International Relations

http://ire.sagepub.com Security Studies and the `Security State': Security Provision in Historical Context
Bryan Mabee International Relations 2003; 17; 135 DOI: 10.1177/00471178030172002 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/17/2/135

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Security Studies and the Security State: Security Provision in Historical Context
Bryan Mabee, Oxford Brookes University, UK

Abstract
The role of historical change in international relations has been an important issue, especially regarding the ahistoricism of mainstream theories. In this context, security studies has suffered from a lack of analysis of the state and its relation to historical change. When this attitude is challenged, it can be seen that the particular state of security studies fits into a particular historical logic that structured states which is susceptible to change. A historical sociological analysis of the development of the state society complexes surrounding security can provide a historical analysis of the state, in order to better articulate its continuing relevance to political life and security, its relationship with individuals and society, and the complexities of contemporary citizenship. The 20th century saw the development of the security state, where the western state became the centre of security provision, the protector against external threat and provider of domestic well-being. Keywords: historical sociology, security state, security studies, state theory, state transformation

One of the most important concerns of international relations has been the issue of change. The long-standing debate concerning the role of historical study in the development of theories of international relations has progressed steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s.1 However, this growth has not had much of an impact on the debates in security studies. The end of the Cold War sensitized theorists and practitioners of security to the existence of a diversity of threats, and much attention has been paid to the expansion of the issue areas of security studies and the deepening of the conception of referents of security.2 The major changes that have impacted the international system as a result of the end of the superpower conflict, and the increasing recognition of the importance of globalization in international politics, provide an opportunity for a re-examination of the basis of post-Second World War security, especially in terms of the major security actor: the sovereign state. Though much notice has been recently paid to notions concerning a changing environment of security, little of this has been connected explicitly to globalization, and even less to changes in contemporary western states.3 This lack can be explained by the relative inattention those studying security (and international relations more generally) have spent dealing with theories of the state and its historicization.4 The state is given an implicit definition that is used transhistorically. The problem with the avoidance of state theorization manifests itself
International Relations Copyright 2003 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), Vol 17(2): 135151 Downloaded from http://ire.sagepub.com by Budi Utomo on April 21, 2008 2003 SAGE Publications. All 033131] rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution. [00471178 (200306) 17:2; 135151;

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in the inability to incorporate change, and the state takes on an isomorphic character. When the state is seen as a static, transhistorical institution, change is either ignored or only postulated in terms of a radical break from normal practices. This can be seen, for example, in the often-polarized debates concerning the impacts of globalization on the state, between those who deny change, and those who claim radical transformation.5 The possibility of a change in the state and its functions becomes difficult to hypothesize, and the only possibility for states faced with change is the end of the state.6 As Hobson has noted, the mainstream of international relations theorizing, especially that of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, has been susceptible to an ahistorical attitude: that history only exists in so much as it reflects present conditions, and as such denies novelty and change.7 When this attitude is challenged, it can be seen that the particular state of international relations i.e. the Westphalian state, with its discrete separation of inside and outside fits into a particular historical logic that structured states which is susceptible to change. This is not to deny the reality of the Westphalian paradigm, but to highlight its origins and suggest that it is not the case that it has been existent since the birth of the Westphalian system,8 and that it may lead to somewhere else, by conditions of its own making.9 Security studies has suffered from similar problems with regard to the state and historical change. In the traditional realist approach to security studies, the state has been unquestioned in its historical structure.10 Symptomatic of this, security studies has mainly focused on changes in issue areas caused by globalization and the end of the Cold War, ignoring possible changes to the state and security provision itself.11 While critical scholars have done much to interrogate the assumptions of traditional approaches to security, their views on the state have mainly questioned its role as the object of security (i.e. a criticism of the national focus of security studies) and the state as a security provider (i.e. against the assumption that states act in their citizens best interests).12 This questioning has been valuable in denaturalizing the state as the provider of security, but has ignored to some extent the formation and historical role of states in the security process.13 The debates that the critical agenda have developed, such as where security resides, and who the subject of security is, are important. However, there remains a crucial question concerning how the provision of security has historically changed with the development of the state. A historical sociological analysis of the development of the statesociety complexes surrounding security will assist in this process, by supplying a historical analysis of the state, in order to better articulate its continuing relevance to political life and security, its relationship with individuals and society, and the complexities of contemporary citizenship.14 During the period of total war at the beginning of the 20th century, a particular configuration of statesociety security relationships developed in western states where the state increased its power over society, but also in return gave a bundle of social goods to its citizens as a means of providing security. This model is here

