The Future of Democracy

Papers Submitted by Participants

Wednesday, December 10, 2008 10:15 A.M. 12:00 P.M. Astor Ballroom The St. Regis Hotel 923 16th St, NW Washington, DC

The Case for Liberal Democracy Zeyno Baran

The incoming administration needs to defend and promote democracy. In the context of the current international environment, support for democracy in other states is important not only as an expression of American values, but also as a means of protecting American national security. Throughout the world, liberal democracy is once again being challenged both as a political system and, more fundamentally, as an ideology and as a set of beliefs. The latter challenge stems primarily from two contrary ideologies: Islamism and what I will call Putinism. These two share many features: both value and use the ritual of democracy, but not its substance. A small group of men allow economic openings but keep a tight control over political culture. Both are imperial and have wide-ranging ambitions, with which no true compromise is possible. And both are fundamentally antiAmerican: that is, they see any defeat or failure of America as a gain for themselves. Whether we like it or not, we are engaged in a war of ideasand the US is losing ground. Further spread of Islamism and Putinism will leave America isolated and powerless to achieve its goals in security and foreign policy. This is especially true in Europe, for example, where the influence of Islamism has made support for Israel a rare phenomenon. Similarly, thanks to the influence of Putinism, few European states are willing to defend Georgia or to support Ukraine. Both ideologies are involved in a large-scale transformation of cultures and societiestransformations that require discrediting and ultimately dismantling the existing world order. This is why Islamists claim that the West is now engaged in a cultural crusade against Islam. Huge amounts of money (mostly from oil and gas) is used to create institutions, media outlets, and even so-called civil society organizations that are neither civil nor authentically part of society. Similarly, we have seen a Russian state that has rewritten history to such a degree that its young citizens believe that Stalin was a great leader. (The analogy with Germany or Austria, where each generation is taught about the horrific crimes committed by Hitler and the Nazi regime, is particularly telling.) Faced with authoritarian threats in both religious and secular forms, the US should not be questioning whether to promote democracy; but should be deciding how. A democracy promotion effort needs to be not piecemeal, but comprehensive; a holistic challenge requires a holistic response. The whole concept needs to be redesigned with an eye towards constructing a longer-term timeframe that lasts beyond any one presidential administration. If not, the US and its allies will continue to grow weaker as its opponents strengthen. The first step is to reclaim and promote liberal democracy by championing its fundamental values and principles: critical thinking, free will, equality, and the dignity of all human beings.

The challenge to democracy from Putinism The fierce campaign of anti-Americanism being waged by the Kremlin both inside and outside Russia is stronger today than it was even during the Cold War. Beginning in earnest with the Beslan terrorist attacks (which the leadership even blamed on the US), Russia's increasingly strident anti-Americanism has grown hand-in-hand with its increased authoritarianism. The ruling regime has created an image of the US as an enemyand relies on this image for its survival and legitimacy. While it actively indoctrinates its own people against the West and against liberal democracy, the Kremlin wants to be viewed as a respectable member of the international community. It believes that it can do this because it considers Western democracies weak, easy to manipulate, and ready to appease. The Russian self-image, by contrast, is of a strong state that wants not to be loved, but to be feared. By using Europes energy dependence and reticence towards confrontation, Putin has managed to divide the NATO alliance. Most recently by invading Georgia and unilaterally recognizing the independence of its two separatist regions, Putin demonstrated that the US was unable to help the country it called a beachhead of democracy. He has challenged the West repeatedly and knew, with experience, that after a short period business as usual would return. He has also managed to crush internal dissent (sometimes violently) and outside criticism, expecting that Western liberal democracies will acknowledge Russia's privileged interests in its sphere of influence, even though this acquiescence undermines not only the West's own values, but also the existing world order. In addition to military and financial methods, Putinism relies on Russias soft power over Americans, particularly in the academic sphere, who are devoted to Russia's culture and language and who are genuinely interested in good bilateral relations. Unfortunately, many of these people subsequently end up advocating policies that are not in Americas interests. The challenge to democracy from Islamism Islamism's ultimate threat to democracy stems from the absolutism of its goal: the creation of an Islamic world order, which it holds to be the only means of bringing about true justice and peace. Although various Islamists (Sunni and Shiite; state-backed and anti-state) do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the final target to be reached: a world existing according to the dictates of political Islam. Islamists target the US with accusations of imperialism because they see the US as the primary impediment to their own imperialist goalasserting political Islam as a civilizational alternative to Western civilization. Why is Islamism such a threat to democracy? Because in Islamist ideology, Islamic law sharia regulates every aspect of an individuals life; since it is considered to be Gods law, no compromises are possible. The holistic nature of Islamist ideology makes it fundamentally incompatible with the self-criticism and exercise of free will necessary for human beings to form truly liberal and democratic societies.

Islamists are therefore strenuously opposed to secular governance. Instead, they believe that Islamic rules and laws based upon the Koran and the sharia code must shape all areas of human society, from politics and education to history, science, the arts, and more. In wholly sharia-based countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, there is little distinction between religion and state, leaving no room for liberal democracy. The formal ritual involving candidates, ballots, and victory speeches might be maintained, but in substance it is still an illiberal system lacking dissent, individuation, or critical thinking. Islamists increasingly use democracy as a means to get to power and also to win over Westerners who naively believe that the institutionalization of majority rule is the key to progress in the Arab/Islamic world. Yet, Islamists vehemently reject the fundamental principle of liberal democracy, which is that sovereignty belongs to the people. That is why they talk about Islamic democracy and never democracy or, heaven forbid, secular democracy. While adding the adjective Islamic or Muslim to democracy may sound reasonable, it simply does not work. There are Muslims who are democrats and who accept democratic rule of law, of courseI proudly count myself among thembut Islamists' understanding of these terms is very different. Islamists have not only hijacked traditional Islam but also concepts like democracy, freedom and justice. They are sincere when they use these terms, but for an Islamist, justice means the full implementation of sharia law, while freedom means free to merge religion with the state. What the US fails to recognize is that over the last decade, a majority of Islamist movements have altered previous strategies and begun participating in democratic elections; yet this is only a tactical move, as this has proven to be the easiest and most legitimate path to power. We see Islamist parties from Morocco to Malaysia increasingly advocating democracy and freedom, while eschewing references to sharia in favor of slogans decrying corruption and espousing good governance. With their clear advantage in grassroots mobilization (through related charity, educational, and religious networks), some of these parties have already reached the point at which they would win clear majorities in free and fair elections. This happened after decades of social engineering by those believing in the eventual Islamization of the world to be enacted via a bottom-up process. Many Islamists have moved away from advocating top-down Islamization (which often requires confrontation with the state), in favor of this gradual policy. The bottom up Islamization begins with people being transformed into true Muslimsrejecting Western norms of pluralism, individual rights, and the secular rule of law. Next, the individuals family is transformed; then the society; then the state; and finally the entire world is expected to live, and be governed, according to Islamic principles. It is this ideological machinery that is also at the core of Islamist terrorism.

Recent Mistakes in Democracy Promotion In general, the US looks for short-term successes when often generational commitment is neededas the Bush administration originally stated. But again, the US had to demonstrate success quickly, and thus went for the low-hanging fruitat points even sounding as doctrinaire about democracy promotion as those who oppose

