DISCUSSION

NOTE

The

Tripartite

Soul

in

the

Timaeus

JAMES V. ROBINSON

Although the question of whether the soul in its true nature is simple or composite has been extensively debated, the position of the Timaeus on this issue is generally regarded as uncontroversial. The Timaeus, which is Plato's only sustained effort at providing a cosmology and a cosmogony, discusses the formation (by the Demiurge) of the World Soul and nous, the divine part of the human soul.' The other parts of the human soul were fashioned by the lesser gods and, unlike nous, are mortal. Since we are explicitly told that nous is the only immortal part of the soul, scholars have assumed that nous alone will escape the cycle of rebirth.' I shall challenge the accepted view by contending that the tripartite soul is everlasting (albeit not immortal) and that there is no escaping the cycle of rebirth. This is not offered as the definitive interpretation of the Timaeus; my goal is to cast doubt on the accepted view, thereby provoking discussion and encouraging new lines of investigation. The first step will be to deal with the assertion that only nous is immortal (e.g. 41c-d, 69c-d and 90a). The Timaeus' explicit claim that nous is the only immortal part of the soul is a major obstacle to my interpretation, since the assertion appears to contradict explicitly the notion of an everlasting tripartite soul. However, referring to the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul as mortal does not entail that they will perish, given that they are united with what is divine. Timaeus, repeating the speech of the Demiurge, states: Gods, of gods whereof I am the maker and of works the father, those which are my own handiwork are indissoluble, save with my consent. Now, although whatsoever bond' has been fastened may be unloosed, yet only an evil will could consent to

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dissolve what has been well fitted together and is in a good state; therefore, although you, having come into being, are not immortal nor indissoluble altogether, nevertheless you shall not be dissolved nor taste of death, finding my will a bond yet stronger and more sovereign than those wherewith you were bound together 4 when you came to Here the gods are referred to, not as souls, but as composites of soul and body.' 5 The claim is that although these composites are neither immortal nor indissoluble, they will be maintained forever by the Demiurge because he is good and they are well ordered.6 Immortality is not a necessary condition for everlasting existence. Since for Plato something can last forever without being immortal, the concept of an everlasting tripartite soul is at least possible. Moreover, the willingness of the Demiurge to care for what is ordered makes clear the implausibility of maintaining that, according to Plato, the tripartite soul is destroyed as a consequence of becoming ordered.' The claim that only nous is immortal establishes that the human soul contains something divine, something that gives it kinship with the gods and which enables the soul to improve itself. The claim does not establish that the tripartite soul must eventually cease to be. Indeed, Plato may have held that the soul is everlasting so that it has the opportunity to become virtuous (i.e. ordered).8 Having argued that the mortality of two of the soul's three parts does not imply the soul's eventual destruction, I must now provide positive reasons for the view that, according to the Timaeus, the tripartite soul never perishes. At Timaeus 41e-42d we are told that before the souls first entered a human body, the Demiurge placed them in a star, "mounting them as it were in chariots". After ordering itself, each soul returns to its star, which is described as the site of its first and best condition. As in the Phaedrus, the image of a chariot is used in connection with the soul.9 Although Plato does not state that

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the star becomes the body of the soul, we shall see that this possibility should not be rejected out of hand. The idea that the soul ends up in a body is significant for three reasons. First, if nous inhabits a body, even a heavenly body, the claim that it must separate from the other psychic parts because of their corporeal associations is overthrown. Second, if the soul does return to a star's body, the soul may be tripartite simply because, in order to govern a body, nous needs the other parts of the soul. 10Third and finally, the soul's return to a star will resolve a dilemma that has faced Plato since the Republic, where he argues that the soul is tripartite. As early as the Gorgias (503d-504d) we learn that if something is ordered, it is good, and if it is not ordered, it is bad. In the Republic the goal of the individual is to order his soul. By so doing, he becomes virtuous (4:443c-444a, 444d, 431d-e and 442c-d). By ordering the disparate parts of his soul," the individual unifies and harmonizes them: he becomes one instead of many (4:443d). Having said this, it would be very difficult for Plato to claim that the soul which is ordered, and hence unified, somehow loses its spirited and appetitive parts. If corruption and strife cannot break up and destroy the tripartite soul, how can order and unity? Plato's claim that order both improves and unifies indicates that the best soul, which has escaped the cycle of rebirth, is tripartite; however, his claim that the spirited and appetitive parts are tied to the corporeal realm (e.g. Rep. 7:S10d-e) requires that the true soul consists only of the rational part. If the tripartite soul is always embodied, then Plato has escaped the dilemma: he can assert that

