Iranian and Hezbollah Hybrid Warfare Activities: A Small Wars Journal Anthology

Contents

Acronyms

Foreword: The Future of Iranian and Hezbollah Hybrid Warfare

Introduction: Iranian and Hezbollah Hybrid Warfare Activities

Section I: Iran’s Military Capabilities And Nuclear Ambitions

Chapter 1: Are We Prematurely Designating Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as Criminal-Soldiers?

Chapter 2: Does Iran’s Political Crisis Stem from a Financial Crisis?

Chapter 3: Will Foreign Investors Avoid Iran’s Energy Sector?

Chapter 4: Organizing Iran’s Containment

Chapter 5: Iran Goes Nuclear: An Analysis of the Bushehr Nuclear Plant and Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks

Chapter 6: The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat and a Phased, Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense for Europe

Chapter 7: The Prospect for a Unified International Policy on Iran

Chapter 8: A Sino-Persian Grab for the Indian Ocean?

Chapter 9: Iranian Bomb Plot Blows Up Deterrence Theory

Chapter 10: All We are Saying… An Iran Rethink is Needed

Chapter 11: Iran’s Response to a U.S. Attack

Chapter 12: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions under the Shah and the Ayatollahs

Chapter 13: Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War Part One of Three: The Build Up to War

Chapter 14: Ghazalah’s Phased Analysis of Combat Operations: Part Two of Three Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazaleh on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran-Iraq War

Chapter 15: The Dawn of Victory campaigns to the Final Push: Part Three of Three

Chapter 16: Changing Iran’s Cost-Benefit Analysis of its Nuclear Program

Chapter 17: An Anthropological Comparative Study of the European Oil Sanctions Against Iran

Chapter 18: The Costs of War with Iran: An Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Chapter 19: Dual Use? The Iranian Nuclear Program

Chapter 20: The Five Biggest Middle East Challenges for Obama’s Second Term

Chapter 21: Iran is Not the Problem, Wider Proliferation Is

Chapter 22: Evolution of the Immortals: The Future of Iranian Military Power

Chapter 23: US-Iran’s Nuclear Conflict and the Exercise of Arab/Iranian Realpolitik

Chapter 24: A Review of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Qods Force: Growing Global Presence, Links to Cartels, and Mounting Sophistication

Section II: Hezbollah’s Global Operations

Chapter 25: Hezbollah: The Party of God

Chapter 26: The Hezbollah-North Korean Nexus

Chapter 27: Review Essay: Fighting and Learning Against Hybrid Threats

Chapter 28: Holding Lebanon Together: The Lebanese Armed Forces

Chapter 29: Why Lebanon Will Not Fall

Chapter 30: Grandmother’s Footsteps: Hezbollah Hedging

Chapter 31: Agents of Destruction: Hizb’allah—A Primer on the Party of Allah

Chapter 32: Hezbollah: Lying Low and Winning

Chapter 33: The 2006 Lebanon War: A Short History

Chapter 34: The 2006 Lebanon War: A Short History Part II

Chapter 35: Beirut, Oh Mistress of the World

Chapter 36: Lebanon’s Anchor: The Lebanese Armed Forces

Chapter 37: Hezbollah’s Strategy and Tactics in the Security Zone from 1985 to 2000

Chapter 38: Why is Hezbollah in Syria?

Section III: Iran And Hezbollah’s Involvement In Middle East Security Dilemmas

Chapter 39: Understanding Iran’s Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support

Chapter 40: The Hezbollah Myth and Asymmetric Warfare

Chapter 41: The Clash of the Caliphates: Understanding the Real War of Ideas

Chapter 42: Book Review: The Ayatollah’s Democracy: An Iranian Challenge

Chapter 43: An Assessment of Israeli Deterrence against Asymmetric Threats

Chapter 44: The Middle East’s Outlook and America’s Evolving Security Conundrum

Chapter 45: Will Hezbollah Attack Israel? Only If…

Chapter 46: Why Israel Will Attack Iran

Chapter 47: Book Review: Iran at War 1500-1988

Chapter 48: The Iranian View of Stage Two of the Arab Spring

Chapter 49: Arab Rockets, Iranian Missiles, and Israeli Air Defenses

Chapter 50: The Ansar of Yemen: The Huthis and al-Qaeda

Chapter 51: Review Essay: The Israel Air Force and the Evolution of Arab-Israeli Warfare

Chapter 52: Russian & Iran: Strategic Alliance or Marriage of Convenience

Chapter 53: Radical Islamic Terrorism

Chapter 54: The Syrian Conflict and its Impact on Hezbollah’s Authority

Chapter 55: Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques

Chapter 56: Iran’s Involvement in Bahrain

Section IV: Iran And Hezbollah In Latin America

Chapter 57: Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area of South America

Chapter 58: Iran’s Expanding Footprint in Latin America

Chapter 59: Book Review: Bumerán Chávez: Los fraudes que llevaron al colapso de Venezuela

Chapter 60: Iran and Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Areas of Latin America: A Look at the Old TBA and the New TBA

Afterword: U.S. Iran Policy and its Implications

Postscript: The Continuing Relevance of Hezbollah

Notes on Contributors

Iranian and Hezbollah Hybrid Warfare Activities

A Small Wars Journal Anthology

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Acronyms

Foreword: The Future of Iranian and Hezbollah Hybrid Warfare

Jason Rivera

For the past few decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in and will continue to engage in hybrid warfare activities in order to advocate for the ruling Regime’s security interests. Iranian leaders are often characterized as rogue or irrational actors—this, however, is far from the truth. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has faced what it believes to be existential threats from a variety of sources, including nuclear powers such as Israel and the United States and Sunni-dominated neighbors under the protection of Saudi Arabia. Given Iran’s geopolitical predicament on multiple fronts, it is possible to understand how the nation might perceive itself at a disadvantage from a conventional military standpoint. The Iranian response has been large-scale investment in hybrid warfare activities in order to secure its own interests against multiple conventionally powerful adversaries. These activities have taken many forms, including Iran’s investment in Hezbollah, its special operations capacity (Qods Force, certain IRGC elements, etc.), and its Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) inventory. Over the past decade, the Iranian security situation has been particularly tense and, by the estimation of many experts in the field, headed toward open conflict. In 2015, however, events seemed to suggest certain conflict had been avoided.

