CHAPTER

16

MALAYA CONVOYS : JANUARY 194 2 ARTIAL law had been proclaimed when, on New Year ' s Eve , Singapore was subjected to another night raid . But the exotic city could still cast its spell and in the night clubs and hotels people briefl y forgot, or pretended to forget, that the Japanese were so desperately close . Their number, understandably, included men of the fighting Services fre e to snatch a few hours of relaxation from combat or the other task s of war. Sirens sounded their warning through the music of dance bands . A band leader would break off to make the announcement : "An enem y air raid is approaching ." But the music and the dancing would continue with scarcely a break, even when the sound of anti-aircraft gunfire coul d be heard, followed by the muffled rumble of bursting bombs in the distance . A few would leave quietly ; the others would dance on . "Champagne . . . expensive food . . . immaculate uniforms and bare white shoulders, " an Australian flight lieutenant wrote later, adding, "Tonight the Japs ar e a back number . . . . Tomorrow? . . . We'll think about that, tomorrow . " That "tomorrow "New Year's Day 1942brought the first serious air attack on Tengah airfield . Considerable damage was done by th e bombing, but one of the most serious results of such raids was the disappearance of the native labourers . That set a problem not only in maintaining the airfield ' s facilities but in repairing the damage done . And the natives were not only being frightened away ; they were being entice d away by cunning enemy radio propaganda that invited them to move t o a designated safety areathe Japanese would see to it that no bombs fel l there and would tell them the precise time of the next raid . For the better air defence of the island, Fighter Control Headquarter s was expanded and redesignated No . 224 (Fighter) Group, with Grou p Captain Rice' in command . An effort was made, too, to cope with nigh t raids by reorganising No. 27 (Night Fighter) Squadron which now ha d five serviceable Blenheim I aircraft . But the effort was entirely unsuccessful ; a reflection not on the squadron but solely on the incapacity of their outmoded aircraft. A report that reached Air Headquarters on New Year's Eve from a reconnaissance pilot told of an enemy force in small steamers and towe d barges moving down the Perak coast . With the first reinforcement convo y now approaching Singapore Air Vice-Marshal Pulford dared not diver t aircraft in any strength from the task of protecting it, a task that demande d shepherding operations by fighters, and reconnaissance sorties by 6 Hudsons, 4 Glenn Martins and 2 Catalinas daily for three, days, while al l other available combat aircraft remained at the alert ready to strik e

Gp Capt E . B . Rice, RAF . (1914-19 : 4th Dismounted Rifles, SAF; Lt Royal Dublin Fusiliers ; RFC and RAF .) Comd 223 Gp HQ 1941, 224 Gp HQ 1942. Regular air force offr; b . Claremont, Cape of Good Hope, Sth Africa, 5 Jul 1892 . Died while a prisoner of war 5 Sep 1943 .

