The

Meaning

of

at

Timaeus

31c

PAUL PRITCHARD

1. The inadequacy of current interpretations The argument from 31b4-32c2 purports to prove, by an elaborate deduction, that the world of becoming is composed of just four simple bodies which stand to one another in continuous proportion, thereby forming a complete and indissoluble whole. This 'deduction' is in fact an extraordinary tissue of mathematical sophistry. Or, to be fairer to Plato, we should recall that he has already announced (29c) that in matters such as these, the account to be given will be but a likeness of a scientific' account, just as its subject matter is a mere likeness of those things which can be the subjects of a scientific account. Here the imitation becomes a parody of scientific discourse, so perhaps we should allow for an element of playfulness. _ Part of this argument is a rather convoluted statement about the terms of a continuous proportion, which can be rendered as follows: For if there is a mean among three things, such that as the first is to the mean, so the mean is to the last, and again in reverse, as the last is to the mean, so the mean is to the first; then the mean becomes both first and last, and the last and first also appear in the middle. The point is in fact a simple one. In a three-term continued proportion we have F :M : : M :L (e.g. 2:6 :: 6:18), and in reverse L:M :: M:F (18 :6 : : 6:2). It will also be true that M:L :: F:M (6:18 :: 2:6). This is presumably what is meant by "the mean becomes both first and last, and the last and first also appear in the middle." This much is uncontroversial. What is problematic is the nature of the terms mentioned by Plato in the phrase.

182

onozav yap aQL8f..lwvTQLMV FtTc oyxwv EL'tE8vva?.?wv Evlwwvobv fi TO goov ... That this is a matter for dispute will be clear from the following attempted translations. 1. (Archer-Hind 1886) 'For when of three numbers, whether expressing three or two dimensions, one is a mean...' 2. (Taylor 1929) 'For when of three integers, or volumes, or characters, the midmost is ...'z 3. (Cornford 1937) 'For whenever, of three numbers, the middle one between any two that are either solids (cubes?) or squares ...' 4. (Bury 1942) 'For whenever the middle term of any three numbers, cubic or square ...'3 The root of the problem lies in the meaning of the term variously rendered as 'two-dimensional number' (Archer-Hind), 'character' (Taylor), and 'square number' (Cornford, Bury). We also have three views as to the syntax. These are: (a) 'Whenever there is a mean among three X's, which are either Y's or Z's' (Archer-Hind, Bury), (b) 'Whenever of three X's, there is a mean between two which are Y's or Z's' (Cornford). (c) 'Whenever there is a mean among three X's or Y's or Z's' (Taylor). 2. The first syntactical alternative Whichever view we take of the syntax, we are here dealing with a three-term geometrical proportion, the middle term of which is the geometric mean of the other two. For example, each of the following is a geometric proportion: A 6:9 (1) 4:6 :: (2) 6:12 :: 12:24 (3) BD:AD :: AD:DC (see figure) The third example shows that the terms need not be numerical. But if we adopt views (a) or (b) of the syntax, then the terms must be numerical. Further, under view (a) all three terms must be either 6YXOL or 8UVdt[LF-Lg. Consequently these

183

words must refer to kinds of arithmoi. What might these be? Archer-Hind's note on the passage reads: oyxog is a solid body, here a number composed of three factors, so as to represent three dimensions. 6bvapig is the technical term for a square, or sometimes a square root; cf. Theaetetus 148A; and here stands for a number composed of two factors and representing two dimensions. This interpretation of the terms seems to me the only one at all apposite to the present passage. What we are being asked to believe is that Plato is here ruling out arithmoi which are not two- or three-dimensional - but Archer-Hind does not tell us why Plato should want to do this, or why this interpretation is 'apposite to the present passage.' We can, however, fill out the argument by consulting Sir Thomas Heath, who was in fact a slightly younger member of Archer-Hind's college, and presumably discussed these matters with him. Liddell & Scott acknowledge Heath's contribution to the lexicon. It must have been Heath who was responsible for the following entry under 'V . I . b square : number PI Ti 32a.' The only reference given for this meaning of the term is precisely that which we are considering. Elsewhere Heath makes his case as follows: It is true that similar plane and solid numbers have the same property [sc. of having a mean proportional number] (Eucl. VIII.18,19); but, if Plato had meant similar plane and solid numbers generally, I think it would have been necessary to specify that they were 'similar', whereas, seeing that the Timaeus is as a whole concerned with regular figures, there is nothing unnatural in allowing 'regular' or 'equilateral' to be understood. Further Plato speaks first of 6vvMpEig and 6y%otand then of 'planes' (ejtLJte6a)and 'solids' (oleped) in such a way as to suggest that 6vv6pEig correspond to aiaE6a and oyxov to aiepea. Now the regular meaning of 6Ovapig is square (or sometimes square root), and I think it is here used in the sense of square, notwithstanding that Plato seems to speak of three squares in continued proportion, whereas, in general, the mean between two squares as extremes would not be square but oblong. And, if 6vvMpEig are squares, it is reasonable to suppose that oyxoLare also equilateral, i.e. the 'solids' are cubes.' We note that Heath's interpretation of oyxog is entirely determined by his He is led to this view because he thinks that 'the interpretation of allusion must be to the theorems established in Eucl. VIII . l l , 12, that between any two square numbers there are two mean proportional numbers." Now Heath himself notices two difficulties with this: (i) It is clear that, though the extreme terms might be square arithmoi, the middle term need not be square (see my example (1) )6 .

