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Copyright 1985
Interpretation
Philosophy
Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy. By Leo Strauss and others, with an in troduction by Thomas L. Pangle. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
264
pp.:
cloth,
$25.00.)
I
This
collection of essays was arranged
by
Leo Strauss
a year
in
1973.
Thirteen
of
Only
complete
bibliography
of
Strauss's
writings appears
back.
we are and
Again
indebted to Joseph
wishes so
faithfully
puzzle order
arising from the fact that the essays were placed in and given the title, "Studies in Platonic Political
additions
Philosophy,"
by
Strauss
himself. Two
had
also
been
contemplated
by
the author
a chapter on
Plato's Gorgias
tion would
and an
introduction. Neither
essays on
was written.
Husserl,
Machiavelli,
among others,
be Platonic
studies.
prepared at
up for this lack, a long introduc Cropsey's request by Thomas Pangle, known for To
make explain
Plato
and
less than
a comprehensive analysis of
Strauss's follower
over
teaching
Pangle tries to
the
manner
in
which
Strauss became
of
the
of
Socrates described
by
Starting
turn
with
Plato's doctrine
natural
ideas, he
and
explains
how Strauss
Socrates'
from
philosophy
resurrects political
the
philosophic
and
ready to
shake that
Pangle is forced
and revelation
to cope
the
mortal
by faith
philosopher or theologian.
by any other antirelicontrary to the gious bias of modern philosophy and science, Pangle tries nonetheless to find a Socratic justification for philosophy's continued existence, and hence for
a threat more
powerfully
by
Strauss than
Accepting
this argument, so
Strauss's "Studies in Platonic Political These are the highest highpoints of Pangle's
Philosophy."
complex
exposition,
with
and we must of
be
grateful
for his
willingness
to
undertake a
task so
fraught
difficulties
298
Interpretation
interpretation. In
fact,
assisted
by his
numerous cross-references,
found
myself
critical
asperity The Claremont Review of Books. Does Pangle, as Jaffa charges, drastic underestimate Strauss's interest in political action? Does he so far abandon ally Strauss's position as to adopt an Epicureanism that under modern conditions
with which
disagreeing with the analysis. But I was unprepared for the Harry Jaffa greeted Pangle's essay in the Fall of 1984
issue
of
must
lead to nihilism, thus promoting the extremes of both corruption and tyr anny? And is Jaffa right in claiming that Strauss's lifework was primarily aimed
at
rescuing
from
modern political
theory? that
he fa
vored
placing
classical
political philosophy?
that he actually
shared
Yehuda Halevy's
passionate
interest
asser
in morality
and consequent
longing
for
revelation?
be found in Pangle's
of opinion about
Differences
Strauss's teaching
from many
sources:
from its complexity, from its having unfolded over time to some degree, from differences of emphasis required for different circumstances, from the interests
and capacities of opinion
can assume
that differences of
between
like Pangle
and of
and
Jaffa, however
But
unfortunate
in
some
ways,
us re
will prove
instructive
helpful in
others.
where shall we
begin? Let
body
the
Most
of
its
essays
he has dealt
with
Mai
to
be
added an
Machiavelli Husserl
and one on
the natu
ral
law,
By
and
last
of
the fifteen
on
deal
one
little treated
elsewhere: with
and
Heidegger,
the
Hermann Cohen, on the other. The same is true of the essay on hand, Nietzsche, and of at least the part of "Jerusalem and analyzing the Bi ble. All these have the special interest that comes from novelty.
Athens"
While the
ceptions
order of
to this rule.
is generally chronological, there are some ex The first chapter is clearly meant to demonstrate the failure
the chapters
and
of modern
dialogues, the philosophy directly most important of which by far is the Apology of Socrates. After this, the chapter on the gods in Thucydides is perhaps be slightly out of chronological order
chapters enter political
philosophy Platonic
the
need
origins.
The
next
two
through three
Evil,
Notes,
appears
in
what might
be
called
book.
II
Before
modern political
ters a coma
philosophy becomes moribund, and, so to speak, en in the twentieth century, it suffuses the world of action and becomes
Philosophy
299
Marx, Nietsche
Hegel. He
Heidegger to
happens to historicist
philosophies after
ends
these remarks somewhat darkly: "One is inclined to say that Heidegger has learned the lesson of 1933 more thoroughly than any other man. Surely he leaves
no place whatever
for
philosophy."
political
"Let
us,"
fantastic hopes,
Husserl"
more to
be
expected
from
visionaries
(34). Now
by
"fantastic
hopes"
here he certainly
the
view of
the
future he had
ascribed
life facilitated
marked
by
just before to Heidegger, anticipating a new era in human the combined efforts of the thinkers of East and West, and
hopes"
by
as well to the
of
the
future he had
we
ascribed
By
what peculiar
inversion,
which modern
philosophy originates entirely visionary as it works its way through historicism toward existentialism? "Fantastic may be the natural consequence of false oversimplification a realism which begins by reducing man to certain masquerading as
hopes"
"realism"
may ask, does the realism with in Machiavelli, Bacon and Descartes turn
of
ends
by
making
itself impossible.
seems
Husserl's thought
or science
that is
not
historically
determined. For
purposes of
action,
however,
cannot
future, by
conduct of
Weltanschau-
kind
of
historically
Having
rested
variable wisdom
in the
life that
comes expansive.
serl seems and
to have
instead
on assumptions
liberalism. He did
in
on the
Weltanschauungen,
the
political conditions
isting
after
diversity
so
side
by
side.
Husserl's
concern
1933, but he
"ideas"
necessary to their ex for the fate of philosophy grew were stronger than the "empirical
beings"
powers,"
in the
"those
who are
con
tradition."
tented
with
the
refers
to the persecution
not ob
beginning of philosophy as
archetypal.
ject, as well he might have, to the implicit likening of Nazi Germany to Periclean Athens, and of the fate of philosophy in both. Instead, he calls for examining the
political
conflict
between
Husserlian generally
philosophy
understood.
and
the
alternative
to
it
way
presumably "the
of
tradition,"
indicating the original and perennial character of the conflict between phi losophy and the opinion-based sphere of politics. He is beckoning the reader to
move
nings
beyond the
of
assumptions of philosophy.
Enlightenment With
an
and
political philosophy in support for the his and its near- absence Nazis, engendering of even the effects and conditions of his own phi in Husserl, enfeebling his grasp losophy, the stage is set for a new look at the ancients.
political
absence
Heidegger
capable of
300
Interpretation
of
Strauss's treatment
as
Plato's
Apology begins
to the text
and
on
the next
page.
One is amazed,
usual,
pointed
observation and
close
inference, but
somewhat
disap
and
conclu
sions of
deals, in
History and What is Political Phi his introduction, with the threat posed by faith
piety"
hearkening
(p.
21).
Socrates
does, in fact, portray his public philosophizing Delphic god, but the evidence in the dialogue
hearkening."
as a mission commanded
by
the
As Strauss
indicates, it
was
hardly
he,
supports
wiser
than
and who
chooses,
on
his
own, the
route of
(41-42).
of
taking
excuse
Socrates'
favor keeps
such confrontations
morally irresponsi
ever repeated
them,
nor
drawing
By confounding his victims with his questions, the conclusion that we human beings only know that we
gives
After this, he
wisdom
is
more than
our
the insight
norance of virtue
into the
the
worthlessness of
human
wisdom"
(45)
that
is, into
ig
most
process of
exhorting
people to
consists chiefly in exhorting people to vir he lets them believe they already know what
already implicit
cast
doubt on the possibility that virtue could ignorance? From the outset, then, the Platonic
to traditional piety, tradi
Socrates
presents a
deep
or explicit challenge
tional politics
can
and even
little
be
replaced
by knowledge,
of
If philosophy
set
proves
incapable
making
progress
from this
point
the
for tradition's re-entry into this vacuum with a vengeance. Jaffa seems unwilling to admit that Strauss, as a follower of this Soc rates we are not discussing his relation to Aristotle yet is essentially like
stage
Socrates. Jaffa
tional moral
"traditional
piety"
and
"tradi
philosophy,"
philosophy divorced from the morality of 'the Bible and Greek (p. 20, col. 2). But Strauss's study of the Apology the anchor of these "studies in Platonic po
philosophy'
"questionable
status of
"
litical
philosophy"
reveals a
Socrates
whose
"traditional
piety"
interests do Strauss
as spirit
life Jaffa
should man
considers so vital to
added
himself.
By
Jaffa's
logic, Socrates
not
be
yearning for
the best of
"believers."
But is this
to
mis-
contrue
Even
Pangle,
who
Philosophy
301
fullness
of
Strauss,
speaks
too
loosely
in referring to
to
Socrates'
"new
hearkening
to the
voice of authoritative
piety."
According
to the city
two ways:
pirations
pected
Pangle,
of
the
new or mature
Socrates
of
The
Apology
admits
his
"idiosyncratic"
and
life has to be "justified according to standards acceptable way its moral-religious (14). He tells us Socrates does this in
beliefs"
first, by claiming that as a gadfly he recalled the city to its highest as (to virtue, presumably); second, by claiming "that his life is the unex summit of human and offering to the city the life of the philos
existence"
opher
(or
"noble image in
speech of that
life")
as
the "otherwise
can
unrecognized
standard"
in the light
of which moral
disagreements
to the
be
questions clarified.
ever came
claim
to pass in the city than my this he does say that virtue cities,
and
god"
meaning his
virtue
"gadfly"
function
of
spurring them to
of
(30a). In
support of
the perfection
for in
man"
dividuals
and
the source of
"money
things to the
(29d,e;
other good
30b).
And
we
to
(38a). But
second
justification
Pangle's judgment
might
be
as a studied
explicitly appears in the dialogue, however valid it inference from what does transpire there, or as a transcrip
never
tion
of what
Strauss
says elsewhere.
It's
a claim
Socrates
never
makes,
and
is in
no position to make.
So the
city,
and
"gadfly"
claim
is
justifying
the gadfly is
said
to be sent
by
is
on a religious mission
that becomes
a public good
he engages in is therefore understood as essentially a with done others, aiming at the mutual improvement of their activity, direction of souls in the virtue, and of benefit to individuals and the city of Athens alike. Most important, and most surprising to us, philosophy as the open
inquiry into
forms
than
all
things,
or even
into
all
human things,
including
political
things,
physics or politics
is
made
derstood
tue.
also
having to prove,
this search
The
this point
is to
give
for
to democratize it
through the
all men.
impression that it
can
be
undertaken and
by
After this it
comes as a
distinct
shock to
hear
fully
about virtue
audience of
departure from
they
take
for
granted
(38a).
Otherwise,
part. mission
the
positive part of
his
mission
finds him
being
less
offensive
tions
testing knowledge
us
in the first in
Socrates'
Let
frankly
acknowledge
something
extravagant
gen-
302
erally.
Interpretation
Someone
who
be
made
to examine their
own
lives,
ac
actually improve in virtue is extremely impolitic in tively the precise sense of the word. He does not seem to realize that the virtue or cor ruption of large bodies of men is a function of the political regime and its condi
search
for virtue,
tion,
rather
by
and
apparent
difficulty by
two
consider
One is the very politic recognition that democratic Athens lacks the ca pacity for dedicating itself to virtue. He seems also to have decided against at as an aristocratic activity in tempting to justify his activity as fit only for a few
Justification before the city democratic appeal "alike to rich and
some sense.
men
of
Athens
seems
to require an
inherently
of all
poor"
(33b)
and
hence
calling
by
philosopher seems
to
city,
as an
Athenian, just
51).
as a general
he does in accepting
the authority of
its laws
tentiality
times, independent
independence of, and even superiority to, the city is another sion Socrates leaves for philosophy. He himself is sent on his
the city acknowledges as its superior, and is guided
the impres
mission
by
being
He
view,
by
his Saifioviov
in
as well.
impudently
challenges
the knowledge
public
and establishes
his
to a standard of
nian.
verbal rather
battle. He
appeals
He looks down
life,
refuses
in the injustices constantly required by political life, and will not be intimidated by the threat of death itself if the price is abandoning philosophic examination. He
as even assumes a certain anticipates
superiority to the
greatest of
those
dwelling
in Hades,
nervier
he
It
subjecting them to
move
similar examination: at
the end
he is
from the
concern
for
virtue
to a
concern
for
politics,
step
at
his trial. In
keeping
with
do in their writings, but Socrates does not take this the nature of democratic Athens, virtue, while
pursuit, like
wealth.
urged on all at
the god's
And
philos
ophy,
rather
as
than in the
stood will
derive
the part
pher's close
of
or under the earth. Respect for philosophy thus under from piety on the part of the many, or a love of virtue on the few. But preserving this respect seems to depend on the philoso
heavens
either
walking
tightrope
to
impiety,
venturing observably in his expression or too much into politics. Such philosophy to
emerge.
neither
too
restrictions
guidance
will make of
it difficult for
Even direct
beyond,
and
litical
impartiality
required
for the
circumscribed area
in
which
he
can
safely How
operate.
by limiting it to
Philosophy
in
303
a passage
defense is this?
According to Plutarch,
Plato
gave
studies,
including
the
He did this
by
the sterling
reputation of
his
life,
and
by
his
having
"subjected
principles"
cellent
(Nicias,
23).
natural necessity to divine and more ex Strauss himself puts it even more strongly. What
defense
of
philosophy has been required "always and everywhere, whatever the have been"? It is: "In satisfying the city that the philosophers are
atheists, that
they do
not
desecrate everything
sacred
they
reverence what
they
are not
they
are not
irresponsible
but
p.
zens"
126).
was
By
city's
defense
inadequate. If he fended
off
with
the the
charge of
impiety,
he
his dissatisfaction
with
worldly
pursuits and
injustices,
and,
above
all,
the claims
of
its
politi
cians,
wanted
to
do
more
wanted
to make
clear,
of
once and
the city's
approbation or
itself, Socrates may have used a novel shock treatment, public examination, softened, to some extent, by its subsequent restriction to the search for virtue. And he may have used his death as he used his
even admiration of
life. We
always remember
three things
about
talking back to the city, even somewhat defiantly; and his obediently drinking the hemlock. After Plato, political societies would concede unlimited scope to a So
cratic
philosophy that
the
supported
the rule of
divine
principle
in the universe,
affirmed
dignity
of
the city
itself,
partisanship by weighing impartially the claims of the parti themselves. Only in modern times were the political prerequisites of philos
removed
ophy completely
by
and
liberalism.
Ill
As Strauss observes, the Apology tells us nothing about philosophy, on the basis of which he was already accounted
phon
Socrates'
pre-Delphic
wise.
For Chaere
and this was
had
asked
the oracle
whether anyone
is
wiser
than
Socrates,
before Socrates began publicly questioning one and all. Against the background provided by Strauss's Socrates and Aristophanes Pangle assumes that the earlier
,
"pre-Socratic"
Socrates
Clouds
was
the
philosopher
ridiculed
in
Aristophanes'
The
for undermining the social conditions necessary to philoso says of the soul, and for atheism. "The new ignorance phy, for and political psychological prudence that Aris Pangle, "has learned the lesson in
ridiculed
Socrates,"
tophanes
sought
to teach. He has
on
recognized
his
manifold
dependence (both
(15). As the
erotic and
calculative)
those
304
Interpretation
accounting for Socrates's interest in human things,
"erotic"
means of
and
hence his
Hiero,"
origi
"calculative"
and nating political philosophy, those curious words to be made much clearer. In his "Restatement on Xenophon's
need
Strauss
combination of
and attach
to
them,
experienced
by the philosopher.
is
also a
his
philosophic
detach
things
ment, the philosopher has only to show respect for the religion and
other
dear to the
on others
being who not only depends While wishing to mitigate the evils all men experience, he naturally "cannot help being more attached to his and will "give advice to his family and city than to city or to other rul ers. Since all advice of this kind presupposes comprehensive reflections which as
city.
But the
philosopher
human
but has
a natural concern
for
all men.
strangers,"
business
of
the philosopher,
he
must
a political
philosopher"
ment
(What Is Political Philosophy?, 120, 118-26). The special attach experienced by the philosopher is to well-ordered souls, and particularly to
be
perfected
through philosophy.
social side of
Finding
and
teaching
is his
natural
love
the
his love
of wisdom.
Pangle
concludes
phizing
by drawing
One is
upon
his discussion (17, 18) of the nature of Socratic philoso Strauss's distinction (in another essay from the same
earlier) between two
meanings of
volume, but
losophy."
"political
phi
philosophy that
represent
as
its
subject. of
They
is politic, the other philosophy that has politics different views of why the philosopher turns to the
of opinion out of which
study it had to
human things. At
reflect upon
the sphere
demonstrate just why it was necessary to human life. This meant showing that "the well-being of the political community depends decisively on the study of
philosophy"
(What Is
93),
which
in turn,
addressed as
it
was
to citizens, re
quired an
litical
life."
understanding of political things "exactly as they are understood in po So the deeper meaning of political philosophy is the first rather than
the second.
political
These two essays, back to back in the same volume, give different accounts of philosophy, but they share the principle that philosophy is higher than The
a
earlier account allows whose main
political philosophy.
Pangle to
emphasize a
Socrates
remains philosophy proper Strauss) life is essentially solitary. On the other side, as if to overcompensate, we have Jaffa insisting that Strauss's life work aimed mainly at redeeming mod ern political practice that it was more concerned with political benefit than with anything else. Consequently, as Jaffa tends to regard him, Strauss remains
and whose closer
(and, by implication,
interest
in
spirit
to Aristotle's political
teaching
than to either
Socrates
or
Plato.
not
called
Platonic,
Aristotelian,
tioning
political philosophy?
as
inquiry,
distinguished from Plato, limited the ques both with respect to its beginning and its
and
(Natural Right
and
Man,
21).
This
effort
Philosophy
more
305
political, naturally led to
an
in
interest in the
Now the
political
subjects
facing
most
states
of
Strauss
range
from the
immedi
ately
remotely
Xenophon's Anabasis) to the only Book of Knowledge) The first essay deals with highly abstract thinkers, Heidegger and Husserl, but against the background of modern politics in general and Hitler in particular. The last ends a difficult ex
account of so
.
amination of
Jews
under
Hitler
a reflection on
range of considerations
from the
most practical
by
Strauss
of
the term
questions,
of moral
ity,
are
beyond it
action.
so
preserving the Aristotelian closeness to political because of the theoretical problems that must be
the phi
faced today or on more general grounds is not clear. Strauss's rejoinder to Kojeve about the detachment losopher is
of course
and attachment of
intended to apply to himself. The practical motive of help men can, in great crises, supplant philosophy itself. Sometimes the other ing cause of philosophy and the cause of the nonphilosophers coincide, and so it was for Strauss in the his last
word
to Kojeve
is
a call
for the
against communism
with
the
help
of philosophers
patibility
one, the
of
dispositions, it is
harming
no
in himself
per
haps
more
ing
the
combination
is the
unique
function
of political
philosophy (15,
to
col. 2). so ex
If so, Strauss's
studies must
have themselves
developing
on
traordinary
an appreciation of political
greatness,
military,
the part
of one whose
customary
engaged
actions consisted of
turning
in
an armchair.
The West is
philosophy,
in
to preserve
liberty, decency,
time, it is
un modern rational
religion and
every
crisis
element of civilization.
At the
same
dergoing
principles
an
intellectual
by
which
its
confidence
in the
that
have
made
it
what
it is has been
badly
shaken.
Pangle's introduc
tion does understate Strauss's interest in these overarching and intertwined issues of our time, as Jaffa charges, and, perhaps for similar reasons, the Aristotelian
element
in his
teaching.
and more
it is
pos
sible
to
collect
from Strauss's
survival of
the
his
concern
for the
West") is so often in the forefront of Strauss's attention that it has been Perhaps this fact, along with his decision to con repeatedly discussed by others.
sis of the
centrate
single-mindedly
on
caused
Pangle to
ne
glect
Strauss's
long
philosophy, past
and present.
306
His
the
Interpretation
is
much more on
emphasis
solution
Strauss
arrived at
than on
long
way to
it. Nor
would
then,
expect
ested
in the
today
of a revival of
losophy that is, in a coming together of the two issues. By contrast, Jaffa never lets us lose sight of these active
sophical concerns of the present ment of
Strauss's
and ours.
Accordingly his
Strauss's
legacy
logy
can
of
stirring commentary on his marvellous eu Jaffa offers has problems of its own. One
that "Strauss's entire
work pointed
conviction
of
toward
the
modern world
from the
consequences of
toward"
the
philosophy"
theory
of modern
at,"
(14,
col. 2).
If "pointed
means
"primarily aimed
Strauss's time, the
of or statement crisis of
mark.
Jaffa draws
attention
to
(at the
beginning
is
what
of
The
the
West"
impels
to turn to the
thought
of
classical antiquity.
And Strauss certainly does want to help guide the the modern world. But what motivates him is the wish not simply to do this, even to save the West: it is to discover the true principles required for the human life generally
principles that must
"practice"
guidance of
necessarily be
and
related
Repeatedly
constantly,
philosophy is understood by Strauss as the effort to gain knowledge of the most important things, and especially of the whole (What is Political Philosophy?
,
39).
crucial
"core
of
philosophy
or rather
losophy,' "
opening
the West
a new
nal
out
to philosophy generally
as
20).
The
crisis of
is the
crisis of all of
basis to
,
such,
and comes
down to this:
modern
philosophy
logic to
undermine
itself,
thus
by
modern
philosophy for
began,
and whether
it
philosophical even
before it is
practi
It includes but
beyond Jaffa's
concern
current political
guidance,
however
It is
to
claim
be
un
derstood,
false
rightfully
at
least in
one of
as a refutation of all
those
modern
exercising
review
theirs"
(16,
col. 1).
beginning of Jaffa's
dwelled
on
the im
portance of the
Declaration
of
derstanding
sage
of
America's
present
Independence for Lincoln, and for Strauss's un intellectual plight as well. But the quoted pas
is
adverse to
has
Lincoln,
untrue of
impolitic in itself. It suggests, if it does not say, that the true political philosophy held by Strauss wants to see the gentlemen of the modern world "ex an authority of which ercising the authority that is rightfully they have
and
theirs"
Strauss
been
stripped
by "false
theories"
modern
of
of classical
modern) political
Philosophy
307
universal
is to deny that what is abstractly best has deed any necessary applicability in a particular set
losophy
applicability
or
in
of circumstances. of wisdom
Moreover,
was much
as
basic to the
theirs?"
Again,
authority in all time and places, and hence that has any direct applicability to the United States whatsoever, whether involving philosophers, gentlemen, or anyone else. So the notion of allowing
of political
gentlemen
rightfully
American
theirs"
is in
It
principle
in
classical principle
entirely
ungermane to
and
politics.
raises
the spec
unin
tre of
a shock
is surely
tended
Crisis of the House Divided. In this country, the idea of the gentleman as a person
the the
end of
by
of
education survived
with and perhaps
aristocracy,
and was
democracy Today little remains of even the attenu ated form of that idea, a gentleman with good manners or politeness. identifying Consequently, attempts to revive the term and the institution of "the risk being interpreted as restoration of something alien and dangerous to democ racy. Adding notions of rightful political authority would conjure up images of
that
"rightfully"
beneficial to
belongs to
such persons.
gentleman
and
could
do
more
harm to Strauss's
with a regime
legacy
is to
than to cause
it, however
was
unintentionally, to be linked
overthrow.
the
American Revolution
intended to
If classical
political
philosophy
a practice
formed
by
modern political
philosophy
a
it
cannot
directly
ideas. If
city
or nation
midstream principle.
antithetical.
This is itself
a classical
Jaffa's study of Lincoln already provides the guideline: to perpetuate our po litical institutions, the master statesman must make use of powerful political ele ments at hand, like the spirit of liberty and the spirit of Christianity. The classical
spirit and
its kindred
elements
remain
among
us
same
strength.
The
assistance
furnished It
by
classical political
fore be
inspire
of another sort.
suggest
can provide
standing,
the
by
liberal
democracy,
and
It
can
supply
an additional
incentive to
revive
those notions of
the
founding
fathers
liberty
forbids
to
republican government.
But Lincoln's
direct
attack on
the
of
principle of natural
political
defense
this
principle
most
part,
remains
rights underlying such government. The is simply that it is the source of much good and the intellectual life-blood of the nation. Even "in
still accept and subsist on much of
who reject
its form
its
content.
308
Interpretation
much others political
But however
within
"modern
again
practice"
fall away from it, the defenders of all that is good will, like Lincoln, remain ever faithful to it,
understanding better than
anyone else
while
like Lincoln
its
possible stand
politics.
IV
Now let
changes us
look
little
what as
more
closely
of
at what preceded
calls
Socrates "the
and
the
he
wrought
problem of
Socrates."
Philosophy
few
on
gan when a
men questioned
ties,
ture"
and
insisted
things
looking,
causes of
as
particularly for the originating causes of all things, or for "na the first things. Strauss's account of this beginning of philosophy, this
very discovery of nature (Ch. 3 in Natural Right) is certainly among the most amazing and far-reaching of his reflections. It forms the background of what he
calls conventionalism
the first
philosophical view of
justice
on
and
the city, ac
agreement or
cording to Pangle
which
they
an
only
human
convention.
gives
extensive
description
(6,
er
Pangle's
own philos
some
form
of
Epicureanism
(18,
col.
2, to 19,
col. 2).
This
is
inadvertently
have
encouraged
by
Pangle's direct
mode of expression
there,
Jaffa
whose views
he
was expressing.
pointed out
possible confusion
for the
in Strauss. Instead, he presses home the charge of Epicureanism against Pangle and sounds the full alarm. Under modern conditions, he insists, Epicure
anism of
necessarily points in the direction of Hugh Hefner, nihilism and the tyr that is, the worst evils of the modern world. Whether Hitler and Stalin
an
interesting question,
defense
and
but
of virtue ples
(6,
devotion to Socratic
suffice to
free
any Epicureanism
of and
at all.
forms,
in the
process
opinions.
Whatever the
varieties of pre-Socratic
philosophy,
they
all seem
to
have
of a world and
language,
whence
that
have
to explain
they
came
(3,
5),
or
they
are parts.
excellence"
cause par
(City
and
The "class, or the class character, is the Man, 19). Now this is. the view Strauss ex-
Philosophy
will
309
make
have to
their
own
pre-Socratic philosophers
be
able
to
also
note, beyond
what
is
said
above, that
of
discovering just
remains
away from them all to the study Was it for a theoretical reason
human things
readily known than the natural ing the whole (Pangle emphasizes
23)?
or
for example, because human things are more things, or because they are the key to understand
knowing
pp.
Or
was
it for
a practical reason
such as
justifying
because
all
knowledge is the
have
basis in
in different
a clear
places of
by
Pangle
(e.g., 8,
able
to form
idea
their relation to each other and order of priority. the turn to the forms and the turn to the study of
as one and
We
Pangle
not
human things
together,
(4-6) follows the former alternative, as Strauss usually does too. But it is that clear from the Phaedo and Parmenides, and at least once Strauss himself
and Aristophanes ,
(Socrates
the
logic
by
which
4) Strauss
to be
suggests moves
from
noting
the
class
character
of
things
them
their eldog
to
having
dialectically,
is
said about
needs
elaborated
by us
step-by-step.
We
want
to be sure
we can
fully justify
Are
all
what
them (Natural
we see
Right, 123-24)
wrapped
that
is,
political.
the things
of
in
city-formed
opinion,
as
in
political
become
an object of
by
virtue of
need of already-formed
theoretical philosophy to
it
arose
92),
and
before
which
it
must
justify
to
itself? Or do the
an
about
good
life
somehow
have
independent
either on
their own or
not attribute
in
response
conventionalism?
Why is it
that Strauss
what
Socrates'
himself does
turn to his
directly
of
life,
or
Ischomachos,
in that dialogue
of
Xenophon's Strauss
not what
in
discovering
in the
the good
Socratic discourse, he is inter life is but what the perfect gentleman The biggest
question seems
is
and
context of
household
management.
concealed
in
what at
(Xenophon's So
cratic
Discourse,
27-28).
Was it important
by implying
a possible
of
life
the
one
it
provides?
V
Of the
essays
in this volume,
all except
that on The
Apology presume,
without
In-
justly
preoccupies
Pangle in his
310
Interpretation
The explicitly closest to the center of Platonic political philos dealing with Plato's Crito and Euthydemus. Crito's presence is
others
traduction.
ophy the link between them, but the former seems as serious as the latter seems frivo lous. In the Crito, Socrates argues Crito into accepting his refusal to escape from
prison with and
are those
his
help
and
therefore
magnifies
after
farcically
pupil of us
interrogations, Socra
eristic
two
insuperably
to
brothers.
was
And Strauss
the
only
by
reminding
that, according
Socrates, it
the
phy.
The figure
of
Com
of paring him with Xenophon is one of the main reasons for Strauss's treatment 2Soc "Jerusalem and the latter's Anabasis (1 1 13, 119, 128, 135). In
Athens,"
rates's mission
is
compared and
prophets
(167-73). Nietz
and
sche's
Beyond Good
Evil is
understood as an attack on
Plato
Socrates for
the sake of freeing philosophy from the illusions of reason, truth, goodness and nature. And the final appearance is in connection with Machiavelli's attack on
the political teachings Socrates engendered
sists
(210-11,
227-28).
So Strauss
per
in
keeping
him
life,
of the attacks
coming from
revelation.
philosophy,
of the
which
from
one
instance to
With the
help
of
account of
his
suggests
the
impossibility
he corrects Socrates by adding a political from his nonharming view of justice and virtue. He of Nietzsche's accomplishing what he sets out to do
"ascent,"
without self-contradiction.
He explicitly criticizes the narrowing of horizon and Machiavelli's philosophy its entirely novel look. But "Jerusa
ends
lem
Athens"
and
The
great alternative
well
on much
in the
volume, going
clared
beyond this
Strauss, Pangle
tells us, de
in 1965 that ever since his first work on Spinoza (1930) "the theological(19). It involves political problem has remained the theme of my
investigations"
of
Western Civilization
on
demands to be the ruling principle of life, dominating every part of life, from politics downward. Is this conflict essentially the same as that between Greek poetry, speaking in the name
and philosophy.
Each
its
own
of
divine wisdom,
and
Greek
philosophy?
Pangle
says yes
no
(Claremont Review 17, 18), and here Jaffa's position at once looks stronger. But does it completely overcome the central point in Pangle's? Let us go from one to
the other. In "Jerusalem and
Athens,"
Strauss has
and
occasion
ing
of
philosophers, and
gulf
he does
so
in
such a
way
between the
poets
and philosophers
is
much
less
considerable
and the
Philosophy
for
-311
Moreover,
we could
be
excused
having
cratic
of nature
counted
inability
philosophy (pre-Socratic and Socratic, Greek and modern) to defeat Biblical monotheism. Strauss's argument to this effect is most fully presented in
two places: in "The Mutual
Influence
Bible
of
Theology
book
the
on
Philosophy"
and
(1954),
and
the
new
introduction
says:
to
his
re-published
are
Strauss drama
"Philosophy
and
alternatives or
of
the human
soul"
(1
14).
also
true that if
and
we
lay less
stress on
something like
makers of
the gods
report, these
point
are remarkably similar is that miracles, revelations, prophecies have their place in the one as in the other, thereby rendering them comparable, and thus accounting for the epigraph from Avicenna that Strauss uses in his work on Plato's Laws: "the treatment of
look instead to the divine things they in the Greek and Biblical worlds. Pangle's
Viewed in this way, the prophecy and the Divine Law is contained in the Bible may have brought to perfection in a reality or possibility rather gener knowally known before. This implies that the apparent differences in power and
. .
Laws."
gods and
describing
make
do
not suffice
to
them
"god,"
beings
action, is
in both. It is
superior of
this comparability that the view Socrates or Plato had formed of the gods
might
well
as
Avicenna,
and
Strauss,
to suggest in
In
capsule
form, Strauss's
view of
Bible is this.
of
Philosophy
must admit
it
the
impossibility of the
the
world.
God
Rev
miracles,
elation
is therefore life
choice of of
philosophic
life
erence, resting
on an act of
shows
case, philosophy
faith (in reason) rather than on reason per se. In this itself inconsistent with its own distinctive claims to be
ing
life,
while
faith
itself. So To
philosophy
Pangle it
might
victory to
this
revelation.
the compelling
character of
demonstration,
for
poses a grave
be
posed
is
overcome
difficulty by Strauss's
quoted
philosophy.
To Jaffa
whatever
difficulty
Greek
support of
Jewish orthodoxy
and
philosophy
the
together.
Pangle had
Strauss's in
being
potential
believer
a remark made
connection with
Halevi's far
objection to
philosophy
recognizes
Strauss'."
on moral grounds.
Jaffa does
not think
he
goes
enough:
"Pangle
He
means
is moral, but not that it may be the same defense of Jewish orthodoxy as
312
Halevi
Interpretation
that
both,
as
"moral
man,"
are potential
ground"
believers. In
fact,
Jaffa
claims
Socratic
phy
and
skepticism
is the "rational
col.
for both
2),
quence,
latter
the former:
appeal
"would
2).
revelat
(20,
col.
what
intends
by
this
seeming
route
submission
of
philosophy
to
whether
is
not
outcome of the
Pangle does
to take. In the
stead of
faith
and
philosophy in favor
of one or
other, Pangle
for
finding
a means
whereby philosophy
without who
can continue
in
good conscience
that the
is, consistently
"mature"
Pangle
claims
it
was
Socrates
first
quences were
count of
things"
for philosophy of its inability to produce "a (22). He suggests, without directly saying,
that
Socrates found
faith."
philosophy would not be arbitrary if the philosopher He must kept seriously examining the "phenomena and the arguments of fuller and show he has a ac strongest claims of the both scrutinize the faithful,
Choosing
count of
experiences:
his dialogue
with
the faithful
clear
human
soul and
its longings. It is
not
perfectly
from Pangle's
revelation at
its intention is to
save
philosophy, hold
bay,
having
thus
brought his
which
victory for philosophy by another route. Nevertheless, inquiry into Strauss's Platonic political philosophy to a
consistency, Pangle
proceeds
conclusion
by
it
to apply
Strauss's
essays
in this
volume.
The
Socratic
examination of
faith
or
piety is
what
theme
holding fully
the
fifteen
essays
together,
and
he
by indicating
the
to this theme.
Stated
more
losopher devote
spokesmen
much
"painstaking,
critical examination of
intelligent
for,
and students
poety."
Yet this is
hardly
the
true
of
is there but
"critical"
not the
examination,
and
Euthydemus do
where
even
The
Apology
same
piety is
of great
importance
kind
does
which
"critically."
is
largely
refers
to the gods
of critical
Thucydides'
examination of
own
fol
lowed
by
certain
101).
But it is
all conducted
plane:
it
never questions
the
gods
just,
phon
or
Similarly,
the essay on to
Xenophon
makes
much mention of
leading
purpose seems
the military
whole, and
Philosophy
-313
his teacher, Socrates. His apparent belief in the gods so man is again not subject to deeper critical examination.
one not
vital
to the
political
Even the essay on Nietzsche has a primary purpose anterior to the theological Pangle emphasizes. It is properly placed after "Jerusalem and but
Athens,"
and surpasses
biblical thought in
some critical
respect,"
explaining (24). He himself notes that Strauss introduces Beyond Good and Evil as Nietzsche's (and hence modern phi
surmises
without
Pangle
losophy's) final
attack on
Socratic
se.
and
After completely
denying help
reason's access
to the
and to nature
itself,
while also of a
rejecting
the
Bible,
Nietzsche tries to
deify
man
lated to that
of
cation of
atheism
But Nietzsche
and
could
only be
unless
to
is true,
it
cannot
be true
his
is
false,
ward
since atheism
itself
requires them.
At least this is
Strauss implies to
a problem
has become
study
of
and yet
he
cannot
do
nature"
without
(190,
Strauss'
and 183).
Nietzsche
as
the last
stage of modern
philosophy
seems
return
Jerusalem
Athens
that preceded
modern subject.
is
so directly and continu Nor is it evident, finally, that even this essay involves the kind of ously devoted to the most important religious subject Pangle thinks both Socrates and Strauss call for. On the "critical
examination"
contrary,
it
can of
consistency
only be described as an astounding appreciation of the amazing thought to be found in the first Book of the Bible. It is the kind of
understanding,
more ety.
likely
to
strangely enough, that a Platonic philosopher would be much look for, perceive and elaborate than a man of the most intense pi
If it is the necessary prelude to criticism, as well it might be, its function is to show how admirably thought out and comprehensive in scope both of the main
alternatives are.