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31 Dec-4 Jan

should enemy air or naval forces, or both, attack the convoy . On Ne w Year ' s Day the enemy force on the west coast reached the mouth of th e Perak River. One tug, with four barges in tow and all vessels laden wit h troops, grounded on a sandbank in the river's moutha perfect target . The defending troops sent an urgent call for naval and air striking forces . There was no naval force within reach that was capable of effectiv e attack and the aircraft that were sent arrived too late to strike . The tide had risen and the "target" had refloated and disappeared somewher e under the dense jungle overhanging the river . As the first reinforcement convoy came nearer, the two Australia n Hudson squadrons undertook the brunt of the reconnaissance sorties whil e the combined Australian fighter unit, No . 21/453 Squadron, which by thi s time had received 16 replacement aircraft, shared in providing the fighte r patrols, sending out aircraft, in relays, 6 at a time . Happily this task of watching over 7 merchant ships, with their escort of 5 warships, wa s performed without enemy interference . The convoy berthed safely o n 3rd January . 2 Further progress by enemy forces down the west coast was accompanied by a strong attack on the main British positions in the Kampar area, but it was the flanking coastal movement that told ; a further Britis h withdrawal was forced, this time to the Slim River area where new positions were taken up on 4th January . Japanese air units were now in Ipoh , and this enabled them to reduce the range of their sorties and increas e the number. An understanding of the strain placed on the troops of th e 11th Indian Division and the communications of the III Indian Corp s by almost incessant enemy air attack while they had no direct air suppor t of their own must temper any criticism of their lack of spirit . On th e other hand the over-worked air units whose resources were so limited were in no way to blame . "They did their willing best, " General Perciva l wrote later, "and it was no fault of theirs that it was a poor best ." 3 The task confronting Air Headquarters was indeed perplexing when Ai r Vice-Marshal Maltby arrived on 4th January to fill the post of Chief o f Staff to the new Commander-in-Chief, General Pownall . 4 By this time headquarters of both Malaya Command and III Corps were calling urgently for air action against the Japanese forces landin g on the west coast and outflanking the British positions . Air Headquarters therefore ordered daily offensive reconnaissance sweeps by from four to six Glenn Martins or Blenheims . At first these were unescorted operation s but the loss of four aircraft in one day from enemy fighter attacks force d the Command to provide escort from its own very precious fighter strength . Four Shark aircraft, one of the two flights of No . 4 Anti-Aircraft Cooperation Unit based at Tengah, had been moved to Batu Pahat on the wes t a -This convoy brought the 45th Indian Brigade and a pioneer battalionall untried and onl y
partially-trained troops . Percival, The War in Malaya, p . 199. * Maltby remained to assist the AOC Far East Command when Pownall became Chief of Staff to Wavell . He was attached to AHQ Singapore on 12th January for that purpose .

2-5 Jan

EFFECTS OF AIR ATTACKS

32 5

coast on 2nd January to bring them within range for such reconnaissanc e operations . On 2nd, 3rd and 4th January Blenheim crews attacked an d damaged enemy barges off Port Swettenham . No definite sinkings wer e reported . At this stage General Percival ordered General Heath s of III Corp s to do his utmost to delay the enemy's advance by flank and rear attacks . It was of the utmost importance, he said, that the airfields at Kuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham should be denied to the Japanese unti l at least 13th January (when another convoy should be in port) . On 2n d and 3rd January enemy attempts to land at Kuala Selangor were repelled , but on the 4th other enemy troops were encountered moving south alon g the coast track about eight miles to the north . In the Slim River secto r the British and Indian troops prepared new positions, working mainly a t night because by day Japanese aircraft were almost continually bombin g and machine-gunning the jungle flanking the road and the railway, eve n when they could not see a target . Though they inflicted few casualties , these attacks seriously demoralised the troops . The commander of on e Indian battalion, Colonel Deakin,0 reported that his unit, which had withdrawn 176 miles in three weeks with only three days' rest, and a t a cost of 250 casualties, most of whom had been killed, had lost 5 0 per cent of its fighting efficiency . His men now " seemed to want to d o nothing but sit in slit trenches" . They complained that they could no t sleep because of the enemy air attacks, and the deadly silence on th e ground, emphasised by the blanketing effect of the jungle, was getting o n their nerves . This silence was broken only by the roar of enemy aircraf t engines overhead . On the day of the arrival of the first convoy two Australian Buffal o pilots, Flying Officer Wallace? and Sergeant Harrison, 8 flew to Kual a Lumpur with orders to make a tactical reconnaissance to the south o f Ipoh . They found a force of Japanese troops with motor transport movin g south and, attacking with low-level gunfire, they caused substantial casual ties and damage . Just as Wallace and Harrison were circling to land a t Kuala Lumpur for refuelling "the whole runway seemed to erupt" a s several sticks of bombs burst on it . The Buffaloes were caught in th e turbulence caused by the explosions and, when their aircraft had levelle d out again, the pilots saw a formation of 27 enemy bombers sweeping west ward at 20,000 feet . Since the runway at Kuala Lumpur was now unserviceable, they flew back to Sembawang, landing there after dark with thei r fuel tanks practically empty . Kuala Lumpur was now untenable even as an advanced base, and th e maintenance party from No . 21/453 Squadron, which had remained ther e
6