184

(ii) Further, it is not actually necessary that any of the terms be square - all that is required is that the extreme terms be similar arithmoi (i.e. that their factors should be in the same ratio). This case is illustrated by my example (2). So why should Plato mention square arithmoi at all? And there is another objection: The existence of a mean proportional arithmos between two square arithmoi might excuse the mention of squares; but still the reference to cube arithmoi would be quite without motivation. Heath is unworried by this; he is satisfied by the fact that between any two cube arithmoi there are two mean proportionals. But Plato is talking about a three-term proportion - the later mention at 32a7ff. of the necessity of finding two mean proportionals to 'bind' two solids is really not to the point here. Why should Plato gratuitously confuse the reader by expecting him to guess what he is going to say next? Further, if in the passage under consideration reference is being made solely to arithmoi, the transition to examples in the realm of continuous magnitude is not made more smooth by its inappropriate anticipation seven lines above. Plato is surely a better writer than this would suggest. Perhaps the introduction of cubes is an (unfortunate) afterthought - but then Plato would surely have written 'three arithmoi, whether square or cube' and not, as he does 'three arithmoi whether cube or square'. 3. The second syntactical alternative Cornford adopts the second syntactical alternative to deal with the first of these objections. He says: The objection ... can be obviated by construing the genitives EL1:E 6yxwv EirE not (as is commonly done) as in apposition to but 8vvawEwvciwzvvwvovv 7 depending on 1:0J.1(Jov. He also mentions the third syntactical alternative, saying Grammatically, the words can. be construed: (1) 'Whenever of three numbers, whether solid or square, the middle one is such...' or (2) 'Whenever of any three numbers or solids or squares the middle one is such...' taking 'numbers' to mean numbers that are neither squares nor solids.g But Heath's interpretation possibility: of oyxo5 and 6uvauic; leads him to reject the second

This interpretation of the ambiguous words oyxoL and 6vvMpEigas 'cubes' and 'squares' seems to be better supported than any other. It rules out the notion that are alternatives to arithmoi.9 yxm and 6uv6t4F-Lg

185

So Cornford rejects this interpretation on account of his favoured interpretation of 6-6vaRLgand oyxog. His argument for the latter term's meaning cube number relies on a comment by Simplicius that Eudemus substituted xupog for oyxog in his account of Zeno's `moving rows' argument. This hardly amounts to proof, and it is clear that his real motive is the same as Heath's - if b6vapig means square arithmos, then 6yxog must mean cube arithmos.1O If it can be shown that b6vapig cannot mean this, we need not bother with the suggestion that oyxog can mean cube arithmos. 4. dvva,ucs as a mathematical term Aristotle gives us an account of this term in his 'philosophical lexicon' the fifth book of the Metaphysics. There is no mention of any use to mean square arithmos, though he does tell us that '66vapig used in geometry is so called by an extension of meaning.'1' The only mathematical sense of b6vapig which Aristotle acknowledges is applicable to geometry. We find an example of this geometrical use at Tim. 54b5: The other [triangle] having its longer side triple the other in respect of This means that the two lines have the same ratio as the sides of two squares one of which has three times the area of the other. 5. dvva?ccs in Diophantus First, the term arithmos in Diophantus is unique to him and does not match Euclid's use. Diophantus uses this term to denote the 'unknown quantity', defining it as having in it an indeterminate multitude of units (J[?80 uovd6<Dv In Euclid (and generally) the term arithmos refers to a definite &6QLCYTOV). multitude of units - precisely the determinate set of units which Diophantus which is to writes as 'so many units'. He would write, for example, say '3 8vva?E?S and 4 arithmoi and 5 units'. This means '3 squares of the indeterminate multitude of units, and 4 (sets) of the indeterminate multitude of units and 5 units'. Now it is only the 5 units which is an arithmos in the Euclidean (and Platonic) sense. Does Diophantus use the term b6vapig for the square of an arithmos (in this sense)? Heath himself observes that he does not:

