Maos Grand Strategy behind the

1958 Kinmen Shelling Zhangdaiwei Xu

2012 Fall

Maos Grand Strategy behind the 1958 Kinmen Shelling

Zhangdaiwei Xu
I. Introduction

Kinmen Island (also known as Quemoy) is located in the Taiwan Strait, between Fujian Province, and the middle of Taiwan Island. Kinmen Island covers an area of only about 100 square kilometers. The small island has been neglected for centuries until 1958 when the Peoples Republic of China (PRC ) launched the notorious Kinmen Shelling. At that time, Jinmen became the hot spot influencing the stability of China and Taiwan, and even all of East Asia.

With the defeat of Chiang Kai-sheks Kuomingtang (KMT) troops in the Mainland China, Chiang with his main troops, foreign currency reserve and gold of KMT, retreated to Taiwan in May of 1949. In the 1950s, Chiang was planning the counterattack against the mainland. His first step was to fortify the defense of the offshore islands, like Kinmen, Penghu and Matzu. At this time, Mao, on one hand, continued the attack on Chiangs residue forces in South and Southwest China; on the other hand, he was busily building railway and airports in Fujian Province, especially in Xiamen, the city facing Kinmen Island. Both the communist and the nationalist armies formed the confrontation situation since then and the military strategic status of Kinmen Island was enhanced with the growing tension between the CCP and the KMT. In fact, Kinmen Shelling was not the first time that the Communist Party

launched the attack on Kinmen Island. On Oct 25th of 1949, 8 days after the Communist Party took control of Xiamen, the 10th Corps of the PLA planned to use 3 regiments (the 28th, 29th and 31st) to take over the island.1 Without the air cover and little experience of landing operations, the fleets of the 10th Corps experienced heavy bombing losses failed to land on the island. General Ye Fei, the director of Jinmen Landing in 1949, wrote in his memoir that Why did this mistake happen? It is because I despised Kinmen, and I thought there is no fortification and only one beaten regiment, Li Liangrong Regiment, with only about 20,000 people.2 He also expressed his regrets in ordering his troops to station in Xiamen, which he described as a misstep that affected the preparations for liberating Kinmen.3 The misstep induced the confrontation between troops from the Communist Party in Xiamen and from the Kuomintang in Jinmen. Before the Kinmen Shelling, the Communist Party never stopped its military actions in other offshore islands, and they even started several small-scale attacks on Kinmen Island. Why then did the Kinmen Shelling in 1958 receive so much attention? First, it is the largest scale shelling ever with the PLA firing more than 30,000 shells in 85 minutes. Second, it is a long lasting war that the shelling did not stop until 1979. Third, the shelling action is astounding to Taiwans and

[Xu Yan], [War at Jinmen], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Publisher, 1992), pp. 49, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]. 2 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir ], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp. 598, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu] 3 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp. 598, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]

American authorities who did not foresee the CCP attack on Kinmen. Fourth, the PLA had several chances to take over the island but they chose not to do it.

II. Hypotheses on Reasons for the 1958 Jinmen Shelling

i. Hypothesis on Supporting the Middle East

1958 is a revolutionary year for the Arab world. Egypt and Syria established the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) to show the impetus in the Arab world had passed from pro-western countries to the triumphant pan-Arab movement4 in February 1958. A few months later, in July 13th 1958, the young officer of the 20th Infantry Brigade of the Royal Iraqi Army, Abdul Salam Aref, announced the overthrow of Iraqs Hashemite Dynasty and the birth of a new peoples republic. This revolution in Iraq was designed to resist Iraqs alliance with Britain through participation in the Baghdad Pact and to advocate the establishment of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). At the same time, Lebanese Muslims pushed the government to join the newly created United Arab Republic. President Eisenhower responded to Lebanese President Chamouns call for assistance by sending the Sixth Fleet, the 2nd Provisional Marine Force and the Army Task Force 201 to Lebanon. Scholars drew the conclusion that Maos shelling of Jinmen was due to his strategic plan to attract American attention from the Middle East (in the revolt of public resentment to Iraqi government) to the Far East, thus relieving the

Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No.1, 2004, pp.177

military pressure on Iraq and Lebanon. This hypothesis is derived from speeches Mao made at that time that China's aid to the Arabic people,..., should not be restricted to moral support but must be given practical actions.5 Afew days later, during the CCP standing committees 1958 July meeting, Mao announced the plan to shell Jinmen and Matzu. Maos attacks on Kinmen were initially planned in late July and early August may coincide with the Middle East crisis, however, the de facto implementation of the attacks was delayed. Xu Yan, a Chinese PLA General once involved in Kinmen Shelling in 1958 also pointed out his doubts in his book: How could the primary objective in easing tensions in the Middle East be Maos motivation for attacking in late August?6 Moreover, the Middle East hypothesis does not answer the question as to why Mao postponed the date twice, from July 25th to July 27th and finally to August 23rd. As in fact, on Aug 20th, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting that American and British troops withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan. That Mao chose the date for the shelling of Jinmen in the epilogue of the tension greatly reduced the shellings influence on helping the Arab world. Thus, the argument about helping the Middle East lacks credibility. Although the US and UKs involvement in Iraq would seem to indicate a planned attack on Jinmen as a strategic response, Mao rather simply used the violence in Iraq as political cover. As Mao firstly asked Chinese military to take

5 6

Jian Chen, Maos China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp.176 [Xu Yan], [War at Jinmen], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Publisher, 1992), pp. 220, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]

some visible action to demonstrate solidarity,7 Mao initiatively commanded the PLAs Headquarters of the General Staff that 1) the air force enter into Fujian Province as soon as possible; 2) the artilleries aim at lock all the maritime transports around Kinmen Island8. To rationalize the intensive military campaign in July, Mao sought every chance to link the military preparations in Fujian with the intention on attack against American imperialism. Mao publicly criticized American designs in Asia and, particularly, the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, on the Beidaihe Conference, Mao stated the continued American intervention was positive for China because it would help motivate Chinese workers and peasants to work harder for less.9 One week after Maos speech on Beidaihe Conference, in Henan, the Peoples Militia was created with propaganda, which referred to the Middle East Crisis and American threats in Taiwan.10 Through the recruit of the militia, not only peoples enthusiasm in protecting their own country was mobilized, but also the militia became the major backup for the regular PLA in human resources of home security. ii. Hypothesis on Testing Americans Resolve

Some scholars assumed the artillery war at Kinmen Island in 1958 was Maos intention to probe Washingtons real intention toward Taiwan, as well as to
7

Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.238 8 [Xu Yan], [War at Jinmen], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Publisher, 1992), pp. 49, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu] 9 Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.238 10 Interviews with Colonel Zhang. He said the newly-founded broadcasting stations in Henan kept mobilizing peoples productivity in the communes and passions for joining the militia by repeating American imperialism in impeding the development of countries in the third world.

determine to what extent Washington was willing to commit to Taiwans defense.11 By the end of 1957, the Chinese-American Ambassadorial Conference in Warsaw reached a deadlock when discussing about embargo and how to resolve the Taiwan Strait. On December 12th 1957, the conference was postponed. The deepening confrontation between China and America could be an explanation of the hypothesis that Shelling Kinmen is Chinas way to solve American threats in the Taiwan Strait. However, why was Mao targeting Kinmen Island? From my point of view, it is also a deliberate choice of Mao. The authorities of Taiwan and America signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2nd 1954. In the Treaty, both parties claimed the resolution to resist armed attacks:

Article 2

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.12

Also in Article 6, it was the first time that the United States integrated Penghu and other offshore islands as parts under American protection.

11 12

Jian Chen, Maos China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp.172 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China , Taiwan Document Project, < http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm>, [accessed Oct 10th, 2011]

Article 6

For the purposes of Articles 2 and 5, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles 2 and 5 will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.13

However, the term, the Pescadores, does not imply if Kinmen Island belonged to the archipelago, thus means it was vague to define if Kinmen Island was under the protection of Mutual Defense Treaty. As in fact, Mao has launched a similar attack on Dachen Archipelago on 1954: On one hand, Mao asked the PLA soldiers not to initiatively attack American fleets or planes; on the other hand, PLA deployed the air forces to bomb the KMT troops on Dachen Archipelago. These reasons may explain the initial shelling of Jinmen, but they cannot explain why the attack lasted such a long time, from 1958 to 1979. In Ye Feis memoir, he states that when he obeyed Maos order to shell only Jiangs convoy, the U.S. fleet abandoned Jiang and retreated. Mao also made the claim that Americans only cared about their national interests. This statement shows that Mao had already concluded that the Americans would not protect Jinmen. Then why did he not stop the shelling and take the next step? Why did he continue the shelling and not proceed with other military plans? Especially, the hypothesis
13

