Interpretation, Vol 15-1

A
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
January
3
1987
Volume 15 Number I
Harry
V. Jaffa
Equality, Liberty, Wisdom, Morality

Consent in the Idea
of
and
Political Freedom
29
John C.
Koritansky
Socratic Rhetoric Plato's Phaedrus
and
Socratic Wisdom
in
55
James C. Leake
Tacitus'
Teaching
1
and
and
the Decline of
and
Liberty
at
Rome (Preface. Introduction,
Chapters
2)
Discussion
97
129
Pamela K. Jensen
Will
The Moral Foundations
of
the American Republic
Morrisey
Delimiting Philosophy
Book Reviews
143
interpretation
Volume 15
JL.
number 1
Editor-in-Chief
Hilail Gildin Seth G. Benardete Gildin
Editors
Charles E. Butterworth
Howard B.White
Hilail
Robert Horwitz
(d.1974)
Consulting
Editors
Joseph
Erich Hula
Cropsey John Hallowell Wilhelm Hennis Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal

Michael Oakeshott Ellis Leo Strauss (d.1973) Kenneth W.
Arnaldo Momigliano Sandoz
Thompson Patrick Christopher A. Maureen
Associate Editors
Fred Baumann Colmo
Coby
Derek Cross
Edward J. Erler
Feder-Marcus Jensen Rubin
Will
Goldberg Morrisey Charles Rubin

Michael Zuckert
Joseph E.
Pamela K. Leslie
John A. Wettergreen
Bradford Wilson
Catherine Zuckert
Manuscript Editor
Laurette G. Hupman Martyn Hitchcock
Design & Production
Annual
subscription rates
individual
$15; institutional $18;

There
are three
student
(3-year
limit) $7.50.
issues
of
interpretation a year.
Address
for
correspondence
interpretation, Queens College ,
Flushing
N.Y. 11367, U.S.A. Authors submitting
manuscripts
for
publication
in
interpretation are requested to
follow
the ML A Style Sheet and to send clear and readable

copies of their work.
Copyright 1987
Interpretation
Contents
Harry
V. Jaffa

Idea
of
and
Consent in the 3
Political Freedom
and
John C.
Koritansky
Socratic Rhetoric
Phaedrus
Socratic Wisdom in Plato's 29
James C. Leake
Tacitus'
Teaching
and
the Decline
and
of
Liberty
and
at
Rome 55
(Preface, Introduction,
Chapters 1
2)
Discussion
Pamela K. Jensen Will The Moral Foundations
of the
American Republic
1
97
29
Morrisey
Book Reviews
"Wallenstein"
Philip
J. Kain
Greek
Antiquity
in Schiller's 143
by
Stephen M. Krason
Gisela N. Berns
Principles of Politics: An Introduction by John J Schrems

.
45
Will
Morrisey
Novus Ordo Seclorum In Defense of Liberal
by
Forrest McDonald;
Walter Berns
148
Democracy by

in the Idea
of
and
Consent
Political Freedom
Harry V. Jaffa
Claremont McKenna College
1 have
written
Founding this founding

recorded
represent an
and the American many times that the American Revolution idea: the idea of political freedom. This revolution and also represent an event, or a scries of
do indeed
events,
which are
in
what we call
history. But
our
interest in these historical

work
events
is de
rivative,
derivative from the fact

of political
that we discover at
particular
in the
events such an
idea
the
as
that of political freedom. The
historical
circumstances
in
which
idea
freedom took
nor as
root are
as
neither as
which
interesting
important
the idea
certainly interesting, but they can be itself. Not the time or place in
when
the idea was blazoned forth to the world, or
(or
even
how) it
was put
into
practice,
but the idea itself, deserves the first

called
rank
in
our attention and es

wonderful work
teem.
Gladstone is
"the American Constitution
the most
ever struck off at a given time and

"wonderful."
by
the
brain For it
man."
and purpose of was
But the "brain
"work." purpose"
prior
to the
the former which made the
latter
our
The Creator
must always
take precedence of his

our
Creation, in
wonder and admiration.
The Constitution has become

and
inheritance,
and we
ought to
honor the intelligence, the devotion,

it to
us.
the sacrifices, of those who be
queathed
sense
Yet
such a
legacy
cannot
be transmitted
by inheritance,
in the
that money,
a
land,
or other external goods can
be transmitted. A
constitu
or
tion,
regime, a way of
can
life
to
no more than posterity.
courage, temperance,
"
justice,
wisdom
be
"willed"
In its
origin our regime was proclaimed

self-evident
to be a matter of
reason:
"We hold these truths to be

not of
And truth it is only it is willed, but

when
is
a possession of
the mind
the
will
and of the mind
of
properly him only in the

of
employed.
Truth is the
possession not of one are no
to
whom
who understands.
There But
lawful inheritors
or unlawful
usurp
ers
possession of truth. although as the
we must also
bear in
mind
that the understand
ing
truth
in these
premises
the
condition of virtue
is
not
itself
virtue.
Just
individual
virtues represent an
habituation
of the will to princi of
ples of reason, so a
free society
must not
dom, but
ment,
must
implement them
by
those
only understand the principles institutions of education and of

actual ground of
free
govern
by
I
which such principles
become the
will
the way of
life
of a
people. cated at
am sure
that many of you

as
wonder
why it
was
that a nation
dedi
its birth
Lincoln
said at
Gettysburg
to the proposition that all men
are created equal, continued
for fourscore
on
and seven years the
institution
for the
of
chat-
This
ocratic
paper was prepared
for
Conference
the Constitution at the Center
Study
of
Dem
Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, February
12, 1986.
Interpretation
This is
an
tel slavery.
sion.
important
question, and deserves the most
serious
discus
Yet I
would assert a priori
that,
as an object of wonder and concern,
it is far de
less
significant than the question of
how it
How
was was
that a nation of
slaveholders
clared that all men are created equal.
it that
this nation
declared its in
dependence,
own, but to
not
by
an appeal to
any
virtues or rights that were with
distinctively
its
of
rights that
it
shared with all men everywhere
human beings
every caste and class and every race and nation derful that having made this proclamation of the
men
and creed.
Is it, however,
to
won
universal right
freedom
of all
the
first time in human
history
that such
a proclamation was made
the
American Founders
were yet puzzled as
to how to implement
tory
of
the republic is one of the fiercest
controversy.
The
ratification of
it? The early his the Con
stitution was publicans and witnessed son and
fiercely
disputed. In the 1790's, the party controversy among re federalists surpassed in ferocity and rancor anything that we have
And
such
in
our time.
animosity
even
divided
some
such as
Madi
Hamilton (the
principal authors of the celebrated
Federalist)
who
had
worked shoulder to shoulder

each now accused
in securing
the adoption of the Constitution. Yet

which would
the other of an interpretation of the Constitution
turn
it into
an engine, not of
freedom, but
ever
of
despotism. To
the
repeat, no one
before
the American
Founding
had
before
proclaimed as
principles of
freedom
the principles of freedom for all mankind

people.
the principles of a
particular
Yet how to
was were was
convert these principles a settled matter.
into
political
institutions,
even
for
themselves,
whom
hardly
And how to them,

met
extend them
to all those to
they
rightfully bound to
of
extend
represented still another chal
lenge. Nor
ciples. nection
it
a challenge that could
be
merely easy
by
a recourse
to the prin
Even in the lives
individuals, it is
health
and
no
matter
to discover the con

even when that
between, let
us say, good
healthy
habits. Yet
knowledge has been

To repeat,
ositions
gained,
it is
frequently
began
a matter of greater
difficulty
to
im
plement the practices that the
knowledge
would with
dictate.
our national existence
the proclamation of certain prop
held to be true. The

of
sense of these propositions was understood to
be
en
tirely independent
of
any
other time or
of eighteenth century America, or any "climate of place. I recall being taken to task once at an English uni
an historian, for treating the Declaration of Independence as he thought as if contemporary. I it had been eighteenth-century document,
versity,
by
an
replied that
was confident
that the one

as
thing Jefferson
never
was
for
moment
dreamed
composing an document. No one believed in the idea of progress more eighteenth-century than yet wrote is he Jefferson, firmly "Nothing unchangeable but the inherent and
of
himself
as
doing
he drafted the Declaration,
inalienable
the
embodied.
not
man."
rights of
"The
rights of
right and
to Jefferson meant, moreover.

the moral principles that
fundamental
principles of political wrote
they
the
Washington, in 1783,
age of
that "The
foundation
but
of our empire was
laid in the gloomy
ignorance
and superstition
at an epoch when at
rights of mankind were
better
understood and more
clearly defined than
any

former
period."
and
Consent
and
5
Washington that "the
and supersti
It
was
axiomatic
for both Jefferson
man"
rights of
(or mankind)
were no
different in
of
ages of
where
ignorance
tion than in ages of enlightenment.

can
But,
course,
they
are unknown
they
hardly
form the basis both

of
of governments. and of
The Declaration
"merciless
of
Independence it
and
self speaks
"barbarous
and
by
so
doing
indicates that barbarism
savagery
and
are
ever-present threats to civilization.
They
ment
may have been

and of
more widespread at certain times and places than at
others,
but they may The
occur at
any time
place.
They
are
negations
of enlighten
the wisdom and virtue that may be founded
upon enlightenment.
opposition
between despotism
whose endless
and
freedom is
at
bottom that
(Troilus
thus:
of
"right
and
wrong,
between The
jar Justice
&
Cressida,
i.iii. 1 16).
same
thought
was expressed
by Lincoln,
Slavery
mise past
is founded in the
selfishness of man's nature
opposition
to it in his love
of
justice. These
principles are an eternal antagonism repeal
Repeal the Missouri Compro

repeal all
repeal all compromises
the Declaration of Independence

nature
history,
you still cannot repeal
human
(Speech
at
Peoria, Illinois, October
16, 1854).
Before proceeding,
The into
"equality"
words
nouns.
In
more
preliminary remarks about language are in order. are in reality adjectives that have been turned pretentious philosophical discourse, they represent hypostasome
"liberty"
and
tization
the linguistic transformation of attributes into
substances.
But
attri
butes,
a red
except as attributes of
substances,
can
have
no real existence.
There it
can
be
barn. And
although one can speak of redness, we cannot see
or even
imagine it
Hence there
except cannot
in be
a red something: a sunset, a
dog,
is
or a red-headed woman.
equality, except
are equal
between
things that are equal. "Things

a
equal to the same
thing
to each
Euclidean
axiom.
By it,
and
equality may be said to subsist between the things that are thing, but only in the respects in which that equality is said to
a chair each of which cost
equal
to the same
subsist.
A bed
$100.00 may be
to be equally
said
to
be
equal a
"furniture."
value.
They
may
also
be
said
But
in their monetary bed is not equally a
chair, nor a chair equally a bed! There cannot be

of
the things
said
to be equal, and
vain
equality except as a relationship in the respects in which they are said to be

whether all men are created
equal.
out
It is then perfectly making clear in what

and
to debate
equal, with
respects we are
asking
whether such
Chickens
correct
human beings
are
two-legged animals, and it
to say that
all chickens and
human beings
are
equality subsists. be perfectly born equal, if one meant by

would
it equally two-legged. In defining justice

equality,
and
the
just, Aristotle declares
that the just subsists in
but he then distinguishes the equality that may subsist in exchanges of honors, emoluments, or from the equality that may subsist in distributions
other external goods.
The
one
is
called commutative
justice,
and said
the other di sto be "equal
tributive justice.
One bed that
exchanges
for $100.00 may be
Interpretation
other
to another bed (or any
commodity) that
also exchanges
for $100.00. The
two beds may be of different styles, materials, workmanship, but

equal
they
are
both
to the same thing, namely,
$100.00,
a sense
and
in
that
sense equal
to each other.
This equality, moreover, defines
in
which
two things, otherwise
dif
of
ferent,
and no
are the same.
The
value of
$100.00
which
is
placed upon either or
both
the beds is a single
The equality is therefore numerical. There is identity, difference, in that respect in which the two beds are said to be equal. On
number.
the other
hand, in
the distribution of the dividends of a corporation, the owner of
200 shares will receive twice as much as the owner of 100 shares.
We
cannot and
do
not
say that the man receiving twice the amount was receiving an unequal
share.
On the
contrary,
his
share would
be
unequal
if, having invested

as
twice
as
much, he were to receive the same amount of dividends the

same amount
the other
man.
Here
is
unequal, and the
double
amount
is
equal.
ists
as an
equality
of ratios and not of numbers.
The
ratio
with
Here equality subof 2/1 in dividends
corresponds to the ratio of 2/1
in
shares.
And
so
it is
honors
to
and awards
based
and
upon merit:
the gold medal goes to the winner, the
silver
second
place,
the bronze to the third.
With these
preliminaries
behind us, let
us turn to the great proposition,
"That
equal,"
all men are created and which
and to the axiomatic premises which
together constitute the core of the idea of political
accompany it, freedom. The philo

section of
sophic source par excellence ond chapter

ernment.
is
without
question, the opening

of
the
sec
("Of the State

as
of
Nature")
Locke's
second
treatise
Of Civil Gov
It is
follows.
derive it from
original, we must consider
To
understand political power aright, and
its
what state all men are
naturally in,
their
and
that
is
a state of perfect
freedom to
order
their
actions and
dispose law
of
possessions and persons as
they
think
fit,
within
the
of
bounds
of
the
of nature, without
asking leave,
or
depending
upon
the will,
any
other man.
state also of equality, wherein all more
the power and
jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one
nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subor
than another; there
having
being
dination
or subjection, unless of
the Lord and Master
of
them
all should
by
any
manifest
declaration
His
will set one above another, and confer on
him
by
an evident and
clear appointment an undoubted right
to
dominion
and sovereignty.
"Declaration
tal
Before considering this text of the Causes and
by itself, we turn to the Necessity of Taking Up

were
opening
Arms,"
sentence of
the
of
the Continen
and
Congress, July 6,
we
1775.
The draftsmen
John Dickinson
Thomas
Jefferson, but
anticipates,
the
do
not
know
which of them was responsible
for this
sentence,
it
however, lacking only

of
two
days to the
year, the great

consider the
trumpet
call of
of
Declaration
Independence. And
whether we
declaration
and
Consent
1
Locke's fa
July 6,
1775
or
July
4, 1776,
what we
find
are
distinct
reminders of
mous phrases.
If it
were possible
for
men, who exercise their reason to

a part of the
believe,
that the
divine Author
and
of our existence
intended
human
race
to
hold
an absolute
property in,
an unbounded power over others, marked out
by
his infinite
goodness and wisdom, as
the objects of a pressive, the
legal domination
of
never
inhabitants
some
these colonies might at
rightfully resistible, however severe and op least require from the Parliament
over
of
Great Britain
that
evidence, that this dreadful authority
them has
been
granted to
body.
The demand
vested over
of
the
Congress that Parliament

the right of property
offer evidence or
that
God had in
in
"that
body"
with
"dominion
and
"the inhabitants
on
colonies"
of these
is
irony
their
of cosmic grandeur.
Sidney
his Discourses
some
Government had
born
with
expressed a similar thought

on
by
men
are
not
saddles
backs,
and
others
saying that booted and

written
spurred
to ride them. (Jefferson

1826).
would repeat
Sidney's
words
in the letter
just before his death in

means
The
back"
"saddles on their
as
figure
of speech
that there
is no such natural
men and
horses,
to indicate that one
difference among men, is by nature the master
there is between
and the other
by
na
ture the
servant.
It is fair to
point out,
however,
men
that
neither
horses
apt
nor men are
born
with saddles on
their backs! Horses are,
however, born
horses that
for serving the

purposes.
purposes of man, although
it is left to
to train them to serve those

makes
There is
a natural
difference between
men and
the natural order, or natural right, that men ride

men should with
it according to horses. Although we say that

kindness
consistent
used we
treat horses
humanely
the
that
are
is to
say, with the
the
purposes
for
which
horses
properly
do
not
say that the
horses'
natural
rights
are violated,
by taking
For
them out of their herds and sub
jecting
and
them to the
service of men.
we reason a posteriori
from the
powers rank
faculties inherent in the

And
are we
species
found in
nature, to the
serve
distinctions in
among them.
true that there
say that
it is just that the lower

many
the higher. It is also
many
species of plants and
of animals that are good
for
as
food for
there is
other species.
There is
a natural
aversion
among human beings
also
among
other species
to eating their own kind.
But that
some spe
cies should serve as
food for
others
whether we consider all plants and animals
in relationship to man, or plants in relationship to animals, also seems part imals in relationship to the carnivorous
and right
or the of
herbivorous
an
the order of
"dominion"
nature
hence
to
of natural
right.
In
each such case,
we
discover
or the
appropriate and
to use, the right of property,
inhering
in beings held
su
in relationship to those held inferior, in the order of nature. A prima facie objection to this is, of course, that we have merely equated right with power. Within the lower order of Creation this is undoubtedly true. But as we shall see
perior,
in due
to his
course,
own
it is
not
true with respect to man. Man's sensibility of what is
due
humanity,
will
be
seen
to
result
in the idea
of power
being
controlled
Interpretation
by
right,
by
something
called moral obligation.
Even in
man's
dealings
with
brute
sion
creation, the unlimited power of man
is
not understood
to
result
in
permis
to use that power indiscriminately. It

of
is
no accident that associations to mon

"humane"
itor the dealings
human beings
with
brutes
are called
societies!
Turning
to the text of John
Locke,
. .
we are
told, to begin with, that in
order
"to
understand political power aright
we must consider what state all men are
naturally in dispose of their

nature,
without
This
is
"a
state of perfect
freedom to
think
order
their actions and the bounds of
possessions and persons as
they
fit,
within
asking leave,
more
or
depending
upon
the will of any other
But
this is "a state also of equality,
wherein all
the power and jurisdiction

"
is
recipro
cal,
no one
having
man
than another
nature.
This state, in
of perfect
freedom, but
Each is free equality
are
also of
equality, is the state of
It is
a state
which
there is no political
authority.
No
is
subject to
another. alone.
Each is his
or
own master.
equally free
liberty"
to obey himself
Freedom
liberty
and
then two names for two aspects of the

and must
same
thing. The "balance between equality

of men
be
sought
in
another
relationship than that
in the
state of
nature.
Locke
writes
that "there
same species and rank,
nothing more evident than that creatures of the promiscuously born to all the advantages of nature, and
should also
[is]
the use of the same
faculties,
.
be
equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection
he
means what
Jefferson
created equal.
For
says that nothing is more evident, in saying that it was self-evident, that all men are proposition to be self-evident means that it cannot be made meant
When Locke
clearer, terms
of
or
better known,
truths"
by
any form
of
demonstration. If
well as
one
grasps
the
the proposition, one understands it as
it
can
be
understood.
"Self-evident "Things
equal
may
to the same
refer either
to analytical or to
"
empirical propositions.
thing
are equal to each other
is
analytical
or, if you
equal"
will, tautological. "That all men are created

our experience of a class of ence of a number of
mon noun
arises
from
reflection upon
beings
"men."
called
We
abstract
from the
"man."
experi
com
individual human beings the
common noun
(A
differs from individual is the

"dog"
a proper noun as the name of a species of
differs from the
name of an
that species. In "Fido is a
dog,"
"Fido"
is the
way that
proper we ab
noun,
stract
and
common
noun.) We do
so
in the
same
from the
experience of a number of
performed the act of
individual dogs, the
abstract noun
"dog."
Having
nouns are
inductive reasoning
by
which these common
understood,
act of
we can articulate attributes which reflection shows were
implied in the
"man,"
standing beings from "man in
grasping that noun. We discover, for example, that in under we not only distinguish the characteristics of individual human
general,"
but
we also
distinguish And
we
man
from
"nonman."
We
the
distinguish the human from the

nonhuman that
nonhuman.
distinguish, moreover,
is
superhuman.
is
subhuman
from the
nonhuman that
We
con
as
clude,
for example, that there is

and
no such
difference between
man and
man,
there is between men
dogs,
that
makes men
by
nature the ruler of
dogs,
and

dogs
and
Consent
by
nature the servants of men.

us
But that very
experience of man and
dog
also
instructs
sary to
order
that
God is
as much above man as man
is
above
dog. Nor is it
neces
"experience"
God in the
same sense that one experiences man and
dog, in
to arrive at this conclusion. It
is
evident that
it is
by
the power of reason
by
which we
draw this
conclusion
that
man
is
elevated above the elevation
brute
creation.
But
the power of reason
by
which man of a
discovers his higher in that

upon
in the
scale of
being,
reason
instructs him in the idea

reason
being
scale, a
being
also possessed of
but
without the evident
limitations
own
the perfection and use of
that every man discovers in his

aware that of a
soul, at the same moment that he becomes the power of reason we form the conception there are no passions to act as impedi
might
he
is a rational
being.
By
perfectly
reasonable
Being, in
of
whom
ments
to reason.
From
this perspective,
it
be said,
reason
forms
His
an ade
quate
idea
of
the essence
God,
without
necessarily
implying
existence.
But
whether or not
God's
essence
faith is necessary for the mind to make the transition from to His existence, it is unnecessary to make that transition "to un
derive it from its
"
derstand
political power aright, and

at
original
Natural theol
ogy, stopping
the idea of God's essence, informs us of the meaning of the

man and
difference between
man and
beast, by informing
us of
the difference between
God.
man
Thereby
we understand anew what
Aristotle declares in the Poli

that is neither beast nor God.
must
tics, that
is the in-between being, the
being
We
the
understand
therefore that the rule of man over man
differ,
be
rule of man over
beast, but from

to secure the
the rule of God over

such, that
man.
not only from For the difference
between the idea

that
of man and of
God is
it
in
would
absurd to suppose
provi
God
would need
consent of man
order
to exercise His
dential
government.
It
would
be
as absurd as that of men
their dogs as a condition of exercising authority over them.

men of
securing the consent of Hence, it was that the
Maiden, Massachusetts,
can never
as
independence
subject
approached
(May
fit to
27, 1776),
declared "we
possessed of
be willingly
to any other
King
is
than he who,
being
is
infinite
wisdom, goodness, and rectitude,
alone
possess un
limited
King."
power."
Hence Tom Paine declared that "In America, the law
alone
For the
conception of
God informs
us of
the idea of law
in Aristotle's
all
desire."
words, the rule of "reason

elements of the rule of
unaffected
by
And therefore is it that
the
law
responsibility
of the government
to the governed,
civilian au
freedom
thority,
pus,
of speech, press, and religion, subordination of

separation of powers,
military to
writ of
independence discoveries
of
of
the
judiciary,
reason,
as
habeas
cor
trial
by jury,
etc.
are
human
whereby the rule of

as possible
men will, under effects of
the denomination of rule of
law, be
nature
free
from the
those infirmities
by
which
human
is
understood to
differ from
that of God.
It is
must
frequently
objected
to this, that the rule of law is an
illusion,
is
no
that laws
be interpreted
If this
and administered
means
by
men, and that there
rule of men. goal of
that the rule of law can never

desire,"
escaping the completely achieve its

perfectly true. If
how-
being
"reason
unaffected
by
it is
of course
10
ever
Interpretation
means that the
it
law
of
can never approximate this goal,
it is
wrong.
The
sign
ers of the
Declaration
Independence
appealed
to "the Supreme Judge of the to ask God for

of
world,
a
for the
intentions."
rectitude of our same
No
one expected them of the
jury
trial! But the very
reasoning led the framers
Bill
Rights in
one
the first
would
Congress to insist (in Article VI)
upon the right of trial
by
jury. No
say that trial
by jury
in
criminal cases yields perfect are never convicted.
justice;
that the
never escape,
or that the
innocent
Yet
criminal
guilty jurispru
dence
ments
over the centuries
by juries. The
are
rules of evidence
has developed many safeguards against arbitrary judg have constantly been refined in the light of
concentrate the attention of
experience to enable
judges better to have been
juries
upon
the
facts that
material.
material, and to
we
remove
from their
consideration
facts that
a
are
im
With this
gree of reasonableness to the
reasonably judgments of juries in
quite
able to
impute
criminal
very high de cases. We do not
say that these judgments are perfectly reasonable, or that criminal jurisprudence has reached a state of absolute perfection. The debate today about such matters
as the
Miranda
rule
is
sufficient evidence of this.
Yet
no one
seriously
proposes
the replacement of the adversary system of our courts

one.
No
one
equal and
entirely different seriously doubts that the enfranchisement within the courtroom of opposite interests before a jury that (to the best of the knowledge of
with an with either side
the court) shares no interest

ments untainted court
is
well adapted
to making
judg
be
by
the interests of either of the contending parties. Nor could the

were no separation of powers,
be impartial if there
if the judge
could
threatened or bribed
by
anyone who
had
an
interest in the
so
cases
that came before
him. We say, But

we
of
course, that judges should,
far
as
possible,
be incorruptible.
take great pains to arrange things so that the corruption of judges is

and that
difficult,
tempts at
the probable losses of those who would participate
in any
at
bribery
far
outweigh their probable gains.

desire,"
At every step
a realistic
of
the way. the

of
idea
of
"reason
unaffected
by
informed
by
understanding
human nature, improves the
operation of
the legal system,
and acts
to make the
justice
of the regime genuine.
But is it true,
"all
all
and
as
Locke proposes,
and as
the
Founding
be
Fathers assumed, that
men,"
human beings,
"promiscuously
faculties,
"
born to
all the same advantages of equal one
nature,
the use of the same
should also
to
another
without subordination or subjection
Do
not
human beings differ degree to
greatly,
both
as
to their natural endowments,
and as
to the
which those endow
ments are or not
may be cultivated? Are not these differences politically relevant? Is government, like all the arts by which human life is benefited, itself benefited
conducted
by being
words of
by
"the
wise and the good"?
Is it
not
best conducted, in the
the ioth
of their
Federalist, by
those "whose
wisdom
interests
country,
and whose patriotism and
may best discern the true love of justice will be least

Is
not
likely
man
to sacrifice it to
conside
temporary
or partial
the
fact that
ta-
is the
rational animal reason to place
in authority
to use one of
Locke's

vorite phrases
and
Consent
11
"the
rational and
industrious"? The
answer to all these questions
is,
of
course, an emphatic affirmative.

application of reason to
In considering the
public.
human affairs, however,

of
we are re
minded of an argument advanced
by
the
Socrates in the first book

of opposites.
Plato's Re
of
All the
and
arts
involve knowledge
of
Medicine is knowledge is to
preserve
health
disease. The function
doctor,
we say,
health
and
disease, or to cure disease and restore health. things, however, the doctor must know equally well
prevent
prevent or
To know how to do these how to

cause
as
disease
and
injure health. The health
art of medicine
and
considered
an art or and
edge of the causes of
disease
is
simply knowledge
the knowl
of opposites. as
And
we
know that
We
medicine can
be employed,
is
employed
in the in
as well
vention of
as
the instruments
also
of nuclear and
biological
warfare
for
killing
enter
for
curing.
know that
physicians
have been known to
into
con
spiracies against
their patients. (For example, plots in collusion with heirs to col profoundly, we know that despotic regimes
of
lect
insurance.) More
especially
are called call enemies
those peculiarly malicious forms

"totalitarian"
despotism which, in
our
time,
regularly employ the medical art against those

of
they
the
regime.
Hitler
employed
thousands
of
physicians
not
only
Dr.
the
Mengele
to murder "undesirables":
Jews,
gypsies,
homosexuals, invalids,
"insane,"
chronically ill. The Soviet Union today has suborned the entire fession within its borders to treat political dissidents as
against them
psychiatric pro
to
testify
body-
in court,
and to turn their

"doctors"
hospitals
and sanatoria patients

with
into
mind
prisons and and
torture chambers.
These
inject their
destroying
drugs.
neutrality"
The "ethical
was recognized
of
the arts and the
sciences
(tfxvui
ymi
eirioxfmai)
equally
clear
by Aristotle,
in the Nicomachean Ethics

none of
when,
in Book
VI, he
moral
makes
it
that the exercise of
the intellectual
virtues requires
moral virtue,
with of
the exception only of prudence, or practical wisdom. This

was recognized
defect
the arts and sciences

even
in the
ancient world
by
the
before entering into prac today by tice. Whatever may be the noble and just intentions that lead most young physi cians into the medical profession, there is nothing in the art of medicine, consid
all physicians
Hippocratic oath, taken
ered
merely
as
knowledge
of the causes of
health
and
disease,
that directs it
oath
towards
healing
and
away from injuring. It is
the addition of the
Hippocratic From this
to medical knowledge
virtue
that is to say. the addition of moral virtue to
intellectual
exam
which together constitute what we call

multiplied
the
healing
art.
ple, which can be
many times over, we conclude that something must
be
added
to each of the arts, considered merely as forms of

of causes, to assure that
knowing,
or know-
how,
or
knowledge
it
will
benefit those
of
who are
to be
governed
by
it. Aristotle But

each
classified governments
into those be
the one. the
and the many.
kind
of government could
either good or common
few, bad, de
pending
wards
upon whether
the
government was
directed to the A
good, or to
the private advantage of the government.
government, whether of the
12
one,
Interpretation
few,
or
many, may be
skillful
or unskillful
in the
art of governing. efforts
But
re
whether skillful or unskillful,
it
could not
be good,
if it directed its
as a whole.
to
warding the rulers at the the "consent of the
expense of
the community
supreme
The
principle of
governed"
is the
discovery
of the political art
for di
recting government towards the benefit of the When we go to the doctor, we subject ourselves to his
governed.
regimen.
We
consent to
be
governed
by him,
in
one of
the most important
respects
in which,
because
during
our
lives,
we subject ourselves governed
to the rule of others. We
do
so
we think
that
it is better to be
with respect
by
one with medical
knowledge than
by
ourselves.
to our health. But we also think that it is essential, that the

want
full
ex
tent of the doctor's skill be devoted to our benefit. We

negligent nor want
him to be
us.
neither
we
lackadaisical, because
of
any indifference towards
Nor do
he
should exert
on
him to be distracted in any way, by having any reason to ask himself, why himself fully on our behalf. We want assurance, or even reassur
this
point.
ance,
First
of all,
it is essential, for the
"health"
of our relationship,
that it be voluntary. However

and professional,
is based
wise
upon our
much we may, or must, rely upon advice, both lay in choosing a doctor, it is essential that his government over us consent. To the hypothetical objection, that this is a case of the
depending
have
upon the an
unwise, for the exercise of wisdom, the reply must be:
the
unwise
pensating for the defect ple who, however

their
interest in choosing well that goes a long way towards com of their knowledge. Of course, we are supposing a peo
"enlightened,"
"unwise"
as
laymen,
are nonetheless and vigilant
aware of own
ignorance,
proposition
and
therefore
intelligent
in their
interests. The
consent of
civ
very
"that
equal"
all men are created
(the
ground of
"the
the governed") as a philosophical truth, implies a civilized understanding of
ilization generally norant and free in

1816.
shared
by
the
people as a whole.
"If
a nation expects to
be,"
be
ig
it
expects what never was and never will

would not
wrote
Jefferson
We
are not
then considering people who

and
know the difference
between
witch
doctors
highly
trained graduates of
modern medical schools.
And, in
als will medical
general, we do not expect that the choice of doctors
by
private
individu
be
guided
by
nonmedical considerations.
If
you are
in
urgent need of
attention, you do not look

rather
for
someone whose some
diagnosis is intended to
some people are guided
flatter you,
more
than cure you! Or
if, in
cases,
by
the
doctor's "bedside
The
manners"
than
general
by
his
professional
knowledge,
society
this
does
be
not constitute a reason
why in
the choice whole,
of physicians should not
voluntary.
medical profession as a
in
a political
consti
tuted
by
the principle of the consent of the governed, depends very much upon
the reputation
it
enjoys with
society
a
at
large. The
chances are not great, there

chosen
fore,
that someone will choose
very bad doctor because he has
him for
considerations that are
the medical profession
less than strictly professional. Because our patronage of is voluntary, the medical profession, through professional
organizations,
and
through the
licensing
laws
(usually
administered
in
coopera-
and
Consent
13
tion with the professional medical organizations) has a great incentive to police
itself. And however doctor to be paid,

greatest possible
vantage.
we
may
to
complain of our medical
bills,
we
and paid well,
for his
services.
We
want
really want the him to have the
Paying
apply his wisdom as skillfully as possible to our ad him, however, is only one aspect of a system of incentives and
him. It is important
also that the payment
ought
incentive
constraints with which we surround

"market"
be for
as
nearly incentive to be
as possible a
price.
The individual doctor
to have the
able to charge
gain
higher
prices
because
practice.
of
the superior reputation

price
excellence vice
us
he may
in the
course of
his
A fixed
for
fixed
ser
does
not produce
the unqualified
incentive for
unqualified
devotion,
each of
likes to think that the doctor is giving him. Further: we surround the doctor with a web of law (including the aforesaid licensing laws), civil law by which he may be
criminal sued
law
for any form of negligence or incompetence (malpractice), and by which he may be prosecuted if he is thought to have deliberately
whatever motive. oath reminds us amoral.
inflicted injury, for

The Hippocratic
edge of causes,
moral
that the
medical
art, taken merely as knowl

moral
is
But
we expect our
doctors to be
makes
men, whose
intention
combined with
their knowledge
their art the

of
healing
art.
Yet
we surround with
the practice of medicine with a myriad

rewards
institutional
arrange
ments
both
for
good
behavior
and punishment
for bad behav
ior
designed to
moral.
assure
that
physicians will act
morally,
whether or not
they
are
actually
ter
as a matter of
In taking these precautions we do not regard their actual charac indifference. In fact, we recognize that habitual good behavior
or anyone else even
whether of
doctors
if begun lor
nonmoral reasons
is
good
foundation is
of
upon which
genuinely
good character
may develop. All
moral
education
this sort.
as
In health care,
in
criminal
justice,
the aim is behavior reflecting the

"reason"
stan
dard
desire."
of
"reason
unaffected
by
by
Yet it is
Here any
refers
to
medical
knowl
edge pure and simple,

nomic
uninfluenced
nonmedical considerations of eco
(or other)
advantage.
well
to remember, when we consider the that the good health we

virtue of
seek
"government"
of ourselves
by
medical
doctors,
through their assistance depends only partly on the skill and
the doctors.
govern when
Our desire for health is indeed

ment.
a powerful
pain
Patients
who
flinch
at
the least
incentive to obey the will undergo drastic surgery

are
doctors'
the
alternative
degree
is
will
is sufficiently stark. Those who follow regimens of abstinence But the

not a end
ordinarily
self-indulgent
to the last
and self-denial when the thread of which
life
slender.
intrinsic to
medicine
is to
contribute
to human
we pre
health
sume saved
is
final end, but

to be
a means to
human
well-being.
No doctor,
would want
remembered as
Adolph Hitler's life (even if

physicians are
such a
ing
his duty). If
and not
the moral
the man whose supreme skill in 1935 doctor rightly believed he was only do men we wish them to be (and as moral
will
men
merely
as physicians
they
have higher
ends than
health)
14
then
Interpretation
too
will recognize a
distinction between repairing the ravages of glut tony, greed, or promiscuity and in providing that relief to the human estate which is required by the ills to which all flesh is heir.
they
There
are
those, however, justifies the

upon the
who
think that the
modern project
for the
relief of
man's estate of all
abolition of what condition:
is
sometimes alleged of virtue. of
to be the greatest
burdens
human
the burden
Modern
philoso
phy if the
conceives of a project
passions
in
which a much
higher degree
and
felicity
if they
is imagined,
are not con
do
not
have to be controlled,
comparison
in
particular of
trolled
of
by
reason.
(In the
between the life

and
the tyrant, and the
life
the just man,
sketched
in both the Republic

the
the
Gorgias, they
in
opposi
tion to Socrates
choose
life
of the
tyrant. This is the starting point for
Machiavelli,
mean
and
for
all
modern
political
philosophy.) It does not,

sense.
however,
that men must become tyrants in the classical

science will make nature
principle without
The
conquest of na
ture
by
in
the
universal slave, so that men can
become ty
will
rants
becoming
tyrants in fact. That is to say, science

moral
enable them to
live lives
unrestrained
without
injuring
themselves and
by injuring
principle,
yet somehow without
each other. a
This last is the
greatest of
the illusions
of modern man.
It imagines
unfettered release or
indulgence
of the passions, and
surpassingly greater happiness, in the imagines that reason per

In the light
of
forms
a truer
function
as a slave to the passions than as their ruler.

medicine
this enterprise, the essential purpose of
is
not
health,
as conceived
tra
ditionally
because it
The
(or
by
common sense).
Health in the traditional
sense was a good
thing
contributed
to the
summum
bonum. happiness. A
imposed
happy
life
was one virtues.
lived well, because lived in

restraints upon the
accordance with the moral and

passions
intellectual
human
by
the habits
of the moral vir
tues are
by
this dispensation no longer
regarded as goods
in themselves. What
it may be a temporary necessity or exigency which will in due course make way for unrestraint. Thus, in MarxistLeninist theory, the dictatorship of the proletariat will be followed in due course
ever goodness seen restraint
such
is
in
is
only
as
by
the withering away of the state. Under the "pure

will
commu
which
follows.
there
be
no constraints upon
human behavior, Garden
either political or moral.
Pure
communism represents the return to the ence: there will pulsion
of no
Eden
but
with of a
this differ
be
no
forbidden fruit (and hence
from the Garden!).
Contemporary
possibility ideological liberalism
Fall,
or ex
or at
least its
libertarian wing
why anyone For example, sodomy is not something one ought not to engage in. although it may be wise to abstain from it until a cure for aids is found. Meanwhile, unlim
differs from Marxism-Leninism only in this: it sees no reason should wait for the Revolution, or the withering away of the state!
ited resources may be demanded for finding a cure for aids. The reason for this demand is only incidentally to avert the evil of the disease. It is essentially for the
sake of
the
felicity
of unrestrained sodomy.
Nor
can medicine object
to the
use of
drugs that
are
unhealthy, if they
the mind
or of
give pleasure through
illusions beyond the
natu
ral powers of
the imagination. Doctors might advise patients to

abstain
and
Consent
15
side effects
from them
"vices'
until
an
adequate antidote to their
deleterious
to
might
be found. But it is
as
as much a purpose of medicine
find
antidotes
to
pleasant
to find cures for painful diseases. The physician,
qua physi
cian, may not make moral
judgments
qua
as
to how his
man?
healing
art
may be
exercised.
But
what of
the physician
moral
Is there
not a contradiction
in
wishing doctors to be just, to genuinely care for the good of their patients, but yet to be neutral or indifferent to all other moral distinctions? Does not the goodness
of
the doctor
depend
upon an
understanding
of goodness rejected
by
those who
qua
would
thus commandeer the art
of medicine?
Does
not
the good
doctor,
good man,
have
an obligation
to refuse to serve Hitler or Stalin? Does he not also
have
as
an equal obligation not
to serve a regime in which every man is as free to do
he likes,
without regard to moral considerations, as a regime

e.g. a
in
which
only
one man
Hitler
we
or
Stalin
is? Is
not government
by
the consent of the
governed controlled
not
(whether
think of medical government or political government)
therefore
inexorably by the idea of "reason unaffected by desire"? inexorably commit us to the control of the passions by
from medicine, may be
repeated with
And does it
reason?
The
example taken
law,
engineering,
architecture, and even strategy. Benedict Arnold was probably the greatest mili
until he attempted to betray that cause. It was tary talent in the American cause more than who was responsible for the victory at Saratoga he, the only Gates,
substantial ance
in favor
American victory before Yorktown, and the one that tipped the bal of France's decision to intervene on the American side. It is not im
material
that one reason for
George Washington's
selection
to command the
American army before Boston in 1775, was his very considerable wealth, which represented a fundamental pledge of (or, if you will, hostage to) his loyalty to the American
cause.
Benedict Arnold,
unlike
George Washington,
proved
to be a
moral
talented but unreliable military

character and
adventurer.
He lacked both Washington's

was appointed to
Washington's
Two
other reasons
in the community he for Washington's appointment

stake
defend.
gress are also noteworthy.
They
were
his
unusual
and
by the Continental highly regarded

and the
Con
mili
tary
record, gained
a
in the Seven
Years'
War
with
France;
of
having
latter
Virginian in interests
command of an
American army
the
outside
necessity of Boston. For this

and
consideration also sought to seal

as
loyalty
and
the commander
his
regional
Virginian
out
to the larger cause of America as a
whole.
Had the Revolution broken

uated,
man
in Virginia, for the
had the American army been

Massachusetts
and
sit
let
us
say, on the Yorktown peninsula, it is probable that a Massachusetts
would
have been
sought
command. of
Virginia
were, so to speak, the
Dan
and
Beersheba
the thirteen colonies. But the rebel
lious
colonists were
Whigs,
and
had
remembered as was their
if it
were
only yesterday, the

the
British
and
experience of
Oliver Cromwell. It federal
intention, in
army
Revolution,
in both the
state and
constitutions which ensued upon
the
Revolution,
com-
to avoid the
dangers
of a professional Iv commanded
following
a gifted
16
mander well.
Interpretation
the Caesarean formula represented to them
of
by
the army of
Crom
Because
that experience, for nearly two hundred years

purchased.
commissions
in
the British army had to be

would
It
was thus assured that
the officer corps
and civilian overriding interest with the propertied classes Thus the which would keep them from ever "crossing the society constitutional axioms of the dependence of the sword upon the purse, and of the
share
an
Rubicon."
military
upon the civilian authority.
(The American Constitution
makes
the
Pres but it
of
ident,
makes
who must
be
civilian,
upon the
commander-in-chief of
the armed services;
him dependent
Congress for
supplies.
It
also makes the

all
House
Representatives
it
the more popular branch
the origin of
requires the consent of the
Senate for the
appointment of all
money bills, while the higher military
offices.)
It is
clear that
British
experience underlies much of
American
constitutional
ism.
Underlying this
of
experience,
however, is
this relationship
rooted
in the
na
ture of things
the subpolitical,
or nonpolitical arts to the political art
or
to
Different institutional (or other) devices may be required in different circumstances, but the purpose is the same: to bring the different practi
political science. cal
disciplines
of
human life (whether,
e.g.
strategic,
medical, or economic)
under moral
political.
control,
and under the control of the master

of
discipline
not
which
is the
The "consent
governed"
the
is the foundation,
"wisdom"
only
of the re
sponsibility of the government to the governed in the broader sense in which under such a government
ences
political sense,
but in the
in
all the arts and sci
may become beneficial to the whole community. The natural equality of man, as we have seen, results in government by the consent of the governed. This consent must be uncoerced, although it becomes, in turn, the foundation
principle of
all of
lawful
coercion.
But
voluntary
association alone can
society organized upon the implement the voluntary principle in

a civil
those other relationships of
life resulting from the

principle alone
cultivation of
knowledge
and wisdom.
And it is
by
the voluntary
that the means are

an effective
found
by
which wisdom
and not
freedom
of
becomes
force in the life

"rectifies"
not
only
of
individuals, but
the polity. But the
wisdom which sense.
(so to
speak) all
other
wisdom, is wisdom in a more
fundamental
And this is that in the

supervi
political wisdom
defined originally
by
Aristotle
which stands
sory
or architectonic of
foundation
this architectonic
of
relationship to all other practical arts and sciences. The discipline, within its Lockeian context, is to be
nature"
found in that "law

erned.
by
which
"the
state of
is
said
to be
gov
But is
nature"
not the
"state
of
past?
thetical rather than a real

came together to
merely imaginary? Does it not Or if some time in the actual past
refer a
to a hypo
of men
group
form
civil
society
have for
others
us
today? Our
agreed to.
natural
by a social compact, what relevance does that liberty does not consist in being bound bv what
the objections to
have
These
are typical of
Lockeianism heard

today,
and to
and
Consent
17
as that of
any Lockeian interpretation

that
of the
Constitution (such in
Abraham Lincoln).
In reply,
we observe
it is necessary, that
of
we,
living
civil society, un
derstand
tion
what
the law of nature is in the state
nature, to
understand
the founda
of our rights and our
duties here
and now.
Whatever
it is
status the
idea
of the
state of nature
may
possess, as a
historical free
concept,
a permanent attribute of
our consciousness as members of a
society.
Everyone knows that he may, if necessary and at any time, take "the law into his own either to defend himself, or to defend other innocent persons from unlawful violence. No positive law can repeal this natural law. That every normal human being does understand this proves that we are conscious of the law of nature in the state of nature, whether we conceptualize this consciousness or
hands,"
not.
Hence
we also understand
that where there are no police, or
impartial
courts
in
which
to seek
damages, it
is not unjust
to seek redress for injuries
by
whatever
means are
available,
including
force. Again, international law

different
tries to supply the
defect
of
the state of nature, when individuals
nations, and
individual
of
citizens of
nations
meaning here both individual having no common judge
(Locke's definition
the state of nature)

are
attempt to provide
juridical
means
for
redress.
All
of
these examples
testimony
that, however ineffective the law
of nature might
the understanding that such a law exists, is entirely independent of its enforcement. That is to say, the law of nature, as Locke says, is the law of reason. We thus look to the state of nature a priori to
state of nature,
be in the
understand what
not
is the law
of
reason, the law which ought to govern, whether or

we
it does
govern.
From this
instruct
ourselves of the ground of our rights
and
duties in
civil society, under government.
Reason teaches
punishment
us not
to
inflict in
jury
have
upon other
human beings,
It instructs
us
except as
just
for
offenses
they may
aban
committed.
that murder, theft, adultery, perjury, the
donment
or neglect of children,
ingratitude towards parents,

against
are
injuries,
of
fenses
against reason, and
therefore
the law of nature.
They
are offenses
against the
law
of civil ought
wrong, that
right and
they
society because we understand antecedently that they are not be done, and if done, punished. This understanding of
of our
of
wrong is in us all, and we become aware of it when we become aware own humanity. By it we become aware of what we owe to others, because
say,
we understand
the
a
is
humanity that they share with us. That is to ground of friendship in nature, apart from the
form interests. We
more
that there
more obvious ground
in fam
particu
ily,
lar
clan, nation, or any other

circumstances or shared
of personal relationship,
arising from
understand, of course, that these other

and nobler and
forms
of
friendship
are
naturally
intense,
better than those it. We
of mere
humanity. But
we also understand that
these friendships are potentiali

possible without of this under resem
ties of our common

stand ourselves
humanity,
and would not
be
and our own each other.
humanity
We
in the light
underlying
blance
we
bear to
understand particular manifestations of our
humanity
including
its
negations
in barbarism
and
savagery
in the light
of
18
what
Interpretation
is
consistent with, or
this resemblance
is
inconsistent with, this underlying understood, on the one hand, by the light
all
resemblance.
And
of
both the
resem
blance
and the
difference between
human beings
of
and
the lower order of
Cre
ation, and on the other, tween man and God.
by
the
light
the
resemblance and
the difference be
The
state of nature
is then to be
understood
primarily in
being"
analytical terms: as an
inference from have "no
man's place
in that "great
chain of
that both links and dis
tinguishes the higher and the lower

judge."
natures.
It
recurs whenever men meet who
common
of a people as
It may at some point become a feature of the history it progresses from family and clan and tribe to civil polity. Or it
the revolutionary right of human beings both to dissolve
may
arise
in
virtue of
particular societies, and to

ones.
But its
most common
break up oppressive utility is to be found,
governments and not
institute
new
in
extreme situations,
but in
normal ones: and
that
is
to understand the ground and purpose of our citizenship.

whether
It is to
enable us to
judge the tendencies,
in
ourselves or
in others, away
nor
from,
or
towards,
government
that fulfills the purposes implicit in our human na
ture. It enables us to reflect upon that fact that,

are yet a compound of and
being
in
or
neither
beasts both
gods,
we
both,
with potentialities
ourselves,
individually
collectively, for
descending
into bestiality,
ascending towards the divine.
and the
We may illustrate the foregoing from documents of the era of the Revolution Founding. In the Lockeian language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights
(1780)
The
body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social com by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good
pact
And the
All
premise of this compact
is that
have
the
certain natural, essential and unalienable right of
men are
born free
which
and equal, and
rights;
and
among
may be
reckoned
enjoying
and
defending
their lives
of
liberties;
and
that
of acquiring, possessing, and

and
seeking
obtaining their safety

happiness"
protecting happiness.
the
alpha
property:
in fine that
"Safety
ness
and a
constitute
politic.
and
omega
of
human beings
joined together in
How safety is to be achieved, and how happi body is understood, are inferences from the understanding of human nature cither
expressed or
ers granted
implied in the implied
compact
by
which civil
society is formed. The
pow
as well as the powers reference.
denied to
government, are also understood
from the
same
The ubiquity of the social compact theory in the American Founding is no where better illustrated than in the thought of the Father of the Constitution,
James Madison. In
one of
his last
extended
discourses in
political
theory
("Sov
p.
ereignty,"
The Papers of James Madison,
edited
by
Gaillard Hunt, Vol. IX.

569),
and
Consent
mind
19
Madison
wrote
that "it is proper to
keep
in
"
that all power in

career,
just
and
free
governments is
derived from he
compact
all
Throughout his
Madison
"com
repeated over and over again

pact."
that
free
government
is founded
upon
What he
go
meant
explained as
follows.
us consult
To
to the
bottom
of
the subject,
as
let
the
Theory
which contemplates a
certain number of
individuals
order that the rights, the safety,
meeting and agreeing to form one political society, in and the interest of each may be under the safeguard of
each
the whole.
The first
supposition
is. that
is to
individual
being
previously independent
must result
of
the
con
others, the compact which

sent of
make them one
society
from
the
free
every individual.
as
But
the objects
in
view could not
be
attained,
if every
the
measure conducive
to them
required the consent of
every
member of society,
theory further
supposes, either
was
that the
it
was part of
the original compact, that the will of the majority

was a
to be deemed
nature of po
will of
the whole, or that this
law
of nature,
resulting from the
litical society itself, the offspring of the natural wants of man. Whatever be the hypothesis of the origin of the lex nia/oris partis it is
operates as a
evident that
it
plenary
substitute of
the
will of
the
majority
of
the society
for
the will of
the
whole society; and
that the sovereignty
of
the society as vested
in
and exercisable
by
the majority, may
do anything that
reserved
could
currence of
the members; the

parties
be rightfully done by the unanimous con rights of individuals (of conscience for exam
ple)
in
becoming
to the
original compact
being
beyond the legitimate

pp.
reach of
sovereignty, wherever vested or
however
viewed
(Ibid.,
570, 571).
"To
go
to the bottom of the
subject"
the nature
of
tution and government of the United States

"Theory."
it
was
sovereignty in the Consti necessary for Madison to
consult a
And this theory
requires us
as we
have
said
it
must
to
contemplate man
ual
in the
state of nature:
"a number of individuals (each individ
being
one
previously independent of the others') meeting and agreeing to form political society, in order that the rights, the safety, and the interest of each
under
may be
the
safeguard of
the
In
antecedent
order
to be competent to
and
make
the
contract, each must be

of each of each
free
of
any
human authority,
be the
equal
the
persons with whom
he is
contracting.
Having
made
the contract,
is
under an equal obligation
to cooperate in the establishment of the govern

possesses
ment.
The rights that

of each
each
individual
by
nature, and the
freedom
and
equality
in the
possession of such rights,
defines the
nature of the com
pact, and instructs us both
in the
nature of
the powers
ol government which result
therefrom, No
of a
one
and
in the limitations
state of nature
upon such power.

state of nature
in the
leaves the
to become a
member
bodv
politic,
contract
freely
entered
properly into. Subsequent coming

of age
so-called
except as a consequence of a compact or

generations
born into
tain the right
upon
to accept or reject
cannot
free society re the polity into which

a
and
they
each
are
born. Of
course, civil
society
be torn down
to the
begun
anew with
generation.
But
each
individual
succeeds
same
political rights as
20
Interpretation
those who preceded

world or
him, including
in part,
what
the
that is
not of
his
making, and everyone
Founders. Everyone is equally born into a has the same natural right to accept
each one
reject,
in
whole or
he finds. That is to say,
has the he
same
the say wants. He of because it is what he is not society into which he is born, simply course at liberty to persuade others to join him in remaking it, but their relative
right
to choose among the
alternatives
he finds. No
one can
that
rejects
contentment
must
if it be
such
does
not entitle
him to
reject
its
authority.
But he
be
permitted to
leave, if he
wishes.
That there is
as a
a natural right of emigra

association.
tion is a corollary of the idea of civil society

obligations ciation.
voluntary
One's
asso
are
flow from the fact that

obligations
But the
voluntary member that flow from the exercise of

one
is
of a
voluntary
one's
free
will
themselves binding.
cause one resulted
Paying taxes
with some
and
serving in the military

of
are not
optional, be
which
disagrees
(or any)
the
purposes of
the laws
have
from the
political process.
As
right
a citizen of a
polity
constituted
by
the social contract, one has an

under.
equal
to share in the making of the law one is to live
And those
who make
the law must live under the identical laws that
they
make
for the
rest of their
but not I To say "You shall pay is another way of saying "You work, I'll Still, we must recognize that the operation of laws may be unequal without intending to be so, fellow-citizens. There
taxes"
can
be
no privileged classes.
eat."
and so.
laws A
which are
regime of
surreptitiously intended to be unequal may equality cannot be expected to be perfectly so.

that there
share
not appear
to be
either
in
appear
ance or
in
reality.
One
be
must also recognize

"equal"
is
no abstract answer
to the question of
principle can and
what constitutes an must
in lawmaking. Although the

terms
stated
in
abstract or universal
that all men are created equal
the means of
implementing
this principle must
follow the dictates
of prudence,
taking into consideration circumstances that are not universal, but particular. The idea that proportional representation, for example, more nearly implements the
principle of equal rights than other electoral misunderstanding. equal weight
systems, involves
fundamental
The
purpose of
government."
in the voting process How that "equal

what sensible
voting in a free society is not to assure an but, in Lincoln's words, "an equal voice in the
particular govern cannot
ment ered
indeed,
may be achieved in any meaning may be assigned to it

cannot
voice"
be discov
com
which
by
plexity
there
of
any different many
abstract
formula. We
here
enter more
largely
into the
electoral systems.
Suffice it that
proportional
voting (of
of
are
forms) generally
who must
encourages the
fragmentation
the citizenrv
into
splinter groups,
then be compounded into working majorities.
such majorities are not bound by party loyalties, they tend to be fragile, the resulting governments weak, and the rights both of majority and minority in jeopardy. A voting system such as that of district representation, in which "the
all"
Since
winner
takes
that
compels
the
coalescence a
of smaller
minorities
into
larger
minority, and of
minorities
into
maiority
produces stronger and more

stable governments.
and
Consent
21
This is to the in
a
advantage of
ought
The
electoral system
free society
This
both majority and minorities. to be designed to facilitate coalition
building
ble,
in the
electoral process.
coalition
building
ever
should, so
far
as possi mi
take place before the elections. The loyalties generated
by
the
discrete
norities, to each other,

process of
they form themselves into compromise, in the service of a common

as
larger
This
parties, assist the

makes possible a
good.
two-party
ernment. each
system, the only system compatible,
in the
long
run, with popular gov
In
two-party
system, the broad base of the
major parties
is
such
that
is competing for
members of the other s coalition.
In this way
minorities
and protection for their rights as minorities may obtain political influence far beyond what may be represented by their numbers. Thus the real interest of minorities
is
much
better
served than
in
a system of proportional representa
tion,
where
their status
as minorities
is
preserved
political
by
the voting, but where

of
they
are separated,
if
not
isolated, from the
influence
loyal
members of a
major party.
Majority
rule, says
Madison,
arises
from the fact that the

lesser
ones
most essential pur
poses of government
not to mention
could not
be
achieved
if the
action of the government
depended
upon
the unanimity which lies at its founda

a willingness or as
tion. That unanimity, in short,
implies necessarily
"original
will
to be governed
of
by
compact" nature
the majority,
either as a part of the will of
"a law
Henceforth "the The
majority"
the
be "deemed the
is
will of
the
unanimous consent
with
by
which civil
society
constituted,
itself invests the
majority
without
the authority of the whole. But this authority of the majority is not
criteria
limitations. The two
that limit the authority of the majority, ac
cording to Madison here, are unanimity and rightfulness. There is, we say, unan imous consent for majority rule. But that unanimous consent implies that the ma
jority
is the trustee
of
the
rights of
the
minority.
own name,
but in the
name of the
minority
as
The majority does not act in its well. And the minority is supposed
man elected
to look upon the decisions of the majority as its own decisions. (The
President
of
the United States is the

of those who voted
representative of
every
citizen of the
United
States,
we
not
only
at
for him.) But this
would not
be
realistic,
if
did
not understand the rights under the protection of our common govern
ment, to
be
bottom the
same.
If fellow
citizens
looked
upon each
other, in the the wars of
way that Protestants and Catholics looked upon each other,

the
during
Reformation,
or as
medieval
Christians looked
could not
upon
medieval
Jews,
then
rule
Protestants, Catholics,
would
and
Jews
be fellow
citizens.
Majority
be chimerical, because
what
divided
majorities and minorities would
be
more
fundamental than
what united
them. It is in this light that
we recall
Wash
ington's declaration that the American

of
Founding
"was
ignorance in many only
and
And that
age survives
laid in the gloomy age today in Khomeini's Iran,

not
and ated
other parts of the world as well. Nor are superstitions to
be
associ
perse-
with man's prescientific religious consciousness.
The demon
of
22
cution
Interpretation
in National Socialism interpretation
and
Marxism-Leninism
The
arises
from
an
allegedly
"scientific"
of the world.
moral education of
the whole com
munity in the
compact,
rule
common natural rights of
humanity,
as the ground of the social
is a necessary condition of free society, of a polity in which majority be combined with minority rights. And no free society can perfect itself may beyond the point that has been made possible by its progress in this education.
The Virginia Bill
of
Rights
of 1776 expresses the common
faith
of
the
Revo
lution,
That but
when
it declares:
no
free
government, or the
adherence to
blessings
of
liberty,
can
be
preserved
to any
people
by a firm
justice,
moderation,
principles.
temperance,
frugality
and virtue and
by
frequent
recurrence
to fundamental
By this it is implied that the citizens of a free community must be characterized by a morality that generates trust among them. And the moral virtues, as virtues
of
the will, are themselves grounded upon "fundamental