democracy. Now, as a result, we are back at the same point in the cycleif not lower. Quickly wanting to hold elections in Palestine, for example, brought us Hamas. Since the US could not recognize the kind of political party that so broadly espouses terrorism, it had to consequently pull back on democratization efforts. Despite over 60 years of on-again, off-again efforts at democracy promotion, the binary model that forces a choice between autocrats in power and populist extremists out of power has never really disappeared. It is a mystery to me why the US does not remain true to its own values and support the third optionthe liberal democrats. Yes, liberal democrats in Russia or the Middle East are but a small minority todaybut they will never grow in support unless backed by the US; the other two sides already get all the financial and organizational help they could want. I think the biggest mistakes took place in the broader Middle East region. I was at first very confused about some of the policies; now I understand that the US simply does not understand Islamism, even though it has been an active and increasingly powerful counter-ideology over at least three decades. Islamism is not compatible with democracy; Muslims can be democrats. There is a huge difference. The prevailing viewthat Islamists should be co-opted into existing political systemssimply will not work. The fallacy in this policy of appeasement lies in assuming that an individual or group that sounds moderate in fact is moderate. Often, Islamists are willing to make superficial concessions while continuing to hold an uncompromising worldview. The academics, analysts and policy makers who argue that a movement like the Muslim Brotherhood today is moderate seem to disregard its ideology, history, and long-term strategy. They even seem to disregard the Brotherhoods own statements. It is true that most affiliates of this movement do not directly call for terrorist acts, are open to dialogue with the West, and participate in democratic elections. Yet this is not sufficient for them to qualify as moderate, especially when their ideology is so extreme. Turning a blind eye to the Brotherhood and its ideological extremismeven if done for the sake of combating violent extremism and terrorismis a direct threat to the democratic order. Unfortunately, since 9/11, the US has alienated many of its allies and strengthened enemies in the Muslim world. This is one of the reasons why the US lost the support of the secular movement within Turkey, which is traditionally the domestic constituency most closely allied to the West. It (correctly) perceives US policy as promoting a moderate Islamist government in their countryone that can serve as a model for the Muslim world. Yet even the current political leadership coming from an Islamist past opposes to be called moderate Islamist and instead prefers Muslim democrat as a description. Turkey is truly unique for a country with nearly all Muslim citizens; the US needs to first understand what makes it unique before trying to change it so it fits a particular democratization theory. The end of the caliphate and the Islamic sharia legal system and the separation between mosque and statewere revolutionary moves. Most Muslim countries still have sharia law enshrined in their constitutions, something which has impeded their democratic evolution. For its part, Turkey has evolved as a democratic country because it was founded as a secular republic. It is in this context the country has served as a beacon of hope for liberal democrats across the Muslim world.

The US has failed to grasp why freedom of the public sphere from religionat the core of the Turkish and French conceptions of secularismis essential in a Muslimmajority country, whereas freedom of religion based on the US model can open the way for gradual Islamization. Moreover, while it is true that Turkeys Islamists are the most reformed and moderate, this is only a reflection of Turkey's status as the most reformed and moderate country in the Muslim world. There are other inconsistencies: There is democratic erosion, especially in dissent, yet Washington has not expressed concern about such critical areas in Turkish democracymainly because the success of the moderate Islamist model became an end in itself. Second, if Turkey is increasingly perceived as a Muslim democracy and not a Western one, how can it join the EU? Wanting to fit reality to theory, US often ignores the reality. What to do? Since 9/11, anti-American movements, groups and leaders have come closer together in a shared hostility to the Western liberal system. The worldwide US commitment to, and promotion of, liberal democracy must therefore not be tacked on as an afterthought, but must be at the core of the US foreign and national security strategy. This means returning to the fundamentals of what America is about: defending and guaranteeing freedom and dignity. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that anti-American groups will continue to try to take advantage of open societies. Some intentionally provoke incidents intended to promote an us versus them mentality. They also feed conspiracy theories. The Islamist narrative, like Putinism, is about victimization and humiliation. Russia, as NATO secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently pointed out, feels itself victimized by the spread of democracy and the rule of law. Putinism shares with Islamism the focus on a past golden age (whether the Caliphate or the Stalin-era Soviet Union) in which its strength was widely respected. Even though these victimization complexes are thus based not in the experience of oppression by outsiders, but rather by a loss of ability to oppress, this sentiment is part of a deadly mixture of the feeling of political and economic inferiority with moral and ethical superiority. This January, the inauguration of a new president will grant the US only shortterm relief; both Islamists and Putinists are working on new narratives and searching for new grievances, since their need to undermine the US and its democratic vision is so incredibly strong. Hopefully, the Obama administration will not be so eager to reverse the unpopularity of the Bush years that it will limit democracy promotion that is essential to advance American interests. America needs to be true to its values and principles. The US should not be promoting moderate Islam but liberal democracy. There is no Russian or Arab exceptionalism; the leaderships come up with these arguments to continue to hold power over their people. Even though people in different parts of the world may use different terms, the yearning for what we call freedom and liberal democracy is indeed universal. There are no easy solutions, but if the US does not show leadership, no one else will. We need to be patient and focus on institution-building to enable democratic cultures to take hold. Each country has its own path that is based on its own history, culture and traditions, and it takes time; there simply is no shortcut. The US seems to

have a lot of patience with the democratization process in Saudi Arabiaso why is there a different approach to Egypt? We need to make a long-term commitment and not look for short-term successes that jeopardize longer-term gains. It should be clear by now that democracy is not merely about the electoral process. Holding elections, however free and fair in a technical sense, without first undertaking the difficult process of building institutions will get us only one thing: Hamas. Simply put, hungry, fearful, and uneducated people cannot be democrats. They need to be safe from being killed purely because they are from the wrong ethnic, religious or sectarian background. People also need to be educatedilliteracy is a problem in itself, but what is taught is as important. If all they are taught is how to memorize the Koran or why to hate the West, how can they transcend this teaching? And without building critical-thinking skills as well as teaching civics and democratic values, we will continue to see highly intelligent Western-educated doctors and engineers committing suicide attacks. People also need to be able to feed and clothe their families; but material successes are not enough to imbue one with a love for the liberal democratic system that makes them possible. Clearly, the US cannot do this cheaplyespecially given how much everyone else is spending on anti-democratic agendas. In many of these programs, there can be partnerships with Europeans and others who are similarly committed to democratic development. Moreover, compared to how much US is spending on wars and military budget, the amount will be minimal with huge returns. And, with the economic crisis hitting parts of the world that are so critical, such as Pakistan, there is even greater need for the US to allocate larger sums of money for education and institution building by supporting organizations that would eventually lead to democratic civil society particularly secular organizations (press, judiciary, womens organizations, small and medium business associations, etc). In many parts of the world, following the shock of globalization and the resulting questioning of identities, countries are reconstructing their own national identities. The US has to be influencing this process so destructive ideas do not take root. For this purpose providing alternative media sources to Russian or Islamist propaganda is critically important. The US must increase funding and coverage of both the Voice of America as well as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2009 will be a particularly challenging year for democracy. There are elections in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Iran has gotten much stronger in Iraq and across the wider regionand its influence will grow even further once it obtains nuclear weapons and once US begins leaving Iraq. Iraq may also witness serious clashes based on ethnic and sectarian division lines that could even draw in neighboring states. If Pakistan fails, Islamists will finally have access to nuclear weapons, possibly first directed at India. Relations with Russia are up in the air at best. The list goes on. There has to be a rethinking of democracy promotion in a holistic way in light of these very serious and imminent issues; otherwise the incoming administration may repeat the mistakes of previous onesmyopically solving short-term problems while leaving the longer-term future picture more blurry than before.

The Future of Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy Larry Diamond

The current moment represents a major historical conjuncture for democracy in the world in several respects. First, it marks the close of one American presidential administrationthe one that has put the promotion of democracy most audaciously at the core of its foreign policy, at least rhetorically. And that administration of George W. Bush is ending with its freedom agenda largely in ruins, particularly in the Middle East. Second, power is rotating to a new American administration and a new approach to foreign policy. The world awaits the Obama Administration with a depth of hope, admiration, and anticipation rarely if ever equaled in the history of the American presidency. During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama released a Strategy to Promote Global Development and Democracy that clearly signaled his support for peaceful efforts to support democratic development and to stand behind struggling democrats abroad. This included a pledge to enhance funding for American efforts to assist young democracies and to support democratic activists and civil society organizations, including through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Yet there is a strong current of sentiment among foreign policy specialists, including many Obama supporters, that the Bush Administration over-prioritized democracy promotion and then also discredited it with its incompetence, inconsistency, use of force, and imperial overreach. There is thus some concern that democracy will be demoted in the next administration, below the broader pursuit of global development, and now the overriding priority to stabilize and revive the world economy. Third, there is the new reality of global economic crisis, as yet unfathomable in scope, but which could become the most severe and prolonged contraction of economic output since the Great Depression. That was a calamitous time for freedom in the world, swallowing up many young and fragile democracies and evolving semi-democracies. It is an axiom of political science theory on democracy, codified in the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset, that democracy depends for its stability to a unique degree on legitimacy, that is a popular belief that the constitutional system is the best form of government for the society. Democracy is most stableand secure against reversal in stressful timeswhen this belief is intrinsic and deeply rooted. However, in the absence of crisis, democracy can persist indefinitely, either for want of a better alternative or because it generates what Lipset called performance legitimacy, particularly as a result of good economic growth. Quite a number of the new democracies in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Africa have had in the last five to ten years a surprisingly good run of macroeconomic performance, relative to previous times. So there is now the danger that people will become disenchanted with democracy as prosperity suddenly evaporates. Even where people have been disappointed with economic performance under democracy, either relative to the previous authoritarian regime (as in East Asia) or in terms of the puny benefits of growth that they have actually

