ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC [G.R.

119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN] FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1st district of Leyte. Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1st district of Leyte, filed a petition for Petitioners disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed ____ years and seven months. Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry seven months to since childhood. This was not accepted for it was filed out of time. It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with the resolution: 1. Finding the private respondents Petition for Disqualification meritorious 2. striking off petitioners Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995 3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy Even the MR to COMELEC was denied. Petitioners reasons for the change: o It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte. o She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcos who was then the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her husband throughout his political career. o Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace. o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it was sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there.

ISSUES: HELD: 1. Qualification on 1 yr residency No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile. In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Courts concept of domicile is to mean an individuals permanent home. She has never lost her domicile, which she had since birth even when she got married. When she got married, the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but regained such domicile when her husband died. It was further decided that when her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption. Furthermore, on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom to choose her domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile 2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue. Qualification on 1 yr residency The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in accordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it. Mandatory vs. Directory provision o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law o Statute is construed to be merely directory when the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes. Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.

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or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. AQUINO VS. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) FACTS: ISSUE: WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional HELD: NO to both issues. RATIO: Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile. Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the people. CODILLA V. DE VENECIA (150605, 393 SCRA 639) FACTS: These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Petitioners, Sixto Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987 congressional election. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the said district. Petitioners filed election protests. Petitioners contend his qualification as a member of the House of Representatives on the basis of Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution. The HRET declared that the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however, denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari. On the issue of jurisdiction The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members, as stated in Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these tribunals. It has been argued that under Article VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. On the issue of citizenship The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in 1895 and was able to obtain a certificate of residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought the private respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from China. The respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan filed with Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, and the same court declared him to be a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondent in Samar was burnt twice and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing his elementary education in Samar, went to Manila to acquire his secondary and college education. He took and passed the CPA Board Examinations and since employment opportunities were better in Manila, Ong found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10 months) Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification. COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration. On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes. COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates.

elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention where his status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino. Respondent Ongs situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majority are citizens of the Philippines. Section 2 of the same article also reads in its last sentence: Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. There is no dispute that the respondents mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. The aforementioned provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, they were both considered as naturalborn citizens with legislative intent to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. The petitioners also argue that the respondents father was not validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of oath of citizenship. On the issue of residency The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore be a resident of the said place. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that (1) respondent Ong is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respondent Ong is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Respondent Ong is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. On the issue of residency The petitioners argument on this issue is misplaced. It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. The legislative intent is to adhere to the earlier definition of the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. It is characterized by animus revertendi and that in the case at bar, the periodical journeys made by the respondent to his home province, while studying and later on practicing his profession in Manila, reveal that he always had the animus revertendi. In considering the residence of a person, It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689) FACTS: The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in the National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress? HELD: No. Election to high government offices doesnt free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a

free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isnt reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. Instant motion is denied. PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689) FACTS: The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of rape. He was confined in the National Penitentiary while his appeal was pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement was depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress? HELD: No. Election to high government offices doesnt free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of equal protection. Election to the position isnt reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. Instant motion is denied. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268) FACTS: Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996: MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion? MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker? THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved. (Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion. MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute. (It was 3:01 p.m.) (3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or challenging the validity of RA 8240. ISSUES: Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House. HELD: It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown. In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown. PIMENTEL, JR. VS HRET (393 SCRA 227) FACTS: In the May 1998 elections, 14 representatives from 13 party-lists are entitled to occupy seats in the House of Representatives. Subsequently, the House nominated contingents for the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission on Appointments (CA) however, no party-list representative is nominated for the said constitutional bodies.

Sen. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to the Senate requesting the restructure of HRET and CA. No response from the Senate. Pimentel files petition for mandamus, prohibition and preliminary injunction with this court. He contends that under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party list representatives are entitled at least 1 seat in HRET and 2 seats in the CA. ISSUE: WON the exclusion of party-list representatives in the HRET and CA is unconstitutional HELD: No. Petition dismissed RATIO: Sec 17 & 18 Art VI of the Constitution provides that in the composition of HRET (6 members of the House) and CA (12 members of the House) there must be a proportional representation from the political parties and the party-list. Since according to the Party-List System Act, the party-list representatives must constitute 20% of the seats in the House, party-list representatives must have 1 and 2 seats for HRET and CA respectively. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court rules that it cannot interfere with the exercise by the house of this constitutionally mandated duty unless there is an abuse in discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Party-lists are not unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to be nominated in the HRET or CA. Party-list has no locus standi. Furthermore, HRET and CA have no constitutional powers to reconstitute themselves. PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS (110 PHIL 331) FACTS: Wenceslao Pascual, Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted an action for declaratory relief, with injunction, assailing the approval of the Republic Act No. 920, entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works and the Donation made by Jose Zulueta, who at the time of the passage and approval of the said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines. RA 920 (Act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item (Section 1 c[a]) for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals (the projected and planned subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta). Antonio Subdivision was a private property of Zulueta. Zulueta donated said parcels of land to the Government 5 months after the enactment of RA 920, on the condition that if the Government violates such condition the lands would revert to Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Wenceslao Pascual, questioned the validity of the donation and the Constitutionality of the item in RA 920, it being not for a public purpose. ISSUES: Whether or not the item in RA 920 is constitutional. Whether or not the donation made by Zulueta was valid. HELD: It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occupying, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Herein, inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to Senator Zulueta at the time RA 920 was passed by Congress, or approved by the President, and the disbursement of said sum became effective on 20 June 1953 pursuant to Section 13 of the Act, the result is that the appropriating sough a private purpose and hence, null and void. The land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by the Congress for that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the Government, made over 5 months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of giving a semblance of legality to the appropriation, does not

cure the basic effect. As a result, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.