Aristotle's Great-Souled Man Author(s): Jacob Howland Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 64, No.

1 (Winter, 2002), pp. 27-56 Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408693 . Accessed: 30/07/2011 16:16
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

Aristotle's Great-Souled Man

Jacob Howland
is crucial to Aristotle's discussion of the great-souled man (megalopsuchos) Ethics.Yet there is no scholarly consensus any interpretation of the Nicomachean This article examines about the nature and significance of the megalopsuchos. Aristotle's treatment of the great-souled man within the context of the Ethicsas a whole and in connectionwith other relevantpassages elsewhere in theAristotelian corpus. In particular,Aristotle's identification of Socrates as a great-souled man in the PosteriorAnalytics provides an interpretative key to his discussion of greatness of soul in the Ethics.Aristotle's presentation of the great-souled man reflects an ambiguity at the heart of virtue itself, and underscores the Socratic character of the fundamental lessons of the Ethics.According to Aristotle, the true megalopsuchos is Socrates. Oedipus: You reproach me with the sorts of things in which you will find me great. Teiresias: Yet this very luck has destroyed you. Oedipus:But if I've saved this city, I don't care. -Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannos441-443

Ethics is an inquiry into the highest Aristotle's Nicomachean end of human life, the telos of living that constitutes the human good. The ultimate aim of life appears to be "happiness" (eudaimonia), but in what does happiness consist? Aristotle famously answers that "the human good is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete" (1.7.1098a16-18).1 This orienting insight leads him to examine the various ways in which human beings may manifest virtue or excellence (arete), and to inquire into the relative perfection of individual virtues. It is in the course of this investigation of virtue that Aristotle introduces, in book 4, chapter 3 of the Ethics, the figure of the or great-souled man. EN 4.3 is the first and most megalopsuchos influential philosophical investigation of a leading virtue that in Stoic and Christian thought would be translated as (and
I wish to thank the Editor and anonymous referees of the Reviewfor their excellent criticalsuggestions, and Matthew Oberriederfor many good discussions about the megalopsuchos. 1. Unless otherwise indicated, all parentheticalcitationsreferto book, chapter, and line numbers in the Nicomachean Ethics(EN),and all translations are my own.

28

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS I

transformedinto) magnanimitas or magnitudo animi,and that would subsequently enter into the consciousness of speakers of English under the guise of "magnanimity."2 The chapter's unusual length and exceptionally full and detailed treatment of its subject furthermoresuggest that it plays a significant role within the Ethics as a whole.3Aristotle's reflections on the megalopsuchos accordingly promise not only to clarifyhis influential conception of preeminent excellence, but also to open a path to the heart of his ethical and political thought. At first blush, the great-souled man would appear to deserve special considerationsimply on the basis of his extraordinarymerit. The man Aristotle describes looks like a heroic figure in the classic mold, and manifests a level of moral excellence that seems to be utterly beyond reproach.Everything about him is great. He faces enormous risks, including the loss of life, in order to do the noblest deeds (4.3.1123b19,1124b8-9).His actions are few, but great, and areworthy of the greatestrewards (4.3.1123bl5-16,1124b24-26). The in turn, looks like a quality of greatness of soul (megalopsuchia), strong contender for the title of the best and most complete virtue. "Thatwhich is great in each virtue,"Aristotle states, "would seem of the great-souledman"(4.3.1123b30). to be characteristic Greatness of soul accordingly "seems to be like a kind of ornament [kosmos] of the virtues" (4.3.1124al-2). There may, however, be other reasons for Aristotle's special The apparent straightforwardness interest in the megalopsuchos. of the text notwithstanding, scholars have long debated what Aristotle was trying to convey in his discussion of the great-souled man. One reason for this uncertainty is already hinted at in the passages quoted above: Aristotle writes cautiously, not of what greatness of soul is, but of what it seems to be. As is so often the case, Aristotle's meaning cannot be discerned without careful attention to the subtleties of his writing.

2. See R.A. Gauthier, (Paris:Librarie PhilosophiqueJ.Vrin,1951). Magnanimite 3. EN 4.3 is the fourth longest of the book's 116 chapters (as measured by number of lines in the Bekkercollation);only 10.9, 5.5, and 4.1 are longer.

