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Gujarat National Law University

LENIENCY PROGRAM: A REMEDY TO CARTELIZATION (Comparative Study)

(Project submitted for partial fulfilment of Seminar Course in Competition Law)

Disha Arora
Registration No- 12LM06 Submitted to: Dr. Udhaykumara R

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sr. No 1. 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Abstract Acknowledgment Abbreviations

PARTICULARS 3 4 5 6 7-9 10-13 14-16 17-18 19-20

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Chapter 1 : Introduction Chapter 2: Cartels Chapter 3: Chapter 4: Chapter 5: Conclusion Bibliography

ABSTRACT Cartels are considered as one of the most harmful anti competitive agreement across the globe since their only aim is to undertake prohibited anti competitive activities. But because of the leniency program, one member of the cartels blows the whistle on to the other, giving itself an exemption from the penalties. This was one of the major accomplishments of US Anti Trust Laws in some previous laws was the modification of the Corporate Leniency Program in 1993 by Department of Justice (DOJ). It is strongly evident that Corporate Leniency Program helps revealing information of the criminal behaviors and activities, in the manner that the agency working gets the information about the cartel than as it was working in the absence of such cartel. Because of such a program the prosecution and investigation cost has been seen to be minimized. Leniency program policies give incentives to those cartel members who come ahead and give details of the cartel activity by promising a chance to keep away from prosecution for their own past activities.

Across the globe different jurisdictions have different laws to break the HCC. Similarly there are diverse leniency regulations and policies implemented by those different jurisdictions. A Corporate Leniency Program for HCC and other illegal cartel is interesting both from the theoretical point of view and also from an empirical viewpoint and outlook. In theory, a lessening in the fines forced, for the primary self-reporter participant of the cartel and skyscraping fines and penalties for all other team participants brings a motivation to be the one, to be the first, who will come forward and take the advantage of the CLP. Three main features of a market make it easier for the firms in this market to conspire. Markets such as power, oil, cement, gas, steel, which have no available substitutes, provide better extent for enormous earnings and gains by price rise, and therefore a chance for open conspiracy amid the firms. Second important characteristic is the point of competition in the relevant market. The more is the competition and lesser the prices, in non existence of the cartel, the better are the probable profit from setting up of a cartel.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Any accomplishment requires the effort of many people and this is not different. I wish to express my gratitude to those who have to do this work and whose patience support was instrumental in accomplishing this task. I acknowledge & thank my teacher, Dr. Udhaykumara K. Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar, for providing me an opportunity to undertake a Research project on CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM: A REMEDY TO CARTELIZATION (A Comparative Study). I must acknowledge them and say thanks. Their diligent efforts have made me learn so much. They were helping hand to me and their meticulous efforts provided me the foundation for the work done LASTLY I would also like to thank the library staff of Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar, for providing with every possible effort for the fulfilment of this project.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS

1. Act: Indian Competition Act, 2002 2. AAEC: Appreciable Adverse Effect On Competition 3. CLP : Corporate Leniency Program 4. DOJ : Department of Justice 5. EU: European Union 6. HCC: Hard Core Cartels 7. ICN: International Competition Network 8. OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 9. RPM: Retail Price Management 10. S.C. : Supreme Court 11. U.S.: Unites States of America

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY The idea behind the present research paper is to bring the light on the fact that how the corporate leniency program are helpful in bursting cartels. The other important object of the present research paper is to make a comparative study of the different corporate leniency programs governing Unites States of America, European Union, and India. RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM: A REMEDY TO CARTELIZATION

(Comparative Study) is a very relevant study as it helps us gain knowledge on the working of Corporate Leniency Programs. The present research paper will also help us to study the Leniency guidelines in a better way by the comparative study RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. To understand the concept of Corporate Leniency Program 2. To understand the nature of Leniency Program, of how it is helpful in breaking the Cartels. RESEACRH METHODOLOGY The present is done with the Doctrinal method of research.

