Kants Dynamic Constructions

Kenneth R. Westphal

The definitive version of this article appears in:

Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995):381429.*

ABSTRACT . According to Kant, justifying the application of mathematics to objects in natural science requires metaphysically constructing the concept of matter. Kant develops these constructions in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN). Kants specific aim is to develop a dynamic theory of matter to replace corpuscular theory. In his Preface Kant claims completely to exhaust the metaphysical doctrine of body, but in the General Remark to MAdN ch. 2, Dynamics, Kant admits that once matter is reconceived as basic forces, it is no longer possible to construct the concept of matter. I argue that Kants admission is only the tip of the problem, and that none of Kants commentators has fully grasped the problems infecting the MAdN that underlie Kants admission. I show that Kants proof that matter consists of forces is fallacious. I then re-analyze the circularity in Kants definition of density, criticizing both Adickes formulations and later dissolution of it. I also show that a third circularity infects the relations between Kants treatment of Dynamics and Mechanics (MAdN ch. 3). These three fundamental problems demonstrate the untenability of Kants metaphysical method, and they require the radical revision of the relation between mathematics and metaphysics Kant undertakes in his opus postumum. I show that some of Kants most surprising and critical later claims about the Critical philosophy are correct, and that they require the sorts of remedies Kant contemplates in the opus postumum. (I defend the essentially correct analyses offered by Burkhard Tuschling and Eckart Frster against criticisms by Michael Friedman.)

I. INTRODUCTION . According to Kant, natural science can be properly scientific only to the extent to which it applies mathematics to its objects.1 However, the possibility

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of applying mathematics to objects in natural science presupposes principles for the construction of the concepts which belong to the possibility of matter in general.2 Hence a complete analysis of the concept of matter in general is the basis of natural science, and this analysis is provided by pure philosophy.3 The official aim of Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science; hereafter MAdN) is to provide metaphysical constructions, together with the principles of these constructions, as a distinct discipline which explains and justifies the possibility of mathematical physics.4 Kants more specific aim in the MAdN is to develop a dynamic theory of matter to replace the corpuscular theory of matter. To do this, Kant must develop the main concepts needed to formulate a dynamic theory of matter, and he must show that the resultant theory provides an adequate, if not a superior, basis for Newtonian physics and for scientific research generally. Moreover, to propound such a theory as a philosopher, in particular, as a Critical philosopher, Kant must link his theory of matter with the main tenets of the first Critique, and he must develop his theory of matter within the constraints of the metaphysical method set out in the MAdN.5 Unlike other sciences, Kant says one can expect completeness in metaphysics because it is based on the fundamental laws of thought, where the Table of Categories of the first Critique provides the schema for determining that completeness.6 In his Preface Kant optimistically claims to have completely exhausted the metaphysical doctrine of body, though he modestly admits that this is not a large accomplishment.7 In view of these claims it is startling to find Kant admitting, in the General Remark to Dynamics (the second chapter of the MAdN), that once matter is reconceived, not as corpuscles, but as basic forces, it is no longer possible to construct the concept of matter,8 and to find Kant making suggestions to guide the development of the requisite constructions.9 This tension, if not contradiction, has generated significant, on-going discussion. After briefly reviewing this discussion (II), I argue that Kants admission in the General Remark is only the tip of the problem, and that none of Kants commentators has fully grasped the fundamental problems infecting the MAdN that underlie Kants admission in the General Remark. Understanding these deeper problems, which Kant came to recognize after the MAdN was published, ultimately leads to understanding some of the radical revisions of Kants epistemology in the opus postumum, revisions so radical that they constitute a distinctly post-critical phase of Kants theoretical philosophy.10 Kants later claims about the Critical philosophy have long been suspect among Kant scholars. My aim is to show that some of the most surprising and critical of those claims are correct, and that they require the sorts of remedies Kant contemplates, in particular in the virtually completed manuscript bergang 114. I shall not offer a new account of Kants doctrines in the opus postumum here; but I will defend the (essentially correct) analyses of this material offered by Burkhard Tuschling and Eckart Frster against criticisms made recently by Michael Friedman.

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Understanding the problems facing the MAdN requires reviewing some main points of its metaphysical method (III). I then show that Kants proof that matter consists of forces is not only fallacious, but begs the question (IV). I then reanalyze the circularity in Kants definition of density, criticizing both Adickes formulations and his later dissolution of it (V). These two fundamental problems demonstrate the untenability of Kants metaphysical method in the MAdN, and they require (among much else) the radical reassessment of the relation between mathematics and metaphysics Kant undertakes in the opus postumum (VIVIII). II. KANTS ADMISSION OF THE UNCONSTRUCTABILITY OF MATTER. According to Gerd Buchdahl, the fundamental forces of matter (repulsion and attraction) cannot be constructed because they fall under the categories of Quality (reality, negation, limitation), all of which are intensive (rather than extensive) quantities.11 Kants justification for introducing forces into the MAdN rests ultimately on his claim that in space no activity or alteration, even as a mere motion, can be thought apart from the ascription of causes.12 Actual causes can only be inferred on the basis of empirical data.13 This follows the doctrine of the first Critique that only the form, but not the matter, that is, not the reality, of perceptions can be anticipated.14 Kants success in these constructions lies in the important negative point that the existence of an attractive force acting immediately at a distance is an empirical issue that is not precluded by our concepts of matter and force, once those concepts are properly understood.15 Buchdahl takes this to have been Kants main aim, and he finds Kants greatest contribution to philosophy of science to lie, not in his constructions, but in his tripartite methodological schema of constitutive, regulative, and evidential components of our theoretical knowledge of nature.16 Buchdahls work on this tri-partite schema is very insightful, and he is right that this schema survives the ultimate failure of Kants constructive method. However, Buchdahl does not admit how radically he must revise Kants own understanding of the division of labor among these three areas in view of the failure of Kants constructive method. Kant insists that pure philosophy is to provide a complete analysis of the concept of matter as a basis for physics and in particular for the application of mathematics to physical phenomena. Buchdahls concentration on Kants systematic architectonic allows him too easily to by-pass Kants very strong claims about how the necessity of natural laws betokens a strong a priori component in those laws. Indeed, Buchdahl reduces Kants quite specific account of the constitutive component of natural scientific knowledge, which derives from his transcendental idealism in the first Critique and metaphysical constructions in the MAdN, to the mere claim that there is a constitutive component in our natural scientific knowledge.17 Gordon Brittan contends that Kant is forced to admit that forces are unconstructable by a basic, unresolvable paradox in his philosophy.18 He gives the example that on Newtonian grounds, forces of acceleration cannot be constructed because their value shifts with shifts in reference frames.19 Kants

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paradoxical result is that the corpuscular hypothesis is mathematically, but not metaphysically adequate, while his own dynamic hypothesis is metaphysically, but not mathematically, adequate-despite Kants effort to show that mathematical and metaphysical adequacy coincide, at least in the case of the dynamic theory of matter.20 Ultimately, Brittan contends, the underlying problem comes from distinguishing form and content in a certain way. Forms are determinate, they fit into a propositional account of knowledge, and they are objective, yet they can never be determinate enough to preclude distinguishing from them a content that is real, yet indeterminate and so not objective; determination and reality never quite coincide.21 We shall see below, however, that Kants admission of the unconstructability of matter is quite specific and restricted. If his view faces the kind of global paradox Brittan alleges, it would take much careful argument to justify his charge. Also, his counter-example, that on Newtonian principles forces are unconstructable, is mis-aimed. His counter-example presupposes that Kants metaphysical constructions are to provide the quantitative laws governing forces. (Only on the basis of those laws can any specific values of forces be calculated.) Kant specifically denies this; he seeks to construct forces at a metaphysically general level that admits of quantification, but where that quantification must rely on empirical research.22 Robert E. Butts rightly stresses that Kant cannot defer solving the problem of the construction of the basic forces of physics until someone more able figures out how to do it, because if those basic forces are not at present constructed, then they have no definite scientific meaning or application, and consequently no concepts of derivative forces or any other concepts derived from those of the basic forces can have definite meaning or application.23 He tries to show that Kant was not bothered by the apparent tension between his insistence on the constructability of admissible concepts and the non-constructability of fundamental forces because fundamental forces are ultimately regulative postulates of reason that guide research and our systematic integration of the various physical forces we discover empirically.24 Although Kant suggests once that fundamental forces have such a regulative status,25 this cannot be his real view, or at least not all of it. Kant ascribes a fundamental, constitutive status to forces in his theory of matter. The problems with Butts interpretation have been pointed out by Howard Duncan and Kathleen Okruhlik. Duncan stressed that if fundamental forces are just regulative ideas, then they must be instrumental and they cannot be explanatory, that is, constitutive of matter or its possibility.26 Kathleen Okruhlik further points out that Kants views contain three importantly distinct kinds of theoretical postulates: purely regulative necessary fictions, hypothetical idealizations (including maxima species), and fundamental forces.27 Butts mistakenly assimilates these three kinds of postulates. She argues convincingly that Kant intends a realist interpretation only of the fundamental forces, which is a crucial part of Kants effort to provide a realist interpretation of Newtonian mechanics.28 Howard Duncan points out, against both Buchdahl and Brittan, that the facts that Kants basic forces are a posteriori and fundamental do not suffice to

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explain their unconstructability, since corpuscles are constructable and also are a posteriori and fundamental.29 He contends that the problem of unconstructability is a purely practical, technical problem whose solution awaits the development of better analytical techniques, both geometrical and experimental.30 Only fully defined concepts can be constructed,31 and definitions are the result, not the beginning, of scientific inquiry.32 Duncans approach is obviously the most favorable to Kant, but I do not think that he has adequately resolved the strongest doubt about his view, that the constructability of a concept is sine qua non for its scientific acceptability, and for its role in guiding research.33 More specifically, Duncan overemphasizes the role of geometrical figures at the expense of the more central general problem of providing intuitions a priori that correspond to fundamental scientific concepts that underwrite the application of mathematics to phenomena, in particular, to apply extensive, quantitative considerations to intensive phenomena. None of these commentators have grasped the qualifications Kant puts on his admission of the unconstructability of matter. Kants admission, that when matter (Stoff) is reconceived as fundamental forces, it is no longer possible to construct the concept of matter and to present it in intuition as possible,34 is made specifically in connection with the issue of density and the corpuscular explanation of density in terms of vacant interstices.35 What he disclaims, just before providing his advice about possible lines of construction of the concept of matter, is a sufficient explication of the concept of matter, and in particular, of density.36 Kant insists that for his metaphysical purposes it suffices to present the filling of space as a dynamic property of matter; he claims not to need to specify the laws governing that property, and not to need to explain the further properties of matter such as cohesion, density, fluidity, elasticity, dissolution, decomposition, or specific differences among different materials.37 His optimistic claims to completeness in the Preface must concern his essential aim of analyzing matters occupation of space in dynamic terms.38 However, there are two crucial problems facing Kants essential aim to present the filling of space as a dynamic property of matter. First, his argument for introducing forces in the first Proposition of Dynamics is fallacious and begs the question. Second, his treatment of density is circular. This second problem shows that Kant cannot relegate the problem of density to the periphery of his concerns. It incidentally also shows that he cannot dismiss the problem of cohesion as a secondary, empirical concern. Finally, both problems show that Kants quasimathematical constructive metaphysical procedure is specious. Once Kant recognized these problems, he saw that their remedy required radically re-casting his philosophy of nature, and with that, his Critical philosophy as a whole. Kants admission of the unconstructability of the concept of matter has been discussed with surprisingly little attention to Kants own account of his metaphysical program. To understand Kants problems properly, and to understand their theoretical repercussions, requires at least a brief review of some central features of Kants aim and method in the MAdN.

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III.

KANTS AIM AND METHOD IN THE MAD N.

Kants MAdN analyses metaphysically the concept of matter presupposed by Newtonian physics, in particular, by its application of mathematics to the behavior of material bodies. The scope of Kants project is set by the intersection of two senses of nature. In the formal sense of the term, nature designates the first inner principle of everything that belongs to the existence of something. In the material sense, nature designates the totality (Inbegriff) of all things as objects of our senses. There are two natural realms, the objects of inner and outer sense.39 Kant contends that the objects of inner sense dont admit of scientific treatment.40 Hence the term that, strictly speaking, covers both possible kinds of science, viz., the metaphysical foundations of natural science, can be used to designate its one proper part, namely, the metaphysics of corporeal nature.41 Something can affect our outer senses only through motion, Kant claims; hence motion is the most fundamental characteristic of an object of outer sense.42 All other properties belonging to the nature of matter ultimately derive from motion; accordingly, natural science is pure or applied doctrine of motion.43 The applied doctrine of motion is empirical; Kants concern in the MAdN is with the pure doctrine of motion, and indeed only with one of its parts. The pure part of physics as a natural science contains both mathematics and metaphysics.44 Physics inevitably postulates metaphysical theses about the nature of matter; it needs them in order to analyze natural phenomena mathematically.45 Kants concern is two-fold. As scientific postulates, these metaphysical theses do not receive proper analysis or justification.46 Moreover, if they are not properly distinguished from the fundamental mathematical principles of physics, this introduces confusion and uncertainty about the justification of scientific principles and theory.47 Natural science can be properly scientific only to the extent to which it applies mathematics to its objects.48 However, the possibility of applying mathematics to objects in natural science presupposes principles for the construction of the concepts which belong to the possibility of matter in general.49 Hence a complete analysis (Zergliederung) of the concept of matter in general is the basis of natural science, and its analysis is the task of pure philosophy.50 Kants MAdN provides metaphysical constructions, together with the principles of these constructions, as a distinct discipline which explains and justifies the possibility of mathematical physics.51 The MAdN forms a scientific discipline unto itself, and must meet Kants general standards of scientific knowledge. A science, on Kants view, is a systematic whole of knowledge organized according to rational principles.52 Science is pure rational knowledge; its fundamental laws are apodeictically certain, and hence must be known a priori.53 These laws, as rational principles, enable us to derive the multitude of phenomena that belong to the existence of something from its inner principle by reasoning from ground to consequence.54