GREAT-SOULED MAN The Problem of Megalopsuchia

29

Just who is the great-souled man of EN 4.3, and how does Aristotle rate his virtue? The difficulty of these questions is apparent from the variety of responses they have elicited. Some commentators, mindful of the praise of the philosophic life with which the Ethics concludes, identify megalopsuchia with the perfection of theoretical virtue.4 Others claim that it is a moral virtue operating at the heroic pinnacle of political life. Some of those who argue for the latter interpretation find fault with the great-souled man;5 others do not.6 Some of the fault-finders suppose that they may have grasped Aristotle's implicit view, while others maintain that Aristotle was oblivious to the greatsouled man's deficiencies.7 The main lines of these scholarly disputes map the central tensions of what turns out to be a carefully balanced discussion. Ethicsoften upset this balance Commentators on the Nicomachean in rushing to resolve the ambiguities of the text, because they fail
4. Gauthier, Jolif,L'thique Magnanimite, pp. 104-17,and R.A. Gauthierand J.Y. a Nicomaque (Louvain:Publications Universitaires, 1970),vol. 2., pt. 1, pp. 272-98. Ethicsof Aristotle(Oxford: Clarendon Cf. J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Press, 1892), 1: 334-46. Gauthier and Jolif follow an interpretative tradition going a Nicomaque, back to the Greek philosopher Aspasius (L'Ethique pp. 272-73). 23 (1978): 5. W. F R. Hardie, "'Magnanimity'in Aristotle's Ethics,"Phronesis 63-79;Nancy Sherman,"CommonSense and Uncommon Virtue,"MidwestStudies in Philosophy 13 (1988):97-114. 6. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica,trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1948), II-1.129-133, and on the Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Chicago: Henry Commentary Virtue: Aristotleon the Regnery,1964),vol. 1, lectures 8-11;Steven White, Sovereign Relation Between andProsperity StanfordUniversity Press,1992), (Stanford: Happiness pp. 250-71; John Alvis, "Coriolanus and Aristotle's Magnanimous Man 7.3 (1978): 4-28; Carson Holloway, "Christianity, Reconsidered," Interpretation Magnanimity,and Statesmanship,"Reviewof Politics61 (1999):581-604.Holloway follows Thomas in arguing thatAristotelianmegalopsuchia is not incompatible with with 161.2). II-II.129.3 Christianity (cf. SummaTheologica, 7. The former group includes Sherman,Hardie, and Harry V.Jaffa,Thomism andAristotelianism: A Studyof theCommentary on theNicomachean by Thomas Aquinas Ethics(Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1952).SirDavid Ross, however, states thatEN 4.3 "simplybetrayssomewhat nakedly the self-absorptionwhich is the bad side ofAristotle's ethics"(Aristotle [London:Methuen and Co., 1977],p. 208);cf. the criticalremarksby MacIntyreand Russell cited by Hardie, "Magnanimity," p. 65.

30

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

to recognize that a certain tension is integral to the attempt to do justice to the virtues. Forwhere virtue is concerned, as Harry Jaffa observes, "the ambiguities are inherent in the subject matter, and it is part of exactness to preserve them where they are found."8 One central ambiguity can hardly be overemphasized. Philosophical inquiry into ethics requires a kind of double vision: one must see each virtue in its own terms, and also as a part of the whole of virtue and of our shared, political life. It would be a moral as well as an intellectual error to consider virtue in only one of these ways. Strictly speaking, Aristotle notes in EN 6.13, there is no moral virtue in the absence of practical wisdom (phronesis). Phronesis, however, is an extraordinary kind of understanding: it is the knowledge of what is morally appropriate in every concrete context (2.6.1106b36-1107a2), and so of each part as of the the interrelationship of virtue as well parts within the whole. Aristotle accordingly does not confine himself to speaking strictly of virtue, for to do so would be to refuse to recognize that our common life is sustained, and sometimes saved, by the lessthan-extraordinaryvirtues of our fellow citizens. Because these virtues-courage, public-spiritedness, generosity, honesty, and politeness, to name a few-ordinarily exist apart decency, from an understanding of the whole of which they are parts, it is an act of phronesisto attempt to understand them in their own terms. For only in this way can one appreciate the meaning they possess for the virtuous themselves, and just such an appreciation is presupposed by the ability of the man of practical wisdom to enter sympathetically into the concrete contexts of (phronimos) human life and to determine the mean "relative to us" (2.6.1107al).9 That is not all. Because the virtues are fully intelligible only in the light of the whole of virtue, the ordinary understanding of the virtues is in some respects defective. The principle defect of ordinary understanding is its failure to recognize the partiality or incompleteness of the virtues. Phronesis,which alone sees the
andAristotelianism, 8. Jaffa,Thomism p. 114. which makes its possessors "able to contemplate the good for 9. Phronesis, themselves and for human beings in general" (1140b9-10),involves the capacity imaginatively to "re-enactthe agent's point of view and to consider what it is like for the agent to do that action in that context" (Nancy Sherman, The Fabricof Aristotle'sTheory Character: of Virtue[Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1989], p. 36).

GREAT-SOULEDMAN
-

31

virtues from the perspective of the whole of virtue, corrects this defect insofar as it grasps the partiality or incompleteness of every virtue, including itself. For even practical wisdom is less than the whole of virtue: it is one thing to know what ought to be done by the soldier facing fearsome odds, the wife of an alcoholic husband, or the adult child of an infirm parent, and quite another to have cultivated the settled disposition that allows one consistently to do it. And even if it were possible for one person somehow to cultivate all of the virtuous dispositions at once, his virtue would still be incomplete in another sense, for he would not cease to depend for his life and well-being upon the virtuous action of his fellow citizens. The preceding considerations prepare us to approach EN 4.3 as an account that does full justice to the outstanding virtue of the great-souled man by seeing him as he sees himself through the eye of the city, while simultaneously inviting us to see him through the eye of phronesisthat takes in the whole of virtue (6.11.1143b11-14,6.13.1144b10-17).To see the great-souled man through both eyes is to read EN 4.3 with a view to the pedagogical trajectoryof the Ethicsas a whole. It is furthermore in Aristotle's discussion of greatness of soul that this trajectoryis perhaps most clearly visible. If an attentive reading of this crucial chapter of the Ethics makes it clear that the pinnacle of political life lacks the perfection that it claims for itself, it also helps us to understand the imperfection of even the supremely happy theoretical life sketched in book 10.

