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Moro Identity and the Philippines: An Analysis of the Effects of Colonialism and Islam on the Moro Insurgency

Paul Doherty December 16, 2012 Professor Phillip Karber GOVT 451: Conflict in Asia

Table of Contents I. II. III. IV. V. VI. Introduction The Formation of Moro Identity The Formation and Campaign of the Moro National Liberation Front 1968-1996 The Formation and Campaign of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 1977-Present The Formation and Campaign of the Abu Sayyaf Group 1990-Present Conclusion and Prospects for Peace

Introduction What role does religion play in civil conflict? What causes a religious minority to take up arms against a state? How effective have religious insurgencies been in modern history? In the 21st century, the influence of radical Islam has dominated conversation on the ideological structures, goals, and actions of Muslim insurgencies and terrorist groups in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Additionally, the progression of the Arab Spring Revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Syria has contributed to further discussion on the role of Islam in revolutionary actions against secular, repressive states. The United States and many in the international system have established radical Islam as the number one security threat to modernity and stability in the world and have cringed at the onset of Islamist governments in the new Middle East. But how much influence does radical Islamism actually have on these rebel, insurgent, and terrorist groups? Is Islam a practical way to mobilize the people, or does it serve as the central ideology and strategy for the groups to achieve their political goals? In his seminal piece Counter-Insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, David Galula discusses the necessity for an insurgent group to have a cause. Insurgencies live and succeed or fail because of the mobilization or lack thereof of the causes they have championed.1 Mark Juergensmeyer attributes religion to terrorist and insurgent motivations and argues that conventional mediating strategies prove futile against such ideologically driven individuals and groups.2 Other scholars add that ethnic and religious divisions cause conflict.3 On the other side, authors James Fearon and David Latin and Collier and Hoeffler dismiss ethnic division as a cause of civil war and attribute conflict onset with poor economic development and political exclusion.4 Nicholas Sambanis determines that political grievances rather than economic grievances cause more conflict
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David Galula, Counter-insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964). 2 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Name of God, Current History, (2001): pp. 357-361. 3 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72: 3, (1993): p. 22.; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 4 James Fearon and David Latin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, American Political Science Review , vol. 97: 1, (2001): pp. 75-90.; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, On economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 50, (2001): pp. 563-573.

in ethnic wars than other civil wars, but he dismisses ethnic division as a primary cause of conflict.5 In Southeast Asia, much of the literature has focused on the effect of colonialism, ethnic nationalism, and religious division on the onset, recurrence, and lack of resolution of conflicts in India, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Scholars, policymakers, and peacekeepers have established the connection in varying degrees between Islam and the separatist movements in Sri Lanka, Aceh, Thailand and Mindanao. Errol A. Henderson and David Singer argue that the effects of colonization among other factors have contributed to conflict onset in Southeast Asia.6 Other authors Cline and Chalk add that the Islamic factor has provided motivation to insurgencies in Southeast Asia.7 In the case of Mindanao, conflict has raged there for over four decades since the founding of the Moro National Liberation Front in the 1960s. After years of war, multiple failed peace attempts, the involvement of numerous rebel groups, and the presence of outside governments and peacekeeping institutions, the civil war for autonomy and independence in Mindanao still persists. In this paper, I argue that the degree of Islamism in the opposition groups in Mindanao has exacerbated conflict, led to conflict reoccurrence, and undermined any chance of conflict resolution. I examine the three major insurgent groups in the civil war in Mindanao, the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Abu Sayyaf group, and analyze how much Islam has influenced their diplomacy and campaigns against the government of the Philippines. I present four arguments regarding the three major groups involved in the Mindanao conflict. Argument #1: The unity of the Moro people under one identity occurred because of 400 years of economic and political exploitation by major colonial powers Spain,
5

Nicholas Sambanis, Do ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry, Journal of Conflict Resolution , vol. 45: 3, (2001): pp. 259-282. 6 Errol Henderson and David Singer, Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-1992, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37: 3, (2000): pp. 275-299. 7 Peter Chalk, Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24:4 (2002): pp. 241-269.; Lawrence Cline, The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 11:3, (2007): pp. 115-138.

Britain, the United States of America, and the Philippine government. Islam, though a common denominator, did not unite the various tribes and ethnic groups of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Argument #2: The Moro National Liberation Front, though reputed as a Muslim group, did not exhibit Islamic influences in its founding or leadership. In its campaign against the Government of the Philippines, the MNLF exacerbated the conflict as negotiations failed, showing that the MNLF necessitated violence for political rather than religious reasons. The MNLFs status as a nationalist, political group rather than religious insurgency allowed its eventual assimilation into the Philippine political system with a peace agreement. Argument #3: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front has shown Islamic tendencies in its founding and leadership. In its campaign against the Government of the Philippines, the MILF has engaged in consistent violence and exhibited few intentions of working with the Philippine government. The religious motivations of the MILF and resulting violence within Mindanao have limited the MILF insurgencys capacity for successful mediation with the Government and resolution of the conflict. Argument #4: The Abu Sayyaf Group cannot be considered an insurgent group like the MNLF and MILF. Instead, Abu Sayyaf has established a fundamentalist Islamic ideology but has acted and thrived as a criminal, terrorist organization. Without any real intentions of autonomy or independence, Abu Sayyafs propensity for mediation with the Government is low, as the groups terrorism and criminality have thrived off of the instability and war-torn environment in Mindanao. To understand the context of the Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, I first explain the background of Islam in the Philippines. Then, I describe the major colonization period of the Philippines by Spain and the United States of America including colonialist wars involving Mindanao and the Moro people and how it relates to later Moro identity. Then, I describe the post-World War II, end of colonization period, with a focus on the rise of Moro nationalism following Philippine independence. From there, I analyze the extent of Islamism in each of the groups in an historical context