"individuals"
which are of
virtues of
the mind or intellect. It
is
then not
any description
whatever, who are united

of a rational will
into
polity
by
the social contract, but those possessed
who give unanimous consent to of what unites
majority
rule.
By
reason of
their
a
understanding free society, while
them on the
fundamental level, the

"factions")
w
citizens of
becoming
will
partisans
(and
even
ith
respect when
to the these
interests that divide them,

threaten the genuine
above all,
rights of as
be
able to transcend these

share as
not
distinctions,
It
will
interests they
fellow
citizens.
teach them,
members of a majority,
to permit the endangering of those
the minority, which ought to be their common care.

we recall, said
Madison, thing
"
that the majority, acting
for the
whole,
"may
do any
that could
be rightfully done
by
the unanimous concurrence of the

as a criterion of
members
He thus
adds rightfulness
to unanimity,
majority rule,
and
even gives
it
a particular emphasis.
Clearly, unanimity
acts as a check on major
ity rule, by inviting each member of the majority to ask himself, whether he is doing anything to another, that he would not have another do to him. In a free so
ciety
men
rule and are ruled
in turn. In
or
representative
part of
government,
they may
ma
"rule"
either
by holding
office,
by forming
the victorious electoral
jority. No one, in the majority, may act to deprive others of those civil or politi cal rights, in virtue of which members of the minority may hope to rule in their
turn. But unanimity
by itself,
although a
necessary
criterion, is not
sufficient.
Men may be unanimous and wrong. Madison gives us but one example, but it is one whose importance cannot be exaggerated. The rights of conscience may not become a matter of governmental action, no matter how unanimous opinion ma\
be
with respect
to them. Religious
homogeneity
ask
is
not a
justification for laws

of
ex
of a
pressing that agreement among the citizens. A

particular
community
Christians (or
denomination
of
Christians) may
themselves whether,
to
in compel
ling
they
non-Christians
are
(or Christians
of another
denomination)
what
join their church,

would not
violating the
golden rule of
doing
to others
they
have

others
and
Consent
think
23
or categorical
do to them. But it is
not
likely
that
they
will
in Kantian
terms of what
it
would mean
if
everyone were at
much more
in
matters of religious
faith. It is
liberty to compel everyone else likely that, thinking only of their

nothing wrong in itself,
that
or
own
faith
as an unqualified
blessing, they
would see
contrary to the golden rule, in using the compulsion for the sake of an end of
whose goodness
they have
no
doubt. (Shakespeare
was confident
few
mem
bers lock
of an
at
Elizabethan
audience would
doubt that the forced
conversion of
Shy
in
the end of The Merchant of Venice was as philanthropic as it was

of a social
just.)
The very idea
compact,
founded
upon
the common
rights of man
the state of nature excludes from legislation whatever is not intrinsic to those
rights
that men share, and
for
which
they
need common protection,
in the
state of
nature. sis of
The Statute
of
Virginia for Religious
Liberty
of 1786
the doctrinal ba
our civil
the religious clauses of the First Amendment
declares that
rights
have in
no
more
dependence
A
upon
our religious opinions,
than upon our
opinions
physics or geometry.
sequel
to this statute might have declared that

the color of our skin, or of our na
our civil rights
have
no more
dependence
upon
tional origin, than upon our religious opinions.
In the
course of
time,
as
we
know,
such amendments
to the
Constitution,
of the
and statutes
to enforce such amend

we tend
ments, have in fact become the law

to view
as
United States. For this reason,
illegitimate
political parties whose aim
like the Ku Klux Klan, the free
Nazis,
ship. of
or
the Communists
not
it is to deprive do
others of their equal rights of citizen
Are
those, free
we
ask, who
not accept the premises of excluded
society, and
majority rule, themselves

society?
justly
from participating in
be
a prudential one.
the political
processes of a
The
answer
to the
foregoing
question must
Denying
civil
or political rights to those who are ever
intolerant
of the equal rights of others,
how
just in itself, may be actually serve the interests however
counterproductive.
It may in
some
circumstances
of
those
we
suppress.
Contemplating
this question
instructs us in the like contemplating man in the state of nature fundamental rights and duties of the citizens of a free government. It teaches us
that education of the citizens in the
mental task of
principles of
the regime is the most

cannot
funda
any free
government.
For
free society
be
neutral
towards
the convictions of its

cannot
wards
citizens with respect
to their mutual rights and duties.

without
It
to
be
neutral towards
the morality of citizenship,
being
neutral
itself. And this is
absurd.
Without that frequent
recurrence
to (that is to
say,
frequent
re-education
in) fundamental
principles enjoined government
by
the great docu
ments of
the American Revolution "no
free
can
be
preserved
to
any
whenever
These
principles as
the ground of our
patriotism must
be defended,
the nation itself
is defended, if necessary,
by
not
the
souls of
be defended politically or by force, if they are not the citizens. The greatest threat is in the souls
guide
But they can defended first and last, in

the
sword.
of those who
believe
that reason as a
to the
ends or purposes of man's moral and political exis and who
tence is
either as
blind
or
impotent,
think that
reason
is
relevant
to human
life, only
the slave, and never as the master, of our passions.
24
Interpretation
APPENDIX
Walter Berns has
written
(This World, Fall 1983,

[of
church and
pp.
97, 98) that
the champions of separation
state] in the United States
Madison,
in the
is incom
Washington,
patible with
and
Jefferson, for
. .
example
were not
Christians,
except perhaps
most nominal of senses
would go
Christian doctrine and,

and
by
further: the very idea its formulators, was understood to be incompat

of natural rights
were enemies of all revealed religions.
ible. In
fact, Thomas Hobbes
John Locke
I have
commented elsewhere
(This World, Spring/Summer 1984,
pp.
3-7,
but
see also
National Review, November 29, very

popular
1985, pp. 34-36) on this thesis of

and all revealed religion
Berns'
now
that
Christianity
is "in
compatible"
with
"the very idea
of natural
According
Religious
to Berns
of
himself
the idea of natural rights, as expressed above all in the Declaration
Indepen
the
dence (but foundation

are
end
not
less
so
in the Virginia Statute
of
of our constitutional and political order.

with revealed
very To say that these foundations

success of
Liberty) is
"incompatible"
religion, means that the
the one must
in the withering away, if not the I believe Berns is mistaken, and that the doctrine
ultimate extinction, of
the other.
of natural rights
is
not
compatible with understood
Christianity
is
(and
fortiori
with revealed religion as
such),
only but is
to be a requirement of it. The ground of individualism that we find in

anticipated
Locke's
personal
state of nature
by Christianity,
relationship, between each human soul and
in the idea of an individual, God, arising from Creation

order, and yet one such,
itself. This relationship is understood to be outside the natural that is reflected in the government of the natural order. It is, as
of
independent
the
asser
the
political community.
The Virginia Statute

created the mind
of 1786
"
begins
with
tion that
example set
"Almighty by "the holy

do
God hath
free
who
and goes on
to cite the
religion"
author of our
"being Lord
not
of
both
body
Berns
and mind, yet chose
to propagate
"
it
by
coercions on either, as was
in His Al
as
mighty
power to
The
success of
Christianity
.
its demise,
suggests
depends
fear
upon
its influence
or civil
upon the mind, altogether
free
of
"tempo
ral punishments or
burthens
incapacitations
Wealth
or power
in
this
world, or
of
persecution, may beget

profession of
meanness."
"hypocrisy
apart
and
and
but
not true
faith. Inducements to the

to faith
faith,
from the
evidences presented
itself,
are responsible
for establishing
over the greatest part of ginia
the
world and
through all
time."
maintaining "false religions The doctrine of the Vir itself to

contribute to
Statute,
the
doctrine
of natural rights, understands
true religion,
of
and not
to the elimination of religion.
By contributing
to the purity to the
religion, it is
meant
to contribute to the purity of society, and
thereby
moral
foundation
of civil government.
Prior to the
own was
rise of
Christianity
in the Roman
laws city
of
world,
every
a
ancient
divine law. The

typical
of
attribution of the
the Mosaic
the
ancient world.
Every
either
had
polity to god as its
Moses'
city had it s God

or
lawgiver,

received
and
Consent
received
25 from
a god.
them
from
legislator
appears
who
had in turn
them
The
God
of
Israel Himself
for
some time as
if He
were
"one among
gods.
First He
must persuade
the children of Israel that He alone
is their
god:
then
he
moves on
to that most shocking of paradoxes: their

when cities were
God
alone
is God.
In the
ancient world,
defeated in war, they

then the survivors
slavery.
often ceased
to exist. If the
inhabitants only
were not all
killed,
even
women and children
were carried off
into
Their
altars were
usually the de
"clients"
stroyed, and their gods ceased to exist

of
for them.
They
became
the
religion of
their masters
the way
in
which
black
slaves
in America for
got
their native religions, and became in time Christians. The only conspicuous the
exception was
Jews,
God,
it
perhaps even more
strangely (to the adamantly in defeat.

who
more
rest of the world)
clung to their
As Rome
conquered the cities of the ancient
Mediterranean world, it found

to
more profitable
(only incidentally
humane)
longer
leave
them to their own
internal
enemies
self-government.
as
The Romans
no
exterminated
their defeated
they did Carthage
or even enslaved them.
Rome imposed trib
ute, which
it found it
could collect more
nearly intact as possible. after the destruction of the Senate

successors, Rome itself ceased
efficaciously if it left their civic life as After the Republic was succeeded by the Empire, and
and
the patriciate of Rome

proper sense
by
Caesar
and
his
in any
to
be
a political community.
All
power was concentrated within the
Imperial palace,
and
the Praetorian
guard.
Eventually,
between
was
the distinction between Rome and the
provinces, and
the distinction
citizens and noncitizens,
became
so attenuated, empire and
that Roman citizenship
extended
to
everyone. universal
The
that
Roman
in
its
own
self-under
standing was to be equally

and called.
became
is,
catholic
to be a
citizen of
Rome
a citizen of the world.
Of
course, to
be
a citizen of
was
the
world meant
not to
be
a citizen at all.
Citizenship
as such
divorced from ruling
being
As
or
ruled.
It
was
divorced in fact from

United States,
or
all political
citizens of the
or
we are not citizens of
identity, properly Great Britain,

we was
so-
or
Italy,
man
Israel,
China,
the U.S.S.R.
Citizenship
of otherness.
is
a matter, not of same
ness as
such, but
of sameness
in the light
(We are,
recall, hu
beings insofar
political
as we are not
as
beasts,
and not
God.) If Rome
above
the world,
then
life
heretofore
understood
all,
as
understood
in
Aristotle's Politics
tion, the
ceased
to exist. The Roman empire became
by
anticipa
secular antecedent of the
city
of
God: in
which also
there are no political
identities
recognizable as such, and no ruling and being ruled. Once Roman citizenship became universal citizenship, the separate gods of the separate cities, whose worship Rome had both permitted and protected, lost
their reason for being. If

one's
everyone was a
Roman,
then Roman
law
was
every
of their
law. The
separate gods of
the separate cities
had been the lawgivers
cities.
If there
was
theism
what
must be only one God. Some form of mono the Roman religion. The only question was become thus destined to
was
but
one
law there
form. We
observe
here only that
Christianity
was able
to combine the mon
otheism of
Judaism
with
the universality of Roman
citizenship.
26
Interpretation
of universal political empire sustained
The idea
by
universal
monotheistic
re
ligion certainly
gripped the
establishment of
Christianity
West for nearly a millenium. within the Roman empire,
From the
the
moment of
the
contest
tor
suprem
acy began between the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. With varying degrees of success, and in different ways, political nature reasserted itself. That is to say,
men were not content
to be citizens
of
the world,
without
recognition
of
their
greater attachments to their own ancestors, their own
families, their
political
own
clans,
their own soil, and their own ways of life. Men in their
an
existence seek
identity
that
they do
not share with everyone else.
Patriotism
reasserted
itself,
and as
it did
so the
Holy
Roman Empire became
ever more
feeble
and ever more
gradually faded. But the spiritual dominion of the One God did not. The City of God in any one of many mani festations endured. Since loyalty to God takes precedence by definition to any
contemptible.
The
spirit of universal empire
lesser loyalty,
cal.
loyalty
be
to one's separate
a
polity here
and now
became
problemati
of
It therefore became
nature might
question
reflected
necessity in the diversity

of
of political
theory, that the unity

a
human
of civil polities, without
calling into
the unity of the
City
God. It
also
became
as
ory, that men might conceive of themselves
necessity of political the perfectly loyal to the God who,

an equal
being One,
was common
to them all,
without
sharing
loyalty
to their
separate polities.
As
we
have
observed,
Christianity
had
established within
the
souls of men the idea of a
direct,
personal, trans-political
not
the
individual
and
his God. But this relationship did

the idea of a
relationship between determine what the laws laws. The
were to
be,
or the precise character of the obligation owed to those
idea
law
of the state of nature
non-political state governed
by
moral
corresponded to the
other
Christian
as
he
considered
society.
relationship himself Just

as
which
prior
every Christian had with every to and apart from his= membership
in
a particular civil
without moral of
being
a member of civil society, so
every Christian was under the moral law. every human being was under the entering
a particular civil societv
law
of the state of nature, prior to
by
way
the social contract. Hence Madison's assertion that, in entering civil societv, in making the social contract, a man does not indeed cannot surrender his
rights of conscience. moral
He is, both
and
as man and
Christian (or Jew), limited
by
the
law in
what
he may,
may
not, agree
Christianity
a
we might
say, when
it
was established
to, in making the social contract. in the Roman empire, con

so
tinued the political role of the gods in the ancient cities. In
doing, it
performed
function,
and
filled
a role, consistent with
its
genesis, as the successor to the

of
gods of the ancient city.
Yet however intelligible in the light
these originating
circumstances
and
"barbarism
superstition"
and nature.
however necessary it may have continued to be in ages of this function and role was essentially at odds with
the separation of church
and state, under
its intrinsic
the
Only by
the
aegis of
doctrine
of natural rights,
did it find
a role
fully
consistent with its avowed
mission of spiritual salvation.
In Aristotle's Politics No
consent
man
is
seen
as,
by
nature, a
au-
member of the political community.
is necessary to establish the
Equolit}', Liberty, Wisdom, Morality

thority
which
and
Consent
27
of
the city, or of its
laws,
since
those
laws
are given
by
gods.
Aristotle
himself
understands
the authority of the city in the light of man's perfection,
is the
perfection of a
being by
is
nature rational and political.
But the
pres
ence of priests
in his
polities,
evidence that
for the nonphilosopher, that
is.
for
the citizens,
divine
sanction will support
the authority of the laws. Divine

although
sanc
tion will support the
authority
of
the
laws,
the
intrinsic
ground of that
authority is its reasonableness. There must then be either immediate divine sanc tion for the laws, or a natural sanction translated from that form visible only to
philosophers, to one that
tics
is intelligible to
nonphilosophers.
Nowhere in the Poli
does Aristotle
confront the question of
how the
citizens will
be
persuaded
to
obey the
where
laws, if
there are no gods to whom those laws will be ascribed. No the question of how the authority of an unmediated the authority of the gods. The state of
nature and uni
does he
confront
versal nature will replace

social contract
the
supply
that mediation. Aristotle recognizes that particular polities
will require particular
institutions
that
they
will
be the
work of
legislators
act
ing
in
particular circumstances.
But if these legislators
can no
longer
crown their of their
work
by
appealing to the authority

must appeal
of particular gods as the
foundation
of
laws, they
directly
the
to nature.
They
must
have
some
ing
the authority of
a universal nature
into the
ground of particular
way laws. This, to
translat
repeat,
is exactly
what
doctrine
of the state of nature, as we so
have described it
of
above, accomplished.
Moreover, it did beast,

and
by defining
nature
itself in the light

so
the differences between man,
God. That is to
say,
it did
by
a
a natural
theology
consistent with monotheistic revealed theology.
emendation
in Aristotle's
own
teaching
required
Aristotle's principles, but

political
by
the transformation of
necessary any transformation in and of the human condition

not
It is then
by
life
in
which
those principles are
applied.
The idea
of
the
state of na
ture
modifies and yet preserves
the idea of
man as
by
nature a political animal.
Moreover the idea

association, lays
totle's
a
of
the state of nature,
by treating
shown,
civil
firmer foundation for the idea

as
of the rule of
society as a voluntary law than in Aris

of
Politics. It is guided,
desire."
we
have
by
is
Aristotle's idea
law
as
"reason unaffected
which
by
It
enshrines
the doctrine of popular sovereignty
in itself is
un-Aristotelian.
Contrary
to
what
often said,
however, it
en
shrines not
the people's will,
but
only their
rational will.
The people, in
unani
mously agreeing to form

ground and purpose of nature
a civil society,
may
enjoin
in the
social contract as
the
of
law only those things that
are consistent with the as
law
in the
state of nature.
They
may
enjoin
may be
the teed
willed
unanimously law
and rightfully.
only Hence the
Madison
said
what
rule of
law, resulting from

with
social
contract, contains guarantees against

as
despotism,
which are not guaran
by
the rule of
described
by
Aristotle. For Aristotle's polity
less than
would
10,000 citizens
had
natural checks against
tyranny
or
despotism,
that
have been
post-republican
absent from any political society formed in the Roman Empire. The anarchy and despotism accompanying both
politics
wake of the
theological and ideological
in the
post-classical era
has
shown
the
neces-
28 sity ory
of of
Interpretation
firmer foundations for the
the
state of nature
rule of
law than Aristotle

reason
as
anticipated.
The the
obli
whose
law is
the
ground of political
gation, emancipates church and state to pursue their
proper goals
in
a manner
both complementary
rable, as the
grounded
and
harmonious. Those
and
goals are as
distinct,
and yet insepa
concavity
the convexity
of
of a curved
which
line. For they
are
both
in that
ultimate
unity
of
human life
is itself
grounded
in the
equality
of man and the
unity
God.
Socratic Rhetoric
and
Socratic Wisdom
in Plato's Phaedrus
John C. Koritansky
Hiram College
In his
much
discussed
"Introduction"
to his edition of Leo

raises the
Strauss'
Studies in
"To
Platonic Political Philosophy, Thomas Pangle

what extent
turn?"'
was
the core of
Socratic philosophizing
Socrates'
affected
following by
question:
the
Socratic
The
question refers
to
orientation towards concern with
human
and
and espe
cially political matters. Is ings a concession dictated
Socrates'
human themes
human be
by the necessity of preserving conventional life and from the danger philosophy they pose to each other, and so is it essentially a cast ing of philosophy into a new rhetorical posture; or alternatively, does
Socrates'
political
philosophizing indicate his he

cannot
discovery
that
human
being
is
the center or
the
key
to the structure of the whole? It is certainly understandable that Pangle
should confess that
supply
an answer to
this difficult question, nor can

Strauss'
he
show
there to be a succinct and final answer in

offers as
Platonic
writings.
What Pangle
swers
.
"some heuristic
reflections and
tentative beginnings of an
not
"Ms
plausible as
far
as
it goes, but he is surely Pangle
being
facetious in
to be said to un
underscoring its
that may
require
provisional character and,
therefore, that there is

ventures
more
recasting derstand (in Xenophon's Oeconomicus) that however tentative
the whole issue.
Socrates
or
came
hypothetical
philosophy might argue or wish itself to be, it could not escape a sort of dogma tism in its very rejection of the authority of transrational revelation. Philosophy
must, at
not
least,
presume that the

possible
life independent
of
any
particular revelation
is
a
only seriously
but best. Must this
presumption not
degenerate into
thin and querulous sort of faith? Pangle

philosopher ceases to
suggests
that: "The choice to
live
as a
be simply
an act of
faith
or will
if
and
only if it is
a choice
to
live
as a philosopher preoccupied with the
serious examination of
the phenom
ena and the arguments of
faith: if
and
only if, that is, the

scrutiny
claims of
philosopher never com
pletely
ceases
engaging in
and
conversational
of those who articulate most
authoritatively
of others
compellingly the
the
faithful,
and
if
and
only if
through that perscrutation that he
has,
not a
he repeatedly shows to his own satisfaction and to that definitive, but a fuller account of the moral experi
experiences."'
ences to which the pious point as their most significant
The
prob
lem
with
this statement, though, is that, at least in

a serious examination of
Plato,
we never see
Socrates
engaging in
I.
the
arguments of
faith, if serious by
means
free
"Introduction"
Strauss. Leo, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy. (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 17.
2.
Thomas Pangle
Ibid., Ibid.,
p.
18.
3.
p. 22.
30
Interpretation
The Euthyphro is the dialogue in
more
which
of rhetorical ploy.
Socrates
confronts a
self-professed ample
piety
directly
life
than in any other dialogue,
and yet
in this
to the
ex
su
it is
hardly
the case that Euthyphro presents a

such
serious challenge
premacy
of philosophical
that Socrates has to deal
with
it forthrightly. from
some
Here,
as
elsewhere, Socrates performs
ironically, hiding his
wisdom
one not given
to understanding it for himself. Where Socrates is being ironic, how does the gold with which his interlocutor may be satisfied though,
fools'
save
Socrates from the he talks
accusation
that
his
own wisdom or rhetorical
Nor is it the
when
case that with
Socrates is ironic
may be a smug conceit? in a pejorative sense only

are
disagreeable
characters or when
his dialogues
involun im
tary, to cite a distinction among the dialogues that Strauss considered a great
portance.
outstanding example of a dialogue that is highly perfectly voluntary. Socrates talks down to Phae drus and hides himself from him even though there is surely a genuine affection that passes between them. Whether with friends or opponents, Socrates is always The Phaedrus is
an
ironic
and rhetorical although
ironical. What
acter
gives
is just that Socrates
Plato's writing its permanently enigmatic, wonderful char never drops his veil entirely; he never abandons the rhe
torical posture that mediates the disjunction
between himself fact

we
and the nonphi
losophers
with
whom
he
speaks.
And in
view of this
may
restate the
question about
Socrates that Pangle

rhetoric and
raises as wisdom.
the question of the relationship be
tween
Socratic
Socratic
Anything
derstood
we come
to understand about Socratic rhetoric will have to be un

Socrates'
against the
backdrop
of
scathing
critique of rhetoric as
taught
by
the sophists
which
art"4
he develops in the Gorgias. There

because it is merely
of
rhetoric
is
said
by
Socrates to be "no
unaccompanied
a set of techniques of manipulation are effective on an
by
an
understanding
nature, or,
why these techniques
auditor of a particular
relatedly, whether
they
are or are not good
for
that nature. Rhetoric

of
is, then,
a slavish
tool; it
suits
Thrasymachus,
whose view
statesmanship is revealed in the Republic to be a knack for soothing and strok ing the great beast to which he is bound. For such bogus art to be desired and
must
honored, it
be
fail to be it is
understood
in its
own
true character.
Instead,
the
clev
erness that goes with

confused
with
valued
for itself; in the

sets
extreme case this cleverness can

and
a wisdom that
one
free
its
possession
thought the
greatest of all goods.
Socrates knows that this confusion
of wisdom and sophisti
cal cleverness presumes an omnicompetence of
speech, and so. especially in the
dialogues
where
Socrates is
to
on
the attack (or counterattack) like Gorgias or

opponent of that presumption
Protagoras, he
proceeds
disabuse his
ing
home the
relevance of
brute fact.
by bring
If, however,
gage
the Gorgias gives the
impression
said
that
a wise man will never en
in rhetoric, the Phaedrus may be it. Phaedrus is brought not to contemn

4.
to present
a qualified rehabilitation of
rhetoric
but
to appreciate
it in
a new way.
(lorxius,
462b.
Socratic Rhetoric
a
and
Socratic Wisdom in Plato's Phaedrus
31
way that involves a nod towards philosophy as a sort of culmination of the rhe torical art. On close inspection, though, it is highly problematical whether the
rhetoric
Socrates defends
and engages
in self-consciously in the Phaedrus

Socrates'
con
tains
any lessons or even intimations for teachers Socrates himself. On the contrary, it appears that he
says of
and practitioners other than
rhetoric
is like
what
his prophecy that it is just good enough for his own the Phaedrus we probably do not learn anything of use to our
rhetoric,
purposes.
From
own practice of
nothing that compares with Aristotle's great text for instance, but we learn what it is about Socrates that causes him to speak rhetorically. may A distinctive feature of the rhetoric of the Phaedrus that indicates its essen
tially Socratic
anything hearer in
character
is that it
will
prides
itself for
being
oral and, so, superior to
written.
Socrates
deprecate
written speeches
by
comparing them to
soul of an actual
the spoken word as
breathing,"
"living
and
inscribed
an
on
the
a particular context.
Socrates'
Can there be in
independent
art of rhetoric that
could survive
deprecation
own except
of writing,
though? It is
hard to imagine
rhetoric
coming into its

of
connection with speeches
being
written
down,
He
to stand as monuments to the speech writer's craft. To be sure,
Socrates'
deprecation
says
writing is
not
intended be
by him
to be
thoroughly destructive
of
it.
that writing
speeches can
permitted
merely imitates the though,
spoken word and remains
writing is informed that it inferior to it. We have to wonder,

such
if
whether this somewhat
niggardly
concession to
writing is
adequate
to the
development
An
even
of a genuine art of rhetoric. more
fundamental
versus
question,
moreover,
is
whether
what
Socrates
rheto
says about
writing
speaking is
sound.
Can it
Socrates'
explain
ric
is
oral?
Indeed, does Socrates really

of
understand this whole
why issue
after all?
In
the
background
the writing theme, of course, is the
tion of the relationship between
Socrates
and
baffling but tempting Plato himself; and I will try to by

offering
a statement on
ques
bring
the thoughts in this paper to their conclusion
just this
issue. What
of
sort of attraction can
Phaedrus hold for Socrates? The impression

name
we get
we get
him from the dialogue that bears his

where
is
consistent with
the one
from the Symposium,

acter's.
he
also appears
in
a role
just
short of a major char

contest
There he is the love. His
one who recommends and
initiates the
among
speeches on
own contribution,
though, is
somewhat weak
and, more
over, fails his purpose since he ends up

which was commanded
by
praising the
self-sacrifice of
Achilles,
by
his
sense of
honor,
as greater than
the self-sacrifice of
Patroclus.
cannot
which was animated acknowledge
by
his love for Achilles. We learn that Phaedrus
finally
On the
the supreme value or power of love. He is too sober

not make
for that. This,

things.
ored of
of course,
does
him brutish
or
insensitive to beautiful he is especially enam dispassionate urbanity.
contrary,
his tastes
are elevated and urbane;
brilliant speech. His very name suggests a sort of brightness that goes along with the kindredness between him and the intellectuals and helps explain their fondness for him. He is
a person of cheerful,
Phaedrus is
32
a
Interpretation
not a
fellow traveler among the sophists but s well disposed towards Socrates.
In his
own
highly
combative one
and
he
is
dialogue, Phaedrus brings

reads
a written speech which, after some

obvious consonance
ful
coaxing,
he
to Socrates. There is an
and this speech and
significant and
play between the feature

of
character of
Phaedrus
the more
we reflect on this
the dialogue the more
amazing it
appears.
We may
note
that if
Socrates had
could
wished so.
to cross-examine the actual author of the speech,
Lysias. he
on.
have done
Lysias is
still
in Athens
while
the
conversation
is going
In its
a way,
though, Phaedrus
reflects read
the charm of that speech even more than docs
author and
for Phaedrus to
it
rather
than Lysias himself is consistent with
its
peculiar,
brilliantly
to
paradoxical thesis. a youth
That thesis,
is
which we
learn
well
be
a
fore the
speech
itself is read, is that

a
well advised
to yield
his favors to
nonlover rather than and so about
lover! Phaedrus
much
presents
this
said
as
delightful bafflement;
thesis
it is. Obviously, there is

sense and
that can be
in
support of such a
the good
discretion
of a nonlover and so
on,
but the bafflement is
in trying to understand the posture of one who advances the position. What is his aim? If he does not love, what does he care for its favors; if he loves, how can he
hope to
win
by
the unfavorable comparison? Must we necessarily attribute to one
who makes such a speech a
lack
of candor
then,
as
Socrates
appears to
do
subse
quently
on
when
he
advances
the same thesis? There is something close to a paradox
this score too, though.
Can
one
hope to
win
love's favors
on
the basis of
an
indefinitely
successful masquerade as a nonlover?
Clearly,
even to
say this
much
is already to have been caught in a foolish attempt to explain a punch line. Phaedrus understands, and we do too, that the bafflement produced by the speech
is itself its brate his We
virtue and charm.

cleverness.6
The only
aim of the author of this speech
is to
cele
own
Lysias'
can see too that the clever paradox of

writer's craft.
thesis
is
the speech other,
When
one writes a speech
that is to
a sort of parody of be delivered by an

speech abstracts
he necessarily
all
performs an effacement of
himself. The
from
this
whatever motivates
its
author:
fame,
on
money, or whatever. In
address an
some sense
holds true for
forms
of
writing where, to
impersonal
speech
audience,
a
the author assumes an
impersonality
in that it
his
own part.
Lysias'
is in
play
ful way
paradox
self-referential
makes
ment characteristic of speech writers.
indirectly, to the self-efface As for Phaedrus, his involvement in the

reference,
is
shown
by
his coy
pretense that
he
will recite the speech onlv
because
Cf. R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979). p. I v Rosen's paper, "The Non-lover in Plato's 'Phaedrus is kind of redemption ol Phaedrus and a persuasive accounl of what attractions he might have for Socrates; Man and World. Vol. 2, No. 3, August 1969, esp. pp. 426 and 429.
5.
Stanley
',"
"a
writing But Ronna Burner. Plato's "Phaedrus fense of a Philosophical Art o/VVwwk (University of Alabama PressfigSo) esp pp
think that Phaedrus is
at all aware of
Lysias'
speech is unintelligible as a personal statement wherehv to persuade someone to accept the explicit thesis. The purpose of the speech can only be to exhibit the brilliance of the speaker's wit. Reasonably, she connects this with the question of the self-monumentalization of speech through the impersonal medium of does
6.
Ronna Burger
Lysias'
observes
that
the speaker is
trying
Burger
/)<
irony'.'
cf.
"
note I
Socratic Rhetoric
Socrates tells him to Phaedrus
wants
and

memory.
33
reveals
and
from imperfect
speech
In fact, Socrates he has

no need
that
very memory since he has a copy of the speech hidden in his cloak. The reason for this is that, like anyone who performs a speech written for him, Phaedrus would like
the speech to appear as
ticular case,
to recite the
much and
to trust his
his
own and not

not
simply
parrot
the author. In this par
however, it is
the thesis of the speech Phaedrus would own
but
rather
the speech itself
its clever,
baffling
it
brilliance. In
order
to own the
speech
in this sense, Phaedrus tries to

to make up
make
appear
that he relies on
his
own
"knowledge"
for
whatever might
have been the imperfection
of
his
memory.
Socrates,
of
course,
sees
through all this and makes Phaedrus pay the price for
remains
trying
out of
to be coy.
Nevertheless, Socrates
Phaedrus
perform out
intrigued
and charmed;
the
prospect of
hearing
Lysias'
speech
is
enough
to draw Socrates
his
usual
haunts in the city, As the

Lysias'
into the
countryside where
he
and
his
a
friend
can relax undisturbed.
companions are
walking about,
looking
for
place to sit and examine
speech, Socrates says something that goes a

Phaedrus'
explaining why the whole environment is strange to him and question he finds it so hospitable at this moment. In response to why whether he puts much stock in the old myths about gods and woodland nymphs
long
way towards
and
that sort of thing, Socrates says that he has not time for the business of ex
such stories.
plaining away
pursue
Instead he
must
follow the inscription

himself.7
at
Delphi
and
the more urgent business of seeking to know

refers
Then, by way
himself
of
illustration, he
a
to a myth himself. Must Socrates
understand
as
monster,
complex and
whom
furious like the fabled Typho;
or
is he
of a gentler, sim
pler
sort, to
the gods grant a quieter life? ".

xai
[idXkov
e'ire ti
{hjpi-ov
xvyxavw
Tucpcovog
xai
(230a).8
JtoûjiA-oxcbterjov
juTdi3u,u.evov,
e(Te tjucocoxeoov re cpmei

reference
CutXoijaxeQov
t,tpov, ffeiaq
xtvog
xai
ftrucpou uoioag
Socrates'
Amidst
their placid,
idyllic
surroundings,
to the
Socrates'
monster
self-examination not presume
Typho is especially startling. It causes us to reflect: to discover whether he is like Typho or just
some
does
not
what
he is like
within
degree
of
detachment from the may be
passions
warring
him? Granted
even
this
presumption
questioned; still
for the
practical
purpose of self-examination
it
seems necessary.
Now Phaedrus
which
represents
just
that
detachment,
that claim to some freedom from egiog.
Socrates
cannot
help but
at
presume even
for his
own purpose of
home in the city,
where champions of
examining it. Although Socrates is this opinion or that engage in their con
out of
tinual contest to
7.
persuade
him, he
can
be drawn
the city
by being drawn
to
Socrates does
not
envy those
who spend their energies
explaining
such myths away,
but he is
very
much
interested in
accept
phenomenon of mythical what truth may be reflected mythically and in the
reflection
itself. I
Jacob Klein's
explanation at
this general point, which
he
gives
on
in
connection
with a reference
to this very
of
passage of
the Phaedrus. Jacob
Klein, A Commentary
Plato's Meno
1701. North Carolina Press. 1965). pp. whether in Greek or in translation, I 8. Where I have quoted the text of the dialogue directly, transl. Harold North Fowler, ed. W. R. M. have relied on the Loeb edition. Phaedrus is in Vol. I, i960). (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, London: Heinemann,
(Chapel Hill:
University
Lamb
34
Interpretation from the

passions
a sort of refuge
that vie to rule and

charm
shape
his very
out of
soul.
In his
so
innocent way, Phaedrus holds the

to speak.
for drawing
Socrates
himself,
The
atmosphere of
the whole
conversation
between Socrates
and
Phaedrus is
to mythi
charged with a supernatural, magical quality.

cal
There is
much reference
figures
and powers.
Any
complete account of
the dialogue
would
have to be
extended to treat all of the references to the various sources of
certainly inspira
to talk.
tion that seem to

most
inhabit this
one
enchanted place; of all of these,
though, surely the

settle
a
outstanding The word for "shade
is the
tree"
shade
tree where Socrates
and
Phaedrus
homonym for in Greek is Jikaravog, practically Plato! This fact has invited many speculations as to its meaning and I mean to submit one of my own. With what is almost a mention of his own name as a
power that graces and shades this eration as
conversation, Plato invites
his
readers'
consid
to how it relates to himself and his own art. Plato too is a "speech
a certain sense.
writer"
in
Moreover, by way
original
will provide
of
Plato's art,
Socrates'
speeches
and
will
be
withdrawn speech of
from their
context,
as
Phaedrus
Socrates
with
draw the
amined
Lysias. Plato
for
Socrates'
speeches too to
be
ex
in
a place of cool
not quite.
leisure. So Plato
scene of
almost on
breaks the
strange,
spell of
the dia
logue; but
what
Instead the
it takes
its
fairy
tale quality.
put that
Plato has the
characters sense that the senses without quite
setting is
not quite real.
It may be
Socrates
realizing it is the
process of
being
trans
formed into Plato's dramatis

With
rates regard
persona. speech of
to
its content, the
Lysias that Phaedrus
reads to
Soc
a
is
straightforward and quite sensible.
One
should yield one's
favors to
nonlover rather
than to a lover because love takes one out of one's head. A lover to recognize or to pursue his own advantage or his beloved's
submit that we ought not
is
not able either and
sensibly
discretely. I
of
be
so scandalized
by
the al
most raw
frankness
this thesis that
we not consider whether
it
might not ulti elabo
mately be the
which
recommendation of wisdom.
I beleive that
Socrates'
when
rate response to the thesis
is
considered
in toto,
we sec that there

Lysias'
is
a sense
in
he
agrees with
it. Viewed
without
blinking,
position is undoubt
edly prosaic but not necessarily vulgar is cerebral rather than visceral. Lysias
animal mends sions
or swinish.
Surely
its
appeal
to Phaedrus
preserved a
human detachment from the

He
recom
desires he
admits
by
means of
his ironic
our
and sophisticated wit.
yielding accompany them. To yield to desire on these terms is not really yield ing; it is rather a kind of self-mastery, expressed in irony. So, advice to
that
Lysias'
to everyone that we give
play to
desires
without
to the illu
the youth to yield to the one who

youth more
does not love him is a sort of invitation that the join the free community of those who can master their hearts and enjoy due.9 purely intellectual charms, while conceding to desire only its
commentators share
9-
Most
Hackforth's
This
reaction of contempt and outpace at
Lvsias'
speech
fuel the debate about whether Plato ,s reiterating an actual speech of t vsias; or whether he is up. Thus Taylor making argues that, "I, would be sclf-stultifving to publish a se vere cnticism of a welt-known author based on an imitation of him which the critic hau comp sed or
reaction appears
to
Socratic Rhetoric
and

is
a problem and what
35
Naturally, though,
to moralizing.
there
it
can
be identified
without recourse
Does Lysias know

all that
duces love to desire

cannot
is
real
he is talking about? His speech almost re in love is desire. On the other hand, Lysias
since
simply
equate
love
with
desire
he
wants
to argue that the youth

an
should submit effects are
to one
who
desires but does

Lysias'
not
love. If love is
illusion,
for. The
still
its
real, and evil.

of that
speech cuts and
through the illusion of
love but it
speech
leaves the fact
illusion
its
specific nature unaccounted
fails, then, precisely because it does not or anywhere. Subsequently, Socrates is

of
set
forth
what
love is, very
either at
the outset
careful to give a
explicit
definition
love
at the
of
superiority Socrates is
Lysias'
starting point of his his own efforts.

either reluctant or
speech and
he identifies this
as the cause of the
he
pretends to
be
reluctant
to make any rejoinder

speak. unless
to
speech.
so
He
appears to
Phaedrus does
by threatening
of
never again and
bait Phaedrus into compelling him to to read a speech to Socrates he

enforces
he
makes
speech
his
own
his threat
Socrates'
with
an
oath,
"by
as
It is only
we readers, of
whose
course, who really
understand
this oath
identifying Having no
make
the
divinity by
now
power we with
have
speeches
to
read. will
choice
but to comply
Phaedrus'
demand, Socrates
the attempt.
Still,
the task is not only difficult but
somehow shameful.
If he
is to
speak at
all, it has to be from behind a veil, as if direct eye-contact between

would reduce
himself
and
Phaedrus
Socrates to
silence.
There is doubtless
part of
some
thing
of
flirtation
about
Socrates veiling his face for the first

the
his
speech,
given the
lighthearted,
a
playful atmosphere of
whole scene.
At the
same
time,
though, it is
who
little
eerie.
While the
veil
is in
place, we are not quite so sure

not
just
is speaking
or where the voice
god or muse whose voice
is coming from. Might it Phaedrus hears?

speech
really be
some
one
Not only does Socrates deliver his but himself for its content, but he
we
from behind
a
a veil, and
also
invents
dramatis
persona
blame any to speak it

persona
for him. Thus,

and author.
have
drama
within a
drama,
with
Socrates
of a
as
both
The
persona
that Socrates invents is a

persuaded
lover
beautiful
youth who,
in
order
to
prosecute
his love, had
the youth that
he did
not
love him
defini
which
and
then cites the

an
advantages of a nonlover.
He begins from
the
an explicit opinion
tion. Love is
irrational desire that
overcomes
acquired
prompts us to act rightly.
Specifically,
He
will
lover
will
always
try
of
to
make
his be
and
real
loved
weaker
than himself.
deprive his beloved
advantage,
most
especially
of philosophy.
suffer
every virtue Moreover, besides these very

embarrassments, such
harms,
his
is
the beloved must also
distasteful
as
the
"
own purposes
Hacklorth,
imitation to
on the other a slavish
hand
cannot
believe that Plato
could
have
subordi
nated
his
own powers of
borrowing
from
someone else s pen.
Hackforth 's
point
reasonable, and
Taylor's
man.
argument
stupid and venal
straw
peak of sobriety that marks
sity Press. 1979), p. 301; Rosen, op. cit..
philosophy according 18; A. E. Taylor, Plato: the Man

p. 42(1.
is less compelling if we reject the judgment of the speech as a says it well that the prosaic sobriety of the speech prefigures the Rosen (Cambridge Univer to Plato. Plato's
"Phaedrus"
and His Work
(New
York: Meridian, i960),
p.
36
wildly
when
Interpretation
exaggerated praises
together
with reproaches
from his lover, bad

when
enough
the lover
is
sober
but
still worse when
he is drunk. Then,
before. It
object.
he has been
his former ruined, the beloved eventually finds that love has cooled, and
lover is
disloyal because
and resentful of the promises what
he
made
always
has the
same end
love really
wants
is to devour its
The
speech
then concludes
with an epigram so
of the whole
sharp dialogue.
and clear that
its ring
echoes
throughout the remainder
"As the
wolf
loves the lamb,
so the
lover loves his
love."
cbg Tcuxot,
ccqv
hycmchc,, &q
JtouSa cpiAouaiv
koaoxa (24id).
Might that
At the
getaway.
not
be the truth? his first speech, Socrates is has been

anxious to make a
not
conclusion of
hasty
his
Phaedrus,
of course, entreats
over what
Socrates to stay, if
said.
to complete
speech then at request
least to talk
Socrates
yields
to
Phaedrus'
because his daimonion,
which always
holds him back from from
doing
some
was
thing
that he ought not
do, in
this case prevents him
retreating.
As he
speaking he had been somehow aware that what he was saying was wrong but he had kept on going as if carried through by momentum. Now, though, he can see just he
he
what
it
was that
had threatened to
is,10
Socrates'
unnerve
him. Does Phaedrus
not see that
if
Love is
said?
god, as he certainly
wonder
No
Socrates is guilty of blasphemy for what divine sign spoke; it wished to warn him against
then
what with
the sin of blasphemy. Now Socrates feels compelled to recant every iota of
said.
If he
as
were not
to
do this, Socrates fears Love

were punished
would punish
him
blindness
quel, in
ment
Homer
and
Stesichorus
love."
before. We learn in the

is the
se
Socrates'
recantation, why the

of
loss
of sight
appropriate punish
for the
blasphemy
When Socrates
through a
persona.
resumes
his formal speech, he

so
retains
the device of speaking
He drops the veil, though, here the

sense
that his
persona
is
now
his
own
we
bald face. If
can
we recall
in
which
Socrates is
imitating Plato,
Socrates'
draw
a rather refined comparison.
The difference between
veiled nar
speech and
the unveiled one is very much

performed
like the difference between Plato's
rated and
his
persona, almost always
dialogues. That is, in all his dialogues Plato adopts a Socrates, however in only some of them, the performed
with
ones, does he let it seem that he identifies
his
own
persona, as Socrates does
in his
10.
second speech.
Moreover,
be
a god
we can attribute
the same reason
for
this differthe
That love is
and the
said to
in the Phaedrus
is so
marks an
as
important difference between

opposite
Phaedrus
Symposium,
where
Socrates
bold
to say the
Can this difference be

and tenta
explained with reference to the context and apparent purpose of the two
dialogues? Briefly
tively, in the Symposium Socrates

cause
poeticizes philosophy
infinite
longing
for
an object set
beyond
even
making it appear to be the reach of imagination. So the

more relaxed
eros as a
by
an exquisite
be
sta
subordinate
tus of eros is stressed. In
Phaedrus, philosophy is
of
arduous and elevated

who graces
but
not
tragic. It finds satisfaction. Here emerges a philosophic
divinity
life. We have. final

view.
though,
n.
no reason
to think that either
these two
different
representations
is Plato's
more
Cf.
p. 40
below.
Socratic Rhetoric
ence
and

the Republic
37
to Plato
and
Socrates. In
style
Socrates is
says that poets ought to as represented are the ac a
sume a
directly
imitative
only
when what
being
tions or speeches of a good man
acting freely. When it is
bad
man who
acts,
or when a good one acts under some evil compulsion should
(e.g., love), his
actions
them.12
only be narrated so as not to tempt the hearer or reader to imitate Does Socrates not say that the sentiments of the first part of his speech
proper ones'?
are not
Is that first persona,
who masks
his true feelings him from in
of
love,
not
from
tion?
an evil compulsion
in
way that prevents
being
a
Clearly
the thought that controls this question moves

Lysias'
worthy direction
of
acting imita
of seri
ousness
beyond the
playful self-effacement of
Socrates'
speech.
Strictly
definition
speaking,
second speech proceeds

one so
from the
same
beginning
as
his first
that it may be
said
to be
a second part or even a con
tinuation of a single speech. Love is a sort of madness, but this would amount to
a sufficient condemnation are
only if
an
all madness were evil.
In truth, though, there

the etymological con
and
forms
of madness that come as a gift of the gods and through which good
things come.
nection uavta
Prophecy
is
example, as is suggested
words
Socrates'
by
that Socrates alleges between the very
pavrixt) (prophecy)
that
(madness). As for
love,
second speech will show
it, too, is
one of the good
forms
of madness, good
for both lover
and
beloved.
The first step in the demonstration that love is a good sort of madness is a proof of the soul's immortality. That proof practically consists in the definition
of
the soul as the
principle of self-motion
from
which all
derived
motions are
de
rived.
The
argument not
that there
made
must
be
such a
first
principle of motion
to explain
motion would
is be
itself
explicit, perhaps for the reason that any denial of it

made explicit
motion
quibbling.
What is
is that,
as a
first
principle
the soul's
motion cannot
be brought into
tion cease lest all that derives

a
motion
by anything still prior; nor could its mo from it also cease and the universe grind to
may think of the validity of this argument, what is perhaps especially noteworthy is that it operates wholly on the level of abstract principle. We understand it without any recourse to imagination. By contrast, in what im
halt. Whatever
we
mediately follows and throughout the remainder of the speech, imagination be relied on very heavily and In the next place, Socrates would like to describe the form (Ideccg) of the
self-consciously.13
will
soul
12.
13.
Republic III, 396c, e. The

real question
is
not whether the argument presented
here is intended to
establish the
im
mortality
of the
individual
soul against
the
most
searching inquiry.
Nearly
all commentators share the
opinion that
it
cannot succeed at
that.
The
question and
dialogues,
given
e.g..
Laws, Republic. Phaedo,

underscores
is why should different proofs appear in different Phaedrus! I suggest that the form of the argument
of
in the Phaedrus
true,
the necessity
the recourse to imagination when we move
from
the
pated
knowably in by an
cosmic principle of motion
to any speculation about how that principle is partici

with
individual
soul.
Thomas Gould notes,

of
disappointment,
tends to
that this proof, which as the need to refer to
serts the self-sufficiency and
primacy
the
principle of motion,
obviate
cause of motion, a la the Symposium. So it does. Thomas Gould, Pla any i:oioc tor the good as the Press of Glencoe. 1963), p. 120. free York: tonic Love (New
38
but that image
Interpretation
would require a
very
long
and
divine
speech.
We can, however,
horses
cast an
eer.
of the soul by saying that it is like This image may hold for both gods and men but whereas the souls of the gods operate in smooth harmony, in men's souls one of the horses is unruly and a team of winged
and a chariot
his
management
takes much effort. If the
image Socrates
else
conjures
is tempting,
with
what
probably
makes
it
so more than
anything
is
our own
familiarity
our own
constantly necessary
of or mortal? soulless. mortal
efforts of self-control.
What, though,
beings immortal
the embodiment of the soul and in what sense are
besouled
charge of
In the
general sense of enters
the term, soul that besouled
has
everything that is
mortal
When it
body,
body is, then,
living
be reasonably
of
supposed
being. Now Socrates becomes very insistent; it cannot that any besouled body is immortal, for the combination being. If
and we think
body
to to
with soul
is
mortal
otherwise, it is because when we
try
imagine soul, it. In
by
itself
immortal,
we cannot
help
but
attribute a sort of
body
our notion of an
immortal
god.
for
example, we attribute
body
to
that which, as
ourselves at charioteer
be disembodied. It is scarcely necessary to remind immortal, this point that the image of the soul as a pair of winged horses and a
must an
is
instance
of the error we commit when we
try
to
imagine just
soul.
Phaedrus,
As
surely, is
aware of this.
Still, does he
speech
understand
fully
what are
the consequent defects of this error in the

we
that follows?
hear him
Socrates'
description
of
how the
of
soul comes to mix with

splendor that
body
follow
we
soar with of
on an
imaginary journey
incredible
traces the orb

we
as
heaven. Zeus
and the other gods
lead the flight
around
heaven;
well as we
can, struggling all the while to manage our evil-natured horse. At the the orbit we stop for a while. The gods actually take a step be
a region
very
yond
summit of
heaven, into
real
that no poet has ever
described
and wherein reside the
eternally
give
ideas. When those divine
charioteers
their horses nourishment of nectar and ambrosia, so that
have beheld the ideas, they in effect the wings

vision of
of the soul
itself
those
are nourished of us weaker
by
means of
the
intellectual
the ideas.
catch
Naturally,
less in
of
souls, whose teams are harder to manage,
the
wing-nourishing
in life that
sight of the
ideas
and moreover as we press together
confusion and competition our wings are corresponds
damaged. We then fall
to earth, to
we
assume a station
when still aloft.
to the measure of reality that
beheld
The is
vision that
Socrates has drawn is breathtaking. We

as we are ourselves.
expect
that Phaedrus
swept
up in it
The language is
so
graphic that one wishes
for the talent
of a painter and we
richly detailed and can hardly help but to When

we ac a
depict the
scene
for
ourselves on the canvas
before
our mind's eye.
tually try
render
to perform that picturing carefully though, there is
difficulty in how
to
the
ideas. On reflection,
we see
that that
difficulty
and
is insuperable. How
could we picture
"absolute justice
and
temperance
knowledge?"
Socrates,
are
moreover,
has insisted that these ideas have

"visible"
no shape or color, that

as
they
in
tangible and
only to the mind. Just
when we
imagine
the soul, we
Socratic Rhetoric
and
39
Perhaps
imagine the ideas only at the cost of a distortion of their true manner of being. nowhere in Plato's writing is the invisibility and unimaginability of the ideas made so forcefully and so frustratingly clear as a limitation upon our ability
to understand the structure of the whole.
When
a mortal
dies, if its
the
soul
has
not grown new wings,
the earth to a place of punishment or to some part of

manner
it may go beneath the heavens to live "in a
worthy
of
life they led in human
form"
(249b).
Every
thousand years
types de up pending on how well they lived their former lives. Some may even descend into forms of beasts but only after the first incarnation. No less than ten thousand these souls are reincarnated;
they may
move
or
down the
rank of
years, or ten
rejoin
incarnations,
must elapse
before the
soul can grow new wings and
the
those who are

(jcooXuk wings
divine throng. The only exceptions are the genuine philosophers and lovers of youth along with philosophy, "tou cpiXoaocprjaauToq
JtaibeQaoTTJoauToc;
ucxa
f|
cpfAoaocpiac"
(249a). These may
grow
their
in three thousand
years.14
The
philosophers and the philosophical
lovers are, then, the
most
human
of
human beings.
For
a
human
being
must understand a general conception
formed
and
by
unity
by
means of reason
the many perceptions of the senses;
this
collecting into a is a recollection

and,
of those things which our soul once

vision above
beheld,
when
it journeyed
with
God
lifting
its
the things
which we now
say exist,
it is just that the
mind of
the
philosopher
up into real being. And therefore only has wings, for he is always, so far as he
rose
is
able,
in
communion
through memory
with
those things the communion
with which
causes
rightly is always be ing initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect; but since he separates himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is
God
to
be divine. Now
a man who employs such memories
rebuked
by
the vulgar,
who consider
him
and
do
not
know that he is inspired (249c, d)
recognize in this quotation the every contemporary reader of Plato will dialogues in the Meno, Phaedo, and present also is which avapviiotg thesis,
Nearly
"rj"
14.
DeVnes
says
that the word

with
"rj"
in the
phrase quoted
here
means
"in
other
i.e.,
is
that
the lover
of youth
along
the
philosophy
are other words
for the
philosopher.
But
as
that
so?
In the
or
preceding
warlike
paragraph
clearly
means
something like "or,

and so
in "lawful
or
king
lover
business."
or "politician or man of
loving."
in the first
this,
case, "philosopher
when
of
beauty
fate
lover
or someone musical and
Immediately following
he
what seems
as equivocal
Socrates
reflects on
the
of those who of youth
belong
to the first rank of human types, the
uses
the formulation "philosopher or
in along with identical things but willing to treat them

we ought
same
vein.
i.e.. admitting
The
that these are not
for
present purposes.
question
is
whether modera
to take
tion and graced
literally by the philosophical
the
teaching
of the myth that
love for beautiful

how the highest
youth, ennobled
argues
by
muse,
is
philosophy.
Herman Sinaiko
the affirmative,
and the
for
he
says
that the Phaedrus both
asserts and exemplifies
sort of
love
highest
as philosophy. To me it seems that discourse, i.e., dialectics, are identical with one another myth. indulged by of overestimation idolatrous beauty this conclusion involves just the (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1969). pp. 144-5DeVries Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato Plato (Chicago: University ot Chicago Press. Herman Sinaiko, Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in
sort of
Socrates'
1965). ch. 2.
40
Interpretation
in
Philebus. What is especially noteworthy though, is that only here
the
Phae
drus
but
are we told not
also that our
only that knowledge is
learning
a
is
a repossession of what we
knew before
memory
of what we
beheld in
our minds
beyond
heaven. The
ory.
philosopher is said
to remain the realm of the ideas through mem
This is,
as
Jacob Klein
says, to elevate
memory to
a mythical status and
significance
which
Socrates does "somewhat
apologetically."15
Do
we
under
stand
why memory is
paid this special tribute at this point?
The
general problem
is this. how
Memory
appears
to involve an
imagining
of what
is remembered, but
can there
be
shapeless and visible
memory image of the ideas when they are colorless and in no way but by vovg? The potential for this difficulty lies
in the very idea

we
avoid.
of an
idea
as an
"invisible
take sight to be the image of
look"; and it is unavoidable so long intellection, which image is itself very hard
on this problem.
as
to
The Phaedrus
is drawn to the
will cast no
further light
does have
of
an
very amazing ability to do the impossible
one
special
idea: beauty,
which, although an
Instead, our attention invisible, still

image
and present to vision an
itself!
But beauty,
as
said
before,
shone
in brilliance among these
visions; and since we

clearest of our senses,
came to earth we
though wisdom
have found it shining most clearly through the is not seen by it, (250d)
This earthly
representation of
beauty
is
not
like
a particular
instance
of. say,
jus
tice whereby we are put in
mind of an
invisible idea. When itself

visible.
we see we
something
see
beautiful, it is
catch
as
if the invisible
makes
Somehow,
do
it;
we
its image. When
we recognize
on our memory.
formed its amazing power So the mythical

consequence of an
beauty, it naturally seems that it has per to image itself upon us before, i.e., it has left its mark
enhancement of of as
the natural
of
idolatry
memory may be interpreted as beauty. Socrates makes the enthusiasm
love for the beautiful intelligible
a sort of approximation or version of
the philosopher's recollection of the

"philosophical"
and even share
the
ideas. In this way the lover may be called happy fate of the genuine philosopher.
the sight of
Love
chaste.
of the sort
wishes
its
that is
inspired
by
beauty
"a
is.
of course pure and

beauty"
It
only to
and
behold in the beloved

such
object
good
image
of
(251a).
By
capacity for
love the
soul proves that
ence of true
beauty
the other ideas
was recent and
that
its transworldly experi it has since remained
relatively
uncorrupted.
Returning
to the
image
of the soul as a charioteer and two we
horses,
one noble and uglier
tame and the other unruly,
understand now that the

which sees
darker,
only
must an
horse
represents the
lust that is in
all of us
in
beauty
opportunity for the

made to submit
perverse pleasure associated with

and violent must
body. This horse

must
be
through brutal
are
force. The bit
be jerked
from his teeth till his jaws

15.
bloodied; he
and
be
whipped till exhaustion and
Cf. Jacob Klein,
op. cit.. p.
151,
line
2.sod of the
Phaedrus.
Socratic Rhetoric
fear
and
41
him from running away with the soul when he sees the beautiful beloved. The struggle to control this beast calls for the most heroic vir
of pain will prevent
tues, but it is
of the
worth
it, for
the price of the victory is the truest sort of possession to imagine. Once the lover has become moder
beloved that it is
exhibits
possible
ate,
he
nothing but
good will towards the
beloved. In time that
goodness a
will outweigh embarrassment or
any
other resistance
in the beloved, for it is

evil and
law
of all powerful
fate "that
evil can never
be
friend to
cannot
that good must

astonished at
always
be friend to
good"
(255b). The beloved

a
help
but be
the
goodness of
his lover's love. It is
form
of
purity that rivets his attention.
By
purifying the lover, love makes him beautiful and so the inspiring power of beauty can now work in the opposite direction. The beloved now loves. Just
what
he loves
that
would
be hard for him to

other.
beauty,
beautifies the
say, for it is originally himself, his own The beloved is fixated on his lover as if he were
another self.
He is the only
From this point, the responsibility for success or failure is entirely the lover's. one who has self-awareness. He knows what has happened to him,
struggled
having
heroically
in the depth
of
his
own soul against
his darker,
self-
destructive
his
animus.
The beloved is innocent
of that struggle.
Whatever his lover

goodness
requests or commands
he interprets
as an expression of
the purity and

which of
of
soul.
He
will yield
to anything, scarcely
exercises
knowing
his
his two horses
is
which.
Since the lover is good, he
supreme
responsibility prop
erly lives
and the two souls grow

and at the end
happy
and strong. no
They
may
they
will
know that
divine
madness nor
pline contributes to them
Finally,
ton
nefit
even
any greater good than that of a if the lovers disappoint themselves a little
what
way all their disci human any tame and moderate love.
exist this and allow their wan
horses to indulge in for

will a
they
consider
bliss,
still
the lovers may reap a be
love
whose origin was chaste.
Once
such wanton acts are committed
they
from
continue, but rarely
what the
lovers
will
the
body, they
and only on the basis of a reluctant concession to know to be their darker urges. "And at last, when they depart are not winged, to be sure, but their wings have begun to
grow, so that the madness of
love brings
them no small reward;
for it is the law
that those who have once begun their
upward progress shall never again pass
into
as
darkness
and
journey
under
the earth,
but
shall
live
happy
be
life in the light in their
they journey together, and because of their love (256d). And so. Socrates when they receive their
shall
alike
plumage
makes a reluctant and
moderate concession to the

whv.
beast
who
wishes carnal
pleasure.
We
understand
Our dark horse

run
needs no more
than that,
and we ought not give
him
more
lest he
away
while
with us.
Such
pleasures way.
we may be thought of as a gratuity that
may enjoy
actly,
more
looking
of
the other
Socrates'
magnificent performance
has been
hymn to
moderation.
More
ex
it is
song
love
as
beautified
by
heroic
moderation which
makes
it
intense. The
effect of
the
great speech
is to
nurture and also

such
to tame the
that the
mad
passion of love and at the
same
time to
interpret it in
way
enthusi-
42
asms were
Interpretation
this reason, even il it may propel us to a realm of sublimity. For lifted from its context in the dialogue, it would be a good speech. As we en
it
releases
counter
it in the
context of
paints a
the
dialogue, however,
which
we read
would
it
with more circum
spection.
Socrates
love in
the lovers
imitate
and even
ap
proximate philosophy. or at
Their
communion would
be through talk
of
rather than
touch
least mostly so. What this his beloved as an image of the

wise
requires
is
form
idolatry;
the lover must sec
divinity
and therefore not

which of
to be violated.
which
Other
his
is
he
would
be confused,
unable
to tell
his horses is
and, so,
sec
pathetically likely beloved as but an image
to give in to his darker one.