Overview of the Argument: Megalopsuchia and Socratic Self-Knowledge

As is evident from the scholarly debate sketched above, the great-souled man defies easy classification. He straddles borders in a way that provokes reflection. He is a fundamentally political man who embodies a philosophical detachment from politics. He is, so to speak, an extraordinary embodiment of virtue as it is is not, as some ordinarily understood. Although megalopsuchia have argued, a theoreticalvirtue (see below), the great-souled man is nonetheless in one respect philosophical in character: he is a lover of the noble, not of honor. He seems to have learned the lesson of EN 1.5 concerning the inadequacy of honor and the

32

III

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

priority of virtue as the end of the political life (see 1095b24-29). As we know from Plato's Symposium(216a-b), this is the same momentous lesson that Alcibiades, whom Aristotle cites as an example of a great-souled man at Posterior Analytics97b, failed to learn from Socrates. Yet while the megalopsuchos of EN 4.3 has in one respect surpassed Alcibiades, he, too, turns out to be unable to complete-and in a certain sense, even to embark upon-the path of philosophical development to which Socrates attempted to introduce his honor-loving companion. The great-souled man is characterizedby heroic, superhuman, or godlike virtue, which finds its fullest expression (or so I shall argue) in a deed whereby the whole community is saved. From the point of view of the community,such virtue possesses absolute value; it is the sine qua non of all other goods. Hence Aristotle is serious about giving the great-souled man his due as a rightful claimant of the greatest honor. To read EN 4.3 in the light of the Ethicsas a whole, however, is to see that the great-souled man's self-understandingis defective just to the extent that he uncritically absorbs the community's estimation of the absolute value of his saving virtue. While the great-souled man has overcome the love of honor for its own sake, he is with respect to self-knowledge still a slave to honor. In regard to virtue, he understands himself to be perfect and therefore self-sufficient, but he is neither. Aristotle's implicit criticism of the great-souled man of EN 4.3 points toward Socrates as the true megalopsuchos. Aristotle names five great-souled men in the PosteriorAnalytics. Of these five, Socrates stands in a class by himself, for he alone is genuinely indifferent to honor and dishonor. EN 4.3 recalls the in the PosteriorAnalytics because it discussion of megalopsuchia at first appears to present a great-souled man after the model of Socrates. Further reflection, however, reveals that the of EN 4.3 suffers from a potentially tragic lack of megalopsuchos self-knowledge. The Socratic megalopsuchos, in contrast, recognizes that not even practical wisdom can rightly claim to be an ordered whole (kosmos)of the virtues, which is to say that he recognizes our inevitable imperfection and lack of selfsufficiency. The discussion of greatness of soul in EN 4.3 thus points ahead toward the indispensability of friendship as a context for critical self-examination, and therewith for the nurture and preservation of virtue and the avoidance of hamartia.

GREAT-SOULED MAN

33

In fine, reflection on the problem of megalopsuchia suggests that the fundamental lessons of the Nicomachean Ethics, both for philosophical readers and for those who strive for active, political excellence, are Socratic in character.

Great-Souled Men: PosteriorAnalytics, Politics, Rhetoric

Aristotle touches upon greatness of soul in several books besides the Nicomachean Ethics,including the Politics,Rhetoric, and, most notably, the Posterior Analytics.In the latter work, Aristotle speaks of greatness of soul in the course of illustrating one way to arriveat a definition of something. The procedure involves looking for what is common to different groups of relevant instances. In this case, Aristotle considers two fictional characters(Achilles and Ajax) and three actual historical figures (Socrates,Alcibiades, and Lysander).
I mean, e.g., if we were to seek what greatness of soul is we should inquire, in the case of some great-souled men we know, what one thing they all have as such. E.g. if Alcibiades is great-souled, or Achilles and Ajax, what one thing do they all have? Intolerance of insults: for one made war, one waxed wroth, and the other killed himself. Again in the case of others, e.g. Lysander or Socrates. Well, if here it is being indifferent to good and bad fortune, I take these two things and inquire what both indifference to fortune and not brooking dishonor have that is the same. And if there is nothing, then there will be two sorts of greatness of soul.10

"Intolerance of insults" manifests itself in a variety of ways. Alcibiades, having been charged by the Athenians with impiety, went over to the Spartans during Athens's ill-fated Sicilian expedition of 415-413 B.C.E.,while Achilles effectively made war on his own army simply by withdrawing from battle. Although the consequences of these actions were disastrous for the Athenians in Sicily and nearly so for the Greek army at Troy,the order of Aristotle's examples is suggestive in its own right. Alcibiades' famous remark upon hearing that the Athenians had condemned him to death-"I'll show them that I am alive"
10. An. Post. 97b16-25, trans. Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle'sPosterior Analytics (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1975),slightly modified.

34

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

(Plutarch Alcibiades22.2)-seems restrained in comparison with the insults Achilles heaps upon Agamemnon when he vents his wrath in the first book of the Iliad.But withAjax, who in Sophocles' tragedy by the same name attempts to slaughter the Greek commanders after having been cheated of the prize of valor, we reach the peak of mad fury.All three men respond to dishonor by turning against their own communities; beyond this, Aristotle's mention of Ajax's suicide, the consequence of his inability to avenge himself upon his enemies, brings home the extreme selfdestructiveness that sometimes accompanies the love of honor. The subtext of Aristotle's first three examples of great-souled men in the PosteriorAnalytics is the politically destructive and potentially tragic rage that highly spirited, honor-loving individuals are prone to feel in the face of insults. This is also the theme of a passage in the Politics in which greatness of soul is mentioned. The context is a discussion of spiritedness (thumos), in connection with which Aristotle mentions the Guardians of Plato's Republic.
But it is not right to say that they [the Guardians] are harsh toward strangers. One ought not to be of this sort toward anyone, nor are greatsouled men savage in their nature, except toward those behaving unjustly. And further, they will feel this rather toward their companions, as was said earlier, if they consider themselves treated unjustly. Moreover, it is reasonable that this should happen. For when it is among those they suppose should be under obligation to return a benefaction, in addition to the injury they consider themselves deprived of this as well. Thus it has been said: "harsh are the wars of brothers," and "those who have loved extravagantly will hate extravagantly too.""