It certainly
revelation
foresee philosophy, already know philosophy, in a revelation: in order to counter it so thoroughly? But in this place way include philosophy Strauss confines himself to comparison, summarizing the points of similarity and
does
on the one
hand,
and
VI
in applying Pangle's interpretation of the theologi cal-political problem to these essays not for their own sake but because they bear on the accuracy of the interpretation itself. Did Socrates, long before Strauss, come to the same conclusion about philosophy's inability to refute "revelation"?
I
mention
these difficulties
314
Interpretation
indication,
put
theism are
hard
only polytheism but certain features it to survive Socratic questioning: are we sure
not
apply similar questioning to the God of the Bible? Would Socrates be compelled in the end to admit a fundamental arbitrariness in the Socrates
would not
choice of
the
philosophic
way
of
life,
as
Pangle
suggests?
And
while
Socrates is
surely
ous
critical
eager
to
may have in
he does
not often
do
so
in the
context of a
faith"
"preoccupation"
with
might
"the
arguments of perhaps
(22).
As to how Socrates
thought the answer
have
Bible itself,
three
Strauss
unequal
lay
with
Maimonides,
to
whom
pieces of
very
length front
are
all with
In his
each
makes
how philosophy and the Bible con the Bible the winner over modern
philosophy in one (new Spinoza preface) and Greek philosophy in the other (Mu tual Influence). Now the consequence of this for philosophers should be their
surrendering philosophy
and
going only
over
can
operate
in
a sphere allowed
it
by revelation.
which
Without spelling
out all
the
details,
on
Jaffa is
prepared to move.
Pangle,
for
the other
hand,
wants
to
keep
so?
philosophy's
inde
establish
its
rational
right to do
Athens,"
The fact
of philoso
defeat He
and need
submission seems
by his
solution.
claims
that, in "Jerusalem
faith"
and
what
fully
ing?"
capable of
meeting biblical
(24), but
does he
And his
solution concedes
from the
outset piety disclaims the possibility of philosophy's and need for of moral experience than it does. As for Strauss him giving a better his studies in Platonic political philoso self, his own continuing studies seem to belie the of the conclusion favorable to revelation that phy necessity
"account"
his
Sometimes he
to
even goes so
far
as
sics
in reducing the
little if any
regard
the political
with
City
and
Man, 29,
and this
volume, 176).
Athens,"
likelihood that Strauss thought philosophy could do more than he allowed in his own argument. Thus, in "Jerusalem and he seems to include himself among "all of us who cannot be (150) and
the
orthodox"
who must
he
opens
of the
The
by
saying it is
message"
"Faithful City": to
as
to
understand
it
fully
is hu
the
to
which
man can
discern
with
explanation,
allows at
least
an
independent
place
allows
philosophy only
revelation, where,
nevertheless, it
is
required to
capacity for
understanding.
Strauss's
Philosophy
-315
hardly seems consistent. But much of it presupposes the possibil ity that philosophy can indeed extricate itself from the argument favoring revela
tion. In what
direction The
might
us consider
the alternatives.
is that philosophy cannot disprove the possibility of the Biblical God, with all His mystery, miracles and revelations. As along this to be the what follows? Is the philosopher to go searching for a case, suming revelation he can personally experience? What if it never comes? How can he
problem
judge among past revelations? And what should he do with the reason naturally welling up in him, that still demands evidence? Since, apart from this abstract possibility
why
wise nation? of a mysterious
God,
the life
of
should
he
punish such
Strauss
the philosophers
"absolutely
what
an
all-
God
would not
do this (Mutual,
not
113).
Would God
and command
them
to use
it, but
to rely entirely on
Now
what are
disproving
four:
the
possibility
an appeal
revelation,
according to
Strauss? Altogether he
principle of
mentions
by
to experience,
by
providing a total philosophical explanation of things, and by showing that miracles are incompatible with the nature of God (Spinoza, 28-29; Mutual, 1 16-17). The first two seem utterly
contradiction,
applying the
by
hopeless,
theology,
which
completely impracticable. The fourth involves natural there the main obstacle is overcoming the view (asserted by
name) that God's
perfection requires
own
His incomprehensibility,
says natural
(Mutual). Strauss
theology
unknow
to
get rid of
same piece
he had
able
man
argued
man:
from God's
to His
being
One to his
being
to
"But
an omnipotent
God
who
is in
way
subject
to man, in so far as
is in
power.
form
part of what
Strauss later
of
calls natural
to be the
philosophical
study
attributes of
theology, God.
Part
of
conceptions, such as
omnipotence,
sumption
incomprehensibility,
wisdom,
perfection.
Its fundamental
as
that verbal is that reality must follow the logic of words or ideas incompatibilities necessarily involve real ones. For example, if God is omnipo
tent, and man's knowing God would involve power over God, then man cannot know God. The Biblical position, as Strauss states it, calls God omnipotent and
mysterious or unknowable.
parts must
al
be
clear
as
in any
statement.
we mean a
being who
Him,
and
the same
making a claim to know something holds for calling Him omnipotent, and even mysteri
us, then
certain respects at
least, be intelligible.
to all things
We normally
without
be
granted
by
being
as well
as thought.
mentioned
by
Strauss
as a possible means
316
of
Interpretation
though
disproving revelation,
he
immediately
new
and
flatly
dismisses it
as not ob
the principle of
not mean
(28,
that
finding
a contradiction
be found
by experience or by recourse to preface). By this Strauss could in the premise would fail to refute it, but implying that finding one would refute it.
Spinoza
and
God
cannot
be both God
and
limited in power; he
of
cannot
One,"
both
and
If,
as
Jaffa
claims
the
can
Bible, "He is
be truly said (18, col. 1),
and
that He
is
"absolutely
created"
is
not unknowable.
separate,
be both knowable
and unknowable
This
is,
of
of
course,
ral means.
different from saying that He is in any way knowable by natu It does mean God is bound by a requirement derived from the nature
He is the
supreme
being
as such:
being,
being. A
counter
part can
truth
not?
insisting at one point: "But there can be only one (Mutual Influence 114), not two or more contradictory truths. Why Because it is the nature of being to be this but not that, to be something, to
,
be found in Strauss's
be in
a certain
way,
and so on
(Natural Right,
that
a
122).
It is
what
it is
and cannot at
is to be intelligible.
Every
thomable
statement about
will
God
He is one, eternal, separate, even of unfa fixed nature and is therefore, in principle,
and
what sense
wholly intelligible. As to God's will, what is meant by unfathomable, is God thought to have a will at all? Is it compatible with His
in
perfec
tion? And
does
mysterious mean
arbitrary,
or
uncaused,
or
irrational,
that
or
for God's
nature to
be
possible
is,
not
simply in
in
not
other, but
only must all such attributes be consistent with be free of inconsistencies within itself. The claim
God's justice
difficulty
God
not
different from
one raised
by
whether
commands the
just (or
holy)
things because
they
are
so,
or whether no
leaves
be
justice. God's
no other
there is nothing
independent
of
Himself,
thing
that He
model of
justice
not
must the
suggests
com
its
being
manding its
prohibition.
cussions of revelation's
It is surprising to find that Strauss's two extensive dis challenge to reason state its main claim in terms of God's
omnipotence and
or wisdom.
justice,
and even
His
omniscience
cf.
This
is
added
in "Jerusalem
Athens"
and
(162;
166,
153),
where
God's
mysteriousness
is
ing
of
His
the
omnipotence as such.
With
to the question
justice, Strauss
is God's
gives
impression that
Philosophy
-317
creating the world by His word, rather than by looking first to the eternal ideas (166). Perhaps with this in mind, he never speaks of God's reason, only of His
will, and does
not
usually
speak of
His
perfection
(the
main exception
is Mutual
Influence,
117).
paying almost exclusive attention to God's omnipotence and mysterious Strauss ness, may have several things in mind. One of these leads in the direction
By
of
problem as of
sity
causation,
or
the absence
arbitrariness, in the
universe proceed
at any time, or change into by something utterly different at any moment? This goes back to the very idea of as first things, or the permament underlying causes, and the omnipotent necessity? could
"nature"
it disappear
God only gives the difficulty of proving nature something like a personalized form. Another and perhaps more obvious reason for Strauss's concentration on
these attributes
is to indicate
fundamental
of
psychological
difficulty
within
the
Bible
as a whole.
In the interest
inspiring awe, it must stress God's power and far as possible. But in the interest of relevance to
love, especially
God's
power and
human
must
concerns
to justice and
ends
mystery
even
be directed toward
beings,
they
if the
faith is
cannot
the God in
trust a
they
can
have faith, in
Socratic
they
can
trust,
and
being
philosophy
shows
strength
that
rendition of
drastically
clarify the
have to
some
extent,
take more seriously than most, Socratic philosophy has a firm anchorage in what we immediately know. It can therefore judge the moral aspects of religion by this
knowledge; it may
also
be in
a position
how
the actually function in life, and whether any given religion or form of piety lives up to its own expectations. Of such interests there are many prominent examples in these essays. theology is based on the idea that
various religions
Nikias'
the gods
support
but he
his
and
Strauss
says
"his theology is
by
fate"
falsity! Or again, concerning Xenophon's bearing from Nikias', and hard to distinguish different it is that says Strauss totally piety, (118). Soon af wittiness and from Xenophon's combined "toughness, have
a
on theological truth or
wiliness"
terward, Strauss wonders about how Xenophon's extraordinary piety went along with his extraordinary wiliness, asking whether a man can be wilier than a god, and whether attributing omniscience to the gods may not itself be a part of man's
wiliness.
He
concludes
this discussion
Socrates
characterize
the
never asks
"what is law?
knows the laws regarding the gods but his Socrates ever
god?"
318
point,
Interpretation
one
surmises,
at which
Socratic philosophy
even more
and monotheism
together, but
directly
Pangle may not allow sufficiently for the direct power of Platonic philosophy, in Strauss's sense, to undo philosophy's apparent defeat at the hands of revela
tion. But we are
now
in
better
he has in
the
mind when
he
speaks of
the "fuller
account"
philosophy
can provide of
by
standing
of
completely
the same
kind, philosophy
human life
It
It
can point
to in
facts
likely to
he
says
be
acknowledged
by
everyone.
can
derlying
be right,
different
parts of revelation.
clarify If this is
the
assumptions un
Pangle
means when
faith"
(24), he may fully meeting biblical in the importance he attaches, for this purpose, to both
capable of
"Jerusalem
and
and
the Maimonides
raise
pieces. of revelation
the position
to
its
greatest
heights
to
strengthen
in fact, he has done more by far than anyone else in centuries both of Western civilization: the Bible and Greek philoso
"roots"
phy.
The
overall
classical
modern
Plato
over
(227-28)
his
however,
will
accede to
arguments
Rather,
the complications
the greatest
ever can
statesman.
care.
It
take a
long
time before
we are able
if
we
whether
Strauss's
argument
for
revelation
is that
of a philosopher or a
Certainly
is
even stronger
than the one against Greek philosophy, and that religion, so vital to
healthy society, is something philosophy cannot provide from within itself. Certainly he believed that the life of western civilization depended on the coex
a
istence, in tension,
says against
We
should
hasten to
add
that
by exaggerating philosophy in forcing its loss to revelation. It is not that the case for turning to philosophy, before Biblical revelation came on the scene, was weak. On the contrary, it was compelling. Nor does Strauss argue that Socratic philoso
what
Strauss
phy makes little progress, or learns nothing of importance. Its sole defect is that it cannot refute the possibility of revelation, either by way of direct theological
argument or
by producing a complete rational explanation of all things (Spinoza, Mutual Influence, 16- 117: notice that the requirement in one place is 28-29; even greater than in the other). Nor does Strauss fail to point out the defect in
revelation's victory:
it is
rather
(Spinoza,
Jaffa
norance
30).
goes too
far in making Socratic skepticism the knowledge of our ig the "rational for both classical political philosophy and the
ground"
Philosophy
(17,
-319
God"
col. 2).
do have to
a
wonder about
of
beyond
a
knowledge
of
at a partial
parts,
or
knowledge
the
fundamental
but
not of
the
solu
tions,
about
and so on
to use
and
own expressions.
human life
Strauss's
explicit words
he
says
in
Is
treating
particular subjects?
of
Many
in Pangle's
presentation.
the "enigma
man"
the
soul"
or
is the
enigma
itself
also elusive
(5)? What do
distinction between
erence
forever
sound
in the
to
ref
of sound
(12)? Was
Socrates'
turning
Socrates'
his
"What
questions sound
needs
forever
expertise on
and
the soul's
His
it
was a
"fundamental
philosophy that
said:
being
how
certain
is this
most
City
and
Man he
"...
whole within
known"
be wholly
tentative in this
for
philosophy! philosophic
In reviving the
tainties
way
turn
cer
ev
philosophy
and reestablish
ident
basis for
philosophy.
Socrates for
him
and
for
us.
In his
argument with
Kojeve, Strauss
the
is born
tion"
at
the
"subjective
certainty"
becomes
stronger than
"his
awareness of
problematic character of
that solu
1 16).
A few
pages
later he
says that
"Phi
ignorance regarding the most important things, knowledge regarding the most important
be
stronger.
things"
And
of
yet
it is
also
of
and certain
knowledge
the most im
what
which we
begin, is
inspires
applies not only to the quest for knowl of Strauss. Few philosophers have for knowledge quest but to the generally done so much for their students, restoring depth and subtlety where there was
knowledge is beyond
This dilemma
edge
only shallowness, and covering so wide a range of experience and reflection. None has done so much to revive the serious study of all previous thought, spanning so many centuries. None has, to the same degree, rescued all forms of human greatness from the mire. None in our time has inspired so much deeper hope for
mankind.
In
of
following
his
such a
master, our
duty
and
interest is to
pre
his conclusions,
until we can
basis
of slow and
painstaking thought.
320
Interpretation
essays
by Strauss,
taken together
with
these
by
the
devotion
require
it,
together.
Socratic
Teaching
of Delaware
and
Jan H. Blits
University
Clitophon
share.
raises a criticism of
of
Plato's
readers no
doubt
While Socrates is
them what
excellent at
teaching
them?
it is
or
urging men on to virtue, he is useless at how to attain it. Instead of leading men to virtue, his
exhortations
lead only to
not
more exhortations.
How, then,
will
are we
to
understand
Are
is
all
there
be to
our
those who
possible
have
Whatever
finally
be
said
in defense
Socrates'
of
matic situation of
Clitophon's
Socrates has
previously discussed justice with him, and those conversations have had two principal effects. They have aroused and confused Clitophon. Socrates first
aroused his desire for virtue by convincing him that to become happy one must become virtuous, but then confused him by first telling him that justice consists in helping friends and harming enemies but later indicating that the just man
never
harms
anyone
but benefits
everyone
in
everything.
to be taught
or
about
justice,
his
per
plexity
to explain why
he is unwilling
of
do
so.
Remaining
silence.
silent
throughout all
but the
beginning
the
dialogue, Socrates
seems
to go out of his
way to incite Clitophon's criticism only to corroborate it his refusal to teach Clitophon about justice be itself an act
I
by
of
his
Could
justice?1
undeserved
obscurity for
century
and a
traditionally considered the introduction to the Republic (see Diogenes Laertius, ill. 60; Proclus, In Timaeum i.7b), nearly all scholars since the early nineteenth century have either dismissed it as spurious thereby defending Plato against the unanimous tradition of anti 0r else defended it on the trivializing ground that it is a fragment or preliminary sketch of an quity
brief brisk dialogue
was
unfinished
Platonic
work.
of scholars considers
Clitophon's
criticism of
Socrates
easily refuted. Neither group sees anything fundamentally problemat wholly ical in teaching Clitophon justice, nor does either believe that Plato does. Both groups, it should be noted, agree with Clitophon that justice is a doctrine or a teaching. examples of scholars who regard the dialogue as spurious include Schleiermacher, Intro
unfounded; the second,
Socrates'
Leading
duction to
consider
the Dialogues of Plato (1836) and W. A. Heidel, Pseudo-Platonica (1896); of those who it incomplete, George Grote, Plato (1865) and G. M. A. Grube, "The Cleitophon of Classical Philology, XXVI (1931). The dialogue is ignored by Jowett, Apelt and, more recently, Hamilton and Cairns in their translations of Plato, but included in The Loeb Classical Library, though
Plato,"
For a brief and depreciating treatment, see Paul Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933) p. 422; for an intelligent and informative treatment, see Clifford Orwin, "The Canadian Journal of Political Science, XV4 (Decem Case against Socrates: Plato's
Cleitophon,"
ber,
1982),
741-53-
322
Interpretation
seem
The dialogue begins strangely and abruptly as Socrates reports what might to be mere gossip concerning himself and Clitophon. "About Clitophon,
Aristonymus,"
son of
he tells
Clitophon,
with
in
a conversation with
"someone recently described to us that with spending time with Socrates but
(4o6ai-4). Socrates
reports
and unnamed others about what
praised
highly being
said
together
Thrasymachus"
Clito
had
to a mutual
or companion
reports
By
it.
Clito
effect separates
is
being
said
from those
discussing
Speaking
he
as though
he
were
telling
what some
fourth,
subject
manages
to
remove
both the
present
speaker
matter
of
their conversation.
Socrates,
in
almost a
parody
speech.
Clitophon
feigning
own. mant
confidently but cautiously. He is sure that Socrates is simply indifference to his criticism and responding with a personal attack of his
replies
He therefore
immediately
Socrates'
infor
was, he explains, he did not correctly relate the conversation with Lysias, (4o6a6-7). "for in some things indeed I did not praise you, but in others I
did"
spoke of
both Clitophon's
praise of
Thrasymachus
and
his
Socrates, Clitophon speaks only of what he had said about Socrates. His remarks, in contrast to Socrates', are entirely personal. And just as Clito phon replaces his reported praise of Thrasymachus with his unreported praise of Socrates,
so, too, he suppresses the fact that he had
blame.2
criticized
him in
everything.
his
Saying frankly
they
him
while
He
and
hopes to
convince
not
hold
so
low
an opinion of
him
be
more
friendly
in
return.
Socrates readily
made.
Concluding
Clitophon's offer, but not in the spirit in which it was the scene-setting prologue, he says it would be shameful of
accepts
him
not
to bear with
Clitophon
when
Clitophon is
so eager
to
when
his better
Clitophon in the
his
teacher.
might
matters to
him is
not whether
acknowledge
Clitophon
will praise
until
him, but
that he
He does
not
explicitly
blaming
Socrates
dialogue
(4ioe5).
Socratic
Teaching
says
and
323 Clitophon's
his bad
improve him.
teaching.
He
not
his
ones, but
The
most
he
might
good points
he does
could cause
not
possess.
ac
lesson's
effect
may be greatly limited inasmuch as Socrates promises to act to the full extent of his strength, not to the full extent of his knowledge. His strength may fail his knowledge. He may not always be able to act as he knows he should.
Clitophon begins
memorized3
with
and which
cism.
He
says
he
was
his praise, the first half of which is a set-piece he has he introduces in a way that anticipates his central criti often amazed at hearing Socrates, who seemed to him to
nobly compared to other human beings, when, rebuking human be he ings, sang his words like a god upon a tragic stage (407a8). In saying this Clitophon suggests that Socrates, at his best, resembles the tragic poets who,
speak most when
faced
with a
difficulty, have
as
recourse
to a
deus
ex machina.
pears at
just the
opportune moment to
do
what
ordinary
a
men cannot
disappears
had
said
again
just
suddenly,
sons'
grounding in reason. Clitophon first quotes Socrates at length rebuking fathers for neglecting their (and their own) education to justice. Are they ignorant, Socrates asks, that
425d).
should?
(cp. Cratylus
without
he
While
devoting
to the acquisi
will
neglect
they
leave it if
know how to
can
it justly,
or
and
they do
not
of justice
indeed it
be learned,
those
who can
justice if justice is
of
a matter of
training
of
and practice.
putting the
teaching
or
training
is
know how to
over
justly.
Emphasizing
the power
glossing
seems
to argue that as
neglect
differences among the types of education, he leaves men unjust, so education can make them
opposites, so are their
effects.
just. Just
Rather than try to prove his point, Socrates appeals to something the fathers already believe. He says that they consider an education in grammar, music and
gymnastics
"the
complete education
makes neither
in
virtue"
(407C2-3),
and yet
this educa
tion, he
spect
3.
points
out,
them
not
nor
less
to
wealth.
Clitophon
will
in the broadest
sense.
Consider his
performance
(SiE^eX&oifii [40639]) his conversation with Lysias only in light of section VI, below, and Phaedrus 228a ff.
324
Interpretation
after
(407C6)?
And
not
yet
it is because
lyre,
that brother
with
brother
and
with
harmony
what
and are at
strife, and
presumes
city in
the
their warring commit and suffer the most extreme things. Socrates
fathers
tion to
mean
by
"complete
education
in
virtue"
he*
means
by
an
"educa
justice,"
education, and
but they may mean nothing more than a so-called gentleman's in fact he acknowledges that the fathers deny that any sort of edu
just. The
unjust are
unjust,
they insist,
commit
not
through
lack
of
through
ignorance, but
with
willingly.
They
wrongdoing know
ing it to be
fathers. He
also
wrong.
Faced
points out
that while
they
knowingly
gods.
unjust,
shameful and
hateful to the
Anyone, they say, who is weaker than plea sure. But, Socrates rejoins, "Is not this involuntary, since victory is (407d6-7)? Although the fathers are unmoved by pious shame, they are silenced
manly shame, allowing Socrates to every way that injustice is involuntary every city publicly Socrates claims to have
one should
conclude and
voluntary
by
in
every
(avdga) privately
they
now
and
pay
more attention
do.
no
just because
premise. men
His argument,
however,
rests on
are receptive to
justice
rests on
justice. No
man wishes
to be ruled
mastered.
by
because
no
man wishes
Thus, just as Socrates be gan his rebuke by addressing the fathers contemptuously as "human (407bi), so he ends it by challenging their manliness. Concern for manliness,
to be ruled. To be ruled
is to be
beings"
not
justice,
but
Socrates'
treatment of the
sons.
fathers
seems
to
be the
model
for the
he
means
for their
It is
not an education of
to knowl
edge
rather an
habituation,
of justice
training
or
conditioning
rest on
knowledge
but
on
it
produces
is merely a kind of duty manly Clitophon does not say that Socrates
on pressed
rates'
based
any
of
him
was not
the
effect so much as
Soc
gard
Socrates in his opening statement mentioned Clitophon's high re for Thrasymachus, and Clitophon in his closing statement will threaten to
speech. and
leave Socrates
pears
whose
symachus as
being
defending
Socrates'
surmise that at
about
draws
to at
Thrasymachus
the
ability
attacks.
Socratic
Teaching
and
325
(407e-408b)
Clitophon
praises at
extends as
his
praise to a series of
Socrates'
least
highly
says
as
Socrates'
rebuke of the
that
next point
but
being
be
ruled.
not
say in
way,
or even
whether, the
higher
should care
or what
obligations, if any,
Socrates'
ma
jor point, he says Socrates also argues that unless someone knows how to use something, it is better for him not to use it. Clitophon and Socrates agree that
beneficial
of practice presupposes
seem
to
mean
different
sorts
knowing
how to
use wealth
justly, Clitophon speaks only of knowing how to use something. He says nothing about knowing its just use. Where Socrates meant knowledge of the goodness of
something's
mean
knowledge
of
its
operations.
means.
The
one
knowing
ends, the
other with
knowing
The
sequel
show,
however,
rather a particular
to art.
Clitophon
should
of examples
know how to
The list
seems meant
things, to be
or types of exhaustive.
.
things,
one
The first
ex
parts, the
second
"any
instrument
or pos
(40833-4),
of use as
and of
understands
knowledge
ends,
as
judgment
to use
rather
than as technical
competence.
If
someone
does
not
not
know how
his
eyes or
ears, Clitophon
to hear or to see. In
other
body
hear
without without
how to do
knowing
what to see or
should
be heard. The
second
duces art,
of the
confounds
knowledge
knowledge
What is true
body,
does he
nor
Clitophon continues, is
not who
true of art,
he
who
use
his
own
lyre
will not
er's,
and
know how to
know how to
his own,
refer
any
instrument
to
ends.
to
operations or
value
here is equivocal. It may or possession. Someone may know how to play a lyre but not of its end (407b8-d2) or how to judge its end but
how to play it (4iob8-c4). Either way, he may know how to use it in one which now becomes the sense without knowing its use in the other. Art or xe%vr], between the two distinction obscure the theme of the dialogue, tends to
leading
sorts of
knowledge. A
knows both
what needs
to be
326
done
and
and
to
contain
both know-how
judgment.
model
Clitophon's
reason
art.
Art, he believes,
he
of
embodies
knowledge.
Turning
tes ends to be
Socra
beautifully,
and not good
that without
how to
it is better
posses
dead,
any
to
live,
than to
and act or
according to
The
sion of
can
be
good
soul, is only conditionally good. It knows how to use it or use it well. But,
a person
ignorant
of such
knowledge to
over
as a slave than as a
of a
freeman, handing
the
rud
ship, to
someone who
art of
often calls the steering human beings, which art, he adds, Socrates same as that of judging and justice (cp. Rep. be the it to declaring
political
art,
590c8-d6).
to according to art, Clitophon believes, is the same as living according live ac necessity. To reason. It is the opposite of living according to whim or life. Furthermore, a person cording to art is to live a rational and hence a good
Living
able
others.
Just
as someone who
knows
how to
his
own
lyre
also
knows how
use
his
knows how to
Such knowledge
the person who
to just rule.
rule
Conversely,
others also
knows how to
himself. Just
as someone who
knows how to play another's lyre knows how to play his own, so, too, someone who knows how to guide other men knows how to use his own soul. In Clito
phon's
view, the
political art
to the statesman.
is ultimately identical to wisdom, Justice in the city is identical to justice in the him to
He
understands
and
soul.
Clitophon's
speech
in
politics. and
guiding
someone's thought to
be the
same as
ruling
him,
and ruled
phasizes
why anyone inclined to act according to whim willingly obey reason's commands. Even as he em by necessity the difference between knowers and nonknowers, he minimizes the nat he
never explains would
to
reason.
opposite
the acquisitive fathers and close to the sophists who suppose that the art of
rhetoric
is identical to,
governed
or superior
to, the
political
Politics
and education
are are
by
is the
rul
ing
for the ruling art is the captain's art, for the captain's art clearly demonstrates that having knowledge means having the ability to com mand. The captain rules his ship because of what he knows. He is the authority because he is the
who
4.
Clitophon's
expert.
His knowledge
one's
1
gives
him
genuine
authority
over those
ulti-
captain's
knowledge is
16.
Socratic
mately how to
Teaching
and
327
only with means and not with ends. While his art teaches him his ship safely to port, it does not teach him whether it is better or not for anyone to arrive there. That is something the art simply assumes. The same is true of art. Just as medicine teaches physicians how to restore every health but not why health is good, so every art ultimately takes the goodness of
concerned
guide
its
its
own end
for
granted.
Guided
by
some opinion or
art
particular sphere of
competence, every
ultimately
goodness
it
cannot explain.
not wholesale.
agrees with
Clitophon, too,
the good
Socrates that
that such a
reason, he
never suggests
life is distinguished
or
by
its
In his account,
happy lives,
their
lives
are not
while only knowers can lead good distinguished from the lives of nonknowers by
the ends
are
they pursue, but only by the means they possess. Their only differences instrumental. Clitophon seems to recognize that teaching and justice are simi
are concerned with
improvement. But he
never supposes
that edu
might
providing him
with
the means to
means.
he already pursues while at the same time justifying his claim to The life of reason, as he understands it, is not the life devoted to,
served
after
good
for
Clitophon's
of men.
regard
blinds him to
never of
nature
souls5
He
speaks of
soul, but
types
of
souls,
and
he
the
never
soul.6
distinguishes among the intellectual, spirited, He regards the mind as the soul and hence art
tinction among
joy.7
as
makes no
dis
en
men except
for the
arts
they
possess and of
reputations of
they
Instead
of
looking
the parts
the
soul and
their
model of
to the
body
ited
despotic
rule.
The
rulers are
masters; the
ruled, willing
Clitophon destroys
politics
by ignoring
the
middle or spir
opinion.
He
confuses
understanding that corresponds to it, namely, knowledge and opinion (and philosophy and politics) be
kind
of
cause
he
sees
and
ignorance,
or reason
and
desire.
In the Republic (34oa-b), Clitophon defends
Thrasymachus'
definition
of
justice
advantage of
the stronger
by
the
it is his true
Just
as
to the legal
5.
or
lawful,
so
it
also
shows, more
broadly,
that Clitophon
Note
See
407e6.
spiritedness"
6. Clitophon
7.
mentions
"easy
(Qadvuiav)
when
esp. 408C5-7.
328
Interpretation
he
suggests
in the Clitophon
about
himself:
as
the
spokesman
for art, he is
above all
(408b-409d)
Clitophon
it is
many other very beautiful speeches, in which is teachable and that a person should above all pay atten
tion to
pose
he has
hardly
in opposition,
nor
does he sup
awak
he
ever
will, for he
considers
them
most
exhortatory
and most
useful,
ening
us as
if
we were asleep.
awakened, he is
now unable
to
find
went
to "your
and
comrades,
and asked
or
should name
those so disposed to
(408C5-7)
first
those
he
Socrates holds in especially high regard what the argument would be after this. Quoting himself at length as he had earlier quoted Socrate's rebuke and say
says
Socrates'
Socrates'
companions after
Socrates'
own manner,
exhortation
he
says
to virtue.
Do
this as
it is
to accomplish
it in
it
completely"
(408CI4)? Is this
life's
(egyov)
to exhort those who have not yet been exhorted, and for them to
Or
should we ask
Socrates
to
How
should we
begin the
learning
related
Although Clitophon
that
complains about
being
justice is he
and
an art similar
Comparing
young
the predica
says
Socrates'
ment as
in to that
of
boys, he
it is
that
such care
for the body, observing that they, belongs to gymnastics and medicine, and
afterwards rebuked
them
by
the things we
saying it was shameful for them to care for food and labor to acquire for the sake of the body, but not to
seek an art or
device to
body
is in the best
possible
condition,
even
the art
is that is
related to
soul"
granted
to be the strongest at
is
justice, he immedi
ately
rejected
the answer,
a name.
Quoting himself
by
see
considered
teachable,
the assertion that one should above all pay attention to oneself, see Republic 44309-44432 and Alcibiades Major i3oe ff. Clitophon's understanding of these two asser tions seems, characteristically, to ignore the inner disposition of the soul.
means
For
he
Xenophon, Memora
by
Socratic
Teaching
and
329
are accomplished.
physicians and
Physicians
health. "Of
of
these,"
but the
call
work
(egyov)
taught,
which effect we
health"
effect,
with
and
Similarly, in carpentry, there is the house, which is the the art, which is the teaching (to jjlev egyov, to de didaypia). So, too,
argued: one part
(409b3-5).
justice, he
is to
produce
just men,
work or
produces man
artisans; but
what shall we
say is its
effect, "what
the just
do (jioieiv) for
us"
(409b8-ci)?
Two considerations, at least initially, make the productive arts a plausible model for justice. First, the productive arts seem to possess the disinterestedness usually
to their
associated with
justice. The
carpenter
others and
only
incidently
for the
benefit,
his
own.
Artisans
as artisans seem to
welfare of others.
Second,
For
possess
the sort
of
knowledge justice
requires.
whether
Republic)
of
himself, justice is
concerned with
intending it;
securing be disposed to
artisans as artisans
have the
sort of
technical
knowledge that
suggests),
art
knowledge is
deed.9
virtue
(as Socrates
sometimes
Clitophon
wants wants
to to
be
told what
justice
just
says
men.
He
know the
counterpart
in justice to health in
medicine.
the
another said
it is the needful,
and a
fourth the
guishes
profitable.
But Clitophon
other arts. and
objected
the
All the arts, he explained, act (ngaxreiv) cor like, but all the others can say what it is to
production of
these
tend,
as
"the
needful"
tend to the
well,"
tes'
them to
operates
its means,
recognize
not
its
end.
Insisting
that
justice is
be
art, he fails to
his
own assumption
just,
that
is justice.
men's
Despite his
concern
phon subordinates
model
for possessing the art of steering education to its extrinsic effects. If the
could
thought, Clito
the
an art
be
considered
is
"teaching"
a or
(409b6)
new
it
is
(409b4)
but
education
justice
would
like
would
benefitting
would
and
benefit
without
teaching.
deed
its
Xoyog and
City
egyov
be
and
330
Interpretation
would
Justice then
not
be "the
art
soul"
virtue of
the
(40933),
in the
sense
beneficiary,
to what
goal of
justice
would not
but only in the sense th3t the soul be to improve the soul, but to use it for
Contrary
he
supposes about
himself, Clito
he
says should
he
is
be
ruled
(40765-8,
4iod5-ei).
not
He may believe that knowledge can rule human believe that knowledge is the highest good or even an end
Socrates'
Clitophon's
with
general criticism of
exhortations,
which
is
of a piece or con
his
general emphasis on
ventional
deed.10
in
in
Socrates
Clitophon that
speeches should
lead to
deeds,
that
of
be
an end
Socrates
Socrates'
in themselves. In fact, Clitophon's criticism criticisms of the poets, who, he says, are unable
they
are removed as
from
what
is
most real
(Rep.
599b).
But Clitophon
and
Socrates disagree
to whst
is truly
deed.
Whereas Socrates
actions gues
because to be
fectly
cause
to do so in action or in practice.
Doing
is better than
knowing be
in
the real world is the world of bodies in action, not the world of the mind
thought:
knowledge is derivative, not primary. Thus, whereas Clitophon under deeds as opposite sorts of things with the former subordinate
considers them ultimately the same, united in philosophical The city Socrates founds in the Republic exists in As a community, it is obviously incomplete, as Socrates himself points out
speech.11
to the
latter, Socrates
conversation.
political
as
he
munity, it exists in deed as well as in speech. It exists in and among the souls its members. The development of the just city in speech is Socrates' education
of
his interlocutors
stitutes
and
Plato's
readers
speech con
his
educational or
what
ductive arts,
the
same
dialogic community in deed.12 Unlike any of the pro his speeches are, is what his speeches do. His speeches are at
Clitophon
was
reports that at
speak most
last
Socrates'
one of
companions,
who seemed
(or
reputed) to
work which
belongs to
10. 11.
See,
36935, C9, 472ei, 592311. 12. Eva T. H. Brann, Introduction to The Republic, trans, Heights, 111.: AHM Publishing Co., 1979), pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.
and ed.
Socratic
justice
meant when
Teaching
and
331
cities.
friendship
in the
The
speaker
the sort of
exhorted
friendship
cities
Socrates indicated
to strife
he
and violence
in the
(407c6-d2). He
meant
philosophical,
not
political,
evil,
and
friendship. When questioned, he said that friendship is good for that reason he also denied that the attachments of children
we call rather
and never
and
animals,
which
friendships,
are
friendships,
since
they
and
are
for the
most part
harmful
Friendship existing really truly, he said, is most clearly a unanimity or agreement in mind (dptdvoiav). But the agreement, he explained, is not in opinion (dptodo^iav), but rather in knowledge (imoTrjnr]v) for of neces
,
than good.
sity many
wholly
sists
agreements
in
opinion
good and
the
work
people are
harmful but
friendship
is
or civic
not true
friendship. As
knowledge concerning
Clitophon
present,
ment
they
being
a
perplexed,
were
ready to
the speaker
medical
and
argu
had
circled
point.
For the
art, he
quotes them as
saying, is
what
kind
(6/j.ovoia),
as are all
but,
unlike
what
they deal
unanimity (6fj.6voiav), the other they produce. Clitophon does not say
say sug be
gested
might
be the
art of
might
philosophy.
Nor does he realize that the speaker's answer, rather than returning full circle, actually repudiates art as the model for justice, for whereas on the model of the arts justice would exist between knowers and nonknowers (for ex
ample, between
would exist physicians and
patients),
on
only among knowers. Clitophon's model for justice is political; the speaker's is not. It is worth noting that, whereas Clitophon previously empha sized that it was he who questioned companions, he does not say who
Socrates'
cross-examined
what
this
speaker
(cp.
That friends
must
know
in
is
good
is precisely the
says
suggestion
Clitophon dismisses
as unimportant
the Republic.