of a
However, if the lover does

will
distant perfection,
he
still
love? The
answer
surely yes; such love is possible even if not entirely innocent. The love the Phaedrus celebrates is something over which we do have control even while we operate, partly, under its spell.
Socrates'
cal sort of
only describes and recommends the chaste, philosophi love but it imitates it as well if from a certain distance. His own image
speech not
of the soul as the winged
horses
and charioteer, which
he
confesses
to be idola
trous,
carries ride. not
him
and
Phaedrus
aloft as
if
on the wings of
Socrates'
for the Do
we
Lysias'
In this
sense,
great speech celebrates return
love; itself, its
and we are
along
own charm.
recognize
this as a
to something like the clever conceit of to the youth that he yield to the non
speech?
Lysias had
recommended
lover,
yield
which
is to
make a sort of
play
out of
love. Socrates
says
the youth
should
to the lover who masters his dark
horse,
likes
so as to preserve the most
beautiful
one
of pretenses.
No
wonder
that Phaedrus
this speech,
for like the first
he
is
able
to read his own native disposition in it!

steps out of
Finally, Socrates
god
his
persona and addresses
himself directly to the
Eros. He
prays
that Eros
will accept
his
recantation and not
blind him;
at
we
are now able to understand the poetic sort of
justice that Socrates

not seem
least
claims
to
be fearing. For if
the
one
blasphemes love, does it
that he no longer de
serves soul?
faculty
there for
Socrates
put
also asks that
whereby he receives the true image his beloved casts on his Eros excuse the poetical figures of his speech; those
Phaedrus'
were
sake and so
they
are
not
now
his fault! As for
what
Socrates,
should
or
Phaedrus, may have
said earlier and
has
been
recanted,
so
Lysias
be blamed.
May
Eros
cause
Lysias to turn to
are
philosophy
his lover,
Phaedrus, may become

One
of the
cially, is the
lovers along with philosophy. outstanding features of the Phaedrus as a whole, at least superfi way that it moves from the breathtaking sweep of the love speeches
one of
those who
to the rather prosaic, pedestrian analysis of those
speeches and of rhetoric
in the
latter
part.
If
we
find
this odd, though,
it
makes it more
striking that for Phaedrus
nothing in
could
be
more appropriate or natural. which

all
The
reason
for this is the limitation

the whole dia
Phaedrus'
character,
is
also
the
limitation
in
within which
logue
operates.
He finds it
too easy to assent to the proposition that the very

just
reason
for
living
for
free
man consists
the
sort o\
talk
in
which
he
and
Socrates
are about to engage.
This is
what
Socrates
relied on and confirmed to
Socratic Rhetoric
some extent
and
Socratic Wisdom in
Plato'
Phaedrus
43
almost
ognize
by painting his picture of a sublime and supremely happy love as an purely intellectual affair. Although Phaedrus is oblivious, we should rec
that the love
Socrates describes
but
also
and seems to share with
him is
not
spiritualized childless
and moderated
denatured. If
I
this were
love it
might
only be
fact
Phaedrus'
which seems either to escape called the

of
notice or not
"idolatry"
to bother
Socrates'
Phaedrus'
him.
quasi-satisfaction with what
of not
speech provides some ground
for this
"body"
denaturing
love. Is it
just
by
wav of
the conjuring of an
imaginary
for the soul,
which
Socrates
warned us not soul's natural
to take
literally,
16
that we can abstract from the requirements of the
embodiment?
In the brief
analysis of
section
that
forms
the transition between the
love
speeches and
the
rhetoric,
Socrates
encourages
Phaedrus to
continue the conversation
way that, for us, underscores the abstract and limited character of the whole dialogue. One effect of great speech is that Lysias and his whole craft
in
Socrates'
"speech-writing"
of
has
come to
look
so pale, so unserious.
that Phaedrus cannot
imagine his continuing it for long. Socrates, however, simply repudiates the sug gestion that there is anything unserious about speech-writing itself; the whole
question proceed
is
whether
it is to be done
well or
ill,
and
Socrates
and
Phaedrus
should
to examine just that. Does Phaedrus
not see
that there is no
difference
serious
between writing speeches and writing laws, which is of course a most business? Phaedrus assents. Our assent, however, must be withheld so
we
long
as
do
not
forget that,
unlike a written speech, the
law does
not seek
suade.
It issues
commands and attaches sanctions that
include,
ultimately,
only to per life or force.
death. In
The
reality, our
lives
are governed
by
a mixture of persuasion and
structure and
dramatic quality
of the
Phaedrus
upon
suggest,
own
however,
that for
rhetoric and not and
to come into its to be simply an
own as an art
built
its
independent
principles
aspect of. say, statesmanship, an abstraction side of
from force
represents
from
body
almost
and
from the brutal
life is
necessary.
Socrates
this
idea
comically very
near
the center of the
dialogue,
by
his
reference
of
to the
myth about
the crickets, who have been chirping in the background
the
whole conversation.
To these beings the

believe that Plato
Perhaps
muses
have
granted
the privilege of
1
such
Hackforth
cannot
condemns carnal,
heterosexual
relationships
homosexual
carnal
relationships.
not; the
Phaedrus. however,
makes
the
equally v. ith distinction that be

or
tween
vs. spiritual
love
and treats
the former as
contemptible whether
it be homosexual be
seen as
het
erosexual.
All
carnal sexual relations are condemned as unnatural!
This
should
the price
that
is paid
for the
idolatry
of
beauty
characteristic of spiritual
love. It is
a price that
normally, where the

mosexual.
love is homosexual,
loves nobly
and so it
is
more or
less
assumed
that
such
may be easier. love will be ho
The condescending
which one who
concession
to the darker horse later on can also be taken to illustrate
the spirit in that
will engage
in
sexual
in the Law, (VII. 837c. X4id.e)
the Athenian
stranger reproves
activity with whichever sex. It is true homosexual relations much more

that
strictly than docs Socrates here. Does this mean, as \V has finally "run itself clear of A more cautious
taint?"
H. Thompson hopes,
explanation of
Plato's
is
great mind
the
divergence
that Socrates
docs
not
have the freedom to
lay
sume.
Ct. Hackforth,
1 973). p.
op. cit.,
pp. 98 and
down the law to Phaedrus that the Athenian 109: W. H. Thompson. The
stranger
is
able
to as
(New
"Phaedrus"
of Plato
York Arno,
163.
44 singing
Interpretation
all
day
without ever
needing food
or
drink. If Socrates
and
Phaedrus
con
tinue their leisured conversation, they may hope that the crickets will give a account of them to the muses, probably Calliope or Urania, and they may
good
even
hope ultimately to enjoy

selves!
17
life
as
blessed
as
that of the chirping crickets them
Socrates initiates the

pears
to be a
rather
someone
to make a
up what ap standard, even well-worn question among intellectuals. For good speech, is it necessary for him to know the truth about
next stage of
conversation
the
by bringing
the topic of the speech?
Moreover, if
rhetoricians
do
grant
that one
must
know
his subject, is there in fact anything else that know? Socrates then takes the position that a
about which we speak
one could genuine
conceivably need to knowledge of the truth for
is both the necessary
and sufficient condition
knowing
entails
how to
speak well about
it,
is
provided we understand related
that
such
knowledge
genuine
knowing
Now
how the
subject
to
other
things. For
instance,
knowl
edge would
include
knowledge
of what
things were similar but not
identical.
as rhetoric can
from
one position
be broadly but correctly defined as an art of leading the soul to another by means of words, it follows that a rhetorician is
to take,
one who
knows
what path
leading
from
one point
to another nearly simi

what
lar
one.
Rhetoric is, then, knowledge Phaedrus
of the
truth,
as
knowing
things are
appears to
"maybe."
truly
similar.
answers all this with a cautious
He
wonder whether
he himself may have been led along

that
what
a chain of similitudes
to
something Socrates
about.
opposite the truth. suggests
is
needed
is
some example of what
he is talking
will serve.
Phaedrus
agrees
enthusiastically; the preceding conversation has been too

Lysias'
abstract to win
his
Socrates'
confidence.
and
Lysias'
speeches on
speech
love
There is
no
Socrates
now
doubt any longer that explains, was that Lysias did
is inferior. What
what
made
it so,
not
know
he
was
talking
about.
Upon rereading the opening of the speech Socrates and Phaedrus Lysias did not bother to define the term at the outset. It
"love"
observe that appears
that
Lysias did
not even
know that
"love"
is
highly
problematical term and as such

"love"
requires explicit clarification.

speech?
Did Socrates define
at the
beginning
of
his
God knows it; he
made
very
much of
it! Now Phaedrus

Lysias'
understands; the
compelled
Socrates'
grandeur and
sweep of himself to deal with the

view of a
speech as versus phenomenon

aspects.
is that he
comprehensively
rather
than settle
for
a re
variety
of
its
We
He has
point
should observe
the sophistry that

definition"
Socrates is practicing
"knowledge"
Lysias'
on
Phaedrus here.
substituted
"clear
for
as the requisite
beginning
Socrates' Socrates'
for
a persuasive speech.
It is true that
speech
what
is inferior to
is
whether
because
Lysias'
lacks
a certain
knowledge;
is less
clear
17.
in
Hackforth
reports
Frutinger's
wholly
contention that this and the myth of
the
dialogue,
Theuth,
encountered
later
are
the only
original myths
in the Platonic
corpus.
Op
cit., note 2, p. 1 18
Socratic Rhetoric
advantage
and

what
45
need
is that he knows
love is,
or rather, that
he knows it to be in
of a
clarifying definition. Phaedrus understands this only vaguely though. For him it is apparent only that Socrates has knowledge which enables him to lay
down definitions Lysias'.
on
sticky
points
for his
speech
in
way that
a
made
it
superior
to
Socrates'
speech
was,
as
it
should
be, like
living
so
organism, each part
of which was suited
to the other and to the whole. Now that the importance of the
organizing definition of a speech has been brought out we have to wonder whether Socrates in fact gave two way he puts it at this point it seems that he gave but how could it both blame and praise the same
amination
emphatically,
however,
speeches or
one speech,
only one? The but if it was one,
to see
just how the
speech passed
Socrates'
It, therefore, bears reex from blame to praise. In a word, the

dialectical. Socrates then has
come
thing?18
answer gives a
to this question is that
speech was
very formal
and precise statement of what that means, which
to
be
recognized as one of all of
the most authoritative accounts of the dialectical proce
dure in
Plato's
writing.
Dialectics
consists of two principles:

scattered particulars,
"That
of
perceiving
and
may
are,
make clear and
bringing by definition
other
together in one idea the the particular

of
that one
thing
which
he
explai
wishes
to
(266d),
the
is, "That
dividing
after
things again where the natural joints the

manner of a
and not
trying
to
break any part,
bad
carver"
(266e).
was the power whereby Socrates was able to but divisible into parts; a left-hand and a right-hand side. By further subdi thing each side he was able to arrive at a left-handed kind of love, which de viding
Dialectics
conceive madness as one
served censure, and also a right-handed

at
love, worthy
of
of praise.
So,
what seemed
first two
speeches
by
Socrates
are
in fact the two
sides of a single godlike
dialectical
of
structure which
he
could expose
just because
his own,
knowledge
dialectics.
Has Socrates in fact stipulating that
one
resolved
the apparent contradiction in
his
speech
by
he
was
talking
about
two different things
two
separable parts of
larger
whole?
Phaedrus thinks he has, but

says
we should see chosen
that the question re
mains.
As Socrates himself
in carefully
language, everything de
Does it
correspond
pends upon the act of natural
division that dialectics
performs.
to a
of
division? In this case, is the distinction drawn between the two forms
distinction? If not, then the Socrates
marvelous
love
a true
pertained to each part of all that plification. position

must
said would
clarity have derived from
and
consistency that
oversim
If
we refuse
to indulge this oversimplifying

Socrates'
distinction,
then the
op
between the two

either
parts of
speech
is
a genuine
ambiguity
which
be due
to his
inability
that
to
get
to the truth about
love,
or to an ambigu
ity
about the
thing itself
speech can
only
reflect
but
resolve.19
not
We
may,
8. Ct.
p. 21 supra.; also
Burger,
and
op. en., pp. 78-8 and
Sinaiko,
in
op. cit.. pp. 24-5. argues
19.
In Love. Knowledge,
to be the
the
Disiourse in Plato, Herman Sinaiko

wholeness, resolves
that
in the Phaedrus
"ontological"
love
is shown
principle of
principle
a sense of that word one and
he derives from
albeit
myste-
Kurt Riesler. Love is
that
the
problem of
"the
the many",
46
then,
Interpretation
still wonder whether, when we are
or cursed,
or
both. Finally,
as
in the grip of love, if we are blessed. to the dialectics, it appears to have the power
Socrates
claims
for it only
if it
proceeds
from the
right
starting points, but it

Socrates'
may love
not provide or reveal
those starting points.

rhetorical power of
Relatedly, is it
the case that the
speeches on
derived simply from his application of the dialectical method ? That would be to ignore the charm of the very beautiful examples that he had recourse to, albeit with apology. We saw how much recourse to example is often necessary in
Socrates'
speech, as tion
Phaedrus
was
hardly
able to
follow he
account of
the connec
between dialectics
as examples.
and rhetoric except when
could see the speeches on
love
Do
we understand
that the utility of examples
is
somehow a
truth?20
consequence of
As far
as
dialectical reasoning to reach certain Phaedrus has understood him, Socrates appears to have shown that
the
failure
of a pure
the true art of rhetoric consisted in dialectics. Dialectics appears there does not seem to be room
suasiveness of a speech.
so powerful
that
for anything else that could contribute to the per Nevertheless, Phaedrus cannot help but remember that
and
there is something else. That something is hinted at in the techniques of effective

speech taught stand
by
Thrasymachus
his ilk
although
they do
not teach or under
the whole of
it
either.
It is
exemplified
best in the
great
statesmen, like
Pericles. We
witness
ner with which we
it especially in the majestically calm and authoritative man know that Pericles speaks about everything. This example is
would not made.
easy for Phaedrus to accept, but only with a question that probably have been present if the earlier argument about dialectics had not been
what
Just
does Pericles know?

confesses might an art
Socrates
art at all.
that
what sets
Pericles
above the
teachers
might not
be
an
It
be it
a sort of
loftiness
of mind
that is part of his natural disposi

art"
tion. If
it is
must
be
of a
broad
and grand sort
(a "liberal
in the
con
temporary
sense), such as is necessarily supplemented
bv leisurely
speculation
about cosmic questions.
This is because
rhetoric
is probably very
much
like
med-
riously.
Moreover, love
of
is
dialectical,
of
and
Sinaiko
Socrates'
understands
treatment of love in his
speech with two parts as
illustrative
its
essential nature.
1 have
no quarrel with
Sinaiko's
attribution
to Socrates
this
Socratic. I
am
insight into the mystery of wholeness, although it is not exclusively or originally not persuaded, though, that this accounts for the specific features of the dialogue.
Socrates'
mystery of the whole, that would seem to any dialogue or any act of concern for anything particular. Such a purpose might be better served by some form of mystical poetry. It is unlikely that any advance against this difficulty can be made unless one undertakes to grasp Socrates purpose in the dialogue as a and Sinaiko has eschewed that purpose. He tells us that he does not explain the relation ship between the subjects of love and rhetoric which appear to divide the dialogue into two parts < note
trivialize the specific
Moreover, if it
were
overall purpose to reveal the
features
of
whole
28. pp. 298-9).
He hints
as to
how he
would address
is
that issue insofar
"love"
"dialectics'
as
and
are
controvertible terms and that

logue."
one
clearly absorbed into dialectics in the second half of the dia This last statement, though, is false. What in I act happens is that dialectics is shown to be but ingredient of rhetoric. Cf. Statesman (esp.
277d. 279a).
"rhetoric
20.
Socratic Rhetoric
icine. It is
a sort of
and

soul as medicine ministers to the
47
ministering to the
in
a
body. The
true rhetorician,
therefore,
would need
to
know the
soul and not
but
also as
it
resides
besouled individual. He
its effects; if it is know the
would need
just in general, to know how it is

know how its
affected and parts relate
how it
produces
complex,
he
must
to one another. Since the

to
besouled individuals
occur
in
variety
variety
of
types, the
rhetorician needs
complete catalogue of that
to
gether with
the effects each may suffer and the causes it may produce. In other
words, what must

was unable phor of
not
be known is precisely that great, divine discourse that Socrates to provide in his speech about love and which necessitated the meta
the two winged
horses
and
the charioteer! At this point, although he does
say that it is
of
knowledge
seem
makes a very elaborate statement about the psychology that the true rhetorician must possess that makes it numbingly difficult. Phaedrus responds as if with a blink; the task Socrates
impossible, Socrates
has
outlined
is "not
can
small."
Phaedrus has
shown
to be required
hardly help but to understate the enormity of the task Socrates by the art of rhetoric. It appears beyond human power,
for dialectics has
not
in fact. The
earlier requirement
been dropped but is
now
supplemented
by
an exhaustive
psychology; the full implication is that
rhetoric
is
nothing less than the comprehensive wisdom for which the unendingly. Phaedrus has no more than an external sense
still the argument will
philosopher searches of what that means.
how. To
now
whatever
probably extent he is affected, his for

philosophy.
affect
his
expectations and enthusiasm
his demands
Socrates'
some
will
for speech-making
involve
an enthusiasm
the end of his speech on
love that the
god
(We may recall Love turn Lysias towards

Phaedrus'
prayer at
philosophy.
If that
were
in fact to happen, it has transpired
would
result of what
since
very likely be by Socrates lifted his prayer.)

that a
agency, as a
Phaedrus has been brought to

acquire the art of rhetoric as
see
prodigious effort will
Socrates has
outlined
it; but
can we
be necessary to imagine him ac
tually undertaking
know just
which
that effort
in
the future? More
likely
he is.
paralyzed with a sense of awe at the magnitude of the task and
step
comes next.
In that
condition, will
said
as we are, nearly is scarcely able to he not be vulnerable to

point
the criticism that everything Socrates has
up to this
is just
so much
high-toned
nonsense?
For
are there not
in fact
effective rhetoricians and teachers

psychology?
of rhetoric who
know
next
to nothing of Socratic dialectics or his

of whom
According
to the Sophist
no need
Tisias,
Phaedrus has already
made a careful with
study, there is
for
an effective speaker
to have anything to do
truth,
or good conduct, or
any
other sublime value.

what
men
believe is to know
Phaedrus
is
probable
All that is necessary to affect what what seems likely in general. Soc
prepare
rates reminds
of this criticism as
if to
him for his
own conclu
sion which
may
set and seal
the
effect of
the
elaborate argument
that
they have
just
gone through.
response what
In part, Socrates
argument.
to Tisias is only a
He insists that
is
probable
is
so
summary of his earlier because of its similarity to what

capsule
48
Interpretation
is
true and so
he
who
knows the truth
will
be best
able
to discover the persuasive

useful
similarities.
Moreover,
and
as the characters of one's

are
hearers do differ, it is
to
know them
how they
variously
affected
by
probabilities.
Even
Tisias'
purposes will
be better
served
the more one actually knows. To this recapitula

somewhat
tion Socrates then adds the

reason
following,
moralizing, sentiment.
The
real
that
we should make
the effort Socrates has outlined is not

so that our speech
just to be
more
effective
gods.
among human beings, but

after
This consideration,
all, is the only one
may be pleasing to the worthy of a free man and it

problem with what
ought to guide all our conduct, speech
included. The
Socrates
it is in
says
here is that insofar
as
it is
a summary,
what
it
reproduces
the problem
tended to answer.
Fundamentally,
has
never
been
cleared
tics can be insufficient and just how psychology

when
corrects
up is how dialec for it. Nevertheless.
this summary is put together
with
the
this
reference
to the gods,
Phaedrus
of
somehow understands.
The
explanation of
requires an
genuine movement that
Phaedrus has
undergone
understanding in this dialogue.

of rhetoric as a
Socrates'
the
Phaedrus hears
Socrates'
account of the
ingredients
confirming
description
love. We
of moves
of
his
own recent experience of
listening
to
great speech on
understand that
Phaedrus has heard that
speech not
only
as an example charms and
Socrates'
rhetorical art
but
also as an account of
how the truth
the soul;
he
appears now
to have accepted that account almost literally. If
it follows
the way
Socrates'
prescription, speech can cast a true image upon the soul, like
beauty
casts an
image
of
her true
self upon the
lover. Thus understood,

will
true speech
finds
a metaphor
in love,
speech.
as we
imagine true love

connection
be
charac
terized, for the

that the
speech
most
part,
by
In this
it is
of course the case

Socrates'
that is true will
be
most persuasive.
Moreover, just
as
speech exemplifies the persuasive power of
the truth, it
also exemplifies
the fact
that the speaker's most
important
concern
is
not with persuasiveness per se.

supreme value.
The
truth has been shown to be useful, but that cannot be its
Socrates
had taken Eros. It
care to speak truth so as to make this speech acceptable to the god,
was
that concern that compelled him to give his
speech
the ring
of
truth.
Phaedrus
nosticism
accepts this too.
We
see
how far he has

of the
he indicated
Phaedrus'
at the
beginning
come from the easygoing ag dialogue (229c). Socrates has
made use of of piety.

Lysias'
instinct for beautiful
speeches
to impart to him something

charm of speeches
This
will
be his
amulet against the
degrading
ascribes
like
and against the sophistical
interpretation he
of rhetoric.
With
Socrates'
rejoinder to the argument
to Tisias. the Phaedrus to the

subject
reaches what appears to

of rhetoric and whether
be it
a conclusion.
And in fact,
art,
with regard
can
become
Nevertheless,
subject
the
dialogue
continues, as
something that had dropped out of is writing, the second part
said. nothing if Socrates is suddenly remembering the conversation without their noticing. That
a genuine
more will
be
of
the
formula
"speech-writing"
that was to
have been the
While strictly speaking this last section is but correlative to the formal teaching about rhetoric, it is related directly to the question about the nature of Socratic rhetoric with which we benan. overarching
object of examination.
Socratic Rhetoric
Socrates
lates that
and

his
point about a god
49
proceeds to make
once
long
ago, in
Egypt,
writing by way of a myth. He re named Theuth presented to the god

them for the benefit of the
king, Thamus,
king's
people.
several of
his inventions,
intending
Theuth had invented

on, and
numbers and various mathematical sciences,
games of chance and so
most especially, writing. wise and would
that it would make the

wise
Egyptians
Of writing Theuth said improve their memories. The

though, is inferior be
and wisdom
king Thamus
responded,
however,
that writing will enable men to rely less
on their memories
by being
a substitute.
The
substitute,
of
cause men will mistake
the mere appearance
knowledge
for the
that
real
things that once resided in their

might
memories.
Socrates does
acknowledge
writing utility is
be
useful
in reminding
men of what
they do
remember,
but this
to re
likely
to be offset
written
by
the temptation to think that
we
do
not need
member what
is
down.
responds that
Hearing
true,
of what
this. Phaedrus
whole cloth.
Socrates
answers with a
make
Socrates is just making up a story out of surprisingly stern rebuke: if the moral rings
what source
difference does it
from
the story comes? The priests
Zeus say that the first
words of
people of that time were content

spective of who spoke words can ever
prophecy spring from oak and rock, and yet the with them because they contained the truth, irre
anyone
them.
Socrates continues, if
in themselves,
of what
or
thinks that
written
be
clear or certain
mind someone who
already knows
which says
have any use except to re he knows, he must be unaware of the There is clearly
an
prophecy
of
Ammon,
the
contrary.
irony
in the
way Socrates puts this insofar as the authority of prophecy to which Socrates re fers in his myth, and which he relies on to deprecate writing shares the disadvan
tages of writing itself. That
is,
it
maintains a solemn silence

might as well
the prophecy is an impersonal pronouncement and beyond just the words pronounced! In other words,
on sacred text.
Socrates
be relying
But
what
does
Socrates'
practi
cal admission of such a reliance over written
imply
for his
assertion of
Socrates'
the primacy of spoken

mythical reference
language? Are
language have
of
we not reminded
by
to
the original
the first prophets that all our language makes use of to
words which
or claim
personality written language essary

conversation.
of their speaker or
have a meaning of their own irrespective of the point that hearer? This is not to repudiate
Socrates'
suffers a
disadvantage in that it its
cannot make what
concessions to the peculiarities of
audience as can
may be nec be made in a living
It is, though, to
as of
point towards a
ken language that insofar

transcend the limitations
ested
it is language it
the
aims towards
complementary criticism of spo formulations that will
conversants and
be intelligible to any disinter

Socrates'
hearer
or reader.
Although Phaedrus is
myth of
initially
but
put on
his
guard
by
recourse
Socrates'
to the
Theuth, he is
all
oblivious
to the incompleteness of
depre
cation of
it easy
also obfuscated by the myth. He finds writing that is both involved and that written proposal that the difficulty with writing is to accept
Socrates'
words are
like
paintings, that
is, they
are
frozen,
silent,
dead. If
you
try
to
cross-
examine them
they just say
the same
thing
over and over, without explanation.
50
Interpretation
supplies
With only a little coaxing, Phaedrus What we actually remember is

"
the obvious, and
fantastic,
words of
contrast.
the
knows,
see,
of which
the
written word
Socrates'
may be
words
living and breathing justly called the

stirring
within
him
who
image"
(276a). Per
this! We
of
haps Phaedrus
still
feels
him
as
he
says
though, that
what
he
says
involves the
that
same overestimation of
the
faculty
is
memory to hold a "true

words themselves and
image"
we observed
before. The
real problem
with
their
inability
to
recapitulate
perfectly the
wordless
dia
logue
of the mind with
itself. writing
at
To summarize, the
pears
public
specific criticism of
the end of the Phaedrus ap
to
be
the version of the more general criticism of
image-making
(cf. Re
the
X)
which survives
breathing"
the somewhat
of
spurious and mythical assertion of
"living
pared
and
all
images
love
and speech.
Phaedrus has been

Socrates'
being
pre
for this
tion of
along writing is practically
and we can understand why. a sufficient guard against
limited depreca
the sophistical
interpreta
all
Phaedrus'
tion of speech as self-monumentalizing of which
Socrates has been
laboring
along to disabuse Phaedrus. It is part of the process ot transforming being attracted by brilliant and beautiful speeches into a near instinctive
sance to philosophy.
Socrates'
obei
Although for these
reasons
it does
seem
that
deprecation
of
writing
points pen?
at the conclusion of the
Phaedrus is ironical
and rhetorical,
this judgment
to
an obvious problem.
Why,
on this
Moreover, how
wisdom?
can we understand
view, did Socrates in fact disdain the Plato's writing as a medium for
Socrates'
It
seems unthinkable
that Plato should be inferior to
Socrates,
that is to
Plato's Socrates, but does Plato, then, transcend a limitation from which his Socrates suffers and if so what limitation? And however those questions might be
answered,
clusively? at
why does Plato limit himself to writing Socratic dialogues almost ex These issues, which are fundamental to the whole Platonic corpus, lie
Socrates'
the outermost reaches of the dialogue Phaedrus.
As for Socrates, surely it is
not possible to explain
refusal
to
write
by
way Even if there is something ineffably mysterious about the cosmos, there still might be a sort of writing that addressed itself to that mystery, if it were properly
tentative and circumspect.
against all philosophical what prevents
of reference
to any presumed content of his
theology
or metaphysics.
If it
were on
otherwise, we would have to

authority!
pronounce
Socrates'
writing
Moreover,
the thesis that
by
a comical
Socrates from writing is his philosophy would always be attended difficulty. For how could someone formulate that thesis in a way
a general audience without
that would
be intelligible to
the error
Socrates'
it supposedly
Socrates'
condemns?
So,
it
appears
we
committing a version of have to look to explain

things more idiosyn
refusal to write to more

cratic
incidental factors, i.e.,

once we swallow
to
personality.
Now
the
initial disappointment
that we may well
Socrates did
with this proposal, it may occur to us that the reason is simply that he could not! Of course he was not illiterate, but it may be that Socrates lacked and knew that he lacked the fine craft of
feel
not write
writ-
Socratic Rhetoric
and
Socratic Wisdom in
Plato'
Phaedrus
a
51
ing
well about
important
so.
and
difficult things. In fact there is

end
hint in the Phae
drus that this is

rival,
Towards the
Socrates
mentions
the name of Plato's actual
Isocrates,
as someone who
as yet
writing to heights
other
is very likely to develop the study of speechunknown. I submit that for Socrates to mention anyone
alone
than Plato himself
in this connection, let
Isocrates, does
art.21
suggest
that
he actually was oblivious to the truly highest prospects for writing, and that therefore he had little grasp of the practice of literary Regarding the whole
corpus,
do
we not
finally
as not
have to interpret only

a pleasant
Socrates'
almost perfect silence and on
disinterest in Plato shortcoming

of
modesty
Plato's
part
but
also a real
Socrates?
speculation
Still,
Socrates
the
foregoing
may be
to
said
to
beg
the question.
Why
did
not correct
for his
inability
write?
Must
we not
consider, in this con
Socrates'
nection, the possible relevance of

of
famous
or notorious
demonic
voice
daimonion? To be sure, Socrates does

to his
not explain
his
refusal to write
by
way
the
of reference
daimonion;
and
that is
because he
presents an argument to
same effect which pertains
to Phaedrus as well as himself. In view of the ironical that argument, though, we are driven back to the
and
unsatisfactory daimonion as the What

are we
character of
most outstanding,
distinctive feature
Socrates'
of
character.
to
make of
this dark and difficult subject? Are we to take it

own
literally
that Socrates
even
unnatural'
hears something within himself that is not his We are naturally inclined to suppose that
that he
but
alien and
Socrates'
daimonion is
of
somehow a metaphor;
own
is referring to
a pecular
quality
or
dimension
his
basic
eros.
The
main
thing
that stands in the way, though, of that surmise is
the description of the daimonion as
issuing
Socrates from going into shalt could function

ple of the
politics,
as an
for
example.
only negative commands, preventing For how is it possible that a "thou

Now
on
animating
principle?
this point the exam

noteworthy.
daimonion in the Phaedrus,

prevented of
noted earlier,
is especially
This
The daimonion
would
Socrates from ceasing to
speak, at the point where

makes
he
have been guilty

appear
blasphemy
had he
not continued.
somewhat pro
it
clear
that the
negative character of
the daimonion is
a mythical
forma. And so, the

peculiar about separate and
daimonion does
Socrates'
to be
reference
to something
eros, something
negative.
which
is only hinted
at
by
making it
If this
makes sense,
then I think we can
be helped
still
further
by
recalling
offers
what was said about what attracts
Socrates to Phaedrus. That is, Phaedrus

out of
Socrates the
sion of
Socrates'
prospect of
about
being
drawn
himself
by
participating in
a suspen
his doubt
whether
he is
a victim of monstrous
passions within.
need, though, is
a general one. to which

Socrates'
Phaedrus
can
supply only
partial answer. 1 am suggesting that

21.
amazing insight into the

it in
a paper read
attempt
souls of
This
specific
observation
American Political Science Association
is Joseph Cropsey's. in 1976. Much
who presented
before the
of what
follows is my
to follow up
not
hints that
to
accuse
were contained
in
of
that paper about the relationship
between Socrates
and
Plato. This is
him, however,
being
responsible.
52
Interpretation
he talks,
and the enormous, erotic power that a
those with whom
he has for
to
other
people, derives ultimately from

overcome what otherwise would and of
dependence he has
a
Socrates'
upon others
help
him
be
paralyzing doubt regarding the

universal
freedom
the authority of
reason and mind.
doubt, his "knowledge
becoming a doubt of the wisdom of pursuing Socrates to torpor, only as Socrates is able to come knowledge, and so reducing alive with others, who do not have that doubt. In his dialogues, Socrates enters
is
prevented
ignorance"
from
into
form
of
life
represented
by
of
the
other soul.
Of course, he does
not submit
himself
fully
to the limitations
as
that other soul ; rather

each
he
traces them out,
he
un
derstands them
limitations. He learns
type of soul and more profoundly
he learns how
own
each actual soul and need
its form
of
life
confirms the
primacy
of
his
unanswerable
to know
all
there is to know. These reflections lead

not write
again to the thought
that Socrates did

what
because he
could not.
He lacked
the self-containment and
is usually
a
called self-motivation
Socrates'
that any writer
has to have. We
might now square ourselves with

might
mythical or a
language
by
his
If
saying that he
have been
not
writer, or a
poet,
statesman, or any of a
number of things were
it
mind to wake and act
for something demonic in him that would not allow except in the intimate company of another living soul.
it
appears
all
this
is
satisfactory, then
turn"
that a possible and
likely
explanation of
the "Socratic
And dained
what of
is the awakening of his demonic voice. Plato? If the foregoing speculations make superiority
of
sense then there
is
nothing that requires us to explain Plato's assumption of the pen Socrates dis
as a measure of a
Plato's
wisdom
to
Socrates',
was
or an
inferi
ority, or to any difference at all. Plato did not experience the

Socrates'
daimonion;
Plato
that re
able
mains
distinction. If that is true, though, how then
to
overcome the
tion naturally arises but it

plication of a
potentially paralyzing doubt that Socrates obviously cannot be settled in

concerned primarily with
one of
experienced?
The
ques
connection with
the ex
dialogue that is is the in

still
Socrates'
Socrates'
erotic rhetoric. much can
The
question
broader
Plato's
art.
This
be
said:
in
Plato's
case as
it is
not
the love of wisdom itself that
gives specific
form to his way
of
life
and mode of expression, nor could
it be. To Plato
we at
tribute some strength of will and an
by
love he
with
must
instinct for beauty, tempered and sharpened have felt for Socrates and by the passion to avenge his unjust
punishment.22
death
the most just
22. Ronna Burger and Jacques Derrida have both looked to the Phaedrus as being important chiefly for what it has to say regarding writing and particularly Platonic writing. Burger thinks that, "The ideal meeting point defined by dialectics, as the convergence of two paths of living speech and writing, is in fact represented Op. cit., p. 109. I would agree that by the Platonic dialogue Plato's art involves a self-conscious recognition of the incompleteness of writing and speaking but not that it represents both in a way that corrects for the incompleteness of each. Therefore. I do not find evidence for the view that Plato held his own writing to be more philosophical than, say. Aristotle's was to be.
.
itself."
In the ambiguity
the
of the word yaouaxnv
(remedy,
poison), which
Plato
uses to name
opening
scene of the
Phaedrus (230c), Derrida finds
writing in
sub-
a pretext to correct
Socrates'
subsequent
Socratic Rhetoric
Before he
the place.
us
and

the scene,
with
53
and
Phaedrus depart
while still
Socrates lifts
a prayer to the gods of

and
Earlier,
to
imbued
the mania that seemed to bear him
aloft, Socrates had

prays
prayed
to Eros that he not be
blinded for his blasphemy.
Now he
Pan, by
whose prosaic and
earthy
spirit erotic matters are some
times viewed,
which
especially
when with a mind
to the whole natural order within

prays
human desires
are to
be
explained.
Socrates
is
for
moderation of
and
his
possessions and
his desires, to be
what
made
beautiful
on the
inside
for there to be
still
harmony between
afraid
is
within and what
outside
him. Maybe Socrates is
that there might be something essentially unharmonious,

against similar
Typhonic,
about
sim
him, for
ply
fears have
we all not wished
to be allowed to
be just
natural ?
understand him, Derrida thinks that the opposition between writing to speaking. If I matrix for the opposition between speaking and the ideas about writing in language is a imparts to us of overcoming that opposition which we would speak The impossible dream Plato write a perfectly faithful representa through a perfect and univocal speech is a version of his dream to
ordination of
speaking
and
tion of the
spoken word.
However,
this interpretation,
if it is that, for Plato
seems to give no
heed to the
abso
lute propriety of Socrates Derrida not elucidate that

well as the
speech such that
Plato's writing
what,
might content at
itself to imitate it. Should

highest
prospects as
propriety to
understand
least,
are the
limits
of
both speaking
and writing?
Jacques Derrida, Plato's Pharmacy, in Dissemina

of
tion, Barbara Johnson,
transl. (Chicago:
University
Chicago Press,
1981).
Tacitus'
Teaching
The Thesis of
and
the Decline
of
Liberty
at
Rome
James Chart Leake

submitted
to the
Department of Political Science.

College*
Graduate School, Boston
To
My
Mother
and
Father
Clara L. Leake
and
Robert S. Leake
CONTENTS
/ (in this issue)
Preface Introduction
Why Read Tacitus?

I.
Tacitus'
Manner
Intent
of
Writing
in
a
The Problem
Tacitus'
of
Writing
Tyranny
Which Is Hostile to Virtue
2.
3.
4.
Tacitus'
Rhetoric
Methodology
Assessment
Prefaces
of
II.
Tacitus'
the Roman Republic
1.
Tacitus'
2. The Roman Republic

*The
author of this
dissertation,
which won the
American Political Science Association's Leo

will publish native of
Strauss Award for the

was a
year 1981 and which
Interpretation
and promise.
in
a series of two
installments,
young
scholar of unusual
was graduated with
brilliance he
Chart Leake
years at
Fort Thomas, Kentucky, James high honors from Williams College in 1971 and spent the next three
A
received the
Yale University, from he
which
degree
of
M.Phil, in
1974.
Introduced to the
student at
world of political
thought through his study

was granted a
of the classics,
he then
enrolled as a
doctoral
Boston College,
tor
a year as a
where
Ph.D. in
political science
in
1979.
years
visiting
assistant professor at
Kenvon College, for two

the
He subsequently taught as a Harper Fellow at the

was a gen
University
of
Chicago,
and
for
a year as an assistant professor at

of classical
Assumption College. His
tle soul, whose tastes ran to the authors
antiquity
and
Renaissance,
to
and whose noble
aspirations were more characteristic of those ages than of ours. His

narrator of the
attraction
Tacitus,
the "greatest to
as
deeds
and speeches of
hateful
tyrants,"
is partly
explained
by
an extreme sensitivity of 1983.
the
harsh demands that life

was
sometimes makes upon us.
His untimely death in the fall

classical colleagues, and
just
he
beginning
heard
to work on
Vergil, deprived
deprived his
of
the world of
seldom
nowadays.
It
also
mentors,
former
scholarship of a poignant voice, fellow students of a be
loved
and much admired
friend. The text

with
his
manuscript was never revised

corrections
for
publication.
It is
re
produced
here
as
he left it.
only
tew necessary
by
the editors.
E. L. Fortin. Boston College
56
Interpretation
and
3. The Republican Alternative

4.
Tacitus'
Its Limits
Assessment
of
the Doctrine of the Mixed Constitution
// (to
appear
in Vol. 15, No.

of the
2)
Tiberius'
III. The Consolidation

1
.
Principate:
Rule
and
his Character
Tiberius Begins to Rule

Tiberius: Excessive Fear
of
2. The Case for Tiberius: Capable Administration
3. The Case
against
as a
Cause
of
Tyranny
IV
1
.
The Scope
and
of
Limits
Moral Natural
,
and
Divine Law
Tacitus'
The Limits
a
Law:
or
Teaching of Moderation
Tyrant
of
2. Is there
Divine
Natural Basis for Virtue?

under a
V
I
The Place for Virtue

Tacitus'
.
Teaching: Moderation in the Face
Overpowering Depravity
Senate
2. Seneca
and
Burrus, Tutors
and
and
Ministers
of
of
Nero
the
3. Thrasea Paetus
the
Decline
Liberty in
VI.
1
.
Philosophy
and
the Causes of the Corruption of Oratory
An Alternative to Political Participation

of of
2. The First Speech

3. The First Speech
Aper: The Case for
Maternus: The Case for

of
Oratory Poetry
and
4. The Second Speech

Decline
of
Aper
and
Messalla's Response: The New Style
the
Oratory Superiority
of
5. Messalla's Second Speech: The Education

Maternus'
Ancient
Upbringing
Decline
of
and
Thorough
6.
Second Speech: The Political Causes

and
of the
Eloquence:
Eloquence
Wisdom
VII. Epilogue
Selected
Bibliography
PREFACE
This thesis is the last

to the lavish
effort of
my
graduate studies.
As such, it is
a testimonial
generosity
The
my
members of
studies of
of my teachers over the years. dissertation committee warmly encouraged me to pursue my helped me to get started, but this was the least of Tacitus; they
what who
they
offered me.
For it
was
they
who
introduced
me to
the classic thinkers
first taught Tacitus to
recognize what man can possibilities.
be,
though he lived
in
an age
of somewhat
Tacitus'
limited human
Some
familiarity
with the masters of

was also
youth was
very helpful in my my
own youthful
investigation. It
due to the
members of
committee that
was acquainted with
Machiavelli
and
Montesquieu,
those two
latter-day
admirers of the grave
Roman. From the
work
Tacitus'
Teaching and the

of
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
57
both
of
I became
I drew inspiration to study Rome, and through Machiavelli, acquainted with "il the sixteenth-century humanist move
these
men
Tacitismo,"
ment of exuberant
commentaries on the writings of Tacitus.
am
bold to
claim
to
be, in my own small way, its last surviving heir. Father Fortin was the chairman of my dissertation
power of
committee. studies
The
gentle
his
mind
has
charmed me and
illumined my
far
more
than he
could ever
know. I have
gained access to certain
high thoughts
and an almost
for
gotten
tradition only through his efforts: Doceas iter et

vi. 109).
sacra et omnia pandas
[Aeneis
Professor David Lowenthal
was also a member of
the
commit
tee. Whatever grace this work possesses owes much to
his
careful advice.
From
him I learned to
tage
I'
read our greatest
English poet,
and
this
was not without advan
De
in reading Tacitus, esprit des lois and

quod est
perhaps as much a poet as an

under
historian. In his it first dawned
classes on on
his benevolent
I
guidance
me, as
am not
Tacitus says,
able
difficillimum
what
ex sapientia,
modum
(Agr. 4.3). I
to express adequately
owe to
teacher (// mio maestro)
in the
most emphatic sense.
Professor Christopher Bruell. He is my I have learned more from

me
him
each
year, because
of what
he taught
the year
before,
best
and
count
it the
highest
again
good
fortune
that I have been able to study with
him for
time. In him
burns that
ardent
love
of
the truth which
moved
the
of the
disciples
of
Socrates: Pauci,
Juppiter
potuere
quos aequus amavit
aut ardens evexit ad aethera virtus
(Aeneis
vi.
129-
131).
To
all
these three men I may say
what
Vergil's
shipwrecked soldier said to
his
royal
benefactor (uter
magnis exemplis nee meae
fortunae,
sed vestrae aptis):
Di tibi,
usquam praemia
si qua pios respectant numina, si quid
justitia
est et mens sibi conscia recti,

saecula?
digna ferant. Quae te tarn laeta tulerunt

genuere parentes?
Qui tanti talem
In freta dum fluvii current, dum
montibus umbrae
lustrabunt
semper
convexa, polus dum

nomenque tuum
sidera
pascet,
manebunt
honos
laudesque
quae me cumque vocant terrae (Aeneis
1.603-
I0)-
Professor Donald Carlyle

me
was also a member of the committee.
He introduced
consented
to the
problem of modern
tyranny in the USSR

as a child and
so
well:
and
graciously
to
read the manuscript of this
Hazel Girvin,
who
taught
me
essay Latin
on ancient tyranny.
owe a great
debt to Miss
first led
votes
me to that great classi
cal tradition she
knows I
and
loves
Pia
et
Phoebo digna locuta

who read
(Aeneis
sulted
vi.662).
also wish
to thank Professor Carnes Lord
the manu
script with characteristic thoughtfulness
and made several suggestions which re

saw
in
considerable
improvement. Michael Cull

which would
to it that I to
me
received
number of useful
books
have been
unavailable
had it
not
been
58
Interpretation
members of
for his kindness. The

ceived
ness, persistent
the staff of Bapst

with
Library
at
Boston College
re
courtesy my lohn Waggoner carefully and enthusiastically script. I am grateful to all of them. Unless
otherwise
importunities
and considerable resourceful proofread
the
final type
noted, all references to the Annales are to the newly revised

1971).
edition of
Erich Koestermann (Leipzig: Teubner,

Annales
Clarity
and ease of ref
erence suggested that we refer to the
by
numbers alone.
We have
used
the
following
formula. Books
of
that
work are
indicated
by
capital roman numer
als,
chapter and passage
by
arabic numerals
(for example, vi.51.3 for
Annales,
Book VI,
chapter
51,
passage 3).
We
also used
Koestermann \s
and
editions of the
other works,
the Historiae (Leipzig:
Teubner,
have
1969),
the Opuscula (Leipzig:

works are as
Teubner,
1970).
The
abbreviations we
used
for these
and
follows:
Dial, for Dialogus de Oratoribus, Agr. for Agricola,

passage; in the
we used work
Hist, for Historiae. In
the Dialogus and Agricola we used two arabic numerals to indicate chapter and
Historiae,
which
is divided in the
same manner as the
Annales,
cita cita
the same system of
roman and arabic numerals
that we had used in that
to
designate book,
chapter, and passage.

are preceded
The only difference is that

,
tions
from the Historiae

Furneaux
tions from the Annales are designated

notes of
by by the
the abbreviation Hist.

numbers alone.
while
the
We
,
always
had the
Henry
at
hand, The Annals of Tacitus.
2 vols.
2d ed.
(Oxford:
Clarendon, 1896). We profited tremendously from the brilliant critical, philolog ical, and explanatory commentary of Emile lacob, Qiuvres de Tacite, 2 vols. 2d
,
ed.
(Paris:
Hachette,
always
difficult, but
helpful in reading the sometimes beautiful Latin. Detailed study of important words was made
1885).
was
It
immensely
more systematic
by
the Lexicon Taciteum of Gerber and
Greef,
2 vols.
(Leipzig:
Teubner, 1877,
1903).
work not writ
All translations appearing in the text from Tacitus or any other ten in English are our own, except where otherwise indicated.
INTRODUCTION
wieland
nounces them
agree that
Tacitus'
principal aim
is to
punish
tyrants
but if he de
a change of tyr
ought
it is
not to their slaves, whose revolt would

of ages and
only
bring
anny;
he denounces them to the justice

enough
to mankind.
And the latter henceforth
to
have had
rule
trouble
and
experience, that its
reason should
acquire the
heretofore solely
all about and
enjoyed
by
its
passions.
napoleon
That is
what all our philosophers
say; but that
supremacy
of reason
look for
find it
not
nowhere.
wieland
Sire, it is
long
since
Tacitus began to have

the
hankering
of
for him is
a clear progress of
out of academies as well as
from
courts.
so many readers. That human mind, for for centuries, he was shut The slaves of taste were quite as much afraid since
him
as the servants of
despotism. It is only
Racine
named
him le
plus grand
peintre
de
Tantiquite,
that your universities
and our own
have thought this judgment
Tacitus'
Teaching
might
and
the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
59
be true. Your
and
sins,
informers,
the
in reading Tacitus, you see nothing but assas scoundrels; but, sire, that is exactly what the Roman Empire was,
Majesty
says that
governed
by those
monsters
of
fallen
Tacitus'
under
pen.
The
genius of
Livy
travelled the
world with
legions
the Republic. The
genius of
Tacitus
must almost always
have
all
been
the
applied to
of
the study of the
prison-records of
Rome, for
there
history
the
Empire. It is
even
only in
prison-records
that
only historians
could
he find
can
become
acquainted with
those unhappy times,

views and principles,
amongst all
nations, when
princes and
their peo
ple,
opposed
in
slightest pretext gives rise to criminal rions and executioners oftener than
live trembling before each other. Then, the trials, and death appears to be inflicted by centu
time and nature. than
by
Sire, Suetonius
genius
and
Dion
energy,
as
Cassius
while
relate a much greater number of crimes more
Tacitus, in
in the
off
a style void of
nothing is
terrible than
Tacitus'
pen.
However his
even
is
as
impartial
it is inexorable. Whenever he
can see
of
any good,
monstrous reign of
Tiberius, he looks it
everything.
out, takes hold
it,
and shows
it
in the bold
relief
he
gives to
He
can even
find
praise
for that imbecile Claudius,
by
the
nature and
by
his dissipation. That
impartiality By the
the
most
justice
Tacitus
exercises on the most opposite subjects, on
so only important quality of the Republic as well as

who was
really
Empire;
on citizens as well as on princes.
stamp
of
his
genius one would
be
lieve he
could
love only the Republic One

.
could confirm that opinion
by
his
words on
Brutus, Cassius,
when not
and
Cordus,
so
deeply
had
engraven so
in the memory
art of
of our
youth;
but
he
speaks of the emperors who

and
happily reconciled
feels that the
what was
thought could
appears
be reconciled, the Empire

most
liberty,
one
governing
to
him the
beautiful
discovery
on earth.
Conversation
of the poet
Wieland
with
the Emperor
Napoleon.1
Why Read Tacitus?