On 14 July 2015, the United States announced an agreement between the United Nations Security Council P5+1 and Iran with regards to its nuclear program. This agreement required Iran to greatly reduce the size and scope of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from related United States, European Union, and UN Security Council sanctions. With a nuclear deal reached, the United States has been free to refocus some of its conventional military posture within the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility away from Iran and towards other regional adversaries, such as Islamic State (IS) actors operating within Iraq and Syria. Over the next few years, it is possible that many nations will resume diplomatic relationships with Iran, which may serve to further deescalate hostilities and lower the probability of conventional armed conflict. In an ideal world, the above would imply a lower level of regional hostility. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to occur in the near-term.

On 4 January 2016, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Iran in an escalating feud over the Saudi execution of a Shia cleric and Iran’s subsequent attack on the Saudi embassy in Iran. The Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) both designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in early March 2016. These developments have further increased military tensions in the region and raise the probability of intentional or incidental armed conflict between the two nations. Israel, which vehemently opposed the nuclear deal, remains at high alert and is postured for military conflict. Iran is currently engaged in armed conflict against IS fighters in Iraq and is likely lending support to the isolated Assad Regime in Syria. Thus, despite the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran is engaged in conflict with current threats such as IS and remains in a position where it must prepare for conflict against its traditional regional adversaries: Saudi Arabia and Israel.

So, where does that leave the situation today? Despite the fact that the United States may be redirecting, at least partially, its conventional military focus away from Iran, the Islamic Republic may very much perceive itself engaged in an existential conflict. Israel remains a nuclear power and Saudi Arabia is still the patriarch of a region populated largely by Sunni Muslims. All this suggests that Iran will likely continue to defend itself asymmetrically against more powerful threats through the use of hybrid warfare, including the continued development and deployment of its TBM inventory and investment in its special operations and unconventional warfare capabilities via Hezbollah and the Qods Force.

The implication is that, although the nature of tension and conflict within the Iranian sphere of influence has changed, it has certainly not dissipated. Iran has every reason to continue to arm itself, train and deploy its unconventional forces, and prepare for what the Islamic Republic believes to be a likely, perhaps even certain, future existential conflict.

Introduction: Iranian and Hezbollah Hybrid Warfare Activities

Alma Keshavarz, Robert J. Bunker, and Dave Dilegge

Iran and Hezbollah have had an extremely close relationship since the founding of this terrorist group in the early 1980s. Iran has annually funded its proxy with hundreds of millions of dollars as well as an arsenal of advanced weaponry. The first major attack against the United States was directed at the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon on 23 October 1983 by suicide bombers, killing 241 American military servicemen. Iran was later identified as having supplied and financed Hezbollah to carry out the attack. As the terror group matured over the past three decades, it developed an organizational structure that is thus far unmatched in sophistication. Hezbollah has a kind of ‘terrorism acumen’ that has granted them the ability to survive for so long with immense wealth and support. They are a terrorist organization that possesses a large well-armed militia in Southern Lebanon that is also able to stealthily deploy their operatives across the world in order to wreak havoc at a moment’s notice with deadly precision.

Figure 1. Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing 1983

Source: United States Marine Corps History Division.

http://marines.dodlive.mil/2013/10/22/30th-anniversary-of-beirut-bombing-survivor-shares-his-story/

Small Wars Journal—an outlet for informing governmental and military policy makers, and indeed all its readers alike, on global affairs and pertinent threats to the national security of the United States—has a ‘special interest’ concerning Hezbollah given the Marine Corps background of many of the journal’s principles. It is derived from the 444 day U.S. Embassy take-over in Tehran in November 1979 by Iranian revolutionaries and additional international incidents—such as 1983 Marine Barracks bombing—that have sporadically transpired between the U.S. and Iran and its Hezbollah proxy over the decades. Hence, this anthology focuses on the changing dynamics of Iran and its proxy Hezbollah as an ongoing challenge to U.S. global security interests. The essays themselves date from 2007 to 2015, detailing Iranian and Hezbollah hybrid warfare activities and the threat potentials they represent. The impressive array of contributors ranges from analysts and retired military officials to leading scholars in Middle East politics and graduate students. The foreword by Jason Rivera—an intelligence and cyber operations professional, and a Manager at Deloitte & Touche LLP—sets the tone of this volume, detailing the current climate in the Middle East with regard to Iran and Hezbollah. The first 24 chapters examine the functionality of the Iranian military, Iran’s path towards nuclear weapons, and an evaluation on the threat it poses to the international community. The second section, chapters 25 through 38, shifts the focus to Hezbollah’s worldwide terrorist related activities. The third section, chapters 39 to 56, explores the integration of Iran and Hezbollah and how they are complicating an already unstable Middle East. Finally, the fourth section, chapters 57 to 60, touch on a rather minimally understood yet strategically critical area, which is the influence and presence of Iran and Hezbollah in Latin America. The afterword by Dr. Luis Fleischman—Executive Director at the Jewish Federation of Palm Beach County and co-editor of the Americas Report—incorporates the themes of each section with potential policy outcomes and the future of the United States and the international community concerning Middle Eastern affairs. Finally, Dr. John P. Sullivan—a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST) and a senior fellow at Small Wars Journal-El Centro—concludes the anthology with his estimate of the current threat posed by Iran and Hezbollah’s hybrid warfare activities and their futures and potentials.