CHAPTER 2 CARTELS

2.1 OVERVIEW Cartels are born when given the opportunity and market conditions are right, while cartels die because of internal collapse or they are caught and convicted by the antitrust authority. The likelihood that a cartel, once identified, is convicted depends inversely on the caseload of the antitrust authority due to an implicit resource constraint. The authority also chooses an enforcement policy in terms of the fraction of non-leniency cases that it prosecutes.1 Cartels are, in real meaning, agreements connecting competitors not to connect in competition with one other. Cartel activity, usually involves market allocation, price fixing and collusive tendering, is usually seen as the mainly serious of competition law contraventions by competition authorities across the world2. Competition law considers Cartels as one of the most damaging and harmful type of anticompetitive agreements between enterprises, as their plan is classically to get involved in prohibited activities like collusive tendering (bid-rigging), price fixing, and market division which will lead to hiked prices and reduced efficiency. Normally, competition authoritys clash to examine and investigate and prosecute enterprises and firms caught up in cartels without the support of an insider, as cartels are by their natural world collusive and mysterious. Leniency programs incentivize cartel enterprise members to come ahead and account cartel activity by hopeful of an opportunity to keep away from prosecution for their previous past behavior and actions. 2.2 MEANING OF CARTEL Cartel as defined by the European Commission for Competition is a group of similar, independent companies which join together to fix prices, to limit production or to share markets or customers between them. 3 The European commission (EU) includes only independent companies under the purview of cartels. The Indian Competition Act defines Cartelization as entering into the agreement or arrangement or understanding between enterprises and instituting measures to control competition. The Act defines cartel in section 2 as follows1 2

http://ideas.repec.org/p/jhu/papers/548.html http://www.bowman.co.za/ezines/Competition/Newsletters/CorporateLeniency.htm 3 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html

Cartel includes an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders, or service providers who, by agreement amongst them, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution sale or price of, or, trade in goods or provisions of services4 The definition is very wide and inclusive, covering both trade and competition. It is formal association of manufacturers or suppliers to maintain prices at high level, and control production, prices, marketing arrangements etc., and thereby limiting competition and imposing restraints on trade. It, thus, imposes unreasonable restraint on free trade and disorts competition. To give a wider impact, it includes all kinds of combinations which are anti competitive. In Alkali Manufacturers Association of India v. Sinochem International Chemicals Company Ltd.5 It was stated as cartelization being an economic field, a greater latitude has to be given to the word cartel to include all sorts of combinations, which are anti competitive. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation6 SC defines cartel as, therefore, is an association of producers who by agreement among themselves attempt to control production, sale and price of the product to obtain a monopoly in any particular commodity or industry. A cartel is formed, interalia, with a view that members of the cartel do not wage a price war and they sell at an agreed price. There may also be cartel where members divide territories. A cartel is a formal organization of the producers in an industry, to which the individual member surrender their price making powers. The cartel agreements may be open or decretive and are directed towards price, production and market control. 7 The Office of Fair Trading defines cartels as an agreement between businesses not to compete with each other. The agreement is usually secret, verbal and often informal. 8 2.3 CARTEL: AN APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION When we study cartel, an important question that comes to mind is why cartel harmful? Cartel is assumed to have AAEC. In a very layman language, competition law seeks to promote, maintain and sustain competition in market being beneficial to various stakeholders in society. In case of Cartel, competitors agree not be compete on price, product, customers etc. since in the case of a Cartel, direct competitors agree to forego

Mittal, D.P, Competition Law & Practic e (New Delhi: Taxmann Publications (P) L td ., 3 r d Ed ., 2011, pg 5.11 5 [1999] 98 Comp. Cas. 333(MRTPC)] 6 [1993] 3 SCC 499/AIR 1994 SC 988 7 Ibid 4 8 http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/cartels/what-cartel

competition and opt for collusion, the consumers and business houses lose the benefits of competition. Thus, cartels are inherently harmful. Further, competitors know that such an agreement is unlawful and it compels them to keep such agreement secretive and resultantly it is invariably not reduced to writing and it is often found to be in the form of arrangement or understanding. Moreover, the best evidence against Cartel is usually in possession of the charged parties, which are not likely to easily part with and make available to the investigator or enquiring authority. These compulsions seem to have persuaded the law makers to prescribe that Cartel is presumed to have AAEC.9 2.4 SOME OF THE LEADING CARTELS Some famous worldwide cartel cases are The International Vitamins Cartel where all important and major manufacturers of vitamins situated in Canada, France, Belgium, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States and Switzerland which included Hoffmann-la Roche AG and BASF of Germany, Rhone-Poulenc of France operated for over 10 years from 1989 to 1999 and covered all major vitamins consumed the world over, Cement cartels of Argentina, Pharmaceutical cartels, washing powder cartel of Unilever and Procter&Gamble etc.

