SMR Aff/Neg

1AC ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 Plan Text................................................................................................................................................ 6 Leadership ............................................................................................................................................. 7 Nuclear Renaissance ........................................................................................................................... 15 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................. 20 Extra Advantages .................................................................................................................................... 24 Economy.............................................................................................................................................. 25 Warming.............................................................................................................................................. 28 Peak Oil ............................................................................................................................................... 31 Inherency ................................................................................................................................................ 34 Nuclear Power Coming Internationally ............................................................................................... 35 Nuclear Power Coming in US .............................................................................................................. 36 Nuclear Power Coming in US/International Commuity ...................................................................... 38 No US SMRs in the SQUO .................................................................................................................... 39 Leadership Advantage Extensions .......................................................................................................... 40 Uniqueness (Proliferation) .................................................................................................................. 41 Uniqueness (Technology).................................................................................................................... 43 Solvency (Proliferation)....................................................................................................................... 45 Solvency (Technology) ........................................................................................................................ 47 Impact (Proliferation).......................................................................................................................... 49 Tech Key to Heg .................................................................................................................................. 50 Heg Impact .......................................................................................................................................... 53 SQUO Nuke Power Bad Extensions ......................................................................................................... 55 Uniqueness (Meltdowns) .................................................................................................................... 56 Uniqueness (Terrorism) ...................................................................................................................... 57 Solvency (Meltdowns)......................................................................................................................... 59 Solvency (Terrorism Proliferation) ................................................................................................... 61 Solvency (Terrorism - Attack) .............................................................................................................. 63 Impact (Meltdowns)............................................................................................................................ 65 Impact (Nuclear Terrorism)................................................................................................................. 66 Economy Advantage Extension............................................................................................................... 68 Uniqueness.......................................................................................................................................... 69 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................. 70 Impact ................................................................................................................................................. 73 Warming Advantage Extensions ............................................................................................................. 74 Uniqueness.......................................................................................................................................... 75 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................. 77 Impact ................................................................................................................................................. 79 Peak Oil Advantage Extensions ............................................................................................................... 81 Uniqueness.......................................................................................................................................... 82 Solvency .............................................................................................................................................. 84 Impact (Economy) ............................................................................................................................... 86 Impact (Add-On Resource Wars) ........................................................................................................ 87 Solvency .................................................................................................................................................. 90 A2 Licensing Constraints ..................................................................................................................... 91 Global deployment / energy export.................................................................................................... 92

Incentives Solve .................................................................................................................................. 94 Upfront Costs ...................................................................................................................................... 97 2AC Blocks ................................................................................................................................................... 99 States CP ............................................................................................................................................... 100 Cant Solve ........................................................................................................................................ 101 Politics DA ............................................................................................................................................. 103 SMR Link Turns Public .................................................................................................................... 104 Public Key to Agenda/PC ................................................................................................................... 106 SMR Link Turns Congress ............................................................................................................... 107 Pollution DA .......................................................................................................................................... 108 SMR Link Turns .................................................................................................................................. 109 Warming DA .......................................................................................................................................... 111 SMR Link Turns .................................................................................................................................. 112 Backstopping DA ................................................................................................................................... 116 Link Turn............................................................................................................................................ 117 Link Defense ...................................................................................................................................... 118 Russian Oil DA ....................................................................................................................................... 119 UQ Defense ....................................................................................................................................... 120 Link Defense ...................................................................................................................................... 121 Spending DA .......................................................................................................................................... 123 SMR Link Turns .................................................................................................................................. 124 Elections DA .......................................................................................................................................... 126 SMR Link Turns .................................................................................................................................. 127 Neg ............................................................................................................................................................ 129 Inherency .............................................................................................................................................. 130 Generic .............................................................................................................................................. 131 Nuclear Renaissance Wont Happen ................................................................................................. 133 No Nuclear Renaissance.................................................................................................................... 134 Solvency ................................................................................................................................................ 137 Laundry List ....................................................................................................................................... 138 Wrong Direction ................................................................................................................................ 140 Cost ................................................................................................................................................... 141 Leadership ............................................................................................................................................. 143 Prolif Leadership High ....................................................................................................................... 144 Tech Leadership High ........................................................................................................................ 145 Hurts Cred - Generic.......................................................................................................................... 146 Causes Prolif ...................................................................................................................................... 147 SMRs Hurt Tech Leadership .............................................................................................................. 149 SMRs Not Key to Tech Leadership .................................................................................................... 150 Proliferation Impact D ....................................................................................................................... 151 Heg Defense ...................................................................................................................................... 153 SQUO Nuke Reactors Bad Advantage ................................................................................................... 154 No Meltdowns................................................................................................................................... 155 SMRs Not Safer ................................................................................................................................. 156 SMRs bad - Meltdowns ..................................................................................................................... 159 No Nuclear Terror ............................................................................................................................. 160 No Terror Attacks .............................................................................................................................. 162 SMRs Bad Terror Prolif ................................................................................................................... 163 Economy Advantage ............................................................................................................................. 165

Econ Resilient .................................................................................................................................... 166 SMRs Bad - Jobs ................................................................................................................................ 168 SMRs Bad Cost................................................................................................................................ 169 Econ Impact D ................................................................................................................................... 172 Warming Advantage ............................................................................................................................. 174 Warming D Emissions..................................................................................................................... 175 Warming D No Extinction ............................................................................................................... 176 Warming D Not Anthropogenic ..................................................................................................... 178 SMRs Dont Solve Warming .............................................................................................................. 179 Nuclear Tech Bad Lead to Warming ............................................................................................... 180 Peak Oil Advantage ............................................................................................................................... 181 Peak Oil D Not True ........................................................................................................................ 182 No Resource Wars............................................................................................................................. 184 SMRs Dont Solve Peak Oil ................................................................................................................ 186 Econ Collapse Impact D ..................................................................................................................... 187 Off Case ..................................................................................................................................................... 189 Contamination/Pollution DA................................................................................................................. 190 Links .................................................................................................................................................. 191 Elections DA .......................................................................................................................................... 193 Links .................................................................................................................................................. 194 Politics DA ............................................................................................................................................. 196 Links Feinstein ................................................................................................................................ 197 Link General ................................................................................................................................... 198 Links - Public...................................................................................................................................... 199 Public Key to Agenda/PC ................................................................................................................... 201 A2: Scientists ..................................................................................................................................... 202 Russian Oil/Backstopping DA ................................................................................................................ 203 Links .................................................................................................................................................. 204 Spending DA .......................................................................................................................................... 206 Links .................................................................................................................................................. 207 Warming DA .......................................................................................................................................... 210 Links .................................................................................................................................................. 211 States CP ............................................................................................................................................... 212 States Solve ....................................................................................................................................... 213

SMR Aff

1AC

Plan Text
Plan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase marketfixed production cost incentives for domestic deployment of small modular nuclear reactors.

Leadership
Lack of reactor development is eroding US nuke leadership now- SMR deployment key Rosner and Goldberg 2011
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011, https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf , accessed 7-31-12, RSR) As stated earlier, SMRs have the potential to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission reductions. They could provide alternative baseload power generation to facilitate the retirement of older, smaller, and less efficient coal generation plants that would, otherwise, not be good candidates for retrofitting carbon capture and storage technology. They could be deployed in regions of the U.S. and the world that have less potential for other forms of carbon-free electricity, such as solar or wind energy. There may be technical or market constraints, such as projected electricity demand growth and transmission capacity, which would support SMR deployment but not GW-scale LWRs. From the on-shore manufacturing perspective, a key point is that the manufacturing base needed for SMRs can be developed domestically. Thus, while the large commercial LWR industry is seeking to transplant portions of its supply chain from current foreign sources to the U.S., the SMR industry offers the potential to establish a large domestic manufacturing base building upon already existing U.S. manufacturing infrastructure and capability, including the Naval shipbuilding and underutilized domestic nuclear component and equipment plants. The study team learned that a number of sustainable domestic jobs could be created that is, the full panoply of design, manufacturing, supplier, and construction activities if the U.S. can establish itself as a credible and substantial designer and manufacturer of SMRs. While many SMR technologies are being studied around the world, a strong U.S. commercialization program can enable U.S. industry to be first to market SMRs, thereby serving as a fulcrum for export growth as well as a lever in influencing international decisions on deploying both nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technology. A viable U.S.-centric SMR industry would enable the U.S. to recapture technological leadership in commercial nuclear technology, which has been lost to suppliers in France, Japan, Korea, Russia, and, now rapidly emerging, China.

Ensures safe nuclear technology - allows the US to promote non-proliferation objectives, otherwise wildfire prolif is inevitable Loudermilk 2011
(Micah, research associate with the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program at National Defense University, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, Journal of Energy Security, 5-31-11, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=116%3Acontent0411&id=314%3Asmall-nuclearreactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-andcosts&tmpl=component&print=1&page=&option=com_content&Itemid=375, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) Reactor safety itself notwithstanding, many argue that the scattering of small reactors around the world would invariably lead to increased proliferation problems as nuclear technology and know-how disseminates around the world. Lost in the argument is the fact that this stance assumes that US decisions on advancing nuclear technology color the world as a whole. In reality, regardless of the US commitment to or abandonment of nuclear energy technology, many countries (notably China) are blazing ahead with research and construction, with 55 plants currently under construction around the

worldthough Fukushima may cause a temporary lull. Since Three Mile Island, the US share of the global nuclear energy trade has declined precipitously as talent and technology begin to concentrate in countries more committed to nuclear power. On the small reactor front, more than 20 countries are examining the technology and the IAEA estimates that 40-100 small reactors will be in operation by 2030. Without US leadership, new nations seek to acquire nuclear technology turn to countries other than the US who may not share a deep commitment to reactor safety and nonproliferation objectives. Strong US leadership globally on nonproliferation requires a vibrant American nuclear industry. This will enable the US to set and enforce standards on nuclear agreements, spent fuel reprocessing, and developing reactor technologies.

A robust domestic industry is critical to signal U.S. leadership on non-proliferation norms. Domenici 2012 (Energy and Infrastructure Program, Energy Project, Maintaining U.S. Leadership in
Global Nuclear Energy Markets, A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Centers Nuclear Inititative. Pete Domenici and Warren Miller, July 2012, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf) JD In addition, policy makers and the public must understand the clear linkages that exist between a strong domestic industry and competitive U.S. nuclear suppliers on the one hand and U.S. leadership in international nuclear markets and nonproliferation issues on the other hand. Americas history of global leadership in this technology area was built on many different factors, including the domestic industrys extensive operating experience, the influence of the highly-respected NRC, technology advances achieved through domestic research and development programs, and a sustained commitment to nonproliferation principles. Maintaining excellence in each of these areas is the only way to assure continued U.S. leadership both technologically and diplomaticallyon nuclear issues of vital interest to our long-term energy and national security.

Development of commercial technology is directly linked to the procurement of weapons BPC 2012
(Bipartisan Policy Center, Bipartisan Policy Center Nuclear Initiative Releases Report on Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets and International Non-Proliferation Issues, 7-19-12, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/news/press-releases/2012/07/bipartisan-policy-center-nuclear-initiativereleases-report-maintaining-, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The new report underscores the relationship between civilian programs and non-proliferation leadership. Nuclear power technologies are distinct from other potential exports in energy or in other sectors where Americas competitive advantage may also be declining. Because of the potential link between commercial technology and weapons development, nuclear power is directly linked to national security concerns, including the threat of proliferation. Although reactors themselves do not pose significant proliferation risks, both uranium-enrichment and spent fuelprocessing technologies can be misused for military purposes. If U.S. nuclear energy leadership continues to diminish, our nation will be facing a situation in which decisions about the technological capabilities and location of fuel-cycle facilities throughout the world will be made without significant U.S. participation. Leadership is important in both commercial and diplomatic arenas, and it requires a vibrant domestic industry; an effective, independent regulator; access to competitive and innovative technologies and services; and the ability to offer practical solutions to safety, security, and nonproliferation challenges.

Unchecked nuclear spread will cause global nuclear war shorter flight times and lack of second strike capacity. Cimbala 2008
(Stephen, Political Science Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, March, Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia Comparative Strategy, Vol 27 No 2, p 113-132, InformaWorld) The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one anothers vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially strategic effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strikevulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the
United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the Revolution in Military Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The

spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the
international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quooriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These

arguments, for a less alarmist viewof nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history War.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the ColdWar was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence rationality according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19
of nuclear policy in the first nuclear age, roughly corresponding to the Cold

SMR production also key to US nuclear tech leadership it would support the development of the most advanced technologies King, et al. 2011
(Marcus (Associate Director of Research at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs), LaVar Huntzinger (Center for Naval Analyses) and Thoi Nguyen (Professor at the University of Santa Clara), Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations, CNA, March 2011, RSR) Finally, a significant appeal of SMRs is their ability to be manufactured substantially within a factory environment using state-of-the-art6 fabrication and manufacturing. While other industries already use advanced modular construction techniques, including for the balance-of-plant systems in nuclear plants, they have

not been applied to the modularization of the nuclear steam supply system. Development and demonstration efforts will be needed in order to adapt the most advanced technologies and processes to domestic nuclear plant fabrication and manufacture. This should yield significant improvements in product performance, quality, and economics. Such an effort can help support the revitalization of U.S. manufacturing, spurring domestic job creation and international leadership in key nuclear supply areas.

Key to overall tech competitiveness- Maintains US workforce and tech edge Fleischmann 2011
(Chuck, Representative from the 3rd District in Tennessee, Small Modular Reactors Could Help With U.S. Energy Needs, American Physical Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2011, http://www.aps.org/publications/capitolhillquarterly/201110/backpage.cfm, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The timely implementation of small reactors could position the United States on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. As the world moves forward in developing new forms of nuclear power, the United States should set a high standard in safety and regulatory process. Other nations have not been as rigorous in their nuclear oversight with far reaching implications. As we consider the disastrous events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility, it is imperative that power companies and regulatory agencies around the world adequately ensure reactor and plant safety to protect the public. Despite terrible tragedies like the natural disaster in Japan, nuclear power is still one of the safest and cleanest energy resources available. The plan to administer these small reactors would create technologically advanced U.S. jobs and improve our global competitiveness . Our country needs quality, high paying jobs. Increasing our competitive edge in rapidly advancing industries will put the United States in a strategic position on the forefront of expanding global technologies in the nuclear arena.

Prefer our internal link explains the last five centuries of global hegemons Drezner 2001 Daniel Drezner (professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University) 2001 State structure, technological leadership and the maintenance of hegemony http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/tech.pdf In this decade, proponents of globalization argue that because information and capital are mobile, the location of innovation has been rendered unimportant.6 While this notion has some popular appeal, the globalization thesis lacks theoretical or empirical support. Theoretically, even in a world of perfect information and perfect capital mobility, economists have shown that the location of technological innovation matters.7 Empirically, the claims of globalization proponents have been far-fetched. Capital is not perfectly mobile, and increased economic exchange does not lead to a seamless transfer of technology from one country to another.8 The location of innovation still matters. Long-cycle theorists have paid the most attention to the link between technological innovation, economic growth, and the rise and fall of hegemons.9 They argue that the past five hundred years of the global political economy can be explained by the waxing and waning of hegemonic powers. Countries acquire hegemonic status because they are the first to develop a cluster of technologies in leading sectors. These innovations generate spillover effects to the rest of the lead economy, and then to the global economy. Over time, these technological hegemons fail to maintain the rate of innovations, leading to a period of strife until a new hegemonic power is found.

Otherwise status based great power conflict is inevitable relative lead key to prevent global conflict Wohlforth 2009 William C. Wohlforth (a professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009
Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War Project Muse Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may

affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional goodsomething whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 If everyone has high status, Randall Schweller notes, no one does.8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9 I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity. The rest of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three ways: by showing that the theory advanced here is consistent with what we know about large-scale patterns of great power conflict through history; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theorys expectations. Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that major war arises out of a power shift in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state.10 Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzleseach of which might be explained by positional concerns for status. First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebows reading, for example, Thucydides account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assemblys vote for war.11 The issues that inspired Louis XIVs and Napoleons dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challengers dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.12 Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germanys continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.13 Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partnerthe great power that presented the least plausible threat to its

security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status.14 Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join.15 And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders oft-expressed yearning for a place in the sun. The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.16 Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work, the nature and governance of the system, and the distribution of territory among the states in the system.17 If these are the *End Page 32+ issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? 18 Why cant states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power? Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. Most aspects of a given international order are readily divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.19 Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem.20 In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains. Yet recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of decision makers.21 Once issues surrounding the status quo are framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants relative standing, then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily divisible issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be seen as indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains. The historical record surrounding major wars is rich with evidence suggesting that positional concerns over status frustrate bargaining: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder; decision-makers *End Page 33+ inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost. The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.22 This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen.23 The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational

choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status? Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a states satisfaction *End Page 34+ with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a states status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

Solves escalation of global hotspots- retrenchment causes bickering internationally over leadership and prevents cooperation Brzezinski 2012 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (CSIS counselor and trustee and cochairs the CSIS Advisory Board. He is also the Robert E.
Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C. He is cochair of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus and a member of the International Advisory Board of the Atlantic Council. He is a former chairman of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee. He was a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976; and principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in the 1976 presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. In 1981, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in the normalization of U.S.-China relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national security policies of the United States. He was also a member of the Presidents Chemical Warfare Commission (1985), the National Security CouncilDefense Department Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (19871988), and the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (19871989). In 1988, he was cochairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force, and in 2004, he was cochairman of a Council on Foreign Relations task force that issued the report Iran: Time for a New Approach. Dr. Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950) and Ph.D. from Harvard University (1953). He was a member of the faculties of Columbia University (19601989) and Harvard University (19531960). Dr. Brzezinski holds honorary degrees from Georgetown University, Williams College, Fordham University, College of the Holy Cross, Alliance College, the Catholic University of Lublin, Warsaw University, and Vilnius University. He is the recipient of numerous honors and awards) February 2012 After America http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=0,0 For if

America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare

uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More

probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a
world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. RELATED 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India,

Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be
thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will

almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of
commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a

balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others

may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably
mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China

is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's
economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A

decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a
particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another

consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict. None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would
generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start

Nuclear Renaissance
US nuclear renaissance inevitable- Only way to meet demand and government subsidies Worthington 2012 (David Worthington, February 9, 2012, The U.S. nuclear renaissance has begun ,
Smart Planet, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/the-us-nuclear-renaissance-hasbegun/13058) JD There are cooling towers on the horizon in the United States. The nuclear renaissance is slated to begin in rural Georgia with new reactors being built over the next five years, and work is already underway to leap another generation ahead. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) today announced that it has granted licenses to a consortium of utilities to erect two Westinghouse AP 1000 reactors at Southern Companys existing Vogtle site, clearing a path to end a decades long hiatus in new construction. Westinghouses design incorporates passive cooling, which extends the duration under which a reactor can operate safely without outside intervention in the event of a disaster. The AP 1000 is classified as Generation III+ reactor. Generation III+ reactors have more redundant systems than older reactor designs. Those include emergency cooling systems, a double containment system, and an ashtray like cooling area to capture molten fuel in the event of a meltdown. Existing U.S. nuclear reactors require active cooling such as electric water pumps. Japans Fukushima used active cooling, and its reactors melted down last spring when external power was unavailable. There are a total of 104 nuclear plants in the U.S today that are dependent upon active cooling. The meltdown risk associated with those legacy reactors and the high capital requirements of nuclear power are some of the reasons why no new reactor has been built in the U.S since the late 1970s, when the 1979 Three Mile Island incident soured public sentiment. For now, anti-nuclear sentiment has been marginalized. The U.S. is energy hungry and nuclear power is receiving generous government subsidies. The Vogtle reactors would power up to 1 million homes at a cost of US$14 billion, CNN reported.

And internationally- Multiple countries going nuclear now Chu, 2010

(Steven, Energy Sectretary, America's New Nuclear Option, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704231304575092130239999278.html, accessed 8-312, RSR) Perhaps most importantly, investing in nuclear energy will position America to lead in a growing industry. World-wide electricity generation is projected to rise 77% by 2030. If we are serious about cutting carbon pollution then nuclear power must be part of the solution. Countries such as China, South Korea and India have recognized this and are making investments in nuclear power that are driving demand for nuclear technologies. Our choice is clear: Develop these technologies today or import them tomorrow.

Successful US SMRs allow us to shape international renaissance- SMRs already being studied but US leadership key to effective deployment Rosner and Goldberg 2011 (Robert Rosner, astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy
Policy Institute at Chicago, and Stephen Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011) There are many opportunities and challenges for United States industry and government to be leaders in SMR technology. Opportunities As stated earlier, SMRs have the potential to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission reductions. They could provide alternative baseload power

generation to facilitate the retirement of older, smaller, and less efficient coal generation plants that would, otherwise, not be good candidates for retrofitting carbon capture and storage technology. They could be deployed in regions of the U.S. and the world that have less potential for other forms of carbon-free electricity, such as solar or wind energy. There may be technical or market constraints, such as projected electricity demand growth and transmission capacity, which would support SMR deployment but not GW-scale LWRs. From the on-shore manufacturing perspective, a key point is that the manufacturing base needed for SMRs can be developed domestically. Thus, while the large commercial LWR industry is seeking to transplant portions of its supply chain from current foreign sources to the U.S., the SMR industry offers the potential to establish a large domestic manufacturing base building upon already existing U.S. manufacturing infrastructure and capability, including the Naval shipbuilding and underutilized domestic nuclear component and equipment plants. The study team learned that a number of sustainable domestic jobs could be created that is, the full panoply of design, manufacturing, supplier, and construction activities if the U.S. can establish itself as a credible and substantial designer and manufacturer of SMRs. While many SMR technologies are being studied around the world, a strong U.S. commercialization program can enable U.S. industry to be first to market SMRs, thereby serving as a fulcrum for export growth as well as a lever in influencing international decisions on deploying both nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technology. A viable U.S.-centric SMR industry would enable the U.S. to recapture technological leadership in commercial nuclear technology, which has been lost to suppliers in France, Japan, Korea, Russia, and, now rapidly emerging, China.

Old reactor types make meltdowns inevitable reactors have shut down in the past and the NRC has failed at regulation Gronlund 2007 (Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf) JD Safety problems remain despite a lack of serious accidents. A serious nuclear power accident has not occurred in
the United States since 1979, when the Three Mile Island reactor in Pennsylvania experienced a partial core meltdown. However, the absence of serious accidents does not necessarily indicate that safety measures and oversight are adequate. Since 1979, there

have been 35 instances in which individual reactors have shut down to restore safety standards, and the owner has taken a year or more to address dozens or even hundreds of equipment impairments that had accumulated over a period of years. The most recent such shutdown occurred in 2002. These year-plus closures indicate that the NRC has been doing a poor job of regulating the safety of power reactors. An effective
regulator would be neither unaware nor passively tolerant of safety problems so extensive that a year or more is needed to fix them.

SMRs solve Wheeler 10 (November 22, 2010, Small Modular Reactors May Offer Significant Safety & Security
Enhancements, John Wheeler, Clear Trend, http://thisweekinnuclear.com/?p=1193) JD Even better, most SMRs are small enough that they cannot over heat and melt down . They get all the cooling they need from air circulating around the reactor. This is a big deal because if SMRs cant melt down, then they cant release radioactive gas that would pose a risk to the public. Again, this means the need for external emergency actions is virtually eliminated. Also, some SMRs are not water cooled; they use gas, liquid salt, or liquid
metal coolants that operate at low pressures. This lower operating pressure means that if radioactive gases build up inside the containment building there is less pressure to push the gas out and into the air. If there is no pressure to push radioactive gas into the environment and all of it stays inside the plant, then it poses no risk to the public. SMRs are small enough to be built underground. This means they

will have a smaller physical footprint that will be easier to defend against physical attacks. This provides additional
benefits of lower construction costs because earth, concrete and steel are less costly than elaborate security systems in use today, and lower operating costs (a smaller footprint means a smaller security force).

Meltdowns cause extinction Lendman, 2011

(Stephen, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, 03/ 13, Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,, The Peoples Voice http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclearmeltdown-in-japan, accessed 8-2-12, RSR)
Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under

a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas
unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions

from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly
likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If

the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event.

Old reactor types make nuke terror inevitable- Theyll steal fissile material Early, et al., 2009
(Bryan (Former Research Fellow at Harvards Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), Matthew Fuhrmann (Professor in Political Science at Texas A&M) and Quan Li (Professor in Political Science at Texas A&M), Atoms for Terror: The Determinants of Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism, Social Science Research Network, RSR) The presence and size of a civilian nuclear infrastructure affect terrorist groups cost-benefit calculus in several respects. First, as many pundits agree, gaining access to the NR materials represents the most important hurdle for terrorist groups seeking to engage in NR terrorism. The presence and size of a civilian nuclear infrastructure increase the availability of fissile materials (e.g., plutonium or highly-enriched uranium, HEU) and
radioactive materials (e.g., Cesium-137 and Strontium-90), all of which could be used in NR terror attacks.18 According to various studies, these materials are widely available in countries with nuclear programs and sometimes poorly guarded.19 Being both rational and cost sensitive,

terrorists will be tempted to either steal NR materials or purchase them illicitly when they are cheap and/or readily available. Since terrorists have significantly greater access to nuclear and radiological materials in countries with civil nuclear infrastructures, the probability that they will employ NR terrorism in these states increases .20 Although terrorists could acquire NR materials in one country and use them in another, it is easier to use the materials in the same country where they are acquired. Transporting NR across borders involves additional costs and raises the likelihood that the materials will be interdicted. Groups are cognizant of this consideration
and often look for NR materials in the country that they wish to attack.

Terrorists can also use aircrafts and truck bombs to trigger a meltdown. Schifman 2010
(Ben, J.D. Candidate at the Columbia School of Law, The Limits of NEPA: Consideration of the Impacts of Terrorism in Environmental Impact Statements for Nuclear Facilities, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 35, No. 2, pg. 374, RSR) Existing nuclear power plants were designed to withstand natural disasters, such as earthquakes, but not deliberate attacks such as those that took place on September 11, 2001. 3 Such an aircraft strike on a nuclear plant could cause a core meltdown, releasing hundreds of times the radioactivity of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. 4 Even if it did not affect the reactor, the effects of an attack on only the fuel stored at a plant could be catastrophic. 5 Even a smaller-scale attack, such as one using a truck bomb, could inflict severe damage. 6 An attack on a facility near a major metropolitan area, such as the Indian Point reactor near New York City, could result in massive environmental devastation as well as up to 44,000 near-term deaths and as
many as 518,000 long-term deaths.

SMRs solve - theyre buried underground, heavily layered and no on-site refueling Loudermilk 2011
(Micah, research associate with the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program at National Defense University, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, Journal of Energy Security, 5-31-11, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=116%3Acontent0411&id=314%3Asmall-nuclearreactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-andcosts&tmpl=component&print=1&page=&option=com_content&Itemid=375, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) As to the small reactors themselves, the designs achieve a degree of proliferation-resistance unmatched by large reactors. Small enough to be fully buried underground in independent silos, the concrete surrounding the reactor vessels can be layered much thicker than the traditional domes that protect conventional reactors
without collapsing. Coupled with these two levels of superior physical protection is the traditional security associated with reactors today. Most

small reactors also are factory-sealed with a supply of fuel inside. Instead of refueling reactors onsite, SMRs are returned to the factory, intact, for removal of spent fuel and refueling. By closing off the fuel cycle, proliferation risks associated with the nuclear fuel running the reactors are mitigated and concerns over the widespread distribution of nuclear fuel allayed.

Nuclear terrorism causes retaliation that sparks global nuclear war and extinction. Ayson 2010
(Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July) But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to

be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

Solvency
Incentives now takes out their disads WNN 12 (World Nuclear News, SMR vendors apply for government funds, May 22 2012,
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-SMR_vendors_apply_for_government_funds-2205124.html) JD The DoE announced in March 2012 that a total of $450 million would be available to support the development and licensing for up to two SMR designs over five years. The funding, through cost sharing agreements with private industry, is expected to provide a total investment of about $900 million. The deadline for applications was 21 May. In its call for applications, the DoE said that the funding program was "to promote the accelerated commercialization of SMR technologies that offer affordable, safe, secure and robust
sources of nuclear energy that can help meet the nation's economic, energy security and climate change objectives." It requested that applicants "provide their plans for attaining design certifications and licences in order to identify the most viable candidates for accelerated commercialization."

But only the plan solves- production cost incentives for SMRs key Creates a sustainable domestic industry. Rosner and Goldberg, 11
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011) RCM Production Cost Incentive: A production cost incentive is a performance-based incentive. With a production cost incentive, the government incentive would be triggered only when the project successfully operates . The project sponsors would assume full responsibility for the upfront capital cost and would assume the full risk for project construction. The production cost incentive would establish a target price, a so-called market-based benchmark. Any savings in energy generation costs over the target price would accrue to the generator. Thus, a production cost incentive would provide a strong motivation for cost control and learning improvements , since any gains greater than target levels would enhance project net cash flow. Initial SMR deployments, without the benefits of learning, will have significantly higher costs than fully commercialized SMR plants and thus would benefit from production cost incentives. Because any production cost differential would decline rapidly due to the combined effect of module manufacturing rates and learning experience, the financial incentive could be set at a declining rate, and the level would be determined on a plant-by-plant basis, based on the achievement of cost reduction targets.43 The key design parameters for the incentive include the following: 1. The magnitude of the
deployment incentive

should decline with the number of SMR modules and should phase out after the fleet of LEAD and FOAK plants has been deployed. 2. The incentive should be market-based rather than cost-based; the incentive should take into account not only the cost of SMRs but also the cost of competing technologies and be set accordingly. 3. The deployment incentive could take several forms, including a direct payment to offset a portion of production costs or a production tax credit. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized a production tax credit of $18/MWh (1.8/kWh) for up to 6,000 MW of new nuclear power plant capacity. To qualify, a project must commence operations by 2021 . Treasury Department guidelines further required that a qualifying project initiate construction, defined as the pouring of safety- related concrete, by 2014. Currently, two GW-scale projects totaling 4,600 MW are in early construction; consequently, as much as 1,400 MW in credits is available for other nuclear projects, including SMRs. The budgetary cost of providing the production cost incentive depends on the learning rate and the market price of electricity generated from the SMR project. Higher learning rates and higher market prices would decrease the

magnitude of the incentive; lower rates and lower market prices would increase the need for production incentives. Using two
scenarios (with market prices based on the cost of natural gas combined-cycle generation) yields the following range of estimates of the size of production incentives required for the FOAK plants described earlier. For a 10% learning rate, Based $60/MWh44 (6/kWh), the LEAD plant and the subsequent eight FOAK plants

on a market price of would need, on average, a production credit of $13.60/MWh (1.4/kWh), 24% less than the $18 credit currently available to renewable and GWscale nuclear technologies. (The actual credit would be on a sliding scale, with the credit for the LEAD plant at approximately $31/MWh, or 3.1/kWh, declining to a credit of about $6/MWh, or 0.6/kWh, by the time of deployment of FOAK-8). The total cost of the credit would be about $600 million per year (once all plants were built and operating). If the market
price were about $70/MWh (7/kWh), the LEAD and only four subsequent FOAK plants would require a production incentive. In this case, the average incentive would be $8.40/MWh (0.8/kWh), with a total cost of about $200 million per year. Higher learning rates would drive down the size of the production incentive. For example, at a 12% learning rate, At a market price of $60/MWh (6/kWh), the LEAD and the subsequent five FOAK plants would require a production incentive, with an average incentive level of about $15/MWh (1.5/kWh). Total annual cost (after all plants are in full operation) would be about $450 million per year. At a market price of $70/MWh (7/kWh), the LEAD and three FOAK plants would require a production incentive averaging $9.00/MWh (0.9/kWh, half of the current statutory incentive), with a total annual cost of about $170 million per year. The

range of costs for the production incentive illustrates the sensitivity of the incentive level to the learning rate and the market price of electricity. Thus, efforts to achieve higher learning rates, including fully optimized engineering designs for the SMRs and the manufacturing plant, as well as specially targeted market introduction opportunities that enable SMRs to sell electricity for higher priced and higher value applications, can have a critical impact on the requirements for production incentives. The potential size of the incentive should be subject to
further analysis as higher quality cost estimates become available.

Designs are good to go Gallagher 2011

(Nancy, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Marylands School of Public Policy, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR ZERO, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 442, RSR) Current efforts to develop small modular reactors could be redirected to prioritize the most proliferation-resistant designs, even if they are not the designs that are closest to becoming commercially available. Technically sound designs exist for small reactors with sealed cores that would not require refueling for multiple decades. Regional fuel cycle centers could produce these lightweight, passively safe reactors; transport them by rail, road, or barge to the desired location; then return them to the regional center for spent fuel management. Implementing this hub-and-spoke arrangement on a large enough scale to help avert
catastrophic climate change would require both nuclear disarmament and subordination of national and commercial advanced fuel cycle operations to international control. That is hard to envision under current conditions, but it

is even harder to figure out how to simultaneously avert global warming and prevent proliferation in a less radical way.

Government funding specifically key its necessary to overcome upfront costs, long timeframes, and uncertain returns. Rosner and Goldberg 2011
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011) RCM Assuming that early SMR deployments will carry cost premiums (until the benefits of learning are achieved), the issue is whether federal government incentives are needed to help overcome this barrier. Some may argue that commercial deployment will occur, albeit at a slower pace , as the cost of alternatives increases to a level that makes initial SMR deployments competitive. Others may argue that SMR vendors should market initial modules at market prices and absorb any losses until a sufficient number of modules are sold that will begin to generate a profit. However, the combination of the large upfront capital investment , the long period before a return on capital may

be achieved, and the large uncertainty in the potential level of return on investment make it unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive . The present
analysis assumes that government incentives will be essential to bridging this gap and accelerating private sector investment (see Appendix D). It is the study teams understanding that DOE has proposed to share the cost of certain SMR design and licensing study activi ties. This section analyzes possible options for government incentives for early deployments (LEAD and FOAK plants) in addition to federal cost sharing for the design and licensing effort. The present analysis considers several alternative approaches to providing such incentives, either in the form of direct or indirect government financial incentives, or through market transformation actions that will spur demand for FOAK plants in competitive applications. The study teams approach is to identify targeted, least-cost incentives that could form the basis for further dialogue between stakeholders and policy makers. Possible financial

incentives need to be designed and evaluated relative to a particular management model for deployment of LEAD and FOAK plants. The study teams management model assumes that
these initial SMR plants will be managed and financed by the private sector, consisting of a possible consortium of the SMR vendor, the reactor module manufacturer, other major vendors, a host-site utility company, and one or more other electricity generation or vertically integrated utilities. The types of incentives that could be structured for this type of management model are discussed in the subsections that follow. Other management models were considered by the team. These alternative models would have a greater direct government role in the ownership, financing, and marketing of the SMR plant. Under a build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) model, for example, the federal government would license, build, finance, and operate an SMR plant, and upon successful operation, seek to transfer ownership to the private sector. Another model would provide for the federal government to lease a privately developed SMR plant and take full responsibility for operation of the plant and marketing of the power generation. The various possible management models are described and contrasted further in Appendix E.

Key to reduce risky investment and encourage learning necessary for job creations and proliferation leadership. Westenhaus 2011 (Brian | Thu, 15 December 23:44 Small Modular Nuclear Reactors to be Mass
Produced in US? http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Small-Modular-NuclearReactors-To-Be-Mass-Produced-In-US.html ) RCM New studies from the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago (EPIC) conclude that small modular reactors may hold the key to the future of U.S. nuclear power generation. The reports assess the economic feasibility of classical, gigawatt-scale reactors and the possible new generation of modular reactors. The smaller modular reactors as considered would have generating capacities of 600 megawatts or less, would be factory-built as modular components, and then shipped to their desired location for assembly. As a beginning point on other news this week, the reports followed up a 2004 University of Chicago study on the economic future of nuclear energy. The 2004 study concluded that the nuclear energy industry would need financial incentives from the federal government in order to build new plants that could compete with coal and gas fired plants. The other news this week is the realization by many that the Obama appointment of Gregory Jaczko, to Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should be removed. A petition drive is underway at Change.org, following an inspector generals report released last June that said Jaczko intimidated staff members who disagreed with him and withheld information from members of the commission to gain their support. The report also said several high-ranking employees at the independent agency complained that Chairman Jaczko delayed and hindered their work on important projects. The inspector general report times well with the four experienced and well-educated nuclear energy professional commissioners, who among them can count close to 100 years of working with nuclear reactors, nuclear safety analysis, nuclear propulsion plants, advanced nuclear energy research and development, and nuclear project management, that have signed a letter addressed to the Chief of Staff of the President of the United States detailing their frustration with the leadership style and decision making processes used by the 41-year-old, politically-appointed Chairman. Its far past time for Jaczko to return to Congress where his skill set can be hidden more effectively. Back out in Chicago the newest University of Chicago report is clear, It would be a huge stimulus for high-valued job growth , restore U.S. leadership in nuclear reactor technology and, most importantly, strengthen U.S. leadership in a post-Fukushima world, on matters of nuclear safety , nuclear security , nonproliferation , and nuclear waste management . Robert Rosner, the EPIC director and the William Wrather Distinguished Service

Professor in Astronomy & Astrophysics, sums the obvious and now well proven with, Clearly, a robust commercial SMR industry is highly advantageous to many sectors in the United States. The earlier report, Analysis of GW-scale Overnight Costs, updates the overnight cost estimates of the 2004 report. Overnight costs are the estimated costs if you were to build a new large reactor overnight, that is, using current input prices and excluding the cost of financing. It would now cost $4,210 per kilowatt to build a new gigawatt-scale reactor, according to the new report. This cost is approximately $2,210 per kilowatt higher than the 2004 estimate because of commodity price changes and other factors. A near doubling in just 7 years. The problem is explained in part by Center for Strategic and International Studies CEO John Hamre who said that economic issues have hindered the construction of new largescale reactors in the United States. The key challenge facing the industry is the seven-to-nine-year gap between making a commitment to build a nuclear plant and revenue generation. This is a real problem. Hamre said. Few companies can afford to wait that long to see a return on the $10 billion investment. Nor can the ratepayers. But the advent of the small modular reactor offers the promise of factory construction efficiencies and a much shorter timeline. That could be so if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be at work executing on its mandate. This could be a huge economic development opportunity. Small modular reactors could be especially appealing for markets that could not easily accommodate gigawatt-scale plants, such as those currently served by aging, 200- to 400-megawatt coal plants, which are likely to be phased out during the next decade. The other hand holds some problems. The new modular designs in mass production affecting price reductions depends partly on how quickly manufacturers can learn to build them efficiently. The faster you learn, the better off you are in the long term because you get to the point where you actually start making money faster, Rosner noted. Its the risk that matters. Nuclear is vastly more capital demanding than natural gas. Should efficiency continue its trend, or a new technology breakout, or the economy drift lower and slower, having a huge capital investment waiting years to build, more years to recover the investment, with rates indeterminate sets an investor up for a generations worth of worry. Yet the new reactors could be the low capital investment leaders if the stage were to be set for the good of the nation over the fears of the fools.

Extra Advantages

Economy
Slowing growth, increased taxes and the debt crises will result in a recession now. Crutsinger 8/2 (Martin Crutsinger, Fed: US growth slows, but no action needed _ yet, AP Economics
Writer / August 2, 2012, http://www.boston.com/business/news/2012/08/01/fed-says-economy-hasslowed-takes-new-steps/rZBAjeR07EmouRnoIDtzJN/story.html) JD U.S. economic growth slowed to an annual rate of just 1.5 percent from April through June. Thats down from a 2 percent rate in the first quarter and a 4.1 percent rate in the fourth quarter of 2011. Fed officials have signaled in speeches their concern about job growth and consumer spending. Bernanke told Congress two weeks ago that the Fed is prepared to take further action if unemployment stays high. Worries have also intensified the U.S. economy will fall off a fiscal cliff at the end of the year. Thats when tax increases and deep spending cuts will take effect unless Congress reaches a budget deal. A recession could follow, Bernanke has warned. Economists also are concerned that the debt crisis in Europe could intensify. Borrowing costs are too high for many governments, including Spain and Italy, and growth is
slowing across the region as the effects of budget-cutting take hold. Unemployment hit a record 11.2 percent in June for the 17 countries that use the euro currency.

However, the development of an SMR industry will result in significant economic benefits. SRS 10 (SRS Community Reuse Organization, September 29, 2010 at a Center for Strategic &
International Studies forum, http://www.srscro.org/energy-park/small-modular-reactors/) JD
A new assessment of potential American jobs created by development, manufacture, and deployment of small modular reactors in the U.S. was unveiled on September 29, 2010 at a Center for Strategic & International Studies forum. The study was underwritten by the American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness. The study concludes that development

of a robust domestic SMR industry

will result in significant economic benefits.

The analysis was a collaborative effort by the Boise State University in

conjunction with the University of New Mexico. According to the report:A

prototypical SMR costing $500 million to manufacture and install on-site is estimated to create nearly 7,000 jobs and generate $1.3 billion in sales, $627 million in value-added, $404 million in earnings (payroll) and $35 million in indirect business taxes. In addition, the annual operation of each 100 MW SMR unit is estimated to create about 375 jobs and generate $107 million in sales, $68 million in value-added, $27 million in earnings payroll) , and $9 million in indirect business taxes. total economic impacts were determined to range from $200B $400B.

These growths will be linear. Goff 10 (Emily Goff, October 1, 2010, Small Reactors, Large Potential Impact, The Heritage Foundation,
http://blog.heritage.org/2010/10/01/small-reactors-large-potential-impact/) JD
The study investigates potential impacts of SMR manufacturing, construction, and operation on the U.S. economy. Researchers relied on organizational model data contributions from industry members, demonstrating their integral role in new nuclear technology advancement. As the studys inputoutput analysis reveals, both the direct and indirect economic impacts are potentially quite robust. Findings taken directly from the study project that: - A prototypical 100 megawatt (MW) SMR costing $500 million to manufacture and install onsite is estimated to create nearly 7,000 jobs and generate $1.3 billion in sales, $627 million in value-added impacts (a measure of GDP), $404 million in earnings (payroll), and $35 million in indirect business taxes; -The annual operation of each 100 MW SMR unit is estimated to create about 375 jobs and generate $107 million in sales, $68 million in value-added impacts, $27 million in earnings (payroll), and $9 million in indirect business taxes.

Four scenarios assuming certain levels of energy demand and SMR adoptionhigh, moderate, low, and disruptivelay out the economic growth projections for the U.S., using the year 2030 as a benchmark. Nuclear power capacity expansion, SMR market share of that expansion, and U.S. presence in the SMR market are also taken into account. Under a high adoption case in which the U.S. manufactures 40 SMRs annually, the U.S. could see 255,000 jobs created annually, $48.3 billion generated annually in sales, and $23.2 billion generated annually in value-added impacts. Additionally, domestic operation of the reactors through 2030 would mean 81,000 jobs, $23 billion in sales, and $15 billion in value-added impacts. Under a moderate adoption case of 30
reactors manufactured annually, the annual growth estimates are 215,000 jobs, $40.5 billion in sales, and $19.4 billion in value-added impacts. Domestic operation of the reactors through 2030 creates 50,000 jobs, $15 billion in sales, and $9.6 billion in value-added impacts.

A double dip recession triggers an economic depression. Isidore, 11

(Chris, Senior Writer, Recession 2.0 would hurt worse CNN Money, 8-10-11, http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/10/news/economy/double_dip_recession_economy/index.htm, accessed 8-2-11, RSR) Another recession could be even worse than the last one for a few reasons. For starters, the economy is more vulnerable than it was in 2007 when the Great Recession began. In fact, the economy would enter the new recession much weaker than the start of any other downturn since the end of World War II. Unemployment currently stands at 9.1%. In November 2007, the month before the start of the Great Recession, it was just 4.7%. And the large number of Americans who have stopped looking for work in the last few years has left the percentage of the population with a job at a 28-year low. Various parts of the economy also have yet to recover from the last recession and would be at serious risk of lasting damage i n a new downturn. Home values continue to lose ground and are projected to continue their fall. While manufacturing has had a nice rebound in the last two years, industrial production is still 18% below pre-recession levels. There are nearly 900 banks on the FDIC's list of troubled institutions, the highest number since 1993. Only 76 banks were at risk as the Great Recession took hold. But what has economists particularly worried is that the tools generally used to try to jumpstart an economy teetering on the edge of recession aren't available this time around. "The reason we didn't go into a depression three years ago is the policy response by Congress and the Fed," said Dan Seiver, a finance professor at San Diego State University. "We won't see that this time." Three times between 2008 and 2010, Congress approved massive spending or temporary tax cuts to try to stimulate the economy. But fresh from the bruising debt ceiling battle and credit rating downgrade, and with elections looming, the federal government has shown little inclination to move in that direction. So this new recession would likely have virtually no policy effort to counteract it .

Economic collapse results in nuclear war. Burrows and Harris 09

(Mathew J. Burrows, counselor in the National Intelligence Council, PhD in European History from Cambridge University, and Jennifer Harris, a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit, April 2009 Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf)
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history

may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying
those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms

appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be
a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become

self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements

with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short
of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal

stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves , but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Warming
Global warming is happening; 5 reasons NWF 12 (July 2012, National Wildlife Federation, http://www.nwf.org/Global-Warming/What-isGlobal-Warming/Global-Warming-is-Happening-Now.aspx) JD No longer is global warming something only facing future generations. Changes to our climate are being documented all across the planet today. People, animals, and plants are already feeling the heat. Temperatures are increasing The most striking evidence of a global warming trend is closely scrutinized data that show a relatively rapid and widespread increase in temperature during the past century. The 10 warmest years on record occurred during 1997-2008, according to
NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies. The rising temperatures observed since 1978 are particularly noteworthy because the rate of increase is so high and because, during the same period, the energy reaching the Earth from the Sun had been measured precisely enough to

Declining sea ice is one of the most visible signs of global warming on our planet. Since 1979, Arctic sea ice extent in September (when the annual minimum is reached) has declined by over 30 percent, according to the National Snow and Ice Data Center. The ice extent has
conclude that Earth's warming was not due to changes in the Sun. Sea ice is melting been declining in other seasons, too. Despite slightly larger ice extents in 2009, recent observations indicated that the ice is thinner and much younger (less multiyear ice) than it used to be. Covering an average of 9.6 million square miles, these areas of ice floating on ocean waters play an important role in regulating our climate, by reflecting some sunlight back to space, and in the life cycles of many polar species, such as polar bears, seals, and walruses. Precipitation patterns are changing

Some places are getting more rainfall and others are getting less. Nearly everywhere is experiencing more heavy rainfall events, as warmer air is able to hold more water vapor. Right here in
the United States, we are already seeing some important trends in precipitation. The Southwest appears to be shifting to a more arid climate, in which Dust Bowl conditions will become the new norm. Annual

precipitation totals in the Northeast, Midwest, and Plains have increased by 5 to 20 percent during the last 50 years. The southeastern United States is having both more drought and more floods. Oceans are acidifying The ocean has absorbed a large fraction of the carbon dioxide fossil fuel burning has pumped into the atmosphere, slowing the rate of global warming. But, all this extra carbon dioxide is impacting the ocean, too. The pH of surface seawater has decreased by 0.1 units since 1750, and is projected to drop another 0.5 units by 2100 if no action is taken to curb fossil fuel emissions. These changes would take tens of thousands of years to reverse. Sea levels are rising Global sea level has increased by roughly 8 inches over the past century , and the rate of increase
is accelerating. Global warming causes sea-level rise in two ways: (1) Ocean water is expanding as it warms. (2) Land-based ice in glaciers and ice sheets is melting. Sea-level rise has been happening even faster than scientists anticipated a few years ago. If recent projections are accurate, 2-3F warming could bring about 3 feet of global sea-level rise by 2100, displacing approximately 56 million people in 84 developing countries around the world. Coastal habitats also face major changes as low-lying areas are inundated with saltwater.

Its anthropogenic and scientific consensus goes aff. Lewandowsky and Ashley 2011 (Stephan Lewandowsky, Professor of Cognitive Studies at the
University of Western Australia, and Michael Ashley, Professor of Astrophysics at the University of New South Wales, June 24, 2011, The false, the confused and the mendacious: how the media gets it wrong on climate change, http://goo.gl/u3nOC) But despite these complexities, some aspects of climate science are thoroughly settled. We know that atmospheric CO2 is increasing due to humans. We know that this CO2, while being just a small fraction of the atmosphere, has an important influence on temperature. We can calculate the effect, and predict what is going to happen to the earths climate during our lifetimes, all based on fundamental physics that is as certain as gravity. The consensus opinion of the worlds climate scientists is that climate change is occurring due to human CO emissions. The changes are rapid and significant, and the implications for our civilisation may be dire. The chance of these statements being
wrong is vanishingly small. Scepticism and denialism Some people will be understandably sceptical about that last statement. But when they read up on the science, and have their questions answered by climate scientists, they come around. These people are true sceptics, and a degree of scepticism is healthy. Other people

will disagree with the scientific consensus on climate change, and will no matter how many times they are shown to be wrong, they will never change their opinions. These people are deniers. The recent articles in The
challenge the science on internet blogs and opinion pieces in the media, but Conversation have put the deniers under the microscope. Some readers have asked us in the comments to address the scientific questions that the deniers bring up. This has been done. Not once. Not twice. Not ten times. Probably more like 100 or a 1000 times. Denier

arguments

have been dealt with by scientists, again and again and again. But like zombies, the deniers keep coming back with the
same long-falsified and nonsensical arguments. The deniers have seemingly endless enthusiasm to post on blogs, write letters to editors, write

opinion pieces for newspapers, and even publish books. What they rarely do is write coherent scientific papers on their theories and submit them to scientific journals. The few published papers that have been sceptical about climate change have not withstood the test of time. The phony debate on climate change So if the evidence is this strong, why is there resistance to action on climate change in Australia? At least two reasons can be cited. First, as The Conversation has revealed, there

are a handful of individuals and organisations who, by avoiding peer review, have engineered a phony public debate about the science, when in fact that debate is absent from the one arena where our scientific knowledge is formed. These individuals and
organisations have so far largely escaped accountability. But their free ride has come to an end, as the next few weeks on The Conversation will continue to show. The second reason, alas, involves systemic failures by the media. Systemic media failures arise from several presumptions about the way science works, which range from being utterly false to dangerously ill-informed to overtly malicious and mendacious. The false Lets begin with what is merely false. A

tacit presumption of many in the media and the public is that climate science is a brittle house of cards that can be brought down by a single new finding or the discovery of a single error. Nothing could be further from the truth. Climate science is a cumulative enterprise built upon hundreds of years of research. The heat-trapping properties of CO were discovered in the middle of the 19th century, pre-dating even Sherlock
Holmes and Queen Victoria.