It is easy to ignore Hezbollah with the crisis in the region involving the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda before it, but it is a testament to Hezbollah’s long term strategy to operate below the United States’ ‘early warning radar’ as they continue to expand and gain regional and global influence partially as a byproduct of their state sponsorship by Iran. From the Middle East to Latin America, Iranian and Hezbollah hybrid activities gain traction with the aid of loyal groups. They are actively involved in the crises in Syria and Yemen, while Hezbollah maintains a strong presence in Latin America moving drugs, laundering money, and proselytizing its authoritarian form of Shia Islam to local communities. Army Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of U.S. central command recently stated at a Senate hearing that Iran maintains hegemonic ambitions and will continue to pose a threat to the region through the employment of various anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, theater ballistic missiles and cyber capabilities, aggressive maritime activities, and the destabilizing activities of the Iranian Threat Network (ITN) with its Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Qods Force and external proxies operating in the region.[1]

As the turmoil in the Middle East intensifies, the United States and the rest of the world must be better prepared to counter hybrid warfare activities as they slowly metastasize. On January 2, 2016, Saudi Arabia executed Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Shi’ite cleric, which set into motion a dangerous chain reaction. Violent protests in Iran ultimately led to the destruction of the Saudi embassy and a consulate in Tehran. Saudi Arabia immediately cut diplomatic ties with Iran. The Kingdom later broadened its sanctions, halting nearly $4 billion worth of aid to Lebanon in response to Hezbollah’s actions in inciting violence in the region in support of Iran in Syria and Yemen. On 2 March 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and the Council of Arab interior ministers, designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. They have since taken legal action against Hezbollah media, most prominently the terror groups main television channel, Al Manar. The Arab League, the 22 member states within North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Arabia, followed the actions of the GCC on 11 March 2016 in Cairo, Egypt. Iraq and Lebanon were the only states to not align themselves with the vote, since Iran has a significant military presence and influence in Iraq and Lebanon is home to Hezbollah. The capture of the ten U.S. naval personnel by the Revolutionary Guard’s naval force earlier this year and the IRGC’s recent statement about creating a monument celebrating this event has served to only reinforce the pre-existing bad blood between the U.S.—and especially among U.S. Marines—and the Iranian regime.

As Iran and Hezbollah continue to support other groups like the Houthi[2] rebels in Yemen and assert their presence elsewhere, they are likely to endure pressures and adapt to the environment and security systems previously put in place. Other groups, such as the Houthis are funded and supplied with weapons by Iran while at the same time being trained by Hezbollah fighters. Figure 2[3] is the most recent depiction of Houthi controlled territory, which has made significant advancements since rebels began receiving training by Hezbollah militants.

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Yemen

Source: 0ali1. Yemen War Detailed Map. Wikimedia Commons.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yemen_war_detailed_map.png. This url can be accessed to view the original image in color.

In Syria, though there is no data on the exact number of Iranian military and Hezbollah fighters, their presence is felt considerably. Figure 3[4] shows the amount of territory controlled by each terror and insurgent group.

Figure 3. Control of Terrain in Syria: May 2016

Source: Esri, HERE, DeLome, MapmyIndia, OpenStreetMap contributors

Hezbollah and regime loyalists have gained momentum since October 2015 with IRGC and Qods Force support from Iran, which has pushed back the rebel militants.[5] Though the control is currently spread out among each of the groups, Iran and Hezbollah have nonetheless strengthened Assad’s forces.

These details are important to consider when approaching the sections in this anthology as such. Each chapter builds from previous scholarship leading up to the most current, all of which is conducive to learning more about Iran and Hezbollah’s hybrid warfare activities. This anthology is meant to in part highlight wide-ranging analyses on the growth and expansion of a terrorist group and its state sponsor. Independently or as a collective force, Iran and Hezbollah are evolving unpredictably in an already volatile region and further deliberations are necessary as they continue to promote new security challenges to the United States and its global allies.

Notes

[1] Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III, United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 8 March 2016. Page 5.

[2] Ibid. Page 19.

[3] 0ali1. Yemen War Detailed Map. Wikimedia Commons.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yemen_war

_detailed_map.png

[4] Control of Terrain in Syria: May 2016. Esri, HERE, DeLome, MapmyIndia, OpenStreetMap contributors.

[5] Ibid.

Section I: Iran’s Military Capabilities And Nuclear Ambitions

Chapter 1:

Are We Prematurely Designating Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as Criminal-Soldiers?

Robert J. Bunker and Hakim Hazim

First Published September 5, 2007

The recent U.S. consideration to designate the 125,000 person strong Revolutionary Guard of Iran as a specially designated global terrorist (per Executive Order 13224) has quite a few international security implications.[1] On the most basic level, it highlights growing U.S. and Iranian tensions over Iran’s nuclear weapons program and Iranian involvement—via its Qods Force belonging to the Revolutionary Guard—in both fermenting and supporting terrorist and insurgent activities in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

What may be far more significant, however, is the U.S. designating the military branch of a sovereign state as a terrorist organization. In the past, such designations have applied only to non-state entities.[2] While the intent of such a designation would be to target the Revolutionary Guard’s multi-billion-dollar business network with ties to over 100 companies,[3] broader implications concerning state sovereignty, political legitimacy, and, ultimately, non-state-on-state conflict readily emerge. Before these issues are discussed, a short overview of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRG) should be provided with a focus on the Qods Force.