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China , Taiwan Document Project, < http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm>, [accessed Oct 10th, 2011]

that Maos intention for the Kinmen Shelling was on exploring American resolve cannot explain why the shelling kept so long and did not stop until 1979. iii. Hypothesis on Domestic Mobilization The third explanation for the shelling arises from the domestic context. In 1958, China was undergoing the Great Leap Forward, to encourage all people to

contribute to rapid economic development. In order to inspire revolutionary zeal and the passion for the Great Leap Forward, Mao decided to start a war, saying that a tense [international] situation can mobilize the population, , and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction.14 However, the purpose of waging war is to promote the urgency to develop the country. However, the shelling contradicts this intention in three aspects: first, the shelling did not cause many casualties for the PLA and was more like a unilateral military response rather than all-out war; second, the intensive shelling only lasted for about one month with several cease-fires during the period, then the PRC tended to focus on diplomatic negotiations with the United States; third, in the aftermath of the crisis, the shelling continued in a merely symbolic way by targeting the beach or other non-populated areas. According to Yes description, although there is no formal agreement between the two sides, the shelling actually became an unwritten tacit understanding. Shelling Jinmen is no longer targeted at the battlefield and residential areas. The returned shelling

14

Jian Chen, Maos China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp.175

of Jiangs army in Jinmen is also only aimed at our beach. 15 On these grounds, the Second Strait Crisis had limited influence in terms of creating tension. From the history, it is also seen that Mao had a deliberate plan to control the tension. He strictly required no shelling of the U.S. fleet. It seemed that he did not want to intensify an already tense situation.

III. The International Context

In the beginning of 1950s, United States made a series of alliances with non-Communist countries in the Asia-Pacific.

Year 1951 1951 1951

Treaty Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S. Philippine) The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan

1953 1954

1953 Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S. R.O.K.) Sino-America Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S. R.O.C.)

Although the Sino-America Mutual Defense Treaty was not made until in 1954, the United States gave Taiwan financial aid starting from 1948. Especially after the Korean War started, American National Security Council approved the decisions in the document of NSC48 5: America provides military and financial aid to strengthen Taiwanese military power for self-defense and other

15

2007pp.675

purpose. In 1951 for example, the United States gave 97.7 million U.S. dollars in financial aid to Taiwan.16 Also the military aid was increasing every year from 1951 to 1954.
Year 1951 1952 Military Aid (million dollar) 71 275 Reformed 25% military strength. Ground and air force combat capacity increased to 50 % and 100% that of U.S. army`s separately. Trained and equipped ten corps forces consisted of 20 division, 1 independent division and 1 armored brigade Kept increasing combat capacity of ground force, navy and air force Detail

1953 1954

300 320

However, one of the major problems behind the U.S. - Taiwan cooperation was United States converted to promote the two China policy, while Chiang still planned to recover the mainland. Dulles revealed his desire in most public speeches in 1954 and 1955 to explore a more rational policy toward China than that embodied in the fiction that Chiangs Nationalists could be considered representative of the entire Chinese people17. According to Professor Hu Zhiguang, Chiang and American representatives had several oral fights on Americans rejection on assisting Chiangs plan of counterattacking the mainland.18 Americas reluctance in growing Chiangs power is also exemplified in its Taiwanese policies. On June 27, 1950, President Truman ordered the
16

(Sino-America Economic Cooperation ) (Republic Of China Yearbook) (Taipei: Republic Of China Yearbook Press, 1952), pp.583 17 Immerman, Richard H., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 18 Interview with Professor Hu Zhiguang, the son of General Hu Lian, the Charge of KMT armies on Kinmen Island

Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Strait, thus preventing either side from attacking the other.19 When dealing with the stalemate in Korean War, President Eisenhower unleashed the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for a possible attack on mainland China. As Joseph Alsop revealed, Secretary Dulles advocated the policy of unleashing China and urging Chiang to strengthen his forces on the offshore islands.20 However, Chiang showed reluctance in reinforcing the garrisons on offshore islands but used the military aid mainly on strengtheningdefenses on Taiwan Island. Chiangs determination on solely protecting Taiwan Island forced Dulles to suggest the United States to give him a warrant to insure him against the risks involved in reinforcing his garrisons21. On the other hand, the Communist bloc in Asia, especially the Soviet Union and the PRC also experienced a rough relationship in 1950s. Though the Soviets, Chinas big brother, kept sending their experts to assist Chinas development in industry and military as well as their financial aids since the PRC was founded, China still felt insecure by being marginalized both in the Western World and the Communist World. In addition, the Soviets economic assistance was designed by the frame of the Soviets economic pattern, which focused on the development of heavy industry. This economic strategy faced the bottleneck in China and had only exacerbated the problem of capital accumulation shortages in the

