Islamic 'Newspeak': Language and Change in Revolutionary Iran Author(s): Haggay Ram Reviewed work(s): Source: Middle Eastern

Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 198-219 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283557 . Accessed: 01/08/2012 05:55
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Islamic 'Newspeak':Languageand Change in Revolutionary Iran

HAGGAY RAM

The Iranianrevolutionof 1978-79,whichwassupportedby nearlyall the ideologicaltrendsin the country,religiousand secular,is consideredone of the mostimportant eventsin the modernhistoryof Iranandthe Islamic worldat large.Althoughit gave riseto an Islamicregime,this revolution doubtlesswas a productof the effortsof variousmovementsand groups, many of whichneitherintendednor plannedto bringabout an 'Islamic Republic' such as that which has taken shape in Iran during the past decade. The ascendancy of Ayatollah Khomeini's people to power order, markedthe end of the following the demise of the monarchical coalition which the heterogeneous toppled ancienregime.In the internal which the followers of Imam Khomeini's line have ensued, struggles been able to their gradually deprive counterpartsin the revolutionary movementof virtually all politicalpowerandconsolidatetheirpositionas the sole rulersof the 'new' Iran. Islamicrevolutionary indoctrination has therefore been and still is a crucial device for the solidificationof the new regime, a means for fosteringpopularsupporton the one hand, and for subduingthe diverse oppositionmovementsto their rule on the other. The increasingalienation and resentmentof many Iraniansowing to the regime'sfailure to resolve the mountingsocial and economicproblemsand, until 1988, the lack of a significantbreakthrough in the war against Iraq, have only intensifieddomestic indoctrinationto keep revolutionaryardor alive. Intensiveandeffectiveindoctrination, writesD. Menashri,'considerably workedfor the successof Khomeini'sfollowersin the processof estabVarious their adversaries'.' lishing[their]institutionsand in supplanting channels through which political instructionis propagatedhave been institutedin Iran since 1979. Among these, the mass media, the educa- the Revolutiontional institutionsand even the militaryestablishment the ary Guards, Basij (mobilization)units, and the army- are noteworthy. Fridaycommunalsermonsdeliveredin differentcities on a weekly basis were also institutionalized as majormodes of Islamicpersuasion.' Naturally,the employmentof Islamicideas and themes by the Iranian regimeis intendedto advanceits own politicalends of massmobilization
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No.2, April 1993, pp. 198-219 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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and regimesupport.Its effectiveness,however, stems not so muchfrom the regime's constancy, as from the strong religious susceptibilitiesof most Iraniansand their attachmentto the ulama. Indeed, the profound devotion of the popular classes in Iran to Islam cannot escape the attention of the Iranianregime, which, in turn, utilizes it for its own purposes. This article will examine how the regime is seeking to enhance its legitimacywithinIranby employingcertainIslamictermsin its political rhetoric.The basic assumptionis that languageis dynamicand flexible, In its expressivenesscan be intensifiedor diminishedby circumstances. other words, underconditionsof social changethe meaningsand interpretations of culturally familiar words tend to be modified as each generation reinterpretsthe past in terms of its currentpremises and values. As A. Ayalon contends, 'Languagemirrorsits speakers'understandingof their culture, their past, and their present. As the "cycle" moves and the historicalsituationchangesso does language.New words are coined, old words acquirenew meanings,their intellectualor emotional "loadedness" accumulating or waning.'3

The terms which I intend to examine in a historicalcontext may be groupedin two categories.First,termswhichare designedto depictand constituentsand virtuesof the Islamicregime. define the characteristics, this group are the terms velayat, Imam, and hokumat. Representing the origins of the term 'republic' (jomhuri) are traced to Although Iranwill Westerncivilization,the meaningit hasacquiredin post-Pahlavi The secondgroupare termswhich also be analyzedunderthis category.4 the Islamicregimeemploys as rhetoricalweaponsaimed at discrediting the government'salleged internal and external opponents. The two andjihadwillbe examinedunderthiscategory. Quranictermsmunafiqun The termsin both groupswere not chosen at random.'The heads of the [Iranian] regimerepeatedlystressthe identitywhichexists, in theirview, betweenthe revolutionand Islamon the one hand,and the opponentsof on the other.'5 the revolutionandthe unbelievers Followingmy examination of several political speeches and declarationsissued by Iranian spokesmensince 1979,I havecome to the conclusionthat, quantitatively, both groups represent the most commonly used and defined Islamic of distinguishing between'us' (Islam termsin the government's campaign or Iran) and 'them' (unbelief or Iran'sinternaland externalenemies). anddeclarations The sourcesusedfor the articlearevariouswritings by key Iranianspokesmen and leaders, but my main focus is on Friday communal sermons (khutbas) delivered in Iran since 1979. Special emphasisis laidon Fridaysermonsbecausethey haveemerged,following
the ousting of the Shah, as the most important element in the Iranian

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mass media, designed to expound and legitimize the policies of the Islamicgovernment.As P. Chelkowskiexplains,
[T]hough radio, television, and newspapers are the mouthpieces of

the Islamicgovernment,majorpoliticalpronouncements and condemnationsare made at Fridaycommunalprayersthroughoutthe country, often makinglocal Fridayprayerleaders more powerful than the provincialgovernors.6
THE DIVINELY ORDAINED GOVERNMENT

The extensiveliterature alreadygeneratedby the IslamicRevolutionhas movementin Iranmade sophisticateduse the shown how revolutionary of Shiite sentimentin orderto furthertheir cause. Hence their employmentof the most evocativethemesof ShiiteIslam.Indeed, by callingthe Shah 'Yazid', and, conversely,by equatingthe struggleof the Iranian people with that of the martyredImam Husayn, the clerics made the where their obligationslay. believers understand The very same themes were reactivatedfollowing the ascendancyof Khomeini's people to power. With the increasingchallenges by the domesticoppositionand of warwith Iraq, these themes helped to unite the massesagainstinternaland externalenemies. But upon the removal of the Shah'sregimeand the establishment of an Islamicgovernment,a new discoursewas also required.The clerics were now called upon to legitimizeand perpetuatetheir new politicalorder, in additionto their zeal againstthe new 'Yazidof the age' effort to keep alive revolutionary (the Iraqileader, SaddamHussein)and other 'enemiesof Islam';hence their appeal to other Shiite motifs and, more specifically,to culturally familiarterms, designed to portraythe new regime's self-proclaimed and virtues. characteristics Velayat(wilayain Arabic)is perhapsthe most basictermemployedby the Islamic governmentin order to depict its self-proclaimedcharacteristicsand virtues. This term is a derivativeof the Arabic root w-l-i, which literally means 'to be near or close'. But it also acquiredthe In short, velayat, followingmeanings:to govern,to rule, and to protect.7 as it appearedin the Quran,the hadithand the early literature,came to 'denote, respectively,the ruler and the exercise of rule.'8 In twelver-Shiism, the rightto assumethe velayatexclusivelybelongs to the Prophet, and after him to the Imams. In this respect the most innovativeaspectof the politicalsystemdevisedby AyatollahKhomeini is his doctrineof the ivelayat-efaqih, whichprovidesfor the establishment of the ulama as the supremepolitical and legal authorityin the state.