Clitophon only do
that
when
he
finally
put
his
questions
to
Socrates, Socrates
injure
one's ene
confused
me
that it belongs to
justice
to
friends, but later on it appeared that the just man never (4ioa8-b3). injures anyone, for he acts to be useful to everyone in Clitophon sees this as a contradiction, because he sees no difference between po
mies and
well
everything"
litical
and transpolitical
part of what
most political
principle of
helping
harming
as
of one's
enemies
is the basis
virtue,
for,
as the
Republic
shows,13
justice
disinterested love
to transpolitical
fellow
citizens and
part of what
13.
he told him,
ff.
the
other
hand,
pertains
justice.
See
esp. 414b
332 While
not
Interpretation
is
a
harming enemies
necessary
part of political or at
life,
the
truly just
do
man will
will
help
everyone,
least
he has
can
goods
will.
he
pursues
not require
him
be
Socrates'
statements would
contradictory only if the just man were identical to the statesman, only if the king.14 losopher were identical to the
phi
(410b-d)
he
endured such
Clitophon is disheartened
answers not
and
disaffected. He
complains
that
only once,
nor even
long time,
and was
finally
worn
out
by his perplexity. So after repeated questioning and getting nowhere, he finally gave up, concluding that although Socrates is most excellent at exhorting
men
must
be true. Either he is
may
praise
capable of
and no
more,
as someone who
is
not a captain
the captain's
ing
of great value
doubt, however,
and go to
he
it is.
So,
after
threatening
one
to
leave him
Thrasymachus
and
others, he gives
Socrates
last
chance
Socrates, he
for
other and
says, should
things
"suppose Clitophon
that I have spoken in
through"
but
neglect
labor in
other
things;
suppose also
I have just
agreement
now gone
on all
(6fj.okoyovvta) is in knowledge
memorize,
so
Just
swer
he
can
of
he
sees no
difference between
it in the
knowing
sense of
in
the sense
or
being
to
able
to repeat it and
being
able
explain
it,
let
alone
Socrates merely supposes (r?eg) that he agrees. His speech is several times re moved from what exists in deed. As Clitophon lives fully in the realm of other
men's
opinions, his
speech
is entirely imitative
and
derivative,
as
his
name
sug
gests.15
Returning
to the dialogue's
to do as he
asks, lest he praise him in some things but blame him in others to Lysias and the rest. For Clitophon will say that while Socrates is worth everything to someone
who
has
of
not
been exhorted, to
someone who
has he is
almost a
hindrance in
in
a
the
way is unjust.
14.
becoming
happy.
Socrates,
word,
Just
of
as
politics and
philosophy,
so
he
also sees no
healthy
ones; see
gymnastics'
improving
"judging
and
the
at
justice"
408b3-5. 15.
Clitophon is
also
dialogue identified
by
reference to
his father;
see
4o6ai-4.
Socratic
Teaching
and
333
nor
Clitophon's
tion worked
exhortation
has
resolve
his
perplexity.
exhorta
like
gadfly to arouse
opposite
Clitophon (Apol. 30e-3ia), his subsequent effect of a torpedo fish, leaving him tired as
(Meno 8oa-b).
other not
things,
a sign of
his lack
of
wisdom; opinion,
knowledge. Both
Socrates'
Clitophon's closing
opinion
statements associate
Clitophon
with
the orator
audience or
judge
whose
Socrates is
supposed
Lysias
argues
(228c,
a
ff.), (227c, 228d, lover, praising the lover the unloving beloved. Like Socrates, he is a lover of but, unlike Socrates, he reduces reason to selfish calcula
23oe
In the Phaedrus
tion (230c ff.). His understanding of love and speech implies the ascendancy of
utility.
It lacks
and
love
of
(i77d-e)
pursuit of
the Theages
beauty. Socrates, by contrast, claims in the Symposium (128b) to know only the erotic things. Because his
knowledge
stems
from
love
of
knowledge,
reason and of
love
converge
for him in
philosophy.
Yet Socrates
argues
the nonlover to
the lover in one major activity. Those who would be the best those
who would
be the
must
be forced to
re
Blessed,
realm of
being
and
truth.
They
deed,
scent
what
duty.16 In be nothing more to them than a necessary burden or would be unjust for its for for the the de would be just rulers, city
to
possibly improve
In
becoming
king,
a philosopher would
necessarily
sacrifice
his
virtue
to his
duty, his
own
good and
happiness to the
who sees
common good of
the
city.17
Clitophon,
osophical
life
as one of
in fact
never mentions
philosophy, be
that knowl
and
is
political
applies directly necessary and sufficient claim to goods rule. The prerogatives of wisdom become the prerogatives a theoretical and a practical
fully
to
of rule as
be
a would-be
12761?.).
It is
no real wonder
that
exhortations
more exhortations.
For
exhorta
which are
the
objects of genuine
-e2),
love.
not
Men
can
be
exhorted
but
springs
from
not
a spontaneous
desire.
justice
or
duty, but
to philosophy
or wisdom.
Socrates'
treatment of
Clitophon
modern or
contemporary
I264bi6ff.
ff.,
539e
ff.
17.
and see
Aristotle, Politics
334
Interpretation
concerned with
Education, he believes, is
soul around so cation
communicating
answers or
imparting
the
turning
the
what
is,
edu
is thought to
in blind
in the (Rep.
soul
knowledge
It
already there,
like
sight
eyes
5i8b-c).
direction. Clito
phon
thus
and
"open-ended."
Destroying
the distinction
between
liberal
ends
it technical
and
instrumental, serving
oneself, but outside
is
not to master
things.18
Accordingly, his understanding of education ignores all but intellectual differences among men. It fails to consider the possibility that the sort of knowl
the just man must possess can be learned only by someone naturally gifted for it. What Clitophon ignores is exactly what causes Socrates not to answer him. silence is ambiguous, however. If to practice justice means to im
edge
Socrates'
he
wants
to hear
would
has dealings, it is hard to see how telling Clitophon be just. Clitophon needs restraint, not encourage
of
Yet Socrates
and
will
him, if not
with
public,
it is
by no means
him
any better than what he has already heard from Socrates. Clitophon is no Alci failures. It is not clear biades, Critias or Charmides, but he is one of
that
and
he learns or hears from Socrates benefits him or his country in any way, it may do both real harm.19 At the end of the prologue, Socrates promised to avoid his bad points when they have been made known to him, "according to my
what
strength"
(40734). His qualification may not have been simply ironical. Socrates may lack the ability to refrain from doing some of the things he knows he should not do. Where duty is concerned, his knowledge may not be identical to, or
sufficient
always
As Lysias suggests, a passionate man like Socrates may not be in full control of himself. He is not likely always to perform his duty.
for,
virtue.
proper what
introduction
not
he does
to the
difference between
his
what
reflects the
difference
and
Socrates
no
can
easily carry
toward
duty
performance
in
way
grain; desire
men
duty
coincide.
In the Republic,
on the other
hand, duty
like Clitophon may demand one thing, but the desire to converse with others like Glaucon and Adeimantus demands another, and love, not duty, wins out.
misleading to associate Clitophon with technology. While, on the one knowledge as a form of external mastery, on the other, he is close to the original sense of the term, for originally referred to the art of rhetoric the art that spoke about the artful use of speech. It was at once the speech concerning art and the art concerning speech. See Aristotle, Rhetoric I354bi7, 26, 1356s! 1. 19. For Clitophon's political career, see Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 29.3 and 34.3. Lysias and his family turned out to be victims of his political see ibid.
18.
It is
not altogether
hand, he is
concerned with
"technology"
mistakes;
35.1 and
Lysias,
Individuation
and
in Feuerbach's
Commonality "Philosophy of
Man"
Kit R. Christensen
Bemidji State
University
European intellectual history is usually un in light of his concomitant aims of critically reformulat derstood, appropriately, ing Hegelian philosophy on a materialistic basis, and exposing the "anthropolog
place of
The
Ludwig Feuerbach in
ical
this
essence"
of religious
chief product of
dual
project to
be
"new
grounded
"man"
in the
affirmation
of,
and a
more concrete
came
as such. At least after 1839, Feuerbach understanding of to believe that such a new "philosophy of was needed to combat and
man"
overcome
of
both Hegelian
speculative
philosophy
and
Since he was especially Christian religious himself from the then-dominant ide
and
doctrine.1
alist
to be
a radical critique of
ness of
his
reduction of
subsequently engage in what appeared that system, and because of the novelty and thorough "religious to "human his work also was
by Hegel,
truths"
truths,"
deal
of enthusiasm at the
time
by
other
thinkers
who were
becoming
disillusioned
years
with
ac
knowledged
".
later in
Feuerbach's influence in
.
looking back on the period of the early 1840s, when Germany was at its peak, that in response to his work
Feuerbachians."2
.we
all
became
at once
clear
to
at
least Engels
blood"
and
philosophy"
human life remained, for the most part, abstract and idealist in right, ignoring as it did the actual, historically determined material rela tions between human beings that constituted the true sources of oppression and
and
"flesh its
own
alienation
in their
the
lives.3
man"
Even
1.
will
given
be
In 1839 Feuerbach's book Philosophy and Christianity was published. Prior to this time, as pointed out, he was actually a proponent of Hegelian philosophy in all his writings, and this
was the last one in which he would actively defend Hegelianism against its opponents. After 1839 Feuerbach became one of Hegel's most vocal critics. The text is found in Ludwig Feuerbach: Sdmtliche Werke edited by Wilhelm Bolin and Friedrich Jodl (Stuttgart: Frommann 1903- 11), Vol.
text
Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, found in and Frederick Engels: Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), Vol. II, p. 368. The original German text was published as Ludwig Feuer
2.
und
1886).
Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, translated by Clemens Dutt, W. Lough, and C. P. Magill, and reprinted in its entirety in Karl Marx I Frederick Engels: Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, and New York: International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 5. The
principal elements of
are
to be
found in Part I
of this text.
336 does
Interpretation
nearly far enough towards an adequate materialist view of human ex istence, it can still be argued that, particularly in his analyses of the "human es and of human "species he has provided us with some accurate and
not go
sence"
life,"
various
dimensions
of
human
experience.
In
what
follows
tribution to the
field
inquiry
nowadays called
"philosophical
Specifically, I
perspective on
will attempt
sense of
Feuerbach's from
his
the
position
itself
cannot
be
understood apart
constitutive role
relations
present
play in conscious life. inquiry, it should be pointed out first that in the
career
Feuerbach's intellectual
rather than as a
he
saw
himself
as a
faithful fol
lower
of
Hegel
critic,
fying the
period
Hegelian
philosophical project.
In
most
Feuerbach took
against
an
defending
start
Hegel
However,
from the
Feuerbach in
while still
effect
much of
viewing himself
as not of
having
"system"
categorizations and
his (then)
doctoral dissertation,
maintains
which
again was a
that
"man"
as such
is
Spirit,
and
man species
self-unified, just
being.4
ently
Feuerbach did
Absolute Spirit
or
non-
superhuman,
Being
which
self-actualization.
merely embodied itself in humanity as part of its progressive This 'supreme for Feuerbach is mankind itself, seen as
being'
unity
constituted
species
of as
living,
it
conscious
actualizes
Geist, Reason,
time the human essence is only to be found in the univer and thus also thought, itself taken as a supra-individual the essence of
as well:
"man"
In this
characterization of
re
Hegel
one can
not a
say that the human being is not born, but is developed. For in nature, he is thinking being, but a reason-less being who is completely separate from others.
not
Reason is
4.
inborn,
or
implanted,
referred
as magnetic
force is in
a magnet.
Nor does it
grow
was titled "De ratione, una, Auctore Ludovico Andrea Feuerbach, phil. Doct., Erlange MDCCCXXVIII. Written in Latin, it was first published in German in Ludwig Feuerbach: Sdmtliche Werke edited by Wilhelm Bolin and Friedrich Jodl, Vol. IV. The passage quoted here in English was translated by Marx Wartofsky, and found in his book Feuerbach (Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 43. I should note in passing that I consider Wartofsky's text to be the best study of Feuerbach available in English, and I must acknowledge
infinitd"
to just as the
"Dissertation")
universali,
Dissertatio inauguralis
philosophiae
the major
on
my
own
investigations.
Feuerbach'
"Philosophy
on a
Man"
of
337
man
in
man as
fruit does
has
no part of
Reason
at all.
For Reason is community, universality; but man as a single individual is completely divided and separated from every other As reason is a communal thing, not an in
.
born property of single individuals, so man, unless he lives in a community, cannot at tain to Reason. He comes to Reason not by himself, but through the actual presence of
Reason in the form
we
of a
living
find
man
in
living
communities.
community Animals
.
only as one man, as the human race, as a whole, as a community. The or igins of Reason, insofar as they are present in single human beings, can only be under
stood
in terms
of
the
totality
is
of mankind
...
strict
sense of
fiction;
human
being
in
himself, i.e.,
by
must
look for
one
bom,
nor
nothing.5
Two
years after
work appeared
(1830), in
in
he took
clearly
antireligious and
opposition
to Christian
doctrine,
plicitly Hegelian. In this text, entitled Thoughts on Death and Immortality, Feuerbach again argues both that the essence of the species, that is, of "human is Spirit, where Spirit is consciousness, and that the essence of the individ
ity,"
ual
human its
being
is the
species.6
here is the
"Reason"
same as
and
always
as well as
"Spirit") is
a
by
essential
universality, but
in
such a
way that it is
reality that
transcends the
human:
itself is purely universal; knowing is an activity of essence, of Spirit as such is self-equal, self-identical, one in all humans. Only con various; variety belongs only to the objects that are determinate per
consciousness.
But
consciousness
itself. Consciousness
scious
beings
are
sons who
know themselves in
In their
knowing,
all
humans
are
one, as
if undivided, but in that which they know, they are various and separated, for that which they know in the knowing that is consciousness is just themselves, the various
particular persons.
Consciousness is the
light;
persons are
the
colors.7
Here
and
also
it
seems as though
Spirit,
that
of
Absolute Idea,
as
as
being
the actualized,
'human
spirit,'
is,
"man"
such; there
reality, or
God,
and no
Subject
than, that was other than, Given this view, a case can be made for the claim that Feuerbach's interpretation Feuerbach's career, is very similar to that of Hegel, at least in the earlier part of Hegel's Geist more anthropologically. seen have also who of later commentators
history
in its totality.
Dissertation; see Wartofsky, Feuerbach, p. 44. from the Papers of a Thinker, along 6. Ludwig Feuerbach, Thoughts on Death and Immortality Theological-Satirical Epigrams, Edited by One of His Friends, translated by with an Appendix of pp. 107-108. The original Ger James A. Massey, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), Johann Adam Stein in 1830, in Nuremberg (the author re was edited and published
5.
man
text
by
maining
7.
anonymous).
Ibid.,
pp.
108-109.
338
Interpretation
as one
such
commentator,
maintains
that, according to
never, at any
moment of
Time, is
there a
Spirit existing
outside of
the human
of
his
torical World.
and the
History
Spirit, Therefore, there is no transcendence; History is the becoming Spirit is nothing but this historical becoming of Man As for the goal of that is Philosophy (which finally becomes it is Wissen, Knowledge of self
...
Wisdom). Man
creates an
order
himself in
And
again:
Hegel
means
infinite
Being
that
is,
the absolute
Spirit
solely from the totality of human or historical exis tence. Therefore, the temporal past of eternal Being is human, and only human. If one wants to talk about in Hegel, therefore, one must not forget that this
"God's"
past
is Man: it is
Man
who
has become
"God,"
and not a
God
who
again
becomes
God.)'
In Feuerbach's later writings, this view of what Hegel was up to changed quite noticeably. It became more and more clear to Feuerbach that he needed to
make a
definitive break
with
he
were
to
a
"philosophy
of
towards
which
he
was working.
Such
was
ten beyond
necessary because he came to believe that Hegel had not after all got in the latter's characterizations of Absolute Spirit, "the
"theology"
History,
system the
Absolute,"
transcendent,
rather than
being demystified;
philosophically up only mak from actual human life. As ing already indi Feuerbach's own perspective was fairly antireligious cated, early on, but he had previously seen the Hegelian system as really only in need of some clarification
them more abstract and detached
palatable ended
regarding essential human reality, not repudiation and Aufhebung. Eventually, however, he saw that the idealist philosophy of Hegel, as trans formed theology, did have to be transcended, so that his philosophical project
and extension
to derive the necessity of a became, in part, an attempt ". philosophy of man, that is, anthropology, from the Philosophy of the Absolute, that is theology Again, this construction of an adequate philosophical anthropology
. .
would need
to
be brought
about
(that
is, Hegelian
philosophy)
and religious
Feuerbach's
Jr.
,
8. Alexander Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, translated edited by Allen Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 161-62.
9. 10.
printed
by James H. Nichols,
Ibid.
p. 167.
From the Preface to Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, by Ludwig in The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of translated and
Ludwig Feuerbach,
original
edited
Hanfi (New York. Doubleday, 1972), p. Grundsatze der Philosophie der Zukunft.
Feuerbach, re by Zawar
in 1843
as
176.
The
German text
was published
Feuerbach's
works after with
"Philosophy
Man"
of
339
engages in just such a critique of both types of thought, exposing their distortions on the one hand, and of bringing to light the concealed kernels of truth concerning which they also contain, on the other hand. For example, he opens his 1842 "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of with the claim: following
1839, he
the
aim of
"man"
Philosophy"
The
secret of
the secret of
speculative
by
being back
and
into this
ordinary theology
projects
out of
fear
ignorance; in
the Divine
contrast to
Being.11
and realizes
He then
tem:
goes on
of
the Hegelian
speculative sys
The Absolute Spirit according to Hegel philosophy. This simply means that the Absolute Spirit. But
reveals or realizes
spirit
and
of art, religion,
philosophy is the
tion,
and
perception,
philosophy from thought. In short, one can the Absolute Spirit from the Subjective Spirit, or from the essence of man,
being thrown back to the standpoint of theology, without being deluded into regarding the Absolute Spirit as being another spirit that is distinct from the being of man, i.e. without making us accept the illusion of a ghost of ourselves existing out
,
side ourselves
spirit"
of
theology that,
as a
On the
same
and
its 'supreme
being,'
"the
Idea,"
also
here:
and presence;
The Hegelian Logic is theology that has been turned into reason ology turned into logic. Just as the Divine Being of theology is
embodiment same with
,
,
it is the
the
of all realities i.e., of all determinations of all finitude s, so, too, it is the Logic. li
of
Hegel
underwent a
fairly
drastic
the
course of
his
phy, he did
also
his focus
on
the life
development
of
had been
so central
earlier writings.
In
words, Feuer
bach's
anthropologization of
Absolute Spirit,
of all
of
the
Idea, Reason,
"Man"
etc.,
consti
his
of
analyses.
as
such, that
is,
the
re-
in its totality
and
in terms
its
essential
nature, became
and
Ludwig Feuerbach, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 153. The original
1 1
.
Philosophy,"
reprinted
in The
German text
was written
zur
Reform der
Philosophie."
Ibid.,
p. 155-
340
mained
Interpretation
the Subject of
history,
or the
of
history
self-knowledge of
Geist, it
and
being
constituted
by
the self-development,
progressive
self-realization
movement was
of
the human
species
its
transformed
by
Feuer
of
the
self-
recognition,
by
human consciousness,
the
logical
constructs
only
level
of
Feuerbach's
an
his post-1839 writings, he apparently was aware that explaining human reality from the standpoint of the species-asSubject in its self-development did entail speaking in mere abstractions, since he
continually "real
asserted
that only
existence."14
On the
individual, physically existing human beings have other hand, the results of this admittedly abstract level
for
what
backdrop
Feuerbach himself
considered
to be
his
his/her
level
Marx
and
Engels, justifiably
was still
allegedly
Feuerbach
guilty that clearly is a difference between these two investigative standpoints on he assumed (which is not to say that he took up these distinguishable standpoints
"man"
of
hypostatization
and
evaluate
in any methodologically consistent manner). Thus, it seems most Feuerbach's more abstract explanations of the activities
species"
productive to
and goals of
"the
in terms
of
framework to
which
they
give
his
conclusions about
individual human
If this
evaluative perspective
is
here, it can be
pointed
14.
See,
e.g.,
Ludwig Feuerbach,
and
Lectures
1967).
on
the
Row,
and published
in German in
reads
851
as
from the
14th
122-23):
is
true of other
me are not
human lost
or
virtues and
faculties,
reality for
and
in any diminished if I
human traits
instead of
deifying
or
hypostatizing
human
faculties
concepts; they do not exist outside of things and beings, they are not distinct from, independent of, the individuals from which we have abstracted them. The subject, that is the ex isting being, is always the individual, the class is only a predicate or attribute. But it is precisely this predicate, this attribute of the individual, that nonsensuous thinking abstracts from the individual and makes into an independent object. This abstraction is then held to be the essence of the individuals in question, while the differences between them are disposed of as "merely that is contin
versals and class
individual,"
reduces all
individuals to
a single
individual,
or rather
concept, and
leaving
shell
for the
which shows us
individuals
as
individuals in
their multiplicity,
diversity, individuality,
existence.
In
other words,
cate, an attribute, a
thought transforms what is in reality the subject, the essence, into a predi mere mode of the class concept, and conversely, turns what is in reality mere at
essence.'
tribute or predicate
into
Feuerbach'
"Philosophy
character of
Man"
of
reasons
out
further that
on
one of the
primary
the
importance
the
human
itself,
what
taken as a whole,
is that
he
self-realization of the
is
given shape
by
some
form
of
is
not
by
itself
so significant
Of course, the fact that human beings are "social for Feuerbach, since other species of creatures
etc.).
creatures
are
(bees, ants, wolves, naturally community life is that human beings have the capacity to
also
ception
"social"
What is
unique about
human
of the community to
which
they belong,
and
of themselves
of
that
community.
Our
cognitive
faculties
is
not
limited to
ulars,
an awareness
(or
discrete
(or
partic
whether particular
humans,
As human be
of
ings
we can
have
as an object of consciousness a
of organisms
'transindividual'
objects),
whether or not
physically present before us. Since we are all human community of some sort then, and even though our first ready existing conscious contacts are with other individual humans (parents or siblings in most
immediately
and
'normal'
cases),
under
circumstances
we
as
individuals
develop
an
explicit or
awareness of
than,'
which we see as
transcending,
of
being
'more
particular
humans
As
we
develop
into
a conception of
(which,
course,
we
then can
refer
to,
or think
about,
even
if
physically
that
alone at the
time),
we are able
to
enter
stand
that we are, as
individuals,
parts of
As
this cognitive
process we come
to
recognize ourselves
both
basic
sense
belong
to it.
This
recognition of our
'belongingness'
ipation,
and
facilitates the
developed
sense
we
belong to
being,
specifically human
we are
community; we see
but that
ness,
of
and of others as
belonging
humanness,
the human
we are able
species
to derive
a conception of
peculiar
itself,
and
thus
of
capacity to
with
have
as an object of consciousness,
along
hu
beings
of
apart
from,
One
tus as
idea
being"
vidual as a
by periodically referring to the human indi (Gattungswesen), in this context meaning that the hu
is
man
being is
being
that normally
342
Interpretation
consciousness,
the
beings"
and who
is
conscious of
himself/herself
as
of,
or as
belonging
can
beings
ness,
are not
"species
other sentient
of conscious
even
though
they
be
classified as
belonging
by
us
(such
as
classify Feuerbach is concerned, only humans have this cognitive capacity for classification, categorization, and abstraction). In addition, this consciousness of far
as
'species-membership'
is
what
marks
the
individual's
attainment of self-con
sciousness itself as characteristically human. In other words, for the individual human being, to become self-conscious means becoming conscious of oneself as an individual human being who stands in a necessary relation to, but is not im mediately identified with, the human species as a whole. Actually here, to be
self-conscious of one's
oneself as
belonging
to a
species-membership involves not only being conscious of human living community, which one unavoidably par "essential human
nature."
ticipates
in, but
also
species"
consciousness
is referring to the consciousness of "the human further constitutes the distinctively human
essence,"
and
this
mode of
self-consciousness :
But
what
is this
essential
difference between
man and
the
brute? The
most
simple,
gen con
to this question is
consciousness:
but
in the
strict
feeling
of self as an
individual, in discrimination
outward things
by
according to definite sensible signs, cannot be denied to the brutes. Consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom his species, his
essential
nature,
and
is
an object of
of
himself as
an
individual
cessive
Since this
is
part of
the
human
essence
itself
in Feuerbach's estimation, and since he also often uses the term in a second sense whereby it just refers generally to one's "essential human na one can say from this perspective that to be a species being is also to be
ture,"
"species-being"
being,
of
'species-
In attempting to
15.
understand
self-consciousness.17
pecular technical term Gattungswesen, of rather obscure origin, was used by Feuerbach in his writings, and appears most often in his most famous work, The Essence sporadically of Chris tianity, translated by George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans) (republished by Harper and Row, 1957); the original German text was published in 1841 as Das Wesen des Christentums. as will be seen
This
Also,
shortly, he
these two
16. 17.
uses
the term
in
at
and switches
back
and
forth between
different
usages without
as
"species
the
essence,"
"generic
essence,"
or
"essence
of
the
species,"
"species
being,"
and much of
understand-
Feuerbach'
"Philosophy
Man"
of
clear
an
343
of analysis
man
self-consciousness, it becomes
the human individual taken as
is
not
plained as such
in
contrast
as a
primary focus
ness
at
this
investigative level is
interaction
by
human
as those
individuals
are
meaningful and
existentially
constitutive
with other
only become
conscious of
self-conscious species
through
man
being, my being my relations with other at least potentially self-conscious individual hu beings. Likewise, I only stand in conscious relation to the human species it
and conscious of myself as a species
self
through my ongoing
no
interaction
immediate
persons, in
such a
is in reality
theless
and
direct
or
(conceptual
and
or
the species to
none
belong. The relationship between myself as individual and the species, my relationship to myself, are both necessarily mediated by other persons.
analyses of the
dynamics
of con
relation
in his
constant emphasis on
foundational relationship of "I and It is within the context of this I-Thou lian
ness analysis of
(Ich
undDu).n
relation
of
the Hege
the
individual
self-conscious
becomes
most visible.
Hegel
also asserted
that human
self-consciousness
was attained
mediation of
others,
recognized
by another self-consciousness:
insofar is
as
that
is, individ
acknowl
exists
it
also exists
for,
and
is
edged as such
by,
self-consciousness.19
another
This
constitutive process
is,
of
course,
dialectically reciprocal,
as
evidenced
immediately
when
is
and
is
consciousness, as also
and
it
cancels
has
sett
ing
the
significance of
this term in the works of both Feuerbach and Marx (who borrowed the term
multivalent character of
from Feuerbach)
nomic and
can
be traced to the
both
Gattung
are
and
Wesen. The
most
Marx's
use of
Gattungswesen
to be
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, translated by Martin Milligan, edited by Dirk J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964); see especially pp. 106-19. Ich-Du dyad as the cornerstone of an analy 18. Feuerbach seems to have been the first to use this in his famous text simply titled Ich und sis of interpersonal dynamics. Others such as Martin Buber,
Du (English translation
by
Walter Kaufman; New York: Scribner, 1970), clearly were influenced by but I the phrase. Ich und Du can just as easily be translated as "I and
You,"
and translate
it
as
many
others always
have,
as
"I
Thou"
and
(the
"Thou"
to convey the
sense of
Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Phdnomenologie des Geistes (original German publication: 1807), Mind (Harper Torchbook edition; New York: translated by J. B. Baillie as The Phenomenology of
Harper
and
Row,
1967),
p. 229.
344
Interpretation
only in the
self-existence of the other.
existence
other, through
itself
Each is the mediating term to the with itself; and each is to itself
at the same
time,
exists
thus
They
recognize themselves as
mutually recog
By
is
in this interaction
each
being
able
to recognize that
it
an object for
the
other
consciousness,
is be
able
being
same
able
to
conscious of oneself
from the
in the
spell and
it
way as that other, who is conscious of one out in exactly this way, it seems in this anal
"I"
ysis as though
thus the
posited
by reflective consciousness
in the reflexivity
of con
(that
is,
of
the
"I"
self-consciousness),
sciousness,
itself is
grounded
in the
(For
'point
sort of
view'
of, the
"I,"
conscious other.
"ego,"
or
that emerges at an
earlier moment
in the dialectic
"I,"
the
de
velopment of
ever, this
is superseded, and the self-conscious as a later is less incomplete and less achievement, Although the focus on the developmental need of conscious human beings for
earlier moment
abstract).21
throughout
focus
his
appropriation of
consistency
ity
his
in Feuerbach's
Part
views on
with respect
appropriation of of
Hegel,
I-Thou
relation
it
self.
views,
when
he basi
cally
accepted
framework,
may
shaped as
it
was
against and
consistency really
and precision
never
these interpersonal
dynamics, in
vidual
by
In his dissertation, for example, Feuerbach argues that the human indi an insatiable desire to unite with others from whom he is divided nature but this separation between individual humans is has
"
.
.
"natural"
20. 21.
Ibid.,
p. 231.
This description
of
Hegel's
namics taken
by
of symbolic
the
also was
'see'
influenced by Hegel, and his central himself/herself (and thus can have a
other'
individuated self-consciousness) by being able to "take the role of the can, I think, be viewed as just a different, and ultimately more concrete, formulation of the same basic process that Hegel was elucidating here. Cf. George Herbert Mead: On Social Psychology edited by Anselm Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, revised edition).
22.
Dissertation:
see
Wartofsky, Feuerbach,
p. 44.
Feuerbach's
only
"Philosophy
the
Man"
of
345
sence of
Here,
for self-differentiation
of thought, that is, Reason posited as the "es fundamental need for the is not due to the need and individuation as a distinct human since in fact this
universality
"Thou"
"I,"
individuation is just
parently
which
to transcend: the
with
need
for the
enter
"Thou"
ap
amounts to the
desire to be "one
of
the
other,"
to
into
unity
transcends the
particularity
of man
the I-Thou
dichotomy
itself:
particu
lar, finite, in
which
nature
There
therefore be
the yearning for the Thou can longer counterposed, where this unity is not only nection, but is absolute, unconditional, fully
essential
way in the depths of man in be fulfilled: where the / and the Thou are no
some a virtual
realized.23
The
persons qua
is both the
precondition
for
others,
and an efficacious
reality only
by
virtue of such
interac
(whereby,
role of
as was stated
living
ating
community").
earlier, Reason is only made real in the "form of a In this context there is no acknowledgment of the individu
thought
(i.e.,
of reflective
"Thou"
cognitive
myself as
consciousness), and thus, again, of the for my very ability to become conscious of
On the
the process of
The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach does affirm that self-individuation, as essentially entailed in the coming-to-self-
hand, in
consciousness of gues
human beings,
requires
the
"Thou."
that I
first became
conscious of
my commonality
In this text, he in effect ar is like me, that is, I become human being, and then recognize
as
that I am an object
consciousness
of consciousness
for
me.
This
"I."
pacity
same
of
thought)
to my
come a self-conscious
help becoming an object of consciousness to myself: I be In becoming conscious of myself in this way I at the
recognition
he/she is
of
an object of
the reflexive ca
time differentiate
myself
from
all
other conscious
person,
sense
whose
my own, in the
man
that I become
conscious of
hu
the
human
not
be
able
against
which
he/she normally
mediates
"Thou"
stands
in
"I"
self-conscious
distinction. In
in
"Thou"
words, the
eral, so that
pear/or
the
and
the
world would
disap
more or
less merely
absorbed
into the
'flow
life'
of
without
any
consciousness of
being
so:
Only through his fellow does man become clear to himself and self-conscious; but only
when
am clear
to
myself
does the
world
become
clear
to
me.
man
existing
abso-
23.
Ibid.,
p. 45.
346
Interpretation
alone would
lutely
lose himself
The
without
Nature; he
world as a
any sense of his individuality in the ocean of himself as man nor Nature as Nature. The first
which opens
object of man
is
man.
sense of
Nature,
world, is a later product; for it first arises through the distinction of man
from
himself.24
and
Feuerbach's
other
a crucial
and
the
and
is
process of
in
dividuation,
mental
and
commonality, it is
no
most
funda
human bond. Thought becomes, for Feuerbach, secondary and derivative in relation to, and is viewed as being dependent for its efficacy upon, the even
more
basic bond
of
Sinnlichkeit
("sensuousness"
or
blood"
"sensibility"). Whereas in
his
"flesh
and
character
trapped
came abled which
or pleasure and
pain)
was what
and apart
"sensuous"
nature as
individuals to
the I-Thou
enter
into
other,
and without of
Here,
the "natural
"I"
standpoint"
human
beings is the
standpoint of
"Thou,"
and and
where
both
no
are recognized
in their human
existence,
this
distinction is
"I"
longer something that needs to be transcended in order for the unity of the and to be realized: Feuerbach now sees that this natural distinction (which he
"Thou"
even refers
fact
constitutes
this unity
in
the
first
place.
And,
even
have
an essential role to
as necessarily communal capacity for abstraction it can overlook, or distort, the fundamental connective force of concrete, flesh and blood human existence, and abstract philosophical
self-conscious
thought
has
often
been the
most
guilty
of
this
sort of oversight:
am
I I
for
myself
You
far
as
am a sensuous
abstract
for others. But I am You only inso intellect isolates being-for-self as sub
stance, ego, or God; it can therefore, only arbitrarily connect being-for-others with being-for-self, for the necessity for this connection is sensuousness alone. But then it
is precisely sensuousness from which the abstract intellect abstracts. What I think in isolation from sensuousness is what I think without and outside all
connections.26
The
relation
between humans
"I"
and
"Thou,"
basic level
of
human
sensuous
life
("sensuousness"
physically
24. 25.
real
and
referring to the totality of our natural capacities as to what Feuerbach sometimes calls the realm of "the
,
pp.
82-83.
of the
Philosophy
Future,
paragraph
56,
p.
243;
and paragraph
59.
P-
of Ludwig Feuerbach.
"You'
26.
Ibid.,
paragraph
as
rather
than as
"Thou."
Feuerbach's
heart"
"Philosophy
Man"
of
"the
347
as
concerns of
head"), is thus
of all
grounded
in the
essen
tial need of
living
the concomitant
mutual
de
human
social
life. This
realized,
the rela
most
fully
in
a sense
its
most concrete
expression, according to
Feuerbach, in
tionship between
physiological
attraction, but
the
due solely to a more immediate involves the fact that our consciousness of our
not
This is
selves,
own
as an outcome of
I-Thou
corporeality, sexuality,
and gender
"masculine"
or
In addition, Feuerbach
tween
nied
recognizes
of
lovers, based
as
it is
"feeling"
on and
than mere
at
intellect,
and accompa
by an
emotional
dependency
fulfillment that
(with
digmatic in Feuerbach's
and
human
need
blood Other. As he
bit
of typical
Feuerbachian
hyperbole):
Hence personality is nothing without distinction of sex; personality is essentially dis tinguished into masculine and feminine. Where there is no thou, there is no /; but the distinction between / and thou, the fundamental condition of all personality, of all sciousness, is only real, living, ardent, when felt as the distinction between man
woman.27
con and
It is
within
the
life-context
and
provided
by
the need-motivated
interaction
of ac
tually
man
existent, sensuous,
hu mutually dependent human beings that That is, it is this fundamental I-Thou relation be
enables thought to
'real'
tween flesh
a
develop
and
become
itself,"
uniquely human force in the world. In Feuerbach's anti-Hegelian writings, thought is no longer treated as a separate, independent reality "in and for but is always emphasized as being just the thinking activity of concrete human
individuals. In fact, he
claims
need of
human beings to
can arise.
is
later
[Ojnly
son.
only in speech,
a social
To
Thought originally
demands
Our
both
(primar
role of con
ily verbal)
"I"
with
others,
we
role of
the
"Thou"
and
for ourselves),
carry
internal
this, according to
27.
28.
Ibid.,
p. 92.
348
Interpretation
Feuerbach, is human thinking at its most fundamental level, and its development is, again, constitutively intertwined with the consciousness both of ourselves as uniquely human individuals, and of the essence of the human species itself as
that which we
belong
that
to as species beings:
converses with
Man thinks
which
is, he
function
man
has
relation
to its species
without another
itself; but
such a
functions
of thought and
imply
relation,
from
another
and
thou; he
can put
himself in
essential
nature, and
merely his
individuality, is
perspective
In Feuerbach's
then,
other particular
human beings
as a conscious
human individual to
and
world,"
"my
"Nature"
that
itself
the realm of
that I also re
late to from
a unique
self-consciously human point of view, and finally (iii) myself as being in that world who stands in essential relation to himself. It is
a
through the
dynamics
of
being,
and
my
exis
being,
other
are
In
words, I only
in my distinc
recognition of
being,
through
my
human
character
sons,
at
they
beings
human like
myself.