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Doctrine based on empirical principles lacks this certainty, systematicity, and necessity; it is merely historical, and may count as natural history or description of nature, but it is not, properly speaking, science.55 To justify the application of mathematics to the behavior of bodies within physics, the MAdN must be non-empirical,56 and must be independent of the rational principles concerning the use of mathematics in physics.57 The MAdN must be a priori. According to Kant, to know something a priori is to know it on the basis of its mere possibility.58 However, a priori knowledge of things cannot be based on mere concepts, for that only determines the possibility of those concepts, but not of their objects.59 A priori knowledge of the possibility of things requires that their corresponding intuition is given a priori.60 To provide intuitions a priori for concepts is to construct those concepts.61 In this regard, the procedure Kant employs in the MAdN is closely allied to that of mathematics, since mathematics (on Kants view) is rational knowledge through the construction of concepts.62 Consequently, although the pure philosophy of nature in general, which examines the constitution of the concept of nature in general (viz., the first Critique), does not require mathematics, a pure doctrine of nature about determinate natural things, such as the doctrine of body given in the MAdN, is only possible by mathematical means.63 Kants presentation imitates the mathematical method for constructing concepts as closely as time allowed him.64 He thinks that the mathematical model is appropriate, and indeed it is required, in view of his aim to provide metaphysical constructions of the concept of matter as the movable in space, by treating that concept in connection with the forms of intuition and the categories. Kants metaphysical constructions in the MAdN bring the a priori concepts analyzed in the first Critique, the categories, to bear on the intuition of matter in space, where the empirical concept of matter is taken in its most austere, minimal sense as the movable in space. The first Critique forms the transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature, formulated independently of the nature of either of the kinds of objects of the senses.65 The MAdN forms the special part of the metaphysics of nature, which takes the empirical concept of matter and determines the range of rational a priori knowledge of this object.66 The MAdN provides a complete analysis of the concept of matter in general as the basis of natural science; this is the task of pure philosophy.67 To this end, philosophical analysis needs no particular experiences, but only what is found in the isolated empirical concept of matter, in connection with the pure intuitions in space and time, in accordance with those laws that depend on the concept of nature in general (that is, the principles of the first Critique).68 This analysis is an actual metaphysic of corporeal nature.69 The completeness of this analysis is guaranteed by the Table of Categories of the first Critique.70 The Table of Categories sets out the general laws of thought.71 Whether it be a priori, based on mathematical construction, or learned by experience, whatever may be thought about matter must fall under the four functions of thought, viz., quantity, quality, relation, and modality.72 To each of the four

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functions of thought, or headings in the Table of Categories, there corresponds a chapter of the MAdN. Each chapter adds a new characteristic to the basic concept of matter as the movable in space.73 The first chapter, titled Phoronomy, treats motion as a pure quantity capable of composition (pure kinematics). The second chapter, Dynamics, adds a qualitative characteristic to the concept of matter, namely, that it has an original moving force. The third chapter, Mechanics, explicates matter as the movable insofar as it has moving force;74 it treats the relations among moving material bodies. Finally in Phenomenology, matter is explicated as the movable insofar as it can be an object of experience.75 This involves treating relative motions in connection with our power of representation as an appearance of outer sense, and determines their modality;76 ultimately this provides the metaphysical principles requisite for distinguishing true from apparent motions.77 Each of these explications is more substantive than its predecessors, and Kants justification and explanation of each presupposes the preceding explications and the soundness of their justifications. Through these methods, Kant proposes to prove a priori three fundamental laws of (broadly Newtonian) mechanics. He does this by applying the three Principles defended in Analogies of Experience in the first Critique to the empirical concept of matter as the movable in space, as that concept is sequentially explicated in each of the chapters of the MAdN. The three Principles are that substance is permanent through all change, that every change has a cause, and that causal interaction is reciprocal.78 Kants three laws of Mechanics (MAdN ch. 3) are that the total quantity of matter remains constant through all changes in corporeal nature, that every change in matter has an external cause, and that action and reaction are equal in all communication of motion.79 Kant regards his a priori proofs as an advance over the empirical proofs offered by Newton and other physicists.80 IV. KANTS PHORONOMIC BASIS FOR DYNAMICS. In Dynamics, Kant explicates matter as the movable insofar as it fills a space, where matter fills a space (as distinct from merely occupying it) insofar as it resists any other body that tends to enter that space.81 At first glance it may seem that Kants first explication of matter in Dynamics, as something that fills a space by resisting the entry by other bodies into the space it occupies, simply asserts a dynamic theory of matter, since resistance would seem to be the effect of some sort of causal force. This appearance is misleading. The idea that matter resists penetration of the space it occupies is held in common by corpuscular theories and Kants dynamic theory of matter. The crucial point concerns how each theory explains this resistance. According to corpuscularism, matter is particulate, and the basic particles of matter are essentially impenetrable. Impenetrability is a fundamental property of matter, and not the effect of some more basic kind of force. The only active forces there are, according to corpuscular doctrine, are forces imparted from without by impact. Kant initiates his argument against corpuscularism with the first Proposition

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(Lehrsatz) of Dynamics, that matter fills a space not simply by existing, but by a particular moving force.82 Kants proof of this proposition rests explicitly on the Proposition proven in Phoronomy.83 Unfortunately, his proof is fallacious and it misrepresents the Phoronomic Proposition. Seeing why this is so, and what the implications of this are, requires examining some of the main aims and doctrines of Kants first chapter, Phoronomy. Kants aim in Phoronomy is to set out the purely quantitative characteristics of motions and their combinations in order, ultimately, to provide a conspicuous physical account of the combination of motions effected by actual causes.84 More specifically, Kant is concerned to provide a clear account of the purely quantitative aspects of motions, the extensive magnitudes of space traversed (including direction) within an elapsed time, in order to clarify the intensive aspects of motions, beginning with the rates of changes of place (velocity).85 Kant rightly remarks that it is not self-evident that velocities (quite apart from accelerations) are inherently additive in the way that the extensive quantities of distance or volume are.86 Consequently, Phoronomy is a pure kinematics that abstracts from all causal considerations and treats solely the quantitative aspects of motion, direction and velocity, and the quantitative combination of motions.87 Although Phoronomy abstracts from causes, Kant plainly intends to treat motions that can have a physical basis. Because Phoronomy cannot treat motions that have causes, such as curvilinear motions, it is restricted to rectilinear motions (which can be inertial).88 Kant thus needs to treat combinations of rectilinear motions in the same direction, in opposite directions, and in divergent directions (where the directions of the motions form an angle).89 Since these are supposed to be cases of combined (rather than successive) motions, they must be motions of the same point at the same time.90 Kant repeatedly insists that combinations of motions in the same space can only be understood in causal terms, and conversely, that purely quantitative (non-causal) combinations of motions require distinct spaces.91 These distinct spaces are relative spaces which, like modern reference frames, can be understood to move with respect to each other within a larger relative space (or frame of reference). Absolute motion is a fiction, and absolute space is merely an idea of reason in accordance with which we can construct ever larger, more inclusive relative spaces.92 A relative space may be treated as absolute for purposes of analyzing motions within it, whether those motions be of bodies or of other relative spaces.93 Motion is thus relative to what is regarded as stable, which may be either a body or a relative space (or, reference frame).94 One point that distinguishes Phoronomy from geometry is that Phoronomy includes considerations of time, the time that elapses during a motion.95 Motions occurring at different times are distinct motions. Since Phoronomy treats the combination of motions, the combined motions must be understood as occurring simultaneously. This cannot be achieved by chronometric means, where we would determine the equal duration of motions occurring at different times and compute their combination, simply because chronometric techniques

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of any kind presuppose what Kants phoronomic constructions are supposed to prove, namely, that mathematical measures can be applied to experienced motions.96 Consequently, Kants phoronomic constructions of combinations of motions must allow the two combined motions to occur simultaneously. (The problems involved in combining more than two motions reduce to those of combining two motions.97) The two combined motions are motions of the same point, and the two component motions are to be contained in the resultant motion; they are not to produce a third motion.98 In this way Kant seeks to make intuitively evident a priori the geometrical congruence between the two combined motions and a third motion,99 which, under physical conditions, would be their result. Consequently, Kants phoronomic constructions must use simultaneous motions of or within distinct relative spaces.100 Kant summarizes these doctrines in the sole Proposition defended in Phoronomy:
The composition of two motions of one and the same point can only be thought of by one of them being represented in absolute space, but instead of the second motion being so represented, a motion of the relative space in the opposite direction and with the same velocity is represented as being identical with the first motion. (MAdN 4:490.713)

It is sufficiently evident that the composition of two motions can be represented by recourse to distinct relative spaces or frames of reference; the important point for present purposes is why Kant thinks it can only be represented in this manner, for these reasons underscore the necessity of distinguishing relative spaces in phoronomic constructions. Kants proof of the Phoronomic Proposition is divided into three cases; two motions in the same direction, in opposite directions, and in diverging directions. In the first case of combining two motions in the same direction, a line segment in a single space that represents the total distance traversed by the combined motions must be understood as occurring in the same period of time as each of the component motions; otherwise that line segment would not represent the combined velocities of those two motions. Consequently, no parts of that line segment can represent either of the component motions, because the distances represented by any sub-segments of that line segment cannot themselves be understood as being traversed in the very same period of time as either of the component motions. (The period of time in which any sub-segment is traversed must be less than the total elapsed time, yet each of the component motions lasts the whole elapsed time.101) Consequently, one line segment in a single space cannot represent the combined velocities of the two motions.102 The second case combines two motions of the same point in opposite directions. Kant simply asserts that the thought of combining two such opposed motions of the same point at the same time in the same space is simply impossible.103 The impossibility apparently lies in the fact that such an intuitive construction would at best present the difference between the two motions, and would fail to represent the two component motions themselves, whereas representing those component motions was the very point of the construction. As in

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the first case, recourse to distinct relative spaces is the only way to represent the two component motions and make intuitively evident their congruence with some third motion. The third case combines two motions of the same point in diverging directions. Once again, attempting to construct such a combination in a single space fails to represent either of the component motions. At best, such a construction would present the vector sum of the two component motions, as the product of the two component motions mutual alteration. Kant insists that the point of his phoronomic constructions is that the two component motions should be contained in a third motion, not that either of them should be altered nor that they should produce a third, distinct motion.104 Once again, the only way to represent the two component motions as being contained in a third motion is to construct the two motions in distinct relative spaces. My point in reviewing these doctrines from Phoronomy is to show as clearly as possible the problems Kant creates when he cites the Phoronomic Proposition in his proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics, that matter fills space in virtue of its moving force. Kants Proposition 1 of Dynamics and its proof are as follows:
Proposition 1. Matter fills a space, not by its mere existence, but by a special moving force. (MAdN 4:497.1416.) Proof. Penetration into a space . . . is a motion. The resistance to motion is the reason why motion diminishes or even changes into rest. Now, nothing can be combined with any motion as lessening or destroying it but another motion of the same movable thing in the opposite direction (phoronomic proposition). Consequently, the resistance offered by a matter in the space that fills it to all intrusion by another matter is a cause of the motion of this other matter in the opposite direction. But the cause of a motion is called moving force. Consequently, matter fills its space by moving force and not by its mere existence. (MAdN 4:497.1728.)105

In response to Tuschlings critique of Kants MAdN, James McCall cites most of this passage (beginning with the third sentence, nothing . . .) and states:
[Kant] is not arguing here that force is nothing but an opposition of perceptible motions but, rather, that force is effective in resisting a motion only through the mediation of a motion in the opposite direction. I find here no derivation of force from motion only the recognition that motion can be opposed only by motion.106

However, McCall does not examine Kants Phoronomic Proposition or what Kant could possible mean by citing it in this proof. Examining Kants use of the Phoronomic Proposition in his proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics reconfirms Tuschlings charges that Kant here attempts to derive forces from motions, and that this derivation fails. Kants proof both begs the question and mis-uses his own Phoronomic Proposition.

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Kants Phoronomy is a purely quantitative analysis of the direction and velocity of motions, and specifically excludes any analysis of their causes. The motions at issue in Kants proof that matter has a moving force are entries of material bodies into spaces occupied by other material bodies, and the doctrine of motion that provides the principles of Kants proof is Phoronomy. In his proof Kant prominently appeals to the Phoronomic Proposition; remove that appeal and his argument is incomplete. Consequently, his inference from changes of motions, to causes of changes of motion, to moving forces as causes of changes of motions, is, as Tuschling claims, an attempt to derive forces from motions, insofar as Kant argues that only by postulating fundamental moving forces can matter be conceived to fill space. There are two main problems with Kants appeal to the Phoronomic Proposition in his proof that matter fills space by its moving force. Kant cites the Phoronomic Proposition in the following way: . . . nothing can be combined with any motion as lessening or destroying it but another motion of the same movable thing in the opposite direction (phoronomic proposition).107 The most obvious problem is that Kant here speaks of one motion lessening or destroying another motion. In this context, destroying (aufheben) and lessening (vermindern) either are causal terms or they are not. If they are not causal terms, they do not serve to introduce forces into Kants argument. Hence forces must be introduced by others of Kants premises. I shall show below that the other premises cannot do this validly. If they are not causal terms, they cannot serve as the inferential link Kants argument needs to show that matters resistance to penetration is a cause of its repelling other bodies. If they are causal terms, they cannot be justified by appeal to the Phoronomic Proposition.108 Causal terms were explicitly and repeatedly excluded from Phoronomy in general, and they certainly do not appear in Kants statement of the Phoronomic Proposition.109 Consequently, Kant cannot justify their introduction into his proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics by citing the Phoronomic Proposition. Whether those terms are causal or not, there is another, equally serious problem with Kants citation of the Phoronomic Proposition in this proof. In order for one motion to decrease or destroy another motion, those two motions must not only be motions of the same body, they must occur in the same space. However, as we have seen, the very point of Kants Phoronomic Proposition and its proof was to show that the phoronomic construction of combinations of motions required distinct spaces for each motion. Consequently, Kant cannot justify the central premise of his proof, that nothing can be combined with any motion as lessening or destroying it but another motion of the same movable thing in the opposite direction, by appeal to the Phoronomic Proposition.110 It may seem that Kants proof could be supported, not by the Phoronomic Proposition itself, but by part of its proof, specifically the negative part that aimed to show that combining motions in the way required by phoronomic constructions could not be achieved in a single space. Kants sub-proofs show that combining motions in a single space results in a motion that is their

