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Euro-Zone Monitor
April 2013
Contents
European Equity Markets Diverge as Crisis Resumes ............................................................................... 2 A Walk Through the Euro-zone ................................................................................................................. 3 Nominal GDP: G6+1 .................................................................................................................................. 4 Nominal GDP: Europe ............................................................................................................................... 5 Real GDP.................................................................................................................................................... 6 Governments' Share of GDP ..................................................................................................................... 7 Government Revenue and Spending ........................................................................................................ 8 Cuts in Government Revenue and Spending ............................................................................................ 9 Trade Balances / Average Cost of Debt .................................................................................................. 10 Unemployment ....................................................................................................................................... 11 Debt-to-GDP, Primary Balance................................................................................................................ 12 House Prices, Unit Labor Costs ............................................................................................................... 13 Retail Sales, Industrial Production .......................................................................................................... 14 Deposits, Loans ....................................................................................................................................... 15 Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 16 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................. 16
Page 1
As I was recently dining at a restaurant, the couple at the neighboring table kept complaining about their food. The server tried to make things right, but eventually the manager had to intervene. Later, I overheard the manager lecturing the server, explaining that "perception is reality". And it's true. What does it matter if your bank deposits are safe as long as most customers believe they are safe? The worst thing that can happen to a bank is pictures of long lines of customers trying to withdraw money. Or, as in Cyprus, banks being closed, limited account access and "haircuts" to those who believed their money to be safe. Only then reality pierces perception, and depositors are suddenly reminded they are merely creditors. From the bank's perspective, deposits are a liability, a source of funding for their assets. The bank customer, of course, has no idea what kind of assets the bank acquires, and the risks taken. And he shouldn't have to. However, after the Troika (EU, ECB and IMF) seemingly didn't mind haircutting small depositors in Cyprus, every depositor should be aware that the EU-wide deposit guarantee does not exist. By confiscating deposits of those depositors, who had little to do with the demise of their bank, a new frontier in the Euro-zone crisis has been reached. EuroGroup president Dijsselbloem made it clear the Cypriot bail-in was a template for future bank rescues. Depositors in the Euro-zone periphery are on high alert, and will likely not think twice before starting a bank run. Just as the Euro-zone crisis subsided, politicians have succeeded in setting it on fire once more. A strong divergence of returns in European equity markets since February (see chart) is a sign of increased trouble ahead.
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Nominal GDP, with the year 2000 set at 100. You see that Spain was one of the strongest performers among the G6+1 (I took the liberty to replace Canada with Spain), while Germany was one of the weakest. This is an example how little GDP actually says about the health of an economy.
Zooming in on the time period since the 'great recession' shows how Germany fared better than Italy and Spain (both never reached their pre-crisis level of nominal GDP).
Page 4
Here we zoom in on nominal GDP since the 'great' recession, showing dramatic declines in Ireland and Greece. If your GDP falls 15% (and unemployment skyrockets) your fiscal deficit is going to get worse, not better. Also, a falling GDP makes the debt-toGDP ratio worse than it already is. Harsh austerity is the medicine that kills the patient.
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Moving on to real GDP, or eliminating the effect of inflation in order to get changes in volume. Look at Italy - worse off than Japan. Yes, deflation actually helps your real GDP, since it makes real GDP higher than nominal GDP. However, I don't think Japan feels really good about deflation.
Zooming in on the past six years, we observe that all countries except Ireland and Switzerland have dropped back into recession. Eurostat has apparently given up on publishing numbers for Greece, or is too embarrassed to show how Troika-prescribed severe austerity destroyed the economy.
Page 6
Government know one thing best, and that is to spend all available money (and then some). Not surprisingly, the French government is leading the charts, followed by Greece. Switzerland again stands out by far.
Page 7
Compared with the level in 2000, the German government had the lowest increase in revenues, followed by Switzerland. Meanwhile in Cyprus, working for the government was great.
If governments only remembered not to spend more than they have! Ireland is a special case, since they had to bear the cost of bailing out banks
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Recessions rip holes into government revenue, as tax receipts decline. Some countries quickly recovered, while Ireland and Spain clearly have problems.
How are those countries coping with their loss of revenues? Ireland, Greece and, to lesser extent Portugal, have significantly cut spending (as condition for receiving bailouts). In Spain, however, little attempts are seen at cutting spending, a clear mismatch to the decline in revenues.
Page 9
An important chart, showing the average cost of debt by country. Everybody is between 3% and 4% (even Greece), despite huge differences in debt sustainability. Many countries are benefitting from the implicit subsidy of being a member of the Euro-zone. While this is good for highlyindebted countries, it does not impose fiscal discipline as few countries have to pay the 'true' cost of their debt.
Page 10
Now some ugly charts: unemployment rates. Germany is enjoying its time in the sun, while other economies are struggling. Is this how an economically unified zone looks like? Language seems to be a bigger barrier to free labor movement than thought.
Youth unemployment is the real drama, with rates of over 50% in Greece and Spain, and rising sharply in other countries (except Germany). France saw social unrest with "just" 25% youth unemployment; I am surprised how 'patient' young unemployed Spaniards seem to be.
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The primary balance excludes interest on debt. Even if all debt was forgiven, many countries would still not have sustainable budgets. The adjustment needed in Spain is worryingly high, probably too high (especially given high unemployment). At some point, social stability becomes a factor (and the potential for political extremism).
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German employees showed wage restraint while workers in other countries enjoyed salary increases. Used to fight regular currency devaluations of its European trade partners, German companies are constantly improving productivity. While the price of labor (salaries) is only flexible in one direction (up), adjustments in the other direction usually fall onto the number of workers (unemployment).
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In Germany and France, industrial production peaked in early 2011. Other countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal) never really recovered.
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Finally, a look at the banking sector. Deposits in Spain and Portugal are bleeding with annual rates of 10%. This, together with rising nonperforming loans and increased capital requirements will make banks reduce their lending, choking small and medium-sized companies.
This is reflected in declining loans by financial institutions in the PIIGS (with the exception of Italy - for now).
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Conclusions
Developments in Spain and Italy will lead to further deficits and increase in debt levels. At some point, capital markets will refuse to absorb new debt. ECB/EU/IMF will be forced to step in, as local banking systems are loaded with government bonds. Any government bond restructuring would also impair the banking system. Rumors regarding the solvency of banking systems could trigger bank runs, as depositors are warned by the Cypriot example. Many years of further austerity seem to be the inevitable result, with potential political and social instability sprinkled in. Central banks might be able to paper over (literally) a collapse of the Euro-zone, but still won't be able to prevent stock markets from reacting negatively to recurring crises.
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