starting with the MNLF in the 1960s, MILF in the late 1970s, and Abu Sayyaf in the early 1990s. In my analysis, I look at the totality of the campaigns, including the founding of each group, their goals and objectives, their leadership, their peacemaking and resolution initiatives, and the conflict severity of their campaigns against the state. In measuring conflict severity, I use the Uppsala Universitet UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia Database, which measures conflict deaths year by year. Finally, I look at the current state of conflict resolution, or lack thereof, between each group and the Government of the Philippines and consider the possibilities of peace in the Philippines. The Formation of Moro Identity Islam came to Southeast Asia sometime between the 12th and 14th centuries with the spread of traders from the Persian Gulf and India into the Malay Archipelago. In 1380, the first Arab traders arrived and began converting animistic populations throughout the Sulu Archipelago and Jolo. The traders established the Sultanate of Sulu, which would achieve great prosperity and influence because of itrade. By the 15th century, an Arab married the tribal princess and converted most of the population of Mindanao to Islam and established the Sultanate of Maguindanao. A third sultanate formed in the southern part of Mindanao as a loose confederation of principalities under the Sultanate of Lanau. The three major sultanates exerted control over the islands of Sulu, Mindanao, and North Borneo (now part of Malaysia). Unlike the populations of the southern islands and Mindanao, the Luzon and Visayas populations did not convert to Islam and opposed conversion efforts by the Sultanates and other Muslim groups. The three sultanates jostled for power and engaged in disputes in the greater Malay Archipelago throughout the 15th and 16th centuries. The Muslims of the Sultanates shared similar religion and culture, but the tribal and clan divisions within the sultanates inhibited the formation of a greater identity between them. Not until Spanish colonization occurred in the mid to late 16th century did a greater Muslim identity begin to grow in the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao. After the arrival of the first Spaniards in the 1550s, they engaged in a series of conquests around

the Philippines to augment their colonial empire. By the 1570s, Spain had conquered Luzon, established Manila as the capital, and began the forced conversion of the Filipinos on the surrounding islands. However, unlike those on Luzon and Visayas, the southern island populations, led by the Sultanates, resisted conversion. These conflicts continued for over 300 years as Muslims battled the Spanish and Filipino Catholics for control of Mindanao, Sulu, and Borneo. As the Spanish, Sultanates, and Filipino Catholics fought, Chinese and other Sultanate forces from Malaysia and Indonesia often joined the conflicts. These interventions embroiled Mindanao into the larger imperialist conflict between the native populations and colonial powers. During a civil war in 1658, the Sultan of Brunei appealed to the Sultan of Sulu for help against his enemies. After a successful campaign with the Sultan of Sulu, the Sultan of Brunei granted the Sulu Sultanate North Borneo the northeastern province of Malaysia.8 The resource rich area of North Borneo became an essential part of the Sultanate and the territorial sovereignty over North Borneo has played a large role in Philippine-Malaysia conflict and the Moro insurgency. By the end of the 19th century, Spain controlled most of Mindanao and the surrounding islands despite a lack of conversion of much of the population. Even with the territorial control by the Spanish, the Sultanates still considered Mindanao, Sulu, and North Borneo their birthrights and sovereign lands. The modern map below gives a sense of the territorial claims of the Sultanates to Mindanao, Sulu, and North Borneo (designated as Malaysia in this map) in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Sabah Issues (Royal Sultanate of Sulu, 2006). http://www.royalsulu.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Itemid=11 [Accessed 6 December 2012].

Colonial powers dominated Luzon and Visayas and eventually captured the Sulu Sultanate capital of Jolo in 1851. Following the citys capture, the Sultanate and Spanish signed a peace agreement that outlined the relationship between the two forces. In a translation error, the Spanish interpreted the agreement as total sovereignty while the Sultan viewed the agreement as a protectorate.10 The misunderstood peace agreement signed between the Sultan and Spanish became an unwanted framework for the native Muslims for almost another century of occupation by colonial powers. The Spanish referred to the Muslims in Mindanao as Moros, which corresponds with the term used by the Spanish for the Moors who occupied Spain during the Middle Ages.
9

Sulu Province, Philippines, (Zamboanga, The Portal to the Philippines, 2002) http://www.zamboanga.com/z/index.php?title=Sulu_Province,_Philippines. [Accessed 10 December 2012]. 10 William Larousse, A Local Church Living for Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Relations in MindanaoSulu, Philippines: 1965-2000 (Rome: Gregorian & Biblical Book Shop, 2001).