Combating cartel in markets issues & challenges by G.R. Bhatia, www.competition-commissionindia.nic.in, available at http://www.competition-commission th india.nic.in/speeches_articles_presentations/GR.BhatiaArticle.pdf viewed on 13 March,2013

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CHAPTER 3

CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM 3.1 OVERVIEW In the present century the Corporate Leniency Programs are widely used as an important tool of the competition act. Basically the Leniency program serves two purposes by its implementation, firstly, in the short run application; it helps in the detection of the cartels and helps to cut down the legal enforcement cost of the entire process of breaking the cartel. Secondly, in the long run it creates a deterrent impact on the firms from committing antitrust abuse.10 THE CLP is intended at eradicating and preventing cartel activity as it harms the economy at large. The reason for adopting the CLP is to offer a cartel member the possibility to disclose information on a cartel to the commission in return for immunity from prosecution and fines11 3.2 DEFINTION Leniency is used to mean total immunity and lenient treatment to mean less than full immunity. A competition agencys decisions that could be considered lenient treatment include agreeing to pursue a reduction in penalties or not to refer a matter for criminal prosecution. The terms leniency, immunity and amnesty are used in many jurisdictions but the definitions of these terms vary between jurisdictions. For example, under the U.S. program, corporate amnesty and corporate leniency are used interchangeably to mean complete immunity from criminal conviction and from fines for the anticompetitive conduct. Some other jurisdictions, such as the EU, us leniency to refer to any reduction in fines up to 100 percent. Leniency policy describes the written collection of principles and conditions adopted by an agency that govern the leniency process. A leniency policy is one component of a leniency program, which also includes internal agency processes, for example on how the agency implements its leniency policy, including processes for conferring leniency and/or lenient treatment.12 3.3 THE BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING A LENIENCY POLICY Most of the jurisdictions have developed or developing programs and regulations which propose leniency and/or lenient behavior because of the numerous payback that run from
10 11

Ibid 4 Mihe Heinrich Gaomab II What is Corporate Leniency Program pg 5 12 Anti Cartel Enforcement Manual by www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org

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having them. Leniency programs give confidence to the violators to admit and associate their co-conspirators, as long as first-hand, straight insider proof of conduct that the other parties to the cartel want to hide. The programs and regulations also help to expose conspiracies that would or else go unnoticed and undetected and can subvert existing cartels. They take action as prevention with deterrent impact to those contemplating inflowing into cartel agreements and arrangements. Evidence can be collected more quickly, at a lesser direct cost, in comparison to different other methods of inquiry and investigation, mainly to timely and wellorganized decree of cases. To collect this information, the parties which supply it are promised lesser fines, less restrictive orders, shorter prison sentences, or even complete immunity. The benefits of implementing leniency programs can be clubbed jointly as: Deterrence making cartel membership less attractive Detection promoting the discovery of cartels Desistence causing cartels to cease operation Sanctioning making punishment of co-conspirators more likely The overall objective of leniency programs is however, to improve the level of compliance with antitrust and competition laws, through the increased detection of cartels. This benefits the community through the increase in competition, leading to lower prices, better service, more innovation and more efficient firms, an objective consistent with that of enforcement agencies. CLP comes as a useful tool for 'defectors' to lessen their probable punishments. Leniency programs lessen fines for members of a cartel that gets the evidence to the concerned authority. The punishments and penalties for companies that violate the competition law rules are very strict. Illegal cartel members have a limited chance of either reducing this punishment or avoiding it entirely. Different competition law commissions functions a leniency program where companies that give information about a cartel of how they participated might be given full or at least partial immunity from punishment and fines. It is seen that the majority important input of current years to the global fight against cartel arrangement and its sustainability is the wide recognition of leniency programmes by a large number of national jurisdictions. Leniency policies have till now been successful across the globe in combating cartels by each of the policies stages: 1) Prosecution, making conviction and penalization stricter and more frequent; 2) Detection, making discovery more probable;

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3) Desistance, making cartels less stable, seeding mistrust and suspicion among cartel partners; and 4) Deterrence, making cartels less profitable.13 In year 2002, the European Union Commission has considerably revised its law related enforcement against cartels. Particularly, the fresh policy follows the road of the CLP enacted by the U.S. govt in 1993 and stresses the chances of fine deductions for selfreporting cartel members. CLP in U.S is measured the most efficient leniency program till present for a large number of reasons. 1993, August 10 the DOJ Division of U.S. announced a new CLP according to which a firm can avoid criminal prosecution for anti-trust violations by accepting and confessing its participation in the anti competitive activities, completely helping the Division, and following the other specified conditions14.