This
recognition of as
ity
with
others,
distinctiveness
not
most part
involve the
merely tabu
and pri rela
lating
mary tion,
other,
what attributes
I do
and
do
have in
persons.
According
to
Feuerbach,
in the
there seems to be a
and
basic
mutual recognition of
which originates
commonality
blood"
individuality
in the I-Thou
and
in their "flesh
and
and
human,
thus myself as
a
interdependencies. That is, I recognize the being also human like him/her, because I
other.
human
And,
even
here, they
are now to
be
just
one as
pect, along
constitutes
needs,
totality
that
the
person,"
I-Thou
relation grounded
person,"
in this human
need
"whole
man"
with
type
essentially requires other humans in order to be "truly hu that Feuerbach glorifies in most of his later works (and, a different emphasis, in his earlier works also to some extent), and it is this of flesh and blood human individual who is a species being.
himself/herself,
29.
Ibid.,
p. 2.
Feuerbach's
To be
"Philosophy
being then,
Man"
of
the
349
analysis,
more or
a species
given
foregoing
less
means
living
human dialectic
of
individuation
and common
ality, as
it
manifests
itself in the
individual
a
strives
he/she is
'self-image,'
person,
worth,
and a recognition of
not
limited to
formal
concept of
identity),
by
the
interplay
human
yond
of
individuation
and commonality.
The
body,
past, present,
future,
which goes
be
of oneself as an
historical
being
are
who stands
in
relation to the
historical
species
(as
made
up
of
to),
likewise essentially
oriented
by
the interaction of
Again,
all aspects of
individ
human"
to his/her
"world"
"truly
efficacy by other persons, which is to say that in all facets of our individual lives we are in some sense always already with others. At this level then, Feuerbach's
notion of
being'
"species
being"
'way
of
of
summed
with."30
human beings,
as a
this essential
'way
of
can
probably best be
'world-generating,'
up
multifaceted,
interplay
of
individuation
and
commonality
the self-development of the individual takes place, that most of Feuerbach's claims about the
nature,"
it is in this investigative
"essence,"
sphere
indi
vidual's
or
appear.
Although
on
this sub
ject
of a
human
to
essence
again
regularly
ambiguous and
unclear, he
nature"
does
seem
least
"essence"
a general conception of an
or
be
used
individual
person
in
some sense
manness of
It
must
be kept in
mind
individuals
merely
and on
the reality of
huare
not established
separate
individual
at
subjects all
hav
ing
ers
in
common.
However, he
analyses
it
quite
legitimate to
emphasize
in his
the
distinctively
'normal'
circumstances)
capacities
does
exhibit.
so
ciality
30.
less
una-
This
notion of a
foundational
"Being-with"
has
gained more
acceptance
through the
being"
works of philosophers
and
in my
characterization of
cies
as grounded
mind.
in this
"Being-with"
(Mit-sein) I
original
Dasein in
son
Cf. Heidegger's
and
translated
Row,
The
German text
Sein
und
Zeit
(Tubingen: Neomarius,
1927)-
350 voidably
Interpretation
actualizes
in his/her
or
'being-in-the-
world,'
Feuerbach does
identify
"powers,"
other specific
attributes,
help
to make up that individual's essential nature qua human being. At this point
Feuerbach's
inconsistency
all, in
treated,
which
after
The
specific attributes
Feuerbach focuses
and
on
here is
are
Reason (or
"Thought,"
"Under
standing,"
"Intellect"), Will,
up
a
ophy.31
Affection (or
which
'there,'
"Feeling"),
which
together make
fairly
familiar in the
history of philos
These
just
which
of when
his/her "essential
nature:"
What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will, Affection. To a com
plete man
belong
the power of
thought, the
power of
power of thought
is the light
of the
intellect,
the
power of will
is energy
of
character,
the per
of
fections
will, to
and the
of the
human
being
are
nay, more,
they
being. To
man,
love,
basis
to think,
of
the
his
existence.
nature of man as
will.32
"powers"
of
reason,
feeling
are emphasized as
it is
also
"feeling"
and as
less inter
changeable
for'
concepts, insofar
both
are
intended to
to any type of
'feeling
diately
possess
to
keep
man about
these faculties
for Feuerbach is
that
'normal'
all
human beings be
them, but that, in our manifestation of these ings also have the essential capacity to have them as
and
"powers,"
we as species
objects of
consciousness,
to
("species-essence")
that extent. It
is this self-consciousness, as the individual's consciousness of his/her essential nature, then, that Feuerbach is trying to illuminate when he claims that the faculties of reason, will, and feeling ultimately have themselves
as
their own
objects.33
In addition,
post-
since
in large
human
main
beings
tains
31.
resides
in
being
conscious of,
Feuerbach
in
a number of
his
1839
writings
of a certain
being can
no
Other
commentators
essence as a
have
character of e.g.
,
Feuerbach's
tion of
pp.
human
unity
of
Reason, Will,
Feuerbach's
For
and
Wartofsky, Feuerbach,
261-64,
where
he
reminds us that
"tripartite
32.
soul"
that the
Greeks
affirmed.
human nature is the classical one of the discussion of this point, see also Eugene Feuerbach (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 47-48.
model of
another
ent
The Essence of Christianity, p. 3. Ibid. See, e.g., Feuerbach's discussion of this formulations in many other places in the text.
on pp.
4-6; the
same
idea
emerges
in differ
Feuerbach's
"Philosophy
"objects"
Man"
of
351 any
object of a creature's
be discerned in its
needs,
or
(presumably
and so
activity,
awareness),
as what
distinguish human beings essentially from other types of beings.34 Not only does the individual's human essence include the capacity to have the species, and thus that human essence itself, as objects of consciousness, but it
also seems
include the uniquely human utilization of the same sensory facul strictly speaking, we have in common with other species of animals. That is, the human individual possesses the sense of sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, but not in the same way that other sentient creatures do. According to
to ties which,
Feuerbach,
respect
these
human sensory
"universal"
with
regarding their
objects.
The
nature of all
seen
in the
essentially
of
characterizes the
human
senses
species-specific
limitation
to what experiences
they
with, at least
in terms
breadth:
be
objects of
in
principle
limited
certainly keener than those of man, but they are so only in necessarily linked with the needs of the animal; and
are keener precisely because of the determination that they are limited by being exclusively directed towards some definite objects. Man does not possess the sense of smell of a hunting dog or a raven, but because his sense of smell encompasses all kinds
they
of
smell, it is free
and also
indifferent to
particular smells.
But
where a sense
is
ele
vated above
being
vated to an
independent,
are elevated
dignity
universal sense
is
intellect,
and
senses
smell
taste
in
man
The
smell and
Indeed, even the stomach of man, no mat look down upon it, is something human and not animal be
not
limited to
certain
kinds
of
man
is
free from that ferocious voracity with which the animal hurls itself on its prey. Leave a man his head, but give him the stomach of a lion or a horse, and he will certainly cease
to
be
a man.
A limited
stomach
is
compatible
only
with a
limited,
that
is,
animal
sense.
Man's
a
relationship to his
treatment.35
stomach consists
therefore in his
according it
human
and not a
beastly
As the
above passage
indicates,
between
sensory capacities and experience, and our rational or faculties. That is, not only are the human senses in themselves less restricted and liminarrowly focused than those same senses are in other animals, but even the
our
34.
See,
Philosophy
of the
Future,
inTheFiery
Ibid.,
paragraph
53,
p. 242.
352
Interpretation
our senses
mals)
reflect
are more
on,
our
sensory
experience.
by
our cognitive
'rational'
part of our
conceptualize, and
makeup the ability to classify, categorize, extrapolate, thus to abstract from and theorize about immediate experi
well as our sensuous
ence,
so
by
course,
remain more
sensuous,
generally,
beings. In
and
other
words,
Feuerbach
might
say here,
that gives
"thought"
"sensuousness"
continually
mediate
each other.
It is this uniquely human mode of abstractive, conceptual thought rise to the natural human propensity for generalizing, or universalizing
experiences
(sensory
or
otherwise),
and
it is
also as a result
then of this
capacity
of
for
universalization species
human
important level
hu
and
a product of
abstraction,
one must
is
in
more or
mind
less
related
by the
individual
is
person.
Again,
keep
as
not
merely
a product of philo
"man"
sophical speculation.
From Feuerbach's
the human
"world,"
such
is
a natural product of
of
individual's
interpretation
or
his/her
because the
this sort
exercise of
Reason, demands
universals of
rather
nitive
countered
tion of
apprehension of all types, or species, of entities en in the world, but it is especially compelling with respect to the acquisi the human species as an object of consciousness: "Reason cannot content
itself in the
adequate existence
only
when
it has the
species
for its
object
analyses
having
the
human
species as an
consciousness,
by which
one
designates
oneself as a
human individual,
need
often means
having the
human
essence as an object of
consciousness, the
the need to
to
have the
species as an abstraction
for thought
also
indicates
identify
as a or
to a concept of the
human
essence which
particularizations, that
is,
all
individuality. In this
"my"
context
am
not,
self-conscious
unique capacities as a
ual of
conscious
of
essential
attributes
also recognize
am
finite
and
that as an
man"
distinction between myself as individual existent, and the human essence as such, which amounts to the dis tinction between myself as an individual human and the human species. And, the recognition of this distinction entails the experience of the schism between my own particularity and the Given the universality of "essential human concrete diversity of human beings, no particular individual is an adequate or
an
nature."
as such.
complete expression of
36.
the
human essence,
and
also recognize
this fact in my
p. 287.
Feuerbach's
own
"Philosophy
Man"
of
353
and of
case,
such recognition
my
own
im
perfection qua
human
is
individual.37
between
what one
as a
human essence) is
as an
Further, this consciousness of the dichotomy particular human being, and what the species (i.e., the abstraction for thought, is enhanced in real life, from
as
he
also
identifies the
where
"species"
man,"
this normatively
"ideal
shifts
is
our essential
human
nature.38
As
can
be seen, Feuerbach
here, so that the emphasis is not now so much on the essential nature of the human individual, but more on the fact that the human es sence is really only to be the species itself, with completely discovered
"in"
which
the
individual
into
tion. In addition,
in his
dividual, but only in the human species, he is operating once more at two distinct levels of analysis (which, again, do not appear to stand in any consistent method
ological relation
to each other
in his
species"
as
other
simply
an abstraction
mind
times
he has in
"the up
species"
writings): sometimes he is referring to "the for thought, in the way discussed above; at as an historical reality, that is, as the to
tal human
community
made
of all
past, present,
and
future
generations of ac
tual human
beings,
wherein
species
and
is
"species"
"es
"universality"
and
the characteristics of
and
individual,"
and
just
an
In acknowledging that, at this level anyway, the human essence is abstract object for human thought, Feuerbach wants to point out that this
human necessary and indispensable one for the indi self-understanding, because it illuminates the fact that the na
essence
concept of
is
still a
vidual's adequate
"humanity,"
"man,"
ture of
and capacities as a species qua essential
or
is
not summed
that are
possessed
by
that
particular
being
being
human
is
both
and as a existing individual in distinction from the species, individual. Actually, it was when Feuerbach treated the species object of thought that somehow stood
as a
the essential
in
contrast
individual,
tellectuals,
that he came
most
under some of
by
various other
in
and
two thinkers
just this
aspect of
Feuerbach's
pro
ject,
and accused
Stirner did focus primarily on this notion of an abstract "essence of Feuerbach of dividing human beings into an essential and an
man,"
ines-
adequate expression of his species, 37. Ibid. See, e.g., Appendix i, p. 281: "No individual is an but only the human individual is conscious of the distinction between the species and the individual
38.
pp. 206-207.
354
sential
Interpretation
"ego,"
"I,"
or
whereby the
("man"
species
as
such)
was our
"true
es
sence"
in
contrast
to the
"inessential"
ing analysis is
Feuerbachian
accurate, Stirner
wasn't
"ego."39
If the
preced
of the
an ex
out
this
feature
man,"
"philosophy
of
but he did
overlook
to quite
tent just how and why Feuerbach utilized this concept of an "abstract
sence."
human
es
Given Feuerbach's
nature,"
own
imprecision
of
and
inconsistency
in his
views on
"human
however,
same at
forgivable. At the
misunderstanding on Stirner's part may be time, in his response to Stirner's criticisms (which were
this sort
also seems
directed specifically
miss
to
their point somewhat, insofar as he argues that the overall aim of the text in
question was
in fact to
essential and
inessential
"being
man"
of
in the first
This
sophical analysis
(Vergotterung)
zur
Ferse.")40
of
amounting to the affirmation and, apparently, the deification des ganzen Menschen vom Kopfe bis the "whole (".
man"
Glorifying
the "whole
man"
in this
sense
does
not seem
to an
sta
swer,
tus of
at
least directly, the question concerning the essential or nonessential the existing individual vis-a-vis the abstract species qua "essence of
response
man"
as such.
In this 1845
as
to
also
brings up the
species
point
human
itself,
was
real
feeling of limitation
want
himself/herself
as an
to affirm human
individuality, but he
wanted, through
philosophical
writings, to
help
people overcome
feeling of limitation associated with this individuality, by helping them recognize that they after all do participate in by virtue of their being mem
'unlimitedness'
bers
"in"
of
the human
species.41
This
"in"
aim of
other
level
as
of analysis
at which
he
operates when
he focuses
the
on
"essential human
person.
nature"
it is found
individual
man species
is
individual's
thought,
views
is it merely identical to the human essence as such. Here Feuerbach the species at the actual human community in its historical existence and
nor
reality,
made
up
of all
past, present,
which
and
and
the
multiplic
ity
of social relations
man"
into
they
can and
"essence
39.
of
refers
human
York:
sein
Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, translated by Steven T. Byington (republication; New Dover, 1973), pp. 34-67. The original German text was published in 1845 as Der Einzige und
Eigentum.
40.
My
"
rendering:
Christentums"
of
from head
to
heel."
"Wesen des
in
Beziehung
aufden
"Einzigen
und sein
Christianity
phische
41.
in relation to The Ego and its Own"), reprinted in Ludwig Feuerbach: Kleine philoso Schriften (1842-45), edited by Max Gustav Lange (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1950), p 182 Ibid. See pp. 187-88.
Feuerbach's
viewed as a
"Philosophy
human
Man"
of
355
manifestations
diversity
human
of actual
individuals),
and
to the fundamental
'
'way
being'
of a
of
as an essential
being-
with-others'
in
uniquely
to be
community life.
and
being, is only
far
as
man,"
of
course,
back
as
Feuerbach's
of
thought
he had
earlier asserted.
historically
grounded
human community
their capacities
and who
"world,"
up
to
of
concrete, flesh
blood individuals
etc.),
know themselves
by
the direct
and
indirect interaction
single man
with others:
possesses
The
in isolation
in himself the is
nor as a
essence of man
contained
unity of man
unity,
however,
between
and
"You."42
In this
tial
sense our
"essential human
and
nature,"
our
"species
as
being,"
just is this
essen
life."
"species-life,"
is
also
But Feuerbach
not
wants to go
"the
essence of
human
claim
just
vidual
"man."
beings,
in any number of indi merely designates those individuals as members of the abstract class
present we can
Even though
to
identify
no
essential
features
again,
of
being, according
limitations
vidual,
of
Feuerbach
individual
of
is,
an adequate expression of
the human essence because the limitations the species itself taken in its
whole. as universal and
any
particular
individual
are not
the
as a
transindi-
'transgenerational'
relationships
be
and and
existence,
whole and
part, the
"real"
one and
for Feuerbach, insofar as they ultimately find their they most fundamental and expression in the extremely significant yet more or less commonplace observation that what human beings can't accomplish individ
nonabstract as
will get
ually,
they
That
is,
whereas
individuals
always ac
within
and exercise
their
human faculties,
the
limitations imposed by their own specific, diversified particularity, and are al the human race taken as an historical whole is freed from ways thus
this particularity,
and
is thus
unlimited and
in
"perfect."
effect
According
plete, perfect,
and
truly is
entails
the com
"powers"
distinctively
is in fact
p.
human
faculties,
realized
in the
his-
42.
Principles of the
Philosophy
of the
Future,
paragraph
59,
244, in The
Fiery Brook: Se
356
Interpretation
its past, present, and future actuality). This is so because the shortcomings of one individual in one facet of human life are always made up for by the relative lack of such deficiency on the part of other individuals; human be
torical species (in
ings
in terms
of
essential
features
of
human existence,
and
limita
fo
history.
than
So,
whole
rather
cusing only on the presently existing human population, or only on the isolated individual, is the only adequate way to fully understand what the human essence really is, in Feuerbach's estimation. At this level the distinction between the spe
cies and
the individual is thus preserved and even glorified, but always with the
the
recognition of
fact that the individual is only fulfilled as a human individual, fully appropriates and lives out his/her species being, and that in this
unlimitedness of
he/she only
participates
world-
constituting relationship to the human Other. In fact, Feuerbach's critique of Christian religious consciousness is in part directed at what he considers to be the
false identification
thought
of
sees
"man"
of
limitations
of
limitation individual
as
such,
and thus
only
views
isolated, individual
finiteness
and
sinners,
just
by
virtue of
their
"imperfection":
idea
of
absence of the
the
species
in
Christianity
characteristic
doctrine
dation
of this
that the
individual
shall not
individual,
de
a
individual
by
himself is
Here
belongs
/,
that
be. All
in the
is inclined to falsehood, another is not; he would rather give up his life than break his word or tell a lie; the third has a propensity to in the fourth to while the whether favour toxication, of Nature, or licentiousness; fifth, by from the energy of his character, exhibits none of these vices. Thus, in the moral as
well as the physical and
intellectual elements,
men compensate
for
each
other, so that,
taken as a whole,
they
are as
they
should
be, they
man.43
As
was
indicated
at the
outset, Feuerbach
of
philosoph
would provide a
liberation,
people
and
sorts, for
such a philos
ophy (both
would
help
misunderstandings and
religious
"speculative")
because it
human
inquiry, including
pp. 155-56.
Feuerbach'
"Philosophy
Man"
of
was not all
357
that
think that
after all
his "new
philosophy"
"human
spirit"
bly
(even assuming for the sake of argument that "a might be for people generally), I have tried to
"liberating"
philosophy"
conceiva show
how Feuer
the time
bach
at
least has
accurate,
insightful,
human
and at
to
go
experience.
He
was
rarely consistent,
and
or
in the
presentation of
conceptually rigorous, in his philosophical investigations his conclusions. However, in his constant emphasis on
and
the dialectical
in his
and
relentless assertions
blood"
"real,"
that it is only within the context of the living, "flesh human community that "essential human can be said to be Feuerbach illuminated certain dimensions of meaningful human existence
he forced
a good
deal
of
inquiry
to
attend more
condition."
University
of Waterloo
Over the century since its first publication, countless readers have been im pressed, intrigued and charmed by John Stuart Mill's autobiographical account
of
his intellectual
development.1
Those
which
sustain
and
austere and
permissive, tend to be particularly impressed by the apparently rigorous regimen imposed upon him by his father, in the latter's
effort to groom
of us who
And those
have
been formed in
come clined
in
interpret Mill's touching account of what he terms the "mental development", in terms of subconscious forces somehow
that austere boyhood. That
the
in his
generated
warranted
tendency
his
of
interpretation
and
appears
to be
by by
"crisis"
account of
its immediate
refer
aftermath centers
feelings."
upon
"mental forces
dark,
nonrational
at work.
However,
Mill's
intellectual
im
him
at
And,
account of this
period, he tells
us
he has
"only
and
specified such of
my
new
pressions as appeared
since, to
be
kind
of
turning
points, marking
stresses that this
definite
in my
thought"
mode of
is
fundamentally
his
an account of
the
development
an
this thought
or understanding.
not preclude
"crisis"
is correct,
Mill's
not
explicitly
connect all of
tion;
and
it is
the
not
resulted a
differing
interpre Some
tations
of
his
lines
of
interpretation
who
following
Alexander
knew Mill personally, empha Bain, physical exhaustion. Others, like A. W. Levi and
disturbances,
espe
still
volume 1 of
John M. Robson
erences to the
(Toronto:
University
as
Autobiography
will
will
be
rendered
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. Toronto Press, 1967-82). Specific page ref in parentheses in the text. Further references to the
of
Collected Works
be
rendered
simply
C.W., followed by
360
Interpretation
M. Robson, R. D.
other
Cumming
of
and
John
Durham, have
Mill
came
to
to be
concerned at
narrow.2
that or
these
of
These
are not
exclusive
lines
interpretation,
three; but the
tends to
and
virtually
when
all commentators
psychological
dimension,
not
even
distract
focus, distort, entirely from, the philosophic problems which were at the root of Mill's despair. Consequently, the most patently questionable feature of the extant inter
not made
it is
the primary
it does
attention
pretations of
Mill's crisis,
as the
following
exposition will
implicitly
show, is
that
of
they fail to take sufficient notice of what Mill himself tells us in explanation his malady and its remedy. That failure no doubt owes much to modern psy
theories
which
chological
he knows
subject
himself does.
crisis with one or an
so
Although
other of
some commentators
connected
Mill's
with which
he
was
grappling, none,
far
as
know,
so.
attempts to explain
it
by
he
intellectual
problems which
The
to
do
Through
will
the
elements
included in Mill's
own ac
count, it
become
evident
that his
was
ing. Whatever
ambivalence
may have
afflicted
the threshold
a proper
understanding
of the nature of
that crisis, its cause and its resolution. Mill's crisis was caused that the philosophy
or connected view of
father
was
by the realization things to which he had been led by his story of his resolution of that difficulty is a
of
struggle with a logically connected series story ical problems. His account of that struggle is a brief of
his
intellectual
or philosoph with
sketch of
his break
his
account makes
it
clear
inti
mately connected with Mill's understanding (or misunderstanding) its relation to human choice and action.
Mill's
resolution of
of nature and
his basic
problem appears to
have been
worked out
in
as
stages, through
a series of successive
insights
or alterations of
understanding,
well as exposure
initial
stages
2.
37-38; A. W.
See: Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill: A Criticism (London: Longmans, Mill," Levi, "The Mental Crisis of John Stuart Psychoanalytic
86-101; Clinton Machann, "John Stuart Mill's 'Mental Crisis': Adlerian Interpretation," Journal of Individual Psychology, 29, No. I (May 1973), 76-87; John M. Robson, The Improvement of Man kind: The Social and Political Thought of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), ch. 2; R. D. Cumming, Human Nature and History (Chicago: of Chicago
1969), 11, 370-88; John
Thoughts,"
19th
visited,"
Press, University Durham, "The Influence of John Stuart Mill's Mental Crisis on His American Imago, 20 (1963), 369-84; Crane Brinton, English Political Thought in the Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 89; J. Stanley Yake, "Mill's Mental Crisis Re The Mill News Letter, IX, No. I (Fall 1973), 2-12.
361
we shall
see. ent
We
intellectual causes of his problem, as that it is only in the last stages that Mill arrives at
problem and the things to which
a coher
understanding
emerged
his
it relates,
albeit one
that
remains problematical.
It
will
be best to
by
which
Mill
occurred.
from his depressed state, more or less in the order in which they The brevity and imprecision of Mill's later autobiographical account of
his thinking
sequence,
details
of
the
but the
direction
of movement appears
fairly
clear.
"FAILURE"
OF THE
"FEELINGS"
In the
autumn of
1826,
at the
tender
age of
twenty years,
intellectual
and
journalistic
belied his youth, Mill ceased to find pleasure in the work which had previously given meaning to his life. He reports that he was, at the time, "in a dull state of
nerves,
such as
unsusceptible
to enjoyment
or pleasurable
excitement;
those
. .
is
pleasure at other
(137). The times, becomes insipid or indifferent been wholly or partly the product of obscure emotional
"mood"
or physiological condi
"mood"
did
not constitute
followed.3
the
"crisis."
The
the
the thought
which
And,
"mood"
while
it may have helped to trigger the thoughts, there is no evidence to sug gest that the thought which ensued was in any way determined or distorted by the
"mood"
or any subrational elements underlying it. In his depressed state of mind, Mill put to himself the all your objects
following
question:
'Suppose that
in life
are
were
in insti
which you
would
his dismay, "an irrepressible effect was devastating. "At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been
looking forward to, could be completely be a great joy and happiness to To self-consciousness instantly answered, The
this
you?'
'No!'"
found in the
for"
continual pursuit of
could there ever again be any interest in the means: I seemed to have nothing left to which he refers, of course, is his benevolent ob (139). The to live were his jective of promoting the happiness of his fellow men; and the
"end"
"means"
Mill's initial
assessment of
"feelings"
failure
3.
of
the
or emotional attachments
"In
all
many
the
was
others
so peculiar as I fancied it, and I doubt not that probability my case was by no means idiosyncrasies of my education had given to but the similar through a state; have passed
it
it
hardly
possible
for time to
remove"
(145)-
362
Interpretation
Mill had been carefully reared by his father in and psychological doctrines which James Mill
association with
accordance with
aspirations.
the
philosophic
de
veloping in
taught that
and
Jeremy
Bentham.
of all rules
Young John had been persistently of conduct, and the end of (145)
life"
that "the pleasure of sympathy with human the good of others, and especially
were
beings,
and
made
mankind on a
happiness"
existence,
vigorous
dedication to
such
upon
fueled
no
by
"feelings"
of others.
But
he discovered he
longer really cared about the happiness of others. He had apparently not ceased to care for his own happiness; and he had not ceased to believe in "the
happiness
corollary.
principle"
"the benevolence
practical
principle"
as
its
But the
"feelings"
necessary to give
and not give
lence
principle were no
longer there;
make me of
did
merely "to know that a feeling would (143). Thus, the collapse me the
feeling"
his benevolent
"feelings"
also
destroyed the
prospects
for his
own
happiness.
If Mill's continuing happiness was to be secured through the noble struggle for social reform for the benefit of his fellow men, what would become of his
happiness if that
his
own
task was
successfully ills
completed?
Mill had
come
to realize that
happiness
others.
If
all social
were
completely eliminated, he
would
be
his "object
existence,"
of
his
own as a
be paradoxical, both
of others.
his
own
happiness
to the
happiness
his
Although his strong sense of duty was sufficient to support the continuance of usual activities in pursuit of the public good, even during the periods of his
activities were carried on without enthusiasm or plea continue to promote the good of others through various
now realized
reform; but he
that
he
was unable
to
truly "sym
no
them. He felt no pleasure in working toward their pleasure in contemplating the happiness which they would
with
happiness,
from his
efforts.
He
concluded
of
its
own
sake, had
worn of
itself
out"
(139). It
was
the
happiness
of others was
believe
means
surest"
own
sake,
merely as the means to one's own pleasure. Mill's initial reaction to his new incapacity to take It
appeared to
pleasure
in the happiness
real
of
any his
light
on
its
own
happiness
had taken
grasping character grossly inconsistent with his rearing presumably due to some defect in his own character for which he was responsible. He felt that his was not in "There any way a "respectable was nothing in it to attract (139). It was simply And,
distress."
sympathy"
on a narrowed and
"egotistical."
363
own
deprived
of
happiness,
even
the
lesser
the
pleasures
general
lost their flavor. Thus, he came to take "no delight in virtue or good, but also just as little in anything else. The fountains of vanity
to
have dried up
within
me,
as
completely
as those of
be
nevolence"
(143). "Thus
me."
He had thoroughly lost the capacity to draw pleasure from the activities which should please; and he was depressingly preoccupied with the loss. Mill's
increased
pects
the loss
of
his love
of mankind could
by
his
his
own
It
"interesting"
condition,
other
narrow personal
way, because it revealed no useful general truths of any kind (139). It was only of interest to Mill, the selfish egotist. It was of no interest to Mill, the philoso
pher or scientist.
And it
was
merely
contemptible
to
Mill,
the moralist.
In
ized"4
view of
of course
to say "Christian
character of
his father's
and
moral
beliefs
and
the
consequent
heavy
emphasis
upon
love
of
humanity
he
And in
perhaps not
surprising that
his fellow
man.
himself for any perceived deficiency of love for the intense love of nobility which Mill had ac
extensive
quired, in large
cal and
measure
from the
historical texts
prescribed
by
study of classical Greek philosophi his father, it is little wonder that he would
opportunity to attain nobility on a James and John Mill's moral phi
ones.
be
so
devastated
by
greatest
grand scale.
elements of
losophy
rested
abandonment of modifications
very different foundations than their original Christian theological doctrine must lead to some
"Christian"
The
significant
love and charity re in the meaning and implications of same tained within a different framework of thought. And the may be said of the classical conception of human nobility when divorced from the teleological con
ception of nature upon which
it
was
thought
originally based. Did the new framework of for the retention of that love of humanity and
of excellence or virtue
Had young Mill's motivations been with the implications of the basic doctrines he had been taught Bentham and others? Or, had he (and they) been living off
for their
own sake?
legacy
inconsistent
with
He
must
have had
doubts
this as
he
put
his
sense of
cause of
his
affliction
by
reflecting
upon
the
"association-
psychological
doctrine
which provided
study,"
"My
4.
course of
he
explains,
"had led
mental and
Christian moral principles heavily influenced That is, merely in the sense that the conventional even though neither adhered to James Mill's moral views, as they did those of his son, (41-53)The specific influences are derived were principles those which the religious doctrines from moral legacy of Christianity, in his essay on the "Utility of the on remarks later John's in reflected note 37, below. which he began writing in 1854: see
the
content of
Religion,"
364
moral
Interpretation
and
feelings
qualities,
whether of a good or a
bad kind,
association; that
action or
we
love
one
thing,
and
pleasure
in
one sort of
contemplation,
and pain
in
another
urable or painful
ence"
ideas
of
those
things, from
(141). Therefore,
what
desire
or
to
avoid, depends wholly upon the associations which are formed by his particular combination of life experiences, especially those which occurred during the ear lier and thus more formative period of his life. The wide diversity of such experi ences, owing to the
wide
diversity
of circumstances
different individuals, along with variations accounts for the observable diversities of aspiration belief in
and
aversion,
as well as of
disbelief.
that chance plays a very great role, perhaps the chief role,
"association"
This
would suggest
determining
vidual.5
stressed
the content of the beliefs, aspirations and aversions of each indi But, following his father's lead, Mill's theory rather the possibilities of transcending this element of chance, by deliberately these variable circumstances
"associations"
seizing
a
control over
way
as
to shape the
of all men
individual
one can
direct the
and values.
father's
psychological
Thus Mill approvingly tells us that his doctrine was "the formation of all human
universal
character
by
Principle
of
Association,
and
dition
of mankind
by
education."
possibility of improving the moral and intellectual con He further observes that, of all his father's doc
or needs more
trines, "none
quired
was more
to be insisted on
(109-10). And,
ac
informally
institutions
and
practices,
a proper attention
heavy em
princi
All
ple"
by
"the happiness
was
and
vate
principle.
to culti
the
happiness
heard it
maintained
myself
possible associations of
salutary class;
great whole of
humanity
resolved,
human
of
was
thus to be
finally
not
by sacrificing
the
happiness
the
individual to society, nor the converse, but by artificially contriving to make them one. For the sake of what was promised to be his own greater and more as
sured
5.
happiness,
the
individual
must
learn to
care most
and
immediately
,
and in.
John Stuart Mill: The Reformer Reformed tensely for the happiness
of others.
365
well-
And
when
being
of others come
into direct
and
conflict with
his
must sacrifice
the
latter,
thereby
his
templating the
This
was
own nobility in facilitating it. assuredly an ingenius and inspiring strategy, if it would work. And it did work, for a time, with young John, whose education had been meticulously directed by this strategy based upon this understanding of the nature and genesis good to others and
of
human
But
now the
strategy
seemed
to be
failing
in
its
most essential
sundered the
"association"
between
associ
Mill's
ation
the happiness
of others?
If the
was a sound practical ap Mill's malady in its terms. What does it reveal? In the first place, the deterministic character of the "associa process described by that theory seemed to imply that the cause of any such
plication of
theory
it,
then
it
ought to
be
possible to explain
tion"
failed
association
must
external
circumstances
which are
beyond the
control of
being
theory
for
moral self-castigation.
What
further
case
reflection upon
that
theory
reveal?
Was the
crucial
association plied?
in Mill's
the
improperly formed;
was
the doctrine
improperly
respect?
Or
was
some
important
ap Mill's
of misapplication.
In
keeping
with
the ostensibly
"feelings"
accidental and
between the
and
specific
or aspirations and
aversions,
on
the one
hand,
the
constitute our
world, on the
of
other
to explain
artificial
his
condition
through an
investigation
the
requirements of a
durable
bond between
was
believed to
possess no natural
links. He
thus
the
means employed
by
application of
the
association
his
"teachers"
He tells
us
that,
looking
forming
and
keeping
that time, it appeared to but superficially with the means up these salutary associations. They seemed to have
back
upon
his
education at
occupied themselves
trusted
altogether
instruments,
praise and
blame,
He
not
that,
while
inculcation
effective.
durably they dependably wholly ineffective, begun early and explains that he "did not doubt that by these means,
neither are
He
applied un
remittingly, intense
be
desires
lasting
undimin-
366
Interpretation
life"
ished to the in
some
end of
instances
(141). That is to say, they may be effective and durable conditions, but will not be so under all condi durable in the
present case.
tions,
and were
clearly
are requisite
teaching?
problem
Or,
be
What is the
to
blame,
re
they induce
tie
. .
contain
"some
casual."
thing
with
artificial and
"The
forcibly
associated
things,
them
by
any
natural
."(141).
Lacking
such a natural
tie, they
tend to
be
vulnerable
to destruction
especially, if not
peculiar nature of
exclusively,
"analysis"
by
"analysis"
on
the one hand and the nature of the aspirational and aversive associ
hand. Mill
he
now
began to
now
understand or
something
of analysis
had previously puzzled and confused him. "I I had always before received with incredulity
saw,
thought I saw,
that the
habit
has
to
tendency
an
."(141).
Critical
reason
is
now seen
have
associations;
that
"feelings"
their objects
is,
are perceived
which relate
directly connected
basic
bodily
functions.
"Analysis,"
is necessary necessary
erodes
and what
then, is particularly concerned with the distinction between what is merely accidental. It not only distinguishes between
associations, it
somehow strengthens
and accidental
the former
and
is the
result of
prejudice; that it
enables us men
tally
does
to separate
ideas
which
have only casually clung together However, it dissolution over natural connections or associa
"the
real connexions
tions of
ideas,
those
which reflect
feelings;
natural
laws, by virtue
in
fact."
another
which enables
us to perceive such
laws
of nature which
thoughts."
compels.
imposes itself
on
invariable,
are
unavoidable,
and necessary.
The
vari
avoidable
associations
artificial, accidental,
and
unnecessary.
"Analytic habits may thus even strengthen the associations between causes and effects, means and ends, but tend altogether to weaken those which are, to speak
familiarly,
a mere matter of
feeling.
They
are
prudence and
sions and of
clear-sightedness, but
the effects
of
a perpetual worm at
both
of
the
pas
fearfully
undermine all
pleasures,
which are
association, that
367
entire
held,
the
all except
insufficiency of which
were
to make life
desirable,
had
a stronger conviction
laws
of
human
nature,"
he concludes,
"by
which,
as
it
seemed
to me, I had
been brought to my present state of distress."6 He blamed his teachers, then, for their failure to generate benevolent "feel in him of sufficient strength "to resist the dissolving of anlaysis,
ings"
influence"
while
they
cultivated
in him
the
an
"inveterate
habit"
of analysis.
They
were aware
that
it is the
"feelings"
which provide
sures
associated with
loftier
aspirations.
clearly the
concerned
course.7
antagonism
between the
"feelings"
But they had failed to perceive and critical reason. James Mill
was confident
that the
feelings
to
avoid
the
intrusion
the
"feelings"
Having
failed to
also
posed of a
by "analy
sis,"
John's teachers
failed to
perceive the
and
intensive
cultivation of
the appropriate
"feelings"
sought
to appeal to
was
his
benevolence
viction
the best
to his
own
to serve as
reformer
happiness,
and
his
friends had
sought to
bring
"the
enlightenment of
the selfish
feelings"
their
benevolence
rather of
than
justice"
(U3-I4)What
ever
degree
of cultivation of
his
"feelings"
which sense.
was
accidental
in the fullest
were
of
books, some of which were self-chosen and others prescribed by his fa However, it was not specifically for this purpose that his father prescribed
now
that
John
saw
his
teachers'
methods as
emphasis.