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product, but which does not contain them as components. Could these sub-proofs be turned into a proof that the motion that results from combining motions in a single space is a causal product of causally active material bodies? No. Kant does insist, in the third sub-proof, that the alteration or the production of a third motion is excluded from Phoronomy, and yet is required in order to construct the combination of diverging motions in the same space.111 However, the alteration and production at issue in that sub-proof are strictly quantitative, mathematical notions. Each of Kants sub-proofs treats motion in strictly quantitative terms, and none of them analyzes the causal etiology of motion. Consequently, those sub-proofs cannot themselves be used to justify the introduction of causal terms into Kants proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics. On the contrary, those sub-proofs underscore the original point that appealing to Phoronomic considerations in a proof that matter is invested with moving forces amounts to an attempt to introduce forces on the basis of motions, and it underscores Tuschlings original criticism of Kants proof, namely that motions alone do not suffice to justify the introduction of forces. Kants proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics is fallacious. Kants inference, that Consequently, the resistance offered by a matter in the space that fills it to all intrusion by another matter is a cause of the motion of this other matter in the opposite direction,112 does not and cannot follow from the Phoronomic Proposition. It may be suggested that Kants proof could be supported instead by his repeated claim that motions can only be combined within a single space by recourse to causes.113 Though this may seem to be the needed principle, Kant merely asserts that principle without argument, and in fact it is not the requisite principle after all. Instead, close examination of this claim reveals another fallacy in Kants argument. Although these causes must be some sort of moving causes,114 in two of the three passages in which Kant makes this claim he rightly indicates that the causes required to combine motions in a single space are external causes.115 External causes are not identical to the moving force Kant seeks to show is an essential internal property of matter in the first Proposition of Dynamics and its proof. Kants proof ends with the inference that the cause of a motion is called moving force. Consequently, matter fills its space by moving force and not by its mere existence.116 This is a non sequitur; the cause of motion to which Kant appeals is the cause of somethings moving; it is not the cause of somethings filling space, not even if the resistance whereby a body fills a space is part of what enables that body to impart motion to another body (as Kant states both in the immediately preceding premise and in the second sentence).117 The issue is what accounts for that resistance to penetration, and Kants proof does nothing to advance his case against corpuscularism, which accounts for that resistance by ascribing impenetrability to matter. Kant is quite right that the law of contradiction doesnt repel any material bodies.118 However, according to corpuscular doctrine, what would violate the law of contradiction is a piece of matter that lacks impenetrability; impenetrability itself is a physical property of matter, and this prop-

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erty of a material body is what resists the intrusion by other bodies into the space it occupies. Kants argument does nothing to show that what repels the penetration of a body into the space occupied by another body is a moving (repulsive) force rather than impenetrability. His argument does not show that material bodies in motion, whatever may be the external causes of their motion, affect each others motion on contact in virtue of internal forces that are essential to matter.119 Kants conclusion, that a moving force is what enables a matter to fill space, simply begs the question against corpuscularism. Kants proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics is unsound. Indeed, the problems with his proof are so great that its surprising Kant didnt notice them immediately. As Tuschling notes, the problems with Kants proof did not escape the notice of one of the first reviewers of the MAdN. On December 2, 1786, an anonymous review of Kants MAdN appeared in the Gttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen No. 191. The reviewer said the following about Kants chapter on Dynamics:
2nd Chapter. Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics. Here matter is the movable that fills space; to fill space is to resist everything movable that by its motion tends to enter a specific space. Matter fills space, not by its mere existence, but by a moving force since its resistance to that which tends to enter changes its motion, and nothing can reduce or destroy motion except motion in the opposite direction. To support this the Phoronomic Proposition is cited. (Phoronomy contains the sole Proposition, previously cited, concerning combined motion. The reviewer confesses that he presently doesnt find the same expressly, and, even if he may have also overlooked something, doesnt understand how this could follow from the Proposition cited. A body that moves admittedly remains at one and the same place in absolute space if the plane on which it lies is moved in precisely the opposite direction with the same velocity, but must every persisting at a place be thought in this way? Must a moving force be ascribed to a wall because one cannot proceed past the wall? It is not at all evident how one can base moving force on motion, whatever its source.)120

As we have seen, Kants proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics does not contain an adequate answer to this reviewers questions; it does not prove that matter fills space in virtue of an original moving force. Tuschling notes that Kant quoted this passage almost verbatim on one of the loose leafs found with the IV. Convolut of the opus postumum (Loses Blatt 25).121 Adickes dates the leaf only as prior to 1796. Kant read literary reviews avidly and anxiously awaited a response to the MAdN, especially from Gttingen, home of the physicist he esteemed so highly, Lichtenberg.122 His transcription is likely have been made shortly after the review would have appeared, no later than 1787. He doesnt comment on the problem on that leaf, but he must have meditated on it long and seriously. As Adickes noted, Kant tried throughout his career to demonstrate some version of the first Proposition of Dynamics, never with

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success.123 One of the questions Kant had to answer when considering the reviewers objection is where the ultimate source of his difficulty in demonstrating that matter consists of moving force lies. That source becomes more evident after examining a further problem with his theory of matter Kant noticed a few years later. Even when the reviewer pointed out that Kants proof was problematic, Kant did not immediately see why. In the midst of his transcription from the review, Kant inserted a parenthetical note defending his appeal to the Phoronomic Proposition: (N.B.: The phoronomic proposition was cited by me to support the claim that nothing can abolish motion save motion in the opposite direction.)124 Kant still insisted here on speaking of motion being abolished, but for reasons just given, that is the kind of causal idiom which he specifically and of necessity excluded from Phoronomy, and it requires motions in the same space, which was also necessarily excluded from Phornomy. V. THE CIRCULARITY IN KANTS DEFINITION OF MATTERS QUANTITY . Kants dynamic theory of matter in the MAdN faces a fundamental problem of circularity, and this circularity reflects directly back onto the tenability of his metaphysical approach to constructing the basic concepts necessary for the possibility of matter. While expositors sympathetic to Kants MAdN have ignored this problem, critics who have emphasized this problem have relied on Adickess initial formulation of it, and havent considered Adickess later retraction of the difficulty.125 Although it is on the right track, I contend that Adickess initial formulation is not adequate, and that his later dissolution fails. I develop an improved statement of the problem of circularity, and show how fundamental this problem is within Kants theory of matter. In VI I show how it reflects adversely onto his constructive metaphysical method. The aim of Kants dynamic theory of matter is to explain the fundamental properties of matter in terms of fundamental moving forces. To do so, he must describe those forces in such a way that he can preserve the main physical definitions and laws of matter. Matter fills space through its moving forces,126 more specifically, through the mutual limitation of its attractive and repulsive forces.127 Matter fills a space by repelling other things from the space it occupies.128 The action of repulsion alone would dissipate matter throughout space.129 The action of attraction alone would compress matter into a mathematical point which may be located in space, but would not occupy space and so would not exist; space would be left empty.130 Hence a material substance exists and fills a space through the interplay of its attractive and repulsive forces; both are essential to matter.131 Problems arise when Kant tries to specify the volume and density of matter. The space a matter fills is determined by the balance between the attractive and repulsive forces.132 Density is a function of the intensity with which the two opposed basic forces fill a region of space.133 The attractive force, which Kant ultimately identifies with Newtonian gravitation, is supposed to be the same in all materials. Repulsive force, which acts only at the surface of a matter, and

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hence only on contact, is supposed to differ in different materials. In this way, Kant seeks to account for different densities of different materials as an original property of those materials, without recourse to the corpuscular hypothesis of vacant interstices between otherwise equally dense fundamental particles.134 Kant himself came to think that his analysis was circular. Adickes cited the two relevant passages. The first passage comes from Kants remarks on a letter he received from J. S. Beck (8. Sept. 1792):
[PASSAGE I] The greatest difficulty is to explain how a specific volume of material is possible by the inherent attraction of its parts in the ratio of the inverse square of the distance, [in conjunction] with a repulsion, which can only affect those parts which are in immediate contact (not those at a distance), in the ratio of the cube of the distance (and hence of its volume). Thus the power of attraction depends on density, but density depends again on the power of attraction. Also, density varies in accord with the inverse ratio of repulsion, that is, of the volume. (XI 1st ed. 348; 2nd ed. 361.30362.2; my tr.)135

The second passage comes from Kants reply to Beck of 16. October 1792. Kant praises Beck for recognizing the importance of the physical question of explaining differences of density without recourse to vacant interstices. He then states:
[PASSAGE II] I would of course set up the solution of this problem as follows, that attraction (universal, Newtonian) originally is equal in all materials while only the repulsion of different materials differs, and thus constitutes the specific differences of density. But this leads in a certain way to a circle I cant get out of and which I myself must try to understand still better. (XI 1st ed. 362; 2nd ed. 376.35377.4; my tr.)136

Adickes offers two different accounts of Kants problem, along with two different assessments of its severity. The differences between his accounts are instructive; examining them will enable us better to grasp the real dimensions of the problem Kant faces. In his editorial apparatus to Kants Reflexionen zur Physik und Chemie, Adickes explains the problem as follows:
[ADICKES 1911] This circle is also found in the Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science and consists in this: gravitational attraction is proportional to mass, and thus (with equal volumes) is also proportional to density. But this density is supposed in turn to be dependent upon that same attractive force, taken in connection with the original repulsive force. Repulsive force differs in different materials; but attractive force on the contrary is not supposed to differ in different materials. It is always the same degree, and is proportional only to the quantity of the material. However, only through the effect and counter-effect of both of these

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basic forces is a determinate degree of the filling of space and so also the quantity of material possible (MAdN 4:521.78). Thus how could the basic force of attraction be proportional to this quantity, which is still undetermined, and indeed which presupposes that force? It is in fact a circle in which Kant moves . . . (XIV 337.35338.4; my tr.; quotation marks indicate Adickess quotations from Kant.)

In 1911 Adickes thought this problem was genuine and required radical alterations of Kants theory, in particular, the recognition of two distinct kinds of attractive force.137 I shall argue below that Adickes was right about this, and further that the implications for Kants method of recognizing two distinct kinds of attractive force are very serious. But first we should examine the weakness of Adickess later presentation and resolution of the circle problem. Adickes subsequently described the circle problem in the following terms:
[ADICKES 1924A] If one says: it is one and the same attractive force, which on the one hand, together with the repulsive force, constitutes matter and thus also its quantity (mass), and which on the other hand depends of course again in its degree, as gravitational attraction, from precisely this mass . . ., then the circle is altogether undeniable: the presupposition of mass should equally be its consequence. (Kant als Naturforscher 85 [vol. I, 215]; my tr.)

In 1924 he thought the solution to the problem required nothing more than redescription:
[ADICKES 1924B] But one can also describe the circumstance differently, by beginning with the repulsive force and saying: the repulsive force that is present in a region of space determines through its degree the amount of attractive force that is possible in that region, and indeed in such a way that this amount always stands in inverse proportion to the repulsive force. Once again mass is directly dependent upon the degree of attractive force; mass and attractive force (which as one and the same [force], on the one hand helps to constitute matter, and on the other hand produces gravitational effects), are therefore proportional to each other. With this way of regarding and presenting [the issue] one can no longer speak of a circle. (Ibid.; my tr.)

Adickess 1924 formulation of Kants problem (ADICKES 1924A) captures the main point of his 1911 formulation (ADICKES 1911), according to which gravity cannot both be presupposed by a quantity of matter (as one of the two fundamental forces that constitute that quantity), and also depend on that quantity for determining its strength (in the Newtonian manner according to which gravitational force is directly proportional to mass). I shall argue that this problem is genuine, that it is not relieved by Adickess redescription (ADICKES 1924B), and that it is only one among a knot of closely related problems infecting Kants dynamic theory of matter.

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The first thing to notice about both of Adickess formulations of Kants problem (ADICKES 1911, ADICKES 1924A) is that they diverge from Kants statements in an important regard. Although Adickess 1911 formulation begins by mentioning volume and density, these terms are dropped by the end of his statement; ultimately nothing about density enters into either of his statements of the problem, even though Kant formulates his problem of circularity expressly in terms of density. Another shortcoming of Adickess 1911 formulation (ADICKES 1911) is that he does not consider the possibility that what might seem to be a circularity is in fact an interdependence. Indeed, this possibility is just what his 1924 solution (ADICKES 1924B) exploits. Most importantly, Adickess solution introduces, without explanation, a puzzle of its own, namely the claim that attraction (not density) is inversely proportional to repulsion. I shall argue that Adickess later solution fails. The reasons for this failure afford an improved formulation of Kants problem.138 In 1924 Adickes suggested that the problem is merely verbal, because one can specify the relation between the two fundamental forces and mass by beginning with the repulsive force. The strength of the repulsive force within any region of space determines inversely the strength of the attractive force possible within that same region. In this way, attractive force and mass are directly proportional, and there is no circularity, even though the attractive force has two roles, one as constituting the quantity of matter, the other as the source of gravitational attraction. However, this simple solution omits consideration of density, it departs from Kants account of attractive force in a significant regard, it inverts the relation between attraction and mass by making mass dependent upon attractive force (i.e., gravity), and it introduces a spurious problem about the quantity of matter. Kant insists that the attractive force is a constant in all materials. Adickes departs from this (in ADICKES 1924B); he must explain and justify his claim that the strength of the attractive force within a region of space could vary inversely with the strength of the repulsive force. Perhaps the net effect of these two forces would vary with differences in the repulsive force, but Kant cannot allow that the strength of the attractive force itself varies inversely with the strength of the repulsive force in any region of space. In effect, Adickess 1924 solution to the problem implicitly introduces, without explanation, a second kind of attractive force, which is what his 1911 solution did explicitly. Most importantly, Kant formulated his problem of circularity in terms of volume and density; he did not formulate it in terms of mass or the quantity of matter. Adickes substitutes these latter terms for the former. This introduces another problem of circularity, but it is merely a corollary to the problem Kant formulates. The passage Adickes cites concerning the quantity of matter is the following:
Therefore, the original attraction of matter would act in inverse proportion to the square of the distance at all distances and the original repulsion in inverse proportion to the cube of the infinitely small distances. By such an action and reaction of both fundamental forces, matter would be possible by a determinate degree of the filling of its space. (MAdN 4:521.47)