13

Combating cartel in markets issues & challenges by G.R. Bhatia, www.competition-commissionindia.nic.in, available at http://www.competition-commission th india.nic.in/speeches_articles_presentations/GR.BhatiaArticle.pdf viewed on 13 March,2013 14 US Corporate and Individual Leniency Policy., www.justice.gov, Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.html, visited on 12th March,2013

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Chapter 4 COMPARISON OF LENIENCY PROGRAM: US, EU AND INDIA 4.1 OVERVIEW Corporate Leniency Programs exists in the increasing number of jurisdictions where HCC conduct is a criminal offence, as well as in jurisdictions, such as EU and many of its member states, where HCC conduct is not subject to criminal sanctions. 15 As a result of the success achieved with the existing policies in the U.S., Europe, and Canada, as well as the International work on leniency pogrammes that has been taking place in the forums such as OECD, ICN, and European Competition Network many other jurisdictions have redefined their prior leniency programmes or introduced the new ones that attribute many of the features of the best in class policies.16 4.2 COMPARISION The highest rate of success in the leniency policy is gained by U.S and EU. But for their success many important factors comes into play. The U.S. CLP was first drafted in the year 1978 and then it was later amended in the year 1993. Before 1993 the program did not present immunity but rather "prosecutorial discretion" that was comparatively unproductive.17 Scott Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement, stated "[prior to 1993] comparatively few general pardon applications, in detail, no additional than one a year, and also did not guide to the discovery and breaking of even a single international cartel."18 For this very reason that of, the DOJ altered its regulations and policy to the leniency policy of present situation which defines leniency as "not charging such an individual criminally for the activity being reported."19 The reorganization of the regulation prove to be very useful and is supported by Department of Justice's statement,

15 16

http://europe.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/authorities_with_leniency_program.pdf Vinod Dhall, Competition Law Today- Concepts, Issues, and the Laws in Practice, (Oxford University press,2008) pg no 108-109 17 Farhad Sorabjee, Reeti Choudhary, J. Sagar Associates, available at http://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes%20th %20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDF visited on 15 March,2013 18 The European Commission's New Leniency Policy,www.crowell.com, available at http://www.crowell.com/pdf/leniency.pdf , visited on 23rd March,2013 19 Leniency Policy for Individual, www.usdoj.gov , available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htm) visited on 23rd March,2013

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"the Amnesty program has been responsible for detecting and prosecuting more antitrust violations than all of our search warrants, consensual-monitored audio or video tapes, and cooperating informants combined. It is, unquestionably, the single greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel enforcers."20 After the achievement of U.S. CLP, the EU leniency policy was first introduced at EC level in 1996 and was later revised twice, in Feb 2002 and more recently in December 2006. Not likely the U.S. system of CLP which mainly focuses on criminal approach of antitrust law, European Unions policy is basically used on civil suits, because the criminal prosecution of EU anticompetitive law does not exist. EU's leniency policy is only accessible for companies since only companies and not any individual can be liable for anticompetitive actions. Adding to the giving way immunity to the companies which provide information on hidden cartel or the one which provides the evidence to establish the cartel infringement, as of its civil nature, EU guidelines also recognized a "sliding window" scheme for corporations that do not qualify for absolute immunity. The civil nature of European Union's anticompetitive law helped to make it probable to compute punishment exclusively on monetary damages; as a result it is possible to start a system where companies who can give evidence that is measured to be of "significant added value" for Commission investigation are to be approved reduction in the fines.21 The "sliding window" policy in EU's leniency program reflects the view on violation of antitrust been a civil subject not been a criminal matter. Since the absence of the infringement holding moral weight, it is acceptable that penalties are reduced, for companies to put in for the investigation not in favor of itself. Not likely the EU legal society, a few unpleasant or even minimal violation of any antitrust law in U.S. brings a disgrace and so fractional exemption cannot be very easily intended and it becomes not as much of meaningful for companies to assist inquiry and investigation not in favor of itself. By means of the help of violators, EU Commission can further successfully decide cases, and spotlight their restricted resource on investigation and prosecution of other anticompetitive violations.22