SMRs key to spurring the development of nuclear technology increases the competitive edge. Fleischmann, 11
(Chuck, Representative from the 3rd District in Tennessee, Small Modular Reactors Could Help With U.S. Energy Needs, American Physical Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2011, http://www.aps.org/publications/capitolhillquarterly/201110/backpage.cfm, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The timely implementation of small reactors could position the United States on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. As the world moves forward in developing new forms of nuclear power, the United States should set a high standard in safety and regulatory process. Other nations have not been as rigorous in their nuclear oversight with far reaching implications. As we consider the disastrous events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility, it is imperative that power companies and regulatory agencies around the world adequately ensure reactor and plant safety to protect the public. Despite terrible tragedies like the natural disaster in Japan, nuclear power is still one of the safest and cleanest energy resources available. The plan to administer these small reactors would create technologically advanced U.S. jobs and improve our global competitiveness . Our country needs quality, high paying jobs. Increasing our competitive edge in rapidly advancing industries will put the United States in a strategic position on the forefront of expanding global technologies in the nuclear arena.

Nuclear tech solves warming decreases reliance on carbon based sources. WNA 7 (World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Energy: Meeting the Climate Change Challenge , IPCC, 4th
Assessment Report, Mitigation of Climate Change (2007), http://www.worldnuclear.org/climatechange/nuclear_meetingthe_climatechange_challenge.html)
Over the next twenty five years global electricity demand is expected to double. By the middle of the 21st century that demand could be three or four times larger than that of today. Growth is inevitable and necessary, as the world economy evolves and countries seek to improve the quality of life of their citizens. Meeting the increasing low or non-emitting

demand for electricity will require a mix of energy resources, with sources, including nuclear power, taking an increasingly predominant role. Nuclear energy already makes a substantial environmental contribution to generating electricity. Today nuclear power plants operating in over thirty countries produce 15% of the worlds electricity, avoiding the emission of over two billion tonnes of carbon dioxide each year. This saving equals more than 20% of global CO2 emissions from power generation. Extensive studies have shown that the full lifecycle emissions from nuclear power are similar to most forms of
renewable generation, and many times lower than electricity generation from fossil fuels. Nuclear technologies can be used in areas other than the generation of clean low carbon electricity. A number of nuclear reactors have already been used to power desalination plant, a role that will become increasingly important as the worlds water resources become scarcer.

Nuclear technologies can also be able to reduce emissions in the transport sector by providing electricity to recharge battery-powered vehicles or by producing hydrogen for fuel cells. Nuclear power plant designed to generate high temperature heat will be able supply
process heat, enabling industry to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels.

Warming causes extinction Tickell, 8

(Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction, 8-11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2008/aug/11/ climatechange)
We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the

idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing longterm sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The
world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather

would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the
summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And

as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far
this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the

warming caused by

human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

Peak Oil
Peak oil will occur before 2015 Smith 7 (Michael, DOE and EPA official, Resource Depletion: Modeling and
Forecasting Oil Production, Modeling the Oil Transition: A Summary of the Proceedings of the DOE/EPA Workshop on the Economic and Environmental Implications of Global Energy Transitions)
aking all of the above into consideration, global oil production can be analyzed and my analysis shows that it is truly due to peak between 2010 and 2020 (Figure 19.6). Onshore

production (shown in green) has been on a plateau for the past 25 years, largely due to OPECs restrictions on

production. Offshore production will peak around 2015, at which time global oil production will as well . Although Figure 19.6 does not include the production of synthetic crude oil from unconventional sources, this will not come on-stream fast enough to delay peak by more than a year. Depending on how rapidly petroleum demand grows, an

enormous gap will rapidly open between petroleum demand and supply after 2015 (Figure 19.7). Even if demand is flat, the gap will reach nearly 4 million barrels per day by 2020. But if demand is growing, as it has been, at roughly 2% per year, the gap will exceed 30 million barrels per day as soon as 2020. I am not saying these figures are exactly right, but they are realistic and the message is clear and
compelling. Governments and industry must take many more energy risks in the form of capital intensive projects, alternative forms of energy, alternative means of transport, and increased taxes on petroleum, even rationing systems and even at the expense of votes. Concerns about the environment, in particular global warming, can only help provide the impetus for them to do this. The need is urgent and the time is short.

SMRs are key to delaying peak oil could be used by smaller utility companies, allow for the recovery of more oil and have numerous energy conversion/heating applications. Ingersoll, 9
(Daniel, Senior Program Manager at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Deliberately small reactors and the second nuclear era, Progress in Nuclear Energy, 51, 2009, RSR)
It is likely that large nuclear plants will continue to be the option of choice for well-developed, large-grid markets for the foreseeable future. However, the

rapidly increasing cost of fabrication and construction of large plants in recent years ($46 billion in 2008) may cause smaller utilities and owner/operators to consider smaller plant sizes even in large-grid regions. In developed countries like the U.S., where electricity demand growth has been a modest 1.51.8% per year, the reduced cash outlay feature of smaller plants will become increasingly attractive to customers and investors alike. The real attractiveness of small reactors is their flexibility to enter traditionally non-nuclear energy markets. Additional applications have emerged that could significantly benefit from replacing their current fossil fuel consumption with the use of nuclear power, if the appropriate reactor designs are available. These applications include: Water desalination and purification Advance oil recovery process from oil shale and tar sands Hydrogen production for the enrichment of liquid fuels and eventually fuel cell applications Advanced energy conversion processes such as coal-to-liquids and liquid biofuel production General process heat for chemical or manufacturing processes Districting heating In all cases, smaller sized, more robust reactors are more likely to enable these applications than will large plants because of the many advantages discussed earlier.

Oil peak collapses econ Lundberg 4 (Jan, environmentalist activist and son of oil analyst, Here comes the nutcracker: Peak oil in a nutshell, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/842) KGH
The end of abundant, affordable oil is in sight, and the implications are colossal. About now in our hydrocarbon phase of human history, we have pulled out of the Earth approximately half of the available petroleum (crude oil and natural gas). The other half still in the ground is harder to extract and may not - as assumed - fuel the global economy or even provide a transition to another phase. To hope for an increase in discoveries is to turn a blind eye to the world trend in declining oil extraction which has been relentless for the past four decades. The
approximate bell curve of petroleum extraction cannot be changed by any one big new discovery. Yet, the idea of "the Caspian" or any other mega-field du jour is an example of the constant hope for perpetual energy for high living in contradiction with nature.

The same can be

said of the dominant assumption that petroleum will be replaced by other "technologies ." This ignores the overwhelming petroleum-based infrastructure we have, and neglects to account for the lesser return on energy from non-petroleum sources of energy. But, "they" (scientists, leaders, corporations) will "think of something." Another common assumption popular among "radicals" is that "the ruling elite will refuse" to allow the global economy or the lucrative capitalist system to collapse. If peak oil means we are at a half-way point, does this mean we now have years to either plan energy use or get used to recession, as claimed by many a writer on peak oil? Before the reader makes assumptions on
how society may utilize the remaining store of petroleum, let me repeat what I told The Institute of Petroleum in London two years ago (on February 17, 2003): "What the world went through in 1979s oil crisis, which my former company warned of in the U.S., based on our projection of a 9% shortfall in gasoline deliveries, can happen again. The difference will be that global production of oil will be falling instead of increasing." This

means that the next tough oil shortage, even if it is not acknowledged as a post-peak oil extraction phenomenon of diminishing supply, will cripple the globalized economy. Understanding of both the
economics and social dynamics of collapse is rare, and even when it is present there is an absence of taking into account the "market factor" in ushering in collapse. Despite

the need to be prepared for imminent, final energy shortage - which could happen now or in several years at the latest - people persist in focusing too much on the likely date of the passing of the
peak. It is already clear that the oil industry and OPEC numbers on oil reserves are suspect. So we can simply offer a range of oft-quoted peakoil arrival times: 2005-2012. Some more distant figures such as 2020 are based on infinite technological improvements on extraction and removing the problematic sulfur, for example. Factoring in the "irregular" petroleum sources, the peak year of world oil extraction is to be 2007, according to the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas. A flurry of peak oil stories hit last fall. But in general, the price of oil is deliberately about where the main players want it, as it is so profitable. So let us not look at the $50 price neighborhood as proof of peak oil being here now - although it may be a factor. Taking peak oil doctrine further The bell curve of oil "production" was devised by Marion King Hubbert, a Shell Oil and U.S. government geologist. Although Hubbert has on the whole been borne out except in the minds of fundamentalistclassical economists, what he did not factor in was collapse. Therefore, the curve will be truncated to a cliff just as the gap between supply and demand is felt and hits. The scenario I foresee is that market-based panic will, within a few days, drive prices up skyward. And as supplies can no longer slake daily world demand of over 80 million barrels a day, the market will become paralyzed at prices too high for the wheels of commerce and even daily living in "advanced" societies. There

may be an event that appears to trigger this final energy crash, but the overall cause will be the huge consumption on a finite planet. The trucks will no longer pull into Wal-Mart. Or Safeway or other food stores. The freighters bringing packaged technotoys and whatnot from China will have no fuel. There will be fuel in many places, but hoarding and uncertainty will trigger outages, violence and chaos. For only a short time will the police and military be able to maintain order, if at all. The damage that several days' oil shortage and outage will do will soon wreak permanent damage that starts with companies and consumers not paying their bills and not going to work. After an almost instant depression seizes the modern industrialized world, and nation-states break down, the frantic attempts of people to feed themselves, stay warm and obtain fresh water (pumped presently via petroleum to a great extent), there will be no rescue. Die-off begins. The least petroleum-dependent communities will survive best . These "backward" nations will be emulated by the scrounging survivors of the U.S. and the rest of the "developed" world, as far as local food production will be tried - in a paved-over, toxic landscape by people who have lost touch with the land. What about renewable energy and other alternatives? They are not ready, and will never be as long as oil is king.
This is something not acknowledged by the boosters of the technofix. When oil abdicates, no one can fill the shoes.

Economic collapse results in nuclear war. Burrows and Harris 09

(Mathew J. Burrows, counselor in the National Intelligence Council, PhD in European History from Cambridge University, and Jennifer Harris, a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit, April 2009 Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf)
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history

may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth

century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying
those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms

appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be
a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become

self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short
of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal

stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves , but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Inherency

Nuclear Power Coming Internationally

Nuclear renaissance occurring internationally other countries are on board. Chu, 10
(Steven, Energy Sectretary, America's New Nuclear Option, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704231304575092130239999278.html, accessed 8-312, RSR)
Perhaps most importantly, investing in nuclear energy will position America to lead in a growing industry. World-wide electricity generation is projected to rise 77% by 2030. If we

are serious about cutting carbon pollution then nuclear power must be part of the solution. Countries such as China, South Korea and India have recognized this and are making investments in nuclear power that are driving demand for nuclear technologies. Our choice is clear:
Develop these technologies today or import them tomorrow.

Global cooperation has restored public faith in nuclear energy; Fukushima doesnt matter WNA 11 (World Nuclear Association, The Nuclear Renaissance , August 2011, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf104.html) JD
The 1986 Chernobyl disaster marked the nadir of public support for nuclear power. However, this tragedy underscored the reason for high standards of design and construction required in the West. It could never have been licensed outside the Soviet Union, incompetent plant operators exacerbated the problem, and partly through Cold War isolation, there was no real safety culture. The

global cooperation in sharing operating experience and best practices in safety culture as a result of the accident has been of benefit worldwide. The nuclear industrys safety record over the next 25 years helped restore public faith in nuclear power, though the multiple-reactor Fukushima accident in 2011 brought his run of unrivalled safety to an
end. Over this period, operating experience tripled, from about 4000 reactor-years to more than 14,500 reactor years (plus a similar total in the nuclear navies). But an

objective look at the safety record, despite Fukushima, still shows it very favourably compared with any alternative. Another factor in public reassurance is the much smaller than anticipated public health effects of the Chernobyl accident. At the time some scientists predicted that tens of thousands would die as a result of the dispersal of radioactive material. In fact, according to the UN's Chernobyl Forum report, as of mid 2005, fewer than 60 deaths had been directly attributed to radiation from the disaster, and further deaths from cancer are
uncertain. The human toll from Fukushima is no deaths from the nuclear accident and no serious radiation effects, but the inconvenience of evacuation has been massive, just as it was with Chernobyl. One of the criticisms often levelled against nuclear power is the alleged lack of strategy and provision for its long-lived wastes. It is argued that local communities would never be prepared to host a repository for such waste. However, experience

has shown in Sweden and Finland, that with proper consultation and compensation, mostly in the form of long-term job prospects, communities are quite prepared to host repositories.
Indeed in Sweden, two communities were competing to be selected as the site of the final repository. In fact, radioactive wastes, including those from the nuclear industry, are handled and managed responsibly in all countries, and there has never been any harm or hazard to anyone on account of those from nuclear power

Nuclear Power Coming in US

Nuclear power coming in US now despite development of technology. WALD 2011 (MATTHEW L. Nuclear Industry Thrives in the U.S., but for Export March 30th, 2011,
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/business/energyenvironment/31NUKE.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all ) THE American nuclear renaissance is going strong, even if hardly any nuclear reactors are being built in the United States. Japans continuing nuclear calamity has heightened concerns about the future of nuclear power and its safety, but in China, India and other regions, the push for nuclear power seems likely to continue to surge. Those are the countries that provide a strong market for the American companies that build nuclear reactors and their components. Ask Steven Haas. Since the day he was born, 27 years ago, nobody in this country has ordered and completed a nuclear
plant. But there he was, one day recently, plugging circuit boards and other electronic components into a cabinet the size of an industrial refrigerator that was labeled Sanmen. That is the name of a twin-reactor plant in China that the Westinghouse Electric Company has been supplying with a design and major components. The cabinet was one of scores that will go into each reactor, allowing digital communications and control of equipment. After Sanmen, he said, will come Haiyang, another Chinese twin-reactor plant, and Vogtle 3 and 4 in the American state of Georgia, and V. C. Summer 2 and 3 in South Carolina. And I think theres other jobs coming, he said, adding: I hope so. If not, I wont have a job. But he probably will. In addition to the four units Westinghouse is supplying China, it is negotiating for 10 more. While the process has hit a pause amid the crisis in Japan, where an earthquake knocked out all cooling to six reactors, it seems bound to resume. The electricity demand of China, India and the Middle East grows unabated. And the Westinghouse design and another by General Electric are intended to provide passive methods of cooling a reactor in an emergency, by relying on natural forces like gravity and convection, with few or no power-operated valves, diesel generators and other safety systems that a tsunami or other hazard could knock out. For

the United States, nuclear power has become an export industry. And here in western Pennsylvania, production is going full tilt. Westinghouse, which two years ago moved into a 750,000-square-foot office complex here, looks more and more like
Boeing or General Motors, a company that designs crucial parts, makes some and farms out the manufacture of others, and integrates components from all over the world. The

four Chinese reactors have generated about 5,000 jobs in the United States, at Westinghouse and related companies, said Aris Candris, chief executive of Westinghouse Electric. The company had hoped for many reactors to be under construction in this country by now, he said, but overseas projects are growing a lot faster than we are and are picking up the slack. The result is some odd alliances. For example, the
United Arab Emirates last year picked a consortium led by South Korea to build four reactors in a contract valued at an estimated $20 billion. It could be worth more because it could lead to yet more reactors. About 20 percent of the nuclear island, meaning the reactor and immediately associated parts, will come from Westinghouse, according to a company spokesman, H. Vaughn Gilbert. The flip side is that some of the biggest parts of the Vogtle and Summer reactors will come from Japan Steel Works. American steel makers never developed the equipment needed for the next generation of nuclear plants because there has been no new construction here. But that is not to say that

American technology lags; in fact, in some cases it exceeds anything available elsewhere. Take, for example, the reactor
coolant pumps. In the Westinghouse design, the pumps pull water from the reactor vessel and push it through a web of tiny thin-walled pipes in heat exchangers, and then back to the vessel. Outside the tiny pipes, a second circuit of clean, uncontaminated water is boiled into steam, for use in making electricity. The design keeps the radioactive materials bottled up, but the pumps are one of the major causes of reactor shutdowns and maintenance headaches. So the Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company is building sealed pumps that are supposed to run maintenance-free for 60 years. Each is 23 feet tall, weighs almost 100 tons and pumps about 13,000 gallons of water a second. They sell

for

more than $10 million each, and there is nowhere else to buy them, the company says.

Nuclear power is on the rise in the US. Worthington 12 (David Worthington, February 9, 2012, The U.S. nuclear renaissance has begun ,
Smart Planet, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/the-us-nuclear-renaissance-hasbegun/13058) JD There are cooling towers on the horizon in the United States. The nuclear renaissance is slated to begin in rural Georgia with new reactors being built over the next five years, and work is already underway to leap another generation ahead. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) today announced that it has granted licenses to a consortium of utilities to erect two Westinghouse AP 1000 reactors at Southern Companys existing Vogtle site, clearing a path to end a decades long hiatus in new construction. Westinghouses design incorporates passive cooling, which
extends the duration under which a reactor can operate safely without outside intervention in the event of a disaster. The AP 1000 is classified as Generation III+ reactor. Generation III+ reactors have more redundant systems than older reactor designs. Those include emergency cooling systems, a double containment system, and an ashtray like cooling area to capture molten fuel in the event of a meltdown. Existing U.S. nuclear reactors require active cooling such as electric water pumps. Japans Fukushima used active cooling, and its reactors melted down last

spring when external power was unavailable. There are a total of 104 nuclear plants in the U.S today that are dependent upon active cooling. The meltdown risk associated with those legacy reactors and the high capital requirements of nuclear power are some of the reasons why no new reactor has been built in the U.S since the late 1970s, when the 1979 Three Mile Island incident soured public sentiment. For now, antinuclear sentiment has been marginalized. The

U.S. is energy hungry and nuclear power is receiving generous

government subsidies. The Vogtle reactors would power up to 1 million homes at a cost of US$14 billion, CNN reported.

Nuclear Power Coming in US/International Commuity

Nuclear power is globally expanding and is catching on in the U.S. WNA 11 (World Nuclear Association, The Nuclear Renaissance , August 2011, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf104.html) JD Since about 2001 there has been much talk about an imminent nuclear revival or "renaissance" which implies
that the nuclear industry has been dormant or in decline for some time. Whereas this may generally be the case for the Western world,

nuclear capacity has been expanding in Eastern Europe and Asia. Globally, the share of nuclear in world electricity
has showed slight decline from about 17% to 13.5% since the mid 1980s, though output from nuclear reactors actually increased to match the growth in global electricity consumption. Today nuclear

energy is back on the policy agendas of many countries, with projections for new build similar to or exceeding those of the early years of nuclear power. This signals a revival in support for nuclear power in the West that was diminished by the accidents at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl and also by nuclear power plant construction cost overruns in the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with years of cheap natural gas. The March 2011 Fukushima accident has set back public perception of nuclear safety, despite there being no deaths or serious radiation exposure from it (while the direct death toll from the tsunami which caused it is some 25,000). Also the advent of shale gas has adversely changed the economics of nuclear power in places such as North America.

No US SMRs in the SQUO

The SQUO is uncertain of SMRs not convinced about their potency.
Katie Howell and Hannah Northey, E&E reporters E&E Daily: Monday, February 13, 2012 DOE: With fresh clout, White House likely will continue clean energy spending push http://www.eenews.net.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/public/EEDaily/2012/02/13/1
The nuclear industry also will be closely watching to see whether the president includes funding for the federal cost-share program to develop small modular reactors. Last month, DOE

announced it would offer up to $452 million over five years to develop a pair of designs for the miniature reactors. The money was available under the omnibus spending bill Congress

passed at the end of last year (Greenwire, Jan. 20). Some sources say the program could see as much as $90 million, compared to $67 million last year. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairwoman of the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, has

been critical of advancing the development the tiny plants without a national solution for disposing of nuclear waste. Feinstein is working with Sen. Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, the ranking Republican on the subcommittee, and Senate
leaders on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee to find a solution within a year. Environmental groups have also questioned the technology. Last week, groups including the

Wilderness Society said in their annual "Green Budget 2013" that DOE should eliminate funding for developing small modular reactors because the plants will be expensive and present new safety and permitting issues. Industry sources are doubtful the president will ask for additional loan guarantees for nuclear power projects, or include any money for the now abandoned nuclear waste
repository under Yucca Mountain in Nevada.

Leadership Advantage Extensions

Uniqueness (Proliferation)
Global proliferation leadership is lacking now Duffey 10 (Leadership, Sustainability and Clean Nuclear TechnologyDuffey, Romney. Mechanical
Engineering 132. 5 (May 2010): 58.http://login.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docvie w/230176328?accountid=4485) JD
One issue should not go unnoticed: all current and under-construction reactors are based on an unsustainable once-through fuel cycle, which is incomplete. Not only is the resource unequally (even inequitably) spread around the world's geology, there is a major mismatch between the resource location versus the world population and energy growth. This once-through use of a valuable resource would not be an issue except it is not in touch either with energy needs or with modern times. Nowadays, the social norm in any civilized town or debate is recycling, selective separations, renewable portfolios, waste to energy, emissions reductions, and waste stream reduction. The touchstone is "renewable," so much so that hugely preferential energy rates and tariffs are gifted to those schemes that can claim sustainable renewability, namely wind and solar power. In the U.S.A., the situation is even more acute, with the failure of Yucca Mountain to attain social acceptance and/or political closure, despite theoretically being already full. What is clearly needed is new leadership in a successful direction. The sustainability issues are: (a) finite resources ultimately affecting price; (b) finite energy content that is not being replaced; and (c) lack of other resources in the places that need it. With

non-proliferation concerns about enrichment, no one trusts anyone to supply, provide or guarantee what may not exist readily or cheaply after the middle of the century anyway. There is no guaranteed 60year 'fuel cycle.

U.S. proliferation leadership is low now rising threats Maass 10 (Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony, Richard Maass, Professor of Political Science at Notre Dame,
http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf The threat of nuclear terrorism is currently on the rise; however, preemptive measures can be taken to prevent such a catastrophe. As

the sole international hegemon, the U.S. needs to rethink its role as an advocate and enforcer of nonproliferation. A bipolar power structure no longer exists in world politics; the U.S. sits alone atop global hierarchy. The United States needs to take an active role in non-proliferation and change the way it conducts international political discourse in the second nuclear age. Today, the nuclear threat posed by other nuclear-armed states is being
eclipsed by a new threat, that of nuclear instruments in the hands of non-state, terrorist organizations (Ferguson and Potter, 2004, pg. 318). Terrorism comprises the greatest threat to U.S. primacy; Washington needs to adapt its policies in a manner that allows it to maintain and

It would be impossible for the U.S. to monitor all nuclear arsenals and prevent proliferation on a state-by-state case. Regulating fissile materials at the source would be the simplest and most inexpensive means to prohibit nuclear terrorism. Obtaining fissile materials, or an actual
resolve diplomatic relations with irrational political actors. weapon, poses the greatest problem for terrorist groups seeking to gain possession of a nuclear weapon. Restricting the flow and spread of fissile materials mens terrorists can neither purchase nor steal a nuclear weapon.

Proliferation leadership is low now Moltz 5 (June 1, 2005, James Clay Moltz, Deputy Director at Monterey Institute of International
Studies, Practical Steps for Improving U.S. Nonproliferation Leadershiphttp://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/improving-us-nonproliferation-leadership/) JD
The United States has long been a leader in international nonproliferation policy. Along with the Soviet Union, it spearheaded efforts to form the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, and it has been a crucial player in the formation of a variety of other nonproliferation organizations (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency), treaties (such as the Chemical Weapons Convention), and non-treaty efforts (such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the recent Proliferation Security Initiative). Washington remains an active and interested player today, arguably the most active in focusing attention on problems of nonproliferation enforcement. At the same time, however, as

states ponder the failure of the May 2005 NPT Review Conference in New York, the United States faces mounting international (and some domestic) criticism about not having done enough to support-much less lead--the cause of nonproliferation. Even some backers of the George W. Bush administration wonder whether more could be done to improve communications with other key actors, particularly on matters that would cost the United States little, enhance the U.S. international reputation, and, most importantly, improve U.S. security. In certain areas, the
United States seems to be arguing for "double standards" in regard to proliferators (accepting Israel, Pakistan, and India, but criticizing Iran and North Korea). In other areas, Washington has taken stands in treaty discussions to preserve narrow exceptions aimed at furthering U.S. nuclear weapons options, rather than focusing on core, long-term nonproliferation and security goals.

U.S. proliferation leadership is low now; several reasons Moltz 5 (June 1, 2005, James Clay Moltz, Deputy Director at Monterey Institute of International
Studies, Practical Steps for Improving U.S. Nonproliferation Leadershiphttp://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/improving-us-nonproliferation-leadership/) JD While the United States is not alone in failing to put an adequate emphasis on nonproliferation at the global level, as the world's most powerful state (according to a variety of military, economic, political, and cultural measures), the United States could be a much more effective advocate for nonproliferation policy with only modest policy adjustments, thus enhancing its own security and those of its friends and allies. In the face of 21st century threats, restoring international momentum in nonproliferation policy is likely to be far more important than any possible marginal gains to be had from
new nuclear weapons, new tests, or protection of anachronistic Cold War nuclear assets. While there is an unfortunate international tendency to "blame" the United States for all manner of problems in the nonproliferation regime, a

strong case can be made that the United States has a unique responsibility to lead the nonproliferation process, since it is the sole remaining superpower and the world's leading military power. In the past decade, however, failures of international nonproliferation policy under conditions of U.S. "unipolarity" can be seen in several key areas: 1) the recent expansion in the number of nuclear states outside the NPT; 2) the recent reduction in the number of nuclear-capable adherents to the NPT with the first official state withdrawal from the treaty (North Korea); and 3) the recent lowering of the threshold against nuclear testing and possible use.

Uniqueness (Technology)
U.S. leadership is eroding with aging facilities Domenici 12 (Energy and Infrastructure Program, Energy Project, Maintaining U.S. Leadership in
Global Nuclear Energy Markets, A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Centers Nuclear Inititative. Pete Domenici and Warren Miller, July 2012, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf) JD Set against this considerable legacy of institutional and technological dominance, however, are the many real challenges the U.S. industry confronts today, on multiple frontspoor economics, increased safety and security requirements, and uncertainty about the resolution of the waste management issue. The crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant focused the
attention of regulators and the public on the need for continued attention to safety and security at existing reactors, particularly as some of the older plants approach the end of their extended 60-year license periods. In

2029, the earliest licensed plant will reach the 60-year operation limit, and, after that, approximately one-third of the fleet will quickly follow. While some plants may engage in another round of relicensing for up to 80 years, a significant fraction likely will be retired and replaced by newer-generation resources
(potentially including some nuclear replacements). Prospects for new reactor construction in the United States have constricted significantly in recent years. In the years following passage of EPACT05, 18 utilities applied for combined construction and operating licenses (COLs) to build a total of 28 reactors. In addition, DOE received 19 applications for loan guarantees to support financing for 21 proposed reactors. A combination of factorsincluding downward revisions to electricity demand projections, difficulty executing the EPACT05 loan guarantee program as intended, and drastically reduced natural gas priceshas put all but two projects on hold. While these projects, comprising four reactors, have received NRC licenses and are currently under construction in Georgia and South Carolina, these plants still face financial, regulatory, and construction challenges. And, though natural gas prices have historically been quite volatile, the ability to tap large shale gas reserves will likely keep natural gas prices sufficiently low to make financing additional new reactor construction very difficult for at least the next decade, if not longer.

U.S. nuclear leadership has eroded; only through short-term demand spikes can we reclaim that position Domenici 12 (Energy and Infrastructure Program, Energy Project, Maintaining U.S. Leadership in
Global Nuclear Energy Markets, A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Centers Nuclear Inititative. Pete Domenici and Warren Miller, July 2012, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf) JD With the worlds largest commercial nuclear fleet, the United States was once the worlds leader in nuclear technology development and operations. In recent years, other countries, notably France and South Korea, have risen in international prominence; these countries will continue to develop technologies for domestic markets as well as to export. It will be increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain its technological leadership without some near-term domestic demand for new construction. Diminished U.S. leadership will make U.S. firms less competitive in nuclear export markets while also reducing U.S. influence over nuclear developments abroad. As more countries seek to develop nuclear capacity, the United States must work with the international community to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.

U.S. tech leadership is declining Domenici 12 (Energy and Infrastructure Program, Energy Project, Maintaining U.S. Leadership in
Global Nuclear Energy Markets, A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Centers Nuclear Inititative. Pete Domenici and Warren Miller, July 2012, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Leadership%20in%20Nuclear%20Energy%20Markets.pdf) JD

As the worlds largest commercial nuclear operator and dominant weapons state, the

United States has traditionally been

the clear leader on international nuclear issues. Today, the

United States still accounts for approximately one-quarter of

commercial nuclear reactors in operation around the world and one-third of global nuclear generation. This

position is likely to shift in coming decades, as new nuclear investments go forward in other parts of the world while slowing or halting in the United States. In past decades, the United States was also a significant exporter of nuclear materials and technologies, but this dominance too has slowly declined.

U.S. tech leadership is declining quickly Wallace 12 (Nuclear Energy in America: Preventing its Early Demise Michael Wallace and Sarah
Williams, Center for Strategic International Security, 2012, Global Forecast, http://csis.org/files/publication/120417_gf_wallace_williams.pdf) JD Americas nuclear energy industry is in decline. Low natural gas prices, financing hurdles, new safety and security
requirements, failure to resolve the waste issue and other factors are hastening the day when existing reactors become uneconomic, making it virtually impossible to build new ones. Two generations after the United States took this wholly new and highly sophisticated technology from laboratory experiment to successful commercialization, our

nation is in danger of losing an industry of unique strategic importance, unique potential for misuse, and unique promise for addressing the environmental and energy security demands of the future. The pace of this decline, moreover, could be more rapid than most policymakers and stakeholders anticipate. With 104 operating reactors and the worlds
largest base of installed nuclear capacity, it has been widely assumed that the United Stateseven without building many new plants would continue to have a large presence in this industry for some decades to come, especially if existing units receive further license

current market conditions are such that growing numbers of these units are operating on small or even negative profit margins and could be retired early.
extensions. Instead,

Nuclear leadership decline is inevitable Wallace 12 (Nuclear Energy in America: Preventing its Early Demise Michael Wallace and Sarah
Williams, Center for Strategic International Security, 2012, Global Forecast, http://csis.org/files/publication/120417_gf_wallace_williams.pdf) JD In this context, federal action to reverse the American nuclear industrys impending decline is a national security imperative. The United States cannot afford to become irrelevant in a new nuclear age. Our nations commercial nuclear industry, its military nuclear capabilities, and its strong regulatory institutions can be seen as three legs of a stool. All three legs are needed to support Americas future prosperity and security and to shape an international environment that is conducive to our long-term interests. Three specific aspects
of U.S. leadership are particularly important.

U.S. nuclear leadership is declining, which causes proliferation Wallace 12 (Nuclear Energy in America: Preventing its Early Demise Michael Wallace and Sarah
Williams, Center for Strategic International Security, 2012, Global Forecast, http://csis.org/files/publication/120417_gf_wallace_williams.pdf) JD The results were not perfect, but Americas institutional support for global nonproliferation goals and the regulatory behaviors it modeled clearly helped shape the way nuclear technology was adopted and used elsewhere around the world. This influence seems certain to wane if the United States is no longer a major supplier or user of nuclear technology. With existing nonproliferation and safety and security regimes looking increasingly inadequate in this rapidly changing global nuclear landscape, American leadership and leverage is more important and more central to our national security interests than ever. To maintain its leadership role in the development, design, and operation of a growing global nuclear energy infrastructure, the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican, must recognize the invaluable role played by the commercial U.S. nuclear industry and take action to prevent its early demise.

Solvency (Proliferation)
Exporting SMR key necessary to promote US norms on prolif. Rosner and Goldberg, 11
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011, https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf , accessed 7-31-12, RSR) The Department of Commerce has launched the Civil Nuclear Trade Initiative, which seeks to identify the key trade policy
challenges and the most significant commercial opportunities. The Initiative encompasses all aspects of the U.S. nuclear industry, and, as part of this effort, the Department identified

27 countries as markets of interest for new nuclear expansion. A recent can be a solution for certain markets that have smaller and less robust electricity grids and limited investment capacity. Studies performed by Argonne National Laboratory suggest that SMRs would appear to be a feasible power option for countries that have grid capacity of 2,0003,000 MW. Exports of SMR technology also could play an important role in furthering non-proliferation policy objectives. The design of SMR nuclear fuel management systems, such as encapsulation of the fuel, may have non-proliferation benefits that merit further assessment. Also, the development of an SMR export industry would be step toward a U.S.-centric, bundled reliable fuel services.
Commerce Department report identified that SMRs

Commercialization of SMR key necessary to strength anti-proliferation norms globally. Rosner and Goldberg, 11
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011, https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf , accessed 7-31-12, RSR) Clearly, a robust U.S. commercial SMR industry is highly advantageous to many sectors in the United States. It would be a huge stimulus for high-valued job growth, restore U.S. leadership in nuclear reactor technology, and, most importantly, strengthen U.S. leadership in a postFukushima world, on matters of nuclear safety, nuclear security, nonproliferation, and nuclear waste management.

US SMR leadership key only way to uphold proliferation norms. CERN, 11

(COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE, Hearing, SMALL NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ALTERNATIVE FUELS, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg68432/html/CHRG-112shrg68432.htm, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) There's also a national security aspect to the development of U.S. SMR technology that must be considered. Beyond the United States, over 60 countries have expressed interest in new nuclear power plants. Some of
those countries already have nuclear power plants, others are developing Nations who do not have the electrical grid that can support a 1,000 megawatt nuclear plant. While reliability, the

U.S. nuclear technology is still considered to be the gold standard in safety and nuclear supply market has been increasingly international in the last 30 years. If the U.S. is unwilling or unable to develop exportable SMR technology there are several other Nations who are prepared to meet the growing demand. I believe it's clearly preferable to have the active U.S.

engagement in global nuclear marketplace rather than seeding that territory to non U.S. suppliers that may always not share our approach to our safety and non-proliferation.

Reducing restrictions on US nuclear tech key to prolif norms necessary to maintain U.S. non-prolif influence. ANS, 12
(American Nuclear Society, ANS adopts position statement on U.S. global nuclear leadership through export-driven engagement, 7-2-12, http://ansnuclearcafe.org/category/nonproliferation/, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) In short, a U.S. nuclear export regime that restricts rather than promotes U.S. nuclear trade will ultimately reduce U.S. influence in shaping the safety and security norms of the global nuclear landscape. In order to enhance U.S. nonproliferation goals through its export policies, ANS recommends that the U.S. government should: maintain a flexible approach for negotiating bilateral nuclear trade agreements (also known as 123 Agreements); continue developing a coordinated approach to promoting U.S. technology to other nations; and ensure U.S. nuclear export policies and procedures are transparent and responsive to the needs of the U.S. nuclear industry.

Solvency (Technology)
SMRs key to tech leadership puts the US on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. Fleischmann, 11
(Chuck, Representative from the 3rd District in Tennessee, Small Modular Reactors Could Help With U.S. Energy Needs, American Physical Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2011, http://www.aps.org/publications/capitolhillquarterly/201110/backpage.cfm, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The timely implementation of small reactors could position the United States on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. As the world moves forward in developing new forms of nuclear power, the United States should set a high standard in safety and regulatory process. Other nations have not been as rigorous in their nuclear oversight with far reaching implications. As we consider the disastrous events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility, it is imperative that power companies and regulatory agencies around the world adequately ensure reactor and plant safety to protect the public. Despite terrible tragedies like the natural disaster in Japan, nuclear power is still one of the safest and cleanest energy resources available. The plan to administer these small reactors would create technologically advanced U.S. jobs and improve our global competitiveness . Our country needs quality, high paying jobs. Increasing our competitive edge in rapidly advancing industries will put the United States in a strategic position on the forefront of expanding global technologies in the nuclear arena.

SMR production would boost U.S. leadership government involvement would ensure U.S. dominance of the sector. Taso, 11
(Firas Eugen Taso, 21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular Reactors, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836, RSR)
SMRs require less policy support than large reactors, leading to less government involvement in the process than with large nuclear. That is not to say that no support is needed, and the

paper has argued for steps the government should take to assist in SMR technology and deployment. Assistance with the regulatory process streamlining to deal with SMRs, incentives for manufacturing onshore, establishing the industry as a leader that others will follow and that will dominate the SMR market for the foreseeable future in exports of units and expertise are paramount. It is also important to facilitate near-ready models for deployment, testing and demonstration. Like any incipient industry, government support can be helpful, as long as it is not suffocating and creating a distortion in the market. Again, if producers get the economics right, widespread adoption limited only by capacity constraints will follow.

SMR production would boost U.S. leadership timeframe is now. Freed, et al., 10
(Josh (Vice President for the Clean Energy Program at The Third Way), Elizabeth Horowitz (Policy Advisor for Third Way's Clean Energy Program) and Jeremy Ershow (Policy Advisor at Third Way), Thinking Small On Nuclear Power, Third Way, September 2010, RSR) Getting small reactors deployed quickly is a national imperative. Our energy needs demand it, and the economic upside of becoming a leader in this space is tremendous. Moreover, the moment for economic leadership is fleeting, with emerging international competitors including designs backed by the governments of South Korea, China, India, and Russia. 30 The federal government has unique resources to help this happen, and we should put them to use. This includes its research and development from our national labs or the purchasing power of DOD or DOE to create first markets and help drive down costs of firstmover technologies.

SMR production would boost the economy and re-establish the U.S. as a leader in technology Sandquist, 10
(Gary Sandquist, Contributor, 10/13/2010, Are small modular nuclear reactors in the U.S's future?, Standard-Examiner, http://www.standard.net/topics/opinion/2010/10/13/are-small-modular-nuclearreactors-uss-future, RSR) With six nuclear companies involved in the design of SMRs, competition could create a global market for U.S. SMRs. These companies include Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox, which build small reactors for the U.S. Navy, as well as start-ups like
NuScale, Hyperion, and Intellectual Ventures, a Seattle firm financed by Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates. The NRC expects applications for SMR approvals from many companies within the next two years. Energy Secretary Steven Chu anticipates an SMR will be generating electricity by the end of this decade. Ranging in capacity from 45 to 140 megawatts, SMRs are a fraction of the size of conventional 1000 MW nuclear plants and can be rapidly assembled at new or existing nuclear plant sites. Major

SMR components such as the reactor vessel and turbine-generator are factory fabricated and transported by truck, rail or barge for prompt onsiteassembly. Some SMR designs operate continuously for over a decade before refueling. Because factory fabrication permits greater cost savings, SMRs are expected to cost about $5,000 per kilowatt or several $100 million rather than billions for a 1000 MW plant. If successful, the construction and operation of SMRs would provide a tremendous boost to U.S. manufacturing and re-industrialization. With innovative designs that are simpler and safer, SMRs could regain U.S. world leadership in reactor technology and contribute to correction of U.S. imbalance of international trade. Russia is currently seeking to dominate the international nuclear power market.

Impact (Proliferation)
Proliferation snowballs collapse of the nonproliferation regime would trigger an avalanche of nuclearization. Dunn, 90
(Lewis, Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation, 1990. Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime pg.31-32) Collapse of the nonproliferation treaty in 1995 would increase significantly the prospects for the further spread of nuclear weapons around the globe. Heightened perceptions of the likelihood of runaway proliferation, corrosion of the norm of nonproliferation, lessened assurance about neighboring counties intentions, and a weakening of nuclear export controls are but some of the direct results of the treaty's breakdown. As a result, the world would become more dangerous and all countries' securityboth former parties and outside citieswould be gradually undermined. To elaborate, one direct impact of a breakdown of the NPT in 1995 would be to change international perceptions of the likelihood of widespread nuclear proliferation. More
specifically, over the nearly two decades since the NPT entered into force in 1970, perceptions held by government leaders, observers, and other about the prospects for the spread of nuclear weapons have markedly changed. In the early 1960s, it was widely expected that there would be twenty-five nuclear weapon states by the mid-1970s. In the late 1980s, it is now widely assumed that such proliferation can be prevented. The very fact that more than 135 countries have renounced nuclear weapons by adhering to the NPT has greatly contributed to this change of perception. Particularly, if the treaty's collapse followed several highly visible nonproliferation breakdowns, there would be many fears that the earlier predictions, though premature, were correct. Such fears would be further reinforced if after a failure to renew the treaty many parties were reluctant to reaffirm otherwise their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. This perception

of the likelihood of more widespread proliferation could well become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Leaders of countries that had renounced
nuclear weapons would now be asking whether such renunciation would be reciprocated by other countries, especially their close neighbors. At the least, some countries could be expected to hedge their bets by starting low-visibility programs to explore the steps needed to acquire nuclear weapons. In other countries that had already been weighing the pros and cons of convert pursuit of nuclear weapons, a perception that many countries might soon move toward nuclear weapons in the decades after 1995 could tip the balance for a national decision.

Efforts to prevent proliferation shield us from extinction. Taylor, 2

(Stuart, Invading Iraq Wouldn't Necessarily Make Us Safer, The National Journal, 2002)
The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation another five or ten potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off on our soil by terrorists or terrorist governments. Even an airtight missile defense will be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat. Unless

we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for a world filled with nuclear -weapons states where every crisis threatens to go nuclear, where the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day, and where it wold be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal
organizations. So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a modderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Teaty.

Tech Key to Heg

Tech decline will cause heg collapse- US will lashout to retain power Pape 2009 Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago)
January/February 2009 The Empire Falls, The National Interest, June 28, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484 America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras-the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"-leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The PostAmerican World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter-it means that China, with more than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future. So, how much is U.S. decline due to the global diffusion of technology, U.S. economic weaknesses under Bush or China's superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible, one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory, but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course, these are merely thought experiments, which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects." Still, these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. The answers are pretty straightforward. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2.2 percent, the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth, America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25.2 percent instead of its actual 23.1 percent.6 When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008-7.7 percent-the assumed marginal gain of 2.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U.S. decline. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case-that China had not grown, and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. If so, America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24.3 percent, or 1.2 percent more than today. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008-7.7 percent-the assumed marginal gain of 1.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U.S. decline. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to U.S. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War, tax cuts, current-account deficits, etc.), a sixth to China's superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. In other words, self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline, both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the mid-nineteenth century. And when one examines past declines and their consequences, it becomes clear both that the U.S. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever, the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage

drop in share of world product. THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences. Tsarist Russia presents the first case in point. Compared to other great powers on the European continent, its power declined the most during the mid-nineteenth century. And, it became the target of opportunistic aggression by the state with the greatest rising power, Great Britain, during the Crimean War (1854-1856). Indeed, the consequences of Russia's decline were not fully recognizable until the war itself. Though Russia was still a great power and the war cost Britain and France more than expected, Russia emerged the clear loser. Russia's inability to defend the status quo in the Crimea confirmed its grand-strategic weaknesses, and ultimately left it worse-off than had it anticipated its vulnerabilities and sought to negotiate a reduction in its military commitments to the region peacefully. Considering that the Crimea conflict left Russia with fairly gaping wounds, and that even its slow 10 percent decline in relative power over twenty years left the country bruised and battered, one might wonder how our far more rapid descent might play out. Meanwhile, similar destabilization occurred in the two decades before World War I and before World War II, when France and Great Britain were declining European powers. In both instances, France and Britain became targets of opportunistic aggression by one of the strongest rising powers in the region: Germany. And as a small cottage industry of scholarship suggests, Germany's fairly modest relative declines compared to Russia prior to World War I and the Soviet Union prior to World War II encouraged German leaders to wage preventive wars. Again, these declines occurred as another power was concomitantly rising (Germany in the case of France and Britain, and Russia-later the Soviet Union-relative to Germany). Of course, this only served to increase the danger. But again, these rises and falls were less precipitous than America's current losses, and our descent appears far trickier to navigate. As we look to address our current fall from grace, lest we forget, the United States faced two major declines of its power during the cold war as well. Neither was without risk. The first occurred shortly after World War II, when the devastation of the Soviet, European and many Asian economies, combined with the increasingly productive American economy, left the United States with a far larger share of gross world product-41 percent in 1948-than it even possessed in the age of unipolar dominance beginning in 1991. As the war-torn economies recovered, U.S. share of world product fell 20 percent by 1961 while that of its main rival, the Soviet Union, grew by 167 percent. This relative American decline corresponds to the height of U.S.-Soviet cold-war rivalry in Europe and Asia. Eight of the nine U.S.-Soviet nuclear crises occurred from 1948-1962, all of which involved efforts by the Soviet Union or its allies to revise the political status quo in their favor7-that is, all could be reasonably interpreted as instances in which the United States or its allies became the targets of opportunistic aggression. The second major U.S. relative decline occurred from 1970 to 1980, when the U.S. share of world product fell 27 percent. This decade brought with it challenges to America's position in the world. This was especially true toward the end of the decade with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, which collectively increased concern about Soviet dominance of Persian Gulf oil. However, the 1970s was mainly a period of "dtente" between the cold-war protagonists, which corresponds to the fact that the shares of world product for both the United States and the Soviet Union

were in decline. In other words, it is reasonable to think that America's decline in the 1970s did not lead to more significant trouble for the United States because its main rival was descending even faster. Clearly, major shifts in the balance of power in the international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America's current predicament is far more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied, not by an even-steeper decline of our near-peer competitor, but rather by a 144 percent increase in China's relative position. Further, the rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decades-long predominance. And with a rising China-with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology-a true peer competitor is looming. America's current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall.

Timeframe is quick other countries are rapidly catching up once we lose it we cant get it back Warsh 2007 David Warsh (Proprieter of Economic Principles and former J.P. Morgan Prize Fellow at
the American Academy in Berlin) 2007 The World Is What? http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/RAND_CF235.pdf Today it is China and India (and Russia, Brazil, and all the rest) that have entered global markets, computers and software having replaced power looms. Central banks in Germany and France have sold much of their gold reserves in order to symbolically plow the proceeds into research universities. (Note to governments: the reform of higher education is harder than it looks.) In the United States, a blueribbon panel of the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, in Rising Above the Gathering Storm, last year prescribed a range of far-reaching reforms, from investing more heavily in K12 education to funding more high-risk research and modernizing the patent system. The rapid pace of technological change and the increasing mobility of capital and talent mean that our current lead in science and technology could evaporate quickly if we fail to support it, the authors wrote. The consequences would be enormous, and once lost, our lead would be difficult to regain.

Heg Impact
Hegemony is key to maintain economic growth, human rights, trade channels, democracy, and prevent natural disaster crises, terrorism, and great power wars*** Thayer 2006 Bradley A. Thayer, November/December, 2006 In Defense of Primacy, NATIONAL
INTEREST Issue 86 THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts,

the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.( n4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74 000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

SQUO Nuke Power Bad Extensions

Uniqueness (Meltdowns)
The NRC regulative failures makes accidents more likely Gronlund 7 (Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf) JD
Of course, accidents are not the only measure of safety, and the absence of accidents does not necessarily indicate that there are no safety problems. The

number of U.S. reactors shut down for a year or longer to address numerous safety problems provides strong evidence of poor safety practices and inadequate NRC enforcement. A weak safety culture within the NRC itself prevents effective oversight. The agency also relies on flawed approaches to assessing risks and inspecting nuclear facilities, and its standards for preventing and mitigating severe accidents are too low. The NRC has recently taken steps to limit public participation in the reactor licensing process, even
though past participation has led to improved safety. Moreover, rather than raising the bar for new reactor designs, the NRC is relying on existing standards, and federal limits on the liability of nuclear plant owners reduce incentives to improve the safety of future reactors. The

NRC also suffers from an inadequate budget. These shortcomings indicate that the NRC needs to greatly strengthen its approach to nuclear power safety.

Meltdown risks still exist, and the NRC does not account for the minute risks Douglass 12 (Elizabeth Douglass, How Fukushima Challenged a Core Tenet of U.S. Nuclear Safety: An
Expert's View , Inside Climate News, July 16, 2012, http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20120716/fukushima-japan-disaster-nuclear-energy-san-onforediablo-canyon-safety-meltdown-peter-lam-expert-interview) JD
In a presentation before the California Energy Commission in July 2011, Lam raised questions about the NRC's reliance on "likelihood calculations" to guide its safety and plant design regulations. He said the

industry practice of not planning for statistically improbable accident scenarioslike the disasters that struck Fukushimacould be catastrophic and needed to end. The
Fukushima calamity involved two of the industry's five most dangerous but "extremely unlikely" nuclear events, Lam said. It also included multiple nuclear reactor core meltdownsa "Black Swan" scenario never contemplated because it was deemed impossible. "Probability

dismissal is not an exact science. By [using] it, one can be very, very wrong," Lam told the commission.

The chances of a meltdown is 200 times higher than NRC predictions Lelieveld 12 (J., May 23, 2012, Probability of nuclear reactor core meltdown higher than expected ,
Homeland Security News Wire, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120523-probabilityof-nuclear-reactor-core-meltdown-higher-than-expected0) JD To determine the likelihood of a nuclear meltdown, the researchers applied a simple calculation. They divided the operating
hours of all civilian nuclear reactors in the world, from the commissioning of the first up to the present, by the number of reactor meltdowns that have actually occurred. The total number of operating hours is 14,500 years, the number of reactor meltdowns comes to four one in Chernobyl and three in Fukushima. This translates into EventScale (INES), every

one major accident, being defined according to the International Nuclear 3,625 years. Even if this result is conservatively rounded to one major accident every 5,000 reactor years, the risk is 200 times higher than the estimate for catastrophic, noncontained core meltdowns made by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1990. The Mainz researchers did not
distinguish ages and types of reactors, or other potential contributing factors to accidents such as whether reactors are located in regions of enhanced risks, for example by earthquakes.

Uniqueness (Terrorism)
Terrorist attack likely nuclear facilities represent a prime target for terrorists. Early, et al., 9
(Bryan (Former Research Fellow at Harvards Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), Matthew Fuhrmann (Professor in Political Science at Texas A&M) and Quan Li (Professor in Political Science at Texas A&M), Atoms for Terror: The Determinants of Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism, Social Science Research Network, RSR) Second, nuclear facilities present targets of opportunity for terrorist groups. Attacking structures that produce or house radioactive materials, such as nuclear power plants, could cause large-scale radiological contamination or, at least, generate that fear in the public.23 Such attacks may appeal to groups that seek mass-casualties or publicity. Indeed, numerous groups have plotted to target nuclear plants. For example, al-Qaeda possessed
diagrams of American nuclear power plants and considered using commercial airliners to strike nuclear reactors as part of the 9/11 attacks.24 On a smaller scale, the North African terrorist group Salafia Jihadia plotted to launch a suicide attack against a French nuclear power plant in May 2003.25 The

more extensive a states civilian nuclear infrastructure, the more potential targets terrorist groups can plan and execute attacks against.