"It
was not
that
he
was
or
trary
cal
feeling could
take care of
rather
from the
con
to be enough of it if
philosophi
actions were
properly
cared about.
by
the
frequency
controversy,
feeling
a
is
made
instead
of
being
it
self called on
for
are
justification,
as
which
human happiness is
mischievous, tains a
praise
credit
defended
being
he
by feeling,
and
feeling
ob
for desert,
or of
of
thought only
most
to
feeling,
the discussion
things"
due to actions, he had a real impatience of attributing sparing reference to it either in the estimation of persons or in
8. "The
that
and
same
inspiring
they had
experienced
by
some modern
effect which so many of the benefactors of mankind have left on record from Plutarch's Lives, was produced on me by Plato's pictures of Socrates, biographies, above all by Condorcet's Life ofTurgot a book well calculated to
rouse the
best
the
it
contains one of
the
lives, delineated
the to them as others
by
one of
The heroic
affected carried
sympathized,
when
deeply
to
me, and I
perpetually
recurred
do to
favourite poet,
needing to be
thought"
(1
15).
But they
were unable
rekindle
up into the more elevated regions of feeling and his enthusiasm during the period immediately prior
368
yet
Interpretation
a well-formed notion of
employed. problem
have
the alternative
methods
which
they
should
rather
have
of
be solved, then, merely by a greater timely concentration emotionally appealing stories glorifying benevolence and the virtues, or some Could the
cultivating the emotional appeal of the salutary objects? There is certainly good reason to doubt it on the basis of what we have been told. and so long as is inherently antagonistic to such Insofar as
other such method of
"analysis"
"feelings"
the habit
"analysis"
of
vation remain
in
constant
danger
and
likely be postponed
"analysis"
order
the
"ANALYSIS"
According
things
to Mill's account,
causes and
"analysis"
the
connections
between
between
effects,
And, by
"necessity"
he
understood at
this
clear
mechanical necessity.
This is
implicitly
crisis.
principle"
during
the period of
his
Mill
belief
in "the happiness
weakened
principle"
the
first
principle of since
by
his habit
"analysis."
of natural or
And,
were of
in any way
classification,
which
distinguishes between
connections,
necessary
cidental
appears
to be an exhaustive one, the survival of these con them as natural or necessary. Let us see what this
to
mark
in
each of
regarded as a connection
between Mill's
or passions and
the
"idea"
of
happiness,
there is
or
is
construed to
his
as
"feeling"
(or
set of
"feelings") per
se,9
no
regarded
be simply it
given, compulsively,
fact.10
"Analysis,"
by nature.
then,
sire
the
have
no power
to
diminish
.
that
desire; it
This is
a point of
ambiguity in Mill
'
subject
piness which
Mill had
at
this time was clearly a desire for a plentitude of pleasures and absence of
pain, going beyond merely those connected with "the physical and
alone are
natural,
insufficient to
make
has
have to
be satisfied by Mill's fullsome desire as an artificially bloated reflection But in that case, its successful resistence of the eroding effects of
given us an appetite which cannot
And since, in Mill's ac life worthwhile, it would appear her own provenance. Alternatively,
of the natural remains
"analysis"
organic."
regard
unexplained.
io.
A few
years
a criticism of
the unfairness of
Bentham's blan
ket
proof
indeed
can
be
369
a greater awareness or under
by
creating
somehow
in
Was the
"connection"
not
completely
compulsive
in the first
place?
Does its
compulsive
dimension
provide some
kind
"necessary"
of
guidance to
its
noncompulsive
dimension? A
problem
lies buried
which can
here
come
"necessity"
into play only to the extent that compulsive necessity does not prevail. That is the kind of necessity entailed in moral imperativeness, a kind of necessity which authoritatively directs but does not compel. While Mill's account implic
itly
acknowledges
this
distinction, it does not explore it or the relationship be because, at the time, Mill's thoughts were so
completely inclined to
carried
along
by
minimize
justification,
too easily
drawing his
moral principles
from his is
mechanistic premises.
moral principle
a prescribed standard
by
reference
to which deliberate
choices are
cal compulsion.
properly made; and that would seem to be the antithesis of mechani But Mill, like Bentham before him, saw no great problem in
supposing that the latter somehow provides the former. As Bentham says at the outset of his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, "Nature
has
pleasure.
It is for them
alone
to
do,
as well as
to
de
termine
what we shall
do."11
But
nature's power
to
compel
in this
regard
is far from
absolute.
And it
re
mains obscure
which
how
one can
logically
derive
to
a principle of
deliberative choice,
attribute
Mill's "happiness
principle"
appears
be, from
a mere rule of
of
tendency
To the
of mechanical
force
unless one
is willing to
ostensibly
uniformity intelligent
and purposeful
ple."
design to the
mechanism which
provides
the "princi
extent
"determined"
by
compulsive
necessity
of
deliberative
choice.
deliberative control, there is no place for "princi And where there is a place for such principles, they
possibility
and a on
are needed
because there is
probability
of action
in
contrary
principle,"
the other
hand,
attempts
to deduce
do from
to do
what
they
cannot
help doing
and
therefore what
they
can
be
counted upon
more or
less.
"modern"
Mill had
of course
in the
repudiation of
been too thoroughly schooled, as a philosopher, of capable is the notion that nature providing authoritative
by these [natural]
that we ought to
natural
laws [alleged
"
by writers criticized by Bentham]; but neither can any proof be given, by utility. All that can be said is, that the pursuit of happiness is
Bentham's
Philosophy,"
to us.
"Remarks
on
CW.
1 1
to the Principles of
x, 6. Morals
,
and
Hafner,
ple
Bentham's
emphasis.
For
discussion
of
the problem of
from
psychological
generalization, see:
Henry Sidgwick,
and
370
Interpretation
other on
directives,
explicitly
imperatives
its
various
a
forms,
presupposes
or
that what
man.
is
natural
is,
at
least in
qualified
sense,
authoritative or
imperative for
what
Mill, along with so many other modern philosophers, vigorously and consis tently denies in his explicit treatments of this subject in his later writings. He was
well acquainted with
thoritative
ethical
is inclined
by
But though, as previously noted, Mill drew from those ancient texts, he was thoroughly
telelogical
ral
view of
understanding
their
modern
utter rejection of
nature,
including
human
nature.
telos,
is the
Mill's lem
of
But that
entails a as we
as a standard of guidance
"analysis"
powers of
up to the task of
at the time.
His
mechanistic perspective
principle
sorting out this prob led him away from the examination
to an eventual preoccupation with
of
fully
what
he
perceived as the
nature of
"fatalistic"
implications
process
his
mechanistic understand
ing
of
the
the associative
"fatal,"
that
moral
principle,
benevolence,
and therefore
his
prospects
is,
to his
"analysis"
so
devastatingly
was
reveal
to Mill about
second
the logic of
ural or
apparently revealed, in the first place, that benevolence was not a nat necessary objective, not an end in itself, and not an intrinsic good for its It
revealed
practitioner.
not
pulsion
by disclosing that the inclination to benevolence is directly with one's "feelings"; man has no natural com
this
or virtue as
he loves himself
one's
or
his
physical plea
sures.
desire to dedicate
others;
and
life to the
promotion of the
happiness
pleasure
well-being
or
of
there could be
association
no natural or
necessary
and
in
doing
having
done
so.
The
between benevolence
"analysis"
Mill's
had been completely dissolved by because it was it was not even based upon a natural inclination to compassion wholly artificial; for one's fellow creatures. As James Mill explained it at about this time, the
sympathetic pleasures and pains which we
"feelings"
form
of
feeling
Our human
for
ourselves.
"We
never
own."12
natural
inclinations
just
a
are all
nominally feel for others are really a feel any pains and pleasures but our selfish. An based upon such a
"analysis"
view of other.
nature was
bound
few
to undermine
benevolence in
one
way
or an
John
observed
years
later
James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2nd ed.; ed. by John Stuart illustrative and critical notes by John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, Andrew Findlater and George Grote (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869 reprinted in New York
12.
Mill,
with
371
such a moralist as
as
Socrates,
Plato,
or
Christ;
believed
and
their spirit
imbibed,
must either
be hopeless
giving themselves up to a life of that miserable self-seeking, taught to regard as inherent in their original and unalterable
they
nature.13
John's
analysis
led him to
understand
(and the
own
other
virtues) both
as an end
in itself
the primary
means
to
his
revealed that
his
pursuit of
own sake
had been
by
tion":
direct
connections
between his
emotions or
and
benevolence,
generated
for example, stirring tales of noble by purely and indirect of the intellect, in the form of the ratio actions; connections, by way nal conviction of the intrinsic goodness of benevolence. He concluded that there
emotional stimulation was
former, in his
own case.
His
zeal
for the
good of
mankind,
his "strongest
sentiment,"
was, he tells us, "as yet little else, at for speculative opinions. It had not its root in
with
that period of my
genuine
benevo
place
in
standard"
and a mere
analysis;
endured
clear.
although
coldly calculated sort of decency. Both apparently succumbed to he seems to imply that his true love for mankind would have
more
if it had been
not
of
not made
But it is
difficult to
upon
the vulnerability
of
conviction
to
an analysis quires us
based
Mill's
mechanistic presuppositions.
Moral necessity
re
psychology insists that only that is good for us which we happen to love; and the only things which we love necessarily are our own pleasures and avoidance of pain, and,
more
to love the
good
because it is
good.
But Mill's
mechanistic
specifically, those
to
our
basic
for their
That,
longer be justified nor, consequently, psychologically of course, did not preclude the possibility of another morally justifiable
sustained.
"feelings"
benevolence,
in the
a calculated association of
emotions.
benevolence
presence of
as means
to
directly
Mill
stresses
the
not
this further
association
in his
Augustus M. Kelly, 1967), 11, 217. Hereinafter cited as Analysis. The first edition was pub 1829. Young John was proof-reading the successive chapters for his father as they were the period of his crisis. In an editorial note in the 1869 edition, John observes that completed
by
lished in
during
expression"
of
on this point
fails to
guard against
self"
implica
pleasure or pain
is consciously
referred
to
in
all
cases, thus
implying
that we are
truly
able
to
for
John's
rather equivocal
implica denies that his father intended that making his point neither confirms nor interpretation because it had been his possible that alert to was John that previously tion. I believe
way
of
"erroneous"
own, as
13.
well as
his father's.
on
"Remarks
Bentham's
Philosophy,"
C.W.,
x, 16. Mill's
emphasis.
372
ceased
Interpretation
to believe that benevolence was the best
retention of the
means
to his
personal
happiness.
now
belief in the he
causal connection
between benevo
that
lence
and
his
own
happiness,
of
which
could not
help desiring,
linkage
of desire and pleasure with his connecting his benevolent activities. That appears paradoxical. One would expect that the moti proved
incapable
"feelings"
be mediated, if
not
ception
of
the
causal
association.
Thus, believing
surest"
greatest and
means
primary
to
desire)
ought to generate a
more or
less
proportionate
which
to do so?
piecemeal
of
Mill does
and
not
directly
only gradually,
by
a peculiar
one's own
it;
and
that peculiarity
"Analysis,"
is
due, in turn,
by
laying
bare those peculiarities, fatally destroys the efficaciousness In his later discussion of the "anti-self-consciousness happiness
of pleasant
of
the means.
theory"
which
he de The
to
sion that
could
be
attained
only
"by
not
end."
"enjoyments
make
life"
cannot
thing"
life "a
They
are sufficient
passant"
"the
object"
principal
As
soon as one
makes them
"they
are
immediately
felt
to be
insufficient"
instruments
to be
of one's
happiness. "Ask
happy,
so"
(147).
as
But why
tion
happiness diminish
one ques
logically
on the pleasures
swer
and the successive answers have a chilling effect previously forthcoming. One cannot give a fully thoughtful an to the self-put query, "Am I without addressing the logically prior
happy?" happiness?"
leads to another;
question, "What is
And, insofar
"happiness"
as
is
construed as
something
ment of
may be acquired or attained in varying quantities, the assess sufficiency leads to the further questions, "How much happiness is
which
justify
possible?"
"How
it?"
"Which
activi
less
productive of
happiness?"
"How
or
happiness?" why does any particular activity or pursuit produce or contribute to The scrutiny of one's current happiness and its sufficiency thus leads to the scru
tiny
pursuits,
provide a
sufficiency
not
And
one
is led to
ity
it
and
pursuit,
only "How
happiness does it
bring
and will
me?"
thus
and perhaps, "How much happiness should it bring me bring and, finally, "Why should I expect it to bring me any happiness at It becomes, at least implicitly if not explicitly, a search for some necessary
it
more?"
373
this search,
one's
between the activity or pursuit and the happiness of the actor. And if well conducted, can, in Mill's view, only result in putting much of happiness "to flight
attained
by
fatal
questioning"
and
"forestalling
in
imagination"
one's
But why must the questioning of the loftier activities destroy the latter's
"analysis"
and prior
its relationship to
to
each of
capacity
bring
pleasure?
It is be
upon
cause
reveals to us
were
necessarily based
of
illusions. Mill
each of which
implicitly
has its
activity, organic;
of
associated
(a)
physical and
(b)
moral or
ethical;
(c) intellectual;
loftier
and
(d)
aesthetic.
these
constitute
As
we
have seen,
Mill
one
makes a
hand,
and
the other
hand, regarding
and
The
apparently based
calculation;
the activity is
"Analysis"
intrinsically
now
The
pleasure
valuable or necessarily good for its practitioner. discloses that that belief is, in every case, an illusion. derived from benevolent activity is apparently based upon the il
lusion that
goodness
moral goodness
inheres in
such
perceived
intrinsic
is
from the
philosophic
merely an artificial concoction. The pleasure derived dedication to the pursuit of truth is apparently based upon And the
pleasure
the illusion that such truth or understanding is real and good as it seems, that it is
necessary to
ture's
our well-being.
derived from
poetic
beauty
is based
it is
a
upon
beauty
is
real and
enjoyment of
"Analysis"
possess
necessary destroys these underlying illusions by revealing that nature does not any certifiable dimension of goodness which provides support (necessity)
"loftier"
to that good.
for these
possible activities.
Nature does
for man; it
is merely indifferent, if not hostile. merely compels. Where it fails to compel, it It appears, then, that it is not the case that benevolence is perceived to be good because it happens to
it is
ness and
perceived
to be
bring us pleasure, but rather, it brings us pleasure because intrinsically good. And when the belief in its intrinsic good
provide pleasure
"happiness"
in terms
of pleasure and
activity
can
can
And,
since
apparently
reasonably be valued only as a means to pleasure, and not thing, the activity as an end in itself. And, if its pleasure-producing capacity is dependent upon a belief in its intrinsic value, then that capacity is also dependent upon a lack of
thoughtfulness,
or
"self-scrutiny."
That is why
he
concludes
that happiness
is
attainable
only
by
putting it
374
Interpretation
own
sake,
not
consciously
as a means
to one's
happy (I thought)
happiness;
on the
who
have their
of
minds
fixed
happiness
others,
on the
improvement
of
mankind,
or pursuit, followed
not as a
means, but
as
itself an ideal
end.
Aiming
illu
If Mill's
sions.
analysis
But the
case
not so self-evident as
it
appear.
Mill's Benthamic
"happiness"
(the term
employed
to
identify the
human existence) to more or less compulsive plea and all of the loftier ac sures, and the resulting disjunction between tivities which appeared to Mill to be necessary for a full and meaningful life, is
authoritative end or object of
"happiness"
of course a
man
ity.14
highly
debatable
view.
Earlier thinkers
such as
Aristotle defined hu
life
and
happiness in terms
of
While there
and
were perceived
activity itself, and especially virtuous activ to be some tensions between life (or happi
ness)
life,
be in fatal
Virtuous activity,
including
be the
pursuit of a natural
end, the
satisfac
despite Mill's
acknowledgement of the
insufficiency
the physical pleasures to provide a full and satisfying life, his contrary concep tion of the order of nature prevented him from perceiving his unsatisfied loftier
desires
as necessary or authoritative. If compulsive necessity is the primary consideration underlying the difference in the standings accorded by Mill to the physical and the mental pleasures, as ap pears to
of
absolutizing
what
is only
a rela
activ
tive difference. While it is apparent that the physical pleasures result from
ity
which
is
which produces
the
mental
pleasures, the
one
difference is
one of
degree,
even
though of
significant
hand,
rudimentary
motivation
from
inclinations
or
by
Mill:
sympathy for
our
fellow human beings; a natural, seemingly tion to the beautiful. These three, however,
upon
curiosity;
appear to
be
more
heavily dependent
case with
the
re
On the
other
hand,
is
well.
If one
allows oneself
(as,
gists continue to
do,
although
usually
disguisedly
as
organic"
a greater or
lesser
amount of calculation
purpose served.
11
76b
375
gustatory
pleasure which
preserving life and supporting healthy growth, not primarily for it provides as inducement to satisfy the need. Pain
the physical level provide thoughtless thoughtful motives based
since
upon
and pleasure on
(compulsive)
of
motivation
in lieu
ends.
of more
the
understanding
the proper
But,
secondly,
human intelligence
comes to
natural
of excess or
deficiency, his
well-being,
even on
level,
depend
upon a
thoughtful understanding of
of pleasures per se.
his
nature and
needs,
rather than
And
ex
perience
teaches
us that
due
regard
for the
served, results eventually in the defeat of that purpose, of healthy diminished growth, capacity for the pleasures so highly esteemed. Mill's reported loss of zeal for his altruistic endeavors, then, appears to reflect
purpose and a a
growing
awareness that
his
preference
for benevolence
was perhaps
little
more or
than a mere
eccentricity.
"radical,"
arbitrary conventionality, if not a merely It seems that Mill, the energetic social
come
personal
idiosyncracy
had
to at
least
suspect
more underwritten
by
objective
necessity
institutions
indignation. His
he had
of
new
understanding
of
long
necessity
It
would appear
a contradiction
as an expression of
desire for
pain,
and
the
benevolence
desires
and pleasures
strategy in favor
which requires
That contradiction, however, is fatal only to those who are analytically aware of it, for that awareness prevents the fulfillment of the promise of even greater per
sonal
happiness
"sacrifice."
as
nominal
But those
who re
the paradox would presumably escape its unfortunate conse blissful in their ignorance. Benevolence and the other lofty aspirations quences, could still bring happiness to those whose belief in their intrinsic goodness had
main unaware of not
been destroyed
"analysis."
by
And that
meant
that
it
for the
reformer
others
for promoting the happiness of them from the fatal paradox revealed by other things, shielding by, among
to devise possibly
successful strategies
"analysis."
apparently too late for Mill himself to benefit from any such strategies. had already been destroyed. "And there seemed no power in na ture sufficient to begin the formation of my character anew, and create in a mind
It
was
His
"character"
now
of
irretrievably
desire"
analytic,
fresh
any
of
the objects
human
(143). If
apparently have to be
possibility that
and
a
satisfaction.
nature's
doing,
since
Mill's habit
the
him
376
with
Interpretation
motivation
little
might save
the happiness of
others.
However, Mill
"true
to
busy
himself
with reform of
activities, without
which pro
Coleridge15
description"
his
state of mind at
this time.
Work
without
hope draws
nectar
in
sieve,
And hope
live (145).
Mill
reports
light"
broke in
upon
his
gloom when
he
was as a
young
relief"
by
reading his favorite books, which contained "me from which he had "always hitherto
greatness"
drawn
tel'
animation,"
they
no
longer
produced
They
account of
young Marmon
me, and I
was moved
to
my burthen
lighter. The
feeling
was
dead
within
ter, capacity for happiness, are made. Relieved from my ever present sense of irremediable wretchedness, I gradually found that the ordinary incidents of life could again give me some pleasure (145).
.
This
was
was not
final
resolution of
his
"crisis."
It
only the
as
beginning
solution,
at
relapses"
into de
pression, "some
erable"
of which
lasted many
months,"
but he "never
he had been.
of a
What lessons
perience?
less
personal nature
ex
He does
not say.
And
yet
it
Something
ca
had apparently
pable of
"analysis"
survived
after
all, some
being
by
nobility. and
natural?
Is
destroyed
ing
active
again,
even
by anlaysis, why it was also capable of becom in the wake of "analysis"? Or had he merely exaggerated
"analysis"
and "the feelings"? It was relationship between only later that he was led to explore these further implications. In the first flush of his renewed hope he was preoccupied with efforts, first, to devise a protective or misconstrued
the
"analysis"
from
destroying
his
"feelings,"
new
and, second,
or
effective methods of
stimulating
15.
vols.
Hope,"
ofS.
T. Coleridge,
311
the
"anti-self-consciousness"
strategy
which
he hit
upon was
of
theory already
values.
mentioned.
This
new
"theory
life"
value of more or
deliberate
attempt
less conventionally acquired aims and to insulate the aspirations and aver
"salutary"
sions
from
contact with
"analysis"
so as
to prevent exposure
of
the illusions
which animated
ing
to cultivate the
capacity
and
their focus
of attention or employment.
thought of
your
your own
happiness
your
you must
"let
self-consciousness,
on
interrogation,
themselves"
exhaust
tives; and he assures us that "if otherwise hale happiness with the air you breathe
preoccupy
one's critical
fortunately
in
faculties
with
(147). That is to say that one must the practical problems involved in the at
the scrutiny of the
moral
tainment of the
"ideal
of
ends"
standing
or
imperativeness In light
of
the
Mill's
own
diagnosis
of
the problem,
and considered
by
itself (that
"anti-self-
is,
without
supplementary
assistance
from
other
strategies), Mill's
consciousness"
cumvent
strategy provides a rather tenuous solution. It attempts to cir any thoughtful association between the powerful natural desire for happiness and the activities of the individual; it seeks to restrain the critical un
derstanding
already fettered
or
within prescribed
boundaries. But
"inveterate,"
where not
the analytical
habit
of mind
exists and
within
has become
it is
likely
to allow itself to be
by
some
boundaries imposed arbitrarily by itself at an earlier point in time other source. The strategy therefore enjoyed some prospective
unenlightened
success
many, but
among the
to
require
group
of
It
would seem
the
highly
analytical reformers
in itself, despite the fact that their critical understanding tells them that its intrinsic value, if any, is unevident or undemonstrable. And if they are to deceive themselves about this, how can they (or we) be certain that they are not further deceiving
end, to
regard a substitute
is really only
means,
as an end
motives?
May
not a
desire for
be
by
the
professed
satisfying
fessedly
tensibly
of such
questionable
readily contribute to their own happiness as a con dedication to the well-being of those others, given the os
"associations"?
And,
even
in the
absence
dark motives,
end
factors
up
also
deceiving
they
are
themselves about
serve?
dedicated to
And, finally,
not
even
supposing
all
these
16.
possible pitfalls
successfully negotiated, is it
recreant
likely
that the
deter-
He
assures us
that
he "never turned
both
of
individual
and of social
improve
(147).
378
Interpretation
sophisticates must strive to maintain minedly brave front which these critical and irrepressible would, at least periodically, be broken down by that give way to bouts of despondency and despair? It is not surprising, then, dejection. of periods recurrent of his termination Mill does not yet report the final
"analysis,"
with
his
analysis of
the
shortcomings of
his
methods,
effectiveness of
suggested a
increase the
culti
the
anti-self-consciousness strategy:
the early
intense
the salutary
objects,
such as
by
specifically
to be
emotional stimulants.
His
experience
to
be
cul
tivated as
well as
and required
guided."
as well as
There
would
be
no neglect of
analysis"
both
individual
and of social
consequences were
to
be
corrected
Consequently, "the
cultivation of
the
he tells us, "became one of the cardinal points in my And my thoughts and inclinations turned in an
(147).
This
gram.
new strategy required a shift in the focus of emphasis in the reform pro Mill tells us that he now "ceased to attach almost exclusive importance to
training
of
the human
being
for
for action";
the prime
ual"
necessities of
(147). This
added
and "for the first time, gave its proper place, among human well-being, to the internal culture of the individ dimension of "internal was to be accomplished
culture" arts."
The artists,
au
thors,
of
be
as
indispensable to
manipulate
progress as
They
would
skillfully
the emotions
the young so as to inculcate in them an intense love of mankind and virtue and
and other forms of baseness. If begun early would become "so intense properly conducted, these inveterate as to be practically indissoluble, before the habitual exercise of the
"associations"
power of analysis
had
commenced"
(141).
would
"salutary"
The
apparent
hope
was
produce artificial
direct
"associations"
the
activities so
links
would constitute a
kind
of
"second
nature"
on Mill's analysis, could not be wholly employ that term). Such immune to dissolution by analysis, so long as they partake in no way of "first na ture"; but they would presumably have a relatively high degree of resistance to analytical
"associations,"
destruction. To dissolve
such
strong
emotional attachments to
virtue,
but
likely to
subject
suffer periodic
bouts
analytical
thoughts
straying into
379
strongly inculcated
sense of
might
be
intervals,
they
restored them
doses
of artistic stimulation.
It appeared, then, that the problem caused by nature's lack of positive support for the loftier activities necessary to individual happiness was perhaps manage
able
by
human
at
least it
might
be,
so
long
as nature was
artifice.
only
Mill's
soon
search
for
brought him to
As he explored,
first,
to
lem
of
which
could
human happiness. Music was the only one of the imaginative arts in he had previously taken "great But he now concluded that it be of only limited utility for the purpose of cultivating the feelings. It is, he
pleasure."
concluded, superlative in
those
which
"exciting
kind
pitch
feelings
of an elevated
utmost
height, is
precious
at other
was
util
ity
"character"
as a method of
use was
primary
doubtful;
or
and even
with
its
secondary
miliarity,
limited,
because the
pleasure which
it
provides
"fades
fa
to be revived
by intermittence,
fed
by
continual
novelty"
pleasant combinations of
(149). And Mill morosely reflected upon the limited number of possible which constitute the the "five tones and two
semitones"
octave,
and was
This
but the
beginning
of a
provided
the de
or contrast. In pressing bases for his later formulation of the law of his father's second edition of in an editorial note in the Analysis, he re 1869, marks that his father, in "endeavouring to express the most fundamental fact of
"doubles"
consciousness
another
in
order to our
being
all
does
all
not quite
"all consciousness,
passed
sensation,
knowledge
be
of
doubles the
us."
state
He explains to, are equally recognized by know things only by contrast. "Any single thing is unknowa ble by us; its relative opposite is a part of its very "Opening the eyes a present light, a past to the light, for the first time, we know a contrast,
from
and
that this
means we
existence
privation
other."17
There is
no
way
of
ascertaining precisely
as the
point
in these
universal
terms. But
pleasures
17.
broader
possible
the transitoriness
of music's
reformers of
society
Analysis, II,
Mill's
emphasis.
380
every
person
in the
commu
no nity would cease to be (149). and longer kept up by struggle privation, Those who have never known the unhappiness which comes from deprivation
and a state of physical
will
free
in
comfort, the
pleasures of
life, being
pleasures"
be
unable
derive
could
improvement in the
the im
plementation of
if the
recipients of and
this
largesse
self
could
be
expected
increasing ingratitude,
egotism,
grasping
ishness
as their
improved? And
would
there
fore its
remained
for
believing
bring
happiness to
trived
of
of an artificially con increased and assured in and happiness for all interests society harmony its members must have begun to appear to be a piece of naivete based upon a ostensible of
faulty
reading of the nature of the human psyche. Mill now recalled an earlier perception of another
which
manifestation of
the law of
contrasts,
had
occurred when
success.
pleasure relative
to worldly
assessing his own lack of desire and Personal success, he believed, had come too
was
he
quickly
and
struggle,
a period of
deprivation,
of unsatisfied
vanity at too early an tion, and felt myself of some importance, before the desire of distinction and of importance had grown into a passion: and little as it was which I had attained, yet
some gratification of
hunger. "I had had (as I reflected) age: I had obtained some distinc
having
me
been
attained too
early, like
blase
and
indifferent to the
pursuit"
(143). And
now
he
concluded that
"the
flaw in my life, must be a flaw in life (149). This law of contrasts also illuminated the significance previously noticed, Mill, like his teachers, had
and more
itself"
of another curious
fact,
observed
that the
"associations"
painful
were stronger
pleasureful ones.
Or,
as
James Mill
expressed
"pleasurable
sensations"
are not so
"pungent"
as of moral
the painful
ones.18
inculcation
scruple, blame
and punishment
tools than
Deprivation
be
expected to
form
a character more
could
be
produced
life. One
would also
have to
expect
aversions,
which are
based
of
pain, to bet
Mill does
not attempt
fading previously as due to satiety and boredom. to account for this greater responsiveness to pain, but
with
falter
the
their
natural; satisfaction
cial,
and
Pleasure is
18.
Analysis,
II, 203.
381
are visited upon us
by
farther
reach of artifice.
Pains
by
given
specific
desires
are always
dependent
among
alternative
One
might
of the world,
including
nature, acting
upon
inflicted
upon us or
unwillingly
words,
pain
experienced and
the individual acting upon the world, insofar as pleasure is actively pursued and
embraced.
In
other
is
more
and nature
ple"
is
pure compulsion.
It
would seem
as a
directive principle, is
best,
really given by nature after all. We are merely driven from directed to anything in particular.
not
Nature,
at
painful sit
This
to
pain
than to
to be a
corollary
the
the
fear
of
death
the most
powerful natural
passion,
as so
forcefully
of upon
expounded
by
the importance
reflection of
attached
modern
to this
feature
human behavior in
thought is a
the
insistence
identifying
rather
"nature"
than ends,
with
least
common
denominators
is
also a reflection of
or mechanical
the
causes
the pleasures
"primitive"
and
or which
wants, those
function
mechanically,
be those
define
as well.
On the Benthamic
which are natural
view of
can still
distinguish between
organic,"
pains
are
imposed
toring his
latter But the
by son. According
be
of
and
penal system or
"associations"
by
father tu
generated
by
the
would
vulnerable
to
"analysis,"
while
those of the
former
would not.
durability
Mill's
sense of
duty
and
its
motivational effectiveness
dur
ing his
depressed
to be a testament to the
durability of even
"duty"
identifies
the
pain as
its enforcing
sanction.20
Similarily,
wants,
as
Mill stresses,
generate as connected
very durable,
while
directly
organic"
"physical
are more
and
machine, the
and vulnerable
for
example,
fragile
in
all of
their
apparent
loftiness.
The
totle
was,
of
course,
no new
discovery. Aris
long
sures
19.
calism
(except those
smell) that
they
are
inextricably
Elie
connected with
the
allevi-
(Boston:
quoted
by
of Philosophic Radi
20.
382
Interpretation
(as in the
case of
hunger). He
argued that
it is
one of
the marks
of
superiority of the loftier pleasures that they do And it was seen to be a mark of a properly cultivated
motivated
not share
that characteristic.
that
it is
by
the natural
attraction of
nobility
and
are of
fixed
on pleasure of
kind,
must
be
beast
burden."21
The young
and virtuous
Mill,
who
nobility
and and
base;
he
his
own noble
inclinations
Mill's
had
preciation of convinced
the
apparent
loftiness
of
his
own motives.
accomplishments were
colored by his ap His father had effectively due to the advantageousness of his no and not
doubt been
of
his teachers,
to any special
his
own.
Consequently, young John was inclined to regard his own nat ordinary. Therefore, if he could be so successfully educated to
virtue, why could not
all?
love
of mankind and
But now,
more
as
he began to grasp
and concluded
teaching
real
clearly,
unattainable,
and
therefore incapable
bringing
happiness to others, he
If the
have
realized that
his
duty
be
and as
happiness,
was an anachronism.
pursuit of
nevolence was
merely the
means of
which
illusions,
depended
on
deprivation for
than
dog chasing its own tail. And yet, somehow, "the destiny of mankind in general was ever in [his] And he concluded that, "unless I could see my way to some better
their elimination.
seemed to
position of a
thoughts."
He
be in the
"
must continue
that, due to the refractoriness of human nature, the contradic happiness principle and the benevolence principle is fatal, not
only to those few who are analytically aware of it, but also to the many, who are fated to become aware of it through practical experience. It is, of course, logic
ally
coherent and
pain of
human
conflict cannot
be
eliminated pleasures
for
more or
little
or no regard
But if the
of
more
compelling reality to
selfish which
which
nature responds
pain
frustrated interests
desire,
has
rather
harmony
of
been manifest,
or
of a sense of noble
The Biblical
21.
version of
the
benevolence principle,
Nicomachean Ethics,
u8oa
383
support
oneself,
very strong
by arguments
Mill
from
nature and
divine will,
including
who
duration in
has
supports which
But, for
the reformer
it is
one
thing
to
imagine
a world of perfect
than that of nature, a world in which the Biblical injunction is assuredly fulfilled. It is yet another, less inspiring, prospect to antic ipate a never ending struggle in the soul of every man, which is bound to corrupt,
efforts a world more perfect
in
one
degree
or
another, every
social
plan, every
political
a complete relapse
into
a condition of
barbarism
be
and savagery.
kind
sup
in
nature
for the
expended own
for the
sake of
relatively
must
modest
gains, if any,
over
the
course of
his
lifetime? And
where nature's
support
does
not
success, it
take
the
form
of attractive natural
ends, the
approximation of
pleasures,22
which,
by
the
individ
not
merely
artificial ones
organic"
to compete
to be
with
plea
hope to
generate
love
the
for their
by
imaginative arts, when the greater pungency of pain promises the recurrent destruction of the inclinations to self-restraint thereby generated? Pain is not a
of
promising
sake,
as
method of
creating
wholly
artificial
love
of
Mill
recognized.
rescue
themselves
their
fellow
men
apathy generated by the development of critical reason, and the grasping selfishness imposed by nature by seeking out artificial to stimulants jack artificial "associ admittedly up admittedly
wilderness of skepticism and
"salutary"
ations"
from the
What is
"appropriate"
an
stimulant?
What is
Is there any reason to expect that all would respond as Mill did to the reading of Marmontel's tale? Might not some be more moved by the tales of the Marquis de Sade? What grounds are there for preferring Mill's in
a
association?
clinations to those of
de Sade's in
admirers?
What
grounds are
there for
prevail?
an expecta
preferences can
necessarily
spared
Or,
to take
ac
the reformers
deliberately
Or
are
contrive
to reshape themselves
this
they, too,
necessity
by beof
There
was no
the
reward
for the If
sacrifice of more
immediate
to the
happiness
poetry in the quality of the pleasure which it provides, as Bentham maintained, then it follows that the choice is reduced in every case to considerations of rela tive quantity and certainty of attainment. Thus, Bentham identifies seven dimensions of measurement
other people.
pushpin
duration; (3)
certainty
or
uncertainty;
and certainty: (i) intensity; (2) (5) fecundity; (6) purity; and (7) benefitted. The Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. iv. upon various aspects of
focus
quantity
(4) propinquity
or
remoteness;
384
Interpretation
of
ing
deprived
the capacity
for it,
by
nature,
conceived as an
irresistible
compul
sive machine?
over
the
to
reformist
hopes
by
his
increasing
deliberate
fundamental
natural obstacle to
any kind. He tells us that, "during the later returns of my dejec tion, the doctrine of what is called Philosophical Necessity weighed on my exis (175). A central implication of that doctrine, as Mill then tence like an
incubus"
understood
ence"
it, "was
proved
the
which
plagued
operative force in the depressing and paralysing influ him (177). Consequently, he says, "I felt as if I was slave of antecedent
scientifically my
our
to be the helpless
circumstances;
as
if
us
by
agencies
beyond
could
He wholly out of our own "disbelieve the doctrine of the formation of character by
control,
and was could not.
wished that
he
circumstances"
but he
Thus, by following
had
out
tressing
and
conclusions which
he had imbibed from his father, he was led to dis escaped his father's notice and which completely
He
saw
undercut
his reformist,
moralistic endeavors.
himself in the
"Fatalism"
paradoxical
burdensome
position of
believing
the
doctrine
of
to
be true but
cial.
to be false but morally benefi morally destructive, and the doctrine of That is, of course, an ambiguous perspective on the problem, since the no
"freewill"
destructive
of
and the as
"fatalism,"
morally beneficial are contradictions in described, is strictly true. But Mill was
apparently aware of the ambiguity and was struggling to resolve it. Confronted by the realization that his moral preconceptions were inconsistent
with
his basic
causality, Mill
was reluctant
to sacrifice
his morality to his metaphysics. But he could not readily bring himself to aban don the latter. His eventual resolution of the dilemma appeared to be both simple
and
ingenious, for it
seemed to allow of
him to
save of
both,
tion"
in his understanding
on the
word
the
implications
as a
that
he
"pondered painfully
ceived, that the
applied to
cation of
subject, till
Necessity,
gradually I saw light through it. I per name for the doctrine of Cause and Effect
association"
human actions, carried with it a misleading irresistible compulsion. It seemed to imply that
unknown author of the
the impli
the inev-
23.
