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CR 2013/1

Cour internationale de Justice LA HAYE

International Court of Justice THE HAGUE

ANNE 2013

Audience publique tenue le lundi 15 avril 2013, 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la prsidence de M. Tomka, prsident, en laffaire relative la Demande en interprtation de larrt du 15 juin 1962 en laffaire du Temple de Prah Vihar (Cambodge c. Thalande) (Cambodge c. Thalande)

________________ COMPTE RENDU ________________

YEAR 2013

Public sitting held on Monday 15 April 2013, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand)

____________________ VERBATIM RECORD ____________________

-2Prsents : M. M. MM. Tomka, prsident Seplveda-Amor, vice-prsident Owada Abraham Keith Bennouna Skotnikov Canado Trindade Yusuf Greenwood Mmes Xue Donoghue M. Gaja Mme Sebutinde M. Bhandari, juges MM. Guillaume Cot, juges ad hoc M. Couvreur, greffier

-3Present: President Tomka Vice-President Seplveda-Amor Judges Owada Abraham Keith Bennouna Skotnikov Canado Trindade Yusuf Greenwood Xue Donoghue Gaja Sebutinde Bhandari Judges ad hoc Guillaume Cot Registrar Couvreur

-4Le Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge est reprsent par : S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires trangres et de la coopration internationale, comme agent ; S. Exc. M. Var Kimhong, ministre dEtat, comme agent adjoint ; S. Exc. M. Long Visalo, secrtaire dEtat au ministre des affaires trangres et de la coopration internationale, M. Raoul Marc Jennar, expert, S. Exc. M. Hem Saem, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plnipotentiaire du Royaume du Cambodge auprs du Royaume des Pays-Bas, M. Sarun Rithea, conseiller du ministre des affaires trangres et de la coopration internationale, M. Hoy Pichravuth, assistant du vice-premier ministre, comme conseillers ; M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur de droit international lUniversit Paris I (Panthon-Sorbonne), sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau dAngleterre, membre de la Cour permanente darbitrage, professeur invit de droit international lUniversit dOxford et lUniversit de Cape Town, M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat la cour dappel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris, comme conseils et avocats ; M. Guillaume Le Floch, professeur lUniversit de Rennes I, Mme Amal Alamuddin, membre des barreaux dAngleterre et de New York, Mme Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (Angleterre et Pays de Galles), cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris, comme conseils.

-5The Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia is represented by: H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, as Agent; H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State, as Deputy Agent; H.E. Mr. Long Visalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar, Expert, H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mr. Sarun Rithea, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister, as Advisers; Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor (Panthon-Sorbonne), of International Law at the University of Paris I

Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of International Law at Oxford University and the University of Cape Town, Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat la cour dappel de Paris, member of the New York Bar, Eversheds LLP, Paris, as Counsel and Advocates; Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes I, Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars, Ms Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (England and Wales), Eversheds LLP, Paris, as Counsel.

-6Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thalande est reprsent par : S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plnipotentiaire du Royaume de Thalande auprs du Royaume des Pays-Bas, comme agent ; M. Voradet Viravakin, directeur gnral du dpartement des traits et des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires trangres, comme agent adjoint ; S. Exc. M. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires trangres, S. Exc. M. Phongthep Thepkanjana, vice-premier ministre et ministre de lducation, S. Exc. M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, A.C.M., ministre de la dfense, M. Thana Duangratana, vice-ministre rattach au cabinet du premier ministre, M. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, secrtaire permanent du ministre des affaires trangres, M. Nuttavudh Photisaro, secrtaire permanent adjoint du ministre des affaires trangres, Le gnral Nipat Thonglek, secrtaire permanent adjoint du ministre de la dfense, Le gnral Nopphadon Chotsiri, directeur gnral du service gographique royal thalandais, quartier gnral des forces armes du Royaume de Thalande, M. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, secrtaire gnral adjoint du bureau du conseil dEtat, cabinet du premier ministre, M. Jumpon Phansumrit, procureur expert au bureau des politiques et stratgies, bureau de lAttorney General, M. Darm Boontham, directeur de la division des frontires du dpartement des traits et des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires trangres ; * M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit lUniversit de Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de lInstitut de droit international, avocat, M. Donald McRae, professeur lUniversit dOttawa, titulaire de la chaire Hyman Soloway, membre de la Commission du droit international, membre associ de lInstitut de droit international, membre du barreau de lOntario,

-7The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand is represented by: H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Thailand to Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Agent; Mr. Voradet Viravakin, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Deputy Agent; H.E. Mr. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. Phongthep Thepkanjana, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, H.E. A.C.M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, Minister of Defence, Mr. Thana Duangratana, Vice-Minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nuttavudh Photisaro, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Lieutenant General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director-General, Royal Thai Survey Department, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy-Secretary-General, Office of the Council of State, Office of the Prime Minister, Mr. Jumpon Phansumrit, Expert Public Prosecutor, Office of Policy and Strategy, Office of the Attorney General, Mr. Darm Boontham, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

* Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Member of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Ontario Bar,

-8-

M. Alain Pellet, professeur lUniversit Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, prsident de la Socit franaise pour le droit international, membre associ de lInstitut de droit international, M. Thomas Grant, membre du barreau de New York, matre de recherche au Lauterpacht Centre for International Law de lUniversit de Cambridge, Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Universit Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, comme conseils ; M. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., membre honoraire de lunit de recherche sur les frontires internationales du dpartement de gographie de lUniversit de Durham, M. Martin Pratt, directeur de recherche lunit de recherche sur les frontires internationales du dpartement de gographie de lUniversit de Durham, comme conseillers experts ; M. Ludovic Legrand, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Universit Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, comme conseil adjoint.

-9Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, President of the Socit franaise pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit international, Dr. Thomas Grant, member of the New York Bar, Senior Research Associate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, as Counsel; Mr. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., Honorary Fellow, International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University, Mr. Martin Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University, as Expert Advisers; Mr. Ludovic Legrand, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, Assistant Counsel.

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The PRESIDENT: The sitting is open. Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, It is with great honour and joy

that the Court meets today for the first time in the newly-renovated Great Hall of Justice. On this important occasion, I wish to emphasize that the renovation of the Great Hall coincides with the centennial anniversary of the Peace Palace, which opened its doors in August of 1913. momentous occasion will be celebrated later this year, in many ways. The Great Hall of Justice was first used by the Permanent Court of Arbitration for arbitral proceedings administered by that institution. In 1922, it became the home for judicial proceedings conducted before the Permanent Court of International Justice and, since 1946, the International Court of Justice has made it its permanent courtroom. Over the decades, countless eminent agents and counsel have appeared before these institutions; ground-breaking legal arguments have been put forward by parties; peaceful solutions and settlement of international disputes have been articulated while upholding the rules and principles of international law; and greater adherence to the international rule of law has been continuously promoted. This room has been the breeding ground for some of the most seminal and important decisions in the field of international law during the last 90 years. The prospect of bringing a dispute to the World Court for adjudication which should not be construed as an inimical or hostile act, as the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes tells us actually serves to further the objectives of international peace, security and justice. Proceedings before the Court may contribute to diffusing tensions between disputing States and ultimately help strengthen the rule of law on the international plane. Needless to say, this room has seen its share of historical disputes over the last century and has remained a locus for the formulation of timely, well-reasoned and just legal solutions. The Great Hall of Justice quite a suitable name, indeed! What is more, today the Court is presented with the outcome of the first major renovation of this Hall in 100 years. In the past, minor refurbishment works had been carried out to This

- 11 accommodate certain requirements of the Courts predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, such as extending its bench in view of its enlarged composition. Yet, no renovation project of this magnitude had ever been envisaged prior to the recent reconfiguration and refurbishment of this Hall. Today, the Great Hall features vastly superior working capabilities, being now equipped with first-rate and modern technical facilities, all while exhibiting a fresh and modern look. Thus, the Court is very pleased that it will continue hearing the cases submitted to it faithfully and impartially, as dictated by the noble judicial mission entrusted to it, in improved and modern working conditions. In many ways, therefore, this centennial anniversary year provides a

propitious opportunity not only to reflect and meditate on the great past and history surrounding this Hall, the Palace and institutions housed in it, but also to look forward and to embrace a future in which international peace, justice and modernity can work hand in hand. While it is no doubt important to commemorate the past, we must not forget those more immediate actors that have helped shape the present. The initiative of renovating the Great Hall of Justice was first raised by Dame Rosalyn Higgins when she was President of the Court, for which she must be heartily commended. The renovation of this Great Hall was made possible through the tireless efforts of several individuals and institutions. In this spirit, the Court extends its sincere gratitude to the Carnegie Foundation its Board led by Dr. Bot and its Director-General Mr. Steven van Hoogstraten , to the Dutch Government, and to the United Nations for financial support towards the achievement of this renovation project. Warm thanks are also due to those individuals and companies that have helped create the newly-designed Great Hall, namely: the main architect, Marijke van der Wijst; the co-architect, Julian Wolse; the carpet designer, Annet Haak; the project managers, Edwin van Eeckhoven and Corne Noordam; the co-ordinator for the Carnegie Foundation, Guido Bennebroek; the company Smeulders for providing the new bench, the technical booth and the interpreters booths; the company ERCO which designed the lighting; the company Verkaart for handling all technical aspects of the renovation; the company Du Prie for carrying out the rebuilding tasks in the Great Hall; and the company Vitra for furnishing the Great Hall.

- 12 It is to be hoped that this Great Hall of Justice which has served for 90 years as a bastion of international peace and justice and as an incubator for the peaceful settlement of disputes will be of further use in promoting and strengthening the international rule of law.

Excellencies, distinguished guests, the Court meets for the first time since the passing away on 13 February 2013 of our esteemed former colleague, His Excellency Judge Pieter Kooijmans, who was a Member of the International Court of Justice from 1997 to 2006. Mrs. Jeanne Kooijmans-Verhage, is now among us here in the Great Hall of Justice. It was with profound sadness and sorrow that Members of the Court learnt of the death of Judge Kooijmans, which is a tremendous loss for the Netherlands, for the international legal community and for international law and justice which he served with exemplary authority and great talent. As a Judge of the International Court of Justice, he was highly respected for his moral and human qualities, his knowledge and skills. As a professional jurist, he was eminently wise, perceptive and pragmatic, possessed a remarkable sense of compromise and was widely praised for his balanced judgments. None of us will forget the major contributions Judge Kooijmans made to the fulfilment of the Courts important mandate: he participated actively in numerous cases, offering all his experience and knowledge and thus serving the cause of international peace and justice. We will also His spouse,

remember the great significance he attached to human rights, which permeated all his work. During his long and illustrious legal career Judge Kooijmans also served as a Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Hague Academy of International Law and lecturer at the same Academy, Chairman of the Netherlands Branch of the International Law Association, Member of the Board of Editors of the Netherlands International Law Review, Professor of Public International Law at the Free University of Amsterdam and at the University of Leiden. In addition he occupied numerous other important posts.

- 13 Judge Kooijmanss political and diplomatic career was no less illustrious: we need only recall that he served first as Secretary of State and later as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and was appointed Minister of State. In all the positions he held, he discharged his responsibilities with the utmost competence and professionalism. In recognition of Peter Kooijmanss outstanding service to his country,

Queen Beatrix made him Knight of the Order of the Netherlands Lion, Commander of the Order of Oranje-Nassau and Knight of the Order of the Gold Lion of the House of Nassau. We are keenly aware of how devoted Judge Kooijmans was to his family and we hope that Mrs. Kooijmans, his children and other close family members will be able to find support and solace in the shared memories of their departed loved one. On behalf of Members of the Court and myself, the Registrar and Registry staff, let me extend our deepest sympathy and our heartfelt thoughts to them at this time of affliction. May I kindly ask you to stand and observe one minute of silence in memory of Judge Peter Kooijmans. Please be seated. Thank you.

* * *

Le PRESIDENT : La Cour se runit aujourdhui pour entendre les Parties en leurs plaidoiries dans laffaire relative la Demande en interprtation de larrt du 15 juin 1962 en laffaire du Temple de Prah Vihar (Cambodge c. Thalande) (Cambodge c. Thalande). La Cour ne comptant sur le sige aucun juge de la nationalit des Parties, chacune delles sest prvalue de la facult que lui confre le paragraphe 3 de larticle 31 du Statut de dsigner un juge ad hoc. M. Gilbert Guillaume, dsign par le Cambodge, et M. Jean-Pierre Cot, dsign par la

- 14 Thalande, ont t tous deux dment installs le 30 mai 2011 comme juges ad hoc en laffaire louverture des audiences sur la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires prsente par le Cambodge.

Je rappellerai prsent les principales tapes de la procdure en lespce. Le 28 avril 2011, le Royaume du Cambodge a dpos au Greffe de la Cour une requte introductive dinstance dans laquelle, se rfrant larticle 60 du Statut de la Cour et larticle 98 de son Rglement, le Cambodge demande la Cour dinterprter larrt quelle a rendu le 15 juin 1962 en laffaire du Temple de Prah Vihar (Cambodge c. Thalande). Le Cambodge, dans sa requte, prie notamment la Cour de dire que larrt de 1962 se fonde sur lexistence pralable dune frontire internationale reconnue entre les deux Etats et dfinie par la carte sur la base de laquelle la Cour a constat la souverainet du Cambodge sur le temple de Prah Vihar. Le mme jour, aprs avoir dpos sa requte, le Cambodge, se rfrant larticle 41 du Statut et larticle 73 du Rglement, a galement dpos une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires afin de faire cesser [l]es incursions [de la Thalande] sur son territoire en attendant que la Cour se prononce sur la demande en interprtation de larrt de 1962. Par ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011, la Cour, aprs avoir rejet la demande de la Thalande tendant obtenir la radiation de laffaire du rle de la Cour, a dit quelle avait prima facie comptence et indiqu certaines mesures conservatoires. Par lettres du greffier en date du 20 juillet 2011, les Parties ont t informes que la Cour, en application de larticle 98, paragraphe 3, du Rglement, avait fix au 21 novembre 2011 la date dexpiration du dlai dans lequel la Thalande pourrait prsenter des observations crites sur la demande en interprtation du Cambodge. Le 21 novembre 2011, dans le dlai prescrit cet effet, la Thalande a dpos ses observations crites sur la demande en interprtation du Cambodge. Par lettre date du 22 novembre 2011, lagent du Cambodge a indiqu la Cour que son gouvernement sollicitait un dlai dune quinzaine de jours pour tudier au pralable [l]es

- 15 observations crites de la Thalande, suivi dun dlai de trois mois pour apporter sa rponse [auxdites] observations. Par lettres du 24 novembre 2011, le greffier a fait savoir aux Parties que la Cour avait dcid de donner ces dernires la possibilit de lui fournir par crit un supplment dinformation, conformment au paragraphe 4 de larticle 98 du Rglement, et avait fix au 8 mars 2012 et au 21 juin 2012, respectivement, les dates dexpiration des dlais pour le dpt par le Cambodge et par la Thalande dun tel supplment dinformation. Chacune des Parties a dpos celui-ci dans le dlai prescrit cet effet. Par lettre du 2 mars 2012, lagent de la Thalande a pri la Cour de donner aux Parties la possibilit de lui fournir oralement un supplment dinformation. Dans un courrier du

7 mars 2012, lagent du Cambodge a fait savoir la Cour que son gouvernement n y tait pas oppos. Par lettres du 22 juin 2012, le greffier a inform les Parties que la Cour avait dcid de leur donner la possibilit de lui fournir oralement un supplment dinformation, conformment au paragraphe 4 de larticle 98 du Rglement. *

Conformment au paragraphe 2 de larticle 53 de son Rglement, la Cour, aprs stre renseigne auprs des Parties, a dcid de rendre accessibles au public, louverture de la procdure orale, des exemplaires des pices de procdure et documents annexs. En outre,

lensemble de ces documents, y compris leurs annexes, seront placs ds aujourdhui sur le site Internet de la Cour. *

Je constate la prsence laudience des agents, conseils et avocats des deux Parties. Conformment aux dispositions relatives lorganisation de la procdure arrtes par la Cour, les audiences comprendront un premier et un second tours de plaidoiries. *

- 16 Le premier tour de plaidoiries dbute aujourdhui et se terminera le mercredi 17 avril 2013. Le second tour de plaidoiries souvrira le jeudi 18 avril 2013 et sachvera le

vendredi 19 avril 2013.

Le Royaume du Cambodge, qui est lEtat demandeur en laffaire, sera entendu le premier. Etant donn mon discours de ce matin, la dlgation cambodgienne peut, si cest ncessaire, dpasser 13 heures dune dizaine de minutes. Je donne prsent la parole S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, agent du Royaume du Cambodge. Excellence, vous avez la parole. M. HOR NAMHONG : 1. Monsieur le prsident, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, cest avec beaucoup dmotion et de gravit que je me prsente une nouvelle fois aujourdhui devant vous en tant qu agent reprsentant le Royaume du Cambodge. 2. Il sagit cette fois-ci de clore la procdure qui mnera votre Cour vers sa dcision finale dans laffaire qui nous occupe. Je mesure donc la gravit de ce moment pour mon pays et je souhaite que votre juridiction puisse rendre un arrt sur linterprtation de larrt de 1962, qui clturera dfinitivement ce litige qui obscurcit depuis quelques annes les relations entre notre voisin la Thalande. Il est temps dsormais dentretenir entre les deux pays des relations cordiales, pacifiques et animes par un esprit constructif. Le Cambodge le souhaite plus que jamais. 3. Comme il se doit, je laisserai les conseils du Cambodge rpondre aux diffrents arguments juridiques qui ont pu tre dvelopps dans les crits successifs de la Thalande. Pour ma part, il me revient de rappeler le contexte dans lequel nous nous trouvons, contexte qui ncessite que votre Cour prenne une dcision dune importance fondamentale pour la paix, lamiti et la coopration entre les deux pays, et pour la rgion en gnral. 4. Auparavant, je souhaite remercier sincrement la Cour pour avoir permis au Cambodge et la Thalande de sexprimer de manire consquente durant cette procdure, car vous avez bien voulu laisser au Cambodge et la Thalande un cycle complet de procdures crite et orale,

- 17 prouvant par l mme limportance que vous attachez laffaire que le Cambodge a porte devant vous. Le Cambodge veut croire que ceci nest pas d au hasard mais rsulte du srieux des fondements sur lesquels cette affaire a t porte devant vous. 5. Dabord je souhaite rappeler rapidement pourquoi le Cambodge revient devant la Cour 50 ans aprs larrt initial ; quelle est aujourdhui la situation sur le terrain, notamment au regard des mesures conservatoires prononces par votre Cour en juillet 2011 ; quelle est lattitude de la Thalande vis--vis de cette situation ; ce que le Cambodge souhaite, et pourquoi la Cour doit se prononcer sur linterprtation pertinente lissue de cette procdure. I. RAPPEL DE LHISTOIRE RCENTE 6. Pourquoi le Cambodge revient 50 ans aprs larrt du 15 juin 1962 devant votre juridiction ? Il ne sagit nullement pour le Cambodge dune procdure superflue, mais bien de la ncessit qui sest impose de revenir devant votre Cour pour lucider la bonne interprtation donner larrt initial afin de rgler le diffrend portant sur le sens et la porte de larrt de 1962. 7. Cette ncessit rsulte, comme on le sait, dactes dagressions armes de la Thalande alors gouverne par le premier ministre Abhisit Vejjajiva contre le Cambodge de 2008 2011 la frontire entre les pays dans la rgion du temple de Prah-Vihar, depuis que le Cambodge a russi faire inscrire ce temple sur la liste du patrimoin e mondial de lUnesco en 2008, en dpit dune forte opposition de la Thalande. Sans ces agressions armes, le Cambodge aurait continu de jouir paisiblement de sa souverainet dans cette rgion. Cest donc bien le classement de ce temple au patrimoine mondial de lUnesco qui constitue le point de dpart de ces incidents arms, ainsi que la rclamation de 4,6 km, proximit du temple, comme ceci est explicitement mentionn dans une publication du ministre thalandais des affaires trangres en dcembre 2011 sous le titre Les informations que le peuple tha doit savoir, et ainsi que plusieurs autres publications thalandaises. 8. Mystrieusement, la Thalande, dans ses observations crites du 21 juin 2012, semble oublier que cette srie dattaques militaires contre le Cambodge, faiblement arm, de 2008 2011, ponctue de destructions y compris celles touchant le temple lui-mme de blesss et de morts la suite de ces agressions armes. Elle souhaite donc faire oublier la raison pour laquelle il est

- 18 ncessaire que votre juridiction se prononce sur la bonne interprtation donner larrt de 1962. Ceci nest gure tonnant puisque, aprs avoir fait ressurgir les tensions que le Cambodge pensait de lordre du pass, la Thalande feint dignorer quil existe bien un diffrend entre les deux Etats sur linterprtation de larrt de 1962. 9. Ce sont pourtant bien ces vnements qui ont pouss le Cambodge, faute darrangements diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement thalandais cette poque, le gouvernement de M. Abhisit Vejjajiva, revenir devant la Cour internationale de Justice. Lattitude incohrente de la Thalande prouve surtout que cet Etat na jamais rellement accept la solution de larrt de 1962. Certes, aprs quelques tergiversations, la Thalande aurait finalement accept larrt du 15 juin 1962, mais son interprtation dudit arrt, comme en tmoignent essentiellement ses prises de position depuis 2008, prouve quelle a toujours cherch en minimiser le sens et la porte. Cest bien la raison pour laquelle le Cambodge se voit oblig de poser aujourdhui votre juridiction la question du sens et de la porte exacte de larrt de 1962. II. LA SITUATION AUJOURDHUI 10. Malheureusement, le Cambodge ne peut que dplorer la situation actuelle dans la rgion du temple de Prah Vihar puisque les ngociations bilatrales sur le retrait des troupes de la zone dmilitarise provisoire conformment aux mesures conservatoires dcides par votre juridiction le 18 juillet 2011 nont pas abouti, contrairement ce que souhaite le Cambodge pour un retrait rapide et simultan. Lors des runions du groupe de travail conjoint cr la demande de la Thalande en dcembre 2011, charg du retrait des troupes de la zone dmilitarise provisoire, la Thalande trouve toujours des chappatoires pour ne pas respecter votre ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011. Il en fut ainsi lors des trois runions entre avril et dcembre 2012. En

consquence, il na pas t possible de mettre en place des observateurs indonsiens chargs, sous les auspices de lASEAN, de contrler le retrait des troupes de la zone du temple en attendant votre jugement dfinitif. 11. Le Cambodge ne peut que regretter cette situation contraire votre jurisprudence qui rend lapplication des mesures provisoires obligatoire pour les deux Parties. Dans le Livre Blanc de la Thalande de dcembre 2011, que le Cambodge a vers au dossier de la Cour, il est

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notamment indiqu que La Thalande souhaite que le Cambodge retire ses forces armes et sa population civile de la zone du temple de Phra Viharn, de la colonie, du march et de la pagode Keo Sekkha Kiri Svara, avant que les observateurs indonsiens puissent y entrer. Dans la

dcision de la Cour du 18 juillet 2011, il na t nullement demand le retrait de la population vivant paisiblement dans cette zone depuis des dcennies qualifie en lespce dune manire injurieuse et contraire au droit de colonie. Cette expression de colonie veut faire accroire que le Cambodge aurait install des populations sur un territoire thalandais occup par le Cambodge et qui se situerait en dehors de sa souverainet, alors que la population cambodgienne vivait aux abords du temple, en territoire sous la souverainet cambodgienne. 12. En ralit, la Thalande continue de sarc-bouter sur une hypothtique ngociation sur la dlimitation des frontires dans le cadre du Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) de lan 2000. La Thalande fait de ce mmorandum linstrument dune future dlimitation des frontires entre les deux Etats, alors que le MoU en question stricto sensu ne concerne que la dmarcation qui est diffrente de la dlimitation car la frontire de la rgion du temple de Prah Vihar a dj t dlimite par la carte de lannexe I, ainsi que lindique votre arrt de 1962. III. LATTITUDE DE LA THALANDE 13. En effet, pour la Thalande, il nexisterait pas de diffrend et, selon une expression quelle utilise plusieurs reprises, larrt de 1962, et notamment son dispositif, serait clair comme crystal clear. Cette affirmation quelque peu ironique est dailleurs dans la ligne du ton quelle utilise dans ses crits o se mlent la mauvaise foi, lironie et mme le mpris, quand il ne sagit pas darguments absurdes ou rptitifs. 14. En ralit, au-del de ce ton, la Thalande essaie une nouvelle fois de refaire larrt de 1962. Elle introduit des lments de confusion dans le dbat, notamment en alimentant une soi-disant querelle sur les cartes prsentes ou en rfutant des affirmations quelle a elle-mme souleves, comme la question du primtre de 4,6 km, revendiqu par la Thalande dans son Livre Blanc de dcembre 2011 que jai dj cit. 15. La vrit, Monsieur le prsident, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, est que la Thalande ne sait plus comment dfendre une position contradictoire et intenable et quelle

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fait tout pour retarder un jugement que le Cambodge souhaiterait au contraire rapide de manire claircir la situation. Cette stratgie du recul est bien connue de la part dEtats dont largumentaire nest gure fond. Le refus par la Thalande daccepter la prsence dobservateurs indonsiens dj voqu va galement dans ce sens.