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Kant speaks in this passage of the determinate degree to which a matter fills its space, but he does not speak either of the quantity of matter or of mass. This is not accidental. Although it seems intuitively obvious that Kant ultimately would have to define (or at least explain) mass and the quantity of matter in terms of the intensity with which a matter fills space, he in fact does not make this connection in the MAdN. Kant does not define either the quantity of matter or mass within his chapter on Dynamics; he defines them only in the next chapter, Mechanics. In the second Explication of Mechanics he defines the quantity of matter in terms of the amount of the moveable in a determinate space, which constitutes mass, and in the first Proposition of Mechanics he insists that the quantity of matter can only be estimated by comparing the motions of different bodies.139 He contends that no matter would have moving mechanical forces if it did not have the original moving forces explicated in Dynamics,140 but he does not explicitly or directly relate either mass or quantity of matter to the intensity of the original forces of attraction and repulsion with which a matter fills its space. Adickess initial formulation (ADICKES 1911) thus inserts a conceptual, definatory relation into Kants account that Kant himself did not formulate.141 Moreover, in Dynamics Kant speaks quite generally of attractive force, but does not equate this force with gravity. Adickes insists on treating the attractive force involved in Kants circularity as a gravitational force. This is, I believe, correct, but it must be explained. While Kant himself equates attraction and gravity in his letter to Beck (PASSAGE II), his original formulation (PASSAGE I) does not do so. In his original formulation Kant does ascribe to attractive force the familiar inverse square rate of diminution. While this may suggest Newtonian gravitation, it is not decisive; like the illuminating power of light, other forces can have that same rate of diminution.142 However, Kant contends that there can be only two fundamental forces, one attractive and one repulsive.143 Consequently, he must identify gravitational attraction with his original attractive force. Indeed, Kant identifies the two of them already within his Dynamics.144 Kants problem of circularity arises strictly within Kants dynamic theory of matter, and does not involve the relation between his Dynamics and his Mechanics. In particular, Kants problem of circularity does not involve his concepts of the quantity of matter and of mass, which are treated only in Mechanics. By ignoring the terms in which Kant originally formulated his problem (volume and density), and by inserting terms foreign to Kants formulation (quantity of matter and mass), Adickes generated a different problem than what Kant himself formulates. While Kants view does face a problem like the one Adickes formulates, that is merely a corollary to the fundamental problem infecting Kants dynamic theory. Kants problem concerns the relations among the two fundamental forces, volume, and density. Kant holds that the volume of a basic matter is a function of the balance between its fundamental attractive and repulsive forces.145 (Notice that Kant speaks of the parts of a matter in the MAdN and in his notes on Becks letter.146 I speak of basic matters to avoid exacerbating the atomistic ten-

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dency of Kants view.) The only thing that can limit a fundamental force is an opposing fundamental force.147 The volume or the space a basic matter fills must be a sphere whose radius is determined by the distance from their center point at which the two fundamental forces balance each other. Now the attractive force is supposed to be constant in all materials, while the repulsive force is supposed to differ, and such differences are supposed to account for differences in density. This strategy cannot work. The balance between the two forces is struck at whatever point their respective strengths are equal (though opposed). One problem is that a different degree of repulsive force will change the spatial determination (the radius of a spherical surface) at which this balance occurs, but not the scaler intensities of the forces involved. Because the attractive force is constant, the repulsive force that balances it cannot change in scaler degree, however much it may change in intensity. Instead, the volume occupied by those balanced forces will vary inversely with the strength of the repulsive force. Kants theory of the volume and density of matter as a function of the balance of the two fundamental forces entails that basic matters with different degrees of repulsive force must differ in volume! They will thus also differ in density because a stronger repulsive force will balance the same degree of attractive force within a smaller volume, but the total (scaler) quantity of these forces must be the same in all basic matters. Thus basic matters must all fill their respective spaces to the same (scaler) degree of intensity. This is absolutely not the result Kant sought or claimed; he claimed to have a theory according to which the same sized basic matters could differ in density.148 Kants dynamic theory of matter thus leads quickly in the direction of either corpuscular atomism or physical monadology, both of which he sought to avoid.149 Notice, too, that Kant is quite right (in PASSAGE I) that the problem of density arises in connection with the question of how a determinate volume of matter is constituted by the opposition of the two basic powers of attraction and repulsion. Once Kants basic matters are found to fill different spherical volumes of space to the same degree, Kant will be forced to account for differences in density between the equal volumes of materials of different densities in terms of the different number of basic matters contained in each respective volume of material. In fact, in Mechanics Kant does define the quantity of material in terms of the amount of the moveable found in a specific space,150 but he does not seem to recognize that he must treat this amount in terms of a number of discrete spherical basic matters. Once Kant is forced to account for differences of density by recourse to different numbers of different sizes of basic matters, his theory generates the same license to speculate for which he so sharply criticized corpuscularism.151 Because matter is constituted by the balance of two opposed fundamental forces taken as radiating out from a common point, these basic matters must be spherical. Spheres do not conjoin into larger volumes without either large distortions or vacant interstices. On the latter option, Kants view would entail that denser materials have more inter-

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stices of smaller volume than do less dense materials of equal total volume. Interstices may not be explanatory on this account, but there they are, and they are just as vacant as the corpuscular interstices Kant sought to banish for not being objects of possible experience.152 On the former option, according to which originally spherical basic matters form larger solid materials through distortion of their spherical forms, speculation must abound about the processes through which or the functions according to which these distortions and combinations occur. For bridling speculation, Kants dynamic theory of matter looks little or no better than corpuscularism. I do not see any way for Kant to avoid the result that his basic matters are spheres which either form interstices when compounded into larger volumes of matter, or which must undergo radical changes of shape when compounded.153 Kant can only avoid the other result, that different materials with different densities will consist of different sizes of basic matters, by distinguishing two different kinds of attractive force, one that is responsible for the basic constitution of matter, and another that is responsible for gravitational attraction. Moreover, the attractive force responsible for the basic constitution of matter would have to vary directly with the absolute value of the repulsive force, and both would vary directly with density (for any given volume). Gravitational attraction would then have to be a second kind of basic power of attraction, one that depends directly upon density and volume. I shall argue shortly that admitting two fundamental kinds of attractive force is tantamount to admitting the untenability of Kants constructive metaphysical methods (VI). First we need to be quite clear about why Kant is forced to admit two different kinds of attractive powers. Clarifying this point requires answering the original question, What exactly was Kants problem with circularity? How does density figure into that problem? Notice that PASSAGE I speaks of the greatest difficulty, and formulates a circularity: attraction depends on density, which in turn depends on attraction. Kants reference to the greatest difficulty suggests that Kant is troubled by more than one problem. Consider again the elements in Kants first formulation. Kants theory of matter requires that the two basic forces differ in certain regards if they are to make matter possible. If they are not simply to neutralize one another altogether, they must act differently and, Kant thinks, they must diminish with distance at different rates.154 Kant claims that the power of attraction is a penetrating force, effected by all the parts of a material body and effective immediately (without contact) through all of space.155 He also ascribes to it a rate of decrease that is the inverse of the square of the distance it extends.156 He claims that the power of repulsion is a superficial force, effective only at the surface of contact between bodies, and effected by only those parts of the bodies that are in contact.157 He also ascribes to it an inverse cube rate of diminution.158 Hence the power of repulsion varies directly with volume.159 Kant says (in PASSAGE I) that his greatest difficulty lies in explaining how a specific volume of matter is possible on the basis of the balance between

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these two powers.160 This difficulty cannot lie in specifying the laws according to which these two powers function; those laws belong to mathematical physics, not to metaphysics.161 Kants problem must lie in his fundamental metaphysical concepts and constructions. Kants problematic is set, of course, by the Newtonian physical principles whose metaphysical basis he sought to provide. According to Newtonian principles, the power of attraction is proportional to mass, and within a given volume mass is proportional to density. Hence, within a specific volume, the power of attraction must be a function of density. This is contrary to Kants official view, according to which density is supposed to be a function of the balance of the two fundamental powers.162 It may seem that Kants problem rests on a simple oversight. On the general principles of Kants dynamic theory of matter, density should be a function of the degree to which a given region of space is filled by mutually counterbalancing attractive and repulsive forces. In this way, density should be directly proportional to the combined absolute value of the intensities of these two forces. One historical point needs to be set aside in order to appreciate the metaphysical difficulty facing Kants dynamic theory. The definition and symbolism for absolute value (the value of a magnitude irrespective of its sign) had not been developed in Kants day.163 However, introducing the concept of absolute value wont solve Kants problem at this point; on the contrary, introducing this concept helps to show clearly the nature of the metaphysical problem Kant faces. On Kants theory, density should indeed be directly proportional to the combined absolute value of the intensities of the two fundamental forces that counterbalance each other in any basic matter. However, to preserve the Newtonian principle that gravitational attraction is proportional to mass, Kant must distinguish between gravitational attraction and the original power of attraction that, on his theory, combines with the original repulsive power to determine the basic quantity of matter. It is important here to distinguish which quantities are proportional to which others, and which are functions of which others, since proportions are symmetrical (strictly, they are convertible) relations, while functions are asymmetrical (non-convertible) dependencies. On Kants view, density and volume are functions of the original repulsive and attractive forces. However, gravitational attraction cannot be identified with the original attractive force that helps constitute any quantity of matter. This is because, to retain the Newtonian equation, gravitational attraction is a function of density and volume, while density and volume are functions of the absolute values of both of the original attractive force and the repulsive force. Therefore, gravitational attraction cannot be identified with the original attractive force that constitutes any quantity of matter. This is because the original attractive force is only one of the two forces of which gravitational attraction is a function. Consequently, gravity is not an original force of matter; it is a derivitive force, deriving from and dependent on the two supposed fundamental forces of original attraction and original repulsion. The problem with this result for Kant is that

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Kant sought to improve on Newtons official agnosticism about whether gravity is essential to matter. Kant thought he could show that Newtonian principles required ascribing gravity directly and essentially to matter, and in the MAdN Kant tried to show this.164 However, his proof requires that gravity is the one and only fundamental (or original) attractive force essential to matter. The problem of circularity in his anlysis of density shows that he cannot maintain this identity. Consequently, Kants argument in Dynamics fails of one of its main aims. This largely confirms, thought also modifies, Adickess original 1911 conclusion that Kant can only avoid the problem of circularity by distinguishing two kinds of fundamental attractive force. (I disagree with Adickes, for the reason just given, that gravity can still be counted as a fundamental force.) However, this reconfirmation relies solely on the concepts at issue within Kants Dynamics; it does not require the spurious appeal to Kants definitions of mass and of the quantity of matter that is central to Adickess formulations. Density is central to Kants problem because Kant sought to explain how equal volumes of different basic matters could differ in density. As shown above, he can only do this by rejecting his view in the MAdN that the basic power of attraction is the same in all materials. Thus is it understandable that Kant should focus on density in his note and in his letter to Beck (PASSAGES I and II), and not on mass (as Adickes does in his formulations). However, Kants problem with density directly raises the problem of circularity, since solving the problem of density requires admitting that the original power of attraction differs in different materials just as does the power of repulsion. Once this is admitted, it is virtually impossible not to recognize that gravitational attraction is a function of both of these powers. Hence the problem of density broaches the problem of circularity, which requires distinguishing two different kinds of attractive power, and demoting gravity to a derivitive power. Recognizing these points requires rejecting the theory of matter propounded in the MAdN, and along with it the metaphysical method undergirding that theory (see VI). A closely related implication is worth noting here. Within Kants theory of matter in the MAdN, the basic constitutive power of repulsion is a superficial force, and it is exactly counter-balanced by the power of attraction at the spherical limit of the volume of any basic matter. The power of repulsion is effective only in contact, and its effectiveness is neutralized outside the spherical limit of the basic matter. Consequently, Kant must introduce yet another attractive force to account for the cohesion of pieces of matter that comprise a plurality of basic material parts.165 Hence Kants remarks about the importance especially given his overall theory of matter of the questions of cohesion and rigidity.166 The failure of Kants theory of matter in the MAdN to account for density is a very serious set-back for his dynamism. Kant recognized that a major support of corpuscularism lay in its apparently simple account of density. According to corpuscularism, all material bodies consist of microscopic material corpuscles,

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which are absolutely dense and rigid, interspersed with varying proportions of vacant interstices.167 Kant recognized that to undermine corpuscularism it sufficed to provide a theory of matter that could account for density without appealing to hypothetical vacant interstices. He claimed that his dynamic theory of matter did just that, and that his theory provided a better basis for physical research.168 Unfortunately, as Kant came to see in 1792, in PASSAGES I and II, the dynamic theory of the MAdN cannot account for density at all. Kants dynamic theory can only account for density by admitting that there are two distinct powers of attraction, and that gravity is a derivitive, not a fundamental, power. As Adickes showed, Kant explicitly distinguished two kinds of attractive power in 177577 (about 10 years before the MAdN), in Reflexion 44 of the Reflexionen zur Physik und Chemie, where he distinguishes between basic constitutive power of attraction, which he ascribes to the aether, and gravitational attraction.169 Kant mentions the aether only occasionally in the MAdN, and it plays no constitutive role in his published theory of matter. This is no accident. For reasons I examine below (VI), Kants constructive metaphysical method cannot admit more than two fundamental forces, one attractive and one repulsive. However, admitting two kinds of attractive power and demoting gravity to a derivitive status doesnt solve the other problem I have stressed, namely that Kants dynamically characterized points generate material spheres which cannot compound without either interstices or severe and speculatively unlimited distortion. Whatever may have been Kants influence on the development of field theory, Kants dynamic conception is not a field concept, since it is based on individual points in space. Kant must rely on points in space if he is to retain any hope of basing his dynamics in his transcendental epistemology. The connecting link between them is the empirical concept of matter as the movable in space, which Kant treats as a point ultimately imbued with dynamic powers.170 To sever that connection would require replacing the MAdN with an entirely different link between the general metaphysics of the first Critique and empirical physics. However, Kant must give up his reliance on points in space imbued with causal powers if he is to maintain his view that matter is essentially continuous rather than discrete.171 Ultimately Kant was forced by these problems to forge an entirely different link between transcendental philosophy and physical science. To show why, I now turn to the systematic ramifications of Kants problems with the MAdN. VI. THE SYSTEMATIC RAMIFICATIONS OF KANTS PROBLEMS WITH THE MAD N. Each of the two problems with Kants Dynamics, his fallacious introduction of forces and the circularity in his definition of the quantity of matter, reflect adversely on Kants metaphysical method in the MAdN. Their combined effect is to show that Kants metaphysical method is untenable. Though his analysis of pure kinematics in Phoronomy remains intact, at the very least he

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needs an entirely new link between it and dynamic forces, and a new way of basing a theory of matter on those forces. Lets see why. The fact that Kant must distinguish gravity from his basic attractive force, and the serious prospect that he must posit yet another attractive power to account for cohesion, reflects adversely on Kants constructive metaphysical method. For all of his qualifications on the metaphysical constructability of the concept of matter, and on his own constructions of it, Kant claimed it sufficed for his purposes to present the filling of space as a dynamic property of matter.172 Kants presentation, his metaphysical construction, brings the categories to bear on the forms of intuition, in connection with the elementary empirical concept of matter as the movable in space. (See III above.) Kant contends that these constructive grounds suffice to demonstrate that only two basic moving forces of matter are possible. This conclusion, Kant argues, follows from the fact that matter can be treated as a moving point, and that two points can only move in two directions with regard to one another; they can either approach or recede from one another. Each kind of basic motion is accounted for by each kind of basic force, attraction and repulsion. Consequently, Kant infers, only these two fundamental forces are conceivable.173 Once Kant is forced to acknowledge that gravity is distinct from his basic attractive force, because gravity is a function of that basic force plus the basic repulsive force, it is evident that Kants quasigeometrical reasons for maintaining that there can be only two fundamental forces are specious. This is because his basic argument for there being only two basic kinds of force turns on the two possible alterations of spatial relation between two basic matters; they can either approach or recede from one another. Each basic force is supposed to account for one of these basic relative motions. However, the power of attraction between bodies, even if those bodies are Kants basic matters, is gravity, yet gravity must ultimately be distinct from the (alleged) basic power of attraction said to be constitutive of the very possibility of matter. Resolving the circularity in Kants analysis of density thus severs the relation between his argument to show that there can be only two fundamental forces constitutive of matter and his arguments to show that those fundamental forces are basic forces of attraction and repulsion. VII. A FURTHER CIRCULARITY IN KANTS ARGUMENT.