19

Tsou, Tang, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles, (Salt Lake City, Utah: The University of Utah Press, 1959), pp.6 20 Alsop, Joseph, Quemoy: We Asked For It , The New York Herald Tribune, (September 3, 1958, p.18) 21 Tsou, Tang, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles, (Salt Lake City, Utah: The University of Utah Press, 1959), pp.6

countryside, where some 80-90 percent of the Chinese population resided.22 Mao felt insecure about Chinas backwardness. By 1958 the Chinese clearly feared that, if they fell further behind, the Soviets might then cut separate deals with the United States without regard to their weaker ally.23 As former Vice Minister of Defense, General Xiao Jingguang recalls the fear was intensified after the Soviets demonstrated their capabilities to a Chinese military entourage in late 1957.24 Mao also worried about the threats of national security since the Soviets had their Eastern European satellites. Chinese suspicions on the Soviets intentions on making China develop independently were growing in the late 1957 and 1958. Though the Soviets signed the agreement on transferring nuclear weapons with China in 1957, Mao considered it as a side payment for support of Khrushchev in his struggle against the Anti-Party Group.25 In November 1957, Khrushchev discussed with Mao asking the Soviets experts to return. By March1958, the Soviets started to avoid the discussion about transferring atomic weapons to China. At the same time, China found the Soviets transferred technology was at least two generations behind their own.26 Since then, the brotherhood between the Soviets and China was breached that Mao started to call China as an abandoned

22

Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.206 23 Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.238
24 25

Interview with General Xiao Jingguang Liu, Chushi Sulian Ba Nian, pp.45-46, reprinted by Christensen, Thomas J., Useful Adversaries: Grand

Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996): pp.206
26

Interview with Ye Xiaonan, the daughter of General Ye Fei

little brother and push for more independence in weapons production.27

IV. The 1958 Jinmen Shelling and Maos Grand Strategy

By analyzing the readings and historical evidence, I would like to propose my own hypothesis to answer why the shelling continued so long, why Maos shelling was only aimed at Jiangs fleet, why Mao did not want the offshore islands in the end of the crisis and what the implication from the three Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan are. From my point of view, Mao had a Grand Strategy, that is, to alienate Taiwan and the U.S. in order to undermine Taiwan and thus guaranteeing the One China. The global context before the shelling showed that U.S. control of Taiwan was increasing. In 1954, the U.S. and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. It allowed the U.S. fleet to cruise around Taiwan for protection. Taiwan was becoming more dependent on the U.S. for supplying the Taiwanese army with advanced arms. The U.S. had set up several military bases in Japan, like the Yokosuka Navy Base and the Okinawa Navy Base. Having an example in Japan, it is not hard to understand Maos concern about Taiwan becoming the second Japan. Moreover, after the First Strait Crisis, during 1954 and 1955, Dulles began promoting the notion of two Chinas, trying to legitimize the independence of Taiwan. Furthermore, by late 1957 and early 1958, while the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw (which began in 1955) had hit a deadlock, Beijings leaders became alarmed by Washingtons increasingly complicated
27

U.S. control of

Interview with General Xu Yan.

military involvement in Taiwan following the signing of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty.28All these events highlighted the critical need to connect reclaim Taiwan. In the first Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan, Mao mentioned that Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are Chinese territory, which was approved by you [Taiwan], referring to your leaders public announcement, and these islands are not American territories. Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are parts of China, not another country. There is only one China, not two Chinas in the world. This point is also approved by you, referring to your leaders public announcement.29 One China is not only supported by the PRC, but Jiang Chai-Shek as well. The principles of One China also can be proved from Liu Zi-rans case in 1957 (The Taipei Riot). The initiator of the riot, the widow and her dead husband are thought to be related to Jiang Ching-guos secret organization: The screaming widow is alleged to have been provided with a prepared text which she obligingly read into a recording apparatus conveniently at hand when the riot began.30 Also, as the riot had been occurring for hours before Jiang Ching-guo used police to handle with it, its a popular guess that the whole riot was designed by Jiang. The riot showed the fractured cultural and nationalistic resentment towards Americans. Also, seeing the perspective of the U.S. control of Taiwan, Liu Zi-rans case indicated the sensitive extra-judiciary
Jian Chen, Maos China and the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press (2000) pp. 172 2007pp.666-667 30 Marine Embassy Guard Association Historical Archives, http://www.msg-history.com/HistoricalItems/HI_Taipei_1957_Riot.html
29 28