The
following
"Damn,
limerick
might well
mind:
There It
was a
young
man who
said,
grieves me to
think that I am
move
Predestined to
In Not Not
a circumscribed
groove.
tram."
even a
bus, but
even the manipulation of other people's grooves can provide a sense of accomplishment when
to
consequence of the
inescapable
in.
385
"character,"
and
that our
in turn, is irre
not appear to
of one's
sistibly
by
external circumstances.
of one
The
process thus
control or
did
admit of
direction
now
our character
by circumstances,
There
seemed
do
much
stances."
to be
for morality
"see"
and
responsibility
What
was
it that
enabled of
Mill
the
fatalistic
erroneous sophical us
interpretation
Necessity"? The
answer
necessary implications of the doctrine of "Philo is provided in his Logic,2* to which he directs
his
solution to the problem.
There
we
learn that Mill simply applied Hume's caveat concerning our knowledge of His application of Hume's argument leads to the conclusion that, since
"causes."
we are
incapable
of
any direct
we
"causes,"
observation of
or
"secret
powers
capa
ble
"Causality"
of
compelling,
more
is
therefore
nothing
than a
mere
hypothetical
based
upon
limited
It is
sequen
observation
merely
our
intimate
con
nexion, of some
ent over
tie,
by
the anteced
the
consequent."25
While Hume's
sion which
caveat allows
not require
the
conclu
equally
restricts us
from thinking
that we
know that
billiard ball
which strikes another possesses a power which we are not required over continue
compels
it does; but second ball possesses any deliberate own movement. We are rather inclined to
the latter to
move as
"control"
its
to
movement
of as
the second ball is indeed compelled the only way of making sense of
by
the
force
or power exerted
even
by
the
first,
what we
observe,
we are
Hume's
that
skeptical point.
But Mill
concludes
that
it is
willing to "grand to
error"
we are
thus
irresistibly
compelled
by
forces
over which we
have
no
What
"control"
sort of
Mill
ter."
do we have, then? And how do we exercise it? one will do in any circumstance depends upon his
a certain
"character";
has, "to
own charac
Its being, in the ultimate resort, formed for him, is not inconsistent with its being, in part, formed by him as one of the intermediate agents. His character is formed by his circumstances (including among these his particular organization); but his own
pages 837-42. imagination which, "considered as applying to the human will, our voli conflicts with our consciousness, and revolts our feelings. We are certain that, in the case of we are not compelled, as by a magic know that We constraint. mysterious this is not there tions,
24. 25.
Book VI,
ch.
11, especially
It is this
product of our
We feel, that if we wished to prove that we have the power of re be observed, a new anteced sisting the motive, we could do so, (that wish being, it needs scarcely is of more importance) paralysing to our de and (what our to be would pride, and it humiliating ent;)
spell, to obey any
particular motive.
otherwise."
sire
for
excellence,
if
we
thought
Logic, C.W.,
emphasis.
386
Interpretation
mould
desire to
it in
a particular way,
influential.26
is
by
no
means one of
the least
But
one's
"character."
desires, in turn, are seen to be dictated by, or reflections of, one's How, then, does one manage to break out of the vicious circle? We
may easily imagine the potential beneficiaries of the reform activity being re formed through the interventions of the reformers. But is there any possibility
that the
reformers can
break
them
selves on a
loftier
plane?
Mill tells
that we
and
can
reform ourselves
by first
forming
acter.27
the desire to
change our
shape,
then proceeding to
bring
about
in
our char
But do
we
have? Or,
are our
have any deliberative control of what desires we can or will loftier desires wholly determined by external circumstances
are
generating artificial "associations"? Mill states that such desires for self-reform
perience"
ultimately
generated
by
"ex
the
including
education, "experience
had,"
of
the
painful consequences of
character we
aroused."
and "strong feelings of admiration previously But he has not retracted his earlier account
which
or
of
aspiration,
the wholly
aspi
or
the
"analysis"
of experience
has
on all of the a
loftier
What does
all of
we
have
degree
of
freedom
autonomy in
our
what we
desire
for ourselves;
or are we
merely
more com
first
presupposed?
Does
degree
of potential or
"feelings"
desires;
does it merely
to act
in
accordance with
"laws"? It is
every inclination or aspiration which may aroused; but is that due to an autonomy-generating
by
chance
rational
impelling
effects of
those
desires
or
or
is it
compulsive
force
of
countervailing desires
over which
have
no
deliberate
control?
If Mill
means to
will
imply that we
are,
after
all,
more
to which the propriety and relative priority of each of the possible desires is
such principle our other must
ultimately be
guided or
"de
by
"feelings"
something
than reason
as shaped
by
the cumulative
the passions or
external circum
which are in-
body
"laws"
we are.
But
neither
did those
who
were supposed
directly will that we should be what we are. Their will had no direct power except over their own actions. They made us what they did make us, by willing, not the end, but the requisite means; and we, when our habits are not too inveterate, can by similarity
our
formed
characters,
willing the
requisite
different."
means,
make ourselves
387
that case
in
there
is
no meaningful sense
in
which we can
be be
to be in
destiny.
In Mill's He
"fatalistic"
view,
man appears
to
a strange and
ill-fated
machine.
of
intellectual
complex and
astounding
of those capacities
is the ability to
as
to
most pathetic
feature is
self-awareness and
his developed
capacity to demand
self-
tive purpose.
justifications for his actions, by reference to some necessary Thus, it appears that when the machine attains full is destroyed
and
or authorita
awareness,
its
motive power
it
can no
longer
sustain
itself.
"FEELINGS"
Mill's continuing
took a fruitful turn
potent medicine
to see his way to a better prospect for mankind finally he discovered that the poetry of Wordsworth provided a for his ailment. Wordsworth's poems, with their descriptions of
efforts
when
"rural
of
beauty"
that
feelings"
is,
the
beauty
of nature
culture
the
for
Wordsworth's
poems
It
was
not
that
of nature.
"Scott
does this
more
still
and a
very
second-rate
landscape does it
poet."
effectually than
any
The
explains, is "that
they
expressed, not
beauty, but
feeling.
"feel
beauty."
by feeling,
under
the excitement of
That is to
beauty
and the
And he
made
was
led to
revise
his
disjunction between
nature and
the
loftier
"feelings."
Mill had
enough
now
discovered
he
regarded as substantial
to
make
life desirable,
did
not require
deprivation
and struggle
of po
etry
inward joy,
all
of sym
imaginative pleasure,
be
in
by
human beings; be
made richer
had
imperfection, but
would
mankin
by every improvement in the physical or social condition of From Wordsworth he learned "what would be the perennial sources
ness,
when all the greater evils of
(151).
of
happi
The
quiet contempla
tion of the beauties of nature, along with the unfailing exercise of virtue, would
provide that
happiness for
all.
Those
communion with
nature,
on
388
and
Interpretation
mountains,
for example, be
as
Those
stifled
who
possessed
of proper
"unpoetical
cultivation,
natures,"
had been
by
lack
by artful
interpreters
arts.
of nature such as
Wordsworth
the imaginative
But how
can
these
pleasures escape
destruction
by
can
they be independent
natural other
of
They
less
and
between the
"cultivation"
facets
and are
therefore not
wholly
natural when
in the
compulsive
sense,
they
"feelings"
they
to
occur.
to be
to certain dimen
sions of nature
which we
do
have
access
facul
Draft"
"Early
and
of
his autobiography,
in
all
My
faculties became
more attuned
kinds,
and
feeling
character,
vibrating in
unison
And
we
find him, in
late
stage of
the
resolution of
of receptiveness was
to this
newfound appreciation of
his problem, regretting his "the him that the imaginative in us, is not (157).
.
in
vain
urged on
emotion which an
idea,
when
vividly conceived,
excites
.
an
illusion
but
fact,
as real as
The
set
emotional
any inspiration
of
is
now seen
of
to
be
yet another
facet
of
the beauties
nature,
whether viewed
properly to
nervous
be
system; it is the
sible
the
individual
not acces
feelings"
do
by
our other
faculties
or ca
pacities;
they
supplement
from
and
delusive in
the object,
knowledge
intellectual laws
and
There
to be found in the
facets
to be
of our emotional re
which requires us
facts
of nature.
lighted
of as
by the
setting sun,
"The intensest
the
water, subject to all the laws of vapours in a state of suspension; and I am just
likely
to allow
for,
and act
on, these
of
physical
laws
whenever
there is
occasion
to do so, as if I
and
beauty
ugliness."
Thus, Mill
appears to
his
moral principles
389
seems
necessarily to
beauty
it is
of the
virtues, the
sentiments,
which
and excellence
is
beauty;
and
our perception of
their
to love them
order or
for their
own sake.
It
now appears
disharmony of nature,
character and
there is actual
was
contrary to any
of
Mill's
earlier expressed
"no
in
nature"
capable of re
forming his
generating "fresh
and
the objects of
human
desire,"
contributions of
Marmontel
of nature's
exercise of
Mill,
This
new perspective on
and
the order
of nature of course
"associations"
led Mill to
"analysis."
and
"analysis,"
which pos only "precocious and premature and thereby undercut the aspira sesses the tendency to "wear away the tions by destroying our confidence in their necessity and therefore their propri rather
feelings"
but
ety.
It
now appeared
that
"analysis"
endangers and
mental
habit is cultivated,
happiness only "when no other remains without its natural had been destructive
view of of
correctives."
complements and
Mill's
was
"analysis"
earlier
upon an
based
incomplete
the natu
order, mistakenly
construed
By
the
in
which we
led to
an
incomplete
the
and
pacities and of
implicitly denied
significance.
of
is
the
utmost
human
But
the
new appreciation of
provides support
for those
meaning to
the plea
beauty
of nature seem
which
perfectly
natural and
necessary;
and
habit
analysis"
of
(153).
of contrasts
and
"feelings"
does
evidently
possess
the
power
directly;
our responsive
capacities
do
not require us
to be impelled
by
the
repulsiveness of
the
painful
things
which
lie below
are
or elsewhere.
good
They
possess
that
power of attraction
be
cause,
first, they
truly
second,
we possess a natural
for us, truly necessary to our well-being; and, their capacity to become tuned in to their goodness,
this sensitivity in a higher degree than others; and
necessity.
Some individuals
possess
390
Interpretation
"poets,"
make an
invaluable
this
contribution
to the
happiness
able
of the others.
It is
not
entirely
while
clear whether
disparity
is
attribut
ulti
impression that it is
mately
And
perience
the necessity
of
"analysis,"
duller
sensibilities
"for those
have but
a moderate
degree
for enjoyment, that is, for the great majority of Mill's confidence in the viability of his project
to have been completely restored at this trasts has no significant application,
point. even
mankind"
sensibility (147).
and of
capacity
of
benevolent
reform appears
That
suggests
to the relatively
can
insensitive many,
be sufficiently sensitized to a long run. It implies that the many satisfying resonance with virtue and brotherly love to eliminate any backsliding into selfishness and the resulting pains of conflict and deprivation. But their probable sensitivity, and therefore their firsthand knowledge of the necessity of
the
least in the
lofty things,
danger
of
appears
ing
"analysis"
kind
of
poetry
which tells
them what
own
they
should
feel in
or spontaneous
therefore
would seem
to pro
from the
Mill
stress own.
fully
the
need
for the
reformer
to
internal
be
resources of
The
"feelings,"
cultivated.
They
deliberate directional
therefore
intensification. The
that he
reformer must
discriminations between
it
would appear
And,
while
own
consulting
are
how
the
vibrations and
in tune
with nature
cannot merely assume that his because merely they are his own. Criti their naturalness; and it must do so by locat
ing
of
Does this Or is it
deliberative
choice?
is un how clearly Mill perceived these lingering problems at this time; but he not have been wholly unaware of them. However, he was able now to pro
no fatal pitfalls remained to undermine his new hopeful understanding of the human condition. He felt himself "at once better and for having come under the influence of Wordsworth's poems.
point
he
"gradually
emerged"
391
It
was about
this
ceased to participate
in the Debat
needed
ing Society
more public.
few
years earlier.
He felt that he
time to
clarify his thoughts in private, and less pressure to exhibit them in "fabric" He found the of his "old and taught opinions giving way in many
anew"
fresh places"; and so he was "incessantly occupied in weaving it vent it from falling to pieces. He was not content to be a casual
to pre
eclectic or a
dilletante; he
phy.
strove to maintain a
consistent, coherent,
comprehensive philoso
And
his
he
confronted
the
difficulties
until
significant change
opinions"
was
triggered
by
Thomas Macaulay's
ment,"28
highly
critical review of
829."
the
science of
psychology
upon which
it
was
based. Mill's
his
re
action
to Macaulay's
that he was
caulay's
about of
fundamental
James Mill's
method of
initially inquiry
comments on
of
unpersuaded and
by
Ma
reasoning
conclu
politics,
although
he
saw merit
in Macaulay's
the narrowness
his father's
resulting defectiveness
good of
his derivative
It
was
sions
government.30
his father's
response
really something
was"
more
his
in my father's
Method,
as applicable to poli
there
(167). But
more
before he
was able
to formulate a clear
notion of
methodological
flaw.
subsequent
It
was
during his
inquiry
him.
of
expla
"flashed"
nation
suddenly
upon
science modelled on
Euclid's
both
Macaulay inappropriately deductive and a priori: a political geometry. Macaulay insisted that it should rather
on
had
James Mill's
be
empirical and
inductive:
modelled
the
science of chemistry.
John
con
cluded that
they i.e.,
were
wrong:
tics
was provided
by
philoso
"dynamics"
It
could not
be
empirical
28.
29.
James Mill, Essays (London: Innes, n.d. 1825). Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Mill's Essay on Government: Utilitarian Logic
Politics,"
and
Edinburgh Review, XLIX (March 1829), 159-8930. "Identity of interest between the governing
practical sense which can
body
and
the community at
be
attached
to
it,
the only
thing
ther
can this
identity
of
interest be
election"
secured
by
the mere
conditions of
(165).
392
and
Interpretation
could not
inductive because it
be "a
science of specific
experience"; the
are not
"laws,"
behavior
unique;
they
The
are not
character
and of specifically political or social. They are the "laws of formation which explain all forms and varieties of human behavior.
mind"
be essentially derivative, deductive. But model since it is not "a science of cau geometry does not provide the appropriate As he explains in his Logic, "geometry affords no room for what so sation at
science of politics must therefore
all."
the constantly occurs in mechanics and its applications, another. forces: of causes which counteract or modify one
.
case
.
events one
is constantly
more
conflicting
forces;
far
it
requires
something
deductions,
made at a
remove
from the
those variable
forces clash, to
arrive at ade
the results
which ensue.
John
his father's
premises was
due to
It was, here, he misconstruction of his concluded, that the chemical analogy more appropriately applied. The narrow ness of his father's premises was associated with a static quality in his conception
fundamental
science of psychology.
of
the
mental process.
He
did,
of
course,
out of
allow
for the he
new and
higher
aspirations
growing
the rudimentary
"primitive"
to
seek
the
explains
that,
as
the conse
quence of a
long
indirect
association we
between
a means and
from the
end which
it serves,
eventually
come
between the
self.32
into
an end such
in it
But his
reductionist explanation
pounds,"
"com
elements of
atomistic
they
are of
ostensibly
composed.
explanation
it
granted no real
integrity
no
further
enrichment of
irre
of
the ostensibly
lofty
aspirations.33
James apparently
such
saw
nothing
problematical about
the
authoritativeness of
accidentally
generated and
tenuously
maintained ends.
He
was quite
impa
tient with Sir James Mackintosh when the latter suggested that his
31. 32.
reductionist
Logic, 887-88.
Analysis, 11, ch. xxii. See the exposition of this element in John Mill's philosophy, Happiness," R. Berger, "Mill's Concept of Interpretation, 7 (Sept. 1978), 95-117.
33. all
by
Fred
than
from any
to observe by what a potent call we are summoned to Virtue. Of is derived from those acts of other men, on which we bestow the name Virtue, cause. Our own virtue is the principal cause why other men reciprocate the acts
of virtue
toward us. With the idea of our own acts of virtue, there are naturally associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous acts of our Fellow-creatures. When this asso
ciation
tive
of virtue
main
business
of a good education
to effect, the mo
breast,"
Analysis, 11,
292-93.
393
of
deflationary
and
destructive
them:
"Gratitude
before,"
re
mains
in the
remains resentment, generosity remains generosity feels them, after analysis, the same as he in to James firm John Mill's However, contrary assurances, young had, in fact, found it impossible to maintain his enthusiasn for his noble goals after anal ysis had made clear to him their dubious foundations in self-regarding utilitarian
mind of
gratitude, resentment
him
who
sisted.34
ism.
While John
shared
Mackintosh's
ignoble
motives which
lie
described
by
and
"chemical"
analogy, to
the psychological
theory
of
the
lowly
"higher"
aspirations,
while
providing them
"primitive"
standing
not reducible
to
selfish
desire to
some of
disappear,
origins.
ties, istence
mental
unique and
integrity
of
If there
were such a
"chemistry,"
to their
lowly
primitive origins
is,
nobility,
morality
as more
seen
among its
That,
to
the younger
It is
now clear
why it is
neither
necessary
nor preferable
rely
upon argu
ments of
the "enlightened
self-interest"
variety in the
effort
to induce
benevolent
and virtuous
persuasiveness; but
behavior. Not only are such arguments often of uncertain effect or they also fail to establish morality on the proper level of no
shortly to deliberate
conclude
bility. Mill
with
was
that
truly
virtuous
behavior
was
inconsistent
to
any
such
oneself. self
Only
when
in it
in the
pulsive,"
spontaneous,
therefore
truly
virtuous.
Pleasure
on
and
pain,
and
ap
also
the
law
of
contrasts,
continue
to motivate,
this
operation
level,
A
moment of
rather than
pleasureful,
quoted at
spontaneous
James Mill, "Fragment on the 1869 edition of his father's Analysis, ii,
34.
Mackintosh,"
length
by John
Mill in
of
in
320m
He
accused
Mackintosh
subjects."
pacity
35. 36.
of
these
and
854.
Philosophy,"
Bentham's
the
(1833), C.W.,
truly commiting man "recoils from the very thought of commiting the act; the idea of placing himself in such a situa tion is so painful, that he cannot dwell upon it long enough to have even the physical power of
result of a calculation of
the
virtuous
perpetrating the
crime.
His
conduct
is determined
by
pain; but
by
act,
not
394
Interpretation
thing
a
perceived as
intrinsically
good.
And the
what
involves
spontaneous,
painful
shrinking from
is
bad. This
reversal of
order allows
Mill to
while
lofty
sure
actions,
principle"
is
retained
displacing them as the ends of those actions. Thus, "the plea in sublimated form; and the attraction or pull of the
into the
be
push of
lofty
objectives
of
is
converted or at
The law
contrasts,
least those
seen
manifestations of
it
which
far perceived,
continued
to
have
Pain
operates within
the properly
cultivated
without
imagination in
the
way
as
to assure a
inclination to virtue,
necessity
of a periodic
falling into ac
pleasure
derive
from
And the
directly
to the com
of
pounded people.
lofty
new
the "enlightened
self-interest"
the
Mill's his
"chemical"
perspective on
"the laws
mind"
of of
of course vindicated
the internal
development
the
individual, but it
also
restored confidence
in the viability of the program to eliminate all external condi deprivation. Insofar as the appropriate internal development is
external reforms would
be
enabled
to accomplish their
by
its imaginative
And those
be necessary, to free people's minds from the lower daily cares itate their concentration upon the process of raising their
sponsiveness to the
thereby facil
to a due re
"feelings"
to be an
loftier things. But, while external conditions would continue important factor in the formula for human happiness, the task of external
presumably have a termination point dictated by the success internal reform. A nation of noble and virtuous human beings
have
no
insurmountable
difficulty
in gradually working
out
the optimum
ing circumstances
rogression,
and
might require.
periodically making whatever minor adjustments chang The ostensible irreducibility of the new aspira-
hint
even
at
their
the
assumed ascent
This
conception of
into
ne-
by one
ally
and
which
is
expected
to follow it. Not only may this be so, but unless it be so, the man is not re the act, cannot arise, unless there is
virtuous.
deliberation;
lost."
the
man as well as
'the
woman who
deliberates,'
is in imminent danger
of
Mill's
tion
being
This is
emphasis. an end
seems to presuppose
is
in itself unrelated to any other possible ends; and that is why it is unnecessary to delib relationship between ends and means or between competing ends. But this is possible only the framework of an extremely rigid and simplistic set of moral rules. This is ob
specificity and concreteness of Mill's example. Had he identified a specific such as murder or theft, it would have been more apparent that some deliberation is neces sary in order to distinguish between justified and unjustified killing or taking of property, and to determine and compare the relative benefits and costs of one course of action or another.
"crime,"
others'
scured
by
the lack of
difficulty
395
"chemical"
into
nature.
As the
consequence of such
transforma
tions, the individual apparently acquires a kind of second nature which supplies what original nature failed to provide for man's happiness. Does it no longer
matter,
then,
whether our
"loftier"
vibrations correspond to
anything in
nature
in
merely the
as
"chemically"
rent
and
start. of
may be
necessary
from the
However, before
argument,
we allow ourselves
by this
Mill
line
we need
transmitted only
by
continued
or
belief, teachers,
are appar
and cultural
traditions,
immutable
infallible. We
ently
not
to accept as morally
imperative
aversive associations as
be
no need
are
"associations"
to be
for
encouragement and
inculcation,
to be eliminated,
according to which the selections are to be made? What is the basis for the judgements as to what is higher and what is lower, what
what provides principle
the
is
is base,
what
is
is
vicious?
Mill's
new
theory
of mental
imperativeness in terms
of
or
"progres
Mill's
to
nature
of sympathetic
"vibrations,"
as well as and
his
account of the
"chemistry"
aversions,
evince
Mill's continuing in
such a
penchant
for
be
solved new
if
we assume
that the
fully
in his Since
it. The
He
was
himself
aware of
account of
his
tion
in
respect
to his old
political
creed,
the
undergone
itself
was required.
Many
the
retained; but
which
they
in
a new and
in
they
were perceived
to be altered in their
significance,
the
yet
political things.
Some
of
segments of
truth had
to be
doubt they
were
covered.
He
was not
long
in
the
finding
at
least the
of
needed
to
complete
foundations
his
It
European
upon
him
Goethe,
the
Saint-Simonians,
396
ers.
Interpretation
sources was
"philosophy
of
He
now
became
of
that
"any
general
theory
and
or
philosophy
theory
of
human progress,
thing
or
with a
philosophy
history"
it
"suppose"
must
be based
upon a philoso
phy of history if it is to approximate the truth with any degree of success. This historical perspective is necessitated by the fact that "the human mind has a cer
tain order of possible progress,
in
which some
der
instructors
not
to an
unlimited
Mill
refers
to this order of
possible progress as a
and acknowl
conception of some of
its
es
focus is
on
is
"critical"
seen
to
proceed
through alternating
periods.
"creeds,"
The
by
firm
which and
direct
people's actions
in
ways more or
less
suitable
circumstances,
facilitating
some
degree began
of progress.
But
is
"outgrown,"
eventually
such as
giving rise
creed,
which
the
destruction
the
old
a new creed
round of
further
progress.
He
expected
this
pattern of
the critical
the best
periods."
qualities of
the organic
It
would
be
characterized
by
liberty of thought, unbounded freedom of individual action in all modes not hurtful to others; but also, convictions as to what is right and wrong, useful and perni cious, deeply engraven on the feelings by early education and general unanimity of sentiment, and so firmly grounded in reason and in the true exigencies of life, that they
unchecked
shall not,
like
all
former
and present
and
political,
require
to
be periodically thrown
by
others
(173).
In that
mark not
disparities in understanding and morality which now the distinction between the few and the many will be drastically reduced, if
golden
age, the
great
ments and
makeup.
entirely eliminated. And new political, economic and other social arrange institutions will reflect those more fundamental changes in the human
"progress"
This
order of
to be more or
37.
as
desirable; it was
with
also seen
keeping
his
"Humean"
The likelihood
on
the
of any backsliding or retrogression was seen to be remote, as Mill stresses in "Utility of Religion": "Are not moral truths strong enough in their own evidence
they have
acquired
it? I
grant
Christ
as exhibited
in the Gospels
ever
been
attained
Mankind have
be lost
entered
cannot now
by anything
amounts to, has been it. It has become the property of humanity, and to primeval barbarism. The 'new commandment to
of
goodness to a greater
397
Mill's
abbreviated account
the conception
of casual
"necessity,"
man effort
deliberative hu operating within an overarching framework of compulsive necessity in predetermined directions. The "active receive their direction from
allows
an element of
capacities"
the process
of psychic
development
for
nature
susceptibilities,"
on an
acters,
formed through
char
nature"
influences, dispose
them to
spe
aspirations, aversions,
of
and
actions, associated
to modify their
ings
tions
themselves
and of
acquired
disposi
own characters
through the
altered cir
modification or reform of
their social
with
institutions
and practices. of
The
cumstances, in conjunction
the
unchanging laws
changing (or
ing) human
the next
develop
nature, gradually
step.
reform
developmental
people,
And
so on.
The primary
educator of
institutions is
now seen to
be that
of a shaper and
interests."
And,
place each
timetable from
decides
what
is
needed
in
case,
"mainly by
improvement in life
that"
and cul
ture stands next in order for the people concerned, as the condition of their fur ther progress, and what
institutions
are most
likely to promote
Europe
(177). What
is
appropriate to
the
for
And,
Mill had
now
his "practical
po
his
own
time and
country"
remained unal
and
tered. "I
especially
England."
Nature,
or
guard of more
history, it seen to work its progressive scheme through sensitive, responsive individuals, possessed of
authors and philosophers possess
a small van
"poetic"
natures.
the
natural
capacity to
can ex
level
of conventional
with
the next
by
of
or public
only if they
religious,
beliefs. And it by
oth
love
one
another'; the
recognition
that the greatest are those who serve, not who are served
ers; the
reverence
for the
weak and
humble,
which
is the foundation
that of 'he that
of
chivalry,
they
strong
being
pointed out as
having
in God's
first
claim on
their
fellow
to be
of
Samaritan;
is
without sin
first
the
stone'
; the precept
doing
as we would
found
with
it is difficult to
ascertain
precise
object, in the
and
authentic sayings of
Nazareth;
these are
the intellect
once
feelings
of
every
be in
no
having
x,
been
acknowledged as
foremost
portion of
CW.
416-17.
398
Interpretation
to follow that these poetic trailblazers cannot be expected or re to the relatively
would appear
quired
to
prove
insensitive
natures
that the
new
way
not a
before
reform.
The latter's
resonance most
precondition,
of reform.
The
delicate
difficult problem
then,
would appear
balancing
two prime
desiderata
broadening,
as much as possi
ble,
of the
base
provide
thereby
the
further devel
behav
opment of
the
moral and
intellectual
capacities of
tion of the
liberty
of
conventional
belief
and
ior,
by leading
the way to a
loftier,
more civilized
existence.
and unstable
"theory about the prospects for success in the long run. As Mill conceives it, there is ap parently a basic harmony between the requirements of human development and the consequences of power politics, since his high hopes were accompanied by a
short
in the
run, the
newly
acquired conviction
that "government
is
always either
in the hands,
and
it"
or
passing into the hands, of whatever is the strongest power in society, what this power is, does not depend on institutions, but institutions on
And he
appears
that
(169).
to
have had
no
long
run
it is the in
people as a
society.
There
is,
then,
at
least in the
needs of
long
run,
a perfect
harmony
between the
needs of philoso
phy, the
society,
and what
is
needed
for the
perfection of
human
nature. solved
is
by
nature
itself,
understood
in historical
and compulsive
preordains
that the
ties and logic of that predetermined order. Nature provides a more or less auto
matic guarantee vor of
that the
The
truth, along
the rest
of
the
truth,
must
marketplace of
heap
of
harmonious
history. Nature, viewed as gradually unfolding over time, is revealed as and beneficent after all. Or so it would seem. And yet Mill never Nature's
precise character
and
role
remain
VIII. CONCLUSION
Mill's
"crisis"
was precipitated
by
growing human
reconciling his
political
and
moral objectives
and
the
mind.
399
he had successfully solved that problem, through the series of alterations in his philosophy we have observed, and most especially through the modified view
"causality,"
of
the
new conception of
"mental
chemistry,"
history."
"philosophy
Critical
as we
of
But
reason
the ends
which we of
pursue, insofar
have
"Humean"
a choice.
treatment
the
problem of
"ne
cessity"
is anything
really
which our
more
and
if
we
do, therefore,
intelligence
degree
of potential auton
omy, in
understanding is
capable of
freeing
us
from
complete enslavement
satisfying the demands of critical reason. But the rational grounds, or justifying principles, for the moral imperatives which Mill recommends to us re
main obscured
in his
modified
but
the
world.
His
earlier
obviously does
moral
to
even
if it
were capable of
does it
is
appear
that his
new
capable of
supplying
years
Nor
history,"
he tells it
us of
it here,
to
principles
unless
contains more
than merely an
account of what
has happened
and what
is
perceived as repudiated
likely
happen. Some
advanced
the notion,
by Comte,
it tends to
"an
"natural
history"
of
society, "as it
become,"
is,
and as or
obviates
ology"
accurate
definition
and
or philosophical estimation of
He in
sists and
that "a
writer on
Morals
Politics
requires
he
complains
gives
decisions
freely
try
of which
necessarily in
volves some
having
teleological stan
dard he
by
which
to
all subordinate
ends, the
vice
appeals
in
each
of common
men, a
with
mere com
pound
gestions of
and social
traditions,
the
sug
But it does
tional
count
that Mill's
"chemical"
account of
the
compounded
aspira-
associations
is
capable of
merely tends to be. pellingly produces what is and what That is to say that these accounts of a mechanical
grounds
provides a more
providing those principles either, since that ac detailed view of the ostensible process that comthe the
for justification
or authoritative
direction
of
human choices,
unless
no
they describe are viewed as parts of a purposeful evidence here of any such belief on Mill's part; and his
views on
his
and
his father's
religion,
in
an earlier chapter
compulsive
(11)
of the
which
Autobiography,
38.
tends to
suggest
the
contrary.
But
necessity
In the
1851 edition of
ch.
xii,
C.W., vm,
95on.
400
exists even
Interpretation
only
by chance
would seem
means.
to be incapable
absence of a
of
generating
moral
necessity,
by
"chemical"
In the
showing
of adequate rational
grounds
lower,
we are
for his ends, for his judgements concerning what is higher and what is left to wonder if they are not as arbitrary, conventional, and idio
he found Comte's to be. We
are not
syncratic as
later,
"feelings"
"those in
whom
a sort of sympathetic
contagion,
inspiration,
that a noble
to
itself."39
of critical reason
satisfied,
of
we are
in
no position to vouch
not to speak
wisdom,
of
"feelings"
being
assimilated.
Mill's
philosophy
who are
history
for us,
"poets"
land,
will
necessarily love
and not
is truly
good our
for them
emotions
no guarantee that
is vibrating in
newfound
poet capable of
manipulating
her lower
potentiali
ties.
Mill's
historical
part,
perspective
provides
kind
of skepticism on our
beliefs
that
limited
and
by
the his
they
or,
are generated.
we
have
Mill's
"feelings"
and conceptions of
"associations"
indeed, his
pattern
conceptions of the
pro
and
the
natural
of
historical
and
development
and
of
human
somehow escape
these
limitations
distortions
truly
represent
of such
development? What
of
are we to make of
Mill drew
his
moral
ancient
Greek
of
philosophers and
ideal
excellence"
and not as something which could emerge only in a distant future. It was, in important part, through his reading of Plato and Xenophon that his love of nobility was cultivated, a love which was to lead him
Aristotle,
and
is utterly
unbe
coming to impulse
torical to that
high-minded
liberal
But Mill
the ultimate
justification for
the noble
celebrated
by
is
that his
his
"teleology"41
imparting
a comparable moral
imperativeness
them in
legacy
from
If Mill has
problems, he does
not present
his
account of
39.
his
on
"crisis"
and
"the only
16.
has
ever taken
"Remarks
Bentham's
Philosophy,"
40. 41.
I338b.
a
of
us
that "The
word at
Teleology
to Mill
employed
by some
,
writers as a name
for the
causes"
CW.
is
401
that
crisis was resolved. a
in my
thinking"
modes
of
(199), by
for
which
Whether
or not
he
solves
fur
be
reserved
another occasion.
Mill
of public
than one
"resonance"
"convictions,"
by
radical
liberal
"poetry."
I do
not
doubt that he
"poets"?
or
be greatly disappointed by it. Would he blame the the public? or the liberal politicians who have largely followed
or nature
his teaching?
table realities?
arts"
itself,
as
he
so often
did
tive
"crisis,"
and
Would his reflections, upon the rather sorry state of the "imagina the internal development of the people, propel him into another
"revolution"
he merely because more perfect, stubbornly keep hopefully distant, expected future? If the limited and apparantly declining success thus far achieved by radical liberal political, educational and artistic reforms is due to the
necessitating
gaze
a second and
in his thought? Or
upon a more
would
his
fixed
faultiness,
those
the oversimplifications, of the psychology and cosmology upon which their associated expectations are to recede into the
would
reforms and
based,
order
future,
It is
uncertain
how far it
have had to
of
recede
in
to precipitate another
"crisis"
in the "mental
development"
the
Theory of Geometry
Moral
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Appropriation
and
Understanding
in the
History
of
History
through a
i960: v;
of political
practiced as a "present-
minded"
activity, aiming to
of
fructify
thought
and action
in
(Wolin, grasp Gunnell, 1979: 13-14). A most insistent current of thought within the field presently, however, denies the validity of the enterprise as thus pursued.
writings of
the
The loose
though to
"the
new
history of political
for
thought"
(al
be
called
here "Cambridge
(As
historiographism"
reasons
to be
given and
anon) insists
the "political
view puts our own
on a strict
"history"
activity
philosophy"
one of
the
leading
52;
this point of
it, if
we wish
to engage in
political
philosophy, "we
must
learn to do
thinking for
of political
ourselves"
[Skinner,
a
1968:
of
History
thought
remains
form
accordingly
cal
entirely in its
own terms.
history
of thought from
life
or action
(Pocock,
1981a: 13).
What
our political
political
life
which provided on a
the
context
very snug fit between political thought and its own political life. These scholars find historical political thought almost or entirely alien from the present, but almost or entirely at home in its own historiographists insist
historians'
present.
History,
thinkers
or even
historiography holds
more or
to
be
living
through is nothing
emergence of a
truly
autono
mous
method, one
phenomena"
of
those
seeking bridge I
to
am
identifying bring about this transformation, suggestion of one of the leading historiographists the following
and
in
them with
Cam
him
self, J. G. A.
movement can
Pocock, who pointed out that most of the men associated with this John Dunn, Quentin Skinner, Pocock himself, Peter Laslett, Dun
Wallace "emerge
Forbes, John
from
Cambridge"
(Pocock
1981a:
7).
While they share a great deal with positions we might call historicist, they differ from the latter on one principle that plays a prominent part in most mature histor icist discussion of the understanding of past thought: in Pocock's words, the
historiographists'
sense
that
they
aim
to depict
politi
cal
historicists
de-
404
clare
Interpretation
of attainment
impossible
1975:
(Pocock,
mer,
235-74,
482-91).
They
are
method
"to discover
188; Pocock, 1981a: 7; cf. Gada interested in adumbrating an historical eigentlich rather than in a theory
1962:
doing"
of
historical
being
as such
(Pocock,
1981:
10; but
cf.
Skinner,
1968: 50-53).
They
observation
that methodological
reflection
is especially necessary for studies in history of political philosophy for the texts with which the historian is concerned always require some sort of expla
nation or
interpretation, but
the
by
the nature of
incorrect,
that
is,
an
unhistorical, manner.
Pocock
speaks of
tendency
of
he studies, but to misapply them to his own activity: "the studies had all, in varying degrees, a tendency to become
to organize their thought towards higher states of
"plainly"
men whose
philosophers
is,
coherence."
rational
The histo
thought
the
is to determine "on
of
what
levels
of abstraction
did take
thinker
place,"
but instead
"assist"
in his
movement
"towards higher
coherence."