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referred to as the security state.15 Though this is often divorced from discussions of security, as domestic concerns have been relegated to the margins of security studies, this development indicated a particular change in statesociety relations. The increase in domestic security provision was a compromise for a greater internationalization of the state, and provided a distinctive separation of external and internal security. Security was very much linked to the idea of external threat, and the divide between discrete internal and external realms became very much reified in thinking about international relations. A move towards examining statesociety security complexes requires an attempt to historically situate the role of contemporary states as security providers. This is particularly important in investigating the rather undeveloped impacts of globalization on security studies.16 While in other areas, particularly the economic, globalization has been linked explicitly to changes in the state, it is in the realm of security that these impacts have been most neglected. A focus on the changing nature of security provision will help to analyse where the security state has come from, and its prospects for the future. This will be accomplished by demonstrating the historical development of the European model of state and society security compacts, and show the specific development of the security state. However, there is a problem in generalizing about the security state, as there is a tension between its use as a theoretical concept and the geographical scope of its existence. In this regard, the discussion will focus on the development of the western model of the security state.17 This geographical neglect is necessary in order to focus clearly on the main theoretical problem: the historical analysis of security provision. In order to accomplish this analysis, three steps will be taken. First, an introduction to the possible contribution of neo-Weberian historical sociology to security studies will be given, in order to show how security provision is embedded in the statesociety complex, through the concept of citizenship. Second, an overview of the development of a security relationship between state and society in the European state-building process will be given, demonstrating the increasing intensity of statesociety bonds that were partly maintained by the granting of protective rights to citizens. Third, an analysis of the development of the security state in the 20th century will provide the background for a historically constituted statesociety security complex, with the possibility to incorporate change.

Security and the neo-Weberian state The problem that is most apparent in the way the state is utilized in international relations (and, by extension, security studies) is that of transhistoricism, where the contemporary state is seen as unchanged from its emergence in 1648 (or, perhaps better put, the modern state is seen as the same as the contemporary state).18 This tendency both overestimates the coherence and capacity of early

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European states, as well as ignoring the tendency for the state to evolve.19 This is a symptom of the general reluctance of scholars of international relations to devote much effort in analysing the state itself. The state has generally been viewed as a national-territorial totality, where, as Halliday notes, the state provides in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map.20 The state in international relations is, due to this, often under-theorized, and often conceptualized in a static manner. In security studies, the state has primarily been discussed, if at all, in terms of its relevance as an actor in the security process.21 Though these debates are important, the terms of the debate encompass the security provision by western states in the latter half of the 20th century. There is little sense that states have developed particular security relationships with their constituent societies, other than those that embrace notions of the state and a liberal social contract. The result of this is a situation where the arguments have mainly hinged around the promotion or dismissal of states as security actors.22 Though this is not a problem in the sense that the questions that these debates have raised are indeed important, it does seem to limit the possibilities of examining the future of both the state and security provision. The international context of security must presume some kind of relationship with states and their domestic societies, as states have a domestic (societal) role in addition to their international commitments.23 This could, theoretically, go along a continuum from the idea that states themselves act completely in their own interests, without regard to their domestic constituencies, to the idea that national security is primarily determined by domestic constituencies, at least in the abstract sense that the national interest embodies the collective interests of domestic society. As McSweeney points out: It is implicit in most studies of national and international security . . . that the ultimate reference is people. . . . It is from the human need to protect human values that the term security derives its meaning.24 Contemporary state theory has relevance in this context, for it has struggled with the problems of examining the state historically, the relevance of state society relations and developing a model of how changes in state structures and statesociety relations occur. Sociologists, and especially those working within neo-Weberian historical sociology, have done much to help clarify the state as an institution.25 These approaches separate the state (as a socio-political institution) and society (as social relations in general), for the purpose of examining the context of relationships between the two.26 The merits of this approach are that it helps to clarify statesociety relations, and importantly, allows for and substantively examines the state as a historically constituted and dynamic institution, providing for the possibility of change in the institutional framework of the state itself.27 The crucial idea that derives from such an approach is the concept of state autonomy. Though in realist international relations thought autonomy has generally been placed in the context of the international realm, in that states are

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autonomous from one another, in this context it also refers to the way the state relates to society. The state should be seen, as Poggi notes, as itself constituting a distinctive social force, vested with interests of its own, which affect autonomously, and sometimes decisively, the states own arrangements and policy.28 This is important because it describes a relationship between states and societies that goes beyond the fiction of the state as a mere outgrowth of individual desires.29 However, the autonomy of the state from society is never total, as states often rely on their constituent societies for certain types of social action, exemplified by the role played by extraction. These ideas concerning autonomy come out clearly in Manns important distinction between the despotic and infrastructural power of the state.30 The former refers to the ability of the state to act freely, without regard to society, while the latter refers to the ability of the state to penetrate society and organize social relations.31 Despotic power thus concerns the state elite, and its ability to take action without regard to civil society. As Mann puts it, despotic power refers to the range of actions the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups.32 The autonomous powers of the state do not amount to much, however, as Hall and Ikenberry have pointed out, if the orders do not translate into reality.33 Infrastructural power is a crucial part of state power, as it concerns the ability to structure and organize civil society through the institutions of the state. As Mann describes it, infrastructural power refers to the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.34 Infrastructural power, however, should not be seen just as power in the sense of power over referring to the states domination of civil society. It is a form of what Mann describes as collective power, which is a type of enabling power that is not a zero-sum game.35 An increase in infrastructural power means that civil society is subject to more control by the state, but also has the reciprocal affect of enabling civil society to affect the state itself. As Hall and Ikenberry suggest: The state can be too distant from society as well as too constrained by it: gaining, exercising and maintaining state capacity is an extremely complicated matter, in which there is a perpetual dialectic between the state seizing and being granted authority.36 This is an important feature of Manns theory, as the rise of infrastructural power is one of the key features of the contemporary state, and helps to develop a security relationship between state and society. In the contemporary state, the concept of citizenship should be seen as specifying a type of compact between state and society, as a part of increasing infrastructural power. Citizenship is both relational and reciprocal, and it therefore is not simply the case of a beneficent state giving rights to citizens. It also outlines the obligations of the individual within civil society to the state, and individuals legitimate claims and expectations of the state. As the state increases infrastructural power, the possibilities and potentiality of civil society rise, and this is expressed through the duties and benefits of citizenship.37