The diplomatic manipulation continued between the Sultanate and the British in 1878 when the Sultan of Sulu ceded sovereignty of North Borneo to a British trade company when he intended only to lease the lands. The Spanish and British controlled the lands as pieces in their colonial empires without regard to the indigenous populations, but they still referred to the historical right of the Sultanate in treaties. The Madrid Protocol, for example, recognized the claims of the Sultanate but still ignored any sovereign control of the Sultan: The Spanish Government renounces, as far as regards the British Government, all claims of sovereignty over the territories of the continent of Borneo, which belong, or which have belonged in the past to the Sultan of Sulu11 Despite territorial, historical recognition, colonial powers dominated the Sultanate lands and exploited the resources and trade of the region. The exploitation in the southern islands precipitated the lack of development in the region that continued during the American occupation in the 20th century. Following the Spanish-American War, the Spanish ceded control of the Philippine territories to the Americans with the Treaty of Paris. After the annexation of the Philippine by the United States, the First Philippine Republic movement out of Luzon and Visayas initiated the Philippine-American War in 1898. The Americans wanted neutrality with the populations of the southern islands and Mindanao as they battled the Filipinos in the northern islands. The Americans and Sultanate of Sulu signed the Bates Treaty to maintain neutrality but with the same wording error as the previous Spanish treaty, which granted American sovereignty over the southern islands. Americans established the treaty as a pacifying measure until they successfully repressed the Filipino independence movement in the northern islands. Brigadier General John Bates, who constructed the treaty, admitted that it was only a temporary measure and the Americans soon invaded the southern islands in order to expand their colonial empire.12 In the next two decades, the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu fought the Americans in a guerrilla
11

Article III, Madrid Protocol of 1885. http://www.lawnet.sabah.gov.my/Lawnet/SabahLaws/Treaties/Protocol(Madrid).pdf [Accessed 10 December 2012]. 12 Madge Kho, The Bates Treaty, Philippine Political Update. http://www.philippineupdate.com/Bates.htm [Accessed 10 December 2012].

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insurgency known as the Moro-American War. As the insurgency raged in the early 1900s, the Americans conducted a series of changes that led to two important effects for the forming of a Moro identity. In 1906, Americans under Major General Leonard Wood eliminated the political power of the Sultans and established the southern islands as an American province known as Moroland. This change led to an important transformation of Muslim politics in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. While the Muslims have long divided themselves into tribal groups, of which the Maranos, Maguindanaos, and the TausugSamals make up 75% of the Muslim population13, the Sultanate families retained the traditional, legitimate source of power in the region. As political and religious leaders, the Sultans and their officials controlled the population and made class structure rigid to maintain power. However, when the Americans undercut the Sultanates, a new group of leaders emerged whom, in collaboration with the American occupiers, began to form a concept of a Moro identity beyond the Sultanates. By the end of the Moro Insurgency in 1913, the Americans had recognized the separateness of the Moro people and adopted reforms in the legal and economic systems with the help of the new leaders. The reforms included private land ownership and a codified legal system consistent with Moro customs.14 The American occupation brought important reforms to Moroland, but continued exploitation by the northern Filipino government in Manila undermined southern progress and further alienated Moros in political and social terms. The decades of Moro separation from the Filipino government led Moro leaders to address the United States Congress with their nationalist goals: That in the event the United States grants independence to the Philippine Islands without provision for our retention under the American flag, it is our firm intention and resolve to declare ourselves an independent constitutional sultanate to be known to the world as the Moro Nation.15 The Moro

13

W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Mows of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford UP, 1990), p. 19. 14 Vic Hurley. The Formation of the Moro Province, in Swish of the Kris, (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1936). 15 Katherine Mayo, A Declaration of Rights and Purposes Addressed to the Congress of the United States of America, Isles of Fear , (1924), p. 334.

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nation declared in the mid 1920s the desire for its own sovereign state. After hundreds of years of Spanish, British, American, and northern Filipino occupation and exploitation, the new and old leadership of the Moros gathered together for the first time to make its sovereign claim to Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and North Borneo. Future Moro insurgent leader Nur Misuari remarks on the formation of the Moro identity as independent: Even if we turn back the pages of history, it is impossible to find any single moment in our existence as a people where we were ever a part, let alone a possession of the Filipino government Our people have always zealously maintained their distinct character and identity as a nation.16 The Moro people desired statehood and separation from the Filipino government, but that did not stop the United States from granting Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago to the Republic of the Philippines in 1946 after World War II. After 400 years of constant colonial interference, the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu encountered similar domination by the Filipino government in Manila. With the historical memory of colonialism, the Moro nation did not intend to subjugate to another foreign power. After World War II and the global nationalist movement, new sovereign nationstates established their own governments, economics, and ideologies in the Cold War. While many nations modernized and moved their people out of poverty, the Filipino government continued to exacerbate underdevelopment and economic exploitation of the Moro people. Mass migrations and inequality in the legal system contributed to the economic and political conditions that spawned the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front in the late 1960s. The northern islands suffered a severe depression during World War II as unemployment and overpopulation soared into the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, the central government in Manila began an aggressive campaign to provide jobs to its impoverished citizens of Luzon and Visayas through a migration program to Mindanao. The migration led to two major effects: reduction of percentage of

16

Nur Misuari, The Final Struggle of the Moro People. Muslim Filipino Struggle for Identity: Challenge and Response. (Manila: Islamic Studies Institute, University of the Philippines, 1985), p. 3.