experienced, the economic hardships since the transition may pale in comparison to what will soon come, especially if the hemorrhaging of economic confidence and the obstruction of capital flows are not soon reversed. Finally, and unfortunately, the global economic recession comes at a time when the world has already slipped into some degree of democratic recession as well. This downturn encompasses several phases and dimensions. The Democratic Recession The extraordinary growth in the number of democracies in the world leveled off in the mid to late 1990s, stabilizing at around 120, give or take a fewor roughly three in five states in the world. Since 1995, there have been important instances of democratic transitionincluding in such key states as Indonesia, Mexico, and Ukrainebut these have been offset by democratic reversals or breakdowns. There has also been a rising trend of democratic reversals, with the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan marking what I feared at the time would be and has in fact become an important watershed or inflection point. Since the third wave of democracy began in 1974, I count a total of 25 reversals of democracy (most recently, the military coup in Mauritania earlier this year). But 17 of these reversals, or about two-thirds, have occurred just in the last nine years (beginning with the coup in Pakistan). Moreover, a disturbing number of these reversals have come in big and strategically important states, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria, and the Philippines. This raises a third worry: Many democratic reversals have been sufficiently subtle to escape coherent condemnation and painful sanction by the growing architecture of regional and international organizations that have adopted principles of democratic defense, because these have been tied to the overt seizure of power in military or executive coup. When democracy dies by the creeping degradation of competitive processes, political freedom, and independent institutions, as has happened in Russia, Venezuela, Nigeria and the Philippines, it does not generate the kind of outrage that might otherwise be mobilized by collective actors like the OAS or powerful democracies like the United States. It is even harder to mobilize pressure when the continuity in the form and functioning of institutions is, as in Nigeria and the Philippines, so great that it is hard for outside actors to get a handle on what has happened. This then suggests the fourth negative trend in democracy globally: the growing number of regimes in the world that fall into an ambiguous gray zone between democracy (with its essential requirement for free and fair elections, buttressed by a larger climate of political and civil freedom) and dictatorship. If one were to insist upon a more exacting standard of electoral democracy (with more freedom and institutional integrity, and a reasonably level political playing field) then a number of countries classified by Freedom House as democraciessuch as Georgia, Senegal, and Guatemalawould be reclassified as competitive authoritarian regimes (as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have done), and the number of democracies in the world today would drop by another ten to fifteen. We have in the world today a class of democracies that are so shallow, superficial and poorly functioning that they stretch the meaning of the word democracy. Pakistan is a classic case in point. In Thailand, the new civilian government that has come to power via more or less free and fair elections is so

paralyzed by political polarization and so lacking in authority and capacity at this moment that it is something of a strain to call it a government at all, much less a regime. In Yemen, which fortunately Freedom House does not recognize as anything close to a democracy (but which some observers once mistook for one) the writ of the central government is so limited that much of the country outside the capital is simply a nomans land. One thing that political science has (belatedly) rediscovered in the past decade is the obvious truth that democracy presumes a functioning state. Yet in significant swaths of Africa, Asia, and now even parts of Latin America, the state itself lives a tenuous existence, or as in Liberia and East Timor (not to mention Iraq and Afghanistan) struggles to re-establish authority after civil conflict. If the global economic recession proves protracted and severe, it will challenge the very viability of many states, not to mention the legitimacy of whatever democratic institutions may exist. The Authoritarian Vulnerability While a whopping worldwide recession has potentially alarming implications for the stability of democracies, it may not turn out to be such a good thing for dictatorships either. And this exposes a possible silver lining in the present yawning crisis. If there is one word that captures the historical moment that is upon us now, it is volatility. We cannot know how cataclysmic this recession will be. We cannot exactly how it will affect different types of regimes. But one thing we can predict is that it will generate uncommon stress and increased scope for political change of all kinds. One is tempted to recall the famous phrase about conjunctural crisis of Marx and Engels: All that is solid melts into air. Marx and Engels would acclaim the time ripe for some sort of revolutionary upheaval against capitalist democracy. But I think the turbulence will take a different form. If the economic crisis is long and severe, major dictatorships could be threatened even more than democracies. For, at least democracy rests on a legitimating idea or value. The remaining dictatorships of the world enter the current global crisis largely bereft of any intrinsic, ideational form of legitimacy. The capitalist-Leninist systems in China and Vietnam and their postcommunist variant in Russia all rest purely for their legitimacy now on economic performance. China in particular may face a swelling tide of labor unrest and civic mobilization if economic growth falls even below five or six percent. The legitimacy of the Islamic Republic in Iran is long since drained, except among a hard core of believers and beneficiaries. Even the quasi-authoritarian populism of Hugo Chavez depends largely by this point on his ability to pump oil-based patronage into society. In fact, all of the worlds despotic oil-and-gas regimes with large populations will find themselves hard-pressed to maintain the flow of public subsidies and private benefits that sustain their rule if oil remains under $70 or so a barrel. More generally, most Arab authoritarian states (i.e., those that do not have so much oil income relative to population that they can easily ride out the storm) are headed for serious political strain, because of their huge youth bulge (with nearly two in five citizens under the age of 15) and the failure of their economies to generate nearly enough jobs to absorb it even in the relatively good times of the last decade. By contrast, the democracies of the world that are more clearly democratic have a systemic advantage. They have something other than short-term economic performance

that they can offer their people as a foundation to justify their rule: namely, democracy itself. Fifteen years of public opinion surveys in the postcommunist world, Africa, Asia, and Latin America show that citizens in young democracies value the political outputs of democracyfreedom, participation, electoral choice, accountability, responsiveness, and the rule of lawas ends in themselves. To the extent they see these political outputs in evidence they exhibit greater support for democracy and a more solid willingness to reject authoritarian alternatives. At least to date, these citizens have (on balance) shown an ability to distinguish between economic and political performance, surprising patience in waiting for the material benefits of democracy, and support for democracy when it delivers on its political promise (even if it falters on the economic side). Moreover, dissatisfied citizens in a democracy can change their government without changing the political system. The only way citizens in an authoritarian regime can change their leaders is to change their regime. In democracies, the coming years will likely be a hard time for incumbent governments. But if those governments give their citizens a reasonably high quality of democracywith effective representation, transparency, control of corruption, respect for basic rights, and a rule of law with public orderthey can survive. In the face of rising popular disenchantment, authoritarian regimes may be forced either to crack down harder or open up politically. The first path could generate deepening political polarization and crisis while the second represents a slippery slope toward popular mobilization for democracy. The Democratic Prospect Given the combination of the prevailing democratic recession and the incipient economic recession, the prognosis for democracy in the next decade or so is not as grim as it might seem. Democracy will be challenged most where it is most deficient as a democracy. Authoritarianism will be challenged most where it has seemed most successful and dynamicor least some kind of model or source of diffusionin countries like China, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, as well as in semi-authoritarian regimes like those in Singapore and Malaysia. With this in mind, the clear imperative, as I will briefly outline , is first to improve the quality of democracy where it is most deficient. The second imperative is to avoid giving stressed authoritarian regimes an obvious reason or context to blame us, the United States or more broadly the democratic West, for the troubles they will be having. The third imperative is to support democratic dissidents and organizations in authoritarian situations, because in a volatile world, we cannot know specifically where and when that support might become instrumental to a democratic breakthrough, but we know from the experience of the last two decades that the potential is there. There is one more acutely worrisome dimension to this prognosis, however, and it also has urgent policy implications. We should not assume that the unraveling of authoritarian regimes will lead to democracy. The most common successor to a failed autocracy is another type of autocracy, and often a worse one. There is more than a theoretical danger that if an economic depression knocks out the performance-based foundations of stability in China and Russia, the alternative could be not democracy but heightened and militarized authoritarianism, with nationalist and possibly fascistic