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Citizenship is the key to examining security relationships between state and society, in that citizenship rights and duties describe the necessary functions of the state in order for it to legitimate itself. Much security studies literature has taken the western security state for granted as the model of security provision, with its rigid demarcations of internal and external security, and ignores the way such provision developed over time. This is not only because citizenship rights were rather looser than they are in the contemporary state (i.e. they mainly related to the maintenance of internal order, perhaps a very basic or minimal form of security), but also because societies were not as bounded by the state as they became in the 19th and 20th centuries. The problem with taking the security state for granted is that it creates difficulty in analysing the possibility of change in the state, both because the state is taken as a static institution, and because the array of contemporary security functions and relationships are taken for granted. The slow development of citizenship rights and duties is an important part of the growth of security compacts between state and society, demonstrating the dynamic nature of the state itself, and also pointing to the possible further evolution of the state. The benefit of a historical sociological approach to the state is found in the recognition of the functional autonomy of the state itself, manifested both in despotic and infrastructural power. The development of infrastructural power goes along with the development of citizenship, and therefore provides a crucial corrective to the analysis of the state in both security studies and international relations.

The evolution of western security provision The history of the development of the European state is one that has been told a number of times from various angles, but primarily in the context of how elite war making eventually necessitated the development of states, both for the advancement of order and the need for the formation of an infrastructure for extraction to finance the ever more costly means of warfare.38 The development of European states, therefore, was as a means to power it was not an end in itself.39 In the context of citizenship and infrastructural power, there had to be the arrival of the state as an end in itself, something that was not properly seen until after the French Revolution, in order for the kind of security provision associated with the contemporary state to develop. Around this time, citizenship and the state became intimately connected, and the infrastructural power of the state increased enormously, through a slow process of development of material infrastructure. Along with the eventual development of the rights of citizenship, we see a gradual change in what those rights and duties consist of, that moves from the relative disinterest that early states and rulers saw in their subjects to the relatively compassionate governance seen in contemporary western states. An accompanying change in the scope of state security provision is also apparent: from the early state emphasis on social order and lack of violence (at least against the state)

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to the contemporary welfare/warfare state. Although this story can be told in developmental terms i.e. a switch from mere state despotism to enlightened democratic forms of governance it is essential to examine this through the context of infrastructural power, where benefits were trade-offs in some sense for the further penetration of state into society. Tilly provides an example of an early variant on the development of security relations between states and at least one class actor in civil society, the new bourgeoisie, and the role it played in the development of the state in western Europe. Tilly describes the growth of the state as a consequence of the development of a protection racket, where the pursuit of power and control caused elites to monopolize the control over violence within their territories, while, furthermore, the pursuit of war caused rulers to set up systems of extraction in order to raise capital for these endeavours. The extraction process, though not excluding outright pillage, importantly included taxation, through the making of promises of protection (of a particular social class). This led to the entrenchment of substantial bureaucracies to regulate taxation, police forces, courts, and account keepers, therefore solidifying the existence of exclusive territorial states.40 Therefore, one of the factors in the consolidation of states was the unintended consequence of the rulers search for power that the need for capital to invest in war making inadvertently led to the elimination of rivals within a given territory, in order to have a greater capacity to extract resources.41 The development of such a relationship is borne out by the two major watersheds in the state: its increase in size in the 18th century, and the increasing extent of its civil functions in the 19th century.42 This can be seen in a number of areas, but one of the most important was the increasing level of bureaucratic management of the state, which came to be seen more and more as the actual location of rule in the state. As van Creveld points out: By the beginning of the nineteenth century the point had been reached where the bureaucracy itself became the state, elevating itself high above civil society and turning itself into the latters master.43 This was also accompanied by the development of infrastructures, both material and symbolic, exemplified by the development of roads, railways, postal services, telegraphy and mass education; civilian functions that increased the prosperity of society but further politicized society in the sense that it could not ignore the states influence its members.44 In terms of civilian expenditures, the average over the course of the 19th century was about a 50 percent increase. At the beginning of the 20th century about 75 percent of state expenditure was channelled towards civilian purposes.45 In the 19th century, the states commitment to educating its subjects became an important aspect of its increased civil role. This, of course, was connected to the economic needs of the states, and also to the rise of nationalism, and receiving the correct education; education was a product of further democratization, but also contained a strong element of parading, flag-saluting, anthem-singing, and heroworshipping.46 Over the course of the 19th century, states also started to focus on the conditions of the poor, the sick, and on the conditions of workers. In Britain,