privileges enjoyed by US personnel in Taiwan. The riot resulted in Chinese Nationalist officials demand[s] that President Chiang Kai-shek revokes the present diplomatic immunity bestowed on US soldiers.31 All these scenarios indicated the expanding U.S. control on Taiwan. As the resources in PLA explode, Mao said once on a private meeting that Kinmen should be the connection between the mainland and Taiwan, which means either to take over the island or to abandon it will cut this connection.32 Therefore, Mao may have used the shelling to establish political communication with Taiwan. The aim of the Kinmen Shelling was only a warning to Chiangs government, not a sign for the start of a new Civil War. As shown in fact, Mao had a long plan in eliminating KMTs residual power on offshore islands and Taiwan: In July 1949, 2 months after Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan, Mao deployed the 10th Regiment of East China Field Army to go to Fujian. On July 10, 1949, Mao also wrote a letter to Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss about the steps for attacking Taiwan and propose the idea of building the air force.33 Starting from October 1949, the 10th Regiment was following Maos plan to reclaim the offshore islands. In 1954 and 1955, the PLA recovered almost all the offshore islands in Taizhou Bay and other islands east to Zhejiang Province. (Below is the graph showing the PLAs reclaim of offshore islands)

31

PANG YANG HUEI, THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES, 1954-1958: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN (2010), http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/20930
32 33

Interviews with Colonel Zhang, who was an intimate fellow of General Zhu De

[Xu Yan], [War at Jinmen], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Publisher, 1992), pp. 294, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu]

Kinmen Island, which was also in Maos military plan, was even being attacked twice before: the first was on October 26, 1949 and the second was between January and March in 1953. The Kinmen Shelling was not a surprise according to Maos mentality on determining to reclaim all the offshore islands. However, it was not a good time to start a war with Taiwan ---- not to mention the possible American military aid, the PLA was not competent in air force in late 1950s (as shown in the form below).
Item Number of Combat Aircraft Main Aircraft Model Equipped Missile Pilot Skill Level CCP 520 Mig-17 Worse Better KMT >600 F-86 Better (Sidewinder) Worse

(Statistics from Informations on Xu Yans book, War of Kinmen)34 Maos intention of shelling Jinmen to alienate Taiwan from the U.S. can also be seen in his three Messages to the Compatriots in Taiwan. In the first message, he claimed that TaiwanPenghu, Jinmen, Mazu are parts of China (see above). In the second message, Mao criticized the U.S. as ruthless and called for the solidarity of Taiwan and the Mainland: saying the U.S. would surely abandon you somedayThe signs are already there in Dulles talk on Sep. 30th. Based on your

status, wouldnt you be disappointed? After all, American imperialism is our common enemy.35 Mao also indicated his shelling was aimed at expelling the U.S. navy: the Americans cant escort Jiangs fleets in the sea around Jinmen; If so, [we will] shell immediately.36 In the third message, the warning to the U.S. became even more poignant. He said that We only hope that you do not yield to the pressure from the U.S, do not live under their thumbs, and do not lose your sovereignty, at last, [we do not want you] to be homeless and thrown into the sea.37 The shelling did have an influence on alienating Taiwan from U.S. Ye recalled that Jiangs fleet was so anxious about the shelling that they used radiosrather than the cipher telegrams to communicate to Taiwanese authorities. It allowed Ye to monitor their communication. It is said that soldiers on Jiangs