Lt-Gen Sir Lewis Heath, KBE, CB, CIE, DSO, MC . GOC 5 Indian Div 1939-41 ; comd II I Indian Corps 1941-42 . Regular soldier; b . Poona, India, 23 Nov 1885 . Died 10 Jan 1954 . c Brig C. C. Deakin, DSO, OBE . GSO1 1 Aust Div 1937-40; comd 5/2 Punjab Bn 1941 . Regula r soldier ; b . Cruck Meole, Shropshire, Eng, 16 July 1896 . Sqn Ldr R. H . Wallace, 586 . 21, 21/453, 5 and 30 Sqns . Regular air force offr; of Larg s Bay, SA ; b. Largs Bay, 12 Jan 1918 . Killed in aircraft accident 29 Oct 1944 . e F-Lt G . T. Harrison, 407578 . 21, 21/453, 23, 84 and 450 Sqns . Shoe designer ; of Kensington Gardens, SA; b. Glenelg, SA, 10 Dec 1917 .

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2-7 Jan

when all the aircraft had moved to Singapore Island, was ordered to withdraw, undertaking demolition work at Port Swettenham on their wa y back ; they reached Sembawang on 6th January . Before dawn on the sam e day two other Buffalo pilots, Flight Lieutenant Kirkman and Flyin g Officer Sheppard, left Sembawang to investigate a report of further enemy barge movements along the Bernam River . After searching for some tim e they sighted nine barges laden with Japanese troops . It was one of thos e too rare occasions when the enemy could be paid back in like measure . Kirkman and Sheppard climbed to 2,000 feet, rolled their aircraft over , and dived to blast the troops in the barges with their gunfire . They repeated these tactics until they had spent most of their ammunition . Later, in the mess at Sembawang, Kirkman answered the questions o f fellow pilots with the terse comment, "We saw a lot of Japs in the waterdead ones . " But such operations were too few to relieve the 11th Division which was being sorely pressed despite all the efforts of the commanders to develop a tactical situation in which the enemy could be held . Afte r more confused fighting in which the Japanese advance was temporaril y stayed the enemy's numbers, fitness for such combat, armament and tactical advantages told again. On 7th January their main column, consistin g of tanks with infantry support, smashed through the 11th Division's for ward positions ; then the tanks drove deeply into the British defence area and continued for 19 miles, sweeping aside all attempts at opposition and reaching a point three miles south of Slim River Bridge, a key position in the British defences . The battle of Slim River was a spectacular succes s for the Japanese and a disaster for the British forces ; the loss of central Malaya was now certain . Meanwhile, the 9th Indian Division, with the 8th Indian Brigade in th e Kuala Lipis-Jerantut area and the 22nd Indian Brigade at Kuantan, ha d been given a task comparable in purpose with that of the 11th Divisio n at Kuala Lumpur : denial of Kuantan airfield to the enemy, and for th e same reasons . These forces might have been effectively used for an operation against the left flank of the main Japanese force by moving alon g the Jerantut-Raub-Kuala Kubu road but for the over-riding importanc e of the need to defend the airfield . Something of what Percival has terme d the "poor best" of the air force was contributed in an attempt to destro y enemy aircraft on the ground in the Kuantan area on 2nd January . The Gong Kedah airfield had been occupied by the Japanese on New Year 's Eve, bringing Kuantan more nearly within their grasp . It was an expression of the weakness of Air Command's striking power that the attack on thi s airfield should have to be limited to the two remaining Catalinas o f No . 205 Squadron R .A .F ., reinforced on 7th January by three more . The Catalinas were so vulnerable to enemy fighter attacks that they ha d been withdrawn from daylight reconnaissance and were being used instea d for long-range night attacks ; they were the only aircraft available wit h sufficient range for attacks on such targets as Singora (on which they

