national

ism. In the early 1950s those of us from America, Britain, and Canada who participated in institution building in higher education in Africa and Asia were
comparatively free to function out front, visible as educational advisers and even as heads of departments or deans of important faculties. Today the most
experienced educationists

from the developed

countries

have found they

can

be

working behind the scene, making themselves available for counsel and advice but rarely occupying official positions. What is true of higher education is true a fortiori in agriculture and in population and environ
effective

only

by

mental

assistance.

Outsiders

at

best, in
on

the top.

favorite

words of

the public ad

ministrators, must remain on tap, not

Given the

persistence of extreme

nationalism, it is difficult to understand

the stubborn resistance of transnational thinkers to the

facts. One

explanation

may be that the study of international politics has proceeded by starts and stops from one approach to another, each designed to hold out fresh hope for the
grim

and conflict-ridden world.

The harsh

and

bitter

struggles of nations-in

arms a

have

so appalled and revolted men of conscience that rush

they have joined in

In
recent years

headlong

to substitute a more peaceful

role

international
the

order.

know-how for producing discovering weapons of mutual annihilation, have felt a particular responsibility. Those physical scientists who have turned from the slow and painful discipline of their
scientists, remembering their

in

laboratories have infused

reformist zeal.
men

efforts to understand the word politics with a

frenzied

Social scientists, intrigued by the power of science to propel to the moon, have joined the crusade, adopting techniques they believed

were responsible

for

physical

science's success stories.

Along

the way

they

have lost

sight of realities

that commonsense observation should have taught

prestige of the physical sciences science reformers

them were problems to be

coupled with the march

faced. The immense

of self-conscious

social

have

pre
of

vented their
universalism

seeing because the prevailing forces

other pathways and patterns.

the world as it

is. Transnationalism is
of

a premature

form
are

international

politics

still

moving along

The Moral Problem The has

search

for

viable concepts of

morality

and

foreign

policy,

therefore,
trans-

not ended with the scientific revolution nor

the

first faint

signs of a

Science, Morality,
national

and

Transnationalism

425
more

community. given

The task

of

the moralist has become if anything

perplexing,
about which
erhood.

the

state of world politics.

Gone

are

the moral certainties

St. Augustine

wrote and ancient convictions about universal

broth

Roscoe Pound

wrote:

"We

are told that observation shows us social

interdependence through similarity the central fact in human

of

interest

and

through division of labor as

existence."

(Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the

Philosophy

of Law, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1922, p. 23.) It was for Pound, however, and not science that promised new theories and philosophy conceptions for understanding interdependence and its application and meaning

for discrete
times

areas of the

law. A

similar note

has been

struck

in

more recent an

by

the Indonesian cultural historian and

stands and out as

diplomat, Soedjatmoko. To

Asian,
about

what

morality
our

missing from most present-day American debates foreign policy is concern with a philosophy of history or

the destination of

mankind.

Every

previous

historical

era

had

such

perspectives,

but for

Not only the but the promised millenial ideas of Christianity have come under question, communist Utopia has also been replaced by Soviet and Chinese authoritarian
times all controlling
world views shattered.

have been

ism

and oppression.

Man's loss

of

faith

and

his growing
passion

incapacity for deeply

when one can no peace and

rooted sible

beliefs have

some connection with

his

to crowd as much as pos

into the
accept

present.

We live

within

shifting time

frames;

longer

the hope of life

after

death,

the time frame of

justice

changes.

If there is

way back to We

a more coherent and

defensible

view of

morality,

it is through

awareness

that the present world scene

remain

has

elements of a

both

con

tinuity
unities

and change.

perilously
and

suspended

between

but forgotten
of

religious

universalism

too-pretentious

once-healthy definition of the

continues to work
needs require an narrow and

modern-day transnationalism. Whether we like it or not, morality itself out in a world populated by nation-states whose urgent

toounending search for recognition of the needs of others. A but exhortations has in the nationalism imperils civilization as it past,

scientific

declarations

show

little

prospect

of

bringing
of

about

its demise.

One
from

of

the

most poignant examples of

the moral

predicament we

nationalism

to

universalism

is the

present position

face in moving UNESCO. That

between

international (transnational) organization founded on the battleground in the of scientific humanism has become a fierce developed
and
underdeveloped

assumed universalism

struggle

nation-states.

Basically,
the
or

the problem of trans

role and character of

nationalism

is

rooted

in differences in

perception of

the

nation-state.

To scientists,

whether natural

behavioral

social

scientists,
outmoded.

nation-state and no less to the great corporations, the present-day

is

The logic
national

of the situation

in the developed has

world requires

that men transcend

loyalties. In the third world, the

the
nation-state

problem as

is

almost

the direct oppo

site.

There

emerged

development
also

of particular
unit

freedoms,

social

necessary instrument for the justice, and national unity. It is

a

the negotiating

for the

attainment of a

better

world.

This negotiating

426
process goes on

Interpretation

It

will

not

day do,

after

day

even within so-called

claim

transnational organizations.
groping"

therefore, to

that the "blind

complex and

and endless realities

us.

process of ancient

adapting

moral principles

to

intractable

is

an

task from

which

science and transnationalism

have liberated
ever

The

demands for
all

political and moral wisdom are at

larger than

before. Man

needs moral

the resources
moral

his

command:

wise

statecraft, diplomatic science,

insight,
and

maxims,
morality.

reasoning,

technical

understanding,

practical

It

would

be

a counsel of perfection to claim

that all these taken to

gether would solve sion

the moral problem. It is nothing

short of a

crippling illu

to believe science alone has all the answers.

Discussion
THE CRISIS OF CONTEMPORARY

POLITICAL THEORY
Peter T. Manicas
Queens College

A Review les:

of

Pride

and of

Solace, by Norman Jacobson (Berkeley

have been
In

and

Los Ange

University
now we are

California Press, 1978)

told of too many and perhaps

By
we

tired of crises. We

have

experienced

too many. Perhaps we are, in consequence, just tired.

vulnerable.

Political theory is especially

195 1, David Easton

noted

that political

that the sort of activity practiced

by

essay written in had become theory Aristotle or Montesquieu traditional polit

a well-known
"impoverished,"

ical theory had ended, that the contemporary political theorist had become a kind of historian, concerned exclusively with a "form of historical On the other hand, he noted, the sort of theorizing requisite to a genuinely
empirical

analy

(i.e., behavioral)
were some

political

science was not

being

generated at

either.1

And there
In
anyway,

suspicions

that

it

could not

be

generated
"science"

least in

accordance with

the self-imposed prescriptions of the new

of politics.

1956

came

the

pronouncement

from England that "for the moment,

Peter

political

occasion, is an

philosophy [is] informed historian. He

dead."

Laslett,

the coroner on this

suggested that political

philosophy

was

dead "because
Laslett'

politics

[had] become too

political

serious to
was

be left to

philosophers."2

s
seemed

judgment that

philosophy

dead but "for the

resuscitations wrought

to

be

correct, as we were
Justice1

literally

made

dizzy by

at

Harvard. A
a new
nation

like
to a

was surely serious political philosophy and, Theory of Second Treatise of Civil Government, it offered considerable solace badly needing it.

But
and

disquiet
writers

nonetheless remained.

In

other

places, both in this country

and

abroad,

from

an earlier generation

(especially Orwell, Camus,

Arendt), and letters,

writers with a

deeper understanding
this century, were

of

and more

important,

writers who were more

nineteenth-century philosophy profoundly influenced

what

by

the

political events of

defining

Norman Jacobson in
of

This essay was first presented at & M University. The author wishes to
their many kindnesses.

a colloquium at the

Department

Philosophy, Texas A
and

thank Professor

John J. McDermott

his

associates

for

Journal of Politics, 13 (February 1951). 'David Easton, "The Decline of Political 2Peter Laslett, ed., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 1st ser. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956),
p. vii.

