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CASE ANALYSIS Title: Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Assoc., Inc.

, Nicolas Aglipay and those mentioned in Annex A of complaint, petitioners, vs. Carlos Dimayuga and Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel, respondents. G.R. No. L-32049, June 25, 1984 I-PARTIES Petitioners: Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Assoc. Inc., headed by Nicholas Aglipay-> tenants-lessees of the parcel of land which is the subject of litigation/Civil case. Respondents: Juliana Diez Vda. de Gabriel->lessor, the original owner of the parcel of land being leased to the petitioners. Carlos Dimayuga->the buyer/the person to whom the property was sold. II- PRIOR PROCEEDINGS Petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of preferential rights with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV alleging that the Contract of Sale executed by Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel with Carlos Dimayuga is expressly prohibited by law as it is mandated for the respondent to execute such sale to petitioners. Therefore said contract should be declared null and void. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering the dismissal of the case on the ground that petitioners failed to state a cause of action. Thus petitioners resorted to the petition of certiorari for the review of the said order before the SC. III- THEORIES OF THE PARTIES The petitioners claims that on May 14, 1968, without giving notice to them or informing them of the transaction, Juliana Diez Vda. de Gabriel sold the parcel of land to respondent Carlos Dimayuga. They invoke their right vested by R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516, tenants have a preferential right to buy the lands they are renting within Metro Manila, provided there are at least 40 tenants, regardless of non expropriability or size of the land in question. The aforesaid provision further requires the respondent to offer the sale of the land to petitioner unless the latter renounces their rights in a public instrument. Making the sale executed by respondents illegal. Respondent Vda. de Gabriel claimed the land subject of the complaint is not a landed estate, and not being such, the same cannot be expropriated , and not being expropriable, no preferential rights could be availed of by the tenants. While respondent Dimayuga claims that plaintiffs had no personality to initiate the action since the Land Tenure Administration possessed the power to institute the proper expropriation proceedings before the competent court and that the subject complaint stated no cause of action against respondents. IV- OBJECTIVE The petitioner prays that the contract of sale be declared null and void and that respondent Vda. de Gabriel to execute a deed of sale in favor of petitioners at the same price and conditions followed in the contract with respondent Dimayuga, plus attorney's fees and damages. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint, that the plaintiffs be ejected from the property and for other remedies. V- KEY FACTS For more than ten years prior to 1959, the petitioners have been occupants of a parcel of land (with their 110 houses built thereon-110 tenant families) formerly owned by Vda. de Gabriel to whom petitioners have been paying their rents for the lease thereof, but who, on May 14, 1968, without notice to petitioners, sold the same to respondent Dimayuga, who in turn mortgaged the same to her for the balance of the purchase price. On the discovery of the sale the petitioner filed a complaint for the exercise of their preferential rights before the CFI. And that pursuant to R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 a parcel of land in Manila and suburbs , with at least 50 houses of tenants erected thereon and actually leased to said

tenants for at least 10 years prior to June 20 , 1959, may not be sold by the land owner to any person other than such tenants, unless the latter renounced their rights in a public instrument. Which means, respondent Vda. de Gabriel sold the land to respondent Dimayuga without the said tenants-appellants having renounced their preferential rights in a public instrument. Their complaint also states that since the aforesaid contract of sale is expressly prohibited by law, the same be declared null and void and for Vda. De Gabriel to execute a deed of sale in their favor because they are likewise willing to purchase said land at the same price and on the same terms and conditions observed in the contract of sale with respondent Dimayuga. On January 31, 1969, respondent Vda. De Gabriel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is not a land estate and not being such, the same cannot be expropriated and that no preferential rights can be availed of by the tenants. On february 6, 1969, Dimayuga filed his answer admitting therein certain factual allegations, denied some averments, interposed the affirmative defense that plaintiffs had no personality to initiate the action, that the subject complaint stated no cause of action against respondent and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and other remedies. Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, maintaining that R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 does not refer to landed estates, but to any piece of land occupied by more than 50 families leasing the same for more than 10 years prior to June 20, 1959; that their preferential right is independent of the expropriability of the land; that therefore, said rights may be exercised even if land is not expropriable pursuant to the police power of the State for the general welfare. On October 30, 1969, the CFI issued the subject order which found respondent's motion to dismiss well-taken and thereby dismisses complaint. After a series of motions, reply, rejoinder, surrejoinder, and answer between both parties, the lower court issued it's order of May 11, 1970 dismissing petitioners appeal. Petitioner thus resorted to this petition. VI- ISSUES Whether or not the contract of sale is null and void. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke their preferential rights as tenants. VII- HOLDINGS The Court finds that the said sale was made illegally and therefore void. The court also finds that petitioners' case falls with in the law thus they may invoke their VIII- Ratiodecidendi The R.A. 1162 as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516 set forth the following conditions-that of offering first the sale of the land to petitioners and the latter's renunciation in a public instrument-were not met when the land was sold to respondent Dimayuga. Evidently, said sale is illegal and therefore void. The 1973 Constitution section 6, article II emphasizes the stewardship concept that such private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his right to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community. P.D. 1157 Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implenting Machinery thereof. superseded R.A. 1152, 2342,3516. This decree is firmly based on sec. 6 of art. II of the 1973 constitution undoubtedly adopts and crystallizes the greater number of people criterion when it speaks of tenants and residents in declared urban land reform zones or areas without mention of the land area covered by such zones. The focus therefore, is on people who would benefit and not on the size of the land involved. Under section 6 of which also states that tenant-families have been vested the right of first refusal to purchase of the land within a reasonable time and reasonable price subject to the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Human Settlements. It is further supported by PD 1967 which evidently include Mataas na Lupa, the land in controversy with in the Urban Land Reform Zone. IX- DISPOSITION The order issued by the CFI is hereby set aside and the Ministry of Human Settlements is hereby directed to facilitate and administer the implementation of the rights of the petitioner. Cost against respondents. preferential right.