My first main objection to Kants dynamic analysis of matter (IV) is this: The invalidity of Kants proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics, that matter fills space by virtue of its moving force of repulsion, shows that considerations of Phoronomy, of pure motions, do not suffice to justify ascribing forces to motions; certainly not within the constraints of Kants a priori metaphysical constructions. This point can be reinforced by noticing a further circularity in Kants argument. Kants explication of matter in the third chapter, Mechanics, that matter is the movable in so far as it possesses moving force,174 presupposes his

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explication in Dynamics, that matter fills space by virtue of its moving force.175 However, examining his justification for the Mechanical explication of matter shows that he implicitly appealed to Mechanical considerations in his proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics! Kant states that, in contrast to the Mechanical explication, the mere Dynamic concept of matter could regard matter as being at rest.176 Kant insists that nothing movable would have moving force if it were not effective in the space it occupies in virtue of an inherent force, whether repulsive or attractive, through which alone it can convey motion to other movable things.177 Kant claims that repulsion is an original moving force by which a matter imparts (erteilen) motion, while the force of a moving matter enables it to communicate (mitteilen) motion.178 The problem with this way of distinguishing between the dynamic properties of stationary matter and the mechanical properties of matter in motion is that, according to Kants own phoronomic doctrine, what is at rest and what moves is merely a function of ones frame of reference.179 Kants proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics may have treated one body as being at rest, but it treated another matter as being in motion, impacting on the matter at rest and then rebounding from it.180 As Kants Remark on the Mechanical explication of matter shows, neither matter would impart motion to the other if they did not both possess an original repulsive or attractive force.181 Only Kants analysis of forces of moving matters in Mechanics could justify his use and interpretation of the second matter (the one that moves) in his proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics. If Kant can distinguish between Dynamics and Mechanics by specifying which matters are at rest and which are in motion, then he cannot appeal to the effect of, or the effects on, a matter in motion impacting on and rebounding from a matter at rest in his proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics. If he relinquishes the distinction between Dynamics and Mechanics based on matters being at rest or being in motion, then he has no independent Dynamic principles to which to appeal in Mechanical explication of matter. In either case, Kants constructive metaphysical method fails to demonstrate, by considerations of motion by constructing the minimal empirical concept of matter as the movable in space in accordance with the Categories, forms of intuition, and Principles of the first Critique that matter fills space by virtue of original moving forces. VIII. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS.

Kant admitted that, on the basis of his constructive metaphysical methods, he could only suggest possible lines for constructing such important characteristics of matter as density, cohesion, rigidity, or friction.182 The two problems of circularity show that Kants metaphysical methods in the MAdN do not even suffice to establish the basic terms of Kants dynamic theory of matter, the two powers of attraction and repulsion. An analysis of density is essential to Kants purposes of opposing corpuscularism, but his analysis of density shows that gravity cannot be identified with the fundamental constitutive force of

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attraction. Bringing the categories to bear on the forms of intuition and the minimum empirical concept of matter as the movable in space in the way Kant proposes is not sufficient for defining the dynamic possibility of matter. Apart from Kants architectonic views of the relation between the first Critique, the MAdN, and empirical physics he hoped to defend, and of the a priori structure of a rational science in general, this metaphysical approach does not appear to be necessary either. Kants metaphysical method in the MAdN affords no insight into the inner possibility of things,183 and because its arguments are supposed to be cumulative, the failure of his proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics entails that the MAdN provides no a priori justification of the kind Kant envisaged of any principles of mechanics, pace Kants hope and aim.184 IX. RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS WITH THE MAD N.

Two main implications for Kants project in the MAdN are evident. First, the failure of Kants arguments for introducing forces into his analysis entails that only the first chapter, Phoronomy, escapes unscathed. This is not insignificant, for his analysis of spatial regions and motions there show how to replace Newtons absolute space with a constructive procedure for defining frames of reference.185 Second, Kants effort to imitate the mathematical method, so far as possible, with his constructive metaphysical method must be rejected. Constructive analysis of bodies in motion cannot justify the introduction of basic forces that constitute the possibility of matter, and (because of the cumulative structure of Kants analysis) they cannot justify principles of mechanics. Forces must be taken as basic. These problems are a deep blow to the Critical philosophy, for (as Tuschling has emphasized) Kant claimed that the first Critique was essential for the systematic grounding of natural science.186 Now Kants constructive metaphysical method, explicating the minimal empirical concept of matter as the movable in space in accordance with the four moments of the Table of Categories and the two forms of intuition, is just what one should expect in an effort to apply the first Critique to natural science while maintaining a philosophical claim to a priori analysis. The failure of this constructive method would require serious re-consideration of the relevance of transcendental idealism to natural science, and might well require revising transcendental idealism itself. Thus it is no surprise that Kant only made one crucial step after several years of reflection. Presumably Kant saw the critical review of the MAdN in 1787. We know he discovered the circularity in his definition of the quantity of matter around January 1792. Not until the third quarter of 1798 did Kant take the decisive step that resolves both the question-begging proof of the first Proposition of Dynamics and the circularity in his definition of the quantity of matter. Kant finally recognized that dynamical principles and the concepts of force they employ simply cannot be constructed.187 Concomitant with this, Kant recognizes that the MAdN only amounted only to Phoronomy.188 Kant now

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demotes mathematics from a model to be imitated in metaphysics to a mere auxiliary aid.189 This demotion, and its concomitant rejection of the metaphysical method of the MAdN, now opens up a gap in Kants critical philosophy; Kant must find an entirely new way to relate the system of categories of the first Critique to physics. To fill this gap is the main (though reivsed) aim of Kants Transition project, especially the version set out in the nearly complete manuscript known as bergang 114.190 Frster points out that Kant recognized that he must addresss a further problem. As noted above, in the MAdN Kant regarded cohesion as a secondary concern. However, he realized in the late 1780's or early 1790's that cohesion is necessary for the existence of bodies, certainly for the existence of the macro-scale bodies studied by physical mechanics. Because the MAdN provided no account of cohesion, it provided only an analysis of matter in general, and not the doctrine of body it had claimed and intended. Hence Kant needed to develop a more thorough analysis of matter in order to provide a metaphysical foundation for physics.191 As Tuschling has shown, there is no place for Kants proposed Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics within the framework of the classical Critical corpus of the three Critiques plus the Prolegomena and MAdN.192 Hence the very fact that Kant contemplates a Transition at all indicates that he thinks something is seriously wrong with the Critical Philosophy. Three basic problems confronting transcendental idealism that stem from the problems with the MAdN discussed above may be briefly indicated. First, recall Tuschlings point that the MAdN formed a test case for applying the systematic organizing principles of the first Critique to natural science. Second, Eckart Frster and Karen Gloy have pointed out that the Schematism of the first Critique only considers time, but omits space. The MAdN, in effect, complete the schematism by bringing the categories to bear on outer intuitions.193 Finally, I have argued elsewhere that the principle Kant actually needs in the Analogies of Experience is not the general causal principle that every event has a cause, but the specifically metaphysical principle that every physical event has an external cause.194 Kant only formulates this distinction, and he only defends this specific metaphysical principle, in the MAdN. The utter failure of the MAdN to justify forces, and the consequent reduction of the MAdN to Phoronomy, entails that Kants Critical system has no adequate justification of any of these three crucial doctrines. This marks a very serious shortcoming of Kants transcendental idealism. Thus it is not surprising that idealism and Kants arguments for it (primarily in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the first Antinomy) play an ever diminishing role in the opus postumum. Kants shift toward realism is further supported by the point emphasized by Buchdahl and Philip Kitcher, that the tenable portions of Kants views on the systematic principles of science are quite independent of his idealism.195 Kant came to see that the mathematical expression of forces presupposes those forces as fundamental, because those forces are necessary for the means

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of measurement through which alone their mathematical relations can be determined. Quantities of force and matter can only be determined by measurement. Yet the very existence and functioning of instruments of measure, such as balance scales, presuppose dynamic forces, such as cohesion, in order that those instruments (and their parts) have a form and function at all.196 Forces are basic. This leads Kant to develop a transcendental argument for realism-for the reality of forces and their fields. The existence of a continuous dynamic field of physical forces is conditionally necessary for the possibility of self-conscious experience, but its reality is no longer merely empirical reality. This is Kants new transcendental dynamics.197 Its implications for the analysis of ourselves as knowing subjects stem from thinking through the implications of Kants basis for regarding moving force as the fundamental property of matter. His reason for this is that only by its moving force can matter affect our sensory organs.198 If this is so, then our sensory organs must themselves be (at least in part) material causes. Eckart Frster has shown that along with Kants transcendental dynamics comes (ca. August 1799April 1800) a new doctrine of self-positing, according to which we can only identify perceptible objects in space if we first identify ourselves as physiological beings who are centers of active force. We perceive ourselves and objects through our dynamic interaction.199 These are very surprising, and surprisingly naturalistic, doctrines, especially for those accustomed only to the classical Criticism of the three Critiques. It is not my aim to explore them further here.200 My only aim has been to show that these quite surprising doctrines are legitimate responses to genuine problems infecting the Critical epistemology. Michael Friedman has recently criticized Tuschlings and Frsters analyses. I close my defense of their interpretation of Kants late work with a brief reply to Friedmans objections. X. CRITIQUE OF FRIEDMAN . Friedman aims to understand Kants claim, in both the first Critique and in the Prolegomena, that the understanding prescribes laws to nature.201 To do so he interprets the Transcendental Analytic of Kants first Critique in terms of MAdN, and the MAdN in terms of Newtonian science. According to Friedman, the three laws of motion defended in Kants third chapter, Mechanics, realize the principles of the three Analogies of Experience by specifying their application to the empirical concept of matter as the movable in space, thereby schematizing them sufficiently to apply to objects of experience.202 Kants MAdN replaces Newtons postulates of absolute space and time with a procedure, adapted from Newtons Principia Book III, for constructing frames of reference from regions of space and motions of bodies within them.203 Within Kants procedure, the law of gravity has a mixed status because it is derived from a priori laws of the understanding (specifically the principles of the Analogies) and of sensibility (Euclidean geometry) together with the empirical data of experience (Tycho and Kepler).204 The immediacy and universality of

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gravitational attraction are not merely empirical properties of matter known inductively; they are necessary presuppositions for determining the true motions of material bodies, and hence are conditions for the possibility of objective experience of them.205 Friedmans reconstruction cannot represent Kants position or argument. First, even if the MAdN serves as a schematism of the Categories with respect to outer intuition, Kants Analogies of Experience cannot be so closely tied to or dependent upon Newtonian physics as Friedman repeatedly insists. The principles of the Analogies are jointly necessary to identify co-existing objects, objects that move, and objects that undergo non-spatial changes of state;206 indeed, they are necessary to determine even the apparent time series in our sensory apprehension.207 Consequently, applying these principles is necessary in order first to identify planets and their apparent motions, or even our instruments and records of astronomical observation. These principles are necessary for collecting Tychos data and for formulating Keplers laws, on the basis of which alone Newton was able to develop his gravitational theory. The laws of motion may be necessary for distinguishing true from apparent motions, but they are not and cannot be required for applying the principles of the Analogies in order to make self-conscious experience of objects possible.208 One must be very careful interpreting Kants use of the term experience; sometimes it concerns self-conscious experience of spatio-temporal objects, sometimes it concerns a systematically organized whole of empirical knowledge. The former sense is prominent in the Analogies of Experience; only the latter can be at issue in the final chapter of the MAdN, Phenomenology. Friedman conflates them.209 Second, Friedmans interpretation of the MAdN ignores Kants metaphysical method. The only empirical element in the MAdN is supposed to be the empirical concept of matter as the moveable in space;210 Kants further specification of this concept is to be entirely a priori.211 Friedmans version of Kants reconstruction of Newton has Kant appealing to Tychos data about planetary orbits, and mounting an a posteriori boot-strap argument (in Glymours sense) for the immediacy and universality of gravitational attraction, which Friedman calls a transcendental argument.212 If Kant made such an argument in the MAdN, he was not entitled to it, and he would be guilty of inverting the very priority of metaphysics over physics whose legitimacy and fruitfulness he sought to establish. My charge may seem incredible; its validity can bee seen by noting Friedmans shifting treatment of this issue. In his first briefest sketch of the relation between Kants philosophy of science and Newtons physics, Friedman noted that Kants three Laws of Mechanics are supposed to follow from the Principles of the Analogies of the first Critique together with the metaphysical explication of the empirical concept of matter developed in MAdN.213 He also contends that the laws of fundamental forces, and in particular, the law of universal gravitation, is supposed to follow from the analyses of the first

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Critique and the MAdN, in conjunction with the empirical regularities formulated in Galileos and Keplers laws.214 This much, I believe, is correct. The problem is that even in this preliminary essay, in which he recognizes the Kants methodological restriction of the scope of his metaphysical foundations of natural science to the explication of the empirical concept of matter, Friedman says:
Now, if I am not mistaken, it is just this Newtonian procedure for constructing the center of mass frame of the solar system that Kant has in mind in the final chapter (Phenomenology) of [the MAdN], a chapter whose subject is the transformation of appearances [Erscheinungen] into experience [Erfahrung]. Kant begins with the purely relative motions which, as such, are so far merely appearances . . .215

Friedman mistakes the subject of Kants chapter on Phenomenology. To be sure, Kant does have Newtons procedure in mind, but Kants chapter treats the metaphysical foundations of phenomenology, as is stated in the full title to the chapter. This is to say, Kant purports to treat the metaphysical principles required for transforming appearances into experience, or for distinguishing true from apparent motions, but he does not undertake that transformation itself, because he cannot, given his restriction of the MAdN to the metaphysical analysis of the empirical concept of matter. Friedmans effort to insert that transformation into Kants chapter on Phenomenology is a forced fit. Thus it is little surprise to find his effort to do so in this first briefest sketch superceded by an extended (and very interesting) analysis of Prolegomena 38, which was then incorporated into his book.216 One important thing to note, however, is that the Prolegomena was published in 1783, three years before the MAdN. Only in the MAdN does Kant propound his Critical metaphysical method; in Prolegomena 38 Kant need not restrict himself to explicating metaphysically the mere empirical concept of matter. In Kant and the Exact Sciences Friedman admits the following:
There is a serious problem facing [my] reconstruction of Kants procedure [in the MAdN], however. For the most interesting and important step in this reconstruction the step that proceeds from the observable (Keplerian) relative motions in the solar system to the law of universal gravitation and the center of mass frame of the solar system, as in [Newtons] Principia, Book III does not explicitly occur in Kants text. In fact, although Kant refers to Newtons Scholium to the Definitions, he does not explicitly refer to Book III at all in the [fourth chapter,] Phenomenology. (149)

Given Kants methodological restriction in the MAdN to the a priori analysis of the empirical concept of matter, one should expect that Kant does not take the step Friedman thinks is missing from Kants chapter on Phenomenology.