186

With Diophantus, however, it is not any square [sc. which is called 6uvauig], but only the square of the unknown; where he speaks of any particular square number, it is isz?aywvo5 This is precisely the Euclidean usage. So Diophantus does not use the term 8vva?.t5 in a way which could provide a parallel for its use at Tim. 31. 6. The third syntactical alternative The failure to find adequate parallels for the use of b6vapig to mean square arithmos directs us back to the source of this putative interpretation. For it was the adoption of one of the first two syntactical alternatives which led to the search for an arithmetical reference for the terms b6vapig and oyxog. If instead we adopt the third alternative, then the terms need not refer to kinds of arithmoi. Indeed, they need not be mathematical terms at all. All that is required is that they should refer to quantities which can stand in a continuous proportion. And that will be true of any sets of quantities of the same kind - for example time intervals, weights, line segments etc. We can be certain that it is possible to construe in this way, for this is the way Proclus construes - indeed, he considers no other alternative. In his commentary on this passage he writes:

Since there are three means (or proportions), 13 arithmetic, geometric and harmonic, and these being such as we have said, it is reasonable for Plato to take these three to be the terms in each case For the arithmetical 6yxoi and mean is in QL8!!OL, the geometrical mean rather in continuous magnitude, and the harmonic mean is in 6vvMpEig

187

not particClearly he takes oyxog and b6vapig to be alternatives to ular kinds of this and us with good Taylor adopts syntax, provides Platonic parallels. He argues: The EvE is suppressed before the first of the alternatives. For parallels cf. h6yov auxvov xai' ilAaUT6V,EIIE xai 3TQ6g Sophistes 217el &noR71x-6vFtv The effect of the suppression is l;zEeov, ib. 224e2 xaaqhix6v Elzs aiJ1:oJt(oLXV. to throw special stress on the first alternative as that which is chiefly contempated, 'three integers, or - for the matter of that, three 6yxoLor 'to deliver a long discourse to myself, or, as it may be, to a companion', 'retailing the wares of others, or possibly selling his own manufactures'." I believe Taylor is right to follow Proclus thus far. Unfortunately he goes further and endorses Proclus' suggestion" that Plato has in mind three different kinds of mean: But what are yxm and 6vvMpEig?The explanation of Proclus is pretty clearly right. He takes 6yxoi to mean, as it usually does, 'bulks', 'volumes' (so Heraclides Ponticus is said to have called the 'molecules' of his corpuscular theory 6vac)[tot yxm 'uncompounded volumes'. As Heraclides is known to have given some account of the theories of the Pythagorean Ecphantus, it is not impossible that the phrase may actually belong to Ecphantus and so be Pythagorean.... ) What the and 'low' in mean Proclus explains by saying that the 'high' 6vvMpEig musical pitch are an instance of such a and that the interval of a fourth is a 'mean' (paov) between the 'high' and 'low' extremes of the octave. Thus Timaeus will be illustrating his general proposition about 'means' by an example taken from

188

each of the three Pythagorean studies, arithmetic music (8uv6tREwv).

geometry (oyxwv),

But the three means are found equally in arithmetic, geometry and music, so to connect each mean with its homonymous study would be misleading and gratuitous. Also, there is no reason to believe that Plato has any but the geometric mean in mind here, in spite of the use of all three means in the construction of the world-soul a little later. For, immediately after the sentence we are discussing, he continues:

If the body of the universe needed to be plane, having no third dimension, then one mean would have been enough to bind together itself and those with it - but as it is the universe must be three-dimensional, and solid bodies are joined together always by two means, never by one. The reference here must be to the discovery by Hippocrates of Chios that the problem of doubling the cube reduces to the discovery of two mean proportionals between sides of length one and two units. This is the three-dimensional analogue of the doubling of the square, which is solved by finding one mean proportional between sides of length one and two units. These means are, of course, geometric means. Other Platonic pronouncements lead to the same conclusion. In the Protagoras we are told that communities of men will not hold together unless each man has a sense of justice and respect for others, which 'bring order into our cities and create a bond of friendship and union. What is true of the city also applies to the universe as a whole, as we are told in the Gorgias: The sages say, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by partnership and friendship and moderation and justice, and because of this they call the whole 'order' (cosmos), my friend, not disorder and licentiousness. You seem to me not to attend to these matters, though you are clever-it has escaped you that geometrical proportion has great power among the gods and among men, and you think one must try to get more than a fair share. This is because you are ignorant of geometry.'8 We find that Platonic justice is clearly a matter of geometric proportion; influence in the state is to be allotted so that power is exercised in proportion to the intellectual and moral worth of each person or class, while the numbers in each class are in inverse proportion to their power. In such a state we shall find the unity of order and friendship, and it is the same with any stable whole, including the entire sensible universe.19