Theory,"

3John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.:

Belnap

Press

of

Harvard Univ.,

1971).

428
Pride
and
Solace*

Interpretation
"political theory without have been influenced by them
calls
solace."

For these

writers and

the many who

conclusions via

or who

have

come

to similar the right

different

routes

this sort of

theory, if

"theory"

is

still

word, is

an expression of courage and of

desperation,

of shipwreck and catas

trophe without prospect of a safe shore or even a stable mooring. It

of caution and compassion

is

a counsel

in the face

of self-doubt. pervasiveness.

worse, it

is

an expression of

increasing

And, for better or for Thus, Jacobson 's book

At times moving The
are not memora

is important. Pride
and

Solace is (and

longish essay,

even a meditation.

and passionate
middle

often

unclear), Jacobson

evokes rather than evinces. and

three chapters on

Machiavelli, Hobbes,
"wrong"

Rousseau
we sense

ble,
the

though

they
of

are not

or

unhelpful, but

that

they

are not

business
of

the

book; they

are counters
end.

for

other

things, things

said at the

beginning
have they
are

the book and at the

The

problems raised are not all are serious problems

new,
and

nor

gone

entirely

unattended.

But they
the

they
as

earnestly addressed. Jacobson suggests that

we read

history

of

Western

political

theory

the
or

history

of

"various

solace."

structures of

His interest is
"form
of

not methodological

historical in the
and

sense that

he

offers

but

another

historical
"the

analysis."

With Strauss
make a

Voegelin, Arendt
political

and

Wolin, Jacobson

tradition"

uses

to
no prideful

contemporary

point, specifically that there can

be

offer of salvation

by

political

means.5

His idea is that

throughout the

history

of

Western

political thought

has been the belief that

private

desperation

must

somehow

be

susceptible of public
of

solution; that it is the

office

of

the political theorist to be

doctor

the soul, to
upon the

join in

helping

relieve the conflict

resolved once and

raging within for all (p. i).

by

projecting it

outward

city, there to be

The
on

articulation of of

the solution, the

discovery

of

the truth is an

act of pride

the part

the

theorist;

from anything (p. 5), he can

There
political
are

within

showing that the fears of his readers themselves, but from the particular political

by

stem

"not

condition"

show also

that there is public cure. He thus gives assurance, he

consoles and comforts.

three central

features

that characterize the traditional effort at

author

theory:

(i)

the

idea that the

is prideful; (2) the idea that he

to public resolution; and

identifies

a private

desperation

as amenable

(3)

the

idea that he discovers truth. At first blush the idea that the
"Norman Jacobson, Pride
1978).
and

great political

theorists

write

from the

pride

Solace

(Berkeley

and

Los Angeles: Univ.

of

California Press,

5For criticism of the idea of the trsdition and of the uses to which it is put by Strauss, Voegelin, Arendt, and Wolin, see John G. Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Cam bridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1979). This little book is highly informative, helpful, and provocative.

Discussion
of

429

discovery

seems either

dubious

or unimportant.

Obviously,

the claim is not

intended to be based
then is

on psychological

evidence,
and

nor

presumably is it to
mixed motives.

deny
What

that the great writers wrote from

different

generally

its

point?

It

seems

that it is essentially
supposes

related

to points

(2)

and

(3),

that one

must

he

prideful

if

one
or

that

one's

private

desperations

are

really

political

problems,
should

that one's

diagnoses
(either

of

the particular malaise and its solution

"must"

be

accepted as

true. The force of the

one or

in "must be

prideful"

is that

the

following
or

suppositions

both)

are mistaken:

There is

no author

ity

truth in such matters and/or it

is

a mistake

to think that one can resolve

private

desperations with public resolutions. Jacobson seems to have something like this in mind, and that is what makes his book provocative and important. Let us consider each of these ideas, beginning with the idea that private desperations are resolvable politically. There are two questions here. First, did
the great

theorists, Plato
were

and

Aristotle, Hobbes
correct

and

Rousseau, believe
is yes,
even

this?

Second, if they did,

problems

they

in their belief? first

question

Taken generally, the

answer to the

if there

are

regarding the formulation of the question. Its formulation suggests a psychological orientation that is generally foreign to the tradition. That is, we
who

live in the Age

of

the Therapeutic tend to construct

our models

in individ important

ual and psychological

terms. We begin with an encapsulated self and take as a

self and society.

datum
shift

a contrast

between

This move, already

an

away from the

classical

tradition, is then further

science, the

personalized with the

narcissistic

elusive categories of psychological

lonely

ego, the

self,

self-concern, compulsion, obsession,

fantasy, desperation,

pride,

and solace.

To be sure, the psychological motif is anticipated in Rousseau and perhaps behind him, in Plato (two of Jacobson's favorites), but it seems hardly charac teristic. Even so, Jacobson's formulation of the question is perhaps less impor
tant than his tions to
correct observation

that the tradition

did

articulate political solu

problems

that were articulated in political terms.

may now be asked: Was the tradition correct in doing this? Jacobson thinks not. Here we see the full force of the psychologizing of politics. In the first formulation of his main theme, as cited above, the met The
second question
soul"

aphor of

"doctor

of the

is

used

in explicitly

post-Freudian

terms: the

theorist "joins
outward upon

in
the

helping
is

to relieve the conflict

raging

within

by
We

projecting it
are
solaced

city."

The because

conflict

within

and

is only

projected

outward.

we are

deluded. The "schemes designed to defend

the

us against either the are

reason"

wantonness of our passions or

frailty
an

of our

(p. 4),

doomed to
The "ter

failure because the

rifying

conflict contains

irresolvable

"contradiction."

powers at work

in the human

heart"

but they cannot be eliminated. temptation "to blind himself to certain 'facts
repressed,

may be assuaged, or sublimated, or The political theorist, yielding to the

life'"

of

(p. 2), is

deceiver,

and

430
the

Interpretation
of political

history

theory is

history

of

deceptions
"civilize."

not

ideologies
original

being
in
a

like

civilization

itself
the

a continuous effort to

The

city, the

polls, the

Church,

State,

are each asylums constructed

by

self-deceivers

continuous, but ultimately

tents.
"unmasking"

unsuccessful effort

to

control and console

its discon has

the

The
no

of political was

theory, the

discovery

that the Emperor

solacers and

clothes,
of

initiated

by

Rousseau, "one

of

the last of the

first

the

unmaskers

of

the machinery of solace employed

by

the modern

State,"

and was

impelled

by Marx, Nietzsche,

and a

host

of others

writing in

this century. The

ble"

Age

of

Disenchantment forced the

choices

for the "responsi

writers of our

time:
act
of

Abhor the

prideful

granting but
so

solace

and

accept

ineffectuality;

or

embrace

the
and

masses'

dispensation
become

of solace, without which

"the
"in the

cannot

world"

a monument

to pride,

effectual

conceivably be moved, (p. 18).

psychological an armed man

As

Phillip
into

Rieff has
a world

withdrawn

perceptively noted, "the always at war, where the ego is

peace."

has

force
the

capable

of

achieving armistices, but

not

Thus, "turning away from

of others

Occiden

tal

ideal

of action man

leading
has

toward

salvation

besides ourselves, the

self-

psychological

espoused

the Oriental ideal of salvation through

contemplative

manipulation."6

he
not

go as

To be sure, Jacobson does not put matters just as I have here, nor would far as the text from Rieff suggests. But the reading I have offered, if
seems nonetheless
shall

exact,
as

to

underlie much of what

Jacobson

says.