Short
of civil war we sometimes think the worst a political point of view
thing
that can happen to
a so
ciety from
is to lose its is
this
liberty
and
become
subject
to an
absolute monarch.
How
much worse
fate if it is
suffered
by
those who
were educated to rule themselves
in
free
country.
But there
are times when the
republican constitutional order

ment of absolute
Rome that
was
has completely broken down, and the establish is the monarchy only alternative to anarchy. The Principate of established by Caesar Augustus on the ruins of the Roman Re Too
often
public was such a case.

one are
its
rulers were tyrants.
The
standards
by
which
wisely judges the behavior of rulers and different from those applied to happier
subjects under such circumstances
regimes.1
The
standards are
different
I.
nam's, 1891; reprint ed.,

1
.
Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, trans. Raphael de Beaufort, 5 AMS, 1973), 1:332-33.
Strauss'
vols.
(New York: Put
Voegelin
made
the
following
objection
to the
argument of
On Tyranny. The
known
as
classical
concept of when
tyranny is
too narrow because "it does not cover the
phenomenon
Caesarism:
'constitutional'
that calling a given regime tyrannical we imply tive to it; but Caesarism emerges only after the final breakdown
government
is
a viable alterna
of
the
republican constitutional
order;
m the
hence Caesarism
classical sense of
or 'post-constitutional
cannot
be
understood as a subdivision of
tyranny
tyranny."
Strauss replies, "There is
no reason
to
quarrel with
the
view
that genuine
60
Interpretation
and more complicated.
Here,
such
even though
the
regime
tere,
accepted as a
harsh necessity, for the

conditions
alternative
may be just, justice is aus to such a regime is a worse
is severely circumscribed, for he who seeks immortal glory through excellence appears as a rival to the prince. The link between virtue and glory is then necessarily severed. Cornelius Tacitus surpasses
regime.
Virtue
under
all
writers
who
have
ever
attempted
to describe
one can
such
conditions.
He
goes
further
cessities.
he
elaborates a
teaching
of
how
live best, faced

and vain
with such ne
His formula is that

of
of neither
desperate
rebellion, nor abject
servility, but
prudent
dignified
acceptance of evils when and
that are beyond changing, and a

work
disposition that knows

are
possible.2
how to
only if they
Someone
might
ask, how is this
quietly for improvements a matter of interest to
us, citizens of
liberal democracies ?
and stratagems of monarchical or tyrannical rule are a of perhaps explicit
The hazards
neglected
too much
study in modern political science, democracies where it flourishes are founded with the
such rule
field
because the liberal intent

of
abolishing
forever. But it
can no
longer be confidently
the
maintained
that liberal de
mocracy is fated to be triumphant

the interest of
everywhere on earth and
forever. Therefore, in
phenomena,
political commu
familiarizing
ourselves with ourselves to will of one
full
range of political
it is necessary again to expose nity is kept subjugated to the

rule.
the arts whereby the

and
man,
to learn the hazards of such

our practical commitment
It may not be merely an incidental benefit if liberal democracy is thereby strengthened. Before turning to
ment.
Tacitus'
to
study, we would
like
briefly
to indicate the
judg
ment of power-politics made
by
the philosophic
founders for
of our
kind
of govern
For it is because is
of
the success of their project that the problem of political

"solved"
ambition
now neglected as was
once and
all.
But they did
not neglect
structure.
it. In fact, it
the firm
basis
on which
they
erected
their stupendous
Montesquieu wrote, in a once celebrated passage of De T esprit des lois, that, "It is an eternal experience that every man who has power tends to abuse it; he goes limits."3 on until he finds From history and introspection Montesquieu had
learned
what
to expect
of men
in high
places which are without external
limits.
Caesarism is
on the
not
tyranny, but this does
not
justify
the conclusion that Caesarism is incomprehensible

still a subdivision of absolute
basis
of classical political philosophy:
Caesarism is its
the classics understood it. If in a given situation 'the republican constitutional
broken down,
and
there
is
no reasonable prospect of
restoration within all
monarchy as has completely the foreseeable future,

order'
the establishment of permanent absolute rule cannot be
justly blamed;
therefore it
is
different from the
fundamentally
establishment of tyranny.
Just blame
could attach
only to the
manner in which that
permanent absolute rule that
there are tyrannical as well
as royal
is truly necessary is established and exercised; as Voegelin emphasizes Leo Strauss. On Tyranny, revised and enlarged ed.
Caesars."
(New York: Free Press

2.
of
See
Tacitus'
praise of
Glencoe, 1963) pp. 190-91. Manius Lepidus, "Is it permitted

of ambition and
to pursue a course between

iv.20.3.
vol. 2. ed.
stubborn
defiance
and servile
obedience, free equally

I'
dangers?"
3- Montesquieu, De esprit des lois, xi.4, in CEuvres Completes, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1951 ), p. 395.
Roger Caillois,
Tacitus'
Teaching
He doubted the efficacy
rare
solution powers.
and the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
in
61
silence as
of
internal
ones, or passed over them

politically.
too
to merit consideration or be depended on
Montesquieu's
original
to the problem posed
by
political ambition was
the famous
separation of
Governmental
power
is divided into three distinct functions
and
they
are
distributed to different
prevent
men so
independent
power
as to check and control each other and

or
the consolidation of
by
be
one-man rule
become impossible
security
was
and
any one man its excesses
faction. The
abuses of under
unnecessary.4
Liberty
stood, above all, as

established marked
to
secured thereby. after
Such
constitutions were
throughout the Western World

an unwillingness
Montesquieu.
They
were
all
by
to trust the rulers. The

rule of was
widespread maxim
that rule
of men was
to
be
replaced
by
law indicated that it
was
the superior artifice
of the constitutional
solidation of power
law that
trusted to thwart and make impossible the con

ruled.5
by
the men who
The
rights
new governments people.
had
as their object
a
to
procure
liberty
and
defend
within
natural
them.6
for the
Under the
new
Accordingly, democratic morality grew up dispensation, the ambitious men the founders had
The
circumvented
came to see themselves as the people's servants, rather than as rulers power came
claiming
attained
in their
own right.
conditions under which power could

political men.
be
to define ambition for most
To
gain power men
had to defer it
was
to the people, whose will was expressed in the

more
democratic law. As
a result,
emphatically
than before an era of the rule of law. The
ambitious struggle
for
power that earlier governments

of constitutional powers
had to
contend with was replaced with admin

people.7
istration
in the
name of
the
We
aimed
to have a
ambi
government
"of the people,
by
the people, and for the
people."
Personal
tion such as the

4. power.
founders had feared
seemed unthinkable
during
to
those
years.
The
"So that
one cannot abuse power
it is necessary that,
which
by
be
the disposition
constrained
of
things,
power arrest
which
constitution can
not
be [made]
such that no one will
do the things
the
him."
law does
5.
require, and to not do the things
the law permits
Ibid.
of the
Madison
elaborated the principles of this

great
"new science of
in his defense
Con
stitution
in the Federalist Papers. "But the in the

same
security
to
against a gradual concentration of
the sev
nec
eral powers
department
consists
in giving
those who administer each

resist
department the
the others.
essary Ambition
constitutional means and personal

must
motives
the
51
,
encroachments of
be
made
to counteract
Federalist
n.d.).
The Federalist, intro. Edward Earle,

consequence of
The Modern
Library
(New York: Random House,
For the
these
doctrines,
see
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, if the laws furnish no remedy and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, 1 Cranch (1803). Madison v. for the violation of a vested legal Marbury 6. What Madison said of the Bill of Rights could, with equal truth, be said of the Constitution as
Marshall: "The
government of the
a whole.
"The
political truths
declared in
that
solemn manner acquire
by
degrees the
with
character of
fun
damental
maxims of
free Government,
and as
they become incorporated

From
a
the National sentiment,

17. 1788. quoted
counteract the
impulses of interest and in Marvin Meyers, The Mind of the Founder

7.
letter to Jefferson. October
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1973), p. 207. took him into politics

was an
"When
Stanley
and
Baldwin
said
that
what
'ideal of
he
was
claiming
a motive
that a Roman
audience would not
have found
plausible.
Roman
politicians sought
power, position,
This
remains contrast, while not exhaustive,
late Republic,
which
is
what
Miss Levick
1976), p. 7-
is
speaking
of.
substantially true for the Barbara Levick. Tiberius the Politician
(London: Thames & Hudson,
62
Interpretation
view that
Supreme Court's
to the
here,
"all
officers of the government,

was
from the highest

true.
lowest,
are creatures of the
law,"8
widely held to be
A Congres
sional committee
has recently
remarked
observed
that, "Our
nation owes
its strength, its
stability, and
its
principle."
endurance to
this
It may
now
be
that the Watergate hearings have at least served to re
mind everyone
in
this
government need not regard
country of the possibility that a very high officer of the himself merely as a creature of the democratic law.
the Constitution and two hundred years of
potent
Despite the
principles of
democratic
however it
eliminate
practice, ambition remains a
force in
a certain
kind
of
man,
may be disguised. The initiated

against
government of
laws has
also provided a
way to
the power-seeker whose ambition is unmasked. Impeachment proceedings were
President Nixon in
was
1974.
The
abuse of governmental power
for
"personal
tem of
political and morals
the core of the charge against
him. Our
sys
law is
is hostile to nothing
before he
was
so much as personal ambition.
Such
ambition
so pernicious as to undermine our

resigned
democratic
faith.9
The President despite this

men, there
made
study.
tried. His conviction looked certain. Yet

passion which can
reminder of
the underlying
survive
in
political
has
not
that passion
been any widespread return to the premodern thinkers who and its various artifices and subterfuges a direct subject of
I know to the
prevalent an
The only
exception
indifference among
us to the
complex nature of political men
is found in
thoughtful statesman, Abraham Lincoln.
among the writings of the advocates of
early But Lincoln's warning democracy.
speech of perhaps our most

stands
alone
spite of our
Lincoln vividly identifies a certain kind of man as the threat we always face in law and morals. He asserts that the history of the world- bears witness
talents"
that "men of ambition and
have
always
existed, and that
they
will con when
tinue to spring up among us,
despite the
artifices of the
Constitution. "And, be
so
they do, they
will
naturally
them."
seek the gratification of their
ruling passion, as others

satisfied
have done before
He denies that
such men would would
to hold
office under an established government: not
"Such [as
be
satisfied]
belong
Cae-
to the
family
of the
lion
eagle."
or
the tribe of the reigning dogma
Men like Alexander,
8. In 1882, the Supreme Court

the
expressed the
which to so great an extent was a
truthful expression of the practice of those times: "No man in this
law. No
ment,
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law, and
country is so high that he is above impunity. All officers of the govern

are
supreme power
in
our system of government, and

more
every
man who
by
bound to obey it. It is the only accepting office participates in

limita
its functions is only the

quoted
strongly bound to
submit to that supremacy, and to observe the

gives.'
tions upon the exercise of the authority which it
Nixon. President
9.
in House Judiciary Committee Report 93-1305. of the U.S., August 20, 1974.
administration of each of
Lee, 106 U.S. 196. 220 (i.XX;), Impeachment Proceedings of Richard M.

v.
agencies is vital
U.S.
"The faithful
these
[executive]
to the protection of
the rights of citizens and to the maintenance of their confidence in the
The
laws
committee
finds
clear and
convincing
evidence that
Richard M.
integrity of their government. Nixon knowingly disregarded

his
personal political
ob|ec-
and regulation of these agencies and sought to
have them
serve
tives."
Ibid.,
p. 177.
Tacitus'
Teaching
sar,
and
the Decline of Liberty

seekers of
at
Rome
to
63
new
Napoleon,
who are
emphatically
fame,
seek
do something
and are not content coln's
merely to insight into the passion
maintain
institutions
established
by
others.
Lin
characteristic of
the toughest, most
demanding
He
will
political men parallels
Machiavelli's. He is
be hindered
well aware that such a
one, if given
opportunity,
will
not
by
constitutional
law
or
morality.
somehow present a supreme political challenge
to the
people.
Lincoln
admon
ishes his
citizen-audience that
they
must
be "united
with each other, attached
to
the government and

designs."10
laws,
and
If the
people are
generally intelligent to successfully frustrate his to be fully prepared to meet this challenge, they
must understand arts arts.
the nature of their adversary, his passion for

consolidates and maintains power.
distinction,
and
the
by
which
he
quately
We characteristically fear political understood it? We think that no one has

that art as Cornelius Tacitus
and the other
Lincoln only hints at these ambition, but can we say we have ade
given so vivid a portrait of those
account of
passions and
in his
the
reign of
the First
Citizen Tiberius
tyrants
of
the Julio-Claudian dynasty. Although

lion,"
we would not claim
that Tiberius
and
was of
the
"family
of the
yet
he
was
sufficiently ambitious, adept, nature and his policies. And there is, above all, the advantage that they scribed and interpreted by the mind of the inimitable Tacitus. Someone
want to
might ask what use about
cunning that one can learn a great deal from his

are
de
it is to study
modern
such an old work on
tyranny if
we
learn
tyranny in
the
world, for the
problem continues
to
exist, despite the liberal democracies. Hasn't the

mentally?
phenomenon changed
funda
lightenment has
We believe that there is something to this objection. In a word, the En changed politics here, too. Modern philosophy has endowed re
cent tyrants with a sponsored
technology
of
not at the
disposal
of
their predecessors,
modern
for it has
the conquest
nature.
More fundamentally,
philosophy
has transformed
some varieties of modern politics
by
dreamed-of hopes for the

nection
transformation of the
human
condition.
arousing previously un The direct con
between these
Utopian
hopes
and the more unlimited of the
brutality
of a certain
type
of modern
tyranny is
of
apparent
in the terror
Jacobins
who tried to es or the
tablish their version
Rousseau's
social contract
in revolutionary France,
brutal
collectivizations and expropriations practiced
in
our own times
by
commu
will
nists who
believe
with
Marx that
evil will end
in
man and complete with
unity
be
achieved as soon as private

war."
property is done away

world
in
one
last terrific
civil
Philosophy
in
the ancient
tended to discourage such extravagant
hopes. There is,

io.
accordingly, a difference.
Institutions.'
Address Before the Abraham Lincoln, "The Perpetuation of Our Political ed. Richard Abraham Lincoln, Thought Political The in of Springfield Young Men's Lyceum, 1838,
Current, The American Heritage Series

11.
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), pp.

contemporaine,
18-19.
Hippolyte Taine, Les Origines de la France

1892)
469-
vols..
12th ed.
(Pans:
Ha-
chette
1 19.
Compare the
article.
reflections
of the
distinguished contemporary philosopher,

"It is
not
Stalinism."
Leszek Kolakowski, in his

whole
or
"Marxist Roots
summed
of
Stalin's invention that the
theory
of communism
may be
up in the
single phrase
'abolition of private property';

capital; or that the
state
that there
can no
longer be any
wage
labor
when
there
is
no
longer any
has
64
Yet
Interpretation
one should not
let the difference blind
one
to the
considerable
similarities
that exist between tyrannical

or
regimes ancient and modern.
However Robespierre
Stalin formulated the

unaccountable
rationale
be
to anyone.
of
for their rule, they ruled, and it was their aim to Aristotle's distinction between good regimes that
the
common
rule
in the interest
the
citizens or
good, and those which are per
verted and rule
in the interest
Some
of
the rulers
is
still
the
place
to start
if
one wants
to
evaluate a regime.
modern
qualifications
may then have to be introduced for the
ideological governments, based on the fact that there are those who gen that the revolutionary ideal to which they are devoted is good, believe uinely while closer examination may show that it is based on a mere hollow hope for human
cated as nature.
Ultimately,
do
so
to judge the
worth of a government
is
thing. To
and an
it is,
student of
deep adequately ability to distinguish its true needs from its mere desires. The best government is the one who brings to it the deepest understanding of
one must experience of
have
very compli human nature
the human heart.
It is
on
this
basis
that we make our claim that precisely the modern student of

studies
tyranny
stands to
learn from Tacitus. Tacitus
the problem as a problem,
tout court.
He
sees
tyranny clearly
as a
problem, as a defective regime. He ana that

of
make
lyzes the ies the
political weaknesses or
degeneracy
tyranny
possible,
he
stud
being, ranging variety from the very worst (post-adolescent Nero), to a very high type (Seneca). He does not neglect to study its effect on a mediocre or middling nature (Tiberius),
effect of absolute power on a
types of human
in full
awareness
that this is exactly what he is doing. Tacitus does not confine

of rulers.
himself to the study
He
shows
how
good and such rule.
bad
men are affected
by
the temptations and opportunities provided
by
He vividly describes the
to have centralized rule

pear
over all means of
production; or that national
hostilities
are
bound to
disap
together with class antagonism. All these
ideas,
as we
know,
are
clearly
stated
in the Communist
Manifesto. Taken together they do not simply suggest but actually imply that once the factories and the land are state-owned and this is what was to happen in Russia the society is basically liber
Lenin's, Trotsky's, and Stalin's claim was precisely that. The point is that Marx really, consis without achieving unity. And, except for tently believed that human society would not be despotism, there is no other technique known to produce a unity of society; no other way of sup
ated;
'liberated'
pressing the tension between

other means
civil and political
society but
by
the suppression of civil society;
no
to remove the conflicts between the individual and 'the

'higher,' 'positive'
but the destruction

'negative.'
of
the
individual;
freedom
conceived
no other road
toward
of
freedom
'bourgeois'
as opposed
to
but the liquidation in

class terms
the latter. And if it were true that the whole of
human
history
is
to
be
that all values, all political and legal
institutions, ideas,
else'
moral norms, reli

ser
gious and philosophical

'real'
beliefs,
artistic
creativity, etc..
are
'nothing
effect
but instruments in the in Marx's

writings)
vice of
class
interests (and there
are
many fragments to this
then
it
society should start with breaking violently the cultural continuity with the old one. My suspicion is that Utopias (meaning visions of a perfectly unified society) are not simply impracticable but become counter-productive as soon as we try to create them with institutional means; and this is because institutionalized unity and freedom are opposed to each other, and a soci
.
is true that the
new
ety that is deprived
of
freedom
can
be
unified
only in the
sense that the expression of conflicts

all."
is
stifled, not conflicts themselves, consequently, it is not unified at
Robert Tucker, ed., Stalinism,
Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: Norton, 1977),
pp. 296-97.
Tacitus'
Teaching
sycophants and
and
the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
65 He
shows
well
flatterers,
no
less than
the dissidents and the
martyrs.
the effect of political

as
helplessness in
the desperate
resistance of
analyzed as
the brave as to its
the acquiescence of the meek. Political terror is

as
causes and
insofar These
of all
it
affects the political men and the
are not
things that
change.
ordinary subjects in their lives. The human heart remains the cause and object
to arise in all times when the po
these effects. The same
situations continue
litical community is subjected to perverse or destructive rule. Let us take an example to show what we mean by saying we
present causes or necessities at work
can
learn
about
causes
must
leading
said
to the rule
by
a
in tyranny from Tacitus. Let us consider the terror of Stalin and that of Tiberius. At the outset it
and
be
that Stalin
is
Communist
that Tiberius is a Roman aristocrat.

attempts a
This
accounts
for
a certain
difference
Stalin
dynamic
Utopian mod maintains
ern program
to
industrialize
and communize
Russia; Tiberius merely

take note of this
Roman domination in the Empire. But
after we
difference,
was a
the
similarities of the two reigns are more than striking.
The
necessities at work
in
both
men's attempt
to hold and consolidate
power are
brutal. Stalin
lesser
man who succeeded a political
leader
of acknowledged since
ability, Lenin. "Lenin's

power over
mode of rule was
hardly
to be
duplicated,
had been
Lenin's immense
his
lieutenants flowed from

before his
cesses."12
their recognition of
his
political genius and their awe
great
deeds
which
crowned with almost unhoped-for suc
Stalin intrigued
problem
and
removed
his
after
rivals
after
Lenin's
strokes
and
death. But his
remained even
the
main
competitors,
Trotsky,
Kamenev,
dominate
and
Zinoviev, had been

absolute,
the
and
removed
from
positions of
influence. His
power was not
his
nature was not such
that he could ever expect to

saw
and secure
opposition as
ents men whose resistance could not

was
and
found
difficult to find any political a logical solution the
among his own adher easily be broken, and for whose removal it excuse He put these two thoughts together
had Lenin. "He
assassination of
Kirov."13
By
concealing his
of par
responsibility for the crime, Stalin constructed a pretext for accusing ticipation all he suspected of independence. Thousands of such men
own
party
made
members
were
tortured
to
confess
and
sentenced
by
abject,
sycophantic
courts,
hypocritically
indifferent to their innocence. Through terror, Stalin

crawl
all political men
in the Soviet Union
before him. His
caprice was
law,
not
only in politics, but in the arts, in
science, and
in
philosophy.
Stalin
through
in
humanity
of
of an unlimited scope
became
as absolute as
Lenin had been
by
force
his intellect.
Tacitus describes
a similar
ruler
development in the
reign of
were
Tiberius,
the
source
who also
followed
prestige.
an
absolute
whose
accomplishments
of great
The early
chapters
of the
Annales
the
analyse
the
deeds
through which
12.
Myron Rush, Political Succession in
USSR (New York: Columbia University. 1965),

revised ed.
p.
10.
13. the Thirties, Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of
(New York:
Collier,
1973),
p. 54-
66
Interpretation
Augustus'
Augustus
came
to hold
supreme power at
Rome. The
sources of with which
au
thority
mans
were
the perseverance, guile, to
and ruthless
energy
he had in
pur
sued all rivals
bring
decisive
end
to the civil
wars
that had consumed the Ro

peace
for
a century.
But Augustus in
war.
was a no
less
consummate politician
than unrelenting enemy
Through lavish
inces he brought
peace
to the long-troubled
the honors of the
bribery of soldiers, people, prov Empire. Surviving nobles were culti

new order.
vated and given a share of cism
Augustus disarmed
criti
by
a modest
life-style
this
without pomp.
He
made a show of
consulting the for the

succes
Senate. Through
soul
all
manipulation
he
preserved a
trust in his own grandeur of
(magnitudini.
preserve
in. 56. 2), and the
security
of
his
arrangements
sion, to
the peace and
maintain
his
supremacy. settled
Tiberius inherited the

plishment of over as a
world as
it had been
suppressed
Augustus'
in the
stupendous accom
Augustus. He too had
seditions,
and obtained
triumphs
Rome's enemies; but he lacked lesser man,

ruled and was even
character, was widely perceived

and
hated
feared for his
arrogance and
cruelty be
could rule.
was
fore he feared
trusted
1.
(1.4.3-4). This
made an enormous and
difference in how he
others,
While Augustus trusted his prestige,
manipulated
Tiberius
by
and
them and
would
feared
them
in turn. Where Augustus honored the

trembled
nobles and esp.
they
hold him in awe, Tiberius

vague
before them (see
13),
in fear turned to the into his
law
of treason
(lex majestatis) to frighten
them
indiscriminately
compliance
with
his
sovereignty.
Like Stalin, he
inadequacy by terrorizing his subjects. Though the Tiberian terror is limited to the political class, its effects on politics are much
solved the problem of own
the same as those we know as

vile courts are
Stalinism; hypocrisy,
in both
abject
flattery, delation,
times.
ser
the results of this policy

one need
ancient and modern
We believe that
scope of
his
accomplishment.
only read Tacitus to appreciate the cogency and In a time when most discussion of tyranny has cen
Tacitus'
tered on Hitler and
Stalin,
we
believe that the lead to
wide range of
study, the
variety
of
tyrants, their minions, in dark times

and
and opponents cannot

a
but
help
clarify the
situa
tion of men
rediscovery
of the permanent aspects of
the problem.
CHAPTER I:
TACITUS'
MANNER OF WRITING
The Problem of
Writing
in
Tyranny
Which Is Hostile
to
Virtue
Today
ently. garded
neutral record of past events.
in the West it is commonly held that history should be an objective or In time good historians thought differ Rome was then ruled by a succession of tyrants, and such historians re
Tacitus'
it
as
their civic
duty
to
keep
alive examples of noble speeches and
deeds,
extin-
though their rulers
labored
to subjugate and
degrade
all public men and
Tacitus
guish even
Teaching and the

the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
'
67
the most urgent
task of good
where
memory historians
of what a good and great man
is.
It
was
to
supply
an education
in
political excellence
in
an age
it
was
difficult
to acquire
such an education and
by
actual participation
in
pub
lic
affairs.2
Conversely, they frankly

This
was
lation
and crime.
will
looked
who
upon with great
outspokenly denounced servility, adu disfavor by the authorities.

evil
You
the
find those [in power]

are charged and virtue
may think
of a
deeds
[they
see
described in
histories]
glory
to them because
similarity
of character
\morum\. Nay,
even
[virtus]
have
enemies since
they
censure their opposites
from too
close a contrast
(iv.33.6).3
Accordingly,
memorials of
such
historians
were persecuted and
their writings,
"containing
regards
the most
illustrious isolated
the part
(clarissimorum ingeniorum. Ag.
2),
were entrusted
to the hangmen to
be burned in the forum. Tacitus

but
as part of a
these persecutions not as

comprehensive
acts of madness
deliberate
and
policy
on
of certain emperors
to extirpate everything per

public significance. under
taining
he
to virtue from their courts and indeed from all
Here
speaks of the
intent
of a typical persecution of
historians
the
Domitian:
Doubtlessly, they
and
thought that in that fire the
voice of and
Roman
people, and the
manly independence
[libertatem]
of
of
the Senate
the conscience
[inner
sense of good
bad,
conscientiam]
the human
race would perish, since moreover were
the teachers
of wisdom
[sapientiae professorihus]
driven
out, and
was practiced
lonly] in
exile,
so
that nothing
noble
every liberal art [bona arte] [hone stum] was to be met with any
where
(Ag.
2).
History
tues"
was of great
importance
"conscience"
as
the
of an age
"hostile to the
vir
(Ag.
1.4).
Tacitus
admired the courage of those who

with which
dared to brave
those
dangers. He
reveals
the seriousness
a
he took their task in the follow killed

under
ing
praise of
Cremutius Cordus,
historian
who was
Tiberius for
Romans"
praising Brutus and calling Cassius "the last of the his books were burned, copies were hidden and later
1. said to
(iv.34.1). Though
published.
See Cremutius have

praised
Cordus'
defense
ot
freedom
of
judgment
in a trial
held
under
Tiberius. "I
am
Brutus
and
Cassius,
whose
deeds,
though many have narrated, no one has called
to
memory
did this
without
honor. Titus Livy,
magnificent
[fidei],
nor
celebrated
stand
Gnaeus
Pompey
of
with such praises that

. .
trustworthiness among the first for eloquence and Augustus used to call him the Pompeian;
in the way
their friendship.
This Cassius himself, this Brutus, he
never calls
assassins able
[latrones] [insignes] men. The

honors. What
and parricides, which words are now

writings of
imposed, but
an
often names them as remark
Asinius Pollio hand down his
the same; Messala Corvinus extolled Cassius as

riches and else
general, and
of outstanding [egregiam] memory both flourished thoroughly with
did Caesar the dictator

than
respond
to the book of Marcus Cicero in which

judges'.'"
he
equalled 2.
3.
Cato
with
the
heaven,
of
There
was "ignorance
in answering oration the republic as a foreign

blush
as though
before
Hist. 1. 1
.
iv.34.
thing"
[ut
as
alienue].
Emile Jacob
explains this passage
in his commentary
to imitate;
the vice
follows. "The
objects ot a
dreaded
per
comparison appear too close.
One does
not
glories or virtues; at the picture of ancient
they
tain to
aues
that one does not feel
obliged
they
represent
the
.deal.
On
the contrary,
recent
virtues whose too close; one
reality is
not contested wound
against which
they
protest:
the
accusation comes
understands
it
too
Emile Jacob, CEuvres de Tacite.
1:313. n.
10.
68
Interpretation
reason
For this
it is
permitted
to laugh to
scorn
[irridere]
the
age
those who
believe
that the memory of even the
following
stupidity \socordiam\ of is able to be annihilated

are
with present power.
For
.
on
the contrary,
when geniuses
[ingeniis]
punished, their
authority increases
(iv. 35.5-7). to
publish under
Yet Tacitus
caution
was not so rash as
Domitian. He
tyrant."
exercised great
in his
public career under
that suspicious
Therefore he lived
on
to see the good emperors, Nerva and Trajan. This
meant
for him
above all
the
opportunity to
was
write
in
comparative
safety,
for,
at
last,
under
these emperors, it
think"
"permitted to think
1. 1. 4).
[sentire]
was
what you
please, and to say what you
(Hist.
of the
Yet Tacitus
deeply
the
affected
by
his
awareness of
the character
Principate
of
as revealed
by
persecutions of
the earlier
emperors.
The
new
freedom he
thought appeared
precarious
to him. A tyrant
would one
day
come
again and the persecutions would

which
be
renewed.5
He
regarded
times like those in
was able
to write as a mere respite
ger of persecution of rare
decent
writers and their writings.
from the recurring and massive dan This respite he calls "a
Hist. 1.1.4),
at
and
times"
blessing
of
the
(rara
temporum felicitate,
therefore
writ
he
continued to
be
actuated
by
sober
fear, if not for himself,

a
least for his
ings. We accordingly expect to find in these writings a caution. Candor was permitted under Trajan, who was Tacitus
always
wanted
mixture of candor and
friend
of
virtue, but
would
his
work
to survive
be
so
lucky. His in
praises
for posterity and of virtue and his own
he doubted that they

political
teaching
are there
fore
presented
a reserved manner.
At least
one
student, Traiano
Boccalini,
author of
the politic
seventeenth-
century commentary on the first six books of the Annales, has seen that Tacitus responded to this danger. He claims that history is for Tacitus, in fact, a kind of
disguise in
nature
which
to present unobtrusively a
with
teaching
study
about politics and
human
in those times
their residual
hostility to
virtue. with
For Boccalini, Plato
history
is but the
surface of a work which repays close
insight into the deepest

and
political and moral problems.
Tacitus is the worthy heir
of
Aristotle:
prise: not
But considering the prudence of Cornelius Tacitus, in undertaking this laborious enter if he had wished to openly [scopertamente] treat such rules of politics, he would have been it
able to
do it
by
studies
and contemplates
carrying so copious and so noble a delight to him who it. Furthermore he would have entered into a sea already
or
happily
navigated
by
more
illustrious pens, Therefore he

under
the seasons of
his
century.
resolved to
very difficult to practice, especially in hide a treasure of such great price

of
with studied artifice,
enclosing it
and
the
key
the present
history,
set
down
with
the title of
not
making such secret nooks as in a jewel casket, that it be easy for any inexperienced [imperita] hand to open the most concealed
Annales,
would
things
4.
moral
See
A
our
Chapter V
on
the virtuous man
in
tyranny for an
on
Tacitus'
elaboration of
view ot this
dilemma.
character
5.
in the Historiae
asks
the
Senate
the tyrants?
Those
who were survivors of
Tiberius
and of
Nero's death, "Do you think Nero the last of Gaius had believed the same thing while
arose."
meanwhile one more execrable
[intestabilior]
and crueler
Hist. 4.42.5-6.
Tacitus'
Teaching
[arcana]
light,
many
and
and the
Decline of Liberty
guarded
at
Rome
69
those most
jealously
minds
And
although a work results of more
laborious application,
studious
and such
nonetheless, with much more noble profit and with singular
de
]studiosi]
worthy
fish up his
pearls
He
wove
into his histories

.
so
counsels
]auvertimenti]
that one
might
say to him
how
greatly does he
penetrate the
insides \viscere\
what
of
human
nature.6
We
will
try
to understand just
Boccalini thought had been hidden

writing.
as we
consider
Tacitus
own statements of
his intention in
Tacitus'
2.
Intent
worthwhile on
It is
about as
beginning
intent in
guide us
we
the study
of an author
to
see what one can what
learn
and
the
author's own allow
writing.
In
this
way
we
learn
to expect,
it were,
to
him to
to discover the
questions we can most
fruitfully
led
oc
put
him. If, accordingly,
turn to the
beginning
kind
of
the Historiae.
we are
to believe that Tacitus intended to

curred
write a
of catalogue of
horrors that
during those
in
peace
years.
"The
trophes, dreadful elty

even
[atrox]
with
undertaking is rich [opimum] in catas discordant with seditions and [full of] cru battles,
work
am
itself"
(Hist.
1.2. i).
It
seems
to be especially the
hostility
of
the regime to virtue that arouses his interest: "The cruelty in the city
was more
dreadful [atrocius]: nobility, riches, honors,

an
whether refused or accepted
led to
(Hist.
accusation,
and
there
was
most certain ruin a mere pessimist:
on
account
of
1.2.3).
Tacitus is not, however,

virtue,
although
virtues
his
open-minded realism com
prehends
it
was precarious and rare.
"However the century (Hist.
was
not so sterile
in
that it did not also produce good
1.3. 1
).
We find
orders,
and
a more severe account of continual
his
subject
in the Annales: "We
collect cruel
accusations, treacherous
of
friendships, danger
of
of the
innocent
and
the same causes
ruin,
unmindful of the
satiety"
propensity to cause Tacitus seems to be the

and
their similarity of theme the (iv.33.3). At first impression, then,
these things
largely
dreadful
to
effect of the
Principate
on
Roman
a
morals
the rare but splendid
it.7
resistance
He
seems
in
way to be
kind
of firsttold."8
will be century Solzhenitsyn who takes responsibility that "everything virtue active actual is Yet he is more discriminating than Solzhenitsyn, for it
that
6. Traiano Boccalini, La bilancia
politico:
Osservazioni
sopra gli
Annali di Comelio Tacito
(Venice,
"
1674). p.
iii.
the
accusers were no
7.
The
rewards of
less hateful
than their crimes, since some who at
tained
others priesthoods and consulates regarded them as spoils, and
[who obtained] imperial

their patrons, and
procu-
ratorships and posts of

and terror.
influence
with
the
prince
drove
impelled and overturned everything,

against
by
hate
who
Slaves
were corrupted against
their masters, freedmen

mothers went with
they
enemy died through friends. [Yet] followed their husbands in banishment, relations lacked
an slaves was self was
their
sons
into voluntary
constant,
exile
wives
were
daring,
sons-in-law
the
faith
of
,t-
unyielding
even against torture:
[in]
the last
necessities
of
outstanding men,
necessity
bravely [fortiter]
were equal to the endured, and their ends
praised
deaths
of the ancients.
H'S's
'
,9,8-,956:An
Invcsngaiion.
Archipelago. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Harper & Row, P. Thomas Whitney (New York: 2 vols., trans.
Experiment in Literary
,974). .:x..
70
Interpretation
to care about
attitude
he
seems
from the start,
and the regime
is judged from the

Tacitus'
stand
point of
its
toward and
effect on
individual
virtue.
This formulation does not, however, sufficiently do justice to cal orientation. He had the capacity and the opportunity to revive
of
politi old standards
frankness in the
had
evaluation of
the characters of the the
emperors and
their
favor
ites. For him it

scale as
was possible
to
write
history
of
Rome's
government on a wide
not
been successfully
or
safely done for

Roman
a century:
But
the successes or misfortunes of the old

writers, and
people
have been
recorded
by
of
illustrious
times of
fitting
they
geniuses
were
[decora
ingenia]
were not
lacking
to tell the
Augustus,
until
Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius,

and after
and
they had died
were
by growing adulation. The affairs flourished were falsified from fear they distorted from recent hatreds (i. i
discouraged
while
Nero
.2).
Power in the hands

men who wish
of small men corrupts, and
to
make
their way in the
world.
it especially corrupts other small The noble indifference to seeking

rare.
success an no
through accommodating the truth to the rulers became

effect on the
motive
Tyranny
had
insidious
writing
of
history. Tacitus
explains
that this provided
inconsiderable
Therefore the
and
for his
own undertaking.
counsel occurred
to
me
to hand down
few things concerning Augustus

without anger and
before,
et
then the Principate of Tiberius and the others,
partiality
[sine ira
studio] from the
causes of which
I hold
myself
far
off
(1.
.3).
Tacitus
ality.
claims to
hold himself "far
off"
from the
"causes"
of anger and parti
These
causes are most
man who writes

ruler cannot
history
significantly in the character of the historian. The while his fears and hopes make him dependent upon the
an
be trusted to be
impartial
judge of
his
character or that of present
his
other
courtiers.
Here Tacitus is
not
merely stating his intent to
the facts without
distorting
them or making a pre-modern confession of the present ideal of histori
cal accuracy.
evaluating charac ter, especially that of political leaders. This is borne out by all we have already shown about what Tacitus thought was at stake, above all, in the persecutions.
He really has
larger
concern with
judging
and
Still,
the notion that the historian is a judge of character is only implicit in this
passage.
We
are not surprised
that
its full implications have been

of
missed.9
For
this was then also the most controversial concern the opening of the
history,
and this passage, at

said
Annales, is
the most conspicuous. As we
earlier, we find
polit
in
Tacitus'
manner of concern of
ical
writing his history, which
a mixture of candor and caution.
The deepest
could cause
him trouble
with
future tyrannical
rulers, is only adumbrated on the

work.
It is in Books III
and
but openly avowed deep within the IV that he becomes more frank about what he is do
page,
makes an
first
ing. Almost casually near the end of Book III, he explaining his choice of subject matter.
9.
important
statement
E.g. Jacob. QLuvres de Tacite, 1:6,
n. 5.
Tacitus'
Teaching
I have
and the
Decline of Libert}'
at
Rome
71
by
no means undertaken to relate political opinions
were remarkable on account of
nobility [per
that
ableness.
because I
consider
it
the chief task

and
]sententias] unless they honestum] or noteworthy for dishonor]munus] of annals ]annalium] that virtues
speeches and
[virtutes]
of
should not and
be silent,
depraved
deeds
should
have fear
posterity
now
disgrace (in. 65. 1 ).
It is "a
moral view of
generally conceded that, as this passage makes clear, Tacitus takes the function of history."10 He is not satisfied to merely inform did
and said at a certain
us what a certain person
time. His purpose extends to
refining our taste and forming our judgment. We are to become healthy, thought ful, decent human beings from the study of his work. This function was once ac
cepted, as we can see
from the
following
the
remark of
Gaston Boissier.
of
In reading
those of
our
present-day historians,
to
us
we
dream confusedly
melodrama, whilst
antiquity Thanks to the striking beauty of the scenes which ancient history de scribes, its solicitude for simplicity, for harmony, for fine proportions, for perfection
rather recall
serene comportment and
the majesty of ancient
tragedy
of as
form,
little
the part
it devotes to
morality, the care
it
exerts to
depict
exceptional
beings
as
possible, and, though

of
mon
basis
humanity
which
magnifying its great figures, leaving them that com lets them remain in fellowship with us in all these el
.
ements we cation.
why it has proved so admirable an instrument of edu Since the Renaissance it has reared the entire youth of the civilized world
an explanation of
find
when ancient
history
has disappeared from
our schools, there will
be something
lacking
to
them."
We have
if these
singled out
judgment
of character and
Tacitus'
the formation of moral taste as

not
were
the
main qualities of
work.
This is
for they
"the
all
are the qualities that are most conspicuous on
entirely misleading, first reading, and these

to
move
qualities are chief

were
intended
of
by
Tacitus to
as
strike
the
reader and
him. After all,

were
task"
history,
he said, is meting
one would
and
out praise and
blame. If this
that
to be
found in Tacitus,
satirist,12
edifying writer, perhaps a view that Tacitus is mainly

men
be justified in regarding him as an relegating him to the schoolroom. The
a moralist
cannot,
however,
account
for the
profound
influence he has had in Europe in the

principles of politics.
since the
Renaissance
as a teacher of political
S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, M. P. Charlesworth. eds., The Cambridge Ancient History, io Macmillan, 1934), 10:872. Cf Gaston Boissier, Tacitus, and Other Roman Stud ies, trans. W. G. Hutchinson (New York: Putnam's, 1906). pp. 145ft'. Syme, the most illustrious re cent interpreter of Tacitus, though aware of these passages, ignores them in his simply factual ac
10.
vols.
(New York:
count of the period. I I. 12. various
Ronald Syme, Tacitus,

pp.
2 vols. (Oxford:
Clarendon.
1958).
Boissier, Tacitus,
"In
85-86. Annals alone, but

all
one sense, not the

which
the works of Tacitus are satire;

was
for satire, in the
forms
it
took under
Persius, Petronius, Martial, Juvenal,

with
the
chief
literary
force
of
the ase, and a

edged maxims
writer out of
harmony
hand."
the times of which he writes

ed..
had
a whole
armory
of
sharp-
ready to his
Henry Furneaux.
The Annals of Tacitus,
1:36-37-
72
Interpretation
us to
Far be it from
deny
men.
that for Tacitus the basis of
politics
the character of noble

one can
This is amply
with
shown on
easily
see
beginning
the passage
every from Book III be ignored
page of we
is morality and his work, as

quoted.
have
But
there
is
another side of
Tacitus
which must not
by
one who would un
derstand his intent. He has been

their devotion to morality.
them.13
much admired
by
writers who are not noted
for
Machiavelli
and
his followers
moral
are
chief
They
We
tend to
ignore
or subordinate show that

wish
the
intent to the is
political
among in
sights.
will
later try to
we
these two
sides
are part of a profound

another side of
only Tacitus. This is the Tacitus who
whole, but for now,
to
make
it
clear
that there
sees
deeply
into the he
amoral motives and
deceit
of
ful
policies of political men.

"realist"
For this
reason
was a
favorite authority
the
modern
be"
school
which
repudiated
are."
the Classical orientation

men
by
"what
ought
to
for
the
"way
things
Such
did
not
think that Tacitus al
lowed his devotion to morality to deform or limit his understanding of politics to mere edification. First we appeal to the judgment of the philosopher Hume, him self a capable historian:
Tacitus is
.
the
greatest and most
penetrating
under
genius perhaps of all antiquity, and so

of atheism and
free from credulity that he

profaneness.14
even
lies
the contrary imputation
Francis Bacon,
strong
admirer of the
diabolical Machiavelli,
compared
Tacitus
favorably
It is
to Plato and Aristotle as a realist.
worth
ethics of
noting too, that many writings of lesser renown are more serviceable. The Plato and Aristotle are much admired; but the pages of Tacitus breathe a
truer observation of morals and
institutions.15
livelier
and
Justus Lipsius
called
him
"hard
and prudent writer
who
did
not write
but
for the powerful, for those

assist them with
who are at
the summit of the state and for those who

advice."16
their counsels and their this appreciation
So
when
widespread was
of
the amoral penetration of Tacitus that
Machiavelli
was put on
the Index in 1564, Tacitus

political
became
a substitute
France.'7
for
him in broad
circles of
humanist
thinkers in
Italy
and
"To
13. Tacitus is treated as an authority in politics by Machiavelli in his Discorsi sopra la prima decadi Tito Livio, 111. 19; cf. 1.29, and m.6. Niccolo Machiavelli, Tutte le opere, ed. Francesco Flora and Carlo Cordie (Verona: Mondadori, 1949).
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Charles W. Hendel, Li Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 131. 15. Francis Bacon, The Masculine Birth of Time, or The Great Instauration of The Dominion of Man over The Universe, trans, and ed. Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon. Phoenix Books (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1964), pp. 71-72.
14-
David Hume, An
brary
of
16. p. 174.
Quoted in See
also
Philip Butler, Classicisme et baroque dans I a'uvre de Racine (Paris: Nizet, 1959), Laistner, a modern classicist, who speaks of the "uncompromising, indeed brutal
M. L. W.
re-
alism"of
vol. 21
17.
Laistner, The Greater Roman Historians, Sather Classical Lectures, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1947), p. 127. See Giuseppi Toffanin, Machiavelli e "il (Padua, 1921).
method.
Tacitismo"
his
Tacitus'
Teaching
Croce)
of an expedient
and the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
73
(says Benedetto
to dissimu
of
conserve machiavellianism without
Machiavelli,
Tacitus
and
one thought
worthy
of
those Jesuitical times,
which was
late Machiavelli
Tiberius."18
under the mask of commentaries on
his
prince under
the figure
The
Tacitus
written
by
these Machiavellians are
known
"Tacitism."
as
Philip
.
Butler
characterizes the movement as
follows.
Tacitism is
one of the essential aspects of the political produced a considerable
theory
of the sixteenth cen

machia
tury
at
and
it has
literature
It is distinguished from
practical results.
vellianism
in its
method of exposition rather than
in its
It
claims
to
be
first
and above all, a
knowledge
of a
one
is
compelled to take account and
historical reality that one deplores, but of which to draw out the consequences. It insists with re
which
morse on mires
the
abyss which separates
that
is from
that which ought to
be. One
ad
the Latin
historian for
sigh.19
having
pitilessly
unmasked
human
wickedness and one
machiavellizes with a
In
fact,
the concern
of
Tacitus
comprehends
both intents. The
"moralists"
and
"realists"
the
did have
blame.20
have both detached something present in the outlook of Tacitus. He moral intent in writing, but his purpose is not exhausted by praise and
was also
It
his intent to
provide
dence that the Tacitists found in him later

it is
so
precisely that training in political pru and so admired. One wonders whether
thought.21
For easy to detach prudence from morality as some of them now, let it suffice to adduce an important statement of his intent that is found in Book IV
and completes the revelations made
in Book I
and
Book III:
18.
19.
20.
peal
Butler, Classicisme Ibid., p. 176.
et
baroque,
of a
p.
171.
He knew the limitations better
to the judgment of Lipsius: "From the reading of

not always
or more
predominantly edifying work, for he knew Livy. Here we ap Livy I have risen always excited [commotior]
life."
but
instructed toward the

p. 4.
misfortunes of
Justus Lipsius, ed., C. C.

of
Tacili
opera quae exstant
(Antwerp, 1648),
mind
This
was also the
judgment
Tacitus, I
suspect,
for
in iv.32, and esp. iv.33.3 [oblectionis]? Livy After long acquaintance with business 21 Gordon seems to have seen both sides of Tacitus: and men, he applied himself to collect observations and to convey the fruits of his knowledge to pos
who
.
but
could
he have in
"
terity,
seen
under
the
agreeable
dress
had
of a
history. For this task he
was
excellently
qualified: no man with greater
had
more,
scarce
any
man
ever thought so much, or conveyed
his thoughts
force
and vivacity; a powerful orator, who abounds summate
in
great sentiments and
description;
yet a man of con
integrity,
who
who, though
events
he
frequently
agitates the passions, never misleads them: a
masterly
historian,
and a
draws
from their first for
sources; and explains
them with a redundancy of
images,
frugality
of words: a profound politician who takes off

public
artifice: an upright patriot, zealous
liberty
and
every disguise, and penetrates every the welfare of his country, and a declared en
a man of virtue, who adored emy to tyrants and to the instruments of tyranny; a lover of humankind; abhors falsehood and iniquity; and truth, and everywhere adorns and recommends them; who
liberty
despises little
wicked men,
arts,
exposes
bad
ones; and shows, upon all occasions,
by
the
fate
and
fall
of great
by
the anxiety of their souls,
by
the
precariousness of their power,
by
the uncertainty or
and
suddenness of their persecuted virtue
fate,
what a poor price greatness obtained
is for
goodness
lost;
how
infinitely
2
is
preferable
to smiling and triumphant
Thomas Gordon, The Works
of Tacitus.
vols.
Containing
the
Annals to Which Are Prefixed Political Discourses Upon That Author,

and
(London: Thomas Woodward
John Peele, 1728),
1:10-11.
74
Interpretation
.
It may be
useful
to collect and hand down these
occurrences since
few distinguish
the virtuous courses
[honesta] from
many
the worse, the
useful
from the harmful

of others
by
pru
dence [prudentia],
while
are taught
by
the
fortunes [eventis]
(iv.33.2).
We do kind
of
not
think it
would
be
Tacitus'
an exaggeration to prudence writes
say that
work
is
means
mind.
training in prudence, for to noble Tacitus

ends.22
is the
choice of effective and
decent
in
with
precisely these
considerations
While Tacitus
shares with
Classical
political
philosophy this
concern with
virtuous political action,
he
parts with that

which
tradition in actually emphasizing the

nobly.23
harsh
his
or
indecent
climate
in
the prudent man must act

refusal not
This is,
we
believe,
the significance of
his illusionless
to write Utopian treatises, and therefore abandon moderation
preference
for history. But Tacitus does
and an orientation
by
a prudence whose ends are moral.
He
rather maintains mo
rality limited way, he

phy.
while
emphasizing the difficulties and dangers to

anticipates
which
it is
exposed.
In
Machiavelli's break
right
with
Classical
political philoso
of poli
He
seems
to say, Machiavelli is
to this extent: the orientation
is rarely realized in the course of history. But this strengthens by him in his devotion to character and capable goodness. Tacitus agrees not with
tics
moral ends
Machiavelli, but
response
with
Plato, in seeing
one must
education of
the individual as the deepest

rule.24
to the political problem that
good men seldom
He
shares with re
Aristotle the thought that

gimes.25
Tacitus is
a realistic cosa
study moralist. He
actual regimes no anticipates
less than the best
Machiavelli's turn to the

yet at
veritd effettuale
della
in Chapter XV
of
the
Prince,
the same time
he
fails to
make
Machiavelli's decisive break

traditional philosophy.
with
the evaluation of political affairs
developed
".
by
22.
Prudence
as well as moral virtue
determines the
complete performance of man's proper
function:
virtue causes
the aim to be correct, prudence causes the things that lead to this (aim to be
1 14436-9.
correct)."
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,

23.
character
in the Dialogus
expresses a parallel
dissatisfaction
"scientific"
with a merely
ac arts them
count of
the acquisition of the
art of oratory.
"Although there is
practice present
in the
selves, no one is able to
grasp
so
many
varied and
hidden
matters unless
he brings
practice [medita-
tio] to the science, Dial. 33.

24.
natural
ability
to the practice, and the experience
of eloquence
to the natural
ability."
'"Yet, my
good
Adeimantus,
on
I said, 'these
are not, as one might think,
many
great com
mands we are
imposing
he
them, but
they
are all slight
if,
as the
saying goes,
they
guard the one
thing.'
great
or, rather than great, sufficient

that?'
'What's 'Their easily
said.
education and
said.
'If
see to all this and
everything
else we are now
by being well educated they become sensible men, they'll leaving out that the possession of women, mar
as possible
riage, and procreation of children must as far
be
arranged
friends have
Plato, The Republic, trans, by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 423d-424a.
all
things in
common'
"
with notes and an
according to the proverb that interpretive essay

that the good
25.
"In many
and
cases
it is
not possible
to get hold of the
best
constitution perhaps, so
law-giver
but
he
who
is truly
political should not

.
is best according to the circumstances. also what is possible, and likewise
forget [not only] the best simply but also that which For it is not only necessary to contemplate what is best, is
"
what
simpler and more common to all.
Aristotle,
Poli
tics, i288b24-39.
Tacitus'
Teaching
Tacitus'
and
the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
75
3.
Rhetoric
Tacitus'
There is something imposing and magnificent in the gravity of which cannot but produce a sober mood in the reader, even on first The tone
of of
style,
acquaintance.
his
eloquence
is
set
by
morality
which
looks
on the omnipresence
vice, sees all its startling
power and
variety but
surprises
always retains no
its dignity, is be
reflects, and
yond
keeps its distance.
Nothing
him,
human
artifice
his
comprehension.
He looks
judges them in pithy derful moderation which

sort of
epigrams.26
with equanimity on the just and the unjust and The heart of the eloquence of Tacitus is a won
moves and cannot
but form the taste

conveyed
of
his
readers
to a the
thoughtful sadness. In his solemnity is
the love
of virtue and
acceptance of
its limited
power.
The
grandeur of
this rhetoric
is
well character
ized
by
Emile
Jacob,
an
intelligent French classicist, in
a comment on
Pliny's
re
mark
that
Tacitus'
oratorical
delivery
was oepvov
(august).
[This reflection]
a
corresponds well to the
idea that
one
forms
of
Tacitus,
in
severe without
doubt,
and
naturally
majestic,
and
full
of grave
thoughts
and
and measured
words;
in
all
things
going to the basis
to the principles,
imposing
itself
with all
the authority
that
attaches
to the eternal maxims of the truth and of justice;

and more art, to that of
austere
with more
imagination
very similar, although Thucydides, for the force and profun
dity
of
the reflection, for the
beauty
to
of
the reasoning and
finally
for that type
of
empire which a soul exercises over us that we sense to

mains master of
be
to
moved although
it
still re
its
emotion and seems
fear to
yield
its
enthusiasms
[elans].21
He
Besides the solemnity of his moral tone, men have remarked his conciseness. seems to delight in embedding the deepest reflections in the fewest words so
them.28
Though many have remarked is constantly led to reflect upon pithiness, only Thomas Gordon, the English political commentator, has plained how it was linked to a deeper educational intent.
one
this
ex
Besides the
grandeur and words
dignity
of
his
phrase,
he is
remarkable
for
ity: but let his

expression
be
ever so
few, his
thought and matter are
surpassing brev always abundant. His

a of the
is like it
the dress of Poppaea
Sabina, described by himself; "part

it
was
face
He
becoming."
was veiled so
should not satiate
the onlooking, or because thus

pursue
starts the
idea
and are
leaves the imagination to

curious
it: the
sample
he
gives you you
is
so
fine,
26.
that you
presently
to
see the whole piece, and
then
have
your
"First hopes
of
tyrannizing
are
difficult;
once you
have
entered
in,
partisanships
[studia]
and
ministers are
ruled"
(iv.7).
1.49).
"By
the
agreement of all
(Hist.
"By fate,
powerful
[Galba] was capable of empire except that he influences [potentiae] are rarely eternal, whether [because) ei
ther satiety takes those

which sima]. able
when
desire"
they
might
is any longer left they have given all things, or these when nothing [altis(m.30.7). "The best of mortals, of course, desire the loftiest things
[All]
other things are of
immediately
present
for
princes.
One
ought
insatiably
to
prepare a
favor
despised."
memory
himself; for
said that
by
contempt of reputation,
the virtues are
iv.38.
27. 28
Jacob, CEuvres de Tacite,

Nietzsche
p. xviii.
down"
Tacitus
aimed at
immortality
and
through a
"boiling
144.
(Einkochen)
of
his
thoughts. Friedrich
Nietzsche, The Wanderer
His Shadow, Aphorism
76
share
Interpretation
in the
merit of the
readers.29
discovery;
a compliment which some able writers
have forgot
to
pay their
The
those less than the gravity of the sentiments "maxims of the eternal truth and is part of the underlying educational aim in the Annales. Education for Tacitus is more than making the reader read; it
brevity
of
his rhetoric,
no
justice"
encourages
and
him to think for himself. Some

of the souls of political men
of
the complexity, multifacetedness,

mirrored
disguise The
is
style.30
apparent
difficulty
of
his
work
in the complexity of his has the political intent of discoura
first reading all but those who are fit for learning to think. Tacitus viewed ging the highest education as something possible only for a natural elite who were ca pable of completing the hints and motives he indicated from their own active
on
observation of men and affairs.
For
such
men, as Gordon saw, his work is a
treasure-house
Neither
were
of psychological and moral
insight:
such as governed states, or
his
works
intended for the populace; but for be do
such as attended to the conduct of governors; nor were the style and
Latin
came
ever so
plain,
would
they
ever
understood
by
such as
not.
As Plutarch
to under
stand the
Roman's tongue human
by
understanding
their affairs,
Tacitus is to be known
government.31
by
knowing
Tacitus
nature and
the
elements and mechanism of
shared with and
Plato, Dante,
and
Shakespeare that highest

this "divine
rare combination of
philosophy deepest education. Hippolyte Taine better than

anyone:
poetry that characterizes the
genius and
is
required
for the
gift"
recognized
and expressed
it
Tacitus is
clarifies
.
a poet.
This type
of
imagination is
a sort of philosophic genius which
by
sudden
power
.
illumination
to create
or
and penetrates
into the truth
as
It is the
to reproduce
beings
as true and as
deeply as reason itself living as those we can
see and
touch
There
are
harsh
colors and
in Tacitus
which cause one
to understand not merely the
striking traits and a violence of the truth human soul in general, but
which
that multiple, tortuous, profound, complicated, infinite thing,

soul.32
is
an
individual
Jacob has
remarked an order
in the book
a
which
is
not
entirely
governed
by
chro
nology, and he compares it to
drama:
that of
a
The
movement of the account

unfold with an apparent
is
drama. Open
each of
these
books
where
the
us
facts
age:
uniformity, year
by
year
according
to the consecrated up, so
how the
climaxes prepare
themselves, group themselves,
are cleared
as
to
29.
30.
Gordon, Works
Bayle
remarks,
of Tacitus, p. 16. "His Annals and his
History
are
something admirable,
of
and one of the greatest
efforts of the
human spirit; thoughts,
whether one considers the
singularity
the style, or one is
interested in disguises
the
and
beauty
of the
and
in that
happy
pencil with which
he knew how to
paint the
the artifices of the political men, and the weakness of the
passions."
Pierre Bayle, Dictionaire
Historique
31. 32.
et Critique (Amsterdam: P. Brunei, 1740), s.v. Gordon, Works of Tacitus, p. 16. Hippolyte Taine, Essai sur Tite Live, 4th ed. (Paris: Hachette,
"Tacite."
1882),
pp. 347-48.
Tacitus'
Teaching
put
and the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
11
in the life
of the
in
relief a
determined
people.33
object, a tragic catastrophe, or an epoch
prince or of
the
We too have
noticed
these sections,
and
think that
they have
an
intent.
will
They
are
a
like little
essays on
different
study.
political and ethical problems.
They
furnish
determinate
4.
object
for
Methodology
clear that we
Let is be
have
no
intention
"behind"
of
going
the account of
Tacitus to discover how he
wrote
history
or what sources
he
followed.34
We
are
interested in using Tacitus as a teacher of political wisdom, and not as a for rewriting history ourselves; not to mention the fact that one could not begin to
use
"source"
him
"source"
as a
without
beginning by
himself.35
We believe that Tacitus is
a man of
understanding him as he understood higher capacities than his Tiberius

credit
or
any
of
his characters, he
and are
accordingly willing to
and even
his interpretation have

no
of
their power-hungry
deeds,
speeches,
thoughts. We
doubt that
in
general
understood political men
better than they
understood
themselves.
which
Thus,
were
on occasion
he may
attribute to them motives and passions
by
they
governed, but
ask, how could

swer
only partially he know their hearts? Is he a god? But
of which
they
were
conscious. we
Someone may
think a sufficient an
is that he
was a man of
than lesser
could
men could ever
extraordinary hope to know themselves.
capacities who
knew himself better

self-knowledge
By
he
judge
other men's aspirations and motives which
were
beneath his
and
comprehended
33. 34.
in his
greater
humanity.
Furthermore, he
was a great
historian
Jacob, Qzuvres de Tacite,

In his
masterful review of well established
p. xxviii.
and appeals could
to a
Syme's book, Professor Momigliano exhibits the same reluctance, tradition of Tacitus scholarship in support of his position. "One
Tacitus'
be
of various opinions
concerning
facts, but actually

picture and to
self.
this
is
a subordinate problem.
authority as a researcher If Syme raises to the central
and a
discoverer
of new
position of
his investiga
obscure
tion the question of the value ot Tacitus as a researcher, he appears to me in this way to
the
impose
not
on
Tacitus does
or even of Syme him Tacitus the stamp of a twentieth century historian belong to those historians who represent a new method of research directed
He also does not belong to the class of and Polybius. whom it is important for us to Dionysius Halicarnassus, regarding Livy figure out how they have collected their materials. The question, 'where did Livy get his knowledge about has a completely different scope than the question, 'where did Tacitus get his knowledge about Basically the Tacitus studies since the Renaissance have clearly recog of historical nized this situation. Tacitus was never viewed as a researcher, but as an interpreter
against their predecessors,
like Thucydides
and
historians like Titus

Romulus?'
Tiberius?'
events.'
vols.
2 Arnaldo Momigliano, Terzo contributo alia storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico, Professor grateful to friend. I am 2:742. my (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1966),
who translated this passage of modern
Donald Maletz,
35. an extensive
for
me.
reached
Ronald Syme, the doyen

investigation
of
Tacitus studies,
the
the other
sources.
"Is the Tacitean Tiberius
following conclusion after largely and mainly the cre

and sometimes with
ation of the author? obstinacy.
That
thesis
has been
argued with eloquence and

against
ingenuity,
are
Certain
reasons
tell powerfully
it. Suetonius There is

reflects
and
Dio
in
general concord with
Tacitus.
They
can rank as
independent
authorities.
no clear sign
that Suetonius used Tacitus.
Yet the biographer,

with
though casual and
incoherent,
gradually
the same diagnosis of Tiberius duplicity,
hidden
vices
(especially
cruelty)
breaking
Syme, Tacitus,
1:420-21.
78
Interpretation
infinite
pains
who took while at
to know the whole of the life of the men he

show us
judged;
he
whole
so,
was
any
moment
he may in the
only the
overt
deed
or
speech,
aware of the rank and tendencies of
its
author over
the
period of
his
life. life In
This is
which
most obvious
numerous
instances
of
his judgment
of a whole
he
shows us
Tacitus'
thus giving to than
in his obituary notices, above all in that of judgments, expressed in his own name, a higher
that we go against the common
of the
Augustus.36
status
facts,
we are aware
tendency
of
his
modern
interpreters. But, to say nothing they have been sufficiently impressed

and a
interpreters themselves,
we
do
not
think
by
the difference in rank between a Tacitus
Tiberius, for instance.

said
It has been
than the
that, "It is
of
safer
to
understand
the
low in the light deprive the low

this
of the
high free
high in the light

whereas
the low. In
doing
the latter one necessarily distorts

not of of the
the
high,
in
dom to
ple,
we
reveal are
itself
doing fully as
the
former,
it
one
does
what
is."37
In light
and
methodological princi
more
interested in the thought
interpretations
and thoughts
of
deeds
and
thoughts provided
by
Tacitus than in the deeds

of what was
themselves.
We
learn better
what
to think
thought and done
by
others, in light
of the
thought of a
supremely thoughtful
man, than we could

without
from the
naked actions of
the less thoughtful political men, taken
his
interpretations.'8
In follow
ing
as
this principle we reverse the priorities of most modern criticism of
Tacitus,
and appeal
to an older tradition
where
his
aphorisms and
judments
were revered
"golden
sentences."
We
are not unaware
that
in this
methodological procedure
Vico.39
we
may claim so illustrious a predecessor as the philosopher, There are a few modern scholars who have paid some attention to this dimen
Tacitus'
sion of
work, but none in any extended or systematic fashion.

our studies.
They
have been helpful in orienting

36. 37.
p. 2.
The best
of them
is Alain Michel,
1. 9-10.
Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion,
trans.
E. Sinclair (New York: Schocken, 1965),
38.
Consider the defense

with
of the poet
Wieland
who was charged
by
Napoleon
with
having
mixed
"history
"Men's
ideas,
sometimes, are worth more than their actions, and good nov
els are more valuable than where are
mankind.
Compare,
sire, the
found
the
best lessons for
sovereigns and
century of Louis XIV, with Telemaque, for the people. My Diogenes is virtuous though
wisdom
living
in
cask."
39.
Tacitus
was paired with
Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, p. 327. Plato and Bacon in comprehensive
by
Vico:
"Up
to that
time, Vico had
only above all other learned men: Plato and Tacitus; for with an incom parable metaphysical mind, Tacitus contemplates man as he is, Plato as he should be. And as Plato with his universal knowledge explores the parts of nobility which constitute the man of intellectual
admitted two
wisdom, so
malice and
Tacitus descends into
all the counsels of
fortune,
the
man of practical wisdom
utility whereby, among the irregular chances of brings things to a good issue. From this it fol
.
lows that
dom
the wise man should
be formed both Vico
ot esoteric wisdom such as
Plato's
and of common wis

unique-
such as
that of Tacitus.
now proposed
to have these three

so
[including Bacon]
authors ever
covery."
elaborating his works of dis The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, trans. Max Fisch and Thomas Bergin (Ithaca:
writing, and
went on pp.
before him in
meditation and
he
Cornell University, 1944),
138-39.
Tacitus'
Teaching
whose
and the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
79
book Tacite
et
le destin de T Empire"0 has the
virtue of
in the Stoic tradition
of rather transpolitical opposition to the