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Muslim population in the southern islands and a disruption of the traditional land system in Mindanao. Until the 1960s, the Muslim population outnumbered indigenous and Christian populations by a significant margin despite colonial occupation. The Moro demographic superiority provided political, economic, and traditional support systems to the population if just on the local level. For example, land customs in Mindanao passed the ownership of land down family generations, but traditional Moro policies never gave official recognition to land ownership. Though the Americans attempted to reform and codify these traditions, the Moro leadership through the Sultans and others never implemented full reform and instead maintained the customs. With the influx of Christian settlers, local, traditional balances were disrupted, with the Moro population bearing the brunt of the negative outcome.

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Muslim and Non-Muslim Populations of Moroland17 1918 Cotabato Non-Muslims Muslims % Pop. Muslim Lanao Non-Muslims Muslims % Pop. Muslim Palawan Non-Muslims Muslims % Pop. Muslim Sulu Non-Muslims Muslims % Pop. Muslim Zamboanga Non-Muslims Muslims % Pop. Muslim 102,544 44,789 30.40% 263,956 92,028 25.85% 288,593 133,348 31.60% 829,389 194,444 18.99% 4,147 168,629 97.60% 16,584 230,533 93.29% 1,393 226,883 99.39% 15,972 310,926 95.11% 63,529 5,524 8.00% 87,278 6,395 6.82% 97,655 8,614 8.1% 149,893 12,776 7.85% 8,140 83,319 91.10% 80,805 162,632 66.81% 106,703 237,215 68.97% 236,670 412,260 63.52% 61,052 110,926 64.53% 135,939 162,996 54.53% 284,507 155,162 35.29% 672,659 356,460 34.64% 1939 1948 1960

In Cotabato, a province in Mindanao, major demographic changes in 40 years reduced the Muslim population from a near 2/3 majority in the early 20th century to a 1/3
17

Thomas J. OShaughnessy, How Many Muslims has the Philippines? In Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon. Peter Gordon Gowing, ed. (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979), p. 377.

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minority. The massive shift towards Christian majoritization can also be seen in the provinces of Lanao, Palawan, and Zamboanga after World War II.18 Even in Muslim dominated Sulu, Christian migration made Christians a notable minority of almost 5% in the island chain. The demographic change proved devastating because as Christian settlers moved to Mindanao, the Filipino central government ignored Moro customs and granted land owned by Moros to new settlers. The local Moro support system gave way to increased dominance in politics by Christian officials and even further marginalization of Moros: Christian settlers regularly obtained ownership of the best new lands as well as crop loans and other forms of government assistanceBy 1970, this differential access had produced a profound economic gap between Muslim and Christian communities throughout Mindanao.19 In addition to land ownership, the Manila government engaged in a massive resource drain from mineral rich Mindanao and Sulu without any return, benefit, or investment given to the Moro people.20 The economic marginalization of the Moro people became a cause of MNLF leader Nur Misuari to mobilize popular support for insurgency in the 1970s. The other major contributing factor to the formation of the modern Moro identity was political corruption and exclusion on the local and national level. As the Christian population grew, the postcolonial Muslim elite saw their power diminishing and attempted to maintain control through cooperation with Christians at the local and national level. Christian leaders tolerated this cooperation because they believed the Moro leaders were fit to control the greater Muslim population: While the demographic balance remained favorable to (the Muslim political leaders) they readily formed coalitions with Christian politicians and appealed to Christian voters. Implicit in those appeals was their claim to be able to control Muslims.21 Moro leaders assuaged the Muslim population even as they continued to permit Christian expansion into Mindanao

18 19

Ibid, 377. Thomas Mckenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines , (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 117. 20 T.J.S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippines Politics, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980). pp.107-128. 21 Mckenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels , op cit., p. 137.

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and Sulu. The Moro population accepted the leadership of Manila and local Christians in the 1960s because the traditional Moro elite limited dissent to maintain power. However, after hundreds of years of exploitation and exclusion, Moro tensions had risen to an uncontrollable level, even towards its traditional leaders. The Formation and Campaign of the Moro National Liberation Front (1968-1996) The Jabaidah Massacre of 1968 confirmed the Moro populace and its young activists suspicions that the Manila government had no intentions to cooperate with Moros and actually meant to exploit them for the governments benefit. After the Sultanate of Sulu acquiesced to the Manila government and ceded its territorial claims to resource rich North Borneo, the government began a process to reclaim the area then under sovereignty of Malaysia. By the time President Marcos took over, diplomatic options had been exhausted in the international courts and only military alternatives remained. Marcos began training a select number of Moros, who spoke the language and shared cultures with the Muslims there, to insurrect a rebellion there that would favor Philippine annexation. However, when the Moros refused to fight their own people, the Filipino commanders executed between 14 and 68 of them.22 The news of the massacre ignited a popular firestorm in Mindanao and became the seminal event that started the Moro insurgency: The Jabidah Massacre provided both provocation and metaphor. Philippine Muslims who had volunteered to serve the republic had been deceived, exploited, and treacherously murdered by Christian agents of the state Philippine Muslims had to separate themselves from those whom they were judged unfavorably and in relation to whom they were materially disadvantaged- they must proclaim themselves a new people.23 MNLF founder Nur Misuari mobilized the people against the state through economic and political reasons. Nur Misuari did not view Christianity as the problem,
22

Syed Serajul Islam. "Ethnic conflict in the Philippines: The Case of Mindanao-Sulu Region," in Rajat Ganguly (ed.) Ethnic conflict and Secessionism in south and Southeast Asia, (New Delhi: Sage, 2003), p. 201. 23 Brackette Williams, A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation across Ethnic Terrain. Annual Review of Anthropology, vol, 18: (1989): pp. 401-44. In McKenna, Thomas, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 143.

