The Failure of the Ontological Argument By Nadav Kravitz Of all the proofs for the existence of god, the

ontological proof is perhaps the least convincing and weakest, yet it is not easy to refute. The proof essentially relies on defining god as the maximally great being, and in St. Anselms original formulation, he reasoned god would have to exist, because a thing that exists is greater than a merely imaginary one. The revised proof relies on some higher concepts of logic, and the unused to such may not be able to see where the proof breaks down. The trouble is, apologists usually take the inability of non-experts to deconstruct the proof as evidence of its impeccability, which is the equivalent of taking a faulty sentence in Chinese, asking a Frenchman to translate it, and then claiming that it is therefore perfectly grammatically sound. It is not surprising that this proof is only rarely used in debated for the existence of god, as it is conceptually not easy, is built on very shaky ground (if any at all), and reeks of sophistry. In its most modern formulation, that of Dr. Alvin Plantinga, or the one promulgated by Dr. William Lane Craig, the proof is made in terms of modal logic. It goes like this: 1) God is defined as the maximally great being, which entails that he be necessary (i.e. he exists in every possible world). 2) If god is logically possible, he exists in some possible world. 3) If he exists in some possible world, he exists in every possible world. 4) If he exists in every possible world, he exists in the actual world. 5) Therefore god exists. The proof is typically claimed to rely on premise 2 alone, forcing anyone to prove that the definition of god makes him logically impossible. However, it is not hard for the apologist to continually recast or explain his definition of god so as to make god logically possible, and the apologist, quite self-satisfied, typically then begins to smirk insipidly. However, the problem resides not in the second premise, but in the first definition, which attempts to derive necessity from maximality. What justification is given for premise 1? Typically it is this: If one exists contingently then ones existence depends on the existence of something else. Thus, one needs that other thing in order to exist, which is why it is better to exist necessarily, meaning ones existence doesn't require additional things. In modal logic, things are contingent if they are possible, but not necessary. But the usage above is taken in another sense altogether to mean existentially dependent, that is, they could not exist if something else did not exist as well. This definition has the benefit of being much more in line with the definition, as a maximally great being can easily be assumed to be existentially independent. However, this is nothing less than a textbook example of equivocation: contingent A, possible, but not necessary, has not been shown to be equivalent to contingent B, existentially dependent. In fact, it is not hard to show that they are not equivalent. To show that B is not a subset of A, we look at the number 2. This, like all numbers, is necessary, though it is entirely dependent on the number 1: if 1 were not to exist, 2 could have no possibility of existing (though this is logically impossible, it is not hard to see). To show that A is not a subset of B, we examine a world that is eternal,

static, infinite and empty. If we imagine a universe with only time and space, but eternal, infinite, static and empty, it is independent of the existence of anything else, and yet is by no means necessary. Thus the two are independent: one does not entail the other. In fact, existence, let alone necessity, is not a property of a thing, but the condition under which it has properties. A being is not maximal if it is necessary, or even if it exists, rather, it can only be maximal if it exists. That is, the condition is actually reversed. The ontological argument actually makes its own case difficult to sustain, as it posits a crucial dichotomy: god is either necessary or impossible. Thus, all it takes to prove that god is impossible is to show that a world without god is logically possible, and this is eminently plausible. Moreover, a being is only necessary if it is logically impossible that the being not exist in any world, and this is where the weight of the proof truly lies: the apologist must show that a world without god is logically impossible, and this is no easy feat, and is likely not possible. However, suppose we accept the ontological argument, what else can we similarly prove? In the vein of Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, we are then forced also to accept the existence of other beings whose existence can also be proved by the same type of argument. For example, let us define antigod to be the maximally horrible being. If necessity makes god maximally great, certainly necessity also makes antigod maximally horrible, for a being that is maximally horrible would be inescapable: existing in every possible world. Thus, by the same argument, antigod is also forced to exist, and we are lead inexorably to ditheism at least. However, this brings into question the prospect of true omnipotence, as how could god destroy antigod or subdue him if the two are equally infinitely powerful? In fact, the triviality of imagining a similar being casts doubt on the entire exercise of proving a priori any things actuality. Suppose we set aside these other objections. Certain formulations will cite more explicitly the so-called S5 premise (corresponding to 3 of the above formulation) If X is possibly necessary, then X is necessary. However, it is important to draw the distinction between logical possibility and for all we know possibility. The number of atoms in the universe, or even in a glass of water, may be even, or it may be odd. There is, however, one right answer only, which is definitely true. If we say its possible that the number is even, this is a for all we know possibility and not a true possibility. For a more universal example, we can look at the Riemann hypothesis. It may be true or it may be false, but whichever it is, it is necessarily that: it could not have been otherwise, and we were just not knowledgeable enough to know it. If we then let X be the RH is true, then we have If X is possibly necessary, then X is necessary. Thus the Riemann hypothesis is true! Hello? Clay Mathematics Institute? But, alas, this is no way to do mathematics. In fact, one could use it to prove it is false as well. Gods existence is either true, or it is false, and we may just not be knowledgeable enough to know which it is. However, whichever it is, by the very nature of the OA, is necessarily the case. This fundamentally cripples the OA, so formulated, as it first requires the proof of the existence or non-existence of god, which it itself seeks to show. It may be interesting to note that for all other things whose necessity can be demonstrated, these things do not stand in causal relation with anything, rather they are uniquely definitions. As apologists seem to like to say, no one has ever turned over a rock and found the number seven. If only by analogy, we should have no expectation that any thing that is logically necessary will have any causal potentiality. For example, we can

