COALA NAIONAL DE STUDII POLITICE I ADMINISTRATIVE

DEPARTAMENTUL DE RELAII INTERNAIONALE I INTEGRARE EUROPEAN

Studii masterale: Relaii Internaionale - Analiza i Soluionarea Conflictelor

Anul II semestrul I

Tema: Rzboiul de ase zile - 1967

2013

Cuprins

1. Evoluie istoric 2. Cauzele izbucnirii conflictului

Naterea statului Israel a reprezentat scopul final al micrii sioniste. Termenul sionism, fcnd trimitere la Sion, locul unde a fost construit primul templu i care este un simbol al Pmntului Fgduinei, a aprut n 1890. Apariia acestei micri a fost determinat de atmosfera antisemit, european care mai trziu i-a atins extremitatea superioar n ideologia nazist. Astfel, dorina evreilor de a avea un stat naional pe teritoriul populat de strmoii lor pare natural, dar n acest caz situaia este complicat de prezena naiunilor arabe pentru care enclava sionist aprea ca un abces, o ran occidental care fcea s sngereze inima Orientului Mijlociu . Conflictele erau inevitabile.

Context general. Perioada care a urmat celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial s-a caracterizat, n planul relaiilor internaionale, prin bipolaritatea lumii (structurarea ntregului ansamblu politico-militar mondial n jurul a doi poli de putere, SUA i URSS), ceea ce a determinat rivalitatea dintre cele dou superputeri i dintre cele dou sisteme, democratic i comunist, cunoscut sub numele de Rzboiul rece (1946-1989). n aceast perioad, ndeosebi n prima parte (1946-1962, etapa maximei confruntri), nenumrate iniiative sau aciuni politice, militare, economice, tiinifice au fost reflectate prin prisma competiiei provocate de Rzboiul rece. Conflictele locale izbucnite dup 1946, precum Rzboiul din Coreea (1950-1953), Criza Suezului (1956), Rzboaiele arabo-israeliene (1948, 1967, 1973), Rzboiul din Vietnam (1955-1975) etc., au reprezentat evenimente cu implicaii la nivel mondial, ca urmare a participrii directe sau indirecte a celor dou superputeri, SUA i URSS. Criza canalului Suez a fost un exemplu tipic pentru aceast situaie. O iniiativ local, privind naionalizarea unui obiectiv economic i strategic de pe teritoriul Egiptului, a determinat o criz mondial, cu urmri neprevzute, devenind un eveniment-cheie pentru relaiile internaionale postbelice. Prin interveniile lor, SUA i URSS au colaborat pentru prima dat, nlturnd pericolul declanrii unui nou rzboi mondial.

Dup declararea independenei Israelului n 1948, n ciuda superioritii numerice a diviziilor libaneze, siriene, irakiene, iordaniene, egiptene i cu ajutorul puterilor europene, armata israelian, numit Tsahal a ieit nvingtoare din rzboiul de independen. Aceast nfrngere a sfrmat Liga arab. Obiectivele diferite ale aliailor au devenit vizibile. Muftiul Ierusalimului i-a proclamat prerea c evreii trebuie aruncai n mare. Sirienii visau la o nou ordine regional, Siria Mare. Regele Abdullah I al Iordaniei ar fi acceptat existena statului evreu n schimbul unei pri din rmiele mandatului

britanic, motiv pentru care a fost asasinat. Libanul, o ar nu de mult timp independent dorea s-si impun autonomia n regiune. Iar n Egipt se pregtea deja revoluia din rndurile armatei, mai trziu condus de Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein. Nasser a devenit prim-ministrul Egiptului n 1954, iar apoi n 1956 preedintele Egiptului socialist. El a adoptat o politic panarabist, astfel a condamnat sionismul, imperialismul i regimurile corupte i complice. Dup Criza Suezului sau Rzboiul Suezului din 1956 n care vedem forele israeliene mpreun cu cele franceze i britanice luptnd mpotriva armatei egiptene, a urmat o perioad de tensiune politic care a condus la urmtorul conflict armat: Rzboiul de ase zile. n 1967 Nasser a hotrt s nchid Golful Aqaba pentru navele israeliene i a cerut ca trupele ONU s se retrag din Egipt. Se pare c el nu dorea un rzboi, ci doar spera ca prin strategia tensiunii s obin avantaje, dar aceast blocad pentru statul evreu a fost un casus bellii.