IRG and Qods Force

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard was originally conceived to be the guardian of the values, mores, and ideals of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini established it with this purpose in mind. In time, the domestic dimension of its responsibilities proved too limited due to the fact that the Ayatollah believed the Islamic Revolution should be exported. The ambitions of the Revolution were fueled by Shia eschatology and the ‘soldiers of the Last Days’ were the IRG, particularly the special unit known in later years as the Qods Force.

Following Khomeini’s lead, the Ayatollahs have continued to increase the Revolutionary Guard’s training and sphere of influence. It has proven to be a formidable adversary in the region and a thorn in the side of the U.S. and Israel. The Qods force specializes in setting up training camps, funding, safe havens, and weapons for terrorist organizations including the following: Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and other lesser known groups. The Israel-Hezbollah war, and the subsequent damage Hezbollah inflicted on Israel, gave the world a glimpse of the extent in which Iran has aided just one of its proxies.

There is strong evidence that the Qods Force has, in the last four years and with ever increasing boldness, turned its attention to Iraq. The evidence has come not only from the U.S. but from captured operatives as well. Ali Mussa Daqduq was captured in Iraq on the 20th of March this year. He is a known Hezbollah special operative and confessed to being supported by the Qods force.[4] There is no shortage of Last Days soldiers like Daqduq and Iran is getting the most out of them. Iran is doing all of this behind the scenes, via the Qods force and Hezbollah, while acting on its interest in Iraq.

Iran sees Iraq as a golden opportunity to expand its ever-widening influence in the region. Although Iraq is predominantly Arabic, Iran knows the primary loyalty of the majority of Iraqis is in the Shia faith. Since the invasion, Iran’s clerics have openly called for the Shia militias to resist the occupation and have green-lighted the Qods Force to assist some of the Shiite militias, giving rise to yet another problem for U.S. troops and their attempts to help support the creation of Democratic institutions in Iraq.

Criminal-Soldier and Criminal-State Implications

As seen in the previous section, the Qods Force, as ‘soldiers of the Last Days,’ represent holy warriors who do the bidding of Iran’s Shia clerics. These clerics, in their spiritual role as the representatives of the Mahdi (the hidden one), openly advocate the overthrow of perceived apostates and non-believers and the future establishment of an imamate (Shia version of a caliphate).[5] The Qods, viewed from this perspective and coupled with the fact of their direct involvement in terrorist activities, are more of a non-state entity than a component of a national military force such as the IRG.

Given this realization, the term ‘criminal-soldier’ can be readily applied to the Qods Force because they are representative of pre-nation-state soldiers. Its members, furthermore, should be recognized as ‘holy warriors’ that exist somewhere within the blurring of crime and war that is taking place globally. Such holy warriors are incompatible with our perceptions of political legitimacy and, for that reason, a specially designated global terrorist designation would be well warranted.

The issue with such a well-warranted designation, however, are the implications for political legitimacy it then extends to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and, ultimately, to the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. If the Revolutionary Guard is labeled a 125,000-person force of ‘criminal-soldiers’ then would it not follow that the sovereign state that fielded it would also be considered criminal? Similar issues and designations were discussed and analyzed in a recent essay on Defining Criminal-states.[6] Those parts of Iran under the control of the Ayatollahs ruling under Mahdi mandate were viewed to be one example of the ‘Jihadi Insurgency’ criminal-state form. Other examples can be found in Southern Lebanon under Hezbollah influence and those lands once belonging to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and now existing in the Pakistani tribal border regions.

State sovereignty and legitimacy issues will thus become more and more important as time goes on because warfare is shifting from state-on-state to non-state-on-state conflict. In this new form of conflict, war is increasingly being fought over ‘humanity’s future social and political organization’ and not over more traditional notions of ‘the extension and preservation of national sovereignty.’ While the Islamic Republic of Iran might appear to be a state at first blush, in actuality, it is representative of a Shia apocalyptic non-state group that has taken over the vestiges of state trappings—the Ayatollahs ruling under Mahdi mandate kept in power by their religious enforcers.

The critical question stemming from this observation is should the U.S. currently designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization and, as a result, give a de facto challenge to the political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran? Or do we bide our time, considering the already extended nature of our resources, before preparing to engage in direct global conflict with another non-state entity and its terrorist and insurgent allies. Since the U.S. is already in a global war with radical Sunni entities (e.g. the Al Qaeda network)—do we really want to ‘go hot’ and openly enter into a new global shooting war with radical Shia entities (e.g. the Ayatollahs, Hezbollah, et. al.)? Prudence would suggest otherwise.

In a war over humanity’s future social and political organization, the U.S along with other Western Democracies and their allies cannot allow either an imamate or a caliphate to be established in the Islamic world. Consequently, it is recognized that the issue is not ‘if’ we should openly move against the criminal-state known as the Islamic Republic of Iran but ‘when.’ Nevertheless, the importance of success in this endeavor is such that we cannot approach it without the means to fully follow through. A possible compromise at present would be to only designate the Qods Force as terrorists per Executive Order 13224 at present while continuing to covertly exert pressure on Iran and the IRG behind the scenes.

Notes

[1] Robin Wright, U.S. to Designate Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as Terrorists. Washington Post. Tuesday, August 14, 2007.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Kim Murphy, Iran’s $12-billion enforcers. Los Angeles Times. August 26, 2007.

[4] Michael Ware, Officials: Hezbollah agent played deaf before confessing. CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/07/02/iraq.hezbollah/index.html. July 2, 2007.