189

If this is not enough, consider Plato's words as he continues the argument in the Timaeus - the four simple bodies are to one another in the same ratio zov affrav X6yov). There is absolutely no reason why any reference to any other mean than the geometric should be seen here. With this out of the way, why should we look for a musical meaning for b6vapig? As it happens, a much simpler and more plausible interpretation is available. 7. What bvva,ucs really means We are looking for a reference to things which (i) are magnitudes of the same kind (since they must be capable of appearing in a continuous proportion, and hence have some ratio with one another),2 and which (ii) Plato would require to be in proportion in his cosmos. In his discussion of the infinite Aristotle writes:

For if the power in one simple body is exceeded by that of another by as much as you like - for instance if fire is finite in quantity and air infinite, and an equal amount of fire is in its power any multiple whatever (so long as it is a finite multiple) of the power of an equal amount of air, nevertheless it is clear that the infinite quantity will overcome and destroy the finite.2' We see that the 'powers' of the simple bodies can be said to have ratios with one another. Thus they satisfy our first criterion. As for the second, we find that this meaning for b6vapig is in fact the most frequent in the Timaeus. Three particular cases will show that it would be appropriate in this sense at 32al also. At 33a3 we find

surrounds a When heat and cold and anything which has strong powers (6vvMpEig) dissolves the and falls this before its time, and it, composite composite body upon by bringing on disease and old age it causes it to decay.

190

This is why no powers are to be left outside the cosmos. But how are these powers to be prevented from tearing apart the cosmos from the inside? The following is part of Plato's description of the pre-cosmic state, before the demiurge has put his plan into effect (52el):

[the nurse of becoming] seemed to take on all kinds of forms, and because she was filled with powers (6vvMpEig) which were neither uniform nor balanced, she was in no sort of self-equilibrium, but, buffeted unevenly in every part, she was shaken by these [powers] and, moving herself, she shook these in turn. We see how this is dealt with at 56c3:

And we must also suppose that, with regard to the proportions which hold among the multitudes, the motions and the other powers [of the simple bodies], that the god, insofar as the nature of necessity yielded willingly to persuasion and [these proportions] were brought to accurate perfection by him, articulated these [viz. the multitudes, motions and powers] according to geometric proportion. So this sense for b6vapig at 32a would be entirely appropriate. 22 We do not have to accuse Plato of sloppy writing, as we would have to if it were taken in the sense 'square arithmos'. Further, we do not have to postulate a unique use of this term. (This should always be a last, desperate resort.) The meaning 'power' makes perfectly good sense here.23

191

8. The meaning of oyxos Once the interpretation of b6vapig as 'square arithmos' is abandoned, the term 6y%og presents no problem. Consider this parallel at Theaet. 155a3:

Nothing can ever become larger or smaller either in bulk (oyxw) or in number as long as it remains equal to itself. Here we find oyxog as an alternative to contrast to b6vapig in Aristotle:" We can see oyxog used in

For, although small in bulk (oyxw), in power others.

and worth it far exceeds the

Our text should therefore be read: 'Whenever among three arithmoi, or (for that matter) three bulks or three powers, one is a mean ...' One advantage of this reading is that we need not postulate a unique sense for any of its terms. Neither need we find Plato guilty of incompetent writing. Thirdly, this interpretation is entirely appropriate to Plato's wider concerns both in the Timaeus itself and elsewhere. The fact that the argument in which this phrase is embedded is a piece of (playful) nonsense should not lead us to suppose that it is unskilfully handled. It would be madness not to find method in it. 25

192

Works Cited Burnyeat, M.F., 'The Philosophical Sense of Theaetetus' Mathematics', Isis 69 (1978) 489-513. Cornford, F.M., Timaeus. Plato's Cosmology (London 1937). Heath, T.L. (1), The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements (Dover 1956) (2) Diophantus of Alexandria: A Study in the History Of Greek Algebra (Dover 1964) . Lee, H.D.P., Plato: Timaeus and Critias (London 1956). Mugler, C., Dictionnaire Historique de la Terminologie Geometrique des Grecs (Klincksieck 1958-9). Rivaux, A., Plato Oeuvres Compltes Vol. X (1925) (ed. J. Souilh). Souilh, J., Etude sur le Term i (Paris 1919). Taylor, A.E., A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford 1928). Tracy, T.J., Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle (The Hague 1969). Vlastos, G., 'Isonomia', American Journal of Philology LXXIV (1953) 337-66. Centre for Ancient Philosophy University of Bristol.

193