20

Hammond, "When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying for Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put a Price Tag on an Individual's Freedom?", the Fifteenth Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime 2 (Mar. 8, 2001) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.htm) 21 nd Einer Elhauge, Damein Geradin Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford and Portland, Or egon, 2 edi) 22 How the Punishment of the European Union Competition Law and United States Antitrust Law Reflect Respective View on Competition., www.voices.yahoo.com, available at http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishmenteuropean-union-competition-4523875.html?cat=17 visited on 23rd March,2013

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In spite of the record high fines posed to 8 vitamins companies which included HoffmanLa Roche (800 million) for agreeing to charge a higher price for the product illegally, in most of the cases of cartel they do not have fines thereby making the policy a money-making profitable choice for companies. The EU leniency policy is considered as unbeaten following it had undergone 2 amendments and knowledge of around 16 years. The Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations was 1st introduced in the year 2009. With barely three years this leniency policy came into picture, it will certainly take more time to extend in the Indian markets and increase additional experience from other Commissions. Though the finest provisions of different leniency policies from across the world, diverse jurisdictions have been incorporated in the Indias lesser punishment regulations and rules, there are still some of the few factors which makes the U.S. and EU leniency policies enhanced than Indias CLP. 4.3 LENIENCY POLICY: SIMILARITY BETWEEN EU AND U.S. 4.3.1 REDUCED PENALTY: It is relevant to understand that at present in both the EU and U.S.; all or any willingly helpful cartel member who might have missed the competition for complete and full resistance from prosecution may still get a less penalty. That makes it clear that in both the EU and U.S., two evenly culpable participants of the same cartel be able to be given greatly different penalties relied on their near the beginning taking of liability and the appropriateness and worth of their cooperation. 23 With this situation, India also stands on the same position as the Lesser Penalty Regulation in its section 4(b) which states that The applicants who are subsequent to the first applicant may also be granted benefit of reduction in penalty on making a disclosure by submitting evidence, which in the opinion of the Commission, may provide significant added value to the evidence already in possession of the Commission or the Director General, as the case may be, to establish the existence of the cartel, which is alleged to have violated section 3 of the Act. 4.4 LENIENCY POLICY: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EU AND U.S. 4.4.1 MOMENTUM: In the United States., near the beginning cooperators not only supply evidence that can be valuable to the Division, but can be used in opposition to remaining
23

Nathan H Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement www.jstor.org available on

th

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481, visited on 15 March,2013

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members of the cartel, and also just the once their request agreements are filed on the public evidence they over and over again give a tough drive that fastens the Division's investigation procedure and prosecution of remaining members and also, in an Amnesty-Plus situation, further cartels. Plea negotiations are secret and private, but just the once agreements are gets reached, the plea agreement is presented before the court and made public.24 Other cartel members can then make out that further participating companies which have acknowledged their liability and promised to help and cooperate with the authority, and so they frequently rapidly line up to beg guilty.