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Thus, Khomeiniproclaimed,the ulama are 'the legitimate rulers (alhukkam al-haqiqiyun)and authority must be in their hands.'9Yet, velayat,accordingto the Islamicregime, acquiredan additionalsignificance- beyondthat of the office and the functionof government,or the exerciseof state authority.By velayat,Khomeiniandhis discipleshavein mind the functionof overseeingand supervising the implementation of the Sharia (the Divine Law) as well. Velayat,therefore, also means or 'trusteeship'. 'The velayatwhichis grantedto the faqih 'guardianship' the Khomeini Imam', by explained in February1979 in most general terms, 'is for fulfillingour sacred duty, which is the preservationof
Islam.'10

In his famoustracton the natureand functionof Islamicgovernment, Velayat-e Faqih(1971), Khomeiniassignedthe officeof the velayatto the doctorsof the Holy Law (fuqaha)collectively.Nevertheless,article107 of the 1979constitution of the IslamicRepublic,whichgrantedKhomeini exclusivepowersto thispost, totallychangedthe purportandmeaningof velayat. It is true, the constitutiondefined this position as a 'leader' (rahbar). However, we must bear in mind that so long as Khomeini served as the single and supremefaqih, the office of the velayatwas - by a manwho wascalled 'Imam'. occupiedby a charismatic personality The contentof numerous reflectthisveneration Fridaysermonsfaithfully towards Khomeini- or what Weber defined as 'the appearanceof a personal saviour'1- and by implication,the new meaning of velayat. First, Khomeiniwas placed in the same rankwith the Prophetof Islam since, as one prayerleader(Imam-eJom'eh)put it, 'bothare responsible for the revivalof faith and humanity',and for 'awakening the depressed 2 Within this framework of (mardom-e people khofteh)'. equationsof the with Khomeini was the assessment identical trendsand Prophet whereby circumstances in the lives of the two hadled to the revolutionsundertheir leadership.For instance,some prayerleadersspoke of the Prophet'sand of Khomeini's'emigration'(hijrat)- the firstfrom Mecca to Medinain 622, and the latterfromIranto Turkey(andlaterto Iraq)in 1964- as the for the subsequenttriumphant 'IslamicRevolutions'under precondition their command.Both had to live in exile only to returnin later years to overthrow the existingorder.Indeed,they concluded,a 'revolution is not possible'withouta prior 'emigration',as the experienceof the Prophet and Khomeiniclearlyillustrated.13 Second, Khomeini was frequentlyequated with the main heroes of Shiite Islam and, particularly, with the Imams. Variousprayerleaders thatdisbeliefin Khomeiniis, in effect, disbeliefin constantlymaintained the Imams.'4 Furthermore, they often concludedthat the 'link between the HiddenImamand the Islamicnationof Iranis maintained by the ...

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One of the membersof the Assemblyof Guardians Imam[Khomeini].'15 even impliedthat the velayat-e faqih was in fact the HiddenImam:'The Iraniannation',he announced,'knowsthat all the officialsin the country thatis, the Vali-ye'Asr[the Hidden are dependenton the velayat-efaqih, of the the IslamicRevolutionwas regarded victory Imam].'6 Moreover, as result of leaders the a joint enterpriseby Allah and by many prayer bestowed it was his grace (lotf) upon the Khomeini. Allah, argued, Iranianpeople, while Khomeiniawakenedthem from their 'negligent Finally, the velayat-e faqih was describedas a sleep' (khab-eghaflat).'7 Hence in Weberianterms, catalystfor the returnof the Hidden Imam.'8 the velayatwas reinstatedin the handsof a man possessingsupernatural and superhuman powers- as was the case in the age of the immaculate Imams. Indeed, most sermonsreferredto Khomeiniplainlyas 'Imam'without calling him by name. Thus, when prayer leaders wished to turn the attentionof theiraudiencesto topicswhichwere discussedby Khomeini, they usuallyannouncedthat 'the Imamsaid' or the 'Imamcommanded' (this or that). It is possible that by calling Khomeini 'Imam' prayer leaders had in mind the conventionalmeaning of religious leader or prayerleader.Nevertheless,it seemsthat, withregardto Khomeini,they have expandedthe use of the termbeyondits commonmeaningto imply that he was of the samerankof the eleven 'rightful' successorsof Ali, the divinelyappointedguidesof the Shiitecommunity,or perhapsof the last Imamwho is to returnfromoccultationas the expectedmessiah.Within this context, M. Fischerinformsus that on the eve of Khomeini'sreturn to Iranin 1979 'Thiswaitingfor the returnof the marja'-ye taqlidled to elaborationsof similaritiesbetween 'Imam'Khomeiniand the awaited TwelfthImam,who will usheran era of justice before finaljudgment."' In any case it seems thatthe abstentionfromreferring to Khomeiniby name was premeditated, in orderto create an indirectequationbetween the Imamsand Khomeini,or at least between the Imams'decrees and those of Khomeini.Indeed, the apparentequationof Khomeiniwith the Hidden Imam cited above may lead to this conclusion, as well as the madeby MohammedYazdi:'The velayat-efaqih is followingdeclaration exercisedtodayby... a loftyperson,who hasturnedthe IslamicRepublic of Iraninto the governmentof the Imamat.'2" To sum up, on accountof Khomeini'sproclaimed cameto qualities,the officeof the velayat-efaqih personifythe image of the Imam, as it was interpretedby the late Ali Shariatiand his followers: Accordingto the followers of Shariati,an Imam is a charismatic figurewho arisesout of the people and expressesthe generalwill.

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For Shariatihimself this is only a translationof the traditional theologicalterm, Imam,into the Weberiansociologicalcategoryof charismatic leader.2' Anothertermwhichwas frequentlyemployedby the Islamicregimein order to depict its constituentsand virtues is hokumat.This term is a derivativeof the Arabicroot h-k-m,originally meaning'wisdom',andby extensionto pass judgment,to adjudicate,to have authority,to govern, to rule and to command. In its political connotation, hokumat(or its Arabic equivalent,hukuma)has, since the nineteenthcentury,become the most common word for 'government'.22 In conformitywith the general Islamicdoctrine, the Islamic regime of one government - thatof (hokumat) recognizesthe absolutelegitimacy God. As Khomeini wrote in 1943, 'the only governmentthat reason acceptsas legitimateand welcomesfreelyand happilyis the government of God....'23 Accordingto the politicaltheory of the Shia, the Prophet and the Imamsalone had all legitimaterule as God's deputieson earth, divinelyprotectedagainstsin anderror.Thus,withthe occultationof the Twelfth Imam Muhammadal-Mahdiin 874, all legitimate exercise of are fromthe world. Hence all temporalgovernments powerdisappeared even those of formal Shii affiliation. irredeemablyusurpatory, In practice,however,the Shiahave been willingto accorda degree of to Islam,since legitimacyto anystate that attemptedto governaccording the politicalorderof the Imamwas viewed as an unattainable ideal in his absence. As S. Akhavi explains, of the Imamis held up as an exampleto To be sure, the government try to approximate,but there is no illusion that the ideal can be realized. In the absence of the Imam, therefore, twelver Shi'ism acceptsthe existenceof a temporalruleras a necessityfor orderand
prosperity, even if it denies his legitimacy in the ultimate sense.24

Thus, in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran (1905-11), a substantialnumberof ulamawere preparedto endorse the constitutionalmonarchyas an acceptableform of government.In the absence of the Imam, they argued, a Western-styleconstitutionmay ensurethat legislationdoes not runcontraryto the laws of Islam. It will also providefor the presenceof justmojtaheds in the assemblywho would ensure that all legislationconformsto the Sharia.25 Ayatollah Khomeini himself did not offer a form of government alternativeto the constitutional monarchyuntila relativelylate stage in his career.Whilehe neverrefrained fromcriticizing andcondemningthe of the viewed the he institution of as a relatively Shah, policies monarchy