Terrorist attack likely they see it as an opportunity to roll back nuclear power. Early, et al., 9
(Bryan (Former Research Fellow at Harvards Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs), Matthew Fuhrmann (Professor in Political Science at Texas A&M) and Quan Li (Professor in Political Science at Texas A&M), Atoms for Terror: The Determinants of Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism, Social Science Research Network, RSR) Finally, NR terrorism can readily incite public opposition towards domestic nuclear industries, producing high economic costs for countries with large nuclear programs that are targeted with NR terrorism.29 For example, the Chechen militants that planted the dirty bomb in a Moscow park in 1995 sought to rouse public fear over their ease of acquiring NR materials and the Russian Governments inability to protect its expansive nuclear infrastructure. The incident and the groups threats of future NR terrorism forced the cash-strapped Russian government to devote considerable resources to improving the security of its NR installations to shore up public confidence in the security of its nuclear infrastructure.30 These types of attacks are attractive to terrorists because they can undermine public support for civilian nuclear energy due to security concerns, force governments to commit vast resources to securing their nuclear infrastructures, and sap public confidence in governments competence. These costs will be higher in countries with large nuclear infrastructures than in those without them, increasing terrorist groups incentives to target the countries with large nuclear programs with such tactics.

Terrorist attack likely fissile material can be weaponized. Masse, 10

(Todd, senior national security analyst with The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Nuclear Terrorism Redux: Conventionalists, Skeptics, and the Margin of Safety, Orbis, Spring 2010, RSR) One of the central conundrums of nuclear non-proliferation is that if a nation possesses the ability to enrich natural uranium (which has .7 percent 235 U) to low-enriched uranium used for nuclear power plants (usually having an isotopic makeup of 3-5 percent 235 U), the same process can be used to produce weapons-grade uranium (about 85 percent 235 U).
While possessing the requisite amount 18 of ssile material does not, by itself, mean a country or non-state actor can construct and deliver a nuclear weapon, acquiring ssile material is the greatest barrier to nuclear weapons construction . Under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), all parties to the Treaty have an inalienable right. . .to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. . . in conformity with other articles of the Treaty. The idea of a nuclear fuel bank controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been offered numerous times in the atomic era. Iranian mastery of uranium enrichment (via centrifuges) for allegedly peaceful purposes has, however, given the fuel bank concept renewed interest. While Iran may likely not relinquish its

current enrichment capability even if such a bank were established, the availability of nuclear fuel on attractive terms would substantially undermine Irans (or any other nations) argument for producing nuclear fuel indigenously. 19

Solvency (Meltdowns)
Passively safe machines remove the reliance on human intervention, increasing inherent safety Rosner 11 (Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and
Physics , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Robert Rosner, Rebecca Lordan, and Stephen Goldberg, 67(4) 2329, sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav) JD Reactor safety systems have three goals: to prevent serious consequences resulting from an accident (preventing the melting of reactor fuel if reactor cooling fails catastrophically); to mitigate damage by allowing for timely, economic restoration to normal operations (like the backup cooling system found in the Westinghouse AP-1000 design); and to delay potential serious impacts by providing advanced indications that severe transients and pre-accident conditions could shortly ensue (sufficient warning time for the plant operator to prevent eventual serious consequences). 6 The push toward passive safety is fundamentally motivated by a pessimistic view of the man -machine interface. Simply stated: The reliance on safety mechanisms that are based on fundamental laws of nature with very limited reliance on active sensing or intervention by safety systems (no matter how redundant) is invariably preferable to even the
most redundant active safety systems. This view assumes, of course, that such passive systems can be realized, and this assumption is not always valid. Room exists for operator error or misinterpretation with electrical and mechanical safety controls room that the passive safety designs are specifically aimed to minimize or mitigate. Or, best of all, to entirely eliminate. But when considering the issues surrounding safety, it is useful to understand how relevant passive systems are to nuclear reactors.

SMRs are safer for 5 reasons Wheeler 10 (November 22, 2010, Small Modular Reactors May Offer Significant Safety & Security
Enhancements, John Wheeler, Clear Trend, http://thisweekinnuclear.com/?p=1193) JD In summary, small modular nuclear reactors offer potential safety and security advantages over larger commercial reactors because they can be designed (1) to have smaller source terms, (2) to have accident scenarios that progress more slowly, (3) to be meltdown proof, (4) to operate at lower pressures, and (5) to have smaller security footprints. These safety and security advantages can result in considerable cost advantages. A large percentage of a
nuclear plants operating expenses go into emergency planning and security. It is possible that four or five SMRs packaged together to provide the equivalent of a large nuclear unit could operate with a smaller staff size and lower costs. However, because existing rules were written for larger reactors, some

changes to NRC regulations will be required for SMRs to take full advantage of their inherent safety and security features. There are groups already working on these changes.

SMRs produce less waste and are passively safer Martin 11 (Stephen Martin, Australias nuclear options, (CEDA policy perspective, November 2011,
http://ceda.com.au/media/153125/nuclearfinal8nov.pdf#page=38, Committee for Economic Development of Australia) JD
The possible uses for SMRs in Australia include powering Australian Defence Force sites, remote mining locations, large industrial sites requiring reliable, competitive cost electricity or process heat supplies, desalination plants, water treatment plants, recycling schemes or irrigation systems and baseload electricity supply for small grid systems A

major advantage of SMRs is their passive safety. No electrical supplies or pumps are required to cool the reactor, as this is achieved by natural convection and gravity coolant feed. This feature ensures the reactor will remain safe under severe accident conditions. This also reduces the capital and maintenance costs compared to large power reactors and fundamentally
changes the economic equation in favour of SMR nuclear power generation A modern 1,000 MWe nuclear power plant produces around 150 m3/ year (two shipping containers) of low level radioactive waste (resins, filter cartridges, etc). This low level waste requires no shielding and needs to be stored for a relatively short period, less than 300 years. In most countries it is stored in concrete lined trenches in a near-ground surface repository. Due to its smaller size and simpler design, a

SMR will only produce a fraction of this amount of waste, less than onesmall shipping container per year. There will also be a small amount of intermediate level waste, less than a fridge full,
which can be stored on site in a shieldedcontainer. The long core life of many SMRs means fewer spent fuel assemblies tostore, and there is the possibility in the future that spent fuel assemblies will be ableto be used as fuel for large fast neutron reactors.There is extensive experience of much of the technology employed by SMRs. For many years they have been the power supply for submarines and icebreakers, where totally reliable power with long periods between refuelling is essential. However, their commercial deployment has yet to be proven.

SMRs include passive safety measures to prevent electrical sabotage Hise 9 (Phaedra Hise, December 2009, Mini Reactors Show Promise for Clean Nuclear Power's Future,
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/nuclear/4273386) JD As in modern reactors, the containment shell acts as a heat exchanger, Reyes explains. The water closest to the core is vented into the outer shell as steam, where it condenses and drips into the cooling pool, which is recirculated to cool the core. The whole unit sits below grade, without telltale cooling towers. The reactor doesn't use pumps to circulate the water if the unit overheats, which means it needs no external power to cool down. That's a "passive safety" feature that protects the unit from electrical sabotage. The new unit can be manufactured cheaply, with standard turbines from General
Electric, for example, rather than custom-made parts. Because the steel reactor vessel is only 9 ft. in diameter, it can be made entirely in the U.S., rather than relying on Japan Steel Works, the only manufacturer who can cast today's one-piece, 25-ft.-plus reactor vessels.

Passive safety designs allow for disaster avoidance Rosner 11 (Robert, William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of
Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics, and Stephen, Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011,https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalco py.pdf, accessed 7-31-12) JD While the focus in this paper is on the business case for SMRs, the safety case also is an important element of the case for SMRs. Although SMRs (the designs addressed in this paper)use the same fuel type and the same light water cooling as gigawatt (GW)-scale light water reactors (LWRs), there are significant enhancements in the reactor design that contribute to the upgraded safety case. Appendix A provides a brief overview of the various technology options for SMRs, including the light water SMR designs that are the focus of the present analysis. Light water SMR designs proposed to date incorporate passive safety features that utilize gravity-driven or natural convection systems rather than engineered, pump-driven systems to supply backup cooling in unusual circumstances. These passive systems should also minimize the need for prompt
operator actions in any upset condition. The designs rely on natural circulation for both normal operations and accident conditions, requiring no primary system pumps. In addition, these SMR designs utilize integral designs, meaning all major primary components are located in a single, high-strength pressure vessel. That

feature is expected to result in a much lower susceptibility to certain potential events, such as a loss of coolant accident, because there is no large external primary piping. In addition, light water
SMRs would have a much lower level of decay heat than large plants and, therefore, would require less cooling after reactor shutdown.

SMRs are comparative more safe than other reactors; 3 reasons Rosner 11 (Robert, William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of
Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics, and Stephen, Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011,https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalco py.pdf, accessed 7-31-12) JD Specifically, in a post-Fukushima lessons-learned environment, the study team believes that the current SMR designs have three inherent advantages over the current class of large operating reactors, namely: 1. These designs mitigate and, potentially, eliminate the need for back-up or emergency electrical generators,
relying exclusively on robust battery power to maintain minimal safety operations.

2. They improve seismic capability with the containment and reactor vessels in a pool of water underground; this dampens the effects of any earth movement and greatly enhances the ability of the system to withstand earthquakes. 3. They provide large and robust underground pool storage for the spent fuel, drastically reducing the potential of uncovering of these pools.

Solvency (Terrorism Proliferation)

SMRs have high prolif resistance the fuel is never removed from the core. Marcus, 11
(Gail, Former Visiting Professor in the Research Laboratory for Nuclear Reactors at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nuclear Power after Fukushima, Mechanical Engineering Magazine, December 2011, RSR)
Many of the advanced and small reactor concepts are being designed for a much longer core life than current reactors. In the United States, refueling for current large LWRs is usually done on an 18 to 24 month basis, with about a quarter of the fuel changed out at each refueling. By contrast, SMR

designs call for core lives that may be as long as 30 years, although this varies considerably by concept. Furthermore, since the designs are modularized, in many cases, the entire core could be removed and replaced when the reactor is refueled, which should provide smaller countries without extensive facilities the ability to use nuclear technology without having to invest in facilities to handle used fuel. A removable core should also improve the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle, as the used fuel is never separated from the core until it is returned to the manufacturer (or other ultimate handler) for removal, storage, and if appropriate, reprocessing.

SMRs have high prolif resistance dont have to be refueled. Taso, 11

(Firas Eugen Taso, 21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular Reactors, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836, RSR) There are those who claim that SMRs will inherently be safer to operate and would reduce the risk of terrorism, proliferation and waste management. Since some will be buried underground, they would be less accessible to terrorists wishing to sabotage them or steal fuel , according to Roger Howsley. Since they are
small, the redundant systems that are built into large plants can be simplified or reduced due to size and simplicity of design, and the operation and supervision made easier. As they are built in factories, they can be standardized and a new workforce can be trained to deal with safety of operation and emergencies, rather than sitespecific training as is done today. Finally, proliferation concerns

are reduced since some of these reactors do not need to be refueled for their useful life, and others have longer and easier refueling cycles than existing plants. The waste issue remains, as SMRs would add to the total stock of waste worldwide,
but since they are smaller and some may use reprocessed fuel, waste management for them will likely not altering the status quo on the waste issue.

SMRs have high prolif resistance low enrichment uranium, unattractive plutonium discharge, high fuel burn up and no separation of plutonium. Kuznetsov, 8
(Vladimir, former Lead Researcher at the Kurchatov Institute (Russia), Options for small and medium sized reactors (SMRs) to overcome loss of economies of scale and incorporate increased proliferation resistance and energy security, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 50, pg. 248, RSR)
For many less developed countries, these are the features of enhanced proliferation resistance and increased robustness of barriers for sabotage protection that may ensure the progress of nuclear power. All

NPPs with innovative SMRs will provide for the implementation of the established safeguards verication procedures under the agreements of member states with the IAEA. In addition to this, many innovative SMRs offer certain intrinsic proliferation resistance features to prevent the misuse, diversion or undeclared production of ssile materials and/or to facilitate the implementation of safeguards (IAEA, 2006b). For example, many of water-cooled SMRs employ low enrichment uranium and once-through fuel cycle as basic options. Therefore, the features contributing to proliferation resistance of such SMRs are essentially similar to that of presently operated PWRs and BWRs. They also include an unattractive isotopic composition of the plutonium in the discharged fuel, and radiation barriers provided by the spent fuel. The intrinsic proliferation resistance features common to all HTGRs include high fuel burn-up (low residual
inventory of plutonium, high content of 240 Pu); a difcult to process fuel matrix; radiation barriers; and a low ratio of ssile to fuelblock/fuelpebble mass. Although several HTGRs make a provision for reprocessing of the TRISO fuel, the corresponding technology has not been established yet and, until such time as when the technology becomes readily available, the lack of the technology is assumed to provide an

enhanced proliferation resistance. All

liquid metal cooled SMRs are fast reactors that can ensure a selfsustainable operation on ssile materials or realize fuel breeding to feed other reactors present in nuclear energy systems. In both cases, and if the fuel cycle is closed, the need of fuel enrichment and relevant uranium enrichment facilities would be eliminated, which is a factor contributing to enhanced proliferation resistance. Other features to enhance proliferation resistance of fast reactors are the following: No separation of plutonium and uranium at any fuel cycle stage and leaving a small (1e2% by weight) fraction of ssion products permanently in the fuel; Denaturing of the ssile materials, e.g., through the optimization of the core design to achieve a higher content of 238 Pu in the plutonium, to preclude the possibility of weapon production via securing an inadmissibly high level of residual heat of the plutonium fuel e the 238 Pu/Pu ratio needed to achieve
this still needs to be dened adequately.

SMRs have high prolif resistance high corelifetimes. IAEA, 5

(International Atomic Energy Agency, Innovative small and medium sized reactors: Design features, safety approaches and R&D trends, May 2005, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1451_web.pdf, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) In order to beat the economy of scale SMRs have to incorporate specific design features that result into simplification of the overall plant design, modularization and mass production. Several approaches are being under development and consideration, including the increased use of passive features for reactivity control and reactor shut down, decay heat removal and core cooling, and reliance on the increased margin to fuel failure achieved through the use of advanced high-temperature fuel forms and structural materials. Some SMRs also offer the possibility of very long core lifetimes with burnable absorbers or high conversion ratio in the core. These reactors incorporate increased proliferation resistance and may offer a very attractive solution for the implementation of adequate safeguards in a scenario of global deployment of nuclear power.

SMRs have high prolif resistance safe protocol has already been designed. Gallagher, 11
(Nancy, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Marylands School of Public Policy, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR ZERO, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 442, RSR) Current efforts to develop small modular reactors could be redirected to prioritize the most proliferation-resistant designs, even if they are not the designs that are closest to becoming commercially available. Technically sound designs exist for small reactors with sealed cores that would not require refueling for multiple decades. Regional fuel cycle centers could produce these lightweight, passively safe reactors; transport them by rail, road, or barge to the desired location; then return them to the regional center for spent fuel management. Implementing this hub-and-spoke arrangement on a large enough scale to help avert
catastrophic climate change would require both nuclear disarmament and subordination of national and commercial advanced fuel cycle operations to international control. That is hard to envision under current conditions, but it

is even harder to figure out how to simultaneously avert global warming and prevent proliferation in a less radical way .

Solvency (Terrorism - Attack)

SMRs are safer from terror attacks reduction and simplification of existing safety features. Carelli, et al., 10
(M.D. (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Garone (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), G. Locatelli (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M. Mancini (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), C. Mycoff (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Trucco (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M.E. Ricotti (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Energy, CeSNEF-Nuclear Engineering Division) , Economic features of integral, modular, small-to-medium size reactors, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 52, 2010, accessed 7-31-12, RSR) Even the technological choices on the design phase can directly affects the economics of NPPs. An integral and modular approach to the design of the nuclear reactors offers the unique possibility to exploit a simplication of the plant. This can lead to a reduction of the type and number of components. As an example, the complete integration of all the primary components inside the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) reached by IRIS design (Carelli et al., 2004) avoids large, high pressure piping. This positively affects also the safety of the plant, allowing a dramatic increase of the safety level, via a reduction of the number of safety systems and a simplication of the remaining ones. The integration concept increases also the compactness of the plant (volume over power ratio), with a reduction of the containment volume. A further positive effect is that also the security of the NPP is improved, with a small imprinting of the plant on the ground and a limited area of its skyline, leading e.g. to a reduction of terrorist air attack probability. Moreover, the plant lifetime can be increased and the plant quality of
performance kept all along its lifetime, since e.g. radiation damage on the RPV is practically avoided by the inherent shielding provided by the large water thickness between the RPV and the core. Considering all these aspects, for a given size, the multiple SMRs option might decrease the Levelized Unit Electricity Cost (LUEC).

SMRs are safer from terror attacks theyre buried and can be surrounded with concrete. The Economist, 10
(Thinking small, December 9th, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17647651, accessed 7-31-12, RSR) Others fret that lots of small reactors, rather than a few big ones, will be more vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Hyperion's Mr Deal insists that neither a rocket-propelled grenade nor a tank round could smash a small reactor. Small reactors can be shielded by a heavy layer of concrete and buried, in effect making them safer than big ones , whose protective concrete domes can only be so thick, lest they collapse under
their own weight.

SMRs are safer from terror attacks underground facilities are better protected. Campagna and Sawruk, 10
(Mark (Lead Writer for the American Nuclear Society) and Walter (Assistant Writer for the American Nuclear Society), PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS, American Nuclear Society, July 2010, RSR) Rely on government response for SMR facilities with vital assets underground or otherwise well protected. Shallow burial or a hardened structural design provides excellent protection against large explosive weapons and aircraft impact as well as an excellent means of enhancing security system effectiveness against sabotage. Application of the traditional multilayered defensive approach of detection, deterrence, delay, and

defeat can be used effectively for physical protection of SMRs. Detection, deterrence, and delay concepts must be
integrated into the early design phase of the facility in order to provide sufficient lead time for government response.

SMRs are safer from terror attacks limited access points and multiple passive barriers. Campagna and Sawruk, 10
(Mark (Lead Writer for the American Nuclear Society) and Walter (Assistant Writer for the American Nuclear Society), PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS, American Nuclear Society, July 2010, RSR) Design the facility with limited access points and multiple passive barriers. A defenseindepth approach incorporating multiple passive barriers and limited access points to vital areas at the conceptual design stage will enhance overall security system effectiveness. Passive safety systems that do not require routine access for surveillance and maintenance can be hardened to provide long passive delay times .

SMRs are safer from terror attacks advanced security system technology. Campagna and Sawruk, 10
(Mark (Lead Writer for the American Nuclear Society) and Walter (Assistant Writer for the American Nuclear Society), PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS, American Nuclear Society, July 2010, RSR) Security system technology. Significant advances in security system technology and countermeasures will most likely occur over the facility lifetime. Plan for security system technology obsolescence during the conceptual design phase. Build in redundancy and separation of systems to allow for future system overhaul or replacement with minimal need for compensatory measures.

Impact (Meltdowns)
Meltdowns would cause extinction. Earth Island Journal, 2
(America's Terrorist Nuclear Threat to Itself, October 2002) The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl.
The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A

terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to
quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps,

natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed . Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles on September 11. Now that we are at war,
this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse operating in the US. They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Do we take this war seriously? Are

we committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

Impact (Nuclear Terrorism)

Terrorist use of nukes causes extinction Hellman 8 (Dr. Martin E., professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University, The Bent,
Spring 2008, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the publics mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A

terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former
weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we cant live in a world where its anything but extremely low-probability. *Hegland 2005+. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years, with 79 percent of the respondents believing it more likely to be carried out by terrorists than by a government *Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce whichever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). This article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full-scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, societys almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The Cost of World War III The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War IIs fatalities were double or triple that numberchaos prevented a more precise determination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapolation of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Congress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, Global

war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
expressed a similar view: If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed *McNamara 1986, page 6+. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagans belief that nuclear

weapons were totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization. [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care millions of people might starve or freeze during the following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. further millions might eventually die of latent radiation effects. [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that assumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the
K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a fullscale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even

a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic

consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engineering
conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessitynot an option.

The US will retaliate against terrorism to prove a point. Fisher 12 (Uri Fisher, Uri Fisher is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado-Boulder, Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values, June 25, 2012 D.A. Gutierrez) .
Recent comments by French President Jacques Chirac and Colorado Congressman Tom Tancredo intensified the debate over how retaliatory threats are communicated to terrorists . President Chirac, speaking
at a submarine base in Brittany in January 2006, stated that France was prepared to carry out a nuclear strike against any country that sponsors a terrorist attack against French interests. Chirac went on to say that Frances nuclear arsenal is now organized to include the ability to retaliate against a terrorist attack with tactical nuclear strikes.5 President Chirac was clearly sending a warning to Iran and various Arab countries that continue to support terrorist organizations. In a more reckless assertion,

Congressman Tom Tancredo stated in 2005 on a Florida radio talk show that the U.S. could consider taking out Muslim holy sites if terrorists attacked the U.S. with nuclear devices. Both comments created a public storm, as many observers quickly labeled these statements
irresponsible. Notwithstanding the merit or lack thereof of such comments, the response that these statements engendered revealed another problem with the possibility of establishing a deterrent mechanism against terrorists. Because

effective deterrence requires the U.S. to directly threaten targets of value to terrorist elements, a dilemma arises: whether the U.S. would be willing to carry out the necessary actions to credibly communicate to terrorist elements that what they value is at risk if terrorist acts occur. What targets must the U.S. threaten for a potential terrorist element to
estimate that the costs of carrying out a course of action are unacceptably high? Is the U.S. prepared to implement policies that may evoke strong dissent from certain segments of the domestic and international community? Can the U.S. credibly threaten these targets without crossing certain ethical, political, and legal boundaries of behavior?

Another terrorist attack could cause the US to consider holding up to their threats. Fisher 12 (Uri Fisher, Uri Fisher is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Colorado-Boulder, Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values, June 25, 2012 D.A. Gutierrez) The nature of Americas democratic system and the need for retaliation efforts to pass moral muster continually remind our enemies that they will rarely have to face the full consequences of U.S. power. To deter terrorists from attacking the U.S. or its interests, the U.S. will have to be prepared to compromise many of its core values and conceivably set in motion the moral decline of the worlds lone superpower. In truth, many of our enemies must be amazed by some of the debates currently being waged in the United States.
Debates regarding the humane treatment of suspected terrorist detainees, responding in a proportional manner to suicide bombings, upholding the civil rights of September 11 suspects, or not directly targeting terrorist perpetrators are most likely construed as superfluous discussions by U.S. enemies. Incidents viewed as symbols of U.S. heavy-handedness by some Americans, such as Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, may not represent the same thing to U.S. enemies. Robert Kaplan made this point recently: For Iraqis meeting with Am ericans in Mosul, Abu Ghraib had a different connotation than it did in the United States. Here it meant not brutality but American weakness and lack of resolve.35 Concern over the cost of compromising our ideals undoubtedly undermines efforts to make our enemies believe we ar e willing to punish them no matter at what expense. To

effectively deter terrorists the U.S. will have to accept the price that comes with violating some human rights, responding with overwhelming force, alienating certain allies, and even eliminating those assets and people that terrorists may hold dear. Any discussion of
deterrence that fails to acknowledge the necessity to implement such policies belongs only in ivory towers where the theoretical does not have to be tested by the practical. Deterring

terrorists will not happen with strong policy statements alone, it will only happen if the U.S. can clearly illustrate to terrorists and their supporters that they will feel significant pain as the result of their actions. However, as long as arguments about the conflict between what is necessary and what is right continue to
resonate throughout American society, the idea of deterring terrorists, who have no qualms about using pipe bombs to blow people up, represents little more than a pipe dream. And even if we, as Americans, did suggest that we were willing to sacrifice some ideals to combat terrorists, would the terrorists believe

us?

Economy Advantage Extension

Uniqueness
The Feds statement portrays a weak economy Crutsinger 8/2 (Martin Crutsinger, Fed: US growth slows, but no action needed _ yet, AP Economics
Writer / August 2, 2012, http://www.boston.com/business/news/2012/08/01/fed-says-economy-hasslowed-takes-new-steps/rZBAjeR07EmouRnoIDtzJN/story.html) JD WASHINGTON (AP) The Federal Reserve said Wednesday that the U.S. economy is losing strength and
repeated a pledge to try to boost growth if hiring remains weak. The Fed took no new action after a two-day policy meeting. But it appeared to signal in a statement released after the meeting a growing inclination to take further steps to lift the economy out of its funk. The

Fed noted that growth had slowed over the first half of the year, with job creation slackening and consumer spending tapering off. The Fed reiterated its plan to hold its benchmark short-term interest rate at a record low near zero until at least late 2014. Market reaction to the Feds announcement was muted. Stocks fluctuated slightly after the statement was released and ended the day lower. The Dow Jones industrial average fell 33 points
to 12,976, and broader indexes also closed down. The yield on the 10-year Treasury note increased from 1.50 percent to 1.52 percent. The statement was slightly different than the one issued after the Feds last meeting, June 19 and 20. In addition to noting that the economy had decelerated, the Feds policymaking committee said it would closely monitor incoming information and will provide additional accommodation as needed to stimulate the economy and job creation. In the June statement the central bank said the economy has been expanding moderately and that it is prepared to take further action as appropriate.

Slow manufacturing is tanking the economy now Woellert 12 (Manufacturing in U.S. Unexpectedly Contracted: Economy, Lorraine Woellert, 2012
Bloomberg News Published 02:10 p.m., Wednesday, August 1, 2012 , http://www.sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Manufacturing-in-U-S-Unexpectedly-Contracted3754930.php) JD American manufacturing unexpectedly contracted in July for a second month, reflecting a drop in orders that threatens to undercut a mainstay of the recovery. The Institute for Supply Managements factory index was 49.8 last
month, little changed from a three-year low of 49.7 reached in June, the Tempe, Arizona-based group said today. Economists surveyed by Bloomberg News projected a reading of 50.2, according to the median estimate, just above the 50 mark that separates expansions and

Manufacturers from China to the euro area joined the U.S. in showing signs of retrenching, indicating Europes debt crisis and the looming U.S. government spending cuts and tax increases that
contractions. constitute the so-called fiscal cliff are taking a toll on customers globally. Federal Reserve policy makers today acknowledged that the economy has slowed and foreshadowed new steps to boost the weakening expansion.

Solvency
Expansion of the NRC regulative structures are key to job creation Chu 10 (March 23, 2010, Steven Chu, Secretary of the SRS, Small Modular Reactor Demonstration
Complex, http://www.srscro.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Small-Modular-Reactor-DemonstrationComplex.pdf) JD It is widely acknowledged that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is neither sufficiently staffed nor technically informed to begin certifying designs for most SMRs. Consequently, if SMRs are to play a role in the U.S. energy mix any time in the next decade or two, demonstrations of SMRs at commercial scale are needed to resolve remaining technical issues and inform and accelerate the NRCs licensing process. As was done with LWRs 50 years ago in Idaho,
the required demonstrations should occur at a DOE site. Of the available DOE sites, SRS is the preferred choice for the following reasons: Safety Culture - SRS has the best nuclear safety culture in the Complex;evidenced by an unsurpassed record of safe and effective construction and operation of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities infrastructure - SRS has the Savannah River National Laboratory, DOEs premier applied engineering laboratory, underutilized land and infrastructure ideally suited to the SMR demonstration mission Logistic - SRS is located in close proximity to the Carolina Nuclear Corridor (Charlotte-Wilmington-Columbia-Greenville) in which the domestic nuclear EPC and manufacturing industries are consolidating. The logistical convenience of having these resources so close together is clear, especially when considering transporting personnel or materials. Jobs - Approximately

six thousand near-term construction jobs and five thousand long-term operations jobs locally and tens of thousands jobs nationally will be created. More than just the individuals employed, the impact on the surrounding economy would be monumental as it provides an exciting new, long-term purpose of truly national importance for the Savannah River National
Laboratorya purpose perfectly in line with its proven competencies. Education - Nuclear education has been largely neglected in the U.S. for the past 30 years and most of the skilled nuclear workforce is approaching retirement age. A large number of universities have banded together under the Southeast Universities Nuclear Reactors Institute for Science and Education (SUNRISE) to meet the challenge of training the next generationof U.S. nuclear engineers and operators. SMRs at Savannah River National Laboratory would provide SUNRISE with the facilities needed for the required hands-on aspects of the curricula.

Backward linkages cause ripples in the national economy Solan 10 (Energy Policy Institute, Economic and Employment Impacts of Small Modular Nuclear
Reactors, June 2010, Davis Solan/Geoffrey Black/ Michael Louis, http://epi.boisestate.edu/media/3494/economic%20and%20employment%20impacts%20of%20smrs.p df) JD In terms of the economic impacts of the SMR industry, the direct effects stem from the actual change in final demand for SMR units. An increase in SMR demand, for example, will create additional employment and salaries within the SMR industry. The indirect effects stem from the purchases of goods and services by the SMR industry from suppliers in other domestic industries. In effect, the SMR industrys backward linkages, as its purchases from other firms, ripple through the economy in a chain- like manner. The
induced effects stem from the increase in wage and salary earnings and other household income that ripples though the economy as direct and indirect dollars are spent and re-spent in the national economy. The biggest driver of these induced effects is employee spending from wage and salary payroll and earnings.

SMRs are an economic boon higher net value than larger reactors. Carelli, et al., 10
(M.D. (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Garone (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), G. Locatelli (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M. Mancini (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), C. Mycoff (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Trucco (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M.E. Ricotti (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Energy, CeSNEF-Nuclear Engineering Division) , Economic features of integral, modular, small-to-medium size reactors, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 52, 2010, accessed 8-4-12, RSR) Whereas market conditions are relatively certain (i.e. the trends of the electricity price and demand are steady and, thus, can be relied upon for long-term planning), the SMR modularity translates in scalability. In contrast, whereas

market conditions are highly uncertain, the SMR modularity translates in adaptability, which is an extreme form of temporal and spatial exibility in the plant deployment. Such a reversible nature of investment in SMR units is apparent when one focuses upon the market risks related to LR investment (Gollier et al., 2005). The LR adopters have to cope with upward (or downward) swings of price and demand or localised increase (or decrease) of demand by the means of longterm planning, given the LR long lead times. Since the event is at the best known in likelihood, both the decision to invest and the decision not to invest may prove to be inefcient. A large share of invested capital may result to be sunk (idle), or consistent revenues may be foregone: the economic risk of LR investment is greater because is greater, for a certain period of time, the sunk portion of invested capital. Due to shorter lead times and smaller size, SMRs allow the investors to more closely and quickly adapt to early signals of changing market conditions. The
shorter lead times of SMRs allow to split investments for additional units in a closer proximity to the market evolution (electrical load market matching under uncertainty). In

comparison, the LR investment may result in an expected loss of revenues with respect to SMRs for power not taken. The latter effect translates in a higher net present value, which
emerges for any given cost of capital. Yet an additional effect of temporal and spatial exibility of deployment is related to a lower cost of capital due to a perception of reduced risk by both creditors and shareholders. They are aware that investments in SMR units are more capable to match the new market conditions; i.e. they are less exposed to market uncertainty than LR investment, other things being equal. Accordingly, they demand a lower risk premium to invest in the project (reduced risk premium).

For a given size, the multiple

SMRs might have lower nancial costs than LR.

SMRs are key to the energy economy lower market risk. Rosner and Goldberg, 11
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011, https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf , accessed 8-4-12, RSR) Furthermore, CBO discussed the market risk associated with GW-scale plants: Market risk is the component of risk that investors cannot protect themselves against by diversifying their portfolios. Investors require compensation for market risk because investments exposed to such risk are more likely to have low returns when the
economy as a whole is weak and resources are more highly valuedIn the case of nuclear construction guarantees provided to investor-owned utilities or merchant power providers, for example, plant construction may be more likely to be slowed or canceled when the demand for electricity is depressed by a weak economy. 23,24 SMRs

could potentially mitigate such a risk in several ways. First, SMRs have lower precompletion risk due to shorter construction schedules (24-36 months as compared with 48 months). Second, because of their smaller size, SMRs have lower market risk because there is significantly less power than needs to be sold as compared with GW-level plants. Finally, the modular nature of SMRs affords the flexibility to build capacity on an as-needed basis. In the case of unsubsidized financing, particularly relevant to merchant markets, utility decision makers that have significant aversion to risk of future natural gas spikes (i.e., gas prices rising to about $7/Mcf or one standard deviation above the recent average behavior of natural gas prices) would possibly view alternatives to gas-fired generation as attractive options, particularly if the investment requirements are comparable SMRs could potentially fit the bill.

SMRs are an economic boon more flexible and cheaper to ship to fill energy demands. Wang, 12
(Ucilia, Contributor, Feds To Finance Small Nuclear Reactor Designs, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/01/20/feds-to-finance-small-nuclear-reactor-designs/, accessed 8-4-12, RSR) Small reactors are generally about one-third the size of existing nuclear reactors, and a power plant with small reactors promises to be cheaper to build and easier to obtain permits more quickly than a full-size nuclear power plant, proponents say. Utilities should have more flexibility in modifying the size of a power plant with small reactors if they need more power, then they can add more reactors over time. Nuclear reactors have historically been designed to be 1-

gigawatt or more each because such scale helps to drive down the manufacturing and installation costs. Small

reactors can be economical, too, advocates say, because they can be shipped more easily and cheaply around the world. Energy Secretary Steve Chu has said hes a big fan of small nuclear reactor technology. We think (small, modular nuclear) solves a lot of issues in terms of investments and electricity infrastructure , Chu said at a
press conference a year ago. And its a way for the United States to regain its leadership in nuclear.

Impact
Global economic crisis causes warstrong statistical supportalso causes great power transitions Royal 10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214) Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict . Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms

in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future

expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the

presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the
likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary

theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and
Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen

(2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This
implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Warming Advantage Extensions

Uniqueness
Warming is a fact Achenbach 2012 (Joel Achenbach, writer and lecturer at Princeton and Georgetown, July 7, 2012,
Climate Change: Global Warming is a Fact, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/achenblog/post/climate-change-global-warming-is-afact/2012/07/09/gJQAAGs6XW_blog.html) At some point we should stop litigating the basic question of whether climate change is happening. Climate change is a fact. The spike in atmospheric CO2 is a fact. The dramatic high-latitude warming is a fact. That the trends arent uniform and linear, and that there are anomalies here and there, does not change the long-term pattern. The warming trend has flattened out in the last decade but probably only because of air
pollution from Chinese coal-fired power plants or somesuch forcing we havent fully discovered (smog is hardly the long-term solution we should be seeking). The broader

patterns are clear. Models show the greatest warming spike down the road still, decades hence. Thus in a sense, saying that this is what global warming is like whenever we have a heat wave actually understates the
problem. Having spent much of my life in Florida, I can tell you, what kills you in summer is not the temperature but the duration of the season, which lasts basically forever into November or even December in South Florida. So,

yeah, 100 degrees in July gets my attention here in DC, but so will a stretch of 85-degree high temperatures in October.

Warming is real- Long-term trends prove Nordhaus 2012 (William D. Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University, research for
National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy, and the Glaser Foundation, March 22, 2012, Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong, New York Review of Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/22/why-global-warming-skeptics-arewrong/?pagination=false) The first claim is that the planet is not warming. More precisely, Perhaps the most inconvenient fact is the lack of global warming for well over 10 years now. It is easy to get lost in the tiniest details here. Most people will benefit from stepping back and looking at the record of actual temperature measurements. The figure below shows data from 1880 to 2011 on global mean temperature averaged from three different sources.2 We do not need any complicated statistical analysis to see that temperatures are rising, and furthermore that they are higher in the last decade than they were in earlier decades.3 One of the reasons that drawing conclusions on temperature trends is tricky is that the historical temperature series is highly volatile, as can be seen in the figure. The presence of short-term volatility requires looking at long-term trends. A useful analogy is the stock market. Suppose an analyst says that because real stock
prices have declined over the last decade (which is true), it follows that there is no upward trend. Here again, an examination of the long-term data would quickly show this to be incorrect. The

last decade of temperature and stock market data is not representative of the longer-term trends. The finding that global temperatures are rising over the last century-plus is one of the most robust findings of climate science and statistics.

Anthropogenic warming is happening in line with projections Nordhaus 2012 (William D. Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University, research for
National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy, and the Glaser Foundation, March 22, 2012, Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong, New York Review of Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/22/why-global-warming-skeptics-arewrong/?pagination=false) A second argument is that warming is smaller than predicted by the models: The lack of warming for more than a decadeindeed, the smaller-than-predicted warming over the 22 years since the UNs Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began issuing projectionssuggests that computer models have greatly exaggerated how much
warming additional CO2 can cause. What is the evidence on the performance of climate models? Do they predict the historical trend accurately? Statisticians routinely address this kind of question. The

standard approach is to perform an experiment in which (case 1) modelers put the changes in CO2 concentrations and other climate influences in a climate model and

estimate the resulting temperature path, and then (case 2) modelers calculate what would happen in the counterfactual situation where the only changes were due to natural sources , for example, the sun and volcanoes, with no human-induced changes. They then compare the actual temperature increases of the model predictions for all sources (case 1) with the predictions for natural sources alone (case 2). This experiment has been performed many times using
climate models. A good example is the analysis described in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (for the actual figure, see the accompanying online material4). Several

modelers ran both cases 1 and 2 described aboveone that the projections of climate models are consistent with recorded temperature trends over recent decades only if human impacts are included. The divergent trend is especially pronounced after 1980. By 2005, calculations using natural sources alone underpredict the
including human-induced changes and one with only natural sources. This experiment showed actual temperature increases by about 0.7 degrees Centigrade, while the calculations including human sources track the actual temperature trend very closely. In reviewing the results, the [i.e., natural warming factors] alone

IPCC report concluded: No climate model using natural forcings has reproduced the observed global warming trend in the second half of

the twentieth century.5

Warming is a fact- New research solves skeptics concerns Borenstein 2011 (Seth Borenstein, October 31, 2011, Skeptic finds he now agrees global warming is
real, Yahoo, http://news.yahoo.com/skeptic-finds-now-agrees-global-warming-real-142616605.html) The Muller "results unambiguously show an increase in surface temperature since 1960," Curry wrote
Sunday. She said she disagreed with Muller's public relations efforts and some public comments from Muller about there no longer being a

Muller's study found that skeptics' concerns about poor weather station quality didn't skew the results of his analysis because temperature increases rose similarly in reliable and unreliable weather stations. He also found that while there is an urban heat island effect making cities warmer, rural areas, which are more abundant, are warming, too. Among many climate scientists, the
need for skepticism. reaction was somewhat of a yawn. "After lots of work he found exactly what was already known and accepted in the climate community," said Jerry North, a Texas A&M University atmospheric sciences professor who headed a National Academy of Sciences climate science review in 2006. "I am hoping their study will have a positive impact. But some folks will never change."

Solvency
Expansion of SMRs could kick-start nuclear power globally Taso 11 (Firas Eugen Taso, 21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular
Reactors, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836) JD In recent years there has been a renewed interest, both private and public according to Matthew Bunn, in Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). Some of them are new concepts and technologies, like the Hyperion or Toshiba 4S reactors, or existing technologies scaled down from large PWR or LWR reactors, like the NuScale or mPower. In the eyes of some experts and proponents of nuclear power, these new designs and new approach from the industry could change the playing field and help promote a resurgence of nuclear power not just in the United States, but worldwide, opening the field to countries that were thus far not considering nuclear for economic or capacity reasons. SMRs could, in theory, help promote nuclear power and give it the jump start that has been talked about for decades in the US and other nuclear states. In order to understand
SMRs, and arguments for and against them, this section will describe the technology, look at current models and regulatory and political environment on SMRs and analyze them from benefits and costs perspectives.

Nuclear power results in a fraction of the emissions Gronlund 7 Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf Nuclear power plants do not produce global warming emissions when they operate. However, producing nuclear
power requires mining and processing uranium ore, enriching uranium to create reactor fuel, manufacturing and transporting fuel, and building plantsall of which consume energy. Today much of that energy is provided by fossil fuels (although that may change if the United States takes steps to address global warming). However, the

global warming emissions associated with nuclear

power even now are

relatively modest. Indeed, its life cycle emissions are comparable to those of wind power and hydropower. While estimates of life cycle greenhousegas emissions vary with different assumptions and methodologies, the basic conclusions of most analyses are consistent: for each unit of electricity generated, natural gas combustion results in roughly half the global warming emissions of coal combustion, while wind power, hydropower, and nuclear power produce only a few percent of emissions from coal combustion. The life cycle emissions of photovoltaics (PVs) are generally somewhat higher than those for wind power, hydropower, and nuclear power, because manufacture of PVs entails greater global warming emissions.5 The greenhouse gas emissions stemming from nuclear power depend greatly on the technology used to enrich uranium. The technology now used in the United Statesgaseous diffusionrequires a large amount of electricity: roughly 3.4 percent of the electricity generated by a typical U.S. reactor would be needed to enrich the uranium in the reactors

enrichment would account for some 2.5 percent of the emissions of an average U.S. fossil fuel plant. However, in the near future, U.S. uranium will be enriched using gaseous centrifuge technology, which consumes only 2.5 percent of the energy used by a diffusion plant. Thus this part of the nuclear power life cycle would result in very low emissions. 7
fuel. 6 Because fossil fuels generate 70 percent of U.S. electricity, emissions from that

An increase in nuclear reactors has an inverse relationship with aggregate emissions Gronlund 7 Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf Today 104 reactors produce some 20 percent of U.S. electricity. If demand for electricity in 2050 is roughly that of todaybecause energy conservation offsets increases in demandanother 100 reactors would be required to produce an additional 20 percent of U.S. electricity in 2050. Because electricity production contributes roughly a third of U.S. global warming emissions today, those additional 100 reactors would reduce emissions by 67 percent relative to today. Recall that to avoid dangerous climate change, the United States and other
industrialized nations will need to reduce emissions at least 80 percent by midcentury, compared with 2000 levels (which are comparable to todays levels). Thus an additional 100 reactors would contribute roughly 8 percent of the total required U.S. reduction (67 percent of the required 80 percent), under the assumption that efficiency and conservation measures could offset any growth in electricity demand. (Without additional conservation and efficiency measures, U.S. electricity consumption is projected to almost double by 2050.) All energy sources entail risks to the environment and human health. For example, the risks of carbon capture and storagewhich would reduce the

net global warming emissions from using fossil fuels to generate electricityinclude gas explosions and the release of large amounts of previously stored carbon dioxide, which could undo previous emissions reductions. However, this report focuses on the risks of nuclear power and how to reduce them.

Nuclear facilities are the main substitute in a carbon-free model Verrastro 10 (The Geopolitics of Energy: Emergin trends, changing landscape, uncertain times,
October 2010, Frank Verrastro/Sarah Ladislaw/Mathew Frank/Lisa Hyland, Center for Strategic International Studies, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30101/1/The%20Geopolitics%20of%20Energy. pdf?1) JD Based on efforts to promote the use of environmentally cleaner (i.e., emissions-free or low-emission) fuels, a similar case can be made for the expansion of nuclear energy use on a global scale. Nuclear reactors are a proven and reliable source of clean energy, accounting for a majority of the emissions-free electricity that is produced around the world today. Though reactors presently account for 6 percent of current global energy consumption, the construction of nuclear facilities is expected to grow substantially under certain carbon-constrained projections-not only to replace facilities that are due to be decommissioned in the next few decades, but also to meet incremental increases in demand for electricity.

Nuclear is the only option quick enough to reverse the impacts of warming McCarthy 4 (Michael McCarthy, Lovelock: 'Only nuclear power can now halt global warming'
Published May 23 2004 by Independent UK, Archived May 23 2004, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/320) JD On that basis, he says, there is simply not enough time for renewable energy, such as wind, wave and solar power - the favoured solution of the Green movement - to take the place of the coal, gas and oil-fired power stations whose waste gas, carbon dioxide (CO2), is causing the atmosphere to warm. He believes only a massive expansion of nuclear power, which produces almost no CO2, can now check a runaway warming which would raise sea levels disastrously around the world, cause climatic turbulence and make agriculture unviable over large areas. He says fears about the safety of nuclear energy are irrational and exaggerated, and urges the Green movement to drop its opposition. In today's Independent,
Professor Lovelock says he is concerned by two climatic events in particular: the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, which will raise global sea levels significantly, and the episode of extreme heat in western central Europe last August, accepted by many scientists as unprecedented and a direct result of global warming.

Impact
Warming causes extinction Ahmed 2010 (Nafeez Ahmed, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and
Development, professor of International Relations and globalization at Brunel University and the University of Sussex, Spring/Summer 2010, Globalizing Insecurity: The Convergence of Interdependent Ecological, Energy, and Economic Crises, Spotlight on Security, Volume 5, Issue 2, online) Perhaps the most notorious indicator is anthropogenic global warming. The landmark 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which warned that at then-current rates of increase of fossil fuel emissions, the earths global average temperature would likely rise by 6C by the end of the 21st century creating a largely uninhabitable planet was a wake-up call to the international community.*v+ Despite the pretensions of climate sceptics, the peer-reviewed scientific literature has continued to produce evidence that the IPCCs original scenarios were wrong not because they were too alarmist, but on the contrary, because they were far too conservative. According to a paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, current CO2 emissions are worse than all six scenarios contemplated by the IPCC. This implies that the IPCCs worst-case six-degree scenario severely underestimates the
most probable climate trajectory under current rates of emissions.[vi] It is often presumed that a 2C rise in global average temperatures under an atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gasses at 400 parts per million (ppm) constitutes a safe upper limit beyond which further

global warming could trigger rapid and abrupt climate changes that, in turn, could tip the whole earth climate system into a process of irreversible, runaway warming.[vii] Unfortunately, we are already well past this limit,
with the level of greenhouse gasses as of mid-2005 constituting 445 ppm.[viii] Worse still, cutting-edge scientific data suggests that the safe upper limit is in fact far lower. James Hansen, director

of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, argues that the absolute upper limit for CO2 emissions is 350 ppm: If the present overshoot of this target CO2 is not brief, there is a possibility of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects .*ix+ A wealth of scientific studies has attempted to explore the role of positive-feedback mechanisms between different climate sub-systems, the operation of which could intensify the warming process. Emissions beyond 350 ppm over decades are likely to lead to the total loss of Arctic sea-ice in the summer triggering magnified absorption of sun radiation, accelerating warming; the melting of Arctic permafrost triggering massive methane injections into the atmosphere , accelerating warming; the loss of half the Amazon rainforest triggering the momentous release of billions of tonnes of stored carbon, accelerating warming; and increased microbial activity in the earths soil leading to further huge releases of stored carbon, accelerating warming; to name just a few. Each of these feedback subsystems alone is sufficient by itself to lead to irreversible, catastrophic effects that could tip the whole earth climate system over the edge.[x] Recent studies now estimate that the continuation of business-as-usual would lead to global warming of three to four degrees Celsius before 2060 with multiple irreversible, catastrophic impacts; and six, even as high as eight, degrees by the end of the century a situation endangering the survival of all life on earth.[xi]

Warming causes extinction. Sify 2010 (Sify, Sydney newspaper citing Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at University of Queensland
and Director of the Global Change Institute, and John Bruno, associate professor of Marine Science at UNC (Sify News, Could unbridled climate changes lead to human extinction?, http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridled-climate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction-newsinternational-kgtrOhdaahc.html) The findings of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' emerged from a synthesis of recent research on the world's oceans, carried out by two of the world's leading marine scientists. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is further evidence that we are well on the way to the next great extinction event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind,

particularly if

the trend continues. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in
which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added. The 'fundamental and comprehensive' changes to marine life identified in the report include

rapidly warming and acidifying oceans, changes in water circulation and expansion of dead zones within the ocean depths. These are driving major changes in marine ecosystems: less abundant coral reefs, sea grasses and mangroves (important fish nurseries); fewer, smaller fish; a breakdown in food chains; changes in the distribution of marine life; and more frequent diseases and pests among marine organisms. Study co-author John F Bruno, associate professor in marine science at The University of North Carolina, says greenhouse gas emissions are modifying many physical and geochemical aspects of the planet's oceans, in ways 'unprecedented in nearly a million years'. 'This is causing fundamental and comprehensive changes to the way marine ecosystems
function,' Bruno warned, according to a GCI release. These findings were published in Science.

Peak Oil Advantage Extensions

Uniqueness
UK task force warns oil peak before 2015 Nelder 10 (Chris, former software engineer, devoted post 9/11 life to Oil Peak research, Part 1: The End of Peak Oil Denial, http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/the end-of-peak-oil-denial/1111) KGH
The first bombshell was actually dropped on February 10, when the

UK Industry Task Force on Peak Oil and Energy Security issued a report called "The Oil Crunch: A wake-up call for the UK economy." I only mentioned it in passing at the time, but it was a stern warning that "oil shortages, insecurity of supply and price volatility will destabilise economic, political, and social activity potentially by 2015." It only made the news because Sir Richard Branson personally endorsed it; but the fact that the task force comprised top UK executives and energy experts lent it enough weight to be
rather widely circulated in the press. The British government, including energy minister Lord Hunt, responded by staging a closed-door summit meeting with the taskforce on March 22. As the UK's Guardian reported, the government intended to develop an action plan to contend with a near-term peak, and to "calm rising fears over peak oil." Veteran peak oil analyst and taskforce member Jeremy Leggett explained: "Government has gone from the BP position '40 years of supply left, the price mechanism works, no need to worry' to 'crikey'." He urged

the assembly to properly assess the risks of peak oil, and to immediately begin preparing for the end of globalization and an era of oil shortages in the West. According to reports from attendees, the summit
yielded some important conclusions: Peak oil is either here, or close enough. Prices will have to go higher as demand outstrips supply. Governments will be forced to intervene to maintain critical levels of oil supply, and limit volatility. Rationing measures may be unavoidable.

Electrification of transport must be pursued in order to reduce demand. Communities will need to work quickly to
reorganize around walking instead of driving, producing food and energy locally instead of importing, and generally try to reduce their need for oil. However, the notion that peak oil will mean the end of economic growth, as I have argued, apparently fell on deaf ears. Still, the very fact that the government has engaged with the peak oil community and formed a parliamentary group to study the issue offers a sliver of hope that, at least in the UK, we'll have some measure of consciousness about the issue and an idea of what to do about it as we drive off the peak oil cliff.