This passage helps us to see that the intolerance of insults manifested by great-souled men goes hand in hand with the frustrated expectation that they will be repaid for benefits they have conferred. This expectation is reasonable in itself, but greatsouled men are unreasonable in that they become wildly angry. It is noteworthy that the two quotations with which the passage concludes are both tragic fragments.'2
11. 1328a8-16, translation of Carnes Lord, Aristotle:The Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984),slightly modified. 12.The firstis fromEuripides,and the second from an unknown author (Lord, Politics,p. 267 n. 23).

GREAT-SOULED MAN

35

Finally, we may mention in this connection a passage in the Rhetoricthat speaks of emulation (zelos),which Aristotle defines as "some pain at the evident presence of goods that are esteemed and are possible for one to obtain, in the possession of those who are similar in nature-[pain felt] not because another possesses them, but because one does not also possess them oneself" (1388a32-35).Emulous men "deem themselves worthy [axiountas] of goods that they do not possess"; "the young and the greatsouled," Aristotle adds, "are of such a sort" (1388a38-b3). Let us turn now to the distinguishing mark of the second group mentioned in the passage from the Posterior Analytics.Their character indifference to is also linked with trait, fortune, defining in of soul the Rhetoric's of how to employ greatness exposition praise persuasively. Aristotle mentions in this context the case in which someone goes "beyond that which is fitting [to prosekon] toward the better and the nobler, for example, if one is measured when experiencing good fortune and great-souled when [metrios] (1367b14-16). experiencing bad fortune [atuchonmegalopsuchos]" Greatness of soul is thus more than one is entitled to expect from a decent person: it is an extraordinary self-possession in the face of the vicissitudes of life. Seen from the perspective of this passage, the greatness of soul manifested by Socrates and Lysander is a virtue of a higher rank than that of Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax. Equanimity in bad fortune is extraordinary precisely because anger and pain are the norm. It is sometimes maintained that Aristotle's discussions of greatness of soul in the Eudemianand NicomacheanEthics are attempts to find that which the two types of men mentioned in the Posterior Analyticshave in common qua great-souled.13If one reads the passage from the Posterior Analytics at face value, however, such an attempt must fail: anyone who is intolerant of insults after the manner of Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax is not truly indifferent to fortune.14 Yet Aristotle's hypothetical phrasing-"if Alcibiades is great-souled, or Achilles and Ajax"; "ifhere [in the case of Lysanderand Socrates]it is being indifferent
13. White, SovereignVirtue, p. 262. 14.This considerationdoes not deter Neil Cooper,who proposes thatAristotle was engaged in "a vain attempt to produce an impossible unitary account of ("Aristotle'sCrowning Virtue,"Apeiron22 [1989]:192). megalopsuchia"

36

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

to good and bad fortune"-suggests that the passage may best be read as a starting-point for further reflection.Aristotle's language raises at least the hint of a doubt about the greatness of soul of those in the first group and the correctness of "indifference to fortune" as the distinguishing mark of the second group. If being indifferent to fortune is the mark of the great-souled man, then the first group is not, strictly speaking, great-souled. In any case, the distinguishing characteristic of this group hardly serves to define greatness of soul. The megalopsuchos stands out by virtue of having a soul of extraordinary magnitude (a psuche megale), but intolerance of insults is a quality that may be possessed by individuals who are wholly ordinary in character. The second group is in its own way no less questionable. It is, to say the least, very odd to link Lysanderwith Socrates in the way that Aristotle does here:the Spartangeneral was evidently passionately desirous of honor, angered by insults, and emulous.15The only respect in which Lysanderwas evidently indifferent to fortune was his easy acceptance of poverty, a trait of characterthat he did indeed share with Socrates.16But again, this character trait-praiseworthy though it may be-is hardly the basis on which one would pick out both Lysander and Socrates as great-souled men. The preceding reflections suggest that a more adequate division would separate Socrates from Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, and Lysander.These four are all marked by the love of honor and the intolerance of dishonor, but Socrates shares neither trait;he is indifferentto good and bad fortune, and thereforealso to the cards that fortune deals him with respect to honor and dishonor.17 Socratesis also the only one of the five who was not a great warrior. As we shall see, he is the only one whose soul is free from the which manifests itself in anger potentially tragictyranny of thumos, in of honor and and the pursuit 586c-d). victory (Plato Republic What, then, links Socrates with the other four? A remark in Ethics: offers a hint that is taken up in the Nicomachean the Rhetoric
15. On his love of honor, see Plutarch Lysander18.1-5, 19.1, 23.5; on his intolerance of insult (hubris), 6.5-7;on his emulous nature, 34.3-5. 1.6. cf. Plato 16.Plutarch Apol.23b-c,31b-c,36d,with XenophonMem. Lys.30.1-2; where Socratesis criticized by Callicles for his lack of 17. Cf. Plato's Gorgias, concern with what others think of him (484c-486d).Socrates' tolerance of insult becomes legendary in the later tradition;cf. Diogenes Laertius, Livesof Eminent 11.21,35-36. Philosophers,