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order unifies the soul, making it stronger and better, without having to respond to problems arising from the soul's disembodiment. There are several rather obvious objections to the idea that the human soul is always embodied. Some commentators question the wisdom of taking the Timaeus seriously since, as Sayre puts it, the dialogue is "only a diversion or pastime".12 Sayre's extreme opinion is not widely held, but even those who accept that the Timaeus is an important philosophical work may doubt that Plato was serious when he spoke of human souls returning to their consort star." Cornford, for example, refers to the veil of myth that obscures the passage and which makes literal interpretations dangerous." Nonetheless, given that the soul is a creature of the world of Becoming as well as of the world of Being, it would not be unnatural if, after it escapes the cycle of rebirth into human bodies, the soul enters a godlike body. Since the Sun, the Moon and the planets are embodied gods, this interpretation cannot be dismissed on the grounds that Plato thought embodiment was, per se, demeaning. In fact, since it appears that all the created gods - apart from the Homeric gods (40d-41a), who are a special case - have bodies, it may be more likely than not that the souls which reach their most godlike state are embodied. After all, if embodiment is good enough for the World Soul, which is in every way better than the human soul, then it is good enough for the human soul. In addition, since the human soul is presented as a lesser version of the World Soul, and the World Soul governs a body, one would expect the human soul to have this responsibility also. This expectation is strengthened by the fact that the Demiurge created the World Soul so that the order of the universe could be maintained. For Plato nous has a unique and vital function: it alone can create, maintain and perceive rational order. Nous is able to produce order because, in addition to being a powerful source of motion, it is able to perceive the Forms, which serve as models. Nous is willing to produce order because by nature it desires knowledge and, as part of the tripartite soul, it can satisfy this desire only when the soul is ordered. Furthermore, nous values goodness and beauty which, in the Gorgias and in subsequent dialogues, are seen to depend upon orders

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As we are told in the Republic and in the Phaedrus, it is the soul's function to rule the corporeal. 16 The universe was fashioned so that there would be order instead of disorder and the souls were created so that the order would be maintained. To say that the soul which is best has no part in the ordering of the universe seems wrong, especially in the context of a dialogue that gives the impression that everything in the universe has a function. If the soul that is best does not govern a body, then what does it do?" In light of these considerations, it is best to treat the consort-star passage more as thoughtful speculation than as aimless fancy or impenetrable myth. Plato is speculating when he speaks of man's origin, but then, all such discussions are speculative. What can be accepted as non-speculative are those beliefs which Plato tries to satisfy when constructing his cosmology/cosmogony - beliefs such as that the soul is placed in a body (and in a situation) suitable to the soul's degree of virtuousness. If one accepts that for Plato the human soul will, if sufficiently corrupt, end up in the body of a reptile or a fish, then one should not reject as fantastic the notion that the soul, if sufficiently pure, could pass to a heavenly (god-like) body. The notion of the soul passing from a human body to that of a star is no less plausible than the idea of the soul passing to the body of a fish. Not only is the passing of souls to heavenly bodies plausible, given Plato's general view of souls, but it avoids the inconsistency inherent in the three-part assertion that i) there is a finite number of souls, ii) the human race (soul-body composites) will never perish, and iii) the best souls escape forever the cycle of rebirth. The idea that the soul never escapes the cycle of rebirth, which is indicated in the Phaedrus, is also present in the Timaeus. Plato held that there is a fixed number of immortal souls (Timaeus 41d) and believed that the species consisting of human souls in human bodies must continue (41b-c). From this it follows that the soul's return is temporary, for if the soul can escape incarnation or if its return to the star is permanent, then there would be a gradual depletion of souls available for human (and other) bodies.

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Although it is impossible to determine the extent to which Plato was aware of this implication, other dialogues show his interest in the general topic. At Phaedo 72a-d and 77c-d Plato uses the Argument from Opposites to establish the immortality of the soul. Unless souls are immortal and are continually being reincarnated, there would eventually be no living (corporeal) thing. As has been mentioned, this reasoning is inconsistent with the claim that the philosopher permanently escapes the cycle of rebirth (even if one holds that only a limited number of souls will ever escape). Plato's concern with the number of souls is also displayed in the Republic. At 10 :611a he states that the number of souls cannot vary: it cannot decrease, since souls are immortal; it cannot increase, since this would eventually lead to all mortal things becoming immortal. If mortal things become immortal, then eventually nothing would be mortal. As in the Phaedo, Plato here believes that the natural order of things, including the existence of human beings (soul-body composites), must be preserved. The point is repeated at Laws 10:904a, where we are told that generated body and soul must be imperishable, for if one or the other were destroyed, there could be no living creatures. Given both Plato's interest in this topic and the fact that, in the Timaeus, he explicitly discusses the number of souls (as well as their distribution in the universe and their part in the World order), it is very likely that he would realize that if every soul were permanently to escape rebirth into a human body, then the human race would perish. Since he states that this race must not perish, he probably believed that the soul's escape from rebirth into earthly bodies is temporary. If this was indeed Plato's view, it lends considerable support to the claim that the best soul is composite. In the Timaeus (as well as in the Republic and in the Phaedrus) vice is expressed in terms of psychic disorder, and the soul whose disorder increases will be given a comparatively inferior incarnation. It is difficult to see how nous alone could become corrupt, especially since Timaeus 69c-d specifies that the disruptive desires and emotions belong to the so-called mortal souls.' On the other hand, if the soul that returns to its star is tripartite, then there is always the chance that it will become disordered and once again enter a human body. The image of a disordered soul, falling from its star, matches nicely the Phaedrus' account of chariots that travel across the sky and which, because of disorder, fall to earth. The Phaedrus discusses the disembodied soul without once suggesting that the rational part (i.e. the charioteer) has a destiny independent of the non-rational parts of the soul. We are instead given an explanation of why souls enter bodies and of how they can avoid this fate. As one would expect, the souls which keep from falling are those that are properly ordered and, thus, are able to contemplate the Forms (248a-c).