overtones. This is why we need to maintain an overall framework of relationship with these countries that will not be conducive to a framing of their national crisis in that way. The problem in the Arab world is even more acute, in two respects. First, because of their youth bulges and the historic nature of the authoritarian bargain (roughly, bread for freedom), the Arab regimes that lack sufficient oil revenue to buy off discontent Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, possibly Algeria (and down the road maybe even Saudi Arabia)are going to be severely strained. As Tamara Wittes argues in a wise and important new book, Freedoms Unsteady March, these regimes were already headed for a slowly gathering crisis because of their incapacity to generate sufficient jobs and other opportunities for the next generation. Now the crisis may come sooner. But secondly, in these countries, the principal political alternative to the current autocracy right now is not democracy as we would recognize it, but some form of radical Islamist regime. Undoubtedly, many traditional experts on the Middle East will argue that the global crisis will require us to hang on to these regimes for dear life. A more sophisticated reading of the challenge, however, would suggest that we had better define a new strategy for fostering pluralism (and hence a third way between rotten dictatorship and radical Islam) before it is too late. The Democratic Imperative: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy The Obama Administration will inherit an unusually troubled and turbulent environment for regime stability around the world. But this hardly implies that we should now demote concern for democracy and freedom as a key pillar of American foreign policy. Since my role in this project is mainly an analytical one, I will be able only briefly to spell out the policy implications, but I begin by stressing that we will only downgrade democracy globally at our peril. A more authoritarian world will not manage the social and political stresses of economic crisis more gracefully. It will be much more at risk of giving nasty, nationalistic, and quite possibly violent vent to them. In South Asia, the failure of secular democracy in Pakistan and Bangladesh could usher in much more anti-American, Islamist political alternatives, or possibly state failure altogether. In the Arab world (and probably at least some of the Central Asian states), the failure to open up the political and civic freedoms necessary for democratic alternatives to develop, mobilize, and gain support, could well, as Wittes warns, accelerate precisely the political catastrophe we are trying to preempt. In Africabeginning with Nigeriaa lack of democratic progress could accelerate the slide toward state failure, and what combination of countries or actors will have the resources to stabilize and rebuild Nigeria if the state collapses? Finally, downgrading democracy promotion would miss opportunities for democratic breakthroughsand to regimes much friendlier to the United Statesin countries like Iran and Venezuela. The foregoing suggests four directions for U.S. policy. First, the new Administration should reaffirm that supporting the emergence, defense, and improvement of democracy remains a bipartisan and enduring goal of American foreign policy. This does not mean that it is the only goal or that it will not come into conflict at times and places that need to be frankly acknowledged. Nor does it

mean we must pursue it with the same arrogance, inflated rhetoric, and unilateral style of the outgoing Administration. There are numerous under-utilized means of seeking to shore up, defend and advance democracy in the world, including through regional organizations like the OAS and global associations like the Community of Democracies. Persisting with the goal can even be consistent with giving it a different name to mark the difference in tone: If necessary, call it democracy support, for example, instead of democracy promotion. Second, we need a comprehensive program to improve and secure several dozen young democracies that are at varying degrees of risk. Particularly in a context of severe economic recession, these democracies could fail if they do not become better democracies in the political sense. This requires substantial additional investment in both governmental (primarily through USAID) and nongovernmental (for example through NED) programs to help strengthen parliaments (both members and staff); improve the capacity and autonomy of judiciaries and legal training; professionalize the state administration, and the military and police as well; enlarge and train counter-corruption and audit agencies; make political parties more responsive, capable, and internally democratic; enhance the resources and skills of independent media and civic associations of all kinds; educate the public about democracy; and empower broader civic and political participation, particularly of women, youth and minorities. Relative to what we spend on foreign assistance in general, these programs (and especially those to assist nongovernmental actors) are very inexpensive and provide a significant prospect of enhancing not just freedom but human development and political stability as well. Third, we know from bitter experience and a long sad history of wasted resources that state-to-state assistance to improve democracy, for example in parliamentary or ruleof-law spheres, does little good unless there is the political will to have a better, more accountable democracy. Unfortunately, such will emerges spontaneously all too rarely. It requires some push of incentives from outside, as well as pressure from below in civil society. Tying aid to demonstrated performance with respect to freedom, accountability, and the rule of law can help to generate these incentives. This means not only preserving the Millennium Challenge Account but enlarging (while somewhat reforming) it, andonce the budgetary climate permits an increase in overall U.S. foreign assistanceinvesting most new aid resources in those governments that are walking the walk on good governance. Fourth, now is not the time to dump the baby with the bathwater of fostering democratic change in the Middle East. The Bush freedom agenda for the Middle East failed not only because of the wrong means and tone and a number of strategic and operational mistakes (amply articulated in Wittes book) but also because the Bush Administration lost its nerve when Islamists started winning elections or scoring gains in Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq. We do not need to (and indeed cannot) reorganize our whole foreign policy in the region around democracy in order to press for tangible improvements in political and civic freedom in the region. Rather, what is needed here is a shrewder strategic assessment of what is possible, at least incrementally, in each individual country; which countries are best poised for more significant political reforms; and what degree of leverage we have. That analysis will show we often have more leverage than we use, and that we cant beat something with nothing. President Bush was actually right about this in concept: If we dont help to generate and strengthen in these

societies (and now we must include here much of South and Central Asia) a positive democratic alternative to the decrepit regimes, then their people will increasingly rally around the only available one, radical Islam. Finally, we need to continue to support democratic dissidents and opposition forces struggling against oppression. Morally it is the rightand indeed obligatory thing to do, but also this is a strategically opportune moment to do so. If I am right that the next few years (and perhaps longer) will be a stressful time for dictatorships, too, then it may also be a time when democrats can make surprising gains. Here, our instruments must be mainly non-governmental, particularly when dealing with civic movements. And indeed the more they engage and seek to support opposition movements in the underground, in exile, and in civil society, the more important it is that the assistance be distanced from U.S. government agencies. NED has the knowledge, experience, and credibility to play a leading role in this regard, which is why the Obama presidential campaign proposed a significant increase in its funding for this purpose. Lets also not forget the moral inspiration and practical assistance that international broadcasting through Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty gave to the forces of freedom under communist tyranny during the Cold War. For relatively modest cost in dollars and geopolitical capital, we can and should expand international broadcasting to authoritarian countries while ensuring that, in programming content and tone, it conveys our values of political pluralism and the independence and credibility of news reporting. No doubt, the Obama Administration will pull back from the sweeping democracy promotion rhetoric of its predecessor and reevaluate some of its programs. But the world needs the new President to continue to express a strong American voice on behalf of freedom in the world. It is possible to find and sustain a middle course between a freedom crusade and a freedom retreat. That requires returning to the fundamentals of democracy assistance, generating new incentives to improve democracy, and crafting smart strategies for encouraging democratic change in the worlds remaining dictatorships. Evenno, especiallyin a time of global economic crisis, this is a feasible and indeed urgent agenda.

The Future of Democracy Promotion Carl Gershman

As was suggested in the letter of invitation to this roundtable, the issue of the place of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy will certainly undergo an intense review by the new Administration of President-elect Barack Obama. The main question that will be examined, which is also before us today, is not whether the U.S. should seek to defend and advance democracy in the world, but how it should continue to do so. The idea that the U.S. has a national purpose to support democracy in the world is nothing new. It goes back to the very founding of the republic, when George Washington declared on the eve of his first inauguration that the future and universal validity of the idea of self-government rested on the success of the American experiment. What today we call democracy promotion was initiated by President Reagan in 1982 in his Westminster Address, when he called for a new effort to foster the infrastructure of democracy in countries around the world. That led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy, which in its infancy in the 1980s was both highly controversial and very modest in scope, its budget being less than $20 million a year. But with the end of the Cold War, the resources devoted to democracy assistance expanded exponentially, both in the U.S. and in Europe, as did the range of institutions involved in this work, from political foundations like the NED to development agencies, multilateral organizations, and private foundations. The work has received broad bi-partisan support, and President Clinton, in his first address to the U.N. General Assembly, enunciated his own doctrine of democratic enlargement and took a number of steps to implement this policy, among them expanding the role of USAID in this field and launching the Community of Democracies. President Bush carried the idea of democracy promotion much further, making it a core part of the post-9/11 strategy to defeat terrorism and the animating principle of a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom the Middle East. As the letter of invitation suggests, this has caused many people to question the goal of trying to aid democracy in the Middle East and even the value of democracy promotion itself. But despite the bitter controversies of the recent past, there are actually important areas of agreement that can be built on in this period of transition. The critics are right that making democracy promotion the centerpiece of U.S. policy in the Middle East created unrealistic expectations and was bound to foster disillusionment and cynicism. Even under the best of circumstances, democracy will come only gradually to this difficult region, while security concerns will have to be addressed on a much more urgent basis. Still, the President was not wrong in asserting that political and economic reform is the best longterm antidote to jihadist extremism, or in repudiating the doctrine that the Arab Middle East, alone among the regions of the world, is inherently unfit for democracy. And this policy, despite all the problems of concept and implementation, nonetheless helped stimulate the emergence of new groups in Arab societies that are today pressing for greater pluralism, political space, and free expression. Its important that these groups not be abandoned. Shaping an approach to the region that embeds democracy promotion