Oxford study says peak before 2015 Nelder 10 (Chris, former software engineer, devoted post 9/11 life to Oil Peak research, Part 1: The End of Peak Oil Denial, http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/the end-of-peak-oil-denial/1111) KGH
Oxford Report: Reserves Exaggerated by One Third On March 22, another bombshell exploded in the press as former UK

chief scientist David King and researchers from Oxford University released a paper claiming that the world's oil reserves had been "exaggerated by up to a third," principally by OPEC. Their "objective analysis" showed that conventional oil
reserves stand at just 850-900 billion barrels not the 1,150-1,350 billion barrels that are officially claimed by oil producers and accepted by the politically influenced IEA. They anticipated

that demand could outstrip supply by 2014-2015. In a statement that

sounded like a direct echo of what peak oil analysts like me have been saying for years, co-author Dr. Oliver Inderwildi remarked, "The

belief that alternative fuels such as biofuels could mitigate oil supply shortages and eventually replace fossil fuels is a pie in the sky. Instead of relying on those silver bullet solutions, we have to make better use of the remaining
resources by improving efficiency

Oil peak will happen before 2020, even oil companies agree Micu 10 (Mirela, Doctoral School of Econ Studies Academy, Bucharest, Peak Oil Are We There Yet? Gas University of Ploiesti Bulletin, Technical Series, 63(3B), p. 99-104) KGH
At least one oil company, French super-major Total S.A., announced plans in 2008 to shift their focus to nuclear energy instead of oil and gas. A Total senior vice president explained that this is because they believe oil production will peak before 2020, and they would like to diversify their position in the energy markets.[119] In October 2009, a report published by the Government-supported UK Energy Research Centre, following 'a review
of over 500 studies, analysis of industry databases and comparison of global PEAK OIL Are we there yet? 101 supply forecasts', concluded that 'a

peak in conventional oil production before 2030 appears likely and there is a significant risk of a peak before 2020'.[121] The authors believe this forecast to be valid 'despite the large uncertainties in the available data'.[122] The

study was claimed to be the first to undertake an 'independent, thorough and systematic review of the evidence and arguments in the 'peak oil debate'.[123] The authors noted that 'forecasts

that delay a peak in conventional oil production until after 2030 are at best optimistic and at worst implausible' and warn of the risk that 'rising oil prices will encourage the rapid
development of carbon-intensive alternatives that will make it difficult or impossible to prevent dangerous climate change[123] and that 'early investment in low-carbon alternatives to conventional oil is of considerable importance' in avoiding this scenario.[124] A

2010 report by Oxford University researchers in the journal Energy Policy predicted that production would peak before 2015.

Solvency
SMRs are key to delaying peak oil replace our demand on carbon-based sources. NEI, 11
(Nuclear Energy Institute, Small Reactors Provide Clean, Safe Power and Industrial Process Heat, April 2011, RSR)
Near-term construction of large, new nuclear plants will address two of our nations top priorities: additional supplies of clean energy and job creation. Small,

modular reactors can complement these large-scale projects by expanding the level of deployment and application of carbon-free nuclear energy. Small-scale reactors provide energy companies and other users with a broader array of energy options. Their small sizetypically fewer than 300 megawatts (MW)1and modular construction will allow these reactors to be built in a controlled factory setting and installed module by module, reducing the financing challenge and matching a variety of needs for low-carbon energy. The potential applications for small reactors include electricity generation. Small reactors may be more compatible with the needs of smaller U.S. utilities from the standpoint of generation, transmission and financing
than large 1,400-megawatt (MW) plants. In some cases, the industry envisions modular reactors built in clusters, with modules added as

Small, modular reactors could be used for industrial process heat applications, such as those used in the petrochemical industry, desalination or water purification. Another use for small reactors is providing power for the development of liquid transportation fuels from North American resources of oil sands, oil shale and coal-to-liquids applications, reducing the overall life-cycle carbon footprint of these activities.
needed to match growth in energy demand.

SMRs are key to delaying peak oil diversifies our energy portfolio. Loudermilk, 11
(Micah, research associate with the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program at National Defense University, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, Journal of Energy Security, 5-31-11, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=116%3Acontent0411&id=314%3Asmall-nuclearreactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-andcosts&tmpl=component&print=1&page=&option=com_content&Itemid=375, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) Realistically speaking, a world without nuclear power is not a world full of increased renewable usage, but rather, of fossil fuels instead. The 2007 Japanese Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear outage is an excellent example of this, as is Germanys post-Fukushima decision
to shutter its nuclear plants, which, despite immense development of renewable options, will result in a heavier reliance on coal-based power as its reactors are retired, leading to a 4% increase in annual carbon emissions. On the global level, without

nuclear power, carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation would rise nearly 20% from nine to eleven billion tons per year. When examined in conjunction with the fact that an estimated 300,000 people per year die as a result of energy-based pollutants, the appeal of nuclear power expansion grows further. As the world copes simultaneously with burgeoning power demand and the need for clean energy, nuclear power remains the one consistently viable option on the table. With this in mind, it becomes even more imperative to make nuclear energy as safe as possible, as quickly as possiblea capacity which SMRs can fill with their high degree of safety and security. Additionally, due to their modular nature, SMRs can be quickly constructed and deployed widely. While this is not to say that small reactors should supplant large ones, the US would benefit from diversification and expansion of the nations nuclear energy portfolio.

SMRs are key to delaying peak oil allows for increased oil extraction and captures a share of the energy market. Spencer and Loris, 11

(Jack (Senior Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy at The Heritage Foundation) and Nicolas (Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow at The Heritage Foundation), A Big Future for Small Nuclear Reactors?, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2514, Backgrounder, 2-2-11, RSR) Multi-functionality. SMRs can be used in a variety of applications that have substantial power and heat requirements. The chemical and plastics industries and oil refineries all use massive amounts of natural gas to fuel their operations. Similarly, small reactors could produce the heat needed to extract oil from tar sands, which currently requires large amounts of natural gas. While affordable today, natural gas prices vary significantly over time, so the long-term predictable pricing that nuclear provides could be very attractive. SMRs may also provide a practical solution for desalination plants (which require large amounts of electricity) that can
bring fresh water to parts of the world where such supplies are depleting.8 Perhaps most important, is that SMRs have the potential to bring power and electricity to the 1.6 billion people in the world today that have no access to electricity, and to the 2.4 billion that rely on biomass, such as wood, agricultural residue, and dung for cooking and heating.9 Competition. While competition among large nuclear-reactor technologies currently exists, small

reactors will add a new dimension to nuclear-reactor competition. Multiple it will also provide an additional incentive for large reactors to improve. If smaller reactors begin to capture a share of the nuclear market and the energy market at large, it will drive innovation and ultimately lower prices for both new and existing technologies.
small technology designs are set to emerge on the market. Not only will competition among small reactors create a robust market,

Competitive nuclear power key to avoiding peak oil changes our approach to oil dependency. Hultman, 11
(NE, Associate Director at the Joint Global Change Research Institute, The political ec
onomy of nuclear energy, WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS-CLIMATE CHANGE, Vol. 2, RSR) Despite a history of problems, nuclear power is being discussed as a potentially useful and appropriate electricity source for both developed and developing countries. For example,

expanding nuclear power's share of electricity portfolios could reduce, relative to a fossil-intensive baseline, greenhouse gas emissions that lead to climate change. Moreover, nuclear power has long been advocated as a route to energy security and indeed, for many of the nuclear nations, it could decrease dependence on oil imports under certain technological scenarios, such as an increased use of plug-in hybrid vehicles. The nuclear industry argues that a new generation of reactors , representing a refinement of existing technology, will enable this expansion. Because of these new motivations, some advocates have applied the term 'nuclear renaissance' to the possibility of a rapid expansion of nuclear power to satisfy a projected growing global electricity demand, while simultaneously reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This article outlines
the primary challenges that this unique energy source presents for such a renaissance. Like other technologies, nuclear is situated in a social and political-economic matrix that influences its evolution. After reviewing the basic aspects of the technology, I discuss the history of the existing nuclear fleet, then address the prospects for advanced and next-generation nuclear technologies. I review the economics of nuclear power as it is currently deployed and the potential changes to these economics under potential future development. In examining future scenarios, I explore the effects of national and international policies on nuclear energy.

SMRs are key to avoiding peak oil reduces our dependence on oil. Fleischmann, 11
(Chuck, Representative from the 3rd District in Tennessee, Small Modular Reactors Could Help With U.S. Energy Needs, American Physical Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2011, http://www.aps.org/publications/capitolhillquarterly/201110/backpage.cfm, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) If we delay the implementation of SMRs here at home, we are at risk of being eclipsed by other nations. If we dont make them in America, we will be buying them overseas. By deploying SMRs, we could be taking the first steps in making significant headway to truly gaining energy independence. Many in Congress strongly support advances in
American nuclear power. The U.S. House of Representatives fully funded a Department of Energy program to cost share partnerships for two SMR designs where near-term NRC licensing can be completed. But the program stalled in the Senate where a few influential senators blocked it. While the nuclear renaissance described by Oak Ridge scientist Alvin Weinberg didnt happen, we have another chance to revive his vision.

The United States can lead the world on Small Modular Reactors, provide clean, safe nuclear power to help meet the ever increasing energy demands, reduce our dependence on foreign oil and provide quality jobs. That is a win for the nation and the world.

Impact (Economy)
Global economic crisis causes warstrong statistical supportalso causes great power transitions Royal 10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214) Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict . Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms

in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future

expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade
expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the

presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the
likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary

theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1990, DeRouen (1995). and
Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen

(2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This
implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Impact (Add-On Resource Wars)

Oil peak leads to bloody resource wars Howard 9 (Roger, author of three books on oil, including The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrows Natural Resources, contributor to the Wall Street Journal, International Herald Tribune, The National Interest, The American Conservative, Peak Oil and Strategic Resource Wars, The Futurist, 43(9), p.21-25) KGH
The economic and social impacts of diminishing oil revenues on producer countries will likely be powerful. Many exporting states, particularly in the Middle East, South America, and Africa, have booming populations that in the years to come will impose an immense strain on their national infrastructures. If these countries fail to diversify their economies, then it is not easy to see how they will afford the housing, roads, schools, and job-creation schemes that future generations are likely to demand. Saudi Arabia is already struggling to reduce its rate of domestic unemployment, reckoned to stand at around 15%, and may well struggle even more after around 2020, when its oil output is expected to reach a plateau. The prospect of resource wars has also been much discussed. Conflict could break out, it is sometimes said, not only as consuming countries use their military weight to seize diminishing reserves of petroleum and other natural assets, but also between and within producing countries. Desperate to secure their future, these exporting nations, or factions within them, could perhaps try to stake their claim over disputed oil-rich regions or even blatantly disregard international law by attacking vulnerable neighbors. Current wars in western Africa illustrate how dangerous and bloody such conflicts might become. But the political consequences of peak oil on producer countries are in fact likely to be much more far-reaching and complex. Growing fears about future output may drive these states to react in ways that could have adverse repercussions for local democracy and political freedom or increase tension with neighboring states in unexpected ways.

US will take supplies by force Freeman 4(Richard, journalist on education and econ, Will The End of Oil Mean The End of America? http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0301-12.htm) KGH
In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Robert Pirsig tells the story of a South American Indian tribe that has devised an ingenious monkey trap. The Indians cut off the small end of a coconut and stuff it with sweetmeats and rice. They tether the other end to a stake and place it in a clearing. Soon, a monkey smells the treats inside and comes to see what it is. It can just barely get its hand into the coconut but, stuffed with booty, it cannot pull the hand back out. The Indians easily walk up to the monkey and capture it. Even as the Indians approach, the monkey screams in horror, not only in fear of its captors, but equally as much, one imagines, in recognition of the tragedy of its own lethal but still unalterable greed. Pirsig uses the story to illustrate the problem of value rigidity. The monkey cannot properly evaluate the relative worth of a handful of food compared to its life. It chooses wrongly, catastrophically so, dooming itself by its own short-term fixation on a relatively paltry pleasure. America has its own hand in a coconut, one that may doom it just as surely as the monkey. That coconut is its dependence on cheap oil in a world where oil

will soon come to an end. The choice we face (whether to let the food go or hold onto it) is whether to wean ourselves off of oil to quickly evolve a new economy and a new basis for civilization or to continue to secure stable supplies from the rest of the world by force. As with Pirsigs monkey, the alternative consequences of each choice could not be more dramatic. Weaning ourselves off of cheap oil, while not easy, will help ensure the vitality of the American economy and the survival of its political system. Choosing the route of force will almost certainly destroy the economy and doom Americas short experiment in democracy. To date, we have chosen the second alternative: to secure oil by force. The evidence of its consequences are all around us. They include the titanic US budget and trade deficits funding a gargantuan, globally-deployed military and the Patriot Act and its starkly anti-democratic rescissions of civil liberties. There is little time left to change this choice before its consequences become irreversible. The world is quickly running out of oil. In the year 2000, global production stood at 76 Million Barrels per Day (MBD). By 2020,
demand is forecast to reach 112 MBD, an increase of 47%. But additions to proven reserves have virtually stopped and it is clear that pumping at present rates is unsustainable. Estimates of the date of peak global production vary with some experts saying it already may have occurred as early as the year 2000. New Scientist magazine recently placed the year of peak production in 2004. Virtually all experts believe it will almost certainly occur before the end of this decade. And the rate of depletion is accelerating. Imagine a production curve that rises slowly over 145

years the time since oil was discovered in Pennsylvania in 1859. Over this time, the

entire world shifted to oil as the foundation of industrial civilization. It invested over one hundreds trillion dollars in a physical infrastructure and an economic system run entirely on oil. But oil production is now at its peak and the right hand side of the curve is a virtual drop off. Known reserves are being drawn down at 4 times the rate of new discoveries.
The reason for the drop off is that not only have all the big discoveries already been made, the rate of consumption is increasing dramatically. Annual world energy use is up five times since 1945. Increases are now driven by massive developing countries China, India, Brazil growing and emulating first or at least second world consumption standards. Fixed

supply. Stalled discoveries. Sharply increased

consumption. This is the formula for global oil depletion within the next few decades. The situation is especially critical in the US. With
barely 4% of the worlds population, the US consumes 26% of the worlds energy. But the US produced only 9 MBD in 2000 while consuming 19 MBD. It made up the difference by importing 10 MBD, or 53% of its needs. By 2020, the US Department of Energy forecasts domestic demand will grow to 25 MBD but production will be down to 7 MBD. The daily shortfall of 18 MBD or 72% of needs, will all need to be imported.

Perhaps it goes without saying but it deserves repeating anyway: oil is the sine qua non of industrial civilization the one thing without which such civilization cannot exist. All of the worlds 600 million automobiles depend on oil. So do virtually all other commodities and critical processes: airlines, chemicals, plastics, medicines, agriculture, heating, etc. Almost all of the increase in world food productivity over the past 50 years is attributable to increases in the use of oil-derived additives: pesticides; herbicides; fungicides; fertilizers; and machinery. When oil is gone, civilization will be stupendously different. The onset of rapid depletion will trigger convulsions on a global scale, including, likely, global pandemics and die-offs of significant portions of the worlds human population. The have countries will face the necessity kicking the have-nots out of the global lifeboat in order to assure their own survival. Even before such conditions are reached, inelastic supply interacting with inelastic demand will drive the price of oil and oil-derived commodities through the stratosphere, effecting by market forces alone massive shifts in the current distribution of global wealth. If the US economy is not to grind to a halt under these circumstances it must choose one of three alternate strategies: dramatically lower its living standards (something it is not willing to do); substantially increase the energy efficiency of its economy; or make up the shortfall by securing supplies from other countries.

Oil shortages lead to militarism and totalitarian retrenchment Marcroft 10 (Paul, Vice President of Sales & Marketing and Director of Business Development at APR Energy, LLC., A century of deep anointing, Stimulus: The New Zealand Journal of Christian Thought & Practice, 18(3), p. 23-29) KGH
Stimulus Vol 18 No 3 August 2010 Heinberg, John Michael Greer and others make the reasons for this melting ever plainer. A

recent paper by Jorg Friederichs21 presents three case studies showing how governments have responded in the past. The first is Predatory Militarism as exemplified by Japans WWII conquest of the East Indies to secure oil supplies. The second is Totalitarian Retrenchment as seen in North Koreas handling of the loss of Soviet oil in the 1990s, and the starvation of 3-5% (nearly a million lives) of the population. The most hopeful response was Cubas Socio-economic Adaptation to the collapse of the Soviet Union after which Cubas oil supply between 1989-1993 dropped by 71%. Fidel Castro was forced to proclaim an emergency and announced a Special Period. Although the economy was devastated and people lost weight, the desperation did not
descend into spiralling violence, crime and social breakdown. The extended family, barrio culture, frozen property structures and traditional agricultural knowledge at least allowed people to self-organise, grow food and help each other.

Climate based resource wars cause extinction theyre a conflict multiplier. Klare 06 (Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, March
10, 2006, The Coming Resource Wars, http://goo.gl/sPH9D) It's official: the era of resource wars is upon us. In a major London address, British Defense Secretary John Reid warned that
global climate change and dwindling natural resources are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy.

Climate change, he indicated, "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" -- and this will "make the emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely." Although not
unprecedented, Reid's prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the vehemence of his remarks. "The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur," he declared. "We should see this as a warning sign." Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global

climate change. With sea levels rising, water and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid's speech, delivered at the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain's equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is but the most recent expression of a growing trend in strategic circles to view environmental and resource effects -- rather than political orientation and ideology -- as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring, energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy. Prior to Reid's address, the most significant expression of this outlook was a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense by a California-based consulting firm in October 2003. Entitled "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security," the report warned that global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and continent-wide "dust bowl" effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. "Violence

and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today," the 2003 report noted. "Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor." Until now, this mode of analysis has
failed to command the attention of top American and British policymakers. For the most part, they insist that ideological and religious differences -- notably, the clash between values of tolerance and democracy on one hand and extremist forms of Islam on the other -- remain the main drivers of international conflict. But Reid's speech at Chatham House suggests that a major shift in strategic thinking may be under way. Environmental perils may soon dominate the world security agenda. This shift is due in part to the growing weight of evidence pointing to a significant human role in altering the planet's basic climate systems. Recent studies showing the rapid shrinkage of the polar ice caps, the accelerated melting of North American glaciers, the increased frequency of severe hurricanes and a number of other such effects all suggest that dramatic and potentially harmful changes to the global climate have begun to occur. More importantly, they conclude that human behavior -- most importantly, the burning of fossil fuels in factories, power plants, and motor vehicles -- is the most likely cause of these changes. This assessment may not have yet penetrated the White House and other bastions of head-in-the-sand thinking, but it is clearly gaining ground among scientists and thoughtful analysts around the world. For the most part, public discussion of global climate change has tended to describe its effects as an environmental problem -- as a threat to safe water, arable soil, temperate forests, certain species and so on. And, of course, climate change is a potent threat to the environment; in fact, the greatest threat imaginable. But viewing climate change as an environmental problem fails to do justice to the magnitude of the peril it poses. As Reid's speech and the 2003 Pentagon study make clear, the greatest danger posed by global climate change is not the degradation of ecosystems per se, but rather the disintegration of entire human societies, producing wholesale starvation, mass migrations and recurring conflict over resources. "As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will

create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and
energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those

without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." It is this prospect,
more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals. When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. "In "nuclear

this world of warring states," the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Although speculative, these reports
make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, no

society, however

affluent, will escape involvement in these forms of conflict.

Solvency

A2 Licensing Constraints
No licensing problems the NRC is committed to providing SMRs a distinct advantage. EPI, Energy Policy Institute, 10
(Economic and Employment Impacts of Small Modular Reactors, June 2010, http://epi.boisestate.edu/media/3494/economic%20and%20employment%20impacts%20of%20smrs.p df, accessed 7-30-12, RSR)
While the NRC is actively engaged in developing technology-neutral guidelines for new plant licensing, it has developed its current regulations based on 40 years of design and operation of LWR facilities (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2010). In addition, the

NRC has been

challenged to significantly upgrade its workforce and capacity to license LWR designs in the last five years (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). Because of these factors, the SMRs which utilize light water designs should have a distinct advantage over non-LWR reactors in the NRC design and certification process, and the Department of Energy has publicly endorsed this view with the aim to financially assist SMR LWR designs through the licensing process (Chu, 2010). This should lead to faster certification and give LWR designs an early adoption advantage in the SMR market. An example of this LWR advantage is the backing of Babcock & Wilcox by three large utilities,
Tennessee Valley Authority, First Energy Corp. and Oglethorpe Power Corp. These utilities recently signed a multi-firm agreement to solidify a mutual commitment to acquire necessary approval for the commercial use of B&Ws new reactor design within the U.S (Smith, 201 0). Likewise, NuScale Power has met with Energy Northwest, a joint operating agency for public utilities, about interest in adopting its design, and Energy Northwest has initiated studying SMRs and held informational meetings with its local partners (Dininny, 2009; Haviland, 2009).

Global deployment / energy export

Even if no plants are built in the US, production cost incentives makes the US a massive player in the nuclear export business. SMRs are critical to maintaining that global market share and preventing proliferation. <SMRs are developed and tested in areas like China and India before they are built in the US, so India and China also get a lot of the benefits> WALD 2011 (MATTHEW L. Nuclear Industry Thrives in the U.S., but for Export March 30th, 2011,
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/business/energyenvironment/31NUKE.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all ) THE American nuclear renaissance is going strong, even if hardly any nuclear reactors are being built in the United States. Japans continuing nuclear calamity has heightened concerns about the future of nuclear power and its safety, but in China, India and other regions, the push for nuclear power seems likely to continue to surge. Those are the countries that provide a strong market for the American companies that build nuclear reactors and their components. Ask Steven Haas. Since the day he was born, 27 years ago, nobody in this country has ordered and completed a nuclear
plant. But there he was, one day recently, plugging circuit boards and other electronic components into a cabinet the size of an industrial refrigerator that was labeled Sanmen. That is the name of a twin-reactor plant in China that the Westinghouse Electric Company has been supplying with a design and major components. The cabinet was one of scores that will go into each reactor, allowing digital communications and control of equipment. After Sanmen, he said, will come Haiyang, another Chinese twin-reactor plant, and Vogtle 3 and 4 in the American state of Georgia, and V. C. Summer 2 and 3 in South Carolina. And I think theres other jobs coming, he said, adding: I hope so. If not, I wont have a job. But he probably will. In addition to the four units Westinghouse is supplying China, it is negotiating for 10 more. While the process has hit a pause amid the crisis in Japan, where an earthquake knocked out all cooling to six reactors, it seems bound to resume. The electricity demand of China, India and the Middle East grows unabated. And the Westinghouse design and another by General Electric are intended to provide passive methods of cooling a reactor in an emergency, by relying on natural forces like gravity and convection, with few or no power-operated valves, diesel generators and other safety systems that a tsunami or other hazard could knock out. For

the United States, nuclear power has become an export industry. And here in western Pennsylvania, production is going full tilt. Westinghouse, which two years ago moved into a 750,000-square-foot office complex here, looks more and more like
Boeing or General Motors, a company that designs crucial parts, makes some and farms out the manufacture of others, and integrates components from all over the world. The

four Chinese reactors have generated about 5,000 jobs in the United States, at Westinghouse and related companies, said Aris Candris, chief executive of Westinghouse Electric. The company had hoped for many reactors to be under construction in this country by now, he said, but overseas projects are growing a lot faster than we are and are picking up the slack. The result is some odd alliances. For example, the
United Arab Emirates last year picked a consortium led by South Korea to build four reactors in a contract valued at an estimated $20 billion. It could be worth more because it could lead to yet more reactors. About 20 percent of the nuclear island, meaning the reactor and immediately associated parts, will come from Westinghouse, according to a company spokesman, H. Vaughn Gilbert. The flip side is that some of the biggest parts of the Vogtle and Summer reactors will come from Japan Steel Works. American steel makers never developed the equipment needed for the next generation of nuclear plants because there has been no new construction here. But that is not to say that

American technology lags; in fact, in some cases it exceeds anything available elsewhere. Take, for example, the reactor
coolant pumps. In the Westinghouse design, the pumps pull water from the reactor vessel and push it through a web of tiny thin-walled pipes in heat exchangers, and then back to the vessel. Outside the tiny pipes, a second circuit of clean, uncontaminated water is boiled into steam, for use in making electricity. The design keeps the radioactive materials bottled up, but the pumps are one of the major causes of reactor shutdowns and maintenance headaches. So the Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company is building sealed pumps that are supposed to run maintenance-free for 60 years. Each is 23 feet tall, weighs almost 100 tons and pumps about 13,000 gallons of water a second. They sell

for

more than $10 million each, and there is nowhere else to buy them, the company says. In the U.S., we have a need for energy, but its a lot harder to unify to do it, said Gregory J. Hempfling, general manager of the plant. The Chinese as a country were better able to unify their direction. His company has 800 employees at the plant making the
pumps; at any given time, 80 to 120 are working on the Chinese pumps. Other companies sell huge high-precision parts that will require service. Tyco International, for example, recently opened a $25 million lab in Mansfield, Mass., where it tests valves for nuclear plants. Most of the valves will go to Asia, said Patrick Decker, president of the companys valve subsidiary, Tyco Flow Control. Each

new reactor that uses the companys valves pays $10 million to $30 million, and theres a service tail on this of a few million dollars a year, he said, referring to follow-up work. The valves, precise and reliable, are specialty items that the company has a
leg up in building. At a clean energy conference in Washington in January, Jon M. Huntsman Jr., then the American ambassador to China, said that he had recently run into Bill Gates in China. Mr.

Gates is an investor in a new kind of reactor, part of a class

called small modular reactors, that are intended to be affordable for smaller utilities and suitable for
places where the need is for hundreds of megawatts, not thousands of megawatts. Mr. Gates is an investor with Nathan P. Myhrvold, the former chief technology officer at Microsoft, in a company called TerraPower, which has

developed a design for something called the traveling wave reactor. For the most part, it makes its fuel as it runs, taking extra neutrons released in the chain reaction and using them to turn a low-value form of uranium into plutonium, which is almost immediately consumed. The approach means that a country could have nuclear power without bothering with enrichment plants, which are a route to nuclear weapons. While the traveling wave is an American design, Mr. Huntsman noted, right now the regulatory environment here in the United States means it would take decades just to certify. By partnering with the Chinese, they can move ahead and commercialize the technology around the world when its proven. Babcock & Wilcox, another American company with a history of reactor construction, is working on a
modular reactor of a more conventional design. It is supposed to be built entirely in a shop and shipped to the site, reducing the problems of quality control and skilled labor in remote locations. Its design is for a reactor that can stand alone or be installed in multiples up to 10, as demand grows. Its future may also be abroad, in places where putting a 1,000-megawatt reactor on a small grid would be like loading an elephant into a canoe, causing blackouts every time it shut down unexpectedly. The

focus for now, though, is on the big units, and some of these may seem more worthy of consideration since the Japanese disaster. The
Westinghouse model, for example, puts the emergency cooling water on the roof, so it needs far fewer pumps. Fewer pumps means fewer valves, less safety-grade piping and fewer control cables. The plant has 180 pumps, down from 280 in a standard plant of the same size, and 1.2 million feet of cable, down from 9.1 million in a standard plant. Existing

plants are subjected to mathematical analysis to show that they will suffer core damage less than once every 10,000 years of operation. Engineers
acknowledge that this is not verifiable through measurement of actual accident frequency, but they say that such calculations are a good way of comparing risks among different systems, or sometimes among plants. The

Westinghouse plants frequency, using this

analysis, is 100 times lower than conventional plants. General Electric, too, has a passively safe model on the drawing boards. It takes many components outside the reactor vessel and moves them inside. The design also locates cooling water above where it would be needed and relies on steam to rise through pipes its natural direction to reach cooling water that will condense the steam back to a liquid. The plant can operate without electricity for three days without heating the core, the company says. In contrast, most plants are equipped to run for four to eight hours without some kind of power generation. The

focus for all these companies is on Asia and India. Most of the action that one can really care about, frankly, is in the developing world, said Stewart Brand, the futurist and developer of the Whole Earth Catalog. Mr. Brand, a proponent of nuclear power, said, Those are the places where the massive amounts of power demand are coming on, every month, over the next couple of decades. Theyre the ones building all kinds of new coal-fired plants, plants that could have been nuclear. Matthew G. Bunn, an associate professor at the Kennedy School at Harvard and a nuclear expert in the office of the White House
science adviser, surveyed the landscape after the March 11 earthquake in Japan and said of the Chinese, Theyll build more nuclear than anybody else. Hand

in hand with development of civilian power reactors is the possibility of development of nuclear weapons. When the United States exports fuel, it usually keeps control over what can happen to the fuel after it has been through the reactor, a crucial detail because when uranium-powered reactors make electricity, they also make plutonium, which can be used for bombs. That strikes Michael J. Wallace, a 40-year veteran of the nuclear industry, most recently at Constellation Energy, as a reason for the United States to seek to be a technology exporter, to compete with Russia and, eventually, China. If the United States is going to be relevant in the global market place and have an ability to continue to exercise leadership on matters of nonproliferation, he said, it would seem that weve got to have a viable program going forward.

Incentives Solve
Economic barriers must be lowered before SMRs become realistic alternatives Freed 10 (Josh Freed, Elizabeth Horwitz, and Jeremy Ershow, September 2010, Thinking Small On
Nuclear Power, The Clean Energy Program, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/340/Third_Way_Idea_Brief__Thinking_Small_On_Nuclear_Power.pdf) JD
Several U.S. companies are in the advanced stages of developing small reactors that adapt existing technology to produce smaller amounts of baseload electricity. These technologies are nearly ready for deployment. Final decisions about design, siting, and regulatory approval could be made within the next five years. The federal government can take several steps to help make this possible. First, economic

barriers to entry must be lowered. For first movers, costs of licensing, design and regulatory approval will be comparable to those of the larger reactors because existing regulations have not yet been tailored to suit new designs. As the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gains expertise in evaluating SMRs, and as economies of scale develop,
these costs will decrease. Until this happens, the Department of Energys new cost-sharing program for near-term licensing and deployment of light water SMRs will help reduce some of the financial impact. The

NRC also needs to continue its commitment to allocate sufficient resources and build the expertise necessary to evaluate and license SMRs in a timely fashion.The Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) can also prime the market pump by serving as a buyer
of first-of-a-kind technologies. This could include deploying SMRs on DOE-owned sites, many of which are already zoned to support nuclear power plantsand appropriate DOD facilities in the United States. DOD, the largest single energy consumer in the U.S., comprises 78% of federal energy use, and is the most significant energy consumer in several metropolitan areas. DOE

should also work closely with the private sector to develop standardized designs, with the goal of achieving demonstration and licensing within a decade. The potential market for SMRs is global. As we note in Getting Our Share of Clean Energy Trade,
whichever country emerges as the market leader could dominate a good part of the $6 trillion global energy market. The U.S. could seize that mantle and all the jobs and exports that come with it. American reactors could be deployed within a decade domesticallyand go global soon after.

Government investment key necessary to level the playing field with other alternative energies. Rosner, William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics, and Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory, 11
(Robert and Stephen, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011, https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf , accessed 7-30-12, RSR) Successful commercialization of SMRs will require a level playing field in terms of federal financial incentives relative to other clean energy generation technologies. Wind and solar energy currently qualify for a production
tax credit (PTC), which can be converted into either an investment tax credit (ITC), or monetized in the form of a cash grant from the U.S. Treasury. 62 Large commercial LWRs also can qualify for a PTC, which is capped at 6,000 MW of capacity. Early SMR deployments (LEAD or FOAK plants) potentially could meet the statutory 2021 commercial operations date (COD) to qualify for the existing PTC, but would not otherwise meet the current Department of Treasury administrative criteria, including the 2014 date for start of construction. 63

Acceleration of SMR deployment activities to serve national energy policies will require government incentives. Absent government incentives, there is no assurance that current privately funded efforts will be carried to fruition, and even if so, on what schedule.

Government investment key necessary to develop first-of-a-kind SMR plants. Vujic et al., Professor in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at UC Berkeley, 12
(Jasmina, Ryan Bergmann (PhD Student in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at UC Berkeley), Radek Skoda (Professor in Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M) and Marija Miletic (Graduate in Nuclear

Science at the Czech Technical Institute) Small modular reactors: Simpler, safer, cheaper?, Energy, 2012, RSR) In a colloquium presentation given at the University of California, Berkeley Geoffry Rothwell, examined the economics of a generic light water SMR reactors. The gures presented came from a study currently in progress with the University of Chicago and show the projected levelized cost of of constructing a power plant in real 2011 dollars with real interest rates. These SMRs are estimated to cost about $8000/kWe for rst-of-a-kind plants, which is based on a single installation 600 MWe worth of units. Nth -of-a-kind plants, which is assumed to be 19.2 GWe of installed SMR capacity, are estimated to cost $5000/kWe. The study suggests that if a 25 GWe eet of SMRs were deployed over 40 years in the United States, it would have a positive impact on the economy (i.e. provide prot) if the rst-of-a-kind costs are subsidized by the government
[23].

Government financing key necessary to overcome steep design barrier. Wald, New York Times, 11
(Matthew, Administration to Push for Small Modular Reactors, The New York Times, p. 1, RSR)
Various experts have championed modular reactors as a way for utilities in the United States and other countries to harness nuclear power in an era when the cost of a conventional project has become dauntingly large. Advocates say the modules

can be built inexpensively and with good quality control in a central factory and then set up quickly where they are needed. But the $500 million cost of the design and approval process, steep for a product with uncertain market appeal, is a major barrier. The Energy Departments notion is that if the government provides half the money up front and signs a contract to buy power from the reactor, a utility will be persuaded to order one. That contract, because it guarantees revenue for the utility company, would make it easier for the utility to receive financing.

Government investment key necessary to provide risk mitigation. Fertel, President and Chief Executive Officer at the Nuclear Energy Institute, 11
(Marvin, Testimony for the Record on S. 512, the Nuclear Power 2021 Act, a Bill on Small Reactor Development, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources at the United States Senate, RSR)
The economic, energy security and environmental benefits of small reactor technologies make a strong case for accelerated market development. Work remains to design, develop and license small reactor designs. A variety of factors must be addressed to achieve this outcome. The

cost and time required to design, develop, and license a small reactor is not necessarily reduced linearly with size. In addition, it takes time and resources for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop the institutional capacity to license new reactor designs. All of these issues increase the risk and uncertainty for vendors facing expensive design and licensing challenges. Traditional partnerships among technology vendors, component manufacturers and end users are necessary but insufficient in themselves. Absent additional business risk mitigation through government incentives , the potential benefits of these small, modular reactor concepts may go unrealized, or may be realized later than desirable. Leveraging these private sector resources through public partnerships regain U.S. nuclear leadership .
with the Department of Energy and other government entities

will

accelerate these new reactor technologies to market, achieving their many benefits while helping

Government involvement key necessary for demonstration of SMRs. Ingersoll, Senior Program Manager at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 11
(Daniel, ASME 2011 Small Modular Reactors Symposium, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SAFETY CASE FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS, September 28-30 2011, pg. 5, http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/presentations/crozat_-_brc_smr_questions_10-20-2011.pdf, accessed 7-31-12, RSR)
The global nuclear energy industry, and especially the US nuclear industry, has demonstrated a high level of safety achievement. Still, the natural disaster in Japan has highlighted the reality that extreme events can occur. The nuclear industry and research communities must

vigilantly seek to further improve the safety and resilience of nuclear power plants if nuclear energy is to remain a viable element in our clean energy portfolio. The new generation of large plants offer significant improvements and small modular reactors have the potential to achieve an unparalleled level of safety and plant robustness by virtue of their intrinsic features. Several

SMR vendors are actively developing new designs that build on the successes and learn from the failures of existing plants. The new designs reflect a common set of design principles such as eliminating plant design vulnerabilities where possible, reducing accident probabilities, and mitigating accident consequences. An important
consequence of the enhanced safety and added resilience provided by the many design features reviewed in this paper is that the individual reactor units and the entire SMR plant should be able to survive a significantly broader range of extreme conditions. This will enable them to not only ensure the safety of the general public but also help protect the investment of the owner and continued availability of the powergenerating asset.

What remains is for the nuclear industry and the government to work together to make

SMRs a demonstrated reality.

Government investment key necessary to overcome initial costs. Tomich, Saint Louis Post Dispatch, 12
(Jeffrey, Small nuclear reactors generate hype, questions about cost, The Saint Louis Post Dispatch, p. 1, RSR) The pursuit of small reactors represents a new path to the oft-referenced nuclear renaissance. It was only a few
years ago that the industry focused strategy on certification of a few large reactor designs that would, in theory, eliminate the risk and uncertainty, cost overruns and construction delays that tainted the last nuclear plant boom. While

new reactors are going forward in Georgia and South Carolina, a full-tilt nuclear revival hit a wall for several reasons. Among them: the inability of utilities to finance projects that cost multiple billions of dollars . In fact, more than half of the new reactors for which construction and operating licenses were sought have been deferred or cancelled, including Ameren Missouris proposed 1,600-megawatt Callaway 2 plant. Andrew Klein, a nuclear engineering professor at Oregon State University, sees small reactors as part of a new strategy that could help utilities get over the hump by adding new capacity in small bites. They could then use revenue from the first small reactors to help finance subsequent units as more generating capacity is needed. "Its an entirely different business model," he said. The Obama administration, which is pushing for development of low-carbon energy technologies, sees potential, too. And the president wants the United States to take the lead in developing the industry. Last month, Obama proposed $452 million to help speed up development of small modular reactors. The funding availability would come on top of $8 billion in loan guarantees for the Vogtle twin-reactor nuclear project in Georgia. The federal funding, which has yet to be appropriated by Congress, would support engineering, design certification and licensing of up to two plant designs that have the potential to be licensed and in commercial operation in a decade.

Government investment key necessary to jumpstart commercial interest. Deaton, Contributor, 12

(Paul, SMRs and Iowas Energy Future, Blog for Iowa, http://www.blogforiowa.com/2012/02/25/smrsand-iowas-energy-future/, accessed 2-25-12, RSR) A fundamental problem with development of nuclear technology is there has been little commercial interest in new nuclear power over the last three decades. It is an expensive way to boil water and the financial risks to
investors and electric utilities have restricted consideration of it. In South Africa, hundreds of millions of dollars were invested in a SMR design called pebble-bed and research and development were scaled back dramatically in 2010 for want of a viable path to construction of a prototype (click here to read article).

Unless government pays the research and development expense, or steps

in to alter market conditions so as to make SMRs more attractive to investors, SMR technology seems unlikely to advance near term . Altering market conditions is what the Iowa legislature has been considering with HF 561.

Upfront Costs
Government investment key the upfront costs, large-scale uncertainty and long-term returns necessitate government backing. Rosner, William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics, and Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory, 11
(Robert and Stephen, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011, https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf , accessed 7-30-12, RSR)
Assuming that early SMR deployments will carry cost premiums (until the benefits of learning are achieved), the issue is whether federal government incentives are needed to help overcome this barrier. Some may argue that commercial deployment will occur, albeit at a slower pace, as the cost of alternatives increases to a level that makes initial SMR deployments competitive. Others may argue that SMR vendors should market initial modules at market prices and absorb any losses until a sufficient number of modules are sold that will begin to generate a profit. However, the

combination of the large upfront capital investment, the long period before a return on capital may be achieved, and the large uncertainty in the potential level of return on investment make it unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive .

DOE will serve as customers for the first wave of SMRs, spurring their deployment locally and globally. Freed 10 (Josh Freed, Elizabeth Horwitz, and Jeremy Ershow, September 2010, Thinking Small On
Nuclear Power, The Clean Energy Program, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/340/Third_Way_Idea_Brief__Thinking_Small_On_Nuclear_Power.pdf) RCM
The imperative of creating more diverse clean energy applications has spawned the design of several small reactor technologies which will enable a wide range of new clean energy uses. Known as SMRs, they vary between 1/20 th and 1/4 th the size of large reactors. 8 There are two streams of development on SMRsthose based on the same concept as existing large light water reactors, and advanced reactors of varying design intended to provide new kinds of capabilities. Light water SMRs have the scale and flexibility to provide a range of amounts of baseload power. They can

incrementally expand capacity at an existing power plant or add new capacity at U.S. military installations that need independence from the grid. 9 SMRs are financially viable for many utilities, with costs in the hundreds-of-millions of dollars per reactor. 10 Because of the power conversion system of these reactors, they can be cost-effectively cooled by air rather than water. As a result, SMRs can supply cheaper baseload clean energy to arid cities in the West, like Denver or Las Vegas. 11 And because they can fit into a small structure and
be sized to match the capacity of existing electrical infrastructure, SMRs provide a viable path to retrofitting old power plants with clean energy. 12 Advanced reactors could open the door to intriguing new possibilities. Some advanced SMRs are being designed to supply heat directly to industrial users, as well as electricity. 13 This would enable large manufacturers across industries to replace fossil fuels with clean energy. Micro-reactors could be used in remote locations or under circumstances where a self-sufficient energy source is needed for a limited period of time. Others could convert existing nuclear waste into electricity, dramatically reducing problems of waste storage. 14 Support commercialization of SMRs near ready for deployment. Several

U.S. companies are in the advanced stages of developing small reactors that adapt existing technology to produce smaller amounts of baseload electricity. 15 These technologies are nearly ready for deployment. Final decisions about design, siting, and regulatory approval could be made within the next five years. 16 The federal government can take several steps to help make this possible. First, economic barriers to entry must be lowered. For first movers, costs of licensing, design and regulatory approval will be comparable to those of the larger reactors because existing regulations have not yet been tailored to suit new designs. As the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gains expertise in evaluating SMRs, and as economies of scale develop, these costs will decrease. Until this happens, the Department of Energys new cost-sharing program for near-term licensing and deployment of light water SMRs will help reduce some of the financial impact. 17[i] The NRC also needs to continue its commitment to allocate sufficient resources and build the expertise necessary to evaluate and license SMRs in a timely fashion. The Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) can also prime the market pump by serving as a buyer of first-of-a-kind technologies. This could include

deploying SMRs on DOE-owned sites, many of which are already zoned to support nuclear power plants, 18 and appropriate DOD facilities in the United States. DOD, the largest single energy consumer in the U.S., comprises 78% of federal energy use, and is the most significant energy consumer in several metropolitan areas. 19 DOE should also work closely with the private sector to develop standardized designs, with the goal of achieving demonstration and licensing within a decade. 20 The potential market for SMRs is global. As we note in Getting Our Share of Clean Energy Trade, whichever country emerges as the market leader could dominate a good part of the $6 trillion global energy market. 21 The U.S. could seize that mantle and all the jobs and exports that come with it. American reactors could be deployed within a decade domestically 22 and go global soon after. Support investment in advanced reactor R&D. Even more advanced reactor technologies are in
development. These reactors are distinguished from current SMRs mainly by the fact that their reactor cores are cooled by helium gas or liquid metal, rather than water. 23 As emerging technologies, this years. 24 The

next generation of SMRs has a longer path to deployment, about 10-15 federal government can help bring these technologies to fruition by providing intellectual capital and funding to hasten their development. This could include DOE support of advanced SMR research and development through direct funding, as well as research partnerships with the national laboratories. Such continued R&D support is already pending in federal legislation, with a particular focus on perfecting the designs of reactors capable of recycling used fuel. 25 Meanwhile, the NRC should further build out its expertise in advanced reactors to be fully prepared to review design certification applications when they arrive.

Scaling reactor insurance costs spurs SMR development. International Trade Administration 2011, (U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade
Administration The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors) RCM
According to some U.S. suppliers, several other U.S. government policies may pose challenges to SMR deployment. For example, to

meet the requirements of the Omnibus Budget Reconcili- ation Act of 1990, as amended, the NRC assesses a uniform annual fee for each licensed nuclear power reactor under 10 CFR Part 171.9 The total annual fee for each
operating power reactor includes a spent fuel storage and reactor-decom- missioning annual fee. Separate from the annual fees assessed under 10 CFR Part 171, an

annual premium for the nuclear liability insurance pool is required by the Price Anderson Act. In 2009, the NRC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule- making to consider whether to amend 10 CFR Part 171 to establish a variable annual fee structure for power reactors based on the reactors licensed power limit contained in the operating license. If the NRC issued regulations based on a variable fee structure accounting for reactor size , then it is reasonable to assume that the annual fee assessed to SMRs would be less than the annual fee as- sessed to the current large LWRs. Another consideration U.S. SMR vendors have to address is that the NRCs requirement for the emergency planning zones (EPZs) around reactors does not generally take into account the size of a reactor. SMR vendors argue that the smaller size means that a smaller protection area could suffice, which would
maintain safety while providing cost savings. The NRCs regulations do allow the size of the EPZ to be adjusted on a case-by-case basis for reactors that are gas cooled (such as the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor designs mentioned earlier) or have a thermal output of less than 250 MW. This exception would cover many of the proposed SMR designs, if the vendors can demonstrate that a smaller EPZ is ac- ceptable on the basis of their emergency planning. Adjusting

the 250 MW limit could cover the rest of the U.S. SMR designs not currently eligible for this potential size exception. Aside from the size regulation, additional costs related to emergency planning stem from state and local regulations, which cover environmental protection, police and fire coverage, and other services. SMR vendors will need to work with operators and state and local authorities to determine if SMRs warrant adjustments to those other existing regulations. Other suppliers suggest that current NRC re- quirements for staffing and security systems at a reactor site would be unnecessary for an SMR, because the requirements should be tied more closely to reactor size. The staffing and security requirements (colloquially referred to as guns and guards) are a necessary expense for reactors to ensure the safe operation of the reactor and the security of the nuclear material. If the deployment of SMRs allows for reduction in those costs, SMRs could be more attractive to potential customers. For the NRC to consider adjustments to those re- quirements,
however, SMR vendors must engage in a technical discussion with the regulator and demonstrate how the reactors could be safely and securely operated with fewer control room opera- tors and guards. U.S.

suppliers also say that they enjoy a cooperative relationship with the NRC and that progress is being made on addressing those issues.

2AC Blocks

States CP

Cant Solve
Federal action key its the only way to revive the industry in the wake of competing international players. Wallace and Williams, 12
(Michael (head of the Transatlantic Program at the Royal United Services Institute) and Sarah (program coordinator and research associate in the U.S. Nuclear Energy Project at CSIS), Nuclear Energy in America: Preventing its Early Demise, CSIS, 2012, RSR) With the center of gravity for global nuclear investment shifting to a new set of players, the United States and the international community face a difficult set of challenges: stemming the spread of nuclear
weapons-usable materials and know-how; preventing further catastrophic nuclear accidents; providing for safe, long-term nuclear waste management; and protecting U.S. energy security and economic competitiveness. In

this context, federal action to reverse the American nuclear industrys impending decline is a national security imperative. The United States cannot afford to become irrelevant in a new nuclear age.

Federal action key administrative leadership is the only way to send a signal for adoption. Wallace and Williams, 12
(Michael (head of the Transatlantic Program at the Royal United Services Institute) and Sarah (program coordinator and research associate in the U.S. Nuclear Energy Project at CSIS), Nuclear Energy in America: Preventing its Early Demise, CSIS, 2012, RSR) The results were not perfect, but Americas institutional support for global nonproliferation goals and the regulatory behaviors it modeled clearly helped shape the way nuclear technology was adopted and used elsewhere around the world. This influence seems certain to wane if the United States is no longer a major supplier or user of nuclear technology. With existing nonproliferation and safety and security regimes looking increasingly inadequate in this rapidly changing global nuclear landscape, American leadership and leverage is more important and more central to our national security interests than ever. To maintain its leadership role in the development, design, and operation of a growing global nuclear energy infrastructure, the next administration , whether Democrat or Republican, must recognize the invaluable role played by the commercial U.S. nuclear industry and take action to prevent its early demise.

Only the federal government can enforce compliance, create uniform standards, and fund long-term commitments. Byrne, et al., 7
(John, Kristen Hughes, Lado Kurdgelashvili, Wilson Rickerson, all from the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP), American policy conflict in the greenhouse: Divergent trends in federal, regional, state, and local green energy and climate change policy, 2-19-7, RSR) Effective global mitigation of climate change will require strong leadership by national governments, including that of the US. More specifically, national governments remain vital in mandating and enforcing compliance among diverse actors within their jurisdiction. Only national governments can promote uniform standards for compliance and related programs, thus ensuring achievement of policy goals with maximum fairness and minimal costs (Rabe, 2002). National funding also remains vital to underwrite long-term commitments needed to meet ever more challenging climate action targets (Rabe, 2002).

Federal government best for nuclear power government action needed to repair past mistakes. Karlow, 6
(Edwin, PhD Department of Physics at La Sierra University, February, Physics Today, http://scitation.aip.org/journals/doc/PHTOAD-ft/vol_59/iss_2/11_1.shtml, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The US has substantial precedence and rationale for governmental support of the next generation of nuclear power plants (see "Nuclear Power Needs Government Incentives, Says Task Force," PHYSICS TODAY, May 2005, page 28). The early commercial nuclear plants were built with direct federal subsidies and loan guarantees ; an example
is the Yankee Rowe nuclear power plant built in 1960 under the Atomic Energy Commission's power-demonstration reactor program. The aim of those early demonstration plants was to prove to a fledgling industry that such facilities could be built and operated economically. A significant era for US nuclear funding was the 1970s and 1980s, when nuclear units came in at costs often many times the original estimates.

Some plants with billions of dollars invested were never completed. The overspending and stalled projects stemmed from government actions often in response to activists or legal maneuvering.
Organizations and individuals with specific agendas took advantage of the Three Mile Island accident to exploit unrelated issues.1 Plants already under construction were stymied by new requirements that caused tremendous uncertainty both in building and in the actual start-up of power production. The Long Island Lighting Co's Shoreham nuclear plant, for example, was completed at a cost of $5.6 billion, brought briefly to criticality, and then decommissioned, all because of activism and political demagoguery.2 Today, the reasons for government loan guarantees and other support programs are somewhat different. Vendors having gained experience with overseas projects know how to build advanced nuclear plants, although some of their advanced designs have yet to be implemented. Not surprisingly, any vendor or electric utility, before investing huge amounts, would want some assurance that it would be allowed to complete the plant at a reasonable cost and then operate it. Particularly important is that safety rules and systems requirements not change drastically during construction without very compelling reasons. Given

the way governmental entities contributed to the problems of past nuclear power plant construction, it is only fitting that the federal government share substantially in the investment risk. Building nuclear plants is in the nation's interest.

Politics DA

SMR Link Turns Public

Despite the Fukushima disaster, the nuclear industry is still popular polls prove. Cooper and Sussman, 11
(Michael and Dalia, NYT Staff Writers, Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html, accessed 8-3-12, RSR) The new poll found that nearly 7 in 10 Americans think that nuclear power plants in the United States are generally safe. But nearly two-thirds of those polled said they were concerned that a major nuclear accident might occur in this
country including 3 in 10 who said they were very concerned by such a possibility. Fifty-eight percent of those polled said they did not think the federal government was adequately prepared to deal with a major nuclear accident. Still, 47

percent of those polled said that, over all, the benefits of nuclear power outweighed the risks; 38 percent said they did not. The nationwide telephone poll was conducted March 18-21 among 1,022 adults, and it has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points.

SMRs publically popular easier to explain safety features. NEA, 8

(Nuclear Energy Agency, Why SMRs are being developed, Brief 7, RSR)
SMRs seem to respond well to these requirements, because they allow for design simplification and for introduction of new features, such as passive components and processes that avoid the need for early action by the operator in an abnormal situation .

The design of some SMRs also makes it possible to set clearer and more precise safety criteria that may be easier for the public to understand, for example the exclusion of any possibility of a radioactive release to the environment. Some experts contend that the engineering principles are more readily explainable to the non-specialist, which should improve public acceptance .