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legitimateform of governmentin the absence of the Imam. In fact, his chief concernwas to enforce the constitutionof 1907whichgrantedthe ulamathe authorityto oversee legislation,not to abolishthe monarchy. 'According to Article 2 of the SupplementaryConstitutionalLaw', Khomeinirepeatedlycomplainedin the 1960s,'no law is validunlessthe role in the majlis.Fromthe beginningof exercisea supervisory mojtaheds the constitutionalperiod down to the present, has any mojtahedever exercisedsupervision?'26 Fromthe end of the 1960spoliticalunrestand social tensions 'helped Khomeinireversethe officialShia attitudeof acquiescence,and recapture [whathe believedto be] the earlyImams'spiritof revolt againstthe The relative legitimacy he had once "unrighteous"government'.27 granted the monarchywas, henceforth, null and void. The despotic nature of the government, Khomeini concluded, made nugatoryany effort to enforce the constitution,and consequentlythe Sharia.Monarchy, therefore, came to be regardedas the antithesisof an acceptable form of government in Islam; as a corrupt and oppressive form of which'kill[s]Islamin the nameof faithandthe Prophet'."In government short, monarchy, according to Khomeini, had become 'the greatest disasterthat befell Islam',even greater'thanthe tragedyof Karbalaand the misfortunethat befell the Lordof the Martyrs[ImamHusayn]....'2 to the monarchy alternative The governmental wasfoundin an 'Islamic Government' of IslamIslami),as it existedin the beginning (Hokumat-e in the daysof the ProphetMuhammad and ImamAli. 'The ideal Islamic returnto regime', Khomeiniannounceda few days after his triumphant
Iran, 'is the regime which was headed by Muhammad ... and Ali....'"

Ayatollah Taleqani (d. 1979) explained the essence of such a government, contrastingit to a monarchy.Like Khomeini,he announcedthat existedin the daysof the Prophetand the FirstShii the ideal government Imam Ali. And he added: This government began suffering from defects (naqsha) in the periodof the first[three]caliphs.After them came the caliphateof Ali which was exemplary. After Ali all Islamic governments deviated [fromthe straightpath], because the rulersturnedthem into a hereditary possession,thatis, they establisheda rulebasedon the predominanceof [one] family. In Saudi Arabia, for example, of there exists a government of one family.... Fromthe standpoint does not meanthe sovereignty(hakemiyyat) [of one family]over ... to Allah only....3' [the] people. Sovereigntybelongs Hence a monarchy basedon 'hereditary possession'is forbiddenin Islam,
Islam, this government is non-Islamic.... An Islamic government

ISLAMIC'NEWSPEAK'IN IRAN

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inasmuchas it usurpsthe sovereigntyof God over the governmentand the people. Numeroussermonssince 1979haveprovidedmore examples of the alleged opposition between monarchyand the Islamic governments of the the Prophetand Ali. This is, for example, how Montazeri expressedhimself in a sermon he deliveredin October 1979: The government of the Commander of the Faithful[i.e., ImamAli] ... was not a formof monarchy.In a monarchy the rulersseize the propertyof theirpeople, andif they wishto do so, they maysimply dispose of the people. Moreover,in a monarchywe find palaces, nationalbudget. However, if we considerthe form of government which'Ali institutedwe do not findsuchthings.The Commander of the Faithfulruled over a vast countrywhich included, among its other provinces,Egypt, Iranand Arabia. Yet he lived as a humble
and a simple man. ... This man who ruled over a vast land used to servants ... and all sorts of luxuries which are paid for from the

wear a torn and timeworngarb.32 In short,monarchy,according to the Islamicregime,is synonymous with rule, whereasthe governmentof the Prophetand despoticand arbitrary the FirstImam- the ideal formof government in Islam- denotesjustice and equal distribution of wealth. Yet, even in the very last stages of the struggleagainstthe Shah no unanimous agreement existed among the senior Iranian Ayatollahs concerningthe type of governmentpreferredin Iran. Among the latter there were those who dissociatedthemselves from Khomeini'scall to establish an Islamic government. For instance, Ayatollah Kazem Shari'atmadari (d. 1986) maintainedthat 'an Islamicgovernmentin the a is present age Utopia'.33 Although he was quoted as saying that 'the to the autocraticand colonial regime [of the overthrow people aspire
Shah] ... and establish an Islamic government ...',4 it is clear that his

ultimategoal was muchdifferent.'Ourobject', he repeatedlyargued,'is to establish a free country, where men and women are free.... The struggle,therefore, is for the practicalenforcementof the Iranianconstitution [of 1907].'35 Thus Shari'atmadari remainedloyal to the tradiwho maintained that a constitutional whichrestrictsthe automonarchy cratictendenciesof the kingis the desirableformof governmentso long as the Imamis in occultation.In the aftermathof the resistanceperiod, however, it became clear that Khomeini'sviews prevailed;an Islamic governmentwas establishedon the ruinsof the monarchy. On 30 and 31 March1979, a plebiscitewas held in Iran in whichthe
tional political outlook of the ulama earlier in twentieth-century Iran,

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voters 'wereaskedto approvea singleproposalto replacethe monarchy with an Islamic republic'.36 On 1 April, following the counting of the votes, Khomeiniproclaimedthe establishmentof an IslamicRepublic, and stated:'The Satan[monarchy] is buried;this is the firstday of God's
government. '37

The term 'IslamicRepublic'(Jomhuri-ye Islami) was first uttered by Khomeiniin October 1978, upon his arrivalto Paris from his exile in Until then Khomeinihad remainedambiguousin clarifyingwhat Iraq.38 he actually meant by Islamic government.When asked, for example, 'what is your political program, and what type of government will substitute[thatof the Shah's]?',he replied:'Ourideal is the formationof an Islamicstate.... As a firststagewe haveto establisha government that will meet the basic needs of the nation.'39 During his stay in Paris, however, he was already preparedto declare that a republicwas his chosen alternativeto the monarchy.He explained: whichexist in other By republic,I meanthe sametypesof republics countries.This republic,however,is based on a constitutionwhich is Islamic.... [Beyondthat] the regimewill be a Republicjust like one anywhereelse.4 Upon his return to Iran on 31 January1979, Khomeini resumed his campaignfor an Islamicrepublic.By now, however,he was alreadyable to definethe uniquenessof the republiche had in mind. 'The nation',he said, 'wantsan IslamicRepublic;not just a republic;not a democratic republic,and not a democraticIslamicrepublic.'41 What, then, is the significanceof this republic, and why was it perceived as an alternative to the constitutional monarchy? Accordingto the most general definitions,a republicmay be: any regime in which the governmentis carried,at least nominally,by the people or throughtheir elected representatives, to the case of Iranand the and, more significant Islamic revolution, a non-hereditary form of government.These two characteristicsclarify why Khomeini and his disciples chose the republicanas their preferredform of government:a republic,in their view, meantthe good of the whole, in contrastto the hereditary, despotic formof monarchy, whichmakesthe good of the sovereign,or of one man, the only object of the government. A. Ayalon writes that following the emergence of variousforms of republicsin the Muslimworld, 'Manya Muslimtook part in the lively abouta republic's Iranwas no controversy abilityto be truly"Islamic".'42 exception. Indeed, since 1979 several Iranian figures have provided ample argumentsto prove that the twofold term ('Islamic republic') meant no necessary contradiction- that an Islamic republic, where