More

over,

we

also

see, Jacobson genuinely

as

struggles

for

some

role

for
in

"responsible"

theory.
makes us

But

"fear

error"

of

or

"fatal

involvement"

rightly
theory
the

wary

and

if,
or

as with

Arendt,
of

we can no

longer have

confidence

triumph,"

"glittering
What then
quest of

indeed,
be

"even

improvement,"

can responsible

say anything that can rightly for

called political?
of

the second

feature

the tradition of political

theory

and question of truth?

Jacobson begins identical

with

by

He may be right in this, although it is arguable. He is surely correct, however, in contending that "there is no question that there has existed a preference in political theory for the true over
the quest
i).
meaningful"

noting that the for meaning (p.

quest

for truth

was not taken as

being

the

(p. ix). And

this
book,"

no

doubt,
truth"

this

is

a preference
with

Jacobson disdains.

"The

concern of

meaning rather than The distinction between

he says, "is primarily to establish (ibid.).

"meaning"

the struggle to achieve

"truth"

and more

is

important for him

see

even and

if it is
what

not all

that clear.

Moreover, it is

important to

why,

in is

sense, he disdains the quest for truth. Is it

because he

thinks that truth

not possible?

Is it because truth belongs to

the

science and not to political theory?

6Phillip
P- 392-

Rieff. Freud: The Mind of

Moralist (New York:

Doubleday Anchor,

1961),

Discussion
Or is it because truth,
makes

43 1
undermines,
the
or

as we come to quest

know

it,

overwhelms,

or

impossible the

for meaning,

and of

two,

we need

meaning

more

than truth?
are some moments

There

in the book

when one

is tempted to

suppose that

for Jacobson, truth is not possible (period). In this, he catches another feature at least among the sophisticated. Weary and of our times rightly wary of
claims to truth are

by politicians and intellectuals whose self-serving uses of increasingly and painfully obvious; alive to the collapse or decay of deeply
values and

"truth"

held

beliefs

about

community, religion, and

of even modern accusations of

family;

and sensitive who

to

the genuinely

fragile foundations
or, worse,

science, those

hold

out

for truth
cism.

risk naivete

dogmatism

or even of

fanati

If taken seriously,

however,

the denial of truth becomes a

against

self-defeating
not

nihilism.

Generally,
and when

as

Plato demonstrated

Callicles, it is
not so
and

taken

seriously,

held, is held inconsistently.

Jacobson is

foolish.
of

by

He is surely repelled both "scientific

and we
always

by

rationalist, absolutist,

holistic ideas Truths

come

truth,
small

conceit"

and

"ideological

certitude."

in

packages

stand at
who

low tide
not

Jacobson is Camus's: "He

thing."7

does

Surely

this

is

lesson that

must

on shifting sand. The lesson for know everything cannot kill every be learned. But in rightly rejecting

political absolutisms and which

the underlying

rationalist or positivist metaphysics on

they

stand,

Jacobson, like Camus, leaves

Garden."

us precious

says, "naked in the

give

"The only possibility for the

political

little. We are, he theorist is to

of

himself wholeheartedly to the project of inventing a set (p. 160). Again, as with Arendt, we are to be ical (p. if indispensable, effort to prevent modest,
action"

limits to

polit

content with

the

"catastrophes"

139).

It

would and

be

a mistake to suppose that

crime

Camus's lesson has been learned.

erased.

Nihilistic
analysis

historical
acts

has

not

been

Camus is

correct

in his
of

that such

presuppose

limitlessness

that "unlimited

display

human

pride"

that confuses Creator and Created.

Yet,

what

follows from this?

Are

we

to blame

the theorists?
are the
rejects

More important, perhaps, what ignorance"? Like Camus, Jacobson

limits

of the posture of
and

"calculated
that

complacency
what

recognizes

fray."

"by

our

silence

we

also

enter

the

But

does
limits

"inventing
enough?

limits to

action"

political

mean concretely?

And is

inventing
are

Consider, finally,
here? Jacobson
theorists
are no says

the

idea that limits

for the
(p.

to be invented.
to

"invention"

that "the

mystiques of solace resorted

Why by those

political

who were responsible

us"

creation and maintenance of

the tradition

longer

available

to

160).
"discovery"

I think Jacobson is surely

"invention"

able to us.

in this, both in replacing inherited mystiques are no longer that the in and contending question is, Why? But again, the crucial
right
p. 289.

by

avail

7Albert Camus, The Rebel (New York: Vintage, 1956),

432
For Jacobson it is not,
to
we

Interpretation
may

judge, because
theory

their problems are not ours

seems

and therefore their solutions cannot effort

give solutions

be ours, because it

that traditional

goes wrong.

precisely in the Is it because, then,

for the tradition, theory could be built on solid foundations: Human Nature, God, History? And now this is not possible? A wonderful text from Arendt is
approvingly
not

quoted.
and

We

are

compelled,

she

said,
and

only to find

devise

new

laws, but

to

find

devise their very measure, the

yardstick of good and

evil, the principle of their source.

constitution of a new

Politically,
we shall

this means that

create
not

before

drawing

up the

body

politic,

have to
(p.
129).

merely discover

a new

foundation for human community

as such

This takes
seems

us

to the central issue. It is the

our world

question

of

foundations that

exactly to distinguish

from

worlds

past; moreover, our diffi

culty is the question of whether we possible, how they are to be created.

Jacobson
surprises us.

can create new

foundations and, if it is
that he
would accept

One

might

have

supposed

the

idea, for some, as he notes, the very definition of modernity, that in times past, of man in distinc theories "have always built upon settled views of the
'nature'

tion to the excruciating modern business of the void

of

trying

to create something out of

rejects

the human

'condition'"

(p. 6). But he

(p. 6).

this way of

drawing

the distinction on the ground that "for all great theorists there has always been a
sense

in

which

the civic God is

dead"

Moreover,

political

theory "has
from the

sprung less often from the urge to reflect 'fixed impulse to meet the challenge actually to fix principles in the
seen

principles'

than

midst of what

is

by

the

aristocrat of

the mind as chaos, or

"ideal"

destructiveness"

(pp.

8f.). On his

politics operates

"in the

absence of a

decline, stagnation, or suicidal ("formal") definition of politics, knowable, definable, objective, immuta
9).

ble,

good"

transmittable common
when

(p.

the moment

things

become,

so to

speak,

"Political theory begins precisely (p. 10).

unglued"

at

There is

a great

deal to

commend

in these

remarks.

Plato

and

Aristotle

surely Athens. But they sought to "fix

wrote

gave us reflective responses to the

were not

revolutionary

changes of

fifth-century
they
of

the
that

revolutionaries.

Indeed,
Hobbes

anachronistically,

principles"

history

was

undermining.

Hobbes,

course,

to the crises of the seventeenth century.

principles that made more sense

was the

revolutionary,

in the century following than they articulating did in his own day. Indeed, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that those figures we identify as crucial in the tradition Plato, Aristotle,

Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau are so identified because they so brilliantly articulated politics in what later was seen to be politics at the
transition.
or the

As

reactionaries or

revolutionaries,
civic

they

gave us

insight into the

or

past

future.