SMRs publically popular shortened time frame and accountability to the NRC. Coyne, 10
(Philip, 2010 WISE Intern, Addressing How Light Water Small Modular Reactors Should be Licensed, WISE, 7-29-10, RSR)
10 CFR Part 52 provides a number of options for the applicants to choose from in order to apply for the COL. The applicant could benefit from a shorter time frame in having their plant in operation if they choose an appropriate option. The standard design

of a nuclear plant is especially attractive in the shortened time frame for subsequent builds, which is highly probable for Small Modular Reactors. With the ITAAC process, the safety in operations for the plant is shifted to the licensee, with overseeing power of the NRC. The public should be safer with three different parties reviewing a single facility: the vendor ensuring their design is safe, the utility inspecting the constructed facility, and the NRC supervising during the entire process.

SMRs publically accepted safety designs make it more palatable. Ingersoll, 11

(Daniel, Senior Program Manager at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ASME 2011 Small Modular Reactors Symposium, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SAFETY CASE FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS, September 28-30 2011, pg. 5, http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/presentations/crozat_-_brc_smr_questions_1020-2011.pdf, accessed 7-31-12, RSR) Several SMR designs emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to lessons learned from the many technical and
operational challenges of the large Generation II light-water reactors (LWRs), including lessons from the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979. These designs sought

to add qualities of robustness and resilience to nuclear plants and spawned the term inherently safe designs, which later evolved into passively safe terminology. A major study led by Alvin Weinberg 1 in 1983
observed that successful expansion of nuclear energy would require new plants to be much less sensitive to minor perturbations, respond more slowly to system upsets, and be able to recover from those upsets without immediate operator action. This

added level of plant

resilience is needed to not only further ensure public safety but also protect owner investment and improve public acceptance. The conclusion was that some of the specific new designs that had emerged at that time, such as the
Process Inherent Ultimate Safety (PIUS) design and the modular high-temperature gascooled reactor (MHTGR) design, appeared to offer significantly improved plant resilience. It was

also concluded that smallersized reactors seemed to provide the best opportunity for achieving the desired level of resilience but also created concern regarding their economic viability.

Public Key to Agenda/PC

Public opinion is key to the presidents political capital
Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha, 7
(Andrew W. & Matthew, March, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1, Presidential Success on the Substance of Legislation, University of North Texas, pp. 100-112, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623810, Accessed: 7-15-10) Public attitudes also should influence the president's bargaining position. Despite evidence to the contrary (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Collier and Sullivan 1995), presidents, White House staff, and legislators believe that public approval is important to the president's success in Congress (Edwards 1997; Neustadt 1960; Rivers and Rose 1985). Theoretically, public support will improve the president's bargain- ing position as members of Congress will not want to risk alienating their constituents by opposing a popu- lar president's policy preferences. Therefore, we hypothesize that the higher his level of approval, the more a final statute will reflect the president's policy preferences.

Public opinion polls influence presidential agenda Sparrow, 8

(Bartholomew H., University of Texas at Austin government professor, Who Speaks for the People? The President, the Press, and Public Opinion in the United States, 10-13-8, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 4, Pages 578-592, Wiley InterScience, accessed 7-8-9) Public opinion serves as a metric of presidential leadership with respect to presidential approval ratings. Presidents and their advisors use public opinion not as an absolute guide, but rather for tactical purposes, and instrumentally, for reaching particular political ends (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). In general, political analysts conceive of public opinion as a channel or guide for policy makers , boundaries beyond which
they cannot go but which also offer leeway in terms of the exact path policy makers take. Public opinion serves as a "permissive limit" for policy makers (Almond 1950; Key 1961; Sobel 2001).

Popularity is key to congressional leverage Spitzer, 93

(Robert, Professor of political science at the university of new york state, President and Congress, pg 65, RSR) Three observations about the relationship between Presidents and the people warrant mention here. First, the link between the Presidents public standing and the Presidents influence in Congress is indisputably important but also more complex than the above examples suggest. When the Presidents standing is high, members of Congress are likely to interpret this positive support as either direct or indirect evidence of a popular mandate for the President. Fearing a popular backlash, Congress is less likely to buck presidential preferences under these conditions. Moreover, some members of Congress accept as a matter of principle that Presidents with a popular mandate are entitled, by virtue of that mandate to have their programs enacted. Continued public approval is a sign of success (or, to be more precise, perceived success); declining public approval signals an ebbing
mandate.

SMR Link Turns Congress

SMRS congressionally popular a large group of bipartisan senators supported the newest subsidy. Makhijani, 11
(Arjun, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, The problems with small nuclear reactors, The Hill, 6-15-11, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/166609-the-problems-with-smallnuclear-reactors, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) Yet, the enthusiasts of small reactors are back, promoting "small modular reactors" (SMRs) which, they say, can solve the central economic problem of large reactors that each cost so much and take so long to build that it becomes a "bet the farm" risk. But this is hype and hope more than substance. Unfortunately, Congress and the administration are buying into it. Even in a budget-slashing environment, the U.S. Department of Energy has already requested $67 million in FY2012 to pay for part of the design certification and licensing for up to two designs. Sixteen bipartisan House members have sent a letter in support of this subsidy.
Meanwhile, Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), chair of the Senate Energy Committee, has introduced a bill to require the development of two SMR designs, as have Reps. Jason Altmire (D-Pa.) and Tim Murphy (R-Pa.).

SMRs congressionally popular large congressional backing. News Tribune, 12

(Tri-City Herald, Lawmakers prod energy secretary on reactor project, 7-8-12, http://www.thenewstribune.com/2012/07/08/v-lite/2208105/lawmakers-prod-energy-secretary.html, accessed 8-2-12, RSR) A bipartisan group of 30 state lawmakers has joined with much of Washington's congressional delegation in urging Energy Secretary Steven Chu to locate a small modular nuclear reactor project in the TriCities. The group of 21 Republican and nine Democratic members of the state House of Representatives, including 8th District Reps. Larry Haler, R-Richland, and Brad Klippert, R-Kennewick, sent a letter to Chu last week expressing strong support for the reactor proposals currently under consideration by the Department of Energy. Similar letters were sent by nine of Washington's congressional leaders in June, and by Gov. Chris Gregoire in May. "We believe nuclear energy provides clean, reliable power," the letter said. "Tri-Cities offers not only a very skilled nuclear work force and a supportive community, but the Hanford
site offers land, infrastructure and other essential resources that would provide significant cost benefits to developing and constructing this more modern, more reliable and safer reactor technology here in Washington state."

SMRs congressionally popular seen as an economic boon. Yurman, 12

(Dan, Contributor, Competition heats up for DOE SMR funding, ANS http://ansnuclearcafe.org/category/small-modular-reactors/, accessed 8-4-12, RSR) The race to win $452 million in cost-shared funding from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for licensing and technical support to bring a small modular reactor (SMR) to market by 2022 got a new entry on April 19. Westinghouse has partnered with Ameren (NYSE:AEE) to submit a proposal based on the reactor vendors design of a 225-MW SMR. The proposal won enthusiastic support from elected officials, including Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon, with the promise of high-paying manufacturing jobs to build the components for the reactors in Missouri. Nixon called it a transformational economic development opportunity.

Pollution DA

SMR Link Turns

SMRs cut emissions help reduce our carbon footprint. Wald, New York Times, 11
(Matthew, Administration to Push for Small Modular Reactors, The New York Times, p. 1, RSR) In promoting the reactor, the administrations immediate goal is to help the Energy Department meet a federal target for reducing its carbon dioxide emissions by relying more on clean energy and less on gas and coal. Like other federal agencies, the department is required by an executive order to reduce its carbon footprint by 28 percent by
2020. Yet the longer-term goal is to foster assembly-line production of the small reactors at a far lower cost than construction of conventional reactors. The

reactors could even replace old coal-fired power plants that are threatened by new federal emissions rules and sit on sites that already have grid connections and cooling water.

SMRs key to spurring the development of nuclear technology increases the competitive edge. Fleischmann, 11
(Chuck, Representative from the 3rd District in Tennessee, Small Modular Reactors Could Help With U.S. Energy Needs, American Physical Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2011, http://www.aps.org/publications/capitolhillquarterly/201110/backpage.cfm, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The timely implementation of small reactors could position the United States on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. As the world moves forward in developing new forms of nuclear power, the United States should set a high standard in safety and regulatory process. Other nations have not been as rigorous in their nuclear oversight with far reaching implications. As we consider the disastrous events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility, it is imperative that power companies and regulatory agencies around the world adequately ensure reactor and plant safety to protect the public. Despite terrible tragedies like the natural disaster in Japan, nuclear power is still one of the safest and cleanest energy resources available. The plan to administer these small reactors would create technologically advanced U.S. jobs and improve our global competitiveness . Our country needs quality, high paying jobs. Increasing our competitive edge in rapidly advancing industries will put the United States in a strategic position on the forefront of expanding global technologies in the nuclear arena.

Nuclear power results in a fraction of the emissions Gronlund 7 Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf Nuclear power plants do not produce global warming emissions when they operate. However, producing nuclear
power requires mining and processing uranium ore, enriching uranium to create reactor fuel, manufacturing and transporting fuel, and building plantsall of which consume energy. Today much of that energy is provided by fossil fuels (although that may change if the United States takes steps to address global warming). However, the

global warming emissions associated with nuclear

power even now are

relatively modest. Indeed, its life cycle emissions are comparable to those of wind power and hydropower. While estimates of life cycle greenhousegas emissions vary with different assumptions and methodologies, the basic conclusions of most analyses are consistent: for each unit of electricity generated, natural gas combustion results in roughly half the global warming emissions of coal combustion, while wind power, hydropower, and nuclear power produce only a few percent of emissions from coal combustion. The life cycle emissions of photovoltaics (PVs) are generally somewhat higher than those for wind power, hydropower, and nuclear power, because manufacture of PVs entails greater global warming emissions.5 The greenhouse gas emissions stemming from nuclear power depend greatly on the technology used to enrich uranium. The technology now used in the United Statesgaseous diffusionrequires a large amount of electricity: roughly 3.4 percent of the electricity generated by a typical U.S. reactor would be needed to enrich the uranium in the reactors

enrichment would account for some 2.5 percent of the emissions of an average U.S. fossil fuel plant. However, in the near future, U.S. uranium will be enriched using gaseous centrifuge technology, which consumes only 2.5 percent of the energy used by a diffusion plant. Thus this part of the nuclear power life cycle would result in very low emissions. 7
fuel. 6 Because fossil fuels generate 70 percent of U.S. electricity, emissions from that

An increase in nuclear reactors has an inverse relationship with aggregate emissions Gronlund 7 Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf Today 104 reactors produce some 20 percent of U.S. electricity. If demand for electricity in 2050 is roughly that of todaybecause energy conservation offsets increases in demandanother 100 reactors would be required to produce an additional 20 percent of U.S. electricity in 2050. Because electricity production contributes roughly a third of U.S. global warming emissions today, those additional 100 reactors would reduce emissions by 67 percent relative to today. Recall that to avoid dangerous climate change, the United States and other
industrialized nations will need to reduce emissions at least 80 percent by midcentury, compared with 2000 levels (which are comparable to todays levels). Thus an additional 100 reactors would contribute roughly 8 percent of the total required U.S. reduction (67 percent of the required 80 percent), under the assumption that efficiency and conservation measures could offset any growth in electricity demand. (Without additional conservation and efficiency measures, U.S. electricity consumption is projected to almost double by 2050.) All energy sources entail risks to the environment and human health. For example, the risks of carbon capture and storagewhich would reduce the net global warming emissions from using fossil fuels to generate electricityinclude gas explosions and the release of large amounts of previously stored carbon dioxide, which could undo previous emissions reductions. However, this report focuses on the risks of nuclear power and how to reduce them.

Nuclear facilities are the main substitute in a carbon-free model Verrastro 10 (The Geopolitics of Energy: Emergin trends, changing landscape, uncertain times,
October 2010, Frank Verrastro/Sarah Ladislaw/Mathew Frank/Lisa Hyland, Center for Strategic International Studies, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30101/1/The%20Geopolitics%20of%20Energy. pdf?1) JD Based on efforts to promote the use of environmentally cleaner (i.e., emissions-free or low-emission) fuels, a similar case can be made for the expansion of nuclear energy use on a global scale. Nuclear reactors are a proven and reliable source of clean energy, accounting for a majority of the emissions-free electricity that is produced around the world today. Though reactors presently account for 6 percent of current global energy consumption, the construction of nuclear facilities is expected to grow substantially under certain carbon-constrained projections-not only to replace facilities that are due to be decommissioned in the next few decades, but also to meet incremental increases in demand for electricity.

Warming DA

SMR Link Turns

SMRs solve warming provides a bridge to renewable energy. Clayton, 10
(Mark, Staff Writer, Nuclear power: Obama team touts mini-nukes to fight global warming, The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0330/Nuclear-power-Obama-team-touts-mini-nukes-to-fightglobal-warming, accessed 8-3-12, RSR) To fight global warming, Energy Secretary Steven Chu is calling for the US to pursue solar, wind, clean coal, and nuclear power plants including relatively tiny "bite-sized" nuclear reactors that critics argue are a proliferation risk. Rather than building expensive huge reactors, smaller utilities might find a better option in small, more affordable massproduced nuclear reactors, Dr. Chu said Monday in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, ClimateWire reported. The idea is to fill gaps in carbon-free power generation until nonnuclear renewable energy is widely available. Dr. Chu had previously made a pitch for "small modular reactors" in an opinion piece published last week in The Wall Street Journal. He envisions SMRs that would be less than one-third the size of existing plants. With compact designs, SMR reactors "could be made in factories and transported to sites by truck or rail. SMRs would be ready to 'plug and play' upon arrival," he wrote.

Renewables key to solve warming long-term but bridge tech is key in the interim Nordhaus and Shellenberger 12 (Ted Nordhaus, energy analyst and chairman of the
Breakthrough Institute, and Michael Shellenberger, energy analyst, author and president of the Breakthrough Institute, February 27, 2012, Beyond Cap and Trade, A New Path to Clean Energy, Yale Environment 360, http://goo.gl/dtQf4)
A funny thing happened while environmentalists were trying and failing to cap carbon emissions in the U.S. Congress. U.S. carbon emissions started going down. The decline began in 2005 and accelerated after the financial crisis. The latest estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration now suggest that U.S.

emissions will continue to decline for the next few years and remain flat for a decade or more after that. The proximate cause of the decline in recent years has been the recession and slow economic recovery. But the reason that EIA is projecting a long-term decline over the next decade or more is the glut of cheap natural gas, mostly from
unconventional sources like shale, that has profoundly changed Americas energy outlook over the next several decades. Gas is no panacea. It still puts a lot of carbon into the atmosphere and has created a range of new pollution problems at the local level. Methane leakage resulting from the extraction and burning of natural gas threatens to undo much of the carbon benefit that gas holds over coal. And even

were we to make a full transition from coal to gas, we would then need to transition from gas to renewables and nuclear in order to reduce U.S. emissions deeply enough to achieve the reductions that climate scientists believe will be necessary to avoid dangerous global warming. But the shale gas revolution, and its rather significant impact on the U.S. carbon emissions outlook, offers a stark rebuke to what has been the dominant view among policy analysts and environmental advocates as to what it would take in order to begin to bend down the trajectory of U.S. emissions, namely a price on carbon and a binding cap on emissions. The existence of a better and cheaper substitute is today succeeding in reducing U.S. emissions where efforts to raise the cost of
fossil fuels through carbon caps or pricing and thereby drive the transition to renewable energy technologies have failed. In fact, the rapid displacement of coal with gas has required little in the way of regulations at all. Conventional air pollution regulations do represent a very low, implicit price on carbon. And a lot of good grassroots activism at the local and regional level has raised the political costs of keeping old coal plants in service and bringing new ones online. But those efforts have become increasingly effective as gas has gotten cheaper. The existence of a better and cheaper substitute has made the transition away from coal much more viable economically, and it has put the wind at the back of political efforts to oppose new coal plants, close existing ones, and put in place stronger EPA air pollution regulations. Yet if cheap gas is harnessing market forces to shutter old coal plants, the existence of cheap gas from unconventional places is by no means the product of those same forces, nor of laissez faire energy policies. Our current glut of gas and declining emissions are in no small part the result of 30 years of federal support for research, demonstration, and commercialization of non-conventional gas technologies without which there would be no shale gas revolution today. Starting in the mid-seventies, the Ford and Carter administrations funded large-scale demonstration projects that proved that shale was a potentially massive source of gas. In the years that followed, the U.S. Department of Energy continued to fund research and demonstration of new fracking technologies and developed new three-dimensional mapping and horizontal drilling technologies that ultimately allowed firms to recover gas from shale at commercially viable cost and scale. And the federal non-conventional gas tax credit subsidized private firms to continue to experiment with new gas technologies at a time when few people even within the natural gas industry

thought that firms would ever succeed in economically recovering gas from shale. The impact on the future trajectory of U.S. emissions suggests

gas revolution now unfolding and its potential that the long-standing emphasis on emissions reduction targets and timetables and on pricing have been misplaced. Even now, carbon pricing remains the sine qua non of climate
policy among the academic and think-tank crowds, while much of the national environmental movement seems to view the current period as an interregnum between the failed effort to cap carbon emissions in the last Congress and the next opportunity to take up the cap-and-trade effort in some future Congress. And yet, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which has been in place for almost a decade now and has established carbon prices well above those that would have been established by the proposed U.S. system, has had no discernible impact on European emissions. The carbon intensity of the European economy has not declined at all since the imposition of the ETS. Meanwhile green paragon Germany has embarked upon a coal-building binge under the auspices of the ETS, one that has accelerated since the Germans shut down their nuclear power plants. Even so, proponents of U.S. emissions limits maintain that legally binding carbon caps will provide certainty that emissions will go down in the future, whereas technology development and deployment along with efforts to regulate conventional air pollutants do not. Certainly, energy and emissions projections have proven notoriously unreliable in the past it is entirely possible that future emissions could be well above, or well below, the EIAs current projections. But the cap-and-trade proposal that failed in the last Congress, like the one that has been in place in Europe, would have provided no such certainty. It was so riddled with loopholes, offset provisions, and various other cost-containment mechanisms that emissions would have been able to rise at business-as-usual levels for decades. Arguably, the actual outcome might have been much worse. The price of the environmental movements demand for its legally binding pound of flesh was a massive handout of free emissions allocations to the coal industry, which might have slowed the transition to gas that is currently underway. Continuing

to drive down U.S. emissions will ultimately require that we develop low- or no-carbon alternatives that are better and cheaper than gas. That wont happen overnight. The development of cost-effective technologies to recover gas from shale took more than 30 years. But weve already made a huge down payment on the technologies we will need. Over the last decade, we have spent upwards of $200 billion to develop and commercialize new renewable energy technologies. China
has spent even more. And those investments are beginning to pay off. Wind is now almost as cheap as gas in some areas in prime locations with good proximity to existing transmission. Solar is also close to achieving grid parity in prime locations as well. And a new generation of nuclear designs that promises to be safer, cheaper, and easier to scale may ultimately provide zero-carbon baseload power. All of these

technologies have a long way to go before they are able to displace coal or gas at significant scale. But the key to getting there wont be more talk of caps and carbon prices. It will be to continue along the same path that brought us cheap unconventional gas developing and deploying the technologies and infrastructure we need from the bottom up. When all is said and done, a cap, or a carbon price, may get us the last few yards across the finish line. But a more oblique path,
focused on developing better technologies and strengthening conventional air pollution regulations, may work just as well, or even better. For one thing should now be clear: The

key to decarbonizing our economy will be developing cheap alternatives that can cost-effectively replace fossil fuels. There simply is no substitute for making clean energy cheap.

SMRs key to spurring the development of nuclear technology increases the competitive edge. Fleischmann, 11
(Chuck, Representative from the 3rd District in Tennessee, Small Modular Reactors Could Help With U.S. Energy Needs, American Physical Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2011, http://www.aps.org/publications/capitolhillquarterly/201110/backpage.cfm, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The timely implementation of small reactors could position the United States on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. As the world moves forward in developing new forms of nuclear power, the United States should set a high standard in safety and regulatory process. Other nations have not been as rigorous in their nuclear oversight with far reaching implications. As we consider the disastrous events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility, it is imperative that power companies and regulatory agencies around the world adequately ensure reactor and plant safety to protect the public. Despite terrible tragedies like the natural disaster in Japan, nuclear power is still one of the safest and cleanest energy resources available. The plan to administer these small reactors would create technologically advanced U.S. jobs and improve our global competitiveness . Our country needs quality, high paying jobs. Increasing our competitive edge in rapidly advancing industries will put the United States in a strategic position on the forefront of expanding global technologies in the nuclear arena.

Nuclear power results in a fraction of the emissions Gronlund 7 Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf Nuclear power plants do not produce global warming emissions when they operate. However, producing nuclear
power requires mining and processing uranium ore, enriching uranium to create reactor fuel, manufacturing and transporting fuel, and building plantsall of which consume energy. Today much of that energy is provided by fossil fuels (although that may change if the United States takes steps to address global warming). However, the

global warming emissions associated with nuclear

power even now are

relatively modest. Indeed, its life cycle emissions are comparable to those of wind power and hydropower. While estimates of life cycle greenhousegas emissions vary with different assumptions and methodologies, the basic conclusions of most analyses are consistent: for each unit of electricity generated, natural gas combustion results in roughly half the global warming emissions of coal combustion, while wind power, hydropower, and nuclear power produce only a few percent of emissions from coal combustion. The life cycle emissions of photovoltaics (PVs) are generally somewhat higher than those for wind power, hydropower, and nuclear power, because manufacture of PVs entails greater global warming emissions.5 The greenhouse gas emissions stemming from nuclear power depend greatly on the technology used to enrich uranium. The technology now used in the United Statesgaseous diffusionrequires a large amount of electricity: roughly 3.4 percent of the electricity generated by a typical U.S. reactor would be needed to enrich the uranium in the reactors

enrichment would account for some 2.5 percent of the emissions of an average U.S. fossil fuel plant. However, in the near future, U.S. uranium will be enriched using gaseous centrifuge technology, which consumes only 2.5 percent of the energy used by a diffusion plant. Thus this part of the nuclear power life cycle would result in very low emissions. 7
fuel. 6 Because fossil fuels generate 70 percent of U.S. electricity, emissions from that

An increase in nuclear reactors has an inverse relationship with aggregate emissions Gronlund 7 Nuclear power in a Warming world: Assessing the Risks, Addressing the Challenges,
Lisbeth Gronlund; David Lochbaum; Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-in-a-warming-world.pdf Today 104 reactors produce some 20 percent of U.S. electricity. If demand for electricity in 2050 is roughly that of todaybecause energy conservation offsets increases in demandanother 100 reactors would be required to produce an additional 20 percent of U.S. electricity in 2050. Because electricity production contributes roughly a third of U.S. global warming emissions today, those additional 100 reactors would reduce emissions by 67 percent relative to today. Recall that to avoid dangerous climate change, the United States and other
industrialized nations will need to reduce emissions at least 80 percent by midcentury, compared with 2000 levels (which are comparable to todays levels). Thus an additional 100 reactors would contribute roughly 8 percent of the total required U.S. reduction (67 percent of the required 80 percent), under the assumption that efficiency and conservation measures could offset any growth in electricity demand. (Without additional conservation and efficiency measures, U.S. electricity consumption is projected to almost double by 2050.) All energy sources entail risks to the environment and human health. For example, the risks of carbon capture and storagewhich would reduce the net global warming emissions from using fossil fuels to generate electricityinclude gas explosions and the release of large amounts of previously stored carbon dioxide, which could undo previous emissions reductions. However, this report focuses on the risks of nuclear power and how to reduce them.

Nuclear facilities are the main substitute in a carbon-free model Verrastro 10 (The Geopolitics of Energy: Emergin trends, changing landscape, uncertain times,
October 2010, Frank Verrastro/Sarah Ladislaw/Mathew Frank/Lisa Hyland, Center for Strategic International Studies, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/30101/1/The%20Geopolitics%20of%20Energy. pdf?1) JD Based on efforts to promote the use of environmentally cleaner (i.e., emissions-free or low-emission) fuels, a similar case can be made for the expansion of nuclear energy use on a global scale. Nuclear reactors are a proven and reliable source of clean energy, accounting for a majority of the emissions-free electricity that is produced around the world today. Though reactors presently account for 6 percent of current global energy consumption, the construction of nuclear facilities is expected to grow substantially under certain carbon-constrained projections-not only to replace facilities that are due to be decommissioned in the next few decades, but also to meet incremental increases in demand for electricity.

Nuclear tech solves warming decreases reliance on carbon based sources. WNA 7 (World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Energy: Meeting the Climate Change Challenge , IPCC, 4th
Assessment Report, Mitigation of Climate Change (2007), http://www.worldnuclear.org/climatechange/nuclear_meetingthe_climatechange_challenge.html)
Over the next twenty five years global electricity demand is expected to double. By the middle of the 21st century that demand could be three or four times larger than that of today. Growth is inevitable and necessary, as the world economy evolves and countries seek to improve the quality of life of their citizens. Meeting the increasing low or non-emitting

demand for electricity will require a mix of energy resources, with sources, including nuclear power, taking an increasingly predominant role. Nuclear energy already makes a substantial environmental contribution to generating electricity. Today nuclear power plants operating in over thirty countries produce 15% of the worlds electricity, avoiding the emission of ov er two billion tonnes of carbon dioxide each year. This saving equals more than 20% of global CO2 emissions from power generation. Extensive studies have shown that the full lifecycle emissions from nuclear power are similar to most forms of
renewable generation, and many times lower than electricity generation from fossil fuels. Nuclear technologies can be used in areas other than the generation of clean low carbon electricity. A number of nuclear reactors have already been used to power desalination plant, a role that will become increasingly important as the worlds water resources become scarcer.

Nuclear technologies can also be able to reduce emissions in the transport sector by providing electricity to recharge battery-powered vehicles or by producing hydrogen for fuel cells. Nuclear power plant designed to generate high temperature heat will be able supply
process heat, enabling industry to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels.

Nuclear is the only option quick enough to reverse the impacts of warming McCarthy 4 (Michael McCarthy, Lovelock: 'Only nuclear power can now halt global warming'
Published May 23 2004 by Independent UK, Archived May 23 2004, http://www.energybulletin.net/node/320) JD On that basis, he says, there is simply not enough time for renewable energy, such as wind, wave and solar power - the favoured solution of the Green movement - to take the place of the coal, gas and oil-fired power stations whose waste gas, carbon dioxide (CO2), is causing the atmosphere to warm. He believes only a massive expansion of nuclear power, which produces almost no CO2, can now check a runaway warming which would raise sea levels disastrously around the world, cause climatic turbulence and make agriculture unviable over large areas. He says fears about the safety of nuclear energy are irrational and exaggerated, and urges the Green movement to drop its opposition. In today's Independent,
Professor Lovelock says he is concerned by two climatic events in particular: the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, which will raise global sea levels significantly, and the episode of extreme heat in western central Europe last August, accepted by many scientists as unprecedented and a direct result of global warming.

Backstopping DA

Link Turn
SMRs provide a new bridge to renewables it will attract a new portion of the market. Taso, 12
(Eugen, international manager with HSBC, Small Modular Reactors: A Matrix Analysis, Public Interest Report, http://www.fas.org/blog/pir/2012/06/28/small-modular-reactors-a-matrix-analysis/, accessed 8-4-12, RSR)
Cost information was specifically omitted. While some reactors do have cost estimates, most do not, and since none have yet been built, the information was deemed too speculative and therefore not included. In fact, cost is one of the major concerns that experts indicated when referring to SMRs. There is little indication on how much they will cost to build, deploy and maintain, and until there are a few operational models, this will remain a big unknown. e conclusion of the project is that SMRs, although likely not game-changers per se, can play a complementary role in re-inventing the industry without significant support from policymakers. SMRs

present a great opportunity

for the industry to move forward into a new market. This matrix is meant as a tool for whoever is interested in SMRs and
wishes to get a quick summary of the promising models that are being discussed, both at an industry and a policy-making level. Overall,

nuclear power is a fiercely contended topic, but it is also an opportunity to bridge to the future until new, renewable ways of producing energy become viable. Therefore, if SMRs can be proven to make a positive contribution to the industry, it is likely that their adoption could be considered a priority and the most promising models, which have been developed privately and without major government subsidies, could compete in the market, changing the trend in the nuclear industry.

SMRs directly provide a bridge to renewables. Clayton, 10

(Mark, Staff Writer, Nuclear power: Obama team touts mini-nukes to fight global warming, The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0330/Nuclear-power-Obama-team-touts-mini-nukes-to-fightglobal-warming, accessed 8-3-12, RSR) To fight global warming, Energy Secretary Steven Chu is calling for the US to pursue solar, wind, clean coal, and nuclear power plants including relatively tiny "bite-sized" nuclear reactors that critics argue are a proliferation risk. Rather than building expensive huge reactors, smaller utilities might find a better option in small, more affordable massproduced nuclear reactors, Dr. Chu said Monday in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, ClimateWire reported. The idea is to fill gaps in carbon-free power generation until nonnuclear renewable energy is widely available. Dr. Chu had previously made a pitch for "small modular reactors" in an opinion piece published last week in The Wall Street Journal. He envisions SMRs that would be less than one-third the size of existing plants. With compact designs, SMR reactors "could be made in factories and transported to sites by truck or rail. SMRs would be ready to 'plug and play' upon arrival," he wrote.

Link Defense
Nuclear power does not compete with oil they show little overlap with market. Toth and Rogner, 6
(Ferenc (Senior Energy Economist in the IAEA's Planning and Economic Studies Section) and Hans-Holger (Section Head, Planning and Economic Studies Section at the IAEA), Oil and nuclear power: Past, present, and future, Energy Economics 28, 2006, pg. 22, RSR) While the past expansion of nuclear energy occurred to the detriment of oil in the power sector, this is no longer the case today and highly unlikely to reoccur in the future. The respective market structures in which nuclear and oil operate now display little overlap and an expansion of nuclear power would not impinge on oil sales to power generation. Nuclear supplies base load to large grid-integrated markets where oil provides some peak supply, back-up capacity, small-scale and non-grid applications. Oils main markets are the low energy demand intensity rural and remote areas usually with little or no grid integration. In an environmentally unconstrained future, nuclear power competes primarily against coal and possibly natural gas,
depending on how closely natural gas prices track oil market prices and whether or not gas infrastructures are in place. However, current trends towards electricity market liberalization relying more on private sector shareholder value maximization create economic barriers to the expansion of present-day nuclear plants because of their high up-front capital costs and long amortization periods. In the absence of public policy support and/or the emergence of innovative reactor designs that lower the costs and further improve operating safety, nuclear powers market share might indeed follow a downward trajectory. Yet there is some evidence to the contrary. The order of the new Olkiluoto reactor in Finland is based on several studies, each confirming that nuclear generation is the best economic option to satisfy increasing demand for electricity (WNA, 2004).

SMR does not compete with oil its only an interim solution and cost prevents competition. Winston, 11
(Andrew, Contributor, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Harvard Business Review, 3-14-11, http://blogs.hbr.org/winston/2011/03/future-of-nuclear-energy.html, accessed 8-4-12, RSR)
We can debate this topic endlessly and there are seemingly good reasons that environmental groups and others have changed their views on nukes. Put most simply, it

provides steady base power (20% of our electricity today) and is close to "zero carbon." So as a longer interim solution, until the grid and economy are cleaner, it could be logical. But the most compelling argument I've heard against nuclear is not about safety (although, again, how can we not include that in the discussion given what's going on?). No, it's about cost. For solid analyses on all things energy, I look to long-time
expert Amory Lovins and his impressive assortment of in-depth studies. In a couple of reports, "Four Nuclear Myths," and "Nuclear Power: Competitive Economics and Climate Protection Potential," Lovins tackles the economics of building and insuring nukes, among other things. In

short, compared to focusing on energy efficiency, nuclear is really expensive. And without going into massive detail on economics, I've always liked the really simple logic around renewables they have zero variable cost (wind,
sunshine, and underground heat are free). Lovins and others put more data around how the economics of renewables will win out over time, but basically, free is hard to beat.

Russian Oil DA

UQ Defense
Non-unique: Oil prices already dropped enough to cause investor flight Russias economy is headed for contraction Englund, 11
*Will, Putin warns of bitter pills for Russian economy at party congress, 9-23-11, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-warns-of-bitter-pills-for-russian-economy-atparty-congress/2011/09/23/gIQA2bjhqK_story.html, RSR) MOSCOW Russias plunging stock market and suddenly crumbling ruble provided an unexpected backdrop to the much-anticipated ruling party congress that kicked off here Friday. The meeting of United Russia, which stands
virtually no chance of losing Decembers parliamentary elections, has been the object of a great deal of speculation as to whether Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will announce a decision to reclaim the presidency from his protg, Dmitry Medvedev. Everyone understands the decision is Putins to make. But that will have to wait. Here was Putin on Friday telling the assembled delegates that Russia, unlike some other countries, wasnt going to go begging for financial handouts, which seemed to be an answer to a question that no one was asking. He

talked about bitter pills of economic retrenchment. He said wages had outstripped productivity, threatening inflation. (Thats largely because of government policies.) He said the government cant pour honey on every problem.
Medvedev, who is expected to address the congress Saturday, spent Friday in emergency meetings over the sudden and sharp decline of Russias economic pillars. The

stock market dropped more than 8 percent Thursday and was down nearly 7 percent Friday ruble fell to a two-year low against the dollar. It has lost more than 10 percent of its value since the beginning of September, and more than 16 percent since the end of July. Russia depends on oil revenue, and with commodity prices declining generally, investors are
before a late rally brought it back up about 2 percentage points. The

pulling out of emerging markets like Russias. The turmoil in Europe hasnt snared the Russian economy directly, but the indirect effects of general anxiety have been damaging
enough.

Link Defense
Nuclear power does not compete with oil they show little overlap with market. Toth and Rogner, 6
(Ferenc (Senior Energy Economist in the IAEA's Planning and Economic Studies Section) and Hans-Holger (Section Head, Planning and Economic Studies Section at the IAEA), Oil and nuclear power: Past, present, and future, Energy Economics 28, 2006, pg. 22, RSR) While the past expansion of nuclear energy occurred to the detriment of oil in the power sector, this is no longer the case today and highly unlikely to reoccur in the future. The respective market structures in which nuclear and oil operate now display little overlap and an expansion of nuclear power would not impinge on oil sales to power generation. Nuclear supplies base load to large grid-integrated markets where oil provides some peak supply, back-up capacity, small-scale and non-grid applications. Oils main markets are the low energy demand intensity rural and remote areas usually with little or no grid integration. In an environmentally unconstrained future, nuclear power competes primarily against coal and possibly natural gas,
depending on how closely natural gas prices track oil market prices and whether or not gas infrastructures are in place. However, current trends towards electricity market liberalization relying more on private sector shareholder value maximization create economic barriers to the expansion of present-day nuclear plants because of their high up-front capital costs and long amortization periods. In the absence of public policy support and/or the emergence of innovative reactor designs that lower the costs and further improve operating safety, nuclear powers market share might indeed follow a downward trajectory. Yet there is some evidence to the contrary. The order of the new Olkiluoto reactor in Finland is based on several studies, each confirming that nuclear generation is the best economic option to satisfy increasing demand for electricity (WNA, 2004).

SMR does not compete with oil its only an interim solution and cost prevents competition. Winston, 11
(Andrew, Contributor, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Harvard Business Review, 3-14-11, http://blogs.hbr.org/winston/2011/03/future-of-nuclear-energy.html, accessed 8-4-12, RSR)
We can debate this topic endlessly and there are seemingly good reasons that environmental groups and others have changed their views on nukes. Put most simply, it

provides steady base power (20% of our electricity today) and is close to "zero carbon." So as a longer interim solution, until the grid and economy are cleaner, it could be logical. But the most compelling argument I've heard against nuclear is not about safety (although, again, how can we not include that in the discussion given what's going on?). No, it's about cost. For solid analyses on all things energy, I look to long-time
expert Amory Lovins and his impressive assortment of in-depth studies. In a couple of reports, "Four Nuclear Myths," and "Nuclear Power: Competitive Economics and Climate Protection Potential," Lovins tackles the economics of building and insuring nukes, among other things. In

short, compared to focusing on energy efficiency, nuclear is really expensive. And without going into massive detail on economics, I've always liked the really simple logic around renewables they have zero variable cost (wind,
sunshine, and underground heat are free). Lovins and others put more data around how the economics of renewables will win out over time, but basically, free is hard to beat.

Link going to be triggered anyway Russia plans on expanding its own nuclear industry. Gosling, 11
(Tim, Business New Europe, Russia to keep building nuclear plants despite Fukushima, The Telegraph, 4-5-11, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/business/8429048/Russia-to-keep-building-nuclearplants-despite-Fukushima.html, accessed 8-4-12, RSR) Among the emerging markets, Russia is the most reliant on nuclear power. Sixteen per cent of its power comes from nuclear energy and it is planning to double nuclear capacity in the next 20 years .
Inevitably, some of these plans might have to be reconsidered, said Mr Bubnov. Russia has a vocal environmental lobby, which might lead to the delay or even cancellation of some projects, leading to higher prices. However, as

Russias economy returns to strong

growth, the government has little choice but to build new nuclear plants. Before the financial crisis, the supply and
demand for power were evenly matched, so further economic growth would be constrained by blackouts. The Energy Ministry plans to cope with rising Russian energy needs by building 18 nuclear power and hydropower plants with a combined installed capacity of 11.2 gigawatts. It

is impossible to speak about a global energy balance without the nuclear power industry, Mr Putin said at a meeting of the intergovernmental council of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). Without waiting for the Fukushima crisis
to be resolved and an investigation to be carried out by international experts, Russian authorities ordered an urgent review of all nuclear plant construction projects, both at home and abroad. Tests are already under way to assess the fire- and seismic-proof qualities of the countrys own plants, and facilities will be shut down if necessary, officials said. We will take all necessary measures, however much that might cost, said Alexander Lokshin, deputy director general at the Rosatom state nuclear energy corporation. However, events

at Fukushima do not appear to have seriously dented confidence in nuclear power in the Russian industry.

Spending DA

SMR Link Turns

SMRs are an economic boon higher net value than larger reactors. Carelli, et al., 10
(M.D. (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Garone (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), G. Locatelli (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M. Mancini (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), C. Mycoff (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Trucco (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M.E. Ricotti (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Energy, CeSNEF-Nuclear Engineering Division) , Economic features of integral, modular, small-to-medium size reactors, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 52, 2010, accessed 8-4-12, RSR) Whereas market conditions are relatively certain (i.e. the trends of the electricity price and demand are steady and, thus, can be relied upon for long-term planning), the SMR modularity translates in scalability. In contrast, whereas market conditions are highly uncertain, the SMR modularity translates in adaptability, which is an extreme form of temporal and spatial exibility in the plant deployment. Such a reversible nature of investment in SMR units is apparent when one focuses upon the market risks related to LR investment (Gollier et al., 2005). The LR adopters have to cope with upward (or downward) swings of price and demand or localised increase (or decrease) of demand by the means of longterm planning, given the LR long lead times. Since the event is at the best known in likelihood, both the decision to invest and the decision not to invest may prove to be inefcient. A large share of invested capital may result to be sunk (idle), or consistent revenues may be foregone: the economic risk of LR investment is greater because is greater, for a certain period of time, the sunk portion of invested capital. Due to shorter lead times and smaller size, SMRs allow the investors to more closely and quickly adapt to early signals of changing market conditions. The
shorter lead times of SMRs allow to split investments for additional units in a closer proximity to the market evolution (electrical load market matching under uncertainty). In

comparison, the LR investment may result in an expected loss of revenues with respect to SMRs for power not taken. The latter effect translates in a higher net present value, which
emerges for any given cost of capital. Yet an additional effect of temporal and spatial exibility of deployment is related to a lower cost of capital due to a perception of reduced risk by both creditors and shareholders. They are aware that investments in SMR units are more capable to match the new market conditions; i.e. they are less exposed to market uncertainty than LR investment, other things being equal. Accordingly, they demand a lower risk premium to invest in the project (reduced risk premium).

For a given size, the multiple

SMRs might have lower nancial costs than LR.

SMRs are key to the energy economy lower market risk. Rosner and Goldberg, 11
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011, https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf , accessed 8-4-12, RSR) Furthermore, CBO discussed the market risk associated with GW-scale plants: Market risk is the component of risk that investors cannot protect themselves against by diversifying their portfolios. Investors require compensation for market risk because investments exposed to such risk are more likely to have low returns when the
economy as a whole is weak and resources are more highly valuedIn the case of nuclear construction guarantees provided to investor-owned utilities or merchant power providers, for example, plant construction may be more likely to be slowed or canceled when the demand for electricity is depressed by a weak economy. 23,24 SMRs

could potentially mitigate such a risk in several ways. First, SMRs have lower precompletion risk due to shorter construction schedules (24-36 months as compared with 48 months). Second, because of their smaller size, SMRs have lower market risk because there is significantly less power than needs to be sold as compared with GW-level plants. Finally, the modular nature of SMRs affords the flexibility to build capacity on an as-needed basis. In the case of unsubsidized financing,

particularly relevant to merchant markets, utility

decision makers that have significant aversion to risk of future natural gas spikes (i.e., gas prices rising to about $7/Mcf or one standard deviation above the recent average behavior of natural gas prices) would possibly view alternatives to gas-fired generation as attractive options, particularly if the investment requirements are comparable SMRs could potentially fit the bill.

SMRs are cheaper - quicker return on investments, lower capital costs, and reduced operating costs. UDC, 11
(United States Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report, February 2011, RSR) Some SMR advocates say that smaller reactors have a cost advantage. Conventional nuclear power plants tend to have high capital costs per MWe. Advocates say that the modular production and smaller size could lower capital costs and give quicker returns on investment. The modular nature of SMRs also means that power stations could be built in a stepwise fashion, generating electricity and revenue more quickly to pay for further expansion. Theoretically, SMRs could reduce operating, maintenance, and fuel-cycle costs, because many designs could operate for longer cycles than do existing reactors (although more frequent outages and inspections might be required for safety purposes). Additional cost savings could be realized if a smaller on-site workforce compared to that used for traditional reactors is able to provide the necessary safety and security oversight for plant operations.

SMRs are an economic boon more flexible and cheaper to ship to fill energy demands. Wang, 12
(Ucilia, Contributor, Feds To Finance Small Nuclear Reactor Designs, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/01/20/feds-to-finance-small-nuclear-reactor-designs/, accessed 8-4-12, RSR) Small reactors are generally about one-third the size of existing nuclear reactors, and a power plant with small reactors promises to be cheaper to build and easier to obtain permits more quickly than a full-size nuclear power plant, proponents say. Utilities should have more flexibility in modifying the size of a power plant with small reactors if they need more power, then they can add more reactors over time. Nuclear reactors have historically been designed to be 1gigawatt or more each because such scale helps to drive down the manufacturing and installation costs. Small reactors can be economical, too, advocates say, because they can be shipped more easily and cheaply around the world. Energy Secretary Steve Chu has said hes a big fan of small nuclear reactor technology. We think (small, modular nuclear) solves a lot of issues in terms of investments and electricity infrastructure , Chu said at a
press conference a year ago. And its a way for the United States to regain its leadership in nuclear.

Elections DA

SMR Link Turns

Despite the Fukushima disaster, the nuclear industry is still popular polls prove. Cooper and Sussman, 11
(Michael and Dalia, NYT Staff Writers, Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html, accessed 8-3-12, RSR) The new poll found that nearly 7 in 10 Americans think that nuclear power plants in the United States are generally safe. But nearly two-thirds of those polled said they were concerned that a major nuclear accident might occur in this
country including 3 in 10 who said they were very concerned by such a possibility. Fifty-eight percent of those polled said they did not think the federal government was adequately prepared to deal with a major nuclear accident. Still, 47

percent of those polled said that, over all, the benefits of nuclear power outweighed the risks; 38 percent said they did not. The nationwide telephone poll was conducted March 18-21 among 1,022 adults, and it has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points.

SMRs publically popular easier to explain safety features. NEA, 8

(Nuclear Energy Agency, Why SMRs are being developed, Brief 7, RSR)
SMRs seem to respond well to these requirements, because they allow for design simplification and for introduction of new features, such as passive components and processes that avoid the need for early action by the operator in an abnormal situation .

The design of some SMRs also makes it possible to set clearer and more precise safety criteria that may be easier for the public to understand, for example the exclusion of any possibility of a radioactive release to the environment. Some experts contend that the engineering principles are more readily explainable to the non-specialist, which should improve public acceptance .

SMRs publically popular shortened time frame and accountability to the NRC. Coyne, 10
(Philip, 2010 WISE Intern, Addressing How Light Water Small Modular Reactors Should be Licensed, WISE, 7-29-10, RSR)
10 CFR Part 52 provides a number of options for the applicants to choose from in order to apply for the COL. The applicant could benefit from a shorter time frame in having their plant in operation if they choose an appropriate option. The standard design

of a nuclear plant is especially attractive in the shortened time frame for subsequent builds, which is highly probable for Small Modular Reactors. With the ITAAC process, the safety in operations for the plant is shifted to the licensee, with overseeing power of the NRC. The public should be safer with three different parties reviewing a single facility: the vendor ensuring their design is safe, the utility inspecting the constructed facility, and the NRC supervising during the entire process.

SMRs publically accepted safety designs make it more palatable. Ingersoll, 11

(Daniel, Senior Program Manager at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ASME 2011 Small Modular Reactors Symposium, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SAFETY CASE FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS, September 28-30 2011, pg. 5, http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/meetings/presentations/crozat_-_brc_smr_questions_1020-2011.pdf, accessed 7-31-12, RSR) Several SMR designs emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to lessons learned from the many technical and
operational challenges of the large Generation II light-water reactors (LWRs), including lessons from the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979. These designs sought

to add qualities of robustness and resilience to nuclear plants and spawned the term inherently safe designs, which later evolved into passively safe terminology. A major study led by Alvin Weinberg 1 in 1983
observed that successful expansion of nuclear energy would require new plants to be much less sensitive to minor perturbations, respond more slowly to system upsets, and be able to recover from those upsets without immediate operator action. This

added level of plant

resilience is needed to not only further ensure public safety but also protect owner investment and improve public acceptance. The conclusion was that some of the specific new designs that had emerged at that time, such as the
Process Inherent Ultimate Safety (PIUS) design and the modular high-temperature gascooled reactor (MHTGR) design, appeared to offer significantly improved plant resilience. It was

also concluded that smallersized reactors seemed to provide the best opportunity for achieving the desired level of resilience but also created concern regarding their economic viability.

Neg

Inherency

Generic
Incentives now WNN 12 (World Nuclear News, SMR vendors apply for government funds, May 22 2012,
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-SMR_vendors_apply_for_government_funds-2205124.html) JD The DoE announced in March 2012 that a total of $450 million would be available to support the development and licensing for up to two SMR designs over five years. The funding, through cost sharing agreements with private industry, is expected to provide a total investment of about $900 million. The deadline for applications was 21 May. In its call for applications, the DoE said that the funding program was "to promote the accelerated commercialization of SMR technologies that offer affordable, safe, secure and robust
sources of nuclear energy that can help meet the nation's economic, energy security and climate change objectives." It requested that applicants "provide their plans for attaining design certifications and licences in order to identify the most viable candidates for accelerated commercialization."

Private action, DOE funding and recent legislation solve the Aff now Taso 11 (Firas Eugen Taso, 21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular
Reactors, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836) JD
SMRs came into focus in the past decade, beginning with the joint project started in 2000 between INEEL and Oregon State, as costs of nuclear power have risen and discussion of carbon legislation has increased.212According to Richard Lester and Daniel Ingersoll, who has over eight years of experience working on SMRs, the renewed interest is rather encouraging. While no SMRs the earliest, the

will be built before 2015 at interest in the legislature, regulatory branch and especially in the private manufacturing and utility sectors may stimulate a fast development of the industry based on SMRs. In addition, other countries interest in the topic is also high, leading to a competition for development and potential market share which will accelerate the industry. According to a Heritage Foundation 2011 report, most of the development is occurring without government involvement. Private investors and entrepreneurs are dedicating resources to these
technologies based on their future prospects, not on government set-asides, mandates, or 61 subsidies (excluding insurance and liability), and despite the current regulatory bias in favor of large light water reactors (LWRs).213The

DOE is supporting this research and

development through its R&D Roadmap. A strong supporter of nuclear power, the DOE presented the Roadmap for nuclear
energy to Congress in 2010, supporting the development of nuclear power. Numerous hearings have been held by Congress, with testimony from experts such as Charles Ferguson and Warren Miller, as well as industry and utility representatives such as Christofer Mowry in support of the Roadmap. The DOE states four goals in its 2021 Roadmap: Develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety and extend the life of current reactors Develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the administrations energy security and climate change goals Develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles Minimizing the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism214Part of the roadmap includes support of SMRs through the SMR program, demonstrating the DOEs commitment to the technology.215In November of 2009, the U.S Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources introduced legislation that would provide funding to the Department of Energy for the development of small nuclear reactors. The

Nuclear Power 2021 Act (S. 2812) would allow the federal government to fund 50% of the cost of the development and licensing of two different small modular reactor designs.216One of the co-sponsors of the bill,
Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, hopes that one of these new small reactor designs will be built in Alaska, and Toshiba is already speaking to the town of Galena, AK and the NRC about the possibility to do so. In the 62 proposed 2012 Fiscal Budget, the

Obama administration has reinforced the DOE commitment to nuclear power and SMRs by requesting $500 million over five years, at a national laboratory facility. This would constitute half of the estimated cost to build two designs and secure the Nuclear
Regulatory Commissions approval. The reactors would be built almost entirely in a factory and trucked to a site like modular homes.217This would be necessary despite current public involvement because the cost is still relatively high and a demonstration unit has not yet been built. With government support in this area, the will likely be first movers.

SQUO solves; plan eliminates innovations and prevents SMR expansion Taso 11 (Firas Eugen Taso, 21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular
Reactors, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836) JD

However, the recommended approach and support for SMRs should be different from the approach that legislators have taken or are taking with large reactors. While

in the case of large reactors, as discussed in the previous section, subsidies and support are necessary still in the short term, for SMRs that is not entirely the case. So far, industry has demonstrated that it can take a lead on R&D, marketing, technology innovation and public-private partnerships in support of their ideas. Firms have been able to secure funding from private investors, and that is a very encouraging sign, given that nuclear is currently not a money-making enterprise, at least not in the short timeframe that investors usually operate under. This leads the Heritage Foundation, but also experts like Mike Peters, to recommend reducing or eliminating government subsidies for 83 SMRs, or at least focusing on R&D and licensing only. This will ensure that SMRs have a level playing field, and firms developing and commercializing them have a case to the market.245

SMRs being built now; Obama is behind it Koch 10 (February 18, 2010, Wall Street Journal, Obama nuclear alternative? Small, modular reactors
emerge, Wendy Koch, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2010/02/smallmodular-nuclear-reactors-an-alternative-emerges/1#.UBhH-LQQsb0) JD We see significant benefits from the new, modular technology," Donald Moul, vice president of nuclear support for
First Energy, an Ohio-based utility company, says in the story. The small Babcock & Wilcox reactor, which generate 125 to 140 megawatts of power -- about a tenth as much as a big one, has not yet been approved for U.S. commercial use by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC.) On Wednesday, three

major utilities -- Tennessee Valley Authority, First Energy Corp. and Oglethorpe Power Corp. -- signed an agreement with Babcock & Wilcox, committing to get NRC's approval, according to the story. This development comes as Obama announced Monday $8.3 billion in federal loan guarantees for two new large reactors in Burke, Ga. -- the first new nuclear power construction in the United States in three decades. Obama's call for a "new generation" of nuclear power plants and his proposal to triple loan guarantees to help build them are
generating opposition from environmentalists who once welcomed him.