Tacitus'
situating Tacitus Empire. This book, intent. The

politi
however, does
cal
pay close enough attention to judgment behind the design and the practical intent Michel. He has
the
not
not
own
to educate through exam

consideration
ples escape
adequately
taken
into
that the
fol
lowing
words govern
design
of the whole of the
history: "I have
resolved not or notable
to relate political opinions unless
they
were
distinguished for
integrity
for infamy: this I be

silent and
consider to
be the
of
chief
task of annals, that virtues should not

and the censures of
deeds"
that
by
the dread
future
infamy
posterity
men
should of
be deterred from depraved

applies a
speeches and
(in. 65.1). The
criticism
Michel
ans who
fortiori to Sir Ronald Syme, the chief of the modern histori have written extensively on Tacitus. His book gives scrupulous atten
Tacitus'
tion to individual events and almost none at all to

ing.4'
design
or
his teach
Tacitus'
In
recent
times it has become fashionable in
certain quarters overall
to accept
"
presentation
in
matters of
detail, but
his
to doubt his
judgment:
by
most subtle art of
influencing
picture of
reader
by
all sorts of
innuendo
and
indirect
hints, he
an
managed to
blacken the
character of
the early emperors and has given
entirely distorted results largely from

men,
above all
the whole
period."42
We believe that this behind

acts of
charge
neglect of the political causes
the political
their fear of one another. It seems to be the result of an uncon that no one could
accounts.
scious modern prejudice
be
so
bad
as these emperors and espe
cially Tiberius
political
are
in
Tacitus'
Such
a prejudice results
from
modern
philosophy,
which seemed
to have
conquered
the effects of the passions

used
by the
ered
constitutional arrangements of
liberal democracy. Yet it
to be consid
that Tacitus shows the
political and psychological effects of a
bad
regime.
Without expecting to, his modern critics might learn something about the alter native to liberal democracy if they paid more attention to his account. That they do
not results
from
another prejudice
derived from
modern philosophy,
their so
phisticated assumption that the social or economic or other than political causes are more relevant than the political evils of
for
explaining.
"His only
explanation of
the
his time
the
and of
the preceding
periods
is the
depravity
of character of
the
actors on
political scene,
the lust for

their
power on
the part of the emperor and the
contemporaries."43
servility of the majority of Tacitus is a quintessentially

merit,
use
prominent
This fact, that
political
historian,
was
once considered
his
great
his mastery of the human soul. him in the education of the young:
Alain Michel, Tacite Svme. Tacitus.
Kurt
52
von et
In the Emile, Rousseau therefore
refused
to
40.
41
.
le destin de 1'Empire (Paris: Arthaud,

and the
1966).
42.
Fritz, "Tacitus, Agricola, Domitian,

1957). P- 94-
Problem
Principate,"
of the
Classical
Philology
43.
(April
Ibid.
80
Interpretation
a
Tacitus is
book for
old of
men;
the
youths are not
to see the first desires
heart
of man
read
ready to understand him. One must leam in human actions before seeking to sound its
the deeds before reading the
prejudice which vitiates
maxims.44
depths. One
must
know
well
how to
It
of
seems to us that
in
modern
times the
those readings
and
Tacitus has been
called
into doubt
by
the
rise of
totalitarian
tyranny
the
world wars. political
Modern philosophy has not succeeded once for all in conquering the passions in the heart of man. Tyranny remains a possibility coeval with
Therefore it
to the
seems most relevant
prejudice of modern
political society.
to make an unbiased turn to an

philosophy, and who is noted
whatever
author who wrote prior
for
laying
bare the
pressures of
tyranny
on the tyrant
his intent,
and
its baneful
have been
effect on the subjects
however ill-disposed to servility they may

we are enabled
at the outset.
In this way
to correct our somewhat paro that could
chial outlook and
to
us.
prepare ourselves
for the full
scope of possibilities
conceivably face
CHAPTER II:
TACITUS'
ASSESSMENT OF THE ROMAN
REPUBLIC
I.
Tacitus Prefaces
Tacitus'
Four
of
five
works are
devoted to themes
of civic
life in the Roman
Empire. The
man"
other one concerns
the life and
manners of
the uncivilized German

of each of
tribes who dwelt on its
north-eastern
border. At the
beginning
his "Ro
works, Tacitus alludes to a contrast between the old Roman
republican
constitution and the new

empire when
monarchy that had the Republic failed. It was an
reestablished order and preserved the official claim of the new government
that no significant change had taken place
when power was
transferred from the
defeated
republican armies of
the Senate and People to Octavian:
"The
names of
same"
the magistrates were the
(1.3.7). This
claim
Tacitus silently
rejects at the
opening of the Annales, in his most comprehensive statement litical vicissitudes the city of Rome had suffered since it was
The city Rome
of
was ruled
on the essential po established.
by
kings
at
the
beginning. Lucius Brutus founded The legal authority

consular
liberty
and
the consulate. Dictatorships the
were created on occasion.
decemviri did
not
last beyond two
years, nor
did the
authority
[potestas] [ius] of
the
that of
military tribunes last long. The tyranny ]dominatio] of Cinna was not long, nor was Sulla. The usurped power [potentia] of Pompey and Crassus quickly yielded to
the
arms of
Caesar;
under
Lepidus
and
Antony
under
yielded
to
Augustus,
).'
his sovereignty ]imperium]

which was exhausted
the name of
who received everything First Citizen [principis], [every
thing]
44. 1
as
.
by
the
ou
civil wars
/'
(1.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile

The title
which
de
Education (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion. 1966),
p. 311.
Tacitus
attributes to the emperors
First Citizen. This
was the unofficial name which
is Princeps, Augustus had
which we
consistently
translate
often taken consistent with the
Tacitus'
Teaching
This is
a
and the
Decline of Liberty
of
at
Rome
81
brief
constitutional
history
Rome. Tacitus distinguishes three distinct
periods, characterized
ruled
Rome in the
was
Rome
by three different types of constitution. The ancient kings beginning (753-510 B.C.). For most of her long history. a republic, which had liberty as its principle and which chose her own
the consuls. The other titles of authority
mentioned
annual chief magistrates,
were exceptional grants of power made republican order was
during
difficult times
when
the
regular
inadequate for
various reasons.
Liberty
and
the
consulate
were,
however,
quintessential to the republican constitution
for
almost
four hun
dred years, from
510 B.C. when
Lucius Brutus led the
nobles
to drive out the
kings,
certain
until, with the growth of Rome's empire and the corruption of morals,
individual
citizens
became too strong for the laws
and established a series
of short-lived
military tyrannies
during
the civil wars of the first century B.C. The

and
tyrants and usurpers mentioned in the passage are all from this period,
success
their
is the
consequence of the
failure
of the
Republic. A
new
type of govern
ment was established
by Augustus,
time,
over a of
the victor of the civil wars. That government,
called the
Principate, had lasted from

own
the Battle of
Actium, in
31
B.C. right on
Tacitus'
through
will
be
an
important theme
century later. The character of the Principate our next chapter. For now suffice it to say that
to offend the
sensibilities of
though Augustus
names of
was careful not
his
subjects
("The
the magistrates were the same"), his power rested in the last
analysis on
the
support of
the legions. Perhaps Tacitus does
not call
it
tyranny because
most men accepted with resignation, at
least, if
not gladly, the cessation of the
terrible
drawn-out
civil wars
(nullo
adversantc, 1.2. 1).
Tacitus he
contrasts
the new order with the old, but he does it cautiously. For
wrote under
the new order, which only
speech.
He
of
refers to the changed
intermittently permitted freedom of atmosphere indirectly by contrasting the truth

recorded
fulness
of
the brilliant writers who

with
both the
successes and misfortunes corrupted
the old Roman people,
the swelling adulation that

was established.
historians
who wrote after
the Principate
Noble
geniuses
were
deterred
came
from writing because of this new necessity to flatter. Those who spoke too freely to be punished, their work burned (iv.35). More generally, as he subse
Everyone (1.4.
1).
attended
off"
quently states, "The constitution of the city was changed to the orders of the First Citizen, with equality stripped
It
seems, at
least, that Tacitus

The beginnings
regrets
the passing of the old constitution.
of the
Historiae,
given
the
Agricola,
and
the Dialogus de Oratori
bus
confirm the
impression
had been
by
It is
the opening of the

not
Annales, in presenting
the
republican
fiction that the in his
republic
restored.
to be confused
with
title Princeps
Senatus. S. A. Cook
et al.. ed.
The Cambridge Ancient History, 10:612, less invidious to Roman

ears than
n. I.
We
will
follow Tacitus
was.
use of this title which was
Imperator. That title

victory.
speaking, a military
rulers
honor
given
by
the soldiers to their general on the field of
strictly The Roman
bore that title
as well,
but
would
have been ordinarily
addressed as
Princeps. Compare Syme's

more violence and usurpa
translation of the title to denote the tranquil order of the Principate: "No
tion.
and
The
an
years of
tribulation are buried and forgotten: the First Citizen

which
now governs
through prestige,
by
authority
Senate
and
People have
delegated."
Syme, Tacitus,
1:431.
82
the
Interpretation
of
loss
liberty
as a great misfortune.
They
are,
if
anything, more outspoken
than the Annales.

vorable climate
According
This
to the
for
virtues to arise
Agricola, the Republic provided a more fa in, and they were more highly regarded then
that a very strong case indeed might
than
in
Tacitus'
time.
could suggest question
be
made of
for the Republic. The

eloquence
forensic is
has declined
so much
opening the Dialogus is why the noble art in the Empire that even the name of free Republic. Tacitus ap This suggests the importance
orator peals
of
reserved
for those famous
speakers of the old
to
a republican
taste at the outset of
his
work.
evaluating the quality of life in the Empire in comparison with that in the Re public. That the Republic might furnish an adequate standard seems entirely comprehensible at the outset. For had the Republic not brought forth heroes in
Such, at every age, whose glorious deeds are still the wonder of the least, had been the judgment of the great republican historian, Livy. As republi
world?2
can
liberty
was
coming to
the task
an end
he
wrote:
Unless love
of
I have
undertaken
deceives
me, there was never
anywhere a
greater republic, nor one more

rice and
holy [sanctior],
'
nor one richer

nor was
in
good examples.
Ava
luxuries
never came so and
late into any city,
there anywhere such
honor
so
long
for poverty
frugality
Livy
with
sought to
of
forget the
widespread misfortunes and prevalent vices of the new
Empire
Augustus, in
the
admiring study
of
the past; he sought to fill his
mind
"those
matters,"
ancient pristine
for,
"in these times
we are neither able
remedies."
to endure our vices nor their
Tacitus too
can
presupposes
this
nostalgic
identification
of virtue with the republi
past, but in his hands it

"Roman"
undergoes an enormous refinement.
Tacitus
opens
his
was
works with what one might call a muted patriotic appeal
to what
best in the is found

The
old
Roman
political
tradition. But let us not overlook that this ap

should not mistake
peal
at the
beginning. One
the
beginning
and
for the end,

restated
2.
viewpoint on
the Republic that inspires
Livy
has been
beautifully
forcefully
in
modern
times
by
two men above all: Professor Allan

Hero,"
Bloom,
"The
Morality
of
the Pagan
we a
find these
words:
Montesquieu. In Bloom's essay, "Rome is great by its senatorial class, and

and
that class is really unique
relatively large group

rule of a
of men who are
sufficiently
obedient
to the
laws
self-
to avoid both anarchy and the
single man;
who sacrifice
which are
indulgence
dreds
to a strict military
discipline,
the rewards of
trusted to conclude on the issues of war and peace. And this is not
of years. not
ordinary weakness and only honors; and who alone can be for a day, but has endured for hun
work wonders;
individuals.'
tory is
with
the
Among them, it seems possible for single individuals to history of huge, impersonal movements, but that of great
des lois, Montesquieu twice turns
aside
Roman his
Allan Bloom,
of view
Harry
I'
V. Jaffa, Shakespeare's Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1964).

esprit
p.
80.
to
In De
pay tribute to the extraordinary accomplishments of peoples lived in governments which have virtue as their principle; and as long did there such things as we see no longer today, and which astound our little
"One is
never able to abandon the
from his primarily political point the (Roman) heroes. "The majority
as
of ancient one
it
was
in force
souls"
(iv.4). And again,

new palaces
Romans: thus
eye which
even
today in
their capital one
leaves the
to go seek ruins;
it is thus that the
has
rested on
the enameling
of the
pastures, loves to see
the crags and the

3.
xi.13.
praef.
Livy, Ab Urbe Condita,
Tacitus'
Teaching
or
Tacitus'
and
the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
83
the statement of a problem for an answer to that problem. An investigation of

assessment of
Roman
he
republicanism should
lead
us
to the deeper princi
ples on
the
basis
of which
understands political
life in
general.
2.
The Roman Republic

we
If first
of
turn to
Tacitus'
explicit remarks on the republican constitution we are at
shocked
by
their reserve. We never

as
Rome
"well-constituted,"
as
he
calls
find Tacitus referring to the constitution Sparta (Dial. 40.2-3). During its
suffered
early
years
(510-367
and
B.C.), the Roman Republic
from
a continuous
struggle
between her two classes, the
nobles or patricians, and no single thoughtful
the plebeians. Un
like Sparta
Crete (in. 26), Rome had Rome's
legislator to
settle
those contentions.
mises, and
constitution was the product of
haphazard
held
compro
it
was, as one might expect,
defective. The
nobles
all power at
first.
During
the earliest period (510-450 B.C.), the plebeians rioted often and
own magistrates
demanded their
The
of
to protect them from the arbitrary
sentencings of alone
the regular magistrates, who were then chosen from the patricians
27.1).
culmination of this struggle
was
(111.
the adoption of a written code, the

which
Laws
table
the Twelve Tables
(451-449
B.C.),
Tacitus
calls the
"last
of equi
law"
(111.27.
')
He
seems to approve
the demands of the people in this early to them.
period.
Rome's first
republican constitution was unfair

admission
Subsequently,
the plebeians
demanded
into
all
the magistracies of the city.

was
During
hav
the period between 450 and 367 B.C. Rome

gaged
in
wars with
foreign
enemies.
only free of The reasonable demands
sedition when en of the people
ing been met, they then proceeded to rival the nobility in selfishness and rapac ity. "The laws after [the Laws of the Twelve Tables] were more often carried by force
praved gained
serious
on account of
the dissension
of
the orders, in
order
to
open
the way to
unpermitted
honors,
or
to banish outstanding men, or on account of other
de
(in. 27. 1).

the right to be elected
By
the Sexto-Licinian Law of 367 B.C., the people to the consulate. Thereafter
years''
even
we
do
not
hear
of
discords for
over two
hundred
until
the age of the
Gracchi, begin
ning in 133 B.C. when seditions worsened into the civil wars that sumed the Republic. Yet Tacitus does not speak of the Republic as
finally having
con
been
4 I have found two exceptions that show that the commonwealth was not altogether settled even in these times Envy and ambition still smoldered. In 302-301 B.C. there were tumults roused by the
tribunes on
behalf
of the chief plebeians.
The
result was
that
they
too were admitted
into the
priest
hoods that had been previously reserved to the patricians (Livy x.6-9). In the epitome of Book XI of Livy we find these words: "After a long continued sedition on account of debts, the commons secede
to the
Janiculum; they
Senate
was
should
arc
brought back
by
the
that the
ordinances passed
whole
(286 B.C.). The concession made by Hortensius, dictator by the Comitia Tributa, in which the patricians had little
people
influence,
could
bind the
Roman
("('/
plebescita omnes
plebeians
Quirites
tenerent").
Perhaps
Yet
one
these are the
last because there is

argue
no other right
left for the
to demand after this.

and trust
hardly
from
these cases to an underlying sentiment of
harmony
between
patri
cians and plebeians until that and with
time or
afterward.
Though
rights were
equalized,
inequalities
remained,
them,
passions.
84
Interpretation
even
"well-constituted"
during
the interval when there
were
hardly
any domestic
seditions.
Perhaps this
was not
the only defect of Rome's

Tacitus'
constitution.
at
We may be able to understand her policy during those years when
reluctance sedition at
to praise Rome
was
if
we
look
home
"sleeping."5
For it
was
then that Rome began to practice on a grand scale the imperialism she had
limits.6
pursued earlier within narrower sion
A very
rough sketch of
Roman
expan
during
under
this
period
follows. From
and
342 to
quest of
the obstinate
freedom-loving Samnites,
us that this
275 B.C., Rome engaged in the con and in the unification of
Italy
her hegemony. Florus tells
hardy by
sea
people provided
the
material
for twenty-four Roman triumphs! She

of
then successfully
disputed
with
Carthage the dominion
Sicily by
land
as well as
a new element
for
the Romans (264-241 B.C.).

and genius of
Subsequently, Hannibal
was
defeated
by
the
daring
Scipio
the superiority of
Rome's superiority to Carthage was, above all, institutions,8 her which was demonstrated in a savage war of
em
of a
Africanus;7
pire
nearly twenty years (217-201 B.C.). After that the Romans extended their into Spain and North Africa. King Philip of Macedon lost the hegemony
then decadent
Greece to the Romans

Antiochus
of
after a
-190
brief
B.C.)
war
(200-197
B.C.),
and the
defeat
of
of
King
Syria (191
opened
to them the vast riches
Asia Minor. In the
accomplishment of this marvel of

were performed.
nean
world, many heroic deeds
subduing the Mediterra Indeed Tacitus himself is not

even seems
entirely unmoved by the record of them laid up in the histories. He deprecate the politics of his own times by comparison.
No
one ought to compare our annals with the writings of those who
to
describe the huge
old
affairs of the
Roman
people.
They
used
to
describe
with unlimited scope
wars,
besiegings
of cities, and
defeated
and captured
kings
(iv.32. 1 ).
Tacitus
succumbs to the
fascination
of
the vast
designs
and conquests of the
Roman Republic. He is
Machiavelli
not unmoved
by
their heroes. He too must
have loved his
5.
refers
to them in this manner in Discorsi 1.37.

expansion
6. The
claim that
Rome's
beyond Latium
was
only
possible
because the
struggle
be
tween the orders was concluded is widely accepted among Roman historians. Amaldo Momigliano points out that it had already been observed by Walter Moyle. a seventeenth century follower of Machiavelli and Harrington, in his "Essay upon the Constitution of the Roman Government." "He
[Moyle]
up the
7.
Turks."
sees the essential point that the end of the struggle
between
patricians and plebeians opened

and the
period of
Roman
hegemony
in Italy.
"
Momigliano,
"Polybius between the English
The Seventh J. L. Myres Memorial Lecture (Oxford: Holywell. 1975?), p. 9. B. H. Liddell Hart, A Greater than Napoleon, Scipio Africanus (Boston: Little.
pp.
Brown,
1927),
164-90.
our
8. Polybius is
authority for this: "Insofar

of the
as the
Carthaginian
constitution
flourished before that
Romans, by
so much
had the Carthaginian
constitution passed
had been strong and its prime

in
regard to the or power
then [in the time of the
dering
of
its
constitution.
Second Punic War]. Rome then was especially For this reason the people [at Carthage] had
at
its
prime
in the deliberations, but among the Romans the Senate was at its prime. Therefore, since among the former the many deliberated, among the latter, the best men, the deliberation of the Romans was in full vigor concerning the public deeds. For this reason, even though made false
already taken the largest
they
steps with
their
whole
[forces], by deliberating
nobly, in the end
they
conquered the
Carthaginians
in
the
war."
Histo
ries \i. 51. $-%.
Tacitus'
Teaching
Livy.9
and the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
85
for imitation
But it is
one
thing
to
be fascinated,
and another to single out
and praise. son
Tacitus emphatically does not do the latter. We suggest that the rea for this is that he saw all too clearly the consequences of the policy of largescale imperialism to recommend it. The strains Rome's empire put upon her Re
publican constitution
consequences
for the
directly caused the loss of her liberty not to mention its freedom-loving peoples who lost their liberty to them.
orations
Tacitus knew Cicero's Verrine

picture of what
(Dial. 37.6),
which paint a nonimperial
Roman
rule could
be. In this respect, Rome

was not.
very ugly Sparta and

the con
Crete
"well-constituted"
were
whereas
Tacitus
speaks of
sequences of nature:
Rome's
expansion
in
connection with a sober reflection on
human
The inveterate desire for
power, which was
long
ago
inborn in
mortals, matured and
broke forth
was
with
the
greatness of
the empire. For

with
in
moderate circumstances rival cities and
easily
preserved.
But when,
to desire the
the world subdued and
equality kings cut first be

the
down,
there
was room and
secure
wealth, then contentions
blazed
up, at
tween the
Senators
plebeians.
Sometimes disruptive tribunes,
sometimes
in the city and in the forum there were attempts at civil wars. Thereafter Caius Marius from the lowest plebeian stock and Lucius Sylla, cruellest of
consuls prevailed, and
the nobles, turned

more
liberty,
no
conquered
by
arms,
into tyranny. After them

anything
came
Pompey,
the
disguised but
(Hist.
better,
and never afterwards was
sought except
principate
11.38. 1).
This "moral
perialism at
history"
of
the Republic helps

city.
us
to understand why Roman im
last destroyed the
There
are two main causes.
First,
the desire
for it
private wealth emerged
in the
citizens when empire on a
large
scale made
possible to
mass of men.
gratify desire. This undermined self-abnegating patriotism in the In the early republic, men tended to be more devoted to the city in
proportion
to the prevalence of poverty and simplicity which provided a chance
neither to gain nor to use wealth.
Secondly,
the need
for garrisoning the
far-flung
during
of the
Rome's military superiority to the Hellenistic world is isolated as the crucial factor in her victory these days in a passage that supports what we leam from Polybius: "When one abandons the between Semitism
and
contrasts
Hellenism,
one sees
. .
Hellenistic mercenary leaders [condottieri]

of
easily that Hannibal was the last and the greatest These had conquered or lost kingdoms with the
mercenary, sustained
forces
their armies alone, armies that
were almost always
by
their strategic
genius, but never
[sustained] by
.
a state
that was entirely engaged in their contest,
even when
they
not
possessed such a state.

with
Rome
made war against
Hannibal
as
indeed, already
against
Pyrrus.
her
armies
but
with
herself altogether; the comradeship
and the alternation of the generals, as
the
regular succession of of the resistance.
the
levies,
shows
this civic nature of the army the
first, but
not
the
only
element
That
she made war w
ith
all
the state against armies torn

over
from the
of
civic
life [vita
statale] is the
reason of
the superiority
of
Rome
Hannibal,
over
Antiochus III
spite the appearances over

political
Macedon itself
and over
Greece.
Despite the
of
personal
Syria, and de disparities, the
ineptitude
of
Hannibal
calls to mind
its
origin
in this isolation
the armies in the face of the
state which was regularly characteristic of
the Hellenistic world. And also in this respect one confirms

which is
that the victory of Rome over Carthage cannot be divided from that
victory, the
ico,"
her true
and
fundamental
orders."
victory in Quinto contributo

e
over
the
Hellenistic
political studi classici e
Arnaldo Momigliano, "Hannibale Polit

mondo antico, 2 vols.
alia storia
degli
del
(Rome: Edizioni
di Storia
9.
Letteratura,
1975), 1:344-45.
iv 34.3.
86
Interpretation
empire and and
opportunities maintaining armies abroad for long periods provided and then to armies the corrupt first to then to individuals to power, factions,
oppress their
fellow
citizens with the armies meant
for
subjects
and enemies.
These
opportunities
had
not
been
available to ambitious citizens at the earlier orders was confined to the above all
city.10
stage when the struggle
between the
The loss
the
of patriotism on a wide scale
in the citizens, but
in the
soldiers and
leaders,
nities
prepared
the way for the breakdown

power were
of republicanism.
But the
opportu
for usurping
the decisive cause of the fall of the
Republic, for
of
in the early times

Capitolinus)"
as well there
had been individuals (Spurius Maelius, Manlius
who aspired
to tyranny, but
they
could not prevail
because
the
lack
of resources.
"In
preserved."
moderate circumstances
equality
was
easily
The conspiracy of Catiline, which lacked a erty in the last days of the Republic, as had
great
army, failed to overthrow lib
earlier attempts of
individuals in the
dauntless Cicero
all, the military
fifth
and
fourth
centuries.
The Senate
and the citizens under the

was
were a match
for that disaffected faction. It for the Empire that
instead,
in
above
establishment needed
made
the conquest of
liberty
possible.
Disloyal
and
ambitious captains could corrupt the armies
protracted commands
then
lead them
against
their fatherland. From the time of

pauper adventurers who
Marius,
the Roman
citizens
armies were recruited

of
from
fought,
not as
loyal
the republic, but to make their fortunes.
They
would
fight for their benefactor

and
even against
the city.
Marius, Sylla, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, Lepidus,

desperate
rapacious
Octavian
were all
in
command of such
armies, and Rome

won a
was subjugated
to satisfy one after the other until

rival and ended
Octavian
good.12
decisive
vic
tory
over
his last
Roman
liberty
and
for
The terrible
atmosphere of these
days,
the consequences of the
civil wars
for the already corrupt civic life are described by Tacitus with some vividness in the Dialogus. There they are presented as the fuel that fed the flame of the stu
pendous and
sanguinary
city
was
eloquence of those
days:
itself in factions
no
As
long
as our
lost,
as
long
as
it
wasted
and
dissensions
and
discords,
as
long
as there was no peace
in the forum,
harmony
in the Senate,
(Dial.
no
moderation
in sentencing,
ruined
no reverence of
superiors, no moderation of the magistrates,

a stronger eloquence
doubtless it [the
city]
gave
birth to
of
40.4).
When
one considers the
turbulence
the
declining
years of
the
Republic,
after
corruption
had become rampant, the
order established
by
the Empire looked
10.
Coriolanus
was overcome
by
was more moral
could seem to be an exception. But when he led a hostile army against Rome he pity and the patriotic prayers of his mother and wife before he sacked the city He than Caesar and the others. The evaporation of patriotism is the sine qua non for the
emergence of these ambitious generals who
inflicted
such sufferings on the
Coriolanus,
n.
12. 1.2.
see
Livy
city
For the
story
of
11.33-40.
Livy
iv.
13-16; vi.11-18.
character of those
The
pear in a speech of
tories
in
the civil
Tiberius: "By foreign victories we learned to consume wars, we learned to consume our (111.54. 3).
own."
terrible vicissitudes may be conjectured from these words that ap

the wods of others
by
vic
Tacitus'
Teaching
good,
with zens. even
and the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
87 In the Republic, fellow

citi
if
liberty
was thereafter precarious or nonexistent. great ambitious men were

remarks
its
A
greater
liberty,
free to
ruin their
character
call
in the Dialogus
liberty"
that in that
period
license flourished,
"which fools
The
(Dial.
40.2):
obtained what
orators of these
a
times [the
Empire] have
of
is
proper to
be
attributed
to
them in
composed, prosperous
and quiet commonwealth.
to attain more
for themselves in that time in

confusion and
turbulence and
Nevertheless they seemed license [the declining Re Then

each orator populace.
public],
seemed
when all was
lacking
one moderator.
to know as
much as
he
was able
to persuade the erring
From
this
cause came continual
laws
and
the name popularis.
from this
cause came the public
addresses of magistrates almost
came the accusations of powerful
spending the night at the defendants and hatreds
rostrum,
from this in
entire
cause
hereditary
families,
Senate
from this
against
cause came the quarrels of the nobles and the continual contests of the
the plebeians (Dial. 36.2-3).
at
How vividly Tacitus paints the consequences of the breakdown of political virtue Rome! The rule of one man backed by the force of the legions alone could im hearts. We
repeat:
pose peace and order on these selfish
the Empire destroyed the

circumstances neces
Republic
by
undermining
precarious
political virtue and
the
favorable
sary for that her ruin. Let

us
morality to flourish. Rome's
expansion was the cause of
consider
the problem more deeply.
Tacitus
provides
remarkably
mentions an
tough and unromantic picture of human nature. It is true, he once

age of
innocence
at the rule
ambition and erate
force,
beginning (in. 26). But that soon gives way to an age of by the strong. Man is thereafter constituted by an "invet
Left unchecked, that desire
produces anarchy.
desire for
There
others
fore, in
some places men submitted
have
succumbed
to the dominion of a king. In
they have
to the
rule of
oppression of the weak

makes about
by
laws. Civil society is better than the continued the strong. But if we consider the remarks Tacitus
why
no civil says
those
laws,
we see
society is
deserving
of
his
unre
served praise.
In the
was
case of
Rome, he
preserved."
stances,
"virtue"
equality
easily
simplicity,
only that, "In moderate circum This implies a judgment on the so-called
which some writers

"virtue"
tell us flourished at early Rome. Tacitus regards that

patriotism as a mere concomitant of equality.
frugality,
It is the
product of circumstances, a common
feeling
of weakness or
fear
of
being
dominated its. Thus
by
foreign
enemies or enemies at
home. This
years
political virtue
has lim
when opportunities arose
in the early
(510-367
exist.
B.C.), both the
nobles and
the plebeians tried to oppress each other. Though political virtue has
a real
limits, it is
and
force permitting the early Republic to
The loss
of this
type of virtue makes for quite a difference between earlier Rome (510- 146 B.C.) the corrupt Rome of the civil wars (133-31 B.C.). The absence of praise of
political virtue
from
Tacitus'
work as a whole seems
to point to a sober separa

concentrates on redi
tion of political virtue
from
a rarer true virtue.
Tacitus
where
recting Roman
admiration
from
the
early Republic,
true virtue
is
admired
88
Interpretation
political
less than
We do
virtue, to the true
virtue which can exist even
in the Empire. Camillus

or
not
deny
that true virtue existed

we
in the Republic
consider
Scipio Africanus
ally
admired
merely
wish
to point out that it is not that
which admire
is
gener
by
those who admire the early Republic. Or if
they
not
that
too,
In
they do
not separate
it sufficiently from
a general admiration of the regime.
deed,
Sparta
where
Tacitus
praises an actual political

will
regime, it is
to which
his judgment inclines. We
early Rome but try to indicate his reasons.
3.
The Republican Alternative

most
and
Its Limits
Tacitus'
What is
important for
visible.
discovering
can
hierarchy
recover more
of
human types
and
governments
is least he
the noble men

regimes
singled out
only for praise, for he is far
One
his thought
and cities.
As
we
intend to
and
show
later,13
pondering on in his praise of sparing what distinguishes Marcus

with a rare
by
Lepidus, Seneca, Thrasea Paetus,

and noble quire.
Agricola is the fact that they,

own
greatness,
practiced virtue
for its
sake,
not
for
what
it
might ac
They
were self-sufficient enough to
be indifferent to the fact that honor
among the powerful could not attend their goodness in those degraded times of the Empire. The gentleman who loves virtue above all other good things is the highest type for Tacitus, insofar
ties.14
as
he
considers political
life
and
its
possibili
It is important
perfect
at the outset to
draw
gentlemanship,
and political or vulgar virtue.

Tacitus'
sharp distinction between true virtue or From this distinction fol Roman Republic,
and
low important implications for deed

all actual politics.
noblest
critique of the
men are
in
Those
truly
virtuous who esteem virtue
itself to
rather
be the
thing
and
tend to do what is noble
from
love
of
nobility
than from
fear
of shame or
love
of
the wealth, empire, or even honor that virtue
may
bring.15
Other men,
competent and
apparently good, but
not perfect
gentle-
13.
Chapter V.
14.
Transpolitical
alternatives
poetry
and
philosophy
We
are
only
considered
in the Annales
Tacitus
as
they
will
are practiced
by
active political gentlemen.
reserve until our sixth chapter
consider
ation of
the
be
obliged
question
possibility of a noble withdrawal from political life. In order to examine this question we to leave the horizon of the Annales and study the Dialogus de Oratoribus where the of the best life is raised in a more comprehensive that contrasts transpolitical with
way
drawal
orator. 15.
in philosophic
poetry
with
the version
of
the philosophic life practiced
by
the thoughtful active
of the magnanimous man reveals that the most virtuous men tend to be desire for honor. "Most especially the great-souled man is concerned with honors and dishonors, and he is but moderately pleased in the case of the greatest honors and offered by seri ous men, since he receives but what is his own or less. For no honor would be worthy of perfect vir tue. However he will receive them since they do not have anything better to offer him (Eth Nic 1 12435-10). In the time Tacitus writes about, an indifference to public honor became almost a pre requisite of virtuous conduct, so corrupt and depraved were the Senate and the imperial court where all political honors in those days were perverted and travestied. We examine this in Chapter V in the cases of Seneca and Thrasea.
Aristotle's discussion
unmoved
by
the
"
Tacitus'
Teaching
and the
Decline of Liberty
to the other
at
Rome
89
who possess
men, desire virtue as a
means
goods.16
These latter
mere political virtue are corruptible
in
way that
gentlemen are not.
We have
drawn this interpretation from the

and vi. 22. and
following
passages:
Hist.
11.38.
1, Agr. 1.1,
2, especially
when compared with
the entire lives of
Seneca, Thrasea,
Agricola,
all gentlemen.
Given the opportunity,
men of political virtue will
be powerfully tempted to prefer the merely external good things such as wealth, honor even with a tyrant tyranny, and empire to justice. They will prostitute
their virtue to acquire what is not noble or just. Such men are than the noble type Tacitus admires.
far
more common
It
is
just
such men who are
better
off controlled and

"virtuous"
disciplined
by
good
laws
this
which minimize
temptation. The case for
republicanism rests on
basis. Good laws honor

emplars of noble
virtue and civil spirit.
devotion to the
common good.
They They
hold up for
admiration ex
educate and shame men,
who would otherwise seek
their own selfish goods, to relish
treating
one another
justly. Yet
of
one cannot speak of true virtue
in
a context where the good
behavior
the
citizens
stitution
radically dependent upon the constitution. For when the con deteriorates, so do they. On the other hand, the men Tacitus admires in
is
so
the
Empire
are good
despite the incentive to base
success provided
by
the inferior
political order of
his time.
establishment of an aristocratic republic
Despite this critique, the

political virtue was were
devoted to
monarchies
the
masterpiece of
the legislator's art.
Hereditary
disparaged because the

that is
practiced
good
king
is
is too
much a matter of
chance, and the
eye"
virtue
"under the
master's rule
is less independent than that that

the
uneducated,17
is
enjoined
by
the laws.
Democracy
by
and the
many
as
tend to
be
so preoccupied with
have less
concern with what
winning the battle is noble. Rule by those

to be
against
harsh necessity
to
whose education
taught them
to cherish virtue was most
likely
found in
well-governed aristocratic repub
lics. The laws
of
the
aristocratic republics of political virtue more
Crete
and
Sparta
were
thought to
have
provided
for this
than any other actual cities. Tacitus

works.18
praises them above
Rome twice in his
extant
16.
There is
a passage
in the Eudemian Ethics that

"A
man
seems
to well express the distinction at which

and good
Tacitus hints in
various places.
is
a gentleman
[noble
good things those which are noble
belong
to him for their
own sakes, and
man] because among the because he is capable of
practicing the noble things on their own account. The virtues are noble and the deeds that arise from virtue. There is a certain political habit such as the Spartans possess and other such men. This is the
following habit [hexis]. They are such as to think that they ought to have virtue, but on account of the things by nature good. For this reason they are good men, for what is by nature good is good for them. They do not however have perfect gentlemanship [nobleness and goodness]. The noble things do not belong to them for themselves, nor do they choose the noble and good things. He who
thinks he ought to
possess
the virtues on account of the external goods practices what is noble
by
acci
dent.
is
Gentlemanship
Dial.
mean, not
is
then perfect
(Eth. Eud.
of
I248b34~49ai8).
and
17.
40.2-3.
Here the democracies bad

as
Rhodes
Athens
are most
disparaged.
Monarchy
a sort of
so
democracy,
of
not so good as
passages
the aristocratic republic.

preference
18.
Dial. 40.2-3;
in. 26.
In both
these
the
for Sparta
over
early Rome is city

when
implicit. In the Dialogue, Maternus
chooses
Sparta
"well-constituted"
as an example of a
90
Interpretation
cities were small
These
but self-sufficient, foreigners
were
excluded, meals
were taken
in common,
and private
arice, vanity, and selfish
property was strictly desires from existing in tension

common good.
regulated
to prevent av
and over ed
with
justice
whelming the devotion to the

ucation of
They
were aristocratic
because
this type was only
effective with
the few and
those few set the tone of the society

portant to see that these cities,
vic order of a
would virtue
only if be honored. Above all, it is im

it
was thought that
though organized to preserve
freedom
and ci
high type,
refused
to
expand.19
They
if they
were
too small to engage
in imperialistic
strengthen
would
ventures and
they feared
that
admitted more people
to
the armies the
well-trained citizens would
lose
control and
freedom
tion policy
and
be lost along with the constitution, education, and the laws. The popula is perhaps the crucial difference between these aristocratic republics
Rome.20
For hundreds
ambitions
of
years,
while
she remained small
and
poor, and
confined
her
to regions
ponnese, Sparta preserved
immediately surrounding her in the Peloher liberty and her laws. This is the Sparta Tacitus
"well-constituted,"
praises, not, it is true, as a virtuous city, but as
and posses
sing the "severest discipline No doubt, there was true any

actual constitution and
and severest virtue at
laws."21
Sparta
as
well, but this

on
is
not produced at
by
or
is
hardly
dependent
virtue
laws for its being,
Sparta
Tacitus'
anywhere
else, in the way
political
Sparta
refers
to her encouragement of
emphatically is. political virtue. The relation
praise of
of
Sparta to
true virtue is problematic as it is in all actual cities. A general remark

makes elsewhere applies as well to
Tacitus
occa
Sparta. "Great
and noble virtue
only
sionally has conquered and alike, ignorance of what is

the treatment the
mander
surpasses the vice common to small and great cities

right
[recti]
see
and
envy."22
One has only to think
of
Spartans
the
accorded to
Brasidas,2'
in the Peloponnesian War, to
their only outstanding com how true this is. This is not in the least think that
meant to suggest that virtue when
Spartans did
not
they
were
cultivating true
they
taught patriotism and courage. It is Tacitus who suggests that
his
critique of corrupt with
Rome
would
have
made
it
natural
for him to
contrast the corruption of the
in its decline
shares
its
pristine
simplicity
and soundness.
The fact that he does

"well-constituted."
not, suggests that
city he
Tacitus'
view
(m. 26-27) that early Rome

the
was not
Tacitus
had
19. 20.
speaks
in his
own name, contrast the praise of the
laws
of
of
a single
law-giver, with Polybius, Histories,
haphazard
origins of the
laws
In the Annales, Sparta and Crete, each of Rome (111.26. 3).
where which
vi. 50.
easily preserved in moderate But what Rome's policy of admitting numerous foreigners to swell her conquering armies. The disorder of the large population was the price paid for the ability to ex pand. This was also the view of Machiavelli; see his comparison between Rome and Sparta Discorsi
was
Consider Hist.
11.38:
"Equality
circum
changed these circumstances above all was
1.6.
21. 22.
see
Dial. 40.2-3. Agr. "He

1
.
For
discussion
of
the problematic argument on the basis of which the
cities act
Aristotle Politics
23.
not
128433^34.
sent word to
[Brasidas]
Sparta
and
bid them to
send out another
The Spartans did

wished to get
army in
addition
comply, partly because of the envy of the chief men. and partly since back the men from the island and end the Thucydides, iv 108.
war."
they
Tacitus'
Teaching
they did
not
and
the
Decline of Liberty
at
Rome
reserve
91
devote themselves to true virtue; but his
is
qualified
by
judgment that this may be the highest that can be expected from any actual city. It is certainly the best that has hitherto been accomplished. He is in fundamental
agreement with
Plato,
who elaborated a
best
regime
devoted to the
cultivation of
true virtue, but made

and
it
clear that this regime
is
not a
likely
possibility.
radically differs from actual cities Aristotle's best regime also is meant to make the less radically dif But Aristotle also
of even
cultivation of
true virtue the public purpose of politics. It is

political practice of
ferent than Plato's from the

makes
the
cities.
it
clear
that the object
of
his best It is
regime
is
quite
different from that

to come
difficult25
the best governed actual
cities.24
not
impossible for it
which are
into being,
and
but
certain conditions would
have to be fulfilled
hence
a matter of chance.
Aristotle's best regime, best

no
as well as
Plato's, is
an object of
prayer, rather than a reality. The limited nature of

serves this outlook that even the
actual cities
Tacitus'
praise of short of what or
Sparta
pre
fall
He
prays
for
what
is truly
best,26
less than Plato
Aristotle,
and yet
is truly best. is no
more sanguine than
they
about
its
possibility.
Tacitus'
4.
Assessment of the Doctrine of the Mixed Constitution
There
was an
important
respected part of
the tradition
history by
of the
Roman Republic
time. This was
which
had become
Tacitus'
Polybius'
history
of
Rome's
the
growth
during
of at
the Punic Wars (264-201 B.C.) and their aftermath, until
final destruction
Carthage (146
as a
League, detained
ity. The
sixth
Rome
B.C.). Polybius, a leader from the Achaean hostage, became the friend of Scipio Africanus,
the younger, and had
written
during
this period at the height of Roman prosper theoretical discussion of the com
book
of
his Historiae
contains a
parative weaknesses and strengths of various constitutions.
The three
unmixed
forms
monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy
are shown
to be precarious,
since rulers
having
absolute power are
ruptions and revolutions. good
king
easily corrupted. There is a cycle of cor is chosen for his virtue. Power passes from this
king
to his heirs
who are corrupted
by
a
power and power
deservedly
nobles
overthrown
by
the
a
the oppressed nobles. Under the influence of

and
these
then
degenerate
become
mere
oligarchs, provoking
a
democratic
revolt.
Subsequently
democrats become
mob, unwilling to rule the cycle
by
law. In the all-prevailing license
strong Polybius thought he had

which
power
man comes to power and
is
renewed.
most stable constitutions were
observed
that the
those
forestalled the
corruption of even good men

faction.27
by
to any one man or
The
mixed
constitution
refusing to give complete he described is
24. 25. 26.
Aristotle, Pol. 133355-10. Ibid., 1325533-40.

Dial
41.4. of
27.
Cicero followed Polybius in Book II
mixed constitution.
The
chief speaker.
Scipio Africanus. the

1.69).
his dialogue, De Republica, in treating Rome as a younger, identifies the mixed constitu
In Book II Scipio describes the
genesis and
tion as
better than
all the simpler
forms (De Rep.
92
Interpretation
calm
different from Aristotle's polity which attempted to poor by giving power to a large agrarian middle
tions of
the
struggle of rich
and
class.28
In these best
constitu of
Polybius,
the
power was shared
by being
divided between the factions institution
the
rich and
poor.
Each faction
was
given an
the assembly, the
Senate
in
some sense
dependent
on the
other,
and capable of
resisting
attempts
at oppression ment of an
by its rival. The balance was further strengthened by the establish intermediary monarchic power to check excesses in either of the two
mixed constitution was
factions. Thus the

chy,
and
to include a stable balance of monar
aristocracy and democracy. It resembles the constitutions of Sparta, Carthage which Aristotle singles out as the best actual constitutions
and
Crete,
of
his
time,
his
then
criticizes.29
The two
"noblest"
such
constitutions
known to
Rome
of
Polybius
were
those
of
Sparta before the Peloponnesian War,
and the
own time.
They differed
and
own
freedom
mainly in that Sparta's was devised to preserve her Rome's made her capable of expanding. Unwhile territory,
development
of that mixed constitution at 11.27).
Rome, apparently drawing

also
on a
lost
Polybius'
section of
Histories for his facts (De Rep.

product of chance and
Polybius had
taught that the Roman constitution was the

vi.io).
necessity
rather than a prudent
legislator (Hist,
However,
this same
teaching is
there
manipulated
the all-too-political
adroitly by Scipio to show a dimension of politics that had not been seen 5y Polyhius. Scipio's true inspiration is Plato, and it is the Platonic teaching that
and
is
limit to the justice
rationality that is to he found in

an
actual politics
that he
truly
wishes
to
develop. Plato had

and then
shown this
5y devising
whose
imaginary
city that
was organized
indicating
He
to the careful reader the reasons why such a city
is
highly
heing
(De Rep.
11.21).
Scipio,
teaching has
the same
intent,
uses a
according unlikely to come into different method (adapted
to reason
to Rome).
pretends that
Rome is the ideal city,
"attributing
or
to reason what was done
by chance
or
necessity"
(De Rep.
11.22).
On the
of
surface
he idealizes
beautifies Rome, but he indicates for the

11.57-
careful reader the

of
limitations
his
argument
(see especially De Rep.

1.62 and
59).
Cicero's true
view
the character of the early Roman Republic is not this
presented
by
Tacitus (see especially De Rep.

the limits of reason
idealized view, but much closer to the view Ann. 111 27.1-2). Because the description in
city"
Book II
of
the origin and development of the constitution of the "best
ordinate argument
in
politics
Cicero
must complete
is really devoted to a sub that description with a

of this of
discussion
which
of
the principles of justice and their proper place in civic

and
life. Much
the
discussion, to
Books III
educated
surmised.
Cicero
among
cal more
Rome may be philosophy is not subversive, and thus to make a home for it Romans. The Republica is a masterpiece in his ongoing campaign against the politi
now
IV
were
devoted, is
lost. The intentions
of
idealization
wished
to show that
irresponsibility
civil wars.
demic
the
of Epicureanism. This is the first and greatest intent. But there may have been a timely inspiration. The De Republica was begun in 54 B.C., during an interval in Rome's en
Is it too
much to suspect that
Republic? Perhaps he
wished to persuade men to
Cicero had the further intent of adorning the cause of devote themselves to the regime while there was fact that, while sharing them. He feared that what would
Tacitus'
still a chance
that it might be saved. This would account for the
view
of
the defects of the
Republic, he is
5e
worse.
not so outspoken about

Tacitus'
come af
ter the
Republic
would
Cicero then is
be
more complete of
closer to
an exaggeration
time the Republic was By irrecoverably lost. Plato than Polybius in his understanding of politics. Perhaps it would not to say, that consequently, he is closer to Tacitus. We reserve for our last chapter a
Tacitus'
treatment
this interpretation of
Father Ernest Fortin (cf. "The Patristic Sense

194-95). 28.
29.
understanding of Cicero's theoretical position. For the Cicero's De Republica, I am happy to express indebtedness to
my
of
Community,"
of
essentials
my teacher,
pp
Augustinian Studies 4 (1973)
Aristotle, Pol.
I295bi-96a2i.
Ibid., I269a29-73b26.
Tacitus'
Teaching
like Tacitus, Polybius
and
the
Decline of Libert}'
at
Rome
93
seems
to regard this difference
as a mere matter of arbi

judgment.30
trary
choice, concerning
which
he
makes no prudential
He
writes:
For guarding their own [country] securely and watching over their freedom, the legis lation of Lycurgos is self-sufficient and for those who embrace this end. it must be
agreed of
that there
neither
is
nor
Lycurgos. But if
someone
has been any constitution or discipline preferable to that longs for more, and holds that it is nobler [kallion] and
rule many, and
more august
[semnoteron]
all
than that to
to conquer
and
be
despot
over
many, and
have
look up
and power
and turn to
him, for
this
one must agree
that the Spartan
constitution
is deficient
the constitution of the Romans is
superior and
better
con
stituted
for gaining
(Hist, vi.50).
constitu seems
We have already
to accept the
connected to this
works a
seen
that precisely this difference between the two

"well-constituted"
tions leads Tacitus to prefer

"natural"
Sparta to Rome. Polybius find in

Polybius'
acquisitiveness of men much more uncritically.
Probably
extant
is the fact that I have
not
been
able
to
critique, express or
implied,
of political virtue such as we
find in Taci
precarious,
tus. Since
he does
not seem to regard
it
as conventional and
thereby
virtue.
he does Rome Rome
not make a theoretical point of
condemning
undermine
expansionist republics
like
and
whose
are
policy just two different
and
success
will
political
Sparta
choices
for him. Yet he is
aware of the consequences
of world
empire, if not empire simply. He does predict the corruption and down
fall
of
Rome:
a constitution
Whenever
has
pushed
its way through many

without
and great
dangers
and after
wards reaches
clear that as
any superiority sovereignty happiness settles in it more, lives become more necessary
and
more
battles ]aderiton], it is
extravagant and men more
contentious than
about offices and other charges.
As these things
proceed,
of
the desire
the
of office, and
the shame of
lives
and extravagance will
be the
losing beginning
reputation, as well as the

of a change
boastfulness
(Hist.
for the
worse
vi. 57).
Polybius
continues
in saying
corruption of morals at
Rome
will result
in
mob
rule, the worst of all governments.
This is
a transformation that even the most
perfectly balanced mixed regime will undergo as a result of its expansion. Per haps because he lived among the irrevocably expansionist Romans, Polybius did
not
draw the
conclusion that expansion
beyond
a certain point
is
not good
for
even the most well-tempered mixed constitution.
to
prevent expansion was so much against natural

was
Perhaps he believed that to try desires as to be impractical;

and perhaps
certainly it
at
vided ruin
too late at Rome in
Polybius'
time,
impossible there her

of
any time. Even Sparta had by the defeat of Athens

(Hist.
vi. 49-50), and
which
not chosen at
to resist the opportunity to expand pro

empire she
Aegospotami. The
built then
was
this despite the
admirable and ancient
discipline
Lycurgos,
for
over
had
until then preserved the

years.
city orderly
and
free,
though small,
four hundred
30.
Polybius, Histories
vi.50.
94
Interpretation
refers
Tacitus
passage
with
to Polybius in an important theoretical passage,
and though
the
is
concise and
difficult,
I believe he indicates fundamental

Roman
agreement
Polybius'
analysis of the mixed character of the old

concerned with object rather
constitution.
The
passage
is
the object of writing history. Tacitus shifts the
emphasis
in this
than really
disagreeing
with
Polybius in the
precise-
analysis of the
balance
of powers
in the Roman
constitution.
Polybius
admires
the Roman constitution as it is (in Hist. vi. io, he calls it the "noblest constitution
of
my time"). He
makes no
distinction between
cultivate a taste
political and
true virtue.
Thus
there is a
acter of
of
tendency in Polybius to
that
accepts
the goals and char
the
ordinary political men uncritically. Tacitus does not dispute the analysis Roman constitution as mixed, though he seems to be less willing to praise
objective of
it. The
rable
his
history is
i.i).
to produce an admiration for what
in human character, large (cf. Agr.

that it is wrong
of
an admiration
Tacitus'
people at
much
is truly admi that is all too rarely found among the critique of history is not as
Polybius'
about
the constitution, but that it is conventional in
its
stan
dards
judgment. It is
not a
truly
classical work.
Tacitus
claims to guide men
in
an unconventional or thoughtful useful and
ability to distinguish the noble and the base, the the harmful. He intends not only to inform about what happened, but
and taste.
to
form judgment
The
History
as
Tacitus
conceives
it is
a school
for
perfect
gentlemen.
following
seems
is his
most comprehensive statement on
the purpose of
history. Here he
Either the
of
to be separating
himself from Polybius.

rule all nations and cities.
people or
the chief men, or
individuals
The form
the
republic which
is
chosen
Irom these
and united
is
easier
to be praised than to
come
about, and if
as
it
comes about
it is
by
no means able to
or
be
of
long
duration. There
fore,
once, when the
plebeians were
strong
the
the commons
and as
had to be known, best

and most
and
by
what means
Senators prevailed, the nature of it could be moderately contained; Senate

and
those who
thoroughly
understood the characters of the

and wise,
the
nobles were
believed
experienced
in the times Roman
thus
since
the
constitution
has been
is
useful
changed and there is no other
state
than the commands of one man, it
to gather
and
hand down
these things. This
is because few from

the
men
distinguish the
noble are
things from the worse
by
prudence, and the useful

others
harmful, but many
taught
by
the
results
that
have happened to
(iv.33. 1-2).
The
passage
is
quite concise.
We
understand
its sense as
follows. For
the most
part nations and cities are ruled
by
a part of the citizens.
Rule
mocracy, rule
by
the chief
men of
aristocracy
or oligarchy, rule
by the people is de by one man monar

praised
chy
or
or
tyranny. The "form
the republic which is chosen from these and
united
the mixed constitution is
difficult to
bring
into being. It has been
highly
mind
in the traditional
works of political philosophy.
Aristotle, but from

and perhaps
Polybius
what follows it seems Cicero. The latter two had identified
Here Tacitus may have in most clear that he thinks of

the
Roman
republic as
a mixed constitution
and praised
it
highly
as
stable.
Tacitus
presupposes this
identification of
what
Rome
with a mixed constitution
in
we
all
that lollows.
not see
has been
Indeed, from
could
said earlier about the
Republic,
do
how he
do
Tacitus'
Teaching
otherwise.
and
the
Decline of Liberty
both had
at
Rome
95
The
people and the nobles
a share
in the government, ruling

not
through the assemblies and the Senate respectively.
However, Tacitus does
follow Cicero
mixed
Polybius in emphasizing the stability or security of Rome's constitution. We have seen already how little he is willing to credit that
or
myth, which was, no
doubt, ennobling
and useful as
long
as the
Republic lasted.
be
Strictly speaking, of long
duration."
perfectly balanced mixed constitution is "by no means able to Tacitus illustrates this contention with reference to Roman
perfect
history. Rather than
balance, Tacitus
with nobles
sees an
underlying sharing
at some
of power
which was somewhat
fluid,
predominating
times under cer
tain circumstances, and people predominating at others. Rather than

an
institutional
"settlement"
of the political
relying on problem, Tacitus indicates its fluid

mixed constitution no
character, even
in the
mixed constitution.
In the
less than
in the
rule
by
part, there
is
always need
for
moderate
leadership. For Tacitus

politics.
this is the universal necessity for maintenance of rule and justice in all
While longest
avoid
aware that no
ones. of
lasting
is eternal, Polybius tended to emphasize the He intended above all to teach future constitution makers to
regime pure rule of some
the
defects
giving
the
part, whether nobles,
king,
or com
mons,
by
a share of
the constitution to all three. The

magnified
power of artifice and
constitution-making tended to be
work.31
in
Polybius'
somewhat optimistic
In Tacitus
we
find the
reverse.
He is impressed
In
by
the
prevalence of
means
fac
tional rule or rule

pressed
by
a part of
the
community. unreason and
effect
this
he is im
It is
by
the ubiquitous power of
injustice. The
mixed constitu
tion,
able
which
he implies deserves praise, is

praised
lasting."
nevertheless rare and precarious.
"easier to be
to be
than to come about, and if it comes about, it is
long
There is
seldom
any
respite
for
by long-suffering humanity
no means can
from
oppression
by
corrupt and
insolent
rules.
The best that

men to
be hoped for is
part of
that it will be possible
for
wise and
benevolent
lead the dominant

most rule
the community to exercise rule in a
moderate way.
If
is but
rule of a
and to know "by what means it could faction, it is necessary to "know its For moderation in the pursuit of their own good is the be moderately most that can be hoped for from most men. One who had discerned this sobering
contained."
nature"
truth will not then

with
ordinarily
admire governments,
but
will
be
more concerned
the extraordinary men who arise
under all governments and yet who are al
ways more or
less limited in the
exercise of
their understanding and benevolence

men are rare:
by
the prevalence of
folly
and
injustice. Such
worse
"Few
men
distin
prudence."
guish
the noble things from the
by
of
It
seems
that Tacitus writes
history especially for those of us in the ture, but who can learn from the results
by
nature
second rank, who are not prudent

others'
by
na
deeds. Since Tacitus is

way
as to
prudent
he
exhibits
to
us
the
deeds
of men
in
such a
form
our judg-
role in the development of See Professor Thomas Pangle's illuminating account of Montesquieu's teaching on the halance of powers in the constitutional doctrine he developed which is
Polyhius'
at
on
the hasis of modern liberal democracy: Montesquieu's

the Spirit of I he Laws (Chicago:
Philosophy
pp.
of Liberalism, A
120-22.
Commentary
University
of
Chicago. 1973).
96
Interpretation
too can contribute to
ment so we
just,
moderate, and
effective government
in
world
that is always difficult.

outlook that
It necessarily follows from this sobering his readers to despair, even in the dark times
Tacitus does
not
teach
of
the Empire.
They
are not
entirely
different from
all other serves
times.
Tacitus'
partial
debunking
of the much-admired
exposed and pre
Roman Republic
the important function of revealing the
carious condition of true virtue always and everywhere. proportion
There is
an eternal
dis
between the
Tacitus'
speculate
on
would suggest
society understanding of the causes of this disproportion, we the following. The man of true virtue longs for happiness or selfrelations with attain this
goals of
and the goal of true virtue.
If
we might
of
sufficiency for himself and justice in his the greatness of his mind, he tends to Since
most men are not so well
his fellow
men.
Because is
politically through
benefiting
others.
endowed,
and since
they
mistake what
truly
ness.
good, their innate quest for self-sufficiency leads them to tend to sacrifice
others, even their fellow citizens, to their
longing
to
Under
certain circumstances
such
as
for self-sufficiency or happi the Roman Republic, there was a
greater and
incentive to
use men of
true
virtue
help
honor
most men equate with self-sufficiency.
the society acquire the goods Even so, the goal of the Repub
members; virtue was
lic
was not
fostering
end,
virtue
means to this
public.
not
but the well-being of its the goal itself. Therefore,

for its ends,
more
Tacitus'
ideal
cannot
only a be the Re
ends.
As
politics uses virtue
virtue uses politics
for its
For
this reason, Tacitus
is
favorable to the Republic Principate to
than the
Empire,
since at
least it
was possible
for
virtuous men
to participate actively in
see
republican poli
tics. Now we turn to the character of the

virtuous
how the
situation of the
entirely different when the regime changed. In a sense, we may say that this chapter has enabled us to separate true standard of evaluation of politics from a false one virtue from the Republic.
even
not
Tacitus'
became worse,
if
Discussion