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but rather the government that destroyed the economy and political freedoms of the people. As discussed earlier, many prominent Moro leaders cooperated with the government in Manila in order to maintain favor, power, and wealth. But, Misuari founded the MNLF on the egalitarian basis that the government had no desire to serve, protect, and invest in the people of Mindanao and Sulu who were not part of the privileged northern Filipino migrants following World War II: All people who lived in Sulu and Mindanao were Bangsa Moro, be they Muslim, Christian, or pagan.24 Nur Misuari and the MNLF later released its Manifesto in 1974 with the demands and goals of the Moro people, including: 1. An independent state for the Moro people. 2. The MNLF would never agree to anything short of the goal of independence. 3. Democracy in the new state. 4. Christian Filipinos who want to remain in the state would have their rights protected as long as they renounce their Philippine citizenship. 5. The MNLF is committed to growth of Islam in its homeland, but other religious and indigenous cultures would be permitted. 6. The MNLF shares the general goals of oppressed colonized humanity everywhere. 7. Freedom of the press. 8. Foreign investment in the Moro state would be both welcomed and encouraged.25 The MNLF emphasized political reasons of independence, democracy, anti-colonialism, and freedoms as its goals for the insurgency. The MNLFs campaign reflected a war against the government rather than a Christian Muslim conflict. In 1972, the MNLF launched its first offensive against the government after Marcos declaration of martial law in Mindanao. The MNLFs first offensive focused on the death squads operating in Mindanao that were tools of the local government rather than religious fanatics. For example, one major death squad, the Ilaga, which was
24

Tom Stern, Nur Misuari: An Authorized Biography, (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2012). p. 20. 25 Cline, The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, op cit., p. 122.

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responsible for the Manili and Bukidnon Massacres that led to the deaths of 140 Muslims in 1971, was under the control of Herman Lopez, the first cousin of Marcos mother.26 As these death squads were government controlled, Nur Misuari emphasized the political struggle against the government rather than the Christian population. In the first major battle of the war in 1972, the Marawi Uprising, Misuari and his MNLF clashed with General Fidel Ramos, future president of the Philippines, and his Philippine officers outside of Camp Amai Pak Pak for greater control of Lanao. In the next few years, the MNLF captured the city of Jolo, when Misuari released the Moro Declaration of Independence and Manifesto, and garnered significant international attention for its cause. International influence at this time contributed to mediation between the MNLF and Marcos government. In the early 1970s, Libya and Malaysia provided extensive aid, training, and weaponry to the MNLF as it began insurgency operations against the government. Additionally, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has been active in supporting the Moro cause worldwide. The prevalence of Muslim external support suggests religious motivations but the actions of the Muslim countries involved differ from religious factors. As discussed earlier, Malaysia had been in a territorial dispute with the Philippines since the annexation of North Borneo after World War II. So, Malaysia supported the Moro insurgency in order to keep the Philippine army involved in Mindanao. Though the Moro leadership also made claims to North Borneo, Misuari utilized Malaysian support out of necessity: Misuari said that Malaysias strategy in the Mindanao conflict was obvious, because Manila might turn its attention to the Sabah issue once the war in the Philippine South was resolved. According to the MNLF chairman, (Prime Minister of Malaysia) Mahathir did not want to talk about the Sabah issue because, based on history, the large island just south of Mindanao belonged to his clan and was owned by his forefathers.27 Malaysia support did not coincide along religious lines, but out of Malaysian national security interests. Malaysian support found
26 27

Stern, Nur Misuari: An Authorized Biography, op cit., p. 44. Sammy Martin, Nur Blames Mahathir for War in South. The Manila Times. (27 November 2010.) http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-2201833951.html [Accessed 12 December 2012].

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success. By first negotiations in 1976, Marcos mobilized over 75% of his military in Mindanao and Sulu.28 The OIC and its member countries have provided significant support to the MNLF through both advocacy and aid during the conflict. Though Libya and the OIC initially responded to the MNLFs cause with weapons and training after evidence of Muslim slaughter in Mindanao, the OIC never fully supported the MNLF and its independence movement: In general, Islamic countries and organizations have supported autonomy for Filipino Muslims, but have not backed actual secession.29 The OIC has never supported the establishment of a Muslim state in the Philippines and has instead focused on mediation and humanitarian protection for the Muslims in conflict. The OIC actually persuaded Misuari to pursue autonomy rather than independence. Misuari and the OICs strategy in peace talks reflect the practical goals of the MNLF rather than fundamental religious motivation. After years of conflict in 1976, the war had denigrated into a stalemate and the MNLF succeeded in bringing its demands to the forefront of Marcos regime. In the face of international pressure, Marcos submitted to negotiations with Nur Misuari. With Misuaris concession of autonomy rather than independence, Misuari and Marcos signed the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 that accomplished many of the goals of the MNLF campaign. The Tripoli Agreement granted the Moros autonomous control in Basilan, Sulu, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Maguindanao, Palawan, Lanao, and others for a total of 13 provinces. Marcos granted them their own economic and financial system in addition to a higher percent of the revenue of the rich mines and mineral resources of Mindanao.30 The Agreement called for autonomous democracy within Mindanao and satisfied all of the goals of the MNLF. Misuari and the MNLF planned to disarm and become members of the new government. But Marcos quickly reneged on the Agreement, did not implement any of the reforms, and the situation deteriorated once again into war. After
28 29