Nuclear Renaissance Wont Happen

Fukishima crushed what little hope there was for a nuclear rensaissance Cooper 11 (NUCLEAR SAFETY AND NUCLEAR ECONOMICS: HISTORICALLY, ACCIDENTS DIM THE
PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR REACTOR CONSTRUCTION; FUKUSHIMA WILL HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT MARK COOPER, PHD Senior Fellow for Economic Analysis Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School December 2011, http://www.nirs.org/neconomics/Nuclear-Safety-and-Nuclear-EconomicsPost-Fukushima.pdf) JD The increase in risk associated with the post-accident reviews and the history of cost escalation, before and after accidents will make investors and governments look less favorably on nuclear power. This inclination is compounded by the fact that the cost of new nuclear reactors was highly uncertain before Fukushima (as shown in Exhibit 5). Since the first
estimates were put forward by nuclear "Enthusiasts" in an effort to create the impression of a nuclear renaissance, cost estimates have increased dramatically and the

numbers that were originally hyped to kick off the renaissance proved to be far too low. Although the Enthusiasts have since raised their cost projections somewhat, Wall Street analysts still use construction
cost projections that are at least 50 percent higher Fukushima will magnify the economic problems that the nuclear renaissance faced, which are the very problems that that have plagued nuclear power throughout its history. Nuclear power has always suffered from high cost and continuous cost escalation, high risk and uncertainty. With long lead-times and large sunk costs, nuclear is a very risky investment in an environment filled with ambiguities and competitive alternatives. Thus, new

reactors are the antithesis of prudent investment. That is the reason that the nuclear renaissance never materialized. Hype and speculation of dozens of projects quickly gave way to a handful that became increasingly dependent on massive public subsidies to move forward. Before Fukushima, the Energy Information Administration, which had been one of the early Enthusiasts, had already conceded that only four reactors would be built over the next two decades. After Fukushima, even that number is in doubt.

The results of Three-Mile-Island prove that Fukushima will crush nuclear development for more than a decade Cooper 11 (NUCLEAR SAFETY AND NUCLEAR ECONOMICS: HISTORICALLY, ACCIDENTS DIM THE
PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR REACTOR CONSTRUCTION; FUKUSHIMA WILL HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT MARK COOPER, PHD Senior Fellow for Economic Analysis Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School December 2011, http://www.nirs.org/neconomics/Nuclear-Safety-and-Nuclear-EconomicsPost-Fukushima.pdf) JD Motivated by this safety concern in the pre-TMI period the NRC was convinced the danger of accidents would grow dramatically as the number and size of the reactors in operation grew and their locations moved closer to population centers. They sought to reduce the risk by increasing required safety measures. The growth of
standards and guides was dramatic, from three in 1970 to 143 by 1978, which had a corresponding impact on the cost of reactors. 39 Writing in 1981, Komanoff concluded that the poor safety performance of the industry would combine with an across-the board review of safety after TMI that would maintain safety driven cost escalation. Thus, the

story of the nuclear industry in the 1980s was equal parts cost escalation and reactor cancellations and the underlying theme was a need for greater attention to safety. This is a likely outcome in the contemporary, post-Fukushima environment, except that the nuclear renaissance had not generated many actual orders for new reactors, so there was no need to cancel orders and have abandonment proceedings. Even before Fukushima, the nuclear renaissance had already proven to be more of a rapidly deflating bubble than a renaissance. Fukushima will make it even more difficult to inflate.

No Nuclear Renaissance
No nuclear renaissance cost and discovery of shale gas. The Economist, 12
(The dream that failed, 3-10-12, http://www.economist.com/node/21549936, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) Not all democracies do things so poorly. But nuclear power is about to become less and less a creature of democracies. The biggest investment in it on the horizon is in Chinanot because China is taking a great bet on nuclear,
but because even a modest level of interest in such a huge economy is big by the standards of almost everyone else. China's regulatory system is likely to be overhauled in response to Fukushima. Some of its new plants are of the most modern, and purportedly safest, design. But safety requires more than good engineering. It takes independent regulation, and a meticulous, self-critical safety culture that endlessly searches for risks it might have missed. These are not things that China (or Russia, which also plans to build a fair few plants) has yet shown it can provide. In any country independent regulation is harder when the industry being regulated exists largely by government fiat. Yet, as our special report this week explains, without

governments private companies would simply not choose to build nuclear-power plants. This is in part because of the risks they face from local opposition and changes in government policy (seeing Germany's nuclear-power stations, which the government had until then seen as safe, shut down after Fukushima sent a chilling message to the industry). But it is mostly because reactors are very expensive indeed. Lower capital costs once claimed for modern post-Chernobyl designs have not materialised. The few new reactors being built in Europe are far over their already big budgets. And in America, home to the world's largest nuclear fleet, shale gas has slashed the costs of one of the alternatives; new nuclear plants are likely only in still-regulated electricity markets such as
those of the south-east.

No nuclear renaissance the two newly approved reactors are exceptions and wont change anything. Biello, 12
(David, Staff Writer, Nuclear Reactor Approved in U.S. for First Time Since 1978, Scientific American, 29-12, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=first-new-nuclear-reactor-in-us-since-1978approved&print=true, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) But no nuclear renaissance appears to be imminent, despite the go-ahead to build and operate two new reactors in Georgia. Years of shifting and smoothing Georgia red clay paid off today, as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) voted
to allow construction of two new nuclear reactors (pdf) at the Plant Vogtle nuclear power station near Augusta. Atlantabased utility giant Southern Co. will soon have permission to complete construction and operate two AP1000 type nuclear reactors designed by Westinghouse. But what

were initially lauded as the first reactors of a nuclear renaissance when proposed are more likely to be the exceptions that prove the rule of no new nuclear construction in the U.S. Only this twin set of reactors in
Georgia, another pair in South Carolina and the completion of an old reactor in Tennessee are likely to be built in the U.S. for at least the next decade. "We

won't build large numbers of new nuclear plants in the U.S. in the near term," says Marvin Fertel, president of the Nuclear Energy Institute, a lobbying group for the nuclear industry. The problem is twofold: electricity demand in the U.S. is not growing and natural gas, which can be burned to generate electricity, is cheap. As a result, utilities are building more natural gasburning turbines rather than more expensive nuclear power plants. "Today, you ought to build gas," Fertel admits. But "you don't want to build only gas." That may become even truer as old coal-fired
power plants are forced to retire by new pollution rules and/or natural gas prices rebound. Given the long lead times required to gain permits and actually build a nuclear power plant, however, five new reactors may be as many as the U.S. will see erected during this decade. "If they are built, I suspect all of them are post-2020," says Fertel of other reactor applications awaiting NRC review. In fact, the

only reason utilities in Georgia and South Carolina are building the new reactors is because the governments in those states have allowed them to pre-charge customers for their cost. Southern Co. is already charging customers
$3.73 per month for the reactors' construction, expected to cost roughly $14 billion, and may receive a more than $8-billion loan guarantee from the federal government. In the absence of a national government policy that puts a premium on electricity generation that results in

we get back to the carbon discussion, that will have an effect on new plants that are built," argues Bill Johnson, CEO of Progress Energy, one of the utilities filing for a construction license but with no plans to actually build a nuclear power plant in the near future. "Nuclear can't
fewer emissions of greenhouse gases, there is little incentive to build nuclear power plants in the U.S. "If

compete today. Other than the Watts Bar unit No. 2 in Tennessee, which will simply be the completion of a reactor that started
construction in the 1970s, the four new plants will all employ a novel designthe AP1000. They will be the first to employ so-called passive safety features, or technology that kicks in with or without human intervention. In the case of the AP1000 that means cooling water sits above the reactor core and, in the event of a meltdown like the ones at Fukushima Daiichi, will flow via gravity into the core to cool it with the automatic opening of a heat-sensitive valve. Furthermore, although the thick steel vessel containing the nuclear reactor is encased in a shell of 1.2-meter-thick concrete, that shell is itself surrounded by a building that is open to the sky. Should the concrete containment vessel begin to heat up during a meltdown, natural convection would pull cooling air inside. The NRC initially rejected that open-air building for a lack of structural strength. The U.S. regulator argued that it would not withstand a severe shock such as an earthquake or airplane impact because it was initially planned to be built from prefabricated concrete and steel modules to save money. The NRC approved a modified design (pdf) in December that employs more steel reinforcement, among other changes. Nevertheless, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko voted against approving the license for the two reactors at Vogtle today unless they incorporated a "binding obligation that these plants will have implemented the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident before they operate." The commission also required more inspection and testing of the explosiveopened valves that would allow venting in case of an accident. Already, the Shaw Group facility in Lake Charles, La., a nuclear equipment supplier, has begun churning out gear for the new nuclear power plants. A "mini skyscraper," in the words of Westinghouse CEO Aris Candris, has been built at Vogtle to allow for final assembly of the modules that will reach the site by truck or rail. "Both sites are as ready as you can be," he adds. "Rebar is sitting outside the hole ready to go."

A global revival of interest in nuclear power technology remains underway, despite the April 2011 meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. China is already building four AP1000s and more than 20 other reactors currentlyand many other countries are considering new plant construction, from the Czech Republic to India. But in the U.S., even just to maintain the current fleet of 104 reactors, which provide 20 percent of the nation's electricity supply, would require building as many replacement reactors by 2030. In fact, nuclear power production may shrink in the U.S. before it grows. Aging reactors, even with life extensions of another two decades, will begin to drop off the grid in coming years. "Twenty years is the blink of an eye for 100 gigawatts. The time is now to begin to deploy new nuclear," says David Christian, CEO of Virginia-based utility Dominion Generation, although his company has no plans to do so before the end of the decade. "We're in danger of missing that window."

No nuclear renaissance - Fukushima killed the movement. White, 11

(Ronald, Staff Writer, Report: U.S. nuclear renaissance unlikely after Fukushima, LA Times, 12-28-11, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/12/a-new-study-released-today-said-thattheregulatory-fallout-from-the-fukushima-power-plantdisaster-in-japan-last-marchwill-pro.html, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) A new study released Wednesday said that the regulatory fallout from the Fukushima power plant disaster in Japan in March will short-circuit the U.S. nuclear renaissance of new power plant construction. The report, "Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Economics," was written and presented by Mark Cooper, a frequent critic of the nuclear power industry. The report can be found here. Cooper is a senior fellow for economic analysis at the Institute for Energy and the Environment at the Vermont Law School. Cooper said that past nuclear disasters, such as the one at the Three Mile Island power plant in Pennsylvania in 1979, have tended to greatly raise regulatory barriers and have also severely multiplied the cost of reactor construction. After Three Mile Island, for example, the report said, the cost of nuclear power
plant construction doubled in most cases and trebled or quadrupled in some rare instances. "This is an important moment to compare what is really likely to happen over the next 10 years with the industrys expectations" of a nuclear renaissance, said Peter Bradford, an adjunct professor specializing in nuclear power and public policy at the Vermont Law School and a former Nuclear Regulatory Commission member. "When that comparison is performed properly, it

becomes clear that we are witnessing not a revival but a collapse in expectations for new reactor construction," Bradford added. The report comes just days after a panel appointed by the Japanese
government released a scathing assessment of the reponse to the disaster, which was caused when a huge earthquake generated a tsunami that struck the facility. The investigative panel blamed the central government and the Tokyo Electric Power Co., saying both seemed incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks after the disaster. A

recently updated online report by the World Nuclear Assn. said that as few as four of the 26 new nuclear facilities that have been proposed or planned in the U.S. will be finished by 2020. But it did not mention
Fukushima and instead said the primary reason was the fact that a boom in domestic natural gas production has "put the economic viability of some of these projects in doubt."

No nuclear renaissance Fukushima and viability of natural gas have killed the movement. LaMonica, 12
(Martin, Staff Writer, Nuclear renaissance? More like nuclear standstill, CNET, 3-10-12,

http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57394666-76/nuclear-renaissance-more-like-nuclear-standstill/, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) One year after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, nuclear power is either slogging ahead or at the end of the road, depending on which country you live in. How nuclear grows in the years ahead largely depends on whether new designs can demonstrate better safety and, more importantly, compete on price. Rather than freeze nuclear's progress, Fukushima simply made it harder to make the case for building new plants, experts say. Indeed, one of the primary barriers to a nuclear renaissance is cheap natural gas, not public opinion. "The nuclear renaissance was a very optimistic view that many new nuclear plants would be built, but the slowdown was largely triggered by events that occurred before Fukushima," said Andrew Kadak, a former professor of nuclear science and engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Because of new drilling techniques, natural gas prices have plummeted in the last few years, making it more attractive. "If natural gas is currently where it is, it's difficult to justify the large capital investment for electricity production for the long term. Nuclear is a 30- or 60-year commitment," Kadak said. Also stacked against nuclear are rising construction costs and regulatory delays , he said.

Solvency

Laundry List
SMR incentives bad Nuclear Information and Resource Service 2010 (S517 is fatally flawed,
http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/congactions/s517fatallyflawed.htm ) RCM The Senate Energy Bill, S 517 IS FATALLY FLAWED S 517 provides nuclear welfare on a scale we have never seen before, amounting to protectionism in favor of nuclear energy and against sorely needed renewable energy. S 517 ignores national and energy security in favor of big money handouts to nuclear power. NUCLEAR S 517: *Uses public money to build and test a new generation of dangerous nuclear power reactors on federal land, including (but not limited to) DOE sites and labs. *Streamlines reactor approval. *Discourages small power
generators and funds nuclear power to such a large degree that it amounts to protectionism against renewables, threatening energy and national security. *Treats

irradiated fuel as a commodity or resource, threatening national security . *Deploys more nuclear power reactors which are officially recognized terrorist targets, endangering national security and major population centers. Many thousands of people could be harmed by a terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor. * Seeks to greenwash nuclear power by linking it to clean car technology and hydrogen fuel production. *Repeals PUHCA, the full force of which could have prevented the ENRON debacle, compromising the safety of nuclear reactors. *S 517 would mandate taxpayer money to implement the nuclear
industry-drafted DOE report A Roadmap to Deploy New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010. This report and S 517 would pay the nuclear industry to work to with DOE to embrace the industrys Vision 2020 plan of deploying 50,000 MWe of new nuclear generation by 2020. Specifics: S 517 establishes a new generation of nuclear reactors. It does this first by reauthorizing the Price Anderson Subsidies. Second, it offers public money and federal facilities and land in order to research and operate new reactors like the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). S

517 reauthorizes Price Anderson (SA 2983-VOINOVICH), which limits catastrophic nuclear accident liability to 9 billion with no assured redress for higher costs; it also subsidizes insurance costs up to 3.4 billion dollars per year for
current reactors, further distorting electricity markets. This subsidy will increase with new reactors. New design modular reactors such as the PBMR, receive another special incentive which allows a group of reactors with smaller energy output to be covered as one reactor. This lowers reactor premiums and liability. The energy company EXELON is planning on ordering the first US PBMR. S 517 (SA 2995, CRAIG) seeks fast track ways to ensure the new generation of atomic reactors are operating by 2010. This provision will inevitably trample public participation even more. Additionally, it would use public money and public property to research and deploy a new reactor generation. S 517 would also encourage new atomic reactors by offering over 1 billion dollars in tax breaks for current reactor decommissioning. While this encourages reactor owners to close down current reactors earlier, combined with other incentives in this bill, it encourages these same owners to build new generation atomic reactors. In simple terms, S 517 provisions listed above fund

creation of new and very vulnerable terrorist targets: atomic reactors. An attack could easily affect hundreds of thousands of people. The above amendments directly impede renewable energy progress by skewing the electricity market in favor of old and new nuclear power. Given the current state of security and the dangers nuclear energy poses, these amendments are especially inappropriate. Adding to the nuclear waste threering-circus, S 517 would relapse into technologies that have long been recognized as catastrophic failures worldwide (SA 3009-Domenici). Even the industry has rejected these technologies. These methods include reprocessing and plutonium separation. These methods are responsible for harming members of the public and highly contaminating their surrounding environment. Additionally, these methods do not immobilize and isolate this highly irradiated material, encouraging it to circulate, which greatly increases the probability that it will fall into the wrong hands. This is not just an energy security issue; it is a true national security issue. S 517 repeals PURPA which has required the purchase of power from small generators. This home-grown power is
instrumental in assuring our individual and national energy independence and security. While a decentralized energy grid favors small, locally controlled renewable energy producers, large grids favor nuclear power. In fact nuclear power is absolutely antithetical to a decentralized power system. Discouraging small energy producers discourages renewables and favors a large grid system which gives nuclear power an unwarranted edge. S 517 repeals PUHCA which has protected consumers from a utilitys bad investments. With mergers and buyouts the consolidation of nuclear reactor ownership is inevitable. Without a law like PUHCA to help ensure financial viability and sound investment, poor business judgment on the part of utilities would compromise safety at atomic reactors. S 517 wastes still more money on nuclear fusion, (SA- 2987, CRAIG) a pie-in-the-sky technology that still generates nuclear waste. The Senate energy bill will increase money for the Fusion Energy Sciences Program to $1.4 billion over four years. S 517 would link nuclear power to hydrogen production in an attempt to greenwash nuclear energy. This would link nuclear in a new, tangible way to a clean energy source and present a faade of its necessity to Americas clean energy future (SA-3009, Landrieu) It requires study of designs for a high temperature nuclear reactor to produce hydrogen. In practical terms, having a potentially clean fuel (hydrogen) produced by a dirty method (nuclear) obviates the label renewable. In terms of politics and public relations this ensures that nuclear energy will have a place in a future clean energy source which runs cars. Nuclear Energy proponents can therefore claim that nuclear power is necessary for replacing oil use in this country since most oil is used as gas for automobiles. Although the

industry has tried to say nuclear power was instrumental in replacing foreign oil sources, this argument has rung hollow up to now. Key nuclear power points: Every

dollar spent on nuclear power assures that this country will lack true energy independence and security. 1) Subsidizing nuclear power hurts the energy market and renewable energy which, at the least, should have an equivalent playing field. Equivalency can be achieved by removal of all nuclear power subsidies and recognition of its true costs. 2) Reliance on nuclear energy ensures that we will not get a decentralized energy grid into which ALL producers, businesses and individuals, can supply power. This is where true energy security rests. 3) Further, this bill threatens much of the public input provisions we need to participate in our own energy future, especially concerning nuclear power. 4) Nuclear power is a threat to national, environmental, and public security. Period. It was before September 11. It is more so now. Considering how quickly this bill and its amendments have moved, we must declare our opposition to it now. The promise of amendments to make this bill better is
not enough to support it. Even if mitigating amendments were added (unlikely given recent past experience), the cost of this bill becoming law remains too high.

Wrong Direction
SMR incentives send the nuclear power industry down a costly, dead-end road. Daryan, 2012. (January 3rd, 2012. http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-10-smallreactorsmass-prod/ Part 10 Small modular reactors and mass production options ) RCM So there are a host of practical factors in favour smaller reactors. But whats the down side? Firstly, economies of scale. With a small reactor, we have all the excess baggage that comes with each power station, all the fixed costs and a much smaller pay-off. As I noted earlier, even thought many smaller reactors are a lot safer than large LWRs (even a small LWR is somewhat safer!) you would still need to put them under a containment dome. Its this process of concrete pouring that is often a bottle neck in nuclear reactor construction. We could get around the problem by clustering reactors together, i.e putting 2 or 4 reactors not only on the same site but under the same containment dome. The one downside here is that if one reactor has a problem, it will likely spread to its neighbours . How much of a showstopper this fact is
depends on which type of reactors we are discussing. A proposed modular reactor design with four 250 MWth reactors within the same containment building working a shared pair of turbines to produce 500 MWe Also, in

the shorter term small reactors would be slower to build, especially many of those weve been discussing, given that they are often made out of non-standard materials. Only a few facilities in the world could build them as the entire nuclear manufacturing industry is currently geared towards large LWRs. Turning that juggernaut around would take decades. So by opting for small reactors while wed get safer more flexible reactors, we be paying for it, as these reactors would be slower to build (initially anyway) and probably more expensive too.

Cost
Smaller is more expensive no adoption. Makhijani & Boyd 2010 (IEER Institute of energy and environmental research
http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/small-modular-reactors2010.pdf) JA
SMR proponents claim that small size will enable mass manufacture in a factory, enabling considerable savings relative to field construction and assembly that is typical of large reactors. In other words, modular reactors will be cheaper because they will be more like assembly line cars than hand-made Lamborghinis. In the case of reactors, however, several

offsetting factors will tend to neutralize this advantage and make the costs per kilowatt of small reactors higher than large reactors . First, in contrast to cars or smart phones or similar widgets, the materials cost per kilowatt of a reactor goes up as the size goes down. This is because the surface area per kilowatt of capacity, which dominates materials cost, goes up as reactor size is decreased. Similarly, the cost per kilowatt of secondary containment, as well as independent
systems for control, instrumentation, and emergency management, increases as size decreases. Cost per kilowatt also increases if each reactor has dedicated and independent systems for control, instrumentation, and emergency management. For

these reasons, the nuclear industry has been building larger and larger reactors in an effort to try to achieve economies of scale and make nuclear power economically competitive.

Low estimates are wishful thinking. Makhijani & Boyd 2010 (IEER Institute of energy and environmental research
http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/small-modular-reactors2010.pdf) JA These cost increases are unlikely to be offset even if the entire reactor is manufactured at a central facility and some economies are achieved by mass manufacturing compared to large reactors assembled on site. Furthermore, estimates of low prices must be regarded with skepticism due to the history of past cost escalations for nuclear reactors and the potential for cost increases due to requirements arising in the process of NRC certification. Some SMR designers are proposing that no prototype be built and that the necessary licensing tests be simulated. Whatever the process, it will have to be rigorous to ensure safety, especially given the history of some of proposed designs.

Cleanup is harder and more expensive which means no adoption Makhijani & Boyd 2010 (IEER Institute of energy and environmental research
http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/small-modular-reactors2010.pdf) JA
Proponents claim that with longer operation on a single fuel charge and with less production of spent fuel per reactor, waste management would be simpler. In fact, spent

fuel management for SMRs would be more complex, and therefore more expensive, because the waste would be located in many more sites. The infrastructure that we have for spent fuel management is geared toward light-water reactors at a limited number of sites. In some proposals, the reactor would be buried underground, making waste retrieval even more complicated and complicating retrieval of radioactive materials in the event of an accident. For instance, it is highly unlikely that a reactor containing metallic sodium could be disposed of as a
single entity, given the high reactivity of sodium with both air and water. Decommissioning a sealed sodium- or potassiumcooled reactor could present far greater technical challenges and costs per kilowatt of capacity than faced by present-day aboveground reactors.

SMRs are more expensive than large reactors no adoption. Baker 2012 (writer for the American Security Project(ASP) Do Small Modular Reactors Present a
Serious Option for the Militarys Energy Needs? http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/do small-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/ ) JA Secondly, SMRs pose many of the same problems that regular nuclear facilities face, sometimes to a larger degree. Because SMRs are smaller than conventional reactors and can be installed underground, they can be more difficult to access should an emergency occur. There are also reports that

because the upfront costs of nuclear reactors go up as surface area per kilowatt of capacity decreases, SMRs

will in fact be more

expensive than conventional reactors.

Leadership

Prolif Leadership High

Russia and the U.S. have and will retain joint proliferation leadership Pifer 10 (Resetting U.S.-Russian Leadership on Nuclear Arms Reductions and Non-Proliferation,
Brookings Institute, Arms Control Series, Steven Pifer Joseph Cirincione Clifford Gaddy, 2010) JD
During their first meeting in London on April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev discussed ways to build a more positive relationship. They attached particular importance to nuclear arms reductions and non-proliferation: As

leaders of the two largest nuclear weapons states, we agreed to work together to fulfill our obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and demonstrate our leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world We agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process We intend to carry out joint efforts to strengthen the international regime for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery Together, we
seek to secure nuclear weapons and materials, while promoting the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The focus on nuclear weapons is understandable. Detonation of a nuclear device in an American or Russian city would be a catastrophic event, to say nothing of the consequences of large-scale use of nuclear weapons in an inter-state conflict. The risk increases with the spread of nuclear weapons and the threat that they could fall into the hands of a terrorist group that might not be deterrable. It is difficult to imagine anything that would pose a greater threat to American national security.

Recent G8 committee appointments make U.S. the global proliferation leader Bigongiari 12 (U.S. assumes leadership of G8s non-proliferation bodies Published on January 25, 2012
by Jeffrey Bigongiari http://www.bioprepwatch.com/us_bioterror_policy/u-s-assumes-leadership-ofg8s-non-proliferation-bodies/322874/) JD As the head of the G8 in 2012, the United States has assumed leadership of the organizations three non-proliferation bodies. The United States now chairs the Non-proliferation Directors Group, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and the Nuclear Safety and Security Group, which will meet throughout the year to develop international nonproliferation objectives
among the groups members. The GP, which was launched at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, was created initially as a 10 year, $20 billion initiative to support non-proliferation projects in Russia and the former Soviet Union. It has since expanded into additional regions around the world and has extended its mission beyond 2012. It now includes projects aimed at enhancing biological and radiological security, scientific engagement and U.N. nonproliferation efforts.

Tech Leadership High

IT pros indicate U.S. technology leadership is stable Preston 12 (U.S. Tech Leadership On Solid Ground, IT Pros Say But worries continue about offshoring
of tech jobs and innovation, state of STEM education. Rob Preston July 09, 2012, http://www.informationweek.com/news/global-cio/interviews/240002852)
How have views changed in two years? We fielded an updated survey in April (download our full, updatedInnovation Mandate report), and the results are in: IT pros are slightly more optimistic about the state of U.S. technology leadership, though their opinions about the most pressing priorities and competitive threats, as well as which IT vendors and nations are taking the mantle of leadership and which are falling behind, have shifted a bit in two years. Responding

to our latest survey were 552 business technology pros at a range of U.S. companies, educational institutions, and government organizations. The same percentage as in 2010--63%--think the U.S. is a strong IT player but losing its global lead. The percentage who are more optimistic--who think it's a global leader positioned to grow its influence-rose slightly, to 34% from 32%. Only 3% of respondents think the U.S. is a former IT leader, compared with 5% two years ago.

The U.S. is still the global tech leader - institutions Acemoglu 4/19 (Christian Science Monitor, World's next technology leader will be US, not China if
America can shape up, By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson / April 19, 2012 http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2012/0419/World-s-next-technologyleader-will-be-US-not-China-if-America-can-shape-up) JD But what matters for global leadership is innovation, which is not only the key driver of per capita income growth but also ultimately the main determinant of military and diplomatic leadership. It was the US that proved after Pearl Harbor how a prosperous economy can rapidly increase its military power and preparedness when push comes to shove. So the right question to ask is not who will be the military leader of the next century, but who will be the technological leader. The answer must be: most probably the US but only if it can clean up its act. The odds favor the US not only because it is technologically more advanced and innovative than China at the moment, with an income per capita more than six times that of China. They do so also because innovation ultimately depends on a countrys institutions.

Hurts Cred - Generic

Expanding nuclear power hurts credibility safety issues Walsh 11 (Wednesday, Mar 16, 2011 05:17 PM MST The nuclear credibility gap As Japan and U.S.
officials differ on risks, the Obama administration pushes ahead with nuclear power expansion By Joan Walsh, http://www.salon.com/2011/03/17/nuclear_credibility_gap/)
Im inclined to believe Jaczko, as well as warnings from U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu and other U.S. officials. Japanese leaders have been slow to admit the extent of the Fukushima damage at every step of the way. But American leaders

are putting their own credibility at risk by being so quick to reiterate the Obama administrations commitment to expanding nuclear power in
the U.S. On Wednesday Chu told Congress that officials planned to look at the lessons of the Japan disaster but he also told Rep. Joe Barton (R-Energy Industry) that the president continues to support expanding nuclear power in the U.S. at a cost to taxpayers of $36 billion, mainly in loan guarantees for new reactors, and to fund new small, modular reactors. To meet the presidents clean energy goals, Chu said, We believe we will have to have some fraction coming from nuclear. Without

knowing the lessons of the unforeseen Japanese disaster, Im not sure why any administration leader is making a full steam ahead commitment to nuclear expansion.

Causes Prolif
Spreading nuclear energy inevitably increases proliferation Miller 9 (Steven E. Miller & Scott D. Sagan Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation? 2009 by
the American Academy of Arts & SciencesDdalus Fall 2009, 7-18, http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/22659/Sagan_Nuclear_power_without_nuclear_proliferation.pdf) JD Concerns about proliferation (whether to states or terrorists) arise at the intersection of nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Indeed, the connection between power and weapons is somewhat inevitable because key technologies in the nuclear sectornotably, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilitiesare relevant to both. In the nonproliferation context, this is the dual-use dilemma: many technologies associated with the creation of a nuclear power program can be used to make weapons if a state chooses to do so. When a state seems motivated to acquire nuclear weapons, a nuclear power program in that state can appear to be simply a route leading to the bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Irans nuclear activities is a case in point. Depending on what capabilities spread to which states, especially
regarding uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, a world of widely spread nuclear technologies could be a world in which more states, like Iran, would have the latent capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.

This could easily be a world filled with

much

more worry about the risk of nuclear proliferationand worse, a world where more states possess nuclear weapons. A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous.

Technical changes dont solve prolif its motivated by a still existing political desire Acton 9 (James M. Acton is an associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace and frequent contribu- tor to the prominent blog Arms Control Wonk. a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, The myth of proliferation-resistant technology, December) Forty years on, Hardins central thesisthat it is impossible to solve a political problem with a technical solutionis still salient and applicable to more than just managing population. At the mo- ment, a number of initiatives promote a technological approach to solveor at least amelioratethe problem of nuclear proliferation through the misuse of civilian nuclear facilities (particularly reac- tors and reprocessing plants). Their aim is to make novel nuclear technologies proliferation resistant. There is nothing wrong per se with technology that makes the di- version of nuclear material harder or more likely to be detected. Yet a failure to appreciate fully the political dimension of nonprolifera- tion risks makes the concept of proliferation resistance at best ir- relevant and at worst counterproductive. For the anticipated global expansion of nuclear energy to not exacerbate nuclear insecurity, a more politically savvy
approach to proliferation resistance is needed.

Peaceful nuclear cooperation causes prolif Fuhrmann 9 (Matthew, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina,
Abstract of Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Matthew Fuhrmann,, International Security Summer 2009, Vol. 34, No. 1, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2009.34.1.7) Peaceful nuclear cooperationthe transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposesleads to the spread of nuclear weapons. In particular, countries that
receive peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate weapons programs and successfully develop the bomb, especially when they are also faced with security threats. Statistical

analysis based on a new data set of more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed from 1950 to 2000 lends strong support for this argument. Brief case studies of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs provide further evidence of
the links between peaceful nuclear assistance and proliferation. The finding that supplier countries inadvertently raise the risks of nuclear proliferation poses challenges to the conventional wisdom. Indeed, the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad.

Even assistance that is often viewed as innocuous, such as training nuclear scientists or providing research or power reactors, increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will spread.

Proliferation-proof nuclear assistance does not exist. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major
suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs.

Cooperation on nuclear leadership causes prolif Fuhrmann 9 (Matthew, Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Matthew Fuhrmann,
Matthew Fuhrmann is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, International Security Summer 2009, Vol. 34, No. 1, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2009.34.1.7) JD

This article examines the relationship between peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons proliferation. Speciacally, it explores whether countries receiving civilian nuclear aid over time are more likely to initiate weapons programs and build the bomb. The conventional wisdom is that civilian nuclear cooperation does not lead to proliferation. Most scholars argue that nu- clear weapons spread when states have a demand for the bombnot when they have the technical capacity to proliferate.4 Those who recognize the im- portance of the supply side of proliferation argue that certain types of nuclear assistance enable countries to build nuclear weapons but that others are innoc- uous or even positive from a nonproliferation standpoint. Nuclear suppliers, for instance, generally restrict the sale of uranium enrichment or plutonium re- processing facilities because these can be used directly to produce assile mate- rial for a bomb, but suppliers routinely build research or power reactors in other countries and train foreign scientists.5 A recent study ands that countries receiving enrichment and reprocessing facilities, bomb designs, or signiacant quantities of weapons-grade assile material are more likely to acquire the bomb.6 The implication of this research is that other forms of atomic assistance do not lead to the spread of nuclear weapons. This article argues that the conventional wisdom is wrongand dangerous. All

types of civilian nuclear assistance raise the risks of proliferation. Peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation are causally connected because of the dual-use nature of nuclear technology and know-how.7 Civilian cooperation provides technology
and materials necessary for a nuclear weapons program and helps to establish expertise in matters relevant to building the bomb. I de- velop four hypotheses based on this general insight. First, receiving civilian

nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will begin nu- clear weapons programs because it reduces the expected costs of such a cam- paign and inspires greater conadence among leaders that the bomb could be successfully developed. Second, militarized
disputes with other countries con- dition the effect of civilian nuclear assistance on program initiation. The likeli- hood that nuclear assistance causes countries to begin weapons programs increases as their security environments worsen. Third, peaceful

aid increases the

probability that countries will successfully build nuclear weapons. Fourth, this is especially true when a countrys security environment deteriorates. To test these hypotheses, I produced a data set on civilian nuclear assistance based on the coding of all NCAs signed from 1945 to 2000.8 A combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis yields support for my arguments, even when controlling for the other variables thought to influence proliferation. The results from my statistical analysis indicate that other factors, such as indus- trial capacity and membership
in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), also have signiacant effects on proliferation. But peaceful cooperation is among the few variables that is consistently salient in explaining both nuclear weapons program onset and weapons acquisition.

SMRs Hurt Tech Leadership

Government investment kills tech leadership creates confusion in the industry. Spencer and Loris, 11
(Jack (Senior Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy at The Heritage Foundation) and Nicolas (Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow at The Heritage Foundation), A Big Future for Small Nuclear Reactors?, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2514, Backgrounder, 2-2-11, RSR) Too many policymakers believe that Washington is equipped to guide the nuclear industry to success . So, instead of creating a stable regulatory environment where the market value of different nuclear technologies can determine their success and evolution, they choose to create programs to help industry
succeed. Two recent Senate bills from the 111th Congress, the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative Improvement Act (S. 2052) and the Nuclear Power 2021 Act (S. 2812), are cases in point. Government

intervention distorts the normal market processes that, if allowed to work, would yield the most efficient, cost-effective, and appropriate nuclear technologies. Instead, the federal government picks winners and losers through programs where bureaucrats and well-connected lobbyists decide which technologies are permitted, and provides capital subsidies that allow investors to ignore the systemic problems that drive risk and costs artificially high. This approach is especially detrimental to SMRs because subsidies to LWRs distort the relative benefit of other reactor designs by artificially lowering the cost and risk of a more mature technology that already dominates the marketplace.

New reactor types undermine nuclear conformity thats key to tech leadership. Lester and Rosner 9 (Richard and Robert, The growth of nuclear power: drivers & constraints,
http://lion.chadwyck.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/searchFulltext.do?id=R04200587&divLevel=0&area=abe ll&forward=critref_ft) In its earliest years, the nuclear power industry also seemed destined to develop along many different trajectories. Nuclear power reactor developers in Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States each
introduced a different type of nuclear power reactor technology. National strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle also differed significantly. Eventually, the light water reactor technology that was first introduced in the United States came to dominate the global nuclear power industry. Light water reactors now account for more than 90 percent of installed nuclear capacity worldwide, although today the leading suppliers of this technology are French and Japanese. (The only other power reactor technology with a significant market presence

There is today a fairly high degree of uniformity in the nuclear plans and programs of most of the major nuclear countries, and nuclear power is one of the most highly
internationally has historically been the Canadian CANDU design.) globalized of all industries. The nuclear power plant supply industry is dominated by a small number of large global suppliers of light water reactor equipment and technology.

National regulatory standards and practices are harmonized to a substantial degree. National strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle are also aligned, and major fuel cycle service providers operate globally. And a new class of global nuclear power plant investor-operators is emerging, led by the French utility
EDF, whose joint ventures with nuclear power companies in China and the United States, and its recent purchase of the U.K. nuclear operator British Energy, have established it as an important player in all of the world's largest nuclear power markets.

This global convergence has yielded a number of benefits, including economies of scale and accelerated learning. The case for international coordination and standardization of strategies and practices is further strengthened by the special care with which nuclear technology and materials must be handled, and the international consequences of local nuclear accidents or missteps. From time to time this strategic convergence has also served the purposes of nuclear industry
leaders and government policymakers, providing them with a sort of strength-in-numbers defense against local critics. A few years ago, when President George W. Bush announced his support for closing the nuclear fuel cycle in the United States, the new policy was welcomed by the French, British, and Japanese, in no small part because it seemed to legitimize their own longstanding commitment to a closed nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing and mixed-oxide fuel use. Thirty years earlier, when the United States abandoned its plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and sought to persuade others to do likewise as a nonproliferation measure, the outraged reactions from Europe and Japan were partly stimulated by a fear that the American policy reversal would give ammunition to domestic critics of their own reprocessing plans, which

The attractions of nuclear conformity remain strong today, yet the prospect of divergent development pathways may now be greater than at any time since the earliest days of the nuclear power industry. What are the implications of this for nuclear energy growth? How might it affect the course
they had no intention of abandoning. of international nonproliferation efforts?

SMRs Not Key to Tech Leadership

SQUO solves for nuclear tech leadership already seen as the gold standard. Domenici and Miller, 12
(Pete (Senator) and Warren (Co-Chair, Nuclear Initiative; Former DOE Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy), Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Global Nuclear Energy Markets, July 2012, Bipartisan Policy Center, RSR) Nuclear power already plays an important role in the U.S. energy supply mix: The nations existing fleet of 104 reactors currently accounts for close to 20 percent of overall electricity production. In many parts of the
country, nuclear plants help to assure grid stability and have been a major source of cost-effective, low-carbon base-load power for decades.

The NRC, the industrys chief regulatory overseer, is expected to approve extension of the operating licenses for most of these plants to 60 years while striving for improved safety and increasingly efficient operations. At present, the domestic nuclear industry is looking at limited opportunities for expansion in terms of increasing the number of U.S. plants. Currently, four new Generation III+ nuclear reactors have been licensed by the NRC and are under construction in the Southeast. In addition, the Tennessee Valley Authority has restarted construction activities at Watts Bar II. Given this near-term expansion, the United States will continue to be a world leader in the development of advanced reactor technologies, including Generation III+ advanced passive reactors and SMRs. International interest in developing new nuclear-generating capacity, on the other hand, presents potentially substantial business opportunities for the domestic nuclear industry. Commercial nuclear exports generate obvious economic benefits for U.S. firms and for the nations overall balance of trade. Importantly, they also help the United States retain a major role in the evolution and maintenance of international nuclear safety and nonproliferation regimes. Other nations not only look to the U.S. industry for operational expertise, they see the NRC as setting the international gold standard for safety and physical security regulation. DOEs National Nuclear Security Administration, meanwhile, has a great deal of influence over the nonproliferation aspects of international fuel-cycle issues.

Proliferation Impact D
Prolif doesnt snowball their tipping point arguments rely on the same discredited assumptions as cold war domino theory. Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 8
(William (Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies) and Gaukhar (Research Associate at the James Martin Center. International Security), Vol. 33, No. 1, Summer 2008, pp. 139-169, Divining Nuclear Intentions, RSR) Hymans is keenly aware of the deficiency of past proliferation projections, which he attributes in large part to the
tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general rogu- ishness of the state as

intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to
proxies for nuclear weapons intentions (p. 217). Such forecasting proliferation.49 Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that the domino theory of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.50 As he points out, the

new domino theory, like its discredited Cold War predecessor, assumes an over- simplified view about why and how decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken.51 Leaders nuclear preferences, he maintains, are not highly contingent on what other states decide, and, therefore, proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with no single instance of pro- liferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis
embraces an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self- assertive ones, and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons in- tent (pp. 208209). Dire

proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisonmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a ticket to interna- tional status; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters. As discussed earlier, Hymans argues that the need for a nuclear deterrent is entirely in the eye of the beholdera leader with an oppositional nationalist NIC [National Identity Conception]. By the same token, just because some leaders seek to achieve international prestige through acquisition of the bomb, it does not mean that other leaders necessarily view the bomb as the right ticket to punch: witness the case of several decades of Argentine leaders, as well as the Indian Nehruvians (pp. 211212). The case of Egypt under Anwar al-Sadat, though not discussed by Hymans, also seems to fit
this category.

New nuclear arsenals will be small and stable. Seng, 98

(Jordon, PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Chicago, Strategy for Pandoras Children: Stable Nuclear Proliferation Among Minor States, p. 203-206, WorldCat, RSR) However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each

of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality

control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of.
Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This

creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in
nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the

small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be
contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the

smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once
one organizational event is triggeredonce an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is madeother branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The

small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

Heg Defense
Heg doesnt solve war Conry and Pena 2003 Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations
consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 47. US Security Strategy CATO Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf
Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th centuryor perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only Washingtons management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or military conflagration.

Empirically proven Fettweis 2010 Christopher J. Fettweis (Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College)
2010 Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 82
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities . Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

SQUO Nuke Reactors Bad Advantage

No Meltdowns
New reactor designs solve the meltdown risk. CFR 2006
*Lionel Beehner, Chernobyl, Nuclear Power, and Foreign Policy, April 25, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10534/chernobyl_nuclear_power_and_foreign_policy.html]
Repeat of Chernobyl-like meltdown. A dozen or so other Chernobyl-era nuclear plants with aging equipment are still operatingand expected to continue to operate for the next thirty yearswithin the former Soviet Union. Although their design flaws have for the most part been addressed, some

experts fear human error makes a future meltdown, however remote, still a possibility. Elsewhere, Chernobyl-like meltdowns are becoming unlikely, thanks mainly to developments in technology, IAEA Deputy Director Tomihiro Taniguchi told the Associated Press. Others point to advanced technologies like pebblebed reactors, which use graphite pebbles and gases like helium as a coolant, and are safer, cheaper, and more efficient but
leave greater waste than traditional nuclear power plants. Plans for these kinds of reactors are in place inSouth Africa and the United States.

Meltdown impacts wont happen empirics WNA 11

[World Nuclear Association, Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, (updated December 2011), http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html]
From the outset, there has been a strong awareness of the potential hazard of both nuclear criticality and release of radioactive materials from generating electricity with nuclear power. As in other industries, the design

and operation of nuclear power plants aims to minimise the likelihood of accidents, and avoid major human consequences when they occur. There have been three major reactor accidents in the history of civil nuclear power - Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. One was contained
without harm to anyone, the next involved an intense fire without provision for containment, and the third severely tested the containment, allowing some release of radioactivity. These are the only major accidents to have occurred in over

14,500 cumulative reactor-

years of commercial nuclear power operation in 32 countries. The risks from western nuclear power plants, in terms of the consequences of an accident or terrorist attack, are minimal compared with other commonly accepted risks. Nuclear power plants are very robust.

SMRs Not Safer

SMRs arent any safer than other reactors Forbes 12 (Small Modular Nuclear Reactors By 2022 But No Market For Them 12 Forbes McMahon
0523, Forbes Magazine, TECH | 5/23/2012 @ 3:03PM |5,221 views Jeff McMahon, Contributor From Chicago, I cover green technology, energy, and the environment. http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2012/05/23/small-modular-reactors-by-2022-but-nomarket-for-them/) Senate staff also heard criticism of the Administrations hopes for SMRs from Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist in the
Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists: The last panelist, Dr. Lyman, provided a more skeptical viewpoint on SMRs, characterizing public discussion on the topic as irrational exuberance. Lyman

argued that, with a few exceptions, safety characteristics were not significantly better than fullsize reactors, and in general, safety tended to rely on the same sorts of features. Some safety benefits, he stated, also declined as reactor power approached the upper bound of the SMR category. Lyman argued that the Fukushima disaster should lead to a reset in licensing. In his opinion,
the incident exposed numerous weaknesses in how nuclear power is regulated, and in order to remedy these oversights, regulation should be revisited.

SMRs arent safer Lyman 12 (Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist, UCS. Presentation to the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
SMR Subcommittee. May 30, 2012, www.ne.doe.gov%2Fsmrsubcommittee%2Fdocuments%2FLyman%2520Presentation%25205-3012.pptx) In general, SMRs (< 300 MWe) are not intrinsically safer than larger reactors Although heat removal for some SMR designs may be easier, safety benefits are not automatically realized Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 was 460 MWe: not significantly greater than the upper SMR limit Unit 4 SFP was only ~ 3 MW, yet presented a major heat removal challenge Far more important are the criteria that will govern SMR design, licensing and operation: post-Fukushima requirements will be key Weakening regulatory requirements for SMRs could erode any inherent safety features provided by their design All other things equal, SMRs come out of the starting gate with a major capital cost disadvantage compared
to larger reactors Major cost savings from factors such as economies of mass production and reduced upfront financing are speculative Consequently, SMR vendors seek to achieve cost savings through regulatory relief from certain operating cost requirements, including operator staffing, security and emergency planning will directly influence the operating cost, which will be a large determinant into the economic feasibility of these plants. John Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, March 2011 One SMR deployment scenario would essentially replace one large unit with multiple smaller units If the units are completely independent and core damage frequency is the same, site risk (probability times consequences) will be the same In fact, overall

site risk could actually increase units will not be independent because of common-cause failures and inter-module interactions (as seen at Fukushima)
Although many new reactor vendors claim that internal event core damage frequencies are lower than for current reactors, external event core damage frequency will likely dominate A number of multi-module issues that arose during Fukushima must be addressed: Adequate operator staffing to cope with the complexities of multiple units in distress Adequate emergency equipment and personnel Adequate separation between units (both physical location and independence of support equipment) Modeling deficiencies (PRA, plume behavior) There is an ongoing terrorist threat to domestic infrastructure that requires the utmost vigilance However, DOE and SMR vendors have emphasized that reducing security staffing is critical Whether SMRs get deployed in large numbers or not is going to come down to O&M. And the biggest variable that we can attack directly is the security issue. -- Christofer Mowry, B&W, March 2011. Optimal security staffing levels [for SMRs+ may appreciably differ from current levels. NEI. NRC staff believe that current regulations allow for alternative approaches that credit security by design Features like underground siting may enhance protection against some, but not all, scenarios A technically sound, source term-based methodology for emergency planning requirements is likely to lead to expanded EPZs for both large and small reactors DOE and SMR vendors have argued that SMRs need not satisfy current emergency planning requirements because they are safer and/or smaller than current reactors NRC staff have proposed an approach by which the 10 mile evacuation planning zone could be scaled for SMRs based on analysis using mechanistic source terms However, Fukushima has shown that the current 10 mile zone provides inadequate severe accident protection NRC worst case projections found EPA evacuation criteria could be exceeded at least 50 miles away Actual release led to exceeding EPA criteria at least 13 miles away and probably much further in certain directions Long-term land contamination presents

A truly passive containment would have sufficient strength and volume to be able to withstand the internal forces generated in worst-case severe accidents by hydrogen explosions The need to reduce SMR capital cost almost certainly will drive containments to be smaller and less robust Neither active (igniters) nor passive (recombiners) means of hydrogen control are likely to be
additional challenges far from the site of origin

as effective as large containments SMRs are not a panacea for the economic and safety problems faced by nuclear power The ultimate level of safety provided by SMRs will strongly depend on the regulatory framework DOE and its SMR
industry partners should halt their drive to weaken SMR regulatory requirements

SMRs arent safer Updegraff et all 12 (Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee Summary Prepared by Derek Updegraff, Rebecca Lordan, Pierce Corden Dirksen-366 May 9, 2012, http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/SummaryFinalSMR.pdf) The last panelist, Dr. Lyman, provided a more skeptical viewpoint on SMRs, characterizing public discussion on the topic as irrational exuberance. Lyman argued that, with a few exceptions, safety characteristics were not significantly better than full-size reactors, and in general, safety tended to rely on the same sorts of features. Some safety benefits, he stated, also declined as reactor power approached the upper bound of the SMR category. Increasing the number of reactors per power station could also increase the complexity of staff members tasks. This became apparent at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station, where managing the cooling needs of six reactors in a single complex placed great strain on staff. Lyman argued that the Fukushima
disaster should lead to a reset in licensing. In his opinion, the incident exposed numerous weaknesses in how nuclear power is regulated, and in order to remedy these oversights, regulation should be revisited. Lyman was skeptical about the prospects for reductions in manufacturing cost resulting from the industrial learning process, and therefore argued that the US should expect smaller reactors to be more expensive per MW. Further, Lyman said that standard economics of scale point to SMRs having overnight capital costs a factor of 2 to 3 higher per MW than large reactors. Lyman noted that some proposed cost-saving mechanisms involved cutting staffing, which would undercut the job- creation benefits advanced by SMR advocates (Mr. Moor noted that, since SMRs would be new construction, they would generate jobs even if they used less staff than full-size LWRs). The

largest variable is safety and security: Lyman believes that if fixed costs were high, utilities would be driven to cut security, emergency and operator staff in order to remain competitive. Lyman also was concerned about the safety implications of placing SMRs closer to populated areas, if enabled by the NRC plans to scale emergency zones to the size of the smaller plants. In his view, smaller evacuation zones may not be appropriate for smaller reactors, since the recent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station showed the evacuation zones for large plants are not large enough.
In Lymans view, the issue came down to whether or not nuclear power was viewed as suitable for small-scale, distributed generation, for reasons of safety and proliferation.

New reactor types undermine nuclear conformity uniform designs promote security Lester and Rosner 9 (Richard and Robert, The growth of nuclear power: drivers & constraints,
http://lion.chadwyck.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/searchFulltext.do?id=R04200587&divLevel=0&area=abe ll&forward=critref_ft) In its earliest years, the nuclear power industry also seemed destined to develop along many different trajectories. Nuclear power reactor developers in Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States each
introduced a different type of nuclear power reactor technology. National strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle also differed significantly. Eventually, the light water reactor technology that was first introduced in the United States came to dominate the global nuclear power industry. Light water reactors now account for more than 90 percent of installed nuclear capacity worldwide, although today the leading suppliers of this technology are French and Japanese. (The only other power reactor technology with a significant market presence

There is today a fairly high degree of uniformity in the nuclear plans and programs of most of the major nuclear countries, and nuclear power is one of the most highly
internationally has historically been the Canadian CANDU design.) globalized of all industries. The nuclear power plant supply industry is dominated by a small number of large global suppliers of light water reactor equipment and technology.