They
of

lamented the

God

who

had died,

they found bases

urgently
idea.
criticism of that

for the

creation of a new civic

God.8

But if so, why the

its many senses). Jacobson as regards the

problem so

"This way
It

identifying

the tradition seems consistent with

one of

Gunnell's

also makes political

theory ideological (in

Gunnell has something in

common with

relation of

the theorist to

Discussion
displayed in Pride functions
and
and

433
about our crisis

Solacel What is there

theory?

that so

alters

the

limits

of political

One
because

answer

we

some new
nity.

is easy to give and it goes like this: Things are different now know too much. We cannot be deceived by some new magician, Sunlight Man. There can be no new foundations for human commu
answer

The

conflicts and contradictions are not amenable to political solutions.

As I noted, this if ambivalently,

is

characteristic of our as

age,

and without

doubt it is felt,
answer.

by Jacobson,

by

Indeed, I do
There
that

not

think it is the one

many others. But it is not the only that Jacobson does give.
an alternative.

are

two texts that suggest

At

one

place, he remarks
a term

"modernity

is

no synonym

for

an absence of

fixed principles, but is

with a

which combines
not

the idea of democratic

"disenchantment'

determination
And in his

to emulate the absolutist systems of the

past"

(pp.

i if.).

prologue

(p. x), he describes Pride

and

Solace in

conventional of

terms

by

saying

that "it examines the ascendancy in political

subsequent

theory

the nation-state, its

decline in legitimacy,

and

the vulnerability
institutions."

of

Western

humanity
nor

bereft

of authoritative politics

ideas,

principles,

and
nor

Our
can

is thus

one of

transition. Neither polls,

our problems. order no our

Church,

State

any longer provide solutions to authority and legitimated the political

The ideas that

authority.

sustained

longer have

They

are

frayed, wearing thin,

similar periods

tattered.
past.

But

time nevertheless is different from

in the
now

If it is true
mean

that there

is

"democratic
rejected, or

'disenchantment,'"

does this
puts

democracy

has been tried

and

that,

as

Jacobson

it in

another

place, "men

must compose their own scripts"?

And if it is true that

denial,

yet

his times. Gunnell notes, for example, that "his it is not simply a matter of personal

response

is

often a response to personal

deprivation"

(p.

142).

Similarly,

the figure of the Hebrew

prophet

that recurs in Jacobson's treatment is found also in Gunnell's.

as regards the contemporary situation in political theory, despite his criticism of the traditional tradition, Gunnell still asks if it is still possible for "this kind of produced. He discovers that features identified by Strauss, Arendt, and be to theory
literature"

Finally,
idea
of the
political

Wolin (e.g., the diffusion

positivism, and
problem of political
society"

of the

idea

of the political, abandonment of the

idea

of a

human nature,

historicism)

are all

relevant

to the "disengagement of creative thought from the

order"

(p.

160).

He

adds another:

are

incompatible

with politicsl theory.

It may be that the conditions of "the open But this is not because the open society is neces

of alternative visions, sarily the good society or because it does not stand in need of criticism or but because in effect, political theory is buried by being ignored: "The political theorist is not un like Sophocles's Ajax, a hero without a field of action or anyone to notice him if he does

set"

(p.

161).

This is

quite perceptive,

but msy be

shortsighted.

but he may still if only from the sort of pride Jacobson spoke about. Moreover, if we sre now in choose to write a period of trsnsition, we cannot now say which documents and theories will come to be identified Marcuse
who taught us of cb-optation was

first

co-opted and

The theorist today then brushed

cannot aside

be

hero

even

as crucial

to understanding our

present.

That

will

depend

upon what

happens

and

how

subsequent

still is?) views this period. My own suspicion regarding A Theory of scholarship (if such there as the divine-right-of-kings literature of the seventeenth viewed will be it that Justice is century is although we all know what they argued for. Perhaps now viewed. No one reads James I or Filmer,

Alvin Toffler

or

Buckminster Fuller

will

be the John Locke

of subsequent centuries'?

434

Interpretation
past,"

there is "a determination not to emulate the absolutist systems of the

does this
solution

mean we must seek a solution

that

is

not

absolutist,

or

that

no political

is

possible?

Our
the

problem

is

not created

by

the

impossibility

of

truth (as such), nor

by
are

question

of whether result

it is discovered, deduced,

or

invented. These

dilemmas that

from

epistemological misformulation within

the Western

tradition between conventionalizing

positivist scientisms and plague on of

Sophists

and

Platonizing
am

realists, between

historicist

absolutisms.

But if I

correct, Jacobson's

both houses is

not a rejection of

truth, but
of

a rejection of certitude and

the idea that those who claim it can speak and act for humanity.

Nor is

our

problem

the

impossibility

creating
or

new

foundations for

human

community.

This is

so even cannot

if it is true that

see that these

foundations

be discovered

we can now more clearly deduced from Human Na

realized

ture, God,
human

or

History,

and

that

they

must

be invented, created,
us now a

by

activity.

Nor is the failure in terms

sive of our

of

the tradition to

help

failure rightly diagnosed

discovery
Freud,
are

that the conflicts are within, and therefore not respon

to

political

solutions.

Rather,

as

Jacobson sees, the unmaskers, Marx.

Nietzsche,
aristocratic

and

showed us that our

fathers

dead

and we

the children cannot, or will not, take that awful

we see

responsibility on ourselves, the care of the whole community. Instead job to fashion the theory and practice of our own discrete existence (p.

it

as our

12).

or no politics.

This is exactly right. Our There is a third

choice

is

not

between

a new politics of

authority

alternative: genuine

democratic

politics.

That
all

is,

past political could

only what each and legitimated the

theorists, as "aristocrats of the do for himself. They gave us

spirit,"

tried to do

for

solutions that of polls, unseated

defined
and

civic God; they justified the authority State. The unmaskers, from Rousseau to Marx to Freud,

Church,

authority

by

explaining

our

craving for it.

we

Sadly
alone

enough, all that

learned

was

that

if

one could not

speak, let

act, for humanity,

one must speak and act abandonment of and

trepidation, the desperation, the tude,

characteristic
triumph,"

only for himself. Hence the politics. Hence also the atti
that we
must abandon

of

"glittering
modest

Orwell, Camus, even improvement,

limits. But this
on

Arendt,

and concern ourselves with the more

task of

inventing
man

assumes that the problem

is to

move

"the

masses,"

for it is

this assumption that limits are demanded.

out of

if the democratic if "the

(p. 13)
rules

"must think himself

his

predicament
of a

By by

contrast,
himself,"

do

not permit

him to

call

for the intervention

foreign
task.

not even

his therapist
a new

then

theory

might

have

a more positive

If there is to be
product of

foundation for human community, it must be the individuals acting creatively and conjointly. In turn, this depends
to take the

upon our willingness

responsibility

of

caring for, of,

and about

the

Discussion
whole community.

435

In Jacobson,

deep

streak of communitarian

in Orwell, Camus, and Arendt, there is a anarchism, a hope though not a prediction, that
as

the undermining of authority and the

end of
politics.9

discovery
theory

of

autonomy

need not

be the

In this regard, late the

responsible political

can

do nothing less than

articu

obstacles and conditions of a

democratic

politics.

My impotence,

like

my desperation is personal; but I cannot wash my hands of it and retire. But neither is it sufficient to share my loneliness and desperation, especially if what As humans, we are to share is the idea that "there is no meaning, all is
lost."

we need

solace; but it

must

be insisted that

we need a critical vision more.

For

as seems clear

to me, where critique or

vision

is absent, there is

no politics.

of The Rebel, Herbert Read remsrks that Camus's "In his foreword to the American edition statement in Arendt is perhaps the concluding chapter best The ideas often come close to anarchism. 1963). Orwell's activities during the Spanish Civil War York: Viking, (New Revolution of her On 1984 is the classic attack on the unthinking conformity that stands at the are well-known, and his
opposite pole of

the

anarchist attitude.