Stern, Nur Misuari: An Authorized Biography, op cit., p. 69. Cline, The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, op cit., p. 132. 30 The Tripoli Agreement, (1976). http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/phil20.pdf [Accessed 14 December 2012]

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the failure of the Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF-Government campaign increased in severity. While 1976 saw only 89 combat deaths according to Uppsalas UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the years of 1977 and 1978 saw 800 and 1000 deaths.31 The pattern of combat casualties shows that as the political talks failed, the MNLF mobilized its insurgency against the government to a higher extent. The severity of violence increased as political grievances and diplomacy failed. The MNLF insurgencys political rather than religious aims precipitated violence when necessary but forwarded diplomacy when the option reached the table. The MNLF never directed violence towards civilians in its insurgency, a characteristic that separates it from the other two major groups, as discussed later. The next major step in the peace process occurred under President Aquino in the late 1980s. In 1987, the Filipino Congress passed the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and called for votes in every one of the 13 provinces and 10 cities to approve entrance in the ARMM. However, as discussed earlier, population demographics had changed to undermine the traditional southern Moro vote. So, when the results of the vote in 1989 were revealed, only Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Lanao del Sur approved entrance in the ARMM. As seen in the picture below, the ARMM covered only a small portion of traditional Moro land.

31

Philippines: Government-MNLF, UCDP Conflict Encylopedia, Uppsala Universitet. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=127&regionSelect=11-Oceania# [Accessed 14 December 2012].

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With the ARMM provinces marked in red, the ARMM covered only the small islands of Sulu and only two provinces in Mindanao. The major population centers in Mindanao remained under central government control. Misuari and the MNLF, enraged by the results of the vote, dismissed the peace talks and re-engaged in war. In the conflict years during second phase negotiations, 1985 through 1988, battle deaths hit 25, 46, 25, and 25, respectively.33 However, when negotiations failed, conflict reached 115 deaths in 1989, 64 in 1990, and 102 in 1993.34 At the end of 1993, negotiations began again under President Ramos as violence decreased. Misuari and Ramos signed the Final Peace Agreement in September 1996 and
32

Map of the Philippines showing the location of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, GFDL, (2003). http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/84/Ph_locator_armm.png/250pxPh_locator_armm.png [Accessed 15 December 2012]. 33 Philippines: Government-MNLF, UCDP, op cit. 34 Ibid.

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Misuari eventually became governor of the ARMM. The Final Peace Agreement called for two phases of socio-economic investment and the consolidation of the ARMM provinces within greater Moroland. Though economic underdevelopment still pervades Mindanao and Sulu, the political inclusion of the Moros caused the MNLFs disarmament. With the political goals of the MNLF accomplished, the MNLF insurgency disbanded and its leaders have become contributing members of the ARMM and greater Filipino government. Though former MNLF members have lapsed back into minor violence at various times with the government, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf Group have become the main players in Mindanao. The Formation and Campaign of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (1977-Present) After the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, a rift occurred between Nur Misuari and many in the MNLF leadership. Hashim Salamat, nephew of the founder of an early Moro independence group the Mindanao Independence Movement, was dissatisfied with Misuaris concessions of autonomy rather than independence. Educated in Cairo during the height of political activism of the 1960s, Salamat served as Misuaris second in command and promoted the MNLF cause around the world. However, as the war progressed, he became more radical and disgruntled with Misuaris leadership. In a petition to oust Misuari, Salamat wrote: The Moro struggle is jihad. It is a Holy War.35 The radicalization of Salamat and the rift between Misuari and Salamat over the future of the Moro movement led to Salamats expulsion from the MNLF in 1977. However, Salamat formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and released its directives soon after: 1. To make supreme the word of Allah. 2. To gain the pleasure of Allah. 3. To strengthen the relationship of man with his Creator. 4. To strengthen the relationship of man and man.

35

Stern, Nur Misuari: An Authorized Biography, op cit., p. 82.

