Chinas Cultural Revolution and Its Implications for Modern China

by: Ryan Villogram

Great Leap Forward begun in 1959 by Chairman Mao Zedong; idea was to bring the nation into the forefront of what was an economic developmental period. Mao wanted to catch up with the Western Culture, so he pushed China to become an industrial power house by demanding construction of steel plants across the country. What Mao did not realize was that his ideology and methods of creating this Cultural Revolution did not correlate with those of the successes by the west. China was not ready for what Mao wanted to call to action. As a rural society, Mao wanted to keep pace with what he had in mind by producing enough food to feed the country and extra for payment for industrialization. Mao believed that the rapid transformation of productive relations does not hamper, but actually facilitates the development of the forces of production. The issue with Maos theory is that theres no pragmatic evidence available thus supporting his methods or way of thinking. Aftermath of the Communist revolution; landowners had their property taken from them and by the year 1957 peasants started to work in agricultural cooperatives. Pig Iron was Maos worst call to action as he preceded to make peasants take all metal scraps and pieces they have and melt them to create steel to help with his new reform of an industrial country. Almost everything the peasants made into iron was usuable because of the products they were making it from would not suffice for the quality for which the end result should be; metal from forks and spoons should simply be not turned into a iron pot or a iron rod to be used in any building project. This was the most Ludacris idea for Mao to establish because not only did it cause hardship for civilians, it took more time for production because these peasants/workers were not trained in this field. People, by the millions, were ordered to build backyard furnaces for iron and steel and together in communities worked on massive building project and large-sized water-conservation plants. As a result, it lasted only a couple of months leading up to the end of 1958.

The bizarre and radical changes were suppose to improve working conditions for the peasants to where they would be able to eat for free and work all day on industrialization, according to Mao, but it all back fired. High ranking officials and central leadership that supported Mao grew out of synch with the reality of the epidemic and Maos dream turned into a bitter disappointment. Mao was so very confident in what he thought was the best way to catch up with Europe and the United States, as he predicted within 15 years China would overtake the thrown of Britain being number one in steel production. The seed of Maos GLF (Great Leap Forward) strategy is not to be found in his Critique of Soviet Economics (1977) but in his 1957 speech in Moscow to international delegates from socialist nations on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution. In that speech Mao confirmed Khrushevs goal that within 15 years the then USSR would overtake USA as the biggest producer of steel and other major industrial outputs, and announced that China would do the same in relation to the UK within the same period. As an optimist, Mao knew how to say great things that sound amazing to his followers but in reality it was nothing more than hell for anyone who stood by this irrational leader. People surrounding Mao started to question his vision and did not want to back him up but Mao very quickly gained major support from another Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping who would later assist Mao in this new economic and cultural reform. But this was bad for Mao, as one year later he arrogantly altered his 15 year timeline in his pursuit on catching up to Britain to be done in just one more year. With success being in Maos constant demand several policies were implemented in his strategy and they were created to achieve a rapid growth of socialization and industrialization. The policies were the following: (1) the formation of Peoples Commune, (2) walking on two legs, (3) the introduction of active planning, and (4) a drastic increase in the rate of investments. The

first commune was formed in Henan in April of 1958, and their formation spread like fire all over the country with the encouragement of the great leader and the approval of the Politbureau of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By years end 753,000 advanced agricultural cooperatives (AACs) had been merged into 26,576 peoples communes and the rate of peasant participation had reached 99.1 percent. This new resound in china called the PCs have really taken over of what the soviet modeled in collectivization and stability. They were respectively bigger than the average collective farm in the Soviet simply because PCs covered the entirety of townships and the latter of the USSR only covered farms in a village. The large size of the Chinese commune was conceived as a vital element in fast-tracking Chinas industrialization. China was just not ready for a major industrialization and trying to copy the Soviet was just not the smartest thing to do on Maos part. According to the Soviet model, extraction of agricultural surplus through price scissors to fuel industrialization was one of their prerequisites. Their country did not suffer from the population and its capita farmland was relatively high leaving them a greater margin of industrial success. China was just much poorer than the Soviets. With its farmers living quite closely to the margins of subsistence, thus very little agricultural surplus was left for investment and Chinas drive for industrialization constantly ran up against the wall of inadequate food supplies. These communes were used as a great tool under Maos reign. In order to reach the level industrialization and agricultural effect he craved, he pushed for the locals to pick up the work and so the PCs mobilized local labor and materials instead of relying on resources of the central government and their plans. Communes were considered ideal tools for this since they could free especially women for participation in the labour force with the establishment of such facilities as public dinner halls, child care centers, and so on. More importantly, communes could