IV. CE QUE LE CAMBODGE DEMANDE 16. Comme ceci fut exprim dans des phases prcdentes, le Cambodge souhaite aboutir une interprtation authentique et dfinitive de larrt de 1962. Il ne sagit pas dune question dexcution de larrt, il ne sagit pas non plus dune question de dlimitation de la frontire puisque celle-ci est dj dlimite par la carte de lannexe I, sur laquelle sest base la Cour pour rendre son arrt en 1962. du 15 juin 1962. 17. La question pose est celle de la souverainet et de lintgrit territoriale du Cambodge dans la zone du temple puisque larrt de 1962 indique clairement que le temple de Prah Vihear est situ en territoire relevant de la souverainet du Cambodge et quil demande la Thalande de retirer ses troupes du temple et de ses environs situs en territoire cambodgien. Or, comment peut tre compris ce retrait si ce nest en rapport avec la seule carte carte de lannexe I sur laquelle votre arrt de 1962 sest bas ; pour la simple raison que celle-ci est reconnue par la Thalande comme tant la frontire entre les deux Etats dans cette rgion de temple de Prah Vihear ? 18. En clair, ce nest pas une dlimitation que le Cambodge souhaite obtenir elle existe dj mais cest une interprtation du dispositif de larrt du 15 juin 1962. En essayant de crer des diversions par rapport aux questions essentielles, la Thalande veut faire douter la Cour du sens de la question pose. 19. Il en rsulte que, pour le Cambodge, linterprtation qui prvaut de cet arrt est que le Cambodge est souverain sur un territoire dont les limites dans la rgion du temple de Prah Vihar sont dcrites dans la carte de lannexe I sur laquelle la Cour sest entirement base pour lintgralit de la dcision quelle a prise en 1962, et quil en dcoule bien une obligation continue dans le temps du retrait des troupes thalandaises jusquaux limites de ce territoire. Il sagit dune interrogation sur le sens et la porte de larrt

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20. En conclusion, Monsieur le Prsident, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, limportance que le Cambodge accorde la dcision de la Cour va bien au-del du simple primtre concern ; il sagit dun symbole trs fort des relations entre les deux Etats, symbole dont dpendent la paix et la scurit, la coexistence pacifique et amicale entre le Cambodge et la Thalande. Le Cambodge veut croire que la Cour, en tant quorgane judiciaire principal des Nations Unies, a un rle fondamental dans la paix entre les peuples. Sans interprtation de larrt du 15 juin 1962, la situation de statu quo qui en rsulterait aurait trs probablement des consquences fcheuses qui empcheraient dautant la ncessit de vivre dans un environnement amical, paisible et coopratif entre les deux Etats. Il en rsulte que le Cambodge attend

impatiemment la dcision que vous prendrez pour clore un chapitre conflictuel de ses relations avec son voisin, surtout dans la rgion du temple de Prah Vihear dont chacun connat lextrme importance historique, politique et culturelle pour le peuple cambodgien. 21. Des confrontations armes en 2008, 2009 et 2011 ont provoqu des dommages irrparables sur les lments architecturaux du temple lui-mme, patrimoine de lhumanit, mais elles ont entran surtout la perte inutile de vies humaines, des blesss ainsi que des dplacements de population. Au-del des aspects proprement juridiques, cest une ralit que ne peut ignorer votre Cour dont on connat linfluence et le poids sur la conduite des Etats. 22. Monsieur le prsident, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie pour lattention que vous avez porte mes propos et je vous prie de bien vouloir donner la parole au professeur Jean-Marc Sorel. Je vous en remercie. Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie Monsieur le vice-premier ministre et je passe la parole au professeur Jean-Marc Sorel. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur. M. SOREL : 1. Monsieur le Prsident, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, cest pour moi un trs grand honneur de me prsenter de nouveau devant vous au nom du Royaume du Cambodge dans le cadre de cette procdure en interprtation. Aprs la prsentation gnrale de S. Exc. le vice-premier ministre, agent du Royaume du Cambodge, il me revient dintroduire la manire dont nous souhaitons rpondre aux diffrents arguments de la Thalande prsents dans ses crits, et

- 22 particulirement dans son supplment dinformations du 21 juin 2012. Pour cela, le Cambodge va successivement indiquer dans cette brve prsentation : tout dabord, quelle est, en rsum, pour le Cambodge, la manire dont se prsente simplement laffaire qui est porte devant vous ; ensuite, limpression globale ressentie par le Cambodge la lecture des observations crites de la Thalande et, notamment, les principaux arguments dvelopps par cet Etat ; enfin, quelle est la structure de la rponse du Cambodge. I. UNE SIMPLE QUESTION DINTERPRTATION DE LARRT DE 1962 2. Alors que la Thalande cherche nous plonger dans les mandres dune argumentation complexe peu linaire, il est ncessaire de rsumer simplement la manire dont le Cambodge aborde laffaire qui est prsente devant vous. Il sagit dinterprter le paragraphe 2 du dispositif de larrt du 15 juin 1962, la lumire du paragraphe 1, en liaison directe avec lobligation pour la Thalande de retirer ses troupes stationnes dans le temple ou dans les environs situs en territoire cambodgien. Ds lors, la rfrence au territoire du Cambodge ne peut tre comprise quau regard de ce que la Cour dit propos de lacceptation par les deux Parties de la carte de lannexe 1 comme indiquant la ligne frontalire dans la rgion du temple. Ce motif central, fondamental quasiment unique indiqu par votre Cour est par consquent insparable du dispositif. Il en dcoule que lobligation dvacuation des troupes est une obligation continue et qui doit tre comprise en rapport avec la ligne indique sur la carte de lannexe 1. Linterprtation unilatrale et volontairement restrictive de larrt par la Thalande ne peut donc tre accepte. Voil dune manire simple et sans ambigut comment le Cambodge comprend le dispositif de larrt de 1962. La Thalande est malheureusement trs loin de le comprendre de la mme manire et il existe donc clairement un diffrend sur linterprtation de larrt. Ceci ressort de la lecture des crits de la Thalande. II. QUELLE EST LIMPRESSION ET LA COMPRHENSION PAR LE CAMBODGE DES ARGUMENTS DE LA THALANDE ? 3. Cette impression peut tre rsume par un triptyque : le ton utilis, lagencement des arguments et la teneur des arguments.

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4. Concernant le ton utilis, celui-ci est le plus souvent ironique, condescendant, voire mprisant. Lironie qui sous-tend les observations de la Thalande nest en effet pas exempte dune certaine condescendance. Ainsi est dnonce la paranoa du Cambodge1. [Nous laissons au Greffe le soin dintroduire les notes et rfrences prcises dans le compte rendu de cette plaidoirie.] De mme, lironie perce plusieurs reprises lorsque certains arguments du Cambodge sont jugs dignes dAlice aux pays des merveilles2, et sans doute le Cambodge pourrait-il prfrer Orgueil et Prjugs de Jane Austen comme rfrence caractrisant largumentaire de la Thalande. Certes, on peut y reconnatre le sens de la formule par exemple, lorsque le dispositif implicite devient le dispositif par accident3 mais cette ironie ne peut suffire masquer un argumentaire pauvre qui se cache derrire un ton dtach. Cela va plus loin lorsque le ton devient plus mprisant, notamment lorsque la Thalande voque des arguments dforms, dnaturs, non pertinents4 dans la rponse du Cambodge. Ceci semble plutt dmontrer la gne de la Thalande pour

rpondre aux arguments du Cambodge, sinon il semblerait inutile de rpter, comme le fait la Thalande, un trs grand nombre de fois le mme argument. 5. Lagencement des arguments est tout aussi significatif. La Thalande estime que laffaire lorigine nest pas une affaire de dlimitation et que le Cambodge cherche aujourdhui obtenir quelque chose quil naurait pas obtenu en 1962, savoir que la carte de lannexe 1 est bien celle, accepte par les deux Parties, qui dfinit la frontire dans la rgion du temple. Le leitmotiv de la Thalande est quil nexiste aucun lien entre les motifs et le dispositif, ce qui rend la carte de lannexe 1 hors sujet et la requte irrecevable. Limpression est que lensemble nest gure

coordonn, que la rponse de la Thalande aurait pu tenir en une vingtaine de pages, et pour le moins, on aura compris que le dispositif est, pour la Thalande, clair comme de leau de roche, ce qui na pas t toujours le cas depuis 1962 comme ceci sera dmontr ensuite. 6. Laspect le plus significatif tient sans doute dans la teneur des arguments. Globalement, la Thalande essaie de faire passer lide que le temple se trouve naturellement en Thalande

1 2 3 4

Further Written Explanations of the Kingdom of Thailand (ci-aprs : FWE), 21 juin 2012, vol. I, par. 1.15. Alice-In-Wonderland-Like, FEW, 21 juin 2012, vol. I, par. 1.27. Ibid., par. 2.52 Voir titre C : Misrepresentation, Distortion, Irrelevancy in Cambodias Response, FWE, vol. I, p. 17.

- 24 mme si la Cour, par erreur, la attribu au Cambodge en 1962. Et, en quelque sorte, elle signifie la Cour que cette erreur ne doit pas tre poursuivie par une interprtation de son arrt qui dfinirait clairement le territoire sur lequel se trouve le temple. Pour ce faire, bizarrement, la Thalande arrte son historique avant 2007, mais ne dit quasiment rien des incidents arms quelle a provoqus en reprsailles linscription du temple sur la liste du patrimoine mondial de lUnesco. Ceci est bien sr contradictoire avec un argument central de la Thalande selon lequel le Cambodge aurait acquiesc la sparation opre depuis 1962, car on peut alors se demander comment des incursions armes de sa part pourraient avoir lieu sur un territoire quelle prtend tre le sien et quelle prtend contrler, incursions la base de la volont pour le Cambodge de demander la Cour une interprtation claire de larrt de 1962, et dont tmoignent les mesures conservatoires adoptes par votre Cour. 7. Au-del, le raisonnement tortueux suivi par la Thalande dans ses observations du 21 novembre 2011 et son supplment dinformation du 21 juin 2012 permet de distinguer trois tapes correspondant trois lignes successives de dfense. Premirement, pour la Thalande, il nexisterait pas de conflit dinterprtation, mais une simple discorde sur lapplicati on ou lexcution de larrt de 1962 et, ds lors, la Cour ne serait pas comptente et la requte serait irrecevable. Deuximement, nanmoins, si la Cour devait se reconnatre comptente et dclarer la requte recevable, linterprtation ne serait pas possible car il faut oprer une lecture isole du dispositif, ce qui rend inutile la prise en compte des motifs pour linterprtation car ils ne sont pas res judicata. Au surplus, le dispositif serait sans ambigut pour la Thalande. Troisimement enfin, si la Cour dcidait finalement dinterprter son arrt de 1962, cette interprtation ne pourrait tre que favorable la Thalande car la Cour devrait reconnatre quil sagit dun conflit territorial et non dun conflit frontalier, que ds lors la carte de lannexe 1 nest pas pertinente mais un autre faisceau de preuves le serait, quune dfinition unilatrale de la frontire est donc possible pour la Thalande, que laccord du 14 juin 2000 existe pour rgler le conflit frontalier, que le retrait des troupes thalandaises exig en 1962 des environs naurait pas un caractre continu et, quenfin, le Cambodge aurait modifi le sens du diffrend entre sa requte et ses observations en mettant en avant dsormais le paragraphe 1 du dispositif de larrt de 1962 au lieu du paragraphe 2 sur lequel le Cambodge se serait initialement appuy pour sa requte. Cela fait beaucoup. Incontestablement,

- 25 il y a une certaine fbrilit dans largumentaire dbrid de la Thalande doubl dun manque dassurance propre douter de sa cohrence. 8. Il parat plus simple la Thalande daffirmer, finalement, que le Cambodge ne rpond pas ses arguments, ce qui a pour objectif dentraner la Cour vers une refonte de larrt de 1962, autrement dit de refaire le jugement, si la Cour acceptait dinterprter son arrt. Or ceci est inutile car il ne sagit pas de refaire le jugement ni mme de reprendre le processus de 1959 1962, mais il faut partir de celui-ci. Le Cambodge a toujours affirm que la question en dbat partait de larrt de 1962, et non y aboutissait. Finalement, la Thalande opre ainsi un magnifique renversement du raisonnement de la Cour, et a bien du mal comprendre ce quest une affaire en interprtation. 9. Sur tous ces points, le Cambodge va dsormais apporter des rponses appropries selon la structuration suivante : 10. Tout dabord, sir Franklin Berman exposera les arguments du Cambodge concernant la comptence de la Cour et la recevabilit de la requte en interprtation dpose par le Cambodge. Il dmontrera que les faits tablissent clairement quil existe une srie de diffrends lis entre eux qui correspond strictement aux critres poss par la Cour pour linterprtation dun arrt dans le cadre de larticle 60 du Statut de la Cour, et que les arguments dans les rponses de la Thalande ne possdent aucune base solide au regard de larrt de 1962. 11. Mon collgue Rodman Bundy prendra ensuite la parole et son expos portera essentiellement sur deux aspects. Premirement, il dmontrera, sur la base des faits avrs dans cette affaire, quil existe incontestablement un diffrend entre les Parties sur le sens et la porte de larrt de 1962. Ds lors, la requte en interprtation du Cambodge est sans conteste pleinement recevable. Deuximement, il discutera des diffrents arguments avancs par la Thalande dans ses observations crites pour amoindrir limportance de la carte de lannexe 1 au regard de versions diffrentes de cette carte qui auraient t rcemment dcouvertes par la Thalande, ainsi quau regard dautres cartes qui nont jou aucun rle dans larrt de la Cour en 1962. Comme mon collgue le dmontrera, la seule carte qui fut au centre de la dcision de la Cour fut la carte produite par le Cambodge sous lappellation dannexe 1 dans sa requte et son mmoire lors de la procdure entre 1959 et 1962.

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12. Pour clore cette journe de plaidoirie, je vous demanderai, Monsieur le prsident, de bien vouloir me redonner la parole cet aprs-midi. Il sera alors temps de revenir sur le raisonnement de la Thalande pour parvenir ce quelle souhaite, savoir la stricte sparation des motifs et du dispositif de larrt de 1962. Le caractre pourtant insparable des motifs et du dispositif comme il sera dmontr entrane des consquences que la Thalande prfre ignorer. Il en va ainsi de limpossible dfinition unilatrale dune frontire lencontre des motifs, tout comme il devient impossible dtablir une claire coupure entre un conflit territorial et un conflit de dlimitation, comme le souhaiterait la Thalande. Pour parvenir ses fins, la Thalande est dans lobligation dinverser totalement le raisonnement de la Cour en 1962 au mpris de la plus lmentaire des logiques, et ceci dans lobjectif de provoquer une refonte insidieuse de larrt de 1962, loppos de la lecture constante par le Cambodge des paragraphes 1 et 2 du dispositif dune manire simultane. 13. Pour entamer cette dmonstration, je vous prie, Monsieur le prsident, de bien vouloir donner la parole mon collgue sir Franklin Berman. Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, professeur Sorel. I now give the floor to Sir Franklin Berman. Sir Franklin, you may present your pleading without any break, or you can also indicate an appropriate moment for a pause if this does not have an impact on the flow of your argument. Sir Franklin BERMAN: Mr. President, it had been my intention to signify a point at which it might be appropriate for the Court to take a break, if that is your wish. The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you. Sir Franklin BERMAN:

JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY 1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is with the customary sense of honour, but coupled with a heavy responsibility, that I address the Court once again on behalf of the Kingdom of Cambodia. The responsibility weighs heavily not merely because this case is of such central significance for Cambodia, and for peaceful and co-operative relations in the region, as has just

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been so eloquently described by the Agent. There is a heavy responsibility as well, because a request for interpretation and especially one brought in these hitherto unprecedented circumstances engages in the most direct way the integrity of the Courts judicial process, and the binding and definitive character of its judgments, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and the Courts own Statute. I am sure that this is a theme that our distingu ished

opponents will accept and endorse. My fear is that we will read different consequences into it. Interpretation under the Courts Statute 2. Mr. President, the procedure for interpretation is built into the Statute itself. It is there for a purpose. The purpose is to ensure that, if difficulties ensue in understanding and giving effect to a judgment formally pronounced by the Court, the Court itself on the application of either party can be moved into action once more, and the outcome of this process will be an authoritative, an authentic and, above all, a definitive statement of how the original judgment should be interpreted and understood. I have laid stress on definitive because this quality emanates from the very fact that it is the Court which has the duty of laying down for the parties the proper understanding that must be given to its judgment. This is the antithesis, in other words, of a renewed struggle of wills between the disputing parties over what the Court had or had not decided; it is the absolute antithesis of a situation in which one party juts its jaw, decides for itself what the judgment is to mean, and sets about compelling others to accept that interpretation. 3. Mr. President, a request for the Court to interpret its own past judgment requires no further act of consent by the parties beyond that on the basis of which the Court originally assumed jurisdiction to hear the dispute. That is important. Its importance is that it shows that this faculty to interpret constitutes an inherent part of the process by which the Court settles, with binding legal force, the dispute between the parties brought before it. To put it another way: the purpose of the process of interpretation, as laid out in Article 60 of the Statute, is to reinforce the legal situation as it results from the judgment, and to do so with all the clarity that may be needed for operational purposes. The matter was neatly and precisely put by the Permanent Court as far back as 1927 in its decision on the interpretation of its Judgments in the Chorzw Factory case, where the Permanent Court said:

- 28 the Court is of the opinion that the expression to construe [in Article 60] must be understood as meaning to give a precise definition of the meaning and scope which the Court intended to give to the judgment in question (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzw), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13 , p. 10). 4. It is not the purpose of interpretation to re-do what the Court has already done; it is not its purpose to undo what the Court has done. I expect that our opponents will, once again, accept this cardinal proposition; they could hardly do otherwise. Or at least they may accept the proposition in theory, but then invite you, the Court, to take a different view of what it means in practice. 5. It is against this background that the Court will, at the end of the day, have to weigh the competing assertions of the Parties: Thailands assertion (which we will demonstrate is entirely without foundation) that Cambodias only intention in these proceedings is to inveigle the Court into deciding something which the Court deliberately did not decide in 1962; and, against that, Cambodias assertion (which we will substantiate inter alia from the materials which Thailand is now seeking to put before the Court), that Thailands whole line of argument, culminating ultimately in its final submissions, is designed to persuade the Court that its predecessors were in error in 1962, that they could not have meant what they said, and that this is the opportunity therefore for the present Court to put matters right by revising what was then decided in final and in binding form. 6. Mr. President, Cambodia has come to the sad realization that a continuation of the wrangling between the two States, which has not led to a common understanding of the 1962 Judgment and its implications over the past 50 years, is most unlikely to lead to a common understanding in future either. Moreover Cambodia has been faced in the starkest fashion in recent years by the fact that the continuation of that situation has serious implications for peace in the region, that it endangers human life and normal existence and, indeed, that it is all too prone to result in direct physical damage to the very sacred site which so Thailand continues to insist constituted the whole essence of what the Court was focusing on in 1962. And the Court will have seen that vividly illustrated by the slides and other materials that were put before it during the proceedings on provisional measures two years ago. [Photo slide showing shelling damage to Temple fabric] Mr. President, that cannot be acceptable as between two civilized neighbours. And

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it would no longer be possible once the Court had given its own definitive explanation of the meaning and scope of its Judgment. That is why we are here today. 7. Mr. President, let me say at this point with the utmost simple clarity: what Cambodia is seeking in these proceedings is the elucidation by the Court of the meaning and scope of its 1962 Judgment, as those terms and concepts have been consistently defined over the years by this Court and its predecessor; that and nothing more. I can state that with full authority because it is no more than a simple repetition of what Cambodia said in its Request for Interpretation and has repeated in its subsequent written observations. Having said it, I now invite our distinguished opponents, when they come to the podium, to say the same, equally clearly and equally simply; that they are not, in other words, seeking from the Court a penitent admission of past error. If they can do that, they will have become partners in the process of assisting the Court to interpret its decision in the 1962 Judgment, and that is a development that Cambodia would warmly welcome, whether or not the Parties continue to differ on what the proper interpretation of the Judgment should be.

Jurisdiction and Admissibility 8. I can now pass, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to a series of points on which I can happily say with confidence there is, not disagreement, but agreement between the Parties. 9. In the first place, and very specifically, there is no disagreement between us that Cambodia must now establish that its Request for Interpretation is admissible, and falls within the powers of the Court under the Statute. Thailand says in its Written Observations of

November 2011 (para. 4.1) This is now the proper stage for the Court to engage in a thorough analysis of Thailands arguments relating to the admissibility of Cambodias request. It is

common ground between us, between the two Parties, that those questions were not conclusively determined by the Courts Order of 18 July 2011 granting Cambodias request for an indication of provisional measures of protection.

Jurisdiction 10. So I begin, Mr. President, with the question of jurisdiction which I can deal with very quickly as Thailand has raised no serious question in this regard. It is well settled that the Courts

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power of interpretation under Article 60 of the Statute is an automatic and inherent one, or, in the Courts own words, [t]he jurisdiction of the Court to give an interpretation of one of its own judgments . . . is a special jurisdiction deriving directly from Article 60 of the Statute (Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 216, para. 43). The Court has repeated this in its Order on Provisional Measures in the present case, adding that the Courts jurisdiction on the basis of Article 60 of the Statute is not preconditioned by the existence of any other basis of jurisdiction as between the parties to the original case (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order of 18 July 2011, para. 21). I need add only that it has long since been established that, if the

conditions emanating from Article 60 are duly met, the Court cannot avoid the duty incumbent upon it of interpreting the judgment in so far as necessary (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzw), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 12). That is a further quotation from the Judgment of the Permanent Court in the Interpretation phase of the Chorzw Factory case.

The conditions for admissibility 11. Nor is there disagreement between the Parties that the admissibility of Cambodias Request for Interpretation depends on three requirements, which must be independently satisfied: (a) There must be a dispute between the Parties to a case in which the Court has given judgment. (b) The dispute must relate to the meaning or scope of the Judgment. (c) The Request must seek interpretation of what the Judgment decided with binding force. Those conditions have been laid down in a long series of cases, going back once again to the decision by the Permanent Court in 1927 which I referred to a moment ago. 12. It is only necessary to add that the third condition, namely, that the Request must seek interpretation of what the Judgment decided with binding force, includes also the case in which the dispute between the Parties is over whether a particular matter has or has not been decided with

- 31 binding force and that, too, once again goes back to the Permanent Courts decision in the Chorzw Factory case. Thailand contests that any of those requirements is met which will therefore be the main focus of this part of the argument. Other issues raised by Thailand will be dealt with after that, either by me or by my co-counsel who will follow.

The existence of a dispute 13. I move now to a demonstration that there is indeed a dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment, first by looking at the Courts consistent jurisprudence as to the meaning of a dispute over interpretation, and then by identifying the materials which the Court has regularly examined in order to establish the existence of a dispute of this kind in particular cases. 14. Mr. President, the Courts classic definition of a dispute is so well known that it hardly needs repeating. When it comes, however, to the particular kind of dispute in question here, namely a dispute between the Parties over the meaning and scope of a judgment, it was once again laid down by the Permanent Court as far back as 1927 that the Court considers that it cannot require that the dispute should have manifested itself in a formal way; according to the Courts view, it should be sufficient if the two Governments have in fact shown themselves as holding opposite views in regard to the meaning or scope of a judgment of the Court (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzw), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 11; emphasis added). And later in the same Judgment, the Permanent Court observed: It thus becomes necessary to ascertain whether such a difference of opinion has in fact become manifest in the present case between the two Governments, as regards the meaning or scope of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8. (Ibid., p. 12; emphasis added.) And that approach has regularly been endorsed by the present Court, which recently made plain, for example, in the Avena case that the manifestation of the existence of the dispute in a specific manner, as for instance by diplomatic negotiations, is not required for the purposes of Article 60 (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008,

- 32 pp. 325-326, para. 54) and the Court went on to say nor is it required that the dispute should have manifested itself in a formal way (ibid., p. 326, para. 54). 15. Mr. President, in the face of the sharply clashing submissions that have been put before the Court in these proceedings to date, Cambodia has some difficulty in grasping on what basis Thailand can be arguing that there is no dispute between the two States. One could hardly have a clearer demonstration that the two Governments have in fact shown themselves as holding opposite views in regard to the meaning or scope of a judgment of the Court or that a difference of opinion in that regard has in fact become manifest between the two Governments, borrowing the words of the Permanent Court in 1927. So, if this claim of no dispute by Thailand is to be understood more as signalling an argument over whether the dispute does concern interpretation of the 1962 Judgment, in other words, over the content and subject-matter of the dispute, that will be dealt with in the next section of my presentation. For the moment, so far as we can discern any substance in the submission of no dispute, it seems to derive from the argument that what Cambodia asserts is the dispute in this case can only be discovered from the written pleadings in these proceedings themselves, and that that is somehow inadmissible. Establishing a dispute for interpretation purposes 16. That argument seems to consist of two parts: first, that Cambodia has in the past accepted Thailands interpretation of the 1962 Judgment and cannot go back on that now; second, that the Parties submissions in interpretation proceedings cannot themselves be used either to establish the existence of a dispute over interpretation or to define its scope. 17. The first of these two arguments is largely one of fact, and Mr. Bundy will show the Court that, as such, it is without foundation. I preface what he will have to say on the subject with only one remark and that is that no basis can be found in Article 60, or in the past judgments of the Court itself, for the notion that a party to contentious proceedings can by subsequent conduct modify or sacrifice the proper meaning of what the Court has decided in its judgment. The notion is fundamentally at odds with the way in which the Statute and the Court in its turn treat the role of authentic interpretation as being an integral and inherent part of the judicial function of the Court. That is why no further jurisdictional basis is needed, why Article 60

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expresses the function of interpreting its own judgments as a duty on the part of the Court, and why the Article puts authentic interpretation by the Court itself as the counterpart to the finality of the Courts judgments which are not subject to appeal. Thailand wants to turn a judgment into something like an agreement between the litigating parties, the interpretation of which may depend on their subsequent practice, and that submission by Thailand is therefore profoundly subversive of the integrity of the judicial function. But we pointed all of that out some time ago in our own written submissions, and it has had no answer. 18. Likewise, the second argument about the use of submissions in interpretation proceedings finds no basis in the past practice of the Court either. At its highest, what Thailand says in this context is that, although Cambodias Request did show the existence of a relevant dispute, we have shifted our position since then in order to try to construct artificially a dispute implicating the first paragraph of the dispositif of the 1962 Judgment as well, and Thailand chides us for having only discovered the dispute after we had filed our Request for Interpretation (FWETh, para. 1.6). What in fact we said in our Response was that Thailands Written

Observations reveal the existence of an even clearer dispute regarding the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judgment (Response of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FWEC), para.1.7) and we then go on to explain that in detail in paragraphs 3.3-3.15 of the same written submission. Not only is it counter to logic to assert that the formal submissions put to the Court on a request for interpretation cannot be taken into account in ascertaining whether a dispute really exists, but it also flies in the face of the Courts past practice. One need only look at paragraph 29 of the recent judgment on interpretation in the Avena case where the Court said the following: It is for the Court itself to decide whether a dispute within the me aning of Article 60 of the Statute does indeed exist . . . To this end, the Court has in particular examined the Written Observations and further written explanations of the Parties to ascertain their views . . . (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 12-13, para. 29; emphasis added.) And that is a passage we rely on as confirmation of our approach.