23Dec-8Ian

JAPANESE SHIPS HIT

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made two strikes) and Gong Kedah . An indication of the importance placed on the attack on Gong Kedah lay in Pulford's expressed intentio n of accompanying one of the crews making the strike . That the Air Office r Commanding should find it necessary to contemplate this was in itself a reflection of the great strain that was imposed upon him . It happene d that at the last moment he was prevented from doing so . Two experience d officers of No . 8 Squadron, Flight Lieutenants Bell and Widmer, wer e selected to fly in the Catalinas as navigators . The strike was made bu t there is no record of any particular success attending it ; nor could s o weak a striking force have gained much success . The 56th Japanese Regiment which had captured Kota Bharu ha d made contact with patrols of the 22nd Indian Brigade on 23rd December and by New Year 's Eve was investing the Kuantan airfield . On 3rd January, the 22nd Brigade, having lost about one-third of its strength in combat, began to withdraw towards Raub . An incidental operation at this time was an attack on 8th Januar y by nine Glenn Martins and four Hudsons on an enemy ship anchored in the South China Sea . It was suspected that the vessel was being used as a navigation base for Japanese aircraft flying from Indo-China t o Malaya . Direct hits were observed by the attacking crews . Next day nine Glenn Martins bombed enemy ships unloading at Kuantan with "som e success" . Two days after the 22nd Indian Brigade had withdrawn, th e enemy achieved what G .H .Q . had been so anxious to preventthe occupation of Kuantan airfield . Even before the actual occupation Air Headquarters had ordered all the available strength of No . 21/453 Squadron to prepare for an attack . On 8th January 8 Buffaloes flew to Kluang . After landing in the dusk the aircraft of both Flight Lieutenant Kinninmont and Flying Officer Vanderfield ran into unmarked bomb craters and were damaged . Surprise was essential to the attack which, therefore, ha d been planned for dawn . There was a final briefing by torchlight nex t morning and all serviceable Buffaloes were airborne before daylight . A s dawn came and the aircraft were circling to pick up formation, there was a cry over the radio-telephone of "Bandit!" and an enemy reconnaissance aircraft swept over at high speed . One Buffalo pilot fired a vain burst of gunfire at it as it disappeared . There was no sign of any othe r enemy aircraft and the Buffaloes set course for Kuantan only to be recalle d by the ground controller because the target had been shut off by torrential rain . The attack was therefore abandoned and the pilots flew disconsolately back to Sembawang . It was now symptomatic of the whole campaign that the army' s initial problem of meeting the enemy's advance from tactically unsound position s so that it might preserve the Malayan airfields for the use of the Allied ai r units had radically changed . Instead it was fighting from equally unsound tactical positions to deny the enemy each of these airfields in turn for a s long as possible . The safety of approaching convoys and of Singapor e Island itself also demanded the maximum effort from the Allied air units .