22

5. To regain the illegally and immorally usurped legitimate and inalienable rights of the Bangsamoro people to freedom and self-determination. 6. To establish an independent state and government and implement Shariah.36 Unlike the MNLF, Salamat and the MILF projected religious motivations in its cause for insurgency. In addition to rejecting autonomy and the Tripoli Agreement, the MILF called for an Islamic state with the full implementation of Shariah law. Along with Salamat, MILF leadership reflected more religious leanings: Clerics are much more prominent among the leadership of the MILF than they are within the MNLF, whose leadership is largely secular.37 The MILF became the second major insurgent group during the 1980s and unlike the MNLF, dismissed peace talks and fought for Islam and complete independence of the Moro people. In its campaign against the government, the MILF has engaged in consistent and indiscriminate violence with few attempts at peace. Though the group has not emphasized indiscriminate violence against civilian and non-combatant targets,38 the MILF executed 150 civilians in 2000, 47 in 2002, and 66 in 2003 according to UCDP.39 The indiscriminate violence of the MILF against Christian migrants in Mindanao and Sulu differ than the MNLF and coincide along religious leanings rather than political goals. Furthermore, the absence of peace attempts between the MILF and the government, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, show the indivisibility and ideologically rigid stakes of the MILF. The MILF existed as a small ideological group in the 1980s but as its power grew in the 1990s, it engaged in consistent violence with the government even during peace negotiations. Though the MILF professed to have engaged in peace talks during the 1996 negotiations with the MNLF, severity actually increased from prior years during 1996, reaching 146 deaths.40 Violence increased to 201 deaths as the MNLF
36 37

Cline, The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, op cit., p. 115-138 Ibid, p. 126. 38 Chalk, Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh, op cit., p. 248. 39 Philippines: MILF-Civilians UCDP, op cit. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=127&regionSelect=11-Oceania# [Accessed 16 December 2012]. 40 Ibid.

23

disarmed in 1997. The conflict became more severe in 2000 with 1055 deaths as MILF leader Salamat declared an Islamic Holy War and Jihad concurrent with President Astradas declaration of all out war on the MILF.41 Conflict severity increased and decreased year by year, but the pattern of violence shows little correlation with peace attempts in the 2000s. For example, a 2009 peace agreement between the MILF and government had some initial success in reducing conflict severity, with 2010 casualties not reaching the threshold of 25 combat deaths. However, in 2011, conflict increased to 83 combat deaths, with both sides still confirming the existence of the peace agreement.42 The peace talks and ceasefires between the MILF and government have served as little more than stopgap, convenient measures to reposition forces on both sides. Though the MILF and government claimed to have achieved a final peace agreement similar to the MNLF truce as recently as November 2012, the continued prevalence of ideological, religious forces within the MILF limit the propensity of mediation and successful disarmament of the group. The Formation and Campaign of the Abu Sayyaf Group (1990-Present) After a period of ceasefires and lack of activity on both sides of the conflict, a number of MILF defectors formed the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in 1990. Translated literally as Bearer of the Sword, ASG formed in order to reinvigorate the fight against the Philippine government. Led by Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, a veteran of the insurgency against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the group brought the worldview struggle of Islam and Christianity to the conflict. ASG leaders desired a much stricter Islamic state than its MILF counterparts: The overall objective is the establishment of an independent and exclusive Islamic Theocratic State in Mindanao (MIS).43 Differing from MNLF and MILF, ASG argued for a state similar to Iran, with few freedoms, no

41

Philippines: MILF-Government, UCDP, op cit. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=127&regionSelect=11-Oceania# [Accessed 16 December 2012]. 42 Ibid. 43 Chalk, Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh, op cit., p. 248.

24

religious tolerance, and strict Shariah legal and economic law. Members of the ASG, unlike the MILF and MNLF, opposed all Christian presence in Mindanao and Sulu and engaged in Violent religious intolerance, advocating the deliberate targeting of all southern Filipino Catholics (including the beheading of women, children, and the elderly).44 However, with its low numbers, estimated at only 330 fighters in 1999, and lack of popular support, ASG has conducted a terrorist campaign rather than insurgency in the areas of Mindanao and Sulu. Abu Sayyaf has terrorized Christian civilians, foreigners, and missionaries since 1990 through bombings, kidnappings, and beheadings. ASGs first major action in 1991 was the bombing of an international Christian missionary vessel named the M/V Doulos. In 1993, ASG destroyed the San Pedro Cathedral in Davao City in Mindanao, which caused seven deaths and 130 injuries.45 In 1994 and 1995, ASG killed 45 Christian passengers in a bus ambush in Basilan and orchestrated a raid on Ipil that led to 53 civilian deaths.46 Violence continued into the 2000s, with two ferry bombings in 2001 and 2004 leading to the deaths of 45 and 116 civilians, respectively.4748 The 2004 attack, known as the SuperFerry 14 Bombing, became the worlds deadliest terrorist attack at sea. Additionally, ASG has engaged in a major kidnap and beheadings strategy since the mid 1990s after the introduction of Khadaffy Janjalani, younger brother of ASG founder, as the leader of the group. ASG has targeted Christian civilians and foreigners in its kidnapping campaign in Mindanao and Sulu. In the early 2000s, ASG kidnapped

44 45

Ibid, p. 248. Ibid, p. 249. 46 Adam Indikt. Asia Watch, The Review, vol. 24:2, (1999); Maria Concepcion Clamor, Terrorism and Southeast Asia: Philippine Perspective, Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia Pacific, (2002). 47 41 Found Dead After Philippines Bombing, The Washington Post, (27 February 2000). http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/50337822.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT& date=Feb+27%2C+2000&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.26&desc= WORLD+In+Brief [Accessed 15 December 2012].; Philippine Ferry Bombing Death Toll Rises to 45, CNN Interactive World Wide News, (26 February 2000). http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/08/28/philippines.ferry.blast/index.html [Accessed 15 December 2012]. 48 Andrew Marshall, Surge in piracy raises concerns over maritime terrorism, The New York Times, (25 November 2008). http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/world/asia/25ihtpirates.1.18133159.html?_r=0 [Accessed 15 December 2012].