- 34 Subject-matter of the dispute: (a) The link between the first and second paragraphs in the dispositif 19. Mr. President, I turn now to the crucial issue of the subject-matter of the dispute. The starting-point must of course be the question that Cambodia put to the Court for interpretation; it can be found in the final paragraph of Cambodias Request for Interpretation, and in identical terms in the final paragraph of Cambodias Response to Thailands Written Observat ions, and the text, I am glad to see, is now on your screens. As the Court will observe, the question Cambodia has posed to the Court focuses squarely on the operative part of the 1962 Judgment, and specifically on the second paragraph which contains the withdrawal obligation. And to simplify the Courts examination, the full text of the operative part of the Judgment is now on your screens, and alongside it, the text of Cambodias question. This will enable the Court to see at a glance that the second paragraph of the operative part that is the one to which Cambodias question is directed does not stand on its own but is organically linked to the first paragraph: the one is the consequence of the other; that is what the Judgment says expressly. But the two paragraphs are symbiotically linked in a deeper way as well. Both paragraphs employ the concept territory of Cambodia: in the first paragraph, it is that the Temple is situated in territory under the

sovereignty of Cambodia, in the second paragraph, it is that Thailand must withdraw its military and police forces, etc. stationed by her at the Temple or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory. And Cambodia submits that the concept of Cambodian territory must have the same meaning in both paragraphs. 20. So what is Thailands position over those two basic propositions? Well, Thailand rejects them both. It denies the way in which the second paragraph depends on the first, and in fact seeks to give the second paragraph pride of place, to make it into the primary element, and indeed to make the interpretation of the first paragraph depend on the second, and thus denying both the legal hierarchy between the two and denying as well how the meaning of the withdrawal obligation is coloured and determined by the sovereignty finding. 21. This represents a categorical opposition of views about the relationship between two main paragraphs in the dispositive part of the Judgment. And Cambodia submits that it plainly

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constitutes in and of itself a dispute between the Parties over the meaning and scope of the Judgment.

(b) The withdrawal obligation under the second paragraph of the dispositif 22. Mr. President, my next submission centres on the withdrawal obligation enunciated in the second paragraph which as I have said is the focus of Cambodias formal request for interpretation , and this time on the continuing nature of that obligation. Cambodia has advanced the position throughout these proceedings that the withdrawal obligation is continuing in character; indeed we say that to construe it in that sense is the only way in which to give meaningful and practical effect to what the Court decided in 1962. As I put the matter in the oral phase of the proceedings on Provisional Measures: the fallacy behind reading this paragraph any other way is that it would allow Thailand to withdraw its troops the day after the Judgment and move them back in again a week later. That is obvious. It seems to us equally obvious that the Court could not have intended to lay itself open to a total absurdity of that kind. So Cambodia is and remains firmly of the view that the obligation laid on Thailand by the second paragraph is of a continuing character.

(b) (i) The continuing nature of the withdrawal obligation 23. Thailands position on this elementary question is however puzzling. We heard

repeatedly through the mouth of counsel on the Provisional Measures application that the withdrawal obligation was ponctuelle et instantane or immdiate et instantane or even simply just instantane tout court. And that is reiterated in Thailands Written Observations of November 2011 [para.4.25]; and there we read that the second and third paragraphs of the

dispositif required action to be taken, and so Thailand continues [a]s such, they are extinguished when the measures ordered therein are taken. That is a pure repetition of the instantaneous theory of the withdrawal obligation. It is, to be sure, glossed though in a rather mysterious way by the remark that follows, to the effect that Cambodia did not complain about Thai withdrawal in the aftermath of the Judgment or for a long time afterwards. Well, that is factually incorrect, as Mr. Bundy will demonstrate later, and we maintain our submission that the Court must have intended the obligation in the second paragraph to have a continuing character. But in any event, Thailands written submissions culminate in their Further Written Explanations, and the

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reference is paragraph 4.103 (v), with an outright denial that the withdrawal obligation is a continuing one. 24. They may have changed that view a little; that is not entirely clear. Because the Further Written Explanations continue to maintain, on the one hand, that the withdrawal obligation was one discharged instantaneously in 1962 [para. 4.102], and discharged instantaneously can only mean: it no longer exists. They do, however, precede that by a limited recognition of the continuing character of Thailands duty to stay out of the areas in question, or at least out of certain areas; only they then seek to attribute that duty to Thailands obligations under general

international law, and these are roundly declared to be independent of the Judgment and independent of the jurisdiction under which the Judgment was reached. It is not clear to us whether this confirms or contradicts what had been said in paragraph 3.81 of one and the same Further Written Explanations, to the effect that the Parties are in agreement that there is an obligation for Thailand not to have troops in the area awarded by the Court to Cambodia and, so Thailand continues, that it matters little if this obligation exists by virtue of general international law or by virtue of the particular conclusion drawn by the Court in 1962 on the basis of the general obligation. And on that basis, so Thailand says, no question of interpretation arises. 25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that is surely disingenuous. Of course Thailand has an obligation under general international law not to invade and occupy Cambodian sovereign territory, and that is something which one imagines a law-abiding Thailand would never dream of doing. But that is not the question, any more than it was the question when the Court gave judgment in 1962; the question was, where, to what areas, does that obligation relate? Had the answer to that question been clear and undisputed between the Parties at the time, there would have been no occasion for the matter to go to the Court; nor would there have been any occasion for the Court to have to enunciate a withdrawal obligation. The Court gave a binding answer to that question then and we say that answer continues to be binding now. Were Thai armed forces to make a fresh incursion into those areas, shall we say next week, after the end of this hearing, as they have done in the recent past, our complaint would not be in the form that this would be contrary to international law; obviously it would. Our complaint would be that it was in breach of the conduct required on the part of Thailand by the 1962 Judgment. And what can one foresee

- 37 would be the nature of Thailands response: that it acknowledged that it was consciously

disobeying the Courts Judgment but that that constituted a fresh dispute which sadly could not be brought back to the Court because Thailand no longer maintains an acceptance of jurisdiction under the Optional Clause? I have some real difficulty in imagining that. No, the response would be that there is no breach because the areas in question are not covered by the Judgment. And that is as clear-cut an example as one could wish of a dispute about the meaning or scope of a judgment of the Court. And it illustrates perfectly why we submit that there is an inextricable bond between the first and second paragraphs in the 1962 dispositif. But it also explains precisely why, in the hope of heading off that undesirable state of affairs, Cambodia now comes to the Court asking the Court to say authoritatively and definitively what the meaning and scope of the withdrawal obligation is. 26. It must be for our opponents now to say definitely whether or not they accept that the withdrawal obligation is a continuing one with continuing effect under the Judgment of the Court. If they do not accept that, then there is without any shadow of doubt a dispute on that question and one which grounds the competence of the Court to pronounce on it by way of interpretation. (b) (ii) The meaning of withdrawal 27. Mr. President, I want to move on now to a key point on the content of the withdrawal obligation, that is to say, the nature of withdrawal, what it means to withdraw. Thailand seems to view that in an abstract, half-dimensional sort of way, as if it simply consisted in movement of some kind. The crucial fact is, however, that withdrawal necessarily means not just withdrawal from somewhere but withdrawal to somewhere else. It is not clear whether Thailand does or does not recognize this inescapable fact, because it simply fails to deal with the question. We are told over and over again with absolute assurance that in 1962 Thailand did withdraw and that in doing so it fulfilled and exhausted the obligation arising out of the Judgment. But we are never told what units were withdrawn, where they were at the time, or where they were moved to. The last of those three elements is the essential one: where were they moved to? Without knowing that, how can one possibly judge whether Thailand is justified in asserting that it did at the time comply? Cambodias submission on this central point is a simple one: that by casting the withdrawal obligation within the envelope of territory or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory the

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Court required all Thai units to be removed from Cambodian territory, and that in turn can only mean removal into Thai territory. Which leads inexorably back, of course, to the umbilical link between the first paragraph and the second paragraph, inasmuch as both of them are about territory: the first is about territory as the fundamental postulate for the appurtenance of the Temple to Cambodia, and the second is about territory as the underlying spatial element behind the obligation in consequence that Thailand must withdraw. Then, of course, there is a further dispute over whether Cambodian territory in the second paragraph has to be understood, following the first paragraph, in terms of the Courts identification of the boundary which the two States had agreed upon for Treaty purposes, and that is equally a dispute over the meaning and scope of the Judgment. Just as the Court says in express terms that it cannot decide whether the Temple lies in territory under Cambodian sovereignty without having regard to what the frontier line is and where it runs, so there is no way of assessing the withdrawal from Cambodian sovereign territory of Thai forces emplaced there without having regard to the frontier line which divides Cambodian sovereign territory from Thai sovereign territory. 28. The fact that Thailand refuses to accept this refuses indeed to accept any of its component parts establishes unambiguously the existence of a dispute, or series of linked disputes, between the Parties; and it would test to breaking point even the ingenuity of our highly able opponents to deny that those disputes, as I have formulated them, are about the interpretation of what the Court decided with binding force in its 1962 Judgment.

(c) The status of the Annex I Map 29. Finally, Mr. President, I will not disappoint our opponents; I will make a brief reference to something to which the Court devoted, on a conservative estimate, about 12 out of the 36 pages that constituted the 1962 Judgment. I refer, of course, to the Annex I map. I almost feel I ought to apologize for doing so, given the violent reaction that any mention of the map provokes from the Thai side. If anyone is obsessed by the Annex I map, it is Thailand, not Cambodia. All that Cambodia has attempted to do is to distil, by careful analysis, the status which the 1962 Judgment gave to the Annex I map. Thailands indignant rejection of the notion that the Judgment gave any status at all to the Annex I map in itself creates a yet further dispute; and it is a dispute over

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whether something has or has not been decided with binding force in the Judgment; and that has been established since 1927 as being a dispute of a kind which is within the Courts power of interpretation under the Statute. 30. So, to summarize: as set out in detail in paragraph 5.9 of Cambodias Response to Thailands Written Observations, there are at minimum three disputes between the two States in issue in the current proceedings; all three of them relate directly to the operative part of the 1962 Judgment and therefore indisputably entail interpretation of what the Court had decided with binding force in the Judgment, or equally indisputably they relate to whether something was decided with binding force, as foreseen in the settled jurisprudence of the Court. Mr. President, this is a natural break in my argument. Would it suit the Court to call a recess? The PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you very much, Sir Franklin. Indeed it is a good moment to take a pause of some ten minutes. The hearing is suspended for ten minutes. The Court adjourned from 11.30 a.m. to 11.45 a.m. The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing resumes and Sir Franklin may have the floor. Please proceed. Sir Franklin BERMAN: Thailands position 31. Thank you, Mr. President. Before the break I had explained in summary why

Cambodias request is admissible. Thailand has no real answer to any of the points that I made. Its effort to argue the inadmissibility of Cambodias request for interpretation rests essentially, as you heard from Professor Sorel, on two points: (1) the status which the Judgment attributes to the Annex I map is not part of the res judicata; and (2) Cambodia is seeking to gain now what it could not achieve in 1962. 32. Both arguments are fallacious, and both are largely beside the point as arguments on admissibility. But before I move on to them, let me first take the Court to a very significant

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document that has only recently become available. This document is significant for so many aspects of the present proceedings that I would like to spend some time on it and, for that purpose, it might be convenient if the Members of the Court had it before them on their screens as they now have (Project Thai Annex 5). This document is Annex 5 to the Further Written Explanations filed by Thailand in June of last year. In other words, it is a Thai document and it only became available for inspection at a very late stage in the course of these proceedings on interpretation, and one can see from the cover sheet that the document was Declassified on 26 May 2011. One can also see that reflected in the document itself which is now on your screens, where a security classification at the head and foot of each page has been struck through.

The 1962 decision of the Thai Council of Ministers 33. What the document represents is the resolution of the Council of Ministers on the implementation of the Courts 1962 Judgment on which Thailand has placed considerable reliance in these proceedings. More precisely, it consists of a brief note, that is the one now on your screens, dated 11 July 1962 recording a decision that had been taken by the Council of Ministers on the previous day. This is backed by a two-page document from the Minister of the Interior dated 6 July which evidently represents the paper which the Council of Ministers had for consideration at its meeting; and attached to that in turn is a small-scale map on the scale of 1:5,000 of the part of the promontory on which the Temple stands. The history of this documents eventual production is also of interest. It shows that it was not until the very close of the second round of written argument which the Court, exceptionally, has decided to order in the present proceedings that Thailand finally let the document see the light of day. 34. What does Thailand say about that? It says that the document simply adds nothing to understanding what occurred (FEWTh, para. 1.34). Well, once again this is surely disingenuous. Cambodia begs to differ: now that the document is available in full, we can see just how

significant it is. I would like to begin by taking the Court to the page which is on your screens. This records the actual decision taken by the Council of Ministers; nothing there, as the Court will note, in the way of a reasoned determination, just a bare choice, without justification or reasoning, between two alternatives. To try to find out more, you have to go to the supporting paper which

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appears on the next two pages and that is now coming up on your screen. That is the proposal that was put forward by the Minister of Interior to the Prime Minister and by him to the Council of Ministers, for decision. The supporting paper says (you can see that in the second paragraph) that it was drawn up after consultation with all of the relevant authorities who had been involved in the handling of the case, the Foreign Ministry, the Royal Thai Survey Department and, of course, the Interior Ministry itself. 35. And what does the Interior Minister propose in this paper to the Council of Ministers? Well, the paper talks, perfectly properly, about implementation, about compliance, about execution of the Courts Judgment, and about determining the limit of the location of the vicinity of the Temple in the context of Thailands obligation to withdraw its forces. And that is presumably an implicit reference to the second paragraph of the dispositif of the Judgment which I was discussing this morning. And all of that looks very satisfactory, until you come to the end of the sentence in question, which reads on the principle that Cambodia will only obtain the ruins of the Temple . . . and the ground on which the Temple stood. 36. And the paper then continues in the next paragraph in the beginning, with what it calls the determination of the vicinity of the Temple may be done according to two methods, namely . . .. And it goes on to spell out the two methods which are illustrated on the map attached and that is on your screens now. So the two methods, one is an abstract triangular figure, starting it seems from the corner of the Temple buildings themselves; and if you look at the map on the screens, you can see the abstract nature of the figure reflected in the fact that the triangle is bounded to the north by straight lines, the yellow line and the red line. The other limits of this triangle are its two long sides to the west and to the east and these coincide with parts of the escarpment edge which as the Court will recognize is the self-same escarpment edge that formed part of the watershed line which Thailand had been advancing as the course of the frontier in the case, and which the Court had declined to uphold as representing the Treaty settlement between the two States. 37. Now we come to the second alternative, the other method: this is the one entirely in red, it is equally an abstract figure. The document calls it not a triangle but a rectangle, though in fact, as you can see from the red lines on this sketch-map, it is still basically triangular in shape,

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except that this time the western boundary of the area is formed by a further arbitrary line. This is a single straight line running due north-south, immediately flanking the Temple ruins which lie to the east. And the drafters of the document are kind enough to spare us trouble because they calculate for us the extent of the discrepancy between the areas resulting from the two methods that is in the paper from the Ministry of the Interior and the discrepancy turns out to be sizeable: one of the methods produces an area which conveniently amputates the other method almost exactly in half; the actual figures are one-half a square kilometre and one-quarter of a square kilometre. So those are the two alternatives. And which of the two alternatives does the Council of Ministers opt for? Well the Court will not be surprised to note that it is the small one, the half-size one. 38. Then finally, in the last paragraph of the paper (on the second page, that is, the Ministry of Interiors paper) he and his colleagues propose and the Prime Minister evidently endorses it because he passes the paper on to the Council of Ministers the proposed erection of the sign boards which we have subsequently seen in Thailands photographic exhibits which talk about the limits of the vicinity of the Temple. The paper proposes the erection of these sign boards but it does not propose a barbed-wire fence; the barbed-wire fence was evidently something that was added by the Council of Ministers itself and you can see that from the first page which is now on your screens if you go back to the first page, this is the Councils decision, look towards the very end that in addition the barbed-wire fence should be constructed.

The implications of the 1962 decision of the Thai Council of Ministers 39. Mr. President, Members of the Court, a number of highly significant points shout out, loud and clear, from this very revealing document. Let me list some of them (and I am sure there are others as well): (1) This is pure interpretation; what else could it be, given that it consisted in a choice between alternative methods for how to read a cited portion of the Judgment? (2) And this interpretation is as unilateral as unilateral can be; it was after all kept secret from us (even in these proceedings) until ten months ago.

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(3) It is not only interpretation but it relates to precisely that part of the Judgment on which Cambodias present Request for Interpretation is focused, i.e., the second paragraph of the dispositif. (4) It also represents proof positive of what Cambodia has said in its written argument on the subject of interpretation versus implementation: that the two are distinct, but that it is not logically possible to proceed to implementation except on the basis of an interpretation. (5) It puts paid at a stroke to the argument Thailand now advances over and over again that the Judgment is crystal clear, that it needs no interpretation, there is no room for any interpretation. Interpretatio cessat in claris, as the Further Written Explanations so engagingly say; to us it seems to be more a case of ut interpretatio non contentos adjuvet. (6) Moreover, Mr. President, the alternative interpretations put forward are purely arbitrary, purely abstract, as the straight lines on the map show; no justification is given for them, no

explanation why they are said to correspond in spatial terms to what the Court had decided, and the two interpretations differ widely from one another, by a factor of 2:1. (7) The choice made between the two interpretations by the Council of Ministers is equally arbitrary and abstract: no reasoning whatsoever, none of any kind. (8) Nor is this a simple case of an administrative arrangement for withdrawal, with no intended implications for territory or an inter-State boundary. Far from it: not only, as already

indicated, does it purport to be based on the principle that Cambodia will only obtain the ruins of the Temple and the ground on which it stood, but it also states with explicit clarity that the purpose of determining the vicinity of the Temple is so as Cambodia will have sovereignty in accordance with the Judgment of the World Court. This is the pure language of the first paragraph of the dispositif; it proves graphically that Thailand has always accepted, right from the very beginning, the link that Cambodia now maintains in these proceedings, namely, the link that must exist between the first and second paragraphs of the dispositif, and it shows that Thailand was perfectly conscious that it was setting out to give an interpretation to the Judgment, and to give an interpretation that would encompass the first paragraph just as much as the second.

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40. So what, Mr. President, Members of the Court, does Thailand now say about its own document, now that it has finally allowed us all to see it? It says and you will find this at paragraph 1.13 of Thailands Further Written Explanations of last June: (a) That this was not a case of Thailand providing its own interpretation of the term vicinity in the 1962 Judgment and seeking to enforce it through resort to force. Well that is clearly nonsense: I have just demonstrated that this was unequivocally interpretation and that the Council of Ministers decided of its own volition to add a barbed-wire fence to the proposal that had already been put up to it; and the documents already before the Court at an earlier stage show that it was plainly evident at the time, even to outside observers, that anyone who transgressed the fence would be fired upon. What else could that be other than a unilateral decision to be imposed if necessary through resort to force? (b) Well, says Thailand, this was not really a boundary but just a line of withdrawal, and the fence was there just as much to keep our own soldiers back in the one direction as to keep the Cambodians out in the other. But who withdraws and sets up a barbed-wire fence behind him if not to create a boundary? And who says that a line is to keep your own soldiers in, except by asserting that the territory within which they are to be kept is your own territory? Moreover, as I have shown, the Thai ministerial document was disarmingly plain that the intention was to mark off the area that Cambodia would obtain and that it was in connectio n with Cambodian sovereignty in accordance with the Courts Judgment. The Court may have noticed that the Thai Agent spoke during the proceedings on Provisional Measures of a so-called deliberate Cambodian policy of progressively encroaching on Thai territory beyond the line established by the Council of Ministers in 19625. And the final conclusive touch surely lies, as we can now see with hindsight, in the Thai unilateral map of 2007 and I have that on the screen now which purports to show nothing less than a frontier line, and one that runs along the old watershed line until it reaches the Council of Ministers line, at which point the purported frontier line has a little nick, rather like a cut on the chin while shaving, before regaining the old watershed line and continuing along it. Well, Thailand makes a great fuss, of

CR 2011/14, p. 11, para. 34 (Plasai).

- 45 course, about Cambodias treatment of this map and whether the map says anything new or not. Thailand can say what it likes about the map and its origins but the document from which that nick on the map has its origin was kept secret until declassified in 2011 and then released in these proceedings a year later, which shows that the map was of a piece with other unilateral Thai actions designed to transmute into an artificial inter-State boundary line the effect of the Courts 1962 Judgment a Judgment which Thailand now insists before the Court cannot be construed as having established any boundary at all in the disputed region. (c) Which brings us inexorably back, Mr. President, to the question of interpretation. Here

Thailand relents a bit this is at the end of paragraph 1.13 by claiming that, if the former barbed-wire fence was not a boundary, it was at least consistent with the area the Court was focusing on; well, what is an assessment of consistency with the Courts focus if not a form of interpretation? But then, when it comes to the 1962 Judgment itself, and specifically to Thailands core issue of the vicinity of the Temple under the second paragraph of the dispositif, we discover that it is not really interpretation at all, it is no more than an estimate of what the vicinity is; but it seems that that does not matter, because it is not a mere estimate, but a good faith estimate, and moreover one that is solidly grounded. And then, Mr. President, Members of the Court, then we come to the really telling point: what is this good faith estimate solidly grounded in? The Thai Written Explanations tell us: it is solidly grounded in the arguments of the Parties before the Court. That is the phrase Thailand uses at the very end of paragraph 1.13 of its Further Written Explanations, and we might pause for a moment to let its implications sink in. We have a specific term used in the dispositive part of a judgment of the Court; it creates a specific obligation for Thailand arising out of the Judgment; Thailand needs to take action to comply, and intends to take action amongst other things by erecting a fence designed to act as a barrier; but regrettably

compliance is not straightforward because the terms employed by the Court in the dispositif are not clear, or not sufficiently clear; so they need to be given meaning, in other words

interpreted; and how does one set about giving them meaning which, incidentally, you intend to compel others physically to respect? one makes an estimate, which, by the bye, is exactly one half of ones other estimate of what the Court meant; and on what does one

- 46 ground this estimate? Not on the Judgment of the Court, but on what the Parties had argued in their submissions to the Court before it came to its Judgment! It is as if the Judgment of the Court is purely evanescent: a blip on the screen, a momentary happening that then descends into the past and can be safely forgotten so that the argument between the Parties can resume again where it left off before the Court spoke. Thailands attempts to marginalize the Courts Judgment 41. Mr. President, this is fairly breathtaking. It contains no hint of a recognition that the pronouncement of a judgment by the Court creates a new legal situation between disputing States. Or of a recognition that, if the effects of this new legal situation need to be interpreted for practical purposes, the material for that is to be found in the Judgment itself, including, of course, the Courts reasoning. What else is the reasoning in a reasoned judgment for? But at least it does go to explain why such a large portion of the Thai argument in these proceedings is devoted to rehearsing what the Parties had been arguing to the Court before it pronounced its Judgment, and to the practice of the two States in the years after that: all part of a strategy of de-emphasizing what the Court itself had said and submerging it in a continuing power play between the two neighbouring States. And the Court will be able to see that vividly illustrated in the Further Written Explanations, at paragraph 3.109. Here we have Thailand accusing Cambodia, the very State seeking through these proceedings to revalidate and vindicate what the Court decided, accusing Cambodia of having the outrageous temerity to suggest that a Judgment of the Court, once handed down, has a life of its own. Yes, Mr. President, we do say that a judgment of the Court has a life of its own, because it definitively settles the dispute between the parties which was before the Court and creates of its own force a new legal situation that is thenceforth binding on the parties. And that is why Cambodia considers itself entirely justified in recalling once again the extreme reluctance with which Thailand was eventually driven to accept in 1962 that it had to comply with the Judgment and the contortion through which it asserted that, if so, this was only because of an obligation under the United Nations Charter not as a direct effect of the Judgment itself.