National regulatory standards and practices are harmonized to a substantial degree. National strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle are also aligned, and major fuel cycle service providers operate globally. And a new class of global nuclear power plant investor-operators is emerging, led by the French utility
EDF, whose joint ventures with nuclear power companies in China and the United States, and its recent purchase of the U.K. nuclear operator British Energy, have established it as an important player in all of the world's largest nuclear power markets.

This global convergence has yielded a number of benefits, including economies of scale and accelerated learning. The case for international coordination and standardization of strategies and practices is further strengthened by the special care with which nuclear technology and materials must be handled, and the international consequences of local nuclear accidents or missteps. From time to time this strategic convergence has also served the purposes of nuclear industry
leaders and government policymakers, providing them with a sort of strength-in-numbers defense against local critics. A few years ago, when President George W. Bush announced his support for closing the nuclear fuel cycle in the United States, the new policy was welcomed by the

French, British, and Japanese, in no small part because it seemed to legitimize their own longstanding commitment to a closed nuclear fuel cycle, including reprocessing and mixed-oxide fuel use. Thirty years earlier, when the United States abandoned its plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and sought to persuade others to do likewise as a nonproliferation measure, the outraged reactions from Europe and Japan were partly stimulated by a fear that the American policy reversal would give ammunition to domestic critics of their own reprocessing plans, which

The attractions of nuclear conformity remain strong today, yet the prospect of divergent development pathways may now be greater than at any time since the earliest days of the nuclear power industry. What are the implications of this for nuclear energy growth? How might it affect the course
they had no intention of abandoning. of international nonproliferation efforts?

SMRs bad - Meltdowns

SMRs have the same issues with meltdowns as normal reactors Singer 2012 (writer for the St. Louis Beacon, Big or small, questions about nuclear reactors remain
https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/24610/pros_cons_of_small_modular_reactors ) JA But Ed Smith of the Missouri Coalition for the Environment said that even though the reactors that could be placed at the site are smaller, the risks they bring, in terms of possible meltdowns and storage of waste, remain the same. The environmental impact of a small modular reactor melting down would not be as great
as the Callaway reactor melting down, Smith said, because it operates at a lower temperature and contains less radioactive material in the fuel rods. But if you have a multiple meltdown of five reactors,

you are going to see the same kind of problems in theory

as you would have from a large reactor.

SMRs Explode Makhijani & Boyd 2010 (IEER Institute of energy and environmental research
http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/small-modular-reactors2010.pdf) JA Of the various types of proposed SMRs, liquid metal fast reactor designs pose particular safety concerns. Sodium leaks and fires have been a central problemsodium explodes on contact with water and burns on contact with air. Sodium-potassium coolant, while it has the advantage of a lower melting point than sodium, presents even greater safety issues, because it is even more flammable than molten sodium alone. 14. Sodium-cooled fast reactors have shown essentially no positive learning curve (i.e., experience has not made them more reliable, safer, or cheaper) The worlds first nuclear reactor to generate electricity, the EBR I in Idaho, was a sodiumpotassium-cooled reactor that suffered a partial meltdown. 22 EBR II, which was sodium cooled reactor, operated reasonably well, but the first US commercial prototype, Fermi I in Michigan had a meltdown of two fuel assemblies and, after four years of repair, a sodium explosion. 23 The most recent commercial

No Nuclear Terror
Conventional retaliation is most likely. Sanger and Shanker, NYT Staff Writers, 7
[David and Thom, U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/washington/08nuke.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin] Among the subjects of the meeting last year was whether to issue a warning to all countries around the world that if a nuclear weapon was detonated on American soil and was traced back to any nations stockpiles, through nuclear forensics, the United States would hold that country fully responsible for the consequences of the explosion. The term fully responsible was left deliberately vague so that it would be unclear whether the United States would respond with a retaliatory nuclear attack, or, far more likely , a nonnuclear retaliation, whether military or diplomatic.

Vanishingly low risk of nuclear terrorism. Mueller, Professor of IR at Ohio State University, 11
*John, PhD, The Truth About Al Qaeda, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show]
As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al

Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the
former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the

group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin
Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al members have Some reports suggest they've also been looking

Qaeda

primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process
that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al

Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to
the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no

Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda
and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it

scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

No Terror Attacks
No risk of attacks newest evidence. NEI 12
*Nuclear Energy Institute, Myths & Facts About Safety, January 2012, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/nei-backgrounders/myths--facts-about-nuclearenergy/myths--facts-about-safety] Myth: Nuclear power plants are likely targets for terrorism. Fact: With protective measures similar to high-security military installations, U.S. nuclear plants are among the most highly protected facilities in the nations industrial infrastructure. It is because of their fortifications and multiple layers of security that nuclear plants present a strong
deterrent to potential threats. Myth: A nuclear power plant cannot withstand a terrorist attack. Fact: With protective measures similar to highsecurity military installations, U.S. nuclear plants are among the most highly protected facilities in the nations industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power plants are protected 24/7 by professional security personnel armed with automatic weapons prepared to repel ground and airborne terrorist attacks. It is because

of their fortifications and multiple layers of security that nuclear plants are far less likely to be targets of terrorism than the thousands of far more vulnerable potential targets across the nation. Anti-terrorism
measures are regularly tested and closely coordinated with local, state and federal authorities. Myth: A nuclear power plant cannot withstand the impact of a jetliner. Fact: Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, sophisticated computer modeling by som e of the worlds leading structural engineers showed that nuclear power facilities that contain radioactive material can withstand a jetliner impact without releasing radiation. Likewise, all new nuclear power plants are required to withstand the direct impact of a fully fueled commercial jetliner. Myth: Nuclear plants are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Fact: There

has never been a successful cyber attack at any U.S. nuclear plant. Unlike industries for which two-way data flow is critical (e.g. banking), nuclear power plants do not require incoming data flow.None of a plants safety and control systems are connected to the Internet. Any additional computers utilized in a nuclear plants are strictly controlled with their content, use and possession monitored by security personnel. Nuclear plants are protected from grid instability and are able to safely shut down in a variety of ways without computer controls under any
condition including a total loss of off-site power.

Zero probability of meltdown attacks Hargreaves 9

[Steve Hargreaves, CNNMoney.com staff writer, The threat of nuclear meltdown, November 12, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/12/news/economy/nuclear_security/index.htm] This is only a drill, but the threat they're preparing for is very real. It's one of the worst disaster scenarios imaginable: Terrorists infiltrate a nuclear power plant and cause a meltdown. The government and the industry say that with all the security measures in place, the chance of that happening is practically zero.

SMRs Bad Terror Prolif

Proliferation risk with SMRs enables countries with high prolif risk to get nuclear energy Moor 12 (Mr. Phillip O. Moor P.E., Consultant in nuclear technology, licensing, and business structuring
and former Director of Project Management at GPU Nuclear, Chair of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) Presidents Special Committee on SMR Licensing Issues, Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Summary Prepared by Derek Updegraff, Rebecca Lordan, Pierce Corden Dirksen-366 May 9, 2012, http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/SummaryFinalSMR.pdf) Moor also discussed one of the downsides of SMRs: The O&M costs are likely to be higher per MW than large reactors, unless new
NRC regulations allow a reduction in staffing. However, additional costs for infrastructure would be avoided if SMR designs that mimic the larger LWRs were incorporated into the existing nuclear infrastructure. SMRs would use essentially the same fuel mixture and level of fuel enrichment (5% Uranium-235) in fuel assemblies scaled to their size. The SMR designs that are designed to use higher enrichment (up to 20% for some designs) and longer fueling cycles would incur greater fuel costs. However, these models are not expected be competitive in the

Proliferation is of particular concern in nations with lower security capacity and experience with nuclear materials. Since many of the nations who might accept SMRs for power generation fall into these categories, nonproliferation and materials safeguarding is paramount. One example Moor sited was Irans domestic enrichment to 20% Iran could rationalize possessing highly enriched uranium if there were reactors that require it. However, if available technologies were using only low enriched uranium, it would be easier to decipher their intentions. To remedy these potential ambiguities, Moor said that a requirement could be to remove spent SMR fuel
near term, both for reasons of infrastructure delay and concerns about proliferation.2 for disposal or reprocessing outside the country of concern.

SMRs are a new way for terrorist to obtain nuclear material MacPerson 2012 (writer for nuclear news online, Small Modular Reactors the way to making
South Carolina the nations nuclear waste dump? http://nuclear-news.info/2012/07/21/small-modularreactors-the-way-to-making-south-carolina-the-nations-nuclear-waste-dump/) JA The technology for the mini-reactors still is in its infancy. If South Carolina gets the green light to develop them, the state would be the testing ground for the rest of the nation. the project is not without substantial risk. Before South Carolina fully embraces this untested technology, we need answers to questions about possible accidents and their consequences, the potential for a terrorist strike or theft of nuclear material but mostly about
the waste.

SMRs used by the military would have devastating impacts if terrorists got ahold of the waste Baker 2012 (writer for the American Security Project(ASP) Do Small Modular Reactors Present a
Serious Option for the Militarys Energy Needs? http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/dosmall-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/ ) JA Firstly like large reactors, one of the biggest qualms that the public has to nuclear is problems associated with nuclear waste. A more decentralized production of nuclear waste inevitably resulting from an increase in SMRs production was not even discussed. The danger of transporting gas into some military bases in the Middle East is already extremely volatile; dangers of an attack on the transit of nuclear waste would be devastating.

SMRs make proliferation easier Democraticunderground.com 2010 (SMALL MODULAR REACTORS NO PANACEA FOR WHAT
AILS NUCLEAR POWER, http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=115x264867 ) JA
SMRs will do little or nothing to help with the global warming problem and will actually complicate current efforts underway. For example, the current schedule for commercializing the above-ground sodium cooled reactor in Japan extends to 2050, making it irrelevant to addressing the

climate problem. Relying

on assurances that SMRs will be cheap is contrary to the experience about economies of scale and is likely to waste time and money, while creating new safety and proliferation risks, as well as new waste disposal problems.

SMRs are dangerous, produce toxic waste, and weapons grade material. MacPerson 2012 (writer for nuclear news online, A reminder that Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
are neither clean nor safe http://nuclear-news.net/2012/04/21/a-reminder-that-small-modularreactors-smrs-are-neither-clean-nor-safe/) JA The heading on Julian Cribbs glowing recommendation of thorium reactor research (April 26, p11) poses the question Why is no one talking about safe nuclear power? The answer is that it doesnt exist. Cribb states that thorium reactors do not produce weapons grade material. This is misleading. To fuel a reactor, thorium-232 must first be converted to uranium-233, which can be used as nuclear bomb fuel. In 1955, the US detonated a
weapon fuelled with U-233. The waste issue is certainly reduced with thorium reactors compared to standard reactors, but thats not very

Cribb acknowledges that the waste would have to be stored for around 300 years or so, compared to tens of thousands of years for current reactors. Only in the world of nuclear technology could a requirement for 300 years of dangerous waste storage be seen as an advantage. India has been trying for decades to commercialise thorium reactors, unsuccessfully. As with conventional reactors, the costs are just one of the problems. The US tried for many years, but abandoned their efforts, and the stocks of U233 were added to the radioactive mess the industry leaves there and elsewhere. Thorium reactors are yet
reassuring. another diversion from renewable energies and energy efficiencies that create no waste problems, cannot be used to fuel weapons and dont need lengthy research and development programs that have already been tried and failed. Renewables

are our future. Nuclear

technologies have had their day.

SMRs allow terrorists to get the material for a dirty bomb (also a general SMR bad laundry list) Adijanto 2012 (Student course work at Stanford, Small Scale Nuclear Energy
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph241/adijanto2/) JA
Since SMRs design allow them to be used nearer to highly populated areas, widespread adoption may increase the risk of accidental exposure to the population. Although the

nuclear fuel is sealed and buried underground, terrorists may find ways to retrieve them. SMRs also suffer from decreased thermodynamic efficiency and neutron economy compared to large scale reactors due to size. SMRs are making a small trade-off on fuel costs therefore it is important to
balance slight losses with major gains in lower capital cost. The biggest disadvantage of SMRs is however the licensing process and public perception.

Economy Advantage

Econ Resilient
Global economy is resilient- oil shocks prove. Farchy, Financial Times, 12 (Jack, 5-28-12, The Financial Times, World more resilient to oil price rises,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/11c38c74-a8e4-11e1-b085-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zo80QqAS, accessed 7-5-12, AS).

The world economy has become more resilient to rising oil prices, according to the International Monetary Fund, although it warned that a supply shock could still derail global growth. In new research published on its website, the IMF argued that the world had become less sensitive to a jump in oil prices thanks to more proactive monetary policy, increasing energy efficiency and greater diversity of energy sources among importing countries. More During the current economic downturn, the price of oil hit over $100 a barrel and prices rose close to levels only seen in the 1970s *in real terms+, the IMF said. But the increases have not triggered global recessions as they did in the 1970s and 80s .

Empirics prove- economy is resilient and still will be b/c of the G20. Myung-Bak, president of South Korea, 6-14 (Lee, 6-14-12, University of Toronto, Maintaining
momentum towards growth, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/newsdesk/loscabos/lee.html, accessed 7 -512, AS). In my time in office I have dealt with a series of economic challenges, beginning with the global financial crisis in 2008 and, more recently, the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. In our increasingly interconnected global economy, risks were felt throughout the world; difficulties within advanced economies were acutely felt in many emerging and developing economies. We lost more than 20 million jobs and youth unemployment is now a global concern. In such a world, the role of the G20 remains crucial. Although some say the eurozone may have avoided the worst and that the United States is showing signs of an economic recovery, we must maintain our sense of urgency. Uncertainty persists and the situation could deteriorate quickly if confidence in the market wanes. Subdued growth in
advanced and emerging economies is raising concerns about a prolonged recession. We must stay vigilant because challenges, including high and volatile oil prices, deleveraging by multinational banks and increasing geopolitical risks, have yet to be resolved. The

G20 must remain committed to achieving sustainable and balanced growth. The collective leadership of the G20 helped the global economy step away from the brink of a depression by fostering effective policy coordination through fiscal expansionary measures and a standstill on protectionist measures and by urging financial regulatory reforms. Now the G20 is helping Europe overcome its sovereign debt crisis.
At the 2011 Cannes Summit, all the G20 members agreed to work together to prevent contagion of the eurozone crisis and support global recovery. Subsequent agreements to strengthen the firewalls of the European Stability Mechanism and International Monetary Fund show strong commitments. Building on these achievements, G20 leaders will be able to deliver meaningful outcomes at the Los Cabos Summit in Mexico. The key role of the

G20 is to lead international collaboration to promote sustainable growth, prevent crises and strengthen global economic resilience. In the short term, and in this still-fragile global economy, we
must maintain the recovery momentum and secure strong growth engines. In the long term, the G20 must go from being a 'crisis manager' to a 'global economic architect'.

Global economy is resilient. Plessis, Investment Professional, 11 (Prieur, 5-16-11, Investment Postcards, Global economy
resilience, rebalancing and repression, http://www.investmentpostcards.com/2011/05/16/resiliencerebalancing-and-repression/, accessed 7-2-12, AS). We dont share these doubts: Our big-picture view on growth remains unchanged from last month. We are constructive on economic growth; we think the global economy is quite resilient to the shocks weve seen; and we think that this recovery will be quite sustainable because of global rebalancing. Being
constructive on growth does not mean we are blindly bullish. We dont believe that global GDP will continue to grow at the 5% snapback pace we saw in 2010. Rather, we expect GDP to moderate to a little over 4% this year (4.2% to be precise) and we look for 4.6% next year. The important point is that we look for global growth to be above its long-term trend rate, which is 3.6% for the last 40 years. Too young to die: Keep in mind that this global recovery is only two years old it only started in the middle of 2009. On average, recoveries in the global economy have lasted a little more than six years. The shortest one over the past 40 years took place in the second half of the 1970s and lasted only four years. The longest one was in the 1980s and ended after eight years. Recoveries typically

end when major imbalances in

an economy have developed and become unsustainable such as overinvestment in the late 1990s or overconsumption in the late 2000s and when monetary policy becomes very tight. Neither is true now. The global economy is relatively resilient: Despite the oil price shock, initial conditions are favourable because household and corporate balance sheets have improved since the financial crisis.
Balance sheet clean-up and repair in the private sector has partly come at the expense of the public sector balance sheet, but thats another story. Personal savings rates have increased in former bubble economies like the US and the UK, and corporate profit margins have widened to record highs. This

implies that the capacity of both households and companies to absorb shocks from higher oil and commodity prices has increased.

SMRs Bad - Jobs

The nuclear industry is a net loss for jobs researchers prove. Warnock 2012 (Wall street Journal, Fukushima Watch: No Reactors, Fewer Jobs?,
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2012/07/13/fukushima-watch-no-reactors-fewer-jobs/) JA Losing jobs in the nuclear power industry would likely mean an increase in jobs elsewhere. A group of researchers from Osaka University estimate that eliminating nuclear power in Japan by 2020 and increasing renewable energy use to 20% of the total could create 200,000 to 300,000 new jobs annually. Central Research Institute, Inc., a consulting company in Tokyo, predicts that the renewable energy sector, including wind and solar power, will employ 1.4 million people by 2020, as the renewables market expands in size to 50 trillion and beyond. The Ministry of the Environment, in a report published in 2010, said that increasing the amount of renewable energy to more than 10% of the nations total energy output by 2020, could create between 458,000 to 627,000 jobs.

Moving to SMRs from other energy forms would lose over 200,000 jobs in the coal industry alone Licata 2012 ( writer for Blue Phoenix, America, Its OK to favor Small Modular Reactors & phase out
coal http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/america-its-ok-to-favor-small-modular-reactors-andphase-out-coal.pdf ) JA
Protection Agency (EPA) proposed the first limits on greenhouse-gas emissions derive from new US power plants. Ten-year low natural gas prices coupled with these more stringent CO2 emissions standards by the EPA only strengthen the economic reasoning to embrace small modular reactors (SMRs)

and prevent construction of new coal-fired plants. With roughly 200,000 jobs at risk both directly (~83,000 jobs employed in coal mining) and indirectly by the coal industry, can the US
justify (both economically and socially) adopting tomorrows energy sources today? We think the answer is a resounding yes to both. Our case for supporting SMRs is one that many feel obliged NOT to make for fear of challenging the coal industry, a sector that feeds ~42% of the countrys current electricity needs (that number is falling by the way). Nevertheless, we are calling on the EPA to put in place a roadmap for aging coalplants to be retired gradually (over a 30-year time-frame). We say a roadmap because the type of move we foresee cant happen overnight. We want to avoid rolling blackouts across in part of the country or a complete shock to domestic power prices that would come with any sudden change at a time when the US is attempting to recover from the worst recession since the Great Depression. This has us thinking the real winner in the battle to lower carbon emissions is not the natural gas bridge fuel we hear championed by the likes of T. Boone Pickens

For those wondering how the US is going to create enough jobs to offset ones lost from the coal industry, lets be clear -- We do not believe in any shape or form that the US should simply throw the coal industry and its workers to the dogs. However, since coal does produce the most carbon from our energy arsenal, coal does need to see drastic carbon capture storage (CCS) technology
but rather the energy technology on the other side of that energy bridgenamely carbon free SMRs.

SMRs Bad Cost

Investment would be costly requires $600 million annually. Rosner and Goldberg, 11
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011) RCM To qualify, a project must commence operations by 2021 . Treasury Department guidelines further required that a qualifying project initiate construction, defined as the pouring of safety- related concrete, by 2014. Currently, two GW-scale projects totaling 4,600 MW are in early construction; consequently, as much as 1,400 MW in credits is available for other nuclear projects, including SMRs. The budgetary cost of providing the production cost incentive depends on the learning rate and the market price of electricity generated from the SMR project. Higher learning rates and higher market prices would decrease the magnitude of the incentive; lower rates and lower market prices would increase the need for production
incentives. Using two scenarios (with market prices based on the cost of natural gas combined-cycle generation) yields the following range of estimates of the size of production incentives required for the FOAK plants described earlier. For a 10% learning rate, Based

on a market price of $60/MWh44 (6/kWh), the LEAD plant and the subsequent eight FOAK plants would need, on average, a production credit of $13.60/MWh (1.4/kWh), 24% less than the $18 credit currently available to renewable and GW-scale nuclear technologies. (The actual credit would be on a sliding scale, with the credit for
the LEAD plant at approximately $31/MWh, or 3.1/kWh, declining to a credit of about $6/MWh, or 0.6/kWh, by the time of deployment of FOAK-8). The

total cost of the credit would be about $600 million per year

(once all plants were built and

operating). If the market price were about $70/MWh (7/kWh), the LEAD and only four subsequent FOAK plants would require a production incentive. In this case, the average incentive would be $8.40/MWh (0.8/kWh), with a total cost of about $200 million per year. Higher learning rates would drive down the size of the production incentive. For example, at a 12% learning rate, At a market price of $60/MWh (6/kWh), the LEAD and the subsequent five FOAK plants would require a production incentive, with an average incentive level of about $15/MWh (1.5/kWh). Total annual cost (after all plants are in full operation) would be about $450 million per year. At a market price of $70/MWh (7/kWh), the LEAD and three FOAK plants would require a production incentive averaging $9.00/MWh (0.9/kWh, half of the current statutory incentive), with a total annual cost of about $170 million per year. The

range of costs for the production incentive illustrates the sensitivity of the incentive level to the learning rate and the market price of electricity. Thus, efforts to achieve higher learning rates, including fully optimized engineering designs for the SMRs and the manufacturing
plant, as well as specially targeted market introduction opportunities that enable SMRs to sell electricity for higher priced and higher value applications, can have a critical impact on the requirements for production incentive should be subject to further analysis as higher quality cost estimates become available.

incentives. The potential size of the

Investment would be expensive historically subsidies have spent billions of dollars. Koplow, 11
(Doug, Founder of Earth Track in Cambridge, Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies, Union of Concerned Scientists, February 2011, RSR) Historical subsidies to nuclear power have already resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in costs paid by taxpayers and ratepayers. With escalating plant costs and more competitive power markets, the cost of repeating these failed policies will likely be even higher this time around . Of equal importance, however, is the fact that subsidies to nuclear power also carry significant opportunity costs for reducing global warming emissions because reactors are so expensive and require such long lead times to construct. In other words, massive subsidies designed to help underwrite the large-scale expansion of the nuclear industry will delay or diminish investments in less expensive abatement options. Other energy technologies would be able to compete with nuclear power far more effectively if the government focused on creating an energyneutral playing field rather than picking technology winners and losers. The policy choice to invest in nuclear also carries with it a risk unique to
the nuclear fuel cycle: greatly exacerbating already thorny proliferation challenges as reactors and ancillary fuel-cycle facilities expand throughout the world.

SMRs are expensive large per-megawatt costs, more control systems and phased implementation. Barczak, 10
(Sara, High Risk Energy Director, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Smaller Size, Big Price Tag: Small modular reactors are risky, Clean Energy, 12-24-10, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) Economies of scale show that this is incorrect. The price per kilowatt of materials used in SMRs goes up the smaller the reactors become. As reported in Public Power Weeklys December 13, 2010 newsletter, TVAs Jack Bailey stated that in dollars per kilowatt, the small modular reactors are expected to be slightly more expensive to build than a single large nuclear plant. Large-scale nuclear reactors have one independent system for control, whereas SMRs could have multiple control systems generating additional expenses. The nuclear industry and its lobbyists also claim that less construction time would lead to fewer costs. However, the expectation is to construct several SMRs in one site over a period of time. This phased implementation of building several SMRs at one site would negate any possible economic gain via shorter construction time. If utilities use the phased implementation approach, the nuclear industry would need to estimate future energy needs and build larger containment structures and a single control room to manage all future SMRs within the facility. This is unwise because energy consumption and future energy need fluctuates as policy and prices change. If future energy need decreased, or nuclear energy fell out of favor, subsequent SMRs would never be built, making the price per kilowatt of those built exorbitantly high. Finally, proponents of SMRs highlight that reactors can be mass manufactured. If this were to happen, however, the oversight and quality control checks would have to be rigorous to prevent catastrophic accidents due to
manufacturing errors.

SMRs are more expensive cost declines with increasing size and the safety system would be very expensive. Makhijani, 11
(Arjun, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, The problems with small nuclear reactors, The Hill, 6-15-11, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/166609-the-problems-with-smallnuclear-reactors, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The devil, as usual, is in the details. For instance, the cost of a nuclear reactor per unit of electrical generating capacity declines with increasing size. This is because, contrary to intuition, larger reactors use less material per unit of capacity than smaller reactors. When the size of given type of reactor is reduced from 1,000 to 100 megawatts, the amount of material used
per megawatt will more than double. And the notion that U.S. workers would get the bulk of the factory jobs is entirely fanciful, given the rules of the World Trade Organization on free trade. Most

likely the reactors would be made in China or another country with industrial infrastructure and far lower wages. And what would we do if the severe quality problems with Chinese
products, such as drywall and infant formula, afflict reactors? Will there be a process for recalls, as has happened with factory products from Toyotas to Tylenol? How do you recall a radioactively-contaminated, mass-produced nuclear reactor if it has problems? There

are

economies of scale associated with security, too. Today, large crews staff a reactor control room round-the-clock and guard the site. To reduce operating costs, some vendors are advocating to lower the number of security staff and to require only one operator for three modules, raising serious questions about whether there would be sufficient personnel in the event of an accident or attack. The same problem is associated with safety. The cost of electricity from SMRs would skyrocket if each reactor had to have its own secondary containment structure. Such containment is needed to prevent large-scale releases of radioactivity in case of a severe accident. To
ameliorate this problem, it has been proposed to put a number of SMRs in a single containment structure. The result is that a typical reactor project would still have to be very large with several reactors per project; a

single small reactor at a site would become prohibitively expensive if security and safety standards are to be maintained. This would defeat the purpose of
the flexible "modular" design. All these problems would be associated with SMRs even if we stuck with the basic design approach - light water reactors - that is well-known. They would be compounded with new rector designs and new types of waste. Nuclear power advocates have long promised far more than they can deliver, ignoring essential hurdles such as cost, safety, and performance. Decades of experience, however,

have proven those promises to be hollow and hazardous. The notion that "small is beautiful" for nuclear reactors is not just fanciful; it is whistling past the graveyard of the "nuclear renaissance" that never was.

SMRs are more expensive larger per-megawatt costs. Biello, 12

(David, Staff Writer, Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power, Scientific American, 3-27-12, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power, accessed 8-1-12, RSR)
Regardless of how cheap such small modular reactors may allow nuclear to be in future, it is unlikely to be as cheap as natural-gas-fired turbines in the present. In fact, low natural gas prices stalled the U.S. nuclear renaissance outside Georgia and South Carolina, long before the reactor meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. "Because

of an unanticipated abundance of natural gas in the United States, nuclear energy, in general, is facing tough competition," noted an analysis of the prospects for small modular reactors from the University of Chicago published last November. The analysis also suggested that small reactors would be more expensive than large reactors on a per-megawatt basis until manufacturing in significant quantities has happened. "It [is] unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive."

An influx of nuclear energy projects will cost billions more than previously expected. Loder, 7
(Asjylyn, Staff Writer, St. Petersburg Times, Nuclear Power Costs Surge, St. Petersburg Times, December 12, 2007, http://www.sptimes.com/2007/12/12/State/Nuclear_power_costs_s.shtml, Date Accessed: 7/5/08) Nuclear energy - billed as the cheap, carbon-free energy source of the future - isn't sounding so cheap anymore. In fact, the price for a new nuclear plant has soared as the rush to construct nearly 30 facilities across the country over the next 15 years has pushed up the cost of labor, raw materials and possibly even the plants themselves. New industry estimates double and even triple prices quoted a year ago by utilities throughout the Southeast, including those for Progress Energy Florida's planned nuclear plant in Levy County. Based on cost estimates for other nuke plants and analyst reports, Progress Energy's costs could balloon to more than $10-billion, far more than early estimates of $4-billion to $6-bil

Econ Impact D
Economic collapse doesnt cause war no causal connection
Thomas P.M. Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war,
as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's

first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than threedozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the
last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking

over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberationthemed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistanbleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn , occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to

sum up: * No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-greatpower crises even triggered); * No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the
emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and *

No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of
strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At

the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as
it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty

of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal
profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

No causal relationship ignores other variables

Niall Ferguson (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) 2006 Foreign Affairs, September/October, Vol. 85, Issue 5
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the Great Depression

most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression . In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

Warming Advantage

Warming D Emissions
CO2 doesnt cause warming Jaworowski 2010 [Zbigniew, Ph. D., M.D., D.Sc., has researched the atmospheric pollution of glaciers
and CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere for many years, and is the author of numerous publications on climate change. He serves as the Polish representative in the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and is a member of the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC) January 15, Global Warming: A Lie Aimed At Destroying Civilization EIR Science and Technology http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles_2010/Jaworowski_interview.pdf] As you can see, there is no connection between CO2 , which has been under such fierce attack, and climate change. Indeed, more than 500 million years ago, according to the geological record, CO2 was present at 23 times the levels we now have in the atmosphere, and yet, half a billion years ago, the land was covered by glaciers. Climate change depends on many factors, and now we are fighting against only one factor, CO2 , which happens to be negligible.

CO2 doesnt cause warming- its colder now with more of it Idso and Idso 2011 Craig D. (founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of
Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) Sherwood B. (president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) February Carbon Dioxide and Earths Future Pursuing the Prudent Path http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf. But could the higher temperatures of the past four interglacials have been caused by higher CO2 concentrations due to some non-human influence? Absolutely not, for atmospheric CO2 concentrations during all four prior interglacials never rose above approximately 290 ppm, whereas the air's CO2 concentration today stands at nearly 390 ppm. Combining these two observations, we have a situation where, compared with the mean conditions of the preceding four interglacials, there is currently 100 ppm more CO2 in the air than there was then, and it is currently more than 2C colder than it was then, which adds up to one huge discrepancy for the world's climate alarmists and their claim that high atmospheric CO2 concentrations lead to high
temperatures. The situation is unprecedented, all right, but not in the way the public is being led to believe.

Warming D No Extinction
No catastrophic warming and its not human caused- past temperatures were hotter and we didnt cause them nor die from them Idso, Carter and Singer 2011 [Craig D. Ph.D Chairman for the Center for the Study of Carbon
Dioxide and Global Change, Robert M. Ph.D Adjunct Research Fellow James Cook University, S. Fred Ph.D President of Science and Environmental Policy Project, Climate Change Reconsidered 2011 Interim Report Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change http://nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/2011NIPCCinterimreport.pdf Evidence of a Medieval Warm Period (MWP) approximately 1,000 years ago, when there was about 28 percent less CO2 in the atmosphere than there is currently, would show there is nothing unusual, unnatural, or unprecedented about recent temperatures. Such evidence is now overwhelming. New evidence not reported in NIPCC-1 finds the Medieval Warm Period occurred in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, South America, Antarctica, and the Northern Hemisphere. Despite this evidence, Mann
et al. (2009) continue to understate the true level of warming during the MWP by cherry-picking proxy and instrumen from locations around the world reveals a significant period of elevated air temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during

Recent reconstructions of climate history find the human influence does not stand out relative to other, natural causes of climate change. While
global warming theory and models predict polar areas would warm most rapidly, the warming of Greenland was 33 percent greater in magnitude in 19191932 than it was in 1994 (2009) reported a decade-long decline (19982007) in globally averaged temperatures from the record heat of 1998 and noted U.S. temperatures in 2008 not only declined from near-record warmth of prior years, but were in fact colder than the official 30-year reference

New research disputes IPCCs claim that it has ferreted out all significant influences of the worlds many and diverse urban heat islands from the temperature databases they use to portray the supposedly unprecedented warming of the past few decades.
climatology and further were the coldest since at least 1996.

Current temperatures are historically low- your evidence is only a shapshot of a broader trend Idso and Idso 2011 Craig D. (founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of
Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) Sherwood B. (president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) February Carbon Dioxide and Earths Future Pursuing the Prudent Path http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf. The claim: With respect to air temperature, the climate-alarmist contention is multifaceted. It is claimed that over the past several decades: (a) earth's temperature has risen to a level that is unprecedented over the past millennium or more, (b) the
world has been warming at a rate that is equally unprecedented, and (c) both of these dubious achievements have been made possible by the similarly unprecedented magnitude of anthropogenic CO2 emissions, due to humanity's ever-increasing burning of fossil fuels such as coal, gas and oil. With respect to the level of warmth the earth has recently attained, it is

important to see how it compares with prior temperatures experienced by the planet, in order to determine the degree of "unprecedentedness" of its current warmth. Taking a rather lengthy view of the subject, Petit et al. (1999) found that peak temperatures experienced during the current interglacial, or Holocene, have been the coldest of the last five interglacials, with the four interglacials that preceded the Holocene being, on average, more than 2C warmer (see figure at right). And in a more recent analysis of the subject, Sime et al. (2009) suggested that the "maximum interglacial temperatures over the past 340,000 years were between 6.0C and 10.0C above present-day values." If anything, therefore, these findings suggest that temperatures of the Holocene, or current interglacial, were indeed unusual, but not unusually warm. Quite to the contrary, they have been unusually cool.

Warming will not cause extinction- the Medieval Warm period was just as badmodels that say otherwise are wrong Idso and Idso 2011 Craig D. (founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of
Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) Sherwood B. (president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) February Carbon Dioxide and Earths Future Pursuing the Prudent Path http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf. Zooming in a little closer to the present, we compare earth's modern temperatures with those of the past 1000 years, where the IPCC bases its claim for recent heretofore-unreached high temperatures on the infamous "hockey stick" temperature history of Mann et al. (1998, 1999). There is a problem with this history, however, in that reconstructed temperatures derived from a variety of proxy data (which make up the bulk of the temperature history) are replaced near its end with the historical record of directly-measured temperatures, resulting in an "apples vs. oranges" type of comparison, where the latter cannot be validly
compared with the former, because the two types of data are not derived in the same way and are, therefore, not perfectly compatible with each other. In addition, subsequent

evidence indicated that the reconstructed temperatures of some regions did not rise as dramatically as their directly-measured values did over the latter part of the 20th century (Cook et al., 2004), demonstrating the importance of the problem and suggesting that if there had been any directlymeasured temperatures during the earlier part of the past millennium, they may also have been higher than the reconstructed temperatures of that period. Therefore, due to this divergence problem, as D'Arrigo et al. (2008) have
described it, reconstructions based on tree-ring data from certain regions "cannot be used to directly compare past natural warm periods (notably, the Medieval Warm Period) with recent 20th century warming, making it more difficult to state unequivocally that the recent

In a much improved method of temperature reconstruction based on tree-ring analysis, Esper et al. (2002) employed an analytical technique that allows accurate long-term climatic trends to be derived from individual tree-ring series that are of much shorter duration than the potential climatic
warming is unprecedented." oscillation being studied; and they applied this technique to over 1200 individual tree-ring series derived from fourteen different locations scattered across the extratropical region of the Northern Hemisphere. This work revealed, as they describe it, that "past

comparisons of the Medieval Warm Period with the 20th-century warming back to the year 1000 have not included all of the Medieval Warm Period and, perhaps, not even its warmest interval." And in further commenting on this important finding, Briffa and Osborn (2002) revealed that "an early period of warmth in the late 10th and early 11th centuries is more pronounced than in previous large-scale reconstructions." In addition, the Esper et al. record made it abundantly clear that the peak warmth of the Medieval Warm Period was fully equivalent to the warmth of the present. In another important study, von Storch et al. (2004) demonstrated that past variations in real-world temperature "may have been at least a factor of two larger than indicated by empirical reconstructions," and in commenting on their findings, Osborn and Briffa (2004) stated that "if the true natural variability
of Northern Hemisphere temperature is indeed greater than is currently accepted," which they appeared to suggest is likely the case, "the extent to which recent warming can be viewed as 'unusual' would need to be reassessed." And more

recently, Mann et al. (2009) have had to admit that even using the "apples vs. oranges" approach, the warmth over a large part of the North Atlantic, Southern Greenland, the Eurasian Arctic, and parts of North America during the Medieval Warm Period was "comparable to or exceeds that of the past one-to-two decades in some regions."

Warming D Not Anthropogenic

Warming is natural- even if its the result of the greenhouse effect that is caused by water vapor Jaworowski 2004 [Professor Zbigniew M.D., Ph.D., D.Sc. is the chairman of the Scientific Council of
the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in Warsaw. Winter Solar Cycles, Not CO2, Determine Climate 21st Century Science Tech http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202004/Winter2003-4/global_warming.pdf] In fact, the recent climate developments are not something unusual; they reflect a natural course of planetary events. From time immemorial, alternate warm and cold cycles have followed each other, with a periodicity ranging from tens of millions to several years. The cycles were most probably dependent on the extraterrestrial changes occurring in the Sun and in the Suns neighborhood. Short term changesthose occurring in a few yearsare caused by terrestrial factors such as large volcanic explosions, which inject dust into the stratosphere, and the phenomenon of El Nio, which depends on the variations in oceanic currents.
Thermal energy produced by natural radionuclides that are present in the 1-kilometer-thick layer of the Earths crust, contributed about 117 kilojoules per year per square meter of the primitive Earth. As a result of the decay of these long-lived radionuclides, their annual contribution is now only 33.4 kilojoules per square meter.10 This nuclear heat, however, plays a minor role among the terrestrial factors, in comparison with the greenhouse effects caused by absorption by some atmospheric gases of the solar radiation reflected from the surface of the Earth. Without the greenhouse effect, the average near-surface air temperature would be 18C, and not +15C, as it is now. The

most important among these greenhouse gases is water vapor, which is responsible for about 96 to 99 percent of the greenhouse effect. Among the other greenhouse gases (CO2 , CH4 , CFCs, N2O, and O3 ), the most important is CO2 , which contributes only 3 percent to the total greenhouse effect.11, 12 The manmade CO2 contribution to this effect may be about 0.05 to 0.25 percent.13.

Warming isnt anthropogenic Idso, Carter and Singer 2011 [Craig D. Ph.D Chairman for the Center for the Study of Carbon
Dioxide and Global Change, Robert M. Ph.D Adjunct Research Fellow James Cook University, S. Fred Ph.D President of Science and Environmental Policy Project, Climate Change Reconsidered 2011 Interim Report Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change http://nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/2011NIPCCinterimreport.pdf New evidence points to a larger role for solar forcing than the IPCC has acknowledged. Likely mechanisms include perturbation of ocean currents, tropospheric zonal mean-winds, and the intensity of cosmic rays reaching the Earth The IPCC underestimated the warming effect of chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) prior to their gradual removal from the atmosphere following the implementation of the Montreal Protocol in 2000. This could mean CO2 concentrations played a smaller role in the warming prior to that year, and could help explain the global cooling trend since 2000. Other forcings and feedbacks about which little is known (or acknowledged by the IPCC) include stratospheric water vapor, volcanic and seismic activity, and enhanced carbon sequestration.

SMRs Dont Solve Warming

SMRs are not a solution for global warming Makhijani & Boyd 2010 (IEER Institute of energy and environmental research
http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/small-modular-reactors2010.pdf) JA
Efficiency and most renewable technologies are already cheaper than new large reactors. The long timea decade or morethat it will take to certify SMRs

will do little or nothing to help with the global warming problem and will actually complicate current efforts underway. For example, the current schedule for commercializing the above-ground sodium cooled reactor in Japan extends to 2050, making it irrelevant to addressing the climate problem. Relying on assurances that SMRs will be cheap is contrary to the experience about economies of scale and is likely to waste time and money, while creating new safety and proliferation risks, as well as new waste disposal problems.

SMRs are not the answer to the energy crisis. Riches 2012 (Nuclear free by 2045, The (False?) Promise of Small Modular Reactors
http://nf2045.blogspot.com/2012/02/false-promise-of-small-modular-reactors.html ) JA
In 2011, American author Reese Palley wrote The Answer: Why Only Inherently Safe Mini-Nuclear Power Plants Can Save Our World, in which he presents a powerful argument that all alternatives except these new SMRs

(Small Modular Reactors, or mini nukes) offer false hope as solutions to the energy crisis. The argument for these SMRs has some severe weaknesses, but Palley must be credited with having written some excellent prose that provides a brutally frank description of how bad
our energy predicament is.

Nuclear Tech Bad Lead to Warming

Nuclear power production speeds up warming Caldicott 6 (Helen, Nuclear power is not the answer to global warming or anything else, p.4)
What exactly is nuclear power? It is a very expensive, sophisticated, and dangerous way to boil water. Uranium fuel rods are placed in water in a reactor core, they reach critical mass, and they produce vast quantities of heat, which boils the water. Steam is directed through pipes to turn a turbine, which generates electricity. The scientists who were involved in the Manhattan Project creating nuclear weapons developed a way to harness nuclear energy to generate electricity. Because their guilt was so great, they were determined to use their ghastly new invention to help the human race. Nuclear fission harnessed atoms for peace, and the

nuclear PR industry proclaimed that nuclear power would provide an endless supply of electcitiy referred to as sunshine units that would be good for the environment and too cheap to meter. They were wrong. Although a nuclear power plant itself releases no carbon dioxide, the production of nuclear electricity depends upon a vast, complex, and hidden industrial infrastructure that is never featured by the nuclear industry in its propaganda, but that actually releases a large amount of carbon dioxide as well as other global warming gases. One is led to believe that the nuclear reactor stands alone, an autonomous creator of energy. In fact, the vast infrastrcutre necessary to create nuclear energy, called the nuclear fuel cycle, is a prodigious user of fossil fuel and coal. The production of carbon dioxide (CO2) is one measurement that
indicates the amount of energy used in the production of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most of the energy used to create nuclear energy to mine uranium ore for fuel, to crush and mill the ore, to enrich the uranium, to create the concrete and steel for the reacotr, and to store the thermally and radioactively hot nuclear waste comes from the consumption of fossil fuels, that is coal or oil. When these materials are burned to produce energy, they form CO2 (reflecting coal and oils origins in ancient trees and other organic carboniferous material laid down under the earths crust millions of years ago). For each ton of carbon burned, 3.7 tons of CO2 gas added to the atmosphere, and thisis the source of todays global warming.

Nuclear power produces heat emissions which exacerbate global warming Science Daily 9 (July 13 , Trapping Carbon Dioxide Or Switching To Nuclear Power Not Enough To Solve Global Warming Problem,
th

Experts Say, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/07/090713085248.htm)

Attempting to tackle climate change by trapping carbon dioxide or switching to nuclear power will not solve the problem of global warming, according to energy calculations published in the July issue of the International Journal of Global Warming. Bo Nordell and Bruno Gervet of the Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering at Lule University of Technology in Sweden have calculated the total energy emissions from the start of the industrial revolution in the 1880s to the modern day.

They have worked out that using the increase in average global air temperature as a measure of global warming is an inadequate measure of climate change. They suggest that scientists must
also take into account the total energy of the ground, ice masses and the seas if they are to model climate change accurately. The researchers have calculated that the heat energy accumulated in the atmosphere corresponds to a mere 6.6% of global warming, while the remaining heat is stored in the ground (31.5%), melting ice (33.4%) and sea water (28.5%). They point out that net heat emissions between the industrial revolution circa 1880 and the modern era at 2000 correspond to almost three quarters of the accumulated heat, i.e., global warming, during that period. Their calculations suggest that most measures to combat global warming, such as reducing our reliance on burning fossil fuels and switching to renewables like wind power and solar energy, will ultimately help in preventing catastrophic climate change in the long term. But the same calculations also show that trapping carbon dioxide, so-called carbon dioxide sequestration, and storing it deep underground or on the sea floor will have very little effect on global warming. "Since net

heat emissions accounts for most of the global

warming there is no or little reason for carbon dioxide sequestration," Nordell explains, "The increasing carbon dioxide emissions merely
show how most net heat is produced. The "missing" heat, 26%, is due to the greenhouse effect, natural variations in climate and/or an underestimation of net heat emissions, the researchers say. These calculations are actually rather conservative, the researchers say, and the

The researchers also point out a flaw in the nuclear energy argument. Although nuclear power does not produce carbon dioxide emissions in the same way as burning fossil fuels it does produce heat emissions equivalent to three times the energy of the electricity it generates and so contributes to global warming significantly, Nordell adds.
missing heat may be much less.

Peak Oil Advantage

Peak Oil D Not True

Geologically, we cant run out of oil. Stevenson 6/25 (Tim, Dir-Post Oil Solutions and staff-Brattleboro Reformer, Is Peak Oil Dead?,
http://www.reformer.com/ci_20930567/is-peak-oil-dead?source=most_viewed) LL
"If we dont change our course, well end up where were headed," says an ancient Chinese proverb. From the deepest waters of the Gulf of Mexico to the prairies of North Dakota, and many places in between, the

production of oil and gas in the United States has greatly increased over recent years through the industrys ability to access heretofore inaccessible and unaffordable "unconventional oil." Using new technology and financed by the rising prices of oil since the mid-2000s,
national oil production has risen over the past four years from 4.95 million barrels a day (mb/d) to 5.7. The Energy Department projects 7 mb/d by 2020, while other experts claim production could eventually be 10 million, which would put the United States in the league with Saudi Arabia. With this increased production, a growing number of people (especially from the oil industry, Wall Street, and the Republican Party) have loudly proclaimed the end of peak oil, dismissing it as a myth that has now been dispelled. Were not running out of oil, they insist. But

peak oil is not about the end of oil. Geologically speaking, that will never happen. Rather, peak oil is about the end of the cheap, abundant, easy to extract oil, the "sweet" crude that has been the bedrock of our industrial civilization, and the basis of the economic growth weve come to take for granted. This older oil still accounts for 75 percent of our daily consumption, but has been disappearing at the rate of 3-4 mb/d each year,
and will be largely gone in 20 years. As older fields dry up, newer ones are not being discovered. In 20 years, cheap oil will be largely gone.

Peak oil theory wrongsix reasons Hossein-zadeh 8 (Professor of Economics, Drake (Ismael, 6/25, Are they really oil wars?,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/JF25Dj05.html)

Peak Oil theory is based on a number of assumptions and omissions that make it less than reliable. To begin with, it discounts or disregards the fact that energy-saving technologies have drastically improved (and will continue to further improve) the efficiency of oil consumption. Evidence shows that, for example, "over a period of five years (1994-99), US GDP
expanded over 20% while oil usage rose by only 9%. Before the 1973 oil shock, the ratio was about one to one." [4] Second, Peak Oil theory pays scant attention to the drastically enabling new

technologies that have made (and will continue to make) possible discovery and extraction of oil reserves that were inaccessible only a short time ago. One of the results of the more efficient means of
research and development has been a far higher success rate in finding new oil fields. The success rate has risen in 20 years from less than 70% to over 80%. Computers

have helped to reduce the number of dry holes. Horizontal drilling has boosted extraction. Another important development has been deep-water offshore drilling, which the new technologies now permit. Good examples are the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and more recently, the promising offshore oil fields of West Africa. [5] Third, Peak Oil theory also pays short shrift to what is sometimes called non-conventional oil. These include Canada's giant reserves of extra-heavy bitumen that can be processed to produce conventional oil. Although this was originally considered cost inefficient, experts working in this area now claim that they have brought down the cost from over US$20 a barrel to $8 per barrel.
Similar developments are taking place in Venezuela. It is thanks to developments like these that since 1970, world oil reserves have more than doubled, despite the extraction of hundreds of millions of barrels. [6] Fourth, Peak energy

Oil thesis pays insufficient attention to sources other than oil. These include solar, wind, non-food bio-fuel, and nuclear energies. They also include natural gas. Gas is now about 25% of energy demand worldwide. It is estimated that by 2050 it will be the main source of energy in the
world. A number of American, European, and Japanese firms are investing heavily in developing fuel cells for cars and other vehicles that would significantly reduce gasoline consumption. [7] Fifth, proponents of Peak Oil tend to exaggerate

the impact of the increased

oil demand coming from China and India on both the amount and the price of oil in global markets. The alleged disparity
between supply and demand is said to be due to the rapidly growing demand coming from China and India. But that rapid growth in demand is largely offset by a number of counterbalancing factors. These include slower growth in US demand due to its slower economic growth, efficient energy utilization in industrially advanced countries, and increases in oil production by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

claims of "peaked and dwindling" oil are refuted by the available facts and figures on global oil supply. Statistical evidence shows that there is absolutely no supply-demand imbalance in global oil markets. Contrary to the claims of the proponents of Peak Oil and champions of war and militarism, the current oil price shocks are a direct consequence of the destabilizing wars and geopolitical insecurity in the Middle
Countries, Russia, and others. Finally, and perhaps more importantly,

East, not oil shortages. These include not only the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the threat of a looming war against Iran. The record of soaring oil prices shows that anytime there is a renewed US military threat against Iran, fuel prices move up several notches.

Peak-oil theory has been disproven Corsi 2005 (Jerome R., PhD-Harvard and Sr. Staff-WND, Hubberts Peak is a failed theory, WND
Commentary, http://www.wnd.com/2005/11/33191/ ) LL
M. King Hubbert, a geologist working for Shell Oil in Houston, is responsible for the concept of peak production. In 1956, Hubbert produced a graph that looked like a normal bell curve. The idea was that oil production worldwide would increase until it reached a peak, followed by a decline to zero, the point where we run out of oil. Also known as Hubberts Peak, the graph was inherent in the very concept of oil as a fossil fuel. In other words, if oil comes from decaying ancient forests and dead dinosaurs, then inevitably we must run out of oil. After all, there only were a finite number of ancient trees and dinosaurs, so the oil resulting from them must be finite as well. Craig Smith and I wrote Black Gold Stranglehold: The Myth of Scarcity and the Politics of Oil to take exception with the Fossil-Fuel Theory. We

argue the science of oil as an abiotic, natural product that the Earth generates on a constant basis. The abiotic oil theory has been central to Soviet science since the end of World War II. Looking deep within the Earth for oil, Russian has advanced from being a relatively oil-poor country in the 1950s, to being today the worlds second largest exporter of oil, contending strongly for first position with Saudi Arabia. Hubberts graph predicted that oil production would peak in 1970, and that it would taper off from there until 2050, when we would have used up all the oil that ever was. Unfortunately for Hubbert, these predictions were flat wrong. Today, the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that we have 1.28 trillion barrels of proven oil reserves worldwide, more than ever before in human history, despite decades of increased usage. Still, having their predictions proven wrong has not discouraged peak-production oil theorists. Since the 1950s, oil experts continually move the date for peak production further out, unable to consider that the theory itself might just be wrong. Craig Smith and I argue that the Peak Production Theory
is nothing more than a logical tautology an argument that assumes as true what one should be trying to prove. In other words, if oil is a fossil fuel, we have to run out eventually. If we are not running out now, we will eventually so the theory goes no matter that we havent peaked yet and worldwide oil-reserve estimates keep growing. The alternative hypothesis that the world will never run out of oil is one the supporters of Hubberts Peak never seriously contemplate.