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this can be seen through a number of developments, such as the Factory Acts and the eventual establishment of the Ministry of Health in 1919.47 The development of a state monopoly of organized violence also proceeded over this time period. The state gained increasing control over organized violence within its territory, which was accompanied by a shift in the status of the military, from a situation where the military was essentially embedded within society, to where the military itself became separate to the state and civil society.48 It was in the 18th century where the distinction between civilians and soldiers became commonplace.49 Along with this came a switch in the purpose of armed force, where it became more an instrument of an abstract state, and less an instrument of the rulers. This, however, also went along with the increased presence of force internally, though eventually through the establishment of police forces as distinct from the military, as the needs of the internal maintenance of order (e.g. controlling mobs) required different techniques than external conflicts.50 These watersheds of the state were accompanied by the increased politicization of society in the late-18th and 19th centuries. As Mann notes: As states transformed into national states, then into nation-states, classes became caged, unintentionally naturalized and politicized.51 The word caging is of importance, as it describes how the development of nation-states in the period was part of a process of the state bounding social relations within its political territory. The rise of infrastructural power developed the boundedness of the state so taken for granted in traditional accounts of international relations; as Hobden points out: Traditional international relations theory has portrayed borders as hard shells. A socio-historical construct has become reified into a physical attribute of social relations.52 This boundedness also contributed to the expansion of citizenship, as the combination of nationalism (the result of the process of caging) and sovereignty led to the demand for greater national rights for the subjects of the state.53 As societies were clamped ever tighter within states, the state politicized societies through nationalism and sovereignty. Modern societies therefore reinvented democracy because the state could not be escaped; as Mann puts it: In the early modern period people became trapped within national cages and so sought to change the conditions within those cages.54 This tendency can also be seen in conjunction with the changing nature of armed force. The shift from armed force as principally an instrument of the ruling elite to being an instrument of the abstract state was noted above, but with the rise of nationalism, this connection became even stronger. As Howard notes: War was no longer considered a matter for a feudal ruling class or a small group of professionals, but one for the people as a whole. The armed forces were regarded, not as a part of the royal household, but as the embodiment of the Nation.55 The overall increase in civilian expenditure and the changing nature of armed force, combined with the increased politicization of society through the development of citizenship rights, point to the development of more advanced forms of security provision. The combination of nationalism and warfare meant that, to a

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large extent, war was becoming more about the national interest of the population, and therefore could be expressed as providing a form of security. Regarding civilian expenditure, the development of mass infrastructures was all part of increased living standards as part and parcel of citizenship, which should be seen as another aspect of security provision. These two dimensions provide the basis for putting the state at the centre of an internal and external divide that has pervaded the literature on security ever since. Though this is obviously a generalized model of the process, it still provides important insights. The rise of European states was thus founded not only on the development of a powerful state elite and governing apparatus, but also through the development of infrastructural power. This was put in the context of protection, which can be seen as a precursor to the more advanced kind of security provision seen through the increased involvement of the state in civil activities. As Hobden points out: States did not emerge in terms of contractual arrangement with society, but because of their effectiveness in extracting resources from society, to protect the state as an institution and the population under its jurisdiction. State survival was very closely linked to the protection of a local population.56 The end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries heralded a more intensive relationship between state and society regarding security provision.

The security state The statesociety relationship in the 20th century has been one of a dramatic rise in the infrastructural power of the state, unprecedented in previous eras. The security state represents a situation where the increased penetration of the state into civil society has provided the basis for not only more co-ordination of society by the state, but the reciprocal effect of increased rights and expectations of the citizens of states. Though this is often ignored by security analysts, as it is seen as a domestic development associated with the rise of the welfare state, it is in fact an important change in the structure of states, and also requires a transformation in the conceptualization of security. The security state is, basically, a relationship between state and society where the state provides insurance against the impact of external contingencies.57 The increase in infrastructural power and rights in 20th-century states had much to do with the rise of industrialized total wars. The need for massive penetration into civil society in order to organize the total wars of the 20th century had a major impact on the structure of the state, which continued after the end of the Second World War. The First World War, of course, provides the precedent for this, where the state managed to organize a vast array of market forces in the domestic economy for its own purposes. As McNeill states: Innumerable bureaucratic structures that had previously acted more or less independently of one another in a context of market relationships coalesced into what amounted to a single national firm for waging war.58

