545U.S.

1(2005)

GONZALES,ATTORNEYGENERAL,ETAL. v. RAICHETAL.
No.031454. SupremeCourtofUnitedStates. ArguedNovember29,2004. DecidedJune6,2005. CERTIORARITOTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHENINTHCIRCUIT 2*23*3STEVENS,J.,deliveredtheopinionoftheCourt,inwhichKENNEDY,SOUTER, GINSBURG,andBREYER,JJ.,joined.SCALIA,J.,filedanopinionconcurringinthejudgment, post,p.33.O'CONNOR,J.,filedadissenting4*4opinion,inwhichREHNQUIST,C.J.,and THOMAS,J.,joinedastoallbutPartIII,post,p.42.THOMAS,J.,filedadissentingopinion,post, p.57. ActingSolicitorGeneralClementarguedthecauseforpetitioners.Withhimonthebriefswere AssistantAttorneyGeneralKeisler,DeputySolicitorGeneralKneedler,LisaS.Blatt,MarkB. Stern,AlisaB.Klein,andMarkT.Quinlivan. RandyE.Barnettarguedthecauseforrespondents.WithhimonthebriefwereRobertA.Long, Jr.,HeidiC.Doerhoff,RobertA.Raich,andDavidM.Michael.[*] 5*5JUSTICESTEVENSdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt. CaliforniaisoneofatleastnineStatesthatauthorizetheuseofmarijuanaformedicinal purposes.[1]ThequestionpresentedinthiscaseiswhetherthepowervestedinCongressby ArticleI,8,oftheConstitution"[t]omakeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperfor carryingintoExecution"itsauthorityto"regulateCommercewithforeignNations,andamongthe severalStates"includesthepowertoprohibitthelocalcultivationanduseofmarijuanain compliancewithCalifornialaw.

I
Californiahasbeenapioneerintheregulationofmarijuana.In1913,Californiawasoneofthe firstStatestoprohibitthesaleandpossessionofmarijuana,[2]andattheendofthecentury, CaliforniabecamethefirstStatetoauthorizelimiteduseofthedrugformedicinalpurposes.In 1996,CaliforniavoterspassedProposition215,nowcodifiedastheCompassionateUseActof 1996.[3]Thepropositionwasdesigned6*6toensurethat"seriouslyill"residentsoftheState haveaccesstomarijuanaformedicalpurposes,andtoencourageFederalandState Governmentstotakestepstowardensuringthesafeandaffordabledistributionofthedrugto patientsinneed.[4]TheActcreatesanexemptionfromcriminalprosecutionforphysicians,[5]as wellasforpatientsandprimarycaregiverswhopossessorcultivatemarijuanaformedicinal

purposeswiththerecommendationorapprovalofaphysician.[6]A"primarycaregiver"isa personwhohasconsistentlyassumedresponsibilityforthehousing,health,orsafetyofthe patient.[7] RespondentsAngelRaichandDianeMonsonareCaliforniaresidentswhosufferfromavariety ofseriousmedicalconditionsandhavesoughttoavailthemselvesofmedicalmarijuana pursuanttothetermsoftheCompassionateUse7*7Act.Theyarebeingtreatedbylicensed, boardcertifiedfamilypractitioners,whohaveconcluded,afterprescribingahostofconventional medicinestotreatrespondents'conditionsandtoalleviatetheirassociatedsymptoms,that marijuanaistheonlydrugavailablethatprovideseffectivetreatment.Bothwomenhavebeen usingmarijuanaasamedicationforseveralyearspursuanttotheirdoctors'recommendation, andbothrelyheavilyoncannabistofunctiononadailybasis.Indeed,Raich'sphysicianbelieves thatforgoingcannabistreatmentswouldcertainlycauseRaichexcruciatingpainandcouldvery wellprovefatal. RespondentMonsoncultivatesherownmarijuana,andingeststhedruginavarietyofways includingsmokingandusingavaporizer.RespondentRaich,bycontrast,isunabletocultivate herown,andthusreliesontwocaregivers,litigatingas"JohnDoes,"toprovideherwithlocally grownmarijuanaatnocharge.Thesecaregiversalsoprocessthecannabisintohashishorkeif, andRaichherselfprocessessomeofthemarijuanaintooils,balms,andfoodsforconsumption. OnAugust15,2002,countydeputysheriffsandagentsfromthefederalDrugEnforcement Administration(DEA)cametoMonson'shome.Afterathoroughinvestigation,thecountyofficials concludedthatheruseofmarijuanawasentirelylawfulasamatterofCalifornialaw. Nevertheless,aftera3hourstandoff,thefederalagentsseizedanddestroyedallsixofher cannabisplants. RespondentsthereafterbroughtthisactionagainsttheAttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStatesand theheadoftheDEAseekinginjunctiveanddeclaratoryreliefprohibitingtheenforcementofthe federalControlledSubstancesAct(CSA),84Stat.1242,21U.S.C.801etseq.,totheextentit preventsthemfrompossessing,obtaining,ormanufacturingcannabisfortheirpersonalmedical use.Intheircomplaintandsupportingaffidavits,RaichandMonsondescribedtheseverityof theirafflictions,theirrepeatedlyfutileattempts8*8toobtainreliefwithconventionalmedications, andtheopinionsoftheirdoctorsconcerningtheirneedtousemarijuana.Respondentsclaimed thatenforcingtheCSAagainstthemwouldviolatetheCommerceClause,theDueProcess ClauseoftheFifthAmendment,theNinthandTenthAmendmentsoftheConstitution,andthe doctrineofmedicalnecessity. TheDistrictCourtdeniedrespondents'motionforapreliminaryinjunction.Raichv.Ashcroft,248 F.Supp.2d918(NDCal.2003).Althoughthecourtfoundthatthefederalenforcementinterests "wane[d]"whencomparedtotheharmthatCaliforniaresidentswouldsufferifdeniedaccessto medicallynecessarymarijuana,itconcludedthatrespondentscouldnotdemonstratealikelihood ofsuccessonthemeritsoftheirlegalclaims.Id.,at931. AdividedpaneloftheCourtofAppealsfortheNinthCircuitreversedandorderedtheDistrict Courttoenterapreliminaryinjunction.[8]Raichv.Ashcroft,352F.3d1222(2003).Thecourt foundthatrespondentshad"demonstratedastronglikelihoodofsuccessontheirclaimthat,as appliedtothem,theCSAisanunconstitutionalexerciseofCongress'CommerceClause authority."Id.,at1227.TheCourtofAppealsdistinguishedpriorCircuitcasesupholdingtheCSA

inthefaceofCommerceClausechallengesbyfocusingonwhatitdeemedtobethe"separate anddistinctclassofactivities"atissueinthiscase:"theintrastate,noncommercialcultivation andpossessionofcannabisforpersonalmedicalpurposesasrecommendedbyapatient's physicianpursuanttovalidCaliforniastatelaw."Id.,at1228.The9*9courtfoundthelatterclass ofactivities"differentinkindfromdrugtrafficking"becauseinterposingaphysician's recommendationraisesdifferenthealthandsafetyconcerns,andbecause"thislimiteduseis clearlydistinctfromthebroaderillicitdrugmarketaswellasanybroadercommercialmarket formedicinalmarijuanainsofarasthemedicinalmarijuanaatissueinthiscaseisnotintended for,nordoesitenter,thestreamofcommerce."Ibid. ThemajorityplacedheavyrelianceonourdecisionsinUnitedStatesv.Lopez,514U.S.549 (1995),andUnitedStatesv.Morrison,529U.S.598(2000),asinterpretedbyrecentCircuit precedent,toholdthatthisseparateclassofpurelylocalactivitieswasbeyondthereachof federalpower.Incontrast,thedissentingjudgeconcludedthattheCSA,asappliedto respondents,wasclearlyvalidunderLopezandMorrisonmoreover,hethoughtit"simply impossibletodistinguishtherelevantconductsurroundingthecultivationanduseofthe marijuanacropatissueinthiscasefromthecultivationanduseofthewheatcropthataffected interstatecommerceinWickardv.Filburn."352F.3d,at1235(opinionofBeam,J.)(citation omitted). Theobviousimportanceofthecasepromptedourgrantofcertiorari.542U.S.936(2004).The caseismadedifficultbyrespondents'strongargumentsthattheywillsufferirreparableharm because,despiteacongressionalfindingtothecontrary,marijuanadoeshavevalidtherapeutic purposes.Thequestionbeforeus,however,isnotwhetheritiswisetoenforcethestatutein thesecircumstancesrather,itiswhetherCongress'powertoregulateinterstatemarketsfor medicinalsubstancesencompassestheportionsofthosemarketsthataresuppliedwithdrugs producedandconsumedlocally.Wellsettledlawcontrolsouranswer.TheCSAisavalid exerciseoffederalpower,evenasappliedtothetroublingfactsofthiscase.Weaccordingly vacatethejudgmentoftheCourtofAppeals.

10*10II
Shortlyaftertakingofficein1969,PresidentNixondeclaredanational"warondrugs."[9]Asthe firstcampaignofthatwar,Congresssetouttoenactlegislationthatwouldconsolidatevarious druglawsonthebooksintoacomprehensivestatute,providemeaningfulregulationover legitimatesourcesofdrugstopreventdiversionintoillegalchannels,andstrengthenlaw enforcementtoolsagainstthetrafficinillicitdrugs.[10]Thateffortculminatedinthepassageofthe ComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlActof1970,84Stat.1236. Thiswasnot,however,Congress'firstattempttoregulatethenationalmarketindrugs.Rather, asearlyas1906Congressenactedfederallegislationimposinglabelingregulationson medicationsandprohibitingthemanufactureorshipmentofanyadulteratedormisbrandeddrug travelingininterstatecommerce.[11]Asidefromtheselabelingrestrictions,mostdomesticdrug regulationspriorto1970generallycameintheguiseofrevenuelaws,withtheDepartmentofthe TreasuryservingastheFederalGovernment'sprimaryenforcer.[12]Forexample,theprimary

drugcontrollaw,beforebeingrepealedbythepassageoftheCSA,wastheHarrisonNarcotics Actof1914,38Stat.785(repealed1970).TheHarrisonActsoughttoexertcontroloverthe possessionandsaleofnarcotics,specificallycocaineandopiates,byrequiringproducers, distributors,andpurchaserstoregisterwiththeFederalGovernment,byassessingtaxes against11*11partiessoregistered,andbyregulatingtheissuanceofprescriptions.[13] MarijuanaitselfwasnotsignificantlyregulatedbytheFederalGovernmentuntil1937when accountsofmarijuana'saddictivequalitiesandphysiologicaleffects,pairedwithdissatisfaction withenforcementeffortsatstateandlocallevels,promptedCongresstopasstheMarihuana TaxAct,50Stat.551(repealed1970).[14]LiketheHarrisonAct,theMarihuanaTaxActdidnot outlawthepossessionorsaleofmarijuanaoutright.Rather,itimposedregistrationandreporting requirementsforallindividualsimporting,producing,selling,ordealinginmarijuana,andrequired thepaymentofannualtaxesinadditiontotransfertaxeswheneverthedrugchangedhands.[15] Moreover,doctorswishingtoprescribemarijuanaformedicalpurposeswererequiredtocomply withratherburdensomeadministrativerequirements.[16]Noncomplianceexposedtraffickersto severefederalpenalties,whereascompliancewouldoftensubjectthemtoprosecutionunder statelaw.[17]Thus,whiletheMarihuanaTaxActdidnotdeclarethedrugillegalperse,the onerousadministrativerequirements,theprohibitivelyexpensivetaxes,andtherisksattendant oncompliancepracticallycurtailedthemarijuanatrade. Thenin1970,afterdeclarationofthenational"warondrugs,"federaldrugpolicyunderwenta significanttransformation.Anumberofnoteworthyeventsprecipitated12*12thispolicyshift. First,inLearyv.UnitedStates,395U.S.6(1969),thisCourtheldcertainprovisionsofthe MarihuanaTaxActandothernarcoticslegislationunconstitutional.Second,attheendofhis term,PresidentJohnsonfundamentallyreorganizedthefederaldrugcontrolagencies.The BureauofNarcotics,thenhousedintheDepartmentofTreasury,mergedwiththeBureauof DrugAbuseControl,thenhousedintheDepartmentofHealth,Education,andWelfare(HEW), tocreatetheBureauofNarcoticsandDangerousDrugs,currentlyhousedintheDepartmentof Justice.[18]Finally,promptedbyaperceivedneedtoconsolidatethegrowingnumberof piecemealdruglawsandtoenhancefederaldrugenforcementpowers,Congressenactedthe ComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlAct.[19] TitleIIofthatAct,theCSA,repealedmostoftheearlierantidruglawsinfavorofa comprehensiveregimetocombattheinternationalandinterstatetrafficinillicitdrugs.Themain objectivesoftheCSAweretoconquerdrugabuseandtocontrolthelegitimateandillegitimate trafficincontrolledsubstances.[20]Congresswasparticularlyconcernedwiththe13*13needto preventthediversionofdrugsfromlegitimatetoillicitchannels.[21] Toeffectuatethesegoals,Congressdevisedaclosedregulatorysystemmakingitunlawfulto manufacture,distribute,dispense,orpossessanycontrolledsubstanceexceptinamanner authorizedbytheCSA.21U.S.C.841(a)(1),844(a).TheCSAcategorizesallcontrolled substancesintofiveschedules.812.Thedrugsaregroupedtogetherbasedontheiraccepted medicaluses,thepotentialforabuse,andtheirpsychologicalandphysicaleffectsonthebody. 14*14811,812.Eachscheduleisassociatedwithadistinctsetofcontrolsregardingthe manufacture,distribution,anduseofthesubstanceslistedtherein.821830.TheCSAandits implementingregulationssetforthstrictrequirementsregardingregistration,labelingand

packaging,productionquotas,drugsecurity,andrecordkeeping.Ibid.21CFR1301etseq. (2004). InenactingtheCSA,CongressclassifiedmarijuanaasaScheduleIdrug.21U.S.C.812(c). Thispreliminaryclassificationwasbased,inpart,ontherecommendationoftheAssistant SecretaryofHEW"thatmarihuanaberetainedwithinscheduleIatleastuntilthecompletionof certainstudiesnowunderway."[22]ScheduleIdrugsarecategorizedassuchbecauseoftheir highpotentialforabuse,lackofanyacceptedmedicaluse,andabsenceofanyacceptedsafety foruseinmedicallysupervisedtreatment.812(b)(1).Thesethreefactors,invarying gradations,arealsousedtocategorizedrugsintheotherfourschedules.Forexample, ScheduleIIsubstancesalsohaveahighpotentialforabusewhichmayleadtosevere psychologicalorphysicaldependence,butunlikeScheduleIdrugs,theyhaveacurrently acceptedmedicaluse.812(b)(2).ByclassifyingmarijuanaasaScheduleIdrug,asopposed tolistingitonalesserschedule,themanufacture,distribution,orpossessionofmarijuana becameacriminaloffense,withthesoleexceptionbeinguseofthedrugaspartofaFoodand DrugAdministrationpreapprovedresearchstudy.823(f),841(a)(1),844(a)seealsoUnited Statesv.OaklandCannabisBuyers'Cooperative,532U.S.483,490(2001). TheCSAprovidesfortheperiodicupdatingofschedulesanddelegatesauthoritytotheAttorney General,afterconsultationwiththeSecretaryofHealthandHumanServices,toadd,remove,or transfersubstancesto,from,orbetween15*15schedules.811.Despiteconsiderableefforts toreschedulemarijuana,itremainsaScheduleIdrug.[23]

III
RespondentsinthiscasedonotdisputethatpassageoftheCSA,aspartoftheComprehensive DrugAbusePreventionandControlAct,waswellwithinCongress'commercepower.Brieffor Respondents22,38.NordotheycontendthatanyprovisionorsectionoftheCSAamountsto anunconstitutionalexerciseofcongressionalauthority.Rather,respondents'challengeis actuallyquitelimitedtheyarguethattheCSA'scategoricalprohibitionofthemanufactureand possessionofmarijuanaasappliedtotheintrastatemanufactureandpossessionofmarijuana formedicalpurposespursuanttoCalifornialawexceedsCongress'authorityunderthe CommerceClause. Inassessingthevalidityofcongressionalregulation,noneofourCommerceClausecasescan beviewedinisolation.AschartedinconsiderabledetailinUnitedStatesv.Lopez,our understandingofthereachoftheCommerceClause,aswellasCongress'assertionofauthority thereunderhas16*16evolvedovertime.[24]TheCommerceClauseemergedastheFramers' responsetothecentralproblemgivingrisetotheConstitutionitself:theabsenceofanyfederal commercepowerundertheArticlesofConfederation.[25]Forthefirstcenturyofourhistory,the primaryuseoftheClausewastoprecludethekindofdiscriminatorystatelegislationthathad oncebeenpermissible.[26]Then,inresponsetorapidindustrialdevelopmentandanincreasingly interdependentnationaleconomy,Congress"usheredinaneweraoffederalregulationunder thecommercepower,"beginningwiththeenactmentoftheInterstateCommerceActin1887,24 Stat.379,andtheShermanAntitrustActin1890,26Stat.209,asamended,15U.S.C.2et