- 47 Res judicata 42. And that may be a suitable introduction, Mr. President, to Thailands treatment of the question of res judicata. 43. Thailand does not disdain to rewrite Cambodias submissions. A gross example is at paragraph 3.7 of the Further Written Explanations, which would have the reader believe that Cambodia alleges that the status of res judicata attaches to the whole of the 1962 Judgment, reasons and dispositif together. This is so far from the truth that I shall not bother with it further. In similar vein, Thailands submissions seek regularly to elide what the Court has said in the past, what the Court has laid down about the status of reasons in the process of interpretation. The Court consistently says that reasons cannot be the subject of a request for interpretation except in so far as they are inseparable from the operative part. Conversely, if the reasons are indeed inseparable from the operative part, then they fall within the res judicata and thus within the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court. The locus classicus of course is the Request for Interpretation in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, where the Court said: These reasons are inseparable from the operative part of the Judgment and in this regard the request therefore meets the conditions laid down by Article 60 of the Statute in order for the Court to have jurisdiction to entertain a request for interpretation . . . (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 36, para. 11.) 44. That is the situation here. But, unlike in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, it is not even necessary for the Court to make a fresh assessment of the essential nature of the particular reasoning which Cambodia invokes for the proper understanding of the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judgment that is not necessary, because the Court has already done so in 1962. As the Court said at the very outset of its reasoning, a mere two pages in to the reasoning, it could only give a decision as to the sovereignty over the Temple area after having examined what the frontier line is (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 17). In our submission, in Cambodias submission, this is a plain and simple determination by the Court itself that establishing the boundary line and where it runs in the region in dispute is the essential basis for the formal decisions that will follow in due course in the dispositive part.

- 48 No alternative basis in the Judgment to the Annex I Map 45. Thailands attempt to suggest that there was some alternative legal basis for the above other than the Annex I map is ludicrous in the light of the Judgment itself. The best that our opponents can dredge up in this connection is the well-known visit to Prah Vihar by Prince Damrong in 1930, which indeed the Court itself referred to as the most significant of the series of episodes which Thailand had tried to put forward, like King Canute, against the incoming tide. I have already had the opportunity to describe to the Court, in the proceedings on provisional measures, how the Prince Damrong incident occupies no more than two paragraphs in the Judgment, in contrast to some 12 pages the Judgment devotes to the Annex I map, its origins, and to Thailands acceptance of it. But what may matter as much as the sheer weight of material is the fact that the Court explicitly put these episodes under the rubric of attempts by Thailand to efface or cancel out the clear impression of acceptance of the frontier line or to overrid[e] and negative[e] the consistent and undeviating attitude of the central Siamese authorities to the frontier line as mapped (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30; emphasis added). Not only that, but when the Court proceeds to evaluate Prince Damrongs visit, it does so expressly in terms of Thailands consistent attitude to the Annex 1 map and line and acceptance of the frontier as drawn on the map the Court will see that at pages 28 and 29 of the Judgment, which to save time, I will not read out now. So there is not a shred of support for Thailands attempt now to assert that the Court had an alternative basis for its decision, and that all of the discussion of the Annex I map was just an interesting excursus of no lasting importance at the legal level. Quite the contrary, the Judgment treats the episode simply as further confirmation of a conclusion it had already reached about the binding nature of the boundary on the map. And the decisive element is surely the Courts own statement: The real question, therefore, which is the essential one in this case, is whether the Parties did adopt the Annex I map, and the line indicated on it, as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation of the frontier in the region of Preah Vihear . . . (Ibid., p. 22; emphasis added.) That is at page 22 of the 1962 Judgment; I ask the Court to put it alongside the paragraph from the Further Written Explanations which is now on your screens the Court says the real question therefore, which is the essential one in this case, Thailand says: the map is simply not an essential part of the reasoning and thus not relevant to a request for interpretation.

- 49 46. Earlier in the Further Written Explanations paragraph 1.8 Thailand sets out to suggest that Cambodia has retreated from its position, now admits that the Court recognized but did not determine the Cambodia/Thailand boundary, and that in consequence there is nothing that could be part of the res judicata and as such available for interpretation. The situation is however perfectly simple and perfectly normal; there is no need for caricature. The Court in its Judgment was abundantly clear about what it was laying down: that it could only decide the dispute, by having regard to the boundary, that the boundary was determined by the Franco-Siamese treaty settlement, and that the acceptance of the Annex I map by the two States caused it to become part of the treaty settlement and thus binding on them. The situation is exactly similar to any disputed treaty issue that comes to the Court for settlement: it is their treaty which creates the legal obligations binding the litigating Parties, it is the Court which settles definitively the dispute between them over what their treaty obligations mean. That no more entails that the Court creates the treaty than it entails in this case that the Court determined the boundary. The treaties

determined the boundary; the Court settled the argument as to what the treaties meant and it did so with binding force, because that is what the Charter and the Statute say. Its as simple as that. 47. Mr. President, if what the Judgment said about the frontier and about the map is not part of the res judicata, then it would mean that Thailand is now free to deny that it had ever accepted the Annex I map as the Court held or that the Annex I map had entered into the treaty settlement as an integral part of it as the Court also held. Well, if that is, again, Thailands position, it ought now to say so.

Cambodia is seeking to gain now what it could not achieve in 1962 48. Mr. President, I move now to the other Thai argument that Cambodia is seeking to gain now what it could not achieve in 1962. Perhaps this is the real kernel of Thailands argu ment. It seems to us to take two forms. There is the form which says: Cambodias request goes beyond the dispute submitted to the Court in 1959, so for the Court to decide it would be ultra petita. Then there is the form that says, more specifically: the Court formally determined not to decide this point in 1962, so to ask the Court to decide it now goes beyond the bounds of interpretation.

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49. In neither form is this a sound argument. But before I proceed to analyse it, let me make one general observation. This is that Thailand regularly accuses Cambodia, in outraged tones, of invoking parts of the Courts reasoning to explain the res judicata; the dispositif, says Thailand, is self-contained and must be interpreted as it stands. But Thailand does exactly the same thing. It cites various paragraphs in the reasoning as showing that, when the Court refers in the dispositif to the territory in which the Temple is situated, it means in fact only the Temple and the Temple ground; and it cites two single paragraphs at the beginning and at the end of the reasoning to show that the Court deliberately decided not to accord any formal status to the Annex I map. Where Thailand picks out a few selective quotations and tries to give overriding effect to them, our effort has been to use the whole central run of the Courts argument to illuminate an understanding of its final conclusions. The Courts treatment of the maps 50. Let me address the classic example of this selective abstraction and confront head-on Thailands central assertion that the Court refused in 1962 to answer the question of the status of the Annex I map that had been posed formally in Cambodias final submissions. This is what Cambodia had asked the Court to adjudge and declare: that the frontier line between Cambodia and Thailand, in the disputed region in the neighbourhood of the Temple of Preah Vihear, is that which is marked on the map of the Commission of Delimitation between Indo-China and Siam (Annex I to the Memorial of Cambodia) (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 11). And this is what the Court said: Accordingly, the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court is confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear. To decide this question of territorial sovereignty, the Court must have regard to the frontier line between the two States in this sector. Maps haven (sic) been submitted to it and various considerations have been advanced in this connection. The Court will have regard to each of these only to such extent as it may find in them reasons for the decision it has to give in order to settle the sole dispute submitted to it, the subject of which has just been stated. (Ibid., p. 14.) And then at the end, at page 36, the Court says, immediately before the dispositif:

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Referring finally to the Submissions presented at the end of the oral proceedings, the Court, for the reasons indicated at the beginning of the present Judgment, finds that Cambodias first and second Submissions, calling for pronouncements on the legal status of the Annex I map and on the frontier line in the disputed region, can be entertained only to the extent that they give expression to grounds, and not as claims to be dealt with in the operative provisions of the Judgment. (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 36.) Mr. President, it defies logic to read into those two pronouncements by the Court a refusal to decide the question that had been put to it. The first extract, it will be noted, refers to far more than just the Annex I map, but to a whole category of evidence that had been presented to the Court, including maps in general and other, unspecified, materials as well. The Court seems simply to be saying that it will have regard, amongst this mass of material, only to that which is relevant to the issue before it. The central indeed unique relevance of the Annex I map is then established later on by the progression in the Courts reasoning, which Cambodia set out in detail in paragraph 39 of the Request for Interpretation. As to the second extract, the one just before the dispositive part, it is perfectly plain just from the words which the Court used that the Court was not refusing to decide a question, a question which, indeed, it had already stated to be the essential question in the case, it was simply declining to decide it in a particular way, i.e. , as a formal determination in the dispositive part of its Judgment. The status of this question within the Courts reasoning was, self-evidently, left untouched, as was its essential place in this reasoning.

The doctrine of ultra petita 51. Mr. President, before I leave the question of ultra petita, may I make two brief comments: first, that the purpose and sense behind the doctrine of ultra petita is to ensure that a tribunal stays within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon it, so that in principle it has no application to proceedings for the Courts interpretation of its own past judgments given that this is, in the Courts own words, a special jurisdiction deriving directly from Article 60 of the Statute; the explication by the Court of the express wording of the 1962 dispositif in terms of its own reasoning at the time could not by definition be ultra petita;

- 52 secondly, that there is in any case no warrant for undertaking, as Thailand has done, a search aliunde for the petita when the Court has itself laid down the scope and subject of the dispute, as it did here in plain and simple terms: Accordingly, the subj ect of the dispute submitted to the Court is confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear. (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 14.) Let me touch briefly on the interesting word confined. What looks on the surface like a term of restriction is in fact a term of inclusion. When the Court finds and this is an operative finding, not a piece of reasoning that the dispute before it is to be understood as confined to the region of the Temple, it certainly means that the dispute does not extend beyond that region; but it also means that the dispute does extend to everything related to sovereignty within that region. Moreover the Judgment goes further; it defines for us what the Court itself decided was the Applicants petitum and the Respondents contra-petitum, because it says: In the present case, Cambodia alleges a violation on the part of Thailand of Cambodias territorial sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear and its precincts. (Ibid., p. 14; emphasis added.) And: Thailand replies by affirming that the area in question lies on the Thai side of the common frontier between the two countries, and is under the sovereignty of Thailand. (Ibid.) And, having recited the petitum and the contra-petitum, the Court then links this description of the petita to its immediately following decision on the subject of the dispute by using the word [a]ccordingly (ibid.). Accordingly. the subject of the dispute submitted to the Court is confined to a difference of view about sovereignty over the region of the Temple of Preah Vihear. 52. So, the ultra petita argument is thus devoid of all foundation. 53. It follows, Mr. President, that the three-stage test for admissibility is amply satisfied: that there is a dispute (or more than one) between the Parties, which relates to the meaning or scope of a judgment, and the Request seeks interpretation of what the Judgment decided with binding force.

- 53 Thailands new submission 54. Before concluding, I must however devote one brief moment to a further matter; a new submission by Thailand in paragraph 5.10 of its Further Written Explanations: Thailand accuses Cambodia of having maintained over the past 50 years a strategy of claiming with growing insistence that, contrary to the terms of the Judgment, the Court decided on the boundary between the two States. This is then elaborated in the last of Thailands formal submissions in that written document, which asks the Court in somewhat different terms to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine that the line of the Annex I map is the boundary line between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia. Leaving to one side the obvious procedural objections to the introduction of a new formal submission in this manner at this very late stage, Cambodia finds itself constrained to observe that while it can understand why the inexorable logic of the 1962 Judgment has driven Thailand to do so this new submission asks the Court for a pronouncement covering in terms the entire length of the Annex I map, in flagrant contradiction of Thailands whole position in these proceedings as to the limited scope of the dispute which it says was brought before the Court in 1959. Given, however, that the substance of this submission finds no basis in the terms of the Judgment itself and given, moreover, that its scope does not respond to any submission put before the Court in these proceedings by Cambodia, Cambodia will, in its closing submissions, ask the Court formally to reject Thailands new submission, and to reiterate instead the findings of the 1962 Judgment that [t]he Court considers that the acceptance of the Annex I map by the Parties caused the map to enter the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of it (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 33), and that the Parties at that time adopted an interpretation of the treaty settlement which caused the map line, in so far as it may have departed from the line of the watershed, to prevail over the relevant clause of the treaty (ibid., p. 34).

Lapse of time 55. Mr. President, I close this oral pleading with a brief discussion of the legal effect of the lapse of time between the pronouncement of the Judgment and the lodging of Cambodias Request for Interpretation. I can do it very briefly by putting before the Court four simple propositions:

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1. The Court has now settled definitively that there is no statutory time-limit on a request for interpretation. I refer the Court to paragraph 37 of its Order on Provisional Measures in this case, which is a definitive finding, not a provisional one. 2. The claim that Cambodia has acquiesced in Thailands unilateral interpretation, and cannot therefore come to the Court to seek the correct interpretation now, is nothing more than an attempt to introduce a time-limit by the back door. 3. Thailands allegation that the lapse of time raises major questions as to the integrity of the interpretation process is unsupported and inexplicable; if a judgment of the Court has a legal meaning, that meaning stays fixed over time. 4. Lastly I feel bound to recall the extraordinary anomaly lying at the heart of Thailands position in this case: that the consequence of a judgment of the International Court of Justice is that it confers on the losing party a unilateral right to interpret what the judgment means, to enforce that on the ground, and to dare the successful party to do something about it on pain of sacrificing the full extent of its rights deriving from the judgment. 56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I submit therefore that no question remains as to the admissibility of Cambodias Request. 57. That brings me to the end of my pleading. Might I ask you, Mr. President, to be good enough to give Mr. Bundy the floor. The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir Franklin, and I invite Mr. Bundy to address the Court. You have the floor, Sir. Mr. Bundy. Mr. BUNDY: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

THE EXISTENCE OF A DISPUTE OVER INTERPRETATION AND THE QUESTION OF MAPS 1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is, as always, an honour to appear before you and to represent the Kingdom of Cambodia in this important case.

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Introduction 2. My task this morning is to address two issues that continue to divide the Parties. 3. The first is whether a dispute exists between the Parties as to the meaning and scope of the Judgment6. And, as I shall show, the factual record clearly attests to the existence of such a dispute. The dispute was already alluded to in the Courts Order on Provisional Measures, where the Court stated that a difference of opinion or view appears to exist between them [the Parties] as to the meaning or scope of the 1962 Judgment (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order of 18 July 2011, para. 31). And it is conclusively demonstrated by the documentary materials that both Parties, including many documents filed by Thailand, have produced with their written pleadings following the Courts Order. 4. The second issue I shall address concerns the myriad of maps and technical arguments that Thailand has introduced in its written pleadings in an attempt to undermine the probative value of the Annex I map, or to limit artificially the area constituting the vicinity of the Temple within the meaning of paragraph 2 of the dispositif. 5. In taking aim at the Annex I map, Thailand relies on a number of maps that were not relevant to the Courts Judgment or that Thailand has only unearthed recently, and technical studies commissioned a short time ago specifically for these proceedings. None of this played the slightest role in the Courts original Judgment. In short, Thailands new line of attack is no more than a side show designed to detract attention from the only map that does have status in this case the Annex I map.

1. The Legal Context for Appreciating the Relevant Facts 6. Before getting into details, let me briefly place the facts in their proper legal context. It need scarcely be recalled that this is not a case aimed at reopening the merits of the dispute that the

6 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Order of 18 July 2011, para. 22; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402; Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 223, para. 56; Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzw), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 21.

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Court decided in 1962 and it is not a case of revision. It is a case of interpretation. In such cases, three key principles must be borne in mind in assessing the factual materials that both Parties have placed before the Court in their pleadings. 7. The first principle is that post-judgment facts are only relevant in so far as they show that a dispute exists between the Parties as to the meaning or scope of the Judgment. It is obviously self-evident that a dispute over interpretation can only arise following the delivery of a judgment7. 8. Second, as Sir Franklin noted, it is also well settled that the manifestation of the existence of a dispute in a specific manner is not required. In other words, the dispute need not have been dealt with in a formal way8. 9. Third and this is the other side of the coin of the first principle post-judgment facts, and facts that did not form the basis of the original judgment, are irrelevant to the interpretation of that judgment. I think the Permanent Court put the point very succinctly in its judgment on interpretation in Chorzw Factory where it stated: Moreover, the Court, when giving an interpretation, refrains from any examination of facts other than those which it has considered in the judgment under interpretation, and consequently all facts subsequent to that judgment. (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzw), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, p. 21.) 10. These points of principle should be uncontroversial. The only reason I have felt it necessary to mention them is because Thailands written pleadings continuously confuse the issue. 11. On the one hand, Thailand ignores the vast quantity and it is a vast quantity of documentary evidence that shows that the Parties held fundamentally opposing views as to the meaning and scope of what the Court decided. But, on the other hand, Thailand shows no hesitation in referring to maps and technical matters that were either discovered long after the Judgment was rendered or which did not figure at all in that Judgment. None of these matters has any bearing on the question of interpretation now before your Court.

Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, para. 37. Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzw), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 13, pp. 10-11; Order of 18 July 2011, para. 22; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 July 2008, I.C.J. Reports 2008, pp. 325-326, paras. 53-54.
8

- 57 2. The Existence of a Dispute Over Interpretation 12. Having discussed the legal framework, permit me now to turn to the facts that evidence the existence of a dispute between the Parties over the Judgments interpretation. 13. In its written pleadings, Thailand repeatedly asserts that no such dispute exists. In its Written Observations, for example, Thailand claimed that the Court lacks jurisdiction because there is no dispute between the Parties over the meaning and scope of the 1962 Judgment (Written Observations of Thailand (WOTh), p. 293, para. 7.5). And Thailands Further Written Explanations go further, where, our opponents allege the following: The impossibility for Cambodia to identify a single document, predating its seising of the Court, in which the Parties held opposing views on the characterisation of the obligation of withdrawal shows beyond any doubt that no such dispute existed. (Further Written Explanations of Thailand (FWETh), para. 3.82.) So, apparently we have been unable to show a single document where there is a difference of view over the withdrawal obligation. 14. Let me test that rather extravagant assertion against the documentary record. Because, I believe, Mr. President and Members of the Court, that that assertion is demonstrably wrong and that the record leaves no doubt that the Parties hold differing views over the meaning and scope of the obligation of withdrawal, and that Thailand itself considered the Judgment was subject to different interpretations.

(a) The Events of the 1960s 15. The Court rendered its original Judgment on 15 June 1962. Following the delivery of that Judgment, a series of internal events took place in Thailand that are highly relevant because they set the stage for the dispute that exists today between the Parties over the interpretation of the Judgment. 16. As Sir Franklin pointed out a short while ago, on 3 July 1962, about two weeks after the Judgment was rendered, at a meeting of the Thai Council of Ministers, Thailands Prime Minister instructed the Minister of Interior to travel to the Temple area to give guidelines to officers on duty there to establish the limits of the Temple and its vicinity9. At the conclusion of its work, the expert group established by the Minister sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister dated

Further Written Explanations of Thailand (FWETh), Ann. 5, p. 34.

- 58 6 July 1962, which recorded the Thai expert groups view that the determination of the vicinity of the Temple could be carried out according to two different methods. Those methods were

described in the memorandum and were depicted by red and yellow lines on a map. That is the map that Sir Franklin showed you, which appears again on the screen [and in tab 6]. [6 July 1962 Thai map on screen] 17. As we have heard, on 10 July 1962, Thailands Council of Ministers decided to adopt the second method for determining the vicinity of the Temple; the much more restrictive one. 18. The Court may recall that, on 26 May 2011, that was just four days before the opening of the oral hearings on provisional measures, Thailand submitted a number of documents. This map was one of them: it was No. 4 on the list submitted by Thailand. Surprisingly, however, this map was the only document submitted by Thailand which its counsel chose not to discuss or to display during those hearings on provisional measures. And, as we have heard, when Thailand filed its Written Observations on 21 November 2011, Thailand once again did not mention this map, or file a copy of the Council of Ministers Resolution. It was only after Cambodia called attention to this rather striking omission that Thailand realized it had no choice but to produce the relevant documents, which it did with its Further Written Explanations in Annex 5 [included at tab 5 of the folders]. 19. I think the Court will appreciate why Thailand has been so reluctant to discuss these documents when it examines the materials in question. I would make just three brief points: First, it is clear from the two proposals considered by the Thai Council of Ministers that Thailands experts themselves realized that the identification of the area from which Thailand was obliged to withdraw was open to different interpretations hence two proposals although neither of those proposals can be reconciled with what the Court decided in its 1962 Judgment. Second, the Thai Council of Ministers decided on the more restrictive of the proposals (the red line). That decision was taken unilaterally without any attempt to engage Cambodia on the matter or to justify it under the Judgment. And as I shall show, Thailands interpretation was firmly and repeatedly disputed by Cambodia; and

- 59 Third, the Council of Ministers ordered a barbed-wire fence to be constructed along the red line, and Thai forces were instructed to respond forcibly to any violation of the red line. 20. The unilateral, and I would suggest self-serving, nature of Thailands determination of the limits of the vicinity of the Temple was acknowledged at the time by Thailands Deputy Prime Minister. On 12 July 1962, he stated that the marking of the vicinity of the Temple of Phra Viharn would be done by the Royal Thai Government unilaterally (WOTh, Ann. 17, p. 91). And it was also noted in Thailands Further Written Explanations, which have attempted to justify that decision by arguing that, the Thai government had to decide itself the limits of troop withdrawal (FWETh, para. 1.13.). Why? What gave Thailand the authority to aggregate to itself such a determination that was manifestly at odds with the Courts Judgment is left unexplained in our opponents pleadings. 21. But in any event, Cambodias objections were made clear afterwards. And without recanvassing the details let me just highlight a number of representative examples. For

convenience, we have listed them all in tab 10 of your folders these are references to materials that are on the record in the case. 22. One month after the Thai Council of Ministers issued its resolution, Cambodias Head of State, Prince Sihanouk, issued a press statement in which he took strong exception to the construction by Thailand of its barbed-wire fence following the red line, and the presence of Thai military personnel on Cambodian land. Let me quote what the Prince said at this time: although the soldiers stationed at Preah Vihear [the Thai soldiers] have been withdrawn, the foot of the hill is surrounded by barbed wire and Thailands Minister for the Interior has ordered his police forces to fire on anyone approaching the barbed wire. It is clear, therefore, that they [the Thais] have not given up on their objectives as regards Preah Vihear. (WOTh, Ann. 26, p. 130.) In itself, that statement evidences a difference of views as to how Thailand had interpreted the Courts Judgment. 23. In the autumn of 1962, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed a personal representative, Mr. Nils Gussing, to gather information on tensions that existed between the two countries. Mr. Gussing issued a report on 25 November 1962 which recorded that Cambodia strongly disagreed with Thailands view of the Judgment. The relevant passage in the report noted the following (tab 11) this is from the Secretary-Generals representative:

- 60 In Cambodia, the Preah Vihear Temple plays an extremely important role in the attitude shown towards the other Government concerned; although the case has been won, the Thais are criticized as being bad losers and as not having accepted their defeat graciously, and the allegation is made that a part of the territory which, under the ruling of the International Court of Justice, should, in the Cambodian view, be under Cambodian sovereignty, is now fenced off . . ., with land mines placed here and there . . . (WOTh, Ann. 32, p. 180). 24. So it follows that, by November 1962, the Member States of the United Nations were aware of Cambodias disagreement with the position adopted by Thailand with respect to the area that was the subject of the Courts Judgment. 25. That same month, November 1962, the French Government also evidenced its awareness of Cambodias rejection of Thailands position. A diplomatic despatch sent from the French Embassy in Bangkok refers to Cambodias objection that Thailand continued to occupy an area that, according to the Annex I map line, was in Cambodian territory10. 26. And in November of that same year, Cambodias Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an aide-memoire that referred to the barbed-wire fence, stating that this limit was in complete disagreement with the Courts decision, which confirmed the frontier as it appeared on the 1907 map [the Annex I map] (ibid., Ann. 34, pp. 205 and 214). The same point was reiterated by Cambodias Ministry of Information in December 196211. Those are documents that Thailand itself submitted with its Written Observations. They clearly show a difference of view. 27. Now Prince Sihanouk visited the Temple in early January 1963, at which time he took official repossession of it. Shortly before that visit, the French Embassy again reported on

Cambodias disagreement with Thailands interpretation of the Judgment. And as the Embassy noted, Cambodias position with respect to the barbed-wire fence and I quote from the French dispatch was that it: was placed there unilaterally by the Thai army and police with no regard to the frontier line imposed by the International Court of Justice (ibid., Ann. 41, p. 261). 28. And when Prince Sihanouk visited the Temple, he repeated Cambodias position that Thailand had established a new frontier line in the immediate vicinity of the Temple, constructed a

10 11

Further Written Explanations of Thailand (FWETh), Ann. 33, p. 193. Ibid., Ann. 38, p. 240.

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barbed-wire fence around it, and erected military and police posts that encroached on Cambodian territory in contravention of the Courts Judgment12. 29. Mr. President, what does Thailand say about these episodes? First, Thailand alleges and I quote from their pleadings in the aftermath of the 1962 Judgment, and clearly for a very long period afterwards, Cambodia has made no complaint as to the way paragraph 2 of the dispositif was implemented by Thailand. (WOTh, para. 4.25) this is Thailands allegation. And Thailand also argues that in January 1963, Prince Sihanouk declared himself completely satisfied with Thailands implementation. (Ibid., para. 4.32.) Now both of those assertions are directly

contradicted by the facts I have just discussed. 30. Thailand also maintains that, after Prince Sihanouks visit to the Temple and I am quoting from Thailands pleadings again never again did Cambodia claim that Thailands compliance with the Judgment had not been completed because of the barbed-wire fence (ibid., para. 4.47.). And once again, that assertion is manifestly incorrect. 31. In January 1965, Cambodias Head of State repeated the complaint that Thailand was continuing to refuse to recognize the frontier13. On 23 April 1966, Cambodias Minister for

Foreign Affairs addressed letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council which referred to Prince Sihanouks earlier statements complaining about the barbed-wire fence and to Thailands failure to respect the Courts Judgment14. And on

11 May 1966, Cambodia sent a further letter to the Secretary-General protesting the fence15. 32. In August 1966, the Secretary-General appointed another Special Representative (Mr. Herbert de Ribbing) to mediate between Cambodia and Thailand. In a letter dated

26 October 1966 to Mr. de Ribbing from Cambodia, Cambodia repeated its position that the Temple and its vicinity are situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia according to the

12 13 14 15

Cambodias Response (FWEC), Ann. 6. FWEC, Ann. 10. Ibid., Anns. 11 and 12. Ibid., Ann. 14.