mobilize surplus labour for capital investment projects in agriculture, such as flood control and irrigation projects, and also for yet more labour-intensive cultivation techniques enshrined in Maos eight-point agricultural constitution. Maos great leap forward act also implanting the active planning, something derived from the Soviets but changed, was designed to create an imbalance and not to achieve a balance between demand and supply like the policy of the Soviets. This was perceived as a dynamic incentive for local authorities and enterprises to fulfill the very ambitious targets set by the central authority. Here is how it works under Mao; his central administration would organize unrealistic targets to cause imbalances which pressure local authorities to mobilize more resources and make a greater effort to overcome them. This pushed communes and enterprises to produce at a very high level of production at which seemed impossible. They were pushed to go further using innovation in order to reach the level in which the active planning policy of Maos GLF implements. This than lead to none other than a major problem; sheer negligence toward the disaster of imbalance on their economy without establishing first a market mechanism. With Mao making constant changes to his timeline led to constant confusion and the mass productions of the essential products were frequently deserted for any serious planning to reach the one year deadline. This upset the Chairman and soon led to high Chinese bureaucrats to execute those whom did not agree with Maos order to a major economic change. Estimates of the total death toll vary widely since it includes direct deaths due to malnourishment and indirect deaths due to a decline of the birth rate, for many women had stopped ovulating due to malnourishment. The count was up to about 550,000 deaths in China by 1958. Within the same year, China grew deeper and deeper into debt as the government increased cash expenditure to the development of profound industry; this heavy industry grew to become 56 percent of the

states capital investment. Contrary to Maos expectation the GLF failed to achieve the anticipated great improvements in industrial and agricultural development. For Mao, he lead to what he thought was going to be a better new and improved China yet his mission converted to literally the exact. The reforms undoubtedly boosted Chinas economic growth but they also constituted a retreat from socialism and the reintroduction of capitalist relations in production. Thus, Maos GLF turned out to be really a Great Leap Backward. Mao suddenly called a stop to his strategy of this Great Leap Forward in 1960. He made sure to reassure himself as well as his followers that, our policys general line is correct, and actual work has been carried out well. So he made a statement in which he learned something from this experience, something that he believes is the reason why it was not being so successful. Mao believed there were two things; (1) there were too many people living in the cities and (2) there were too few people living in the country. Mao thought the Great Leap Forward had failed because of the labor shortages in industry and agriculture. The Great Leap Famine: *1959-1961 There are actually many factors as to why this famine occurred; shortage of money to buy food, loss of possessions due to rules of Mao for his GLF, lack of agricultural production. This ungodly era can be accredited to the decline stages in food stability from either man-made catastrophe or natural disaster. According to one estimate the diversion of labour from agriculture into irrigation, steel making and other industrial projects was responsible for the 29 percent decline of agricultural output in the famine years. Trying to get the grain output back on track Mao installed new systems like the 3-3 system of land. Warned differently by local hgh officals, Mao and his chinese government had in mind they have solved the grain issue but it

only got worse. Using this 3-3 field managing system, one-third of the land area was to apply horitculture crops, another one-third to plant actual field crops, and the last one-third is to do absolutely nothing. By 1959, it was reported by officials that there has been a 10 percent decline in the grain fields. Lacking any real leadership, another sore part of this was that the communes had horrible incentive programs for the workers on the land. Those who worked harder, contributed more got no individual reward nontheless any recognition. The disconnection between indivual work effort and material rewards cause people to undersupply labour in terms of time and effort, leading to universal sloth. Local leaders competed with one another to see who could create the most activity. In the rush to recruit labor, agricultural tasks were neglected, sometimes leaving the grain harvest to rot in the fields, Yang said. In the frenzy of competition, the leaders over-reported their harvests to their superiors in Beijing and what was thought to be surplus grain was sold abroad. Although in theory the country was awash in grain, in reality it was not. Rural communal mess halls were encouraged to supply food for free, but by the spring of 1959, the grain reserves were exhausted and the famine had begun. No one is sure exactly how many people perished as a result of the spreading hunger. By comparing the number of deaths that could be expected under normal conditions with the number that occurred during the period of the Great Leap famine, scholars have estimated that somewhere between 16.5 million and 40 million people died before the experiment came to an end in 1961, making the Great Leap famine the largest in world history. People abandoned their homes in search of food. Families suffered immensely, and reports of that suffering reached the members of the army, whose homes were primarily in rural areas. As

soldiers received letters describing the suffering and the deaths, it became harder for leaders to maintain ideological discipline. Chaos developed in the countryside as rural militias became predatory, seizing grain, beating people and raping women. From famine to reform During the struggle for survival, farmers in nearly one-third of the rural communities took matters into their own hands, abandoning the people's commune in favor of individual farming. Heavy central control was reduced, and the country's agricultural production improved.