25

hundreds of teachers, children, and foreigners in various raids and beheaded dozens of them while demanding ransom for the others.49 Many of the raids took place outside the conflict zones, which incited widespread fear and condemnation by the Filipino and world population. These raids included a Malaysian hotel and a hotel on the island of Palawan, both far from Mindanao and Sulu. The randomness of the raids and attacks combined with the low support shows a lack of insurgent strategy and a focus on terrorist tactics. ASG has had few direct engagements with Filipino army forces. According to UCDP, ASGs most violent year towards civilians was 2004, when they killed 124 civilians.50 However, in that same year, battle deaths between the government and ASG reached only 39, with the highest casualty count reaching 379 in 2000.51 ASG has acted more as a terrorist group rather than legitimate insurgency in the conflict. Though ASG professed an ideological struggle against the Filipino government, the West, and Christianity, ASGs campaign in Mindanao and Sulu reflects more of financial exploitation of the conflict rather than religious extremism. After hundreds of years of colonization and decades of intense conflict, Mindanao exists as the poorest region of the Philippines. With over 62 private armies and over 90% of the countrys 350,000 loose weapons, Mindanao has devolved into a lawless region with little security.
52

ASG has taken advantage of this lawlessness and engaged in predatory taxation,

extortion of local businesses, gun running, and marijuana cultivation, in addition to its major kidnap for random strategy. ASG has used terror tactics under the guise of political motivations to increase revenue for the group. The kidnapping of foreigners has provided ASG with its highest revenue stream, with millions of dollars funneled in ransoms every year.53 The collaboration of numerous opposing groups in Mindanao reflects the war
49 50

Islam, "Ethnic conflict in the Philippines: The Case of Mindanao-Sulu Region," op cit., p. 215. Philippines: ASG-Civilians, UCDP, op cit. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=127&regionSelect=11-Oceania# [Accessed 16 December 2012]. 51 Philippines: Government-ASG, UCDP, op cit. http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=127&regionSelect=11-Oceania# [Accessed 15 December 2012. 52 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, The pitfalls of working for peace in Mindanao, in Rajat Ganguly (ed.) Autonomy and Ethnic conflict in south and Southeast Asia, (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 122. 53 Ibid., p. 123.

26

economy and ASGs financial intent rather than active insurgency for a Islamic state: During the Abu Sayyaf kidnapping incidents, the media frequently reported on how the military, police and civilian officials partook of the huge ransoms paid for the release of hostages, especially kidnapped foreigners.54 ASG members have worked with the same Christians and corrupt politicians they condemn in their ideology. Abu Sabaya, one of Abu Sayyafs leaders, left the group with millions of stolen ransom money and is now being hunted by his former guerrilla fighters.55 ASGs criminal activities and random terrorist beheadings have led even the MILF hardliners to distance themselves from the group.56 Though on the surface it appears that ASG and MILF have similar goals in the formation of an Islamic state, the foundation and campaigns of ASG have proven that money, rather than Islam, motivates the actions of the group. Conclusion and Prospects for Peace After 40 years of conflict in the Philippines, a renewed peace agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front offers hope for a solution to the Moro insurgency that has plagued Mindanao, Sulu, and the Philippines. Though the capacity of the MILF for peace is suspect, international peacekeepers and intervening states hope that the long duration of the conflict has exhausted both sides willingness to fight. The civil conflict in Mindanao and Sulu has set back the economy decades and caused lawlessness and massive displacement of the population in the war torn regions. The government, Moro National Liberation Front, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front all deserve blame for the failure of the countless peace agreements throughout the years. However, in the face of increasing terrorism and radical extremism in the region, the leaders of the government, MNLF, and MILF must work together to dismantle the war economy, increase development, and boost investment to combat conditions that have exacerbated corruption and bred terrorist and criminal groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group. Though the MILF has shown Islamist leanings in its ideology, the recent progress of
54 55

Ibid., p.122. Will America Surrender to Terror in the Phillipines?, Wall Street Journal, (28 May 2002.) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1022561094599445200.html [Accessed 15 December 2012]. 56 Cline, The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, op cit., p. 127.

27

modern Islamist governments in the Middle East suggest the potential for the MILF to assimilate into the greater Filipino political system without further conflict. Furthermore, the MNLF, now as a political organization, must continue to exert influence as the dominant Moro representative body in Mindanao and Sulu for the sake of resolution of the conflict. Finally, the government and the Moro groups must destroy the Abu Sayyaf Group to stabilize a region and bring confidence to a population that has lived in fear for decades. Only time will tell if the most recent peace agreement between the MILF and government holds, but for the sake of the tens of thousands killed, hundreds of thousands displaced, and millions plagued by poverty, the four-decade long conflict needs resolution and compromise between the Moros and the government.

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