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Because that step requires appeal to empirical data, that step has no place in the MAdN. Perhaps that step can be admitted in Prolegomena 38, and it is no surprise that Friedman turned his attention there. What is surprising, is that nowhere in Kant and the Exact Sciences does Friedman mention or refer to the methodological restriction of the MAdN to which he himself referred in his first briefest sketch, namely, that the MAdN can only explicate a priori the empirical concept of matter; no empirical data are thus admissible. Because he ignores this restriction, Friedmans reconstruction of Kants procedure in the MAdN is fundamentally flawed. Friedman ignores Kants strenuous warning in the Preface to the MAdN not to mix the boundaries of distinct sciences.217 Of course Kant has Newtons derivations and their problems in mind and much of what Friedman says about the particulars of Kants concerns is of great interest but Kant does not provide a metaphysical alternative to Newtons derivations within the MAdN; he simply analyzes the metaphysical principles he thinks are provided by the Critical philosophy and are required by some such derivation, the likes of which he may have sketched in Prolegomena 38. But if he did sketch such derivation in the Prolegomena, then he overstepped the bounds of the Critical philosophy in order to illustrate the application of his Critical principles (which were not fully developed then, prior to the publication of the MAdN) to empirical physics proper. Against Tuschling and Frster, Friedman charges that Kants supposed problem with the circularity in his definition of the quantity and density of matter cannot be of great importance to Kants Transition project because the circularity is not mentioned in the opus postumum.218 Friedman claims that Kants distinction between mathematical and dynamical moving forces is instead to be understood in the context of the debate between the corpuscular or mechanical natural philosophy and the Newtonian natural philosophy.219 According to corpuscular theory, forces are only the effect of motion imparted from without; on Newtonian theory, forces internal to bodies are the cause of their relative motions.220 Friedman is surely right that this historical context is important to understanding Kants coming to distinguish mathematical from dynamical moving forces. However, Kant indicates that this is the context of his view of the relation between mathematics and metaphysics in the General Remark to Dynamics, in which he compares and contrasts the corpuscular and dynamic hypotheses. Merely citing this general scientific context does not explain why Kant modeled metaphysics on mathematics in the MAdN (1786), and why in 1798 he rejected the mathematical model; Friedman provides no reasons against Tuschlings and Frsters original contention that making this distinction is necessary to solve a crippling circularity infecting Kants theory of matter in the MAdN. He also provides no reasons against Tuschlings and Frsters original contention that this distinction enables Kant to formulate the problem facing his fallacious argument for the first Proposition of Dynamics, that is, his problem with introducing forces on the basis of motions. The bootstrap argument Friedman attributes to Kant to show that gravity is an essential

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property of matter would, of course, by-pass these problems, and this seems to be what Friedman has done. However, for the reasons given above, Kant cannot propound such an argument within the methodological constraints of the MAdN. Friedman doesnt come to grips with those problems because he disregards Kants metaphysical method in the MAdN.221 Apart from Kants general aim to show that gravity is an essential property of matter, Friedman disregards Kants theory of matter in the MAdN, too.222 Consequently, Friedman is in no position to justify his (mistaken) claim that the opus postumum merely extends Kants theory of matter by addressing points left open in the MAdN concerning cohesion, solidification, chemical forces, magnetism, etc.223 Kant must reconsider at least the problem of density, once he saw that his theory of matter in the MAdN could not account for density at all. Friedman treats Kants proposed Transition project instead in view of two main problems: How can the experimental sciences of chemistry or heat be systematic and be integrated with mathematical physics?224 and, How can the top down constitutive procedures of the Transcendental Analytic and MAdN be cordinated with the bottom up reflective procedures of scientific investigation analyzed in the Transcendental Dialectic and Third Critique? Without a guarantee that these two approaches converge, there is a serious gap in Kants Critical philosophy.225 These are genuine issues, to be sure, but Friedman gives inadequate evidence that these are the issues driving Kants explorations in the opus postumum, and in particular in bergang 114. First, his sole evidence that Kant is concerned about cordinating regulative with constitutive procedures is Kants mention of principles that are both regulative and constitutive.226 Yet Friedman doesnt consider the fact that in the Critique of Pure Reason the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles is already problematic, for Kant ascribes a regulative role to the supposedly constitutive principles of the understanding that are defended in the Analogies.227 Second, Friedman does not address the point highlighted by Frster, that Kant first speaks of the purported gap in the Critical system in direct connection with divorcing metaphysics from mathematics.228 Third, Friedmans stress on these principles that are both regulative and constitutive is at odds with the top down constitutive procedure Kant repeatedly ascribes to his proposed bergang.229 Friedmans interpretation makes it puzzling why Kant focuses on physics and repeatedly formulates his project in terms of a transition to physics, and that he keeps stressing the tendency of the MAdN towards physics, and that he extensively discusses this tendency and transition to physics without mentioning chemistry or biology. Physics should not be stressed so often or so centrally if the MAdN was tenable and if Kants problem was only to relate physics with the other new physical sciences.230 Finally, because he pays so little attention to Kants metaphysical method and theory of matter in the MAdN, and because he is cavalier about Kants doctrines in the first Critique, it is virtually assured that Friedman is in no position to grasp the

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real problems guiding Kants thought in bergang 114, problems to which Tuschling and Frster have drawn attention, the problems which I hope to have made sufficiently clear in previous sections of this essay. XI. CONCLUSION .

Tuschlings and Frsters analyses of Kants problems and strategies for solving them are basically sound, though I have tried to provide some needed refinement. Friedmans objections to their analyses are unsound. Kant came to recognize that his Critical epistemology faced some very serious problems. In particular, the dramatic turn he takes in 1798 stems directly from problems he first saw in 1787 and 1792. Kant did not forget what he has previously written and argued. On the contrary, Kant understood the problems facing his Critical epistemology better than most of his expositors and would-be defenders. Though incomplete, his efforts to confront and resolve those problems in the opus postumum deserve far more, and more careful, attention than they have so far received.231 NOTES
1. Metaphysische Anfangsgrnde der Naturwissenschaft (MAdN) 4:470.1315. Translated by James Ellington in: Immanuel Kant, Philosophy of Material Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). I cite Kants works by volume, page, and line numbers (e.g., 4:321.812) of the second edition of the Akademie Ausgabe of Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1922f.). On occasion, to avoid ambiguity, I indicate the Akademie Ausgabe as Ak. I give the usual A/B designations of the first and second editions of the first Critique. Quotations from Kants first Critique (abbreviated KdrV) are from Kemp Smiths translation (New York: St. Martins, 1929). 2. MAdN 4:472.14. 3. MAdN 4:472.47. 4. MAdN 4:473.510. 5. In what follows I will not be concerned much with the official links between Kants doctrines in the MAdN and the first Critique. For discussion of those links, see Lothar Schfer, Kants Metaphysik der Natur (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966), chs. 14 and Daniel Dahlstrom, Kants Metaphysics of Nature (in: D. Dahlstrom, ed., Nature and Scientific Method [Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1991], 271290). 6. MAdN 4:473.1522, 473.35476.4. 7. MAdN 4:473.3134. 8. MAdN 4:525.712. 9. MAdN 4:525.2024. 10. I adopt the phrase post-critical from Eckart Frster, Kants Notion of Philosophy (The Monist 72 No. 2 [1989], 285304), 285.

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11. Gerd Buchdahl, Zum Verhltnis von allgemeiner Metaphysik der Natur und besonderer metaphysischer Naturwissenschaft bei Kant (in: B. Tuschling, ed., Problem der Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984], 97174), 135. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Buchdahl are to this article. 12. MAdN 4:524.2829; quoted by Buchdahl, op. cit., 136. On the previous page he quotes a similar remark from the first Critique: knowledge of actual forces, . . . can only be given empirically, as, for instance, of the moving forces, or what amounts to the same thing, of certain successive appearances, as motions, which indicate [the presence of] such forces (A207/B252, 3:178.69). 13. MAdN 4:534.18; Buchdahl, 137. 14. A167/B209, 3:153.4; Buchdahl, 134. 15. Buchdahl, 137, with reference to the negative procedure Kant mentions at MAdN 4:524.20. 16. Buchdahl, 137, 138; cf. 101. 17. This is to say, Buchdahl takes refuge in good hermeneutic principles according to which one can best understand an author in terms of later developments (Kants Special Metaphysics and The Metaphysical Foundations of Science [in: R. E. Butts, ed., Kants Philosophy of Physical Science {Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986; hereafter cited as Butts, ed.}, 127161], 146) to disown Kants transcendental idealism and yet to attribute his stripped down tripartite schema to Kant as Kants view. (In this regard, Buchdahl is only more explicit than many of the other commentators, who offer reconstructions as if they were strict interpretations, and who often disown Kants idealism.) After all, one of those later developments is the recognition of the untenability of transcendental idealism! While Buchdahl is right that Kant means to appeal to linguistic usage (e.g., op. cit., 120, 135), he ignores the fact that Kant thinks that linguistic usage ultimately reflects the a priori categorical structure of thought by which we constitute the objects of our experience, in the idealist terms of which alone Kant thought he could explain the necessity of causal principles in application to substances. In effect, Buchdahl ascribes to Kant the very view of the dependence of our conceptual categories on language that Hamann developed to oppose Kants transcendental idealist critique of pure reason! (For a brief discussion of Hamanns meta-critique, see F. C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason [Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1987], 3743; for more details see Robert E. Butts, The Grammar of Reason: Hamanns Challenge to Kant [Synthese 75 {1988}, 25183].) I have criticized Buchdahls broader efforts to reconstruct Kants transcendental idealism in Noumenal Causality Reconsidered (forthcoming). Proper hermeneutic principles require calling a reconstruction a reconstruction, especially when it is so selective. Compare our treatments of Kants proof of the law of inertia; Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 67478, Kant and the Dynamics of Reason (London: Blackwell, 1992), 3234, 36, 8990, 28283, 301; K. R. Westphal, Kants Proof of the Law of Inertia (in: H. Robinson, ed., Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress, 1995). 18. Gordon Brittan, Jr., Kants Two Grand Hypotheses (in: Butts, ed., 6194), 89. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Brittan are to this article.

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19. Ibid., 8990. 20. Ibid., 9091. 21. Ibid., 72. 22. MAdN 4:517.1835. 23. Robert E. Butts, The Methodological Structure of Kants Metaphysics of Science (in: Butts, ed., 163199), 188. All further references to Butts are to this article. 24. Ibid., 188, 194195. 25. MAdN 4:534.2026. 26. Howard Duncan, Kants Methodology: Progress Beyond Newton? (in: Butts, ed., 273306; cited hereafter as Methodology), 287. 27. Kant on Realism and Methodology (in: Butts, ed., 305329), passim. 28. Ibid.. She follows Brittan (Kants Theory of Science [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978], 122) regarding Kants aim to provide a realist interpretation of Newton (op. cit., 315). 29. Methodology, 288. 30. Ibid., 288f., and Constructions and their Discovery (in: G. Funke & Th. Seebohm, eds., Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress [Lanham, MA: University Press of America, 1989], 8395), esp. 92. 31. Methodology, 299; citing KdrV A727/B755f.. 32. Methodology, 298. 33. See Methodology, 285; cf. Brittans criticisms of Duncan in Kants Two Grand Hypotheses (op. cit.), 8586. 34. MAdN 4:525.712. 35. MAdN 4:524.40525.7. 36. MAdN 4:525.2021. 37. MAdN 4:518.2531, 522.39523.4, 525.26ff. 38. These points about Kants qualifications of his admission that he cannot fully construct the dynamic concept of matter, and his insistence that it suffices to construct the two basic forces of his dynamic theory, bear in a particular way on Duncans interpretation. Duncan takes Kants admission to be unrestricted, and he contends that Kant can defer constructions until whenever someone more adept might devise them. This cannot be right, for Kant vigorously sought to establish the basic terms of his dynamic theory in order to opposed corpuscular atomism. If he cannot construct even the two basic forces of his dynamic theory, then he simply has no alternative theory to offer in opposition to corpuscularism. In a very interesting treatment of the relation between Kants chapters

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on Dynamics and Mechanics, Duncan contends that Kant ultimately treats the laws of mechanics in purely kinematic terms because, on the one hand, he cannot construct his dynamic concept of matter, and on the other hand, his main aim was to justify mathematicized physics (Inertia, The Communication of Motion, and Kants Third Law of Mechanics [Philosophy of Science 51 {1984}, 93119). Duncan fails to note the bitter irony this position would involve for Kant. If he were forced to treat mechanical laws in purely kinematic terms because he couldnt construct his dynamic concept of matter, then he would not only have abandoned his dynamism, but would have adopted the main tenets of his opponents, the mathematical students of nature. 39. MAdN 4:467.216. 40. MAdN 4:471.1132, 542.12543.14; cf. A381, 4:238.35239.13; B29193, 3:200.6201.15; B29394, 3:201.3035. These latter passages should be considered in connection with the first Paralogism in each edition. I discuss this in Kants Critique of Determinism in Empirical Psychology (forthcoming). 41. MAdN 4:471.3237. 42. MAdN 4:476.912. 43. MAdN 4:476.12477.2. 44. MAdN 4:473.68. 45. MAdN 4:472.2732. 46. MAdN 4:472.3235. 47. MAdN 4:472.36473.5. 48. MAdN 4:470.1315. 49. MAdN 4:472.14. 50. MAdN 4:472.47. 51. MAdN 4:473.510. 52. MAdN 4:467.1819. 53. MAdN 4:468.1317, 469.1214. 54. MAdN 4:468.1923. 55. MAdN 4:468.2329. 56. MAdN 4:469.2633, 475.3132. 57. MAdN 4:477.1417. 58. MAdN 4:470.1819. 59. MAdN 4:470.1923. 60. MAdN 4:470.2326.