Why this chaos and pure abuse of power from one man? Mao hated what the Nationalist stood for, or lack thereof, and did everything in his power to destroy them and take over. So lets go back in time a little. This all started in the early 1930s when a leader named Chiang Kai-Shek ruled and was Head of the Nationalist government. Chiang spent his years studying and learning ways to improve the struggling country of China to national independence, freedom, and democracy but not everyone approved of his ways and grown tired really fast. In 1931, Japan established the autonomous state of Manchoukuo within Manchuria, and placed former Qing young emperor PuYi onto its throne. So with that mission complete, the Japanese planned on taking over what was Inner Mongolia. Japanese were very greedy and in their eyes they were supposed to control China and eventually all of Asia. The Japanese kept on attacking and progressing with ease, reaching all the way to the Great Wall of China without a fight. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists were too busy in their civil war with the Communists that he pulled back all of his men from stopping the invasion. With failing to stand up to attacks from the Japanese the Chinese people wanted change because all they saw was a poorly run government with no control and a bad military unit.

Fighting with both the Communist and attacks from the Japanese and its allies weakened the Nationalist government immensely which led to WWII and the Cold War and eventually the overthrow by the Communists. At war's end, China's internal political problems were compounded by the destruction of roads, railroads, and cities. The Nationalists were mired in corruption and stubbornly refused to see that the Chinese people were embracing the Communist leadership. Chinese civil war continued but with years of torture and dominance instructed by Mao, he victoriously entered Beijing in January 1949 and by April, Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters was forced to flee to Taiwan to evade death. October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was formally established. Mao Zedong was pronounced President of the Republic as well as Chairman of the Communist Party. Mao then had an attitude that was totally opposite of past leader Chiang but his reasons are understood but then unethical. Inspired and easily influenced by Soviet Union leader Stalin, who was a big name in the 1920s through the 1940s, Mao took over this idea of Marxism and therefore he always regarded himself as a Marxist, even if he knows little about it. The Soviet Union was in a reform and cultural change during this time. Industrialization was a big project they were looking to rebuild and constructs in order to be a powerhouse country and this really impressed Mao and he is willing to begin the process without any care to his china men and women. Over the years, learning and following Stalin and the Soviet Union, Mao envisions if he could adapt the Soviet system techniques of industrialization, tactics, and government this would bring china out of the decline and move forward. Mao also had been cheated or grassed, so he assumed, by the United States during his battles against the Nationalist party. He saw that United States representatives supported and backed Chiang Kai-shek during their last war and that infuriated him to the point where he believed

there will never be a relationship between the two countries again. With much hatred, Mao was always precautious for the whereabouts and scheming of the Americans so with no hesitation he was willing to encourage Soviet Union influence among his people and government. Mao became infatuated with the idea that Americans were planning on an alliance with arch rivals, the Japanese and Chinese Nationalists, to invade northeast China and even launch nuclear bombs on Manchuria and Far East Soviet. China was beginning to be looked at as an old country and no longer dominant and powerful as it was hundreds of years ago. China was not of any concern for other countries and at times would be considered a non-player when it came to economic, social, political, and economic reform. This was very hard for Mao to cope with and being the head of China felt as if he fell in that category. Now Mao may have got a little too carried away with the thought of Americans intervening in Chinese territory and reform but Stalin may also reap the consequences that may come from Maos view. Stalin knew that if a war broke out between the United States and the Soviet Union he would definitely not be prepared and this was a huge concern for the Soviets during their time of industrialization. Stalin thought if he would tell Mao about the possibility of American infringe on his soil he would refrain from trying to drive out the Nationalist too fast which would leave them vulnerable. Mao continued with what he felt was best and in result no American attacks occurred but that did not mean he would then just underestimate them either so he installed military forces along Chinas coast where he felt invasions would happen and he also made the Chinese aware and gain confidence in their leader by announcing how protected they are of which the Chinese numerical superiority would counter whatever technological advantages the Americans might be able to bring to bear, and the moral benefits to be derived from fighting in a just war.

Tiananmen Square Massacre

Resources
Schaeffer, Robert K. Red Inc.: Dictatorship and the Development of Capitalism in China, 1949 to the Present. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2011. Print.

Chai, Joseph C.H. An Economic History of Modern China. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011. Print. Lawrance, Alan. China since 1919: Revolution and Reform : A Sourcebook . London: Routledge, 2004. Print. Smith, S.E., and Bronwyn Harris. "What Was the Tiananmen Square Massacre?" WiseGeek. Conjecture, 18 Mar. 2013. Web. 09 Apr. 2013.