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Psychic order and knowledge will enable earth-bound souls to escape to the heavens and will enable souls that are in the heavens to remain there. Continued existence with the gods depends on the charioteer's ability to train his team. Nothing is said of his leaving the team behind. The charioteer who successfully trains his horses already shares the company of the gods. This would, for Plato, be the best that humans could hope for. By placing the gods in the heavens Plato effectively identifies the best location for human souls, and these souls are said to be tripartite. In addition, the Phaedrus makes no mention of an existence beyond the heavens, such as would indicate that permanent escape from the cycle of rebirth is possible. Indeed, the mechanism of the myth may be seen as conflicting with this idea. As souls become more orderly, their level of existence improves: a soul incarnated in a horse may next enter a human body, a craftsman's soul may enter the body of a philosopher, and a philosopher's soul may escape earthly incarnations and exist in the heavens. But just as souls can move to a better existence, so can they, through loss of psychic order, move to a worse. If this applies to all souls, including those in the heavens,21 then it seems that human souls never truly escape the cycle of rebirth. The best that souls can hope for is existence with the gods, an existence which is conditional on the souls maintaining their psychic order. There is no eternal reward, only everlasting effort, the effort required to maintain psychic order.22 If this interpretation of the Phaedrus myth is correct, then the claim that, in the Timaeus, the return of the soul to its consort star is only temporary cannot be viewed as a radical change in Plato's thinking. To accept that the return is temporary, one must reject that there is a cycle of rebirth which can be permanently escaped. One can instead argue, as Ostenfeld does (253-4), that returning to the star is just another part of the continuing cycle of rebirth - the best souls are incarnated in heavenly bodies, the worst in bodies of snakes or fish. If so, then the destiny of the soul is better expressed by the metaphor of a ladder, which the soul moves up and down, and from which there is no escape. Nor need there be an escape. This point, which is the final one, is important because it suggests that permitting the tripartite soul to remain in the corporeal realm is not simply a response to the previously mentioned dilemma concerning the soul, but is part of a change in Plato's thinking about the world of Becoming. In the Phaedo the corporeal realm is disparagingly contrasted with the Forms, while in the Timaeus this contrast is greatly reduced. According to the Timaeus the universe was modelled after the Form of the Living Creature and is described as a triumph of Reason over Necessity. Constructing the World Body out of mathematical entities gave it an order and hence a legitimacy that is at

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odds with the view of the universe implicit in the Phaedo.1 While maintaining the Phaedo's view that the objects of sight and sound are disorderly and distracting to the soul, the Timaeus also emphasizes the orderliness of the heavens and insists that this order must be studied. The antipathy between soul and body which is so evident in the Phaedo is greatly reduced in the Timaeus. By making the realm of Becoming approximate the realm of Being, the Timaeus undermines the notion that the soul must forsake one realm if it is to embrace the other. Moreover, by stating that the soul is the only source of order, the dialogue provides a reason why the souls should not, one by one, escape the realm of Becoming. In the Republic the philosopher is required to help those still inside the cave; it may be that in the Timaeus this concern for others is extended. The souls which, in the Phaedo, are free to escape to the realm of the Forms are, in the Timaeus, required to remain behind; they must do their part to help other souls and to otherwise aid the World Soul to maintain order and harmony in the realm of Becoming. This view of the role of the human soul is expressed in the Laws. At 10:903c the Athenian, speaking to the man who fails to show gods the proper respect, tells the man that his soul is only one fragment of the universe "and so, for all its littleness, all its striving is ever directed toward the whole, but thou hast forgotten in the business that the purpose of all that happens is what we have said, to win bliss for the life of the whole; it was not made for thee, but thou for it. "21Just as it is not the purpose of the ideal city-state to make the PhilosopherKing happy (Rep. 7:519e-520a), so it is not the purpose of the universe to make mankind happy. The part must serve the needs of the whole. The ultimate goal for mankind is to improve, not to escape, the realm of Becoming. Self-improvement is the most important step toward this goal. Since even the best of souls is destined to remain part of the universe, there is no need to suppose that it is ' other than tripartite." Concordia University, Montreal

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