[5] Hakim Hazim and Robert J. Bunker, Perpetual Jihad: Striving for a Caliphate. Robert J. Bunker, ed. Special issue of Global Crime on ‘Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers.’ Vol. 7. Iss. 3-4. August-November 2006.

[6] Robert J. Bunker and Pamela L. Bunker, Defining Criminal-states. Robert J. Bunker, ed. Special issue of Global Crime on ‘Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers.’ Vol. 7. Iss. 3-4. August-November 2006.

Chapter 2:

Does Iran’s Political Crisis Stem from a Financial Crisis?

Robert Haddick

First Published June 17, 2009

To what extent is Iran’s current political upheaval catalyzed, or even instigated, by sharply deteriorating economic and financial conditions inside the country? I pose the question but have no way of answering it.

Some observers believe the two earth-shaking political upheavals that occurred two decades ago—the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen Square revolt in China—were closely tied to financial crises. Yegor Gaidar, who was Russia’s economics minister and acting prime minister in the immediate post-Soviet period, asserted in an essay he wrote for the American Enterprise Institute that Soviet financial mismanagement related to grain purchases and fluctuating global oil prices led to the Soviet Union’s (literal) bankruptcy.[1] In China, some analysts have linked the countrywide uprising in the spring of 1989 to rapidly accelerating consumer price inflation.

What about Iran today? A table[2] produced by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency shows a rapid acceleration this decade in Iran’s inflation-adjusted per capita oil revenue, followed by a painful crash.[3] These revenues are obviously not distributed equally. Is the emerging polarization of Iran’s clerical elite into Ahmadinejad and Moussavi camps a consequence of these elites attempting to preserve their shares of a rapidly shrinking financial pie?

As for the masses now protesting in the streets, the energy they displayed during the election campaign, the expectations they imagined, and the anger they are displaying over their dashed hopes may be a replay of what occurred in China in 1989. As with China in 1989, Iran’s accelerating consumer price inflation may be a catalyst for street protests by the middle class.[4]

In an essay I wrote last year for The American, I argued that a cutoff in foreign investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector would be the last best hope for the international community to achieve leverage over Iran’s nuclear program.[5] According to an academic study I cited, Iran’s oil export revenue could dry up by the middle of next decade if Iran does not receive foreign technical assistance to maintain and expand its oil production.

When I wrote that essay, I envisioned the necessity of U.S. and European diplomatic pressure to achieve a cutoff in foreign investment in Iran’s oil industry. But Iran’s internal political turmoil may do the trick—foreign investors may now deem the political risk too great.

So what are the economic and financial sources, if any, to Iran’s political turmoil? Should the U.S. government indirectly add to these pressures in the hope of defunding the current regime? Or of inducing its replacement by a friendlier one? More likely, the most the U.S. government will be able to do is watch like everyone else and adjust to whatever happens.

Notes

[1] Yegor Gaidar. The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil. American Enterprise Institute. April 2007. https://www.aei.org/feature/the-soviet-collapse/

[2] U.S. Energy Information Administration. OPEC Revenues 2009. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/images/percapita_real.csv

[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration. OPEC Revenues Factsheet 2009. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/Factsheet.html

[4] International Monetary Fund. Islamic Republic of Iran: 2009 Article IV Consultation. March 2010. https://www.imf.org/external/country/irn/index.htm?type=56

[5] Robert Haddick. Closing Iran’s Oil. The American. 2008. http://www.american.com/archive/2008/september-october-magazine/closing-iran2019s-oil-spigot/

?searchterm=haddick

Chapter 3:

Will Foreign Investors Avoid Iran’s Energy Sector?

Robert Haddick

First Published June 23, 2009

Last week I discussed the possible financial sources of Iran’s political unrest.[1] I concluded that post by wondering whether foreign investors would now deem it too risky to invest in Iran’s energy sector. An article published yesterday by the Associated Press discussed renewed worries some foreign investors now have about political risk in Iran.[2] Without large-scale foreign investment in its energy sector Iran’s energy exports, and thus the vast majority of its foreign exchange and government revenue, will soon waste away.

According to the U.S. government’s Energy Information Agency (EIA), Iran’s oil fields suffer natural production declines of 8-11% per year, constituting 400,000-700,000 barrels per day of crude oil production lost each year.[3]

As all energy producers must do, Iran compensates for natural production decline with the development of new fields and by stretching the production of old fields through enhanced recovery techniques. But the easy finds have already been exploited and new production and recovery is much more technically challenging. For example, Iran seeks to boost the production of its South Pars natural gas field in order to pump pressurized natural gas into declining oil fields to extract additional crude oil. According to the EIA Iran is highly dependent on foreign expertise to achieve its increasingly difficult production goals.

Steady or declining production combined with rising domestic consumption will mean falling net Iranian oil exports, reaching zero by perhaps 2015.[4] Iran requires foreign partners in its energy sector to avoid this outcome. Yesterday’s AP story about rising political risk for investors in Iran darkens the outlook for Iran’s financial and economic stability.