seq.[27] Casesdecidedduringthat"newera,"whichnowspansmorethanacentury,haveidentified threegeneralcategoriesofregulationinwhichCongressisauthorizedtoengageunderits commercepower.First,Congresscanregulatethechannelsofinterstatecommerce.Perezv. UnitedStates,402U.S.146,150(1971).Second,Congresshasauthoritytoregulateand protecttheinstrumentalitiesofinterstatecommerce,andpersonsorthingsininterstate17*17 commerce.Ibid.Third,Congresshasthepowertoregulateactivitiesthatsubstantiallyaffect interstatecommerce.Ibid.NLRBv.Jones&LaughlinSteelCorp.,301U.S.1,37(1937).Only thethirdcategoryisimplicatedinthecaseathand. OurcaselawfirmlyestablishesCongress'powertoregulatepurelylocalactivitiesthatarepart ofaneconomic"classofactivities"thathaveasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce.See, e.g.,Perez,402U.S.,at151Wickardv.Filburn,317U.S.111,128129(1942).Aswestated inWickard,"evenifappellee'sactivitybelocalandthoughitmaynotberegardedascommerce, itmaystill,whateveritsnature,bereachedbyCongressifitexertsasubstantialeconomiceffect oninterstatecommerce."Id.,at125.WehaveneverrequiredCongresstolegislatewith scientificexactitude.WhenCongressdecidesthatthe"`totalincidence'"ofapracticeposesa threattoanationalmarket,itmayregulatetheentireclass.SeePerez,402U.S.,at154155 (quotingWestfallv.UnitedStates,274U.S.256,259(1927)("`[W]henitisnecessaryinorderto preventaneviltomakethelawembracemorethantheprecisethingtobepreventeditmaydo so'")).Inthisvein,wehavereiteratedthatwhen"`ageneralregulatorystatutebearsasubstantial relationtocommerce,thedeminimischaracterofindividualinstancesarisingunderthatstatute isofnoconsequence.'"E.g.,Lopez,514U.S.,at558(emphasisdeleted)(quotingMarylandv. Wirtz,392U.S.183,196,n.27(1968)). OurdecisioninWickard,317U.S.111,isofparticularrelevance.InWickard,weupheldthe applicationofregulationspromulgatedundertheAgriculturalAdjustmentActof1938,52Stat.31, whichweredesignedtocontrolthevolumeofwheatmovingininterstateandforeigncommerce inordertoavoidsurplusesandconsequentabnormallylowprices.Theregulationsestablished anallotmentof11.1acresforFilburn's1941wheatcrop,buthesowed23acres,intendingto usetheexcessbyconsumingitonhisownfarm.Filburn18*18arguedthateventhoughwehad sustainedCongress'powertoregulatetheproductionofgoodsforcommerce,thatpowerdid notauthorize"federalregulation[of]productionnotintendedinanypartforcommercebutwholly forconsumptiononthefarm."Wickard,317U.S.,at118.JusticeJackson'sopinionfora unanimousCourtrejectedthissubmission.Hewrote: "Theeffectofthestatutebeforeusistorestricttheamountwhichmaybeproducedformarket andtheextentaswelltowhichonemayforestallresorttothemarketbyproducingtomeethis ownneeds.Thatappellee'sowncontributiontothedemandforwheatmaybetrivialbyitselfis notenoughtoremovehimfromthescopeoffederalregulationwhere,ashere,hiscontribution, takentogetherwiththatofmanyotherssimilarlysituated,isfarfromtrivial."Id.,at127128. WickardthusestablishesthatCongresscanregulatepurelyintrastateactivitythatisnotitself "commercial,"inthatitisnotproducedforsale,ifitconcludesthatfailuretoregulatethatclassof activitywouldundercuttheregulationoftheinterstatemarketinthatcommodity. ThesimilaritiesbetweenthiscaseandWickardarestriking.LikethefarmerinWickard, respondentsarecultivating,forhomeconsumption,afungiblecommodityforwhichthereisan

established,albeitillegal,interstatemarket.[28]JustastheAgriculturalAdjustmentActwas designed"to19*19controlthevolume[ofwheat]movingininterstateandforeigncommercein ordertoavoidsurpluses..."andconsequentlycontrolthemarketprice,id.,at115,aprimary purposeoftheCSAistocontrolthesupplyanddemandofcontrolledsubstancesinbothlawful andunlawfuldrugmarkets.Seenn.2021,supra.InWickard,wehadnodifficultyconcluding thatCongresshadarationalbasisforbelievingthat,whenviewedintheaggregate,leaving homeconsumedwheatoutsidetheregulatoryschemewouldhaveasubstantialinfluenceon priceandmarketconditions.Heretoo,Congresshadarationalbasisforconcludingthatleaving homeconsumedmarijuanaoutsidefederalcontrolwouldsimilarlyaffectpriceandmarket conditions. Moreconcretely,oneconcernpromptinginclusionofwheatgrownforhomeconsumptioninthe 1938Actwasthatrisingmarketpricescoulddrawsuchwheatintotheinterstatemarket, resultinginlowermarketprices.Wickard,317U.S.,at128.Theparallelconcernmakingit appropriatetoincludemarijuanagrownforhomeconsumptionintheCSAisthelikelihoodthat thehighdemandintheinterstatemarketwilldrawsuchmarijuanaintothatmarket.Whilethe diversionofhomegrownwheattendedtofrustratethefederalinterestinstabilizingpricesby regulatingthevolumeofcommercialtransactionsintheinterstatemarket,thediversionof homegrownmarijuanatendstofrustratethefederalinterestineliminatingcommercial transactionsintheinterstatemarketintheirentirety.Inbothcases,theregulationissquarely withinCongress'commercepowerbecauseproductionofthecommoditymeantforhome consumption,beitwheatormarijuana,hasasubstantialeffectonsupplyanddemandinthe nationalmarketforthatcommodity.[29] 20*20Nonetheless,respondentssuggestthatWickarddiffersfromthiscaseinthreerespects: (1)theAgriculturalAdjustmentAct,unliketheCSA,exemptedsmallfarmingoperations(2) Wickardinvolveda"quintessentialeconomicactivity"acommercialfarmwhereas respondentsdonotsellmarijuanaand(3)theWickardrecordmadeitclearthattheaggregate productionofwheatforuseonfarmshadasignificantimpactonmarketprices.Those differences,thoughfactuallyaccurate,donotdiminishtheprecedentialforceofthisCourt's reasoning. ThefactthatFilburn'sownimpactonthemarketwas"trivialbyitself"wasnotasufficientreason forremovinghimfromthescopeoffederalregulation.317U.S.,at127.ThattheSecretaryof Agricultureelectedtoexemptevensmallerfarmsfromregulationdoesnotspeaktohispowerto regulateallthosewhoseaggregatedproductionwassignificant,nordidthatfactplayanyrolein theCourt'sanalysis.Moreover,eventhoughFilburnwasindeedacommercialfarmer,the activityhewasengagedinthecultivationofwheatforhomeconsumptionwasnottreatedby theCourtaspartofhiscommercialfarmingoperation.[30]Andwhileitistruethattherecordinthe Wickardcaseitselfestablishedthecausalconnectionbetweentheproductionforlocaluseand thenationalmarket,wehavebeforeusfindingsbyCongresstothesameeffect. FindingsintheintroductorysectionsoftheCSAexplainwhyCongressdeemeditappropriateto encompasslocalactivitieswithinthescopeoftheCSA.Seen.20,supra.The21*21 submissionsofthepartiesandthenumerousamiciallseemtoagreethatthenational,and international,marketformarijuanahasdimensionsthatarefullycomparabletothosedefiningthe classofactivitiesregulatedbytheSecretarypursuanttothe1938statute.[31]Respondents

nonethelessinsistthattheCSAcannotbeconstitutionallyappliedtotheiractivitiesbecause Congressdidnotmakeaspecificfindingthattheintrastatecultivationandpossessionof marijuanaformedicalpurposesbasedontherecommendationofaphysicianwould substantiallyaffectthelargerinterstatemarijuanamarket.Bethatasitmay,wehavenever requiredCongresstomakeparticularizedfindingsinordertolegislate,seeLopez,514U.S.,at 562Perez,402U.S.,at156,absentaspecialconcernsuchastheprotectionoffreespeech, see,e.g.,TurnerBroadcastingSystem,Inc.v.FCC,512U.S.622,664668(1994)(plurality opinion).Whilecongressionalfindingsarecertainlyhelpfulinreviewingthesubstanceofa congressionalstatutoryscheme,particularlywhentheconnectiontocommerceisnot selfevident,andwhilewewillconsidercongressionalfindingsinouranalysiswhentheyare available,theabsenceofparticularizedfindingsdoesnotcallintoquestionCongress'authorityto legislate.[32] 22*22InassessingthescopeofCongress'authorityundertheCommerceClause,westress thatthetaskbeforeusisamodestone.Weneednotdeterminewhetherrespondents'activities, takenintheaggregate,substantiallyaffectinterstatecommerceinfact,butonlywhethera "rationalbasis"existsforsoconcluding.Lopez,514U.S.,at557seealsoHodelv.Virginia SurfaceMining&ReclamationAssn.,Inc.,452U.S.264,276280(1981)Perez,402U.S.,at 155156Katzenbachv.McClung,379U.S.294,299301(1964)HeartofAtlantaMotel,Inc.v. UnitedStates,379U.S.241,252253(1964).Giventheenforcementdifficultiesthatattend distinguishingbetweenmarijuanacultivatedlocallyandmarijuanagrownelsewhere,21U.S.C. 801(5),andconcernsaboutdiversionintoillicitchannels,[33]wehavenodifficultyconcluding thatCongresshadarationalbasisforbelievingthatfailuretoregulatetheintrastatemanufacture andpossessionofmarijuanawouldleaveagapingholeintheCSA.Thus,asinWickard,whenit enactedcomprehensivelegislationtoregulatetheinterstatemarketinafungiblecommodity, Congresswasactingwellwithinitsauthorityto"makeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryand proper"to"regulateCommerce...amongtheseveralStates."U.S.Const.,Art.I,8.Thatthe regulationensnaressomepurelyintrastateactivityisofnomoment.Aswehavedonemany timesbefore,werefusetoexciseindividualcomponentsofthatlargerscheme.

23*23IV
Tosupporttheircontrarysubmission,respondentsrelyheavilyontwoofourmorerecent CommerceClausecases.Intheirmyopicfocus,theyoverlookthelargercontextofmodernera CommerceClausejurisprudencepreservedbythosecases.Moreover,eveninthenarrowprism ofrespondents'creation,theyreadthosecasesfartoobroadly. Thosetwocases,ofcourse,areLopez,514U.S.549,andMorrison,529U.S.598.Asaninitial matter,thestatutorychallengesatissueinthosecasesweremarkedlydifferentfromthe challengerespondentspursueinthecaseathand.Here,respondentsaskustoexciseindividual applicationsofaconcededlyvalidstatutoryscheme.Incontrast,inbothLopezandMorrison,the partiesassertedthataparticularstatuteorprovisionfelloutsideCongress'commercepowerin itsentirety.Thisdistinctionispivotalforwehaveoftenreiteratedthat"[w]heretheclassof activitiesisregulatedandthatclassiswithinthereachoffederalpower,thecourtshaveno

power`toexcise,astrivial,individualinstances'oftheclass."Perez,402U.S.,at154(emphasis deleted)(quotingWirtz,392U.S.,at193)seealsoHodel,452U.S.,at308. AtissueinLopez,514U.S.549,wasthevalidityoftheGunFreeSchoolZonesActof1990, whichwasabrief,singlesubjectstatutemakingitacrimeforanindividualtopossessagunina schoolzone.104Stat.48444845,18U.S.C.922(q)(1)(A).TheActdidnotregulateany economicactivityanddidnotcontainanyrequirementthatthepossessionofagunhaveany connectiontopastinterstateactivityorapredictableimpactonfuturecommercialactivity. Distinguishingourearliercasesholdingthatcomprehensiveregulatorystatutesmaybevalidly appliedtolocalconductthatdoesnot,whenviewedinisolation,haveasignificantimpacton interstatecommerce,weheldthestatuteinvalid.Weexplained: 24*24"Section922(q)isacriminalstatutethatbyitstermshasnothingtodowith`commerce' oranysortofeconomicenterprise,howeverbroadlyonemightdefinethoseterms.Section 922(q)isnotanessentialpartofalargerregulationofeconomicactivity,inwhichtheregulatory schemecouldbeundercutunlesstheintrastateactivitywereregulated.Itcannot,therefore,be sustainedunderourcasesupholdingregulationsofactivitiesthatariseoutoforareconnected withacommercialtransaction,whichviewedintheaggregate,substantiallyaffectsinterstate commerce."514U.S.,at561. ThestatutoryschemethattheGovernmentisdefendinginthislitigationisattheoppositeendof theregulatoryspectrum.Asexplainedabove,theCSA,enactedin1970aspartofthe ComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlAct,84Stat.12421284,wasalengthyand detailedstatutecreatingacomprehensiveframeworkforregulatingtheproduction,distribution, andpossessionoffiveclassesof"controlledsubstances."Mostofthosesubstancesthose listedinSchedulesIIthroughV"haveausefulandlegitimatemedicalpurposeandare necessarytomaintainthehealthandgeneralwelfareoftheAmericanpeople."21U.S.C. 801(1).Theregulatoryschemeisdesignedtofosterthebeneficialuseofthosemedications,to preventtheirmisuse,andtoprohibitentirelythepossessionoruseofsubstanceslistedin ScheduleI,exceptasapartofastrictlycontrolledresearchproject. Whilethestatuteprovidedfortheperiodicupdatingofthefiveschedules,Congressitselfmade theinitialclassifications.Itidentified42opiates,22opiumderivatives,and17hallucinogenic substancesasScheduleIdrugs.84Stat.1248.Marijuanawaslistedasthe10thiteminthe3d subcategory.Thatclassification,unlikethediscreteprohibitionestablishedbytheGunFree SchoolZonesActof1990,wasmerelyoneofmany"essentialpart[s]ofalargerregulationof economicactivity,inwhichtheregulatoryschemecouldbeundercut25*25unlesstheintrastate activitywereregulated."Lopez,514U.S.,at561.[34]OuropinioninLopezcastsnodoubtonthe validityofsuchaprogram. NordoesthisCourt'sholdinginMorrison,529U.S.598.TheViolenceAgainstWomenActof 1994,108Stat.1902,createdafederalcivilremedyforthevictimsofgendermotivatedcrimes ofviolence.42U.S.C.13981.Theremedywasenforceableinbothstateandfederalcourts, andgenerallydependedonproofoftheviolationofastatelaw.Despitecongressionalfindings thatsuchcrimeshadanadverseimpactoninterstatecommerce,weheldthestatute unconstitutionalbecause,likethestatuteinLopez,itdidnotregulateeconomicactivity.We concludedthat"thenoneconomic,criminalnatureoftheconductatissuewascentraltoour decision"inLopez,andthatourpriorcaseshadidentifiedaclearpatternofanalysis:"`Where

economicactivitysubstantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerce,legislationregulatingthatactivitywill besustained.'"[35]Morrison,529U.S.,at610. UnlikethoseatissueinLopezandMorrison,theactivitiesregulatedbytheCSAare quintessentiallyeconomic."Economics"refersto"theproduction,distribution,andconsumption ofcommodities."Webster'sThirdNewInternational26*26Dictionary720(1966).TheCSAisa statutethatregulatestheproduction,distribution,andconsumptionofcommoditiesforwhich thereisanestablished,andlucrative,interstatemarket.Prohibitingtheintrastatepossessionor manufactureofanarticleofcommerceisarational(andcommonlyutilized)meansofregulating commerceinthatproduct.[36]Suchprohibitionsincludespecificdecisionsrequiringthatadrug bewithdrawnfromthemarketasaresultofthefailuretocomplywithregulatoryrequirementsas wellasdecisionsexcludingScheduleIdrugsentirelyfromthemarket.BecausetheCSAisa statutethatdirectlyregulateseconomic,commercialactivity,ouropinioninMorrisoncastsno doubtonitsconstitutionality. TheCourtofAppealswasabletoconcludeotherwiseonlybyisolatinga"separateanddistinct" classofactivitiesthatitheldtobebeyondthereachoffederalpower,definedas"theintrastate, noncommercialcultivation,possessionanduseofmarijuanaforpersonalmedicalpurposeson theadviceofaphysicianandinaccordancewithstatelaw."352F.3d,at1229.Thecourt characterizedthisclassas"differentinkindfromdrugtrafficking."Id.,at1228.Thedifferences betweenthemembersofaclasssodefinedandtheprincipaltraffickersinScheduleI substancesmightbesufficienttojustifyapolicydecisionexemptingthenarrowerclassfromthe coverageoftheCSA.Thequestion,however,iswhetherCongress'contrarypolicyjudgment,i. e.,itsdecisiontoincludethisnarrower"classofactivities"withinthelargerregulatoryscheme, wasconstitutionallydeficient.WehavenodifficultyconcludingthatCongressactedrationallyin determiningthatnoneofthecharacteristicsmakingupthepurportedclass,whetherviewed individuallyorintheaggregate,compelledanexemptionfromtheCSArather,thesubdivided classofactivitiesdefinedbytheCourt27*27ofAppealswasanessentialpartofthelarger regulatoryscheme. First,thefactthatmarijuanaisused"forpersonalmedicalpurposesontheadviceofa physician"cannotitselfserveasadistinguishingfactor.Id.,at1229.TheCSAdesignates marijuanaascontrabandforanypurposeinfact,bycharacterizingmarijuanaasaScheduleI drug,Congressexpresslyfoundthatthedrughasnoacceptablemedicaluses.Moreover,the CSAisacomprehensiveregulatoryregimespecificallydesignedtoregulatewhichcontrolled substancescanbeutilizedformedicinalpurposes,andinwhatmanner.Indeed,mostofthe substancesclassifiedintheCSA"haveausefulandlegitimatemedicalpurpose."21U.S.C. 801(1).Thus,evenifrespondentsarecorrectthatmarijuanadoeshaveacceptedmedicaluses andthusshouldberedesignatedasalesserscheduledrug,[37]theCSAwouldstillimpose controlsbeyondwhatisrequiredbyCalifornialaw.TheCSArequiresmanufacturers,physicians, pharmacies,andotherhandlersofcontrolledsubstancestocomplywithstatutoryandregulatory provisionsmandatingregistrationwiththeDEA,compliancewithspecificproductionquotas, securitycontrolstoguardagainstdiversion,recordkeepingandreportingobligations,and prescriptionrequirements.See28*2882183021CFR1301etseq.(2004).Furthermore, thedispensingofnewdrugs,evenwhendoctorsapprovetheiruse,mustawaitfederalapproval. UnitedStatesv.Rutherford,442U.S.544(1979).Accordingly,themerefactthat