Book Reviews
The Spirit of Liberalism. By Harvey C. University Press, 1978. Pp. xii + 130.

Mansfield, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard

$13.50.)

Patrick Coby
Kenyon College

written

Harvey Mansfield's The Spirit of Liberalism is a collection of six essays all during the 1 970s and all directed towards defining liberalism and defending
critics on

it against its
equally to

the left. One surmises that the

"spirit"

word

in the title refers

of soul or
up"

an essence made

known

by

definition

and

to the toughness

thumotic passion that emboldens the supporters of a cause to "speak

(p.

ix)

in

its behalf. Mansfield's

their spiritlessness is

central contention

is that liberals have failed to

short

understand of

their position and as a consequence

have fallen woefully

in their defense

it

his theme.
of which are reprinted

Three

of

the essays are extended book reviews, two

essays are reprints also.

from journals; the three remaining Lowi's The End of Liberalism, Reich's The
Revolution? Rawls A
, '

Selected for review

are

Greening of America, Dahl's

Nozick's Anarchy, State
when written

After the Utopia.

sixties

Theory ofJustice,

and

and

In Mansfield's judgment these books

and

were

timely

in the late

substantial segments of

are

has early seventies; but for his own book (though not originally composed as a book) likewise untimely. In his criticism of these authors, Mansfield is consistently
most, their time
past.

If Mansfield is correct, then

penetrating, witty, and artful; but the result of his success

is that

one

faults him for

of it is calling renewed attention to books which were passing slowly out indeed tiresome to hear again about the folly of Charles Reich! Much better is
memory

Mansfield when disengaged from

such

works, speaking

and tradition of liberalism and the problems currently

liberal

democracy as a mixed regime and on instructive; also interesting is a Bicentennial essay on the right of revolution.
The Spirit ofLiberalism
the authority of the mixed
regime.

directly about the meaning besetting it. The essays on defending liberalism are especially
few
and

revives

the ancient theme of the

submits

the many. On

Aristotle, Mansfield
The
Liberals
are

that liberal

democracy
mixture are

is

a special and

variety nity to

of

elements

comprising the

liberals

democrats- what else?

acquire

those who profit most from the equal opportu

property

and to speak
or

freely,
in
not

the two

rights

most sacred to the and

liberal

"few"

regime.

Hence liberals,
"many"

the

the mixture, are

businessmen

intellec

tuals. The
themselves
as

are

democrats
of

the democrats of old who distinguished

freedom,"

"asserters

but

an

inert

mass

whose

freedom

and

comfort are provided ancient

them

by

the

exertions of

the few. The

difference between

(Aristotelian)

and modern

(Lockean) mixed regimes lies in the fact that the

virtue, whereas the

former based its

mixture on some conception of moral

latter,

438
fearful
of

Interpretation
"soul-caring,"

located the standard of human dignity in the priestly equality of human bodies. Despite such egalitarian underpinnings, liberal de mocracy is a bona fide mixture because room is made in it for liberals to con
tinue their pursuits of wealth and

honor,

so

long

as their accomplishments con standards of

tribute to the

betterment

of

the democrats

e.g., rising

living

and

the steady spread

erals

of science.

The

problem

today,

argues

Mansfield, is

that lib their

privileged positions eralism

have forgotten that they are liberals (not that they are discreet Mansfield concedes the importance of in his
review of

about

"disguising"

lib

Lowi). Unconvinced that they

contribute

to the

well-

being
erals

of society and feeling guilty about the advantages accruing to them, lib "use their unequal status to destroy tolerance for unequal (p. 14.) A
status"

case

in

point

is Rawls,

whose concern

for the "least

advantaged"

is

carried

to

the

extreme of

wanting to

eliminate the natural

distinguishing Taking his bearings from Madison's Federalist 10, Mansfield nicely plains the defining attribute of liberal politics: a compromise, ever-renewed
alone
never

legitimate

differences among liberals from democrats.

men which

ex and

completed, between the

and

openness and

reason)

the particularity of self-love. Liberalism

separate

universality of reason (albeit fallible defends individuality, the

while

fact that human beings occupy

ground upon which

bodies,

striving to find is the

radical

common

they

can come together and act as one.

Opposite this

well-established approach to politics

movement,

whose principal representative

is Herbert Marcuse. The

through an

radical movement

is

of

the opinion that

practical needs

individualism,
have been

self-love, separate bodies cause

no problem once

satisfied

economy

of abundance.

While

self-love,

associated with

the struggle for existence, requires management and

of self-love

restraint; self-expression, the replacement

can

in

an

affluent

society,

be safely liberated from political repression. The ism, and it suffers from several shortcomings: (1) as
rate

argument
with
,

is

vintage

Marx
the at

Marx,

there

is

tempt to combine the universality of species-being (e.g.

the minimizing of sepa

bodies)

with

the

individuality
they

of creative

labor (self-expression); but the

their claim upon the soul;
without

union

depends

on

the unwarranted assumption that the appetites are indeed

will release

satiable and that at some point

supposes

(2) it

that self-expression

can

be satisfying

the recognition and es the fact

teem of others; in this

it

shows no comprehension of spiritedness and of

will continue

that,
tice,
a

even amidst

plenty, love of honor

to divide men;

(3)

although

denying
at

in theory the angry emotions of thumos, radicalism is itself, in prac all times angry; likewise Marx is an angry author even when articulating
(historical materialism) that deprives
calls anger of
of

"science"

its justification.
not a

In the Preface Mansfield

eral.

himself

friend

liberalism but One

suspects

lib

He

says of

liberalism that it bows to human

The Spirit of Liberalism that Mansfield would and that he befriends liberalism because its only
ern world

in reading like to improve human nature,

nature.

genuine alternative

in the

mod

threatens to worsen

human

nature.

Book Reviews
Political Parties in
the

439

Eighties. Edited

by

Robert A. Goldwin.

(Jointly

pub and

lished

by

the American Enterprise

Institute for Public

and

Policy

Research

Kenyon

College, Washington, D.C., Softbound, $5.25.)

Gambier, Ohio,

1980. Pp. 152.

Will Morrisey

Nearly twenty
U.S.A.,

years

ago, Robert A.

Goldwin

edited

Political Parties,

a collection of essays

that informed and educated that portion of a

generation of college students whose professors

judged books discerningly. Of

rod, attracting heat
and

the essayists, Edward C. Banfield was the

sometimes

lightning
and

light from fellow

contributors

readers.

Almost

alone

in the

warm, reformist atmosphere of the early sixties, Banfield stood for

structed parties:

unrecon

Anyone party
able

who reflects on recent

history
was

must

be

struck

by

the

following

paradox:

those

systems that
maintain

have been

most

democratic in

structure and purpose

have been least

to

democracy
France];
and

[he

Third Republic in
procedure

those that
of

probably thinking of the Weimar Republic and the have been most undemocratic in structure and
have
proved

conspicuously those
of

the United States and Britain

to be the

bulwarks

democracy

civilization.'