as a long-term strategic objective, even as the U.S. focuses principally on more immediate priorities, will be one of the key challenges facing the new administration. That same challenge applies to U.S. foreign policy more generally. The current policy, which Secretary Rice has called Transformational Diplomacy, also gives a central place to the promotion of democracy. It is premised on the belief that the main threats to American security today come not from states but from such non-state actors as transnational terrorist groups, and that the principal job of diplomacy is therefore not to manage state-to-state relations but to transform states whose dysfunctions breed these threats. It is appropriate for the U.S. to seek the democratic transformation of states that foster extremism, but linking official U.S. policy and diplomacy so closely to this effort has a number of serious drawbacks. For one thing, its difficult to engage diplomatically with a government while simultaneously funding groups that may oppose that governments policies and even its very legitimacy. For another, as with the Middle East, its exceedingly difficult to use a process as complex, uncertain and protracted as democratic change as an instrument to advance policy objectives that are inevitably driven by immediate needs and crises. Not least, a diplomatic agency like the Department of State is ill-suited to carrying out an effective program of democracy assistance. Because of its diplomatic constraints, it is more likely to aid pro-democracy activists in countries that are unfriendly to the U.S. and where our interests are not deeply engaged than in relatively friendly autocracies, leading to charges of double standards. In addition, the State Department is required by its very nature to subordinate the goals and aspirations of the activists receiving the aid to its own policy objectives, and this can compromise the credibility and integrity of the whole process. This is the very reason the Congress insisted that the NED be an independent institution, insulated from the imperatives of policy and therefore able to pursue a long-term and consistent approach to democracy promotion. Given the questions that are being raised about democracy promotion, and with so many different agencies and organizations now involved in this field, the time has come to step back and consider how this work can be most effectively organized, funded and carried out. What is needed is a new coherence in this area of policy, based on an appropriate division of labor among the various agencies of government, principally the State Department and USAID, and between them and non-governmental institutions; and on a realistic understanding of democratic development and its relation to U.S. foreign policy and national interests. At the risk of over-simplifying, let me say that there are essentially two kinds of democracy assistance top-down assistance to governments to improve their performance at all levels and increase their transparency and democratic accountability; and bottom-up assistance to independent and politically active civic groups working to educate and empower citizens and to promote free media, human rights, economic opportunity, and political and cultural pluralism. Official development aid is needed in the first category, above all in emerging democracies and in post-conflict countries where the most urgent priority is to build effective and accountable state institutions. Support in the second category, which is properly termed political assistance, should logically be extended through non-governmental channels, especially in unfriendly and repressive

political environments, though there are areas of civic development that are not politically sensitive and where official development aid would be appropriate. Democracy assistance provided in this manner should be complemented by a diplomatic strategy designed to build broad multi-lateral coalitions to advance democratic objectives. These objectives should include defending democracy activists who are under attack in back-sliding states, deterring repressive and belligerent behavior by autocratic governments, and encouraging an international balance of power favorable to the United States and its democratic friends. Democracy activists and their support institutions in the West will have a much easier time operating and will achieve better results in a world where the democracies are cooperating politically and diplomatically on such a common democratic agenda. Understanding democracy promotion as a way of aiding in appropriate ways the efforts of indigenous activists and organizations to expand political space, build democratic institutions and promote the rule of law should address the principal concerns of those who question its value and feasibility. Seen in this way, democracy promotion is not, as the letter of invitation puts it, the primary basis of American foreign policy, but rather a core national purpose informing policies that are formulated to address urgent security issues and other pressing concerns. Nor is it an attempt, as is sometimes alleged, to impose our will on others, since its purpose is simply to give people the freedom and wherewithal to determine their own destiny and set their own course. Finally, it does not seek democracy as a short-term remedy for difficult and intractable problems but rather as a long-term goal that can be approached only gradually, sometimes in fits and starts, and always with difficulty. To those who doubt that democracy is a realistic possibility in many parts of the world (again to quote from the letter), let me say that there is no country where taking the next step toward greater openness or democratic possibility is not feasible, from freeing political prisoners in Burma to breaking the information blockade in North Korea to expanding freedom of expression in Saudi Arabia. The concern expressed in the invitation that Americas ability to promote democracy in the world may have been permanently hindered by the unpopularity of American foreign policy in recent years has been belied by our recent election. No electoral process anywhere has ever been more closely or more widely followed around the world. Beyond the goodwill that is now being extended to the United States over the historic election of an African-American as President, one can only imagine the educational and inspirational impact on hundreds of millions of people throughout the world of the election process itself, which was so open, fair, authentic, and riveting. While the United States has only recently developed the instrument of direct assistance to promote democracy, it has been the model of American democracy that historically has been the main source of our countrys democratic influence. That is why Abraham Lincoln warned in 1854 that the monstrous injustice of slavery deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites. Those enemies still exist, but as we approach the bicentennial of Lincolns birth, it is encouraging to know that the just influence of our example is still felt -- more widely today because of the communications revolution than Lincoln could ever have dreamed. But that influence must be used wisely, and that is the challenge we all now face.

Why and How the United States Should Support Democracy Abroad Michael McFaul

Most Americans and many people around the world will breathe a sigh of relief when the Freedom Agenda retires with its author, President George W. Bush, on January 20, 2009. Public opinion polls show a dramatic decline in support for American democracy promotion abroad. In academia, the think tank world, and among television talking heads, the realist renaissance is palpable. When seeking to praise President-Elect Obamas national security team nominations, commentators frequently use words such as pragmatists and realists to distinguish the incoming administration from the ideologues and idealists of the Bush administration. This reaction to Bush is understandable. In the aggregate, neither Bushs soaring rhetoric about freedom, liberty, and democracy or his actual policies has helped to produce more freedom in the world. While Bush and his allies did destroy two of the worlds most repressive regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, democracy has not taken hold yet in either place in the aftermath. Georgias Rose Revolution in 2003 and Ukraines Orange Revolution did take place on Bushs watch, but democracy is struggling to take root in both places today. At the same time, democratic erosion gained momentum in Russia, Iran, and Venezuela also during Bushs time in office. The Bush Administration helped to prod a few positive democratic outcomes in places like Kenya, but other democratic advances in the last eight years, such as in Pakistan, took place in spite of Bush policy, not because of it. Perhaps most disturbing are countries like Egypt where earlier and marginally successful pushes for democratic change by the Bush Administration have now been reversed and the regime is more autocratic today than it had been in 2001. However, the response to this limited record of success should not be isolation, a return to realism, or a rejection of the objective of democracy promotion. Short term, knee jerk reactions against Bush could produce long term strategic negative consequences for American national interests. Those fighting tyranny and seeking to advance democracy around the world also would suffer. Instead, those responsible for pursuing American national security interests in the Obama Administration must remember the moral and security reasons for why the United States should promote democracy, and then look for ways to pursue this policy objective more effectively. When reviewing American security interests over the last two centuries and not just during the last two presidential terms, there should be little doubt that the American people have enjoyed more security and prosperity as a result of democracys advance around the world. Every serious enemy of the United States has been a dictatorship: Germany, Italy, Japan, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the past, and Iran, Syria, and North Korea today. And in the last several years, it is more than coincidence that Russian foreign policy has become more belligerent and anti-American as Russias regime has become more autocratic. Likewise, Al Qaeda and other non-state enemies of the United States espouse illiberal ideologies and these movement recruit the