Notes

[1] Robert Haddick. "Does Iran’s Political Crisis Stem from a Financial Crisis? Small Wars Journal. June 17, 2009. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/does-irans-

political-crisis-st/

[2] Unrest further isolates Iran’s reeling economy. Associated Press. June 22, 2009. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31491846/ns/business-world_business/t/unrest-further-isolates-irans-reeling-economy/ - .VoweyjaCzww

[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration. Country Analysis Briefs-Iran. http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/us-doe-irancountrybrief-0804.pdf

[4] Roger Stern. The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science and Technology (PNAS). http://www.pnas.org/content/104/1/377.full

Chapter 4:

Organizing Iran’s Containment

Robert Haddick

First Published June 25, 2009

This week U.S. Central Command hosted its second annual Gulf States Chiefs of Defense Conference, this time at the Fairfax Hotel in Washington, DC. Centcom organizers hoped the conference would examine current challenges to maintaining and strengthening security and stability in the Gulf states region to include methods to enhance interoperability and military modernization, combating transnational terrorism and regional cooperative measures to enhance security.[1]

Although U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s keynote address touched on piracy and Afghanistan and included a plea to support Iraq, his remarks left little doubt about the U.S. government’s goal for this forum.[2] The U.S. is preparing a containment strategy against Iran and it needs to organize the front line of that containment cordon. The Gulf states will obviously be that front line.

A recent report[3] from the Brookings Institution comprehensively discussed a full range of options available to the Obama administration concerning Iran. The report grimly concluded that none of the diplomatic, covert action, or military options showed much promise. The default option pursued haphazardly by the U.S. government for the past three decades has been one version or another of containment. The Brookings report made no recommendations but hinted that the Obama administration will likely settle on containment just as have all U.S. administrations since 1979.

By Brookings’ definition, containing Iran means accepting Iran’s theocracy and accepting Iran’s eventual emergence as a nuclear weapons state. During the early years of the Cold War U.S. statesmen had to make very similar concessions, which led directly to containment strategies against the Soviet Union and Maoist China. Once the U.S. settled on containment, the task then became organizing the front-line alliances in Europe and East Asia. An explicit containment policy aimed at Iran means organizing the Gulf states. Thus Centcom’s conference this week at the Fairfax Hotel.

A successful containment effort requires broad international support. According to the Brookings report (see page 135) a U.S. containment strategy would attempt to weaken Iran’s economy, thwart Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, and counter Iran’s attempts at regional subversion and proxy warfare. Under a containment strategy the U.S. government would enlist Europe, Russia, China, India, and East Asia to restrict trade with Iran, especially investment in Iran’s energy sector, a topic I recently discussed.[4] Thwarting Iran’s missile and irregular warfare threats will require greater regional military and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. which once again brings to mind this week’s Centcom conference.

Is the Obama administration preparing the way for an explicit containment of Iran along the lines described in the Brookings report? In order to increase international cooperation with a containment strategy, the Obama administration needs to convince the international community that the Iranian regime is a distasteful menace. The Obama team may hope that its repeated eagerness to engage Iran, an effort it may calculate Iran’s leadership will scuttle, would demonstrate to the international community that Iran and not the U.S. is the problem. The U.S. may hope that this gambit clears the way for an effective containment strategy.

According to Brookings, a containment strategy means accepting Iran as a nuclear weapons state. If the region is to avoid a subsequent nuclear and ballistic missile arms race, the Gulf states will have to have great confidence in U.S. security guarantees. Gates and General Petraeus are likely hoping that forums like the Gulf States Chiefs of Defense Conference will eventually remove the urge for countries like Saudi Arabia to hedge with their own strategic programs. Whether Arab states will be—to bet their possible survival on U.S. promises remains to be seen.

Notes

[1] U.S. Central Command. Gulf States Chiefs of Defense Conference. June 2009.

[2] Robert Gates. Keynote Address, U.S. Global Leadership Campaign. July 15, 2008. http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1362

[3] Kenneth M. Pollack, et al. Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution. No.2, June 2009. http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2009/whichpathtopersia

[4] Robert Haddick. Will Foreign Investors Avoid Iran’s Energy Sector? Small Wars Journal. June 23, 2009. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/will-foreign-investors-avoid-

irans-energy-sector

Chapter 5:

Iran Goes Nuclear: An Analysis of the Bushehr Nuclear Plant and Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks

Renanah Miles

First Published August 25, 2010

Iran won’t swerve first and Russia will do as Russia pleases are, perhaps, the intended takeaways from Sunday’s ceremony opening the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The event itself was uncharacteristically subdued, factual, just one more tick on the clock counting down to Iran going nuclear. But in light of Bushehr, it’s a very different announcement made two days prior that is most worth considering: Resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks next month. Progress in the talks is critical to buying Israel, America and wary Arab states strategic room to maneuver with Iran.

With impeccable timing, the news preempted the spotlight from Bushehr, and will likely do so again in September. The planned start date for the talks—September 2—is purportedly linked to the expiration date of the Israeli settlement freeze in the West Bank at the end of September, an incendiary issue that if resumed would likely burn bridges to negotiation yet again. If talks start on time though, it will handily refocus attention off another Iranian milestone the same weekend—Bushehr is scheduled to become operational Sunday, September 5.

That Iran’s march forward puts its interests on a collision course with regional and Western interests is hardly disputable. Israel’s stakes are perhaps the highest, and its room to maneuver the most constrained. A substantial concern echoed in various war games and Iran-strike scenarios, is an Israeli strike that draws an off-guard America in to a high-risk situation it is ill prepared for. A war game organized out of the Saban Center at Brookings last December observed that, An Israeli leadership faced with a strategic situation toward Iran it finds unacceptable might opt to launch a strike simply to shake-up the strategic situation, the hope that doing so would force Washington to take actions that it otherwise would not.[1]

Regardless of the likelihood of an Israeli strike, any military option must fall into one of three basic frameworks—an Israeli-led, American-led or Arab-led strike. An Israeli-led strike would likely draw U.S. forces into the fray and scenarios where American and Arab forces cooperate, or Arab states give tacit approval to an Israeli strike, are plausible, but one of the three forces would lead the initiative, regardless of execution. The Israel-Palestine issue bears directly on the political viability of any of those options.