Rzboiul de ase zile reprezint un punct de cotitur n conflictul israelopalestinian, nu numai prin faptul c urmrile lui au schimbat balana de putere din zon ci i prin faptul c nu se pot face genralizri de genul israelienii au decis atacul sau arabii doreau s distrug Israelul. Realitatea are mai multe faete n acest conflict. Este adevrat c ntrega lume era preocupat de soarta statului Israel n condiiile n care Regele Hussein al Iordaniei declara: Armatele Egiptului, Iordaniei, Siriei, Libanului sunt concentrate la grania Israelului, n spatele nostru sunt gata s intre n lupt aramatele irakului, Algeriei, Sudanului i Kuweitului. Ce va urma va uimi ntreaga lume. Am ajuns la momentul aciunii i nu la cel al declaraiilor. La data de 4 iunie, Irakul a semnat o alian militar cu Egiptul. Preedintele irakian, Rahman Aref, declara: scopul nostru este clar, tergerea Iraelului de pe harta lumii. Opinia public israelian i evreiasc considera situaia Israelului tragic. n Tel Aviv se spaser, n parcurile publice, peste 10000 de gropi de mormnt. Guvernul israelian era mprit ntre cei care ezitau, cei ce dezavuau orice act de rzboi i cei care considerau atacul direct cea mai bun cale de supravieuire. n data de 5 iunie, Statul Israel, incapabil s menin starea de mobilizare general pe perioad nedefinit, neprimind nicio asigurare de ajutor din partea altor state, a iniiat atacul asupra Egiptului. n primele ore ale rzboiului, peste 400 de aparate de zbor militare egiptene au fost distruse, peninsulele Sinai i Fia Gaza cucerite. Primul

ministru israelian Levi Eshkol avertizase Iordania s nu se implice. Ignornd avertismentele, armata iordanian a ptruns n Ierusalim. Israelul a ripostat i dup cteva zile cucerise West Bank i Ierusalimul. Cu toate c Naiunile Unite ceruser ncetarea focului, israelienii au pus stpnire i pe nlimile Golan.

The year 1967 represents a watershed in Israeli history, as it is marking the transition between two well pin-pointed periods: on one hand, the time of a country founded on international, legitimate borders sanctioned by the UN, and on the other hand, a new epoch where Israeli boundaries are neither marked out, nor internationally agreed upon, nor even officially settled. What is changing dramatically is the relationship with the territory, with what is domestically defined as Eretz Israel, a concept very hard to translate in any Western language due to its plentiful meanings and resonances, too often trivialized in country, which alludes only to its territorial dimension. However, for the Israelis, for the role Zionism has played in the return of the Jews to their mythicalhistorical motherland and for all the cultural, religious and messianic meanings related to it, the translation with country is just not accurate enough and does not allow one to infer the role this specific notion of the land has played in setting the non-solving character of the ArabIsraeli conflict (Kimmerling 1983). It is important to underline that only from 1967 on, do there appear movements matching messianic aspirations and political ambitions as Gush Emounim, which convey a militant nationalist message and show an outspoken determination to annex all that is left of the Palestinian territories in order to re-establish the ancient Jewish kingdom of Salomons time according to the dimensions cited in the Bible. From a cultural and political perspective, a radical change has taken place: what up to that moment had been rejected by classical Zionism as a secular movement and had led to the relative marginalization of religious groups inside the country and the establishment, is turned into an acceptable stance which competes on an equal footing with other political trends. Later, the same message will be conveyed by the National Religious Party, originally founded with totally opposite intents. Initially, the attitude of the Mifleget Havod (the Labour Party) is negotiating the return of the occupied Palestinian territories in exchange for peace agreements and security guarantees on boundaries. However, negotiations do not come up with any concrete agreement, whereas the advantages of the Palestinian territories acquisition are immediately visible to both the military and the government. In terms of strategic depth and removal of close military threats from urban centers, the possession of Palestinian territories proves itself to be a real improvement in global security conditions. This will change Israeli internal perception of both the majority of public opinion and the establishment towards the West Bank and Gaza, and will lead soon to a patent will not to give them up as long as stable and comprehensive peace agreements are not reached with the neighbouring countries. The above-mentioned requirement still not met by