GREAT-SOULEDMAN

37

magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits (megalon Rhetoric 1366bl7). Great-souledmen, in other poietike euergetematon: words, are (at least potentially) great benefactors. Now, all five of the men in question understood themselves to be capable of bestowing the greatestbenefits upon their respective communities, and all were arguably justified in this opinion. Achilles and Ajax were each in their time the most valorous warriors among the Greeks at Troy.18 Alcibiades was a military genius whom Plutarch credits with saving the Athenians at least once, and Lysander achieved the decisive victory of the Peloponnesian War.19 Finally, Socrates claimed "to perform the greatest benefaction [euergetein ten megisteneuergesian]" for the Athenians by exhorting them to seek virtue (Plato Apology36c3-4). If one divides in the manner suggested above, one might be Ethicsas presenting a great-souled tempted to read the Nicomachean man who could legitimately be grouped with Socrates rather than with the other four. For the great-souled man of EN 4.3 observes due measure (metri8s echei) in bad fortune as well as good, extending this attitude both to expressions of dishonor, of which he "makes little" (oligoresei), and expressions of honor, even the of which he greatest regards as something "small" (4.3.1124a11Such an individual differs from the group of four identified 19). above in that he seems to have overcome the excessive aspiration to honor that can turn a benefactor into an enemy of his community. Aristotle reminds us of the potential cost of this aspiration when, in the course of his discussion of the "political" courage characteristicof the citizen-soldier, he alludes to Hector's decision to fight and die at the hand of Achilles rather than to flee within the walls of Troyand risk being called a coward. In making this choice, Hector dooms the Trojansfor the sake of preserving his own good name (3.8.1116a21-23; cf. Iliad 22.56-130). For his the man part, great-souled appears to have transcended the political courage exemplified by Hector, as his virtue has no roots in the fear of dishonor (cf. 3.8.1116a18-19). Yetwe shall see that he
18. Ajax's duel with Hector in book 7 of the Iliadsuggests that he would have been a match for the Trojanhero after the death of Achilles. At Sophocles' Ajax of the Greekswho came to Troy, 1340-1341,Odysseus calls Ajax "thebest [ariston] except Achilles." 19. PlutarchAlc. 36.4-5;Lys.11.6-7.At Aegospotami, Lysanderaccomplished "the greatest deed [ergonmegiston] with the least labor" (Lys.11.6).

38
I

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

I / I I

remains prone to tragic error just to the extent that he mistakes his own greatness for perfection, or treats what is relative as if it were absolute. Like Oedipus, the savior of Thebes from the depredations of the Sphinx, his virtue is compromised by spurious self-knowledge. It is in perceiving what continues to separate the great-souled man of the Ethicsfrom Socrates that we may come to appreciate the core of Aristotle's teaching with respect to megalopsuchia.

The Megalopsuchos of Nicomachean Ethics 4.3

In the Nicomachean Ethics,Aristotle takes up greatness of soul in the midst of an examination of the moral virtues. He turns to after speaking of courage (andreia) and moderation megalopsuchia in 3.6-12,and liberality(eleutheriotes) and magnificence (s6phrosune) in 4.1-2. After greatness of soul he considers, in (megaloprepeia) the remainder of book 4, the nameless virtue of due measure with regard to the love of honor; the nameless mean in respect to anger (whichAristotle proposes to call "gentleness");the nameless virtue that lies between obsequiousness on the one hand and surliness or quarrelsomeness on the other; the nameless virtue of truthfulness or sincerity that lies between boastfulness and selfdepreciating irony; wittiness (eutrapelia);and reverent shame takes all of book 5. (aid6s).The investigation of justice (dikaiosune) Book 6 deals with intellectual virtue. Aristotle returns to moral virtue in book 7, in which he considers moral strength, moral weakness, and pleasure, and in books 8 and 9, in which he explores friendship. Friendship, he states, is "some virtue, or involves virtue" (8.1.1155a2). This list of topics brings to light several things that are worth noting in connection with greatness of soul. First, it is striking that the four virtues dealt with in EN 4.4-8 are all anonymous. What this might mean is suggested by Aristotle's comment at 2.7.1107b6-8 that "men deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures are not very common, on account of which those who are of such a sort have not gotten a name."Wemay infer that the four nameless virtues of 4.4-8 are all rare.Perhapsnot coincidentally,these virtues all reflect or recapitulatethe great-souled man's apparent mastery of the love of honor. The virtue concerned with honor that is taken up in 4.4 stands to greatness of soul as liberality does to

GREAT-SOULED MAN

39

magnificence, "for both of these [liberality and due measure in matters of honor] lack greatness" (4.4.1125b4).As we have seen, the love of honor is closely connected with anger; hence it makes sense for Aristotle to turn next (in 4.5) to the mean in respect to anger. Because the great-souled man "is disposed as one ought to be concerning honors and dishonors" (4.3.1123b21-22), he overlooks wrongs done to him (4.3.1125a3-5)and so will not feel excessively angry when insulted. The next two virtues "concern pretty much the same things" (4.7.1127a13)in that they have to do with speaking frankly where others are concerned (4.6) and about oneself (4.7). These virtues, too, are appropriately treated in connection with the subject of honor, since both obsequiousness and boastfulness imply an excessive concern with the impression one makes on others. The great-souled man is notably free of this concern; it is characteristicof him "to care more for the truth than for what others think of one" and so "to speak and act openly" Wemay add that franknessin dealing with others (4.3.1124b27-29). resembles friendship"and is the mark of "the equitable "especially in 2.7, Aristotle even goes so far friend" (4.6.1126b20-21); [epieike] as to call this virtue "friendship" (philia:2.7.1108a28). The connections sketched above begin to clarify Aristotle's of the virtues" claim that "greatnessof soul seems like some kosmos A (4.3.1124al-2). kosmosis a decorous arrangement, an "ordered whole" that is also an "ornament." Both of these senses are suggested by the explanation that greatness of soul "makes them [the virtues] greater, and does not come to be without them" (4.3.1124a2-3).Greatness of soul encompasses not only the four anonymous virtues mentioned above, but also courage and justice (cf. 4.3.1123b31-32).And as we have seen, the great-souled man displays the frankness that characterizes a genuine friend. If we grant provisionally that greatness of soul is an ordered whole of moral virtues, what principle of order is operative within this whole? And in what way are the moral virtues magnified by greatness of soul? In order to address these questions, we must begin where Aristotle begins. The great-souled man, he states, "seems to be the man who deems himself worthy of great things and actually is worthy of them" (4.3.1123bl-2).20 He thus stands
20. Axioun,"to deem oneself worthy,"implies both rating one's deserts high and asserting one's claims.Aristotle: AthenianConstitution, Eudemian Ethics,Virtues