marijuanalikevirtuallyeveryothercontrolledsubstanceregulatedbytheCSAisusedfor medicinalpurposescannotpossiblyservetodistinguishitfromthecoreactivitiesregulatedby theCSA. Norcanitserveasan"objectivemarke[r]"or"objectivefacto[r]"toarbitrarilynarrowtherelevant classasthedissenterssuggest,post,at47(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.)post,at68(opinionof THOMAS,J.).Morefundamentally,if,astheprincipaldissentcontends,thepersonalcultivation, possession,anduseofmarijuanaformedicinalpurposesisbeyondthe"`outerlimits'of Congress'CommerceClauseauthority,"post,at42(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.),itmustalsobe truethatsuchpersonaluseofmarijuana(oranyotherhomegrowndrug)forrecreational purposesisalsobeyondthose"`outerlimits,'"whetherornotaStateelectstoauthorizeoreven regulatesuchuse.JUSTICETHOMAS'separatedissentsuffersfromthesamesweeping implications.Thatis,thedissenters'rationalelogicallyextendstoplaceanyfederalregulation (includingquality,prescription,orquantitycontrols)ofanylocallycultivatedandpossessed controlledsubstanceforanypurposebeyondthe"`outerlimits'"ofCongress'CommerceClause authority.Oneneednothaveadegreeineconomicstounderstandwhyanationwideexemption forthevastquantityofmarijuana(orotherdrugs)locallycultivatedforpersonaluse(which presumablywouldincludeusebyfriends,neighbors,andfamilymembers)mayhavea substantialimpactontheinterstatemarketforthisextraordinarilypopularsubstance.The congressionaljudgmentthatanexemptionforsuchasignificantsegmentofthetotalmarket wouldunderminetheorderlyenforcementoftheentireregulatoryschemeisentitledtoastrong presumptionofvalidity.Indeed,thatjudgmentisnotonlyrational,but"visibletothe29*29naked eye,"Lopez,514U.S.,at563,underanycommonsenseappraisaloftheprobable consequencesofsuchanopenendedexemption. Second,limitingtheactivitytomarijuanapossessionandcultivation"inaccordancewithstate law"cannotservetoplacerespondents'activitiesbeyondcongressionalreach.TheSupremacy Clauseunambiguouslyprovidesthatifthereisanyconflictbetweenfederalandstatelaw,federal lawshallprevail.Itisbeyondperadventurethatfederalpowerovercommerceis"`superiorto thatoftheStatestoprovideforthewelfareornecessitiesoftheirinhabitants,'"however legitimateordirethosenecessitiesmaybe.Wirtz,392U.S.,at196(quotingSanitaryDist.of Chicagov.UnitedStates,266U.S.405,426(1925)).Seealso392U.S.,at195196Wickard, 317U.S.,at124("`[N]oformofstateactivitycanconstitutionallythwarttheregulatorypower grantedbythecommerceclausetoCongress'").Justasstateacquiescencetofederal regulationcannotexpandtheboundsoftheCommerceClause,see,e.g.,Morrison,529U.S., at661662(BREYER,J.,dissenting)(notingthat38Statesrequestedfederalintervention),so toostateactioncannotcircumscribeCongress'plenarycommercepower.SeeUnitedStatesv. Darby,312U.S.100,114(1941)("Thatpowercanneitherbeenlargednordiminishedbythe exerciseornonexerciseofstatepower").[38] 30*30Respondentsacknowledgethisproposition,butnonethelesscontendthattheiractivities werenot"anessentialpartofalargerregulatoryscheme"becausetheyhadbeen"isolatedby theStateofCalifornia,and[are]policedbytheStateofCalifornia,"andthusremain"entirely separatedfromthemarket."Tr.ofOralArg.27.Thedissentersfallpreytosimilarreasoning. Seen.38,supra,at26andthispage.ThenotionthatCalifornialawhassurgicallyexciseda discreteactivitythatishermeticallysealedofffromthelargerinterstatemarijuanamarketisa

dubiousproposition,and,moreimportantly,onethatCongresscouldhaverationallyrejected. Indeed,thattheCaliforniaexemptionswillhaveasignificantimpactonboththesupplyand demandsidesofthemarketformarijuanaisnotjust"plausible"astheprincipaldissent concedes,post,at56(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.),itisreadilyapparent.Theexemptionfor physiciansprovidesthemwithaneconomicincentivetogranttheirpatientspermissiontouse thedrug.Incontrasttomostprescriptionsforlegaldrugs,whichlimitthedosageanddurationof theusage,underCalifornialawthedoctor'spermissionto31*31recommendmarijuanauseis openended.Theauthoritytograntpermissionwheneverthedoctordeterminesthatapatientis afflictedwith"anyotherillnessforwhichmarijuanaprovidesrelief,"Cal.Health&SafetyCode Ann.11362.5(b)(1)(A)(WestSupp.2005),isbroadenoughtoalloweventhemostscrupulous doctortoconcludethatsomerecreationaluseswouldbetherapeutic.[39]Andourcaseshave taughtusthattherearesomeunscrupulousphysicianswhooverprescribewhenitissufficiently profitabletodoso.[40] Theexemptionforcultivationbypatientsandcaregiverscanonlyincreasethesupplyof marijuanaintheCaliforniamarket.[41]Thelikelihoodthatallsuchproductionwill32*32promptly terminatewhenpatientsrecoverorwillpreciselymatchthepatients'medicalneedsduringtheir convalescenceseemsremotewhereasthedangerthatexcesseswillsatisfysomeofthe admittedlyenormousdemandforrecreationaluseseemsobvious.[42]Moreover,thatthenational andinternationalnarcoticstradehasthrivedinthefaceofvigorouscriminalenforcementefforts suggeststhatnosmallnumberofunscrupulouspeoplewillmakeuseoftheCalifornia exemptionstoservetheircommercialendswheneveritisfeasibletodoso.[43]Takinginto accountthefactthatCaliforniaisonlyoneofatleastnineStatestohaveauthorizedthemedical useofmarijuana,afactJUSTICEO'CONNOR'sdissentconvenientlydisregardsinarguingthat thedemonstratedeffectoncommercewhileadmittedly"plausible"isultimately "unsubstantiated,"post,at56,55,Congresscouldhaverationallyconcludedthattheaggregate impactonthenationalmarketofallthetransactionsexemptedfromfederalsupervisionis unquestionablysubstantial. So,fromthe"separateanddistinct"classofactivitiesidentifiedbytheCourtofAppeals(and adoptedbythedissenters),weareleftwith"theintrastate,noncommercialcultivation, possessionanduseofmarijuana."352F.3d,at1229.Thusthecasefortheexemptioncomes downtotheclaimthatalocallycultivatedproductthatisuseddomestically33*33ratherthan soldontheopenmarketisnotsubjecttofederalregulation.GiventhefindingsintheCSAand theundisputedmagnitudeofthecommercialmarketformarijuana,ourdecisionsinWickardv. Filburnandthelatercasesendorsingitsreasoningforeclosethatclaim.

V
Respondentsalsoraiseasubstantivedueprocessclaimandseektoavailthemselvesofthe medicalnecessitydefense.Thesetheoriesofreliefweresetforthintheircomplaintbutwerenot reachedbytheCourtofAppeals.Wethereforedonotaddressthequestionwhetherjudicialrelief isavailabletorespondentsonthesealternativebases.Wedonote,however,thepresenceof anotheravenueofrelief.AstheSolicitorGeneralconfirmedduringoralargument,thestatute

authorizesproceduresforthereclassificationofScheduleIdrugs.Butperhapsevenmore importantthantheselegalavenuesisthedemocraticprocess,inwhichthevoicesofvoters alliedwiththeserespondentsmayonedaybeheardinthehallsofCongress.Underthepresent stateofthelaw,however,thejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsmustbevacated.Thecaseis remandedforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion. Itissoordered. JUSTICESCALIA,concurringinthejudgment. IagreewiththeCourt'sholdingthattheControlledSubstancesAct(CSA)mayvalidlybeapplied torespondents'cultivation,distribution,andpossessionofmarijuanaforpersonal,medicinaluse. Iwriteseparatelybecausemyunderstandingofthedoctrinalfoundationonwhichthatholding restsis,ifnotinconsistentwiththatoftheCourt,atleastmorenuanced. SincePerezv.UnitedStates,402U.S.146(1971),ourcaseshavemechanicallyrecitedthat theCommerceClausepermitscongressionalregulationofthreecategories:(1)the34*34 channelsofinterstatecommerce(2)theinstrumentalitiesofinterstatecommerce,andpersons orthingsininterstatecommerceand(3)activitiesthat"substantiallyaffect"interstate commerce.Id.,at150seeUnitedStatesv.Morrison,529U.S.598,608609(2000)United Statesv.Lopez,514U.S.549,558559(1995)Hodelv.VirginiaSurfaceMining&Reclamation Assn.,Inc.,452U.S.264,276277(1981).Thefirsttwocategoriesareselfevident,sincethey aretheingredientsofinterstatecommerceitself.SeeGibbonsv.Ogden,9Wheat.1,189190 (1824).Thethirdcategory,however,isdifferentinkind,anditsrecitationwithoutexplanationis misleadingandincomplete. Itismisleadingbecause,unlikethechannels,instrumentalities,andagentsofinterstate commerce,activitiesthatsubstantiallyaffectinterstatecommercearenotthemselvespartof interstatecommerce,andthusthepowertoregulatethemcannotcomefromtheCommerce Clausealone.Rather,asthisCourthasacknowledgedsinceatleastUnitedStatesv.Coombs, 12Pet.72(1838),Congress'sregulatoryauthorityoverintrastateactivitiesthatarenot themselvespartofinterstatecommerce(includingactivitiesthathaveasubstantialeffecton interstatecommerce)derivesfromtheNecessaryandProperClause.Id.,at78Katzenbachv. McClung,379U.S.294,301302(1964)UnitedStatesv.WrightwoodDairyCo.,315U.S.110, 119(1942)ShreveportRateCases,234U.S.342,353(1914)UnitedStatesv.E.C.Knight Co.,156U.S.1,3940(1895)(Harlan,J.,dissenting).[1]Andthecategoryof"activitiesthat substantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce,"Lopez,supra,at559,isincompletebecausethe authoritytoenactlawsnecessaryandproperfortheregulationofinterstatecommerceisnot limitedtolaws35*35governingintrastateactivitiesthatsubstantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce. Wherenecessarytomakearegulationofinterstatecommerceeffective,Congressmayregulate eventhoseintrastateactivitiesthatdonotthemselvessubstantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce.

I
Ourcasesshowthattheregulationofintrastateactivitiesmaybenecessarytoandproperfor theregulationofinterstatecommerceintwogeneralcircumstances.Mostdirectly,the commercepowerpermitsCongressnotonlytodeviserulesforthegovernanceofcommerce

betweenStatesbutalsotofacilitateinterstatecommercebyeliminatingpotentialobstructions, andtorestrictitbyeliminatingpotentialstimulants.SeeNLRBv.Jones&LaughlinSteelCorp., 301U.S.1,3637(1937).ThatiswhytheCourthasrepeatedlysustainedcongressional legislationonthegroundthattheregulatedactivitieshadasubstantialeffectoninterstate commerce.See,e.g.,Hodel,supra,at281(surfacecoalmining)Katzenbach,supra,at300 (discriminationbyrestaurants)HeartofAtlantaMotel,Inc.v.UnitedStates,379U.S.241,258 (1964)(discriminationbyhotels)MandevilleIslandFarms,Inc.v.AmericanCrystalSugarCo., 334U.S.219,237(1948)(intrastatepricefixing)BoardofTradeofChicagov.Olsen,262U.S. 1,40(1923)(activitiesofalocalgrainexchange)Staffordv.Wallace,258U.S.495,517, 524525(1922)(intrastatetransactionsatstockyard).LopezandMorrisonrecognizedthe expansivescopeofCongress'sauthorityinthisregard:"[T]hepatternisclear.Whereeconomic activitysubstantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerce,legislationregulatingthatactivitywillbe sustained."Lopez,supra,at560Morrison,supra,at610(same). Thisprincipleisnotwithoutlimitation.InLopezandMorrison,theCourtconsciousofthe potentialofthe"substantiallyaffects"testto"`obliteratethedistinctionbetweenwhatisnational andwhatislocal,'"Lopez,supra,at56656736*36(quotingA.L.A.SchechterPoultryCorp.v. UnitedStates,295U.S.495,554(1935))seealsoMorrison,supra,at615616rejectedthe argumentthatCongressmayregulatenoneconomicactivitybasedsolelyontheeffectthatit mayhaveoninterstatecommercethrougharemotechainofinferences.Lopez,supra,at 564566Morrison,supra,at617618."[I]fweweretoaccept[such]arguments,"theCourt reasonedinLopez,"wearehardpressedtopositanyactivitybyanindividualthatCongressis withoutpowertoregulate."514U.S.,at564seealsoMorrison,supra,at615616.Thus, althoughCongress'sauthoritytoregulateintrastateactivitythatsubstantiallyaffectsinterstate commerceisbroad,itdoesnotpermittheCourtto"pileinferenceuponinference,"Lopez,supra, at567,inordertoestablishthatnoneconomicactivityhasasubstantialeffectoninterstate commerce. AsweimplicitlyacknowledgedinLopez,however,Congress'sauthoritytoenactlawsnecessary andproperfortheregulationofinterstatecommerceisnotlimitedtolawsdirectedagainst economicactivitiesthathaveasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce.Thoughtheconductin Lopezwasnoteconomic,theCourtneverthelessrecognizedthatitcouldberegulatedas"an essentialpartofalargerregulationofeconomicactivity,inwhichtheregulatoryschemecouldbe undercutunlesstheintrastateactivitywereregulated."514U.S.,at561.Thisstatementreferred tothosecasespermittingtheregulationofintrastateactivities"whichinasubstantialway interferewithorobstructtheexerciseofthegrantedpower."WrightwoodDairyCo.,supra,at 119seealsoUnitedStatesv.Darby,312U.S.100,118119(1941)ShreveportRateCases, supra,at353.AstheCourtputitinWrightwoodDairy,whereCongresshastheauthorityto enactaregulationofinterstatecommerce,"itpossesseseverypowerneededtomakethat regulationeffective."315U.S.,at118119. 37*37Althoughthispower"tomake...regulationeffective"commonlyoverlapswiththeauthority toregulateeconomicactivitiesthatsubstantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce,[2]andmayinsome caseshavebeenconfusedwiththatauthority,thetwoaredistinct.Theregulationofanintrastate activitymaybeessentialtoacomprehensiveregulationofinterstatecommerceeventhoughthe intrastateactivitydoesnotitself"substantiallyaffect"interstatecommerce.Moreover,asthe

passagefromLopezquotedabovesuggests,Congressmayregulateevennoneconomiclocal activityifthatregulationisanecessarypartofamoregeneralregulationofinterstatecommerce. SeeLopez,supra,at561.Therelevantquestionissimplywhetherthemeanschosenare "reasonablyadapted"totheattainmentofalegitimateendunderthecommercepower.See Darby,supra,at121. InDarby,forinstance,theCourtexplainedthat"Congress,having...adoptedthepolicyof excludingfrominterstatecommerceallgoodsproducedforthecommercewhichdonot conformtothespecifiedlaborstandards,"312U.S.,at121,couldnotonlyrequireemployers engagedintheproductionofgoodsforinterstatecommercetoconformtowageandhour standards,id.,at119121,butcouldalsorequirethoseemployerstokeepemploymentrecords inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththeregulatoryscheme,id.,at125.WhiletheCourt sustainedtheformerregulationonthealternativegroundthattheactivityitregulatedcouldhave a"greateffect"oninterstatecommerce,id.,at122123,itaffirmedthelatteronthesoleground that"[t]herequirement38*38forrecordsevenoftheintrastatetransactionisanappropriate meanstothelegitimateend,"id.,at125. AstheCourtsaidintheShreveportRateCases,theNecessaryandProperClausedoesnot give"Congress...theauthoritytoregulatetheinternalcommerceofaState,assuch,"butit doesallowCongress"totakeallmeasuresnecessaryorappropriateto"theeffectiveregulation oftheinterstatemarket,"althoughintrastatetransactions...maytherebybecontrolled."234U. S.,at353seealsoJones&LaughlinSteelCorp.,supra,at38(thelogicoftheShreveportRate Casesisnotlimitedtoinstrumentalitiesofcommerce).

II
Today'sprincipaldissentobjectsthat,bypermittingCongresstoregulateactivitiesnecessaryto effectiveinterstateregulation,theCourtreducesLopezandMorrisontolittle"morethana draftingguide."Post,at46(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.).Ithinkthatcriticismunjustified.Unlikethe powertoregulateactivitiesthathaveasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce,thepowerto enactlawsenablingeffectiveregulationofinterstatecommercecanonlybeexercisedin conjunctionwithcongressionalregulationofaninterstatemarket,anditextendsonlytothose measuresnecessarytomaketheinterstateregulationeffective.AsLopezitselfstates,andthe Courtaffirmstoday,Congressmayregulatenoneconomicintrastateactivitiesonlywherethe failuretodoso"could...undercut"itsregulationofinterstatecommerce.SeeLopez,supra,at 561ante,at18,2425.Thisisnotapowerthatthreatenstoobliteratethelinebetween"whatis trulynationalandwhatistrulylocal."Lopez,supra,at567568. LopezandMorrisonaffirmthatCongressmaynotregulatecertain"purelylocal"activitywithin theStatesbasedsolelyontheattenuatedeffectthatsuchactivitymayhaveintheinterstate market.Butthosedecisionsdonotdeclarenoneconomicintrastateactivitiestobecategorically beyond39*39thereachoftheFederalGovernment.Neithercaseinvolvedthepowerof Congresstoexertcontroloverintrastateactivitiesinconnectionwithamorecomprehensive schemeofregulationLopezexpresslydisclaimedthatitwassuchacase,514U.S.,at561, andMorrisondidnotevendiscussthepossibilitythatitwas.(TheCourtofAppealsinMorrison madeclearthatitwasnot.SeeBrzonkalav.VirginiaPolytechnicInst.,169F.3d820,834835

(CA41999)(enbanc).)Todismissthisdistinctionas"superficialandformalistic,"seepost,at47 (O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting),istomisunderstandthenatureoftheNecessaryandProper Clause,whichempowersCongresstoenactlawsineffectuationofitsenumeratedpowersthat arenotwithinitsauthoritytoenactinisolation.SeeMcCullochv.Maryland,4Wheat.316, 421422(1819). AndthereareotherrestraintsupontheNecessaryandProperClauseauthority.AsChiefJustice MarshallwroteinMcCullochv.Maryland,evenwhentheendisconstitutionalandlegitimate,the meansmustbe"appropriate"and"plainlyadapted"tothatend.Id.,at421.Moreover,theymay notbeotherwise"prohibited"andmustbe"consistentwiththeletterandspiritofthe constitution."Ibid.Thesephrasesarenotmerelyhortatory.Forexample,casessuchasPrintzv. UnitedStates,521U.S.898(1997),andNewYorkv.UnitedStates,505U.S.144(1992),affirm thatalawisnot"`properforcarryingintoExecutiontheCommerceClause'""[w]hen[it]violates [aconstitutional]principleofstatesovereignty."Printz,supra,at923924seealsoNewYork, supra,at166.

