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NSP IP #3 Strategies of Containment (Nixon to Reagan) State Department website--State of the World documents Detente Nixon/Kissinger - world has

changed so implementation must change; pathological distrust in bureaucracy and everyone (even each other); Kennan's five industrial centers are seen as great powers (China, Japan, West Europe, Soviets, US) Context: Info tech, economy, Sino-Soviet split, alliances loosening--Europe and Japan emerging finally (economically); Middle East gas issues--helps Soviets because they were net exporter; we perceive Soviet army and nuclear power are on parity or greater than NATO; lack of domestic consensus due to Vietnam; Balance of power produces stability, not zero sum but interlocking calculus Desire to move away from idea of credibility Focus in US interests, not threats What's plan with five great powers? Maintain closer relations with each (bilaterals) than between them (put US in center rather than on peripheral); classic Bismark hub and spoke model; Centralized control model both domestically and internationally Linkage - create a situation where Soviets desire to be contained; connect gains in one area with sacrifices in another area; make negotiations a far more central part of strategy; Take the world as it is and make the best of it-Kissinger's IR theory - status quo states and revisionist states; the goal is to make all great powers status quo states; Communism is not threat, it is Soviet power (less ideological approach); structural realism--internal nature of states is irrelevant; Nixon Doctrine (pg 296): conditional commitment; impetus is primarily limited resources but common thought is also to build relationships; Gaddis--economic constraints come first which pushes to the strategic thought process; constraints enable these thoughts to emerge; Is the US government capable of sustaining level of commitment to carry out strategy? Appears to be no because centralization of power necessary is eventually checked by bureaucracy (Jackson - attempts MFN status link to Jewish emigration...he screws everything up);

Gaddis--idea of short cycle versus long cycle strategy; executive executes grand strategy in real time, legislative branch focuses on long term plan and doesn't get involved in tactics; Realpolitik--both left and right disapprove of detente; Kissinger--greatest flaw was understanding how important liberal values were US; ------------------Carter Administration (Gaddis not a fan) Only election where foreign policy took back seat to economy in time period Grand strategy approach--he's a naval nuclear engineer; policy is about studying a problem and finding a solution; it's not about multidimensional connections and overarching frameworks; as detail oriented, micromanaged; Imbalanced cabinet, not complimentary; Brzezinski ("rock star") vs Vance (lawyer); Concerned about not being Nixon/Kissinger; Really bad timing? Afghanistan, Iran, ... Too many priorities; attempting to recapture the moral high ground--attempting to be moral in every specificity rather than in a broad, overarching way; morality for individual vs morality for state; Is Gaddis painting Carter as trying to attempt being the post Cold War president? 1979 - Shah overthrow, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Sandinistas, Tehran hostages - causes him to return to containment Carter Doctrine - don't attempt to influence Middle East --------------------------Reagan Symmetric vs asymmetric: symmetric response views threats and interests as undifferentiated; asymmetric involves retaining initiative assuming inelastic means; bring interests into line with capabilities rather than the other way around; Symmetric weaknesses: neglect of peripheral areas and apparent narrowness of choice Reagan reconciling the two by pulling strengths together; Ideology? Very Kennan; his political hero was FDR; strong sense of principles and ends but remarkable flexible with approach to means; if it supported his ends, he would support it; Political popularity provides domestic support; after Lebanon, just backs out...bad press not an issue...just move on; Not containment--it's transformation. Pg 376 Risk vs cost--symmetry is too costly, asymmetry is too risky--Reagan goes for high costs and high risks; opportunity?

Gorbachev (per Mike) - opportunist who could play Lenin's program to improve domestics and keep power; what he didn't realize was he was disempowering the Soviet army; Reagan Doctrine is Nixon plus roll back...support to allies to go on the offensive; Almost none of Reagan's advisers agreed with his plan to deal with Gorbachev; Nixon and Kissinger don't even support it; Greatest grand strategic contribution? The ability to go against everyone else; Amazing part is that the great empire collapses peacefully... ----------------Is containment relevant in post Cold War world? Pg 386 Requires thinking-Desirable for enemies to defeat themselves--more positive actions were when we didn't act; don't just do something, stand there. History is a better guide than theory-Combined coherence with accountability-Must not destroy what it was attempting to defend-China--avoid negative aspect of containment...focus on common interests and integration