40

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

in the middle ground between the extremes of the fool or the vain man, who deems himself worthy of great things but is in fact unworthy of them, and the small-souled man, who judges himself to be less worthy than he actually is. One who is in fact worthy of small things and so deems himself is sound-minded (sophron). The vain man and the small-souled (mikropsuchos) man, however, are deficient in self-knowledge. The vain man is not the boaster of EN 4.7, for the latter knows that he is less worthy than he claims to be whereas the former does not. The great-souled man thus resembles the sound-minded man in point of self-knowledge but exceeds him in greatness (cf. 1123b13-15).This self-knowledge involves an accurate sense of one's capabilities in the realm of action, as becomes clear when Aristotle returns to vanity at the end of the chapter. "The vain," he writes, "are foolish and do not know themselves, and they make these deficiencies evident. For they undertake actions that are held in high esteem, and then they The great-souled man, in contrast, are confuted" (4.3.1125a27-29). is able to accomplish great actions and knows himself to be so. The "great things" of which the megalopsuchosdeems himself worthy are in the first instance great deeds.21 In the immediate sequel, the great-souled man is said to be worthy "especially of the greatest things" (4.3.1123b16). His supreme worthiness entitles him to the greatest external good, namely, honor-"the thing we give to the gods as tribute, and that which men of high repute [hoi en axiomati]long for most of The greatall, and the prize of the noblest deeds" (4.3.1123b18-20). souled man, in other words, is capable of bringing to completion the noblest deeds. The noblest deeds are those that merit the community's highest tribute,and that in some sense elevate a man to the level of the gods themselves. These are in the first instance actions whereby the community is saved. Great-souled men are most worthy of honor because, next to the gods, they are considered to be the community's greatest benefactors.
and Vices,trans. H. Rackham(Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), Ethics1233a3. p. 343, note on Eudemian 21. Summa Theologica,II-II 129.4.1; White, Sovereign Virtue, p. 256. This with our ordinary and mikropsuchia observation helps to connect megalopsuchia understanding of magnanimity and pusillanimity: the great-souled man unstintingly does what he can for the good of the whole, whereas the small-souled man ungenerously withholds himself in doing less than he can.

GREAT-SOULED MAN

41

These remarksabout honor point to an ambiguity in the greatsouled man's estimation of his own virtue. In EN 1.12, Aristotle asks whether happiness deserves praise (epainos)or honor (time). Praise is relative;properly speaking, we praise things with respect to some good to which they contribute. "Thus we praise the just man and the courageous man and generally the good man and virtue, on account of their actions and achievements" But the best things, those that are choiceworthy (1.12.1101b14-16). in themselves (such as happiness) and not as a means to only some higher end, deserve "something greater and better" than praise, namely, honor.Aristotle illustrates this point with reference to the gods: it is absurd to praise the gods, he explains, because to do so is to refer them to our standards. In praising the gods, we indicate that we think of them as good just to the extent that they contribute to the accomplishment of our human ends. One can hardly fail to notice, however, that this is precisely the attitude implicit in the conventional view of the gods as expressed in prayers and sacrifices.22 To confuse praise and honor is to obscure the difference between human beings and gods, and between that which is relatively good and that which is absolutely good. These distinctions are blurred within the horizon of nomos or conventional opinion, and so also within the great-souled man's self-perception. As a benefactor, the great-souled man properly deserves praise, not honor. His excellence is relative to what he has achieved or can achieve, which may indeed be nothing less than the salvation of the community as a whole. Now, the city regards the gods especially as actual or potential benefactors, as Aristotle reminds us when he adverts to Homer's story in the Iliad about the way in which Thetis petitions Zeus on Achilles' behalf. This seemingly casual allusion (4.3.1124bl5-16)also recalls Achilles' exemplary quest to achieve Zeus-like excellence, or "always to be the best and to stand above all others" (Iliad11.784). Insofar as he is a great benefactor after the heroic model, it is natural for the great-souled man to think of himself as possessing divine or superhuman excellence, and as being entitled to that which the citizens give to the gods in thanks. To save one's city, moreover, is to do something that seems from the perspective of
22. I am indebted here to Jaffa,Thomism andAristotelianism, pp. 116-23.

42

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

the community to be absolutely good. For if there can be no deed more important than the saving deed, it would seem that there could be no virtue higher than the saving virtue. It is therefore easy for the great-souled man to think of his virtue not only as godlike but also as absolutely good or perfect, and thus as deserving something more than praise-namely, honor, or the recognition that is accorded to the highest and best things. And this is precisely the way in which he does see himself. Thus we are told that in accepting great honors and those that are conferred the great-souled man will by morally serious men (hoispoudaioi), be only moderately pleased, "on the ground that he is receiving what belongs to him or even less; for no honor could be worthy of perfect virtue [aretespantelous].""Yet he will accept them," Aristotle continues, "because they are not able to give him anything greater in tribute" (4.3.1124a5-9).The verb aponemein, "to give as tribute,"is the same one thatAristotle used in speaking of the bestowal of honor upon the gods at 4.3.1123b18. Aristotle's exposition of greatness of soul, I have been suggesting, indicates that the great-souled man's self-knowledge is mediated by conventional opinion, or that he measures his own virtue in accordancewith the standards of the city itself. This point is subtly reinforced by Aristotle's implicit identification of the great-souled man with the citizenry of Athens at 4.3.1124b16-17. And it is more plainly implied by what must strike the reader as a rathercurious way of reachingthe conclusion that the great-souled man is a good man. "The great souled man," Aristotle writes, "if indeed he is worthy of the greatest things, would be the best man, for the better man is always worthy of that which is greater, and the best man is worthy of the greatest things; hence the truly greatsouled man must be a good man" (4.3.1123b26-29).Remarkably, Aristotle does not directly assert the goodness of the great-souled man, but instead infers his goodness from the fact that he is worthy of the greatest things. He seems here to trace the great-souled knows he is best man's own path of inference: the megalopsuchos the community whom of man he is the sort because upon just the honors.23 bestows greatest customarily
"And he would not be worthy of honor if he were 23. Cf. 4.3.1123b34-1124al: worthless. For honor is the prize of virtue, and it is given as tribute to the good."