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61. MAdN 4:470.2526. 62. MAdN 4:470.2627, 469.2125. For an outstanding discussion of Kants views on the synthetic, constructive nature of mathematical knowledge, see Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), chapters 2 and 3. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to Friedman are to this book. 63. MAdN 4:470.2732. 64. MAdN 4:478.2127. Note that Kant did not try to imitate the mathematical method of deductive proof. For further discussion of Kants metaphysical constructions, and their differences from mathematical constructions, see Schfer (op. cit.), 3038. 65. MAdN 4:469.3370.1. 66. MAdN 4:470.112. 67. MAdN 4:472.46. 68. MAdN 4:472.711, 473.610. 69. MAdN 4:472.1112. 70. MAdN 4:473.15474.2. 71. MAdN 4:473.2. 72. MAdN 4:474.2476.4. 73. MAdN 4:476.712, 480.6. 74. MAdN 4:536.57. 75. MAdN 4:554.57. 76. MAdN 4:477.313. 77. MAdN 4:561.311f. 78. A182, VI 124.2022; B224, 3:162.56; A189, VI 128.2627; B232, 3:166.3233; A211, VI 141.1011; B256, 3:180.2527. 79. MAdN 4:541.2830, 543.1617, 544.3233. 80. MAdN 4:549.49ff.. 81. MAdN 4:496.59, 497.1213. 82. MAdN 4:497.1416. 83. MAdN 4:497.23. 84. MAdN 4:487.1014, cf. 495.2426. 85. Cf. MAdN 4:493.34494.1.

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86. MAdN 4:493.26494.1. 87. Phoronomy abstracts from causal considerations: MAdN 4:480.1518, 486.36487.10, 489.1420, 492.1518, 493.1114, 494.514, 494.2838; Phoronomy treats solely the quantitative aspects of motion, direction and velocity: 483.2628, 484.3637, 489.1112; Phoronomy treats the quantitative combination of motions: 489.1420. 88. MAdN 4:488.2631, 495.512. If Kant were not anticipating the application of his phoronomic analysis to actual motions of physical bodies, he would have no grounds for focusing on rectilinear or even curvilinear motions, as contrasted with, e.g., triangular motions or just plain random ones. 89. These are the three cases Kant treats in his proof of the Phoronomic Proposition, MAdN 4:490.1516, 491.1113, 492.13. 90. Cf. MAdN 4:490.2830. 91. MAdN 4:490.713, 493.1424, 494.114, 494.28495.3. 92. MAdN 4:481.1225, 481.2837, 482.36, 487.2229, 488.17, 488.1517. 93. Cf. MAdN 4:490.813. 94. MAdN 4:487.1520. 95. MAdN 4:489.612. 96. Cf. MAdN 4:487.1011. 97. MAdN 4:489.24, 489.1718, 489.2125. 98. MAdN 4:489.1420, 492.1518, 493.1114. 99. MAdN 4:486.3034, 489.14; cf. 486.36487.4, 489.1420. 100. MAdN 4:493.1424. 101. Each of the component motions must last the whole elapsed time, for as soon as one of the component motions ceases, so does the combination of that motion with any other motion. 102. MAdN 4:490.1534. 103. MAdN 4:491.1721. 104. MAdN 4:492.118. 105. By a matter Kant here means a material body, not a kind of matter. 106. A Response to Burkhard Tuschlings Critique of Kants Physics (Kant-Studien 79 [1988], 5779), 70. He cites Tuschling, Metaphysische und transzendentale Dynamik in Kants opus postumum (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971; cited hereafter as Met. & tr. Dynamik), 108. 107. MAdN 4:497.2123. 108. I think it is virtually certain that they are to be understood as causal terms here. 419

Compare Kants parallel usage in his essay on negative quantities: Die Realrepugnanz findet nur statt, insofern zwei Dinge als positive Grnde, eins die Folge des andern aufhebt (II 175.3435); Man versuche nun, ob man die Realentgegensetzung berhaupt erklren und deutlich knne zu erkennen geben wie darum, weil etwas ist, etwas Anderes aufgehoben werde, und ob man etwas mehr sagen knne, als was ich sagte, nmlich lediglich, da es nicht durch den Satz des Widerspruchs geschehe (II 203.3236). Cf. Der einzig mgliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseyns Gottes (II 86.515). 109. Kants formulation is quoted above, p. 15. 110. This general conclusion was already reached by Erich Adickes (Kant als Naturforscher [Berlin: de Gruyter, 19241925], 75, vol. I, 188) and conceded by August Stadler (Kants Theorie der Materie [Leipzig: Hirzel, 1883], 6769). 111. MAdN 4:492.1418. 112. MAdN 4:497.2426. 113. MAdN 4:493.1424, 494.514, 494.2838. 114. MAdN 4:493.21. 115. MAdN 4:494.67, 494.31; note that Kant stresses external in this second passage. 116. MAdN 4:497.2628. 117. MAdN 4:497.1921, 497.2426; quoted above, p. 17. 118. MAdN 4:498.35. 119. A similar argument to the same conclusion is made by Adickes (Kant als Naturforscher, op. cit., I, 188190). 120. Anonymous review in Gttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen No. 191 (December 2, 1786; 19141918), 191516; reprinted in: Albert Landau, ed., Rezensionen zur Kantischen Philosophie 178187 (Bebra: Albert Landau Verlag, 1991), vol. I, 497481; 480; my tr.. Landau claims that A. G. Kstner is the author (ibid., 776); Tuschling quotes this passage from the review and offers persuasive evidence that the author was J. T. Mayer (Met. & Tr. Dynamik, 4749). Adickes does not cite this review either in his German Kantian Bibliography (rpt. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970), or in Kant als Naturforscher (op. cit.). 121. XXI 415.217. G. Lehmann, the editor, quotes the relevant paragraph of the review (XXII 809). 122. Met. & tr. Dynamik, 3947. 123. Kant als Naturforscher, op. cit., I, 190. 124. XXI 415.68. Tr. by E. Frster & M. Rosen, Kants Opus Postumum (Cambridge: Cambridge

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University Press, 1993), 3. 125. Eckart Frster refers to Kants letter to Beck, Adickess editorial apparatus, and to Tuschling, and he accepts Adickess formulation of the problem (Is There A Gap in Kants Critical System? Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 [1987], 53655; hereafter cited as Gap?; 548 note 35). In his splendid introduction to his edition of Kants Opus Postumum, Frster restates essentially the same formulation of the problem as he gave in Gap? (op. cit., xxxvi). Tuschling refers to Kants letter to Beck and to both of Adickess discussions in his editorial apparatus and in Kant als Naturforscher (vol. I, 214215). Tuschling notes Adickess shifting assessment of the circle, and argues against Adickess solution on broad systematic grounds without re-examining the details of Adickess analysis or Kants statements of it (Met. & tr. Dynamik, 46f.). Buchdahl refers to Kants letter to Beck, and to Tuschling, but gives a slightly different formulation of the circle. According to Buchdahl, Kant occasionally assumes the proportionality between inertial and gravitational mass, while also assuming that gravitational mass results from attractive force (op. cit., 131). While Buchdahl is right that the MAdN has a problem with the distinction between gravitational and inertial mass, he discusses no texts in this connection. I shall show below that this, too, is not an adequate formulation of Kants problem. In his response to Tuschlings criticism of Kants theory of matter in the MAdN, McCall simply ignores the problem of circularity (op. cit.). This mitigates much of the force of McCalls reply; even if there are the many points of continuity of doctrine between the MAdN and the opus postumum that McCall claims, in view of the fundamental problems with Kants theory of matter in the MAdN, those points of doctrine must be established on a quite different basis in the opus postumum. 126. MAdN 4:497.1516. 127. MAdN 4:510.28511.12. 128. MAdN 4:497.1528. 129. MAdN 4:508.2732. 130. MAdN 4:511.311. 131. MAdN 4:511.1418. 132. MAdN 4:521.78. 133. MAdN 4:525.2930, cf. 526.24. 134. MAdN 4:523.21524.17. 135. Cited by Adickes, Ak. 14:337.1825, and Kant als Naturforscher 85 (vol. I, 214). Kants German is as follows: Die grte Schwierigkeit ist zu erklren wie ein bestimmtes Volumen von Materie durch die eigene Anziehung seiner Theil[e] in dem Verhltnis des Quadrats der Entfernung inverse bey einer Abstoung die aber nur auf die unmittelbar berhrenden Theile (nicht auf die Entfernten) gehen kan[n] im Verhltnis des Cubus derselben (mithin des Volumens selber) mglich sey. Denn das Anziehungsvermgen kommt auf die Dichtigkeit diese aber wieder aufs Anziehungsvermgen an. Auch

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richtet sich die Dichtigkeit nach dem umgekehrten Verhltnis der Abstoung d.i. des volumens. 136. Cited by Adickes, Ak. 14:337.2935, and Kant als Naturforscher 85 (vol. I, 214). Kants original runs: Ich wrde die Art der Auflsung dieser Aufgabe wohl darin setzten: da die Anziehung (die allgemeine, Newtonische,) ursprnglich in aller Materie gleich sey und nur die Abstoung verschiedener verschieden sey und so den spezifischen Unterschied der Dichtigkeit derselben ausmache. Aber das fhrt doch gewissermaaen auf einen Cirkel aus dem ich nicht herauskommen kan[n] und darber ich mich noch selbst besser zu verstehen suchen mu. 137. Ak 14:337.1517. 138. Adickes does not treat the most puzzling stentence of Kants initial formulation (PASSAGE I), the last sentence in which Kant worries that density is inversely proportional to repulsion. I confess that, after concerted effort, I do not have an explanation of that sentence either, but it is important not to introduce further puzzles in the course of explaining Kants puzzle! Perhaps Kants last sentece is just mistaken, and for that reason omitted from his letter to Beck. The idea that density would decrease with an increase of repulsive force simply makes no sense within Kants theory. 139. MAdN 537.1115, .2325, respectively. 140. MAdN 536.9537.4. Kants grounds for this are given in the first Proposition of Dynamics and its Proof. These are discussed and criticized above (IV). 141. I owe most of the points made in this paragraph to Jeff Edwards. 142. MAdN 518.35519.16. 143. MAdN 4:498.26499.4, cf. 511.1926; see VI for discussion. 144. MAdN 518.1219, cf. 541.1415. 145. MAdN 4:521.712; cf. p. 18 and notes 126131 above. 146. E.g., MAdN 4:499.1415, 499.18, 517.28, 518.21, 524.78; Ak XI 1st ed. 348, 2nd ed. 361.33 (quoted above, p. 25). 147. MAdN 4:508.1832. 148. MAdN 4:533.36534.5. 149. For Kants criticisms of physical monadology see MAdN 4:504.10505.7, 539.32540.4. On the tendencies of Kants theory of matter in MAdN to revert to atomism or monadism, see Adickess editorial comments (Ak. XIV 338.20337.10). 150. MAdN 537.1213. 151. MAdN 4:524.1012, 524.40525.7, 525.1219. 152. MAdN 4:535.510; cf. KdrV A17275/B21416, 3:155.32157.18; A214/B261, 3:183.812.

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153. Kant argues for the continuity (as opposed to the discreetness) of matter by arguing that matter is potentially infinitely divisible, though it is not actually divided (MAdN 4:503.21504.8). What he overlooks in this argument is that because the strength of both the fundamental forces diminish with distance, regions of a matter nearer the center of the matter must be more intensively occupied by those forces than regions nearer the periphery of the matter. Consequently, the density of matter must diminish with distance from the center of any matter. Hence any regions divided out of a matter that differ in their distance from the center would also differ in density. Hence they would be different kinds of matter! Kants view that matter is continuous does not fit with his basic dynamism at all. For further discussion of Kants theory of matter, see Rudolf Ktter, Kants Schwerigkeiten mit der Physik. Anstze zu einer problemorientierten Interpretation seiner spten Schriften zur Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft (in: Forum fr Philosophie Bad Homburg, ed., bergang. Untersuchungen zum Sptwerk Immanuel Kants [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991; cited hereafter as bergang], 157184), and Martin Carrier, Kraft und Wirklichkeit. Kants spte Theorie der Materie (in: ibid., 208230), and Kants Theorie der Materie und ihre Wirkung auf die zeitgenssische Chemie (Kant-Studien 81 [1990], 170210). 154. MAdN 4:517.1835. 155. MAdN 4:516.1426, 517.1821, 518.1719. 156. MAdN 4:521.45. 157. MAdN 4:516.24, 516.914, 524.710. 158. MAdN 4:521.57. 159. Ak XI 2nd ed. 361.3235; quoted above p. 25. 160. This is his proposal in MAdN (4:521.712). 161. MAdN 4:517.18518.2. 162. Ak 14:338.23; quoted above p. 26. Adickess solution (ADICKES 1924B) also inverts the Newtonian relation: Once again mass is directly dependent upon the degree of attractive force, i.e., mass depends upon gravity! 163. It was developed by Karl Weierstrass in 1841 (Mathematische Werke [Berlin, 1894], vol. I, 67). See Florian Cajori, A History of Mathematical Notations (Chicago: Open Court, 1929), vol. II, p. 123. 164. See Kants Proposition 7 of Dynamics, and his second Remark to that Proposition (MAdN 4:512.1732, 514.11515.37). 165. Kant contends that cohesion isnt a fundamental power of matter because it doesnt belong to the possibility of matter in general (MAdN 4:518.2531), it is effective only between basic matters of the same kind of material (and so is only disjunctively, not collectively, a universal property of matter), it is not always proportional to density, and its effect depends upon a material undergoing a process of liquification and solidification (MAdN 4:526.1235). These are plausible reasons for Kants contention, but their