III
Theapplicationoftheseprinciplestothecasebeforeusisstraightforward.IntheCSA, CongresshasundertakentoextinguishtheinterstatemarketinScheduleIcontrolled substances,includingmarijuana.TheCommerceClauseunquestionablypermitsthis.The powertoregulateinterstatecommerce"extendsnotonlytothoseregulationswhichaid,40*40 fosterandprotectthecommerce,butembracesthosewhichprohibitit."Darby,supra,at113. SeealsoHipoliteEggCo.v.UnitedStates,220U.S.45,58(1911)LotteryCase,188U.S.321, 354(1903).Toeffectuateitsobjective,Congresshasprohibitedalmostallintrastateactivities relatedtoScheduleIsubstancesbotheconomicactivities(manufacture,distribution, possessionwiththeintenttodistribute)andnoneconomicactivities(simplepossession).See21 U.S.C.841(a),844(a).Thatsimplepossessionisanoneconomicactivityisimmaterialto whetheritcanbeprohibitedasanecessarypartofalargerregulation.Rather,Congress's authoritytoenactalloftheseprohibitionsofintrastatecontrolledsubstanceactivitiesdepends onlyuponwhethertheyareappropriatemeansofachievingthelegitimateendoferadicating ScheduleIsubstancesfrominterstatecommerce. Bythismeasure,Ithinktheregulationmustbesustained.Notonlyisitimpossibletodistinguish "controlledsubstancesmanufacturedanddistributedintrastate"from"controlledsubstances manufacturedanddistributedinterstate,"butithardlymakessensetospeakinsuchterms. Drugslikemarijuanaarefungiblecommodities.AstheCourtexplains,marijuanathatisgrownat homeandpossessedforpersonaluseisnevermorethananinstantfromtheinterstatemarket andthisissowhetherornotthepossessionisformedicinaluseorlawfuluseunderthelaws ofaparticularState.[3]41*41Seeante,at2533.Congressneednotacceptonfaiththatstate lawwillbeeffectiveinmaintainingastrictdivisionbetweenalawfulmarketfor"medical" marijuanaandthemoregeneralmarijuanamarket.Seeante,at30,andn.38."Toimposeon [Congress]thenecessityofresortingtomeanswhichitcannotcontrol,whichanother governmentmayfurnishorwithhold,wouldrenderitscourseprecarious,theresultofits

measuresuncertain,andcreateadependenceonothergovernments,whichmightdisappointits mostimportantdesigns,andisincompatiblewiththelanguageoftheconstitution."McCulloch,4 Wheat.,at424. Finally,neitherrespondentsnorthedissenterssuggestanyviolationofstatesovereigntyofthe sortthatwouldrenderthisregulation"inappropriate,"id.,at421excepttoarguethattheCSA regulatesanareatypicallylefttostateregulation.Seepost,at48,51(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.) post,at66(opinionofTHOMAS,J.)BriefforRespondents3942.Thatisnotenoughtorender federalregulationaninappropriatemeans.TheCourthasrepeatedlyrecognizedthat,if authorizedbythecommercepower,Congressmayregulateprivateendeavors"evenwhen[that regulation]maypreemptexpressstatelawdeterminationscontrarytotheresultwhichhas commendeditselftothecollectivewisdomofCongress."NationalLeagueofCitiesv.Usery, 426U.S.833,840(1976)seeClevelandv.UnitedStates,329U.S.14,19(1946)McCulloch, supra,at424.Atbottom,respondents'42*42statesovereigntyargumentreducestothe contentionthatfederalregulationoftheactivitiespermittedbyCalifornia'sCompassionateUse Actisnotsufficientlynecessarytobe"necessaryandproper"toCongress'sregulationofthe interstatemarket.ForthereasonsgivenaboveandintheCourt'sopinion,Icannotagree.

***
IthusagreewiththeCourtthat,howevertheclassofregulatedactivitiesissubdivided,Congress couldreasonablyconcludethatitsobjectiveofprohibitingmarijuanafromtheinterstatemarket "couldbeundercut"ifthoseactivitieswereexceptedfromitsgeneralschemeofregulation.See Lopez,514U.S.,at561.ThatissufficienttoauthorizetheapplicationoftheCSAto respondents. JUSTICEO'CONNOR,withwhomTHECHIEFJUSTICEandJUSTICETHOMASjoinastoall butPartIII,dissenting. Weenforcethe"outerlimits"ofCongress'CommerceClauseauthoritynotfortheirownsake, buttoprotecthistoricspheresofstatesovereigntyfromexcessivefederalencroachmentand therebytomaintainthedistributionofpowerfundamentaltoourfederalistsystemofgovernment. UnitedStatesv.Lopez,514U.S.549,557(1995)NLRBv.Jones&LaughlinSteelCorp.,301 U.S.1,37(1937).Oneoffederalism'schiefvirtues,ofcourse,isthatitpromotesinnovationby allowingforthepossibilitythat"asinglecourageousStatemay,ifitscitizenschoose,serveasa laboratoryandtrynovelsocialandeconomicexperimentswithoutrisktotherestofthecountry." NewStateIceCo.v.Liebmann,285U.S.262,311(1932)(Brandeis,J.,dissenting). ThiscaseexemplifiestheroleofStatesaslaboratories.TheStates'corepolicepowershave alwaysincludedauthoritytodefinecriminallawandtoprotectthehealth,safety,andwelfareof theircitizens.Brechtv.Abrahamson,507U.S.619,635(1993)Whalenv.Roe,429U.S.589, 603,43*43n.30(1977).Exercisingthosepowers,California(byballotinitiativeandthenby legislativecodification)hascometoitsownconclusionaboutthedifficultandsensitivequestion ofwhethermarijuanashouldbeavailabletorelieveseverepainandsuffering.TodaytheCourt sanctionsanapplicationofthefederalControlledSubstancesActthatextinguishesthat experiment,withoutanyproofthatthepersonalcultivation,possession,anduseofmarijuanafor medicinalpurposes,ifeconomicactivityinthefirstplace,hasasubstantialeffectoninterstate

commerceandisthereforeanappropriatesubjectoffederalregulation.Insodoing,theCourt announcesarulethatgivesCongressaperverseincentivetolegislatebroadlypursuanttothe CommerceClausenestlingquestionableassertionsofitsauthorityintocomprehensive regulatoryschemesratherthanwithprecision.Thatruleandtheresultitproducesinthis caseareirreconcilablewithourdecisionsinLopez,supra,andUnitedStatesv.Morrison,529U. S.598(2000).AccordinglyIdissent.

I
InLopez,weconsideredtheconstitutionalityoftheGunFreeSchoolZonesActof1990,which madeitafederaloffense"foranyindividualknowinglytopossessafirearm...ataplacethatthe individualknows,orhasreasonablecausetobelieve,isaschoolzone,"18U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(A).Weexplainedthat"Congress'commerceauthorityincludesthepowertoregulate thoseactivitieshavingasubstantialrelationtointerstatecommerce...,i.e.,thoseactivitiesthat substantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce."514U.S.,at558559(citationomitted).Thispower derivesfromtheconjunctionoftheCommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClause. Garciav.SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority,469U.S.528,585586(1985) (O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting)(explainingthatUnitedStatesv.Darby,312U.S.100(1941), UnitedStatesv.WrightwoodDairyCo.,315U.S.110(1942),andWickardv.Filburn,317U.S. 111(1942),44*44basedtheirexpansionofthecommercepowerontheNecessaryandProper Clause,andthat"thereasoningofthesecasesunderlieseveryrecentdecisionconcerningthe reachofCongresstoactivitiesaffectinginterstatecommerce")ante,at34(SCALIA,J., concurringinjudgment).WeheldinLopezthattheGunFreeSchoolZonesActcouldnotbe sustainedasanexerciseofthatpower. Ourdecisionaboutwhethergunpossessioninschoolzonessubstantiallyaffectedinterstate commerceturnedonfourconsiderations.Lopez,supra,at559567seealsoMorrison,supra,at 609613.First,weobservedthatour"substantialeffects"casesgenerallyhaveupheldfederal regulationofeconomicactivitythataffectedinterstatecommerce,butthat922(q)wasa criminalstatutehaving"nothingtodowith`commerce'oranysortofeconomicenterprise." Lopez,514U.S.,at561.Inthisregard,wealsonotedthat"[s]ection922(q)isnotanessential partofalargerregulationofeconomicactivity,inwhichtheregulatoryschemecouldbeundercut unlesstheintrastateactivitywereregulated.Itcannot,therefore,besustainedunderourcases upholdingregulationsofactivitiesthatariseoutoforareconnectedwithacommercial transaction,whichviewedintheaggregate,substantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerce."Ibid. Second,wenotedthatthestatutecontainednoexpressjurisdictionalrequirementestablishing itsconnectiontointerstatecommerce.Ibid. Third,wefoundtellingtheabsenceoflegislativefindingsabouttheregulatedconduct'simpact oninterstatecommerce.Weexplainedthatwhileexpresslegislativefindingsareneitherrequired nor,whenprovided,dispositive,findings"enableustoevaluatethelegislativejudgmentthatthe activityinquestionsubstantiallyaffect[s]interstatecommerce,eventhoughnosuchsubstantial effect[is]visibletothenakedeye."Id.,at563.Finally,werejectedastooattenuatedthe Government'sargumentthatfirearmpossessioninschoolzonescouldresultinviolentcrime whichinturncould45*45adverselyaffectthenationaleconomy.Id.,at563567.The

Constitution,wesaid,doesnottoleratereasoningthatwould"convertcongressionalauthority undertheCommerceClausetoageneralpolicepowerofthesortretainedbytheStates."Id.,at 567.LaterinMorrison,supra,wereliedonthesamefourconsiderationstoholdthat40302of theViolenceAgainstWomenActof1994,108Stat.1941,42U.S.C.13981,exceeded Congress'authorityundertheCommerceClause. Inmyview,thecasebeforeusismateriallyindistinguishablefromLopezandMorrisonwhenthe sameconsiderationsaretakenintoaccount.

II A
WhatistherelevantconductsubjecttoCommerceClauseanalysisinthiscase?TheCourt takesitscuesfromCongress,applyingtheaboveconsiderationstotheactivityregulatedbythe ControlledSubstancesAct(CSA)ingeneral.TheCourt'sdecisionrestsontwofactsaboutthe CSA:(1)Congresschosetoenactasinglestatuteprovidingacomprehensiveprohibitiononthe production,distribution,andpossessionofallcontrolledsubstances,and(2)Congressdidnot distinguishbetweenvariousformsofintrastatenoncommercialcultivation,possession,anduse ofmarijuana.See21U.S.C.841(a)(1),844(a).Today'sdecisionsuggeststhatthefederal regulationoflocalactivityisimmunetoCommerceClausechallengebecauseCongresschose toactwithanambitious,allencompassingstatute,ratherthanpiecemeal.Inmyview,allowing Congresstosetthetermsoftheconstitutionaldebateinthisway,i.e.,bypackagingregulation oflocalactivityinbroaderschemes,istantamounttoremovingmeaningfullimitsonthe CommerceClause. TheCourt'sprincipalmeansofdistinguishingLopezfromthiscaseistoobservethatthe GunFreeSchoolZonesActof1990wasa"brief,singlesubjectstatute,"ante,at23,46*46 whereastheCSAis"alengthyanddetailedstatutecreatingacomprehensiveframeworkfor regulatingtheproduction,distribution,andpossessionoffiveclassesof`controlled substances,'"ante,at24.Thus,accordingtotheCourt,itwaspossibleinLopeztoevaluatein isolationtheconstitutionalityofcriminalizinglocalactivity(theregunpossessioninschool zones),whereasthelocalactivitythattheCSAtargets(inthiscasecultivationandpossessionof marijuanaforpersonalmedicinaluse)cannotbeseparatedfromthegeneraldrugcontrol schemeofwhichitisapart. Today'sdecisionallowsCongresstoregulateintrastateactivitywithoutcheck,solongasthere issomeimplicationbylegislativedesignthatregulatingintrastateactivityisessential(andthe Courtappearstoequate"essential"with"necessary")totheinterstateregulatoryscheme. SeizinguponourlanguageinLopezthatthestatuteprohibitinggunpossessioninschoolzones was"notanessentialpartofalargerregulationofeconomicactivity,inwhichtheregulatory schemecouldbeundercutunlesstheintrastateactivitywereregulated,"514U.S.,at561,the Courtappearstoreasonthattheplacementoflocalactivityinacomprehensivescheme confirmsthatitisessentialtothatscheme.Ante,at2425.IftheCourtisright,thenLopez standsfornothingmorethanadraftingguide:Congressshouldhavedescribedtherelevant

crimeas"transferorpossessionofafirearmanywhereinthenation"thusincluding commercialandnoncommercialactivity,andclearlyencompassingsomeactivitywithassuredly substantialeffectoninterstatecommerce.Haditdoneso,themajorityhints,wewouldhave sustaineditsauthoritytoregulatepossessionoffirearmsinschoolzones.Furthermore,today's decisionsuggestswewouldreadilysustainacongressionaldecisiontoattachtheregulationof intrastateactivitytoapreexistingcomprehensive(orevennotsocomprehensive)scheme.If so,theCourtinvitesincreasedfederalregulationoflocalactivityevenif,asitsuggests, Congresswouldnotenactanewinterstate47*47schemeexclusivelyforthesakeofreaching intrastateactivity,seeante,at25,n.34ante,at3839(SCALIA,J.,concurringinjudgment). IcannotagreethatourdecisioninLopezcontemplatedsuchevasiveoroverbroadlegislative strategieswithapproval.Untiltoday,suchargumentshavebeenmadeonlyindissent.See Morrison,529U.S.,at657(BREYER,J.,dissenting)(giventhatCongresscanregulate"`an essentialpartofalargerregulationofeconomicactivity,'""canCongresssavethepresentlaw byincludingit,ormuchofit,inabroader`SafeTransport'or`WorkerSafety'act?").Lopezand Morrisondidnotindicatethattheconstitutionalityoffederalregulationdependsonsuperficialand formalisticdistinctions.LikewiseIdidnotunderstandourdiscussionoftheroleofcourtsin enforcingouterlimitsoftheCommerceClauseforthesakeofmaintainingthefederalistbalance ourConstitutionrequires,seeLopez,514U.S.,at557id.,at578(KENNEDY,J.,concurring), asasignaltoCongresstoenactlegislationthatismoreextensiveandmoreintrusiveintothe domainofstatepower.IftheCourtalwaysdeferstoCongressasitdoestoday,littlemaybeleft tothenotionofenumeratedpowers. Thehardworkforcourts,then,istoidentifyobjectivemarkersforconfiningtheanalysisin CommerceClausecases.Here,respondentschallengetheconstitutionalityoftheCSAas appliedtothemandthosesimilarlysituated.IagreewiththeCourtthatwemustlookbeyond respondents'ownactivities.Otherwise,individuallitigantscouldalwaysexemptthemselvesfrom CommerceClauseregulationmerelybypointingtotheobviousthattheirpersonalactivities donothaveasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce.SeeMarylandv.Wirtz,392U.S.183, 193(1968)Wickard,317U.S.,at127128.Thetaskistoidentifyamodeofanalysisthatallows Congresstoregulatemorethannothing(bydecliningtoreduceeachcasetoitslitigants)and lessthaneverything(bydecliningtoletCongresssetthe48*48termsofanalysis).Theanalysis maynotbethesameineverycase,foritdependsontheregulatoryschemeatissueandthe federalismconcernsimplicated.SeegenerallyLopez,514U.S.,at567id.,at579(KENNEDY, J.,concurring). Anumberofobjectivemarkersareavailabletoconfinethescopeofconstitutionalreviewhere. BothfederalandstatelegislationincludingtheCSAitself,theCaliforniaCompassionateUse Act,andotherstatemedicalmarijuanalegislationrecognizethatmedicalandnonmedical(i. e.,recreational)usesofdrugsarerealisticallydistinctandcanbesegregated,andregulatethem differently.See21U.S.C.812Cal.Health&SafetyCodeAnn.11362.5(WestSupp.2005) ante,at5(opinionoftheCourt).RespondentschallengeonlytheapplicationoftheCSAto medicinaluseofmarijuana.Cf.UnitedStatesv.Raines,362U.S.17,2022(1960)(describing ourpreferenceforasappliedratherthanfacialchallenges).Moreover,becausefundamental structuralconcernsaboutdualsovereigntyanimateourCommerceClausecases,itisrelevant thatthiscaseinvolvestheinterplayoffederalandstateregulationinareasofcriminallawand

socialpolicy,where"Stateslayclaimbyrightofhistoryandexpertise."Lopez,supra,at583 (KENNEDY,J.,concurring)seealsoMorrison,supra,at617619Lopez,supra,at580 (KENNEDY,J.,concurring)("Thestatutebeforeusupsetsthefederalbalancetoadegreethat rendersitanunconstitutionalassertionofthecommercepower,andourinterventionis required")cf.Garcia,469U.S.,at586(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting)("[S]tateautonomyisa relevantfactorinassessingthemeansbywhichCongressexercisesitspowers"underthe CommerceClause).California,likeotherStates,hasdrawnonitsreservedpowersto distinguishtheregulationofmedicinalmarijuana.ToascertainwhetherCongress'encroachment isconstitutionallyjustifiedinthiscase,then,Iwouldfocushereonthepersonalcultivation, possession,anduseofmarijuanaformedicinalpurposes.

49*49B
Havingthusdefinedtherelevantconduct,wemustdeterminewhether,underourprecedents, theconductiseconomicand,intheaggregate,substantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerce.Even ifintrastatecultivationandpossessionofmarijuanaforone'sownmedicinalusecanproperlybe characterizedaseconomic,andIquestionwhetheritcan,ithasnotbeenshownthatsuch activitysubstantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerce.Similarly,itisneitherselfevidentnor demonstratedthatregulatingsuchactivityisnecessarytotheinterstatedrugcontrolscheme. TheCourt'sdefinitionofeconomicactivityisbreathtaking.Itdefinesaseconomicanyactivity involvingtheproduction,distribution,andconsumptionofcommodities.Anditappearstoreason thatwhenaninterstatemarketforacommodityexists,regulatingtheintrastatemanufactureor possessionofthatcommodityisconstitutionaleitherbecausethatintrastateactivityisitself economic,orbecauseregulatingitisarationalpartofregulatingitsmarket.Puttingtooneside theproblemendemictotheCourt'sopiniontheshiftinfocusfromtheactivityatissueinthis casetotheentiretyofwhattheCSAregulates,seeLopez,supra,at565("dependingonthelevel ofgenerality,anyactivitycanbelookeduponascommercial")theCourt'sdefinitionof economicactivityforpurposesofCommerceClausejurisprudencethreatenstosweepallof productivehumanactivityintofederalregulatoryreach. TheCourtusesadictionarydefinitionofeconomicstoskirttherealproblemofdrawinga meaningfullinebetween"whatisnationalandwhatislocal,"Jones&LaughlinSteel,301U.S., at37.ItwillnotdotosaythatCongressmayregulatenoncommercialactivitysimplybecauseit mayhaveaneffectonthedemandforcommercialgoods,orbecausethenoncommercial endeavorcan,insomesense,substituteforcommercialactivity.Mostcommercialgoodsor serviceshavesomesortofprivatelyproducibleanalogue.Homecare50*50substitutesfor daycare.Charadesgamessubstituteformovietickets.Backyardorwindowsillgardening substitutesforgoingtothesupermarket.Todrawthelinewhereverprivateactivityaffectsthe demandformarketgoodsistodrawnolineatall,andtodeclareeverythingeconomic.Wehave alreadyrejectedtheresultthatwouldfollowafederalpolicepower.Lopez,supra,at564. InLopezandMorrison,wesuggestedthateconomicactivityusuallyrelatesdirectlyto commercialactivity.SeeMorrison,529U.S.,at611,n.4(intrastateactivitiesthathavebeen withinCongress'powertoregulatehavebeen"ofanapparentcommercialcharacter")Lopez, 514U.S.,at561(distinguishingtheGunFreeSchoolZonesActof1990from"activitiesthat