Pamela K. Jensen
Kenyan College
of

H. Horwitz.
pp.: cloth
of
the American
Republic,
of
3rd ed.
Edited
by
Robert
+ 347
(Charlottesville, Va.: University Press $25.00, paper $6.50.)
Virginia,
1986. x
The bicentennial
ered
of
the
framing
of the
American Constitution is
being
ush
in
with
tennial of
self-congratulatory fanfare that accompanied the bicen the American Revolution, a fact that reflects in some measure our
of the
as well
little
ambivalence about this event,

relative ward
as our
to
earlier collective experiences. which
characteristic
uncertainty about its importance American tendency to
self-criticism,
is
noted
throughout The Moral Foundations of the
American Republic, is clearly manifest in our ambivalence toward the Constitu tion, and takes its bearings by interpretations of that document. As indicated by
the recent furor over the weight to be accorded to the intent of the
cial review, we wonder
framers in judi
main
less
about whether
framers'
their intention
can
be in the
dis
cerned than about whether the
views should
in fact be
binding
books
upon us.
Should it happen that

marked
our commemoration of
the Constitution continues to be
in
a sober and reflective manner
by
etc.
lecture
series,
of essays, agree
new editions of
the
founding documents,
also partakes of the
we might
reasonably
that
such a response mixed selves.
is fitting. A
meditative posture corresponds not
only to
our own
feelings, but
sobriety
of
the
original workmen
them
Even those scholarly

framers'
productions that owe their appearance to the extend and continue
bicen
tennial, moreover, essentially

reappraisal of
the process of
appraisal and
the
came
work
that, in the debates between Federalists

with
and
Anti-federalists,
into
being
the Constitution itself.
In his
editorial
preface, Robert Horwitz ties the
publication of
the third edition of The Moral
Foundations of the American Republic expressly to the bicentennial of the Con stitution. The book aims to make a contribution to our ongoing reflections in this
year of
heightened
awareness of our
foundations. The
value of the contribution
it
makes will endure
the
work of
the framers and their
far beyond the anniversary itself. For the light that it intent, for the justice that it does them
readers can
sheds on
illumi be
most
nating both the strengths and weaknesses of the project, its grateful. It is an important and wonderful book.
98
Interpretation
not
Although the American Constitution is
the
official
subject
of
every essay
in one
in the book, way
all the
contributors
take
as
their theme the
founding
principles
or another and consider them
in light
as experienced of their moral effects,

possible
during
within
the last two hundred years. Each essayist also treats of

our
resources
and aug heritage for overcoming the defects of those due prominence to the views of Madi menting their strengths. The book accords philosophical and political context larger the of Locke, son, the philosophy
principles
framers'
within which
the
work
took place, and the contours of current criticism

representatives.
of
the Constitution
by
some of
its best
There
are also
two essays
still
that address specifically two of the most vexing constitutional

much on our minds
issues
very
founders'
today
the definitive accounts of the

"establishment"
view of slav
ery
Storing and of the and its background by Walter Berns. Considering the great success of this book, by
lightly. The
value of
Herbert
clause of
the First
Amendment
one would
be ill-advised to
alter
it
additions
Mr. Horwitz has
made
to the third edition enhance the
the
book,
while
says, the
and
responsible
preserving the extraordinary quality of the individual es manner in which the authors discuss controversial issues,
essays
the book's well-articulated and coherent structure. The new

central pedagogical
further
clarify the book's
intention: to
oblige
the reader to consider
conflicting arguments on fundamental questions relative to our moral foundations and to leave him to draw his own conclusions. With the new essay by Michael Zuckert
on
Locke's
view of civil
religion, the book
establishes even more
firmly
Robert
the centrality of Locke's philosophy to an understanding of the American pro
ject. The Dahl's
addition
of
James Ceaser's thoughtful

of
and
lively
critique of
proposals
for the refounding book in
the nation in view of its defects
extends
the scope of the

scriptions.
mat and
a more pronounced
way into the
realm of
The
new
introductory
and
demonstrates how
essay why to
by
Will
read
it. Mr.
Morrisey Morrisey
explains the
policy pre book's for
takes the reader
by
the sure route of common sense
into the
to the
concerns of the
book, brings its design

in the essays, for
the
into focus for him,

which are arranged
and alerts
him
disputes he
will encounter
in
pairs.
The introduction is
political
an excellent argument
ap
proach point
to the
study
of
American
able
thought employed here. I
can
only
to,
without
being
to
describe,
the
deep
comprehension of the
essays
and of
the relationships
among them that informs Mr.
Morrisey 's introduction. It

will assist
clearly
exhibits the qualities of the essays
it introduces. It
the first time
reader, but only after

appreciate its value.
spending considerable time with the essays can one fully Although the introduction is written, as the book is. with the
undergraduate student
proves to
be,
a manual
especially in mind, it is also, as the book itself clearly for teachers. The book now comprises six pairs of essays
essay
on
three on either side of the

sey. which is so placed
as
the
United States
as
regime
bv Joseph
Crop
to emphasize that it is the central
The first
pair ot essays
by Robert Goldwin
and
essay in the work Benjamin Barber presents two
general views of
the
founders'
political project and establishes the central themes
The Moral Foundations of the American Republic

of
99
political moder
the book. While
they
are allied
in their
praise of the
founders'
ation and
realism, the two men
disagree
about the character and consequences of a
the
Constitution. Mr. Goldwin discerns
deliberate
effort on the part of the
fram
form-giving
ius,
which
project
to respond to the
distinctive American
character or gen
they found already

argues that
preformed, so to speak,
by
cultural
diversity
in light
and
shared ples. need
historical
experiences prior to
1787, in light
of general republican princi

of a
Mr. Barber
the framers
recast republican principles
to respond to
distinctively
American
economic
conditions.
While both
self-
men perceive
the emancipation of the passions conducive to commodious
preservation and ergies
the encouragement of the
economic growth and entrepreneurial en views of
to
be
of
objects of
Constitution, they have differing
the
moral re
standing
those objects and of the extent to which real accommodation of them in view. Both do see genuine
publican principles was possible with
moral
principles
in the Constitution
and agree
that neither the American character, nor
American
conditions, nor republican principles as
they
were understood required
government to
be the
vehicle of moral elevation
most concerned with
the consequences of
in any this fact.
grand sense.
They
are
In
order
to
bring
as
to light the manner in

goes
which
these essays deepen the
reader's
understanding
that
runs
he
along, I will
try
to follow out the strand of argument

orientation, extend
through the book stemming
from Mr. Goldwin's
it
in
one respect, and then return and others. asserts
to the objections to that orientation raised
by
Mr.
Barber
Mr. Goldwin
that the moral principles embodied in the Constitution

of right action pertinent to
foster in Americans habits

self-restraint.
In
way that is
especially decency, later discussions, he

shorn of
moderation,
also notes,
and
how
ever, the ease with which these qualities can be

can repel as
their loveliness.
They
the
frequently
from
an
as
they
attract;
they
cannot escape an association with
middle class. must proceed
As indicated
by
Federalist 10,
fair
assessment of their worth

men are not angels.
mor-
Mr. Goldwin
alism, as
urges that
unflinching if such qualities fail to satisfy
recognition of
the fact that
a purer or nobler
lacking
grandeur,
they
also militate against the utopianism that can
harden into
pointed.
misanthropic self-righteousness when
its
unrealistic
hopes
are
disap
The American tendency toward self-criticism, including the occasional severity of our moral judgments on ourselves, confirms for Mr. Goldwin the de cency of our regime. Throughout its history it has granted a field for the exercise
of a
steady, if not
reach
high-flown,
moral
To
a similar evaluation of
sensibility or sense. its moral consequences, Martin Diamond

nature of
moral
takes the reader
in his essay further into the

understand
the political project em

of
bodied in the Constitution. To

tion,
we must set
science
the
dimension
the Constitu
po
it in the
context of the rejection of classical or

science of
Aristotelian
litical
by
the "new
to
which
the American founders
enthusiastically from the old one is the priority it
subscribed.
The hallmark
gives
of the new science
distinguishing
over
it
means"
to "the efficacy of
"the
nobil-
100
Interpretation
ends."
ity
of
That is to say, it lowered the
ends of politics
available
to
make
them more
commensurate with means
generally
we
and
readily
(p. 83).
Following
founders
them,
Mr. Diamond,
secure
sought to
philosophic teachers, the may say that, like their to men their own, in the sense of what belongs to
including
perfect
their own children, but

and to
beginning
with
their
proprietorship
over
their own
with
bodies,
liberate
men who are all
born
by
nature, as
Locke says,
"a
title to
freedom,"
dependence,
neither of which
from arbitrary political authority and personal benefits nature itself can guarantee. The creation
Leviathan,"
by
consent of an artificial public power or
"mighty
rather
that
directs
men
through settled, standing rules or common measures

can overcome
than will or
whimsey,
the irregularities or
worse.
uncertainties of
the state of nature and/or the
tyranny
of
that
is
The
public purpose of the public power

vengefulness
is
conceived
in
terms of the need to cure the savage
that can overtake men in cases
when
injury close to home, but also the apathetic remissness that descends on them injury occurs at a further remove, a consequence of the fact that, as Hobbes
we are
says,
fitted
with natural microscopes
but
no natural telescopes.
To
a con on
siderable extent all the
defenders
of the modern commercial republic
based
the rights of man share in Rousseau's vision of a regime that would overcome the
chief problems modern
incident
alike to
the
austere ancient republic
'
and
the luxurious
despotism,
where men
learn best how to
command or exploit and
how
to obey,
leaving
them neither
achieve
free,
nor
equal,
nor
tolerant,
nor
humane. It is,
moreover, possible to
old-fashioned sense,
these ends without
i.e.,
the
suppression of
requiring self-mastery in the the baser passions as unseemly or
encouraging an inclination toward war and the mastery of others; the fundamental passions of men will be redirected toward peaceable
sinful, and without
ends.
Madison's
statement of
in Federalist
10 that the regulation of the various and
interfering
forms the sentially
interests
man,
which are permitted
to
flourish in defect
free society,
relied es
principal
task of modern
legislation, implies
to supply the
that the framers

of
on calculations of self-interest
better motives,
such as public
spirit, shame
or
self-sacrifice, to maintain
our republic.
Although the liberal

sions of men, ponent
philosophers take their

and
bearings
by
the
fundamental
pas
Mr. Diamond detects

psychology.
stresses,
above all, the prescriptive com question of the moral
in their
of
He demonstrates that the
foun
dations
moral
the
American
republic
easily
resolves
itself into
the question of its

sense
intent. He
accords us the status of a regime
in Aristotle's
cause the
"less
Constitution, like liberal thought, sought to and did nurture, albeit on a than formerly, a particular kind of ethos. demanding What we intu
model"
largely
be
itively
eral men
call
"the American
way'
arises out of a
or
deliberate
effort on
the part
of
lib
of
thought to
dampen down
domesticate
the passionate self-preferences

motives
on
which could
be translated into
character
hand, but
which also precipitate the most
ennobling ferocious civil
the one
strife,
on
the other. Roeer D V

and
Jea";JaCqUC"R0USSeaU'/7''"?D'''VMW' n and Second . aL Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, .964), p. 57.
Discourses,
trans
'
101
Endorsing
for
mond's
the efforts of their
forebears,
for
the founders evince a decided preference

some passions, over others.
some objects of
the passions, or
In Mr. Dia
view, the American system is
framed
deliberately
to resist "the upward
politics."
gravitational pull of
The founders
"depoliticize"
seek no
less than to
alter the nature of political conflict
itself,
to
it, thereby
to ameliorate
it; enabling
only
men
to
be
more sociable and
accommodating to
and rival economic
one another.
It is
not
and perhaps not
especially
opposite
interests that
create adversaries who are too adversarial as such contain
(Bar
ber,
p.
56).
Noneconomic interests
the good and the
this potential, especially
quarrels over
just
or
those arising out of religion. As Rousseau

alone
suggests, one cannot

one supposes
live peacefully beside, let
love,
the neighbor whom
to be damned. As a consequence of the regime's sanctioning of the to self-preservation,

of
passions conducive cal opinions
however,
men
"will tend to form
politi
in defense
[economic] interests,
and
then
jockey frenetically,
but
ultimately tamely, for group and party advantage on the basis of those (p. 91). If they did not dream of eradicating religious and political differences,
as
interests"
being
inconsistent
with
individual liberty, the founders hoped to interests

and
see
them
multiplied
in the
manner of economic
in that way to dilute them.
The
founders'
preference
for the large
commercial
republic, while
certainly
not
offensive to either the
American
character or
the American conditions, is estab

also
lished
which
on principle.
This
principle enabled
them
to
prefer
the condition
in
they found themselves. The size of the American praised for the diversity it permits and encourages in types
erty, in religious sects, and in avenues
republic and
is variously degrees of prop
for the
expression of
individual talents.
By
so
firmly
stitutional
project,
establishing the context within which to view the American con Mr. Diamond clarifies the gains to be expected from it and by
examining its moral intentions, he raises the central moral questions of the book. What is the moral standing of the human character fostered by the American re
gime or
way
of
life? Are the
resources of
that character adequate to the task of
maintaining If the founders

spirit
our
free institutions?
and
their
predecessors
feared
goals a
there could
be too
much
high
in politics,
as a consequence of
high
that
addressed
the soul,
they did
to
not seem
to fear that there could
be
too
little
downward
gravitational pull
ward supine
inertness
as an untoward consequence of their
very
success.
Is it
that
possible to render the rough and one need no
jagged
edges of men so smooth and uniform
but
an
rather about
longer worry about their accommodating themselves to one another, how to distinguish them from one another? The threat posed by
herd"
"autonomous
preoccupied
both Tocqueville
and
Nietzsche,
Their Locke
one
of
democracy's truest friends

are
and one of
its
most
bitter
enemies.
concerns
treated in the
and
book, first in the
context of
discussions
of
by
Robert
Horwitz
Michael Zuckert.
these two essays provide undergraduate students with a more
Taken together,
comprehensive view of
Locke's thought than they
would
normally be
afforded
102
Interpretation
and permit a
fuller judgment
also
of what the
founders
made of
their
philosophic
in
of
heritance.
They
balance two
previous essays that stress the
importance
pp.
the thought of
Rousseau (Barber,
p.
43) and of
nor
Hobbes (Hofstadter,
urge
73-74),
that
but
exclude
Locke. Neither Mr. Horwitz
Mr. Zuckert
by
any
means
the American founders took over Locke's thought completely
on the subjects
they discuss. They

heirs. The Lockean
count of essays
point, on the contrary, to a narrowing of his views
in his
un-
bring
to the forefront
what might seem at
first to be two
elements of
Locke's
own philosophy.
By
means of an
interpretive
Locke's
ac
his Some Thoughts
Concerning
and
Education
and
On the Reasonableness
on
of Christianity, Mr. Horwitz

posals
for
a civic education and
Mr. Zuckert focus respectively for a civil religion.
pro
According to Mr. Horwitz, Locke's educational proposals express a judgment about the insufficiency of the prudential calculus altogether to supply the defect
of
better
motives
in the
commercial
republic; to act as a substitute for morality or
civic virtue.
In
order
to maintain the
inspiriting
love
of
liberty
for its
in its members, A do
something must be in the civil law, on

mestically but
ments and opinions
added which
to the association of justice and self-interest embodied the regime
fundamentally
relies
security.
managed civic education allows
for the inculcation independent

of the
of proper senti
in
men
by
an operation
laws themselves
an
commensurate
with
their ends,
would enlighten self-interest and

sic or
properly instill civic virtue,
understood.
Such in
education
although not
either a clas
Christian
sense. not share
Although the American framers did its
in Locke's
concern
for
a civic
education, Mr. Horwitz argues that our experience

years
during
the past two hundred
may only
confirm
necessity.
The
successful effort to ensure that men's

or antisocial
spirited
other
self-assertions would take on
fewer angry
forms
than
in
times and places seems to have
domesticated
the optimism
"spirit"
to such an extent that
the vigor of our republic
is threatened. We
must now
fear the
appearance of
Tocqueville's "virtuous America

on
materialism,"
Tocqueville
expressed about
In his concern for the potentially demoralizing effects of the intrinsic features of our regime, Mr. Horwitz treats the moral intentions apart from, and as more
this particular point to the
contrary
notwithstanding.
framers'
entirely
important than, the influence

tions,
and on
on our
development
of objective economic condi regime's success

."he
which,
of
the
limits
according to Mr. Barber in his essay, both the its success can be shown to depend. In so
success or
sponsibility for the
doing
lays the
re
failure
of
the
American
republican experiment
squarely on the shoulders of the founders themselves Locke aims his education at the gentlemen or
and on their principles.
gentry, and envisions
there
fore,
fundamental
reform of the
existing
gentry.
The
continue to impose the
leading
citizens would
stamp of their character on the society as a whole Since Gordon Wood implies in his essay (pp. ,09- .4) the incompatibility of a gentle class in Locke's sense and the manly currents
founders, both he
democratizing
us
unleashed
and
Mr. Horwitz lead
by
the
to
ask about
the
implications for
us of

Locke's
proposals.
103 be admitted, in
Should the
value of
Locke's
civic education
what manner could we undergo
inherit it? What
alterations would
to suit American circumstances or is there a

experience? presents
it theoretically have to substitute for it to be found

his
in the American
As Mr. Horwitz
ence are
it, Locke's they
educational science and
political sci
perfectly employ the same general
compatible:
rest on
identical
psychological premises and asserts the psychic prior
method.
In both
cases
Locke
ity
of
the passions to
reason.
Nor does any

not seek
moral reproof attach to
his
assertion.
The Lockean but instead to
education
does
to suppress the passions or "natural

particu
redirect or rechannel
them toward socially useful ends. In

pride"
lar, Locke
convert
wishes
to redirect our "natural

calls amour-propre,
or
love
of
dominion,
the spirited
self-preference
Rousseau
by
operations
that would gradually
it into the love
of credit and
the
apprehension of shame and would
disgrace.
Taking
to
them in some measure out of themselves, Locke
teach the
young
that
reputation
submit
willingly to the "law of opinion or

principle of
Secret."
It is this
operation
discloses the fundamental

tutes
what
Locke's
educational reform and consti seems
he
calls
its "great
In general, it
must
that the nobler aspira

so
tions of men, which suit them

contradict entitled
for leadership,
be trained
that
they
will not
the pursuits of those who are content to follow (p. 163). We
would
be
to pose to Locke the same question Mr. Horwitz poses to the American
could
founders if it
republic with
be
shown
curbing the
love
that, owing to the preoccupation of the of dominion or the antisocial forms

of
commercial of spirit, of
he lib
himself failed to take sufficiently into account the vulnerability erty in the established commercial republic.
The
above qualification notwithstanding,
the love
Mr. Horwitz's
account of
Locke
en
ables us
to see more clearly the extent to
which
liberalism
conceived of man as
necessary for those philosophers with whom we most closely associate the belief in man's malleability to refute their predeces sors, in the manner that Richard Hoftstadter suggests in his essay (pp. 72ft". ). The tendency of liberal psychology to reduce nature to the passions would seem of it
malleable.
It
was
by
no means
self to enhance the

over nature.
importance
of education,
in the
general sense of
habituation,
is to
give at
To
consider man as
the
matter of education and politics
the
same
time an immense boost to
man as
the
maker of education or politics.
It
is through legislation or will that the passions

their objects and, thus, their form or
preserve themselves and so
(e.g., fear
which
or natural pride) acquire men will
bent;
that
determines how
them what
in
an
important
sense
makes
they
are.
From the unchanging
or unchangeable
features
of
human
nature as
designated
by
liberalism, therefore, widely divergent

and peace, can
and even opposite results,
such as war of the natu
be
expected.
In this way liberalism's very definition

to
the man-made, which, as the proud
ral, as
that
which stands
in
need of man's constructions, produces the
denigration
of
of the natural one's own
by
comparison on
imposition
"almost"
form
the
formless,
human
comes to
maturity in later
thought.
The theory
or conceptualization of
nature
that
Leo Strauss
calls
"the last
104
Interpretation
nature"
refuge of predisposition
in
modern
philosophy
would seem
to have
within
it
distinct
to
self-destruct.2
That
men themselves and not
only their comforts
are
in
decisive
sense
the fruit
of their own
perfect
labors,
whose
their own creatures,
is
prop
osition
that can only expand the
title to freedom Locke says
ready
187).
claim: men are
the property of those
workmanship
they may al they are (cf. p.

we can
It is in the
a greater
allegation of man's
freedom
and all
its implications that lowered
discern
kinship
between the liberalism
apparent pessimism and
political
expectations of classical
and
the immense optimism about the possi
bilities for altering human behavior by means of institutions in the thought that succeeded it, than between either of these views and the traditional science of
politics.
As the
essay
perfect complement to
Mr. Horwitz's reflections, Michael Zuckert's in Locke investigates

a second mode of an operation
on the question of civil religion citizens with
imbuing
the
proper sentiments and opinions
by
inde
pendent of the civil
laws. His essay furthers the

the
argument
right opinion must undergird
political calculus
that, in Locke's view, fostered in the commercial re

modes of
modes
public, for the sake of
its
perpetuation.
The two distinct

as
influencing
opinion, which are perhaps even more prominent

of
distinct
in the thought
Rousseau, lead
it. Just
as
us, in the case of both thinkers, to consider the
relationship be
so might
tween them and, in particular, to ask if one is more useful than the other or could
replace seem at
Locke's
education
is
aimed at
the relatively
few,
it
first that the
civil religion
is
aimed at
the relatively many, those in whom
"the
religious
is
most prominent and who must,
rather
than know (pp.
197, 199). Mr. Horwitz does indicate that

subordinate role
in any case, believe religious in

Locke outlines,
al
struction
has
decidedly
in the
education
though he leaves open the question whether or not the new gentlemen do not
remain
believers in
some sense.
For this reason,
we must correct our
initial im
differentiated simply by being directed at different groups of people. By qualifying Locke's own support for civil religion in his essay, Mr. Zuckert alerts us further to the complexity of the task of estab
pression
that these two modes can be
lishing
any relationship between his
proposals
for
a civil education and
for
a civil
religion.
Mr. Zuckert treats On the Reasonableness of Christianity as an integral part of Locke's philosophy of government, a necessary companion to the Treatises. In his detailed and acute analysis of Locke's arguments, Mr. Zuckert takes the
reader
securely along
with
him despite the
difficulty
perhaps a
of
the path. He discloses two

sets
problems need
concerning for "something like
the role of religion that

religion,"
Locke
himself
of
to
solve:
the
a civil
derivative
Christianity (p.
is.
201), to encourage salutary moral practices in the commercial republic and the
need to render organized
religion, viz.,
Christianity,
reasonable or civil, that
passive, pacific,
2.
and subservient to political authority.

and
Unless the
of
second
prob-
Leo Strauss, Natural Right
History (Chicago: University

'
Chicaco Press
175, 201.
iq) v;>-1''
nn vy'

lem is solved,
as
105
the
Christianity
cannot
be the instrument to
solve
first. In Locke,
in
other
liberal thinkers, the

It
question of
the political utility of piety

religion poses
is, then,
es
weighed against
the clear and present danger organized

also seems
to the
tablishment of just politics.

or at
fair to say
that the
liberal thinkers had, dan
least began with,
keener
and more
lively
apprehension of religion's can
gers than of
its utility; the
question of
has been
religion and
rendered
harmless. The first
of
its utility Locke's
have
hearing
only
after
it
questions
has
particular relevance
for the
perpetuation of
concerning the role of our political institutions
the second considers the role of religion
in
relation
to the proper
founding of
faith
that
over
political
institutions.
shows that
Mr. Zuckert
works, and
it is Christianity's
special
emphasis on
thus on authoritative interpretations of the articles of
faith,
is
of
paramount concern
to Locke. Clerical "impositions on men in matters of
faith"
chiefly deed, Locke

years of
are
responsible stresses
for the
vehement political state of war
divisions in
modern times.
In
the brutal
raging throughout the last thousand

meet
.
Christianity's
dard for the

and no
state of nature.
butchery,"
and
history in language lurid enough to Nothing is seen but "schisms Christians "tearing and being torn in
"all"
Hobbes's
stan
quarrels,
blood,
from
Locke leaves
sects stems
clerical claims
Christian doubt that the uniquely uncivil character of to infallibility. Claims to revealed truth are the
means
by
which
sects set themselves rogate to
up
as
"the standing
measure of
truth to all the
and ar
themselves the right to
punish
and condemn reference
the heterodox. Locke
seems to explain theological

minion and
intolerance
by
to the natural love of
do
its
success
by
reference
to natural fear. The corporate interests of to exclusivity on matters of utmost im

advantage of
clergies can
best be
advanced
by
claims
portance to the people,

and
enabling them to take
the people's credulity
fearful
apprehensions. regards
With Hobbes, Locke

the
the presence of
organized religion,
constituting
clergy as a body, in terms of the threat it poses to public power as its competi tor for sovereignty. From ecclesiastical bodies emanate the most important pri
vate
judgments
of good and evil
causes of all
quarrels.3
that, properly understood, are for Hobbes the Locke also agrees with Hobbes that the common and
that are
embodied
"just
measures of right and
in
civil
law
and serve as
the bonds of civil society (p.

moral
199)
would eliminate
both the
sheer
relativity
the
of
judgments constituting the

orthodoxies
chief
defect
of the state of nature and of
com
peting
constituting the
chief
though the scope of the
public power
existing civil societies. Al is to be limited by the ends for which it
defect
is erected, according to Locke, it must be unrivaled and unconstrained in its sphere. Since religious and political authorities will invariably contest the same field, their rivalry threatens the ability of the civil law to bind men together. It is, therefore, hostile to civil peace and destructive of social unity.
3.
Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan (New York:
Collier.
1962),
Ch. 15.
pp.
123-24; Ch. 29,
pp.
238-39.
106
Interpretation
theological
proper
By treating
intolerance
or
Christianity
at
as
practiced
as
the major
places
impediment to the
founding
of a
free
regime, Locke
essentially
the
ex
critique or reform of religion presses about
instead
civil
of religion
us
its base. The
need
he
to
render
Christianity
forces
to
reconsider
his
own
statement
the utility of
manner of
in the
religion to founders; he specifically by citing, Rousseau, its historical necessity (p. 197), and, we may add, no
makes the case
more than
its historical
necessity.
Those founders
who embraced religion
to es
tablish their societies, and who did not subordinate religion or revelation as such,
may
belong
orders
to the
negligent and
ical
inimical to freedom
unforeseeing first ages of men that yielded polit and the law of reason. As the American case
demonstrates,
people
modern natural right provides
for the incorporation
of men
into
by Indirectly
guided
other means entirely.
returns
to Scripture to read
challenging the clerical it by his
authorities
by
own unaided
circumventing them, Locke lights. Mr. Zuckert suggests
that,
by
the desire to meet the problem of theological
intolerance
without
abandoning religion, Locke is seeking a Christianity he can endorse. Locke puts forward in defense of Christianity, and as proof of its reasonableness, what is es sentially
a reinterpretation of
with
Christian doctrine that brings it into Since the interpretation that

a rejection of the
apparent con
formity
his
political ends.
makes
Christianity
we are en reinterpre
reasonable
itself is tantamount to
biblical orientation,
The
titled to conclude that the concord

tation serves, that
and
is
more apparent than real.
is,
to point up the actual
the Lockean political project. The
incompatibility between Christianity Christianity he is willing to endorse is no

goes
longer Christianity. In the end, Locke

and takes a stance
men
beyond
a stance
that is anticlerical
that is also anti-Scripture or even
antireligious.-
By teaching
that
they
are the creators of value,
Locke derogates "the
religious
especially gratitude and guilt, feelings on the basis of which men have hitherto been encouraged to suppress or master as sinful, rather than to redirect, their
"natural
pride."
That human labor
alone
transforms "the
nature,"
gifts of
such as
they
can
are,
into
utilities or
resources, also relieves
from
opprobrium the acquisitive
impulses for
more
than one needs. Locke suggests,

of
finally,
that the law of
God
be incorporated into "the law

that obedience to the
concludes
reason, or as it is called, of
(p. 188).
such
latter
suffices
steps
Mr. Zuckert
that the
perfectly for obedience to the former. Locke took to render Christianity civil or
harmless,
gime. needs
making say that in the process of solving the problem affectum the proper founding of a free regime, he imperils its perpetuation, insofar as the religious attitude is needed for that end. Nor could Locke meet one challenge
ter
possibility that religion could ever be useful to the re The reinterpretation he directs at the clergy weakens his ability to meet the of the people. To make the former less antisocial, he risks the lat
social.
undermine the
less
We
might
without
rather
than
rendering the other more formidable. Since know, Mr. Zuckert argues that Locke does
most
men
must
believe
not wish to abandon reli

seem
gion or
the religious attitude entirely. His reflections on civil religion
to

Mr. Zuckert, then, to
which
107
a
expose the core
dilemma in Locke's thought;

which
dilemma
he did
not purport
to resolve,
but
he
presented with unexampled
lucidity.
Should it be the
case with
Locke,
as we might more
that one of these problems always remains more than the other
readily say of Hobbes, dangerous and more important

refound-
the
need
to render religion harmless to foundings or

most vulnerable and
ings,
when
the project is
insecure,
rather
than useful to
perpetuation
the over-all demise of "the religious
attitude"
would not appear as
problematic
in Locke's thought
Locke's
as
Mr. Zuckert
suggests.
That is to
say,
we
evi
might change
the emphasis of Mr. Zuckert's conclusion, on the basis of his

own arguments
dence
and argument.
in the Reasonableness
would
lose
their aporetic quality,
if, by
in
comparison
to the solution of the problem of right,
he treated
religion's role
perpetuation as a
consequence, however, be impelled to
ask whether
secondary issue. We would as a Locke envisions religion in
any form to have

republic.
more
than a residual role in the perpetuation of the commercial
According
spirit of
to Mr.
Zuckert,
the Reasonableness is essentially directed toward

most conservative in
the religious authorities, from deists to the
theologians. In the
as sa
ecumenism, Locke searches for and,

sole
the acceptance of Jesus
vior, finds the

core
dogma
on which all
necessary Christians
article of the
can
Christian faith; the rudimentary or be made to agree. On the basis of Mr.
Zuckert's
might
analysis of more
the source of religious
incivility
as
Locke
presents
stands
it,
we
inclined to say that the ecumenism for which Locke Reasonableness can only be a result and not a source of the free be
achievement of peace
in the The
society.
among the warring
sects requires elimination of

condemn
the claims
of revelation and source of clerical
the attendant power to
and censure,
which, as the
influence, it is
the
not
likely they
would surrender or
forfeit
volun
tarily.
To
eliminate
untoward consequences of a
clergy
with a corporate
in
terest, the
claims of revelation must
be displaced
must
The
private measures of right and
wrong
be
by the claims of natural right. forcefully disallowed by the es

men.
tablishment of sovereignty on the

enmesh men
consent of
free
in
a conflict
between their
religious
A religiosity that will and their political duties
not re
quires the complete separation of church and state, achieved

of religious
by the
subordination
to civil
authority.
We
get a somewhat
presentation of
different
perspective on
the
question of
the meaning of
Locke's
the
form
of an appeal over the clergy's
his teaching in Christian terms when we note that it takes head, as it were, directly to the people.
of passion and
Given the inescapable influence

agree with
interest
on reason,
Locke may
Hobbes that
reason must stand together with eloquence

sciences.
in
the moral
though not
phers
in the
past
natural
Locke
suggests several
times that philoso
in the
have
proved
to be
unable
to
persuade or convince
the people be
several
cause
they only had

flaws in the
truth ("reason and

analogy,
her
oracles") on
their
side.
Despite
obvious
Locke
cites as an example of the
difficulty,
the
vio-
108
Interpretation
Socrates'
lence
against
heterodoxy by
priests.
a people
not
immersed in
case,
superstition
and
guided
by
self-serving
Might it
be the
then, that
rather
than
his view seeking to placate a clergy that is in

the clergy and the people, to himself the right to
with
implacable, Locke
his
means
to
speak
the language of the people in order to interpose himself or
philosophy between
own?
puts
for the
sake of
their good and
reinterpret
Christian doctrine, Locke
By arrogating himself on a par

founders have
the clerical authorities and, to this extent, as other legislative
done, he
guise of
God."
too presents his
moral rules as authoritative
by
religion, as reformed and transformed.

no other
He
comes
presenting them in the "with authority from

civil or useful to po
Since
interpretation
of
Christianity
would
be
litical society than the one Locke presents, insofar as they are not compatible with Christianity,
we might source of right opinion.
say that the laws of nature,

replace
Christianity
as
the
come themselves a
This is tantamount to saying that the laws of nature be kind of civil religion. Since the laws of nature are not really in is
civil
laws
dom.
until embodied
law, however, it is
also
the case that no authoritative

natural right or
teaching
about
duty
permitted
that does not derive from
free
It may be that in
tude.
order
to curb the clergy, Locke jeopardizes the religious
alti
Alternatively,
in
we might
say that he
In
deliberately
jeopardizes the
religious
attitude
mise of attitude.
order to curb the clergy.
other words,
the religious authorities precisely
by
he may aim to effecting the demise
achieve the
de
of the religious
Once
the regime
as
is founded
or
the
grounds
forjudging
in
and of
existing
regimes are es
go a
tablished,
Mr. Zuckert indicates, its
effects
themselves would
long
hensions"
way toward ameliorating, if not altogether eradicating, the "fearful appre of men that constitute for Locke as for Hobbes, the natural, passion
ate, source of religion or the religious attitude
only to
rechannel or redirect them

of more
in
a manner consistent with
the aim of
put
making the
such a
body
compelling
con
cern
than
the that
soul.
Of
men
in
condition
we
might
say further,
self-
however,
been
able
they
would
be disinclined to judges
the
subordinate themselves to the
appointed authorities and private
of good and
evil, who have heretofore to the detriment of

civil
to take best advantage

men's
of
religious attitude
peace.
Heretofore,
political
beneficial
tions,
piety has more often effects. With respect to the
given rise to
harmful
rather than
perpetuation of political
institu
mea
men are encouraged
to consult their material
interests (and
the
just
sures of right and act.
Along
with
wrong tied to them) rather than their consciences before they the laws of nature, in the fully constituted Lockean society an
may
present
additional source of right opinion

would
itself, assuming
the rest
of
society
follow their lead, in the

an
education of the gentlemen.
As
lic
instrument
the
to meet the challenge posed
by
religion to
the
sovereign pub
power
Reasonableness
presentation
suggests the value of
frontal
avoiding
other
where possible a
assault on such questions and
distinguishes the
used
manner as well as the sub
stance of
Locke's
from that
in two
famous
efforts to
ad-

dress the
same problem.
109
more
direct
confrontation with religious
the name of political
Hobbes
authority is evident in both the writings of in the theory of the divine right of kings, in its seventeenth century incarnation, whose proponents sought to give kings an illimitable royal preroga
and
authority in the injudicious
tive that could not

clergy.
be diminished by, because it

great
owed
in its
origins
of
nothing to, the

and
Despite their
differences in
the bitterness
other of
respects, both
these treatments
of political power confirm
the rivalry between suggest,
king
clergy
not
to the
detriment
of civil peace.
Locke
seems to
however,
that
they
only fail to
also
solve the problem of

as
the
problem of religion
sovereignty as it bears on executive power, but it bears on sovereignty. Following Harvey C.
Mansfield, Jr., Locke's

to
criticisms
imply
that these views do not merely conduce
despotism, but
both
also
that
sired effect:
an extensive,
they employ a method ill-calculated to achieve the de if not illimitable, royal prerogative and the dimi
nution of corporate ecclesiastical
influence,
are prizes
better
won
in the
practice
than
in the theory.
of
The discussions
son with
Locke
by
Mr. Horwitz
and
Mr. Zuckert invite
compari
the parallel reflections of Rousseau on civil religion and education. This

would
comparison
whether
benefit
our
understanding
of classical
liberal philosophy, Rousseau be

out more
by
revealing the
particular emendations or transformations
lieved it
must undergo
in the two
areas
of concern, of
or
by bringing
and
clearly the kinship seau. Before turning to the

would
between the liberalism
Hobbes
and
Locke
that of Rous
question of religion
in the American founding, 1

a compar
like to try to elaborate further several elements to be included in ison of Locke and Rousseau, as suggested by Rousseau.
Rousseau's
association with a civil religion
is
often
treated as a kind of correc
tion of classical liberalism for the sake of civic virtue. Mr. Zuckert draws our at tention toward the possible disjunction in liberalism between the
conditions nec
essary to the
and
founding
of
free
societies,
especially
self-awareness of
freedom,
ques
the conditions necessary to their perpetuation,
and/or a potential contradic perpetuation.
tion between various of the conditions necessary to their
This
tion
becomes
pronounced
in
the
thought
calls
of
Rousseau, e.g., in the Social

utilitarian
Contract. From Rousseau

argues
what
Mr. Zuckert
the Varran or
perspective,
for
the necessity of a civil religion to inculcate "sentiments of
sociability"
in
citizens civil
in
order
to add
force to the
calculations
of self-interest
which
embodied
in the
law. Rousseau's
wrong
search
for
a social
bond beyond that he
the just
measures of right and
provide appears
to be owing to the ineradi
cable tension
on
between
political and natural or original
freedom,
which
posits
the basis
of the liberal premises, and which the true

heighten.4
theory
of
the social com

endure
pact
the
to may actually liberty. Whenever they are reminded of their natural rights, as Rousseau says must periodically be done, they are reminded as well that man is
Citizens
require
the
support of religion
exercise of
Strauss,
pp.
287-89.
110
not
Interpretation
nature a political animal.
by
Reflection
those
on the
fact that
man
is born free but
is
everywhere
in
chains
may
make
chains chafe
and oppress even where
they
are
legitimate. It is necessary to
prevent citizens
from making
reservation of
themselves
in the
name of
their
original
freedom
whenever
they
are required to
make sacrifices
in the
name of political
freedom.
Every
must will
citizen must
have
a religion
that teaches him to

or one of
of
be found to
civilize religion,
then,
love his duties. A way the "great bonds of
society"
be
without effect.
In Book IV, Chapter 7
the Social
Contract, Rousseau
assigns the task of civilizing religion to the civil religion, as perhaps its central
function. The
religions
civil
religion
is,
so
to speak, the standard
by
which
all
other
are
judged;
in the
no
religion
will
be tolerated that
considers
contradicts
its tenets.
of
Following
Hobbes
and
Locke, then, Rousseau

as such
the
utility
the reli
gious attitude
context of
the overriding need to render harmless all
existing
religions, which are characterized

ance."
by
an anti-social
"theological intoler
Rousseau's
analysis of
the chief impediments to the and,

as
ciety interfuses
practiced
questions of principle
in his
attack
founding of a free so on Christianity as

to the times.
"today"
priest."
or
"the
religion of
the
questions specific
By detaching
makes social end
"the theological
system
from
the political
Christianity
must
found to
unity impossible. Rousseau declares that some method the "perpetual conflict of between civil and
jurisdiction"
be
religious
authorities, which
or rather
divides the
people's
loyalties between "the
master and
the
priest,"
between two
masters.
It turns out, however, that the
king
is no
less
a slave
than the people.
By
means of communion and excommunication,
the
punishments
for breaches
are able to
or errors
in faith, i.e.,
masters over
by
means of theological and
intoler
kings."
ance,
claim
priests
become
both "peoples
The
unites
to revealed truth,
from
which
the right to punish
heterodoxy derives,
interest that is
which
the clergy in a
social compact and gives
it
a corporate
separate
from
in
and
hostile to the
particular political societies
in
it
resides.
The "reli
gion of
the
is
kind
of
theocracy
zeal
as
or exclusive national religion, as
found
ancient
regimes, in
which politics and religion are
they
are
indistinguishable. everything
to"
In its
to
defend
or
perfectly united because its temporal

"homeland,"
branding
"amounts
chastise
outside
al
itself
infidel
heretic,
the modern
enables
theocracy
to
a natural
paganism
its worst,
a circumstance
that
Rousseau
it
under another name.
Intolerant
religions place themselves

encroach upon
in
state of war with all other
societies;
they invariably
the rights of
Rousseau's sweeping indictment of theological intolerance em braces Calvinism as much as Roman Catholicism; there arc now two legislative
sovereignty.
systems or
two
homelands
"everywhere."
The "ancient
achieved
system"
of social
by
a revival of ancient means.
unity that Rousseau endorses must not be Rousseau does not undertake to destroy
the modern
not
theocracy
with a view
to
restoring the
ancient one.
be
purchased at the cost of the rights of nature.
Social unity can Herewith Rousseau would in Book II, Chapter 7
see m
to
be
compelled to revise
his
earlier suggestions

about who
-111
the need
a
for
legislator
who can ascribe a
divine
source to
his laws,
or
is
founder
of religion.
Theocratic
government
belongs to
an
"early"
peoples. national reli
Rousseau's insistence that there

gion"
can never again
be
"exclusive
seems
come which
to rest on the
fact that the true

longer
regard
principles of political right
have
now
to light. Since
men
men no
their
kings
as gods, to end
the era in
reason
like Caligula, it
remains
to prove that the people are not
beasts.
Of
all
"Christian
and the remedy.
only Hobbes has correctly understood both the evil Rousseau bestows effusive praise on Hobbes for daring to pro
of political
authors"
pose the restoration
unity
as
on
the proper grounds. Hobbes departs
from the
without
methods
used
by
on
all those who sought to strengthen
despotic
on
power
subordinating foundations rather than

losopher
Hobbes," Christianity"
religion
such; to establish their
authority
divine
the consent of free men. Rousseau criticizes "the phi to see that "the
which are
however, for failing

of
dominating
spirit with
of
and
"the interest
priest,"
the
incompatible
his
system,
would always prove
to be stronger than the interest of the
State,
and,
thus,
stronger
than those
who speak on
behalf
of
the
state.
Hobbes's
philosopher.
case suggests
the problem posed
by
theological
intolerance to the
Rousseau
makes
this question, as Locke also seemed to
do,
one of
true"
the
underlying themes of his consideration of religion. What is "correct and

"odious"
to those whom he wanted to strike. By in Hobbes's philosophy made it making himself the enemy of the clergy or revealed religion, Hobbes made him self the friend of despots, which friendship proved to be insufficient to protect
him from the
wrath of the
clergy
with
against philosophy.
By
contrast
to his
more
philosophic opponent open attack on
Grotius,
the clergy apparently
retaliated against
Hobbes's
the customary charges and. fired by the cus Hobbes and the people. Hobbes strength between interposed itself tomary zeal, true masters, without being able to liber and their ened the alliance of the people
its homeland
ate
kings from theirs. While Rousseau lets it friend

of
false"
seem
that
he faults Hobbes for

too
weak an
being
of
too weak a
kings, he actually faults him for being

in Hobbes's did
not.
enemy
the clergy. What was "horrible and
philosophy, which should

religious
have esy
made
it
odious,
The
priests attacked
Hobbes for his

of
her
and
branded him
an atheist,
but they
upheld
his defense
despotism. In
verting this position, Rousseau upholds Hobbes's

while
rejection of revealed religion,
for his strictures against attacking Hobbes for his political heresy. Indeed, tyrannicide and his preoccupation with public tranquility, Hobbes teaches the Gospel (or Rousseau's tendentious reading Christian To
author. of
it)
and
Rousseau brands him
solve
the
problem of theological
intolerance,
true
without which
there can be
no solution to the problem of sovereignty,
nor peace
for the
and
philosopher,
what
it is
necessary to ble and false behind.

make
embrace what
is
correct and might
in Hobbes
leave
is horri
to
Everything
of
be different if the
philosopher were
himself the friend
the people and thus orient himself
by
the
rights and
112
the
Interpretation
the
people.
needs of
The
philosopher must
interpose himself on the people's

context
behalf between the tyrant

civil
and the clergy.
In the
of
his discussion
of
the
religion, Rousseau
speaks
approvingly
the
of the alliance of
Cato
and
Cicero
against
the theologizing, philosophizing Caesar.

weakness of
tently
to the
kings
vis-a-vis when
Further, by pointing inadver clergy, that is to say, to the insur
mountable strength of
the people
aroused, Hobbes's
theory
suggests that
the liberation of the

ate them
people
from their A
greater
master, may
in
turn serve to
liber
from
their
lesser
one.
revolution
in
cult
may
suffice to effect the ex
The truly effective and just solution to the problem of the is not the substitution of one particu prince and the between "the rivalry of for lar will for another, one form another, but the declaration of legis mastery
pulsion of tyrants.
church"
lative sovereignty by the people. If we may properly associate Hobbes with despotic royal power and the dissemination of the light of science, in the Social Contract Rousseau
puts
in their
place
the general will and civil religion.
Rousseau does
ments of
not
sociability"
faith,"
profession of
look to any existing religion as the source of the "senti necessary to the free regime, but rather to "a purely civil which establishes its articles "not as religious dog morality
on which
exactly"
mas,
but
as
sentiments essential to support the

civil religion
the
free society
of
is based. The
right,
does
not give rise
to the social contract as a matter of

of
but is,
on the contrary, a
(necessary) derivative
laws
on
it,
and, in particular,
the sovereign's right to establish
the basis
of public utility, the standard of a
that
replaces
the standard of
revelation.
At the base
free society
one
finds
neither natural nor positive
divine right, but

dissolves the
relate
rather natural right.
The true
matters of
social compact except as
clerical social compact.
By
removing
faith,
they
to civil morality, from political considera
tion as a matter of right, the sovereign takes

and condemn errors of or across which
from
priests
the
power to censure
faith
and curbs the zeal to punish them.

promulgate
Whether
within
states, ecclesiastical sects cannot

prosecute a corporate
the views
by
means of
they
to
interest to the detriment faith

or to
of the sovereignty.
By
denying
other so
itself the
as
right to punish errors of
inspect the faith denies that

right
of an
long
morality is upheld, the
sovereign also
to the
clergy.
It is precisely in the call for Rousseau defends the principle
a civil religion to
sanctify the
social compact
that
of the subordination of all religion to political au
thority;
gion
the complete rejection of theocratic government. If men must have a reli

support of their
nor one
in
duties is
as
citizens,
they
can
have
no religion
contrary to
their
duties,
civil
that is contrary to their natural

which
rights.
The
religion,
compatible with all religions that tolerate others,
requires
that
intolerant
religions
be driven
of
out of
the state. In
its
single negative
tenet, its
almost
fanatical intolerance
intolerance,
the civil religion declares
war on uncivil religion or
the religion of the priest. For the people to acquire the
legislative
right
arms against
to change religion, it must be prepared to use the clergy's own it. It is necessary to turn the furious zeal of the citizen against the

zeal of
-113
the
priest.5
war undertaken under
the auspices of the positive and nega
exactly"
tive tenets of the civil religion would "not

a tincture of
be
holy
war, but
would
have
holiness. In this sense, itself

as an
as
is the
case with religions

useful
in the
past, the
civil religion presents
instrument
in the
origin of
nations, to
bring
As in the
the true social compact
into being. for the

civil religion
a most outspoken and zealous spokesman

name of civic
and, thus, the

on
duty, Rousseau may

not
not mind with
incurring
on
the
wrath of
clergy.
Rousseau does
join the debate
political
grounds, in the
name
clergy of the interest of the state; he

from the interest
of
the
theological, but
acknowledges no
in
terest
for the
philosopher apart
the state and no other reason
for opposing theological intolerance than its destruction of sovereignty. It is as the spokesman for the civil religion that the philosopher Rousseau shows himself
to be most useful to the state. In turn, the civil religion meets the needs of the cit
izen
without
encouraging the
hostility
the
to philosophy that is characteristic of both

are
ancient and modern theocracies.

ance
There
indications in the
chapter
that the alli
between the
philosopher and not share
citizen
citizen
If Rousseau does
the zeal of
may conceal a deeper antagonism. in every respect, however, opposi

the bond between them is
tion to theological intolerance

most
is the issue
on which
seau
securely forged. Stated another way, in the chapter on civil religion, Rous lays the foundation for the strongest possible alliance between the philoso
the people
and points
pher and
to the limits of that alliance.
The
civil religion nor
does
not purchase social
unity
at
the cost of freedom and
equality,
these civic goods at the cost of tolerance and humanity. While
Rousseau
ally
the
with
repudiates the notion of a
"Christian
as
consisting love
of mutu
exlusive
terms, he himself
stands
for
a synthesis.
The
civil religion of
tempers
religion of
the citizen, which
promotes vigor and an ardent
freedom,
the gentleness and charity of the religion of man. The synthetic or mixed
qualities of the civil religion point to the
Rousseau
the
envisions
wholly new character of the republic in the Social Contract. That regime could not be typified in
with
image
of
Caesar
the heart of
Christ, but
this
perhaps of
Cato
itself
or
Cato-Cicero clearly in
with
the heart of Christ. The novelty
of
synthesis shows
most
the elimination of
impiety
as a civil crime.
of civil
religion
Rousseau's discussion
civil profession of
leaves
open the question whether a
faith is the only
or
the most effective method of

perpetuation of
instilling
The
the
an
sentiments of sociability necessary to the
free
regimes.
swer to the question of the role of civil religion would require a of the place of religion
full
consideration
in Rousseau's
own educational proposals
in the Emile.
To say nothing
that the topic of
can
of other
education
disagreements that may have led Rousseau to assert was still as fresh after Locke's Thoughts as before, we disagreement between the two
men on
readily
see the central
the issue of
S.
Second Discourse,
pp.
159-60; Politics and the Arts: Letter to
M. D'Alembert
i960), p. 31.
on
the Thea
tre,
translated
by
Allan Bloom (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press,
1 14
"natural
Interpretation
pride"
or
love
of
dominion. What
would seem
presents
itself
as
the cure of the educa
tional problem
for Locke
from Rousseau's
perspective
to entrench
or social existence
forever the disease. While assigning the in the Emile rather than to
Locke's education,
as presented
origin of amour-propre
to
man's relative
Secret"
nature,
however,
the "great
of
by
Mr. Horwitz,
by
no means escapes
Rous
end
seau.
Further, in the Emile, the
tutor-Rousseau
at the
dissociates himself from the

of
of
Locke's
educational proposals
least has
not raised a gentleman.
Book V, claiming that he at beginning In an age of imminent political upheaval, it

reform
would of course
be
folly
to promote any
social
that
depended
question
on settled social
conditions
or an
existing
class, but the larger

"decent"
lingers
whether
Rousseau has
all, one
not
fashioned in the
Emile,
democratic
gentleman after
finally
subject
to the passions of other
men and
to the empire of opinion,

add to the character
away"
but
not
"carried
by
either.
What Rousseau may

not seem
fos
tered
in the
commercial republic
does
to contradict its basic tendencies.
Emile is innured to the enervating influences of social life, but Rousseau's addi tions respecting conjugal society also have much to do with "sentiments of socia
bility"
that add
force to
civil
law
and
bind the individual
more
firmly
than other
wise to civil society.
Both Mr. Horwitz
and
Mr. Zuckert
point out
that Locke saw his task,
by
con
"endow"
trast to ancient ethics, as an effort to

ancient philosophers
men
virtue
failed to
see
that the rewards
by tying it to interest. The of virtue not its beauty make

them to taste and senti
calculation
willing to espouse it (pp. 158, 199). For his part, in the Emile. Rousseau Lockean
calculations of
seems to endow
interest
by tying
which
sentiments,"
ment, to "the sweetest

alone would
of
so that resist.
men will
love the duties
incline them to
own
The
manner
in
he incorporates the love

suggests
beauty
into his
to
project, both in substance and in

the
form,
he
at
least
does
not wish
sacrifice
beauty
of virtue
to its endowments or
rewards.
Given the
sort of character nurtured
in the
commercial republic,
Rousseau
seems
also
to be concerned to insure that its members

themselves.
with
love
not
only
their
duties, but
By
to
contrast to ancient virtue,
it
"endow"
seems
necessary to
decency
beauty,
beautify decency
seems
to make men willing to espouse it. This aspect
of
Rousseau's task
to require at times
blurring
the distinction between the
decent
and the virtuous, as
in the
case of the
distinction between the decent

while
and
decent city Geneva, and blurring the the good, as in the case of the decent Emile,
at other
times Rousseau
is
at pains to emphasize the
these three terms. Although he often presents

and
decency
as a mean
differences among between virtue better

under
vice, Rousseau's practice in the
Emile
suggests
it
is perhaps
stood as a mean
between the denatured

As such, it
virtue of ancient republics and the good
ness of the state of nature.
evinces an advantage over ancient repub over natural goodness.
lics, in particular, but

effort
not
necessarily
its
Both the
negative
Rousseau
makes
to
shield
view of
itself from
light too bright,
and the
positive effort
he
makes to
beautify
it indicate that the
educational proposals
for

modern republics must
-115
include
an attempt to make the

were ever
decent loveable;
a consid
eration of special mestic
importance if there
to be a politically managed
do
education,
i.e.,
suited
to the domicile. Rousseau points, in other words,
to the importance of the
family
in the
commercial republic and
subtly
corrects
Locke
on
the nature of the ties that bind.
To
return
to the
influence
of
Locke
on
the
Constitution, Walter Berns
argues
in his essay that, however matters problem was not left unsolved or in
American Constitution. Regarding,
the fundamental political question,
stand
in Locke's
philosophy, the religious
an equivocal condition as
by
the framers
of
the
Locke did, the
problem of religion
to be
they
either made clearer
the implications of
Locke's thought
the
religious
by
problem
applying it or narrowed his perspective. Mr. Berns delineates in terms identical to those Mr. Zuckert employs from
as elsewhere
Locke, illustrating, here

the essays and their
cess through which
in the book, the
remarkable
integration internal
of
genuinely
comparative character, as well as an
pro
the insights in the individual essays can be verified.
Mr. Berns begins

proached religion
saying that from the first the American founders ap from the standpoint of its political utility. Like Locke, and un
by
der his influence, they weighed the utility of the religious attitude to support re publican institutions against the threat potentially posed by organized religion to those same institutions. Keeping the two dimensions of the religious question in
mind
helps, in Mr.
Berns'
"establishment"
view, to clarify the meaning of the

approach
clause of
the First Amendment. This
is
also
necessary if
we are
to
re
capture the reasoning, now obscured
injudicial doctrine, that
explains
how the
framers
lute
could make
the free
exercise of
religion, or religious tolerance, an abso
right,
but
not
freedom
of political expression.
Discerning
most
widespread agreement note of
Mr. Berns takes
important
of which
among the founders on fundamental issues, some disagreement on "secondary among the is whether the perpetuation of free institutions depends
issues,"
in
some measure on religion,
or
"national
a view
in Washington's is
embodied
phrase,
grounded
in
religious
belief. Such
in the First Amendment
and enables
the
government
to assist
religious establishments on a nondiscrimi
Mr. Berns interprets the First natory basis. Quoting Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., must support reli government of liberty, Amendment to mean that "for the sake
gion
in
general,
but
no particular
He
also cites
Tocqueville's
observa
tion that Americans tend to defend their religiosity unabashedly in terms of the
support
it
gives
to free institutions. It
was
largely
because
classical
liberalism had
already successfully
of republics that the
perpetuation
suggests
reformed religion and rendered
it harmless to the
an
founding
to
framers
could consider
letting
religion
making flourish freely in the
ally
of
it
with a view
private
sphere.
Mr. Berns
that we view the
preoccupation of
the liberal thinkers with the religious the freedom to ignore
problem as a project
to insure to their
statesman-heirs
it
as
116-
Interpretation
a political question.
The American founders
were still
wary,
however; they
of
ex and
tended the work of their the
forebears toward both the
secularization
society
of
socialization of religion.
It is in their
the
establishment of absolute religious
freedom instead
religion,
principle on which
the
specific provisions of
framers'
the First
Amendment rest, that,
fundamental attitude toward religion can according to Mr. Berns, the best be discerned. As is evident from Locke and Rousseau, the absolute right to
the
free
exercise of religion,
source.
or
the
principle of religious
tolerance, is derived is to be foun
from
a nonreligious
The
solution
to the problem of religion
attained grounds.
by
the
subordination
of religion
to just politics, established on other

republic are not religious
The
moral
foundations
of the
American
dations; reiterating Locke and Rousseau, he argues that modern natural right, is, on the contrary, incompatible with the claims of revealed religions. Officially, all
religious
doctrines
are of equal worth, and
it is
a matter of
indifference to the
state which cult one embraces
in
private.
Tocqueville
in
other social
argues
that religious
belief is
more
necessary in democracies than
or political orders.
Given the
ends and
ordinary
operations of
the American regime,

set
however,
religion cannot
be
expected
to activate men or
them in motion, but at most to restrain or apply a brake to the passion for
material
gain, which, if unchecked,

seems
would
be inimical to
political
freedom.
Tocqueville himself
politics and religion
nation
to qualify the extent of any potential alliance of free

related respects. of
in two
He first describes
religion's subordi
to the prevailing tendencies
democratic ages, He
and as a
corollary to this
observation, he prescribes
political weight
its
subordination as a means
to combat the dangers to to accord
freedom
most pronounced
in those
ages.
seems
far
greater
to the artificial supports for individual independence supplied
by
free in
In turn,
stitutions and,
thus, to
the second nature
instilled
by
their habitual
use.
he
praises those aspects of
American life that
are most congenial to the genera
tion of such
habits.
accorded
In the priority
of
to nonreligious over religious structures in the support
freedom, Tocqueville
and the
American founders
seem
to be
agreed.
Apart
the de
from the freedom

gree to which the uate our
granted to the exercise of
religion, Mr. Berns
questions
Constitution actually relies on piety as an instrument to perpet institutions. Drawing on the writings of Madison, Jefferson, and Paine,
not
he indicates that the framers did
fear the demise
of
the
religious attitude that
would occur apace with the socialization of religion, and that some
Americans.
notably Paine, openly celebrated that demise. Reiterating Mr. Diamond's state ment of the Constitution's moral intent, he suggests that, as interpreted by Madi
son, the
Constitution
expresses
the view that the
moral
habits
necessary to repub
lican freedom
should
be derived
and, more and more, would
be derived from
for
some other source than religion, that

gime
is, from
the
ordinary
operations of the re
moral
itself,
or
from acquisitiveness,
other means.
which would serve as a substitute
ity inculcated by
Religion
might yet remain as a subordinate source

of social
-117
values, but only as such. To

as
keep religion
might not
in
a subordinate position,
Mr.
Berns educes,
the founders that
Mr. Diamond did,

saw
an advantage of
the extended republic as

with
generally
it. While it
be fair to say,
relations,
Mr. Barber,
to
they
assimilated political relations
to
market
it does
seem
be the
bal
case that
they
assimilated religious relations on principle to political relations.
They
reposed
their trust, therefore,
in the self-censorship
and checks and
ances made possible
by
the multiplicity of religious sects.
Mr.
Berns'
account returns us
to the fundamental question Mr. Zuckert
poses atti
in his
tude,"
essay.
Are
we as a nation well-served
might
by
the demise of the "religious

question
however it
have been
effected?
This
is
raised
in
a number
of ways
wrought
later in the book. Joseph
by
our regime.
Wilson
Cropsey Carey
points to changes
in
scriptural religion
McWilliams'
Zuckert's
ultimate concern
for the
religious attitude
in
essay large sense,
resonates with so
Mr.
that it in
cludes not
only the "fearful Mr.