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of the people andfor is God'salone, is, in fact, a government government the people. Considerthe followingwordsof Hojjatol-IslamKhamenehi: Not only is a governmentof God not incompatiblewith a government of the people (hokumat-emardomi), but it is the most the participation of the people in eloquent means of safeguarding of the affairs.In an Islamicsociety the ruleris the administration withthe confidenceof the people. In the early electedin accordance the of Islam person who was elected to be a ruler, take the days Prophet [for example], enjoyed the confidence of [all] the people.... All the people in that society were believers and they
accepted Islam.... [Also in our society] the leader ... is an

individualwho is acceptedby the decisive majorityof the people. Hence, whenthe leader... wieldspower... [it actuallymeansthat] the decisive majorityof the people have the last word. The same holds, Khamenehicontinued,withrespectto legislation.In an Islamicsociety, he said, laws are enactedin conformitywith Islam;and since the people profess Islam, they 'accept whatever conforms with Islamand rejectwhateveris not'. The people, therefore,have a sharein the executiveand the legislativebranches.In short, as in the daysof the of the IslamicRepublicis a governmentof the Prophet,'the government ... the people governmentof the people's voice'.43To sum up, it seems that the Iranianregime'sviewson an Islamicrepubliclargelycorrespond with those of the renownedPakistanithinker Abul 'Ala Mawdudi(d. a decade before the Islamicrevolutionin 1979). Indeed, approximately it that 'in Islam,wheregovernmentandlaw are was he who claimed Iran, God'sonly, each memberof the community has a sharein the Caliphate; hence the Caliphate is not an individual but rather a communal
matter....'44

the Islamicregime'ssomewhatapologeticviews on Notwithstanding the issue, the questionstill remainswhichsovereignty- that of God or that of the people - is preferredin Iran's Islamic republic. Numerous declarations issuedby the Islamicregimeillustrate,by implication,which of the two sovereigntiesis superiorin its view. Consider,for instance,the followingwords of Khomeini(December 1980): The preservation of the IslamicRepublicis a divine duty whichis above all other duties. This duty is even more importantthan the of the [Hidden]Imam,becauseeven the Imamof the preservation age (Imam-e 'Asr) will sacrifice everything for Islam. All the
prophets ... were sent in order to preserve God's words ... Islam is

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a divinegrace.... The preservation of Islamis an individual obligation (vajeb-e'eini).45 Thus the ultimategoal is not to preserveor protect the individualand society; it is to promote and enforce God's given laws. Indeed, the of the people is valuable,butits functionis merelyinstrumensovereignty tal. This is to say, only if it advancesthe divine law is it accepted;if not, so long as the Shariais carried thereis no valueto the life of the individual out in practice.This also accountsfor the repeatedargumentin Friday sermonswhereby'obedienceto the laws and regulationsof the government is a religiousobligation(vajeb-edini), and theirviolationis a sin'.4 In the beginningof the revolutionary period in Iran a Westernjournalist rightlyobservedthat 'the Iraniandissidentsare makingextensive andidiomas meansfor expressingopposition, use of religioussymbolism since they are devoid of other modes of protest'.47 However, after the and the of 'dissidents' of Khomeini's the ascendancy people to victory and idiom continued to an Islamic role, symbolism play important power, in the constructionand legitimizationcampaignof the new particularly politicalregime.In view of the profoundreligiosityof the Iranians,it was only naturalthatthe Islamicregimeshouldattemptto sanctifyitselfin the eyes of the masses by defining its constituentsand virtues with such culturallyfamiliarterms as velayat, Imam and hokumat. Likewise, it seemed natural for the Islamic regime to ascribe to their preferred jomhuri- a notionwhichwas absentfromthe MiddleEast untilits recent importationinto the area - Islamic qualities, so as to adapt it to the culturalexperienceof Shiite Iran.

THE OPPONENTS OF THE IDEAL

The campaignto assertthe legitimacyof the Islamicgovernmentin Iran came hand in hand with renewed efforts on the part of the Iranian fervorof the people in the face leadershipto maintainthe revolutionary of internaland external threatsto the stabilityof the regime. In other words,just as Shiitethemesand termshave been utilizedfor strengthenthemesand familiar ing allegianceto clericalrule, so haveotherculturally termsbeen instrumental in the campaign to condemnthe allegedenemies of the Islamicregime. The most commonQuranictermemployedby the Islamicgovernment in orderto denounceits allegedinternalenemiesis munafiqun. Thisword
is directed in the Quran against those in Medina whose faith, loyalty and dedication Muhammad could not completely trust. The meaning of

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munafiqin the Quranis 'a waverer'and 'a doubter',while the conventional translationto 'a hypocrite' suits only a few verses.4 Another Quranicportrayalof such people is those in whose hearts 'is a disease' (2:9), as opposedto the Muslimswho are firmand resolutein theirfaith. in the Prophet'sage were not a homogeneousgroup: The munafiqun adherents of the new religion,only to abandon some becameenthusiastic it later on, some, no doubt, remainedpagans,and manymore remained to the Prophet'scause. They are therefore skepticalor half-committed who 'saywith theirmouthswhatis not in those as in the Quran depicted theirhearts'(3:164).Becauseof theirindecisiveness they sometimesjoin the Prophetand sometimeshis enemies - and all for practicalreasons. They disregardall the obligationsof the true believers, and utter evil remarksabout the Prophetand his companions.In short, they are not better than the unbelievers,and thereforethey will roast in 'the lowest depths of the fire' (4:145). between the variousgroups, The Islamicregimerefusesto distinguish and personswhichoppose the revolution.In its view, all organizations are the 'enemies of God' and are grouped under one category as munafiqun.Hence prayerleaders feel free to ascribe to organizations such as the Mujahidin-e Khalq the title Munafiqun-e Khalq, and style others(suchas Peykar,Jabheh-ye Melli, andthe SAVAK)as munafiqun, without making a distinction between the structural,ideological and other differencesbetween them.49 The versions presented in sermons concerningthe activities of the to the traditional accounts.Morefascinatmunafiqun usuallycorrespond with the ing, however,is how prayerleadersequate the earlymunafiqun internalenemiesof the Islamicregime.Prayerleadersusuallycommence of the earlymunafiqun the characteristics andconsequently by examining who did not accept pointat two majorgroups:the firstare the munafiqun the new religionfromthe outset, but embracedit outwardly(dar zaher) becausethey werecompelledto do so; andthe secondare the munafiqun who became zealous adherentsof the Prophet,but on accountof hardships and afflictionslater abandoned Islam. Having established this, prayerleadersthenturnto makethe aforementioned equation,andthisis how it is usuallydone: In our own society too, there were the [same] two groups [of Some hadno faith... fromthe beginning,not in Islam, munafiqun]. not in Islamicgovernment,not in the IslamicRepublic, and not it

the Imam [Khomeini]. These [people] ... had fled Iran [because] ... the Islamic government did not take them into account.... There were also some who had faith in Islam and in the Islamic