ariseoutoforareconnectedwithacommercialtransaction").Thehomegrowncultivationand personalpossessionanduseofmarijuanaformedicinalpurposeshasnoapparentcommercial character.Everyoneagreesthatthemarijuanaatissueinthiscasewasneverinthestreamof commerce,andneitherwerethesuppliesforgrowingit.(Marijuanaishighlyunusualamongthe substancessubjecttotheCSAinthatitcanbecultivatedwithoutanymaterialsthathave traveledininterstatecommerce.)Lopezmakesclearthatpossessionisnotitselfcommercial activity.Ibid.Andrespondentshavenotcomeintopossessionbymeansofanycommercial transactiontheyhavesimplygrown,intheirownhomes,marijuanafortheirownuse,without acquiring,buying,selling,orbarteringathingofvalue.Cf.id.,at583(KENNEDY,J.,concurring) ("ThestatutenowbeforeusforeclosestheStatesfromexperimenting...anditdoessoby regulatinganactivitybeyondtherealmofcommerceintheordinaryandusualsenseofthat term"). TheCourtsuggeststhatWickard,whichwehaveidentifiedas"perhapsthemostfarreaching exampleofCommerceClauseauthorityoverintrastateactivity,"Lopez,supra,at560, establishedfederalregulatorypoweroveranyhomeconsumptionofacommodityforwhicha nationalmarketexists.51*51Idisagree.WickardinvolvedachallengetotheAgricultural AdjustmentActof1938(AAA),whichdirectedtheSecretaryofAgriculturetosetnationalquotas onwheatproduction,andpenaltiesforexcessproduction.317U.S.,at115116.TheAAAitself confirmedthatCongressmadeanexplicitchoicenottoreachandthustheCourtcouldnot possiblyhaveapprovedoffederalcontroloversmallscale,noncommercialwheatfarming.In contrasttotheCSA'slimitlessassertionofpower,Congressprovidedanexemptionwithinthe AAAforsmallproducers.WhenFilburnplantedthewheatatissueinWickard,thestatute exemptedplantingslessthan200bushels(aboutsixtons),andwhenheharvestedhiswheatit exemptedplantingslessthansixacres.Id.,at130,n.30.Wickard,then,didnotextend CommerceClauseauthoritytosomethingasmodestasthehomecook'sherbgarden.Thisis nottosaythatCongressmayneverregulatesmallquantitiesofcommoditiespossessedor producedforpersonaluse,ortodenythatitsometimesneedstoenactazerotoleranceregime forsuchcommodities.ItismerelytosaythatWickarddidnotholdorimplythatsmallscale productionofcommoditiesisalwayseconomic,andautomaticallywithinCongress'reach. Evenassumingthateconomicactivityisatissueinthiscase,theGovernmenthasmadeno showinginfactthatthepossessionanduseofhomegrownmarijuanaformedicalpurposes,in Californiaorelsewhere,hasasubstantialeffectoninterstatecommerce.Similarly,the Governmenthasnotshownthatregulatingsuchactivityisnecessarytoaninterstateregulatory scheme.Whateverthespecifictheoryof"substantialeffects"atissue(i.e.,whethertheactivity substantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerce,whetheritsregulationisnecessarytoaninterstate regulatoryscheme,orboth),aconcernfordualsovereigntyrequiresthatCongress'excursion intothetraditionaldomainofStatesbejustified. ThatiswhycharacterizingthisasacaseabouttheNecessaryandProperClausedoesnot changetheanalysissignificantly.52*52Congressmustexerciseitsauthorityunderthe NecessaryandProperClauseinamannerconsistentwithbasicconstitutionalprinciples. Garcia,469U.S.,at585(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting)("Itisnotenoughthatthe`endbe legitimate'themeanstothatendchosenbyCongressmustnotcontravenethespiritofthe Constitution").AsJUSTICESCALIArecognizes,seeante,at39(opinionconcurringin

judgment),CongresscannotuseitsauthorityundertheClausetocontravenetheprincipleof statesovereigntyembodiedintheTenthAmendment.Likewise,thatauthoritymustbeusedina mannerconsistentwiththenotionofenumeratedpowersastructuralprinciplethatisas muchpartoftheConstitutionastheTenthAmendment'sexplicittextualcommand.Accordingly, somethingmorethanmereassertionisrequiredwhenCongresspurportstohavepowerover localactivitywhoseconnectiontoaninterstatemarketisnotselfevident.Otherwise,the NecessaryandProperClausewillalwaysbeabackdoorforunconstitutionalfederalregulation. Cf.Printzv.UnitedStates,521U.S.898,923(1997)(theNecessaryandProperClauseis"the last,besthopeofthosewhodefendultravirescongressionalaction").Indeed,ifitwereenough in"substantialeffects"casesfortheCourttosupplyconceivablejustificationsforintrastate regulationrelatedtoaninterstatemarket,thenwecouldhavesurmisedinLopezthatgunsin schoolzonesare"nevermorethananinstantfromtheinterstatemarket"ingunsalreadysubject toextensivefederalregulation,ante,at40(SCALIA,J.,concurringinjudgment),recastLopezas aNecessaryandProperClausecase,andtherebyupheldtheGunFreeSchoolZonesActof 1990.(AccordingtotheCourt'sandtheconcurrence'slogic,forexample,theLopezcourtshould havereasonedthattheprohibitionongunpossessioninschoolzonescouldbeanappropriate meansofeffectuatingarelatedprohibitionon"sell[ing]"or"deliver[ing]"firearmsorammunitionto "anyindividualwhothelicenseeknowsorhasreasonablecausetobelieveislessthan53*53 eighteenyearsofage."18U.S.C.922(b)(1)(1988ed.,Supp.II).) Thereissimplynoevidencethathomegrownmedicinalmarijuanausersconstitute,inthe aggregate,asizableenoughclasstohaveadiscernable,letalonesubstantial,impactonthe nationalillicitdrugmarketorotherwisetothreatentheCSAregime.Explicitevidenceishelpful whensubstantialeffectisnot"visibletothenakedeye."SeeLopez,514U.S.,at563.Andhere, inpartbecausecommonsensesuggeststhatmedicalmarijuanausersmaybelimitedin numberandthatCalifornia'sCompassionateUseActandsimilarstatelegislationmaywell isolateactivitiesrelatingtomedicinalmarijuanafromtheillicitmarket,theeffectofthose activitiesoninterstatedrugtrafficisnotselfevidentlysubstantial. Inthisregard,again,thiscaseisreadilydistinguishablefromWickard.Todecidewhetherthe Secretarycouldregulatelocalwheatfarming,theCourtlookedto"theactualeffectsofthe activityinquestionuponinterstatecommerce."317U.S.,at120.Critically,theCourtwasableto consider"actualeffects"becausethepartieshad"stipulatedasummaryoftheeconomicsofthe wheatindustry."Id.,at125.Afterreviewingindetailthepictureoftheindustryprovidedinthat summary,theCourtexplainedthatconsumptionofhomegrownwheatwasthemostvariable factorinthesizeofthenationalwheatcrop,andthatonsiteconsumptioncouldhavetheeffect ofvaryingtheamountofwheatsenttomarketbyasmuchas20percent.Id.,at127.Withreal numbersathand,theWickardCourtcouldeasilyconcludethat"afactorofsuchvolumeand variabilityashomeconsumedwheatwouldhaveasubstantialinfluenceonpriceandmarket conditions"nationwide.Id.,at128seealsoid.,at128129("Thisrecordleavesusinnodoubt" aboutsubstantialeffects). TheCourtrecognizesthat"therecordintheWickardcaseitselfestablishedthecausal connectionbetweentheproduction54*54forlocaluseandthenationalmarket"andarguesthat "wehavebeforeusfindingsbyCongresstothesameeffect."Ante,at20(emphasisadded).The CourtreferstoaseriesofdeclarationsintheintroductiontotheCSAsayingthat(1)local

distributionandpossessionofcontrolledsubstancescauses"swelling"ininterstatetraffic(2) localproductionanddistributioncannotbedistinguishedfrominterstateproductionand distribution(3)federalcontroloverintrastateincidents"isessentialtotheeffectivecontrol"over interstatedrugtrafficking.21U.S.C.801(1)(6).Thesebaredeclarationscannotbe comparedtotherecordbeforetheCourtinWickard. Theyamounttonothingmorethanalegislativeinsistencethattheregulationofcontrolled substancesmustbeabsolute.Theyareassertedwithoutanysupportingevidence descriptive,statistical,orotherwise."[S]implybecauseCongressmayconcludethataparticular activitysubstantiallyaffectsinterstatecommercedoesnotnecessarilymakeitso."Hodelv. VirginiaSurfaceMining&ReclamationAssn.,Inc.,452U.S.264,311(1981)(REHNQUIST,J., concurringinjudgment).Indeed,ifdeclarationslikethesesufficetojustifyfederalregulation,and iftheCourttodayisrightaboutwhatpassesrationalityreviewbeforeus,thenourdecisionin Morrisonshouldhavecomeouttheotherway.Inthatcase,Congresshadsuppliednumerous findingsregardingtheimpactgendermotivatedviolencehadonthenationaleconomy.529U.S., at614id.,at628636(SOUTER,J.,dissenting)(chroniclingfindings).But,recognizingthat "`"[w]hetherparticularoperationsaffectinterstatecommercesufficientlytocomeunderthe constitutionalpowerofCongresstoregulatethemisultimatelyajudicialratherthanalegislative question,"'"wefoundCongress'detailedfindingsinadequate.Id.,at614(quotingLopez,supra, at557,n.2,inturnquotingHeartofAtlantaMotel,Inc.v.UnitedStates,379U.S.241,273 (1964)(Black,J.,concurring)).If,astheCourtclaims,today'sdecisiondoesnot55*55break withprecedent,howcanitbethatvoluminousfindings,documentingextensivehearingsabout thespecifictopicofviolenceagainstwomen,didnotpassconstitutionalmusterinMorrison, whiletheCSA'sabstract,unsubstantiated,generalizedfindingsaboutcontrolledsubstancesdo? Inparticular,theCSA'sintroductorydeclarationsaretoovagueandunspecifictodemonstrate thatthefederalstatutoryschemewillbeunderminedifCongresscannotexertpowerover individualslikerespondents.Thedeclarationsarenotevenspecifictomarijuana.(Factsabout substantialeffectsmaybedevelopedinlitigationtocompensatefortheinadequacyofCongress' findingsinpartbecausethiscasecomestousfromthegrantofapreliminaryinjunction,there hasbeennosuchdevelopment.)BecausehereCalifornia,likeotherStates,hascarvedouta limitedclassofactivityfordistinctregulation,theinadequacyoftheCSA'sfindingsisespecially glaring.TheCaliforniaCompassionateUseActexemptsfromotherstatedruglawspatientsand theircaregivers"whoposses[s]orcultivat[e]marijuanaforthepersonalmedicalpurposesofthe patientuponthewrittenororalrecommendationorapprovalofaphysician"totreatalistof seriousmedicalconditions.Cal.Health&SafetyCodeAnn.11362.5(d),11362.7(h)(West Supp.2005)(emphasisadded).Compareibid.with,e.g.,11357(b)(West1991)(criminalizing marijuanapossessioninexcessof28.5grams)11358(criminalizingmarijuanacultivation). TheActspecifiesthatitshouldnotbeconstruedtosupersedelegislationprohibitingpersons fromengaginginactsdangeroustoothers,ortocondonethediversionofmarijuanafor nonmedicalpurposes.11362.5(b)(2)(WestSupp.2005).TopromotetheAct'soperationand tofacilitatelawenforcement,Californiarecentlyenactedanidentificationcardsystemfor qualifiedpatients.11362.711362.83.WegenerallyassumeStatesenforcetheirlaws,see Rileyv.NationalFederationofBlindofN.C.,Inc.,487U.S.781,795(1988),andhaveno reasontothinkotherwisehere.

56*56TheGovernmenthasnotovercomeempiricaldoubtthatthenumberofCalifornians engagedinpersonalcultivation,possession,anduseofmedicalmarijuana,ortheamountof marijuanatheyproduce,isenoughtothreatenthefederalregime.Norhasitshownthat CompassionateUseActmarijuanausershavebeenorarerealisticallylikelytoberesponsible forthedrug'sseepingintothemarketinasignificantway.TheGovernmentdoesciteone estimatethattherewereover100,000CompassionateUseActusersinCaliforniain2004,Reply BriefforPetitioners16,butdoesnotexplain,intermsofproportions,whattheirpresencemeans forthenationalillicitdrugmarket.SeegenerallyWirtz,392U.S.,at196,n.27(Congresscannot use"arelativelytrivialimpactoncommerceasanexcuseforbroadgeneralregulationofstateor privateactivities")cf.GeneralAccountingOffice,Marijuana:EarlyExperienceswithFourStates' LawsThatAllowUseforMedicalPurposes2123(Rep.No.03189,Nov.2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03189.pdf(asvisitedJune3,2005,andavailableinClerkof Court'scasefile)(infourCaliforniacountiesbeforetheidentificationcardsystemwasenacted, voluntarilyregisteredmedicalmarijuanapatientswerelessthan0.5percentofthepopulationin Alaska,Hawaii,andOregon,statewidemedicalmarijuanaregistrantsrepresentedlessthan0.05 percentoftheStates'populations).ItalsoprovidesanecdotalevidenceabouttheCSA's enforcement.SeeReplyBriefforPetitioners1718.TheCourtalsoofferssomearguments abouttheeffectoftheCompassionateUseActonthenationalmarket.ItsaysthattheCalifornia statutemightbevulnerabletoexploitationbyunscrupulousphysicians,thatCompassionateUse Actpatientsmayoverproduce,andthatthehistoryofthenarcoticstradeshowsthedifficultyof cordoningoffanydrugusefromtherestofthemarket.Theseargumentsareplausibleifborne outinfacttheycouldjustifyprosecutingCompassionateUseActpatientsunderthefederalCSA. But,withoutsubstantiation,57*57theyaddlittletotheCSA'sconclusorystatementsabout diversion,essentiality,andmarketeffect.Pilingassertionuponassertiondoesnot,inmyview, satisfythesubstantialitytestofLopezandMorrison.

III
WewoulddowelltorecallhowJamesMadison,thefatheroftheConstitution,describedour systemofjointsovereigntytothepeopleofNewYork:"Thepowersdelegatedbytheproposed Constitutiontothefederalgovernmentarefewanddefined.Thosewhicharetoremaininthe Stategovernmentsarenumerousandindefinite....ThepowersreservedtotheseveralStates willextendtoalltheobjectswhich,intheordinarycourseofaffairs,concernthelives,liberties, andpropertiesofthepeople,andtheinternalorder,improvement,andprosperityoftheState." TheFederalistNo.45,pp.292293(C.Rossitered.1961). RelyingonCongress'abstractassertions,theCourthasendorsedmakingitafederalcrimeto growsmallamountsofmarijuanainone'sownhomeforone'sownmedicinaluse.This overreachingstiflesanexpresschoicebysomeStates,concernedforthelivesandlibertiesof theirpeople,toregulatemedicalmarijuanadifferently.IfIwereaCaliforniacitizen,Iwouldnot havevotedforthemedicalmarijuanaballotinitiativeifIwereaCalifornialegislatorIwouldnot havesupportedtheCompassionateUseAct.ButwhateverthewisdomofCalifornia's experimentwithmedicalmarijuana,thefederalismprinciplesthathavedrivenourCommerce Clausecasesrequirethatroomforexperimentbeprotectedinthiscase.ForthesereasonsI

dissent. JUSTICETHOMAS,dissenting. RespondentsDianeMonsonandAngelRaichusemarijuanathathasneverbeenboughtorsold, thathasnevercrossedstatelines,andthathashadnodemonstrableeffectonthenational marketformarijuana.IfCongresscanregulate58*58thisundertheCommerceClause,thenit canregulatevirtuallyanythingandtheFederalGovernmentisnolongeroneoflimitedand enumeratedpowers.

I
Respondents'localcultivationandconsumptionofmarijuanaisnot"Commerce...amongthe severalStates."U.S.Const.,Art.I,8,cl.3.ByholdingthatCongressmayregulateactivitythat isneitherinterstatenorcommerceundertheInterstateCommerceClause,theCourtabandons anyattempttoenforcetheConstitution'slimitsonfederalpower.Themajoritysupportsthis conclusionbyinvoking,withoutexplanation,theNecessaryandProperClause.Regulating respondents'conduct,however,isnot"necessaryandproperforcarryingintoExecution" Congress'restrictionsontheinterstatedrugtrade.Art.I,8,cl.18.Thus,neithertheCommerce ClausenortheNecessaryandProperClausegrantsCongressthepowertoregulate respondents'conduct.

A
AsIexplainedatlengthinUnitedStatesv.Lopez,514U.S.549(1995),theCommerceClause empowersCongresstoregulatethebuyingandsellingofgoodsandservicestraffickedacross statelines.Id.,at586589(concurringopinion).TheClause'stext,structure,andhistoryall indicatethat,atthetimeofthefounding,theterm"`commerce'consistedofselling,buying,and bartering,aswellastransportingforthesepurposes."Id.,at585(THOMAS,J.,concurring). Commerce,ortrade,stoodincontrasttoproductiveactivitieslikemanufacturingandagriculture. Id.,at586587(THOMAS,J.,concurring).Throughoutfoundingeradictionaries,Madison'snotes fromtheConstitutionalConvention,TheFederalistPapers,andtheratificationdebates,theterm "commerce"isconsistentlyusedtomeantradeorexchangenotalleconomicorgainful activitythathassomeattenuatedconnectiontotradeorexchange.Ibid.(THOMAS,59*59J., concurring)Barnett,TheOriginalMeaningoftheCommerceClause,68U.Chi.L.Rev.101, 112125(2001).Theterm"commerce"commonlymeanttradeorexchange(andshippingfor thesepurposes)notsimplytothoseinvolvedinthedraftingandratificationprocesses,butalso tothegeneralpublic.Barnett,NewEvidenceoftheOriginalMeaningoftheCommerceClause, 55Ark.L.Rev.847,857862(2003). Eventhemajoritydoesnotarguethatrespondents'conductisitself"Commerceamongthe severalStates,"Art.I,8,cl.3.Ante,at22.MonsonandRaichneitherbuynorsellthemarijuana thattheyconsume.TheycultivatetheircannabisentirelyintheStateofCaliforniaitnever crossesstatelines,muchlessaspartofacommercialtransaction.Certainlynoevidencefrom thefoundingsuggeststhat"commerce"includedthemerepossessionofagoodorsomepurely

personalactivitythatdidnotinvolvetradeorexchangeforvalue.Intheearlydaysofthe Republic,itwouldhavebeenunthinkablethatCongresscouldprohibitthelocalcultivation, possession,andconsumptionofmarijuana. Onthistraditionalunderstandingof"commerce,"theControlledSubstancesAct(CSA),21U.S. C.801etseq.,regulatesagreatdealofmarijuanatraffickingthatisinterstateandcommercial incharacter.TheCSAdoesnot,however,criminalizeonlytheinterstatebuyingandsellingof marijuana.Instead,itbanstheentiremarketintrastateorinterstate,noncommercialor commercialformarijuana.RespondentsarecorrectthattheCSAexceedsCongress' commercepowerasappliedtotheirconduct,whichispurelyintrastateandnoncommercial.