majority (though not all) of their followers from disenchanted, disenfranchised people living in autocratic countries. No democracy has ever attacked us, and we have never attacked another democracy. The United States has relied on autocratic allies to achieve important national security objectives, and today the security and prosperity of the United States and our democratic allies benefit from cordial relations with autocratic regimes in Saudi Arabia, China, Angola, and Kazakhstan. In the long run, however, Americas most reliable partners have been democracies, not autocracies. Through a combination of increased trade and investment opportunities and decreased defense expenditures, the American economy also have benefited tremendously from transitions to democracy in Germany, Japan, and Italy after World War II, and the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Conversely, the threats to American security interests from democratization, propagated by autocrats in such diverse places as Portugal, Philippines, South Korea, Chile, Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and Pakistan, have never been is bad as promised. Beyond security and economic interests, those advocating an ethical foreign policy should embrace the idea of supporting democratic development abroad. Winston Churchill was right: democracy is the worst form of Government except all those others that have been tried from time to time. Compared to other types of regimes, democracy provides for more accountable government, better constrains the predatory behavior of states, and more vigorously protects individual and minority rights. Regarding economic performance, democracies in the developing world over the last half century have performed as well as autocracies. When celebrating Chinas fantastic growth under autocracy over the last three decades, we also must remember the incredible economic failures of autocracies in North Korea, Cambodia, Zaire, or Zimbabwe over that same time period. Economic volatility is roughly twice as extreme under autocracies compared to democracies, and the worst kinds of economic hardships and security threats famine, gulags, and genocide occur in autocracies, not democracies. Finally, public opinion polls demonstrate that people around the world prefer democracy to other forms of governments. That the United States should promote democracy does not necessarily mean that the United States can promote democracy. While the budgets for democracy assistance have ballooned to over a billion dollars a year recently, it is striking how little we still know about what works and what does not work. If the Obama administration seeks to support democratic development abroad more effectively, the first step must be to commission a comprehensive evaluation of previous programs and policies. In parallel to this much needed learning exercise, some lessons from the past eight years are already clear. First, the United States must get its own house in order. Americans cannot inspire others to embrace democracy if we ourselves do not continue to perfect our own democracy. We cannot champion human rights in other countries if we do not respect human rights at home and abroad. Its that simple. Closing Guantanamo, stopping torture, ending rendition, and placing more restrictions on wire tapping is just the beginning of a long process of democratic renewal desperately needed.

Second, President Obama must state clearly that the United States will never use military force to promote democratic regime change. He could quote Ronald Reagan from his famous speech before the British parliament on June 8, 1982, when he rightly observed, regimes planted by bayonets do not take root. Third, not only military force but most other forms of coercive power -- be they economic sanctions, rhetorical threats, or covert assistance to freedom fighters -- have a very mixed record of success. Instead, the new administration should consider a dualtrack engagement of state and society as an alternative strategy for promoting democratic development. In Chile, the Philippines, and South Korea in the 1980s, American diplomats helped to persuade our autocratic friends to leave office peacefully. Likewise, Mikhail Gorbachev began political liberalization in the Soviet Union during an era of rapprochement with the United States, not during a tense period in bilateral relations. In all of these cases, American non-governmental actors in parallel also engaged the democratic forces inside these countries, interactions (including direct financial assistance) that were facilitated by better state-to-state relations. This dual-track engagement strategy should be pursued when seeking to support democratic change with our allies in Morocco or Jordan or with our competitors in Iran or Russia. Fourth, the Obama administration must talk less and do more. President Bush delivered several lofty speeches explaining why the United States should promote freedom, yet Ayman Nour sits in jail in Egypt. Rather than speeches or even grand goals, the next administration should seek to achieve small, concrete outcomes that advance political freedoms in very tangible ways and do so, without talking about doing so. Fifth, the intertwined relationship between democracy and development must be appreciated and then pursued in tandem. Economic aid to corrupt governments is a waste. Countries that strengthen democratic institutions, such a free press, independent judiciary, and a powerful parliament, are much more likely to control corruption and thereby be more responsible economic aid recipients. Aid mechanisms such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation which provide incentives for improving governance before dispersing economic aid should be expanded. And as Vice President-Elect Joseph Biden has proposed, those courageous leaders who navigate the difficult transition to democracy should be rewarded with a democratic dividend that is, an injection of economic assistance -- to help their new governments succeed. Sixth, the Obama Administration must accelerate the process of internationalizing democracy assistance, and even be prepared to channel American support for democratic development through the aid budgets of other countries and multilateral institutions. In many countries around the world, the Slovaks or Serbs as better partners than Americans for providing grants and training for civil society groups, just as the United Nations or other regional organizations are considered more legitimate monitors of elections than American delegations. American government and non-government actors also should join with others to develop a code of conduct for democracy promotion. Finally, the new Administration must be realistic and patient. The current international context is not conducive to rapid or substantial democracy change. On the contrary, preserving the democratic gains over the last three decades may be as important fostering democratic change in autocracies. Pragmatism is not a substitute but a necessary condition for effective idealism. Small d democrats around the world have been inspired by Obamas election. To help these democrats realize the change they still

believe in requires the development of realistic strategies and concrete actions for helping their cause, and not an abandonment of their cause altogether.

Principle and Pragmatism in Promoting Rights and Democracy Jack Snyder

The American public has become appropriately wary of clarion calls to promote democracy and human rights around the globe. Helping other countries become democratic scored dead last on the list of foreign policy priorities in the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 2008 poll. Human rights fell to twelfth out of fourteen issues, even below strengthening the UN. Its not that Americans have turned hard-hearted. Combating world hunger ranked eighth, above limiting climate change. Its just that they are skeptical of schemes to push American values on societies that might resist them. Many experts agree. The risk of political instability and war rises when countries start to democratize without the necessary economic and social foundations to sustain freedom. Similarly, good human rights outcomes are mainly a result of favorable underlying conditions: fairly high income, democracy, peace, and effective administrative and legal institutions. In contrast, naming and shaming campaigns by rights activists are like Whack-a-Mole: publicized abuses may get beaten down, but others pop up to maintain the countrys overall level of repression. The United States agenda of global idealism needs to be tempered with a stiff dose of realism, but it does not need to be abandoned. Despite Chinas recent economic boom, liberal democracy so far remains the only unquestionably proven pathway to stable modernity. Although economic and political change is often turbulent in the short run, freedom, human rights, social peace, and economic growth are mutually reinforcing in the long run. These desirable outcomes serve US strategic interests, because mature democracies do not fight wars against each other, and they favor free trade. In that sense, Americas chronic urge to help other countries become more like us is not in itself a bad idea. But Americans need to understand that there are no shortcuts to progress through legalism, moralism, or military force. The United States often approaches problems through the mindset of lawyers who see a problem and immediately think pass a law or put them on trial. But in human rights, legal solutions have been oversold. Studies show that signing treaties only improves rights outcomes for countries that have just established democracy and want to signal their sincerity; when dictators sign, its just cheap talk. Setting up war crimes tribunals failed to deter later atrocities even in the regions under their immediate jurisdictionin Srebrenica, Kosovo, and Eastern Congo. Criminalization of female genital cutting tends to drive the practice underground or shifts it to earlier ages. The impact of legally banning child labor has been negligible compared to the effects of high-quality public education and technological change on labor markets. Moralism based on universalizing Western values risks backlash in non-Western cultures. The most effective grassroots rights campaigners have learned to avoid selfdefeating confrontations by checking with local religious leaders first, encouraging ethical discussions based on the locals religious texts and traditional values, and letting the target community take the lead in talking about the rights they want to prioritize.

Successful rights campaigns depend on building up incentives and trust through sustained economic development or community service projects, and they take longer than expected. One lesson that should be well learned by now is that democracy cannot be achieved through the barrel of a foreigners gun. Military intervention has succeeded in installing self-sustaining democracy only in a handful of casesGermany, Japan, Italy, and Panamaand all of these had been somewhat democratic earlier in their history. If shortcuts lead to dead ends, what does work? A pragmatic approach to achieving principled outcomes should keep in view four rules of thumb. First, power considerations always lead; justice follows. Nothing can be achieved without power, and when power is inadequate, the first task is to enhance the power of the coalition that favors reform. Consider the tactics of post-conflict criminal justice. When the perpetrators of war crimes have been decisively defeated, they can be put on trial. But when war criminals still command governmental power or a rebel army, amnesties are needed to induce them to resign or put down their weapons. In intermediate cases, where weakened perpetrators want to quit fighting but could struggle on if necessary, guarantees against prosecution can be combined with truth commissions that humiliate them and discredit them politically. Although it may seem paradoxical, amnesties have paved the way to democratic, rights-improving outcomes in hard cases such as El Salvador, Mozambique, and South Africa, whereas prosecutions, indictments, and criminal investigations have arguably deterred no atrocities and succeeded only in complicating peace settlements with the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda and with Albanian fighters in Macedonia. Second, reformers need to target the motivations of potential spoilers who may oppose democracy or human rights improvements. Too often those who resist reform are caricatured as motivated by undeterrable evil or insatiable fanaticism. In fact, smart strategies can sometimes play effectively on their hopes or fears. Dictators are often poor stewards of their nations economy, and repression often provokes popular resistance, especially from ethnic minorities. When repressive leaders find their power and popularity slipping, they are less likely to use violence in a gamble for political resurrection if they believe that a comfortable life awaits them after abdicating power. Conversely, dictators sometimes embrace partial reforms, especially market reforms, as a way to extend their political life. Authoritarian regimes in Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea oversaw the development of thriving export-oriented market societies with strong middle classes, inadvertently creating conditions leading to democratic transitions. Third, the success of reforms depends as much on favorable circumstances as on clever tactics. Experts generally agree on the list of factors that increase the odds of a successful democratic transition: moderately high per capita income, adequate literacy, a state bureaucracy that is not beset by extensive corruption, at least rudimentary rule of law, an economy that does not depend on oil production, agreement on what groups comprise the nation that will exercise national self-determination, and a supportive international environment. Absent these conditions, moderate democrats lack the tools to compete effectively with divisive populist politicians who play the ethnic or sectarian card to mobilize popular support. Middle Eastern voters that have recently cast ballots for illiberal militants lived in states lacking almost all of these facilitating conditions. Several countries that were ill-prepared for democracy suffered through civil or