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Republicfrom the beginning,but [because]of covetousness[and]

hearts overflowing with personal desire ... they joined the ranks of

the munafiqun.5' The equationof the earlymunafiqun with the regime'scontemporary enemies fulfillsan important functionfor mass-mobilization purposes.It is partof a broadereffort madeby the Islamicregimedesignedto depict the IslamicRevolutionand the IslamicRepublicas a realizationof the Prophet's divine mission, as a resumptionof Muhammad'sso-called IslamicRevolution.To thisend, prayerleadersrepeatedlyarguethatthe features, achievementsand leadershipof Iran'sIslamic revolutionare identicalto those of the Prophet'srevolution.5 Thus, not only arethe two revolutionsidenticalbut theiropponentsare identicalas well - both are munafiqun,as one prayer munafiqun.Accordingly,the contemporary leaderput it, 'resistthe divinemissionof ournation,'andwill committhe most despised crimes: the unbelievers,have burneda bus because The cursedmunafiqun, of their unfathomablehatredtowardthe people of God (khalq-e of... Allah). In thismannerthey causedthe martyrdom (shahadat) a baby.... The munafiqun are determinedto slay the nationof the oppressed. We must say to [them]: you will never succeed in we will continue deviatingus fromthe pathof Islam.O munafiqun! to cherishIslam.52 Consequently,the crimes of the neo-munafiqun,accordingto many prayerleaders,provethatthey rejectIslam,or, moreprecisely,thatthey seek to 'exterminate Islamandthe Quranin the nameof Islam,the Quran and the Nahj al-Balaghah[the sermons, sayings and letters of Imam
Ali]'.53 This fact- the concealment of their hostility toward Islam - makes

the mostdangerous the new munafiqun enemiesof the IslamicRepublic, in the age of the Prophet,who said 'withtheir equalto theirpredecessors mouth what is not in their hearts'. Consider the following words of Khamenehi: When the enemy declareshis animosityopenly, it is rathereasy to resist him. But when the enemy, like Mamun the 'Abbasid, pretendsto be a devoutMuslim,then it is verydifficultto recognize
him as your enemy. In our age ... we are seeing [people] who Bakhtyar ... was an agent and a slave of imperialism, but he

practice deceit and hypocrisy (hileh va-nefaq).... [Shahpur] presentedhimselfas a man who supportsthe nationand Islam. In reality, however, he operated against the nation and sought to weaken it from within.... It was extremelydifficultto know and

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recognize[thisfact]. TodaymanyBakhtyars pursueoppressionand but tell the that people they supportIslam.54 exploitation, Thus the new (just as the old) munafiqun are worse than the infidels; the latter, at least, openlyproclaimtheirobjectionto Islam.55 Therefore, Allah decreed that the believers[the Iranianpeople] wage war [against them] to the bitter end.'56Moreover, in view of the fact that their makesit difficultto discoverthem, all areobligedto handover hypocrisy their munafiqun relativesto the authorities:'Thosefathersand mothers whose childrenare munafiqun,or those childrenand daughterswhose will not be consideredbelievers... if they refrain parentsare munafiqun, In any case, the Courts.'57 from handingthem over to the Revolutionary new munafiqun mustknow that eventuallythey, just like theirpredecessors, will be defeated by Islam:'O munafiqun!' Rafsanjaniannounced, 'the strength of the thirty-sixmillion members of the Party of God from (Hezbollah)will reduceyou to ashes;you willcompletelydisappear
the pages of history.'58

The eight-yearwarbetweenIranand IraqprovidedIranampleopporthe Iraqiregimeand its head, SaddamHussein, as tunityto characterize term was also employed against Iran's external Thus the munafiqun. Islamicenemies, again,for the sake of equatingthe conflictwiththe early warsof Islamagainstthe apostatesand the infidels.This is to say, just as the munafiqunsought 'to deceive the Prophet and lead his followers astray,so does Saddamadornhimselfwiththe plumesof Islam,while all his actionsare in fact directedagainstIslam....'59Withinthis framework of presentingthe conflictas a warbetweenIslamand unbelief(kufr), the Islamic regime has repeatedly argued that its struggle is a jihad, as opposedto a conventionalwar- harborjang- betweentwo statesover a particularterritory.The term jihad is an Arabic word with the literal meaning of 'effort', 'striving'or 'struggle'. However, because in the Quranandthe hadiththe termis often 'followedby the words"inthe path of God", it has usuallybeen understoodas meaning "to wage war"'.6 In classical times jihad, as an offensive war 'in the path of God', evolved into a full-fledgeddoctrine.It emergedas a religiousobligation imposed on the Muslim communityas a whole, a fard kifaya. This of the Muslimrevelationand the obligationderivedfromthe universality classicalMuslimconceptionof whatwe call today the 'Lawof Nations'. Since Islamwas seen as the one true, final, and universalreligion, Ultimatelyall mankindwould adopt it; in the meantimethey must be made to recognize the supremacyof the Muslims and the sovereigntyof the Muslimstate. The worldwas dividedinto two the house of Islam(daral-lslam),wherethe truefaithprevailedand

212

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES the Muslimcaliphruled,and the house of war(daral-harb),where unsubjugatedinfidelsstill remained. Between the two there was perpetualandinevitablestateof war,whichmightbe interrupted by truce, but could never be ended by peace. It would end only when the whole world was broughtinto the house of Islam.6'

Thatis to say, in contrastto the modernlawof nationswhichpresupposes the existenceof differentstates, the Muslimlaw of nationsrecognizes'no other nation than its own, since the ultimate goal of Islam was the of the whole worldto one systemof law and religion....'62 subordination In short,the Muslimlawof nationswasbasedon the theoryof a universal state;mankind,it argued,constitutesone community,boundby one law, Islam, and governedby one ruler- God or his vicegerent. Thus the Islamicstate must be in a constantlyexpandingprocessuntil it establishesIslam as the dominantreigningideology over the entire world. Jihad was therefore enforced as a means to achieve that end. As M. Khaddurinotes, 'the jihad may be regardedas Islam's instrument for carryingout its ultimate objective by turningall people into believers....'63And until that goal is achievedjihad will remain a permanentobligationupon the entire Muslimcommunity. The Islamicregimehas time and againstressedthat its war with Iraq wass not simplyan armedconflictbut a jihadagainstunbeliefas outlined above (although the doctrine of jihad in twelver Shiism is somewhat differentfromthe classicalnotions).Thisis, for example,how the former commanderof Iran'sgroundforces, Sayyed Shirazi,put it: families,[theyreferto it] in termsof manywarsthatoccurredin the past and were not wagedfor God's sake; like WorldWarII which caused the death of millionsand broughtdestructionand demolition.... Today, however,we havechangedthe meaningof war, for we considerit a great blessing... a jihad in the way of Allah. If it were not for [this] jihad how would we be able to distinguish between those who tell the truth and those who lie, or separate between companionsand traitors.M Consequently,thisjihad, accordingto Iranianstatementsissuedfrom 1980 to 1987, must be waged until the final annihilationof the Iraqi 'polytheists'. The Imam-e Jom'eh of the Caspian coastal town of Hashtpar,for instance,cited the Quranicverse 'Fightthem untilthere is no more subversion and religion is wholly God's' (2:193), and then and the announced:'Allah enjoinedthe believersto fightthe munafiqun
There are people ... who refer to the war as a cause for the grief of