B
Moredifficult,however,iswhethertheCSAisavalidexerciseofCongress'powertoenactlaws thatare"necessaryandproperforcarryingintoExecution"itspowertoregulateinterstate commerce.Art.I,8,cl.18.TheNecessary60*60andProperClauseisnotawarrantto Congresstoenactanylawthatbearssomeconceivableconnectiontotheexerciseofan enumeratedpower.[1]Norisit,however,acommandtoCongresstoenactonlylawsthatare absolutelyindispensabletotheexerciseofanenumeratedpower.[2] InMcCullochv.Maryland,4Wheat.316(1819),thisCourt,speakingthroughChiefJustice Marshall,setforthatestfordeterminingwhenanActofCongressispermissibleunderthe NecessaryandProperClause: "Lettheendbelegitimate,letitbewithinthescopeoftheconstitution,andallmeanswhichare appropriate,whichareplainlyadaptedtothatend,whicharenotprohibited,butconsistwiththe letterandspiritoftheconstitution,areconstitutional."Id.,at421. ToactundertheNecessaryandProperClause,then,Congressmustselectameansthatis "appropriate"and"plainlyadapted"toexecutinganenumeratedpowerthemeanscannotbe otherwise"prohibited"bytheConstitutionandthemeanscannotbeinconsistentwith"theletter andspiritofthe[C]onstitution."Ibid.D.Currie,TheConstitutionintheSupremeCourt:TheFirst HundredYears17891888,pp.163164(1985).TheCSA,asappliedtorespondents'conduct,is notavalidexerciseofCongress'powerundertheNecessaryandProperClause.

1
Congresshasexerciseditspoweroverinterstatecommercetocriminalizetraffickingin marijuanaacrossstate61*61lines.TheGovernmentcontendsthatbanningMonsonand Raich'sintrastatedrugactivityis"necessaryandproperforcarryingintoExecution"itsregulation ofinterstatedrugtrafficking.Art.I,8,cl.18.See21U.S.C.801(6).However,inordertobe "necessary,"theintrastatebanmustbemorethan"areasonablemeans[of]effectuat[ing]the regulationofinterstatecommerce."BriefforPetitioners14seeante,at22(majorityopinion) (employingrationalbasisreview).Itmustbe"plainlyadapted"toregulatinginterstatemarijuana traffickinginotherwords,theremustbean"obvious,simple,anddirectrelation"betweenthe intrastatebanandtheregulationofinterstatecommerce.Sabriv.UnitedStates,541U.S.600,

613(2004)(THOMAS,J.,concurringinjudgment)seealsoUnitedStatesv.Dewitt,9Wall.41, 44(1870)(findingbanonintrastatesaleoflightingoilsnot"appropriateandplainlyadapted meansforcarryingintoexecution"Congress'taxingpower). Onitsface,abanontheintrastatecultivation,possession,anddistributionofmarijuanamaybe plainlyadaptedtostoppingtheinterstateflowofmarijuana.Unregulatedlocalgrowersandusers couldswellboththesupplyandthedemandsidesoftheinterstatemarijuanamarket,makingthe marketmoredifficulttoregulate.Ante,at1213,22(majorityopinion).Butrespondentsdonot challengetheCSAonitsface.Instead,theychallengeitasappliedtotheirconduct.Thequestion isthuswhethertheintrastatebanis"necessaryandproper"asappliedtomedicalmarijuana userslikerespondents.[3] Respondentsarenotregulablesimplybecausetheybelongtoalargeclass(localgrowersand usersofmarijuana)that62*62Congressmightneedtoreach,iftheyalsobelongtoadistinct andseparablesubclass(localgrowersandusersofstateauthorized,medicalmarijuana)that doesnotunderminetheCSA'sinterstateban.Ante,at4748(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting).The CourtofAppealsfoundthatrespondents'"limiteduseisclearlydistinctfromthebroaderillicit drugmarket,"because"th[eir]medicinalmarijuana...isnotintendedfor,nordoesitenter,the streamofcommerce."Raichv.Ashcroft,352F.3d1222,1228(CA92003).Ifthatisgenerally trueofindividualswhogrowandusemarijuanaformedicalpurposesunderstatelaw,theneven assumingCongresshas"obvious"and"plain"reasonswhyregulatingintrastatecultivationand possessionisnecessarytoregulatingtheinterstatedrugtrade,noneofthosereasonsappliesto medicalmarijuanapatientslikeMonsonandRaich. California'sCompassionateUseActsetsrespondents'conductapartfromotherintrastate producersandusersofmarijuana.TheActchannelsmarijuanauseto"seriouslyillCalifornians," Cal.Health&SafetyCodeAnn.11362.5(b)(1)(A)(WestSupp.2005),andprohibits"the diversionofmarijuanafornonmedicalpurposes,"11362.5(b)(2).[4]Californiastrictlycontrols thecultivationandpossessionofmarijuanaformedicalpurposes.Tobeeligibleforitsprogram, Californiarequiresthatapatienthaveanillnessthatcannabiscanrelieve,suchascancer,AIDS, orarthritis,11362.5(b)(1)(A),andthatheobtainaphysician'srecommendationorapproval, 11362.5(d).Qualifiedpatientsmustprovidepersonalandmedicalinformationtoobtainmedical identificationcards,andthereisastatewideregistryofcardholders.11362.XXXXXXXX.76. Moreover,theMedicalBoardofCaliforniahasissuedguidelinesforphysicians'cannabis recommendations,anditsanctionsphysicianswhodonotcomplywiththeguidelines.63*63 See,e.g.,Peoplev.Spark,121Cal.App.4th259,263,16Cal.Rptr.3d840,843(2004). Thisclassofintrastateusersisthereforedistinguishablefromothers.Wenormallypresumethat Statesenforcetheirownlaws,Rileyv.NationalFederationofBlindofN.C.,Inc.,487U.S.781, 795(1988),andthereisnoreasontodepartfromthatpresumptionhere:Nothingsuggeststhat California'scontrolsareineffective.Thescantevidencethatexistssuggeststhatfewpeople thevastmajorityofwhomareaged40orolderregistertousemedicalmarijuana.General AccountingOffice,Marijuana:EarlyExperienceswithFourStates'LawsThatAllowUsefor MedicalPurposes2223(Rep.No.03189,Nov.2002),http://www. gao.gov/new.items/d03189.pdf(allInternetmaterialsasvisitedJune3,2005,andavailablein ClerkofCourt'scasefile).Inpartbecauseofthelowincidenceofmedicalmarijuanause,many lawenforcementofficialsreportthattheintroductionofmedicalmarijuanalawshasnotaffected

theirlawenforcementefforts.Id.,at32. ThesecontrolsbelietheGovernment'sassertionthatplacingmedicalmarijuanaoutsidethe CSA'sreach"wouldpreventeffectiveenforcementoftheinterstatebanondrugtrafficking."Brief forPetitioners33.EnforcementoftheCSAcancontinueasitdidpriortotheCompassionate UseAct.Onlynow,aqualifiedpatientcouldavoidarrestorprosecutionbypresentinghis identificationcardtolawenforcementofficers.Intheeventthataqualifiedpatientisarrestedfor possessionorhiscannabisisseized,hecouldseektoproveasanaffirmativedefensethat,in conformitywithstatelaw,hepossessedorcultivatedsmallquantitiesofmarijuanaintrastate solelyforpersonalmedicaluse.Peoplev.Mower,28Cal.4th457,469470,49P.3d1067, 10731075(2002)Peoplev.Trippet,56Cal.App.4th1532,1549,66Cal.Rptr.2d559,560 (1997).Moreover,undertheCSA,certaindrugsthatpresentahighriskofabuseandaddiction butthatneverthelesshaveanacceptedmedicalusedrugslikemorphine64*64and amphetaminesareavailablebyprescription.21U.S.C.812(b)(2)(A)(B)21CFR 1308.12(2004).Noonearguesthatpermittinguseofthesedrugsundermedicalsupervisionhas underminedtheCSA'srestrictions. ButevenassumingthatStates'controlsallowsomeseepageofmedicalmarijuanaintotheillicit drugmarket,thereisamultibilliondollarinterstatemarketformarijuana.ExecutiveOfficeofthe President,OfficeofNat.DrugControlPolicy,MarijuanaFactSheet5(Feb.2004),http://www. whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/marijuana/index.html.Itisdifficulttoseehowthis vastmarketcouldbeaffectedbydivertedmedicalcannabis,letaloneinawaythatmakes regulatingintrastatemedicalmarijuanaobviouslyessentialtocontrollingtheinterstatedrug market. Tobesure,Congressdeclaredthatstatepolicywoulddisruptfederallawenforcement.It believedtheacrosstheboardbanessentialtopolicinginterstatedrugtrafficking.21U.S.C. 801(6).ButasJUSTICEO'CONNORpointsout,Congresspresentednoevidenceinsupportof itsconclusions,whicharenotsomuchfindingsoffactasassertionsofpower.Ante,at5355 (dissentingopinion).Congresscannotdefinethescopeofitsownpowermerelybydeclaringthe necessityofitsenactments. Insum,neitherinenactingtheCSAnorindefendingitsapplicationtorespondentshasthe Governmentofferedanyobviousreasonwhybanningmedicalmarijuanauseisnecessaryto stemthetideofinterstatedrugtrafficking.Congress'goalofcurtailingtheinterstatedrugtrade wouldnotplainlybethwartedifitcouldnotapplytheCSAtopatientslikeMonsonandRaich. Thatis,unlessCongress'aimisreallytoexercisepolicepowerofthesortreservedtotheStates inordertoeliminateeventheintrastatepossessionanduseofmarijuana.

2
EvenassumingtheCSA'sbanonlocallycultivatedandconsumedmarijuanais"necessary," thatdoesnotmeanitis65*65also"proper."ThemeansselectedbyCongresstoregulate interstatecommercecannotbe"prohibited"by,orinconsistentwiththe"letterandspirit"of,the Constitution.McCulloch,4Wheat.,at421. InLopez,IarguedthatallowingCongresstoregulateintrastate,noncommercialactivityunderthe CommerceClausewouldconferonCongressageneral"policepower"overtheNation.514

U.S.,at584,600(concurringopinion).ThisisnolessthecaseifCongresstiesitspowertothe NecessaryandProperClauseratherthantheCommerceClause.WhenagentsfromtheDrug EnforcementAdministrationraidedMonson'shome,theyseizedsixcannabisplants.Ifthe FederalGovernmentcanregulategrowingahalfdozencannabisplantsforpersonal consumption(notbecauseitisinterstatecommerce,butbecauseitisinextricablyboundupwith interstatecommerce),thenCongress'ArticleIpowersasexpandedbytheNecessaryand ProperClausehavenomeaningfullimits.WhetherCongressaimsatthepossessionof drugs,guns,oranynumberofotheritems,itmaycontinueto"appropriat[e]statepolicepowers undertheguiseofregulatingcommerce."UnitedStatesv.Morrison,529U.S.598,627(2000) (THOMAS,J.,concurring). EvenifCongressmayregulatepurelyintrastateactivitywhenessentialtoexercisingsome enumeratedpower,seeDewitt,9Wall.,at44butseeBarnett,TheOriginalMeaningofthe NecessaryandProperClause,6U.Pa.J.Const.L.183,186(2003)(detailingstatementsby FoundersthattheNecessaryandProperClausewasnotintendedtoexpandthescopeof Congress'enumeratedpowers),Congressmaynotuseitsincidentalauthoritytosubvertbasic principlesoffederalismanddualsovereignty.Printzv.UnitedStates,521U.S.898,923924 (1997)Aldenv.Maine,527U.S.706,732733(1999)Garciav.SanAntonioMetropolitan TransitAuthority,469U.S.528,585(1985)(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting)TheFederalistNo.33, pp.204205(J.Cookeed.1961)(A.Hamilton)(hereinafterTheFederalist). 66*66Here,CongresshasencroachedonStates'traditionalpolicepowerstodefinethecriminal lawandtoprotectthehealth,safety,andwelfareoftheircitizens.[5]Brechtv.Abrahamson,507 U.S.619,635(1993)HillsboroughCountyv.AutomatedMedicalLaboratories,Inc.,471U.S. 707,719(1985).Further,theGovernment'srationalethatitmayregulatetheproductionor possessionofanycommodityforwhichthereisaninterstatemarketthreatenstoremovethe remainingvestigesofStates'traditionalpolicepowers.SeeBriefforPetitioners2122cf. Ehrlich,TheIncreasingFederalizationofCrime,32Ariz.St.L.J.825,826,841(2000) (describingboththerelativerecencyofalargepercentageoffederalcrimesandthelackofa relationshipbetweensomeofthesecrimesandinterstatecommerce).Thiswouldconvertthe NecessaryandProperClauseintopreciselywhatChiefJusticeMarshalldidnotenvision,a "pretext...fortheaccomplishmentofobjectsnotintrustedtothegovernment."McCulloch, supra,at423.

67*67II
ThemajorityadvancesthreereasonswhytheCSAisalegitimateexerciseofCongress' authorityundertheCommerceClause:First,respondents'conduct,takenintheaggregate,may substantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce,ante,at22second,regulationofrespondents'conduct isessentialtoregulatingtheinterstatemarijuanamarket,ante,at2425and,third,regulationof respondents'conductisincidentaltoregulatingtheinterstatemarijuanamarket,ante,at22. JUSTICEO'CONNORexplainswhythemajority'sreasonscannotbereconciledwithourrecent CommerceClausejurisprudence.Themajority'sjustifications,however,sufferfromevenmore fundamentalflaws.

A
ThemajorityholdsthatCongressmayregulateintrastatecultivationandpossessionofmedical marijuanaundertheCommerceClause,becausesuchconductarguablyhasasubstantial effectoninterstatecommerce.Themajority'sdecisionisfurtherproofthatthe"substantial effects"testisa"rootlessandmalleablestandard"atoddswiththeconstitutionaldesign. Morrison,supra,at627(THOMAS,J.,concurring). Themajority'streatmentofthesubstantialeffectstestisrootless,becauseitisnottetheredto eithertheCommerceClauseortheNecessaryandProperClause.UndertheCommerce Clause,Congressmayregulateinterstatecommerce,notactivitiesthatsubstantiallyaffect interstatecommerce,anymorethanactivitiesthatdonotfallwithin,butthataffect,thesubjects ofitsotherArticleIpowers.Lopez,514U.S.,at589(THOMAS,J.,concurring).Whatever additionallatitudetheNecessaryandProperClauseaffords,supra,at6566,thequestionis whetherCongress'legislationisessentialtotheregulationofinterstatecommerceitselfnot whetherthelegislationextendsonlytoeconomic68*68activitiesthatsubstantiallyaffect interstatecommerce.Supra,at6061ante,at37(SCALIA,J.,concurringinjudgment). Themajority'streatmentofthesubstantialeffectstestismalleable,becausethemajority expandstherelevantconduct.Bydefiningtheclassatahighlevelofgenerality(astheintrastate manufactureandpossessionofmarijuana),themajorityoverlooksthatindividualsauthorizedby statelawtomanufactureandpossessmedicalmarijuanaexertnodemonstrableeffectonthe interstatedrugmarket.Supra,at64.Themajorityignoresthatwhetheraparticularactivity substantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerceandthuscomeswithinCongress'reachonthe majority'sapproachcanturnonanumberofobjectivefactors,likestateactionorfeaturesof theregulatedactivityitself.Ante,at4748(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting).Forinstance,here,if CaliforniaandotherStatesareeffectivelyregulatingmedicalmarijuanausers,thentheseusers havelittleeffectontheinterstatedrugtrade.[6] Thesubstantialeffectstestiseasilymanipulatedforanotherreason.ThisCourthasneverheld thatCongresscan69*69regulatenoneconomicactivitythatsubstantiallyaffectsinterstate commerce.Morrison,529U.S.,at613("[T]husfarinourNation'shistoryourcaseshaveupheld CommerceClauseregulationofintrastateactivityonlywherethatactivityiseconomicinnature" (emphasisadded))Lopez,supra,at560.Toevadeeventhatmodestrestrictiononfederal power,themajoritydefineseconomicactivityinthebroadestpossibletermsasthe"`the production,distribution,andconsumptionofcommodities.'"[7]Ante,at25(quotingWebster's ThirdNewInternationalDictionary720(1966)(hereinafterWebster's3d)).Thiscarvesoutavast swathofactivitiesthataresubjecttofederalregulation.Seeante,at4950(O'CONNOR,J., dissenting).Ifthemajorityistobetakenseriously,theFederalGovernmentmaynowregulate quiltingbees,clothesdrives,andpotlucksuppersthroughoutthe50States.Thismakesa mockeryofMadison'sassurancetothepeopleofNewYorkthatthe"powersdelegated"tothe FederalGovernmentare"fewanddefined,"whilethoseoftheStatesare"numerousand indefinite."TheFederalistNo.45,at313(J.Madison). Moreover,evenaCourtinterestedmoreinthemodernthantheoriginalunderstandingofthe

Constitutionoughttoresolvecasesbasedonthemeaningofwordsthatareactuallyinthe document.Congressisauthorizedtoregulate"Commerce,"andrespondents'conductdoesnot qualifyunderanydefinitionofthatterm.[8]Themajority'sopinion70*70onlyillustratesthesteady driftawayfromthetextoftheCommerceClause.Thereisaninexorableexpansionfrom "`[c]ommerce,'"ante,at5,to"commercial"and"economic"activity,ante,at23,andfinallytoall "production,distribution,andconsumption"ofgoodsorservicesforwhichthereisan "established...interstatemarket,"ante,at26.Federalpowerexpands,butnevercontracts,with eachnewlocution.ThemajorityisnotinterpretingtheCommerceClause,butrewritingit. Themajority'srewritingoftheCommerceClauseseemstoberootedinthebeliefthat,unless theCommerceClausecoverstheentirewebofhumanactivity,Congresswillbeleftpowerless toregulatethenationaleconomyeffectively.Ante,at1819Lopez,514U.S.,at573574 (KENNEDY,J.,concurring).Theinterconnectednessofeconomicactivityisnotamodern phenomenonunfamiliartotheFramers.Id.,at590593(THOMAS,J.,concurring)LetterfromJ. MadisontoS.Roane(Sept.2,1819),in3TheFounders'Constitution259260(P.Kurland&R. Lernereds.1987).Moreover,theFramersunderstoodwhatthemajoritydoesnotappeartofully appreciate:Thereisadangertoconcentratingtoomuch,aswellastoolittle,powerinthe FederalGovernment.ThisCourthascarefullyavoidedstrippingCongressofitsabilitytoregulate interstatecommerce,butithascasuallyallowedtheFederalGovernmenttostripStatesoftheir abilitytoregulateintrastatecommercenottomentionahostoflocalactivities,likemeredrug possession,thatarenotcommercial. OnesearchestheCourt'sopinioninvainforanyhintofwhataspectofAmericanlifeisreserved totheStates.YetthisCourtknowsthat"`[t]heConstitutioncreatedaFederalGovernmentof limitedpowers.'"NewYorkv.UnitedStates,505U.S.144,155(1992)(quotingGregoryv. Ashcroft,71*71501U.S.452,457(1991)).Thatiswhytoday'sdecisionwilladdnomeasureof stabilitytoourCommerceClausejurisprudence:ThisCourtiswillingneithertoenforcelimitson federalpower,nortodeclaretheTenthAmendmentadeadletter.Ifstabilityispossible,itisonly bydiscardingthestandalonesubstantialeffectstestandrevisitingourdefinitionof"Commerce. ..amongtheseveralStates."Congressmayregulateinterstatecommercenotthingsthat affectit,evenwhensummedtogether,unlesstruly"necessaryandproper"toregulating interstatecommerce.