Banfield

predicted

the increase of

voter manipulation

by

television and

ideologues if party
predicted

patronage

declined further. A

pessimist

in

Camelot, he

that egalitarian reform would reduce the organized power of the

get

American polity, its ability to

things done. For that reason,

wide

Jefferson may have been right in saying that democracy cannot exist without a diffusion of knowledge throughout the society. But it may be right also to say that

it

cannot exist with

it. For

as we

become
us

better

and more

democratic society,

our

very

goodness and

democracy

may lead

to

destroy

goodness and

democracy

in the

effort to

increase

and perfect

them.2

The reformers,

of

course, were not listening.

of reasoned

Banfield's

serious

critics and

thought the gentleman

reminded

too dismissive

planning (Walter

Berns),

the

principled politics of

him that ordinary, patronage-based politics must at times give way to "great (Harry V. Jaffa). But they knew that
main argument was right.

Banfield's

So, increasingly, do
Parties in the Eighties,
reformed reforms. system we
now

the rest of us. Goldwin's new collection,

Political
much-

contains

only
and

one enthusiastic
even

defense

of

the
still

have,

its

authors

recommend

more

Journalists,

politicians,
which

and

scholars old

thusiastic.

The public,

disliked the

are, for the most part, unensystem but liked its results, now

dislikes both the

system and

its

results.
System,"

Nslly,

'Edward C. Banfield, "In Defense of the American Party Political Parties, U.S.A., ed. Robert A. Goldwin 1961),
Defense,"

in (Chicago: Rand

Mc-

p.

23.

2Banfield,

"In

p.

39-

440
Goldwin

Interpretation

reminds us that Banfield told us so; not only does he reprint the in the Appendix, but he includes a new essay in which Banfield essay tells us that he told us so. Perhaps too pessimistically, he contends that, despite his telling and retelling, "Enthusiasm for pressing further and faster toward

1 96 1

direct
only

democracy

remains

unabated"3; the dissatisfaction

with

the present system

goads

Americans toward further democratization. Thus,

centennial period also complete the

in

which we celebrate

the achievement of the

Banfield instead

and

it."4 The American undoing of Nelson W. Polsby argue, the attempt to

"during the Bi Founders, we founding is undone because, as

establish

direct

democracy
of

of representative government

political authorities who once stood rulers.

leads, in practice, to the ruin between the populace and its most bewildered,

those

powerful

In the

short

term this results in what we see today: a centralized but

restless people

divided

elite that attempts to rule a somewhat

by

holding
stead of

up idols called images and extolling quasi-ideas called concepts. In Jeffersonian enlightenment, we see the decline of knowledge, concur

rent with the

decline

of that class of politicians who made

it their business to

know. The journalists

entertained

new

knowers,

the

journalists,

lack

political experience and political

responsibility.

Responsible to

executives whose

business is to

attract

customers,

provide

the melodrama customers

want.

Predictably,

the public
excite

is

but
not

not

ruled; the

star of our with

favorite

afternoon serial

may

us,

but

we

do

confuse

him

a ruler.

With the
with

dramatizing
either.

of politics,

people

do

not confuse
members

Two
reform

of the system

defend the

for NBC news,

and

on party helped devise. Kenneth A. a reporter Bode, they Carol F. Casey, who spent much of 1980 working on

contemporary politicians Democratic Party's

rulers,

several commissions

Senator Kennedy's democratic have

practices

campaign

staff,

argue

that the reforms ended many

and

un

fact

no one

seriously denies

say that if

new elites

replaced

the old ones, observers should not gape and

losers

should not

complain.

They
about

are

less convincing

and

tough-minded when

they try

to debunk myths

the genesis and results of party reforms.

They deny

that the
on

left-liberal,
Structure

McGovernite wing of the party controlled the Commission and Delegate Selection: "Senator McGovern was chosen to
sion

Party
of

chair

the commis

by

liberal

and

Senator Humphrey, who too closely identified

that.

viewed with

Senator Harold Hughes

Iowa

as too

the

McCarthy/Kennedy
horse for Robert

forces."5

Anyone

who recalls

that McGovern was a stalking

Kennedy

in

1968

will wonder at with

Moreover, Hughes
and
'Reform'

was appointed a

to the commission along

liberal Birch Bayh

left-liberal Fred Harris

in
Retrospect,"

Humphrey

backer6

at the

'Edward C. Banfield: "Party

ties, p. 31.

in Political Parties in

the

Eigh

""Banfield, "Party 5Kenneth A. Bode

Parties in the Eighties, "Bode
and

'Reform'

in

Retrospect,"

p. 33.

and

Carol F. Casey,
Reform,"

"Party Reform: Revisionism

Revised,"

in Political

pp.

11-12.
p.

Casey, "Party

12.

Book Reviews
time, but
ter,

441

hardly one averse to undercutting traditional authority. For that mat Humphrey himself was to the left of the majority of Democrats, a fact that escaped his left-wing critics in 1968.
Another
myth

that the reforms give power to activist elites who do not turns out not to be a
myth at all:

represent most voters

"That is
the

and

has been
did
not

true

in every

election

held in the United

States."7

Rule

by

old elite

always work popular

anyway, for "when party leaders view registered in primaries [they

substituted their must

mean

judgment for the

more

the somewhat

popular view

they

mention the selection of

Stevenson

over

Kefauver in 1952,
winners."8

Humphrey
True, but
could

over

McCarthy

in 1968]

they do

not always pick

no one picks winners every time; does anyone imagine that Kefauver have defeated Eisenhower, or that McCarthy could have defeated Nixon? The authors also deny that proportional representation "will fragment the exacerbate

American party system,

and make

divisions, prolong
1976 with
and 1980 with

the nominating contest,

difficult."

unity

more

"Contrast

1968,"

they
1976.

suggest.9

Very
that

well, but

contrast 1972 with eliminated

1976,

As for the

myth

"guidelines

party leaders from

although more

national

convention

delegations,
. . .

thereby depriving
is
some truth

the convention of their judgment

charge,"

and

experience,

there

to this

in

1972 than

in

1976.

10

In sum,
Parties eroding
are

getting

weaker.

Anyone

would concede as much.

"
.

But they have been

over the course of the past century.

Indeed:

since

the

reform movement

began. Bode

and

Casey

actually

contend

that Americans are that

our

less

cynical about politics

today

than ten years ago, proving

debunkers

of myths also

have

a penchant

for making them.

Of the four
with as

essayists with

practice, two
of

seriously prescribe, two concern themselves Donald M. Fraser, who succeeded McGovern theory.
who on

chairman

the Democratic Party's Commission

Party

Structure

and

Delegate Selection, regards the problem of political authority with something like historical fatalism: "once the legitimacy of the old ways was challenged,
the
national
acquiesce in a movement toward party had little choice but to that were more defensible under the values of a democratic
leaders'
society."12

procedures

But surely the legitimacy of the party for decades. Fraser mistakes enthusiasm
acquiescence.
Reform,"

authority had been

challenged

and

the

inability

to moderate it for

7Bode 8Bode
'Bode
10Bode

and and
snd

Casey, "Party Casey, "Party Cssey, "Psrty

p.
Reform,"

151518.

p.
Reform,"

p.
Reform,"

Casey, "Party "Bode and Casey, "Party l2Donald M. Fraser, "Democratizing

snd p.
127.

p. p.

13.
19Party,"

Reform,"

the Democratic

in Political Parties in the Eighties,

442
Fraser
sees

Interpretation
that the results of

democratization,

as

distinguished from the

regain some of

idea

of

it,

leave few

people enthusiastic.

He hopes to

the old

system's virtues

by

exhorting the organized party, whose members better than

most voters

know the

potential candidates

do,

to enlighten its rank and

would reduce

file,

to

improve
primaries

communications

within

the party.

He

the number of
not consider

and, in general,

strengthen the national party.

He does

if this

would

only further
scientist

weaken

the local party organizations; he may believe

their weakness irremediable.