McWilliams'
apprehensions"
that might plague men's
imagina
special
tions, but
also
their very openness to mystery and transcendence. It is the
concern of
essay to show that what we might call the gnosti

affects
cism of modern
life adversely
mean
the belief in absolute values and, in particu
lar,
to show that unless the value of equality is sanctified or enshrined
by being
its true
Mr.
understood
to
equality
of
worth
or
dignity, revealing
If I have
therein
ground,
we undermine our political resilience.
not misunderstood
Storing, I
context of
think
his essay also raises his discussion of slavery.
a question similar to
Mr. Zuckert's, in the
While it
posits
declares slavery to be unjust, the close association between individual natural liberties and prudential calculation enables
modern natural right positive
the civil or
law to drift toward
slavery,
insofar
as
that institution is con
We may stand then, in even more awe of Lincoln's his specific ability in debates with Douglas to crystallize the issue of slavery in moral terms for the nation ever after. Even apart from the issue of slavery, how
venient and practicable.
ever, the
near equation of
the
moral and
the prudential, as qualified
by
the
legal,
a gen
encourages men to eral
lowering of have a hearing when

ment established
believe they may do moral sensibilities. It its
whatever will
they
can
do, threatening
commands conflict
be especially difficult for justice to with what is convenient. The govern

would
to
protect our natural
liberties
instead
of
being
sanctified
by
some
higher
with
source or motive,
be seriously imperilled if, its moral founda
shifting utilitarian or prudential stan dards. The passage from Jefferson that Mr. Storing adduces to establish his points is reminiscent of both Lincoln's call for a political religion and Rous
tions were themselves
confounded
seau's.
Particularly
us
as
he
shares
in Rousseau's defense
"
of periodic refounding. can the
Jefferson takes
tion
back to Rousseau's
have
reasoning. removed
'And
liberties
"
of a na
be thought
minds of
secure when we
their only
firm basis,
God?'
a conviction
in the
the
people
that these liberties are the gift of these authors about

religion
The
questions raised
by
in America
all concern a
possible
tendency
of our principles
to deplete
our moral resources more
than we
118-
Interpretation
than the founders did.
realize and more
Yet,
we
itude
granted
by
the regime to the private
should may ask, why sphere enable it to be
not
a
the lat
breeding
readiness
ground
for
all manner of resources, moral as well as material?

moral grounds
Our very
to take our principles to task on

such matters and points to
counteract
is
evidence of our wakefulness moral
in
to
the possibility of self-correcting
influences
those we may that any
deem to be harmful. We may

extra-constitutional moral
even take solace
from the
on us
recognition
salutary
influences impinge
by
permission of the regime
itself. The
nature and scope of our regime's
influ
on
ence and
the need
for
our regime to co-exist with other
influences that bear

in
our moral character as a whole
is the
theme of Joseph Cropsey's essay.
Mr.
Cropsey
suggests
that our way of
life,
laws
our regime
an extended sense,
calls
flows only partly from the "parchment
our constitution, and
and official utterances,
what
he
that it is
decisively
influenced
by
certain
"ex-
trapolitical"
factors, "alien
it."
to the
regime and unrepresscd on
by
These
extra-
political
factors array themselves,
the contrary, explicitly
against
the parch
ment regime and
the ethos nurtured
by
of
it
and constitute the
tendency
toward self-criticism. In its

of our
identification life that do
of extrapolitical
well-spring of our influences

rather con
decisive for the meaning distinction between
way
not
flow from, but
tradict the parchment regime, Mr. Cropsey's essay is reminiscent of the Marxian
state and civil
society.
In the first place, however, Mr.
Cropsey
for Marx
places
the antagonistic economic interests that constitute civil society
on the side of the parchment regime.
The
family
and
property
are natu
ral outgrowths of
the express design to promote
life, liberty,
and the pursuit of

under
happiness,
guise of minative are
and not
the ends we pursue cynically and surreptitiously,
the
doing
the opposite. In the second place, for Mr.

or
Cropsey,
the
deter
factors
causes,
in both the
political
and
the
extrapolitical
realms,
noetic
rather than
economic,
on
i.e.,
types of thought. After examining the

concludes, once more against
extrapolitical
influences
form to
us, Mr.
Cropsey
Marx,
that we owe our

of
political rather than extrapolitical
factors: the influence
the parchment regime,
itself
a product of
thought,
on thought.
According
ure of
to Mr.
Cropsey,
our self-dissatisfaction
is
prompted not
by
the fail
precisely insofar as it does. There is something unlovely and repugnant, perhaps even ugly, in the ideals of the regime itself ("privacy, calculation, preservation"); they fail to satisfy the human spirit.
In
one
the regime to attain its ends, but
way
or another our self-critical reflections on
family
and
property
express
modern man's
dissatisfaction
with
"the
absence of
any exaltation, vivacity, or
high-heartedness from
mus against classical
official political
modernity
first
as
laid down
(p.
tradition
by
Hobbes
and
ani
Locke and, incidentally,

cal philosophy:
embodied
in
regime"
our parchment
172).
The
liberalism
occurs
within the
of modern politi
the
dialectic
present
in American thought
replicates
in its
wav the
self-criticism
inherent in
modern philosophy.
Mr. Cropsey detects
an energetic
tension in modern philosophy, rooted in
Hobbes.
and renewed
differences between Machiavelli in philosophy from Rousseau onwards. He identifies
and
two

strands of moral
-119
The latter
the
strand or
meaning in modernity tendency makes its

critics.
one
inspiriting
felt in
and
the other indulgent.
presence
classical
liberalism
and
former in liberalism's Our

replication of
regime's
the debate
by
the
depoliticization
characterizing modernity is made possible in part of thought or opinion, in the sense in which Mr.
of the regime,
Mr. Berns employ this notion. The over-all effect of the premises occuring in tandem with the emancipation of thought and opinion, may ultimately deserve to be called the democratization of thought and opinion (Wood, pp. 132-35). As Mr. Cropsey presents it, we, the people, become, by
Diamond
and
default,
and
as
it
were, the guardians of thought and the arbiters of

we
its influence in
po
litical life. Since
collectively
perform, through the vehicle of public opinion

must
according to our character, what task, Mr. Cropsey suggests that we

I
cannot
be
regarded as the statesman s
highest
self-
practice and
test the ultimate form of
government.
hope to do justice to the profundity

general
and
delicate
precision of
Mr.
Cropsey's
collective
analysis of the medley influence. Put in very
of extrapolitical thoughts
coming
the
under our
terms,
with
the original versions in

versions of major
view,
he
reflects on
the
diluted, distilled,
and
distorted
de
velopments critical of criticism
liberalism in
modern philosophy, which comprise our
self-
analysis,
in ordinary discourse: science, existentialism, socialism, and psycho along with traditional scriptural religion. Mr. Cropsey argues that the
giving form to our way of life so decisively as to be treated the regime in its extended sense is itself "passed through the
it"
extrapolitical thought
as part and parcel of
liberalistic modernity it is intended to reform, and transformed by (p. 175). Mr. Cropsey speaks in this passage specifically of existentialism, but his remark has relevance for all the types of thought he discusses, including
medium of scriptural religion.
In the
case of scriptural religion this means alongside
that an
unintended
transformation is occurring
would not regard as
the one the
framers intended;
one
they
benign. It is Mr. Cropsey's
central contention that
the distor
tions we make
in the
thought we receive generally cater to our self-indulgence,

intention."
"even
when
the original thought had the opposite
He
concludes,
then,
that each
nation
"apparently
modifies or vulgarizes available
thought according
to a principle of selection
parchment regime,
and mutation
that
is,
or
is best
articulated
in, its
and
own
its Constitution, its guiding

establishes our regime's unexpected manner
conception of
justice
(p.
180).
ity
Mr. Cropsey's essay to sustain them in an
inherent tendencies
and
its
abil
in its
critics, not despite them. He
also shows that the regime threatens or undermines
itself
where
it does
not
be
lieve it has
cause
to fear. Without better-fortified the

energetic
challengers absorbed
to its
self-indulgent
proclivities,
it
relaxes
tension
it has
is, thus, in danger
of
losing
sight of
its
own
from modernity and defects. Mr. Cropsey's conclusion

that
comports well with

sures of
Tocqueville's
observation
in democratic
ages the plea

plea-
equality
will always
be
more
easily
and more
keenly
felt than the
120
sures of
Interpretation
freedom,
and that these ages are
dangerously
is
not
predisposed,
therefore,
the
toward a collective lassitude or torpor that
inimical to equality, but to

consumes
humanity. In Mr. Cropsey's phrase, "the indulgent silently

iting."
inspir
Marx
argued that genuine
freedom
or
human
emancipation requires
the end of
the material dialectic.
For his part, Mr.
Cropsey
suggests
that the noetic
dialectic
is necessary to cure, or at least to confront, the dehumanizing elements of mod ern life. His account does not preclude any of the other sources of moral vigi lance that
tions, the
are urged
in the book
civil or private
religion, new economic condi to the use of
preservation
of structures conducive
free institutions, diver
traditional private communities
(McWilliams,
in
p.
311),
or racial and ethnic
sity (Storing,
must
pp. 331-32).
Mr.
Cropsey intimates, however,

us as perhaps also
that the solution to

at
the problems posed
by liberalism,
in modernity
large,
ultimately lie in the realm of thought itself. Although he draws our attention specifically toward has
special relevance
philosophy,
his sug
gestion also
for the
democratically
fostered
enclaves of
thought in our society that are supposed to be detached from public opinion.
we not cratic
May
reasonably infer from Mr. Cropsey's extraordinary societies can least dispense with liberal education
to
analysis that
demo
the education per
taining
must
free
men and women
and that one essential purpose of that education strands of modern thought that
be to
promote the
dialectic between the two

abate,
the regime
nation
itself tends to
but
on which our continued maintenance as a
free
may depend. To meet their responsibilities and to take advantage of the freedom they are afforded, our educational institutions would need to keep before
students, and accustom them to respond to, thought in its
and undiluted
full-bodied,
unalloyed,
forms,
as uttered
by
its best
in
representatives, and
including the
best
spokesmen
and guide
for
premodern alternatives
to modernity. Such a task

our colleges
might ground
the
widespread recognition
that
students must
learn to
transcend the parameters phrase, become attuned to

ceived
of
contemporary debate and, to use Mr. Morrisey 's "a world of thought beyond the familiar grabbag of re
to this world of
opinions."
By contributing
thought, The Moral Founda

liberal
education
tions
of the American Republic
practices and promotes
in the
sense suggested.
self-critical reflections on the regime contained in the in book, every essay, enact the modern conversation analyzed by Mr. Cropsey. They fall into two general categories those that see our chief prob
evident
Taken together, the
lems to
stem
stem
from
our
essentially democratic
character and those that see them to
from
prominent
The two strands of argument essentially in the book that follow from these orientations hark back to the dichot
undemocratic character.
our
omy of moral meanings put forward by Mr. Cropsey. There are four essays in the book that urge us to recognize our anti-democratic or inegalitarian character. These essays also share a concern to impart a more
regime.
communitarian spirit to our
As the
respondents to two of the
four
essays suggest,
it is
on
the basis of

their
-121
interpretation
of
both the
goals
for
which we should strive and
the
means we
should use
to achieve them that we can
best judge
which of
the two
moral mean pp.
ings in
and
modern
thought serves most to guide them (See
Diamond,
98-100,
Ceaser,
pp. 280-81).
essayists
The four tage, but

the
treat our egalitarian sentiments as part of our political
heri
Mr.
as more or
less
alien
to the
regime.
As it happens, these
our
challenges to of
regime
for its imperfect

as a struggle
attainment of
democracy view
way
life,
as
Cropsey does,
dencies; they
ever,
rather conflict
see
the
intensity
between two opposing but co-existing American ten of the American contest to be increasing, how
than decreasing. Mr. Barber considers our way of

republic and empire.
life in terms
of a
between
Mr. Dahl
and
Mr. Hoftstadter
see our
democratic ideals
Mr. McWilliams
modern
suppressed
by
anti-democratic
constitutional
arrangements.
notes a conflict
between traditional
would
private communities and
the
ideas
reflected
in the Constitution. I
essays
like to
address the arguments
raised
in the individual
and
further, concentrating
not
on the two essays,
Mr.
McWilliams'
Mr. Barber's, that do
already have
official respondents
in
the book.
Mr. McWilliams
or
argues
that true communality,
which entails genuine
sharing
union, requires a moral commitment to equality or sameness that is at odds
with
liberalism
and,
in particular,
one
that
rejects
liberalism's truck
with
inequal
resis
ity
in the
name of
individual freedom. A
perfect oneness with others
finds
tance in the hearts of men.
Liberalism,
the political form of our era, is perfectly
willing to compound with this
psychological
fact. The ideal
of perfect commu
nity that is necessary to the best
politics and a revitalized public
life,
cannot
be
attained in our time, then, in public life, as it was in the ancient polis, but only in those private, substantive communities that operate on the inner man. Such com
munities
are,
as much as
liberalism itself,
a
conflict
a part of our political
inheritance. "Our
political
history
has involved
between modern,
dominantly
"check"
liberal
ideas
"
and
those derived from
religion and traditional philosophies and cultures
(p. 311). Such

and must
communities
have customarily
if
a
served
to
modern
ideas
be the
source of the
must
requisite spiritual or moral reform.
The
moral
significance of
equality
be
acknowledged
true
communal spirit
is to
ex
ist in America,
which can
only be done
ground and
ian and, therefore, shifting True equality means men are of equal worth or dignity. view combines elements drawn from scriptural religion, on the Mr. classical liber one and from Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, the reformers of
material gratification.
McWilliams'
by divorcing equality from every utilitar by removing it from any association with
hand,
alism, on the other.
As he
views
it,
we
may say that the

does
not go
problem of
equality is inseparable from

to a
mea
the problem of the

sure of
anti-social sentiments or amour-propre: submission
equality premacy and is
of treatment
far
enough
a tyrant
in
one's
heart. It is
to
not
if one secretly yearns for su enough to live beside the neigh

than to redirect our "natural
bor,
one must also
love him.
Seeking
purge rather
122
Interpretation
or
love
of
dominion, Mr. McWilliams

He
also seems p.
seems
to call for our voluntary
self-
limitation
of
or self-effacement. or
to
part
company
with
the proposals
Locke, Rousseau
Tocqueville (see
which
384) for
dealing
if
with
the problem of
amour-propre at
the point at
they
ascribe great
not paramount
impor
pre
tance to individual autonomy or

vent
self-dependence and political
freedom. To
the
subsumption or absorption of
"monstrosity"
the individual
into the
collective, which
he
as
fears
signs
as a
possible moral reform
in
mass
society (p. 311), Mr. McWilliams

communities.
the task of
to private, e.g., religious,

the
Other
es
sayists
in the book have
noted
diffficulty
of
preserving the
observe
integrity
in
of such
communities
in America. We
can also
readily
the way
which such
communities
bring
life,
the
not
concept of equal
dignity,
ever more
bear in
politics.
public
in
opposition
to, but
under
nicely defined, to the influence of, democratic
We must, therefore,
wonder whether
the opposition between the private

as
and the public order on the issue of equality is as great
Mr. McWilliams
por
trays
it and, further,
McWilliams'
whether, with regard to
human dignity,
we must not restore
to our discussions of community, the
recognition of
its dangers to the individual.

toward the eradication of ex
Mr.
ploitative attitudes
argument
that
we should work
is
useful as a
basis
of comparison with arguments and
appearing
self-
in the
essays of
Mr. Hofstadter, Mr. Barber,

sought
Mr. Dahl. The
spirited
preferences
liberalism
to tame, if
imperfectly,
these other authors tend to

of wealth as almost
regard as nonexistent.
They
treat the
unequal
distribution
the
sole cause of political conflict and exploitation, and
the demand
for
as
economic
equality
as almost
the sole claim that could call itself justice. Insofar
their own
proposals either call
for
or anticipate national
methods
moral reform,
they
tend to rest
their hopes on very different

account.
from those appearing in Mr. McWilhams's

national moral reform.
Mr. Barber does

manner of
envision
the possibility of a
reopens
In the
of
the
Anti-Federalists, he
the debate about the
desirability
the extended commercial republic, as opposed to one

shared values, and public purposes.
founded
on civic virtue,
cities and
He
asks us
to purge our luxurious
to rebuild our regime along sterner lines. The rapprochement with
technology in
sharing
and
his
account of a new
republicanism, and his emphasis on
communal
cooperation,
suggest that
he
also purges the old republicanism of some of
its
sterner elements.
Since
objective economic conditions
at the time of the
lounding
militated republi
republic"
"pristine"
against the creation of a can
"democratically
tinged
with
institutions,
the
framers drafted instead
cial respects of surrogates
consisting in cru for those institutions (e.g., federalism, the representa

a political structure
tive system, the

of
adversarial
method); a regime we may call
from his description necessity

and
well-
it
a republican
tinged empire. The framers "made
a virtue of
and
modified republican
institutions to
meet
the demands of expansion
(p. 60). Our
preoccupation with economic growth, progress and material
being,
as well as with continental power, qualifies us
to be
an empire.
Mr.
Bar-

ber
notes our
123
"imperial
scale,"
but
also our
disposition toward "imperial domina

our economic conditions
tion,"
offense."
and
"imperial
rather
It is, finally,
themselves,
pos
however,
sibilities
than our
form,
or the
founders'
legislative skills, i.e., the

open
for "capitalist
expansion"
("open spaces,
jobs
and unmade
for
tunes"), that
possible.
made such accommodation of republican virtue as we
have known
The framers "trusted in invisible hands to

useful
guide the pursuit of private
wealth
in publicly
directions
wealth"
very
much
(p.
52).
and succeeded if only because there was so America has witnessed, however, a gradual but deci
sive and
irreversible
alteration
in its
conditions.
Our
new
conditions, requiring compromises,

es
limited
or even zero economic growth, our
have
compromised our
pecially crisis in
tolerance of
inequality,
and
have
created what we experience as a
public purpose. optimism
founded
growth,
We cannot stay as we are. We must abandon the un in the beneficial trickle-down effects of unlimited economic
but
we
with our new conditions.
have the opportunity to build new structures that are compatible Although at the moment our new conditions bespeak an
society, as shared conditions encompassing both
of tighter social unity,
rich
increased
and
polarization of
poor,
they hold
out
the promise
cooperation, and the

our
development
of national public purposes.
The
prospects
for
becoming
our
full
we
and uncompromised republic are greater now than ever need no
before in
history;
longer
accommodate empire.
Mr. Barber's
view of
somewhat
surprising
:
conclu
sion rests on an natural soil
inversion
"conditions'
of the
Marxian
scarcity is the
for
republican mutualism,
i.e.,
species
life,
and abundance
is the
nat
ural soil
for
competitive
framers'
individualism (p. 60). As is
consistent with
his interpre
de
sanguine
tation of the
pends
success, our success at making "a necessity of
less
on
any
new
form
than on our new conditions.
Mr. Barber's
a
hopes for
of
our moral reform neither rest on nor require,
then,
direct
repudiation
the
acquisitive self-indulgence or passionate preoccupation with private
life
that he sees in our history.
Mr. Barber is unjustifiably

idiom"
skeptical of
the
very idea
of an extended commer
approach
cial republic and prefers the term empire to describe it. His publican also prevents
to "the re
him from coming adequately to lack
grips with either re
the Rousseauean or the Madisonian understanding of the defects of ancient

publics or
where
there was no
of either economic conflict or
imperialism
to see clearly the

"scale"
conditions under which
their virtues came to be. A repub
virtues than severity of morals or may be far less important to their rel self-mastery, without which, some famous examples suggest, small size and and the aggrandizement imperial of basis the ative scarcity can become precisely condi imperial so-called own mastery of others. We should perhaps ask why our
lican
tions did
not give rise to
anything lost
similar.
In his in
analysis, the
complexity
of the
"conditions"
whole question of republican
general and of
the issue of scarcity,

small republics
in
particular, tends to get

present
or
become
obscured.
Struggling
to
day daily
survival.
to
view a wide range of conditions
necessary to their
and
continued
Further,
political theorists
from Plato to Machiavelli
from Locke to
124
Interpretation
whether a natural moderation
Marx have doubted
imposed
on men
from
who
a condi
tion of natural scarcity could or should

sought
maintain
itself. Those
have
not
to overcome natural scarcity through labor seem to have

of
favored,
albeit
for
variety
reasons, a politically mandated and
artificial
scarcity to lend sup
port to
their ends.
should all
We
a vain
heed Mr. Barber's
reminder
that unlimited economic growth
is
dream. But
such
we must also reflect on
the intransigence of the passions un
derlying
dreams in democracies
and on the
corresponding
need
to temper
them. In America concerns about the
limits to
economic growth are expressed as
increasing
demands
on the
existing
social wealth proceed
apace; as witnessed,
for example, in the
objections
that proponents of economic

education, and medical care
democracy
for the
make
to
minimum standards of
housing,
poor.
Nor is
it surprising if Mr. Barber's claim is prognosis that the limited economic

problem, and that it can
strategic
frequently
central
countered
by
the more optimistic

a
growth we are
experiencing is
state-run
temporary
customary
be
solved
by
planning,
capitalism, and
investment
of
initiatives.6
It
remains
to be seen whether the
American blend
ent
acquisitiveness, compassion, and self-dependence, still pres
in this latter view, will preserve the moderation on which it depends. In his praise of the founders Mr. Barber obscures the distinction between def American
condition
erence to the
that the founders thought would
insure their from
success,
our size, and
the political principles that led them to prefer it. Far
viewing
our condition as
requiring
a compromise with republican
institutions,
evident
they
saw
it to be the
one most congenial
to the natural liberties government was the task of

us
established to guarantee.
Our
extent makes
exploiting faction,
in any free regime,

the problems most
public eral
more
manageable, enabling
to republics.
to cure
by
republican means
incident
The lack
of substantive ends or uniform
purposes, in favor
regime,
of a
democratic
but it
multiplicity of ends, is indeed a hallmark of the lib should be evaluated, rather than by conditions, by
lords"
sociability and, thus, of community. Society is com over essentially asocial individuals who are by nature "absolute themselves; the needs of their bodies are the foundation of states. The regulation
posed of
of their various and
liberalism's
standards of
interfering
interests is, however,

the surrender
a public
task, the
perfor
mance of which
hands,"
does
not require
of political work
to "invisible
or
the assimilation of political relations to market relations. The regulat
ing
of
is
accomplished
by
political and quite visible means
in deliberations
gov
erned
by
constitutional
law. Whether
the
choices are made

of
in city councils, houses

who mill in congressio
Congress,
corridors,
or even under
influence
the
lobbyists
nal
are
they
not
fundamentally
by
different from
choices made
by
market
mechanisms?
The influence
treated
exerted
capitalism on our political order

as well as
by
Mr. Dahl's essay

13. 1986.
is thematically
our
Mr. Barber's. The rivalry between

Have
a
6. See Robert Kuttner, "The Democrats
Thursday, November
May
Prouram After
All."
The Washington Post

democratic
moral
125
"historical
sees commit
foundations
and
other,
antidemocratic
ments"
more
favorable to
capitalism as such, which
Mr. Dahl
to have been
playing itself out in our history, has so far been decided in favor of the antidemo cratic. Democracy has been thwarted by our antimajoritarian Constitution and by
hierarchical institutions pervading
particular, are
our society.
Our
constitutional
structures, in
and
intentionally
biased, in his view,
against
"the
demos"
biased
in favor
of a governing elite drawn from the privileged economic classes. Our form has, in turn, enabled economic interests, especially the interests of corpo rate
capitalism, to predominate
over what should
have been
more
fundamental
political ends
is
of
pose
liberty, equality and justice. On this view, the Constitution itself importance secondary by comparison to our moral foundations, which op its tendencies. By means of a wholesale reorganization of our political
would
structures, it
be
possible to
fulfill
rather than
to thwart our fundamental the
moral purposes and view with
to work toward the
full
participation of
demos,
with a
to allowing its
interests to
predominate.
Mr. Dahl
supplies us
the major criteria to guide and to evaluate our

which
performance
in his essay as a pure de
mocracy,
he
calls procedural
democracy. As Mr. Ceaser
points out, the
procedural standards
guaranteeing the equal participation of all adults and the de
mocratization of all aspects of our
life,
would also
meet, and
almost automatic
ally, a substantive
standard of
justice. in favor
of a more
Mr. Dahl does
not make the argument of
thoroughly
be
with a
egalitar
ian
that
order
because
a
its
moral effects on the participants, as might political participation would appropriate
possible,
is, because
rather
fuller
imbue them
disposi
tion toward
independence that is
demos"
to those who are
citizens and
free bet
both
beings
ter
than subjects or slaves. He views more
participation rather as a
ment,
the
way for "the or to fulfill its
to
needs.
aggregate
its demands fact
and articulate
them to govern
guarantee
Relying
on the
of participation
to
benign
would
character of the political
authority
and
the reconcilability of
interests,
le
con
he
gal
dismantle the apparently

on or otherwise
archaic constitutional structures
that place
limits
stitutional safeguards to
modify or break up majority will. individual rights, especially those that

merely
He interprets the
might
temper ma
jority
will or
limit the His
scope of government,
proposals
as safeguards
for the unfairly
privileged
class.
for
procedural
democracy,
To
would,
however,
inter
leave the individual
with
very few resources,
natural or artificial,
pressure.
to resist an in
creasingly powerful social and governmental est, he would interject in lieu of the enlightened bers
of the
serve the public
statesmen on whom
the founders
chose not to rely, enlightened social scientists or experts who would give mem
demos the opportunity "for
discovering
the
and validating,
in the time
(p.
243).
effect
decided"
available, what
his
or
her
preferences are on
matter
to be
These
proposals are
free of,
and treat as unnecessary,

would seem
any intention to
our moral reform.
Herein they
to make manifest a
kinship
with
the
indulgent
occupies
strand of modern
thinking
us
that, to use Mr. Mansfield's

off rather than
succinct phrase,
estab-
itself
with
making
better
better. Mr. Dahl does
126 lish
Interpretation
for America. In the priority he accords to the redistribu however, he does not seem to alter
new economic goals
tion of wealth as the central political task,

much of
the deference of politics to economic ends that he describes as the

conceptualization of procedural
liberalism. Although Mr. Dahl's

and
failing democracy
are
displays Rousseauean
virtually
guaranteed
Kantian
roots
in its
assumption that
just decisions
by
the
decision-making
independent
not automatic.
process
itself, he does
not see, as
they did,
ple
that
in
politics some
operation on
the character of the peo
is necessary, that justice is A

more complete and
knowledgeable discussion
of
Mr. Dahl's
procedural
de
mocracy than my own is undertaken by James Ceaser in his essay. He replies that Mr. Dahl's vision and policy prescriptions come from a variety of sources exter nal to the regime, but he is by no means persuaded that they really do lie within
the American tradition,
associates
including
the place
it
accords to constitutionalism.
He
them
rather with the schools of criticism noted concerned about the evident
as
by
Mr. Cropsey. Mr.

account
Ceaser is particularly
failure in Mr. Dahl's
to see equality or majoritarianism

vantage point of either
the
nation
in any way a threat to our freedom, from the or the individual. Given the requirements of a
and external
healthy
Ceaser
republic asks
to
maintain or not
its freedom from internal

the
threat. Mr.
order
whether
impediments to
preferred to
more
egalitarian
in
America
might not with reason of
be
their removal. He concludes that appear,

represents a
Mr. Dahl's "vision
the
future, however benign it may
flight from
the realism of the greatest parts of our tradition that
draw
on
the
sterner qualities of
the human spirit that have helped to build
and sustain our re
public"
(p. 281).
Mr. Ceaser himself

founders'
presents the outlines of the genuine encounter with the

as well as with that prevalent
self-understanding,
in the
Jeffersonianof
Jacksonian era,
of the other
which
he
myth-making"
of
the sort
for in his essay to stand in place he sees in Mr. Dahl's account. Merely to
calls
"creative
note several
with
dimensions
of
his
comprehensive and
forceful reckoning
"historical
Mr.
Dahl's
proposals and their
implications: he
as
examines the
commit
ments"
treated tive
by
Mr. Dahl
of
impediments
to
democracy
and offers an alterna
understanding
their
the significance of an era
relationship to liberal democratic goals; he considers of limited economic growth in light of goals that
may
be
fundamental than economic growth in our republic; and he analyzes Mr. Dahl's proposals in the context of several decades of criticism of the Constitution
more
from the American left. The

character can
other essays
in the book alleging

Ceaser'
our undemocratic
fruitfully
be
referred to
Mr.
essay
as well. of
would
like
to end with a
final
statement about
the character
this collection.
circumventing or asking us to jettison the disciplines themselves. the essays in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic are emphatically interdisciplinary. They combine historical, economic, and philosophical research
Without
either
by
scholars who are well-versed wherever
home
theory
and
in both theory and practice and very much at practice intersect. The essays reveal with the utmost
1 27
clarity that the true foundation of interdisciplinary education, so much in vogue, depends on that which is least susceptible to institutional reform, namely, teach
ers who are able and
to combine depth and breadth of scholarship, on the one

as well as
hand,
on the
the capacity
the
willingness on
to
render
impartial judgments
letters. The
meaning
of our collective
experience,
the other. The contributors to this vol

of
repute
aristocracy
ume attest
to the existence of a "natural
that
they have
deservedly
is
earned
for their scholarship is

among them,
as
accompanied
by
the repute
they have, including

excellences
the
younger
teachers.
This
combination of of
by
no means an unimportant consideration
in light
the fact that
spiritedness seems
to have taken flight from political and social life only to

and
find
curious refuge
especially making partisanship occasionally stand for scholarship and replacing pale, cold objectiv ity with hot self-assertion. Our colleges have recently witnessed left-leaning fac
ulties
in intellectual life,
on college campuses,
recoiling in
alarm
from the indisputable fact
als,
including
their young disciples on

anxious
right-leaning intellectu campus, have learned so well the lessons

that
they
themselves were once
to teach about the political,

members who
i.e., ideological,
character of all education.
Those
faculty
do
or
not
take the challenge
as a cue to
dig
in their heels
and escalate
the
battle,
to
insulate themselves
from
of
criticism under
the guise of the
doing the opposite,

will always
are reminded of the
fragility
respon
free discussion
and of of
forces that
threaten
it.
It is in the quality
sible nature of
the individual voices in this volume and

and also
in the
their
dialogues,
the manner in which
they
are
formed into
In
addi
a whole or collective voice, that the greatest value of the
book
resides.
tion to its other virtues,

work and
by bringing
to light so well the overall design of this
the intelligence underlying the
it, Mr. Morrisey

an
introductory
essay
makes visible
hand
of the editor that might otherwise escape notice or remain
exceedingly fine and fitting trib ute to the farsighted care and penetrating acuity of Robert H. Horwitz. His schol arly, pedagogic, and legislative skills, expended so freely and so benignly on
invisible. Above all, then, the introduction is
behalf
of
liberal education,
make
him
founder in his
own right.
Will Morrisey
The Limits
pp.: cloth
of
Analysis.
By Stanley
Rosen. (New York: Basic Books,
1980.
279
$8.95.)
the Limits
of
Ethics
and
Philosophy.
By
Bernard Williams. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University
Press.
1985. 230 pp.: cloth
$17.50,
paper
$7.95.)
Is 'political
wisdom
philosophy'
an oxymoron?
If the
philosopher
loves
wisdom, and
is knowledge
of the
truth, then
myths
and conventions
along
with
force the
stuff of politics
must go unloved
by
him. Insofar
as a philosopher will
defend himself from unlovely nonphilosophers, he may avail himself of politic lies. He will not love lies. His philosophy will be political, superficially that
is, if
tions
expressed
in public, it
will
be
expressed prudently.
But obviously there is a truth about lies: that they are lies. Myths and conven deserve attention because there is truth to be loved about them. Political
also means
philosophy
love
of wisdom about politics. are social and
Only
political
somewhat
less obviously, if it is true that human beings
animals, then examining their lies can help us tell the truth about them. In pointing away from the truth, lies and conventions may serve as weather vanes; reverse them, and see where nature is coming from. (Being human, wind
bag
politicians
have
a more-than-meteorological complexity,
but the
metaphor
will serve
if
not
taken too seriously.)

concerns claims
force
The
and
fraud. It
Moreover, politics concerns more than about justice, which may not be fraudulent.
to
where
weather vane of politics also points
human
nature wants
human be
ings to
go.
It is notoriously difficult to trace nature to its origins. Following nature to its ends appears easier, but modern science, emphasizing process, questions this ap
pearance.
Whether
or not
we must end with

philosophers see
mere opinions about origins and
ends, some contemporary
that we must at least begin with opin

overcome.
ions: the Aristotelian
procedure
Descartes tried to
In different
ways,
Stanley
Rosen's
"leads
Rosen
and
Bernard Williams intend to

of
guard reason or
from rationality
world
in
words,
from "the dream
Enlightenment,
effort
who
full
which
us toward
at
the ultimately destructive
to transform the
then "gains
into
concept"
the expense of the conceiver, the

completed structures
his
vengeance
more
by
deconstructing
sively
clear
of the
Writing-
exclu
on ethics,
Williams
as
contends
that "certain interpretations of reason and

ethical
understanding
"old
discursive rationality have damaged

it."
thought
itself
and
distorted
our conceptions of
Both
writers seek
to
rehabilitate
(recover
thought"
and modify)
(Rosen)
and
"ancient
(Williams).
130
Interpretation
Rosen
argues
Stanley
five
that the contemporary

'ground'
emphasis on philosophic analysis
neglects synthesis, and overlooks chapters of
the
of
both. He divides his book into respectively philosophy

nine
what
three, four, five, four,
and three sections,

analytical
teen in all. One might say that Rosen does to
//
Principe does to Christianity, philosophy to

refute
were not
Rosen sufficiently
respectful of analytical
it
on
its be
own terms.
This
refutation takes
three of the
five
chapters; the results can

make
summarized,
albeit at the
expense of
details that
the results
convincing.
Chapter One
I?'
concerns
the relation of analysis to intuition. "In terms

X?'
back to Plato, the 'What is

am must
question cannot
question."
In
order
to
analyze
going be totally severed from the 'Who X, divide it into its structural elements, one
way of sense-percep nowhere.) A philosopher must
physical
first
perceive
'sees'
it,
and not
necessarily in the
mind's eye, or
tions. (One
justice in his
start
cannot
reasonably decide when to tell him when. Nor

seeing
a
analyzing
and when
to stop. Analysis
"intuition"
can synthesis.
Rosen
the
calls
the
by itself faculty of
In
unity and of reasonably tuition or intelligence cannot be is the capacity to

our
deciding
limits
of analysis and synthesis. no structure.
analyzed, because it has
Rather, it
perceive structure.
Theory
means
"looking-into";
preceded
ultimately,
"look-into"
analysis, our
talking
about
structures, must
"talking-about."
be
by
them,
sees
tive."
a silence not violated
by
themselves,
Platonism holds that intuition

and
structures
"as
they
are or show
Kantianism holds that intuition themselves,

constructs
show
passive or recep in the way objects actively them according to universal, invariant principles
is thus
participates
within each
human mind, for
principles called
Analytical
philosophers often vacillate
collectively the "transcendental between one doctrine and the other. Ro among contemporary
'selves'
ego."
sen thus calls
more self-consciousness
analysts
that
is,
consciousness of what their analytical

'self.'
are
doing,
and consciousness
of the
Analysts dislike
tive
"psychologism,"
by
which
they
mean
the intrusion of
decep
go
individual-subjective illusions into
the analytical process. But
they
too
far, denying
only leads to
mathematics sophic.
the very intuition that alone makes analysis intelligible. This
makes
no sense, and the attempt to account extreme subjectivism.

and
for intuition
by
making it into
a structure
Contemporary
and
solipsism,
construction
philosophy oscillates between deconstruction all
subphilo-
W. V O. Quine, for example, yields "a doctrine born in the desire for mathematical but "terminat(ing| in
work of
rigor,"
The
conventionalism."
Rosen
sees
that
intuition, being
speaking, the
unanalyzable,
can
be
approached
only
with
metaphors.
Generally
Greeks
emphasized metaphors of sight, the
moderns those of
alternates
touch, particularly grasp. Aristotle to some extent combines or these metaphors. (The poet Yeats called him, in contrast to Plato.
solider, but
comes to not yet a manipulator of material
"solider
Aristotle"
things.) With
formal
Descartes, "intuition
be
understood as sensation rather than as
vision";
131
vision of the
"since there is
no noetic
form,
we
must
grasp that
knowledge
form from
sensation and account

we
for it in
categories of
constructively discursive
thinking."
For the moderns,

is manipulative
finally
ways:
in two
know only what we make. Modern it knows how to manipulate; it believes
it knows only insofar as it does manipulate. "The object is the project of the For Kant, this subject is still in some sense permanent, "tran thinking but as soon as reason itself is called a construction, "philosophy is
subject." scendental,"
replaced
by
historicism
poetry."
or
Chapter Two
however,
that
essences";
essences, recently much maligned. Rosen argues, "analytical philosophy has not eliminated the traditional notion of it only believes it has. The modern attempt to define essences by sets
concerns
of predicates
by
propositional speech,
we need to
by
of
concepts, without
not to
intuition
leads
but
to this mistaken
denial. "What
and see that
do is
dispense
with analysis,
eyes"
to open our
"the unity them,
the substance is not reducible to the

are the objective or
discursive list
of
its
element-predicates."
Essences
worldly
counterparts of we could not

'lion-ness'
intuition;
Leo.
without
we could never and
distinguish
species, as
distinguish between the lion-look
the
individual lion, between
and
Analytical philosophy depends upon the truth of this, although it won't admit it. It, too, identifies objects by their properties and sorts them out accordingly.
intuition"
"Reference depends
this
upon
intuition
of essences.
Analysts disguise
from themselves.
writings of
The
the logician Saul Kripke attempt to evade such Greek
lessons
one ex
by
positing the
notion of
"possible
worlds
different from this
cept that
they
too are governed
by
the principle of noncontradiction. This attempt
to replace nature
expressed
with human creation-from-nothing fails because imagination in human Adyoc "lacks the creative power of divine Aoyoc and
logos."
qvoig
are not so
easily
sundered.
Mere humanism
cannot mediate
the conflict be
tween Athens and Jerusalem.
Rosen is
account
no uncritical admirer of
the Greeks. He
propositional
faults Aristotle for

goes too
failing
to
for individuals. Aristotle's
logic
far in the direc

about
tion of the modern analysts, and
allows
him to say "nothing

one needs an of an
rational
individual human beings distinction between

sence,
an existent.
events."
or
For that,
essence and a
property
understanding of the individual instance of an es
Chapter Three
concerns existence and nonexistence.

'ontology,'
German
ence of
philosophers
being.'"
invented
prevalent
which
The eighteenth-century "means something like 'sci
Heideggerian and forms in this century then abandons it. first although the conceptual analytical both misapply rigor, between existents, "what is As with intuition and essence, Rosen distinguishes
Its two
phenomenologically tents. The science of
and the sum of the analytical properties of exis
being
requires
that
Being
"conform to the
principle
of
132
Interpretation
This
establishes possibility,
but docs
not establish
actuality,
the phenomena themselves.

ceived
They
too, like
essence, must at some point
be
per
intuitively,
not
just
analytically.
"The
religious conception of
the
radical
contingency
produce
of genesis combines with
Platonic formalism
and modern science
to
the contemporary view that
logical possibility and hypothetical necessity are equivalent to metaphysics. Rosen dispensable, at least for the which in turn makes
'nature'
finds this
view
inadequate, because it loses
sight of unity, of
being,
its
and
loses its
way in the many, in existence. aporia intrinsic to the equation

sents
Plato's Theaetetus examines the problem of "the

of the whole with the sum of not analytical and pre
"rhetorical
and
"accounts of the psychology of
philosopher."
the
response
This is
not mere rhetoric, mere poetry,
but
deeply
reasonable
to the problem of the one and the many,
a problem
that solider and

not
more scientific
Aristotle does
not
in Rosen's judgment
doing."
solve.
Analysis is
in
telligible unless one sees, and
sees as significant,
the unity analyzed; "analysis is
annihilation unless we can see what we are strict themselves
Analytical
are
philosophers re
in
principle
Rosen titles the
central section of
from seeing what they Chapter Three
doing.
Dream."
"Socrates'
It is
also
the central section of

the world
the book. In the Theaetetus, Socrates dreams "of describing
in terms
of an alphabet of simple
Plato
the
never
forgets that
one must also account
for the
dreaming
"address
as well as
dream,
of
an account requir
ing
kind
of rhetoric that can
problems
not amenable
to analytical
con
Indeed, "the Platonic dialogue is
daydream
the
trasting
with
the
writings of
Nietzsche
and
Wittgenstein,
unlike
which
"remind
us of
monologues
in
dialogue."
search of
For Plato,
Aristotle
and
the moderns,
"logos includes
mythos"
along
so
with analysis.
Dreaming
"contributes to making
[the] unity [of the

sis of
whole] visible"; therefore, "the logic
we require
that unity is.
to speak, psychoanalytical rather than

combine
for the analy The
myths of evidence. a
Platonic daydreams The

myths
hearsay,
or
opinion, with
visual/intuitive
may vary from
generation to generation,
but
each points
to
unity, a context of analysis, which
does
not vary.
Hegel
attempts to
unify the
activities of
poetry
and mathematics, myth and analysis,

omits
ion
quite
intentionally
face in
to suggest anything like
but Plato "in my opin Hegel dialectical

logic."
succumbs to the temptation to
try
that
to clarify the picture: "The

account of
great
difficulty
Rosen
become
myself
developing
an explicit
we
my
own
blurred."
writes, "is that I am
advocating
leave the
picture
and
neither poets nor mathematicians
but both,
and more
philosophers.
From
occupies
part of
existence
Rosen turns to its
negation.
The discussion
that
we
of nonexistence
counter
the central pages of the book. Rosen

nothingness, and
shows
intuit the
being,
the counterpart
of
existence, to think
of
nonexistence.
Thus
to think of a nonexistent
much as we
say, a unicorn
is
not
nothing
at
all, inas
have
a concept of unicorns even
if the
phenomenological world
has
no unicorns
in it. More provocatively, Rosen
argues that we can even
intuit
non-
existents
133
no
that are self-contradictory. Round squares have

think of them. This prepares the way
point
nature, but we can

argument
still somehow
for Rosen's later
in
favor
of
Hegelian logic; the

to
does
not make sense to me, as
square'
the term 'round
be
sayable
I personally find but inconceivable. Nonetheless, Rosen's
basic
point
is
well
taken: "If I am puzzled
by
nothingness, my
puzzlement cannot
be
resolved
by
the assurance that I was actually
thinking
about something, and so
was
falsely
is
mere
We intuit
nothingness as well as
being,
a problem a
for the
that
Platonic/Aristotelian doctrine that "there is

nothingness
sen
no
logical contrary to
will go.
concep
otherness, that
Being
and existents alone are thinkable.
Ro
here
edges closer to
Jerusalem than Athens
An
the
elaboration of
the problem of nothingness concludes the third chapter,
last
on analysis.
use
Here Rosen judges Hegel to be if find this
more
instructive than the

an example of
Greeks. If, to
altogether
square'
the previous example, a 'round

we example
is
"the
not,"
and
inconceivable,
is delimited,
at
then in some sense
"we
must think what we are warned
is
unthinkab
and, moreover, "we must

and
be
able
to describe the finite nothing since it
hence
possesses
contradic predicates."
Hegel designed his "logic
of of
to solve this problem.

analyst,"
To do this
questions
one must
look
"consciousness."
at
"the activity
the
The
to
raise
'merely'
nothingness
may be: To what extent does nothingness delimit nature? Or is a logical necessity, not to be found 'out there'? If so, does
as
this not
falsify
Greek logic insofar

concerns what
it intends to
reflect nature?
Chapter Four
is delimited
by
nothingness, namely, the Whole. than a determinate concept,

"mutilation"
Failure to
and
conceive of the
Whole, "something less

of
/'
something
a
more than a vague
leads to
of expe
practice,"
rience,
"sharp discontinuity
the expense
of
theory
and
an exaltation of
T esprit
geometrique at
esprit
de finesse.
Philosophy
begins
with won
dering ity of
about the whole, and
its "fundamental
sense
is "the intelligibil
of politics or physics of common
experience."
Common
can
investigation
("the in
and
tention is the same")
lead to the transcendence
sense
therefore its preservation,

another. provided
as common-sense understandings often contradict one

governed
This investigation is
by
one's own consciousness:
"We
are
by
our
very
being
with measures and
measures."
these
"Philosophy is
the
dream,
it
not
intuitions concerning the use of merely of the whole, but of a ra
tional account of the whole";

dom,"
although
can never
"thoroughly
dreamer
and
waken
into
wis
it
a
can
distinguish between
dreaming
is the
and wakefulness,
being
in between
In the
"for
our
them,
day-dreaming. "The remaining three

and
whole
context of
chapter's
sections
Rosen discusses three
philosophers
own purposes: are
self-knowledge
or philosophical
The
philosophers
Plato, Fichte,
Nietzsche. judgment
serves as
"The Platonic
emphasis upon common sense and good
the
are
background
developed."
against which such
fantastic doctrines
non-sense
as the
Ideas
or pure
Forms
Balancing
fitting,"
sense
and
occurs
"by
means
of our tact or
sense of the
our esprit
de finesse,
not
by
means of rules or methods.
134
Interpretation
we come political
analysis
("The way in which is more like
to understand the context, and so the
limits,
to
of
judgment than it is like
pure
theory
or
technical
a polit
production.
It
must
be
emphasized that
am not
subordinating
analysis
ical doctrine.") Plato's Sophist examining
consists of an exploration of universal
method,
or
dtcdgeoig
not ipoovnoig, analysis not
judgment. This
'Cartesian'
protocartesian aspect of the substitute mathematics

reer of
dialogue
centers on
the Eleatic Stranger's attempt to
for
experience, an attempt
foreshadowing
the actual
ca
Descartes, first among

the extremes
of
the several boy-philosophers of modernity.

mathematical
Plato
overcomes
purely
thinking
tinguishing theory,
strands
production, and practice while
and of sophistry by dis weaving them together "as
in
that
Plato
sees that
"we
cannot see originals except
through
im
direct insight is beyond human

is the dream
capacity,
and
that we approach origi

also moderate
nals us.
through the everyday world, whose limits may obstruct but
"[SJophistry
power,
of the whole expressed as the will

desire."
to
"metaphor for the desire to satisfy

a reasonableness
Without
philosophic reasonableness
that honors rationality or analytical
thinking
while
keeping
of
it
in its
appropriate place
"we
shall
have
no alternative
but to decide to live
on
the basis of
on
pleasure,"
Rosen contends,
perhaps
omitting the possibility
living
the basis of revealed religion.
"It is
logic."
far cry from common sense to Fichte's transcendental or dialectical Fichte accepts the Platonic duality of original and image, but makes the
a
more ambitious claim main of
that one
can move
from "the domain
of
images to the do
originality"
by
which
analyzing
is
them. In so
doing,
the philosopher arrives at

rather
"the
Absolute,"
not outside of
himself but is
"pure
conscious
ness."
"The
own
Absolute, in thinking itself

Christianity)."
image (as in
the world in its Aristotle) The Absolute thinks dialectically, and therefore
(as in
'creates'
represents a non-Greek sense of

objects.
vast
intuition, one that produces both subjects and Both theory and practice become production. The Absolute is a sort of method, itself without definite content but somehow productive of definite
definite
objects
a
subjects and
rationalized
Creator-God. Fichte depreciates

"offer
an explanation of
the
image-world
own cal
of subjects and
objects; he
cannot
it in its
terms."
Fichte's
emphasis on consciousness makes
him
superior
to analyti
philosophers, but his failure to

and
provide a plausible account of the unity, the
connectedness, of the original
the
image-world
to make
makes
his doctrine inferior

contentless
to
Hegel's. To is to
next
rationalize the
Creator-God,
nothing
Him into
He
Method,
Rosen
confuse
him
with
the
out of which
created something.
turns to Nietzsche.
presents us with the most powerful and profound attempt to recon
with nothingness of
"Nietzsche
cile
creativity
the past
hundred
years."
He
attempts to ex
plain order as
"the activity
is
of chaos and not of a separate
principle."
"significant
preserved cularity.
form,"
Order,
arc
then purely temporal, temporary. "Aristotle's forms
forever
within time replaces
by
thought
thinking itself:
god
the
divini/ation
of cir
Nietzsche
the pure
intellective
by Dionysus,
or pure think-
ing by
human
places
135 Thus forgetfulness, the in

chaos and art covering-over of chaos
power."
the will to
assertions of order
by
re
(originating
doctrine
eventually returning to
suggests
it)
Platonic
recollection.
Problem: If
"is
worth more
than the truth, what that Nietzschean
is the
art?"
value of the truth of the
of
Rosen
attempt
to represent
and
creativity
as chaos
dissolves any nonimaginary distinction

and
between high
nant
low,
noble and
base,
thus resembles,
of all things
repug
to
Nietzsche,
a sort of
Christian
egalitarianism.
a representation
Chapter Five
made
concerns the world represented as a concept

ways
in different
by
both Kant
and
Hegel. This denigration thought,

or
of
intuition
attempts one of
fails, leading
either
to
extrarational modes of
to
ill-advised
in
to resuscitate Enlightenment doctrine. Rosen may
have
some criticism
for
his teachers, Leo Strauss,
and
surely for many
Strauss'
of
students,
and the
contend under
ing
that
biaigeoig is
of
considered a r^vn
by
the
Greeks,
and
failure to
stand
this "leads to an oversimplification of
Greek philosophy,
modern
and thus
thought."
to
an
exaggeration
the difference between classical
Plato
himself
understands
that "the problem of the conceptualization of the
world
is
already implicit in the philosophizing of the natural consciousness"; the difference between Plato and modernity may be seen in Plato's acknowledgment that intuition moderates analysis. Kant, for example, observes no such limits. Even his
ethical
doctrine has
his
of
a geometric,
rule-obeying
character.
"Kant's depre
happiness,"
"eudaimonism"
ciation of
with
strictures against
in
nor can
ethics, comport
"his denunciation
truth."
dreaming"; "neither is
Kant
be
rule-go
'Progress'
becomes "the
practical version of what
the infinite progress toward com

calls
plete scientific
Unfortunately,
the Copernican Revolution
in
we
morals rests on
literally
that: a revolution or circularity. We know
make, we
know for
certain
only
what originates
in
ourselves and,
only what if we are
moralistic subjectivists, we then posit this
subjectivity
"the
as
transcendental, the bet
'duties.'
ter to reinforce our
self-made rules or
self-presentation of
Hegel
menal
conceives the phenomenal world as
the
nou-
world."
His dialectical logic
can explain change,
instability,
as
Aristote
lian logic
alize
cannot.
Unfortunately,
this dialectic represents an attempt to conceptu

more profound
the world,
doing
so
in
and
fully
'philosophers'
analytical
do, but
nonetheless
doing
at
what
knowledge."
form "traditional
rhetoric and
dialectic into
scientific
way than do: trying to trans they Hegel's his

conscious
history'
tory
sic
philosophy incorporates nothingness; philosophic positions have "presented

of
attempts
the 'end of
when all
ba
themselves"
the Phenomenology of
Spirit
to show that this has
now
occurred
"the
result
is
is
mutual cancel
lation."
"The transition from the

"
.
Phenomenology
judge,
what
to the Logic
then one
from
nihilism to science.
But
at this transition point,

must now
Rosen
observes, one must

of the
have
recourse
to intuition: "We
on the
basis
heretofore
contradictory results of human Plato. "For modern philosophy
experience,
to
do
We
arc
back to
generally, and above all
for Hegel, the Platonic

wants
harmony
of opposites
is
too fragile to
be
Hegel
to satisfy hu-
136
man
Interpretation
and
desire,
for
all
men, not only
philosophers.
He "intends to fulfill the
Enlightenment"
a robust project, not a
fragile insight.
as
Rosen distrusts
and change.
classical
logic insofar
it fails to
account
for individuation
remains
On these matters, he may

separated
prefer
Hegelian logic. But he
"a
Platonist in this
rupt us
specific sense: poetry, science, or
any human activity
will cor
if it is
from
philosophy.
It follows that philosophy
will corrupt
us
if it is transformed entirely into science, poetry, or academic Philosophy should "preserve the delicate balance between man and the in
part
scholasticism
cosmos"
'disciplines.'
by balancing by
what academics now call
the
various
"As
Platonist, I
philosophy
conceive of
philosophy
as a
dialogue,
not a system.
We
progress
in
debate."
clarifying the conditions of the

chapters
Bernard Williams divides his book into ten
that are very
far from be
ing commandments. He involving "argument,

"technical"
describes it
as
a specimen of
"analytical
philos
distinctions,"
speech"
and
"moderately
do
plain
except when
language becomes "a

about
necessity."
Because the
same could
be
said of a of
barroom debate
cars, this
will not
as even a superficial
description
analytical philosophy.
skeptic, and
But Williams is something more than an analyst; he is a his skepticism does not stop at the portals of the analytic temple. He
any
philosopher, analytical or not, can
intends to
question whether
formulate
coherent ethical theory.
While Rosen centrally concerns himself with of describing the world in terms of an alphabet of simple elements, Williams begins with
"Socrates'
"Socrates'
dream"
question": can answer say.
"How
live."
one should
He doubts that philosophy
by
itself
this question. Reason is both less and more powerful than
rationalists
It
cannot establish a
'third
term'
above,
siderata of
different kinds. It
can
help
to judge these
below, between, or desiderata,
around two
de
one against the
other,
by
comparison.
[The]
pared
assumption
that two considerations cannot be rationally there is

a common consideration
weighed against
each other unless
in terms
of which apart
they
can
be
com
is
at once
very
powerful and
utterly baseless. Quite

their
from the
ethical,
without
aesthetic considerations can
be
weighed against economic ones
(for instance)
being
an application of
them,
and without
both
being
an example of a
third kind
of consideration.
But if this is true, then (to continue of "weighing"? What is the scale? What
weigh something? you cannot afford
Williams'
metaphor),
what
is the meaning in Spain, find

adjusted
"considerations"
gravity
makes
these
If
you wish you could give your wife a castle and
it,
instead bestow
a mere on
ruby pendant, you have

the scale
or
two goods,
tion"
beauty
and economic
solvency,
"common
considera
of
'the
good,'
in
particular the good
for this husband
and wife.
Williams
admits this
good
in asking, "How has one the most reason to life "for human beings as such?" of which this is a
live?"
or,
particular
What is the
instance,
re-
quiring
or a particular solution.
1 37 But he doubts that

reason can
find the human good,

is "the idea
that ethical considerations are a form of knowledge.
The foundation
rational ethics
ing"
or
"Archimedean
objects
point"
of philosophic ethics rational action
of
action."
Williams
that
is
not coterminous with

ethical understand
because, for
assumes
example, two
individuals
with no
"shared
may
nonetheless agree
to ensure one another's survival. But this objection
falsely
dead
or
that
survival
itself has
rational or
but
the
no ethical
status.
Heroes,
alive, demonstrate otherwise (one way
other), as
and
there
is
no reason
to suppose a Raoul
Wallenberg
"ethical
did
not act
for the good,

mutual
for the
good ratio
nally
where
considered.
The
agreement
to
ensure
survival
occurs
precisely
a
the
individuals'
intersect. Williams devotes

whose
chapter each
to Aristotle and
Kant,
one another call
in
at
least
one respect:
Both
very different ethical theories resemble set down a foundation for ethics, and
it
reasonable.
contractualism
He then critically discusses the more recent ethical theories of and utilitarianism, as seen in the writings of John Rawls and Aristotelian human
R. M. Hare,
respectively.
Williams identifies the foundation

ologically
ing,"
of
ethics as
nature ide
understood.
He translates the human end, eibaiuovia,