- 62 Courts 1962 Judgment16. And, in November of that year, Prince Sihanouk repeated the complaint that Thailand was refusing to stop laying claim to the Temple and its surrounding area 17. 33. And the fact that the dispute between the Parties continued to persist is further evidenced in a report that Mr. de Ribbing provided to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in September 1966. That report referred to a meeting that the Special Representative had had with the Prime Minister of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Kantol, in the following way (tab 12): The Prince [the Prime Minister of Cambodia] mentioned in this connection that the barbed wire fence that the Thais had put up on its side of the Temple was not even halfway between the Temple and the border line fixed by the International Court of Justice in its decision regarding Phra Viharn. Cambodia could, if it wanted, take this question to the Security Council and request the Thais to withdraw to the borderline. The Cambodian Government had preferred, however, to abide until further, in order not to have on hand still more trouble with Thailand. (WOTh, Ann. 72, p. 436.) 34. Thailands Written Observations argue that Mr. de Ribbings reports show that the barbed-wire fence was not a real issue and that it was never mentioned again18. That is clearly not true. There is the proof in the report. It is quite clear that Cambodia viewed the issue very seriously and specifically mentioned it to the Secretary-Generals Special Representative. And when Mr. de Ribbing informed Thailand about Cambodias views regarding the barbed-wire fence, Thailands representative reacted in anger19. That scarcely suggests that the fence was not an issue. 35. But not only that, Cambodia continued to protest Thailands actions in 1967. On 22 October 1967, for example, Cambodias Head of State gave a press conference in which he drew attention to the res judicata effect of what the Court had decided, objected to the Thai barbed-wire fence which lay between the Temple and the proper frontier according to the Annex I map, and insisted that Thailand must return to Cambodia the land situated between Preah Vihear and the Annex I map line20. 36. In February 1968, Prince Sihanouk delivered a further address in which he referred to the dispute in the following way:

16 17 18 19 20

FWEC, Ann. 16. Ibid., Ann. 17. WOTh, para. 4.56. Ibid., Ann. 72, p. 442. FWEC, Ann. 19.

- 63 They [the Thais] have, since 1962, revealed their bad faith by failing fully to implement the decision of the International Court of Justice. The Court ordered that the Temple and the strip of surrounding land be returned to Cambodia. And yet, the Thais have refused to surrender that land, laying barbed-wire around the edge of the Temple.21 37. All of the events and I have given you a sample, but I have spared you all of them. All of these events I have discussed are supported by contemporaneous documentary evidence. That evidence shows that Thailand itself was unsure how the Judgment should be interpreted, but that it took the decision to limit the vicinity of the Temple as close to the Temple as possible. Afterwards, Cambodia repeatedly objected to Thailands position and insisted that, under the Judgment, the vicinity of the Temple should extend to the Annex I map line. Cambodias

objections were made known to the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, diplomatic missions and the public generally. 38. In the light of these facts, it is simply not credible for Thailand to say that Cambodia identifies no document where it accused Thailand of not having completely complied with its obligations to withdraw and that [a]ll the evidence submitted by Thailand in the Written Observations remains unchallenged22. It is extraordinary. The facts, Mr. President, are precisely the opposite.

(b) Events Between 1970 and 2007 39. As Thailands written pleadings acknowledge, by 1970 the security situation had deteriorated in Cambodia because of the outbreak of civil war23. The Temple area was one of the first areas occupied by the Khmer Rouge in the early 1970s, and one of the last from which they were driven out towards the end of the 1990s. During this period, the Temple was not an issue. 40. On 23 October 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements were signed. That process allowed the Temple temporarily to be opened to tourists. Representatives of the Parties therefore met on 7 November 1991 to agree on a number of measures to regulate tourist activity24. Thailands Further Written Explanations assert that this agreement represented consistent evidence of

21 22 23 24

FWEC, Ann. 23. FWETh, para. 3.78. WOTh, para. 4.58. Ibid., paras. 4.61-4.65 and Ann. 87.

- 64 sovereignty in the area Cambodia is now claiming, situated north or west of the Cabinet line on the part of Thailand25. That is pure wishful thinking. At that time, there was no evidence that Thailand remained committed to its unilateral delimitation of the limits of the Temple decided by the Thai Council of Ministers in 1962. The tourist regulations agreed by the Parties make no mention of that decision or of the 1962 Thai map, or the red line. And it was Cambodia that took responsibility for clearing landmines in the area and indicating the areas where tourists could visit26. 41. Between 1993 and 1997, the Temple was again closed due to the presence of Khmer Rouge in the area. After the Khmer Rouge had been reintegrated, Cambodians settled peacefully around the Temple on Cambodias side of the frontier delimited by the Annex I map line. 42. In November 1998, Cambodia built a pagoda to the west of the Temple pursuant to a decision of the Ministry of Religion27. A market was also established near the Temple. While the pagoda and the market lay outside of the red line promulgated by Thailand in 1962, they gave rise to no Thai protest. Nor did Thailand object to the fact that Cambodia occupied the Phnom Trap hill, which is also located in the Temples vicinity on Cambodias side of the Annex I map line you can see that on the Annex I map. 43. On 14 June 2000, the two Parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of [the] Land Boundary 28. That instrument, as its title makes clear, provided for the conduct of joint surveys by the Parties for the demarcation of the land boundary, on the ground. It had nothing to do with the delimitation of the boundary. 44. I mention the 2000 MOU because Thailand mixes up questions of delimitation and demarcation. The MOU concerns the latter demarcation and is entirely irrelevant to the present case. It is undisputed that the Court was not requested to demarcate the boundary on the ground in the original case, and it is not being asked to do so in the present proceedings. Rather,

25 26 27 28

FWETh, para. 3.76. WOTh, Ann. 87, p. 513. FWEC, Ann. 24. WOTh, Ann. 91.

- 65 the meaning and scope of the Courts 1962 Judgment must be analysed in the light of what the Court said about the Annex I map, which was recognized as showing a pre-existing delimited frontier in the region of the Temple that Thailand had accepted. 45. From the late 1990s until 2007, the situation was peaceful. Cambodians continued to go about their business on Cambodias side of the Annex I map line in the vicinity of the Temple. And Thailand did not once mention its Council of Ministers red line. 46. The only complaints that Thailand raised came several years later when, in November 2004, Thailand sent a Note to Cambodia in which it referred to the fact that the Cambodian community around the Temple and in its vicinity those were words used by Thailand at the time and its vicinity that community was expanding such that it then included over 700 inhabitants, and that this was affecting the natural environment of the frontier zone29. The complaint was about pollution from these people. Not a word was said about these activities being inconsistent with the Thai Council of Ministers map, which was never mentioned. 47. It is significant that Thailand considered Cambodias activities to be taking place in the vicinity of the Temple. Evidently, Thailands views at that time about the scope of the word vicinity were different from what it had decided unilaterally in 1962 or what it argues in these proceedings. Regrettably, however, this peaceful situation that existed between the late 1990s and 2007 began to change in 2007 because, and as a result of Thailands reaction to Cambodias request to UNESCO to inscribe the Temple on the World Heritage List and that is a matter I would like to turn to next.

(c) The re-emergence of the dispute in 2007 48. The re-emergence of the dispute starting in 2007 was mainly the result of political changes in Thailand. 49. When Cambodia first issued a Royal Decree in April 2006 to have the Temple site inscribed on the World Heritage List, Thailands reaction was positive. At that time, the

Prime Minister of Thailand was Thaksin Shinawatra, who was in favour of friendly relations with Cambodia.

29

WOTh, Ann. 93.

- 66 -

50. In September 2006, one month before general elections were scheduled to take place in Thailand, a coup dtat was staged against Prime Minister Thaksin. The election was cancelled and the army took control. 51. On 17 May 2007, Thailand sent Cambodia an aid- memoire concerning the inscription of the Temple on the UNESCO list30. In that document, Thailand complained about the zones marked out in Cambodias submission to the World Heritage Committee to p rotect the Temple, and asserted Thailand asserted that the international boundary between Thailand and Cambodia was as depicted on a Thai map: the map was Series L7017, unilaterally prepared by Thailand and a copy of that map was attached to this May 2007 aide-memoire. [Thai map L7017 on screen] 52. The map now appears on the screen and at tab 13 of your folders. It was a new map, marked secret at the top, and not one of the maps listed in the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding as a basis for the demarcation of the boundary. For the first time in decades, if we zoom in on the relevant part of the map, it showed a boundary around the Temple as it had been depicted on the Thai Council of Ministers 1962 map. 53. In 2008, the political situation in Thailand changed again following the election of a new Prime Minister. As a result, representatives of the two Governments signed a Joint Communiqu on 18 June 2008 in which Thailand supported Cambodias proposal to inscribe the Temple on the World Heritage List31. That Joint Communiqu had a map attached to it which did not depict the 1962 Thai Council of Ministers line, or this line. On 7 July 2008, the World Heritage Committee formally decided to place the Temple on the list32. 54. But unfortunately, events kept changing in Thailand. Because, on the very day 7 July 2008 of the World Heritage Committees decision, Thailands Constitutional Court declared that the signature by Thailands Foreign Minister of the 18 June 2008 Joint Communiqu violated Thailands Constitution and that the document was a nullity33. In those circumstances,

30 31 32 33

FWEC, Ann. 27. Ibid., Ann. 31. Ibid., Ann. 32. Ibid., para. 5.

- 67 -

Cambodia had no option but to protest this new Thai map, which it did on 19 July 2008 in a letter sent to the President of the United Nations General Assembly. That letter stated that this new map was manifestly incompatible with the Annex I map relied on by the Court in its Judgment34. 55. Thailands actions at this time had the consequence of resurrecting the dispute over the Judgments interpretation that had been dormant for many years. The fact that the dispute had re-emerged was made patently clear when Thailand subsequently sent a letter to the Security Council on 21 July 2008 in which it referred to the area adjacent to the Temple in the following way (that is at tab 14 and now on the screen). This was Thailands letter: Cambodias territorial claim in this area is based on Cambodias unilateral understanding of the said ICJ Judgment that a boundary line was determined by the Court in this Judgment. Thailand contests this unilateral understanding since the ICJ ruled in this case that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of the land boundary and did not in any case determine the location of the boundary between Thailand and Cambodia. (FWEC, Ann. 36.) 56. And I would suggest that if any further evidence was needed to show the existence of a dispute between the Parties over the interpretation of the Judgment, this statement provides it. 57. In summary, Mr. President, Members of the Court: in 1962 Thailands expert group considered that the Judgment, in particular the vicinity of the Temple from which Thailand was obliged to withdraw, could be interpreted in different ways. In July 1962, Thailand issued its own unilateral interpretation of the meaning and scope of the Courts Judgment. 58. Cambodia vigorously protested that decision throughout the 1960s, and it also protested when Thailand reintroduced its red line in its 2007 map. For its part, in July 2008 Thailand objected to what it claimed was Cambodias understanding of the Judgment, which was that Thailand was obliged to withdraw from the Temple and its vicinity up to the Annex I map line. I would suggest that it is clear in these circumstances that a dispute exists between the Parties regarding the meaning or scope of the Judgment and that Cambodias request on this ground, the request for interpretation, is fully admissible.

34

FWEC, Ann. 34.

- 68 3. The Irrelevance of Maps Relied on by Thailand 59. Mr. President, I was now going to turn to the second part of my pleading which will be briefer and in which I will address the irrelevance to the present proceedings of the other maps and technical studies that Thailand has introduced in its written pleadings. As I said, on this I hope to be quite brief, precisely because of the lack of relevance of this material. 60. There are two aspects to this whole map business. The first concerns the technical report that the International Boundaries Research Unit, that is IBRU of Durham University my good friends Martin Pratt and Alistair McDonald what they prepared, dealing with what IBRU called an Assessment of the task of translating the Cambodia-Thailand boundary depicted on the Annex I map onto the ground. That was the title of the report. It was included at Annex 96 of Thailands Written Observations. We will deal with that first and then the second aspect I shall address involves Thailands attempt to resurrect its claim in the original case that the Annex I map does not follow the actual watershed. Thailand refers to maps prepared mainly by its own experts in the original case that played no role in the Courts Judgment. I will deal with each of these matters in turn. (a) Thailands Expert Report on the Annex I Map 61. As for the IBRU report, its purpose is to show that the Annex I map, and I am quoting from the report, contains a number of errors which distort the line of the watershed and hence the boundary (WOTh, Ann. 96, p. 627, para. 1). Further on in that report, the authors make a more candid admission when they state: The aim of this report is to move beyond the debate in the Temple case, which focused almost entirely on a very small section of the Annex I map, and examine the map as a whole... (Ibid., para. 3.) 62. That is a rather telling description, Mr. President: to move beyond the debate in the original case. But the purpose of interpretation proceedings is not to move beyond what the Court considered in the original Judgment, or to examine new facts and arguments that were not introduced by the Parties at the time. It is to interpret what the Court actually decided in its Judgment based on materials it considered at that time. 63. Notwithstanding that, the IBRU report tries to discredit the Annex I map by referring to maps that Thailand apparently only recently discovered, along with satellite imagery, and a visit to

- 69 -

a number of sites along the boundary undertaken by the authors of the IBRU report in August 2011. All of this post-dates the Judgment. Do I need to recall what the Permanent Court said in Chorzw Factory that I mentioned earlier, namely, that: the Court, when giving an interpretation, refrains from any examination of facts other than those which it considered in the judgment under interpretation, and consequently all facts subsequent to that judgment (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzw), Judgment No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, p. 21). 64. Despite that admonition, the IBRU report gives particular emphasis to what it claims is a revised version of the Annex I map that it discovered when it visited the Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs in Thailand in 2011, and which is said to show changes to the contour lines and registration errors in the original Annex I map. Following that visit of the IBRU authors to Thailand, the legal team apparently looked at copies of the same sheet in archives in Paris and London, as well as at the Institut gographique national of Paris, where a so-called third version of the Annex I map was said to have been found. According to the IBRU report, it is not possible today to discover the reasons for the revised editions of this map sheet35. 65. What is clear is that none of these versions were considered by the Court in the original proceedings or referred to in its Judgment. And, as the IBRU report itself frankly admits and I could not have said it better myself: Neither the registration error on the Annex I sheet nor the revised versions of the sheet appear to have been discussed at any point during the original Temple case.36 [Original Annex I map on screen] 66. Exactly, Mr. President. That is why all of this is irrelevant. The only map the Court focused on in the original case was the map that Cambodia attached as Annex I to its Application and again to its Memorial in the original case. That map is reproduced at tab 15 of your folders and is now on the screen. It is the map that the Court found Thailand had accepted, and it is the map that depicts the boundary line which the Court said both Parties agreed to regard as being the frontier line.

35 36

WOTh, Ann. 96, p. 635, para. 12. Ibid., p. 635, para. 13.

- 70 67. As the Court noted in its Judgment, as early as 1908-1909 Thailand did accept the Annex I map as representing the outcome of the work of delimitation, and hence recognized the line on that map [the map you see] as being the frontier line (Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 32; emphasis added). 68. Now the Court will see that the map filed by Cambodia as Annex I in the original proceedings was in poor shape. It was held together with scotch tape. Apparently for this reason, the Court had prepared a copy of the map, which is the map that is reproduced in the Courts publication of the Parties pleadings. [Courts Annex I map on screen] 69. That map now appears on the screen. It is also at tab 16. It is the same as the Annex I map filed by Cambodia except for the fact that a small cartouche in the top right corner of the map and two registration marks were not reproduced. 70. Now, in the original proceedings, Thailand claimed that the Annex I map in the disputed area of Preah Vihear had errors, although these assertions were not made on the basis of any revised versions of the Annex I map, but rather on the grounds, as Thailand argued, that the frontier line depicted on the map was not the true watershed line ( Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21). But the Court flatly rejected that contention stating that the plea of error had not been made out (ibid., p. 27). Still less can Thailand plead error in the present case based on newly discovered documents and arguments that never saw the light of day during the original proceedings and did not form part of the Courts Judgment. 71. Notwithstanding all of this, Thailand seeks to cast a further cloud on the Annex I map by pointing out that the map that Cambodia filed with its Request for Interpretation in these proceedings is not the same version of the map filed by Cambodia in the original proceedings37. But this too is a smokescreen of no relevance to the interpretation of what the Court decided in 1962. [Place Annex I map from Cambodias Request on screen]

37

FWETh, para. 1.23.

- 71 72. It is well known that Cambodias archives were destroyed during the Khmer Rouge period. Cambodia therefore turned to the Institut gographique national (IGN) of Paris to obtain the map, which is what it produced with its Request and which is now on the screen and at tab 17 of your folders. And I have to say that Thailands own experts acknowledge that this version of the map, and I am quoting from the expert report, contains largely cosmetic changes which, to an observer today, hardly justify the work involved to produce a further edition of this map38. 73. And similarly, the version of the Annex I map that the IBRU authors purported to have located in Thailands archives is also without consequence. Because, once again, the IBRU Report says that this version is essentially the same map as the Annex I map39. 74. So, in short, Mr. President and Members of the Court, the entire dmarche introduced by Thailand regarding the Annex I map is without relevance to the case before you. The Annex I map is the Annex I map that Cambodia filed in the original case and which the Court referred to in 14 of the last 16 pages of the 1962 Judgment. And if that Annex I map has any potential technical limitations, as alleged in the IBRU Report40, those are matters that can be raised in connection with the demarcation of the boundary pursuant to the 2000 MOU. But they are without the slightest relevance to a case that concerns the interpretation of a Judgment that was delivered, not in 2000, but in 1962.

(b) Other Maps Relied on by Thailand 75. Now following the submission of its first pleading, Thailand obviously realized the shortcomings of the IBRU report, and Thailand scarcely refers to that report in their second set of pleadings. Instead, Thailand embarked on a new tactic. That tactic consists of relying on a number of other maps produced by experts during the original proceedings back in 1959-1961 showing different versions of the watershed line. Thailands aim in revisiting these materials is to argue that these maps prepared by experts in the original proceedings somehow limit the area around the Temple to a very narrow strip of land consistent with the 1962 Thai Council of Ministers map 41.

38 39 40 41

IBRU Report, WOTh, Ann. 96, para. 9. Ibid., para. 7. WOTh, p. 286, para. 7.9. FWETh, paras. 4.45-4.63.

- 72 -

Now that argument has no merit whatsoever, given that the Court, in its Judgment, clearly indicated that, in the light of Thailands acceptance of the Annex I map showing the frontier, the location of the watershed was irrelevant. 76. Permit me just to recall briefly the sequence of the Courts reasoning on this point. 77. First, after indicating that the acceptance by the Parties of the Annex I map caused the map to enter into the treaty settlement and to become an integral part of it, the Court added: In other words, the Parties at that time adopted an interpretation of the treaty settlement which caused the map line, in so far as it may have departed from the line of the watershed, to prevail over the relevant clause of the treaty. ( Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 34.) 78. And second, after noting that when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality, the Court said the following: The Parties in the present case must have had a reason for taking this further step. This could only have been because they regarded a watershed indication as insufficient by itself to achieve certainty and finality. It is precisely to achieve this that delimitations and map lines are resorted to. (Ibid., p. 34.) 79. And finally, after pronouncing in favour of the Annex I map line as delimited and accepted by the Parties, the Court stated the following: Given the grounds on which the Court bases its decision, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether, at Preah Vihear, the line as mapped does in fact correspond to the true watershed line in this vicinity, or did so correspond in 1904-1908, or, if not, how the watershed line in fact runs. (Ibid., p. 35.) 80. The plain fact is that not one of the watershed maps to which Thailand refers in its Further Written Explanations here was mentioned in the Courts Judgment. The watershed lines they purported to depict did not need to be considered by the Court, and were not so considered, given the status of the Annex I map. And for Thailand, as it does in its Further Written

Explanations, to label these materials, and I quote, these watershed materials as The Material before the Court in Light of Which It Reached Its Decision, is fundamentally misleading 42. These maps are even referred to in the Judgment. 81. By the same token, Thailands argument that the vicinity of the Temple considered by the Court was limited to a small area between the different watershed lines is groundless. Because if the Court did not consider such maps because they were irrelevant, they cannot possibly be used
42

FWETh, p. 41, and paras. 2.14-2.25.

- 73 by Thailand now to show what the Court meant when it referred to Thailands obligation to withdraw from the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory, in paragraph 2 of the dispositif. 82. In fact, it is clear from the 1962 Judgment that the geographical focus of the Court was much broader than the very limited area circumscribed by Thailand on its famous Council of Ministers map. The Courts view as to the positions of the Parties was the following: Thailand asserted that the frontier line ran along the edge of the escarpment to the south and east of the Temple43, while Cambodia principally relied on the line appearing on the Annex I map44. Logically, it follows that the area lying between these two lines was the disputed area and the vicinity of the Temple to which the Court made reference. And it is that area by the way that constitutes the famous 4.6 km area in dispute to which Thailands own recent government publications have referred to. 83. Now the soundness of this reasoning is confirmed by a further citation from the Judgment. Following its analysis of the evidence presented to it by the Parties, the Court

concluded that it felt bound, as a matter of treaty interpretation, to pronounce in favour of the line [Annex I map] as mapped in the disputed area (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35; emphasis added). And from that statement, it is clear that the Court considered that the disputed area to had to encompass the Annex I map line. And, in fact, even Thailands experts IBRU in these proceedings, acknowledge: The evidence before the Court mainly concern the 7 kilometres by 12 kilometres area mapped by Professor Schermerhorn [one of the experts in the original proceedings] in the vicinity [there are those words again, in the vicinity] of the Temple, a small part of the roughly 100 kilometres of boundary covered by the Annex I map (WOTh, Ann. 96, p. 669, para. 61). So the vicinity and the focus, according to the IBRU Report in the original proceedings, was on this area of 7 by 12 km, not the small area circumscribed by the 1962 Thai Council of Ministers map. 84. And Thailands new arguments in its last round of written pleadings aimed at bolstering its unilateral interpretation of the Judgment that it arrived at in July 1962 are unsupported given

43 44

Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15. Ibid., p. 21.

- 74 -

that the Council of Ministers map does not even depict the Annex I map line, let alone the genuine vicinity of the Temple.

4. Conclusions 85. Mr. President, I come to my conclusions. 86. I think the evidence on record clearly shows that there is a dispute between the Parties over the meaning or scope of the Judgment. Even, in 1962, Thailand thought that the Judgment could be interpreted in different ways. That dispute persisted throughout the 1960s. Between 1970 and 2007, it became dormant, first because of the civil war in Cambodia, and then when Cambodians settled peacefully around the Temple and its vicinity without any protest from Thailand except for occasional complaints about pollution. The dispute only re-emerged in

2007-2008 as a result of Thailands objections to the inscription of the Temple as a World Heritage Site, and the publication of Thailands new secret map (L 7017). That map was protested by Cambodia after these incidents. This led to hostilities in the area, as the Court is aware, and ultimately to Cambodias request for interpretation and the indication of provisional measures. 87. And Thailands attempt now to cast aspersions on the Annex I map by moving beyond the debate in the original case, and relying on maps it has either recently discovered, or maps never introduced in the original case such as its Series L 7017, which Cambodia saw only in 2007 for the first time, all of that is completely irrelevant. Equally irrelevant is Thailands attempt to limit the vicinity of the Temple by resurrecting maps that purported to show different watershed lines in the original proceedings, but which the Court neither referred to nor considered relevant in its Judgment. 88. I thank the Court very much for its attention and for the time to complete my pleading and to compete against lunch, and I would be grateful if perhaps after the lunch break, Mr. President, the floor could be given to Professor Sorel. Thank you very much. The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Bundy. Certainly, after the lunch break. The sitting is closed. The Court will meet this afternoon at 3 oclock. The Court rose at 1.20 p.m. ___________

Non corrig Uncorrected

CR 2013/2

Cour internationale de Justice LA HAYE

International Court of Justice THE HAGUE

ANNE 2013

Audience publique tenue le lundi 15 avril 2013, 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix, sous la prsidence de M. Tomka, prsident, en laffaire relative la Demande en interprtation de larrt du 15 juin 1962 en laffaire du Temple de Prah Vihar (Cambodge c. Thalande) (Cambodge c. Thalande)

________________ COMPTE RENDU ________________

YEAR 2013

Public sitting held on Monday 15 April 2013, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand)

____________________ VERBATIM RECORD ____________________

-2Prsents : M. M. MM. Tomka, prsident Seplveda-Amor, vice-prsident Owada Abraham Keith Bennouna Skotnikov Canado Trindade Yusuf Greenwood Mmes Xue Donoghue M. Gaja Mme Sebutinde M. Bhandari, juges MM. Guillaume Cot, juges ad hoc M. Couvreur, greffier

-3Present: President Tomka Vice-President Seplveda-Amor Judges Owada Abraham Keith Bennouna Skotnikov Canado Trindade Yusuf Greenwood Xue Donoghue Gaja Sebutinde Bhandari Judges ad hoc Guillaume Cot Registrar Couvreur

-4Le Gouvernement du Royaume du Cambodge est reprsent par : S. Exc. M. Hor Namhong, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires trangres et de la coopration internationale, comme agent ; S. Exc. M. Var Kimhong, ministre dEtat, comme agent adjoint ; S. Exc. M. Long Visalo, secrtaire dEtat au ministre des affaires trangres et de la coopration internationale, M. Raoul Marc Jennar, expert, S. Exc. M. Hem Saem, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plnipotentiaire du Royaume du Cambodge auprs du Royaume des Pays-Bas, M. Sarun Rithea, conseiller du ministre des affaires trangres et de la coopration internationale, M. Hoy Pichravuth, assistant du vice-premier ministre, comme conseillers ; M. Jean-Marc Sorel, professeur de droit international lUniversit Paris I (Panthon-Sorbonne), sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., membre du barreau dAngleterre, membre de la Cour permanente darbitrage, professeur invit de droit international lUniversit dOxford et lUniversit de Cape Town, M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat la cour dappel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris, comme conseils et avocats ; M. Guillaume Le Floch, professeur lUniversit de Rennes I, Mme Amal Alamuddin, membre des barreaux dAngleterre et de New York, Mme Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (Angleterre et Pays de Galles), cabinet Eversheds LLP, Paris, comme conseils.