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polytheiststo the bitter end; we should not be mercifultoward those And in the words of another prayerleader, Saddams(Saddamiyan).'65 MostafaShakeri, 'We must continue this holy jihad until we crush the Thus the war had become a 'religious polytheist regime of Saddam'66 as such, 'we have a decisive responand obligation' (vazifeh-yedini), a no As to result, one has the rightto preventothers sibility wage [it]'.67 fromleavingfor the front.Khamenehi,for example,appealedin Novemto the armedforces ber 1980to the parentswhosechildrenwere recruited front of thejihadpermit advance to the andsaid:'If yourchildrenwishto them. Thisjihad bringsthem joy. Those who wage a jihad in the path of God will be rewarded,as opposed to the shirkersof militaryservice(alwith the classicaldoctrineof jihad, the qa'idin).'6Finally,in accordance the realmof dar Islamicregimedepictedthe waras a meansof expanding al-Islam.As Taheri stated in September, 1980: We do not covet one inchof Iraqiterritory.... Ourwishis to expand the bordersof the landof the believers(khak-eimanan).... We will not be content with the expulsionof the Ba'thi infidelsfrom our territory;this is because there are no bordersin Islam.6 of the war, the Islamic In orderto underlinethe Islamiccharacteristics celebrated rank with the warsof earlyIslam. it in same the regimeplaced It was, therefore, described as 'another chapter in the wars of Islam Or as one prayerleader, Emami-Kashani, put it after againstheresy'.70 the recoveryof the Khuzestanitown of Bostan in November 1981: of Islam!Withthe occupationof Bostanyourgloryis O Mujahidin to those who foughtin guaranteed, just as the glorywas guaranteed the Battleof the Trench(Jang-eKhandak).... You arethe warriors munafiqunand the polytheists.7i
And as Khamenehi added: whom the Prophet had sent to protect Islam against the infidels, the

of truthand We believe that this [War]is the first [confrontation] falsehood (haq va batel) after one thousand and five hundred years.... In the age of 'Ali all the forcesof kufrwere summonedin order to launch a war against the Commanderof the Faithful. Nevertheless,Ali massacredthem (ba khak va khun keshid), and thereafterthe conquests of Islam commenced.... Likewise, our braveMuslimsoldiersare encounteringthe infidelswith faith and resolution. No doubt, they will vanquishthe enemy just as Ali's soldiers have.72 Accordingly,Iran explainedits policies in the war, its achievements

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

and failures, in terms of an 'Islamic strategy', as was conducted in the age of the Prophet and Imam Ali. This is, for example, how the Islamic regime explained why, contrary to Iraq, it was not willing to bombard centers populated by civilians: We do not take such evil measures. We are not allowed to attack areas which are inhabited by helpless women and children. This is not the way a Muslim soldier fights. O you wicked Saddams! It is clear that you never bothered to learn the history of the wars of Islam. Otherwise, you would have known that when the Prophet sent an army to war he did not allow his soldiers to cut trees, to persecute refugees, or to strike the injured.73 In Iran's view, its jihad against Iraq was by no means an offensive or an aggressive war- although its underlying goal, as we have seen above, was the expansion of dar al-lslam. A few words about the doctrine of jihad in twelver Shiism may clarify the point. The doctrine of jihad in twelver Shiism is fundamentally similar to classical notions. Two differences, however, are apparent: in the first place, the Shiites added dar al-iman (the house of faith - where the Shiis reside) to the traditional dichotomy of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. Accordingly, they are permitted to wage a non-violent jihad, a struggle of persuasion, aiming at the conversion of dar al-lslam (the Sunnis) to dar al-iman.74And in the second place, the twelver Shiites hold that the obligation of jihad is conditional upon the manifest presence of the Shii Imam. Thus the doctrine of jihad has lost its practical character since the last Imam went into occultation in 874AD. However, armed defense against foreign aggression, or a defensive jihad, remains permissible.7This theory became the basis of all later Shii views on war and jihad. That is to say, the distinction between an offensive war, for the expansion of dar al-Islam, and its defense, meant that the former cannot be launched without the Imam's presence or his direct command. This restriction on the launching of a jihad was strictly observed by successive generations of Shii jurists. For instance, when the Iranian ulama proclaimed a jihad against Russia in 1825-26, they stressed that their object was the defense of Islam and the Muslims.76 Khomeini himself had recognized this distinction between the offensive and defensive jihads in the beginning of the 1940s. He wrote: There are two types of wars in Islam: one is jihad; that is, the war of expansion ... and the other is defa', struggle to preserve one's independence. Jihad means expansion and the taking over of other countries, which will be carried on by the Imam himself or under his

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command....

The second type, what we call defa' ... does not

requirethe Imam or his command.77 The defensive dimension of the jihad was underlinedduring the last stages of the struggleagainstthe Shah as well. For instance, when the ulamaproclaimeda jihad againstthe governmentof ShahpurBakhtyar, Ayatollah Taleqaniannounced: Bakhtyarand his people do not know the real meaningof jihad. When they foolishly say that a jihad is an obligation which is enjoined on the Muslimsonly in their struggleagainstthe infidels, they displaytheirignorance.Jihadis enjoinedfor the defenseof the Muslims'rights, the very rights which others plundered. In this case, the launchingof a jihad is an obligation.78 conceivedas a defensivejihad. As R. The Iran-IraqWarwas similarly Ramazanicontends, the Islamicregime 'considersresortingto holy war (jihad)as the prerogativeof only the infallibleImam, and in his absence thefaqih is estoppedfromwagingan offensivewar.But defensivewar ... is anothermattersince it is in self-defenseand hence the faqih is dutyboundto resortto it by all means.'79 fact that Indeed, it is an indisputable Iraq was first to launchits attack againstIran in late September 1980, leavingthe latterno choicebutto defenditself. It wasthereforelogicalfor Iran to refer to the war as an 'imposedwar' (jang-etahmili).80 But even when Iran firstinvaded Iraqi territoryin July 1982, the Islamicregime justified its actions in terms of defense. This is, for instance, what Ayatollah Mosavi Ardebili had to say in August 1982: Certainindividuals haveset forth[theidea]thatthe aggressors have been drivenout from our countryever since we set foot on their
territory ... They say, 'Is this not in itself an aggression? Have we

not calledit an aggression whenIraqattackedIran[on its own soil]? What, then, is the difference between us and them now? ...
Everybody knows that Saddam is an infidel and that ... his masters

[the US] are eager ... to destroyus. [Forthis reason]they placedus underaggression.What, then, are we supposedto do in the face of such aggression? Ali said in regardto this issue: 'Eitheryou accept or with swordsin yourhands.'We too, either we resist abjectness,
surrender to the Saddams or resist them with the sword ... [Sadforward, it is [because] we recognize the aggressor ... As long as

dam] startedthe war and we have been defendingsince that day. Also today, we are defendingon Iraqisoil; and if we take one step Saddamattacksus fromthe rearline, we will also fighthim. For ...
Ali said: 'The aggressor should be destroyed on his own soil.'