2009 has been put forward since 1967 as the main reason for justifing the occupation, always perceived as transitory and therefore never made official. In 1967 there then arose the Occupied Territories question: by then, nobody was going to predict how long it would have lasted and whether it would have marked a second Nakba or just a temporary back fall. What is relevant for the purpose of this study is that Israeli mentality in changing according to the new, improved security conditions. For the first time in its short history, Israel holds safe borders and therefore is no longer at the mercy of the events and of the annihilation will of the neighboring Arab countries. Besides, having re-conquered the Old City, it renews the mythical link between Judaism and the city, and has turned it into its new capital. In the aftermath of 1967, Israel is inebriated and enjoying for the first time regional power: not only has it defeated again all the Arab states allied against it, but has done away with the constant fear of obliteration (Mroz 1980). The army and the country relax, and this attitude will be accounted as the main reason of the temporary defeat for IDF in 1973. At the same time, also world perceptions on Israel are modifying themselves: from a little country surrounded by hostile enemies on all sides, Israels perception turns into a middle regional power, able to change the status quo according to its national interests and without any preliminary authorization from the Superpowers. The Cold War is still stretching out and polarizing any regional conflict. Some officers of the i d f, interviewed in the 70s, declared that at that time Israel was mostly frightened by an eventual Soviet intervention and considered all Arab states as Soviet proxies (Mroz 1980, 119). Therefore, Israel never really abandoned its siege mentality, which was dating back to the difficult conditions of the former Yishuv, and this time more because of the international community than for actual security reasons. Since 1967, indeed, the international community and the Western countries are no longer universally backing Israel as their regional ally and have started claiming the return of the Palestinian territories to Jordan under the aegis of UN Resolution nr. 242. Besides, Israel has taught another scary lesson to the same international community: that the outbreak of a war started out of strict defensive reasons such as a real annihilation threat could be easily turned into a successful story able to achieve results much superior to any early expectations (Levy 1997). Israeli War Perception from the Six Days War to the Operation Cast Lead: An Analysis of the Israeli Siege-Mentality Claudia De Martino University C Foscari, Italy

Reaciile internaionale la noile realiti ale Orientului Mijlociu

n noiembrie 1967, Naiunile Unite au votat Rezoluia 242, rezoluie ce sublinia imposibilitatea acceptrii de ctre comunitatea internaional a achiziiilor teritoriale prin rzboi i solicita Israelului retragerea armatelor israeliene din teritoriile ocupate. Profitnd de o formulate ambigu (retragerea din teritorii n loc de retragerea din teritoriile) Israelul a interpretat rezoluia n sensul c va trebui s se retrag din anumite teritorii ocupate n timpul rzboiului de ase zile i nu din toate teritoriile. Palestinienii au obiectat la adoptarea rezoluiei deoarece aceasta cerea doar rezolvarea pe o cale just a problemei refugiailor. Interesele economice i de securitate ale SUA n regiune au suferit mutaii semnificative ceea ce a determinat transformarea SUA n principalul furnizor de armament pentru Israel i mai mult dect att principalul aliat la nivel internaional.

Six-Day War, also called June War or Third Arab-Israeli War, brief war that took place June 510, 1967, and was the third of the Arab-Israeli wars. Israels decisive victory included the capture of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Old City of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights; the status of these territories subsequently became a major point of contention in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Rzboiul de ase Zile, de asemenea, numit Rzboiul din Iunie sau al treilea Rzboi Arabo-Israelian, care a avut loc 5 - 10 iunie 1967 i a fost al treilea rzboaiele arabo-israeliene. Victoria decisiv a statului Israel au inclus capturarea Peninsulei Sinai, Fasia Gaza, Cisiordania, Orasul Vechi din Ierusalim i nlimile Golan, statutul acestor teritorii, ulterior, a devenit un punct major de disput n conflictul arabo-israelian.