-5The Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia is represented by: H.E. Mr. Hor Namhong, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, as Agent; H.E. Mr. Var Kimhong, Minister of State, as Deputy Agent; H.E. Mr. Long Visalo, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar, Expert, H.E. Mr. Hem Saem, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mr. Sarun Rithea, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Mr. Hoy Pichravuth, Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister, as Advisers; Mr. Jean-Marc Sorel, Professor (Panthon-Sorbonne), of International Law at the University of Paris I

Sir Franklin Berman, K.C.M.G., Q.C., member of the English Bar, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Visiting Professor of International Law at Oxford University and the University of Cape Town, Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat la cour dappel de Paris, member of the New York Bar, Eversheds LLP, Paris, as Counsel and Advocates; Mr. Guillaume Le Floch, Professor at the University of Rennes I, Ms Amal Alamuddin, member of the English and the New York Bars, Ms Naomi Briercliffe, solicitor (England and Wales), Eversheds LLP, Paris, as Counsel.

-6Le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thalande est reprsent par : S. Exc. M. Virachai Plasai, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plnipotentiaire du Royaume de Thalande auprs du Royaume des Pays-Bas, comme agent ; M. Voradet Viravakin, directeur gnral du dpartement des traits et des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires trangres, comme agent adjoint ; S. Exc. M. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, vice-premier ministre et ministre des affaires trangres, S. Exc. M. Phongthep Thepkanjana, vice-premier ministre et ministre de lducation, S. Exc. M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, A.C.M., ministre de la dfense, M. Thana Duangratana, vice-ministre rattach au cabinet du premier ministre, M. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, secrtaire permanent du ministre des affaires trangres, M. Nuttavudh Photisaro, secrtaire permanent adjoint du ministre des affaires trangres, Le gnral Nipat Thonglek, secrtaire permanent adjoint du ministre de la dfense, Le gnral Nopphadon Chotsiri, directeur gnral du service gographique royal thalandais, quartier gnral des forces armes du Royaume de Thalande, M. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, secrtaire gnral adjoint du bureau du conseil dEtat, cabinet du premier ministre, M. Jumpon Phansumrit, procureur expert au bureau des politiques et stratgies, bureau de lAttorney General, M. Darm Boontham, directeur de la division des frontires du dpartement des traits et des affaires juridiques du ministre des affaires trangres ; * M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit lUniversit de Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de lInstitut de droit international, avocat, M. Donald McRae, professeur lUniversit dOttawa, titulaire de la chaire Hyman Soloway, membre de la Commission du droit international, membre associ de lInstitut de droit international, membre du barreau de lOntario,

-7The Government of the Kingdom of Thailand is represented by: H.E. Mr. Virachai Plasai, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Thailand to Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Agent; Mr. Voradet Viravakin, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Deputy Agent; H.E. Mr. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. Phongthep Thepkanjana, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, H.E. A.C.M. Sukumpol Suwanatat, Minister of Defence, Mr. Thana Duangratana, Vice-Minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nuttavudh Photisaro, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Nipat Thonglek, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Lieutenant General Nopphadon Chotsiri, Director-General, Royal Thai Survey Department, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, Mr. Chukiert Ratanachaichan, Deputy-Secretary-General, Office of the Council of State, Office of the Prime Minister, Mr. Jumpon Phansumrit, Expert Public Prosecutor, Office of Policy and Strategy, Office of the Attorney General, Mr. Darm Boontham, Director, Boundary Division, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

* Mr. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Mr. Donald McRae, Hyman Soloway Professor, University of Ottawa, Member of the International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit international, member of the Ontario Bar,

-8-

M. Alain Pellet, professeur lUniversit Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, prsident de la Socit franaise pour le droit international, membre associ de lInstitut de droit international, M. Thomas Grant, membre du barreau de New York, matre de recherche au Lauterpacht Centre for International Law de lUniversit de Cambridge, Mme Alina Miron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Universit Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, comme conseils ; M. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., membre honoraire de lunit de recherche sur les frontires internationales du dpartement de gographie de lUniversit de Durham, M. Martin Pratt, directeur de recherche lunit de recherche sur les frontires internationales du dpartement de gographie de lUniversit de Durham, comme conseillers experts ; M. Ludovic Legrand, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Universit Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, comme conseil adjoint.

-9Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, President of the Socit franaise pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit international, Dr. Thomas Grant, member of the New York Bar, Senior Research Associate, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, as Counsel; Mr. Alastair Macdonald, M.B.E., Honorary Fellow, International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University, Mr. Martin Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Research Unit, Department of Geography, Durham University, as Expert Advisers; Mr. Ludovic Legrand, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Dfense, Assistant Counsel.

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Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez-vous asseoir. Laudience est ouverte et nous allons entendre la suite du premier tour de plaidoiries du Royaume du Cambodge. Je donne prsent la parole au professeur Sorel. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur. M. SOREL :

UNE LECTURE COHRENTE ET LOGIQUE DE L'ARRT DU 15 JUIN 1962 1. Monsieur le Prsident, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, il me revient dsormais pour clore cette journe de plaidoiries dexpliquer ce qui constitue sans doute le cur de la contestation de la requte du Cambodge par la Thalande, savoir la question de la lecture isole ou non du dispositif de larrt du 15 juin 1962 do dcoulent de multiples consquences qui amnent justement le Cambodge revenir devant votre Cour. Le Cambodge tient prciser de nouveau quil souhaite sen tenir strictement aux rponses ou absences de rponses au supplment dinformation de la Thalande du 21 juin 2012. Pour cela, il est ncessaire tout dabord de revenir sur le raisonnement gnral suivi par la Thalande, ou plutt sur les points obscurs qui jalonnent ce raisonnement (I). Le Cambodge pourra alors expliquer en quoi les motifs sont

insparables de la lecture objective du dispositif de larrt de 1962 (II). Les trois consquences dcoulent de cette lecture du dispositif en liaison avec les motifs essentiels de larrt. Premirement, ceci entrane limpossibilit dune dfinition unilatrale dune quelconque ligne frontalire lencontre des motifs (III). Deuximement, ceci implique galement limpossible distinction entre conflit territorial et conflit frontalier (IV). Troisimement, ceci rvle la vritable signification de laccord du 14 juin 2000 (V). Il sera alors temps de sinterroger sur la manire dont la Thalande peut parvenir justifier une telle ngation de la ralit. Elle y parvient par une inversion du raisonnement dductif suivi par votre Cour au profit dun raisonnement inductif quelle reconstruit totalement et artificiellement (VI), impliquant de nouveau la tentation dune refonte de larrt de 1962 (VII). Le Cambodge peut en conclure lincohrence dun tel

raisonnement alors quil a suivi depuis sa requte une lecture constante des paragraphes 1 et 2 du dispositif de larrt de 1962 liant la ncessit du caractre continu de lvacuation des troupes

- 11 thalandaises des environs du temple la souverainet et lintgrit territoriale du Cambodge que le dispositif de larrt lui reconnat pleinement et clairement (VIII).

I. Les points obscurs dans le raisonnement gnral de la Thalande 2. Avant de rpondre aux observations de la Thalande, sans doute est-il utile de rsumer rapidement le sens gnral de son raisonnement, travail de reconstruction darguments disparates ne prsentant gure de cohrence. 3. Selon la Thalande, il faudrait lire uniquement le dispositif de larrt de 1962 indpendamment des motifs. En revanche, il faudrait relire toute la procdure de 1959 1962 pour savoir ce que la Cour a voulu dire. Il parat pourtant plus simple justement de lire les motifs pour savoir ce quelle a voulu dire puisquil sagit de la partie de larrt qui condense le raisonnement suivi par la Cour et sa comprhension de la procdure suivie et des arguments avancs. 4. Il rsulte de ce raisonnement de la Thalande que les motifs ne serviraient rien dans un arrt. On peut alors se demander pourquoi ils existent et pourquoi les juridictions nationales ont de plus en plus tendance motiver leurs arrts limage de ce que fait votre Cour depuis lorigine et ceci pour rendre leurs dcisions plus transparentes et plus accessibles aux justiciables. 5. Mais le raisonnement suivi par la Thalande possde bien sr la logique de la justification de sa propre attitude et de sa propre interprtation de larrt de 1962. Si les motifs ne servent rien, lEtat peut donc faire ce quil veut sur la base de sa seule comprhension du dispositif. En effet, ds lors, la Thalande peut fixer unilatralement une limite son territoire aux abords immdiats du temple selon son interprtation du dispositif de larrt, interprtation qui nest pas la mme que celle du Cambodge. Pour le moins, il y a donc bien un conflit dinterprtation. Mais surtout, la Thalande peut le faire lencontre des motifs de larrt puisquelle naccorde aucune signification ces derniers. Elle ignore ainsi superbement la majeure partie de larrt, fait comme si elle nexistait pas, et dcide quil nexiste pas de ligne frontalire dcoulant de cet arrt, et quelle peut donc la tracer comme elle le souhaite. 6. La Cour ne traite effectivement pas de la frontire dans son dispositif, cest un fait que le Cambodge ne conteste nullement. Elle traite du territoire du Cambodge. Or ce territoire, comme

- 12 -

tout territoire tatique, doit bien avoir une consistance et une limite. La Cour ne place pas le temple nimporte quel endroit du planisphre, mais bien sur le territoire du Cambodge. Logiquement, les Parties au diffrend doivent en dduire que, non seulement le temple se trouve bien au Cambodge mais, au surplus, ils sont dans lobligation de savoir o sarr te le territoire sur lequel le temple a t plac, autrement dit quelle est la limite de ce territoire. Rduire cette rponse un simple conflit territorial qui dans lide que sen fait la Thalande devrait se distinguer nettement dun conflit frontalier, est un leurre. Ignorer cette ralit, cest ignorer le raisonnement suivi par la Cour pour parvenir sa conclusion, et cest donc ignorer les motifs de larrt. Et puisque la Thalande prtend faire un cours thorique sur cet aspect, il faut rappeler que les motifs dun arrt prcdent le dispositif, le justifient et lexpliquent, et non linverse. 7. Ce raisonnement suivi par la Thalande parat dautant plus incongru que cet Etat a bien finalement accept la logique de larrt de 1962 en signant en 2000 un accord prvoyant la dmarcation de la frontire entre les deux Etats, notamment dans la rgion du temple, par lequel il reconnat ipso facto quune frontire existe dj puisque, avant de la dmarquer et de laborner, il fallait bien quelle soit dlimite, suivant en cela le raisonnement de la Cour en 1962 qui, elle-mme, reconnat lexistence dune telle dlimitation accepte par les deux Etats. Dcidment la cohrence nest pas au rendez-vous du raisonnement de la Thalande, ce quil convient dsormais dillustrer par diffrentes observations.

II. Le caractre insparable des motifs et du dispositif qui est ni par la Thalande 8. Si lon peut rsumer brivement et dune manire synthtique largument de la Thalande : la Cour ne peut rpondre la demande dinterprtation du Cambodge et, si elle rpond, elle ne peut le faire positivement car sa thse ne serait pas soutenable puisquelle demande une interprtation sur ce qui nest pas res judicata, autrement dit ne figure pas dans le dispositif de larrt de 1962. En lespce, la Thalande vise clairement la question de la reconnaissance de la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 comme ligne frontalire. Or, pour le Cambodge, la Cour na fait que reconnatre une frontire qui existait dj et tait obligatoire avant le prononc de larrt, reconnaissance clairement indique dans les motifs de larrt qui conditionnent la bonne interprtation du dispositif sans laquelle la solution ne peut avoir de fondements.

- 13 9. Pour aboutir au rsultat quelle souhaite, la Thalande se lance dans une dmonstration teneur thorique sur la structure dun arrt visant dmontrer que le res judicata est circonscrit par le diffrend initial et le petitum, ce qui semble inutile puisque le Cambodge ne le conteste pas. Mon collgue sir Franklin a dj eu loccasion dindiquer ce qutait, aux yeux de la Cour, lpoque, le petitum du Cambodge et le contra-petitum de la Thalande en 1959. Nanmoins, la Thalande explique1 [nous laissons de nouveau au Greffe le soin dintroduire les notes et rfrences prcises dans le compte rendu de cette plaidoirie] quun arrt est constitu de quatre parties2. Cette dmonstration comporte bien sr des lments exacts mme sil est plus courant de considrer quun arrt est constitu de trois parties3 mais semble induire que les motifs ne seraient constitus que par les arguments des parties. Or, les motifs contiennent aussi et surtout le

raisonnement de la Cour qui permet de comprendre le dispositif. Les arguments des parties ne sont alors slectionns et utiliss que pour construire le raisonnement de la Cour, raisonnement qui dbouche logiquement sur le dispositif. La doctrine saccorde unanimement reconnatre que la motivation : [est] la prsentation par la Cour de largumentation juridique en fonction de laquelle elle parvient ses conclusions4, ou encore que lnonc dun arrt comporte un dispositif et les motifs qui le soutiennent5. Affirmer que les motifs ne seraient quun rsum des arguments des parties conduit ainsi mconnatre la structuration relle des arrts de la Cour et lessence de sa

1 2

Voir Further Written Explanations of the Kingdom of Thailand (ci-aprs FEW), 21 juin 2012, vol. I, par. 3.8. 1) de lobjet du diffrend tel que dfini par la Cour sur la base des conclusions des parties ; 2) de la rponse aux conclusions des parties qui dfinit le petitum ; 3) des arguments des parties dans les motifs ; 4) de la rponse de la Cour dans le dispositif.

3 Ainsi, dans son commentaire de larticle 95 du Rglement de la Cour, Genevive Guyomar indique : Les arrts de la Cour comportent trois parties : les qualits [noms des juges et des reprsentants des parties, tapes de la procdure, conclusions des parties], les motifs et le dispositif, Commentaire du Rglement de la Cour internationale de Justice, Interprtation et pratique, Pedone, Paris, 1983, p. 600. Il en va de mme dans le livret de prsentation de la Cour dit par elle-mme o elle mentionne que larrt est divis en trois parties, 5 e d., 2004, p. 70-71. Elle prcise en outre que Les motifs exposent en dtail les circonstances de fait et les motifs de droit retenus par la Cour lappui de sa dcision et discutent les arguments des parties par un raisonnement soigneusement quilibr, p. 71. La doctrine est unanime sur cet aspect, et elle divise galement un arrt en trois parties (prsentation de laffaire, des faits et de la procdure ; motivation ; dispositif). Voir notamment P. Daillier, M. Forteau, A. Pellet : Droit international public, LGDJ, Paris, 8e dition, 2009, p. 1005, par. 547.

P-M. Dupuy, Y. Kerbrat : Droit international public, Dalloz, Paris, 11e dition, 2012, p. 659, par. 556 (les italiques sont de nous).
5 J. Combacau, S. Sur : Droit international public, Montchrestien, Paris, 10e dition, 2012, p. 602 (les italiques sont de nous). Voir, pour la doctrine anglo-saxonne, Hersch Lauterpacht selon qui absence of reasons or of adequate reasons unavoidably creates the impression of arbitrariness in The Development of International Law by the International Court, 1958, Stevens, London, p. 39.

- 14 motivation. Que la Thalande le veuille ou non, la motivation dun arrt nest pas une possibilit, une option sans consquences, mais bien une obligation mentionne sans emphase et sans ambigut larticle 56, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour : Larrt est motiv. Votre Cour la souvent confirm, comme dans son avis du 12 juillet 1973 o vous affirmez : il est de lessence des dcisions judiciaires dtre motives6 (Demande de rformation du jugement no 158 du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, avis consultatif CIJ Recueil 1973, p. 210, par. 94). Enfin, faut-il rappeler larticle 95, paragraphe 1, du Rglement de la Cour qui exige notamment que larrt comprenne les motifs de droit7. 10. Dailleurs, la Thalande rend sans doute involontairement service au Cambodge lorsquelle cite laffaire entre le Nicaragua et la Colombie, dj mentionne par le Cambodge 8, pour dmontrer que lutilisation des motifs ne sert que pour comprendre ce que la Cour a dcid, car le Cambodge est parfaitement en accord avec ce constat et ne demande rien dautre. En effet, larrt du 4 mai 2011 concernant la demande dintervention du Honduras est limpide. Si, dans le paragraphe 69, votre Cour indique que le dispositif est incontestablement revtu de lautorit de chose juge (Voir Diffrend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie), requte du Honduras fin dintervention, arrt du 4 mai 2011, par. 69) ; dans le paragraphe 70 de ce mme arrt que la Thalande cite dune manire tronque9 , votre Cour mentionne que les motifs qui figurent dans larrt de 2007 constituent le support ncessaire du dispositif de cet arrt, puis mentionne les points quelle a dvelopps dans ces motifs dune manire prcise, faisant comprendre au requrant quils sont clairs, avant de conclure : [Document n 18 lcran] Sans cet expos des motifs, il pourrait tre difficile de comprendre pourquoi la Cour na pas fix, dans son arrt, de point terminal. Compte tenu de ces motifs, la dcision laquelle la Cour est parvenue dans son arrt de 2007 ne se prte aucune autre interprtation. (Voir ibid., par. 70 ; les italiques sont de nous.)

Pour le juge Higgins, la motivation est une phase essentielle du processus judiciaire ( Licit de la menace ou de lemploi darmes nuclaires, avis consultatif, CIJ Recueil 1996, opinion dissidente du juge Higgins, p. 584, par. 9). G. Guyomar indique ce propos : les motifs permettent de prciser aussi exactement que possible le sens et la porte du dispositif, op cit, p. 601.
8 9 7

Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, p. 66, par. 4.34. Voir FWE, 21 juin 2012, vol. I, par. 3.35.

- 15 11. Cest parfaitement et exactement ce que le Cambodge souhaite et indique dans la prsente requte, savoir que sans lexpos des motifs, pour reprendre lexpression, il pourrait tre difficile de comprendre ce quest le territoire sur lequel le temple est situ et ce que sont les environs du temple, et que compte tenu de ces motifs, la dcision prise en 1962 dans son dispositif ne se prte, selon le Cambodge, aucune autre interprtation. Mais surtout, votre Cour dmontre ainsi sans aucune ambigut quune dcision ne simpose et ne sexplique dans un dispositif que si elle est soutenue par des motifs qui la justifient et qui, par voie de consquence, simposent aux parties pour comprendre le sens exact du dispositif. Les motifs deviennent

obligatoires non pas parce quils sont res judicata, mais parce quils sont indispensables la comprhension du dispositif10. 12. Ceci nest dailleurs pas rcent dans la jurisprudence de votre Cour depuis votre avis dans laffaire du Service postal polonais Dantzig11. Cest sans doute pour cette raison que la Thalande semble vouloir ignorer des dcisions de votre Cour que le Cambodge a dj rappeles, et dans lesquelles celle-ci explique clairement et simplement limportance des motifs essentiels dun arrt pour son interprtation. A cet gard, le Cambodge permet de rappeler une citation concernant laffaire de la demande en interprtation entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria : Toute demande en interprtation doit porter sur le dispositif de l arrt et ne peut concerner les motifs que dans la mesure o ceux-ci sont insparables du dispositif.12

Comme lexplique S. Rosenne propos de notre affaire : The Temple of PreahVihear (Merits) case illustrates that the operative provision of a judgment may also, where appropriate, contain, in addition to its main finding, consequential dispositions even if the relevant submission was not expressly made in the original claim, provided that the addition is implicit in and consequential upon a finding in favour of a partys principal claim and is not an extension of the subject of the original claim, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005, vol. III, p. 1531-1532. Toutes les parties dun jugement visant les points en litige sexpliquent et se compltent lune et lautre et doivent tre prises en considration, afin dtablir la porte et le sens prcis du dispositif. ( Service postal polonais Dantzig, avis consultatif, 1925, C.P.J.I. srie B no 11, p. 30. Cit dans Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, p. 65, par. 4.32. Demande en interprtation de larrt du 11 juin 1998 en laffaire de la Frontire terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigria (Cameroun c. Nigria) (Nigria c. Cameroun), exceptions prliminaires, arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 35, par. 10. Cit dans Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, p. 66, par. 4.34. On retrouve une affirmation similaire dans laffaire de la Demande en interprtation de larrt du 31 mars 2004 en laffaire Avena et autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Etats-Unis dAmrique) (Mexique c. Etats-Unis dAmrique) : Une demande en interprtation doit se rapporter une contestation entre les parties sur le sens et la porte du dispositif de larrt et ne peut concerner les motifs que dans la mesure o ceux-ci sont insparables du dispositif. (Mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 16 juillet 2008, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 323, par. 47.) Cit dans Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, p. 66, par. 4.34).
12 11

10

- 16 Enfin, faut-il galement rappeler que cest exactement ce que dit votre Cour dans lordonnance du 18 juillet 2011 dans la prsente affaire : il est constant quune contestation au sens de larticle 60 du Statut doit porter sur le dispositif de larrt en cause et ne peut concerner les motifs que dans la mesure o ceux-ci sont insparables du dispositif (Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, par. 23). Il est en revanche dommage de constater que la Thalande ignore totalement, et balaye dun trait de plume13, la jurisprudence des tribunaux arbitraux et de toutes les autres juridictions internationales cites par le Cambodge14 qui, unanimement, donnent aux motifs la valeur que votre Cour leur accorde depuis lorigine. Sans doute la Thalande prfre-t-elle ignorer ce mouvement gnral dans la procdure, initi par votre Cour15, qui devient un vritable principe commun toutes les juridictions internationales lorsquelles sont confrontes une question dinterprtation de leur dcision. 13. La doctrine semble galement pleinement en accord avec ce constat de bon sens. Dans un excellent manuel franais de droit international, on peut ainsi lire propos de la porte dun arrt de la Cour : Il est obligatoire et dfinitif et jouit de lautorit relative de la chose juge Cette force juridique sattache indiscutablement au dispositif de larrt. On admet quelle bnficie galement aux lments de lexpos des motifs qui sont indispensables pour justifier le dispositif.16 Il en ressort que cest bien la Cour qui dcide ce qui est obligatoire et indispensable la lecture et la comprhension dun arrt en fonction de limportance quelle accorde aux motifs qui soutiennent le dispositif. 14. En ralit, la Thalande souhaite surtout insinuer quun arrt serait compos de partie s distinctes sans lien les unes avec les autres. Autrement dit, la Cour dvelopperait une motivation, puis passerait sa dcision, au dispositif, sans quun lien puisse tre tabli entre ces deux aspects.

13 14

Voir FWE, par. 3.33.

Voir Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, vol. 1, p. 67 71, par. 4.36 4.46. Ce passage citait des exemples de sentences arbitrales, de dcisions de la Cour de Justice de lUnion europenne, de la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme ou de la Cour interamricaine des droits de lhomme.
15 Ainsi, par exemple, dans ses conclusions sous laffaire Assider c. Haute Autorit CECA, lavocat gnral Lagrange sest trs largement fond sur larrt en interprtation de la Cour permanente dans laffaire de lUsine de Chorzow. : 5/55, Rec. C.J.C.E. 1954-1955, p. 290.

P. Daillier, M. Forteau, A. Pellet : Droit international public, LGDJ, Paris, 8me dition, 2009, op cit, par. 547, p. 1005 ( la deuxime phrase, les italiques sont de nous).

16

- 17 Il nen est bien sr rien, mais cest sans doute pour cette raison que la Thalande ragit aussi vivement17 la manire dont le Cambodge explique la liaison entre les motifs et le dispositif travers des expressions doctrinales telles que motifs dcisoires ou dispositif implicite. En lespce, la Thalande feint de croire que le Cambodge aurait cr de nouvelles catgories juridiques alors quil ne sagit que de lexpression doctrinale dune certaine ralit. Cest laffaire de la doctrine et non de la Cour de synthtiser des ralits juridiques, et il ny a pas lieu de sen mouvoir ni, a fortiori, de dnoncer une rvolution juridique alors quil ne sagit que de symboliser une ralit prgnante et incontestable : la liaison entre les motifs essentiels dune dcision et le dispositif qui en dcoule. 15. Quoi quil en soit, il ne sagit nullement de crer de nouveaux droits travers cette analyse contrairement ce que prtend la Thalande18, mais simplement de signifier que la Cour peut reconnatre des droits qui prexistent laffaire pour les insrer dans son raisonnement, et cest bien ce quelle a fait en lespce : elle ne cre rien, elle reconnat la validit de ce qui a antrieurement t cr, savoir une frontire tablie sur une carte accepte par les deux Parties. 16. La Thalande semble ainsi signifier que la Cour ne peut voluer, quelle doit rester fige dans un schma immuable. Que la Thalande le veuille ou non, le monde bouge et la jurisprudence de la Cour dmontre une remarquable adaptation aux volutions du droit et de la manire de le comprendre et de lappliquer. Mais, en lespce, le Cambodge ne provoque aucune innovation juridique : il ne dit pas que les motifs sont res judicata, il dit que certains motifs comportent des obligations pour les Parties simplement parce que la Cour ne fait que reconnatre une obligation prexistante sa dcision, obligation qui va sinsrer dans la dcision quelle prendra. En outre, la prise en compte de ces obligations prexistantes, quelle que soit la nature de celles-ci, est indispensable la lecture et la comprhension du dispositif. Il sagit du ratio decidendi au sens de la raison essentielle de dcider. Si lacte de juger est bien celui de dcider dun rsultat, cela est la consquence de dcisions prises au cours du processus de motivation pour aboutir ce rsultat. Sans doute la Thalande confond entre les dcisions et la chose juge, tout comme elle

17 18

Voir FWE, par. 3.21-3.25. Voir FWE, par. 3.22.