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The defensive, albeit universalgoals of the war, were furtherunderlined by two other arguments.First, it was said that SaddamHussein launched his war against Iran by the command of his 'masters', the superpowers,who feared lest the Islamic Revolution would extend to other Islamicand oppressedcountriesand liberatethem from subjugation and exploitation. Hence 'the Islamic nation of Iran is defending Islamand the Quranon behalfof the Islamicnationsand the oppressed ...82 And second, it was argued that the Iraqi Ba'th was collaborating of Islam',Israel, in orderto 'preventIslamicunity with 'the arch-enemy andexterminateIslam'.Thus'the warwithIraqis, in effect, a partof the overall Muslim defense against Zionist aggression'.83 Indeed, Iran's wartimeslogan, 'The roadto Jerusalem passesthroughKarbala',should also be seen in this light. When the Iran-Iraq War entered into its sixth year, Rafsanjani devoted, in a mosttypicalmannerat thattime, an entiresecondsermonat to the issueof the people's'preparedness' the Fridayprayers (amadegi)to continuethe waruntil 'finalvictory.'He stressedthat the Iranianpeople 'have not grownweary'of the war, and that 'The enemy is horrifiedof
your presence in the front.' This is so, he explained, because the enemy knows well that 'should the Imam [Khomeini] raise his finger', the Iranian mujahidin 'will storm the strongholds of Saddam and the Ba'th

No doubt, by 1985-86the Iran-Iraq like a flood whichstormsa house'.84 War had alreadybecome a major source of resentmentand a burden ratherthana 'divineblessingbestowedupon the Muslimnationof Iran'. Indeed, the continuousIraqimissile attackson Iraniancities, the Iraqi use of chemical weapons and the mounting casualties of war finally eroded the very same 'preparedness'of the people Rafsanjani had
pointed to. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that a substantial number of Iranians were still enthusiastic about going to the war fronts. Newspaper

photographsof the multitudesof people attendingthe Fridayprayers, sophisticatedand efficientuse of the people's religioussentiments- the harnessingof the most evocative themes of Shiite Islam (and Islam at large) to their cause - that have kept alive the mass support and the zeal of the Iranianpeople. revolutionary-religious
NOTES
I wish to thank Professors David Menashri, Aryeh Shmuelevitz and Ami Ayalon of the Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and Professor Peter Chelkowski of the Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York

many of whom were dressed in white shrouds so as to show their readiness to be martyred in battle, attest to that. And it was largely the clerics'

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Universityfor taking time out of busy schedules to read the paper and offer helpful comments andcriticisms. A specialthanksis also due to MrYigalShefiandMrHaimGalof the Documentation Centerat the DayanCenterwhose valuableassistanceenabledme to sourcesfor the paper. collect the primary 1. D. Menashri,Iranin Revolution Hameuhad,1988), p. 126. [in (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hebrew.] in the IslamicRepublicof Iran, see Menashri, 2. For the variousmodes of persuasion ibid., pp. 126-31. 3. A. Ayalon, Language and Changein theArabMiddleEast:TheEvolutionof Modern Arab PoliticalDiscourse(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1987), p. vii. 4. A. Ayalonexaminesthe evolutionof the ideaof 'republic' in the ArabMiddleEast.See and the ModernHistoryof NonA. Ayalon, ibid., pp. 97-109, and idem, 'Semantics as a Case Study',TheHistorical Journal,Vol. EuropeanSocieties:Arab "Republics" 28, No. 4 (1985), pp. 821-34 (henceforth'Arab Republics'). 5. Menashri,ibid., p. 128. Iranas Seen through BankNotes', in D. Menashri 6. P. Chelkowski, 'Khomeyni's (ed.), Revolution andtheMuslimWorld TheIranian Press,1990),p. 90. (Boulder:Westview 7. B. Carrade Vaux, 'Wali', The ShorterEncyclopaedia of Islam. andLondon: of Chicago 8. B. Lewis,ThePolitical Language of Islam(Chicago University Press, 1988), p. 34. 9. R. M. Khomeini,Al-Hukumaal-lslamiyya(Beirut:1979)p. 46. 10. Kayhan(Tehran),27 Dec. 1979(Kayhanis also the nameof the Iranian oppositional in London.All referencesto Kayhan belowrelateto the Tehran published newspaper in Islamand Revolution, Government', Kayhan).Also see, R. M. Khomeini,'Islamic trans. and annotatedby H. Algar (Berkeley:MizanPress, 1981), p. 53. 11. Citedin N. Cohn, ThePursuit of theMillennium Press, (New York:OxfordUniversity 1970), p. 51. 12. SheikhMohammed Yazdi in a Fridaysermonin Shiraz,Ettela'at,10 Jan. 1981. 13. See Hojjatol-IslamMahfuzi,Ettela'at, 4 Oct., 1986;Hojjatol-Islam'Ali Khamenehi in 6 Nov. 1982;also see Meshkini's a Friday sermonin Tehran,Kayhan, sermonin Qom, 27 June 1981. Ettela'at, 14. Mohammed 26 Dec. 1981. Taqi Nateqi in a Fridaysermonin Hashtpar,Ettela'at, 15. Khamenehiin a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at,5 June 1980. 16. Hojjat ol-IslamYusof Sane'i, Kayhan,23 Nov. 1980. 17. Madaniin a Fridaysermonin Tabriz,Kayhan,14 Aug. 1981. 18. Rabbani-Amleshi in a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Kayhan,26 Nov. 1981. 19. M. Fischer,Iranfrom ReligiousDisputeto Revolution Mass.& London: (Cambridge, Harvard UniversityPress, 1980), pp. 177-8. 21 March1981. 20. Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, 21. Fischer,ibid., p. 6. 22. On Hukuma,see B. Lewis, ThePoliticalLanguage of Islam,pp. 36-7; andJ. Benda, 'Hukuma',The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition. 23. An extractfrom Kashfal-Asrar,as cited in Islamand Revolution,p. 170. 24. S. Akhavi, Religionand Politicsin Contemporary Iran:Clergy-State Relationsin the PahlaviEra (Albany:State Universityof New York Press, 1980), p. 13. 25. See H. Algar, 'TheOppositional Role of the Ulamain Twentieth-Century Iran',in N. andSufis(Berkley,LosAngelesandLondon:University Keddie(ed.), Scholars, Saints of California Press, 1972), pp. 238-9. 26. A declaration issued on 27 Oct. 1964, as cited in Islamand Revolution,p. 188. 27. M. Bayat, 'The IranianRevolutionof 1978-79:Fundamentalist or Modern',Middle EastJournal,Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter1983), p. 35. 28. Khomeini,Al-Hukumaal-lslamiyya,p. 122. 29. A declaration issuedin 31 Oct. 1971,IslamandRevolution, of p. 200. An examination the underlying in Khumeini's reasonsforthe overalltransformation thoughtis foundin D. Menashri, Vision:Nationalism orWorldOrder',in D. Menashri 'Khomeyni's (ed.), TheIranianRevolution and the MuslimWorld,pp. 40-57.

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

30. Kayhan,6 Feb. 1979. 31. Ettlea'at, 6 Feb. 1979.For similarexpressions,see Khomeini,Ettela'at, 20 Jan. 1979;
The Observer, 4 Feb. 1979, and Ettela'at, 10 Feb. 1979. 33. Kayhan International, 2 Sept. 1978. 34. Kayhan International, 12 Sept. 1978.

32. Montazeri in a Friday sermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, 6 Oct. 1979.Forsimilar expressions see sermonsof Khamenehi,Kayhan,29 March1980;Ettela'at,26 April 1980. 35. KayhanInternational, 2 Sept. 1978. For similarexpressionsby Shari'atmadari, see, 21 May 1979. Kayhan,7 Feb. 1979;and Ettela'at,

Guardian, 5 May 1978; Sunday Times, 21 May 1978; Jerusalem Post, 26 June 1978;

36. S. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: 37. Washington Post, 2 April 1979.

Basic Books. 1986), p. 73.