B
Themajorityalsoinconsistentlycontendsthatregulatingrespondents'conductisbothincidental andessentialtoacomprehensivelegislativescheme.Ante,at22,2425.Ihavealready explainedwhytheCSA'sbanonlocalactivityisnotessential.Supra,at64.However,the majorityfurtherclaimsthat,becausetheCSAcoversagreatdealofinterstatecommerce,it"is ofnomoment"ifitalso"ensnaressomepurelyintrastateactivity."Ante,at22.Solongas Congresscastsitsnetbroadlyoveraninterstatemarket,accordingtothemajority,itisfreeto regulateinterstateandintrastateactivityalike.Thiscannotbejustifiedundereitherthe CommerceClauseortheNecessaryandProperClause.Iftheactivityispurelyintrastate,thenit maynotberegulatedundertheCommerceClause.Andiftheregulationoftheintrastateactivity

ispurelyincidental,thenitmaynotberegulatedundertheNecessaryandProperClause. Nevertheless,themajoritytermsthisthe"pivotal'distinctionbetweenthepresentcaseand LopezandMorrison.Ante,at23.InLopezandMorrison,thepartiesassertedfacialchallenges, claiming"thataparticularstatuteorprovisionfelloutsideCongress'commercepowerinits entirety."Ante,at23.Here,bycontrast,respondentsclaimonlythattheCSAfallsoutside Congress'commercepowerasapplied72*72totheirindividualconduct.Accordingtothe majority,whilecourtsmaysetasidewholestatutesorprovisions,theymaynot"exciseindividual applicationsofaconcededlyvalidstatutoryscheme."Ante,at23seealsoPerezv.United States,402U.S.146,154(1971)Marylandv.Wirtz,392U.S.183,192193(1968). Itistruethatifrespondents'conductispartofa"classofactivities...andthatclassiswithin thereachoffederalpower,"Perez,supra,at154(emphasesdeleted),thenrespondentsmaynot pointtothedeminimiseffectoftheirownpersonalconductontheinterstatedrugmarket,Wirtz, supra,at196,n.27.Ante,at47(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting).Butthatbegsthequestionat issue:whetherrespondents'"classofactivities"is"withinthereachoffederalpower,"which dependsinturnonwhethertheclassisdefinedataloworahighlevelofgenerality.Supra,at 6162.IfmedicalmarijuanapatientslikeMonsonandRaichlargelystandoutsidetheinterstate drugmarket,thencourtsmustexcisethemfromtheCSA'scoverage.Congressexpressly providedthatif"aprovision[oftheCSA]isheldinvalidinoneofmoreofitsapplications,the provisionshallremainineffectinallitsvalidapplicationsthatareseverable."21U.S.C.901 (emphasisadded)seealsoUnitedStatesv.Booker,543U.S.220,320321,andn.9(2005) (THOMAS,J.,dissentinginpart). Evenintheabsenceofanexpressseverabilityprovision,itisimplausiblethatthisCourtcould setasideentireportionsoftheUnitedStatesCodeasoutsideCongress'powerinLopezand Morrison,butitcannotengageinthemorerestrainedpracticeofinvalidatingparticular applicationsoftheCSAthatarebeyondCongress'power.ThisCourthasregularlyentertained asappliedchallengesunderconstitutionalprovisions,seeUnitedStatesv.Raines,362U.S.17, 2021(1960),includingtheCommerceClause,seeKatzenbachv.McClung,379U.S.294,295 (1964)HeartofAtlanta73*73Motel,Inc.v.UnitedStates,379U.S.241,249(1964)Wickardv. Filburn,317U.S.111,113114(1942).Thereisnoreasonwhy,whenCongressexceedsthe scopeofitscommercepower,courtsmaynotinvalidateCongress'overreachingona casebycasebasis.TheCSAundoubtedlyregulatesagreatdealofinterstatecommerce,but thatisnolicensetoregulateconductthatisneitherinterstatenorcommercial,howeverminoror incidental. IfthemajorityiscorrectthatLopezandMorrisonaredistinctbecausetheywerefacial challengesto"particularstatute[s]orprovision[s],"ante,at23,thencongressionalpowerturns onthemannerinwhichCongresspackageslegislation.Underthemajority'sreasoning, Congresscouldnotenacteitherasasinglesubjectstatuteorasaseparateprovisioninthe CSAaprohibitionontheintrastatepossessionorcultivationofmarijuana.Norcoulditenact anintrastatebansimplytosupplementexistingdrugregulations.However,thatsameprohibition isperfectlyconstitutionalwhenintegratedintoapieceoflegislationthatreachesotherregulable conduct.Lopez,514U.S.,at600601(THOMAS,J.,concurring). Finally,themajority'sviewthatbecausesomeoftheCSA'sapplicationsareconstitutional, theymustallbeconstitutionalunderminesitsrelianceonthesubstantialeffectstest.The

intrastateconductsweptwithinageneralregulatoryschememayormaynothaveasubstantial effectontherelevantinterstatemarket."[O]nealwayscandrawthecirclebroadlyenoughto coveranactivitythat,whentakeninisolation,wouldnothavesubstantialeffectsoncommerce." Id.,at600(THOMAS,J.,concurring).ThebreadthoflegislationthatCongressenactssays nothingaboutwhethertheintrastateactivitysubstantiallyaffectsinterstatecommerce,letalone whetheritisnecessarytothescheme.BecausemedicalmarijuanausersinCaliforniaand elsewherearenotplacingsubstantialamountsofcannabis74*74intothestreamofinterstate commerce,Congressmaynotregulatethemunderthesubstantialeffectstest,nomatterhow broadlyitdraftstheCSA.

***
ThemajoritypreventsStateslikeCaliforniafromdevisingdrugpoliciesthattheyhaveconcluded providemuchneededrespitetotheseriouslyill.Itdoessowithoutanyseriousinquiryintothe necessityforfederalregulationortheproprietyof"displac[ing]stateregulationinareasof traditionalstateconcern,"id.,at583(KENNEDY,J.,concurring).Themajority'srushtoembrace federalpower"isespeciallyunfortunategiventheimportanceofshowingrespectforthe sovereignStatesthatcompriseourFederalUnion."UnitedStatesv.OaklandCannabisBuyers' Cooperative,532U.S.483,502(2001)(STEVENS,J.,concurringinjudgment).Ourfederalist system,properlyunderstood,allowsCaliforniaandagrowingnumberofotherStatestodecide forthemselveshowtosafeguardthehealthandwelfareoftheircitizens.Iwouldaffirmthe judgmentoftheCourtofAppeals.Irespectfullydissent. [*]BriefsofamicicuriaeurgingreversalwerefiledfortheCommunityRightsCounselby TimothyJ.DowlingfortheDrugFreeAmericaFoundation,Inc.,etal.byDavidG.Evansfor RobertL.DuPont,M.D.,etal.byJohnR.Bartels,Jr.andforU.S.RepresentativeMarkE. Souderetal.byNicholasP.Coleman. BriefsofamicicuriaeurgingaffirmancewerefiledfortheStateofAlabamaetal.byTroyKing, AttorneyGeneralofAlabama,KevinC.Newsom,SolicitorGeneral,CharlesC.Foti,Jr.,Attorney GeneralofLouisiana,andJimHood,AttorneyGeneralofMississippifortheStateofCaliforniaet al.byBillLockyer,AttorneyGeneralofCalifornia,RichardM.Frank,ChiefDeputyAttorney General,ManuelM.Medeiros,StateSolicitor,TaylorS.Carey,SpecialAssistantAttorney General,J.JosephCurran,Jr.,AttorneyGeneralofMaryland,andChristineO.Gregoire, AttorneyGeneralofWashingtonfortheCaliforniaNursesAssociationetal.byJuliaM. CarpenterfortheCatoInstitutebyDouglasW.Kmiec,TimothyLynch,andRobertA.Levyfor ConstitutionalLawScholarsbyErnestA.Young,MatthewD.Schnall,CharlesFried,andDavid L.ShapirofortheInstituteforJusticebyWilliamH.Mellor,DanaBerliner,andRichardA. EpsteinfortheLeukemia&LymphomaSocietyetal.byDavidT.Goldberg,SeanH.Donahue, andDanielN.AbrahamsonfortheLymphomaFoundationofAmericaetal.byStephenC. WilleyfortheMarijuanaPolicyProjectetal.byCherylFlaxDavidsonandfortheNational OrganizationfortheReformofMarijuanaLawsetal.byJohnWesleyHall,Jr.,JoshuaL.Dratel, andSherylGordonMcCloud. BriefsofamicicuriaewerefiledforthePacificLegalFoundationbyM.ReedHopper,SharonL. Browne,andDeborahJ.LaFetraandfortheReasonFoundationbyManuelS.Klausner.

[1]SeeAlaskaStat.11.71.090,17.37.01017.37.080(Lexis2004)Colo.Const.,Art.XVIII, 14,Colo.Rev.Stat.1818406.3(Lexis2004)Haw.Rev.Stat.329121to329128(2004 Cum.Supp.)Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.,Tit.22,2383B(5)(West2004)Nev.Const.,Art.4,38, Nev.Rev.Stat.453A.010453A.810(2003)Ore.Rev.Stat.475.300475.346(2003)Vt. Stat.Ann.,Tit.18,44724474d(Supp.2004)Wash.Rev.Code69.51.01069.51.080 (2004)seealsoAriz.Rev.Stat.Ann.133412.01(WestSupp.2004)(voterinitiativepermitting physicianstoprescribeScheduleIsubstancesformedicalpurposesthatwaspurportedly repealedin1997,buttherepealwasrejectedbyvotersin1998).InNovember2004,Montana votersapprovedInitiative148,addingtothenumberofStatesauthorizingtheuseofmarijuana formedicalpurposes. [2]1913Cal.Stats.ch.342,8aseealsoGieringer,TheOriginsofCannabisProhibitionin California2123(rev.Mar.2005),availableathttp:// www.canorml.org/background/caloriginsmjproh.pdf(allInternetmaterialsasvisitedJune2, 2005,andavailableinClerkofCourt'scasefile). [3]Cal.Health&SafetyCodeAnn.11362.5(WestSupp.2005).TheCaliforniaLegislature recentlyenactedadditionallegislationsupplementingtheCompassionateUseAct. 11362.711362.9. [4]"ThepeopleoftheStateofCaliforniaherebyfindanddeclarethatthepurposesofthe CompassionateUseActof1996areasfollows: "(A)ToensurethatseriouslyillCalifornianshavetherighttoobtainandusemarijuanafor medicalpurposeswherethatmedicaluseisdeemedappropriateandhasbeenrecommended byaphysicianwhohasdeterminedthattheperson'shealthwouldbenefitfromtheuseof marijuanainthetreatmentofcancer,anorexia,AIDS,chronicpain,spasticity,glaucoma, arthritis,migraine,oranyotherillnessforwhichmarijuanaprovidesrelief. "(B)Toensurethatpatientsandtheirprimarycaregiverswhoobtainandusemarijuanafor medicalpurposesupontherecommendationofaphysicianarenotsubjecttocriminal prosecutionorsanction. "(C)Toencouragethefederalandstategovernmentstoimplementaplantoprovideforthesafe andaffordabledistributionofmarijuanatoallpatientsinmedicalneedofmarijuana." 11362.5(b)(1). [5]"Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw,nophysicianinthisstateshallbepunished,or deniedanyrightorprivilege,forhavingrecommendedmarijuanatoapatientformedical purposes."11362.5(c). [6]"Section11357,relatingtothepossessionofmarijuana,andSection11358,relatingtothe cultivationofmarijuana,shallnotapplytoapatient,ortoapatient'sprimarycaregiver,who possessesorcultivatesmarijuanaforthepersonalmedicalpurposesofthepatientuponthe writtenororalrecommendationorapprovalofaphysician."11362.5(d). [7]11362.5(e). [8]Onremand,theDistrictCourtenteredapreliminaryinjunctionenjoiningpetitioners"`from arrestingorprosecutingPlaintiffsAngelMcClaryRaichandDianeMonson,seizingtheirmedical cannabis,forfeitingtheirproperty,orseekingciviloradministrativesanctionsagainstthemwith respecttotheintrastate,noncommercialcultivation,possession,use,andobtainingwithout chargeofcannabisforpersonalmedicalpurposesontheadviceofaphysicianandin

accordancewithstatelaw,andwhichisnotusedfordistribution,sale,orexchange.'"Brieffor Petitioners9. [9]SeeD.Musto&P.Korsmeyer,TheQuestforDrugControl60(2002)(hereinafterMusto& Korsmeyer). [10]H.R.Rep.No.911444,pt.2,p.22(1970)(hereinafterH.R.Rep.)26Congressional QuarterlyAlmanac531(1970)(hereinafterAlmanac)Musto&Korsmeyer5657. [11]PureFoodandDrugsActof1906,ch.3915,34Stat.768,repealedbyActofJune25,1938, ch.675,902(a),52Stat.1059. [12]SeeUnitedStatesv.Doremus,249U.S.86(1919)Learyv.UnitedStates,395U.S.6, 1416(1969). [13]SeeDoremus,249U.S.,at9093. [14]R.Bonnie&C.Whitebread,TheMarijuanaConviction154174(1999)L.Grinspoon&J. Bakalar,Marihuana,theForbiddenMedicine73(rev.ed.1997)(hereinafterGrinspoon& Bakalar).AlthoughthiswastheFederalGovernment'sfirstattempttoregulatethemarijuana trade,bythistimeallStateshadinplacesomeformoflegislationregulatingthesale,use,or possessionofmarijuana.R.Isralowitz,DrugUse,Policy,andManagement134(2ded.2002). [15]Leary,395U.S.,at1416. [16]Grinspoon&Bakalar8. [17]Leary,395U.S.,at1618. [18]Musto&Korsmeyer323526Almanac533.In1973,theBureauofNarcoticsand DangerousDrugsbecametheDEA.SeeReorg.PlanNo.2of1973,1,28CFR0.100 (1973). [19]TheComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlActof1970consistsofthreetitles. TitleIrelatestothepreventionandtreatmentofnarcoticaddictsthroughHEW(nowthe DepartmentofHealthandHumanServices).84Stat.1238.TitleII,asdiscussedinmoredetail above,addressesdrugcontrolandenforcementasadministeredbytheAttorneyGeneraland theDEA.Id.,at1242.TitleIIIconcernstheimportandexportofcontrolledsubstances.Id.,at 1285. [20]Inparticular,Congressmadethefollowingfindings: "(1)Manyofthedrugsincludedwithinthissubchapterhaveausefulandlegitimatemedical purposeandarenecessarytomaintainthehealthandgeneralwelfareoftheAmericanpeople. "(2)Theillegalimportation,manufacture,distribution,andpossessionandimproperuseof controlledsubstanceshaveasubstantialanddetrimentaleffectonthehealthandgeneral welfareoftheAmericanpeople. "(3)Amajorportionofthetrafficincontrolledsubstancesflowsthroughinterstateandforeign commerce.Incidentsofthetrafficwhicharenotanintegralpartoftheinterstateorforeignflow, suchasmanufacture,localdistribution,andpossession,nonethelesshaveasubstantialand directeffectuponinterstatecommercebecause "(A)aftermanufacture,manycontrolledsubstancesaretransportedininterstatecommerce, "(B)controlledsubstancesdistributedlocallyusuallyhavebeentransportedininterstate commerceimmediatelybeforetheirdistribution,and "(C)controlledsubstancespossessedcommonlyflowthroughinterstatecommerce immediatelypriortosuchpossession.