34

[Xu Yan], [War at Jinmen], (Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Publisher, 1992), pp. 176, [translated by Zhangdaiwei Xu] 35 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.667 36 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.671 37 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.674

fleet complained: Americans are bastards()38. The continued shelling became mostly symbolic, which shows that the shelling was not meant to take a real advantage in the war. It was a diplomatic war, just as Ye said. In Another message to the Compatriots in Taiwan, Mao wrote that every odd day, your ships and planes do not come [to the mainland].39 This quote is a clear announcement of Maos operational disposition, which was obviously not seen in a common war. Ye also pointed out the symbolic nature of the actions: Shelling Jinmen is not aimed at the battle field and residential areas. The returned shelling of Jiangs army in Jinmen is also only aimed at our beach. 40 Shelling is becoming a special conversation among Jiang, the United States, and us.41 At last, the symbolic explanation is a better way to explain why Mao did not want Jinmen after so much shelling. Ye also raised his own question in his memoirs that since tension in Middle East has been mitigated, the U.S. situation also has been resolved throughout the war against U.S.-Taiwan Joint Navy42; why then, despite the expectation43 did Mao choose not to take over Jinmen?

[Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.661 39 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.673 40 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998),
41

38

pp.675

[Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.675 42 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.665 43 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.666

More ironically, during the latter negotiations, Eisenhower has persuaded Jiang to give up Jinmen and Mazu. However, Mao refused to receive the offshore islands. Eisenhower indicated that the desirable solution would be for Chiang to voluntarily evacuate Quemoy and Matsu and entrench himself on Formosa, await internal developments on the mainland, and provide a constant military and psychological threat to the Chicom rgime. The US would compensate for Chiangs loss of the offshore islands with material aid or with the inducement of one US division and an air force to persuade Chiang. 44 This is due to Maos deeper consideration by introducing the noose strategy. Mao once said, Whenever necessary we can shell [Jinmen and Mazu]. Whenever we are in need of tension, we may tighten the noose, and whenever we want to relax the tension, we may loosen the noose. We will let them hang there, neither dead nor alive, using them as a means to deal with the Americans. Apparently, the Jinmen issue is still framed as the internal affairs of China. It also became the de facto strategy to restrict both Jiang and U.S.

V. Conclusion
The Kinmen Shelling, which was the fiercest military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait , was under Maos intention on guaranteeing One China by keeping Kinmen Island Crisis as a domestic issue. Mao made a cautious plan with

44

PANG YANG HUEI, THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES, 1954-1958: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN (2010), http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/20930

the orders, only to attack Jiangs Fleet and avoid any American casualty to keep United States from counterattacking the PLA with the excuse of protecting American soldiers safety. Moreover, Since Kinmen Island was not under the protection of America-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States was left with no excuse to draw into Kinmen Island Crisis according to the Mutual Defense Treaty. As in fact, the Kinmen Shelling had many beneficial by-products to China: by arousing the intensive confrontation in Taiwan Strait, Mao successfully mobilized the public by repeatedly stressing on American threats on PRCs security. The mobilization not only stimulated the increasing recruits of militia, but also aroused peoples enthusiasm in working in the heavy industry.45 In 1958, the steel productivity was two times of that in 1957. Also the Kinmen Shelling alienated the United States from Taiwan. The retreat of American fleets in the fleets received domestic critics46, as Taiwanese soldiers claimed American soldiers as bastards. Mao also used this chance to condemned American army and called the retreat as a betrayal to Taiwanese.47 Also during years from 1958 to 1979, the Kinmen Shelling became symbolic that the shelling was targeted at non-populus area and the PLA even gave the notifications to Taiwan authorities before they shelled. In the years between 1958 and 1979, Mao also sought chances to recover Taiwan: 10 days right after the shelling, Premier Zhou Enlai

45

[Xu Guangshun and Liu Yong], [Assumptions on Maos Commanding Skill in Jinmen Shelling ], [Air Force Radar Institute Journal], vol.1, (2000): pp. 68
46

[Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.661 47 [Ye Fei], [Ye Feis Memoir], (Beijing: Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Publisher, 1998), pp.667

made a public speech to state the shelling was aimed at compelling the American and the mainland welcomes Taiwan authorities to reconsider to open the CCP-KMT talks on sovereignty48. According to General Wang in PLA, starting from 1963, Mao even had three confidential talks with Chiang Kai-Shek about recovering Taiwan. Based on all these evidence, Id like to draw the conclusion that the Kinmen Shelling is the start of Maos whole plan to practice its One China plan. The connections starting from the Kinmen Shelling between the mainland and Taiwan never stops till now. It makes Taiwan still a major sovereign problems in China.

48

[Zhang Wanyu], 1958 [1958 Jinmen Shelling and the One China Principle], [Henan Normal University Jounal (Philosophy and Social Science Edition)], vol. 6, (2000): pp. 37

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