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During the Second World War, all of the industrialized nations involved had to organize their economies around mobilization for the war effort.59 This was usually done through the use of specialized state bureaucracies which organized their economies. In Nazi Germany, economic planning had been divided among the three branches of the armed services and the SS, but under Armaments Minister Albert Speer was centralized to a large degree.60 In Britain, a greatly successful war economy was achieved under the auspices of Sir John Anderson, the head of the Lord Presidents Group, responsible for co-ordination of the wartime economic effort. The planning introduced many compromises in terms of civil liberties, and introduced measures to deal with wartime manpower shortages: by the middle of 1944, one-third of Britains labour force was involved in civilian work in the war effort.61 In the USA, though in many ways a special case due to its relative isolation from the conflict, wartime production was co-ordinated through a number of organizations, including the War Production Board, the Manpower Commission, and the Office of War Mobilization. These organizations proved an outstanding success, and by the end of 1942, the USA was outproducing all of the enemy powers combined.62 The extensive mobilization of society in the war effort led to a post-war situation where society demanded more from the state, and there was an opportunity for states to meet such demand.63 As Mazower states: It seems as though the war had created or intensified a demand for social solidarity, while the economic upswing created the resources to support this change.64 However, not only did the total wars affect the structure of the post-war states, they also affected the relationship between state and society in terms of citizenship. As Giddens points out, in the example of the United Kingdom: The wartime experience quite early on stimulated programmes for widespread social reform following the cessation of hostilities. The need for a thorough-going set of economic citizenship rights was accepted by groups from both major parties.65 The rights that came out of the Second World War rights of full employment, unemployment insurance, housing benefits and the like developed out of the war effort itself, and the increased pressures put on societies by the war, as well as a number of compromises made by political parties after the war.66 The development of the security state hinges on this elaboration of citizenship and rights which were seen as part of the trade-off in the increased penetration of the state into civil society. The rise of infrastructural power over the last two centuries not only increased the states involvement in civil society, but increased the expectations of civil society through its politicization, and the recognition of such expectations can be seen in the expansion of citizenship rights.67 The security that states provide has changed dramatically in the 20th century, through extended ideas of citizenship in the beginning of the century, to the post-Second World World War development of the welfare state and social (or economic) citizenship rights. The domestic compacts, however, were not made in isolation from the international. Just as the war effort had shaped domestic society through

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increasing infrastructural power and through compromises in welfare provision, the war had also fundamentally changed international relations as well. Though the effects of the new nuclear technology have been much commented upon,68 the internationalized nature of wartime planning had a profound effect on the organization of the international system. The internationalism in the war was most strongly seen in the case of the joint US and British mobilization for the war effort.69 As McNeill notes: Thanks to the increasing complexity of arms production, a single nation had become too small to conduct an efficient war. This was, perhaps, the main innovation of World War II.70 The legacy of such organization can be seen in the promotion of economic and political internationalism and integration in the post-war period, often seen as the beginnings of an intense period of globalization.71 The extension of social rights and provision was in part a recognition that the state would have to extend its benefits to citizens in order to participate more intensely in a new international and global environment. The development of more extensive forms of security after the Second World War was part of the postwar consensus of embedded liberalism, the compact giving citizens more security for the trade-off of the state being more integrated into the world economy and military security system.72 When this account is put in the context of the end of a period of total war, which involved the mobilization of society on an unprecedented level, the importance of post-war bargaining as a state strategy becomes clearer. The security state was a result of the war and the need to participate more intensely at the global and international scale, both by the provision for domestic intervention and the protection from external threat. This is emphasized in the way that the term national security came to prominence in the period following the Second World War. As Dalby states: It was only in the middle of this century that security became the architectonic impulse of the American security polity, and, subsequently, of its allies.73 The state had become the prime focus of security, with the USA taking the lead in this development. As McSweeney puts it: The concept of national security serves to focus on the autarky of the state.74 Though the stress in these accounts concerns the peculiarity of the state being at the centre of security,75 at that historical moment, the state did become the centre of security: the expansion of infrastructural power and its reciprocal effects had seen both the caging of civil society into the bounded territory of the state, as well as the development of the state as the main security provider, an insurance policy against contingency. The security state should be seen as a specific arrangement between state and society, where the state acts as a form of insurance against contingency. The combination of the strongly militarist state as a form of external protection, and the extension of rights through further enfranchisement and the development of social rights led to the situation where the state was at the centre of security. Protector against external threat and provider of domestic well-being, the state became the prime guarantor and provider of security.