Political
political

James W. Ceaser knows

more of political

history
put
of

and

learning
idea

philosophy than Fraser does. Unlike many scholars, he can to practical use. He shows that Martin Van Buren, the founder
competition"

his

"the

of permanent

party
and

in

America,13

used a nonconstitutional
order

innovation to
the "personal

serve the aims of our

factionalism"

Constitution's farmers. In
that developed

to straiten
the 1820s,

"demagogy"

during

Van Buren

proposed parties

that would moderate the potential candidates

by

making them win support not only from the people, but also "seasoned
politicians."14

However, Van Buren had

occasional need or

no

from powerful, immoderate appetite for

moderation;
prohibit

recognizing the

the formation of new parties

the reforming

for important change, he did not of the old. Such change, have disliked
and

he knew,

often makes constitutional change unnecessary. reformers

From Woodrow Wilson to George McGovern, the

the nonideological, routine politics of self-interest, with

its hierarchies

its

limited capacity for

offer no evidence

rapid change.
much-

Ceaser dislikes the

reformers

because they

that their
can

vaunted responsiveness will yield wisdom. responsiveness to

Reform

of

institutions is
another

increase

the political atmosphere,

but

wisdom

thing

than the political atmosphere.

It is

an affliction of one strain

cannot attribute

in the American

mindset that when

wrong, some

it to

unavoidable circumstance or normal

something goes human failing,

but instead may be the

reformist

see

it

as remediable

by

some

institutional

change.

inability

to

accept

the

inevitable limitations

of politics

More than anything else, it that lies at the basis of

thought.15

This
man

echoes

Banfield's

complaint

that "The fundamental

fact

of

today is

that

is seen, not as he is, but as he ought to be."16 Result: "The system at the [presidential] nominating stage now very much resembles the popular nonpartisan system at the final election
'open'

with

its
"17

personal

factionalism

and

demagogy, "that Van Buren

"much

attacked

in

1824.

Ceaser

recommends that the parties undo

snd

of what we

have

seen

"James W. Ceaser, "Political Chsnge

p.

Party

Reform,"

in Political Parties in the Eighties,

101.

l4Ceaser, "Political ''Ceaser, "Political

today,

Change,''

p.
Change,"

102. 109.

p.

Ceaser

goes on

to recommend institutional chsnge;

we are all reformers.

l6Banfield, "Party "Ceaser, "Political

'Reform'

in

Retrospect,"

p. 33.

Change,"

p.

109.

Book Reviews
in the last
decade."18

443

Instead

of

opening the

parties

by

allowing

primaries to

proliferate, Ceaser
a

would

limit the

number of primaries

to ten per year, held on

parties

rotating

or

lottery

basis. (This

would strengthen
of

the state

and, pos

sibly, eliminate the need for government subsidies

expenses

would

decline.)

primary candidates, whose While closing the parties, Ceaser would open the

elections

to

new

parties

fourth party candidates by abolishing contribution ceilings parties that do not receive public funding. He predicts that existing would then moderate themselves to prevent the loss of their centrist
to third and to the
new parties.

members parties

At the

same

time, he

would strengthen

existing
to public

by

allowing them to

give

money to their

nominees

in

addition

funding.

The

essayists

who offer

theoretical prescription examine the

philosophic

basis

of

the American party system and, more

importantly,

of the

American

regime.

defective, but for radically different reasons. Benjamin R. Barber, the energetic Rousseauist who edits Political Theory, condemns the American system as undemocratic. The practice of representa
Both
men

find the

regime

tion

more, the

principle

itself

tice."19

By

voting for

someone else to

kills "full freedom, equality, and social jus rule, whether in a party primary or a
Voters
are

general

election,

we renounce our citizenship.

"as far from

citizens

as spectators are

from

participants or patients are

heal

them,"20

for true

citizens make

laws

and set

from the doctors they select to policies themselves. Represen

responsible"

tation

for "the policies kills freedom because only those "directly are free21; it kills equality because it reflects that determine [their] common abstract the formal, legal, equality of one man, one vote in a mass society, only and social reality. It also kills social justice economic and does not reflect
lives"

because it "encroaches
moral order strument which

on the personal
. . .

demands,
justice

autonomy and self-sufficiency that every incapacitates the community as a self-regulating in

of a
root."22

of

the idea of
moral

destroys the possibility public justice might take

and
and

participatory public in Barber's desire for both

individual
seau,

autonomy
their

community

was

shared, of course,

by

Rous

who understood

combination

as paradoxical.
so.

Barber

quotes

Rous

seau, but not on Representative government, Barber continues, destroys

and community.

this point; he

should

have done

It destroys autonomy
mere

by

citizen autonomy leaders to exist; it destroys allowing

community
expense of

promoting the general interest. (Barber mistakenly describes

by

interests,

private

fragments

of

the public, at the

modern political

Change,"

'"Ceaser,
ety,"

"Political

p.

1 14-

"Benjsmin R. Barber, "The Undemocratic

Party

System:

Citizenship

in

an

Elite/Mass Soci

in Political Parties in the Eighties,

p.

35. pp. 35-36.

System,"

:uBarber,
21Barber.

"Undemocratic "Undemocratic "Undemocratic

"Barber,

Party Party Party

System,"

p. 36.
System.'

pp. 37-38.

444
parties as

Interpretation
identical to the factions Madison describes in the tenth Federalist.
or, at

They

are not
of

least,

not usually.
System,"

See

Harry

V. Jaffa, "The Nature

and

Origin

the American

Party

in Political Parties, U.S.A. Bode

and

Casey
in the form

also make this

mistake.) Thus

modern pseudo-democracies.

anarchy Representative government "can know

elitism and

war with one another

no and

of

citizenship
bargain."2'

other

than the sometime voter and the

hungry

client,

can achieve no public purpose other than the self-interested trade-off and prudent

the

No
cy,"

mere reform can change

this.

Only

what

Barber

calls

"strong democra

a active miss
most

community
citizens,"24

ruled

by

"the deliberate

common

will of a

can

remedy

modern self-destructiveness. as

community of Antidemocrats dis

some of

communitarian

democracy

impractical; they

elicit

Barber's

thunderous rhetoric:

people all

The strategy [of the antidemocrats] is elementary but the insignia but none of the tools of citizenship and
and media

not

ineffective:
them of

give

the

accuse

incompe

tence;

throw referenda at them without providing civic education or

insulating

them from

money

[how

about

demagogues?]
issues the
or

and then

inundate them
and then

"experts'

with

problem

pillory them for their ill-judgment; have not been able to solve
or simple-mindedness

carp

at their

uncertainty

indecisiveness

in muddling

through to a

position.25

Alone among the contributors to this book, Barber gives signs that he knows the majority of his readers are undergraduates. In telling them America has feared human depravity too much and appreciated human virtue too little, he
reminds one of cause
observation: the young judge men too leniently be judge the light of their own innocent natures. Some forms of by they innocence no longer characterize American youth, but much political innocence
Socrates'

remains

beneath the

cynicism.

Professor Barber

will mine

it. in
which

"Representative
mit a

government

has had two hundred

years

to com
given

errors,"

thousand

more

than a single

chance."26

he exclaims; "direct popular If the ancient Greeks, is

given

government

is rarely

who gave such

democracy
is that

several

chances,

can

teach us anything about

it, they

show

that the reason

direct its

popular government

fewer
are

chances than republicanism

errors

are

more

spectacular.

They

too,

commit

them, but usually

periods of

after a much

regime-ending longer period of time

errors.