The peace talks—and a tenable solution, even if only partial—are needed to remove the high-visibility roadblock to cooperation that the Palestinian problem poses. Israel, America and Arab governments banded against Iranian aspirations need successful talks to aid in the region’s battle for perception. And, specific to any Israeli option, concessions made through talks offer a way to mitigate Israel’s unique deterrent dilemma.

Roadblock to Consensus

The Palestinian problem is a regional problem. It is—ironically—both a rallying symbol around which Arab regimes attempt to connect with their discontented and otherwise disaffected or neglected populaces and a point by which sub-state groups marshal support from the same populaces against Israel, America and unpopular Arab regime governments. It is a deeply divisive political issue and an effective barrier to most overt Middle Eastern cooperation with Israel. Various scenarios of a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran come back to logistical dilemmas that would require, at a minimum, tacit Arab approval. Minimizing or reducing the roadblock to consensus would allow more strategic leeway for actions against Iran. For example, talks that led to an acceptable solution would provide the Saudi royals with plausible justification for cooperating with, or at least turning a blind eye to, an Israeli strike that traversed its air space.

The Information Element

The Israel-Palestine issue is an important element to the information war across the region. Public perception bears on the political viability and degree of backlash that would follow any course of action against Iran. Whether it’s Israel ceding the messaging terrain to Hezbollah or the ongoing U.S. struggle to out-communicate the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Afghan and Iraq theaters of operation, this issue has rippling effects. With specific ramifications for an Israeli-led strike is Israel’s serious problem with the battle for public opinion and the narrative that inevitably evolves around asymmetric, low-end warfare. Hezbollah (and Hamas insomuch as it follows the Hezbollah model) has impressive control of the information sphere.[2] The likelihood of Hezbollah and Hamas retaliation in event of a strike on Iran makes separating insurgents from the population by winning Israel’s battle for the narrative an imperative, with direct implications for Israel’s deterrent dilemma. But this is a battle that Israel is unlikely to win among its neighbors without some resolution to the Palestinian question.

Israel’s Deterrent Dilemma

Impacting Israel’s strategic options specifically is a two-fold deterrent dilemma. Each Iranian advance undermines Israel’s nuclear deterrent—and could render it irrelevant unless Israel develops a second strike capability in time. Meanwhile, along its immediate borders, Israel’s traditional iron-wall conventional deterrent[3] has run into increasing challenges confronting unconventional threats. Nearby threats posed by Iranian proxies—Hamas to the south and Hezbollah to the north—would spring into action in event of an Israeli-initiated strike on Iran. Israel has not been able to eradicate either group, making containment the only immediately viable option. But marginalizing Hamas does no good without a legitimate alternative governance body. A working relationship with a Mahmoud Abbas-led government based out of the West Bank, or even restored to power in Gaza, is essential to an effective containment strategy.

Progress on the Israel-Palestine issue won’t end fundamental tensions over Israel’s existence in the region. But progress will go a long way in buying breathing room for all parties with a stake in deterring Iran’s nuclear program to figure out what’s coming after Bushehr.

Notes

[1] Kenneth M. Pollack, Osiraq Redux: A Crisis Simulation of an Israeli Strike on the Iranian Nuclear Program, Middle East Memo Number 15. For the full report, see http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2010/02/iran-israel-strike-pollack

[2] In the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah beat Israel soundly in the information battle. For a good overview of Israel’s information operations efforts, see William B. Caldwell IV, Dennis M. Murphy, and Anton Menning, Learning to Leverage New Media, Military Review (May-June 2009).

[3] Vladimir Jabotinsky, an influential Zionist strategist, first called for an iron wall of military power to ensure the state’s survival. The iron wall of Israel’s military power smashed through the Arab forces quite effectively until the inevitable adaptation and resort to asymmetric tactics that ushered in the rise of sub-state and guerrilla actors post-1973.

Chapter 6:

The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat and a Phased, Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense for Europe

John D. Johnson

First Published September 20, 2010

Executive Summary and Recommendations

Iran’s position in the Middle East is unique. Iran is a Persian country surrounded by Arabs and other non-Persian ethnic groups. Iran is a Shia Muslim country surrounded by mostly Sunni Muslims and some Christians. It sees the presence of Western militaries in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, Iran perceives an existential threat. Feeling threatened, Iran continues to develop offensive and defensive military capabilities including long-range ballistic missiles and proxy groups, and probably views a nuclear-armed ballistic missile as a credible deterrent against an external attack.

The threats posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles and the nexus of Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs are of great concern to the U.S., NATO, and the international community. While Iran claims its missiles are defensive in nature and its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, insufficient cooperation and transparency on Iran’s part leaves these claims open to serious debate.

Given Iran’s military capabilities and ambiguous intent, the international community has gone to great lengths to engage Iran diplomatically. The U.S., NATO members and Middle Eastern countries have also engaged in threat mitigation activities including non-proliferation efforts, economic sanctions and the deployment of missile defense systems.

In September 2009, President Barack Obama announced a new U.S. missile defense policy for Europe called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The new U.S. approach is largely based upon the growing threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missile capability.

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO will consider the Iranian ballistic missile threat and decide whether to make missile defense of Alliance territory a NATO mission.

This article examines NATO and U.S. perspectives of the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles, reviews missile defense policies, and makes recommendations related to NATO missile defense policy as follows:

• NATO should make missile defense a NATO mission at its November Summit.

• NATO should merge the U.S. PAA capabilities with NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capabilities to create one overarching NATO missile defense shield.

• NATO members should agree to provide funding and to make national contributions to the overall missile defense shield (e.g., Aegis-capable ships and the purchase of SM-3 missiles for those ships).