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1942

8-12 Ia n

This, in turn, denied air support to the army in its urgent task ; and, i f the army failed to hold the airfields, the enemy would be able to moun t air attacks in such strength that they might be able both to smash th e convoys before they had discharged their urgently needed cargoes an d to make the airfields on Singapore Island untenable to the Allied ai r units . G .H .Q. were thus forced to gamble on whether the reinforcements could be brought in safely, in sufficient numbers and in time . This situation and its implied need to hold the Japanese north o f Johore until reinforcements permitted an effective offensive were immediately apparent to General Wavell when, on the day of the Slim Rive r disaster, he reached Singapore . The day after his arrival in Malaya he visited the headquarters of both the 11th and 9th Indian Divisions . He at once appreciated that the most urgent need of III Corps was rest . He therefore ordered that the 8th Australian Division (except the 22n d Brigade Group which was to stay in the Mersing area) should move t o north-west Johore to meet the main enemy drive on the Segamat-Moun t Ophir-Muar line . These Australian troops, commanded by Major-General Bennett,9 would be supplemented by four battalions then comprising th e 9th Indian Division, which in turn would be brought to strength b y addition of the freshest troops of III Corps and of the 45th Indian Brigade . Wavell also surveyed the defence of Singapore . He noted that n o defences against invasion from the north had been constructed or planned , an omission which he ordered to be corrected at once . His battle plan was that General Bennett's force, to be known as Westforce, would form th e main line of resistance in the Segamat-Muar sector . The III Corps wit h the 22nd Brigade Group A .I .F . (Eastforce) would defend southern Johor e on the Endau-Kluang-Batu Pahat line . The 11th Indian Division was to be rested and reorganised in Johore. While these plans were being made the 11th Division was still i n the front line though General Heath had withdrawn it farther south . The division was ordered to hold Kuala Lumpur until midnight of 10th 11th January and then fall back about 30 miles to the Seremban area . On 10th January the hard-worked Blenheim crews were called o n to destroy 13 trains laden with British stores that had been stranded o n the Malacca branch line because of the congestion and dislocation o f traffic on the main railway . They achieved partial success in this, and i n a comparable operation two days later they bombed several oil tank s that had been left intact at Port .Swettenham . The decision to withdraw from Kuala Lumpur, capital of the Federate d Malay States, carried a heavy responsibility that was emphasised by th e obvious distress of the Asian population to whom the long column o f retreating troops under a sky dense with the smoke from blazing buildings and oil stores was nerve-breaking . It began their own disorganise d retreat to Singapore by road and raila retreat that broke their con Lt-Gen H. Gordon Bennett, CB, CMG, DSO, VD, NX70343 . (1st AIF : Comd 6 Bn 1915-16 , 3 Inf Bde 1916-19 .) GOC 8 Div 1940-42, III Aust Corps 1942-44. Public accountant and company director ; of Sydney ; b. Balwyn, Vic, 16 Apr 1887 .

10-12 Ian

FRUSTRATED FIGHTERS

32 9

fidence in British rule and was to cause serious civil problems in tha t already congested city . Continuing his tactics of land-and-sea movement, the enemy was pressing down the west coast of the peninsula . A water-borne force lande d near Port Swettenham on 10th January without opposition, occupied th e town, and then pushed inland in the hope of cutting off the 11th Division ' s retreat . They missed this opportunity by only a few hours . On 12t h January the commander of the 5th Japanese Division set up his head quarters in Kuala Lumpur and thus closed the first phase of XXV Army's plan for the conquest of Malaya . Although petrol and oil stores a t Kuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham had been run to waste or burned, and demolition had been carried out at Kuala Lumpur airfield, the enemy gained much valuable war material . In the success of the Japanese advance there was, of course, emphasi s on his success in severing the III Corps' communications . Percival has since written that the best way to maintain communications was to suppl y the forward troops by air. In fact Far East Command had no aircraft suitable for such operations and very few containers for supply dropping . The result was that forward troops had to have with them the reserve s they needed to maintain them in the field for seven days, a very heavy penalty in terms of mobility and a contrast to the situation of the comparatively unburdened enemy . Further tactical reconnaissance operations over Port Swettenham , Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh occupied No . 21/453 Squadron on 10th an d 11th January . On the 12th there was another demonstration of th e frustration these pilots were called on to endure . Eight Buffaloes too k off from Sembawang to help defend Singapore against enemy air formations that numbered more than 100 aircraft . After a harassed controller on the ground had directed them successively to three different sector s on their gridded maps, the Buffalo pilots picked out one formation o f 27 bombers which was clearing the target area after the attack . Wit h throttles wide open the Buffaloes gave chase . When the enemy pilot s saw that they were being overtaken, they too opened their throttles and , their aircraft the lighter for having released their bomb-load, they wen t into a shallow dive and gained speed . From that moment the Buffaloe s were left behind . "Bombers outpacing fighters, " one Australian pilot said afterwards with disgust, " You've got to well laugh! " The enemy having divided into three formations, had bombed Seletar, Tengah an d the docks in Keppel Harbour, and then flown away without interception , leaving fires burning in each target area . The Buffaloes landed again, thei r pilots to return to the "alert room" to await further orders and hold "pos t mortem" examinations on yet another futile attempt to meet and matc h the enemy .
The "alert hut" (Kinninmont wrote later) was a large room at one end of ou r double-storied brick station headquarters building . Fifty yards across the road wa s the edge of the aerodrome, and down to the left were four huge iron hangars .