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Ibid 18

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CONCLUSION Cartels have been suspected and confirmed in different sectors, namely, such as steel, cement, trucking, tyres, etc. Like other countries across the globe, India is too alleged to be a sufferer of overseas cartel in bulk vitamins, soda ash, petrol etc. With all these it tends to lift the price or decrease the option of choice of consumers. The corporate houses are affected the most by such cartels as the cost of collecting and assembling inputs is improved or the choice is constrained leading it to be uncompetitive, not viable or be fulfilled with a smaller amount profits. It is because of these draw backs that Cartels are well thought-out as mainly grave competition law infringements and absolute evil of antitrust laws. Cartels are the most dangerous violations and infringement of competition law. Moreover, developing countries are mainly affected more because either due to lack of competition administration or because of not enough capacity to discover, prosecute or detect domestic and also the overseas cartel. The battle in opposition to Cartel is lawfully and basically a difficult and hard task. Cartels are conspiracies and to strike at the foundations of them, Competition Authority desires to deeply and seriously bank upon Leniency Programme or to support and inspire to stimulate the whistleblowers. An growing number of Competition Authorities, may therefore, set up special HCC branches and the inspiration to do so is to expand centers of brilliance with high opinion to knowledge and skilled authority, requisite in organizing raids, search and seizure, interviewing witnesses, concealed surveillance alongside victorious execution of the leniency programmes. The system is designed, bearing in mind inducing participant of a Cartel to defect/subvert from the cartel arrangement or agreement. The party making revelation will, though, be subject matter to other instructions of the Commission as per provisions. The Act does not offer for any encouragement or incentive to the whistleblower, which may possibly be well thought-out after adequate and skill and knowledge in the application anf enforcement of law is gained by the Authority. Certainty and justice are dangerous to make leniency programme efficient and for this reason the Commission can take appropriate actions and measures including formulation of Guidelines etc The accessibility of explicit definition of the Cartel, integration of a leniency programme for a participant of a cartel to defect/break, the control to impose restraint penalty connected with profits or revenue on each member, clear provisions to put into effect jurisdiction in deference of overseas acts having AAEC in India joined with requirements to go into cooperation agreement with current global competition agencies all along with pains and hard works to construct strong competition civilization which includes encouragement to public to put forward

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information by ensuring privacy, synchronization with Government Departments & sect oral regulators and by stressing the call for well-built sanctions in sight of unalterable harms caused, the Competition Commission will be capable to successfully fight domestic as well as cross border cartels.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS 1. Bishop, Simon and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law (Sweet &Maxwell, 3 r d Edition) 2. Dhall, Vinod, Competition Law Today: Concepts, Issues and the Law in Practice (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008) 3. Elhange, Einer and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law & Economics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2 n d Ed., 2011) 4. Joelson, Mark R., An International Antitrust Primer (Hague: K.L. International, 2 n d Ed., 2001) 5. Mittal, D.P, Competition Law & Practice (New Delhi: Taxmann Publications (P) Ltd., 3 r d Ed., 2011) 6. Roy, Abhir and Jayant Kumar, Competition Law in India (Eastern Law House Pvt. Ltd., 2008) ARTICLES 1. http://ideas.repec.org/p/jhu/papers/548.html 2. http://www.bowman.co.za/ezines/Competition/Newsletters/CorporateLeniency.htm 3. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html 4. http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/cartels/what-cartel 5. Combating cartel in markets issues & challenges by G.R. Bhatia, www.competitioncommission-india.nic.in, available at http://www.competition-commission india.nic.in/speeches_articles_presentations/GR.BhatiaArticle.pdf viewed on 13th March,2013 6. Anti Cartel Enforcement Manual by www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org 7. Combating cartel in markets issues & challenges by G.R. Bhatia, www.competitioncommission-india.nic.in, available at http://www.competition-commission india.nic.in/speeches_articles_presentations/GR.BhatiaArticle.pdf viewed on 13th March,2013 8. US Corporate and Individual Leniency Policy., www.justice.gov, Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.html, visited on 12th March,2013 9. Farhad Sorabjee, Reeti Choudhary, J. Sagar Associates, available at http://www.jsalaw.com/Admin/uplodedfiles/PublicationFiles/Leniency%20Regimes% 20-%20Fourth%20edition%202012%20(India).PDF visited on 15th March,2013 10. The European Commission's New Leniency Policy,www.crowell.com, available at http://www.crowell.com/pdf/leniency.pdf , visited on 23rd March,2013

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11. Leniency Policy for Individual, www.usdoj.gov , available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htm) visited on 23rd March,2013 12. Hammond, "When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying for Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put a Price Tag on an Individual's Freedom?", the Fifteenth Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime 2 (Mar. 8, 2001) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.htm) 13. Einer Elhauge, Damein Geradin Global Competition Law and Economics (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2nd edi) 14. How the Punishment of the European Union Competition Law and United States Antitrust Law Reflect Respective View on Competition., www.voices.yahoo.com, available at http://voices.yahoo.com/how-punishment-european-union-competition4523875.html?cat=17 visited on 23rd March,2013 15. Nathan H Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement www.jstor.org available on http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481, visited on 15th March,2013

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