38. See, for example, Guardian,14 Oct. 1978; New York Times, 16 Oct. 1978; and
International Herald Tribune, 21 Oct. 1978.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. F. Buhl, 'munafiqun', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st edition.

Information Service(FBIS),DailyReport,SouthAsia, 5 May1978. ForeignBroadcast Le Monde, 13 Nov. 1978. 3 Feb. 1979. Kayhan,11 March1979. Also see Guardian, Ayalon, 'Arab Republics',p. 833. Khamenehiin a Friday sermon in Tehran, Ettela'at, 18 June 1983. For similar in a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, 3 Sep. 1983. expressionssee Khamenehi Ayalon, 'Arab Republics',p. 833. Kayhan,23 Dec. 1980. AsadollahMadaniin a Fridaysermonin Tabriz,Ettela'at,11 April 1984. Also see in Tehran,Kayhan,3 Dec. 1982. Khamenehi Arabiaand the Gulf, 3 March1978. 'Moslemsor Marxists',

49. See sermons of Hajj Mosavi in Khodabandeh,Ettela'at,27 June 1981 (on the Mujahidin-e Khalq);Asadollah Madaniin Tabriz, Kayhan, 10 July 1981 (on the in Tehran,Ettela'at, 50. Khamenehi in a Friday sermon 2 May1981.Forsimilar expressions in Qom, Ettela'at, see sermons 28 Feb. 1981;andKhansari in Arak, givenby Montazeri
Ettela'at, 21 Aug. 1981. 51. See my forthcoming book, Islamic Mythology: A Study of the Friday Congregational Sermon in Post-Revolutionary Iran, scheduled for publication by the American UniverMujahidin-3 Khalq, Jabheh-ye Melli and Peykar); and Rafsanjani in Tehran, Ettela'at, 31 July 1981 (on the Mujahadin-e Khalq and the SAVAK).

61. B. Lewis. TheMiddleEastand the West(New York:HarperTorch-books,1966),p.

115.

60. B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, p. 72.

sity Pressin Autumn1993. 52. Abd al-HusaynDastgheybin a Fridaysermonin Shiraz,Ettela'at,15 Oct. 1981. in a Friday 21 Aug. 1981.Also see MosaviArdebili 53. Khansari sermonin Arak,Ettela'at, 5 Sept. 1981. in a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, 54. Khamenehi in a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, 11Oct. 1980.Also see his sermon in Tehran,Ettela'at, 18April1981.Forsimilar see AhmedYazdiin a Friday expressions sermonin Borujord,Ettela'at, 31 July 1981. 55. Hajj Mosaviin a Fridaysermonin Khodabandeh, 27 June 1981. Ettela'at, 56. Muhammad 27 June 1981. Taqi Nateqi in a Fridaysermonin Hashtpir,Ettela'at, 57. Hajj Mosaviin a Fridaysermonin Khodabandeh, 27 June 1981. Ettela'at, 58. Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at,14 Sept. 1980. in a Friday 59. Hojjatol-IslamEidollahMohammedi sermonin Meinab,Ettela'at, 25 April of AyatollahQaziin Dazful,Ettela'at, see sermons 1981.Forsimilar 10July expressions 1981;and Dastgheibin Shiraz,Ettela'at,24 July 1981.

62. M. Khadduri, War andPeacein theLawof Islam(Baltimore: TheJohnsHopkinsPress, 1955), p. 45. 63. Khadduri, ibid., p. 64.

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sermonin Tehran, 64. Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982. For similarexpressionsee Khamenehi's 8 Nov. 1980;andLt. ColonelRezaSa'edi'sspeachpriorto sermonin Tehran, Ettela'at, Ettela'at,5 Sep. 14Sept. 1981.Also see Khansari 65. Hojjatol-Islam in a Friday sermonin Nateqi,Ettela'at, 21 Aug. 1981. Arak, Ettela'at, in a Friday sermonin Chalus,Ettela'at, 66. Hojjatol-IslamMostafaShakeri 25 April1981. 4 April 1981. 67. MostafaMir-Salim,Ettela'at, 68. Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at,16 Nov. 1980. 20 Sept. 1980.For similarexpressions 69. Taheriin a Fridaysermonin Esfahan,Ettela'at, see sermonsof Madaniin Qom, Ettela'at,10 Jan. 1981;and Rafsanjaniin Tehran, Kayhan,20 Nov. 1982. 70. Khamenehiin a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, 27 Sept. 1980. 71. Emami-Kashani in a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at,19 Nov. 1981. 72. Friday 27 Sept. 1980.Forsimilar sermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, see sermons expressions, of Meshkiniin Qom, Ettela'at, 27 June 1981;and Rafsanjani in Tehran,Kayhan,18 Sept. 1982. 73. Rafsanjani in a Fridaysermonin Tehran,Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982.For similarexpresin Qom, Ettela'at, 27 June 1981;andRafsanjani in sions, see the sermonsof Meshkini Tehran,Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982. 74. A. Arjomand,TheShadowof God and the HiddenImam:Religion,PoliticalOrder, andSocietalChange in ShiiteIranfrom theBeginning to 1890(Chicago: The University of ChicagoPress, 1984), pp. 61-64. 75. S. Hunter,IranandtheWorld: in a Revolutionary Decade(Bloomington & Continuity IndianaUniversityPress, 1990), p. 41. Indianapolis: 76. H. Algar, Religionand Statein Iran, 1785-1906.TheRole of the Ulamain the Qajar Period(Berkleyand Los Angeles: Universityof California Press, 1969), pp. 86-87. 77. Kashfal-Asrar, as quotedby, F. Rajaee,IslamicValues and World view:Khomeyni on Politics(Lanham,New YorkandLondon:University Man,theStateandInternational Pressof America, 1983), p. 89. 78. Ettela'at, 6 Feb. 1979. 79. R.K. Ramazani,'Shi'ismin the PersianGulf, in J.R. Cole and N.R. Keddie(eds.), Shi'ismand SocialProtest(New HavenandLondon:Yale University Press, 1986),p. 36. Forthe Islamic viewson defensive Revolutionjihad,see R. K. Ramazani, regime's in theMiddleEast(Baltimore& London:The John and Response aryIran:Challenge HopkinsUniversityPress, 1988), pp. 24-7. in Tehran,Ettela'at, 80. See, for example,sermonsof Rafsanjani 11 Oct. 1980;Montazeri in Qom, Ettela'at, 31 Jan. 1981;and Khamenehi in Tehran,Ettela'at, 4 April 1981. 81. Fridaysermonin Tehran,Kayhan,14 Aug. 1981.Forsimilar see sermons expressions, in Tehran, by Rafsanjaniin Tehran, Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982; and Emami-Kashani Kayhan,13 Nov. 1982. 82. Khomeini,Ettela'at, 5 Sept. 1981.Forsimilar see sermons of Rafsanjani in expressions, Tehran, Ettela'at,11 Oct. 1980; Kayhan, 25 Sept. 1982; and Emami-Kashaniin Tehran, 13 Nov. 1982. 83. Ali AkbarVelayatiin a speechbeforea Fridaysermonin Qom, Ettela'at, 5 Dec. 1981. 84. Fridaysermonin Tehran,Ettela'at, 16 Nov. 1985.For similarexpressions see Tehran sermons of Khamenehi,Ettela'at,15 March 1986; Ettela'at,29 March 1986; and Rafsanjani,Ettela'at,17 May 1986.