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strength is mitigated by the problems facing Kants theory of density, which point to the insufficiency of attraction and repulsion for explicating the possibility of matter in general. Kant defines original properties of matter as essential properties that cannot be derived from other properties of matter (cf. MAdN 4:500.16). Kant cannot derive cohesion from the other essential properties of matter he enumerates, and its importance for explaining so many common and scientific phenomena may suffice for holding that it is essential. This may contravene Kants metaphysical grounds for specifying what is essential, namely that it be a condition for the inner possibility of something (MAdN 4:511.1415), where this inner possibility must be a function of rational elements of knowledge or construction, i.e. the first Critique and the MAdN (MAdN 4:517.36518.1), but this may be just one more unsupportable implication of Kants metaphysical attempt to ground science. 166. MAdN 4:529.1825. 167. MAdN 4:525.3136. 168. MAdN 4:523.21524.17. 169. Ak 14:334.1336.16. See Adickess editorial comments (14:337.215). 170. In some notes from the 1770's Kant tries to treat these points as merely heuristic, but even then he was not able to escape his monadological model. 171. See note 153 above. 172. MAdN 4:522.39523.4. 173. MAdN 4:498.26499.4, cf. 511.1926. Kant concludes his argument by speaking of two kinds of force (Also knnen nur diese zwei Arten von Krften, als solche, worauf alle Bewegungskrfte in der materiellen Natur zurckgefhrt werden mssen, gedacht werden [MAdN 4:499.24]). However, Kant cannot be taken to mean by this that there are two genera of basic forces, attractive and repulsive, which are instantiated by various species of each kind. Kants constructive metaphysical method gives him and can give him no basis for distinguishing among distinct kinds of forces, each of which must be described in identical metaphysical terms as attractive or repulsive force. Moreover, as argued above against Butts (II), Kant intends his two basic forces of attraction and repulsion to be explanatory, and to be explanatory they must be constitutive, and not merely regulative heuristic classifications. His initial formulation of his thesis, which precedes his proof, reflects this fact by speaking of forces, not kinds of force: Es lassen sich nur diese zwei bewegende Krfte der Materie denken (MAdN 4:498.27); he repeats this language in his Remark to Lehrsatz 6 (MAdN 4:511.20). The two kinds of force must be the two specific kinds, attractive and repulsive, of the single genus, force. 174. MAdN 4:536.67. 175. MAdN 4:536.15537.1. 176. MAdN 4:536.912. This circularity (and even more so the one discussed above in V) is distinct from those referred to and address by Alfred E. and Maria G. Miller in

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their Translators Introduction and Commentary to their translation of Peter Plaass, Kants Theory of Natural Science (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 159; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994). I do not believe that their means for resolving some other apparent circularities can be extended to the two I develop here, nor do I believe their means are sound. They import Kants regressive, transcendental method of proof in the first Critique directly into the MAdN. In the first Critique, a Principle does serve as its own ground of proof because it makes experience possible (A 737=B 765; Miller & Miller, 59). However, precisely because the transcendental principles of the first Critique are (purportedly) established prior to the MAdN (ibid., 60), Kant cannot offer transcendental arguments for the principles defended in the MAdN. The Millers way of contrasting unthematic and thematic aspects of Kants analysis (ibid., 59) and their way of emphasizing the internal consistency and mutual interdependence of the components of Kants analysis of the metaphysical foundations of physics (ibid., 61) are not precise enough to distinguish transcendental, metaphysical, bootstrap, and viciously circular argument. Regrettably, this matter deserves more attention than I can give it here. 177. MAdN 4:536.15537.4. 178. MAdN 4:536.1315. 179. Cf. MAdN 4:538.2225. 180. MAdN 4:497.1819, 497.2526. 181. MAdN 4:536.1823. 182. MAdN 4:526527. 183. MAdN 4:511.1415. 184. MAdN 4:549.49ff. This, at least, is the official implication, had Kant argued in accordance with his method. As Duncan points out, Kants justification of his laws of mechanics is mainly kinematic, and not dynamic (Inertia, the Communication of Motion, and Kants Third Law of Mechanics [op. cit.]). In view of Kants failures, it is worth mentioning one of Kants successes. As Buchdahl remarks, Kant succeeds at showing that the concept of action at a distance is not absurd. Two further successes, highlighted by Friedman, are noted below. 185. For discussion, see Michael Friedman (op. cit.), ch. 3, esp. 140143. 186. B109110, 3: 95.1223; Met. & tr. Dynamik, 3839. 187. Ak XXI 286287; AugustSeptember 1798. 188. XXI 164.811, 166.29167.10 (Adickes dates these from September/October 1798; Tuschling from the second third of 1798); cf. Met. & Tr. Dynamik, ch. 5. 189. XXI 482; Frster, Gap?, 549. 190. XXI 206247, 535612, 512520, XXII 609615 (MayAugust 1799); Frster, Gap?, 549ff. 191. See Frsters Introduction to the Opus Postumum (op. cit.), xxxviii.

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192. Die Idee des transzendentalen Idealismus im spten Opus postumum (in: bergang, 105145), 105109. 193. Frster, Gap?, 54043; Karen Gloy, Das Verhltnis der Kritik der reinen Vernunft zu den Metaphysischen Anfangsgrnden der Naturwissenschaft, demonstriert am Substanzsatz (Philosophia Naturalis 21 [1984], 3263), 38. 194. MAdN 4:543.1634, KdU V 181.1531. I discuss this issue in Does Kants Metaphysical Foundations Fill a Gap in the Critique of Pure Reason? (Synthese, 1995). 195. In addition to the piece by Buchdahl cited above, see his Neo-transcendental approaches towards scientific theory appraisal (in: D. H. Millor, ed., Science, Belief and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R. B. Braithwaite [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980], 121). Also see Philip Kitchers excellent article, Projecting the Order of Nature (in: Butts, ed., 201235). A similar point about systematicity as a criterion of truth is made by Okruhlik (op. cit., esp. 318). 196. XXI 294.1126, XXII 259.68, Loses Blatt Leipzig 1 (in: bergang, 152). See Eckart Frster, Die Idee des bergangs (in: bergang, 2848), 3536. 197. In addition to Tuschling (op. cit.), see B. Jeffrey Edwards, Der therbeweis des Opus Postumum und Kants 3. Analogie der Erfahrung (in: bergang, 77104). 198. MAdN 4:476.912; discussed above, p. 9. 199. Kants Selbstseztungslehre (in: E. Frster, ed., Kants Transcendental Deductions [Standford: Stanford University Press, 1989], 21738). For a general discussion, see Kurt Hbner, Leib und Erfahrung in Kants Opus Postumum (Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 7 [1953], 204219; rpt. in: G. Prauss, ed., Kant. Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln [Kln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1973], 192204). 200. For further discussion see the articles cited earlier, along with Paul Guyer, Kants Ether Deduction and the Possibility of Experience (in: G. Funke, ed., Akten des 7. Internationalen Kant-Kongress [Bonn: Bouvier, 1991], vol. II.1, 119132) and Martin Carrier, Kants Theorie der Materie und ihre Wirkung auf die zeitgenssische Chemie (op. cit.). There is an excellent bibliography on Kants opus postumum in bergang (op. cit.), 233244. 201. Friedman, op. cit., 165, 183. 202. Ibid., 46, 1367, 159, 1634, 171, 185, 2023, 234, 255, 259. 203. Ibid., 1403. 204. Ibid., 167, 1778. 205. Ibid., 158, 171, 174, 231 note 29, 235. 206. See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 168, 21214, 22425, 228, 239, 246, 27475. 207. A199200/B24445, 3: 173.34174.5; quoted below, note 209.

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208. Contra Friedmans claim that in order to apply this concept [sc. of matter as the movable in space] we thus need an objective notion of true [sc. Newtonian] motion (op. cit., 174 note 14) as if no one had correctly applied the minimal concept of moving object prior to learning Newtons theory! Cf. the passages cited in note 202 above. 209. The strongest case Friedman could make for his interpretation would rest on a passage he doesnt discuss, where Kant says (in the first Remark in Phenomenology) that in appearance no judgment at all of the understanding is to be found (MAdN 4:555.910). This statement, however, should be interpreted in its context. Kant here contrasts appearance with illusion, where illusion concerns systematically mistaken judgments whereby something subjective is taken for something objective (MAdN 4:555.69). This strongly suggests that illusion concerns transcendental illusion, as analyzed in the Dialectic of the first Critique. Kant makes quite plain that appearances here concern motions, which bodies are moving and which are at rest (MAdN 4:554.16555.5). For this to be at issue, we must be able to identify and re-identify apparently moving bodies. To do this requires, as argued in the Analogies of Experience, the judgmental application of schematized categories to sensory intuitions, in accordance with the Principles of the Understanding. In connection with the statement just quoted, Ellington cites a remark in the first Critique that may seem to support Friedmans view, namely: It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all. Truth and error, therefore, and consequently also illusion as leading to error, are only to be found in the judgment, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding (A293/B350, 3: 234.1721). However, on Kants view, sensation alone does not suffice to produce appearances! Appearances are representations, and representations require both sensation and understanding. Kant is quite direct about this: Understanding is required for all experience and for its possibility. Its primary contribution does not consist in making the representation of objects distinct, but in making the representation of an object possible at all. This it does by carrying the time-order over into the appearances and their existence. For to each of them, [viewed] as [a] consequent, it assigns, through relation to the preceding appearances, a position determined a priori in time. Otherwise, they would not accord with time itself, which [in] a priori [fashion] determines the position of all its parts (A199200/B24445, 3:173.34174.5). As he makes quite plain in the immediately subsequent sentences and paragraphs, the time-order at issue here is not an exact or quantitative one pertinent to a debate between Newton and Kepler or even Ptolemy, it is the minimal sequence of before and after requisite for ordinary experience of objects. (Though Kants statement from Phenomenology quoted above may seem misleading, I do not think it is inconsistent with the first Critique, though it needs to be understood carefully in its context.) 210. MAdN 4:472.112, 480.6. 211. MAdN 4:470.112, 477.1417; KdU V 181.1531. See III above. 212. Op. cit., 171. 213. Kant on Laws of Nature and the Foundations of Newtonian Science (in: G. Funke & T. Seebohm, eds., Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989], 97107), 99; Friedmans emphasis. He describes his essay as the briefest sketch on ibid., 98.

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214. Ibid., 99. 215. Ibid., 103. 216. The original article is Kant on Space, the Understanding, and the Law of Gravitation: Prolegomena 38" (Monist 72 [1989], 23684). It appears under the same title as chapter 4 of Kant and the Exact Sciences, 165210. 217. MAdN 4:472.36473.14. 218. Ibid., 223 note 13. In his Introduction to the Opus Postumum Frster grants that Kant doesnt mention the circle in his analysis of density, but he does claim that its easy to see how Kants further attempts to analyze matter propose to avoid the circularity (op. cit., xxxix). 219. Ibid., 226. 220. Ibid. Friedman persistently errs about the extent to which Newton himself was Newtonian in this sense. Newton himself frequently proclaimed his adherence to corpuscular doctrine and treated gravity merely as a calculative hypothesis rather than as an inherent property of matter. Martin Carrier (Kraft und Wirklichkeit. Kants spte Theorie der Materie [in: bergang, 208230]), and Hans-Joachim Waschkies (Wissenschaftliche Praxis und Erkenntnistheorie in Kants Opus postumum [ibid., 185207]) rightly stress that Newtonian principles of explanation at that time meant, not Newtonian laws of motion, but explanation in terms of a postulated geometrical physical microstructure. Also see Brittan, who directly pointed out Friedmans error in this regard (Kants Two Grand Hypotheses, op. cit., 7576 note 19), and Howard Duncan, Methodology (op. cit.), 273277. 221. Friedmans interpretive method is to read Kants texts in the context of the history of science (cf. op. cit., 231 note 29, 226). This is fine, but such an approach can only serve as a basis for excluding other issues or denying that they are important for understanding a text if that approach provides a complete and adequate reading of the text at issue. However, Friedmans reading is very selective, and not even adequate within his chosen range of subtexts, simply because many of the views he ascribes to Kant directly violate Kants explicit views, both methodological and substantive, expressed in the MAdN and the first Critique. 222. At one point Friedman claims that Kants main disagreements with Newton do not concern the theory of matter (ibid., 138), but later he recognizes that Kant criticizes Newton for not counting gravity as an essential property of matter (ibid., 228229). 223. Ibid., 237240. 224. Ibid., 240, 242. 225. Ibid., 254, 2567, 262, 3045. 226. XXII 240.2528, 241.19; quoted by Friedman (op. cit.), 262.

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227. A180/B22223, 3:160.34161.14. Friedman discusses this passage elsewhere, but without considering its bearing on his interpretation of the passages cited from the opus postumum in the previous note (Regulative and Constitutive [Southern Journal of Philosophy XXX Supplement {1991}, 73102], 75f.). Friedman does cite a related passage (A664/B692; op. cit., 163), but doesnt consider it in connection with his claims about Kants problematic in the opus postumum. It will not do to reply that the Analogies represent regulative principles of the understanding, while the Dialectic treats regulative principles of reason. While true, this distinction is obliterated in the relevant passages of the opus postumum because Kant speaks of principles that are both regulative and constitutive without distinguishing reason and understanding at all. Moreover, in bergang 114" Kant ascribes a constitutive function to a whole of matter actively filling space (an aether), and to a whole of experience (cf. XXI 217.26219.27, 223.1224.20, 225.1226). Kant recognizes that this seems strange, to prove a priori a material condition for the possibility of experience, and a material whole at that (cf. e.g., XXI 221.118, 222.17, 226.1229.30, 230.7231.7)! As Edwards points out (op. cit.), this argument has clear roots in Kants refutation of void space in the Third Analogy (3:182.37, 4:142.25 [A213/B260], cf. Kants note at 3:185, 4:145 [A218/B265]); as Tuschling points out, such a proof amounts to ascribing a constitutive role to an idea, which is quite at odds with Kants doctrine in the first Critique (Die Idee des transzendentalen Idealismus im spten Opus postumum [op. cit.], p. 110 and note 9). This strongly suggests that Kant deliberately did not distinguish between principles of the understanding and of reason when discussing principles that are both regulative and constitutive. 228. Friedman relies on the interpretive suggestion that Kant simply came to see that the mathematical approach of the MAdN would not serve to unify all possible moving forces in space, and that only a unity provided by reflective judgment would suffice (op. cit., 261 note 64). This suggestion is of itself unconvincing, and it is mitigated by the fact, emphasized by both Tuschling and Frster, but ignored by Friedman, that Kant recognized in 1798 that the mathematical approach of the MAdN was entirely inadequate, even for its originally intended purposes within the constitutive, constructive domains of physics and the theory of matter it presupposes. 229. E.g., XXII 59.1726, 86.1011; Friedman (op. cit.), 338. 230. Cf., e.g., Friedman (op. cit.), 260261. 231. I thank Jeff Edwards and Eckart Frster for discussing some of the points of this paper with me. I gratefully acknowledge that work on this article was supported by an annual research fellowship in 1992 from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

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