No Resource Wars
Countries will not go to war for resources Luft and Korin 9 (Gal and Anne, Staff- Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Energy Security Challenges
for the Twenty-first Century, pg 67-68, http://books.google.com/books?id=tjjYHIU6xYC&pg=PA66&dq=no+resource+wars&hl=en&sa=X&ei=_bvsT7S7HciprQH2r8TgBQ&ved=0CDoQ6AEwAQ#v= onepage&q=no%20resource%20wars&f=false) LL
At some point in the 21st century, they world will begin to run low on oil. Demand around the world is skyrocketing for the nonrenewable resource, far out-pacing the growth of supply, and all projections suggest the pace will continue. While oil will not likely ever run out on the literal sense, geologists warn that in the not-so-distant future oil may well be a relatively scarce commodity. Per

capita energy use may hold steady or even decline across much of the industrialized world, but projected growth in population will more than compensate. In the U.S Energy Information Agencys mid-range projection, even with higher prices
world oil use will grow from 86 mbd in 2077 to 103 mbd in 2015 and 119 mbd by 2025. Such growth would obviously require a major increase in the current production capacity of the industry. Few think that supply is likely to be able to keep pace. War

need not result from

such shortages, however. There are at least three good reason to believe that war to control the territory that contains fossil fuels will continue to be a very rare phenomenon as the new century unfolds: First, fighting to control oil is likely to be a selfdefeating proposition. It will always be cheaper to buy oil than seize it. Second, the interest of consumers and producers do not conflict-all parties involved in oil production have serious interests in stability, without which no one can benefit. Finally, and perhaps counter-intuitively, all kinds of warfare are becoming more and more rare. The
21st century is likely to be a great deal more stable than the 20th century, and oil politics should prove to be no exception.

No resource wars Idean Salehyan (Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas) May 2008 From
Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet Journal of Peace Research, vol. 45, no. 3 http://emergingsustainability.org/files/resolver%20climate%20change%20and%20conflict.pdf First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries particularly in subSaharan Africa but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts which are all likely to intensify
as the climate warms are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nords & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental

conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource
pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these

conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population
pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies

emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions not just the response of central governments in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martins analysis also points to
the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.

Third, states often bear responsibility for environmental degradation and resource shortfalls, either through their own projects and initiatives or through neglect of the environment. Clearly, climate change itself is an exogenous stressor beyond the control of individual governments. However, government policies and neglect can compound the effects of climate change. Nobel Prizewinning economist Amartya Sen finds that, even in the face of acute environmental scarcities, countries with democratic institutions and press freedoms work to prevent famine because such states are accountable to their citizens (Sen, 1999). Others have similarly shown a strong relationship between democracy and protection of the environment (Li & Reuveny, 2006). Faced with global warming, some states will take the necessary steps to conserve water and land, redistribute resources to those who need them most, and develop disaster-warning and -response systems. Others will do little to respond to this threat. While a states level of income and technological capacity are certainly important, democracy or, more precisely, the accountability of political leaders to their publics is likely to be a critical determinant of how states respond to the challenge. Fourth,

violent conflict is an inefficient and sub-optimal reaction to changes in the environment and resource scarcities. As environmental conditions change, several possible responses are available, although many journalists and policymakers have focused on the potential for warfare. Individuals can migrate internally or across borders, or they can invest in technological improvements, develop conservation strategies, and shift to less climate-sensitive livelihoods, among other adaptation mechanisms. Engaging in armed rebellion is quite costly and risky and requires large-scale collective action. Individuals and households are more likely to engage in simpler, personal, or smallscale coping strategies. Thus, organized violence is inefficient at the
individual level. But, more importantly, armed violence against the state is used as a means to gain leverage over governments so as to gain some form of accommodation, namely, the redistribution of economic resources and political power. Organized armed violence rarely (if ever) arises spontaneously but is usually pursued when people perceive their government to be unwilling to listen to peaceful petitions. As mentioned above, rebellion does not distribute resources by itself, and protracted civil wars can have devastating effects on the economy and the natural environment, leaving fewer resources to bargain over. Thus, organized violence is inefficient at the collective level. Responsive, accountable political leaders at all levels of government are more likely to listen to citizen demands for greater access to resources and the means to secure their livelihoods. Political sensitivity to peaceful action can immunize states from armed insurrection.

SMRs Dont Solve Peak Oil

Nuclear power does not compete with oil they show little overlap with market. Toth and Rogner, 6
(Ferenc (Senior Energy Economist in the IAEA's Planning and Economic Studies Section) and Hans-Holger (Section Head, Planning and Economic Studies Section at the IAEA), Oil and nuclear power: Past, present, and future, Energy Economics 28, 2006, pg. 22, RSR) While the past expansion of nuclear energy occurred to the detriment of oil in the power sector, this is no longer the case today and highly unlikely to reoccur in the future. The respective market structures in which nuclear and oil operate now display little overlap and an expansion of nuclear power would not impinge on oil sales to power generation. Nuclear supplies base load to large grid-integrated markets where oil provides some peak supply, back-up capacity, small-scale and non-grid applications. Oils main markets are the low energy demand intensity rural and remote areas usually with little or no grid integration. In an environmentally unconstrained future, nuclear power competes primarily against coal and possibly natural gas,
depending on how closely natural gas prices track oil market prices and whether or not gas infrastructures are in place. However, current trends towards electricity market liberalization relying more on private sector shareholder value maximization create economic barriers to the expansion of present-day nuclear plants because of their high up-front capital costs and long amortization periods. In the absence of public policy support and/or the emergence of innovative reactor designs that lower the costs and further improve operating safety, nuclear powers market share might indeed follow a downward trajectory. Yet there is some evidence to the contrary. The order of the new Olkiluoto reactor in Finland is based on several studies, each confirming that nuclear generation is the best economic option to satisfy increasing demand for electricity (WNA, 2004).

SMR does not compete with oil its only an interim solution and cost prevents competition. Winston, 11
(Andrew, Contributor, The Future of Nuclear Energy, Harvard Business Review, 3-14-11, http://blogs.hbr.org/winston/2011/03/future-of-nuclear-energy.html, accessed 8-4-12, RSR)
We can debate this topic endlessly and there are seemingly good reasons that environmental groups and others have changed their views on nukes. Put most simply, it

provides steady base power (20% of our electricity today) and is close to "zero carbon." So as a longer interim solution, until the grid and economy are cleaner, it could be logical. But the most compelling argument I've heard against nuclear is not about safety (although, again, how can we not include that in the discussion given what's going on?). No, it's about cost. For solid analyses on all things energy, I look to long-time
expert Amory Lovins and his impressive assortment of in-depth studies. In a couple of reports, "Four Nuclear Myths," and "Nuclear Power: Competitive Economics and Climate Protection Potential," Lovins tackles the economics of building and insuring nukes, among other things. In

short, compared to focusing on energy efficiency, nuclear is really expensive. And without going into massive detail on economics, I've always liked the really simple logic around renewables they have zero variable cost (wind,
sunshine, and underground heat are free). Lovins and others put more data around how the economics of renewables will win out over time, but basically, free is hard to beat.

Econ Collapse Impact D

Economic collapse doesnt cause war no causal connection
Thomas P.M. Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war,
as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's

first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than threedozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the
last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking

over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberationthemed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistanbleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn , occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to

sum up: * No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-greatpower crises even triggered); * No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the
emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and *

No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of
strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At

the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as
it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty

of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal
profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

No causal relationship ignores other variables

Niall Ferguson (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) 2006 Foreign Affairs, September/October, Vol. 85, Issue 5
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the Great Depression

most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression . In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

Off Case

Contamination/Pollution DA

Links
Storage of excess waste creates a high risk of toxic nuclear waste contamination of air and major aquifers Trento 12 (Joseph, has spent more than 35 years as an investigative journalist, working with both print
and broadcast outlets and writing extensively. Before joining the National Security News Service in 1991, Trento worked for CNNs Special Assignment Unit, the Wilmington News Journal, and prominent journalist Jack Anderson. Trento has received six Pulitzer nominations and is the author of five books, EPA Helpless to Stop Further Pollution at Major Superfund Site, July 13th, http://www.dcbureau.org/201207137454/national-security-news-service/epa-helpless-to-stop-furtherpollution-at-major-superfund-site-nnsa-to-resume-plutonium-separation-at-the-savannah-river-sites-hcanyon-for-mox-fuel.html) The ongoing problems with disposing of highly radioactive waste have been 60 years in the making. Starting in the 1950s, five reactors designed to produce nuclear weapons grade materials churned out plutonium at a blistering pace. The fuel was then sent to two huge plants at SRS called canyons to chemically separate the plutonium from other elements and turn it into pits for nuclear bombs. Everything the radioactive chemicals and waste touched became contaminated with radioactivity. The giant F and H Canyons have accumulated a generations worth of plutonium particles in every nook and cranny of these huge and decaying buildings. The F Canyon is in the
worst condition and is a few hundred yards from the new MOX plant under construction. There is also the plumbing hundreds of miles of pipes connecting these canyons to two tank farms where scores of carbon steel tanks each the size of a National Basketball Association Court hold the deadly toxic brew from the nuclear separation process. The

tanks began to corrode and rust not long after their installation in the damp South Carolina climate. At least a dozen of them began leaking into the sandy soil. That
deterioration process is hurried by radiation which damages and breaks down metals and cement. The lesson of SRS and other DOE sites is that the radiation over time will defeat anything mankind has contrived to contain it. More than a billion dollars of President Obamas Recovery Act monies have been spent to clean up SRS, yet it is more dangerous today than it was before the vast amounts were spent. The clean-up undertaken by contractors with DOE oversight is at best a temporary solution to a problem Americans will face for thousands of years. Instead of actually removing and remediating radioactive elements at the site, vast amounts of grout or cement

are used to bury old reactors and fill the waste tanks. Experts believe that at best the cement will last about 30 to 50 years, while the radiological power of the waste would take hundreds and even thousands of years to decay. Because radiation
cannot be destroyed simply isolated and contained these monies are being spent for a comparatively very short term for which future generations will have to contend, much like the SRS workers are dealing with the Cold War legacy waste. More troubling, according to SRS veteran engineer William Lawless, is that like

the Japanese reactors that failed and exploded after the earthquake in 2011, the tanks at SRS build up explosive hydrogen that present a constant danger of high level nuclear waste being released in a massive explosion at one or more of the tanks. The Atlanta Office of the Environmental Protection Agency is supposed to oversee the clean-up at SRS as a designated Superfund site. But NNSA
operates under the Atomic Energy Act that exempts it from EPA authority to stop it from increasing radioactive pollution at the site. EPA official Rob Pope and his colleagues are unable to stop NNSA from adding high-level radioactive waste to the leaking tanks at SRS that were supposed to be emptied, grouted and shuttered. We have no operational authority because

of the way the Atomic Energy Act is written. The ongoing operations are exempt from EPA oversight, Pope said. Saltstone Facility NNSA is not like a
conventional chemical or mining company that the EPA could stop from continuing to pollute at a declared Superfund site. At SRS and the other major federal nuclear sites, the Atomic Energy Act allows NNSA to operate in any manner it deems appropriate. Its powers exceed the EPAs in all nuclear matters including private nuclear waste dump sites. The only way EPA can assist in the clean-up is if there is an accident or radiation leak and even then the EPA must defer to DOE. More startling is that even

if EPA officials detect or suspect potential problems at SRS, they have no power to prevent them. For example, if a safety issue threatened the release
of a deadly and powerful carcinogen like plutonium oxide from the H Canyon or MOX plant, EPA does not have the power to take preventative action. While the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) has serious concerns about the eighteen pollution plumes at SRS and other waste issues, the state agency also has limited ability to stop ongoing activities that result in current pollution on the federally controlled site. DHEC Federal Facilities Liaison Shelly Wilson said in an email, Treatment of high level waste and tank closure remain high focus areas of DHEC for Savannah River Site due to the risk posed by toxic and radioactive liquid in aging tanks. The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) has discussed with Department of Energy the possible addition of relatively small volumes to the high level waste tanks. DHEC respects that this is a DOE decision, ultimately subject to regulatory milestones for overall waste treatment and tank closure. Glass Containers The most toxic liquid waste and sludge from the H Canyon is sent in tiny batches from the Tank

Farms to a nearby Defense Waste Processing Facility to vitrify the plutonium-riddled waste in glass. Even these glass and stainless steel canisters will break down before the plutonium decays. These canisters were supposed to be shipped to a national repository for long term storage. Because the Obama administration shuttered Yucca Mountain, the canisters are being storied in shallow cement silos next to the

SRS sits on an active earthquake fault. Earthquakes are not an uncommon occurrence in South Carolina, the states Department of Natural Resources website says. SRS also sits on one of the Souths most important aquifers. According to leading geologists, its hot, humid, swampy location on the Savannah River make it uniquely unsuitable for long term storage of radioactive waste. South Carolina is subject to tornados, hurricanes and other natural threats that seriously complicate safety storing nuclear waste in these temporary storage facilities. The DWPF is years behind schedule in reducing and isolating tank waste. Now the NNSA is proposing to increase the amount of waste that will need to be processed through the tanks to the DWPF to the storage canisters. To complicate matters, NNSA is creating more radioactive waste at the site on a daily basis as it processes radioactive weapons materials coming into SRS from around the world as part of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs. Some of that material has been run through H Canyon and has produced additional tank waste as the weapons grade material is
DWPF. blended down into reactor fuel.

SMRs have greater problems with waste disposal Makhijani and Boyd 10 (September, ARJUN MAKHIJANI, electrical and nuclear engineer who is
President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research AND MICHELE BOYD, former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for Social Responsibility, Small Modular Reactors No Solution for the Cost, Safety, and Waste Problems of Nuclear Power, www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/.../smallmodular-reactors-no.pdf,)
Proponents claim that with longer operation on a single fuel charge and with less production of spent fuel per reactor, waste management would be simpler. In fact, spent

fuel management for SMRs would be more complex, and therefore more expensive, because the waste would be located in many more sites. The infrastructure that we have for spent fuel management is geared toward light-water reactors at a limited number of sites. In some proposals, the reactor
would be buried underground, making waste retrieval even more complicated and com- plicating retrieval of radioactive materials in the event

it is highly unlikely that a reactor containing metallic sodium could be disposed of as a single entity, given the high reactivity of sodium with both air and water. Decom- missioning a sealed
of an accident. For instance, sodium- or potassium- cooled reactor could present far greater technical challenges and costs per kilowatt of capacity than faced by presentday above- ground reactors.

Elections DA

Links
The public opposes new reactors The Economist 12 (Nuclear power The 30-year itch Americas nuclear industry struggles to get off the floor Feb 18th 2012 |
ATLANTA | from the print edition Still, nuclear
)

power faces strong headwinds. A poll taken last year showed that 64% of Americans opposed building new nuclear reactors. The NRC's last new reactor approval predates Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and
Fukushima, all of which dented public support (and not just in America either: nuclear power supplies three-fourths of France's electricity, yet in one poll 57% of French respondents favoured abandoning it). America's

anti-nuclear movement has been as quiet as its nuclear industry, but as one comes to life so will the other. Already a consortium of nine environmental groups
plans to contest the Vogtle licence in court, alleging that the NRC violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing fully to consider the environmental impact of the new reactors. Mindy Goldstein, who heads the Turner Environmental Law Clinic in Atlanta and is representing the nine groups, said that the NRC failed to consider the implications of Fukushima before issuing its licences.

SMRs unpopular NIMBY attitude would kill their popularity. Taso, 11

(Firas Eugen Taso, 21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular Reactors, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836, 8-2-12, RSR) Paolo Ferroni also mentions that SMRs would not solve the public concern over nuclear power. To the general public, they would still be nuclear facilities, something that they do not understand and fear. Unless they were proven and demonstrated, opposition would exist even for the smaller demonstration projects. The NIMBY attitude would likely preclude SMRs from being a game changer for nuclear power, unless something changes dramatically, not only incrementally, in public perception.

SMRs unpopular the public doesnt differentiate the risk based on size. Locatelli and Mancini, 10
(Giorgio and Mauro, Politecnico di Milano, Dept. Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, The role of the reactor size for an investment in the nuclear sector: An evaluation of not-nancial parameters, Progress in Nuclear Energy 53, 2011, RSR) This is because, in the publics mind, a system with small probability of failure and large consequences is seen as more risky than the opposite, as the common fear of air crashes (Sjoberg, 1999). Fischoffs law (Slovic et al., 1978) bears
that level of acceptable risk is inversely related to the number of people exposed to that risk. Slovic (Fischoff et al., 1980) concluded that belief about the

catastrophic potential of nuclear power is the major determinant of public opposition. Other inuencing the attitude toward NPPs are: trust in government and institutions (Slovic, 1993); knowledge and competences on nuclear topics, which are tightly related to active nuclear power generation in the country (Fischoff et al., 1980); timing and level of public involvement in the decision. Public accepts risks from voluntary activities roughly 1000 times greater than from involuntary activities that provide the same level of benet (Slovic et
main factors al., 1978); risk perception about waste management and disposal (Sjoberg, 2009). Considering different sizes: 1. public competences are not sufcient to understand safety improvements. Deliberately

SMRs have a lower Core Damage Frequency (CDF) thanks to their design, but public has not an education which makes him able to appreciate a reduction of CDF from 10 7 to 10 8 (as in the comparison between Westinghouses AP1000 and IRIS (Carelli, 2003; Matzie, 2008)); 2. public perception of a severe accident is not size-dependant because, in the peoples mind, both SMRs and LRs involve the same catastrophic consequences; 3. III/III GEN SMRs and LRs do not produce different quantity or toxicity of waste. These issues will become differential only with the exploitation of IV GEN disruptive technologies. Considering near-term technologies, overall populations attitude is not differential .

SMRs unpopular public opinion polls show the resistance will persist. Ramana, 11
(M.V., physicist who works at the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, Nuclear power and the public, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 4, RSR) Opinion polls show that public support for nuclear power has declined since the Fukushima crisis began, not only in Japan but also in other nations around the world. People oppose nuclear power for a variety of reasons, but the predominant concern is the perception that it is a risky technology. Some communities that are closely associated with it even suffer from stigmatization. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power including information campaigns, risk comparisons, and efforts to promote nuclear power as a solution to climate change. None of these strategies has worked well, mostly because the public lacks trust in the nuclear industry. Public resistance to nuclear power is likely to continue, making it difficult to build new reactors . This resistance may be a major obstacle to the rapid expansion of nuclear power.
site and

SMRs unpopular the public detests the construction of new nuclear plants. Ramana, 11
(M.V., physicist who works at the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, Nuclear power and the public, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 4, RSR) Japan is by no means alone. Around the world, nuclear energy has declined in popularity. In the United States, for example, a Washington Post-ABC poll conducted in April 2011 found that 64 percent of Americans opposed the construction of new reactors (Craighill and Cohen, 2011). Another poll, conducted by CBS News in March 2011, soon after the Fukushima crisis began, found that only 43 percent of those polled would approve of building new reactors, down from a 57 percent approval rating in 2008 (Cooper and Sussman, 2011). Support for nuclear power
was similar or lower in countries as varied as Chile (12 percent), Thailand (16.6 percent), Australia (34 percent), and the United Kingdom (35 percent) (Fowler, 2011; Green, 2011; van der Zee, 2011). Even in France, which relies on nuclear power for about three-quarters of its electricity, one poll found that a majority (57 percent) were in favor of abandoning nuclear energy (Buffery, 2011).

Politics DA

Links Feinstein
Feinstein opposes SMRs views them as unsafe and costly on taxpayers. Beattie, 11
(Jeff, Staff Writer, Feinstein Frowns On Federal Aid For Small Reactors, 7-21-11, The Energy Daily, RSR) Although few areas of energy policy generate as much bipartisan support as small, modular nuclear reactors, count Sen. Dianne Feinstein--the Senate's chief appropriator on energy issues--as unconvinced they are safe or worthy of significant taxpayer investment. In a hearing last week, Feinstein (D-Calif.) suggested that plans for nuclear sites with multiple small modular reactors (SMR) plants might be inappropriate in light of lessons emerging from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, where the operator was forced to contend with simultaneous meltdowns, radioactive water leakage and spent fuel concerns at six units. Further, she said a proposed Energy Department program to back SMRs was a "one heck of a subsidy" that might cost taxpayers far more than predicted.

Feinstein key to the agenda crucial swing vote and bellwether on legislative decisions. Goldmacher, 12
(Shane, Contributor, NJs Most Influential Women, The National Journal, 7-13-12, http://nationaljournal.com/magazine/washington-s-most-influential-women-20120712, accessed 8-212, RSR) Dianne Feinstein occupies that rare and enviable space for a politician: Shes both popular back home and powerful in Washington . The California Democrat is running for her fourth full term in the Senate this year, but running is an
overstatement. Its more of a saunter. She hasnt faced a serious challenge in a decade, and she finished atop a 24-person field in Junes open primary, with her closest rival a woeful 37 percentage points behind. In an interview, she conceded, I think theres a very good chance Ill be reelected this year. That

electoral security has given Feinstein, 79, the freedom to operate as a political player in Washington. These days, she chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee at a time of drone strikes, cyberwarfare, and counterterrorism intelligence-gathering. A moderate Democrat from a very blue state, she has shown a willingness to buck the party line, such as calling the recent avalanche of leaks of classified intelligence very disturbing. The issue had been mostly seized on by Republicans accusing the White House of doling out details for political gain. But Feinstein has managed to stay in favor in the highest echelons of the Democratic Party. It was in her living room, after all, that
Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton met face-to-face in 2008 for the first time after Obama became the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. And as chairwoman of the Senate Rules Committee in 2009, she presided over Obamas inauguration ceremonies.

Throughout her tenure, she has been a Senate bellwether , sometimes on legislation

and sometimes, as a senior

member of the Judiciary Committee, on whether judges will be confirmed. Ive always felt that the thing that counts is being very practical, Feinstein says.

Link General
SMRs unpopular opposition due to fear of waste, contamination and terror targets. Smith, 10
(Rebecca, Contributor, Small Reactors Generate Big Hopes, The Wall Street Journal, 2-18-10, http://www.generatorsystems.com/pdf/Small%20Reactors%20Generate%20Big%20Hopes%20WSJ%200 2-18-2010.pdf, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) "We see significant benefits from the new, modular technology," said Donald Moul, vice president of nuclear support for First Energy, an Ohio-based utility company. He said First Energy, which operates four reactors at three sites in Ohio and Pennsylvania, has made no decision to build any new reactor and noted there's "a lot of heavy lifting to do to get this reactor certified" by the NRC for U.S. use. Indeed, the smaller reactors still could incite major opposition. They face the same unresolved issues of where to put the waste and public fear of contamination, in the event of an accident. They could also raise alarms about creating possible terrorism targets in populated areas. Still, the sudden interest in small reactors illustrates a growing unease with the route that nuclear power has taken for half a century. What many regard as the first commercial reactor built in the U.S., in 1957 at Shippingport, Pa., was only
about 60 megawatts in size. By the time construction petered out three decades later, reactors had grown progressively bigger, ending up at about 1,000 megawatts of capacity.

Links - Public
The public opposes new reactors The Economist 12 (Nuclear power The 30-year itch Americas nuclear industry struggles to get off the floor Feb 18th 2012 |
ATLANTA | from the print edition Still, nuclear
)

power faces strong headwinds. A poll taken last year showed that 64% of Americans opposed building new nuclear reactors. The NRC's last new reactor approval predates Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and
Fukushima, all of which dented public support (and not just in America either: nuclear power supplies three-fourths of France's electricity, yet in one poll 57% of French respondents favoured abandoning it). America's

anti-nuclear movement has been as quiet as its nuclear industry, but as one comes to life so will the other. Already a consortium of nine environmental groups
plans to contest the Vogtle licence in court, alleging that the NRC violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing fully to consider the environmental impact of the new reactors. Mindy Goldstein, who heads the Turner Environmental Law Clinic in Atlanta and is representing the nine groups, said that the NRC failed to consider the implications of Fukushima before issuing its licences.

SMRs unpopular NIMBY attitude would kill their popularity. Taso, 11

(Firas Eugen Taso, 21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular Reactors, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836, 8-2-12, RSR) Paolo Ferroni also mentions that SMRs would not solve the public concern over nuclear power. To the general public, they would still be nuclear facilities, something that they do not understand and fear. Unless they were proven and demonstrated, opposition would exist even for the smaller demonstration projects. The NIMBY attitude would likely preclude SMRs from being a game changer for nuclear power, unless something changes dramatically, not only incrementally, in public perception.

SMRs unpopular the public doesnt differentiate the risk based on size. Locatelli and Mancini, 10
(Giorgio and Mauro, Politecnico di Milano, Dept. Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, The role of the reactor size for an investment in the nuclear sector: An evaluation of not-nancial parameters, Progress in Nuclear Energy 53, 2011, RSR) This is because, in the publics mind, a system with small probability of failure and large consequences is seen as more risky than the opposite, as the common fear of air crashes (Sjoberg, 1999). Fischoffs law (Slovic et al., 1978) bears
that level of acceptable risk is inversely related to the number of people exposed to that risk. Slovic (Fischoff et al., 1980) concluded that belief about the

catastrophic potential of nuclear power is the major determinant of public opposition. Other inuencing the attitude toward NPPs are: trust in government and institutions (Slovic, 1993); knowledge and competences on nuclear topics, which are tightly related to active nuclear power generation in the country (Fischoff et al., 1980); timing and level of public involvement in the decision. Public accepts risks from voluntary activities roughly 1000 times greater than from involuntary activities that provide the same level of benet (Slovic et
main factors al., 1978); risk perception about waste management and disposal (Sjoberg, 2009). Considering different sizes: 1. public competences are not sufcient to understand safety improvements. Deliberately

SMRs have a lower Core Damage Frequency (CDF) thanks to their design, but public has not an education which makes him able to appreciate a reduction of CDF from 10 7 to 10 8 (as in the comparison between Westinghouses AP1000 and IRIS (Carelli, 2003; Matzie, 2008)); 2. public perception of a severe accident is not size-dependant because, in the peoples mind, both SMRs and LRs involve the same catastrophic consequences; 3. III/III GEN SMRs and LRs do not produce different quantity or toxicity of waste. These issues will become differential only with the exploitation of IV GEN disruptive technologies. Considering near-term technologies, overall populations attitude is not differential .

SMRs unpopular public opinion polls show the resistance will persist. Ramana, 11
(M.V., physicist who works at the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, Nuclear power and the public, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 4, RSR) Opinion polls show that public support for nuclear power has declined since the Fukushima crisis began, not only in Japan but also in other nations around the world. People oppose nuclear power for a variety of reasons, but the predominant concern is the perception that it is a risky technology. Some communities that are closely associated with it even suffer from stigmatization. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power including information campaigns, risk comparisons, and efforts to promote nuclear power as a solution to climate change. None of these strategies has worked well, mostly because the public lacks trust in the nuclear industry. Public resistance to nuclear power is likely to continue, making it difficult to build new reactors . This resistance may be a major obstacle to the rapid expansion of nuclear power.
site and

SMRs unpopular the public detests the construction of new nuclear plants. Ramana, 11
(M.V., physicist who works at the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, Nuclear power and the public, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 4, RSR) Japan is by no means alone. Around the world, nuclear energy has declined in popularity. In the United States, for example, a Washington Post-ABC poll conducted in April 2011 found that 64 percent of Americans opposed the construction of new reactors (Craighill and Cohen, 2011). Another poll, conducted by CBS News in March 2011, soon after the Fukushima crisis began, found that only 43 percent of those polled would approve of building new reactors, down from a 57 percent approval rating in 2008 (Cooper and Sussman, 2011). Support for nuclear power
was similar or lower in countries as varied as Chile (12 percent), Thailand (16.6 percent), Australia (34 percent), and the United Kingdom (35 percent) (Fowler, 2011; Green, 2011; van der Zee, 2011). Even in France, which relies on nuclear power for about three-quarters of its electricity, one poll found that a majority (57 percent) were in favor of abandoning nuclear energy (Buffery, 2011).

Public Key to Agenda/PC

Public opinion is key to the presidents political capital
Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha, 7
(Andrew W. & Matthew, March, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1, Presidential Success on the Substance of Legislation, University of North Texas, pp. 100-112, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623810, Accessed: 7-15-10) Public attitudes also should influence the president's bargaining position. Despite evidence to the contrary (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Collier and Sullivan 1995), presidents, White House staff, and legislators believe that public approval is important to the president's success in Congress (Edwards 1997; Neustadt 1960; Rivers and Rose 1985). Theoretically, public support will improve the president's bargain- ing position as members of Congress will not want to risk alienating their constituents by opposing a popu- lar president's policy preferences. Therefore, we hypothesize that the higher his level of approval, the more a final statute will reflect the president's policy preferences.

Public opinion polls influence presidential agenda Sparrow, 8

(Bartholomew H., University of Texas at Austin government professor, Who Speaks for the People? The President, the Press, and Public Opinion in the United States, 10-13-8, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 4, Pages 578-592, Wiley InterScience, accessed 7-8-9) Public opinion serves as a metric of presidential leadership with respect to presidential approval ratings. Presidents and their advisors use public opinion not as an absolute guide, but rather for tactical purposes, and instrumentally, for reaching particular political ends (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). In general, political analysts conceive of public opinion as a channel or guide for policy makers , boundaries beyond which
they cannot go but which also offer leeway in terms of the exact path policy makers take. Public opinion serves as a "permissive limit" for policy makers (Almond 1950; Key 1961; Sobel 2001).

Popularity is key to congressional leverage Spitzer, 93

(Robert, Professor of political science at the university of new york state, President and Congress, pg 65, RSR) Three observations about the relationship between Presidents and the people warrant mention here. First, the link between the Presidents public standing and the Presidents influence in Congress is indisputably important but also more complex than the above examples suggest. When the Presidents standing is high, members of Congress are likely to interpret this positive support as either direct or indirect evidence of a popular mandate for the President. Fearing a popular backlash, Congress is less likely to buck presidential preferences under these conditions. Moreover, some members of Congress accept as a matter of principle that Presidents with a popular mandate are entitled, by virtue of that mandate to have their programs enacted. Continued public approval is a sign of success (or, to be more precise, perceived success); declining public approval signals an ebbing
mandate.

A2: Scientists
The public will fear nuclear power even when scientists say claim its safe Allison 12 (Wade, Wade Allison is Professor Emeritus of Physics at the University of Oxford and a
Fellow of Keble College. His fields of interest extend from experimental particle physics to medical physics, including radiation, nuclear physics and radiotherapy, April, Public Trust in Nuclear Energy, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=29532&terms=public%20trust) A list of the pros and cons of nuclear energy is straightforward; we need it, it is safe, but people are frightened of it. The need to replace fossil fuels with another large base-load source is widely understood and the safety of the nuclear solution has been demonstrated many times; even in accidents in which reactors suffer irreparable damage, the
impact on human health has been minimal. For example, at Fukushima there has been no death, or even extended hospitalisation, due to radiation, nor is this likely to be responsible for any cancer deaths in 50 years. The

reasons for the fear of radiation are instinctive and historical. It is natural to shun what is powerful and unseen, and the legacy of the Cold War with its weapon of nuclear fear has added to that. Although the public accepts moderate to high doses of radiation when used benignly for their own health, non-medical international safety standards are set extremely low to appease popular concerns - these specify levels found in nature or as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Yet modern biology and medicine confirm that no harm comes from radiation levels up to 1000 times higher and
realistic safety levels could be set as high as relatively safe (AHARS). Indeed the local damage to public health and the social economy caused by ALARA regulations imposed at Chernobyl and Fukushima has been extremely serious and without benefit.

Russian Oil/Backstopping DA

Links
There is a substitution effect between nuclear and oil prices Lee and Chiu 10
(Chien-Chiang, Yi-Bun University Kaohsiung Taiwan;Oilprices, nuclear energy consumption, and economic growth: New evidence using a heterogeneous panel analysis; Energy Policy Volume 39, Issue 4, April 2011, Pages 21112120) BHB This paper applies panel data analysis to examine the short-run dynamics and long-run equilibrium relationships among nuclear energy consumption, oilprices, oil consumption, and economic growth for developed countries covering the period 19712006. The panel cointegration results show that in the long run, oilprices have a positive impact on nuclear energy consumption, suggesting the existence of the substitution relationship between nuclear energy and oil. The long-run elasticity of nuclear energy with respect to real income is approximately 0.89, and real income has
a greater impact on nuclear energy than do oilprices in the long run. Furthermore, the panel causality results find evidence of unidirectional causality running from oilprices and economic growth to nuclear energy consumption in the long run, while there is no causality between nuclear energy consumption and economic growth in the short run.

Incentives for nuclear power lowers oil prices trade off. US Fed News 8 (5/6/08. SKYROCKETING GAS PRICES HIGHLIGHT NEED TO USE AMERICAN
RESOURCES http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=08d0fc06b2da1455085f3578e4de428d&doc num=6&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtzzSkAl&_md5=f4756b7493583c302d5375ed8a4b39a8)
Despite promises of a "commonsense plan" to lower gas prices, the Democrats have failed to act on the number one issue affecting Kentuckians' pocketbooks since taking over the Majority in Congress. Our country must invest in alternative

energy sources in order

to reduce our energy dependence and lower fuel costs. It is time Congress works in a bipartisan manner to create a balanced energy solution that promotes conservation efforts and increases energy production on our own soil. Speaker Nancy Pelosi has rejected commonsense solutions that increase production in America and use our own resources. The

law of supply and demand is a staple of economics. It is commonsense that when we increase domestic supply, gas prices will fall . I have voted for and supported a number of proposals that would do just that. For example, the No More Excuses Energy Act (H.R. 3089) would
encourage new refinery construction, allow for environmentally responsible exploration of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), and provide

tax incentives to encourage the construction of new nuclear power

plants.

Japan proves that nuclear energy trades off with oil Washington Post 12 (For Japan, shutting down nuclear plants brings surge in oil, gas imports, April
7, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/for-japan-shutting-down-nuclear-plants-brings-surgein-oil-gas-imports/2012/04/07/gIQAGwPx1S_story.html) KJS To make up for its dwindling nuclear supply, Japan is on a frenzied but costly hunt for fossil fuels. As part of
that hunt, tankers from as many as 12 countries are pulling up weekly to Japanese port cities, hauling liquefied natural gas super-cooled to 260 degrees below zero. Officials

from Tokyo are making trips to the Middle East, requesting increased

shipments of oil. In the Timor Sea, off the coast of Australia, a Japanese firm has invested in a subsea natural gas pipeline that will
eventually speed deliveries northward. So far, Japans drastic increase in fossil fuel imports, namely oil and liquefied natu ral gas (LNG), has kept the country from the short-term crisis of power outages and darkened cities, even as more of its nuclear plants come offline. But the import surge also comes with a dire side effect, analysts say, that strikes at the heart of the worlds third-largest economy. By relying on pricey, imported alternatives to nuclear energy, Japan this year is facing an ominous cycle in which energy costs rise and business conditions erode. Even if thermal plants operate at full capacity this summer, the country will still be short on electrical power in peak months, hampering industrial production. That means industrial exports could shrink at the same time energy imports are on the rise, shriveling growth rates and leaving the country more vulnerable to global price shocks. There is a solution to all this restarting the nuclear power plants but given Japans mounting objection to atomic energy, it draws only a dark laugh. Even before last years nuclear crisis, a triple meltdown triggered by an earthquake and tsunami, Tokyo ranked as the worlds largest importer of LNG and third-largest importer of crude oil. But nuclear reactors powered one-third of the countrys needs, and the country planned for that share to increase to 50 percent. Thirteen months later, only one of Japans 54 reactors is operating; some were shuttered because of the disaster, and most of the others have come offline for scheduled

maintenance. Despite attempts by politicians in Tokyo to persuade them to do so, provincial governors and local communities wont allow them to restart. In February, nuclear plants produced just 3 percent of the total power generated in Japan. By next month, when the sole remaining reactor, on the northern island of Hokkaido, is due to shut down, Japan will be nuclear-free just as temperatures begin to climb.

In recent months, to fill the void, Japans imports of LNG, crude oil and heavy fuel oil have increased by 15 to 30 percent, compared with comparable periods before the disaster. A recent Deutsche Bank report calculated that Japans power generation costs in February were $1.9 billion higher than during a typical month in which nuclear plants were in operation. The cost of generating electricity from oil is so far above that of nuclear, the report said, that at some point the economics are
likely to become a more important consideration in the ongoing political debate in Japan over whether, when, and by how much to start returning idle nuclear capacity to the grid.

Spending DA

Links
Investment would be costly requires $600 million annually. Rosner and Goldberg, 11
(Robert (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics) and Stephen (Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory) , Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, Small Modular Reactors Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., Technical Paper, Revision 1, November 2011) RCM To qualify, a project must commence operations by 2021 . Treasury Department guidelines further required that a qualifying project initiate construction, defined as the pouring of safety- related concrete, by 2014. Currently, two GW-scale projects totaling 4,600 MW are in early construction; consequently, as much as 1,400 MW in credits is available for other nuclear projects, including SMRs. The budgetary cost of providing the production cost incentive depends on the learning rate and the market price of electricity generated from the SMR project. Higher learning rates and higher market prices would decrease the magnitude of the incentive; lower rates and lower market prices would increase the need for production
incentives. Using two scenarios (with market prices based on the cost of natural gas combined-cycle generation) yields the following range of estimates of the size of production incentives required for the FOAK plants described earlier. For a 10% learning rate, Based

on a market price of $60/MWh44 (6/kWh), the LEAD plant and the subsequent eight FOAK plants would need, on average, a production credit of $13.60/MWh (1.4/kWh), 24% less than the $18 credit currently available to renewable and GW-scale nuclear technologies. (The actual credit would be on a sliding scale, with the credit for
the LEAD plant at approximately $31/MWh, or 3.1/kWh, declining to a credit of about $6/MWh, or 0.6/kWh, by the time of deployment of FOAK-8). The

total cost of the credit would be about $600 million per year

(once all plants were built and

operating). If the market price were about $70/MWh (7/kWh), the LEAD and only four subsequent FOAK plants would require a production incentive. In this case, the average incentive would be $8.40/MWh (0.8/kWh), with a total cost of about $200 million per year. Higher learning rates would drive down the size of the production incentive. For example, at a 12% learning rate, At a market price of $60/MWh (6/kWh), the LEAD and the subsequent five FOAK plants would require a production incentive, with an average incentive level of about $15/MWh (1.5/kWh). Total annual cost (after all plants are in full operation) would be about $450 million per year. At a market price of $70/MWh (7/kWh), the LEAD and three FOAK plants would require a production incentive averaging $9.00/MWh (0.9/kWh, half of the current statutory incentive), with a total annual cost of about $170 million per year. The

range of costs for the production incentive illustrates the sensitivity of the incentive level to the learning rate and the market price of electricity. Thus, efforts to achieve higher learning rates, including fully optimized engineering designs for the SMRs and the manufacturing
plant, as well as specially targeted market introduction opportunities that enable SMRs to sell electricity for higher priced and higher value applications, can have a critical impact on the requirements for production incentive should be subject to further analysis as higher quality cost estimates become available.

incentives. The potential size of the

Investment would be expensive historically subsidies have spent billions of dollars. Koplow, 11
(Doug, Founder of Earth Track in Cambridge, Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies, Union of Concerned Scientists, February 2011, RSR) Historical subsidies to nuclear power have already resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in costs paid by taxpayers and ratepayers. With escalating plant costs and more competitive power markets, the cost of repeating these failed policies will likely be even higher this time around . Of equal importance, however, is the fact that subsidies to nuclear power also carry significant opportunity costs for reducing global warming emissions because reactors are so expensive and require such long lead times to construct. In other words, massive subsidies designed to help underwrite the large-scale expansion of the nuclear industry will delay or diminish investments in less expensive abatement options. Other energy technologies would be able to compete with nuclear power far more effectively if the government focused on creating an energyneutral playing field rather than picking technology winners and losers. The policy choice to invest in nuclear also carries with it a risk unique to

the nuclear fuel cycle: greatly exacerbating already thorny proliferation challenges as reactors and ancillary fuel-cycle facilities expand throughout the world.

High cost tradeoff to nuclear waste disposal Nathwani 9 (Jatin S. Nathwani, Department of Management Sciences & The Institute for Risk
Research, University of Waterloo, THE UNINTENDED SOCIAL RISKS OF NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL www.irr-neram.ca/pdf_files/waste_disposal.pdf) The cost of a nuclear waste disposal project is large, in excess of $10,000,000,000 (ten billion dollars; more
rigorous estimates are in the $14-15 billion range). To spend such an amount on the disposal of waste is equivalent to committing in the order of $ 500,000,000 (five hundred million dollars) every year in perpetuity to an unproductive investment. The

permanent loss to any nation is roughly equivalent to foregoing half a dozen new hospitals, a new university, several opera houses, and or substantive renewal of the urban infrastructure such as public transit facilities: every year - forever! The
wisdom certainly resides within the body politic for not committing such a transparent act of folly. But then, one can never be sure. It is worth emphasizing that the resources directed at reducing a very small hypothetical risk from nuclear waste storage will

most certainly result in our inability to pursue other important educational, social and cultural goals.

SMRs are expensive large per-megawatt costs, more control systems and phased implementation. Barczak, 10
(Sara, High Risk Energy Director, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Smaller Size, Big Price Tag: Small modular reactors are risky, Clean Energy, 12-24-10, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) Economies of scale show that this is incorrect. The price per kilowatt of materials used in SMRs goes up the smaller the reactors become. As reported in Public Power Weeklys December 13, 2010 newsletter, TVAs Jack Bailey stated that in dollars per kilowatt, the small modular reactors are expected to be slightly more expensive to build than a single large nuclear plant. Large-scale nuclear reactors have one independent system for control, whereas SMRs could have multiple control systems generating additional expenses. The nuclear industry and its lobbyists also claim that less construction time would lead to fewer costs. However, the expectation is to construct several SMRs in one site over a period of time. This phased implementation of building several SMRs at one site would negate any possible economic gain via shorter construction time. If utilities use the phased implementation approach, the nuclear industry would need to estimate future energy needs and build larger containment structures and a single control room to manage all future SMRs within the facility. This is unwise because energy consumption and future energy need fluctuates as policy and prices change. If future energy need decreased, or nuclear energy fell out of favor, subsequent SMRs would never be built, making the price per kilowatt of those built exorbitantly high. Finally, proponents of SMRs highlight that reactors can be mass manufactured. If this were to happen, however, the oversight and quality control checks would have to be rigorous to prevent catastrophic accidents due to
manufacturing errors.

SMRs are more expensive cost declines with increasing size and the safety system would be very expensive. Makhijani, 11
(Arjun, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, The problems with small nuclear reactors, The Hill, 6-15-11, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/166609-the-problems-with-smallnuclear-reactors, accessed 8-1-12, RSR) The devil, as usual, is in the details. For instance, the cost of a nuclear reactor per unit of electrical generating capacity declines with increasing size. This is because, contrary to intuition, larger reactors use less material per unit of capacity

than smaller reactors. When the size of given type of reactor is reduced from 1,000 to 100 megawatts, the amount of material used
per megawatt will more than double. And the notion that U.S. workers would get the bulk of the factory jobs is entirely fanciful, given the rules of the World Trade Organization on free trade. Most

likely the reactors would be made in China or another country with industrial infrastructure and far lower wages. And what would we do if the severe quality problems with Chinese
products, such as drywall and infant formula, afflict reactors? Will there be a process for recalls, as has happened with factory products from Toyotas to Tylenol? How do you recall a radioactively-contaminated, mass-produced nuclear reactor if it has problems? There

are economies of scale associated with security, too. Today, large crews staff a reactor control room round-the-clock and guard the site. To reduce operating costs, some vendors are advocating to lower the number of security staff and to require only one operator for three modules, raising serious questions about whether there would be sufficient personnel in the event of an accident or attack. The same problem is associated with safety. The cost of electricity from SMRs would skyrocket if each reactor had to have its own secondary containment structure. Such containment is needed to prevent large-scale releases of radioactivity in case of a severe accident. To
ameliorate this problem, it has been proposed to put a number of SMRs in a single containment structure. The result is that a typical reactor project would still have to be very large with several reactors per project; a

single small reactor at a site would become prohibitively expensive if security and safety standards are to be maintained. This would defeat the purpose of
the flexible "modular" design. All these problems would be associated with SMRs even if we stuck with the basic design approach - light water reactors - that is well-known. They would be compounded with new rector designs and new types of waste. Nuclear power advocates have long promised far more than they can deliver, ignoring essential hurdles such as cost, safety, and performance. Decades of experience, however, have proven those promises to be hollow and hazardous. The notion that "small is beautiful" for nuclear reactors is not just fanciful; it is whistling past the graveyard of the "nuclear renaissance" that never was.

SMRs are more expensive larger per-megawatt costs. Biello, 12

(David, Staff Writer, Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power, Scientific American, 3-27-12, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power, accessed 8-1-12, RSR)
Regardless of how cheap such small modular reactors may allow nuclear to be in future, it is unlikely to be as cheap as natural-gas-fired turbines in the present. In fact, low natural gas prices stalled the U.S. nuclear renaissance outside Georgia and South Carolina, long before the reactor meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. "Because

of an unanticipated abundance of natural gas in the United States, nuclear energy, in general, is facing tough competition," noted an analysis of the prospects for small modular reactors from the University of Chicago published last November. The analysis also suggested that small reactors would be more expensive than large reactors on a per-megawatt basis until manufacturing in significant quantities has happened. "It [is] unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive."

An influx of nuclear energy projects will cost billions more than previously expected. Loder, 7
(Asjylyn, Staff Writer, St. Petersburg Times, Nuclear Power Costs Surge, St. Petersburg Times, December 12, 2007, http://www.sptimes.com/2007/12/12/State/Nuclear_power_costs_s.shtml, Date Accessed: 7/5/08) Nuclear energy - billed as the cheap, carbon-free energy source of the future - isn't sounding so cheap anymore. In fact, the price for a new nuclear plant has soared as the rush to construct nearly 30 facilities across the country over the next 15 years has pushed up the cost of labor, raw materials and possibly even the plants themselves. New industry estimates double and even triple prices quoted a year ago by utilities throughout the Southeast, including those for Progress Energy Florida's planned nuclear plant in Levy County. Based on cost estimates for other nuke plants and analyst reports, Progress Energy's costs could balloon to more than $10-billion, far more than early estimates of $4-billion to $6-bil

Warming DA

Links
Nuclear power production speeds up warming Caldicott 6 (Helen, Nuclear power is not the answer to global warming or anything else, p.4)
What exactly is nuclear power? It is a very expensive, sophisticated, and dangerous way to boil water. Uranium fuel rods are placed in water in a reactor core, they reach critical mass, and they produce vast quantities of heat, which boils the water. Steam is directed through pipes to turn a turbine, which generates electricity. The scientists who were involved in the Manhattan Project creating nuclear weapons developed a way to harness nuclear energy to generate electricity. Because their guilt was so great, they were determined to use their ghastly new invention to help the human race. Nuclear fission harnessed atoms for peace, and the

nuclear PR industry proclaimed that nuclear power would provide an endless supply of electcitiy referred to as sunshine units that would be good for the environment and too cheap to meter. They were wrong. Although a nuclear power plant itself releases no carbon dioxide, the production of nuclear electricity depends upon a vast, complex, and hidden industrial infrastructure that is never featured by the nuclear industry in its propaganda, but that actually releases a large amount of carbon dioxide as well as other global warming gases. One is led to believe that the nuclear reactor stands alone, an autonomous creator of energy. In fact, the vast infrastrcutre necessary to create nuclear energy, called the nuclear fuel cycle, is a prodigious user of fossil fuel and coal. The production of carbon dioxide (CO2) is one measurement that
indicates the amount of energy used in the production of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most of the energy used to create nuclear energy to mine uranium ore for fuel, to crush and mill the ore, to enrich the uranium, to create the concrete and steel for the reacotr, and to store the thermally and radioactively hot nuclear waste comes from the consumption of fossil fuels, that is coal or oil. When these materials are burned to produce energy, they form CO2 (reflecting coal and oils origins in ancient trees and other organic carboniferous material laid down under the earths crust millions of years ago). For each ton of carbon burned, 3.7 tons of CO2 gas added to the atmosphere, and thisis the source of todays global warming.

Nuclear power produces heat emissions which exacerbate global warming Science Daily 9 (July 13 , Trapping Carbon Dioxide Or Switching To Nuclear Power Not Enough To Solve Global Warming Problem,
th

Experts Say, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/07/090713085248.htm)

Attempting to tackle climate change by trapping carbon dioxide or switching to nuclear power will not solve the problem of global warming, according to energy calculations published in the July issue of the International Journal of Global Warming. Bo Nordell and Bruno Gervet of the Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering at Lule University of Technology in Sweden have calculated the total energy emissions from the start of the industrial revolution in the 1880s to the modern day.

They have worked out that using the increase in average global air temperature as a measure of global warming is an inadequate measure of climate change. They suggest that scientists must
also take into account the total energy of the ground, ice masses and the seas if they are to model climate change accurately. The researchers have calculated that the heat energy accumulated in the atmosphere corresponds to a mere 6.6% of global warming, while the remaining heat is stored in the ground (31.5%), melting ice (33.4%) and sea water (28.5%). They point out that net heat emissions between the industrial revolution circa 1880 and the modern era at 2000 correspond to almost three quarters of the accumulated heat, i.e., global warming, during that period. Their calculations suggest that most measures to combat global warming, such as reducing our reliance on burning fossil fuels and switching to renewables like wind power and solar energy, will ultimately help in preventing catastrophic climate change in the long term. But the same calculations also show that trapping carbon dioxide, so-called carbon dioxide sequestration, and storing it deep underground or on the sea floor will have very little effect on global warming. "Since net

heat emissions accounts for most of the global

warming there is no or little reason for carbon dioxide sequestration," Nordell explains, "The increasing carbon dioxide emissions merely
show how most net heat is produced. The "missing" heat, 26%, is due to the greenhouse effect, natural variations in climate and/or an underestimation of net heat emissions, the researchers say. These calculations are actually rather conservative, the researchers say, and the

The researchers also point out a flaw in the nuclear energy argument. Although nuclear power does not produce carbon dioxide emissions in the same way as burning fossil fuels it does produce heat emissions equivalent to three times the energy of the electricity it generates and so contributes to global warming significantly, Nordell adds.
missing heat may be much less.

States CP

States Solve
States have empirically been effective in promoting nuclear policy. NEI 2008 (Nuclear Energy Institute, The Trickle-Up Effect,
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/newslettersandreports/nuclearpolicyoutl ook/ ) JA Ten states have passed policies instituting some form of cost recovery assurance for nuclear plant construction. Three states have introduced and one has passed legislation requiring that nuclear energy be included in some form of clean or alternative energy portfolio. Six of the 13 states with moratoriums preventing new nuclear plants are considering removing those bans. Two states have passed local tax incentives for nuclear plants. For Marylands Jameson, the link between environmental and energy policy is a driving factor in policy formulation. We are nearly surrounded by water in Maryland, she said, pointing to
the Chesapeake Bay, Atlantic Ocean and a network of rivers. We are doing everything we can to limit harm to our waterways and environment

The state has taken a fairly proactive approach to addressing both environmental and energy issues in the face of a Maryland Public Service Commission warning that electricity customers could face power restrictions or rolling blackouts as early as 2011, she said.
because of climate change and global warming.