- 18 -

confond entre la raison de dcider et la dcision finale : si la chose juge est la dcision ultime, ce nest pas la dcision unique. 17. Cest exactement le sens quil faut donner lexpression autorit de chose dcide l aussi conteste par la Thalande19, que lon peut dailleurs rapprocher de ce qui fut qualifi de motifs dcisoires. Le Cambodge na jamais affirm quil sagissait dune chose juge mais simplement dcide, cest--dire que la Cour reconnat dcide comme valable une obligation prexistante entre les parties. Une nouvelle fois, il ne sagit en aucun cas de crer des droits nouveaux mais, au contraire, de reconnatre ceux existants. 18. Des auteurs ont consacr des travaux la question de Lautorit de la chose dcide, et notamment en droit international20. Leur propos tait bien sr plus large et mme diffrent de laffaire qui nous occupe. Nanmoins, ils ncartent pas lhypothse de la jurisprudence de votre Cour, notamment en estimant que les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires ont toujours t revtues de cette autorit de chose dcide21, avant que votre Cour naffirme dans larrt LaGrand le caractre obligatoire de celles-ci22. Cet arrt permet par ailleurs votre Cour de prciser certains aspects juridiques nouveaux car, comme elle lindique, elle navait jamais t saisie des effets juridiques de ces ordonnances auparavant23. 19. Replac dans le cadre de notre affaire, que cela veut-il dire ? Que la Cour possde non seulement un pouvoir implicite mais au surplus inhrent dinterprter tous les faits et tous les traits qui se prsentent elle dans une affaire et de constituer ses motifs selon le choix quelle opre ; que ces motifs reprsentent une suite de dcisions dans lobjectif de parvenir une solution ; que chaque dcision prise dans ce cadre possde bien une autorit qui, sinon, ne permettrait pas de parvenir lautorit finale de la chose juge contenue dans le dispositif. Ds lors, le Cambodge ne dit pas que les motifs possdent lautorit de chose juge, mais quils possdent bien, par les

19 20

Voir notamment FWE, par. 3.21 et 3.22.

Herv Ascensio : Lautorit de la chose dcide en droit international, thse dactylographie, Universit Paris X-Nanterre, 4 dcembre 1997, 690 pages. Voir aussi : Roger Grard Schwartzenberg, Lautorit de la chose dcide, LGDJ, Paris, 1969, 452 pages.
21 22

Herv Ascensio, ibid., p. 313-314. LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis dAmrique), arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 498-506, par. 92-109.

23 A ce jour, ni la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ni la prsente Cour n'ont t appeles se prononcer sur les effets juridiques des ordonnances qu'elles ont rendues en vertu de l'article 41 du Statut. (Ibid., par. 98).

- 19 dcisions et interprtations quils impliquent dans le raisonnement de la Cour, lautorit dune chose dcide au sein de votre Cour pour parvenir lautorit de chose juge du dispositif qui, dfaut, se trouverait priv de fondements. On ne passe pas impunment du non-droit au droit, du facultatif lobligatoire. Les nuances sont plus fines et toute dcision prparatoire un jugement final ne peut tre carte sous prtexte quelle est en amont du dispositif final car, en aval, cest--dire lorsquil est ncessaire de confronter larrt la ralit, elle redevient indispensable. 20. A dfaut, cela voudrait dire que la Cour raisonne par ttonnements, par intuitions, autrement dit dune manire inductive avant que la dcision finale ne soit prise, ce qui est dailleurs lopinion que la Thalande se fait du travail de la Cour comme nous le verrons (voir ci-dessous VI). Or, la dcision nest jamais prise de cette manire, elle est taye, justifie, base sur un raisonnement construit partir de certitudes, et non de ttonnements ou dhsitations . Que les fondations napparaissent plus quand la maison est finie est logique. Il nempche quil a bien fallu ces fondations pour btir les murs, et que, sans celles-ci, la maison scroulerait. 21. Contrairement ce que sous-entend la Thalande, ceci na rien de rcent, ni de rvolutionnaire. Le Cambodge souhaite cet gard rappeler que dans laffaire de l Interprtation des arrts no 7 et 8 (Usine de Chorzw), la Cour permanente indiquait : [Document no 19 lcran] Cela ne veut pas dire quil doive tre incontest que le point dont le sens prte discussion regarde une partie de larrt ayant force obligatoire. Une divergence de vues, si tel ou tel point a t dcid avec force obligatoire, constitue, elle aussi, un cas qui rentre dans le cadre de la disposition en question, et la Cour ne pourrait se soustraire lobligation dinterprter larrt dans la mesure ncessaire pour pouvoir se prononcer sur pareille divergence. (Interprtation des arrts nos 7 et 8 (usine de Chorzw), arrt no 11, 1927, C.P.J.I. srie A no 13, p. 11-12.) (Les italiques sont de nous.)24 Le point qui mrite particulirement dtre soulign est que la Cour permanente distingue la partie ayant force obligatoire, autrement dit autorit de chose juge ou res judicata, des points dcid[s] avec force obligatoire qui concernent clairement des aspects contenus dans les motifs de larrt. Il apparat donc, pour la Cour permanente, que votre juridiction peut prendre des dcisions ayant force obligatoire dans les motifs, dcisions qui mriteront ventuellement dtre claires et qui soutiennent la partie ayant autorit de chose juge. On peut donc les qualifier de
24

Cit dans Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, p. 65, par. 4.33.

- 20 motifs ayant lautorit de chose dcide. Mme lopinion dissidente du juge Anzilotti dans la mme affaire ne va pas lencontre dune telle vision puisquil pouvait affirmer : [Document n 20 dans le dossier des juges] En disant que seul le dispositif de larrt est obligatoire, je nentends pas dire que seulement ce qui est matriellement crit dans le dispositif constitue la dcision de la Cour. Il est certain, par contre, quil est presque toujours ncessaire davoir recours aux motifs pour bien comprendre le dispositif et surtout pour dterminer la causa petendi. Mais, en tout tat de cause, cest le dispositif qui contient la dcision obligatoire de la Cour et qui, partant, peut faire lobjet dune demande en interprtation. (Interprtation des arrts nos 7 et 8 (usine de Chorzw), arrt no 11, 1927, C.P.J.I. srie A no 13, opinion dissidente du juge Anzilotti.) (Les italiques sont de nous.) 22. Ce que la Thalande semble finalement nier, cest la libert pour le juge de choisir ses motifs, et l aussi la Thalande feint de mal comprendre. Dans sa rponse25, le Cambodge signifiait simplement que la Cour avait choisi, dans son arrt de 1962, de mettre en avant la carte de lannexe 1 comme tant un lment pertinent et primordial pour sa dcision, et non quelle avait la libert de choisir nimporte quel motif. 23. Or, la Cour a bien fait le choix de mettre en avant la carte de lannexe 1 comme lment pertinent et primordial. Contrairement ce que laisse comprendre la Thalande qui indique que : La carte de lannexe 1 est elle-mme soumise interprtation26, le Cambodge ne prtend pas que la carte doit tre interprte, il dit que pour interprter le dispositif et savoir en quoi consiste le territoire du Cambodge et o sarrtent les environs, il fallait tenir compte de la carte qui, dans les motifs, explique la dcision de la Cour. La Thalande cre ainsi une confusion permanente en essayant de faire croire que cest la carte qui doit tre interprte et quelle se trouverait ainsi au centre de cette interprtation, alors que le Cambodge ne souhaite, une fois de plus, quindiquer la Cour les lments quelle a elle-mme considrs comme tant une donne indispensable pour rpondre la question qui lui tait pose en 1962. La carte est une donne qui sinsre dans un raisonnement, elle na pas en elle-mme tre interprte, cest bien le raisonnement global qui doit ltre.

25 26

Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, par. 4.14 4.18. Voir FWE : annexe 1 map is itself subject to interpretation, par. 3.33.

- 21 24. Tout comme le Cambodge ne demande pas que soit interprte la carte de lannexe 1, il ne demande pas non plus que soit interprte la frontire qui en dcoule. Au risque de paratre rptitif, il faut rappeler que la Cour reconnat mais ne cre pas en 1962 une frontire qui existe dj et que les deux Parties ont dj accepte. Ds lors, il nest pas ncessaire de disserter sur le caractre obligatoire de la ligne frontalire ou de la carte qui y est associe (qui possde pour cette dernire, comme lindique la Cour en 1962, un caractre conventionnel) puisque dj en 1962 la Cour les considrait comme tablis. Et puisque la Thalande aime les statistiques, il est

ncessaire de rappeler que, dans ses motifs, la Cour en 1962 utilise plus de 120 fois le mot frontire
27

et quelle cite une vingtaine de fois la carte de lannexe 128. Cest une affaire

entendue et les chiffres parlent deux-mmes. En revanche, elle fait bien peu de cas des autres motifs dont la Thalande cherche nous dmontrer quils auraient t prpondrants comme nous le verrons (voir ci-dessus par. 43). 25. Pour dmontrer limportance fondamentale de la question de la frontire et de la carte de lannexe 1 dans le raisonnement de la Cour en 1962, il est tout simplement possible de se reporter au rsum sous forme de lignes directrices publi par la Cour elle-mme sous lautorit et avec lautorisation de son prsident en tte de larrt. En lespce, len-tte de larrt du

15 juin 196229 est particulirement significatif. Vous lavez maintenant sur vos crans. [Document n 9 lcran] Souverainet territoriale Titre dcoulant dune convention -- Dispositions conventionnelles tablissant la frontire sur une ligne de partage des eaux dlimiter par une commission mixte des Parties - Caractre incertain de la dlimitation opre en consquence dans la zone conteste - Etablissement dune carte par les experts de lune des Parties la demande de lautre - Caractre non obligatoire de la carte au moment o elle a t dresse - Acceptation ultrieure par conduite, de la part de lautre Partie, de la carte et de la frontire qui y est indique - Effet juridique du silence impliquant consentement - Prtendue non-concordance entre la frontire de la carte et la vritable ligne de partage des eaux - Acceptation du risque derreurs -- Conduite ultrieure confirmant lacceptation initiale et empchant de la contester - Effets des traits ultrieurs confirmant les frontires existantes et prouvant le dsir des Parties davoir des frontires stables et dfinitives - Interprtation du rglement conventionnel considr dans son ensemble, y compris la carte.

Le terme frontire apparat 128 fois dans les motifs selon le dcompte du Cambodge (ce qui inclut les conclusions des Parties).
28 29

27

Vingt-trois fois en dehors des conclusions daprs le dcompte du Cambodge. Temple de Prah Vihar (Cambodge c. Thalande), fond, arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 6.

- 22 Sans devoir le rpter, len-tte, qui synthtise larrt venir, ne laisse aucune ambigut sur le sens de son raisonnement. Elle y mentionne notamment lacceptation par les Parties de la carte de lannexe 1 et de la frontire, la conduite subsquente qui empche de contester une telle position, mais surtout quelle va procder linterprtation du rglement conventionnel considr dans son ensemble y compris la carte. Il est symptomatique de remarquer que ce rsum qui ne mentionne mme pas le temple est entirement consacr ce qui sera le motif essentiel de sa dcision. Il ne semble pas au Cambodge que ceci ncessite des commentaires supplmentaires, ce rsum parlant de lui-mme. 26. Le Cambodge ne demande donc pas la Cour dans la prsente instance quelle dtermine une frontire mais quelle dise que les environs du temple situs en territoire cambodgien correspondent bien la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 selon une interprtation tenant compte de leffet utile entendu au sens dune interprtation qui puisse recevoir une application effective que lon doit donner au dispositif de larrt de 1962. Ce nest donc pas une dlimitation mais cest bien une interprtation qui est demande. 27. En sparant strictement les motifs du dispositif, la Thalande ne parvient finalement pas combler le chanon manquant de son raisonnement, tout comme, en 1962, ses contradictions taient apparues aux juges. Elle explique ainsi que la Cour a considr en 1962 quil ntait pas ncessaire de dfinir ce qutait le territoire du Cambodge et donc les environs du temple pour la comprhension et lexcution de larrt30, et que la dlimitation de la frontire ntait donc pas ncessaire pour ladoption et lexcution de larrt31. Ceci parat assez

extraordinaire car cela revient admettre que la Cour, en 1962, dit quil existe un territoire cambodgien sur lequel se trouve le temple, mais estime inutile de dire o sont les limites de ce territoire pour la comprhension et lexcution de larrt. Pourquoi la Cour resterait -elle ainsi au milieu du gu dans un inconfort la fois pour elle et surtout pour les Parties ? Cela reviendrait synthtiser la dcision de la Cour de cette manire simplifie. En substance, elle aurait dit au Cambodge : Le temple est vous, vous avez un territoire sur lequel se trouve le temple, mais on ne vous dit pas quelles sont les limites de ce territoire. En ralit, la Cour a estim que ce

30 31

Voir FEW : understand and implement the Judgment, par. 3.53. Voir FEW : the adoption and the implentation of the Judgment, par. 3.53.

- 23 territoire tait dj dlimit et quil ntait pas ncessaire de le prciser, ce qui semble au Cambodge tre linterprtation la plus plausible et surtout la plus conforme lattachement que la Cour porte la stabilit et lintgrit des territoires tatiques dans sa jurisprudence. En aucun cas la Cour ne peut avoir laiss les Parties dans lincertitude. Dcoulent de cette liaison entre les motifs et le dispositif plusieurs consquences. III. Limpossibilit dune dfinition unilatrale dune frontire lencontre des motifs 28. Cest la premire consquence. En 1962, juste aprs larrt, la Thalande dcide

unilatralement de dfinir la limite de son territoire proximit immdiate du temple et le fait dune manire minimaliste en interprtant le dispositif. Sans quaucune justification juridique napparaisse, elle affirme aujourdhui de nouveau que le Gouvernement thalandais a d dcider lui-mme des limites desquelles retirer ses troupes32. Do la rsolution du conseil des ministres et la pose des barbels qui sen suivirent. Comme mes collgues ont pu le noter ce matin, le dispositif de larrt de 1962 ntait alors pas clair comme de leau de roche pour la Thalande et ceci ressort trs nettement des hsitations et interprtations discutes par la Thalande en 1962. Linterprtation unilatrale faite par la Thalande est aujourdhui prsente comme vidente, a lors quelle prouve au contraire la confusion entre plusieurs options et les incertitudes sur linterprtation de larrt de 1962. 29. Ce qui apparat surtout clairement, cest la triple mprise de la Thalande dans ce processus. Premirement, elle ne sait comment interprter le dispositif de larrt. Deuximement, elle dcide finalement de fixer unilatralement une limite sans aucune concertation avec le Cambodge, ce qui semble tre la violation dune rgle lmentaire et immuable : une frontire se fixe pour le moins deux, sauf bien sr en cas de conqute ou de domination impriale, mais ce temps est rvolu et le processus devant la Cour navait certainement pas cet objectif. Troisimement, la Thalande fixe cette limite lencontre des motifs de larrt, ce qui est contraire linterprtation la plus lmentaire de larrt de 1962. Ds lors, quelle est la comptence dun Etat pour dfinir unilatralement la limite dun territoire sur la base dun arrt qui dit autre chose et
32 Voir FEW : the Thai government had to decide itself the limits of troop withdrawal, par. 1.13. Ce qui nempche pas la Thalande destimer quil est inimaginable for a State to be required to unilaterally demarcate a boundary (FEW, par. 3.57).

- 24 sans consulter lautre Etat ? A cette interrogation majeure, la Thalande napporte aucune rponse crdible. 30. La Thalande semble juste nous expliquer quil ne sagirait finalement pas dune frontire mais dune simple limite correspondant la ligne au-del de laquelle les troupes doivent se retirer, et ceci parce que la frontire resterait dlimiter dans le processus de laccord sign en 2000 avec le Cambodge, comme mon collgue sir Franklin la indiqu ce matin. Outre quil y aura lieu de revenir sur le sens de cet accord que la Thalande falsifie en permanence (voir ci-dessous, par. 37 39), et qui nest aucunement un accord visant dlimiter une frontire, elle nexplique toujours pas pourquoi elle trace cette limite dune manire contraire aux motifs de larrt, ni comment un Etat peut unilatralement et sans concertation dterminer une telle limite, mme provisoire, dont elle entend bien faire en ralit une frontire. En effet, comment ne pas y voir une vritable ligne frontalire dans la volont de la Thalande de limposer tout prix en dpit de ses dngations33 ? Comment envisager que la fameuse pancarte pose par la Thalande pour signifier cette limite aurait t symbolique34 ? Autrement dit, comment imaginer quon ne se trouvait pas dans un autre Etat derrire cette pancarte ? 31. Dans lavis consultatif du 9 juillet 2004 propos des Consquences juridiques de ldification dun mur dans le territoire palestinien occup, votre Cour est confronte la question dune barrire provisoire qui ressemble fortement une frontire. Et, tout en notant les assurances donnes sur le caractre temporaire de la construction de ce mur, votre Cour indique : la Cour ne saurait pour autant rester indiffrente certaines craintes exprimes devant elle daprs lesquelles le trac du mur prjugerait la frontire future entre Isral et la Palestine, et la crainte quIsral pourrait intgrer les colonies de peuplement et les voies de circulation les desservant. La Cour estime que la construction du mur et le rgime qui lui est associ crent sur le terrain un fait accompli qui pourrait fort bien devenir permanent, auquel cas, et nonobstant la description officielle quIsral donne du mur, la construction de celui-ci quivaudrait une annexion de facto. (C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 184, par. 121 ; les italiques sont de nous.) Le Cambodge, dans un contexte certes trs diffrent, pouvait galement craindre que la barrire de barbels difie par la Thalande ne constitue de facto une annexion dune partie de son territoire et ne symbolise une frontire plus quune simple sparation.

33 34

Voir FWE, par. 3.58. Ibid., par. 3.59.

- 25 -

32. Le mystre demeure par consquent et il serait logique que la Thalande puisse nous expliquer en vertu de quel raisonnement juridique elle peut ignorer les motifs de larrt et les remplacer par ses propres motifs ? Puisque la Cour dit que la frontire a dj t accepte avant 1962, naurait-il pas t logique, simple et surtout conforme au droit de dcider le retrait des troupes des environs du temple jusqu cette ligne ? Contrairement ce que prtend la Thalande, le Cambodge ne dit pas quen 1962, la question pose tait celle de la frontire ; il dit que pour rpondre la question de lappartenance du temple, il fallait savoir o passe la frontire, quil sagit bien du principal point dbattu dans les motifs de larrt, et que ceci ne peut tre ignor par la Thalande, alors quelle prtend appliquer larrt selon ce que la Cour ne dit pas et ignore ce quelle dit. Il y a donc bien, pour le moins, un problme dinterprtation de larrt. 33. En clair et dune manire synthtique, la Thalande refuse de prendre en compte la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 comme frontire alors que la Cour ly oblige par le caractre obligatoire quelle donne la reconnaissance de cette limite dans ses motifs, mais se trouve galement dans lincapacit de justifier lautre ligne quelle choisit, si ce nest au regard de son chec dans larrt de 1962 puisque, en dehors du temple lui-mme, elle dfinit bien cette limite selon ce quelle souhaite obtenir en 1962. Or, parmi les solutions que votre Cour peut adopter, il est certain que la Thalande ne peut obtenir comme elle le souhaite, comme elle semble le souhaiter, sur la base de votre interprtation, la ligne dfinie par le conseil des ministres thalandais en 1962 puisque cette ligne va lencontre des motifs de larrt. Comment votre Cour pourrait -elle, sur la base de la seule interprtation du dispositif de larrt, dcider que la ligne frontalire unilatralement dfinie par la Thalande selon ce quelle souhaite obtenir en 1962 et quelle na pas obtenue puisse tre reconnue comme dcoulant de larrt ? Ceci est impossible et cest pour le moins une certitude qui dmontre cependant quel point la Thalande adopte un raisonnement en dehors de la ralit.

IV. La ngation de la similitude entre conflit territorial et conflit frontalier 34. Jen viens une autre consquence, la question de la ngation de la similitude entre conflit territorial et conflit frontalier. Dans son supplment dinformation, la Thalande fait une nouvelle tentative pour sparer strictement un conflit dattribution de territoires dun conflit de dlimitation ou frontalier. En effet, la Thalande cherche dmontrer de nombreuses reprises la

- 26 restriction de larrt de 1962 au seul diffrend35 concernant la souverainet sur le temple, donc un litige sur la souverainet territoriale et non sur la dlimitation des frontires36. 35. Le Cambodge se doit de rpter une nouvelle fois, comme il lavait mentionn dans ses observations crites37, quil ne prtend pas modifier le sens du diffrend en 1962, et quil ne prtend pas quil sagissait alors dun diffrend uniquement frontalier. Ce que le Cambodge affirme en revanche, et ceci lappui dune jurisprudence de votre Cour qui reste superbement ignore par la Thalande, cest que la nature du diffrend ne modifie pas pratiquement le rsultat concret auquel on peut parvenir. Un diffrend portant sur la dlimitation dune frontire dbouche directement sur la fixation de cette frontire, mais un diffrend portant sur lattribution de territoires dbouche immanquablement galement sur ltablissement ou la reconnaissance dune limite. Sans doute peut-on tablir une distinction qui portera sur la manire dont le juge va tablir sa mthode, mais non sur le rsultat concret auquel on parviendra. A dfaut, cela signifierait que le juge attribue des territoires sans dfinir de limites ces territoires, ce qui ne manquerait pas de trancher un litige dune manire imparfaite, renvoyant les parties la plus grande incertitude lissue dun arrt. 36. La jurisprudence de votre Cour oublie par la Thalande ne cesse de rappeler logiquement ce constat de bon sens et la concidence des rsultats entre les deux types de contentieux. A cet gard, le Cambodge se contentera de rappeler la phrase pertinente de larrt de votre Cour dans l'affaire du Diffrend frontalier : [Document no 21 lcran] leffet dune dcision judiciaire, quelle soit rendue dans un conflit dattribution territoriale ou dans un conflit de dlimitation, est ncessairement dtablir une frontire (Diffrend frontalier (Burkina Faso/Rpublique du Mali), arrt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 563, par. 17) (les italiques sont de nous)38. En lespce, la Thalande semble soffusquer que le Cambodge puisse prtendre que la Cour sest proccupe de savoir o passait la frontire pour dfinir qui appartenait la zone en litige sur

35 36 37 38

Voir FWE, par. 2.28 notamment. Ibid., par. 2.29. Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, , par. 4.67 4.73. Cit dans Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, par. 4.69.

- 27 laquelle se trouvait le temple39, mais ceci ne signifie pas quelle ne dfinira pas la zone en question mais que, dans le processus, cela lamne sintresser la frontire pour en faire dcouler la zone. 37. Au surplus, la Thalande prtend non seulement que le Cambodge ramne ceci un unique conflit frontalier, mais galement que le Cambodge souhaite ainsi tendre son territoire la suite du classement du temple au patrimoine mondial de lUnesco40. Or, il sagit bien dune inversion de lhistoire puisque les agressions armes thalandaises reprennent justement ce moment-l, cest--dire partir du classement officiel du temple de Prah-Vihar en 2008. Ds lors, comment accuser le Cambodge de vouloir tendre son territoire si on envahit soi-mme le territoire du Cambodge ? Etrange argument une fois de plus puisque cela voudrait dire que la Thalande se rend compte, dun seul coup, que le Cambodge exerait paisiblement sa souverainet sur une portion de territoire que la Thalande considre dsormais comme tant le sien. Chacun laura compris, en ralit, le Cambodge, lors de ce classement du temple au patrimoine mondial de lUnesco, ne fait quexercer sa comptence souveraine sur son propre territoire, ce qui ntait pas contest par la Thalande auparavant. Mais il est galement ais de remarquer que la question du classement du temple au patrimoine de lUnesco est finalement trs peu aborde par la Thalande, comme si cet Etat souhaitait faire oublier ses drives dans ce cadre pourtant lorigine de la requte du Cambodge et de la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires. Il est vrai que dans la tentative de cohrence des arguments de la Thalande, il sagit dpisodes quelle prfre oublier. V. La vritable signification de laccord du 14 juin 2000 38. Cest une autre consquence. Comme ceci a pu tre signal par mon collgue

Rodman Bundy, pour parvenir ses fins, la Thalande doit travestir la signification pourtant claire de laccord du 14 juin 2000 entre les deux Etats propos de leur frontire commune41. Alors quil sagit dun accord portant sur la dmarcation de la frontire, la Thalande insinue quil sagirait

39 40 41

Voir FWE, par. 4.88 notamment. Voir ibid., par. 5.5.

La Thalande semble en outre considrer le Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) du 14 juin 2000 uniquement dans le cadre de questions connexes comme la question de la pollution, de lextension dun march, de limplantation de la population, etc, mais vite de mentionner lobjectif essentiel de cet accord qui est la dmarcation de la frontire. Voir FWE, par. 3.75.