international wars following incomplete democratic transitions in the 1990s, including Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, East Timor, Georgia, and Yugoslavia. In ethnically divided Burundi, the international donor community insisted on free and fair multiparty elections that triggered the outbreak of a war that killed over 200,000 Hutu and Tutsi. In countries that lack favorable conditions, democracy promotion efforts may get better results if they begin by bolstering economic growth, administrative competence, and rule of law before pushing for national multiparty elections. Fourth, inducement is more effective than coercion. Making demands may be more satisfying psychologically, but pressuring dictators to liberalize has rarely worked. A better approach has been to invite successfully reforming states to join the club of liberal democracies and share in its benefits. The European Unions policy of openness to new members that meet its democracy and economic standards has been a spectacular success in luring swing constituencies in fence-sitting countries like Romania and Slovakia, which could have drifted away from liberalism without these incentives. Likewise, European trade treaties that link economic rewards to human rights outcomes have led to improvements when carefully monitored. More generally, the free trading system and international security system presided over by the United States and other advanced democracies has strengthened the hand of liberalizing coalitions in many transitional states over the past three decades. Since the time of Woodrow Wilson, America has repeatedly sought to promote its liberal values on the world scene, despite disappointments and concerns about costs. It is unlikely that we will give up now. America can act on its principles without disillusionment if we design strategies for promoting democracy and human rights based on a pragmatic assessment of what has worked and what has not.

Failing to Spread Democracy Shibley Telhami

The United States has historically stood for democracy and Human Rights and inspired many around the world largely through the power of its example. That power should be restored and promoting democracy and human rights should remain as objectives of American foreign policy. But our discourse about democracy, and the way the Bush Administration framed and pursued democracy promotion have been seriously flawed. We have ignored that democracy in places like the Middle East has been far more affected by our military projects than by our specific democracy promotion policies, public pressure, or economic aid to democracy organizations. To begin with, consider the reality of power. The United States has more than 220,000 troops in the greater Middle East including dominating presence and influence in every Arab state in the Gulf region. It provides significant economic and military assistance to key players such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian authority. Some of the governments in the region are so dependent on the United States that they almost never turn down an American request, big or small. Most of these states strongly felt that the war in Iraq was wrong-headed and that the consequences would be dangerous for us and for them. But when the chips were down, they felt they had no choice but to support us, providing bases of operation, political and intelligence support, and transit for our troops. In contrast, their publics, the vast majority of whom strongly opposed the Iraq war, grew angrier with us and with their governments. The vast majority of the public never believed in our stated objectives. In annual public opinion polls that I conducted with Zogby International (in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon) since before the Iraq war began, those who believed that we were aiming to spread democracy, human rights, and peace in the Middle East have been single digit. Most believed that we were in it to control oil, help Israel, and weaken the Muslim world. The vast majority of the public had unfavorable views of the United States, but even worse, a significant majority (88% in 2008) named the United States as one of the two biggest threats to them. (In contrast, less than 10% named Iran as one of the two biggest threats). The net result is a lethal antidemocratic mix, regardless of what else we do to advocate democracy. The polls tell the story: despite years in which we pretended that spreading democracy in the Middle East was our biggest concern, most Arabs polled believe that the Middle East is even less democratic than it was before the Iraq war. How is this possible? When the gap between authoritarian regimes policies and public opinion expands on issues that are central to both, the outcome is that regimes grow even more insecure. Instead of opening up the system for a public expression that can be used against them, they unleash their security services to preempts opposition and any organizational capacity that can undermine their hold on powereven as they may announce some symbolic steps on elections and reform to deflect outside pressure. The net result is that the public in most places feels more repression than meaningful reform.

One would think that since we have so much power and influence to persuade governments in the region even to go along with wars they dont like, we can also persuade them to reform themselves out of power. This is a naive view. First, for us, the promotion of democracy will always be only a part-time job; for the regimes in the region, staying in power is their full time joband they know far more about their surroundings than we will ever be able to learn. That alone is a challenge. But there is a far bigger challenge when we are engaged in two demanding wars for the conduct of which we need all the help we can get. When you are at war, your military and intelligence considerations trump the aid that USAID provides, or the talking points about democracy that your Ambassadors will go through with usually un-empowered subordinates of powerful autocratic rulers. In the war on terrorism, for which good intelligence is paramount and our own capabilities have been demonstrably low, cooperating with the intelligence services in the countries we are trying to reform is essential. Sometimes we can tell good intelligence form bad, but at other times we cannot see that regimes use the relationship to target their own opposition groups. Our military needs the cooperation of the regional military forces for transit, special operations, and basing of forces. In other words, when you are fighting two wars and have over 220, 000 troops to protect, your biggest institutional allies in every country in which you operate are the intelligence and military servicesthe very backbone of the authoritarian regimes that we are trying to weaken. In other words, our heavy military feet always trump our waving democracy hands. This suggests that our efforts for transformative reform in the region are not likely to succeed so long as we are at war and have heavy military presence. But we can do more to shrink the gap between public opinion and governments as a prelude to incremental reform. This can only be done by putting forth a new vision for a broader and credible foreign policy that addresses regional concerns beyond democracy itself. It starts with reforming ourselves and restoring our credibility particularly of issues of human rights. It proceeds by working with international institutions to uphold commonly accepted norms and demanding compliance across the board. It pushes for credible reform in which the public can trust, concentrating on areas in which governments in the region may have incentives to cooperate, even if reluctantly. And it ends with the recognition that the power of our example must be restored as one of our greatest assets when it comes to inspiring democracy and human rights around the world.

Some Thoughts on Democratization Leon Wieseltier

If the generals should not fight only the last war, neither should anybody else. The impact of the war in Iraq upon the discussion of democratization as an objective of American foreign policy is of course immense, and rightly so: there were lessons learned there. But the question of democratization is not the same as the question of Iraq, both as regards the ends and the means. The war in Iraq was preceded by two decades of intense experience in the field in the methods and the aims of democratization indeed, some of the flaws in American planning (or the lack thereof) for the Iraqi polity after the fall of Saddam were owed to a blithe and somewhat contemptuous ignorance of all that experience. But the war in Iraq, which anyway seems not to be turning out disastrously, should not be the only point of regard from which we evaluate the cause of more democracy in the world. A great philosopher once remarked that people who begin by looking backwards sometimes end up thinking backwards. I should say that, as a matter of principle, having to do both with my understanding of the universal nature of the democratic ideal and my understanding of Americas role in world history, I support the view that democratization must remain a central aim of American foreign policy. An American foreign policy that did not turn in part on this belief, that acted solely on interests, that disguised indifference to the fate and the freedom of other peoples as fidelity to the grand traditions of statecraft such a foreign policy would seem to me not only wrong but also, well, un-American. In this sense, I think, President Bush was propounding nothing controversial in his Second Inaugural Address, though he had a rare gift for burying his occasional good ideas in bitter controversy. I certainly do not see how a liberal can deny the responsibility of the United States actively to support the spread of democracy to side, in deeds and not just in words, with oppressed peoples against oppressive governments. This is very general, I know, and even banal but in the climate of foreign policy opinion after the Bush years I would not overestimate its banality. There are times when first principles need to be restated and re-debated. But the objection immediately arises -- we cannot go around overthrowing dictators everywhere we find them. That is certainly so, though I dare say that we are not exactly in danger of doing so: humanitarian intervention, as many observers have remarked, is hardly in the ascendant these days. So the real perplexity about democratization is: in what cases, and how? For a start, there are the countries that broach, in our policy toward them, both our values and our interests more specifically, that seem to pit our values against our interests. These are the morally awkward cases. Were the free and fair elections that brought Hamas to power in Palestine and led to the putsch in Gaza really such a good idea? Would we risk the Israeli-Egyptian peace on a free and fair election in Egypt? Is the Saudi offense to our values more egregious than the offense to our interests that would ensue from a jihadist regime that might be the result of political liberalization there? And so on. Moreover, while it is true, as President Bush insists, that for the United States more democracy means more security, security is always and essentially an immediate goal, a matter of the short term as much as the long

