PLDT vs. Crispin Jetunan, et.al G.R. No.

l-7756, July 30, 1955 FACTS: Petitioner adopted a Plan for Employees Pensions in 1923. In 1945, the Board of Directors of the petitioner discontinue the pension plan and all payments thereunder which will take effect retroactively. Hence, respondents filed an action for monetary benefits due to them pursuant to the said pension plan. The court ruled that the prewar employees be compensated according to the service and age limit provided by the pension plan. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that they can not be held liable to the employees except upon fulfilment of the conditions stated in the pension plan (age 50 and 20 years service). ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to receive payment pursuant to the pension plan. HELD: The pension plan was not a mere offer of gratuity by the company, inspired by no other purpose than to benefit the employees. The plan sought to induce the employees to continue indefinitely in the service, and to spur them to greater efforts in its service and increased zeal in its behalf. The plan ripened into a binding contract upon its implied acceptance of the employees. Not being a donation, there is no statutory requirement that acceptance of the plan should be express. The assent and acceptance of the employees is inferable from their entering the employ of the company, or their stay therein after the plan was made known. The company violated the contract with its employees, by discontinuing the plan without their consent , is not in a position now to insist upon the terms of the very contract it has breached. In justice to the company, however, those prewar employees who died or voluntarily left the service before the outbreak of the war should be excluded from the distribution of pension benefits. CONCHITA LIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, MARIA NGO VDA. DE LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-11240 December 18, 1957 Facts: Petitioner sought to recover 51.84 hectares of land against the widow and heirs of the late Salvador Lopez. Allegedly, the land was donated to her when she was still a minor so that her parents will allow Lopez to live with her. Private respondent contended that the donation was null and void for having an illicit consideration in a sense that cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation and the donated land originally belonged to the conjugal

partnership of Lopez and respondent. Thus, CA ruled that the donation was inoperative for being null and void. It also rejected the claim of the petitioner on the basis of the rule in pari delicto non oritur action (Art 1412 of NCC) wherein when both the contracting parties is in fault, neither may recover nor demand performance. Also, when only one is in fault, he cannot recover or ask for fulfilment of what has been promised. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE: WON petitioner may recover the land donated to her to the widow and heirs of the late Salvador Lopez. HELD: Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the defense of immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must be decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in character and the right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law. The donation made by the husband in contravention of law is not void in its entirety, but only in so far as it prejudices the interest of the wife. In view of the foregoing, the decisions appealed from are reversed and set aside, and the appellant Conchita Liguez declared entitled to so much of the donated property as may be found, upon proper liquidation, not to prejudice the share of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal partnership with Salvador P. Lopez or the legitimes of the forced heirs of the latter. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. PAULINO GULLAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendantappellant. G.R. No. L-43191 November 13, 1935 FACTS: The Treasurer of the US for the US Veterans Bureau issued a Warrant payable to the order of Francisco Sabectoria Baocs. Petitioner signed as endorsers of this check. It was cashed by the respondent, however, it was dishonored by the Insular Treasurer. Based on the books of the bank, the outstanding balance of petitioner was P509. Notwithstanding the balance, he had issued checks. Upon learning of the bank of the dishonor of the treasury warrant, respondent sent notices to Gullas. However, it was not delivered to him because he left his residence. Upon returning, the notice informed him that PNB have applied the outstanding balances of his current accounts to the latter for the part payment of the check.

Upon returning, notice of dishonor was received and the unpaid balance of the United States Treasury warrant was immediately paid by him. With these happenings, it brought inconvenience to Atty. Gullas. He questioned the right of the PNB to apply a deposit to the debt of the depositor to the bank. ISSUE: WON the PNB has the right to apply a deposit to the debt of the depositor to the bank. HELD: The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation and deposit. The portions of Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other (Civil Code, article 1195). In his connection, it has been held that the relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor. As to a depositor who has funds sufficient to meet payment of a check drawn by him in favor of a third party, it has been held that he has a right of action against the bank for its refusal to pay such a check in the absence of notice to him that the bank has applied the funds so deposited in extinguishment of past due claims held against him. It would seem that notice is not necessary to a maker because the right is based on the doctrine that the relationship is that of creditor and debtor. However this may be, as to an indorser the situation is different, and notice should actually have been given him in order that he might protect his interests. Thus, the action of the bank was prejudicial to Gullas. Rufino Bueno, et.al vs. Mateo Reyes and Juan Reyes G. R. No. L-22587, April 28, 1969 FACTS: Francisco Reyes filed an answer in a Cadastral Case claiming a property belonging to him which was later on adjudicated in favor of him. Twenty -three years thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance claiming that the said property originally belonged to Jorge Bueno, father of Rufino. In the complaint, Francisco Reyes admitted that the parcel of land was acquired in bad faith that Mateo and Juan connived to the malicious acts of the former knowing that he never owned it, and it truly was possessed by the wife of the former being the sister of Rufino. Respondents, on the other hand, raised defenses such as laches, imprescriptibility of title and prescription of action. Likewise, they alleged that the action for reconveyance predicated the existence of implied trust, thus it prescribes in 10 years.

ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyance has already prescribed. HELD: If any trust can be deduced at all from the foregoing facts it was an implied one, arising by operation of law not from any presumed intention of the parties but to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and as a protection against unfair dealing or downright fraud. Indeed, in this kind of implied trust, commonly denominated constructive, as distinguished from resulting, trust, there exists a certain antagonism between the cestui que trust and the trustee. Thus, for instance, under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes." In a number of cases this Court has held that registration of property by one person in his name, whether by mistake or fraud, the real owner being another person, impresses upon the title so acquired the character of a constructive trust for the real owner, which would justify an action for reconveyance. The case is remanded for further proceedings. Carbonnel vs. Poncio, et.al 103 Phil 655 FACTS: Plaintiff alleged that she purchased a parcel of land from defendant Poncio and assumed the latters obligation with the Republic Savings Bank. The balance of which would be payable upon execution of deed of conveyance and Poncio would continue staying in the said land for one year. In the complaint, Carbonnel alleged that defendant Poncio refuses to execute the deed of sale despite repeated demands, hence, suffered damages. Also, the disputed land was conveyed to Infante notwithstanding the knowledge of the sale to Carbonnel. She, therefore, prayed to be declared as the owner of the property and deed of conveyance be issued to her. Further, to pay damages. As to the defense, they denied the allegations of the complaint. They argued that the claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled for the payment of damages. HELD: In executory contracts there is a wide field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has precisely been enacted to prevent fraud." However, if a contract has been totally or partially performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote fraud or bad faith , for it would enable

the defendant to keep the benefits already denied by him from the transaction in litigation, and, at the same time, evade the obligations, responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him thereby. The doctrine of part performance was established for the same purpose for which, the statute of frauds itself was enacted, namely, for the prevention of fraud, and arose from the necessity of preventing the statute from becoming an agent of fraud for it could not have been the intention of the statue to enable any party to commit a fraud with impunity. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Cost against defendants. Reiss et.al vs Memije 15 Phil 350, Gr No. 5447, March 1, 1910 FACTS: Memije entered into a contract with a certain Kabalsa for the repair of a house. The repair of the house was delayed because the contractor was unable to secure a credit for the lumbers to be used in the repairs. The plaintiff, whom he was dealing, did not allow any lumber to leave their yard without paying in advance. Thus, Memije accompanied the contractor to the plaintiffs promising to satisfy their financial obligation. Then, they came out into an agreement whereby the lumber will be delivered to the contractor for the repair of the house. Upon delivery, an action was filed with the court. The judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs wherein it was proven that there was still unpaid balance of the purchased lumber. Defendant contended that the court erred in its findings that the former assumes the responsibility for the payment of the lumber delivered to the contractor or if so, he merely guaranteed payment and such was not made into writing, hence inadmissible as evidence and he was not bound to pay. ISSUE: WON defendant is bound to pay the unpaid balance for the purchased lumber. HELD: Yes. If goods are sold upon the sole credit and responsibility of the party who make the promise, then, even though they be delivered to a third person, there is no liability of the third person to which that of the party promising can be collateral, and consequently such a promise to pay does not require a memorandum in writing; and on the same principle it has been held that when one advances money at the request of another (on his promise to repay it) to pay the debt of a third party, as the payment creates no debt against such third party, not being made at all upon his credit, the liability of the party on whose request and promise it was made is original and not collateral, and not with the

Statute of Frauds. In such cases, the defendant is said to come in aid to procure the credit to be given to the principal debtor, and the question, therefore, ultimate is "upon whose credit the goods were sold or the money advanced, or whatever other thing done which the defendant by his promise procured to be done;" and where the defendant stands in the relation to the third party of surety to principal "if any credit at all be given to the third party, the defendant's promise is required to be in writing as collateral." But it must be clearly recognized that these principles are applicable only where the parties are liable in the same way to do the same thing, one as principal and the other as surety, for if the credit is given to both jointly, since neither can be said to be surety for the other to the creditor, their engagement need not be in writing.