define a maximally great being as a thing with all the usual attributes, but this in no way speaks to whether the thing is instantiated in the world. The angles of a planar triangle always add to 180 degrees, even if no triangle were ever instantiated in the actual world. This is the sense in which all other necessary statements are used: they are conditionals, in a sense. If a true triangle were part of any world, the sum of its angles would equal 180 degrees. I think it would be another feat of the apologists to show that there are statements of the form X is instantiated in world W that are anything but contingent (logically, that is). To show the plausibility of this, we can simply consider the world in which no thing is instantiated: the empty world. This, to all appearances, has no logical contradictions, and is thus logically possible, and gives good ground to infer that god is not indeed necessary. The failure of the ontological argument delivers quite a blow to many theistic paradigms. Once we say that god is not necessary, his other properties are no longer necessary either, that is, he may not be a maximally great being. In fact, the failure of the argument leaves god just as contingent (possibly in both senses, but certainly logically) as any other thing in reality. The argument is designed to be evidence-free, proving god a priori, though this contributes to its downfall. With the argument disconfirmed, the apologist is back to requiring evidence, and it is here that the apologist will have to stay. In fact, it would seem impossible that the apologist could ever claim that god was omnianything, and not just very-anything; also it makes all his properties, including the ofttouted moral perfection, logically contingent as well. Other than the typical assertions, it would seem that the apologist is back with everyone else, proving things about the world a posteriori. The instinctive reaction of most anyone encountering the ontological argument is immediate suspicion. Even proponents will admit that that argument is hardly convincing. Logic, at its base, is formulated to be a regularization and purification of reasoning intuition, so to achieve a result that is so contrary to our reasonability should make us gravely suspicious. It is scarcely surprising that our suspicions are validated, in not only one, but a number of ways. The ontological argument, though interesting and instructive in how not to reason, is not successful, nor does it even come within sight of validity. The argument will, however, live on, continually brought up by the ignorant or the deceptive, or likely as a problem in a philosophy classroom of the type Find the error in the following argument

APPENDIX Even if there were no good arguments against the ontological argument, it would seem strange that we could not imagine a world without god. This would be the equivalent of a mad scientist, in a state of extreme controllingness, vanity and pride, so making his monster that the monster would be incapable of even imagining a world without his maker. Apologists often even say that god is hidden so as to leave us with our free will, then why would he make us incapable of even imagining his non-existence? The apologist cannot have it both ways: either god is hidden enough for us to be able to imagine his non-existence, or god has so designed us and the universe that we cannot avoid his existence. This represents, perhaps, the greatest problem for apologists: hiddenness and absolute proof are mutually exclusive options. Either we can be intellectually fulfilled with or without god, or we are forced by rationality to accept god, due to the overwhelming evidence. If, after a divorce, you wanted your child to choose between living with you and living with your ex-spouse, would you bribe, cajole, or threaten the child, or remain silent, hoping that his love for you alone would bring him to you? If there is a choice, there can be no absolute evidence.