12 Ian 1942 Straight out from the alert hut our fighters were lined up ready to go . Other Buffaloes were dispersed in built-up earthen pens around the edge of the field an d back in the rubber . Hangars and workshops and all vital sections were roughl y inside this headquarters area . Thus the pilots spent most of their time in the centr e of the choicest target on the station ; which fact left them quite unconcerned .

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It was in this attack on Singapore targets that No . 488 (Fighter ) Squadron, R .N .Z .A .F ., formed under the Empire Air Training Scheme , had its first air combat as a unit .' Based on Tengah, which had bee n heavily bombed three days before when the unit's offices and equipment , oil and ammunition stores were practically demolished, the squadro n put 8 Buffaloes into the air . Soon they were in action against 27 enem y fighters, which had, as was customary, the advantage of greater altitude . Within minutes 2 Buffaloes had been shot down but both pilots parachuted to safety . Three other pilots were wounded and 5 Buffaloe s damaged . On Singapore Island the Buffalo pilots on the ground needed at least 30 minutes' warning of an enemy raid if they were to take of f and reach an altitude of upwards of 20,000 feet at which the Japanes e formations usually flew . But with the successive evacuation of Observer Corps posts as the enemy advanced down the peninsula and the inadequacy of the radar cover, warnings of 30 minutes were almost unknown . When the Buffalo pilots did succeed in joining the enemy i n combat they were outnumbered in any ratio between 6 and 15 to one . Of Singapore's anti-aircraft defences, only the 3 .7-inch guns, of whic h there were but 40 on the island, could reach the enemy aircraft flyin g at altitudes of 20,000 feet and more. Through "black weather fronts" and heavy rain storms the Hudso n and Glenn Martin crews were maintaining arduous reconnaissance sortie s from Sembawang, sorties now becoming increasingly hazardous becaus e of the enemy's acquisition of closer bases for their fighters . It was becoming commonplace now for these aircraft to return riddled with bulle t holes caused by the fire from intercepting Zeros . As an example there was the experience of Flying Officer Gibbes 2 who had joined No . 1 Squadron at Kota Bharu on the very eve of the invasion . Gibbes brought his Hudson back badly holed by enemy gunfire from each of four successive sorties and each time it was patched up and made airworth y again by the ground staff. The Australian Buffalo pilots made another and their last attempt t o strike at the Japanese on the ground at Kuantan on the afternoon o f 12th January . Again a wall of bad weather made approach to the targe t area impossible . The tactics employed on these offensive sweeps wer e ' No.
488 was formed in New Zealand in September 1941 at the request of the British Government, earlier in the year, for a fully-manned fighter squadron to share in the defence o f Singapore. The squadron reached Singapore in October and was converted to and equippe d with aircraft left by No . 67 Squadron RAF when that squadron was transferred to Burma . No . 488 Squadron had achieved partial operational proficiency by December, and by January 1942 was performing routine patrols and taking part in major engagements . 9 Sqn Ldr P . J . Gibbes, MVO, DFC, AFC, 262097 . 6 Sqn, 1 Commn Flight, 1 and 7 Sqns; Test pilot duties, Laverton, 1943 ; Trans Pacific Ferry Service 1943-45 . Commercial pilot; of Darling Point, NSW; b . Roseville, NSW, 4 Apr 1915 .