GREAT-SOULED MAN

43

It is now possible to discern the principle of order within the cosmos of virtue that characterizes greatness of soul. This organizing principle is ultimately nomos itself, or conventional opinion about the godlike nature and absolute value of heroic virtue. The energy of the great-souled man is focused on what he takes to be superhuman excellence, and it is the intensity of this focus that draws the moral virtues in its train and magnifies them. The virtues of courage and justice are accordingly introduced negatively and indirectly,within the context of an argument that is designed to show that moral virtue is a byproduct of the greatsouled man's exclusive attention to the most important things. None of the ordinary motives that induce men to do wrong (adikein)or to commit shameful deeds (aischra)can be attributed to one "to whom nothing is great" (4.3.1123b32).Indeed, if one considers each virtue in turn, it is utterly ridiculous to picture the great-souled man as being other than good. The virtues themselves are furthermore magnified by their connection with greatness of soul (4.3.1123b29-24a2). There is some irony in the latter passage's anticipation of the reductio ad absurdum whereby Aristotle attempts to show, in book 10, that the activity of the gods cannot involve the exercise of moral virtue. The great-souled man's opinion of his own superhuman virtue is dependent upon his understanding of the gods as great benefactors. But this conventional understanding turns out to be a laughable projection of human virtue upon more perfect, and perfectly indifferent, beings (10.8.1178bl0-12). Aristotle's indirect way of establishing the moral virtue of the great-souled man also brings to mind Socrates'similar description of the philosopher, whose decency is a byproduct of his exclusive attention to wisdom (Plato Republic 485c-486b).Textual echoes of this sort have led some commentators to suggest that the greatsouled man of EN 4.3 is in fact the man of contemplation Aristotle describes in book 10. Let us now consider more closely the question of the philosophic characterof the great-souled man.

Greatness of Soul and the Perfection of Virtue

One important interpretationmaintains thatAristotle models the great-souled man of the NicomacheanEthics after Socrates, and that Socrates exemplifies the life of contemplation described

44

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS I

in book 10. According to this reading, which is advanced by R. A. Gauthier both independently and in connection with J.Y.Jolif, Aristotle brings to completion in the Ethicsthe suggestion of the Posterior Analyticsthat greatness of soul is to be understood after the example of Socrates' philosophically grounded indifference to fortune.24The conclusions of Gauthier and Jolif rest largely on the following points: (1) Aristotle identifies the great-souled man as the best of men (aristos)and as a man of perfect virtue (arete panteles), but perfect virtue is theoretical virtue; (2) the description of the great-souled man hearkens back to Socrates' description of the philosopher in book 6 of Plato's Republicand in Plato's Theaetetus (172c-176a);and (3) the great-souled man is slow to and a man of few undertakings (4.3.1124b24idle, act, which to is that he is presented as a man of leisure rather 25), say than a man of action, and Aristotle identifies leisure with contemplation.25 Each of these points, however, is open to objection: (1) as we have just seen, in neither of the passages in question (4.3.1123b26-29, 1124a5-9) does Aristotle explicitly vouch for the great-souled man's being best or possessing perfect virtue; instead, he is in both passages describing the way in which the great-souled man views himself. (2) Gauthier overlooks the fact that neither the portrait of the wise or godlike philosopher presented in book 6 of the Republicnor that of the fits Socrates' philosophical so-called digression of the Theaetetus texts blur the distinction between wisdom and the Both activity. love of wisdom, and represent the philosopher as fundamentally detached from human life. If Socrates is the model of philosophical perfection, these portraits must be defective images of the philosopher.26 (3) Gauthier omits key portions of the
24. Gauthier, Magnanimite, pp. 63, 116-17. On this view, Aristotle's directly anticipates the Stoic sage by achieving equanimity through megalopsuchos theoreticalperfection(Magnanimite, p. 118).While I shall argue below thatAristotle Gauthierand Jolifareable to identify does regardSocratesas the truemegalopsuchos, Socrateswith the great-souled man of EN 4.3 only by ignoring the ways in which they differ both from each other and from the sage or wise man. 25. Ibid.,pp. 104-109.Gauthier and Jolif follow Aspasius in assimilating the godlike philosophers of the Republicand Theaetetusto the great-souled man a Nicomaque, (L'Ethique pp. 295-96). 26. For further discussion, see Jacob Howland, The Paradox of Political Trial (Lanham,MD: Rowman and Littlefield,1998), Socrates'Philosophic Philosophy: pp. 57-64.