- 28 dun accord sur la dlimitation de la frontire. La manuvre est certes grossire, mais elle est rpte plusieurs reprises dans lobjectif de crer une confusion en assimilant les deux oprations42, et surtout dans lobjectif de convaincre que la frontire reste dlimiter, alors quil sagit juste de la dmarquer. 39. Quelle est finalement la signification que la Thalande donne cet accord ? Celui dun accord qui viendrait dlimiter la frontire comme si aucun acte juridique navait exist avant 2000 dans ce cadre, et surtout comme si la Cour navait effectu aucun constat sur cette frontire dans son arrt de 1962. Ainsi, la Thalande estime que sil existe un conflit frontalier, l accord du 14 juin 2000 doit sappliquer et que la Cour ne peut sy substituer43. 40. Dcidment, la Thalande a bien du mal reconstituer sa propre histoire, y compris rcente. La Thalande oublie en effet que cet accord est intervenu dans un contexte paisible, au moment o la Thalande acceptait la manire par le Cambodge de comprendre larrt de 1962, autrement dit, au moment o la Thalande se trouvait en dehors du primtre dlimit par la frontire de la carte de lannexe 1. Cet accord, comme on le sait, mentionne la prise en compte des cartes rsultant du processus entre 1904 et 1907, et prcisment les cartes au 1/200 000 parmi lesquelles figure la carte de lannexe 144. Mais, sans doute pour parer une contradiction sur ce point, la Thalande affirme galement que le Cambodge aurait rejet le processus de cet accord en 200745, ce qui na aucun fondement, les procs-verbaux des runions successives prouvant quil nen est rien. Simplement, le Cambodge devait attendre chaque fois que les organes i nternes thalandais approuvent chaque communiqu, ce qui, telle lArlsienne, ne venait jamais en raison de dissensions internes ou dune volont de bloquer le processus. Chaque runion servait

finalement constater que le processus tait bloqu faute de cet aval interne, et cest donc bien la

42 Voir FWE, notamment au paragraphe 3.76, la Thalande induit en erreur en indiquant la boundary delimitation and demarcation contenue dans le MoU alors quil ne sagit que de dmarcation. Idem au paragraphe 3.79 o elle affirme quelle est prte engager in good faith des ngociations avec le Cambodge for the delimitation and demarcation of the whole boundary. Au paragraphe 4.83, la Thalande raffirme que le MoU est un accord de dlimitation qui doit dterminer lintgralit de la frontire (fixing the entire boundary). Aux paragraphes 3.88 et 3.89, si la Thalande reconnat un diffrend frontalier avec le Cambodge, elle estime que ceci sera rgl dans le cadre du MoU. Au paragraphe 5.4, la Thalande affirme de nouveau que la dlimitation doit tre faite par le MoU. 43

Voir ibid., par. 3.88.

44 Article 1 du Memorandum of Undestanding, et article 1.1.3 des Terms of Reference and Master Plan for the Joint Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Kingdom of Thailand. Voir annexe VI de la Requte du Royaume du Cambodge, 28 avril 2011. 45

Voir FEW, par. 4.83.

- 29 -

Thalande qui, ragissant ce qui fut probablement considr comme une erreur, a fait en sorte que le processus nvolue pas. La Thalande ne dit rien sur les raisons pour lesquelles la procdure trane depuis plus de dix ans en attendant un soi-disant aval de son parlement qui ne vient jamais, ni comment le pouvoir civil ne semble ne pas pouvoir contrler le pouvoir militaire quasi autonome dans la rgion du temple. Cette situation semble malheureusement se reproduire pour lapplication de la zone dmilitarise provisoire impose par votre Cour dans son ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011, comme lagent du Cambodge la indiqu. 41. Il est vrai que cet accord prsente bien des problmes pour la Thalande car il se prsente comme la suite logique de larrt de 1962 conformment linterprtation que le Cambodge en donne. Au surplus, laccord lui-mme ne fait pas allusion la carte unilatrale de la Thalande de 2007 refltant la position de son conseil des ministres en 1962. La fameuse carte L7017

[document no 13 dans votre dossier] dont la Thalande nous dit quelle prexiste laccord puisquelle daterait de 1978 et aurait t donne au Cambodge en 200546 , mais dont le Cambodge na eu connaissance quen 2007, nest pas mentionne dans laccord du 14 juin 2000. Voil qui est trange, alors que les cartes au 1/200 000 dont celle qui fut qualifie dannexe 1 devant votre Cour figurent bien dans la liste des cartes pertinentes de cet accord. Il serait ncessaire que la Thalande nous explique et cest une question claire et prcise que le Cambodge pose directement la Thalande en esprant une rponse lors de la suite de ces plaidoiries comment cette carte qui reflte selon elle sa position constante et qui aurait t tablie ds 1978, donc vingt-deux ans avant la signature de laccord de 2000, ne figure pas dans cet accord ? Pour le moins, la Thalande aurait d sen apercevoir si sa revendication avait t aussi constante quelle le dit47. Cette cascade de contradictions laisse perplexe sur la date, les

fondements et le rle que la Thalande souhaite donner cette carte. La seule explication plausible semble tre linconstance de la Thalande, protestant juste aprs larrt de 1962, puis lacceptant durant une longue priode selon linterprtation que le Cambodge en fait, avant de protester de

46 47

Voir FWE, par. 1.32, 1.33 et 3.66.

Puisque la Thalande nous dit notamment que cette carte montre la limite des barbels et reprsenterait le statu quo en labsence dune agreed delimitation and demarcation of the boundary. Voir FWE, par. 3.66.

- 30 nouveau partir du processus du classement du temple au patrimoine mondial de lUnesco dans un volte-face conduisant le Cambodge revenir devant votre Cour. 42. Nous sommes donc, en quelque sorte, hors sujet car, si le Cambodge affirme bien que la Cour reconnat lexistence dune frontire dans son arrt de 1962, il ne demande nullement la Cour de se proccuper de la dmarcation sur le terrain qui en dcouler ait aujourdhui, dautant que cet accord est intervenu prs de quarante ans aprs larrt et ninterfre donc pas dans linterprtation de larrt de 1962, mais reprsente simplement un fait qui prouve la pratique subsquente suite larrt et dmontre, qu dfaut dune comprhension commune, il y a bien une question dinterprtation qui se pose. Il ny a en lespce aucune incohrence du Cambodge 48 : il confirme ici que ce qui sest produit avant le prononc de larrt nest pas pertinent pour linterprtation, et que ce qui sest produit aprs larrt ne doit servir qu dmontrer lexistence dun diffrend, comme mon collgue Rodman Bundy a eu loccasion de lexpliquer prcdemment. Que reste-t-il ? Il reste larrt de 1962, rien que larrt, mais tout larrt, de manire ce que la Cour puisse parvenir une interprtation logique du dispositif de celui-ci. Pourquoi en est-on arriv cet trange argumentaire de la Thalande ? VI. Linversion par la Thalande du raisonnement dductif de larrt de 1962 au profit dun raisonnement inductif 43. Il sagit sans doute dun des aspects les plus pernicieux de largumentaire de la Thalande car il faut le dceler entre les lignes, et il napparat pas au grand jour mais seulement par dduction. En effet, la Thalande inverse sans cesse le raisonnement de la Cour pour retirer au motif essentiel une quelconque importance. Alors que votre Cour raisonne dune manire

dductive, autrement dit elle accumule les lments qui lui permettront de dduire la bonne solution et de parvenir sa dcision, la Thalande laisse penser que votre Cour a, au contraire, utilis un raisonnement inductif formel, autrement dit, elle aurait dcid que le temple appartenait au Cambodge et aurait ensuite construit son raisonnement sur ces prmisses. Cette inversion a lavantage, pour la Thalande, de signifier que la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 ne serait pas un

48

FWE, par. 1.20.

- 31 -

lment dterminant, mais aurait simplement servi conforter la dcision de la Cour, voire que la Cour pouvait, en 1962, se passer de ce constat. 44. Ainsi, la Thalande prtend que la carte a servi seulement parce quelle met le temple du ct cambodgien49, alors que la Cour, linverse, reconnat lexistence dune frontire, et en dduit donc que le temple est au Cambodge. En quelque sorte, pour la Thalande, la Cour aurait donn le temple au Cambodge sur quelques preuves parses la visite du prince Damrong en 193050, la commission de Washington de 194751, lattitude quelle reconnat inapproprie de la Thalande suite la prsence de la France sur le site du temple52, etc , preuves en ralit complmentaires et non dcisives, dont la Cour indique par ailleurs quelles confirment lattitude de la Thalande face ce que la Cour qualifie de problme essentiel53, autrement dit lacceptation par les Parties de la carte de lannexe 1 comme reprsentant la frontire entre les deux Etats. Mais, pour la Thalande, la Cour se serait soudainement aperue que le temple se trouvait du bon ct dune carte frontalire, ce qui aurait confirm son intuition54, et, selon cet Etat, la Cour aurait utilis dautres motifs, indpendamment de la carte de lannexe 1, qui lauraient conduite rpondre la question de la souverainet sur le temple55. Comme mon collgue sir Franklin la indiqu ce matin, ceci prouve, pour le moins, que la Thalande, contrairement sa volont affiche dtablir une stricte sparation entre les motifs et le dispositif, utilise elle aussi des motifs pour expliquer le dispositif, mais elle contourne de la sorte le motif essentiel par lutilisation de motifs secondaires. Ceci est parfaitement rsum lorsque la Thalande affirme : Si lon fait abstraction de la carte de lannexe 1, le rsultat reste donc inchang : le temple est situ en territoire cambodgien56. Ce qui revient dire que la Cour aurait tenu compte de nombreux lments mais, aucun moment, de l o passe la frontire, sauf pour se convaincre in fine que sa solution intuitive tait la bonne. Ce

49 50 51 52 53 54

FWE, par. 4.28, point 2. Ibid., par. 4.17 et 4.18. Ibid., par. 4.20. Ibid., par. 4.21 et 4.22. Affaire du Temple de Prah Vihar (Cambodge c. Thalande), fond, arrt, CIJ Recueil 1962, p. 22.

Ainsi la Thalande affirme que la Cour sest servie de la carte de lannexe 1 pour savoir o se trouvait le temple, mais non pour dterminer the course of the frontier, FWE, par. 4.31.
55 56

FEW, par. 4.23.

Voir ibid., par. 4.24 : Take away the Annex I map, and the same result is achieved : the Temple is in Cambodian territory. Voir aussi par. 4.25 : the other reasons besides the map line were conclusive and independent.

- 32 nest pourtant pas ce que laisse comprendre len-tte de larrt prcit (voir ci-dessus par. 25) tabli par votre Cour qui, malheureusement pour la Thalande, ne cite que la question du rglement conventionnel concernant la frontire et la carte, mais aucunement les fameuses preuves dcisives invoques par cet Etat. 45. De mme, la Thalande nous explique que le Cambodge prtend que la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 confirme le dispositif57. Outre que la Thalande fait dire au Cambodge ce quil na jamais prsent de cette manire, la carte ne le confirme pas, elle lexplique. Une nouvelle fois, la Thalande confond la cause et les consquences, le dductif et linductif. Prtendre que la carte confirme le dispositif revient dire que cest le dernier maillon dune chane qui permet de conclure dfinitivement une solution partir dune intuition. Mais, si comme le Cambodge en est convaincu, la carte explique et justifie le dispositif, cette carte est bien lorigine de la dduction qui amnera la Cour sa solution en 1962. La Cour ne part pas dun rsultat pour le justifier, le confirmer ; linverse, elle arrive au rsultat par un raisonnement qui lexplique. Cest le propre du syllogisme judiciaire qui fait de la motivation une explication, une justification, mais surtout une dduction par une dmonstration qui tient compte des finalits de la rgle interprter au sens tlologique du terme58. Or, la Thalande semble privilgier une vision fige et peu raliste dun raisonnement invers ignorant les causes profondes de la solution trouve par votre Cour et oublie que la conviction qui ressort de larrt de 1962 est la ncessaire stabilit des frontires et le respect de lintgrit territoriale. 46. Au-del de largument conjoncturel dvelopp par la Thalande, cela revient dire quune dcision de la Cour ainsi envisage manque de fondements solides, serai t purement intuitive, et se rvlerait arbitraire. Cest donc aussi un manque de respect pour le travail de la Cour. 47. Bien videmment, cette dmarche inverse propose par la Thalande dans le raisonnement de la Cour en 1962 ne doit rien au hasard puisquil sagit dinstiller le doute sur ce

57 58

FEW, par. 4.87

Sur la manire pour le juge de raisonner, Maurice Mendelson indique ainsi : the sometimes rather mysterious process that bears the compendious name judicial reasoning. Even if there is no provision of treaty or customary law directly in point, the Court has been adept at drawing logical deductions, reasoning by analogy or rejecting analogies, discovering implied terms, taking a teleological viewpoint, and so on ; The International Court of Justice and the source of international law, Mlanges Jennings, Cambridge, CUP, 1996, p. 79-80.

- 33 qui fut la dmarche du juge et, dune certaine manire, dinsinuer la ncessaire refonte de larrt qui, si elle ne peut soprer stricto sensu, pourrait ressortir de linterprtation que votre Cour pourrait adopter. VII. La tentation dune refonte de larrt de 1962 48. La Thalande sait pertinemment que le processus dinterprtation de larrt de 1962 ne peut en aucune manire conduire une refonte de cet arrt, et que la mission de votre Cour est dclairer les Parties sur le sens et la porte de celui -ci. Nanmoins, travers le cumul de nombreux lments, une fois de plus, elle tente une remise en cause du processus qui sest dr oul entre 1959 et 1962 et nhsite pas revenir sur des faits antrieurs cette priode alors que, comme nous le savons, la Cour ne peut prendre en compte que la dcision telle quelle existe partir du 15 juin 1962. 49. Pour ce faire, et dune manire une nouvelle fois tonnante, la Thalande opre un dcoupage entre le processus qui sest droul de 1959 1962, dont elle fait grand cas en reprochant au Cambodge de ne pas en tenir compte59, et larrt lui-mme dont elle ne souhaite lire que le dispositif clair comme de leau de roche sans aucunement sarrter sur ses motifs. Etrange viction une nouvelle fois de ce chanon manquant alors que larrt mais tout larrt se suffit lui-mme. 50. Ce nest pourtant pas lavis de la Thalande qui, dans de nombreux passages, revient sur des lments discuts avant que la Cour ne rende sa dcision. Il en va ainsi dune discussion inutile sur le nombre de mtres entre la sortie nord du temple et la frontire, ou sur la correspondance entre la frontire et la ligne de partage des eaux, ou encore sur diffrentes cartes entre 1908 et 1962, etc60. Ceci est inutile puisque, en 1962, votre Cour nous dit en substance : peu importe o est la ligne de partage des eaux puisque les deux Parties ont accept que la frontire passe un certain endroit figur sur la carte de lannexe 161. A cet gard, il est dailleurs possible de se reporter aux documents produits par la Cour elle-mme au moment du prononc de larrt. Ainsi, et mme sil

59 60 61

FWE, par. 1.20. Voir ibid., notamment par. 4.33 4.73.

De nouveau, lappui de cet argument, la Thalande donne une citation tronque de larrt (FWE, par. 4.39), la mme quelle avait dj tronque auparavant. Voir requte du Royaume du Cambodge, 28 avril 2011, par. 16.

- 34 ne sagit pas dun document officiel, mais manant quand mme du Greffe de la Cour, la fin du communiqu rsumant larrt est significative : [Document no 22 lcran] En consquence, la Cour sestime tenue de se prononcer en faveur de la frontire indique pour la zone litigieuse sur la carte de lannexe 1 et il devient inutile dexaminer si cette frontire correspond bien la vritable ligne de partage des eaux. Cest pour ces motifs que la Cour adjuge au Cambodge ses conclusions concernant la souverainet sur Prah Vihar.62 On peut noter que la solution nonce dans le dernier paragraphe dcoule totalement du paragraphe qui prcde, ce dernier traitant de la frontire, de la carte de lannexe 1, de la zone litigieuse, alors que la conclusion cite Prah Vihar comme tant un lieu, une zone, sans mme que le temple soit une nouvelle fois cit. Au-del, cela confirme la conviction du Cambodge, comme ce fut dj soulign par mon collgue Rodman Bundy, quil est totalement inutile aujourdhui de rouvrir le dbat sur la ligne de partage des eaux puisque votre Cour doit partir de ce qui a t dcid en 1962. Et cest bien l la diffrence entre le Cambodge et la Thalande : le Cambodge part de 1962, alors que la Thalande veut partir de 1904 pour arriver de nouveau 1962. Et comme la Thalande parle trs peu de ce qui sest pass aprs 1962, et encore moins partir de 2007, on peut en dduire que pour elle lhistoire sarrte son chec de 1962. 51. Mais la Thalande va plus loin en insinuant quune revision de larrt aurait t possible si les conditions avaient t runies car elle sait pertinemment que ceci nest plus possible travers linvocation de documents rcents trouvs dans les archives du ministre franais des affaires trangres63. Certes, juridiquement, elle ne peut aller plus loin, mais elle remet bien en cause de cette manire la pertinence de ce qui a t dcid en 1962. 52. Sans doute cette tentation est-elle la plus apparente dans la dernire conclusion que la Thalande formule dans son supplment dinformation puisquelle demande la Cour de dclarer formellement que larrt de 1962 na pas tabli que la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 constituait la ligne frontalire entre le Royaume de Thalande et le Royaume du Cambodge64. Elle demande en
Communiqu 62/16 du 15 juin 1962, rsum des arrts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances de la Cour internationale de Justice, 1948-1991, ST/LEG/SER.F/1, p. 79.
63 64 62

FEW, par. 4.52.

to formally declare that the 1962 Judgment does not determine that the line on the Annex I map is the boundary line between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Submissions, FEW , p. 225.

- 35 lespce votre Cour de rejeter une prtention que le Cambodge na pas puisquil na jamais prtendu que la Cour avait formellement dclar ceci dans son dispositif. En revanche, le Cambodge confirme bien quil considre que la Cour a reconnu la validit de cette frontire et la donc indique formellement dans ses motifs. Si la conclusion de la Thalande est bien daffirmer que le rejet quelle souhaite concerne lintgralit de larrt [Judgment] cest--dire les motifs et le dispositif, et non simplement le dispositif [Decision] selon le sens littral de sa conclusion, alors cette conclusion doit tre clairement rejete65. Cette nouvelle conclusion pourrait ressembler une forme de demande reconventionnelle, si jamais cela tait possible, mais ce nest pas le cas. Il sagit l surtout, une nouvelle fois, dune manire pour la Thalande de faire dire au Cambodge quil demande plus que ce quil ne demande en ralit, en dtournant ainsi le fondement de la requte puisque cette conclusion de la Thalande concerne toute la carte de lannexe 1, alors que le Cambodge a toujours circonscrit sa requte la seule zone en litige. De mme, selon la Thalande, le Cambodge demanderait que la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 soit incorpore dans le dispositif66, ce qui nest nullement le cas. Le voudrait-il que ce serait bien sr impossible. Comme le Cambodge la dj longuement expliqu, il demande seulement la Cour dinterprter le dispositif de larrt de 1962 la lumire des motifs essentiels en lespce du motif essentiel de son arrt. Ces motifs reconnaissent lexistence dune frontire dj dlimite et accepte entre les deux Parties, la Cour considrant en 1962 que la carte de lannexe 1 tait devenue partie intgrante du processus conventionnel et avait donc une valeur conventionnelle. Ds lors, il paratrait bien trange que la Cour puisse formellement dclarer, pour reprendre lexpression de la Thalande, que larrt dans son ensemble nindique pas une telle ligne frontalire.

VIII. La lecture constante par le Cambodge des paragraphes 1 et 2 du dispositif dune manire simultane 53. Jen viens au dernier point, Monsieur le prsident, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, sur la question de la lecture constante par le Cambodge des paragraphes 1 et 2

65 Comme le prcise Richard Plender, la distinction est pourtant ncessaire : Article 59 of the International Court of Justice Statute refers to the binding force of the decision (decision as opposed to the judgment arrt) which is final and without appeal by virtue of article 60. ; Procedure in the European Courts: comparisons and proposals, RCADI, 1997, vol. 267, p. 316. 66

Must be incorporated into the dispositif, FEW, par. 4.8.

- 36 du dispositif dune manire simultane. Un des thmes dvelopps par la Thalande de

nombreuses reprises serait la contradiction entre la requte initiale du Cambodge qui porterait uniquement sur le paragraphe 2 du dispositif, et ses dveloppements ultrieurs qui introduiraient un autre diffrend en liaison avec le paragraphe 1 de ce mme dispositif. En effet, selon la Thalande, dans sa rponse du 8 mars 2012, le Cambodge aurait chang de position car la requte du 28 avril 2011 se focalisait sur le paragraphe 2 du dispositif alors que le Cambodge chercherait dsormais rsoudre un diffrend sur le paragraphe 1 de ce dispositif, ce qui serait incohrent67. De plus, toujours daprs la Thalande, le Cambodge ne demanderait dsormais quune dcision sur la carte dans la zone en litige, ce qui serait diffrent puisquil aurait demand une dcision sur toute la carte de lannexe 1 avant68. Ceci na bien sr aucun fondement puisque le Cambodge a toujours demand une interprtation sur la zone en litige, et non au-del69. Laurait-il voulu que votre Cour ne pourrait de toute faon le faire. Il sagit une nouvelle fois de convaincre votre Cour que le Cambodge introduirait sans cesse de nouvelles revendications sans rapport avec le dispositif de larrt de 1962, comme le reflte la question des 4,6 km dont la Thalande feint quil sagisse dun nouveau diffrend alors quelle a elle-mme invoqu ce primtre pour dlimiter le diffrend70, ou encore que cette requte concernerait lexcution dun arrt et non son interprtation71. 54. Ce que souhaite justement le Cambodge est la liaison entre les paragraphes 1 et 2 du dispositif dans loptique dune interprtation globale du dispositif sur la base des motifs. Le dispositif doit tre lu en entier et la lecture faite par la Thalande a pour objectif de nier les consquences que la Cour tire logiquement du constat fait dans le premier paragraphe, comme ceci a dj t soulign par mon collgue sir Franklin. La Thalande tente ainsi de minimiser le lien entre les deux paragraphes du dispositif et oublie trop souvent l expression en consquence

67 68 69

Voir FWE, notamment par. 3.47. Ibid., notamment par. 1.7.

Dans sa requte du 28 avril 2011, le Cambodge prcise que sa demande en interprtation concerne : [le] territoire dlimit dans la rgion du temple et ses environs par la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 sur laquelle larrt de la Cour est bas (par. 45). Livre concernant le temple de Prah Vihar publi par le ministre des affaires trangres de la Thalande en dcembre 2011, p. 35.
71 70

Voir FWE, par. 4.82.

- 37 qui fait la jonction entre les deux72, mais ceci est rcurrent puisquun oubli semblable stait produit lors des plaidoiries orales dans le cadre des mesures conservatoires dont on nous avait alors dit quil sagissait dune simple erreur73, mais qui, visiblement, se rpte, ce qui devient significatif mais galement inquitant. 55. Quoi quil en soit, les deux paragraphes sont bien sr insparables, et cest bien ce que la Cour a signifi dans la logique de son raisonnement concernant le paragraphe 2 : les troupes doivent se retirer dune manire continue des environs du temple situs sous la souverainet du Cambodge, autrement dit jusqu la limite entre les deux Etats, et encore plus prcisment jusquau territoire thalandais. Car, dans la notion de retrait, il y a bien celle de dplacement jusqu un certain point, comme ceci fut prcis ce matin. Rester aux abords du temple nest pas un retrait des environs. Comment connatre cette limite, comment savoir jusquo ce dplacement doit

soprer ? Le seul lment objectif de larrt qui permet de savoir o finit le territoire sous souverainet du Cambodge sur lequel se trouve le temple et o commence le territoire thalandais est prcisment la ligne de la carte de lannexe 1 que votre Cour reconnat comme tant la limite pertinente et accepte entre les deux Etats. Il nest donc pas possible de la passer sous silence ou de comprendre larrt de 1962 sans en tenir compte. Sinon, il est impossible de savoir jusquo ce dplacement, ce retrait, doit seffectuer et larrt devient ds lors peu comprhensible. Voil qui rpond sans doute un reproche fait par la Thalande au Cambodge qui, selon cet Etat, ne rpondrait pas la question de la signification du terme environs74. Comme prcis dans la rponse du Cambodge75, il parat inutile den chercher les multiples significations dans plthore de dictionnaires car seul le sens que la Cour a souhait donner ce terme importe et, pour le Cambodge, ce sens ne peut qutre li lensemble de ce que votre Cour constate et dcide dans son arrt de 1962, et notamment linjonction de dplacement des troupes thalandaises au-del dune certaine limite, celle du territoire sous la souverainet du Cambodge.

72 73 74 75

Voir FWE, par. 4.98 et 4.99. CR 2011/16, p. 12 (Pellet). Voir FWE, par. 1.17. Rponse du Royaume du Cambodge, 8 mars 2012, vol. 1, par. 4.57.

- 38 -

56. Voil, Monsieur le prsident, Mesdames, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, comment le Cambodge comprend et interprte votre arrt du 15 juin 1962. Il le comprend et linterprte dune manire logique, cohrente et conforme un raisonnement dductif bas sur un ensemble de constats, dinterprtations et de dcisions successives aboutissant au dispositif. Visiblement, la Thalande ne le comprend pas de la mme manire et, pour le moins, devrait-elle admettre quil existe un diffrend sur linterprtation de votre arrt. Il appartiendra votre Cour de donner la bonne interprtation, la seule possible, et cest en toute confiance que le Cambodge sen remet votre jugement. Je vous remercie Monsieur le prsident, Mesdames, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, pour lattention longue que vous avez bien voulu porter aux arguments dvelopps par le Cambodge. Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le professeur Sorel. Voil qui met un terme au premier tour de plaidoiries du Royaume du Cambodge. La Cour se runira de nouveau le mercredi 17 avril, 10 heures, pour entendre le Royaume de Thalande en son premier tour de plaidoiries. Laudience est leve. Laudience est leve 16 h 25. ___________

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