The his
much
doing history
and
engaging "in
kind
of philosophical
he
of
seeks
by
generality he finishes, however, the question remains whether he has reconstructed his sub ject's thought, or constructed something of his own. In either case, this proce dure makes for serious problems of verification (Pocock, 1962: 188). According
to
ever
higher levels
(Pocock,
1962: 186-87).
raising it to When
Pocock,
the philosophic explanation of how the ideas in a system are related to one another is
and
the author
meant
only contingently coincident with, the historical expla to say, let alone of why he wanted to say it or chose to
are arrived at
by
different
different
(Pocock, 197 1:
9).
and
a series of
theoretical articles
plications of
historiographist
might
position. and
single most
important
such piece
Ideas,"
"Meaning
Understanding
as
in the
History
of
be taken
the manifesto of
Cambridge histori
interpretive
Not only does it develop the theoretical and the argument, but it also presents a trenchant polemic
practice of other students of
methodological sides of
against the
history
of political philosophy.
Cassirer, F.
R.
Lovejoy,
interpreters
the thought
of
the past in
one
in Skinner's
"Meaning
Understanding."
and
compelled
ideas"
He finds the
to "demand
practice of
...
(Skinner,
1968:
wholly different approach to studying the history of 30). The issue between Skinner and the others does not focus,
a
405
aspiration
however, simply
Strauss
puts
on
the
historiographist
for
for the
historically
eigentlich,
explicitly
actually thought,
or as
he
it, for "understanding them as they understood (Strauss, 1959: contra 1979: 73). 67-68; Gunnell, Nonetheless, Skinner finds Strauss and others
themselves"
following a philosophically confused and empirically inadequate way of interpreting the texts of the past.
guilty
of
own
approach
of
between two
He tries to
he
history
textism, the
show of
the
interpretation,
he
er
they
guard
they
are so
beset
fundamental
philosophical confusion as to
be
untena
ble
as methods of
study in the
history of ideas.
what
His
however, is
tique of
clusive.
derstanding"
historical texts. In
follows I
shall
first
question
Skinner's
quite
cri
his
the
goal of
showing that it
is,
at
best,
incon
I then
argument
itself.
I. THE MYTHOLOGY OF
MYTHOLOGIES-
failed interpretation both fail because they misunder relationship between text and context. Textism "insists on the
of as
autonomy
of
of
key
.
to its own
meani
while
social contextism
which
It overly reduces the text to its context (Skinner, 1969: 3). any given While there is something aesthetically pleasing to Skinner's typology, we won der whether he has accurately portrayed the vast majority of his predecessors by them into such a neat schema (cf. Tarvoc, 1982: 698). How many of
text."
fitting
critics"
for,
less
practiced a
methodology
of
interpretation "dic
by
the
claim
should
form the
self-sufficient object of
in
understanding"?
(Skinner,
1969: 4).
us
to doubt
when
errors of
context
the
their
frequently
target
1968:
mistaken views of
intellectual
in
which
to interpret their au
is identified
by some
as the unspoken on
or the unspoken
influence
it (Skinner,
employ
a mistaken version of
being
concerned with
context,
having
ceased
to
406
Interpretation
Which of the historians of political philosophy has endorsed Skinner's text ism? Consider, for example, Strauss's Machiavelli book. In order to help under stand the texts with which he is concerned, the Prince and Discourses, Strauss
employs a wide
variety of extra-textual, contextual materials lian writings, Livy's history, other historians such as Polybius
philosophers,
other writings on politics of
other and
Machiavel
other with
Tacitus,
political
contemporaneous
Machiavelli,
events
some of which
include
the
"mirror
princes"
literature,
political church
in Italian
history,
theological and
(Strauss,
the field.
1958: passim).
The
middle ground
one-sided
views, is
always
desirable
territory
on
to hold but Skinner has constructed a straw antinomy here. This is not to
say that there is no genuine disagreement between Skinner and those he criticizes the relation between text and context, but he drastically overstates the degree
and misstates
when
he
paints
his
opponents as pro
ponents of
text,
and
text."
Skinner
the
he opposes; he
also presents a
highly
he
terials
questionable account of
attributes
with
"expectations,"
all
historians,
approach or
their ma
preconceptions,"
"unconsciously
derive
paradigms"
applied
familiarity
1968:
bility
to the
(Skinner,
offending
paradigms
from the very justification which the textists use for their study of past thought. Since they study the historical texts for the sake of finding the "timeless
and
element"
"dateless
wisdom"
in them,
and
in
order
to demonstrate their
"continuing
. . .
relevance,"
that a knowledge of the social context is a necessary condition for an understand ing of the classic texts is equivalent to denying that they do contain any elements
of
interest,
and
is thus
equivalent to
removing the
whole
point of
studying (Skinner, 1967: 4-5). they But Skinner's conclusion follows neither in practice, as in theory
or
or
said"
we
nor
logic. To
ments,"
must
ignore the
expression or
imply in any way that one should or in attempting to understand that work. All thought finds is communicated in some context; an appreciation of the context
not
does
may be
says
relation
requisite to
understanding
is
of
itself
nothing
To have
that
to a particular context
not
context.
Skinner
the
seems a
commits
historian to
kind
of present-minded
own
familiar
thoughts
8-9). But the historian may turn to the past with expectation or hope, to find thought different from that of the
1968:
407
of political attempt
leading
historians
philosophy
including
1979:
com
Voegelin, Arendt,
40-57).
mits one
not
and
Wolin
quite
explicitly
to do (cf.
Gunnell,
in fact
The
elements"
only to the possibility that some given thought expressed in the past is disqualified from being true merely by virtue of having been produced in
time or place. One is
some other
surely
not committed
to the
actual
truth of any
Nietzsche argued, such a commitment, far from nec essarily producing historical distortions may be requisite for the grasp of the his torically eigentlich. Every thought is thought about something; every thinker
as
Moreover,
tries to
bring
his
readers via
his
words
to the understanding
of
the
matter of
his
thought.
A text is like
city,
perhaps shrouded
in
cloud and
hill pointing the way to a distant difficult to discern. If the travelers for whom
he
ple
look along the line of sight for themselves, for exam if they look only at the man and not to what he points towards, they will never see the city. And if they believe the man is blind and thus does not know
points
the way
refuse
to
the city is, they will be inclined not to look with the care and attention that be needed for them to see the city (cf. Strauss, 1959: 66-68; Zuckert, 1977: may 65-66).
where
consequences of
historians'
preconceptions or
"para
in his Baconian
of
catalogue of
the
"mythologies"
on
the basis
the desire
or ex
pectation to
find "timeless
in the
classic
works, says
Skinner,
the textist
fall readily into the first and "most Mythology of Doctrines. If, Skin ner seems to have them reason, the philosophers present "timeless about politics then they ought to have doctrines on all the recognized topics of politics;
persistent"
truths"
if the
philosophers
do
not
on
into
"doctrine,"
or
not
having
which
such a
with
doctrine,
doctrines
or more
extremely, the
to be
classic
theorists
subject, but
(Skinner,
The
1967:
7, 13,
of
13).
often
Mythology
a
Doctrines
finding
in
their thinker
not
historically
form
of this
danger is "sheer
anachronism"
(Skinner,
which
and
his discussion
"remarks"
of anachronism
Marsilius
of
Padua
makes some
lead
some
should
be
said
to have had a
'doctrine'
the separation
of political
of
doctrine familiar to the historian from his knowledge later date (Skinner,
1968:
reflection at a much
find the
attribution of a
doctrine
of
8). Skinner is probably correct to separation of powers (in anything like the
a real anachronism.
form in
that is
which
not
But
408
And
Interpretation
even those experts who
should
be
credited with
this
their conclusions on
could
impropriety
(Skinner,
The issue is
not,
an
of
supposing that he
his text, and not at all by pointing to the have meant to contribute to a debate whose have been lost
of
him,
on
him
8 [emphasis
discussion
Coke,
9).
then the
empirical
issue
whether
Marsilius had
such a
doctrine
or
or whether
his
thought
is
doctrine
could
issue to be
settled a priori.
can we
know he
origins of
be traced to
[a]
canvassed
Marsilius'
death (Skinner, 1967: 8). But this really begs the question, for if Marsilius did have a genuine doctrine of separation of powers, then Skinner must be mistaken in his belief
of whether about the
doctrine's
or
origins.
Surely
the question
and
is the
empirical one
Marsilius did
answered
means
did
not
tion can
be
is through reading
text.
Skinner
makes
to say,
further,
intellectual
context
nearly dead certainty that Marsilius had no such doctrine, whatever impression stray comments may leave with a contemporary historian: Marsilius's context presents strong evidence that his predecessors and contemporaries were
it
not
thinking
about
authors to
largely incremental,
steps
discuss it. Even granting for the sake of argument that thought is that a thinker takes his point of departure from the intellec he
the
from
where
picked
jump
only some few it up to a position reachable from where he started, Skinner wishes to make. For we do not know in ad
and moves
him
art"
thoughts
might
be in
reach
from
what other
thoughts.
At best,
we
have
our
thought, intellectual context, but surely we would be committing the very sin Skinner warns against were we to impose that structure on the thinkers of the past as
no
our preconception of
of our
thought.
Skinner finds
ging:
all
forms
"if
Doctrines strongly question-beg Mythology claimed to have meant to articulate the doctrine with
the
of
which
they
that the
vague
hints?"
are being credited, why is it that they so signally failed to do so, so historian is left reconstructing their implied intentions from guesses and Skinner of course knows the answer to his question: "the authors
did
not
(or
even could
not) have
to enunciate
doctrine"
such a
which, Skinner
assures
plaus
experience, after all, that writers do not always (do they ever?) say explicitly everything they think or intend (cf. Tarcov, 1982: 694). Reasons of time, space, or focus of attention rank high some
of
a matter of common
be
given to
surely Skinner's
among
question.
We
409
not, but
the
interesting
answer
Skinner
suggests
later in may
al
his
essay:
he
refers us
adopt
to "the various
ways
decide to
in
order
disguise
what
he
means"
(Skinner, 1978: 32). He illustrates his point with the cases of Hobbes and Bayle, both of whom "had particular cause to recognize that religious heterodoxy
very dangerous communicate it only by
was a
commitment,"
and means of
thus,
we would
presume, to
wish
to
"vague
hints,"
or perhaps even
No
author gives
every step
the
of
thinking along
leave different
with
author
his thinking, and every act of reading requires in order to fill in the unsaid. Different authors
most
amounts
unsaid.
unsaid, the
interesting
seems
ones,
we would
suspect,
of
leaving
the most
This phenomenon, it
and
to me,
justifies
degree
attention
to the text
itself,
especially to the
the text:
if
text; for the way one thing follows another, that provides some guarantee he is in the groove set by the writer, that he is at least sighting along the line of vision along which his author is
pointing.
When interpreters try to apply the thought of a past thinker to a problem that thinker did not explicitly address, this may, as Skinner says, represent "a means
to fix one's
own prejudices on
to the
most charismatic
names,
under
innocuous historical
sort
speculation"
(Skinner,
1978: 13-14)-
But
an abuse of
does
not
imply
speculation
Skinner
Even if
have had
at a
no opin
when
ion
on a certain
topic
say,
nuclear war
because he lived
mean
time
the
phenomenon
in
question was
doctrine
non.
or position
has
no answers
in"
attempting to
say
what
narrow
they
are
trying
to
looks
the
in
question
did. This
trine. If
represents one
way to test
our
understanding
of
the
principles of a
doc
address we
test and
further
grasp
and
ing
of
how
able
is it to deal
much
light does it
to
which
in'
it
was not a
explicitly
applied?
694.)
That
is,
readers
"fill
in
variety
of ways and
for
having
to do with practice,
some with
the philo
sophical enterprise of
enterprise
and some with the his assessing the truth of the doctrine, meant. When sensi eigentlich thinker the what of discovering
bly done,
"fill
it is
an
eminently
claims
sensible
thing
to do.
Skinner
out"
misunderstands
"fill
in"
or
each
when
he
they do
so
because they
are
to "expect that
410
Interpretation
. . .
classic writer
will
be found
the
to enunciate some
doctrine
on each of
the topics
subject"
regarded as constitutive of
(Skinner,
1968: 7).
He finds
similar mo
Mythology
of
Coherence.
the historical investigation has been conceived
If the basic
paradigm
for the
conduct of
doctrines
historian to
conceive
it
each of
they may
16).
It is
history
written ac
scarcely
contain
reports
thoughts that
were
(Skinner,
his
1968: 22).
But
unstated assumption
that all
"appearance
incoherence"
of real
incoherence.
always so?
Obviously,
some apparent
incoherence is the
ourselves against
thing, but is it
Especially
ought we
incoherence to
a writer of
The unfamiliarity of his thought may make it seem incoherent, but an effort at thinking it through may bring the historian to see its essential coherence. We
may be especially
ers. prone
to see
incoherence
at
first in
They
it
likely
shifts
out of
focus for
If the
deeply,
in
ways
that
forge
new ones.
world were
would not
be the difficult
thest in
ever
and
ongoing
enterprise
is;
then those
a
who
have
gone
fur
thinking
struck
could express
apparent of
be
by
incoherence;
indefeasible have to
and
objective
methodology
interpretation. Then
think
in
order
But
perhaps
to
incoherence
precisely because they push hardest at the boundaries of thought. Perhaps their incoherences are even indications of incoherence in the order of things, or at least in the line of thought of the thinker in question. But can we not aspire to a understanding of incoherence, that is, to an understanding, so far as possible, of just what produced the incoherence in question? Is there another way to achieve this than by pressing every apparent incoherence and attempting to make it yield up either a hidden coherence or the structure of its incoherence?
coherent
And
can we do this without engaging in the activities Skinner condemns? Not every apparent incoherence or contradiction is necessarily a real contra diction. Indeed Skinner recognizes this fact in the part of his essay where he speaks of and Bayle's strategies of their heterodox theologi concealing cal views. Bayle's Dictionary "contains most of the doctrines appropriate to a
Hobbes'
Calvinist theology of the most rigorous and Yet it contains a unforgiving good deal else, and Skinner sides with those who "dismiss this overt message by
kind."
411
irony"
desperate,
governed
systematic
(Skinner,
1978:
33;
The interpretive
"procedure"
system,
which
they may
never
have
been
attain"
meant
to
(Skinner,
1978:
achieved such a
Of course, he is correct; they may not have intended or level of coherence, but then they may have done so. What is one
17).
of
to do in the
face
have here
general approach
particularly difficult form of the hermeneutic circle, but Skinner's is not a good way through this difficulty. We can discern here a underlying
positivist attitude:
strong trace
of an
he
in
advance and
for
all occasions.
But
ture, and we cannot know our end do so only guarantees we will not get far from
Skinner does
about
interpretation, like life, is a bit of an adven point before we set off. The demand that we
where we start.
make one
very
valuable suggestion:
in the light do
of
uncertainty
to orient
the degree
of coherence and
unity
an author achieved we
well
by
the author's own statement of intention. We ought not "in the inter
a message of
extracting
was
higher
coherence
from
an author's
work, to dis
the statements of intention which the author himself may have made about
doing"
he
(Skinner,
1978: 18).
Nor, I
would
add,
ought we
to dismiss
in fact
so
(cf
e.g.
Skinner's
So it
practice
apparently incoherent that they are Spirit Montesquieu, of the Laws: Preface). Unfortunately precept. his is not as good as
by
authors of works
in the
history
of
ideas
deliberately
en
dorses
fantastic doctrines be
the
of
one must
"resolve
antinomies."
Machiavelli
so straightforward as an at
later Discourses. It
can
be
and
has been
appropriate
task must be to
construct
for Machiavelli
a scheme of
of
the Prince to be
capable of
being
(Skinner,
But in asserting that Machiavelli's books relate as a historical development, Skinner disregards Machiavelli's own indications of his intentions and of his un 217of the relationship between the two works (cf. Baron, 1961:
from internal
Machiavelli
wrote
the
Prince,
and the
Prince
when
reader
to
which
book
as
was written
must
be that the
reader
is to take the
books
contemporaneous.
Moreover,
as
Leo Strauss
pointed
out, Machiavelli
indicates in the
knows,"
prefaces
they both
contain
"everything he
view, the
that
is,
points of
412
Interpretation
indicated
points of view
by
books (Strauss,
imply
other
are many ap disagreements between Machiavelli's two books, yet in itself that does not either historical development or ultimate disagreement. stands
While it is true,
One
in
no
less danger
of
losing
the
"historically
eigentlich,"
as well as
things, if one resolves at the outset to stop analysis and interpretation with apparent incoherences and apparent contradictions. Skinner and the other Cam
on
[under the
aegis of
tory
ideas
at
history of thoughts
actually
succeeded
in thinking,
1968: 18).
level
actually
attained
(Skinner,
Skinner's
claim
is
literally
untrue,
of
historian, if
and
no one
else,
"succeeded in If the
thinking"
this "level of
coherence."
achievement not
historian, why
Skinner
and appeal to some
is actual, then it is obviously possible, for the thinker in the first place?
considerations,"
by
"empirical
"commonplaces"
some
of common experience
beliefs,"
about
think
often
ing. First, we know as a matter "adopt incompatible ideals and Of course, the "most
people we ences of
people"
that
people"
"many
so
and
even, he says, do
"consciously."
obvious question arises whether commonplace observations about stand as our most reliable guides when
dealing
with the
kinds
of
typically study in the history of thought. We have, I think, experi "other fewer to be sure who seem remarkably thoughtful
people"
and
able, to
of
high
degree,
beliefs"
to say
nothing
Tarcov,
1982:
693).
a
Echoing
by
John
"second
consideration":
to think at all
is surely
to engage
in
an
and not
just to
manipulate
effortlessly
that we
some sort of
kaleidoscope
in
an
of neutral
images.
...
It is surely empirically
meanings,
and
intolerable
limits
characteristically
of our
intelligence
and get
confused,
may in
disor
der
as much as coherent
doctrines (Skinner,
activity,
1968:
30;
cf.
Dunn,
1972: 160-61).
Thinking
seems
methodology designed to insulate the interpreter from that hard work, for it en courages the historian not to engage in that "intolerable but rather to rest easy with whatever pops out at him. We must, moreover, be as careful not to extrapolate from our abilities and achievements to those of others as we are not to
to be
wrestle,"
is indeed
an effortful
and
the
historiographists'
extrapolate
from
our
historical
things
ample,
not even
imagine to be
humanly
There are gymnasts, for ex bodies which, had I not seen, I would possible from my own experience. Aren't the
their
-413
study
perhaps
among the
Ought
we
basis
as
of a per
failings? That
seems
lies
an odd
arrogance, and
dare
we
historical
situation allows
progressivism. For what else but his superior say it the historian to succeed as a thinker so much better
THIN-
Theory rather than history undergirds the efforts of the Cambridge historiogra
phists, for no strictly gible,
much empirical conception of
historical
intelli
less support, the most characteristic and puzzling claims Skinner makes. As we have seen, for example, he castigates scholars who try to decide whether Marsilius possessed a doctrine of separation of powers on the basis of
Marsilius'
could
have
to put
"by pointing to the impropriety of supposing that he forward such a doctrine (Skinner, 1967: 8). Indeed,
discover
what
Skinner
possible
elevates
the attempt to to
"it
might chief
in
principle
have been
of
for
communicate"
someone
into the
task of
history
ideas
of
(Skinner,
from
1968:
49).
The
historically
eigentlich emerges
from knowledge
rather
what are almost a priori possibilities of what could examination of what was said with a view
than
thought.
The theory which drives Skinner toward this odd conception of the nature of study in history of ideas derives from an amalgam of recent developments within
Anglo-American
analytic
philosophy,
which
he
and
histor
problem of
the agency
which
pur
his
method,"
own
development
which
record"
"gratifying founding of
11).
to
for "much
philosopher"
(Pocock,
but
1971:
not
Historians
enterprise.
their enterprise,
in
their
That
analysis
derives from
of
J. L. Austin's
language. In using language one not only quality do things. Austin uses as one of the also can say things, but in saying things, clearest examples of such linguistic performances the exchange of vows in a
thesis
about
the
performative
one is not describing wedding ceremony. In such utterances, Austin argues, that I am doing it: it is state or to to be in so said "what I should be doing uttering (emphasis added) (Austin, 1975: 6). Austin, and Skinner after him, of to do
it"
somethi
doing
1975: 12).
to describe
the
(Austin,
414
Interpretation
"illocution"
(Austin,
An example,
one
discussions
thin,"
is
may, under certain circumstances very is, "to say something with the force of a
mere
least, be
warning"
(Strawson,
The
grasp
of
is,
of
the mean
ing of the
terms"
statement, does
understanding
of what
has been
said.
Thus,
illocu-
Skinner concludes,
"meaning"
"understanding"
are not
"strictly
correlative
(Skinner,
of
1968: 45).
To
grasp the
tionary force
merely
calls on
the statement as
its
meaning.
But the
illocutionary
said,"
force
of a statement
depends
was and
on a wide
variety
of contextual on
circumstances,
was
and not
"what
said."
Focusing
in Skinner
of
merely
the
"what
what
Austin
appears as
the
text,
cannot
illocutionary
us
supply force.
understand
Skinner's
or more
principles of
illocutionary
of
force is
graspable.
special
theory
of
interpretation arises,
"uptake"
or
force
of a statement
(Skinner,
1970: 118).
capable of
tor]
as
by
must al
ways
be
socially
conventional
intention
fall,
that
is,
the
intention"
(Skinner,
1970:
and
be conventionally grasped as being cases of 133). The conventions determine what can be
what
said,
and
limits to
any
at
possibly
say.
be
clear
that
we stand
here
the very
center of
the
understand
ing
from
which
Skinner's
critique of
emerged and
by
which
of a prioristic of
history
we
have already
noticed.
If
we
adequate
knowledge
we are
in
a position
said
in that time
Thus
we arrive at
Skinner's
the
explicit mandates
for
"appropriate methodology for the history of The role of convention in securing understanding
ideas."
of
illocutionary force
and
of
utterances over
forms the
of
subject of a
P. F. Strawson say
the meaning
do"
Austin's doctrine.
off
Thinking of the
performative role of
ing
"I
in
a marriage
affirmed
convention
in
bringing
Austin,
1975:
14, 105;
Straw-
son,
tion
1964: 441).
...
Strawson
"illocutionary
force is
a matter of conven
in
cases,"
a great number of
not as
but
"there
which
it is
conforming to
an accepted convention of
help
of
-415
illocutionary
"the ice
will over
act
is
performed"
(Strawson,
There
of a
1964: 443).
He in
gives
there is very
thin."
are circumstances
which
have the
illocutionary
force
being
there
is any
be
said
to be
an act done as conforming to that (Strawson, 1964: 444). Skinner asserts, to the contrary, that "any intention capable of being correctly understood by A as the intention intended by S to be understood by A must al ways
ment
. . .
(Skinner, 1970: 133). Skinner's argu socially conventional in favor of that claim is remarkably thin however. "Even when the locution
a
be
intention"
and
the
circumstances
...
are a
both
appropriate
...
for the
act performed as
to
be
assessable as one of
warning,
further
question still
remains,
to
whether
there exists any mutually recognizable convention such that to speak in the way S
speaks
being
sary,
acceptable as a
form
of
warning, and so
capable of
warning"
(Skinner,
1970:
131).
Strawson
did,
that sometimes
it is indeed the
case such
ways seem
to be the
case.
Skinner tries to
lished
situation not
will get
carry
out
his intention to
react or
the point,
buy
raising the question, why might S in this warn A in this way. He may believe that A differently from what he (S) intends (for example,
by
annoyed),
it
as a warning.
A may miss the point of the utterance, that is, not In a breathtaking leap of logic Skinner soars over the
it"
from this latter possibility to the conclusion that "some element of con is necessary for one to get the point of an vention and mutual understanding of
utterance.
Skinner talks
as
of a statement
being
seen
is an instance if every instance of "getting the to fit into some linguistic convention or other, and
missed as
point"
every
case of
the
point
being
due to the
absence of a
mutually
under
stood convention.
The
example at
hand is
nor
a powerful counter-example
provides
to Skinner's
position
however. Neither he
volved
Strawson
any
analysis of what
actually is in
to be taken,
in allowing the
sentence
"the ice
over there
is very be
thin,"
in
the
Skinner
will
suggests
it
can serve as a
in that way, and signals distress. SOS that learn that people learn this convention in the way they But the cases are really quite different, which can readily be seen if we consider over there is the conditions which must be met for A to get the point of "the ice warning because there exists a
that it
used
thin"
very
as a warning.
First, A must be a skater or someone otherwise the ice, or concerned with someone on or about to
and
on or
go on
he
and
S both knew he
a matter of
the
ice,
the
statement
in
only be
information (or
perhaps
must also understand warning addressed to A. A that thin ice is ice which is less likely to hold a person's
understand
that
falling
through the
ice
could
be
a danger-
416
ous or at
Interpretation
least extremely
unpleasant experience. water
Were he
altogether
ignorant
of
the feel
and effects of
icy
he
ing, for
warning requires awareness of something dangerous or otherwise to be avoided, and he might again just consider it a point of information, or perhaps
a
even an requires
invitation for
a swim.
To
get
information
he
or
understandings about
ice, icy
two
or she
be
able to
"put two
together,"
and
is, be
able
to draw the
over
inference from
The
auditor
"the ice
over
there is very
thin"
to "it is dangerous to go
there."
need not
know any conventions about issuing warnings to skaters, unless the var ious pieces of information required are considered to be such conventions. They
certainly are not the sort of conventions (if it makes sense to call them that at all) that Skinner has in mind, for they are not conventions about warning. On the ba
sis of
reasoning
of
methodology
of of
"the
essential
conventionality
and
According
to the
historiographists, philosophy
in
philosophy:
dividual questions, with as many different answers as there are questions, and as The opposite view, or at least the oppo many different questions as
questioners."
historians
who of
function
of
philosopher."
If,
course, there
"peren
nial problems
in
philosophy,"
then
it follows there is
to
supposedly timeless
(Skinner,
Even if Skinner is
does
not succeed
problems."
perennial
correct about the role of convention in securing uptake, he in establishing his major claim, to the effect that "there are no Skinners theory about convention, however, can only es
tablish at best that the communication of a thought occurs within a particular set
of circumstances which are relevant
authors'
to the possibilities
of audience uptake of
the
that the
intentions in making the statement, but he has not thereby established thought involved could not the particular situation in which
"transcend"
it
was made.
Indeed, if
the possibility of speaking about the truth of any state Skinner's frame, then there is no reason to discount the pos
sibility
mits
of
"timeless
truths"
being expressed by past thinkers. Skinner himself ad binding than he sometimes suggests when he
issue
of
deals
the
"very
is
intractable"
innovation in the
realm of
which
thought:
If S's
speech act or at
linguistic innovation
act must
nevertheless
intends
least hopes
will
be understood, the
necessarily,
and
for that
rea
existing
attitude or project
is already convention-governed
and understood
(Skinner,
1970: 135).
411
may be thought,
what nor a
do they
even
expressed
rejected.
woodian
way things, they may be ignored or In sum, Skinner's more strictly historicist conclusions of a Collingsort cannot be made to follow from his Austinian linguistic convention
to a given audience.
may be
said.
They
govern,
at
most, in
other
thought may be
But, among
alist arguments.
(See
appended
Although I
he
characterized
alone as
solely
adequate
tion Skinner and the others wish to effect tion away from the text. It would rather
or
for understanding past thought, nonetheless the redirec is substantial and indeed lies in a direc
be
more accurate
textists,
the best
of
them
not on
the matter of
which sisted
the
matter as
it is
or might appear to
the unas
eye, but
on
trying
look
to get or
whither
help them
the guide
guide as a
points,
attempt
to follow
his line
of
vision;
they
neither
look
at
the
self-sufficient
activity,
nor
independently of his
as mere points
activity. own
Those
texts
guiding or of departure
free associating, act like those who look to the landscape without any particular guidance from the guide. The historio graphists, more to avoid the ahistorical defects of the latter approach, would look
thinking,
or
for their
own
not
to the
matter.
rather, everybody has his own (historical) vantage point, view from where they stand. Stated like this, the
sounds much
to
historiographists'
position of
like
an orthodox
Nietz
schean perspectivism.
In fact it differs in
our
important
of
that is worth re
knowledge
by
the
perspectivality of all our knowledge; the historically eigentlich appears as a boot less aspiration. If there are no perennial problems, if every act of thought "is
inescapably
in
to
a
the
embodiment of a particular
intention,
on a particular
occasion,
situation
its
way that
it
can
only be
transcend,"
naive
to
try
to
thought"
apply
In
a
our efforts
to
understand
those "acts of
(Skinner,
1967: 50).
word: if past thinkers could not, in principle, think themselves out of their situa tions, then present historians cannot, in principle, think themselves into those sit uations. The historiographists are caught in an untenable middle ground between
historicism
and nonhistoricism.
and equally in If Skinner is correct, there must be as many equally valid histories of thought as there are "particular occasions and particular valid
problems."
Can Skinner
and
Pocock,
by
historically eigentlich any better than Wolin or Cassirer? The history constructed Wolin, for example, presents "[his] individual answers to [his] individual
questions."
And the
same
treats
his
predecessors alto
gether
differently
from
reasons with
them, just
as
418
Interpretation
those whom
act of
they
reasoned with
they
studied.
He
subscribes
to the
Mythology
of
Doctrines
subscribes
in the very
to the
He
Mythology of Coherence
for their
practice of speaks to them
as
in the very
and
act of
seeking
coherence
in in
to
though
it
makes sense
"the
matter,"
approach
the
history
of
ideas,
not
having
concludes
is best. He
truth,"
acts as
which
there
be better
or worse
answers, and,
perhaps even a
"timeless
and not
at all as though
different
ques
(Skinner,
1968: 50).
Nor,
as we shall
see, does he
not
of
he blames
them
for
applying
My point is
these men
change with
this is more or
Skinner to apply his standards consistently to less what Gunnell did in his recent book and ex
to
point out
Pocock
under
but
rather
Skinner takes
seri
ously
gets
an
issue
discussion,
matter"
he for
entirely everything he
he is
not
being
serious.
When he is
the previ
actually thinking about something, Skinner of course behaves just ous historians did, and as the philosophers did before them.
as
COLD-
INTERPRETIVE PRACTICES
Even if Skinner's
method were
theoretically better
be
met
grounded than
it is, it
sets
logical
never
requirements
that can
never
in he
practice.
seeks.
of a priori conclusions
First
conventionally (normally?) people in the 13th century who spoke of the difference between the legislative and the executive meant that in an Aristotelian rather than a Montesquieuan sense, it nonetheless does not follow that Marsilius
out that
might
meant
sense.
Even if
we accept
the
not
highly
given
dubious
which a convention
does
warrant,
we can never
be
Marsilius Skinner
can
be
fairly
be
shown
to
have
in
most
would
able
to infer
was that
there
digm") Secondly, the logic of Skinner's position leads him to emphasize the priority of authorial intention, yet his method at the same time closes him off from under
allowing that.
them.
Skinner insists,
on
the
hand,
eventually be
have
meant or
done something
-419
he
could never
done"
be brought to
accept as a correct
description
of what
he had
meant or
(Skinner,
1969: 28):
This
special
authority
of an agent over
his intentions
excludes the
behavior
it
was
itself dependent
description
able
to the agent himself. For if a given statement or other action has been performed
by
has
plausible account of
what
the agent meant must necessarily fall under, and make use of, the range of de
himself
least in
principle
have
applied to
describe
classify what he was doing. Otherwise the resulting account, however compelling, cannot be an account of his statement or action (Skinner, 1969: 28-29).
about authorial
or another challenge
it (cf. Skinner,
1971:
Skinner,
1972:
394-408;
the his
with
Skinner,
1975-76: 213-15).
other
On the
hand, however,
and
directives,
looking
thus
matter"
they
crucial
out"
interpretive activities,
through"
such as
"filling
a
through"
text.
also
"Thinking
provides the
not
only
provides
matter,"
but it
only
access
to the text as an
correct
in
general
historically
by
authorial of
intention,
recognize
the core
Cambridge historiographism
stands as a
the reader or in
frame
of mind
the
author of
the text could have had. The authors of the texts understood their
of
efforts not
prevailing linguistic conventions, nor in terms of ab but in terms of the matter. or stracting from prevailing At the same time, Skinner's theory about the nature of texts and their relation
in terms
"traditions"
"paradigms,"
to context leads in
practice
to difficulties
in the
Skinner's Foundations of Modern Political Thought contain much useful and even some interesting information, but more than anything it reminds of a Cecil B DeMille
.
movie
a cast of
much of
interest to say
about
Machiavelli,
any
of
flabby
as
Skinner
Led
by
his
method
Skinner's
naturally
substitutes erudition
the thought,
Skinner
cerned.
thin"
also
largely
misses
the
character of
with which
he is
con
He takes the
as the model
"the ice
over
there
is very
of
for the
in
history
He looks
at
texts
in terms
of
basic
or primitive nuggets or
meaning
the sentence. He
to generate
420
Interpretation
by the
or
author.
The
au
is
not
communicating to
us
merely
to
string
of
sentences;
rather
he
communi
mat
cates a thought or
ter"
thoughts,
which present a
way
of
grasping
seeing "the
at
hand,
as
power
this way of
grasping
not
true. The author cannot communicate that grasp to transfer his thoughts directly. He
appear one after another and
can
the
only
in
sentences
which
necessarily relationship The meaning is in the whole, in the complex thought the author may lead the reader to think by thinking through what is presented, and not in any colligation of primitive nuggets of meaning. The grasp of the matter as the
with each other. author
in
some structured
in
question grasped
the matter,
which
is the
ultimate
but
of
historical
studies of
itself
a syn
thing, but must be built up from the necessarily diachronously pre text. The transformation of the text from a diachronous to a synchronous
be
a shorthand
entity
the
might well
and proper
task
of
interpreter,
text, away from its structure and holistic or organized character, and towards the context. More than once in his various writings, Skinner gives the following il
lustration
tion.
which reveals
the way in
which
he brings text
and context
into interac
Suppose
an
historian
following
statement
in
Renaissance
moral
tract: "a prince must learn how not to tended reference of the statement are
native
be
virtuous."
in
both perfectly clear. Now suppose two alter itself: either that such cynical advice was frequently
offered
in Renaissance
moral
tracts; or that scarcely anyone had ever publicly offered before. It is obvious that any commentator wishing to
find out which of these alternatives is nearer the truth. If is the first alternative, the intended force of the utterance itself in the mind of the agent who uttered it can only have been to endorse or emphasize an accepted
the answer
moral attitude.
But if the
of
answer
of the utterance
be
comes more
repudiating an established moral commonplace. Now it happens in fact that something like each of these historical claims has been ad
rejecting
of vanced
like that
in turn
by
historians
ideas
in Machiavelli's
Prince. Now it is
also that the
obvious not on
decision
merely that only one of these claims can be correct, but which one is correct will very greatly affect any understand have been
that
ing
of what
Machiavelli
to
can
intending
to achieve
(Skinner,
made
1969: 46-47).
Now, according
the statement
Skinner,
and
"decision"
could not
be
itself
its
meaning."
position, for it
nugget-like
makes clear
his
view
This
claim
is
most
these
"statements."
entities,
as
But this
by Machiavelli does
within a
not ex
ist
by
itself
larger text
421
and point.
to
many
other
scription of
find their
place within
many in
individual statements,
and their
meaning therefore
does
not
lie
they
of
are grasped
array of possible illocutionary understandings when (cf. Tarcov, 1982: 697). Especially important is a fo
cus on
text, for the structure contains the author's articulation the interrelation between his statements, that is, the way in which they serve
the structure
as contexts
for
each other.
are
remarkably
indifferent to the
structure of
they
study.
(In his
discovering
some class of
understanding may
arrive more
from
grasp
than of external
[Skinner, Moreover, Skinner's statements of the alternative meanings of Machiavelli's statement is false, or at least misleading. If others said the same as Machiavelli,
1975-76]).
only"
he "can
tude,"
Skinner. No, Machiavelli can have intended several other things as well, including getting his readers to see why such a statement was true, or how it related to other opinions people hold. That is, just because one agrees with oth
says ers
in
not make
ment.