Ian 1942

CONVOY REACHES SINGAPORE

33 1

those used successfully by the R .A .F . in the Middle East . The squadro n flew as a formation but each pair of aircraft would weave forward i n wide curves, a manoeuvre which permitted a much greater area of searc h than was possible in direct flight . On this occasion two weaving Buffaloe s collided. One of the pilots, Harrison, succeeded in crash-landing his air craft in the jungle . Setting out for the coast he trudged determinedl y for two days . On the second night he found himself in a mangrove swamp . The only place he could find in which to sleep was a hut at the end o f a long Malayan fish-trap . During the night the tide rose and he was forced to climb on to the roof where he clung while three crocodile s cruised round him in the moonlight . Next day he stayed until the crocodiles, seemingly tired of waiting, disappeared and then he struggled to the coast near Mersing where he was found by an A .I .F . patrol an d brought back to safety . The other pilot, Wallace, managed to keep hi s damaged aircraft flying until he was over the sea near Tengora . By this time he was losing height so he "ditched" his Buffalo in the sea and , though injured and bleeding freely, succeeded in swimming 200 yards to the shore . For two days he struggled through the jungle and then buil t a raft and floated down a river until he, too, was found by an A .I .F . patrol . Though only two miles from the A .I .F. base at Jemaluang, th e party took five days to make their way through jungle with the injure d airman, who was then flown to Singapore by one of that little group o f gallant airmen, the Malayan Volunteer Air Force . At dawn on 13th January No . 21/453 Squadron, with 14 Buffaloes , was ready for the big eventthe arrival of the convoy carrying the 5 1 Hurricane fighters . As the convoy approached the island, one half steaming towards Keppel Harbour and the other half towards the naval base , enemy air formations numbering about 100 aircraft were reported to b e approaching . It was at this critical moment that the weather, which seeme d to have favoured the enemy so consistently since the Malayan campaig n began, turned against them . Closing in rapidly a heavy cloud formatio n completely screened the convoy from the Japanese bombers and screene d the attackers from the circling Buffaloes . For the next 24 hours weather , as "bad" as Singapore had known for a long time, gave the convoy complete freedom from air attack not only in berthing but in disembarkin g its troops and unloading its cargo. Reinforcements included in this convoy were a brigade of the 18th British Division ; the 51 Hurricane fighters, in crates, accompanied b y 24 Hurricane pilots from Nos . 17, 135 and 136 (Fighter) Squadron s R .A .F. ; and a nucleus ground staff of No . 232 (Fighter) Squadron R .A .F., the new Hurricane squadron for Far East Command . Some indication has been given of the tension that existed as the convoy approached ; its safe arrival produced a sense of exultation among those who kne w what it had brought. Understandably they felt that this, at last, migh t be the turning point ; here was the means to sweep the Japanese from the

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lan

skies and stem their advance on the Malayan mainland . Thus stimulated they went to work with all speed to prepare the Hurricanes for battle . A reconnaissance by two Buffalo pilots, Flight Lieutenant Sproule and Sergeant Parsons, 3 brought news of enemy air activity at Kuantan3 0 Zeros on the ground and a number airborne . Low cloud gave the Buffal o pilots good cover and they returned without combat . All enemy activit y on the east coast was now watched with growing concern for Intelligence reports increasingly suggested that a major Japanese landing in th e Endau area, to the north of Mersing, could be expected in the disturbingly near future . Initially General Bennett had been in communicatio n with Group Captain McCauley on the question of air support . He ha s since recorded that the liaison between his command and the R .A .A .F . was "excellent" and that he had received a copy of McCauley's tentativ e proposals for air cooperation with the A .I .F . in the event of an attack . These had been submitted to Pulford for approval . The decision by Wavell that the 8th Division should move to meet the main enemy driv e cancelled any such plans . But now, it seemed, a Japanese attempt to lan d a large force on the east coast and to strike south from there wa s imminent .

a Sgt H . W . Parsons, 407802. 21 and 21/453 Sqns, Storeman ; of Port Adelaide ; b . Adelaide , 5 Jun 1918 . Killed in action 19 Jan 1942,