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R. D. Carmichael.-The Logic of Discovery. IX+280 p. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, I930. (Price S 2.00). Only at rare intervals does there appear a book devoted to the discussion of problems in epistemology which is thoroughly lucid. At one place or another undefinables are introduced into the discussion and the meaning is then lost in a confusion of words. The book under review therefore is especially noteworthy in the fact that it belongs to that limited class of philosophical essays which defines its terms, states its postulates, and then proceeds to the development of its theme with an inevitable logic. A reader is thus privileged to disagree with the conclusions, not from any feeling of insecurity derived from semantic uncertainties, but only from unwillingness to grant the initial premises. One thus derives unusual satisfaction in the perusal of Professor CARMICHAEL'S book since one is never on a single page uncertain as to the meaning of the author. The problem of the book is to delineate the character of a logic of discovery, in contrast to a logic of demonstration, ain the sense of a logic by which one infers from the known to that unknown which hitherto has not been apprehended or suspected)). The questions for which answers are sought are of the type: How does the mind behave in the process of investigation ? What constitute heuristic guides in the activities of discovery? Are such guides essentially particular, depending upon the nature of the material of the investigation, or do they possess general attributes characteristic of every investigation? The author, while admitting in the beginning that ((the mind cannot comprehend its highest movements with clearness)) since this would involve an explanation of explanation and so on with an infinite regression, believes that a measure of delineation is still possible for the processes of discovery. In proof of this he cites two examples. The first of these is the heuristic guide first employed by STURM and CAUCHY whereby known theorems about systems of algebraic equations are found to suggest new results in the realm of transcendental equations through limiting processes of doubtful rigor. This method has been amply justified as a tool of investigation in the beautiful results obtained in recent
times in the theory of integral equations by VOLTERRAand FREDHOLM.

The author sees in this a genuine logic of discovery by means of which the mind is led through essentially non-rigorous processes to conclusions which must later be verified by the inevitable logic of demonstration. The second example is EINSTEIN'Spostulate of relativity which may be epitomized in the assertion that natural phenomena are independent of mathematical axes. Once formulated the postulate is a certain guide to investigations. That the discoveries so made may finally prove

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to be vacuous or not consonant with objective experiment has nothing to do with the power of the postulate as the basis of a logic of discovery. The answerin the case cited is of course too well known to requirefurther comment. Other examples will readily occur. Nature acts in such a way that the first variation of the integral of action is zero; matter and energy are indestructible; the time-derivative of entropy is always positive. These postulates have alreadyproduced volumes of discoveries and present tendencies of physical science lead one to suspect that these logics of discovery have not yet been entirely exhausted.
at this point did not It is to be regretted that Professor CARMICHAEL explore more fully the nature of ((an insidious error)) to which he gives the name of ((proof by ignorance )), wherein apparent indeterminations in postulates are attributed to the insufficiency of our knowledge. Postulates which rest essentially upon the calculus of probabilities are apt to have an element in them of this insufficient reason. The author mentions the second law of thermodynamics as a postulate of this nature, but it would have been of the greatest interest to have had also an appraisement of perhaps the most celebrated example in science of this type, in the theory of inverse probability. In this namely, the rule of BAYES connection R. A. FISHERrecently made the following remarkable statement : ((I know only one case (BAYESrule) in mathematics of a doctrine which has been accepted and developed by the most eminent men of their time, and is now perhaps accepted by men now living, which at the same time has appeared to a succession of sound writers to be fundamentally false and devoid of foundation )). (Proc. Cambridge Phil. Soc., vol. 26, 1930, p. 528). The difficulty in this theory is certainly to be attributed to the very subtle introduction of a ((proof by ignorance )). Having in the first chapter of the book exhibited the fruitfulness proceeds of postulates as tools of investigation, Professor CARMICHAEL in succeeding pages to explore their nature. One is frankly surprised ((It seems clear that postulate to see at the beginning the statement: systems have been employed fully and consciously in only a small part of that domain of thought in which their use will yield characteristic values... Too much of what is known on the subject is now known to a relatively small group of thinkers )). And yet the researches of GAUSS,
LOBACHEVSKI, BOLYAI, and RIEMANN in non-Euclidean geometry have

appeared only within the last hundred years and the postulational nature of mathematics itself thus belongs to recent knowledge. The theory of relativity and the new formulation of quantum mechanics begin tardily to force a similar character ulpon the ((laws)) of physics. Less fortunate fields have as yet been unable to achieve a postuilational basis. In this connection the author says : ( ... the known fact of the existence

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of important and extensive bodies of doctrine in the ideal deduictive form afforded by a postulational treatment should be kept in mind by every scientific investigator as suggesting a fundamental criterion by which he may estimate the degree of advancementof his own science )). Having thus set up the postulate as the basis of any scientific doctrine, and having further defined the consistency of such a system as its isomorphism or one-to-one-ness with some set of objects, the author turns to the concept of a doctrinal function as the primary basis of exact
thought. By the term thus so impressively elevated Professor CARMICHAEL means ((any body of statements which is made up solely of a set of consistent postulates about elements or objects not explicitly defined and the logical consequences which flow from them)). The main contribution of the book is perhaps found in its development of the thesis that the progress of any science is measured by the degree to which it approximates the character of a doctrinal function. Omitting hypotheses that never gain scientific currency, the author shows that systems of postulates fall into one of two classes : first, those which for a time are of great usefulness in suggesting the direction of empirical investigation but are ultimately found to lead to contradiction, or, second, those which attain the exalted position of forming the basic principles of science. He concludes however, with a statement pessimistic for those who labor in empirical fields that one may doubt whether any system of the latter class will fail ultimately to recede into the former. It is by means of this constant exploration of the consequences of postulates and the ultimate comparison with experience that the doctrinal function of any science is finally to be attained. The book is full of illustrations mainly though not exclusively from mathematical and physical sciences. The history of the atomic theory is systematically developed as an indication of the growth of hypotheses and the author concludes that ( it promises to hold this supreme place during our generation )). It is quite interesting in this connection, however, to note the opening statement in a recent treatise on atoms, molecules, and quanta, where a certain sharp debate between the two eminent physicists BOLTZMAANN and MACHis recorded. The former had categorically stated in a scientific meeting : ((I know that there are molecules ,), to which MACH had immediately replied: ((You do not )). This modern treatise then makes the significant statement that the present tendency is to side with MVACH. The book concludes with a chapter somewhat unrelated to the main theme in which the autor argues for the larger hluman worth of mathematics. It is interesting, however, irz adding one more item to the record of those who have felt the exaltation experienced by a survey