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Conclusion An engagement with state theory, particularly that provided by proponents of neoWeberian historical sociology proved useful in elaborating the state as an institution, and a historically constituted actor. The incorporation of a more complex idea of statesociety relations demonstrated that the security relationships between state and society have developed over the course of several centuries as the result of a rise in the infrastructural power of the state. In the 20th century, a further rise in infrastructural power was obtained by the involvement of western states in two total wars, which led to the development of the security state. This represented a situation where the trade-off for further penetration into civil society was compensated for through increased citizenship rights, which encompassed a large gamut of the provision of social goods, in which should be included not only basic welfare provision, but the whole range of security provision, both internal and external. The development of the state as the mediator between these two realms, as a protector from external military threats, and as insurer against domestic malaise came at a cost. This was the other transformation that was a development of the total war era: the need to amalgamate more fully into the international realm. In a sense, this is the development of a more integrated international system, where western industrialized states begin to have an increasingly interdependent relationship. This is not only the result of the European allies position at the end of the Second World War, where they were in need of American financial assistance to overcome the hardships incurred in conflict, but also the recognition of the importance of the international economy. This is the essence of the post-war compromise: aspects of the dual development of the security state, social welfare itself provided the ground for the increased internationalization of the state. This reappraisal of the western state in security studies serves a number of purposes. First, it challenges the complacency concerning the impact of change on the state, enabling the state to both be resilient to change, and to incorporate change and come out transformed. This is an increasingly salient point, especially in relation to the often sterile debates on the supposed end of the state in the face of forces of globalization. The increasing need for interdependence and internationalism among western states in the post-war period supplied the grounding for globalization and state restructuring itself. The creation of a rigid internal external division was therefore problematic from the start. The recognition that this divide is historically contingent shows that challenges to the states domestic role do not necessitate its demise. Second, it places the development of western security states into a historical dynamic, which challenges a second complacency towards history, the transhistorical attitude that equates contemporary states with those of the 17th century.76 Crucial here is the gradual adding of security competences to the state, in terms of the areas that the state is responsible for, and an increasing responsibility towards its citizenry.

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Finally, it challenges the idea prevalent in security studies which presumes that the state is either the ultimate security actor, or an insufficient actor. There is in fact a middle ground, when the state is both examined historically as a security provider, and security is seen as encompassing more than just the external military dimension. The recognition of the historical contingency of the internal external divide in security studies helps to connect security more robustly with the rights of people as citizens. The contingency of this divide also adds to the critique of traditional security studies, by showing a more ambivalent view of the states role in the security process, also contributing to the agenda of a more humanized security studies by linking security squarely with the needs of people. These three purposes all contribute to an agenda for security studies that is more historically attuned, in order to better consider changes to both the security agenda of states and challenges to the competence of the state itself as a security provider under conditions of globalization. Although the scope of the enquiry has been geographically limited, and in some ways complicit with ignoring the globalregional variations in state formation,77 it is intended as a first foray into a historical sociology of international security studies, and a challenge to common assumptions about state security.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Ian Clark, Paul Williams and the two anonymous reviewers for comments on the various drafts of this article.

Notes
1 2 3 See especially the debates in Robert Keohane (ed.) (1986) Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. For a good overview, see Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff (eds) (2000) Critical Reflections on Security and Change. London: Frank Cass. There have been a few attempts to deal with the issue of security in the context of globalization, though primarily from a military standpoint. See Victor D. Cha (2000) Globalization and the Study of Security, Journal of Peace Research 37 (3): 391403; Ian Clark (1999) Globalization and International Relations Theory, chap. 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Jean-Marie Guhenno (19989) The Impact of Globalization on Strategy, Survival 40 (4): 519; David Held et al. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, chap. 2. Cambridge: Polity; and Martin Shaw (2000) Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This was noted over a decade ago by Halliday, and has continued to be an important point of contention, especially seen in the current interest in the historical sociology of international relations. Fred Halliday (1987) State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda, Millennium 16 (2): 21529; and Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds.) (2002) The Historical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See Held et al., Global Transformations, Introduction (see note 3). Thanks to Paul Williams for reminding me of this point. Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall (1994) After the Nation State. New York: Harper Collins; Kenichi Ohame (1990) The Borderless World. London: Fontana.