The
the
statement can
agreeing with others the point of the state only be seen by attending to Machiavelli's
through,"
text.
working with the text as a text, instead of "thinking attempt to establish meaning by setting in historiographists "look
Instead
of
the
con
around,"
text. That
approach
context:
"an
appeal
to the context
the
is deceptive:
one never
least in the
context"
case of complex
texts
(LaCapra,
1980: 254).
research shows
that very
well, for we have Pocock's book The Machiavellian Moment and Skinner's The Foundation of Modern Thought, covering much of the same material, but read ing it off rather different constructs of the context. Not merely do they present
different
constructs of
more
the context
and
thus of the
authors
they
are consider
ing
quite
but
importantly they
little
regard
freely
and with
for the
sense of context of
correct that one needs to study (cf. Tarcov, 1982: 708). For example, it is surely consider how Machiavelli's works are written into his context (what illocution
have),'
but one needs to follow Machiavelli's own ary force he intended them to Skinner and Pocock are notable for the de indications about his context. Both gree to which they impose external contextual materials on their authors. Mach
speaks a great
deal
of
his
context as
he
understands
it
and as
address
own
presen-
422
Interpretation
and
tations, however,
case of
Pocock, is
highly
structured,
highly
of
historical research,
1971:
or certain
idees fixes
1975:
3-83;
Pocock,
in the
the
233-72;
Pocock,
1957).
Political philosophy
or political
thought in
relation
theme
of
work of
the Cambridge
origin and
historiographists,
but the
peculiar
interpretation
work
into its
ment of
the
work
untenable.
By
from any other possible context upon which they insist is refuting the Cambridge historiographers we cannot guarantee that
political about
history
will
of political
not
philosophy will prove useful to our degenerate into a mere colligation of claims
life,
nor
that it
mainly of interest to scholars, and not of much interest even to them. But we can hope to have contributed to the survival of the possibility of the understanding for these are not opposed but intimately related activi and appropriation
ties
of political philosophy.
Convention
Pocock's
work
also, but he
never manages
to
mount
his
position.
relevant con
ventions are
Political
"paradigms"
by
which
they discuss their political (and other) these paradigms determine what can or
thinkers may
mix
be
said at
any
given time or
"migrate"
place, but
one con
innovation
and
from
puts
far less
intention than Skinner does, for his paradigms carry more of the weight of thinking than do Skinner's conventions. They seem to be more highly structured than Skinner's conventions, or perhaps, organized at a higher level of complexity. Skin
ner's conventions seem to paradigms seem much more
whereas
or
Pocock's
"theories"
structured,
(Pocock,
1971: 3-41).
Pocock's
notion
of not
paradigm
remains
hopelessly
vague,
however;
one
wonders
whether paradigm
is
(and therefore obscuring) way of saying that at any is characterized society by sets of more or less prevailing, more or less
a
just
fancy
of
the
tory
of political
philosophy
"a
that
from experience,
or
(Pocock,
"paradigms"
1971:
15;
Pocock,
1962: 190).
Let
gives us no reason
thinking is
true.
423
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Austin, John L. (1975), How to do Things with Words. Baron, Hans (1961), "Machiavelli: The Republican Citizen
Prince,'"
and the
Author
of
'The
76
(1 961),
217-53.
and
Pocock,"
ed.
in Philosophy, Politics and Peter Laslett, W. C. Runciman, and Quentin Skinner (Oxford,
'Revisionist'
History History of
Theory
12
(1973),
251-64.
Ideas,"
Methods for Studying the Femia, Joseph (1981), "An Historicist Critique of History and Theory 20 (1981), 1 13-34. History of Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975), Truth and Method (New York, 1975). Gunnell, John G. (1979), Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). (198 1), "Method, Methodology, and the Search for Traditions in the History of Political Theory: A Reply to Pocock's Annals of Scholarship (1981), pp.
Idea,"
Salute,"
26-55-
His LaCapra, Dominick (1980), "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading pp. 245-76. and (1980), 3 Theory tory Leslie, Margaret (1970), "In Defense of Anachronism, Political Studies 4 (1970), pp.
"
Texts,"
433-47-
on
Thin
Ice,"
Philosophical
Quarterly
21
(1971),
Parek, Bhiku,
er's
and
Methodology,"
R. N. Beiki, "The History of Political Ideas: A Critique Journal of History of Ideas 34 (1973), 163-84.
of
Q. Skinn
Pocock, J. G. A. (1957), The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law. in Phi (1962), "The History of Political Thought: A Methodological losophy, Politics, and Society, Series II, ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (New York, 1962), pp. 183-202. (1971), Politics, Language and Time (London, 1971). (1975), The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, N.J., 1975). Annals of Scholarship (Summer (1981a), "Political Theory, History and
Enquiry,"
"
Myth,"
1981),
3-25.
Methods,"
and
"Quentin Skinner's
Method,"
Theory
(i974)>
His Skinner, Quentin (1969), "Meaning and Understanding in the History of tory and Theory 8 (1969), 3 The Philosophical (1970), "Conventions and the Understanding of Speech 118-58. Quarterly 20 (1970), ppThe Philosophical Quar (1971), "On Performing and Explaining Speech 1 terly 2 (1971), New Literary His (1972), "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of 393-408. tory 3 (1972), Politi (1974), "Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and cal Theory 2 (1974), 277-303.
-53Acts,"
Ideas,"
Acts,"
-21.
Texts,"
Action,"
424
Interpretation
History,"
New Literary History 7 (!975)> "Hermeneutics and the Role of (1975-76), 209-32. (1978), The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 1978). Strauss, Leo (1959), What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, 111., 1959). (1958), Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, 111., 1958). Philosophical Re Strawson, P. F. (1964), "Intention and Convention in Speech view 73 (1964), 439-60. Ethics Tarcov, Nathan (1982), "Quentin Skinner's Method and Machiavelli's 92 (1982), 692-709. Tarlton, Charles D. (1973), "Historicity, Meaning, and Revisionism in the Study of Political History and Theory 12 (1973), 307-28. Sheldon Wolin, (i960), Politics and Vision (Boston, i960). Michael The Independent Zuckert, (1977), "Of Wary Physicians and Weary Journal of Philosophy 2 (1977), 55-66.
Acts,"
Prince,"
Thought,"
Readers,"
Book Reviews
Locke's Education for Liberty. Chicago J. E.
By
University
of
Press,
$22.00.)
Parsons, Jr.
Nathan Tarcov 's outstanding book on Locke's Education punctures a few Locke and coins a new word, (or the tendency to
"algedonism,"
pain)
which ought
to pass into
our
Lockean literature
as a
key
term.
First,
Locke's Education is
their children,
not
merely
do the best
regime
but
constitutes a
way
of
by by
a
habituating children to
certain stratum of reputation
which
liberty presupposes
at
least for
in the
grown
child,
which of
in the Essay. A
human life
and
good reputation
the
most
lasting
pleasures of
disgrace
one of
lasting
first
pains. a great
Incidentally, Bacon,
custom or
method of years:
authority for Locke, defines education as early habituation: "Certainly custom is most perfect when it
this we call
education which
beginneth in young
custom"
(Essays,
and
Education";
of
"
.
Bacon
fully
explicable
in terms
Locke's broad
some minds
"[Scil. the
suffered
aptitude]"
is
present
in
themselves to
and prepared
to
receive
continual
amendment,
which
(ibid.). And this constitutes the is exceeding how does it account or even make Locke's Education:
the gentry like Locke himself?
punctures
allowance
for
a philosophical member of
The Tarcov
second myth
almost ex cathedra,
makes
infallibility
of
Laslett's
edition of
than Man
greater
needed'
abundantly clear: "Locke writes that the "desire of having more led to the invention of money, which in turn motivated men to
of
degrees
industry.
Laslett
'Man'
alters
in the
phrase
'desire
of
hav
ing
more
than Man
which
needed'
to
'Men', following
the
first
edition rather
than the
Locke corrected, and he also makes other alterations, without textual authority, in a way that diminishes the connection between this desire and (pp. 177, 253, note 187). What is more, Laslett's inven the invention of later ones,
money"
sees.
168-9
the text
and notes
without
is
faulty,
exile
and
alters
that Laslett "seems to think that Locke lived in the seventh century and that the
in Egypt took
place
in
b.c."
706
not without
his
omissions: cf.
426
p.
Interpretation
note 71 with p.
217
and
erences
to
Laslett, including
253,
note
187
to in this review.
Also
bibliography,
viz.
Zuckert
notably Robert Horwitz's "John Locke and the Preservation of Liberty: A (The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. Perennial Problem of Civic
Education"
pp.
differing
in means,
comes
to similar
of
to those
in the
republic of
Tarcov. Nevertheless, Tarcov is clearly one Locke scholarship, to use a metaphor warranted
of
the
the
by Harvey
C.
The
structure of
after an
introduction that
power,
stresses the
and the
importance
children's
a
desire for
respectively,
by
section
commentary
Some Thoughts
Concerning
(p.
Education The
210)
also or
and a conclusion.
education"
central
commentary dwells on what Tarcov calls "moral education proper. Later I will elucidate the problem of the
education
feasibility
1. 1
of
Lockean
nowadays,
about which
Tarcov is
of
will
of education
worthy
Reflections
Education.
Tarcov's
body
and
commentary has three main divisions: (1) the training of the courage, (2) the rechanneling of basic human passions through habitua
central
liberty,
such as
the
civility and industriousness, and (3) the mind. With regard to the latter, Tarcov
such
self-
the correct
emphasizing the priority of moral habituation to learning as motive for learning, viz. the cultivation of natural curiosity, Expressed
as
differently, learning
game
the
Tom
Sawyerism,
suggested.
Let the
child re
learning not as a duty but as a privileged hardly be able to restrain him from this good
gard
for adults,
"sport."
As
out
regards moral
giving reasons,
and
parents'
the child, so
he develops
no aversion to
his
parents.
Reward
should
be
behavior
and
and as an
inducement
a sentiment
benignity
compassion,
humanity,
nature,"
or a good
once custom
overcome
the
'Roots
of almost all
Contention,
be
so
(pp.
168-9)'"
self-love.
More
could
said about
learning, but
the stock of
habituation
long as we remember that they are (proceeding from initial severity to relaxation
and
civility
or good
breeding,
we cannot go
Book Reviews
421
Accordingly, our author presents a portrait of Locke's "liberal version of the family as the home of pleasant study and educative play, a home founded on lib
erty, civility, and love rather than patriarchal
eralism
tyranny"
(p.
209).
On Lockean lib
Tarcov regrettably fails to connect two of his most valuable and hard-won insights: (1) Lockean tends to include Hobbesian rationality (p. 247, note 82), and (2) Locke, by implication, had a less partisan, more objective
general
view of
in
such as
Bacon
on
and
especially
Hobbes (cf.
quite
259,
note 75).
Let Locke
speak
for himself
this subject in a
verted
surprising passage from Of the Conduct of the Understanding, sec. 24 (ad to in the last note): "Some will not admit an opinion not authorised by men
who were
of
old,
of
. .
knowledge.
Nothing
is to be
put
sury it.
.
truth or
knowledge,
with
Others,
as
with a
and
being
taken
which has not the stamp of Greece, or Rome, upon like extravagancy contemn all that the ancients have left us, the modern inventions and discoveries, lay by all that went
before,
if
whatever
is
have the
decay
of
time upon
it,
and
truth, too, were liable to mould and rottenness. Men, I think, have been much the same for natural endowments at all times. [For] truth is always the same;
.
.
time alters
it not,
nor
is it the better
occasion,
or
worse, for
dition.
moderns
There is
no
on
to one another, or to
be
(emphasis
added)."
My
point
of
substantive conception of
which
Hobbesian rationality is based upon a occurs because Locke takes an evenwhom reason tended
handed
view of passion.
Hobbes, for
the
to be just a
further
I
come at
length to the
mentioned
question of
feasibility
of
Lockean
education
for the
pre
present
day,
by
Locke
the availability and the affordability of a tutor to supervise, in part, the formation of one's children's character. Locke's Education treats only of the ed
supposes ucation of
gentlemen, and
we
gentry, or aristocracy, or
at
both. Nowadays
without a
have in
or
least,
"gentrification"
gentry proper,
plutocracy
aristocracy, although
it may be
argued
that we pos
of
sess a graded
of sorts
life is
imitated from the very rich and filters down in society, a certain note of supercili ousness and incivility is struck, which tends to treat those of inferior economic
status
in
patronizing
way.
In
other
words, we are
ruled
by
establishments per
meated
by
the snob and the snub. In this perspective, the late Nelson Rockefel
fellah"
may
well
lost,
you
could not
have become
politics was a
hobby,
of lesser means. raising goldfish or woodworking is for those our to return to problem, some who benefit from "gentrifi On the other hand, are younger couples who both work, are childless and intend to remain
cation"
that way to
maximize
the
pleasures
that accrue
from
joint
annual
income
of
428
Interpretation
and upwards.
$50,000
These
couples
not contract a
costly
cocaine
habit,
simply do not want children, and if they do they can have many other outlets for spending
such as
income in tutor,
our consumer-oriented
economy,
an
BMWs
or
or
trips to Bali.
The
he
or she
exists, is
instructor
so
trainer,
not a character
former,
Locke
and
many
people's education
of
by
the mindless
mor-
alism of television, especially in families where both spouses work outside the home. More and more in our society we have children who like Topsy, "just
growed"
with
Perhaps Kant
than Locke
in that he
ical in his Education: he certainly better foresaw the later turns in education, for Kant omits all reference to a tutor and
his Reflections
on
twists
and
seems
to assume in
Education that
in
place of
lic
and yet
more
insoluble, being
to solution
in is
speech. of
That
is:
who educates
seemingly
retrograde.
ress of
is less
and
Yet today the notion of such an implied moral prog less acceptable as we proceed to suffer the brutalizing
To
to our
very scientific development which gave Kant such assurance. dilemma: Kant states in the Introduction to his Reflections, "Man
only becomes man through education. He is solely that which education makes of him. It is necessary to note well that man is only educated by men and by men
who
educated.
It is because
of
lack
of
discipline
and
instruc
a
tion
be
ing
what could
be
made
of man (emphasis
Philonenko,
such a master self an animal
Reflections, footnotes
in
master,
this passage
Kant,
for
man
is
an animal
need of a master.
But
is
not available
being human,
is him
For Kant, as Philonenko suggests, man is an animal in need of a true educator, but a true educator, being human, is nowhere to be found, because he himself is in need of education. In other words, the
need of a master.
in
deadly
circle of
indiscipline
states
and
ignorance
cannot
be broken
that is our di
lemma. As Philonenko
right on
it: "The
problem of education
is thus insoluble
by
be necessary that a god took charge of educa perfect solution. The difficulty indicated is not a
difficulty
tion of
susceptible of
a
degree; it is
being overcome it does not concern, in effect, a ques difficulty of principle. Every human educator is a defective
defectively"
(Kant, Reflections
p.
sur
education, trans,
and notes
by A.
73,
note 12).
Book Reviews
429
Nevertheless, despite
education ment speakers wax
is possible, but
Kantian argument, I hold that something like true to be assumed as likely. When we hear commence eloquent over "the dynamics of or "the educa
the
not
education"
tional
not or
process"
that
they
think
they know
what
they do
serve
that
they
are wolves
in
sheep's clothing.
Perhaps this
reminder
may
anything else the distance between Locke's Education and practices a fact which, by implication, does not escape Profes
Tarcov.
The Modern Self in Rousseau's Confession: A Reply to St. Augustine. Ann Hartle. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. xiii +
pp.:
By
186
$19.95.)
Charles E. Butterworth
University
of Maryland
analysis
must
of
demonstrate that it
art"
be
read
less
as an such a
philosophical work of
(p.
12).
In pursuing
fuses to
sume
from
a psychological point of
of what
is,
to pre
that she is
than Rousseau
he
was
trying
to
do
of
with
the
Confessions. Her
argument
is
grounded rather on
detailed knowledge
the Con
fessions,
sights
clear
into the
She
views
understanding of Rousseau's other writings, and provocative in his predecessors, especially St. Augustine and Plutarch. Rousseau's Confessions as a response to St. Augustine's Confessions
work of
his
own
life
with
St. Augustine's
as
Plutarch
con
trasted those
of
illustrious Greeks
and
goal,
ative
argues
Hartle, is
and
to depict the
by
the
cre
imagination
captivating as this interpretation is, I think it places too much emphasis on the Confessions and succeeds only by isolating that work from the Dialogues and, above all, from the Reveries.
Hartle She
considers
the
unquestioned premise
for
modern man's
thinking
his
to
about
himself to be
wishes
reliance on an
irreducible inner
essence.
its
origins and
determine
idea
of of
what
it
stands self
in
opposition
to.
Contending
man's
nature,
she explores
the idea
frequently
of reasons
repetitive analyses.
The first
of
her five
chapters advances a se
ries
among
them
being
for understanding the Confessions as a philosophical work, chief Rousseau's explicit insistence that it offers the only true por For Hartle, then, the Confessions is
neither apologetic nor
trait of human
nature.
430
Interpretation
for human nature, and Rousseau's depiction of himself the only genuine instance of it. She explains factual discrepan
a quest
justificatory, but
presents us with cies
in the
designed to
alert
the the
discerning
details
reader and
interprets Rousseau's
complete as
are accurate or
is fictitious
and
therefore to be read as
something
other
formal
written
parallels
life history. Above all, she draws attention to a series of between Rousseau's Confessions and the book of the same title
notes
by
op
posite
in
In the
can relate
explores
Hartle
observes
he
life, any autobiography is necessarily incomplete and how Rousseau sought to overcome this limitation in the Confessions.
the whole of his
to
She
also
M. de Voltaire in
of an
order
to show that
he
rejects personal
in favor
impersonal
natural providence.
Though little
Rousseau's
more
denial
of
of
to be
a state
in
expecting anything from the future. In Chapter Three, Hartle investigates how Rousseau seeks to transcend time or at least to be steadfast in the face of its changes. Here, too, the importance of rev
which one can recollect
the past
the opinion of
they
never
delights in it insofar
as
it
allows
him to
recall past
joys
without
God-like
stance:
God
would see
it,
perceives
things as does
God,
and
is
by
showing that Rousseau's denial of ulti mate union with God obliges him to insist upon grasping the self as a whole, something he achieves via the creative imagination. She nonetheless notes the
to
careful restrictions not
Rousseau
places on
the
imagination's
creativeness:
He
will
let it
reach
close.
of
divine
providence and
insistence
His
on creative
imagination
bring
him to his
concept of
away from the world and towards solitude al lows him to discern the uniquely human characteristic, the sentiment of exis tence, and thus to view man's nature as subsumed in the feeling of self. Conse
modern man's self. movement
by insisting
on
on
the
Rousseau's
portrait of
man,
his denial
of
the
immortality
state of
of
is
no
nature, and
the fact
his
true
Book Reviews
Ann Hartle's
own, but
we
43 1 Rousseau's teaching differ little from my the Confessions in the same manner. She denies its auto
given
conclusions about
do
not read
biographical
omissions,
character
because,
to avoid
and problematic
un
she wishes
trying
agree with
overcompensates most as
it
as a clever piece of
all
siduous reader
its
ultimate
secrets,
Rousseau's teaching
about provi
dence. Hartle consequently pays no attention to the surface of the Confessions and dwells instead on randomly culled phrases which point to other works with
out
I
that
special all
instance
of what
it
pretends
to
be,
is,
an
autobiography, but
and
one
having
and
noted
by
Rousseau
these fea
tures and
limitations. It
A
hints
background information
his
the Confessions
about
ideas
developed in
natural sentiments.
interpretation
the work,
of
pay
attention
and
be
complete as a
as a chronicle of
Rousseau's
life,
emphasize
his identification
sions and of about save
of
the Dialogues as
character
his true
(see
(Euvres,
appearance of
folly, surely
dismiss his
faced if
contemporaries were
Unreasonable,
far-fetched
it seems, this
the
claim
we are
to
Confessions,
Reveries,
and
the
autobiographical
in
which
Rousseau
attempts
to tell us
himself, I find it necessary to reject Hartle's assertion and it is something that his self-portrait is really a portrait of modern man (see p. indeed only that 126). For me, Rousseau is never modern man. He alone among the men of his
about
generation, and
ties posed
existence.
on this
he
stakes
by
modernity
and
to think or feel
his claim, has been able to fathom the difficul his way back to a happier mode of
interpretation notwithstanding, I find Hartle's
and quite well written.
possible
This difference in
emphasis and
book
most
Only be
cause she
so
has
clearly divergent
and so
carefully is it
for
me
to formulate
opinions.
are quite
good, though
them"
somewhat stilted.
In
she
has
erred: on page 42
the French
rather
"y,"
refer
"there"
sinful
should
be
rendered as
. .
"in
than as
there
.");
have
432
Interpretation
"aussi" "thus" "therefore"
as
or phrase
things"
rather
than as
"also"
("Also,
of
.").
In addition, if the
on
"the
mind
on p.
81 is
translation
meminit,"
et expectat et attendit et
I find it
ex
are
way those
and
(see
pp.
19
39; 23
and
139; 61
and
82;
Philosophy of Common Life. By Donald W. Livingston. University of Chicago Press, 1984. xiv + 371 pp.: cloth, $30.00.)
Hume's
Nicholas Capaldi
Queens College
(Chicago:
Livingston's
scholarship.
heralds
of
a significant
development in Hume
which views
It is in
part a
distillation
the
current
revolution,
Hume from
ical
as a positive
epistemologist who a
thinker, not just a negative one, and as more than just an followed Locke and presaged positivism. Hume is viewed
fresh perspective, and his work is treated as a coherent whole. What Livingston contributes to this revolution is an examination of Hume's philosoph
and
historical writings,
'mutual'
which
be
on the
narrative
con
tinuity between
Livingston losopher
reveals
how the epistemology is itself better understood from is a picture of Hume as a serious
an
his
phi
"historicist"
The title
of
Philosophy
of
Common
over
Life,"
in
dicates the
'common
sense'
and an expression
of past cultural
actually used by Hume). Common life is the sum total practices that have emerged unplanned and unintended into a
of which we
framework in terms
cisions. opher
de
As such,
common
life
contains
implicit norms,
pointing life.
and the
job
of
the philos
philoso
is to
explicate such
theoretical
In addition,
phers
out when
thought, including
philosophy,
the
framework
true
of common
According
to
Livingston,
(p. 3)
on
ity
life
life"
of common
which
philosophy for Hume "presupposes the author thereby gains a kind of transcendental status.
comes about when we attempt to
False philosophy,
the other
hand,
try
to make common
phi-
The
do
so
is
an attempt to turn
Book Reviews
433
losophy itself into an autonomous discipline with an authority all its own. When fully developed, such an autonomy principle results in total skepticism. In ad dition, there is a curious lack of integrity in false philosophy since it is itself
only intelligible when it presupposes the why, as Livingston stresses, the reader
rhetoric of
correctness of common
must
life. This is
style not and
pay
attention
to the
Hume's
writings as
Hume
exposes such a
lack
of
all
integrity,
just to
jargon,
theoretical activity
we cannot
only knowledge.
explicate
it. So history,
applies
not natural
Livingston
argues
this
insight to
various
issues in Hume's
epistemology.
He
ism,
to explain concepts
in
is derived from
specif
about
the
conventions of
language,
ically that
a
someone
is
husband
to
is to
refer
to
Again,
making
ous
explain a causal
judgment is to
causal
judgments. This
no
application of
attention,
but,
doubt,
the
it
with
in
vincible
ignorance.
"historicist"
Given the
preciate
framework in Hume,
we can
better
understand and
'Cartesian'
ap
Hume's
(dubbed
by
the
Livingston), specifically Hume's rejection of natural rights, social contract. In addition, given the historical and secular
work
natural
law,
and
conservative
frame
in Hume,
clearly Hume's
rejection of
false
conceptions of
the
narrative
order,
such as providential
views,
whether sacred
(for example,
(for example, Turgot). The extended application to Kant, Priestley) Condorcet, Hegel, Marx, and liberalism is just as obvious. Finally, Hume's analysis of the Puritan Revolution in his History of England is but another ex
or secular
ample of a critique of a misguided atemporal
theory.
most
The
conclusion
to Livingston's treatment is
instructive. Burke
was
led
by
of
the pressure of events to reject the French Revolution, but Hume's rejection false revolution (ideological instead of conservative) is the articulation of a the autonomy
principle.
philosophical critique of
Because it is
rooted
in
deep
is
much more a
theory
of conservatism of
than a
Hume
was also
the first to
warn of
the rise
"metaphysical
parties"
animated
less
by
interest than
by
false
philosophies.
Such
is
endemic
to the
life.
One may
work.
quibble
commentator on
there, but Livingston has done a superb job. No Hume's social and political philosophy can dare to ignore this here
and
434
Interpretation
of
Selected Letters
and with an
Introduction
by Harvey
1984.
London:
University
of
Chicago
Press,
$27.50.)
Francis Canavan
Fordham
University
This volume, handsomely bound and printed in clear, easily legible type, fine introduction to Edmund Burke's correspondence. All of the exam Burke's ples of writing contained in it are taken from the ten-volume Correspon
makes a
dence of Edmund Burke published from cago and Cambridge University Presses
Thomas W. Copeland. That
correspondence.
1958
to 1978
the
by
the
University
of
edition of
of
Chi
under
general
editorship
the
late
the definitive
Burke's It
The
present
volume, therefore, is
the
is interested
enough
in Burke in
and
his
well.
followed the
chronological
order
which and
Burke's letters
are
printed
his
selected
letters
They
tions
and philosophical
concerns; tol
eration and
with on
America, India,
when
are
two selections of
years
letters
1766-
the theme of Burke and party politics. The first is from the
1780,
he
was
Rocking
other
is from the
and
broke
with
between 1789 and 1797, in which he the Whigs over the French Revolution and be
lone Cassandra trying to awaken the politicians to the gravity of the revo lutionary threat. All of the selections are on the whole good ones and give the
came a reader a
taste
of
Burke's thought
prefaced
on
Mansfield has
Burke's life. The Introduction, subtitled "Burke's Theory of Political manages to deal concisely with that subject in 27 pages. How successfully it does
so
Practice,"
is
a matter of opinion. of
This
field's interpretation
nature and role of
Burke
on
the
relation of
theory
in politics, the
tue, and the meaning of prescription, natural law, and prejudice. Manfield's belief that "Burke does not consider that democracy is
regime"
a possible
on
seems questionable
in
view of
Burke's
own statement
in Reflections
"There may be situations in which the purely democratick form will become necessary. There may be some (very few, and very par ticularly circumstanced) where it would be clearly
the Revolution in France:
desirable."
One
Mansfield's
opinion that
au-
Book Reviews
435
the claims of the
thority
vine
of
the past
and
ensure
Burke's
appeals
to di
law
were
too explicit
and
Similarly,
Mansfield
when
he
says
not
say in the manner of Thomism that we have natural inclinations in our souls that are fulfilled in politics; the soul is not a theme of Whether or not Burke says
his."
anything in the
manner of
Thomism, it
he his
seems a
bit
the
soul
is
not a
he
means
by
constant references to
nature,
feeling,
reason,
and
fun
These may be only the nits that scholars love to pick and which are half the of academic life. They do not, in any case, seriously detract from the value of this well-edited selection of Burke's letters.
American Conservatism
and
near
the heart
of
his impassioned
yet meticu
lously
on
to American conservatism, a
conservatism
based
the
the
Kendall: "Harry,
slaves,"
what
and
exchange with
wouldn't
Willmoore
one of
You
be
said
Kendall. "Did
you ever
hear
Moses?"
of
governm
tried it once,
for
constitutional which
in
order
to
protect
life.
civiliza
Jaffa's
project
is to
explicate and
pillars of
tion, have
However their
differ, they
in
common
tempts to
by
derstood
pains
by
rather express
to
consider
his
central
movingly:
I believe the
saved
time a
soul
is
from
the
dark
night of
fanatical
obscurantism.
It is
soul
is
released
from the
pessimism
that truth
is
to
obtain.
It is
is disabused
of the proposition
that the
subjective
intensity
lidity.
Eternity is indeed
436
Interpretation
becomes
aware of
vidual soul
its
power to
mortal existence.
know, and when it discovers in this power This, above all else, is what is meant by
of the
saving
West.
explored
the
confrontation
between Aristotelian
and
Thomis
tic ethics, and he seems to have absorbed the ancient philosopher's moral-politi
cal
framework. As
eyes.
result, he
views
American politics,
so
to speak, through
Aristotle's
According
a
to the Nicomachean
"median"
Ethics,
virtues such as
justice,
being rare,
tues
is itself
kind
of extreme.
between two extremes; yet virtue, Virtue needs to be defended extremely, because
of our
if necessary. This
"values"
claim shocks
some,
perhaps
habit
of
or our own
"value
values,
judgments."
Doesn't freedom
imply
we should
follow
whatever
enterprise consists
storing the objective ground for the profound difference between good and evil,
"Values,"
he
might
belong
in the Sears
catalogue.
Among
been
discussed in the
essays reprinted
here, Jaffa
the
thinks the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan and a Republican Senate may have
a watershed election
of
kind
of electoral revolution
years.
that
will change
face
American
politics
for many
or
four
before 1980: Jefferson's, possibly Jackson's, certainly Lincoln's, Franklin Roosevelt's. Samuel Lubell and Kevin Phillips have noted the phe
elections, but Jaffa has uniquely
seen
In every
ples of
founding
princi
democracy
wrote
licans, Jaffa
ach
shortly afterward, apparently succeeded in taking democracy back to the people, wresting control from a Democratic Party that had no stom for continuing the fight
against
indecency,
as
economic
redistributionism,
bureaucracy
here
at
home. If this
FDR's drama
whose
-
U.S.
election was
i860; the
the Civil
second
War;
and
Lincoln is the
paradigmatic
American
Jaffa,
book
was a
of an analysis of
the Lincoln
Douglas debates,
understood
argues
issues generally, in the light Constitution, of the Declaration of Independence's teaching that all men are created equal. For Jaffa's Lincoln, the Constitution itself is insufficient as a guide to the deeper is
the
American
politics, such as chattel slavery. Trying to interpret the Constitution with rigorous reading of the Declaration can lead to monstrosities like the Su preme Court's Dred Scott decision, according to which blacks "had no that white men were bound to respect. Lincoln claimed that decision resulted from a conspiracy among the Chief Justice (Taney), the President (Buchanan), a
sues of
out a
rights"
Book Reviews
437
former President (Pierce), and the recognized national Democratic Party leader (Stephen A. Douglas). Yet Lincoln never supported breaking the law, disobey
ing
he
the
individual decision
as
between the
slave
Scott
and
his
"owner."
Instead
Republican majority in Congress committed to reversing the prin ciple of inequality the Dred Scott decision embodied by passing new laws confirming equality and setting slavery "on the course of ultimate
proposed a
extinction
Lincoln's
"moderation"
disgusted
his
"extremism"
infuriated slavery
sent prefer
apologists.
Lincoln
democracy by
enlightened con
majority
to say,
rule
bounded
by
a proper
understanding
of natural
(or
as we now
"human") rights. Lincoln's greatness is revealed in his capacity to explicate the paradoxical principle of enlightened consent. He regarded it as the only way liberal democ
racy
could
be
free,
and
his
genius
lay
in
democracy
mulation.
Civil War
great
accordance with
statesman, possessing
pacity
ceum
either
destroy
of 1838
One
need
Address
was 30
aware of
his extraordinary powers. Jaffa's democratic theme is gradually transformed into the
Three
of
general theme of
political greatness.
the four
a
dedicatory
defense
President
whose greatness
noblest
of
democracy
in
show
ing
the type of
character who
the char
,
acter of
.
the man
. .
bore the
War]
seems
he writes. Jaffa is making the highest thing in the American to me two complementary observations here. (1) Every kind of regime must generate
regime,"
defenders; democracy
mocracy
other regime.
seems
(2) De
seems capable of
producing
higher
or nobler character
The theme
central
of
human
greatness
profound
issue: the
of
age-old
Expounding
Strauss
the thought
Plato, Jaffa
in
of
engages
and other
a relentless confrontation
elevate
the
dignity
the
political.
His
quarrel with
ponents of
the
contemplative
some or
pro
"history"
becoming,
as
"eternity"
being
of which
(Jaffa's title for his central chapter) holds for both ways of primacy of the life. While different kinds of regimes may understand the good differently, phi
losophy
and
cannot
help
but be
political:
it
must articulate
defend
is,
This the
reluctant
so-called
Straussian defenders
the fate of
to
do,
even when
philosophy are, to say no more, the philosophic life itself is at stake in the
of
438
Interpretation
impose
a universal
homogeneous
state.
The truths
of politics
may
or
human
self an
dignity
illusion.
are no more
not
be
"self-evident,"
and
of
philosophy
piety is it
Jaffa's defense
ture may
of
of
American
democracy
rests on
its foundation in
which
nature.
Na
be
understood as
is the
order
human
nature.
The glory
American
Founding
Fathers
dinary
act of of
standing
terms of
establishing an entire political system on the basis of a true under human nature, described in the Declaration and in other writings in
natural
rights.
They
provided
world)
ral
Americans (and ultimately the whole political standard. Natural right implies natu
law
have
a right
by
nature without
taking
their
duties from
Certainly
before
be it
founded in
embodies,
nature.
Jaffa
contends
princ
"dignity
of
the
political
philosophy,
which comes
to sight
the natural and the conventional, is compelled to defend both American democ
racy and the integrity of moral virtue. The scope of Jaffa's intention is breathtaking: to ism. Nihilism
als, politics,
or
rescue
is the
end product of
the historicism
at
the core
of mo
dernity. Historicism may be described as an opinion that the mind is transformed understand our forbears better by the history of human experience such that
"we"
or
differently
than
they
understood
themselves
that
is,
"we"
cannot understand
them as
by
his
history"
of
must
be
superior
to
an advance over
whether progressive or
not, under
the possibility of
fundamental
historical
criticism of process
any
is
that it is
of
epoch,
"our"
when
histori
cism rose
knowing
whether
epoch
is the
final epoch; or, to put it differently, it cannot be known whether the philosophy of historicism is not itself only one phase of the historical process, to be tran
future nonhistoricist age. Historicism is logically and rationally it ends in the abyss of nothingness. self-defeating; Professor Jaffa has probed the American political tradition to its deepest roots
scended
by
some
and
of
tradition qua
"our"
tradition and has given Americans the profoundest rationale for the
legitimacy of
Western
equality and liberty constituting the democratic way of life The twentieth century has lived from its first days in the
.
shadow of
Book Reviews
decline. That it
on
shadow was
by Nietzsche,
who seems
finally to
the
blame
his
ancient
teacher,
philosopher
"who first brought philosophy down from the Nevertheless, the cause for the West's decline is also the cause for the West's hope: historicism, having dissolved the fixed The
order of
have two
choices
left to it:
either
to live in
the nihilist abyss, or to restore moral and political order, approximately as the
classics understood
it,
reconstituted
by
rate
what,
following Strauss,
achievement of
modern
"philosophy
brought the
of
the
future."
At any
of
it is the
political
insight
American democ
democracy by
the
possibilities.
doing
so
life
Lord"
wisd
beginning
of
Jaffa's
work amounts
to a substantial
to the
endeavor of
reversing
William F.
provides an
and
Charles Kesler
of
significance of
the Declaration
social research
an international quarterly OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOLUME 52, NUMBER 2 SUMMER 1985
A
publication of the GRADUATE FACULTY
Sheldon Wolin
Myth in
and
the
Contemporary
I
"^
Neil Harris
Who Owns Our Myths? Heroism and Copyright in Age of Mass Culture
an
jf A
David E. Apter
The New Mytho-Logics and the Specter of Superfluous Man
Michel Perrin
The Myth in the Face
of
Change
the
Destiny
of
Secularization
Hide Ishiguro
Myth
and
False Dichotomies
Umberto Eco
At the Roots
of
of
Symbol
Melvyn Hill
Symbolic Authority
in
Bruno Zevi
The Seven Myths
of
Architecture
Paul Z. Rotterdam
Myth
and
Art
$20;
Institutions: $40.
Business Office:
Forthcoming
G. E.
Articles
Lessing
Ernst
and
translated
by
Ronald
Hamowy
Progress
and
the Social
Philosophy
a
Adam Fergusson
David
Levy
Study
and
in Hermetic Social
Engineering
Will
Morrisey
Shakespeare
Reviews
Steve Balch
W Warren Wagar Main Currents of Marxism
Arnold Toynbee Marvin
and
by
Leszek Kolakowski
the
by
Perry
ISSN 0020-9635