"a
matter of
as
"well be
life"
not
not a
happiness, because it is
sees
the shape of one's whole
and and
transitory feeling. He
Aristotle's distinction between theoretical

virtue as
practical
tion."
reason, and acutely describes Aristotelian
"intelligent disposi
Dismissing
he
asserts
Aristotle's discussion
of virtue as a
balance between extremes,

analytical model
that "the
theory
not
oscillates
between
an
unhelpful
(which Aristotle does
doctrine in favor
moderation."
of
consistently follow) He deigns to

a predicament
and a
substantively
depressing
to
provide no
further
arguments
substantiate this charge.
He finds
in Aristotle's
emphasis on
habit
uation;
individuals
cannot
be
responsible
for
their characters and amenable to

overlooks
practical reason
if they
are creatures of
us
habit. This
that
run
Aristotle's
sugges us
tion that
habit liberates
from
passions
agrees
to excess,
thereby enabling
to reason practically. Williams
that "the formation

and
of ethical
dispositions
is
a natural process
in human
beings,"
that "it is
natural
to human beings to
pro
live
by
convention."
But he denies that Aristotle's psychology adequately

of
vides
firm
standards
for judgment "of one kind

much upon
life
against assumptions
unearthed
Again,
this
criticism natural
depends too
currently fashionable
concerning
'behavior"
teleology (rejected) and the varieties of anthropologists (uncritically accepted) to satisfy any but
that modern
science supersedes
naturalistic
by
modern
those already convinced

relevant way. regards
Aristotelianism in every
Kant
rejects
arguments
in
ethics
because he
nature
as
nonteleological.
Instead he tries to
ground ethics on
human rationality,
con
ceived as universalist
a moral agent, a claim
lawgiving,
the Categorical Imperative. A

with
rational agent
is
Kant fortifies
his
concept of the
Transcendental Ego.
luggage."
Williams
way
calls
the latter "extravagant
metaphysical
He
cannot see
to continue the Kantian
trip
without
it, because
without
universal,
any innate
138
Interpretation
Kantian
ethics
principles
becomes too theoretical, too
abstract.
The line between
pure and practical reason
blurs,
with ethical problems treated too much
like those from
of science and mathematics.
"The
/ that
stands
back in
and
rational reflection
my desires is
cretely, act;
still
the / that
has those desires
will, empirically and con

converted to a
interests,"
and
being
whose
it is not, simply by standing back in reflection, fundamental interest lies in the harmony of all
"reflection"
that
or
is. in
universal ethical rulemaking.
Kant
confuses much of
(theoretical
factual
deliberation)
phy
with
detachment. Clearly, But

unlike can
this
resembles
critique of analysis. with analysis: can
Rosen, Williams
in ethics,
and
tends more to
Stanley identify
Rosen's
philoso
"[W]e
think
in
all sorts of
but "phi
losophy
would
do little to determine how
we should
do
than
this "a skepticism that is more about
philosophy
it is
Williams affably calls about ethics"; Rosen

about philo
insist that it is
more about analytical
philosophy than it is
sophy.
Rawlsian
contractualism
fails for
reasons
similar
to those adduced against
Kant. Self-interested
rance"
rational choice
from behind
Rawls'
famed "Veil
of
Igno
'abstracts'
too much and too

ence or, as
little: too much, because it ignores

too
experi
Williams
puts
it, history;
question of probabilities can altogether
be
little, because "it is hard to see how the avoided, or how, if the probability of
ending up a slave were small enough, it would not be rational for the parties [be hind the 'Veil'] to choose a system involving slavery if it conveyed large enough
benefits."
other
Hare's
utilitarianism
fails because it
cannot avoid
the tendency
of
and passes them on to
every utilitarianism, whereby "benevolence gets credentials from sympathy We cannot logically derive benevolence
paternalism."
from
understanding because a cruel person equally can 'identify his fellow human being; a torturer "certainly but his cognitive sympathy yields no benevolence.
sympathetic
with'
knows,"
In the book
s second
half, Williams
considers ethics more
generally, less at
common
tempting
start
to refute specific doctrines than to examine certain thought. He agrees

with
features
to
all or most ethical
Aristotle that
beliefs"
ethical theories
"intuitions."
"tend to
from just
one aspect of ethical experience,

as a
or
He finds
say
this reasonable, but rejects the notion of intuition that these truths
faculty. "It seem[s] to
[are] known, but
there is no way in which
they |
are
| known"; it
is
"wrong
which
in assimilating ethical truths to is not precisely Rosen's sense, means This intuition holds basic choppy
can seas of opposed
moral
Intuition in this sense,

conscience, albeit a secularized
conscience.
ers upon the
truths to be self-evident, but found
intuitions.
authority"
How then
any
ethical
theory "have
the
to resolve a conflict be
tween opposed
intuitions? Williams Practical
rejects
the "Platonic assumption that the

of
reflective agent as theorist can make
himself independent
be
the life
and character
aims
he is
to
examining."
reason
differs from theoretical

our
reason
because it
"help
us construct a world that will
not the world,
"one
in
which we
1 39
life."
have
social, cultural, and personal

practical reason or, as
Between
rational
theory
and
mere prejudice
lies
seek
Williams prefers, "critical

as
which use
"should
for
as much shared
understanding Should
it
can on
any issue,
use?
and
any
ethical material
that, in the
context of reflective
must ask:
discussion,
Should
makes sense
loyalty."
and commands some

"shouldness"
One
seek?
Whence
comes
this
or
of ethical thought
itself? Williams
criticizes
the "linear
reasons
enterprise,"
"foundationalist
minimal number
whereby
philosophers
trace
for
reasons,
back to "a
one)."
(preferably
cannot
He
prefers a
"wholistic
model"
type of terms of
wherein all
intuitions But
be
questioned at once,
"shouldness"
"justified in
nothing."
(almost)
serious enterprise
whence
then the
of should-talk? after
"The only
is living,
But
and we
have to live
[and
during]
the
reflection,"
Williams
avers.
ethics and politics
inconveniently
"should"
insist
on not
mere
life but the

sense
good
life.
Getting
from
"living"
to
"should"
makes no more, or or
less,
to
than does getting from

"practicality"
"rationality"
to
or at
from
"detachment"
"should."
Without God, teleological nature,

or
least the "Transcendental foundation for is be

eth
"wholism"
Ego,"
"living"
offers no non-conventionalist
ics,
as a
and
it does
no good
to pretend that no
same
foundation but
needed,
this amounts
finally
to the
thing: "Our arguments have to
grounded
in
no
human
point of
view;
they
cannot
be derived from
added).
a point of view that
is
all"
one's point of view at
(emphasis
Williams rightly
'is'
criticizes
'facts'
the distinction analytical

'values,'
philosophers
draw be
and
tween
'ought,'
'description'
and
and
or, more precisely,
'prescription.'
Using losophy
ethical
room
an argument
like Rosen's, he
contends
that
analytical phi
oversimplifies ethics analyst
by failing
to consider the analyst himself and the
beliefs the
brings to his
analysis.
Analytical philosophy leaves

recourse
no
for judgments his
and situations.
employs a
In its very
to
language, however,
intentions
of
analytical
and of
philosophy
tool shaped
by
the
ethical
the user
social-political order.
And this is the only tool

'fact'/'value'
available.
Williams in
extends this critique to all attempts to represent ethics as scientific
knowledge. In
albeit
a
this he adopts the
far
more sophisticated
form. In
or
scientific
distinction he previously attacked, knowledge, he writes, there
is
"ideally"
"background" conception"
an
"absolute
for
one's
investigations:
"how things
about things. ethical
sults
are."
But in
ethics we attempt
to
guide
actions, not merely

understand
find
out of
An
outsider
describing
an alien
society may
its terms
discourse but
no
not use them

knowledge"
himself
wholeheartedly. scientific
Ethical
the
reflection re
in
"body
of
in the
sense
of
phrase.
Those
within a given
"the
simplest oppositions of
society know the ethical facts and
teachings of the society;

values"
in this respect,
are wrong.
not
But
as soon as
would
they
be in
his
reflect upon
those teachings, their knowledge is

even
increased (as it
science) but weakened, confused,

own skepticism
on
destroyed.
Here Williams
reads
"reflectiveness,"
into the
previous
notion of criticism
himself his
of analytical
philosophers
inadvertently demonstrating as insufficiently
140
Interpretation
self-conscious.
strengthen
Reasoning
about
opinions
may
weaken
them
in
some
ways,
them in others. Much depends upon the kind of reasoning employed.
Analysis
by
definition dissolves,
attacks
reduces.
Other kinds
ethics,
of
reasoning do
similar
not.
Williams
Socratic
reflection on
for
reasons
to those
motivating Aristophanes. We do not need more knowledge of ethics, Williams often the reaction to skeptical insists. Nor do we need greater strength of will
corrosion.
reason
We
need what
he
"confidence,"
calls
a social
phenomenon to which
may contribute, as
the
long
as we
do
not suppose
that reasoning
by
itself
can a
establish or construct
social
order
in
which ethical
thought can thrive

makes.
supposition,
incidentally,
a social and of
that neither Plato nor
Aristotle
"Confidence"
today
requires
order
(J. S. Mill's phrase),

prudent man than
permitting free inquiry, "experiments in Williams here proves "some ethical

variety."
living"
a more
many
his
colleagues
in
universities nurtured
by
political
lib
erty, who,
failing
to reflect upon the to live
conditions of
their own activities,
imagine
they
would prefer
in
some sterner polity, or as presented
Socratic reflection, particularly Socrates

ever
as not
by
polity at all. Whether deserves this near-equa Plato,

no
in
tion with analytical philosophy, may of course
be
questioned.
Plato
presents
only the wisest, but the most

analytical philosophers
just
and
the best man Phaedo had
known. Few
inspire
such praise
from any
not see
of
their
auditors.
Williams
sees
sees
something
of what
Plato
sees even
if he does
that Plato
it.
must
deliberate from
stand
what
am.
[T]he desire that

not
our ethical practice should

or a reflection
be
able
aims
to
to
up to
reflection
[does)
demand
total explicitness.
are
that
lay
everything bare
at once.
Those demands
based
on a
misunderstanding
of rationality, personal and political.
Philosophy
"reflective
can assist
living."
in these deliberations, this reflection, but it

never makes
cannot replace
But again, Plato's Socrates only in the health, indeed a kind

"living"
the contrary claim.
Philosophy
this
"death'
replaces
means
sense
that
it
prepares
for
death."
But
of
immortality
conceived nonliterally.
much
Just too
sensible to quite accept conventionalism

as
(including historicism),
too sensible to accept analytical

also cannot accept
philosophy God (at all), Kant's Transcendental Ego. or human nature teleologically conceived (at least to any Aristotelian extent). He is left with polite individualism, intelligent Englishness. One could do worse. One often does. Williams denies
a philosopher can
the whole of philosophy, Williams
transcend his
polity.
Plato's
celebrated were
cave-and-sun
imagery
Even
amounts to overambitious
dreaming. But if this

recognizable
true,
then philosophers could not describe human

and polities. without
'types'
in
other times circum
philosophy, human beings transcend their
stances, although
they do
not
usually
sec
how they do. Not only
analysis
but in
tuition enables us to see these types; without that
faculty,
nonphilosophers could
not
141
portray them, and even language itself would be impossible. The philosopher differs from other types in subjecting the opinions of these language-animals to
logic,
which
Socrates
conceives as thought governed
by
the principle of non the same thing. Phi
'unsaying'
contradiction, of not
simultaneously saying and losophers do this because they love wisdom, that
"possesses'
state of the soul
in
relation
to
the cosmos
whereby Political philosophy begins with the opinions of human beings about their own polity and others. Williams claims that philosophizing only subverts these opinions. One might reply that philosophizing puts opinions in their place, that
one
a rational account of the whole.
is,
subverts
only the
grandest claims of suggests
the opinionated. Insofar as politics in

as
volves
deliberation, it
When
the dialogue-form Plato regards
indispensable
to the public presentation of
philosophy and, symbolically, to philosophic activ philosophy it loses

succumbs
ity
as such.
either politics or and not a
to monologism, it be
one
"remembering.'
comes a
forgetting
By
encouraging the belief that

Williams'
possesses rather
than
loves
wisdom,
sight of wisdom.
objec
tion to
philosophizing
about ethics might
better be
stated this way: one can pos
sess practical wisdom, not
theoretical wisdom. One need not philosophize to be

practical wisdom.
prudent, nor are philosophers necessarily men and women of
No
philosoph
ethical
theory
will make us prudent.
'Political
seeks
would
be
an
oxy
not
moron
if it
sought to establish
justice. If it
the truth about
justice, it is
an oxymoron. not get
If prudently undertaken and in the way of justice and of prudent
expressed, political
action.
to be politic if only to preserve the
phenomenon
philosophy may Political philosophy will tend it looks at, as an unusually use
ful
approach
to better accounting for the Whole.
Philosophy
XaPPttfc
C9Affairs
"PHILOSOPHY &
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
of matters of
was
created
to
promote
the
discussion
public
concern,
and
to
bridge the gap that in other disciplines

raise
philosophical
exists
who
between
are
philosophers
and
those
working on questions that issues. The journal has maintained a high

start."
level
of
discussion from the
Peter Singer, The New York Times Magazine
Articles from
recent
issues include:
and
Egoists, Consequentialists,
Wilcox
Their Friends
by
William H.
Liberalism, Neutrality,
Resources
and
Equality
and
of
Welfare
vs.
Equality of
Capitalism:
by Larry
Alexander
and
Maimon Schwarzschild
of
Exploitation, Force,
Thoughts
on
the Moral Assessment
Roemer
and
Cohen
by Jeffrey
Reiman
) ustice
and
Gender
and
by Susan
Moller Okin
Intransitivity
the Mere Addition Paradox
by Larry S.
Temkin
Foundationalism in Political
Theory by Arthur Ripstein
Enter
your
Subscription
now.
^Public
Philosophy
One Year ($14 50)
CÂffairs
Subscriptions Princeton Institutional
Foreign
and
Two Years ($24 00) Three Years ($34 00)
University Press
Lawrencevtlle. N J 08648
rates
rate:
3175 Princeton Pike
foreign
slightly higher.
$.i 5(1.
year
postage and
handling
Name
Address.
Zip
Book Reviews
Greek
Antiquity
in Schiller's Wallenstein.
By Gisela
and
N. Berns.
University
of
North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages (Chapel Hill & London:
University
of
Literatures, Volume North Carolina Press, 1985. 152
104.
pp.:
$17.00.)
Philip J. Kain
University
of California, Santa Cruz
In his Letters
humankind. It
on the
starts
from
Aesthetic Education of Man, Schiller sketches a history of an original state in which individuals are in unity with
their political and natural world. It proceeds through a state of civilization in which, due to the rise of division of
mented and
labor,
the individual's nature

political
becomes
frag
It
to
the
individual is hope
alienated
of a
from the
and natural world. of our nature
then concludes with the
future
restoration of
the
totality
be brought
about
through a higher art.
In his Naive
of
and
Sentimental Poetry,
the first two
Schiller distinguishes between two types

stages of
poetry
characteristic of
history. Naive poetry involves a union with nature expressed through the imitation of concrete, individual, sensuous reality; it is characteristic of early history especially that of the Homeric Greeks. Sentimental poetry, on the
other
hand,
expresses
the
alienation
between individuals
time it
and nature characteris
tic of the modern
world.
At the
same
expresses a
unity
tion
with nature now experienced as an unattainable
yearning for that lost ideal. Schiller's goal is to
achieve a union of the naive with the sentimental as a means toward the restora
of
the
totality
of our nature. of
This
union would
involve both the

with
concrete and
sensuous
individuality
the
ancient world
in unity
nature and
the ideal
yearning of the modern world for its lost unity. In the Aesthetic Education, Schiller advises
their work from the present but the form from
tries to show, this
is what
artists
to take the
material
for
a nobler
time in the past. As Berns
Schiller does in his dramatic trilogy, Wallenstein. He
takes his
material
from
modern
history
which
Schiller himself had
written
up in his History of the Thirty Years poetry. The highest expression of naive Schiller finds in the Homeric Schiller
tation
thinks
epic.
War and
he takes his form from Greek

unity
with nature.
poetry, and thus of
Euripides'
tragic poetry, on the other

toward the that
sentimental and
hand,
of na
is already
use of
on
its way
Berns
thus the fragmen
of
the
modern world.
argues
in Wallenstein the imitation
ture through the

of
Homeric
and
Euripidian form interwoven
with the
story
the historical Wallenstein
emerges as
Schiller's
presentation of
the ideal the
reconciliation of the naive and
the
sentimental.
In Parts I
and
II
of
her book, Berns
explores
the
complex parallels
in
plot and
144
Interpretation
the
character as well as
interesting differences
within
these parallels that exist

of the
and
be
tween Schiller's treatment of Wallenstein in the
History
and
Thirty
Years War,
Euripides'
Schiller's dramatic trilogy, Wallenstein; Homer's Iliad; in Aulis. The discussion is

meticulous,
Iphigenia
detailed,
modern
dense.
world of
Berns
Years'
argues
that
by
surrounding the
historical
and
the
Thirty
War
with a mythical narrow
horizon taken from Homer

of
Greek tragedy, Schil
ler transcends the

truth
with poetic
limits
historical truth. He
encompasses of nature.
historical
sees
truth and thus points to the higher truth
Schiller
to constitute to endow the natural world with life and meaning The lost unity with nature, now only an echo in the recesses of the human heart, can come to life again in poetry, "To see the sun as the sun of Homer means not only to see it as endowed with the experience of life in an individ
poetry
as able
nature.
ual sense,
"
but
with
the experience of life preserved
in the
archetypal
form
of po
etry
sensuous
Poetry
presents
historical individuals
unity with nature for that ideal and it thus encompasses their whole nature. yearning Poets must transform historical into poetic truth. They must live in their
time but seek the poetic spirit of the lost and far off age of take their material from the
and
present
only in their concrete and found among the Greeks but with their reflective
not
own
must
the Greeks.
They
but their form from that older,

beyond
all
nobler
time
us
try
to achieve a
work of art
lying
time. It is poetry that allows
access
to that unity with nature
lost in the
foundation
course of of
history.
Poetry
the
builds
an
ideal
edifice on the
firm
poet
and
deep
nature; it
reconciles
sensuous
and the
ideal. The
has both the
duty
and the privilege
to live
as a contempo
rary of ize the

As
all ages and
thus to
bring
to life
again
that lost unity with nature
to
real
unattained and
study
of
Schiller's
of
ideal yearning for it. poetic ideal of the
reconciliation of makes a great
the naive and the

of sense.
sentimental, the
study in the Aesthetic Education

not
Schiller's Wallenstein
and
deal
But
elsewhere, Schiller's
an
ideal, he
makes
it clear, is
merely
a poetic
ideal (not
ideal to be
achieved
merely
by
the poet or
through poetry); it is also an ideal to be achieved in the actual world and it is in tended to transform the social and
political realm as well as
the individual.
By
confining her discussion largely to Wallenstein, Berns does not focus on this extra-poetic dimension and thus she has little to say about the realization of this ideal in the social and political realm. Moreover, her discussion of the philosoph
ical issues is
rather
embedded even
and
in the
realization of the poetic

and
ideal,
while
suggestive,
brief
lacks the detail
clarity
one might
hope for.
Book Reviews
145
Principles
of
Politics: An Introduction.
By
John J. Schrems. (Englewood
Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,

Stephen M. Krason
1986. 310 pp.: paper,
$19.95.)
University
of Steubenville
In his brief preface, John J. Schrems

ades most
says the
following: "In
have
the last two dec
'introduction to
oriented
science'
political
studies
come to emphasize
behaviorally
ciples and served
information.
Missing
has been
a consideration of prin
fundamentals,
which underlie and give
book's
in the everyday political roots are in classical political philosophy and common sense. In spite of its shortcomings and rough spots, it is refreshing to be able to use a book like this Schrems has
around produced an
world."
meaning to familiar events ob Schrems does not falsely advertise; this
to introduce undergraduates to the discipline of political science.
introduction to
politics which
builds its discussion
traditional and perennial notions of politics that most such books make at
authority, sovereignty, and the com
statistic
best
mon
passing mention of: justice, the state, good. (Schrems gives the astonishing
texts
that two-thirds of thirty-one
introductory
solid
he
surveyed
do
not even consider the topic of justice.)

and
Further
more, Schrems
training
Although
Schrems'
soundly because of his competently in political philosophy under the late Charles N. R. McCoy. perspective squarely within the Great Tradition of po
can treat such subjects
litical philosophy is apparent in the book, he discusses the approach of con temporary behaviorists and postbehaviorists in political science objectively and fairly. While some might think otherwise, I believe it is a virtue of the book that
Schrems
goes
into their views,

model.
even
to the point
of
devoting
one entire chapter
to
system"
the "political
Introductory-level
political science students should political science, even
learn something
most
about
the
mainstream view
in
if it is
chance
al
gives one the wholly unsatisfactory. Moreover, presenting it show why it is flawed, which Schrems does not hesitate to do. The book is divided into three parts. The first is untitled and the
to
others are
called
"The
State"
"Government."
and
Each
part contains a number of chapters. clear
frankly
find
this
division
and
unsatisfactory.
distinction is
never made
be
"state"
"government,"
tween the
some chapters put under one seem
better
The
placed under the other, and some chapters untitled
do
not
fit clearly
related
under either.
Part I includes three
chapters,
not
directly
to
each
other,
but The
Schrems obviously believes they are important to the beginning of the book. second first chapter is on different views as to what constitutes democracy; the
discusses the
political system model; and
the third is
about
the contemporary dis

State"
cipline of political science and
its
scope and methods.
Part II
on
"The
in
purpose of the state, political cludes chapters on the nature, origin/control, and
"Governm
authority/sovereignty, and ideologies.
Part III
on
has
chapters on
146
the
Interpretation
the state and
and
relationship between subsidiarity and justice, individuals and to groups, constitutionalism, is
its relationship to
"functional" "geographic"
dis
tribution of power (i.e., federalism versus the unitary state, and separation of powers), and political change. There
which also a
brief
bibliography by
in
chapter political
includes
works
from different
perspectives, not all of which are
science.
The three
students
chapters
in Part I include
much good
information,
which
I found
to
chapter on
be generally interested in. They were especially interested in the democracy. The different views about democracy in Chapter One (i.e.. Jacksonian democracy), the
related
popular control notion of popular selection
"democracy is
many contemporary
are
political scientists, and
Aristotelian-based
actual versus virtual

methods shares
particularly enlightening for students. His discussion of representation is also helpful. The chapter on scope and
chapters same
the problem of some other
in the book: it is divided into

are not are also
sections which, while all
discusssing
which
the
broad topic,
interrelated
used, even
very
well.
Similar terms
designate different things
though the terms could very easily be used interchangeably. For example, he dis
"approaches"
cusses three
to political science and then a number of different

"methods"
"methods"; it is
The
not so clear result
why the
mentioned could not also
be
"ap
proaches."
is
occasional student confusion.

seems questionable.
Further,
the ordering of these three chapters in Part 1

of the
The discussion
discipline
and such methodologies as
behavioralism
and
postbehavioralism
seemingly
of
should come
before
an explication of
clear
the political
chapter on
system model,
instead
the other way around. It is not
why the
democracy
The
the state,
and
is
placed
in Part I.
are unified around the theme of the
chapters
in Part II
different
aspects of
as mentioned above.
For
each aspect
are
nature, origin/control, purpose.
authority
Schrems believes that there

though
three basic perspectives
which
might roughly,
imprecisely, be
(or the
categorized as
individualistic,
collectivis-
tic,
and common good

medieval
natural right/natural
law tradition
of classical and
Christian
political philosophy).
He brings these together in the final
chapter of
Part II
when
he discusses
ideologies, although
he
never
directly
links
up the various modern ideologies discussed with these different perspectives. The organizing theme for the early chapters of Part III is the principle
subsidiarity,
which
of
Schrems,
after
surveying
other approaches, posits as the
best
way
and
of
insuring
that
distributive justice is
Schrems
in
promoted and the proper
relationship
side
preserved
between
individuals, voluntary
as the source
associations, and churches on one

lakes E.
government on the other.
Schumacher really.
St.
Thomas Aquinas
course, it is
for his discussion
of subsidiarity; actually, ol
a principle rooted
common sense which manifests
itself in
main
normal governmental practices.
The first half

one,
Schrems'
of
chapter on constitutionalism
in Part III is
nature, and
a good
chane-
providing
an overview of
the
background, development,
Book Reviews
147
constitutionalism.
ing
character of
American
It
also explains, and

of
in
simple
terms
(e.g., just
by
asserting the
the
of which
distinction between
"legally"
"actually"
limited
and
governments),
difference between the

on
constitutions
all
the U.S.
the
U.S.S.R., both
people. weaves
paper provide
sorts
of protections
for
their
The
second
half of the chapter, however, is dense

social science notions as
with constitutionalism.
and abstruse as
it inter
such and
modern
"'political
"political
"infrastructure"
It is
also
disappointing that
he only
while
Schrems
refers
to
Aristotelian
or classical constitutionalism and speaks of
the classification of modern-day constitutions, he does not discuss
briefly mentions it elsewhere in fying the constitutions of ancient

The
chapter on of separation of powers and
"systems"
the
book
Aristotle's
great project of classi
Greece.
power"
"functional distribution
the
of
provides a good explanation
differences between
It
also
the presidential and the par

argues
chosen
model
liamentary by
of government.
a nation
wisely
that the
system
either of these or a combination of them
like the French The fact

not
must
be
one which corresponds to
its
situation and traditions. worked
that particular governmental institutions

guarantee
have
in
one
country does
they
will work
in
another. of power and political change are

argues
The
chapters on
"geographic distribution
than descriptive. In the
more argumentative
former, he convincingly
that
in
spite of all of
the rhetoric to the contrary, the U.S. is not and never was a
truly
"federal"
state,
in the
sense of the states
existing
as sovereign entities or
having
any
real
federalism"
"unauthority apart from the national government. Paradoxically, this had its roots in the Tenth Amendment which, despite speaking of
"reserved"
powers
to the states, specifically
mentions none notion of
that are reserved.

powers
This,
coupled with the powers
development
of the
implied
coming
from the
delegated to the
national government, guaranteed
the
expansion
of national power.
The book's final

points
chapter on political change
has three especially noteworthy

the classical political vir
for
students.
The first is the implicit
emphasis on
tue of
prudence with
its understanding
democratic
of change as gradual and multifaceted.

common opinion, change occurs
ones.
The
second
is its
contention
that, contrary to
regimes
more might
dependably
be
in
stable
than in revolutionary
This
cam
an eye-opener
pus propaganda
to cogitate
to the student, but something which is necessary for him he is probably being barraged with is any remaining doubt there if insists Schrems that, about. And third,
this point
in light of the usual
in the
end of
reader's mind at
in the book,
such questions as
the
nature and
the state, the
origin and
justification
of political authority, and the nature
and role of
justice,
and such principles as
subsidiarity "all have
a profound effect
on particular political
sophical premises of politics,
In
other words, you cannot
ignore the
philo
as so much of
contemporary
political science
has
tried to do.
Simply
put, "ideas
have
numerous
The
good points about
this book are too
to list.
Among
its most
im-
148
Interpretation besides simply its persistent focus on the perennial philo politics, are the following: its discussion of the principle of Schrems effectively argues is a just and reasonable way to its citizens and associations; its thoughtful, al
examination of church -state relations;
portant contributions
sophical
issues
of
subsidiarity,
regulate
which
the state's actions toward
though complicated,
tion
as
its helpful
explica
for the
to why
beginning democracy is
student not an
of
the social
contract
theory; its
explanation
"ideology"
like Marxism,
which some political
scientists and popular commentators

notion of justice
believe; its discussion

political
of
how the
differs from
that of such contemporary thinkers as
Rawls;
and
its
insistence, following
up
with
classical and
Christian
thought, that the

are
nature of
one's viewpoint on the state
that
is,
political
ideologies
ultimately tied
the
his
viewpoint on
human
nature.
In
addition are
to that
mentioned
above, two other substantive
weak points of
book
ologies
its sketchy and somewhat imprecise definitions of various modern ide and its unsatisfactory contention, when discussing individual rights, that
argued that
the principle of subsidiarity indicates that the death penalty should be eliminated
(others have
it
provides a rationale
for it).
frequent digressions
Other lack
of
weaknesses
in the
area of narrative style and structure are the general
tight organization in the

meant
book,
Schrems'
which are
obviously
them,
plain
and
to elucidate points for students but sometimes end up confusing
his
occasional use of
basic his
political realities.
uncustomary or novel terms and notions to ex An additional problem is that some of the latter,
state,"
such as
"unifying element of the
are somewhat vague.
It is to be hoped
that these narrative and structural problems will be corrected in a second edition.
All in all, I have little doubt that this

are
and
Glenn Tinder's Political
Thinking
the two best
introductory
political science texts on
the market today, although
Schrems'
is the
more substantial of
the two.
Any
political science professor con
cerned about
upholding the
Great Tradition
feel
safe
ductory-level
undergraduates can
philosophy with his intro in using Principles of Politics.

of political
The
Founding
and
Perpetuation
of
Will Morrisey
Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins

rest
of
the Constitution.
1985. xiii
By
For
pp.:
McDonald. (Lawrence:
University By
of
Kansas Press,
+ 359
$25.00.)
In Defense tions,
1984.
of
Liberal Democracy.
pp.: paper
Walter Berns. (Chicago:
Gateway
Edi
373
$9.95.)
earned
The distinguished historian Forrest McDonald has less than

starstruck chronicler of the
his
reputation as a
po-
American founding. The distinguished
Book Reviews
litical
scientist
149
earned
Walter Berns equally has
his
reputation as an unenchanted
observer of
the drift away from that founding. Yet their criticisms issue from
different
premises, and thus present a challenge to each other as well as a rebuke
to fashionable
illusions.
In
what
an earlier
book, ironically
titled E Pluribus
about
Unum,*
McDonald
questions
he
"'fictions"
calls nationalist
the American founding: that the Revo
lutionary
private
War
states'
aimed at national, not
independence;
that the Articles of
Confederation
were unworkable and contributed to the collapse of
"public
were
and
morality"
just
after the war ended
in 1783; that the founders
"demi
Along
the way he delivers a number of amusing
Virginians ("Because
they
. .
often
jibes, particularly about found it difficult to feed their slaves, they em

are
braced humanitarianism. Madison

as
"). There
excesses,
as when
he dismisses James
all
"at base
brittle, doctrinaire
even more
theorist,"
but beneath it
McDon
ald wants
to
find the truth
than he wants to polemicize. He differs
from many Southern writers in preferring the nationalist position even as he deflates nationalist mythology. There is a flaw, inevitable in any reductionist ar
gument, no matter how measured: at the end of
founders'
his
apparent
demonstration
of the
profound
disunity, he
calls
cannot quite explain
how they
produced a sys
tem that works.
Instead, he
it "the
miracle of the age, and of
the succeeding
all
age. and of all ages to
If "the
wheel of
history
turns on petty
to incredible good
the
time, then any
lasting
success at all must
be
attributed
for
tune or
amazing In Novus Ordo Seclorum McDonald

understood themselves.
rejects
grace.
undertakes
to
understand
the founders as
problem as
they
This
presents not so much an pessimism of
interpretive
'deco
McDonald
the fashionable
historical one, namely, making tradictory principles. He identifies four
founders'
sense of
the
many
and
apparently
protect
con
of these:
the intention to
lives, liberty,
the use of
and property; the
intention to
establish a republican government;
history
as a source of evidence
for
their arguments, as a
legacy,
and as
a stage on which their
own reputations might
find
a place; and the appeal to mod
ern political
theory, particularly
are
as enunciated
by Hume,
rubrics
Harrington, Locke,
and
Montesquieu. These
ents."
less
principles
than
containing many "ingredi
"incompatible."
some of
them
and
to separate these ingredients

second
In the first half of the book, McDonald tries to demonstrate their incompatibility. In the
of the
compound
half he describes the
properties
resulting from their
mixture.
McDonald tends to
founders'
somewhat exaggerate
theoretical
contradictions
among the
of
philosophic sources.
For
example,
he
contrasts
Locke's idea
prop
erty, based on nature,
with
Blackstone's, based
regards
on
the king's dominion. He
rightly
observes that
Blackstone
moreover
the
source of
kingly
dominion
as rather
mysterious,
teaching
that once the
king
has
granted property, rights

1776-1790
to
Formation of the Republic *Forrest McDonald: E Pluribus Unum: The Indianapolis). in 1979 by Liberty Press. Houghton Mifflin. 1969. Reissued
(Boston:
150
Interpretation
reach except
it
are
beyond his
by
in
means of practical
due
process.
But McDonald does

argument makes
not
draw the
stone's
obvious conclusion:
terms, this
Black-
idea
of
property
similar
to Locke's, and, in theoretical terms, the myste
riousness of
the origins of
kingly
dominion leaves
an opening, so to speak,
for
modern natural right.
McDonald generally does
not
sufficiently His two
allow
for the
philosophic writer's need of prudence rors result
in
such matters.
most serious er
pious
from this incautiousness: He

quoting
theistic passages
attempts
to prove Locke a
Christian
simply
even
by
from his
works; and
he identifies Montes
quieu with
the argument for
"virtuous'
or classical republicanism.
Occasionally,
as when
claims that chapters
relatively Locke
straightforward arguments are garbled

"sanctioned"
in paraphrase,
he
23
and
24
of the
Essay
slavery "under certain conditions"; in fact, in on Civil Government the philosopher calls slav
ery
as
a continuation of at all
the State of
War,
and
describes slavery among the Jews
not
slavery
but
as a
form
"drudgery"
of
whereby any
another
physical abuse of
the
servant was
legal
cause
for liberation. At
key
point
in his argument,
agreement
McDonald unaccountably describes the Lockean social contract as an between the people and a prince, not among the people themselves.
Having
and
said
this,
one should also
say that the

"virtuous"
core of
McDonald's book
his
chapters on
Alexander Hamilton's
on
founders'
adaptation of
the political economy of Smith

and commercial
Steuart,
the tensions between
republicanism,
Humean theory of the passions to the govern mental device of federalism will clarify and deepen any reader's knowledge of the American founding. The chapter on passion and federalism deserves particu
and on
the relation of the
founders'
lar
notice. upon
Many
writers
have
expounded on the
American
refusal to
rely
"the kind
of public virtue required
by
classical and puritanical republi
canism"
while nonetheless often called
insisting
upon
the need
cannot
for
certain common
decencies
'bourgeois
virtues.'
But this
explain
the character of the
founders themselves,
McDonald
of subsequent
American statesmen,
enables
or of whatever
it is in
states
the character of the American people that

men. recalls
them to respond to those
that certain modern writers did not imagine the 'low but
cites
ground'
common classical
to be a sufficient foundation for civil societv. He

and
the
neo
playwright
essayist
Joseph Addison (his Cato

the
was
admired
by
George Washington),
who emphasizes
importance
of
honor,
the esteem of
wise and good men, as a
firmer
and
ground
for
statesmanlike conduct than

parallel
is
virtue
itself. Shaftesbury, Hume,

overlooks their source, esteem
Smith
advance
teachings:
McDonald
wherein
Locke's Some Thoughts
Concerning
Education,
is
presented as virtue's
The
passion
basis, particularly among the class for honor finds institutional support in hereditarv
as
of gentlemen.
aristocracies;
states
McDonald identifies John Dickinson

as
the founder who
saw
the American
a
"institutional
system,"
for the English baronies

hereditary."
"in
manner of speak proposed a

represents
ing,"
the states are "permanent and

mixed
Dickinson "therefore
of
wherein, for example, the House
Representatives
the nation and the
Senate
represents the states,
making the latter "as
near as
may
Book Reviews
be to the House
of
151
England."
Lords in
the English
One
might add
that the American
federal
re
structure resembles
sembles
mixed regime as
the
modern version of
honor
classical
and
Christian
virtues.
These
resemblances cause
McDonald
to call the American Constitution "the
culmination of a
tradition of civil human
ism that dated back

alleged
'miracle'
millennia."
more than two

founders'
Thus
even as
he
emphasizes the works another

'conservative'
discontinuities among the

"Tradition"
principles, McDonald
the same role
of
unity.
plays
much
in
thought as
Hegel's Absolute Spirit
plays
(in
various
guises) in liberal and leftist the

at the ex
thought: as an
pense of
intellectual deus
the American
phenom
ex machina,
"saving
the principle of noncontradiction.
But
not so
perhaps
founding
"It
is
not so
miraculous, in part because it is
from this survey that it is meaningless to say that the Framers intended this or that the Framers intended that: their positions were diverse and, in many particulars, incompatible"; more
of contradictions. should obvious
full
be
over, "no delegate
or coalition of
delegates
was able to
dominate the [Constitu

issues,"
tional]
convention except
for brief
periods and on specific
fact
result
ing
in "repeated
compromises."
McDonald's
argument
limps because it has

represents an
sustained a
logical fall: he fails to
see that a compromise
itself
in
tention,
albeit perhaps a changed speculative
intention. Thus
were of
when
McDonald
to the
claims that
"abstract
doctrines distinction into
limited
mother
use"
founders,
does
not
that
"experience, both
he inflates
tend'
their own and that of their

a
a
country, provided a surer

as such
guide,"
dichotomy.
Theory
'in
to be useful. Modern theory, often
identical to method, does
'intend'
to be
cal regime.
politi usually in any formulaic way when it comes to founding.a As the failures of such men as Comte and Spencer show, even the moderns must rely on prudence, whereby moral and political principles may be brought to bear upon practice without any illusion of melding theory and prac
useful,
but
not
'History'
("conservatives'
'tradition.'
tice.*
Moderns
attempt
to
substitute
read
prudence.
libertarians 'the invisible

torians
adhere
hand,'
the left 'dialectic') for

will
As
long
as
his
to
historicism, they
colors
misunderstand statesmanship.
Berns'
No historicism
wherein
Walter
he
undertakes
the Aristotelian task

not
In Defense of Liberal Democracy, of strengthening the decent regime

'adapt'
under which
he lives. He does this

'times,'
by
seeking to
the United States
Constitution to his
times in tune
with
but "in
part and to the extent possible,
to
keep
the
Constitution."
the
The book's five

republicanism:
parts contain chapters on
the
principal
issues
facing
American
the Constitution, foreign
politics,
domestic
conveys
politics, "racial
founders'
and
"religion and
more
Berns
the
political
realism
commentator on the
Constitution. He has
that the Constitution
McDonald
on
healthy
vividly than any other contempt for the high-flown. Rights

would
none-
Thus he
*For
view
recognizes
without
the Bill of
an excellent critique of
precisely this
point, see
pp.
Charles Kesler
s untitled re
in The American Spectator. Vol. 19. No. 5-
May
1986.
35-36-
152
Interpretation
theless secure rights
by
its
prudent
of
balancing
of governmental powers,
amount
but the
Bill
of
Rights
without
the
body
the Constitution would
to little more
of
'ideals'
By emphasizing laundry the doctrine contorted have Supreme Courts recent tions,
than a
of good not
list
intentions.
instead
ol
institu
judicial
review and,
stresses
incidentally,
upon
overstepped their own
institutional functions. Berns

review
the
limited
and even problematic role of

which
judicial
in the
modern political phi
losophy
law
the
Constitution
more
largely
than
rests.
Hobbes,
Locke,
and
Montesquieu
reduces
respected
lawyers little
lawyers to equality
agree
with other men
they did priests. Modern natural because it regards all men as es

others.
sentially equal, none naturally more fit to rule than the "no
man can
To the
moderns.
rationally
to
an arrangement where another man is authorized

law."
to convert his opinion

more power
into fundamental
moderns
The American
judiciary
enjoys
restrict
than the great
would
permit,
but only if judges
themselves to speaking for the Constitution

set of political
an organization of
sovereignty
or
institutions based
"ideals."
upon consent
and not
lor themselves, for their
own privately-held
alism of the moderns and the realities of
Berns identifies the underlying tension between the so-to-speak theoretical American life in the 1 780s:
of course, than of
re
More,
the
principles of modern natural right and
law
went men
into
the
founding
the United States. In theory, the country was
founded
rights against each
other; in fact
of other
they
were men
closely
associated
claiming by in families.
churches, and a
host
institutions.
character of
These institutions formed the
Americans. Such
character and
institu
them.
tions may have no place in modern
'realism,'
'realism'
but
modern
needs
A country "founded on the principle of flourish if it consisted only, or mainly,
self-interest
could not
be
expected to problem
of self-interested
But the
may be
tion of
created
more subtle than this.
Berns
says
that modern
natural right
and unalienable
rights self-evident,
says.
by
nature.
But this is
not
finds equality what the Declara

that
all men are
Independence idea
The Declaration
their
calls
it
self-evident
equal, endowed
by
Creator
with certain unalienable
rights.
The
founders'
of self-evidence goes
beyond Lockean
self-evidence,
and even
beyond it
a moral sense;
it
posits what might
be
called a metaphysical sense.
This
moral and metaphysical sense would
strongly
resembles
Christian
conscience, although
be
a mistake
to simply
identify
can
the two. In the
Declaration,
between
the
founders
and
enunciate a public or politic conscience.
The
tension
Christianity
modernity remains, but there moderate it.

Berns
shows
'idealist'
be
no question
that the founders
winked
to
how the American
compromise
between Christian
and modern
safe
unravels when guards.
sentiment exerts too much pressure on
institutional
Fear is
animates
American
pacifists more
than faith
docs,
and their hoped-
for
world government could end

not
'love'
only in despotism, rule by fear. In politics, because "experience that Christians "arc more enough,
themselves.'"
likely
to
love their
neighbors when
their
neighbors are
like
"Reli-
Book Reviews
gious
1 53
men
faith
seems
to unite
but divide
mankind,"
Berns
drily
remarks.
As for
existing
institutions,
the United Nations cannot quite overcome certain
formi
dable
obstructions
to universal
humanitarianism,
most
notably the Soviet Union.

and violence es
In American domestic politics, the

cape
'soft'
problems of
pornography
to dull the
the obvious antitoxins, censorship and capital punishment, because libertar

allies with a
ianism
tice.
tolerant or
Christianity
instruments
from
of
jus
to
Shame
and anger are
the passions that prevent
liberty
descending
power
license; they hold men to "We, the

that the
responsible.
Because the American Constitution

a short
assigns
People,"
not
to
God, "it is only
step from the
principle
laws
are
consideration move
merely a product of one's own will to the opinion that the only that informs the law is self-interest; and this opinion is only one re Berns
of
from
lawlessness."
cites
Lincoln
on
the Constitution as an inheri

appeals not
tance of our
fathers, worthy
veneration, but Lincoln centrally

"propositions"
to
veneration of
the old but to the truths

Americans'
or
would
of
the
Declaration,
with
out which the work of

monarch
fathers
be
no more venerable than the
they
rebelled against
or, as the Declaration puts

against
it,
the monarchy who
rebelled against
them and the
indeed
Creation itself. its framers has

never
Veneration
ous
of
law, its
principles, and
been
conspicu
in American "racial
politics,"
to
which
Berns devotes
a section separate
from
ordinary domestic politics. In one of his most substantial essays, Berns charges that the Constitutional provision to restrict the importation of slaves suffers from
an
ambiguity exploited cynically Madison. Today, unfortunately,

of such willful
by
Southern
politicians,
attempts
to counteract the
same contempt
including Jefferson and longstanding effects

for
constitutionality.
distortion
rest on much
the
re way to ideology, as the school of "legal tries '"to persuade us that the essence of the judicial process does not con The attempt defeats itself, because but in making sist in interpreting law its self-proclaimed makers, regarding law cannot but reflect upon for polit whose actions, intentions, and authority then become fair, broad targets
Worse still,
mere
hypocrisy
has
given
it."
'realism'
ical deconstructionists. In the book's final

make
part,
Berns
argues way.
that contemporary
religious
zealots
the same
mistake
in
different
They
denigrate the law
not
by
arbi
transcend arbitrarily seeking to put lay catholics bishops Catholic U.S. the conscription immoral (for example), between to choose obeying either their spir of "in the position
trarily seeking
to
make
it, but by
it. In calling
[someday]
law
having
land,"
itual
advisors or the
of
the
dilemma
likely to
weaken
the authority of
Americans'
both. The dilemma

of
mirrors
"acceptance and
simultaneous rejection
their
eager pursuit of self-interest and
community feeling.
If McDonald's
neo-Burkean
historicism
causes
him to
underestimate
the
intellectual
Berns'
coherence
at the time of the of American statesmanship

underpinnings
founding,
emphasis
on
the Constitution's theoretical the

exact character of
occasionally
founders'
causes
him to
overlook
the
about
statesmanlike adapta
tions
of modern political
as
philosophy.
Writing
statesmanship
is
nearly
as
difficult
practicing it.
Yale French Studies

Yale French
Studies, 71
Men/Women of Letters
edited
by Charles A.
writers'
Porter
Since 1960 French

and more and
critical editions of
correspondences
have been appearing in profusion,

recently
literary critics
to
historians have begun
pay in
a
creasing
attention to the nature and
functioning of the letter.

dozen
Here
critics and editors address
some of the current concerns: the
letter
"object"
as
as well as
"mes
sage/'
the
letter
as a confirmation of
spontaneous expression with
form;
the surprising
fixed difficulties and

a
even more
surprising results of as sembling independent letters into

correspondence.
Yale French
Studies, 69
$12.95
Yale French
Studies,
70
The Lesson of Paul de Man

edited
Images of Power: Medieval History/Discourse/ Literature

edited and
by Peter Brooks,
and
Shoshana
Felman,
J. Hillis Miller
The late Paul de Man was an active member of the Yale French Studies editorial board. This special issue,
by Kevin Brownlee Stephen G. Nichols

volume of
dedicated to his memory, discusses de Man's impact on the criticism and teaching of literature and his
continuing
tual
presence as an
intellec
This
Yale French Studies
force.
$12.95
as single
opens
ing
the
up Middle
new possibilities
for read
Ages,
viewing the
Available
nature of medieval
a closed system or
discourse not as teleology but as a

immanent
issues or by (two issues: $22.00 individuals, $25. 90 institutions).

subscription
problematic subject
in
to
a culture that we now recognize and
be dynamic $12.95
heterogeneous.
Yale University Press Dept. YFSX 92A Yale Station New Haven, CT 06520
PUBLIUS:
THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM
Published by the Center for the Study Temple University North Texas State
of
Federalism
and
University
and
Editors: Daniel J. Elazar
John Kincaid
now
PUBLIUS is
of publication.
quarterly journal
in its
of
seventeenth year principles
It is dedicated to the study
federal
institutions, and processes. PUBLIUS publishes articles, research notes, and book reviews on the theoretical, practical and policy dimensions of the American federal system, intergovernmental relations, and state and local government. PUBLIUS also
publishes relevant studies of other
federal
systems
throughout
the world.
Forthcoming issues
law,
the
munities
will
feature
articles on state constitutional
in Germany, rural com in the federal system, federalism and military rule in Nigeria, bicommunalism, American political thought, and much more as well as the PUBLIUS Annual Review of American
Voting Rights Act, federalism
Federalism.
H. Beer, Lewis A. Dexter, Ivo D. Duchacek, Max Frenkel, Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., A.E. Dick Howard, L. Adele Jinadu, Irving Kristol, E. Lester Levine, William S. Livingston, Catherine H. Lovell, Alexandre Marc, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, Neal R. Peirce, William H. Riker, Harry N. Scheiber, Ira Sharkansky, Donald V. Smiley, David B. Walker, Murray L. Weidenbaum, Frederick Wirt, Deil S. Wright.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: Thomas J. Anton, Samuel
tional
ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individual $20; Institu $30; Student and Retired, $15. (Add $5.00 for foreign
postage.)
Subscriptions
and manuscript submissions should
be
sent to:
PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM Department of Political Science, North Texas State University (817) 565-2313 Denton, Texas 76203-5338
c/o
MANUSCRITO
An International Journal
of
Philosophy
Editors: Marcelo Dascal, Michel Ghins. Universidade Estadual de Campinas.
Volume IX N? 1
April 1986
-
Truth and Existence in Leibniz; 2) Michel 1) George Englebretsen The Ontological Status Mach et Duhem; 3) Jorge J.E. Gracia Paty A Hermeneutica ante o Positivismo; of Individuality; 4) Alberto Cupani La philosophie biologique de Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire : 5) Fernando Gil
-
de l'organisation
of
1 'auto -organisation;
6) Leon Koj
-
On the Foundations
e ceticismo.
Denoting; 7) Oswaldo
-
Porchat Pereira
Saber comum
Volume IX N? 2
October 1986
-
Special Issue: Popper Popper et l'interpretation mCthodologique de 1) Angelo M. Petroni Political Criticism in History: Popper and Althusser; Marx; 2) Asher Idan El racionalismo critico y la fundamentacion 3) Carlos Santiago Nino
-
de la etica; bilidade em perties,

Arrow
and of
Demarcacao e decidi4) Jezio Hernani Bonfim Gutieire Michael Krausz Intentionality, Expressive Pro Popper on the Popper's Placement of Music; 6) Michel Ghins
Popper; 5)
Time; 7) Theory -plus-Method; 8) Robert Nadeau

-
Roberto Martins
A Popperian Evaluation
-
of
Einstein's
question
Popper,
Hayek et la
du
scientismc.
Volume X N? 1
April 1987
Approach'
-
The 'Economic Applied to the Philos Radnitzky What is the Price of Realism in the ophy of Science; 2) Klaus Mainzer Quantum World?; 3) Leon Koj Two Conceptions of Semantics;
1)
Gerard
Las falacias y las paradojas logico-semanticas en la 4) Mauricio Beuchot edad Prolegomenos a epistemologia do media; 5) Roberto Refinetti
-
behaviorismo radical; 6) Ruben Mario Tani tism : on Saying/Doing.

Volume X N? 2
Peirce's Semiotic Pragma
October 1987
Special Issue: Granger
Contributions of Jules Vuillemin, Andres Raggk), David Braybrooke, Joelle Proust, Kuno Lorenz, Marcelo Dascal, Arley R. Moreno, Sergio
Cremaschi, Francis Jacques, Elisabeth Schwartz, Ora Gruengard, Michel Debrun. Jose A. Giannotti, Gilles-Gaston Granger.
published twice yearly by the Centro de Logica, Epis Historia da Ciencia. Universidade Estadual de Campinas. CP. 6133. 13081 Campinas, SP., Brazil. Annual subscription is US$ 10.00 (US$ 5.00 for Latin American
MANUSCRITO is
e
temologia
Countries).
The Political Science Reviewer

Volume
Sixteen Fall
1986
The Political Science Reviewer is an annual journal featuring article length reviews of the leading political science textbooks, the great classics, and recent studies in law and politics.
of the Decline Fall of the Roman Empire Alberto R. Coll
and
Gibbon's
History
and
Editor George W.
Carey
Varieties
of
Participatory Democracy
Democratic
Theory
Managing Editor Gregory Wolfe
Associate Editor James B. Williams
Editorial Assistant Susan-Burns
Joel D. Wolfe
E.F. Schumacher
and
the Politics of Technological Renewal
Charles T. Rubin Crisis

of
the World Split Apart: Solzhenitsyn
on
the West
James F. Pontuso
Approaching
Leo Strauss: Thoughts
on
Machiavelli Peterman Heidegger
Larry
The Political
Board
of
Editors
Christian
Bay
Legacy
of
Nietzsche
and
Jerry
Judicial Reform Under
a
Weinberger
George C.S. Benson John Hallowell Robert Horwitz
Written Constitution
Dorothy B. James
Karl Lamb Harvev Mansfield, Jr. Nelson W. Polsby Ellis Sandoz Mulford Q. Sibley J. David Singer Gordon Tullock
Lane Sunderland Winston Churchill's Thoughts and Adventures James W Muller Hume
the Development
of
on
English Liberty Eugene F. Miller

Totalitarianism
Hannah Arendt
on
Wayne Allen
Please enter my subscription to The Political Science Reviewer, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010
Price
per volume
is $10.00.
except
back issues All I and Volumes

available at
II
are
Name
Street
this
price.
3
~
Volume XVI
Volume
City/State/Zip
C
_
Check
enclosed
social research
AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOLUME 54, NUMBER 1 SPRING 1987
A publication of the GRADUATE FACULTY
SOCIAL RESEARCH
REFLECTIONS ON THE SELF
LIFE AS NARRATIVE Jerome Bruner NOTES ON SELF-CRITICISM Michael Walzer
SELF-DECEPTION David Polonoff
PERSONS AS RHETORICAL CATEGORIES Amelie Oksenberg Rorty

"EVERY ARTIST PAINTS HIMSELF": ART HISTORY AS BIOGRAPHY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY Colin Eisler
SCHREBER'S PANOPTICISM: PSYCHOSIS AND THE MODERN SOUL Louis A. Sass LEONARDO SEES HIM-SELF: READING LEONARDO'S FIRST REPRESENTATION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY Sander L. Gilman
Individual Subscriptions:
$20; Institutions: $40 Single copies available on request Editorial and Business Office: 66 West 12th Street, New York, N.Y. 1001 1 Room GF354
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY

Edited
by Ellen Frankel Paul

of
Philosophy and Policy is devoted to a single philosophy, with specially invited papers (and, for designated issues, unsolicited papers) by leading scholars on the most important issues of our time. The topics for Volume 4 are Philosophy and Law, and Philanthropy. Previous issues have focused on Distributive Justice, Human Rights, Liberty and Equality, Ethics and Economics, Nuclear Rights/Nuclear Wrongs, and Marxism and Liberalism, with contributions from such distinguished philosophers as Maurice Cranston, Ronald Dworkin, R. M. Hare, David Gauthier, J. R. Lucas, Amartya Sen, Jon Elster, and G. A. Cohen, among
topic in social
or political
Each 1 92-page issue
Social
others.
Volume 4:2
Philanthropy, Beneficence, and the Public Good,
contains
the
following articles:
Beneficence/benevolence
WILLIAM K. FRANKENA
Generosity and property in Aristotle's Politics T. H. IRWIN Private philanthropy and positive rights ALAN GEWIRTH The role of private philanthropy in a free and democratic BARUCH BRODY
Philanthropy and selfishness
JOHN O'CONNOR
state
-î
Social
Philosophy and Policy is published in October and April for the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State Unniversity, USA
Subscription to Volume 4, 1 987 Individuals: 1 1 (UK) 1 2.50 (overseas) US$1 5 (N. America & Japan) Institutions: 26 (UK) 31 (overseas) US$45 (N. America & Japan) ? Please enter my subscription to Social Philosophy and Policy/send
.50
me a
sample
copy
? ?
enclose
cheque/money
order made payable
to Basil Blackwell
Please charge my Access/American Express/Barclaycard/Diners Club/ MasterchargeA/isa account number:

Signature
Card expiry date
For payments is 236 6053
via
the National Giro
Bank, the Basil Blackwell
account number
Address
If address registered with card company differs from above, please Please return this form together with your payment if applicable to:
give
details.
Basil Blackwell
108
Cowley Road, Oxford 0X4 1 JF, UK, Murray Hill Station, NY 10156, USA.
Journals Subscription Dept., or, Journals Dept., Box 1320,
Annals
studies
of
Scholarship is
journal devoted to crossdisciplinary

The
editors are
in the humanities
and social sciences.
especially
interested in
contributions related
to the
Curtius (1886-1956)
as a
philologist,
following topics: (1) E. R. literary historian, cultural critic, or
humanist; (2) the history of classical scholarship, with an emphasis on individual figures, publications, or controversies; (3) the sense of the whether it is a period label, the name of a term Postmodernism specific cultural trend, etc.; (4) methodological studies in kinship,
gender,
essays
and sexuality.
The
editors are also
interested in receiving
important
new
work
review
offering
substantial
discussion
of
in the
and
humanities
and social
sciences, and articles
discussing
welcome.
the
work
careers of major scholars of all periods.

contributors
Proposals from
are
prospective
as
well
as
finished
articles
Contact the
Editor, 1841 Broadway, New York, NY 10023-7699.

Annual
subscriptions:
institutions,
air and
$35.00; individuals, $20.00.

$1.00
per
Single
numbers:
$7.00; foreign
available
mail, add
issue. Now
available
available:
issue 4.1, "Science
the
Imagination"; issue 4.2
in April 1987; issue 4.3
in July.
Forthcoming Articles
K. L. Yeager David Bolotin
Man
and
Nature in Plato's Phaedo

and
The Theaetetus
Tacitus'
the
Possibility of False
Decline
of
Opinion
James C. Leake
Teaching and the
Liberty at Rome
(Chapters 3 to 7)
Richard Burrow
Credulity and Curiosity

Pluralism,
in A Tale of a Tub
Kenneth L. Grasso
the Public Good and the Problem of Self-
Government in The Federalist

Chaninah Maschler
On the Wisdom
of
of
Nathan:
Lecture
Review by Will Morrisey
The Fate of the
Self by Stanley Corngold
ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation, Vol 15-1

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Interpretation, Vol 15-1

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

A

Equality, Liberty, Wisdom, Morality

Socratic Rhetoric Plato's Phaedrus

Rome (Preface. Introduction,

The Moral Foundations

the American Republic

Hilail Gildin Seth G. Benardete Gildin

Cropsey John Hallowell Wilhelm Hennis Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal

Arnaldo Momigliano Sandoz

Thompson Patrick Christopher A. Maureen

Fred Baumann Colmo

Feder-Marcus Jensen Rubin

Goldberg Morrisey Charles Rubin

Laurette G. Hupman Martyn Hitchcock

Design & Production

$15; institutional $18;

interpretation, Queens College ,

N.Y. 11367, U.S.A. Authors submitting

interpretation are requested to

the ML A Style Sheet and to send clear and readable

Equality, Liberty, Wisdom, Morality

Socratic Wisdom in Plato's 29

Principles of Politics: An Introduction by John J Schrems

Novus Ordo Seclorum In Defense of Liberal

Equality, Liberty, Wisdom, Morality

Founding this founding

interest in these historical

derivative from the fact

that of political freedom. The

the idea was blazoned forth to the world, or

but the idea itself, deserves the first

our attention and es

"the American Constitution

ever struck off at a given time and

and purpose of was

But the "brain

the former which made the

take precedence of his

wonder and admiration.

The Constitution has become

honor the intelligence, the devotion,

the sacrifices, of those who be

or other external goods can

no more than posterity.

origin our regime was proclaimed

"We hold these truths to be

And truth it is only it is willed, but

and of the mind

properly him only in the

possession not of one are no

possession of truth. although as the

that the understand

of the will to princi of

only understand the principles institutions of education and of

which such principles

that many of you

to the proposition that all men

are created equal, continued

and seven years the

paper was prepared

the Constitution at the Center

Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, February

question, and deserves the most

would assert a priori