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John M. Hobson, Whats at Stake in Bringing Historical Sociological back into International Relations? Transcending Chronofetishism and Tempocentrism in International Relations, in Hobden and Hobson, pp.341 (see note 4). There is an irony here, that contemporary sovereign states are seen as being the products of the new Westphalian order, but most theorists of the state, and many with a more historically nuanced approach to international relations, argue that the modern nation-state is of more recent origin. For a good overview of the myths of Westphalia, see Stephen Krasner, Westphalia and All That, in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, (eds) (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy, pp.23564. London: Cornell University Press; and Andreas Osiander (2001) Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth, International Organization 55 (2): 25187. This is to suggest that it is a structurated process. Representative examples of traditional realist and neo-realist approaches can be found in Barry Buzan (1991) People, States and Fear, 2nd edn. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Hans J. Morgenthau (1978) Politics Among Nations, 5th edn. New York: Knopf; Stephen Walt (1991) The Renaissance of Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly 35: 21139; Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics. Boston: Addison-Wesley; Kenneth Waltz (1959) Man the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press; and Arnold Wolfers (1962) Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Charlotte Bretherton (1996) Security After the Cold War: Towards a Global Paradigm? in Charlotte Bretherton and Geoffrey Ponton (eds) Global Politics: An Introduction, pp.12651. Oxford: Blackwell; Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon (eds) (1996) International Security in the Modern World, rev. edn. London: Macmillan. See especially Ken Booth (1991) Security and Emancipation, Review of International Studies 17 (4): 31327; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds) (1997) Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, pp.3359. London: UCL Press; Steve Smith (1991) Mature Anarchy, Strong States, and Security, Arms Control 12 (2): 325339; and Richard Wyn Jones (1999) Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. This is perhaps less true of recent constructivist work on security, which has examined the constructed and contingent nature of the development of various facets of security. For a good overview, see Theo Farrell, Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program, International Studies Review 4 (1): 4972. Such approaches are gaining prominence in international relations. For examples, see, Stephen Hobden (1998) International Relations and Historical Sociology. London: Routledge; Hobden and Hobson, Historical Sociology (see note 4); Special Section (1998) Debate: The Second Wave of Weberian Historical Sociology, Review of International Political Economy 5 (2): 284 361; John M. Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. There is some overlap here with the idea of the national security state, as conceptualized in the literature on the history of US security policy, with particular reference to the early Cold War years, and the founding of the National Security Act in 1947. This is of importance because of the way this militarized the concept of security and merged domestic concerns with those of foreign policy, the connotations of which are still being felt both in the context of academic IR, and policymaking. For more on the national security state in the context of security studies, see Bill McSweeney (1999) Security, Identity and Interests, Chaps. 1 and 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For the historical literature, see, for example, Michael J. Hogan (2000) A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 19451954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Daniel Yergin (1977) Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. For the policymaking impacts, see Michael McGwire (2001) The Paradigm that Lost its Way, International Affairs 77 (4): 777 803; and Michael McGwire (2002) Shifting the Paradigm, International Affairs 78 (1): 128. On this point, see Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, chap. 6 (see note 3). There is also some justification, as the western state has remained a model for state-building worldwide, for a legacy of the domination (and imperialism) of European states. See Mohammed Ayoob (1995) The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. This problem is especially seen in neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches to IR, where states are not generally seen in their own historical context. For a good overview, see Hobson, Whats at Stake (see note 7).

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Michael Mann (1993) Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying, Daedalus 122: 11540. Halliday, State and Society, p.217 (see note 4). This is especially clear in the work of Buzan and Waever, who have devoted a great deal of analysis to the role of the state in the security process. See Buzan, People, States and Fear (see note 10); and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner. This is mainly a debate between traditional or realist scholars and critical security studies scholars. The former prioritize national security, or the security of the state, while the latter (in the main) focus on the relevance of individuals and other social groupings. For an overview, see Krause and Williams, From Strategy to Security (see note 12). An exception in security studies can be found in the work of Deudney, who has examined domestic forces as being important for security. Daniel Deudney, Political Fission: State Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Security Politics in the United States, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) (1995) On Security, pp.87123. New York: Columbia University Press. McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p.33 (see note 15). Representative examples of this literature can be found in the following works: Anthony Giddens (1987) The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press; John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry (1989) The State. Milton Keynes: Open University Press; Michael Mann (1993) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gianfranco Poggi (1990) The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects. Cambridge: Polity; Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds) (1985) Bringing the State Back In, pp.16991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Charles Tilly (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States: ad 9901990. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. For a succinct statement of Webers position on the state, see Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (eds) (1994) Weber: Political Writings, pp.30969. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This essay is more commonly known as Politics as a Vocation. The approach followed most closely here is that of Mann. See Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, Ch. 3 (see note 25). There are of course other theoretical approaches to the state. For overviews of competing approaches to the state, see Colin Hay (1996) Re-Stating Social and Political Change. Buckingham: Open University Press; and John M. Hobson (2000) The State and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The neo-Weberian approach associated with historical sociology is preferred here, primarily because it both well integrates an historical approach into its overall framework of analysis, and incorporates an international dimension into its theorizing from the outset. The role of the international in historical sociology has, however, been criticized by some international relations scholars for being crudely realist. On this point, see Stephen Hobden (1999) Theorising the International System, Review of International Studies 25 (2): 25771. Poggi, The State, p.98 (see note 25). This is common in pluralist theories of the state, in which the state is actually seen as a fiction, a bureaucratic manifestation of collective political decisions, and not an institution in its own right. For overviews, see Hall and Ikenberry, The State, pp.36 (see note 25); and Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, pp.467 and Ch. 3 passim (see note 25). Michael Mann (1988) The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Results, in States, War and Capitalism, pp.132. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, pp.5961 (see note 25). Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.13 (see note 25). Mann, The Autonomous Power of the State, p.5 (see note 30). Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.13 (see note 25). Mann, The Autonomous Power of the State, p.5 (see note 30). Giddens has also importantly added the role of more invasive forms of surveillance that have developed in the modern state, and these should be seen as part of the infrastructural power. Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, Chap. 7 (see note 25). Giddens notion of surveillance overlaps suggestively with the one developed by Foucault, although Giddens is keen to disentangle them. See Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, pp.1856 (see note 25); and Michel Foucault (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage. Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.14 (see note 25).