term; and the achievement of greater security at home obviously cannot wait upon the achievement of greater democracy abroad. They may become democratic later, but we need to be safe now. So there are cases in which our philosophy is not all we need to know in which democratization must be assessed coldly and systemically. Idealists have a particular obligation to look at things realistically. Worrying about the consequences of democratization in certain instances does not make you Brent Scowcroft. Moreover, there will be very few cases in which democratization can be accomplished at the point of a gun I mean of our gun. One of the reasons that Iraq seems to be moving in the right direction is that the Iraqis themselves have tired of our presence there, and have chosen to turn responsibly against it. The new Iraqi insistence upon self-reliance has a true and organic feel about it. For democratization, if it is to be genuine and not just a mask for a foreign alliance, is above all an indigenous process. How could it be otherwise? It consists in the transformation of a society -- a new selfdefinition and a new self-representation. When the will to such a transformation is incomplete, or is contested by force of arms, as in Afghanistan, there is not much that American troops can do. We cannot force freedom upon traditional societies; they must force it upon themselves. When we try to force it upon them, they will experience our lofty enterprise as rank imperialism, and thereby disqualify us from any further influence upon the present course of their history. But the choice for an American foreign policy that is serious about the advancement of democracy is not a choice between words and war. There is a broad range of instruments available to us, as we learned from our non-violent but resolute resistance to communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Economic, political, and cultural support of the democratizers in a dictatorship has been shown to have decisive and lasting results. The important thing is that there be democratizers already in place. We cannot create an opposition, we can only support one. And in supporting a democratic opposition, we must be prepared to complicate, and in some cases almost to ruin, our relations with the regime that they oppose. In a case such as Iran, this poses (I hope) no problem. But what about China? I confess that I am one of those dreamers who are repelled by the surrender of our Chinese policy to economic considerations to bling; but even I must admit that we cannot make an out-and-out enemy of the Chinese regime, not least because of the great geo-strategic rivalry between China and America that is still to come. Yet what really would have been the cost of the American president boycotting the Beijing Olympics in the name of human rights? It is certainly true that the Chinese government is completely impervious to moral gestures and appeals but the impact upon the human rights movement would have been extraordinary, and those are the men and women upon whom, historically speaking, we are counting. In the long term, we must prefer the friendship of peoples to the friendship of governments. In winning the friendship of representative governments, we are in fact winning the friendship of peoples. I speak of the long term, because democratization is a policy that takes time. After all, it is a policy that deposes, or assists at the deposing of, one political culture so as to see it replaced by another political culture. Democratization is a policy of destabilization, and so it requires patience. In this sense, the pace of political progress in Iraq has not

been shocking at all. The transformation of a society is not an event, it is an era. But war, of course, is an event, which is why freedom cannot be established by force of foreign (that is, American) arms, even by shock and awe. The obstacles to immediate success on the ground will always be many. But it is important to note also that there is an obstacle at home, too, which is that the only success that Americans now seem able to contemplate is the immediate kind. This is true in all the realms of American life (and is a significant cause of the recent self-immolation of American finance). We are now a people for whom attention deficit disorder is not a disorder but a norm. It is attention that is now the disorder. When I hear that the United States is an imperial power, I chuckle: the British were in India for two hundred years. Could the Americans be anywhere for two hundred months? But the policy of democratization is a policy that requires a great continuity of purposes and practices. I am not sure that we are any longer capable of such steadfastness. If I were a dissident in China or Russia or Iran or Myanmar, I am not sure how much I would rely upon the United States for assistance. The fitful nature of American foreign policy, its inconsistencies in concepts and implementations, might leave me feeling even more lonely.

Freedoms March: Promoting Democracy Abroad Richard S. Williamson

We are in the twilight of George W. Bushs presidency. Serious questions linger over his 8 year stewardship in office; questions that framed the recent election and inform the transition to Barak Obamas administration. There is an impatience with the mistakes of the past, real and imagined. There is a hunger for change, new directions, renewal. Among the pillars of the Bush Presidency now in question is the wisdom of Americas pursuit of advancing Freedoms March: the centrality to our foreign policy and the ways and means in which it is done. The decision to go into Iraq and the mismanagement of that endeavor remain a specter that hangs over questions of democracy promotion and shadows any conversation on this topic. President Bushs Second Inaugural Address, while eloquent and stirring, over shot the mark when he said, Americas vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. It suggested that core American values of human rights, the rule of law and democracy can be the primary basis for effective diplomacy and foreign policy. These beliefs can and should animate our foreign policy, but they are not nor can they be its primary basis. As powerfully brought home in the terror attacks of 9/11, Bali, London, Spain, Mumbai and elsewhere, the world remains a dangerous place. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars continue with uneven and, at times, periless consequences. In Georgia, Russia demonstrated a willingness to use force to project its power in its Near Abroad. Irans rising influence in the greater Middle East, while it pursues nuclear technology and its President challenges Israels right to exist, is a growing storm. The renewed carnage in the eastern Congo and the genocide in slow motion in Darfur demonstrate mans inhumanity to man did not end when the Berlin Wall fell. And the financial melt down that now spreads worldwide endangers Americans way of life. Properly, the United States Governments principal responsibility is to protect her people. Questions of National Defense and protecting Americas vital interests, economic and otherwise, are the first claimants on American Foreign policy. While our values are central to the American idea, those cherished rights are inalienable to all people, and the advance of Freedoms march will make the world a safer and more secure place for America, we must be realistic about its pace and humble about our efforts. We must first deal with immediate and near term clear and present dangers while allowing our values to inform our daily actions and, as circumstances allow, promote Freedoms March. As President Ronald Reagan stated in his 1982 seminal address on Freedom at the Palace of Westminster, While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must ot hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. Four years ago there were many unrealistic expectations about the pace of freedoms march due, in part, to the quick collapse of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein and the exhilaration from the Rose, Orange, Velvet and Cedar revolutions. Freedom seemed easy and inevitable, but it is not.

Democracy is difficult. Its progress is uneven. The transition from tyranny to the triumph of freedom is treacherous. Tragedy, traumas, and turmoil often linger. Confidence must e built so that respect, restraint and reciprocity can emerge. Means of compromise, conciliation and cooperation are unfamiliar. Establishing the habits of harmony, protection of minority rights and the rule of law are trying. History reminds us that even while holding deep beliefs about the universal right to freedom and convictions about the virtues of democracy, it is best to project our freedom agenda with humility. Sustainable democracies do not emerge inevitably from the cauldron of conflict. History, heritage and habits matter. And there are no final victories. Democracy is a process, not an end point. It is a process to empower people, protect an open society and provide peaceful mechanisms to deal with divisions. We should publicly acknowledge that democracy building is a long-term project. Nonetheless, as Madeline Albright has said, our approach to democratization should be gradual but not glacial. We should put more emphasis on building blocks of freedom such as the rule of law, civil society, labor unions and media freedoms as we promote elections. USG foreign aid can be directed more effectively to democracy promotion. The fledgling efforts of the government to reorganize to better deal with post-conflict situations should incorporate more centrally democracy programs. We should openly support those struggling to advance liberal democracy around the world. Time and again Freedom Fighters have given testimony to the vital value of vocal solidarity from outside for their struggles under authoritarian regimes. Our diplomats must venture out to engage in active public liaison in universities, unions, womens movements and other nascent civil society institutions. Exchange programs and training for agents of democratic change should be routine aspects of our public diplomacy. It is important to be mindful that spreading and strengthening democracy is a long-term mission, not a quick fix. Preferred candidates will not always win. But inevitably democracies empower people, protect human rights, adjudicate divisions peacefully, and advance harmony. Promoting democracy is in our interest. But also, spreading freedom is Americas opportunity and responsibility. Blessed with freedom, Americans ought to give voice to the voiceless, stand in solidarity with freedom fighters everywhere, and help provide the tools for others to build their own open societies with accountable governments. We are defined by our values. And our own fidelity to those values and our willingness to let those values animate our foreign policy not only exhibit our better selves, but provide hope and support for those denied freedom. The march of freedom has suffered setbacks. Mistakes have been made. Doubts have emerged. Especially at this time of deep national division as the promise of a new Presidency lies before us, Americans must remain united in faith in our values and confident in our future.