Marcos vs. Marcos Petitioner: Brenda B. Marcos Respondent: Wilson G. Marcos Ponente: J.

Panganiban Facts: The petitioner and the respondent first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, Brenda, as an escort of Imee Marcos and Wilson, as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. They were married twice, first on September 6, 1982 and on May 8, 1983 five children were born out of their marriage. After the downfall of Pres. Marcos, respondent left the military service in 1987 and unsuccessfully engaged in different business ventures. He became unemployed and the spouses would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit her and even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake. In 1992, they were already living separately. Brenda on the other hand was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

On October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel and the respondent turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. Petitioner submitted herself to medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions. The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while the appellant (Wilson Marcos) on the other hand did not. The lower court found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that psychological incapacity must be proven medically by experts to exist at the time of the celebration of marriage and to be incurable and since the respondent was not subjected to Psychological evaluation, the finding of his incapacity is insufficient. Issue: Whether or not the Courts of Appeals set aside the finding of Psychological incapacity of the simply because the latter did not subject himself to psychological evaluation Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition.

Ruling: The personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity however, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. In order to determine the psychological incapacity of a spouse the following must be established: The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration' of the marriage. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that

respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Petition DENIED and the decision of the Appellate Court is AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 141917 Feb 7, 2007 Petitioner: Bernardino S. Zamora Respondent: Court of Appeals and Norma Mercado Zamora FACTS: On June 4, 1970, petitioner and private respondent got married in Cebu City. As such, they lived together however, the union did not bear any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. Thereafter, she made periodical visits to Cebu City.

On 1989, she became a U.S. citizen and stopped visiting the Philippines. Petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided under Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not given petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States, had in fact become an American citizen, and that they only lived together for not more than three years. Private respondent denied that she refused to have a child. She said that being a nurse, she loved children and that from time to time, she even borrowed her husbands niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband alleging that he had been unfaithful to her, he had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with them. On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision stating that nothing in the evidence shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed to comply with her essential marital obligations. The complaint was thus DISMISSED. Petitioner appealed to the CA which rendered a Decision

on August 5, 1999 affirming the ruling of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by CA. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents actions are enough indications of psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code and thus be sufficient grounds for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. HELD: The Court stresses that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented should be sufficient to convince them in totality of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions reached by the trial court and the CA. The petition is thus DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner MARIE IVVONE REYES, respondent

G.R. No. 155800 Mar. 10, 2006 Facts: Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Marie Reyes was a chronic liar. She made up stories about her being employed at Blackgold Recording Company as a Singer, concealed the truth about her illegitimate child saying that her family adopted him, made up stories about her being a psychologist, invented friends that would often write letters to her husband, exhibit excessive jealousy toward her husband when there is no reason for such, and spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. Thereafter, they were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code. He presented an expert that proved Maries Psychological Incapacity. Marie denied all his allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also

annulled the marriage and was affirmed by the Vaticans Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision, hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the marriage is null and void according to Art 36 of the Family Code. Held: Following the guidelines established in the Molina case for determining psychological incapacity, the case at bar proved that: The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a

restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged. Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Case Brief no. 4: Lucita E. Hernandez vs. CA and Mario Hernandez 320 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 126010, 8 December 1999 Facts: On 1 January 1981, Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez, and they had three children. On 1986 private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite. It was when Mario was working in this company that his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing worsened. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. As a result on July 10 1992, Lucita

filed a petition for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform his obligations to support the family, devoting most of his time drinking, having affairs with many women (Mario had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"), and cohabiting with another woman(Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite) with whom he had an illegitimate child(Margie P. Oliva). When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion. After that incident Mario finally abandoned her and their family. The RTC-Tagaytay City dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or not Marios habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion and family abandonment constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the aforementioned acts do not by themselves constitute grounds for psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent's completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by the experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Expert evidence are given by

qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. Judgment affirmed. G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006 MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs. BRIX FERRARIS, respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Facts: Petitioner and respondent lived a happy and contented married life for almost a year. According to petitioner, respondent was a loving and responsible husband. Their problem as a couple started when women started calling the respondent and petitioner began to become suspicious of respondent. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. Respondent became withdrawn and continuously was unable to perform his so-called marital obligations. Petitioner then filed a petition to declare her marriage with respondent null, on the grounds of Psychological incapacity, under Article 36 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not respondents alleged psychological incapacity is sufficient for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Held: No. Petition Denied. Decision of the lower courts affirmed. In such cases, Courts rely on testimonies of experts like clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. In the case at bar, Dr. Dayan diagnosed respondent of having personality

disorders like: Schizoid and Avoidant. The court finds her testimony vague and that they also fail to prove that respondents illness exist prior to their marriage. One of petitioners contentions was her husbands epilepsy which is not covered under article 36. Article 36 of the Family Code, refers psychological incapacity as a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Such incapacity demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, which petitioner failed to prove in court. Dino vs. Dino Petitioner: ALAIN M. DIO Respondent: MA. CARIDAD L. DIO Ponente: CARPIO, J Facts: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and

Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994 and in 1996, petitioner and

respondent decided to live together again. On January 14, 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of

Las Pias City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. The respondent was also unfaithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001and that the latter married a certain a Manuel clinical V.Alcantara. psychologist,

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag),

submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and

by nature, incurable. The Court stipulated that the decree of absolute nullity of marriage will be given after the liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Held: Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family

Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties because according to the said article, Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. Article 45 of the Family Code,refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. The marriages in this articles are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains\ unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. There is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. This is contrary to the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.

Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Thus, it is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. Decis ion Affirmed with Modification that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

GR no 17441 Oct. 13, 2009 Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar, petitioner vs. Rey Alcazar, respondent Carpio, J. Facts:

On 11 October 2000 petitioner and respondent got married. Their marriage was solemnized by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan and held at Pabustans residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival. Upon arrival respondent went directly to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled toSan Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002. Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,

providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of thePhilippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT, petitioners marriage with respondent is qualified for annulment, on the grounds of respondents psychological incapacity under Article 45(5) of the Family code? Held: PETITION DENIED. Decision of the lower courts AFFIRMED. To consider a person psychologically incapacitated, the courts rely on testimony of expert witnesses such as Clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag a psychiatrist acted as a witness. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayags invitation. Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Tayags source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial. Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such

a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. The burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. In the case at bar, the court found a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Court also emphasized that an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage, as stated in the case of Marcos v. Marcos. As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity. She told the court that she was informed by Jacinto Fordonez, that respondent was living-in with another woman named Sally. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not

constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. The court must uphold the states high stake in the preservation of marriage, its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.