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ON
COMPETITION AND REGULATION POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE STATE GOVERNMENT
06 JULY, 2007
AUGUSTINE PETER
ECONOMIC ADVISER COMPETITION COMMSSION OF INDIA
WWW.competitioncommission.gov.in
Big business by its very bigness sometimes succeed in keeping out competitors
RECOMMENDATIONS OF MIC- I
Non-legislative recommendation
Setting up public sector enterprises in sectors which have little competition Promoting SMEs and Cooperatives to challenge private monopolies Continuation of license system and import restrictions
RECOMMENDATIONS OF MIC- II
Proposed an autonomous Commission headed by a Judge to implement a new law. The proposed commission to have an investigating arm Punitive powers to the Commission Scope of merger control limited to merger involving a dominant enterprise (at least 1/3 of share in production/ supply/distribution) All proposals for expansion by dominant enterprises to be approved by the proposed Commission IPRs to be under the purview of the proposed law.
MRTP ACT
Made some significant departures from the recommendations of MIC RTP prohibited MTP Government can refer to MRTPC for inquiry and recommendation M & As powers entirely with the Government Enterprises having Rs.200 million in assets and dominant enterprises having Rs.10 million in assets to seek prior approval of Central Government for expansion or setting up a new undertaking MRTPC had limited Civil Court powers enforcing attendance of witness and calling for documents these powers were not provided to the investigating agency Trial of offences in the domain of Courts
SACHAR COMMISSION
Set up in 1997 to consider the working of MRTP Act and recommend necessary changes.
Registration of agreements by dominant enterprises made mandatory Mis-representation as well as misleading or disparaging advertisement included Provisions prohibiting UTPs introduced
RAGHAVAN COMMITTEE
A high level Committee on Competition Policy and Law set up in 1999. TOR inter-alia included recommending a suitable legislation framework which could either be a new law or appropriate amendments to the MRTP Act
MAIN FEATURES OF COMPETITION ACT, 2002 With the above objective, the Act: Prohibits Anticompetitive
Agreements. Prohibits Abuse of Dominant Position. Provides for Regulation of Combinations, and Enjoins Competition Advocacy
[Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 49(3)]
Anti-Competitive Agreements - 1
Agreements having appreciable adverse effect on competition in market in India are void
Presumptive logic
Agreements between competitors - including Cartels(horizontal agreements) presumed to have appreciable adverse effect on competition
price fixing sharing of market limiting production, supply bid rigging/collusive bidding Presumption Vs per se Treatment of JVs; efficiency enhancing JVs: Treatment of Production for Exports (Section 3)
Anti-Competitive Agreements -2
(contd.)
Rule of reason
(i) (ii) Other Horizontal Agreements Vertical Agreements: Agreements between enterprises at different stages of the production, distribution etc. chain (burden of proof of appreciable adverse effect on competition lies on the prosecutor). These include: tie-in arrangement, exclusive supply agreement exclusive distribution agreement refusal to deal resale price maintenance List not exhaustive Treatment of IPRs in Section 3 on Agreements (3.5.1)
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE - 1
Imposing unfair or discriminatory price or condition in purchase or sale Limiting production or scientific development to the prejudice of consumers Denial of market access in any manner Conclusion of contract subject to supplementary obligations Use of position in one relevant market to enter into or protect other relevant market
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE - 2
List of Abuses in the Act are exhaustive No action if an act(ion) is not covered in Abuse Abuses are of two types: > Exploitative (predatory pricing, e.g.) > Exclusionary (interference with competitive process) No concession in case of abusive use of intellectual property Appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) need not be proved
Regulation of Combinations
Combination is a broad term: includes merger, amalgamation, acquisition of shares, acquiring of control Act takes a liberal view High threshold limits only big ticket combinations subject to regulation Voluntary notification regime Commission to decide in 90 working days, else combination is deemed approved Commission can take, upon its own knowledge or information, action within 1 year after combination
RELEVANT MARKET
Relevant market is based on: Relevant product market; and Relevant geographic market
RELEVANT MARKET
Relevant Product Market - 1 Relevant product market is the smallest set of close substitutes
Determination of substitutability of products:
Demand side substitutability- shift of demand to competing
product on price rise
RELEVANT MARKET
RELEVANT MARKET
Usually both should be at least 90% to define the relevant geographic market shipment data required
RELEVANT MARKET
COMBINATIONS
Combination covers
Merger Acquisition Amalgamation Acquiring control
Any combination which causes or is likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) is void
If any of the combining parties belong to a group and any one of them is outside India, assets > US$ 2 b or turnover > US$ 6 b
AAEC has to be determined in the relevant market Relevant market determination depends upon determination of the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market
DETERMINING FACTORS - 1
Factors to be considered to determine AAEC in the Relevant Market (Competition Act, 2002):
Actual and potential competition through importsimports/trade agreements Entry barriers- sunk cost/technological lead Concentration level - CR, HHI Countervailing power Likelihood of increase in prices or profit margins Effective competition after combination
DETERMINING FACTORS -2
(Competition Act, 2002)
Substitutes actual or potential Market share Removal of vigorous and effective competitor or competitors in the market Extent of vertical integration Failing business Nature and extent of innovation Contribution to economic development Whether benefits outweigh the adverse impact
Based on reformative-cumdeterrent theory Seeks to prohibit anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant Prohibit monopolistic, position and to regulate restrictive and unfair trade combinations practices Statutory Authorities can seek opinion No provision to seek opinion
Contd..
No enabling provision to
render opinion to Central Government on such issues No provision to undertake competition advocacy No more requirement to file anti- Restrictive Trade Agreements are required to be filed within competitive agreement with DG 60 days with the DG (I&R) for registration Only restrictive clauses are held to be void Trade Agreement having appreciable adverse effect on competition in the market is Contd.. VOID
Commission to exercise jurisdiction in case of No explicit power with the unreasonable restraints exercised MRTPC in respect of IPRs in respect of IPRs. Contd..
Act implemented partly by Central Government and partly by the MRTP Commission Combinations were regulated by the Central Government upto 1991.
Contd..
The consumer concept is not defined Lacked autonomy and independence Members from restricted number of fields No such delineation of relevant market Power of review / contempt exists
Contd..
Exclusion of jurisdiction
in respect of export business
Implicit exclusion of
jurisdiction in respect of export
Inquiry to be preceded by investigation by DG DG does not have suomotu power for investigation
Inquiry not necessarily pursuant to investigation by DG Suo-motu power of investigation vested in DG (I&R)
DG vested with powers of DG does not have powers a Civil Court of a Civil Court
POWERS OF COMMISSION
> > > > > > > >
Cease and desist order Penalty up to 10% of average turnover for last three preceding financial years In case of cartels, penalty up to 10% of turnover or three times of cartelized profit, whichever is higher. Compensation ( damages) To declare agreement having AAEC as void Order can modify agreement In case of Combination can be approved, approved with modification, or refused approval. In case of dominant enterprise order can recommend Central Government for division of dominant enterprise.
institutions, etc.
Advocacy literature Website, Advocacy booklets etc. Advocacy with about 150 universities/institutions.
Draft regulations. Market studies/research projects Preparation of reference materials Study of economic, legal concepts Competition Forum 39 sessions Close networking with experts through Advisory Committees etc
DISCLAIMER
This presentation provides only an introduction to competition law, and should not be relied on as a substitute for the law itself.
Further, this presentation is subject to any amendments which may be made in the competition law at anytime in future.
www.competitioncommission.gov.in