Republics,
often, if
we

believe

Spengler,

two hundred years.

pessimistic view

Robert A. Licht "inclines toward the

of

that the present

state

the

political parties portends an

unraveling
p. 46.

of what shall

here be

called the

"Barber, "Undemocratic Party 24Barber, "Undemocratic Party 'Barber, "Undemocratic Party

26'

System,"

System,"

p. 47.
System,"

p. 48.
System,"

'Barber, "Undemocratic

Party

p. 48.

Book Reviews
polity."27

445
Barber
makes as a

He

regards the

kind

of recommendation

likely

cause

of that

unraveling,

and one unable to weave a new political science was

fabric.

Licht takes his

"new
old.

politics"

science

of

to

from Aristotle, not Rousseau. Madison's have cured the factionalism seen by the
strong
middle class

Like Aristotle, Madison

considered a
rich and

the

thing

that

can moderate

the contemptuous

the envious poor.

Licht but

agrees with as a mixed

Paul

Eidelberg

that America was not founded as a

democracy

regime or

polity.28

Nevertheless,
end

the economic basis of our regime differs from

that of

Aristotle's: "an

to natural scarcity

by

human agency,

and

the

creation of wealth as a goal of

polity,

are

radical alterations

[of] Aristo
interests"

telian

thought."29

Still,
with

the debate on reform, said to

people,"

concern a struggle of of

"the

"the
the

is "the lineal descendent

that Aristotle
"

the quarrel between the oligarchs

democrats"

and

described.30

In

America, "everyone believes

poor,
nor
propertyless.31

himself to be

'democrat,'

yet

here the many

are not

"The American
chical
have."32

democracy
although

then may perhaps

best be described

as an oligar
we

democracy,
must

to say this requires more candor than prudently

should

Our

regime

is

not

democratic oligarchy because

even our as

opportunity,"

oligarchs

speak of

equality,

albeit

"equality

of

distin

guished

from

result."

"equality
and

of

Oligarchs

democrats

come

to terms in America.

Aristocrats,

some

times, do not. Jefferson's "natural here, for they can enter the government in America
crats
science serves commerce

aristoi"

do

not

lack

means of advancement

or the science-dominated academy. vice

But

(and

versa)

a service some aristo

find distasteful. "The increase in prosperity based upon scientific inquiry is indispensable to a political liberty that is not based directly upon the older

help, brings that, with foundation of liberty. Moreover, those prosperity amounts to a distaste for one to do with science, who have no "com have who of the aristocracy nothing intensely. "[R]esentment is now the regime the often dislike mercial
idea
of

scientists

virtue"1'; a distaste for the

commerce

value,"

"Robert A. Licht: "On

ties,
p.

the Three Parties

in

America,"

in Political Parties in

the Eigh

69.
the

Constitution, doing so, he cites Eidelberg's The Philosophy of on not read Eidelberg's later and more impressive book, A Discourse had he Apparently contempo regards Unlike 1974)Licht, Illinois Press, Eidelberg Statesmanship (Urbana: Univ. of
28In
American
published

in

1968.

rary America
American

as

regime.

describes Woodrow Wilson as the founder of the new thoroughly democratized; he As Licht points out, Eidelberg does not regard the American founding as
also

exclusively modern. See of Massachussetts Press,

Eidelberg's On the Silence of the Declaration of Independence (Univ.

1976). p.

Parties,"

29Licht, "Three
Parties,"

74 75

30Licht, 3'Licht, "Licht, "Licht,

"Three
Parties,"

p.

"Three
Parties,"

p. 76 p.
Parties,"

"Three "Three

p.

77 86

446
aristocratic

Interpretation
passion, not the democratic
passion."34

This is to say that

with

modern

aristocrats partake of no classical virtue.

These discontented

aristoi would replace

with classical or scriptural virtue.

prosperity "The central idea that

an ethics

virtue, but

not

animates

the natural

aristocracy
not on

of our

time is
or

autonomy,"

moral
law.35

based

on will and

rights,

custom, piety,
considers

For

such

men,

political

liberty

as we

have it

(Barber

it

a combination of quasi-political and nonpolitical

liberty)

has lost its allure,

which

as

any

halfway
or a

house must; they "forget the

with

alternative

is

totalitarianism36

they imagine,
own

Barber,

a Utopian alternative.

Their
stem

egalitarianism no

is "but

weapon"

used against
sake."37

oligarchs, "and

can

from

love

of

equality for its

(Here Licht

assumes that our

aristoi

think consistently, an assumption permissible

more

for nothing
the

than

that.) In attempting
which oppose

to

win

aristocracy "undermines the

tastes,"

middle class's

drawing but the hearts the democrats, confidence by imposing its [the
paradigm
of

for

aristocracy's]
cline

those aspects of

democratic taste that in de

democrats to tolerate
with

oligarchs.38

The

aristoi would supplant oligarchic

mocracy Even

"aristocratic

democracy,"

socialism.

Unfortunately,
do something find that they have
with

socialists

in

power

cannot solve the

problem

of wealth. must

socialist economies produce some

wealth,

and rulers

being
the

rulers

it.

Having

acquired control of as

the

means of

production,

they

followed,

it

were

inadvertently,

bourgeois king's

scorned advice: crats

they have

enriched

themselves. Aristocrats who remain aristo

in this

circumstance are purged generations as the

by

their bourgeoisified comrades, only to

scions of the once-new oligarchs.
of

reappear

in future

dissident

Licht

concludes with prescriptions put

modestly in the form

questions,

not exhortations.

Is it both desirable
and,

and possible to

break the grip

of

this idea [moral autonomy]

time?39

if so,

on what

intellectual basis? Is this the

central question of our

These

are questions one might not expect editor of

to see in a book titled Political Parties

in the Eighties. But the

this book has a classical aristocrat's taste

for things beyond today's

atmosphere.

34Licht "Three 35Licht "Three 36Licht "Three "Licht "Three '"Licht "Three 39Licht "Three

Parties,'

'P- 93'P- 87.

P-

Parties,'

Parties,'

89.

Parties,'

P- 91Parties,'

P- 92.
Parties,'

'P-

96.

ERRATA

a number of misprints.

Professor Motzkin's article, On Halevi's Kuzari Corrections follow:

for line

as a

Platonic Dialogue,
120,
note 1

contained

unfortunately

p.
passim

for

nasr

reaa1 nasr

Haver,
The

haver
read

din

din dhalil

Haver, haver
Our
aim p.

dhalil
120,
note

p. p.
p.

1 12,

10

aim

5
2

jujaj
aqns'sni

hujaj
aqna'anl
cause

113, line 9 114, line 14 114, bottom

hama'seh
yuhaqqiqun

hama'seh
yuhaqqiqun
p.

121

line

Cuase
esoteric add cf.

p.
p.

hujjaj
tslst
suhbsti

hujjaj
tslst
suhbatl

p.

121, line 15

exoteric
,

115, line

end of note

below.

n.

23,

end.

p.

121,

note 12

nawamis
read nawamis

p.

117, line 4

from bottom
p.

shari'ah

shsn'sh

darura Mehqere

darura Mehqere
greater

117, line

from bottom
p.

hujja
the good

hujja
virtue

p.

121, 122,

note

14 19

greatest

119 bottom
120,
note

p.

note

fadl

fadl

p.

dalil

dalil dhalil
p.

tshqlq
122,
note 22

tahqiq
adarr

dhalil
khazari
ta'lif

adarr

khazari
ta'lif
end of note

matma' matma'

24
27

add

hujja dalil

hujja
dalil fi
p.

Migne, Pat. Lat. CXCIX, 652B.

al-mutawahhid
read al-mutawshhid

124,

note

for

fi

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