"(4)Localdistributionandpossessionofcontrolledsubstancescontributetoswellingthe interstatetrafficinsuchsubstances. "(5)Controlledsubstancesmanufacturedanddistributedintrastatecannotbedifferentiatedfrom controlledsubstancesmanufacturedanddistributedinterstate.Thus,itisnotfeasibleto distinguish,intermsofcontrols,betweencontrolledsubstancesmanufacturedanddistributed interstateandcontrolledsubstancesmanufacturedanddistributedintrastate. "(6)Federalcontroloftheintrastateincidentsofthetrafficincontrolledsubstancesisessential totheeffectivecontroloftheinterstateincidentsofsuchtraffic."21U.S.C.801(1)(6). [21]SeeUnitedStatesv.Moore,423U.S.122,135(1975)seealsoH.R.Rep.,at22. [22]Id.,at61(quotingletterfromRogerO.Egeberg,M.D.,toHon.HarleyO.Staggers(Aug.14, 1970)). [23]Startingin1972,theNationalOrganizationfortheReformofMarijuanaLawsbeganits campaigntoreclassifymarijuana.Grinspoon&Bakalar1317.Aftersomefleetingsuccessin 1988whenanAdministrativeLawJudge(ALJ)declaredthattheDEAwouldbeactinginan "unreasonable,arbitrary,andcapricious"mannerifitcontinuedtodenymarijuanaaccessto seriouslyillpatients,andconcludedthatitshouldbereclassifiedasaScheduleIIIsubstance, Grinspoonv.DEA,828F.2d881,883884(CA11987),thecampaignhasprovedunsuccessful. TheDEAAdministratordidnotendorsetheALJ'sfindings,54Fed.Reg.53767(1989),andsince thattimehasroutinelydeniedpetitionstoreschedulethedrug,mostrecentlyin2001.66Fed. Reg.20038(2001).TheCourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuithasreviewedthe petitiontoreschedulemarijuanaonfiveseparateoccasionsoverthecourseof30years, ultimatelyupholdingtheAdministrator'sfinalorder.SeeAllianceforCannabisTherapeuticsv. DEA,15F.3d1131,1133(1994). [24]UnitedStatesv.Lopez,514U.S.549,552558(1995)id.,at568574(KENNEDY,J., concurring)id.,at604607(SOUTER,J.,dissenting). [25]SeeGibbonsv.Ogden,9Wheat.1,224(1824)(opinionofJohnson,J.)Stern,That CommerceWhichConcernsMoreStatesThanOne,47Harv.L.Rev.1335,1337,13401341 (1934)G.Gunther,ConstitutionalLaw127(9thed.1975). [26]SeeLopez,514U.S.,at553554id.,at568569(KENNEDY,J.,concurring)seealso Granholmv.Heald,544U.S.460,472473(2005). [27]Lopez,514U.S.,at554seealsoWickardv.Filburn,317U.S.111,121(1942)("Itwasnot until1887,withtheenactmentoftheInterstateCommerceAct,thattheinterstatecommerce powerbegantoexertpositiveinfluenceinAmericanlawandlife.Thisfirstimportantfederal resorttothecommercepowerwasfollowedin1890bytheShermanAntiTrustActand, thereafter,mainlyafter1903,bymanyothers.Thesestatutesusheredinnewphasesof adjudication,whichrequiredtheCourttoapproachtheinterpretationoftheCommerceClausein thelightofanactualexercisebyCongressofitspowerthereunder"(footnotesomitted)). [28]Evenrespondentsacknowledgetheexistenceofanillicitmarketinmarijuanaindeed,Raich haspersonallyparticipatedinthatmarket,andMonsonexpressesawillingnesstodosointhe future.App.59,74,87.SeealsoDepartmentofRevenueofMont.v.KurthRanch,511U.S. 767,770,774,n.12,and780,n.17(1994)(discussingthe"marketvalue"ofmarijuana)id.,at 790(REHNQUIST,C.J.,dissenting)id.,at792(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting)Whalenv.Roe, 429U.S.589,591(1977)(addressingprescriptiondrugs"forwhichthereisbothalawfulandan

unlawfulmarket")Turnerv.UnitedStates,396U.S.398,417,n.33(1970)(referringtothe purchaseofdrugsonthe"retailmarket"). [29]Tobesure,thewheatmarketisalawfulmarketthatCongresssoughttoprotectand stabilize,whereasthemarijuanamarketisanunlawfulmarketthatCongresssoughtto eradicate.Thisdifference,however,isofnoconstitutionalimport.Ithaslongbeensettledthat Congress'powertoregulatecommerceincludesthepowertoprohibitcommerceinaparticular commodity.Lopez,514U.S.,at571(KENNEDY,J.,concurring)("IntheLotteryCase,188U.S. 321(1903),theCourtrejectedtheargumentthatCongresslacked[the]powertoprohibitthe interstatemovementoflotteryticketsbecauseithadpoweronlytoregulate,nottoprohibit")see alsoWickard,317U.S.,at128("Thestimulationofcommerceisauseoftheregulatoryfunction quiteasdefinitelyasprohibitionsorrestrictionsthereon"). [30]Seeid.,at125(recognizingthatFilburn'sactivity"maynotberegardedascommerce"). [31]TheExecutiveOfficeofthePresidenthasestimatedthatin2000Americanusersspent $10.5billiononthepurchaseofmarijuana.OfficeofNat.DrugControlPolicy,MarijuanaFact Sheet5(Feb.2004), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/marijuana/index.html. [32]Moreover,asdiscussedinmoredetailabove,Congressdidmakefindingsregardingthe effectsofintrastatedrugactivityoninterstatecommerce.Seen.20,supra.Indeed,eventhe CourtofAppealsfoundthatthosefindings"weigh[ed]infavor"ofupholdingtheconstitutionalityof theCSA.352F.3d1222,1232(CA92003)(casebelow).Thedissenters,however,would imposeanewandheightenedburdenonCongress(unlessthelitigantscangarnerevidence sufficienttocureCongress'perceived"inadequa[cies]")thatlegislationmustcontaindetailed findingsprovingthateachactivityregulatedwithinacomprehensivestatuteisessentialtothe statutoryscheme.Post,at5355(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.)post,at64(opinionofTHOMAS, J.).Suchanexactingrequirementisnotonlyunprecedented,itisalsoimpractical.Indeed,the principaldissent'scritiqueofCongressfor"noteven"including"declarations"specificto marijuanaisparticularlyunpersuasivegiventhattheCSAinitiallyidentified80othersubstances subjecttoregulationasScheduleIdrugs,nottomentionthosecategorizedinSchedulesIIV. Post,at55(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.).Surely,Congresscannotbeexpected(andcertainly shouldnotberequired)toincludespecificfindingsoneachandeverysubstancecontained thereininordertosatisfythedissenters'unfoundedskepticism. [33]Seen.21,supra(citingsourcesthatevinceCongress'particularconcernwiththediversion ofdrugsfromlegitimatetoillicitchannels). [34]Theprincipaldissentassertsthatby"[s]eizinguponourlanguageinLopez,"post,at46 (opinionofO'CONNOR,J.),i.e.,givingeffecttoourwellestablishedcaselaw,Congresswill nowhaveanincentivetolegislatebroadly.Evenputtingasidethepoliticalchecksthatwould generallycurbCongress'powertoenactabroadandcomprehensiveschemeforthepurposeof targetingpurelylocalactivity,thereisnosuggestionthattheCSAconstitutesthetypeof "evasive"legislationthedissentfears,norcouldsuchanargumentplausiblybemade.Post,at 47(O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting). [35]Lopez,514U.S.,at560seealsoid.,at573574(KENNEDY,J.,concurring)(statingthat Lopezdidnotalterour"practicalconceptionofcommercialregulation"andthatCongressmay "regulateinthecommercialsphereontheassumptionthatwehaveasinglemarketanda

unifiedpurposetobuildastablenationaleconomy"). [36]See16U.S.C.668(a)(baldandgoldeneagles)18U.S.C.175(a)(biological weapons)831(a)(nuclearmaterial)842(n)(1)(certainplasticexplosives)2342(a) (contrabandcigarettes). [37]Weacknowledgethatevidenceprofferedbyrespondentsinthiscaseregardingtheeffective medicalusesformarijuana,iffoundcredibleaftertrial,wouldcastseriousdoubtontheaccuracy ofthefindingsthatrequiremarijuanatobelistedinScheduleI.See,e.g.,InstituteofMedicine, MarijuanaandMedicine:AssessingtheScienceBase179(J.Joy,S.Watson,&J.Bensoneds. 1999)(recognizingthat"[s]cientificdataindicatethepotentialtherapeuticvalueofcannabinoid drugs,primarilyTHC[Tetrahydrocannabinol]forpainrelief,controlofnauseaandvomiting,and appetitestimulation")seealsoConantv.Walters,309F.3d629,640643(CA92002)(Kozinski, J.,concurring)(chroniclingmedicalstudiesrecognizingvalidmedicalusesformarijuanaandits derivatives).Butthepossibilitythatthedrugmaybereclassifiedinthefuturehasnorelevanceto thequestionwhetherCongressnowhasthepowertoregulateitsproductionanddistribution. Respondents'submission,ifaccepted,wouldplaceallhomegrownmedicalsubstancesbeyond thereachofCongress'regulatoryjurisdiction. [38]ThatissoevenifCalifornia'scurrentcontrols(enactedeightyearsaftertheCompassionate UseActwaspassed)are"effective,"asthedissenterswouldhaveusblindlypresume,post,at 5354(opinionofO'CONNOR,J.)post,at63,68(opinionofTHOMAS,J.).California'sdecision (made34yearsaftertheCSAwasenacted)toimpose"stric[t]controls"onthe"cultivationand possessionofmarijuanaformedicalpurposes,"post,at62(THOMAS,J.,dissenting),cannot retroactivelydivestCongressofitsauthorityundertheCommerceClause.Indeed,JUSTICE THOMAS'urgingstothecontrarywouldturntheSupremacyClauseonitshead,andwould resurrectlimitsoncongressionalpowerthathavelongsincebeenrejected.Seepost,at41 (SCALIA,J.,concurringinjudgment)(quotingMcCullochv.Maryland,4Wheat.316,424 (1819))("`Toimposeon[Congress]thenecessityofresortingtomeanswhichitcannotcontrol, whichanothergovernmentmayfurnishorwithhold,wouldrenderitscourseprecarious,the resultofitsmeasuresuncertain,andcreateadependenceonothergovernments,whichmight disappointitsmostimportantdesigns,andisincompatiblewiththelanguageofthe constitution'"). Moreover,inadditiontocastingasidemorethanacenturyofthisCourt'sCommerceClause jurisprudence,itisnoteworthythatJUSTICETHOMAS'suggestionthatStatespossessthe powertodictatetheextentofCongress'commercepowerwouldhavefarreachingimplications beyondthefactsofthiscase.Forexample,underhisreasoning,Congresswouldbeequally powerlesstoregulate,letaloneprohibit,theintrastatepossession,cultivation,anduseof marijuanaforrecreationalpurposes,anactivitywhichallStates"strictlycontro[l]."Indeed,his rationaleseeminglywouldrequireCongresstocedeitsconstitutionalpowertoregulate commercewheneveraStateoptstoexerciseits"traditionalpolicepowerstodefinethecriminal lawandtoprotectthehealth,safety,andwelfareoftheircitizens."Post,at66(dissenting opinion). [39]California'sCompassionateUseActhassincebeenamended,limitingthecatchallcategory to"[a]nyotherchronicorpersistentmedicalsymptomthateither:...[s]ubstantiallylimitsthe abilityofthepersontoconductoneormoremajorlifeactivitiesasdefined"intheAmericanswith

DisabilitiesActof1990,or"[i]fnotalleviated,maycauseseriousharmtothepatient'ssafetyor physicalormentalhealth."Cal.Health&SafetyCodeAnn.11362.7(h)(12)(A)(B)(West Supp.2005). [40]See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Moore,423U.S.122(1975)UnitedStatesv.Doremus,249U. S.86(1919). [41]Thestatepolicyallowspatientstopossessuptoeightouncesofdriedmarijuana,andto cultivateupto6matureor12immatureplants.Cal.Health&SafetyCodeAnn.11362.77(a) (WestSupp.2005).However,thequantitylimitationsserveonlyasafloor.Basedonadoctor's recommendation,apatientcanpossesswhateverquantityisnecessarytosatisfyhismedical needs,andcitiesandcountiesaregivencarteblanchetoestablishmoregenerouslimits. Indeed,severalcitiesandcountieshavedonejustthat.Forexample,patientsresidinginthe citiesofOaklandandSantaCruzandinthecountiesofSonomaandTehamaarepermittedto possessupto3poundsofprocessedmarijuana.ReplyBriefforPetitioners1819(citing Proposition215EnforcementGuidelines).Puttingthatquantityinperspective,3poundsof marijuanayieldsroughly3,000jointsorcigarettes.ExecutiveOfficeofthePresident,Officeof NationalDrugControlPolicy,WhatAmerica'sUsersSpendonIllegalDrugs24(Dec.2001), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/american_users_spend_2002.pdf.And thestreetpriceforthatamountcanrangeanywherefrom$900to$24,000.DEA,IllegalDrug PriceandPurityReport(Apr.2003)(DEA02058). [42]Forexample,respondentRaichatteststhatsheuses2.5ouncesofcannabisaweek.App. 82.YetasaresidentofOakland,sheisentitledtopossessupto3poundsofprocessed marijuanaatanygiventime,nearly20timesmorethansheusesonaweeklybasis. [43]See,e.g.,Peopleexrel.Lungrenv.Peron,59Cal.App.4th1383,13861387,70Cal.Rptr. 2d20,23(1997)(recountinghowaCannabisBuyers'Clubengagedinan"indiscriminateand uncontrolledpatternofsaletothousandsofpersonsamongthegeneralpublic,including personswhohadnotdemonstratedanyrecommendationorapprovalofaphysicianand,infact, someofwhomwerenotunderthecareofaphysician,suchasundercoverofficers,"andnoting that"somepersonswhohadpurchasedmarijuanaonrespondents'premiseswereresellingit unlawfullyonthestreet"). [1]SeealsoGarciav.SanAntonioMetropolitanTransitAuthority,469U.S.528,584585(1985) (O'CONNOR,J.,dissenting)(explainingthatitisthroughtheNecessaryandProperClausethat "anintrastateactivity`affecting'interstatecommercecanbereachedthroughthecommerce power"). [2]Wickardv.Filburn,317U.S.111(1942),presentedsuchacase.Becausetheunregulated productionofwheatforpersonalconsumptiondiminisheddemandintheregulatedwheat market,theCourtsaid,itcarriedwithitthepotentialtodisruptCongress'spriceregulationby drivingdownpricesinthemarket.Id.,at127129.ThispotentialdisruptionofCongress's interstateregulation,andnotonlytheeffectthatpersonalconsumptionofwheathadoninterstate commerce,justifiedCongress'sregulationofthatconduct.Id.,at128129. [3]Theprincipaldissentclaimsthat,ifthisissufficienttosustaintheregulationatissueinthis case,thenitshouldalsohavebeensufficienttosustaintheregulationatissueinUnitedStates v.Lopez,514U.S.549(1995).Seepost,at52(arguingthat"wecouldhavesurmisedinLopez thatgunsinschoolzonesare`nevermorethananinstantfromtheinterstatemarket'inguns

alreadysubjecttoextensivefederalregulation,recastLopezasaNecessaryandProperClause case,andtherebyupheldtheGunFreeSchoolZonesAct"(citationomitted)).Thisclaim foundersupontheshoalsofLopezitself,whichmadeclearthatthestatutethereatissuewas "notanessentialpartofalargerregulationofeconomicactivity."Lopez,supra,at561(emphasis added).Onthedissent'sviewofthings,thatstatementisinexplicable.Ofcourseitisinaddition difficulttoimaginewhatintelligibleschemeofregulationoftheinterstatemarketingunscould haveasanappropriatemeansofeffectuationtheprohibitionofgunswithin1,000feetofschools (andnowhereelse).Thedissentpointstoafederallaw,18U.S.C.922(b)(1),barringlicensed dealersfromsellinggunstominors,seepost,at5253,buttherelationshipbetweenthe regulatoryschemeofwhich922(b)(1)isapart(requiringalldealersinfirearmsthathave traveledininterstatecommercetobelicensed,see922(a))andthestatuteatissueinLopez approachesthenonexistentwhichisdoubtlesswhytheGovernmentdidnotattempttojustify thestatuteonthebasisofthatrelationship. [1]McCullochv.Maryland,4Wheat.316,419421(1819)Madison,TheBankBill,Houseof Representatives(Feb.2,1791),in3TheFounders'Constitution244(P.Kurland&R.Lerner eds.1987)(requiring"direct"ratherthan"remote"meansendfit)Hamilton,Opiniononthe ConstitutionalityoftheBank(Feb.23,1791),inid.,at248,250(requiring"obvious"meansend fit,wheretheendwas"clearlycomprehendedwithinanyofthespecifiedpowers"ofCongress). [2]McCulloch,supra,at413415D.Currie,TheConstitutionintheSupremeCourt:TheFirst HundredYears17891888,p.162(1985). [3]BecauserespondentsdonotchallengeonitsfacetheCSA'sbanonmarijuana,21U.S.C. 841(a)(1),844(a),ouradjudicationoftheirasappliedchallengecastsnodoubtonthisCourt's practiceinUnitedStatesv.Lopez,514U.S.549(1995),andUnitedStatesv.Morrison,529US. 598(2000).Inthosecases,weheldthatCongress,inenactingthestatutesatissue,had exceededitsArticleIpowers. [4]OtherStateslikewiseprohibitdiversionofmarijuanafornonmedicalpurposes.See,e.g., Colo.Const.,Art.XVIII,14(2)(d)Nev.Rev.Stat.453A.300(1)(e)(f)(2003)Ore.Rev.Stat. 475.316(1)(c)(d)(2003). [5]Infact,theAntiFederalistsobjectedthattheNecessaryandProperClausewouldallow Congress,interalia,to"constitutenewCrimes,...andextend[its]Powerasfaras[it]shallthink propersothattheStateLegislatureshavenoSecurityforthePowersnowpresumedtoremain tothemorthePeoplefortheirRights."Mason,ObjectionstotheConstitutionFormedbythe Convention(1787),in2TheCompleteAntiFederalist11,1213(H.Storinged.1981)(emphasis added).Hamiltonrespondedthattheseobjectionsweregross"misrepresentation[s]."The FederalistNo.33,at204.HetermedtheClause"perfectlyharmless,"foritmerelyconfirmed Congress'impliedauthoritytoenactlawsinexercisingitsenumeratedpowers.Id.,at205see alsoLopez,514U.S.,at597,n.6(THOMAS,J.,concurring)(discussingCongress'limited abilitytoestablishnationwidecriminalprohibitions)Cohensv.Virginia,6Wheat.264,426428 (1821)(findingit"clear,thatCongresscannotpunishfeloniesgenerally,"exceptinareasover whichitpossessesplenarypower).AccordingtoHamilton,theClausewasneededonly"to guardagainstcavillingrefinements"bythoseseekingtocripplefederalpower.TheFederalistNo. 33,at205id.,No.44,at303304(J.Madison). [6]Remarkably,themajoritygoessofarastodeclarethisquestionirrelevant.Itassertsthatthe

CSAisconstitutionalevenifCalifornia'scurrentcontrolsareeffective,becausestateactioncan neitherexpandnorcontractCongress'powers.Ante,at2930,n.38.Themajority'sassertionis misleading.Regardlessofstateaction,Congresshasthepowertoregulateintrastateeconomic activitiesthatsubstantiallyaffectinterstatecommerce(onthemajority'sview)oractivitiesthat arenecessaryandpropertoeffectuatingitscommercepower(onmyview).Butoneither approach,whetheranintrastateactivityfallswithinthescopeofCongress'powersturnson factorsthatthemajorityisunwillingtoconfront.Themajorityapparentlybelievesthatevenif Statespreventedanymedicalmarijuanafromenteringtheillicitdrugmarket,andthusevenif therewerenoneedfortheCSAtogovernmedicalmarijuanausers,weshouldupholdtheCSA undertheCommerceClauseandtheNecessaryandProperClause.Finally,toinvokethe SupremacyClause,asthemajoritydoes,ante,at29,n.38,istobegthequestion.TheCSA displacesCalifornia'sCompassionateUseActiftheCSAisconstitutionalasappliedto respondents'conduct,butthatistheveryquestionatissue. [7]Otherdictionariesdonotdefinetheterm"economic"asbroadlyasthemajoritydoes.See,e. g.,TheAmericanHeritageDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage583(3ded.1992)(defining "economic"as"[o]forrelatingtotheproduction,development,andmanagementofmaterial wealth,asofacountry,household,orbusinessenterprise"(emphasisadded)).Themajority doesnotexplainwhyitselectsaremarkablyexpansive40yearolddefinition. [8]See,e.g.,id.,at380("[t]hebuyingandsellingofgoods,especiallyonalargescale,as betweencitiesornations")TheRandomHouseDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguage411(2ded. 1987)("aninterchangeofgoodsorcommodities,esp.onalargescalebetweendifferent countries...orbetweendifferentpartsofthesamecountry")Webster's3d456("theexchange orbuyingandsellingofcommoditiesesp.onalargescaleandinvolvingtransportationfrom placetoplace").