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Hay, Re-Stating Social and Political Change, p.67 (see note 27). A good sampling of these perspectives can be found, though sometimes tangentially, in the following works: Martin van Creveld (1999) The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paul Kennedy (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. London: Fontana; Michael Howard (1977) War and European History. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States (see note 25); William H. McNeill (1982) The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Michael Mann (1986) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II (see note 25). This is pointed out by van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, Ch. 3 (see note 38). There is some contention in this matter over the role of ideational factors in historical sociological analysis, which has primarily (though not exclusively) looked at material motivations for the development of states and the states system. See the critique from a sympathetic theorist in Christian Reus-Smit, The Idea of History and History of Ideas, in Hobden and Hobson, Historical Sociology of International Relations, pp.12040 (see note 4). Tilly outlines an ideal sequence of the classic European state-building experience: Tilly, War Making p.183 (see note 25). Ibid., p.181; Howard, War and European History, p.49 (see note 38). Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.370 and p.375 (see note 25). van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, pp.1423 (see note 38). Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.479 (see note 25). Ibid., p.375. van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, p.217 (see note 38). Ibid., pp.21819. Ibid., p.155. Howard, War and European History, Chap. 4 (see note 38). Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.410 (see note 25). Ibid., p20. Stephen Hobden (1999) Can Historical Sociology be Critical?, Alternatives 24 (3): 406. See Giddens for an account of the connection between these three dimensions of the state. Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, pp.21221 (see note 25). Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.251 (see note 25). Howard, War and European History, p.110 (see note 38). Hobden, Can Historical Sociology be Critical?, p.403 (see note 52). This description has been borrowed from Giddens, though with a slightly different purpose in mind. As Giddens states: The welfare state originated as a security state and was actually called such in some countries. It was the socialised, public counterpart to private insurance. Anthony Giddens, Affluence, Poverty and the Idea of a Post-Scarcity Society, in Ken Booth (ed.) (1998) Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, p.314. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p.317 (see note 38). Also see Mark Roseman, War and the People: The Social Impact of Total War, in Charles Townshend (ed.) (2000) The Oxford History of Modern War, pp.2845. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eric Hobsbawm (1995) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 19141991, pp.449. London: Abacus; Roseman, War and the People, pp.2835 (see note 58). Brian Bond (1998) War and Society in Europe, 18701970, 2nd edn, p.174. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing. Ibid., p.1756. Ibid., p.178. Roseman, War and the People, pp.285287 (see note 58). Mark Mazower (1999) Dark Continent: Europes Twentieth Century, p.304. London: Penguin Books. In the case of Britain, the Beveridge report, outlining Britains post-war social welfare provision, was received with a great enthusiasm, and became the best selling bureaucratic document in British history, selling over 500,000 copies. Hay, Re-Stating Social and Political Change, p.29 (see note 27). Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, p.242 (see note 25). For more on the latter, particularly in terms of the decreased demands of both left and right, see Charles S. Maier (1981) The Two Postwar Eras and Conditions for Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe, American Historical Review 86 (2): 328333.

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Also see Manns account of the different kinds of state strategies pursued to this end, which demonstrates well that the trade-off played differently in different types of state regimes, but was important in all of them. Michael Mann (1988) Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship, in States, War and Capitalism, pp.188210. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. See, for example, Bernard Brodie (1965) Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Robert Jervis (1989) The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; and Michael Mandelbaum (1981) The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This is given brief outline in McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp.3546 (see note 38). Ibid., p.356. Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, p.240 (see note 25); and Ian Clark (1997) Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century, p.115. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This is not to say that nationalism and the nation-state were principles that were abandoned in the post-war period, for it is more accurate to say that the war promoted both nationalism and internationalism, creating some of the main problems of the latter half of the 20th century. See Ibid., p.117. John Gerrard Ruggie (1982) International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, International Organization 36 (2): 195231. Simon Dalby, Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse, in Krause and Williams, Critical Security Studies, p.21 (see note 12). Yergin notes that the term national security had only become utilized in policymaking circles during the 1940s. Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp.1945 (see note 15). McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p.28 (see note 15). In a sense it was peculiar, after the relative failure of the nation-state in the inter-war period. And indeed with the states of any other historical period which happens to resemble the present; e.g. Renaissance Italy, Ancient Greece, etc. On this point, see Hobson, Whats at Stake, pp.911 (see note 4); and Justin Rosenberg (1994) The Empire of Civil Society, Ch. 3. London: Verso. There is some recognition of the different accounts of state-building and state power structures in other regions of the world, despite the continued reliance on western models of statehood as the basis of international society. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbsts work on state-building in Africa: Jeffrey Herbst (2000) State and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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