• NATO should increase cooperation with Russia on missile defense, particularly where PAA plans are being laid to place future missile defense infrastructure in Eastern Europe

• NATO should intensify nuclear and missile nonproliferation strategies vis-à-vis Iran; the U.S. and NATO must engage countries such as Russia, Turkey, China and India to find common ground on the implementation of UNSC sanctions.

This article first looks at perspectives of the Iranian ballistic missile threat, followed by a review of NATO and U.S. missile defense policy for Europe, and concludes with several analytical findings.[1]

NATO Perspective of the Iran Ballistic Missile Threat

A review of NATO documents and the statements by senior NATO officials indicate that, despite some differences among member states, NATO generally views Iran’s ballistic missile program as a significant and growing threat.

The April 2009 Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl is representative of other NATO official documents in terms of how the Alliance views the threat. The declaration states, Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, territory, and populations.[2] With specific regard to the threat from Iran, the declaration later reads, We remain deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, and related proliferation risks and call on Iran to comply with relevant UNSCRs.[3]

The May 2010 NATO Group of Experts report on a new Strategic Concept for NATO stated that, Defending against the threat of a possible ballistic missile attack from Iran has given birth to what has become, for NATO, an essential military mission.[4] The report’s strongly worded assessment further characterized the threat posed by the confluence of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs in Article 5 terms saying, Iran’s efforts to enrich nuclear fuel, develop nuclear weapons designs, and stockpile long-range ballistic missiles could create a major Article 5 threat to the Alliance in this decade.[5]

In a speech in May 2010 at Bucharest University, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen echoed the sentiments of the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration and the NATO Group of Experts report when he spoke to both the policy aspects of the Iranian threat and to some of the technical aspects of Iran’s ballistic missile capability and how it threatens Alliance members directly.

A look at current trends shows that the proliferation threat is real and growing—over 30 countries have or are developing missile capabilities, with greater and greater ranges. In many cases, these missiles could eventually threaten our populations and territories. And several countries are seeking nuclear weapons. This is deadly combination. Iran is a case in point. Tehran is pursuing its nuclear activities in defiance of several UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. And in parallel with these nuclear programmes, Iran also runs an extensive missile development programme. Statements from Iranian officials declare the range of their Shahab-3 missiles to be 2,000 kilometres. That will already put Allied countries within reach: Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania.[6]

Despite widespread agreement among Allies on the threat, there are some differences in the way in which individual NATO countries perceive the Iranian threat. For example, Turkey’s perception of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs is very different from the perception contained in official NATO documents and from the perception held by the majority of the NATO Allies. Three recent developments provide insight into Turkey’s overall attitude toward Iran and show that Turkey views Iran more as a partner to be engaged with than as a threat.

First, in May 2010, Turkey, working with Brazil, signed an agreement with Iran whereby Iran could ship 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey for safekeeping in exchange for fuel rods enriched to a higher level of 20 percent, for use in a medical research reactor.[7] Further indicating a split with NATO Allies on Iran’s nuclear program, during the agreement’s announcement, Turkey’s and Brazil’s Foreign Ministers condemned any new sanctions against Iran and said Iran has a right to a full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment.[8]

Second, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has argued that Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes saying, Iran does not accept it is building a weapon. They are working on nuclear power for the purposes of energy only.[9] Further, when the fourth round of UNSC sanctions against Iran was introduced in June 2010, Turkey, a non-permanent Security Council member, voted against the measure. However, Turkey has said it will enforce UNSC sanctions against Iran.

Third, Turkey has significant economic and energy ties with Iran, a trend that runs counter to that of other NATO Allies. According to a February 2010 Brookings Institution report, The total trade volume between the two countries is $10 billion and expected to double in the next three years—given Turkey’s growing need for natural gas and willingness to lessen its dependence on Russia. As a result, Turkey will resist Western efforts to tighten economic sanctions against Tehran.[10]

While Turkey’s threat perception is very different from what it agreed to in Alliance consensus documents, as it relates to the Alliance’s missile defense plans, Turkey has given no indication that it will resist U.S. and NATO Secretary General efforts to make missile defense a NATO mission.

U.S. Perspective of Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat

President Obama’s remarks and statements by other senior U.S. government officials reflect how the U.S. perceives the threat from Iran. In addition, a review which follows of official U.S. government documents including the Department of Defense’s 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2009 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat report provides greater detail on how the U.S. views the nature of the Iranian ballistic missile threat.

In September 2009 when President Obama announced plans to strengthen U.S. missile defense in Europe, he spoke about the threat posed by Iranian ballistic missiles. He said, First, we have updated our intelligence assessment of Iran’s missile programs, which emphasizes the threat posed by Iran’s short- and medium- range missiles, which are capable of reaching Europe.[11]

In an October 2009 speech to NATO’s Defense Ministers, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, echoed President Obama’s comments regarding the Iranian short- and medium- range missile threat and also addressed U.S. concerns about Iran’s longer-range missiles and its nuclear program. Ambassador Daalder stated, We now know that Iran already has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can threaten its neighbors, and it is actively developing and testing ballistic missiles that can strike farther into Europe. We also know that Iran is—at a minimum—keeping the option of developing nuclear weapons, as well as longer-range delivery systems.[12]

Statements by two U.S. military leaders provide additional insights into the threat posed specifically by Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. In March 2009, then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, Iran’s 2 February 2009 launch of the Safir Space Launch Vehicle [SLV] shows progress in some technologies relevant to ICBMs.[13] In March 2009, then-commander of U.S. European Command, General Bantz Craddock, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee saying, "By 2015 Iran may also deploy an