MAN GREAT-SOULED

45

passages he cites (provided here in italics): the great-souled man "is both idle and slow to act, except wherevera great honor or achievementis at stake,and he is a man of few undertakings, but theseare great and distinguished"(4.3.1124b24-26).27 The preceding considerations aside, any attempt to identify the great-souled man of EN 4.3 with the lover of wisdom must confront two further objections. First, such attempts seem to be oblivious to the shape of Aristotle's exposition. As we have seen, the discussion of megalopsuchia occurs in the middle of Aristotle's treatmentof the political life of active moral virtue, and it assumes the standpoint of traditional opinion with respect to heroic virtue and the gods. Second, and perhaps most decisively, the greatsouled man is said by Aristotle to be "without wonder [oude for nothing is great to him" (1125a2-3). Yet "it is thaumastikos], through wondering [to thaumazein]," Aristotle writes in the "that human beings both now begin and first began Metaphysics, cf. 983a13-17).Tobe free from wonder to philosophize" (982b12-13; is to lack what Socrates, too, identifies as the defining mark of the 155d). philosophical soul (Plato Theaetetus Gauthier's defense of his interpretationin the face of the latter objection raises a question of central importance to our understanding of the great-souled man. In commenting on 4.3.1125a2-3,Gauthier and Jolif interpret the great-souled man's lack of wonder as a sign of his wise equanimity. The sage feels neither religious astonishment in the face of marvellous manifestations of the divine, nor admirationfor commonly valued goods. As for the philosophical wonder to which Aristotle refers in the Metaphysics,Gauthier and Jolif maintain that the greatsouled man has exhausted this emotion precisely because he has achieved wisdom through contemplation.28This interpretation presupposes that the philosopher of book 10 is sophosrather than a wise man rather than a lover of wisdom. Such an philosophos, individual, we may note, could not properly be identified with Socrates, for sophiais a state that Socrates attributes to gods rather than human beings (Plato Symposium204a). This observation,
27. Additional criticismsof Gauthierare advanced by Hardie,"Magnanimity," pp. 67-69.Jaffamaintains that "thereis no suggestion of any philosophic attributes in the description of the magnanimous man" (Thomism andAristotelianism, p. 121). 28. L'Ethique a Nicomaque, pp. 293-95.

46

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

however, leaves untouched the foundation of the interpretation of greatness of soul advanced by Gauthier and Jolif, namely, the identification of theoretical excellence with perfect virtue. To be sure, in the EthicsAristotle reinterpretsthe gods in such a way as to assign to them the pure activity of contemplation, and in book 10 he suggests that human beings have a share in divine excellence insofar as they participate in contemplation. At issue, then, is whether the man of godlike theoretical wisdom could claim to possess perfect virtue. If not, the imperfection that attaches even to godlike perfection would itself be a source of wonder. Conversely, to be without wonder would be a sign that one lacks self-knowledge. The question at hand is a large one, and does not admit of a full treatment in the present context. One consideration must suffice. Even the wise man is still a man, which is to say that his excellence must be understood within the context of political interdependence that characterizes the human condition. To ignore this context is to confuse a human being with a beast or a god (Politics 1253a28-29); to acknowledge it, on the other hand, is to grasp the necessary imperfection of every virtue. Seen in this light, any claim to possess perfect virtue betrays a lack of self-knowledge. If this point is well taken, the great-souled man stands in need of Socratic correction just because he regards his virtue as perfect (4.3.1124a7-8). And correction will be equally requisite whether the virtue on which he prides himself is understood to be moral or theoretical. This is why I suggested earlier that EN 4.3 contains a lesson of fundamental importance for philosophical readers as well as those who strive for political excellence.29 Aristotle's remark about wonder connects the capacity to philosophize with the sense that something is greaterthan oneself, or that there is a perfection one lacks and to which one can look up. But the great-souled man lacks just this Socratic sense of imperfection. Now, one component of greatness of soul is selfa human being," 29. Aristotlestates thatreason is "whatis most of all [malista] and that we ought to make ourselves immortal "as far as possible" (10.7.1178a7, reason"isnot exclusivelyus, nor its activity 1177b33), therebyimplyingthattheoretical exclusively our happiness," and that "thereare constraintson how contemplative activity must be pursued: not as a god would, but as a human would, within the boundaries of our social and moral lives" (Sherman,Fabric of Character, p. 101).

GREAT-SOULEDMAN

47

knowledge: the great-souled man is a good judge of his power to accomplish great deeds and of his deserts. Aristotle suggests, however, that the great-souled man's self-knowledge is less than perfect insofar as it is marred by his forgetfulness of benefits received. This forgetfulness is rooted in a sense of shame, for to receive help from another is implicitly to admit that one is inferior to one's benefactor (4.3.1124b9-15). The great-souled man's understanding of his own superiority is thus intertwined with his sense of self-sufficiency or autarkeia (cf. 4.3.1125a12). But his in of is perception self-sufficiency illusory: his aspiration to Zeuslike perfection, the great-souled man overlooks his dependence on others. He thus fails to acknowledge the truth of Aristotle's observation that self-sufficiency involves "parents and children and a wife, and generally friends and fellow citizens, for a human being is by nature political" (1.7.1097b8-11).30 In letting the memory of his dependence on others slip away, the great-souled man mistakes a part of virtue-his own saving excellence-for the whole of virtue. It was argued above that the whole of virtue is the possession of no single human being, but rather of the political community as a whole. If this is correct, to understand one's political nature is to see that the only true cosmos of the virtues is the polisitself. In mistaking a part of virtue for the whole of virtue, moreover,the great-souled man commits precisely the sort of error that Aristotle identifies with tragic error
(hamartia).31

The nature and scope of the kind of hamartia associated with of is soul clarified Aristotle's reference to Zeus and greatness by the Athenians (4.3.1124bl5-17). Thetis comes to Zeus to ask his help in war, and a similar motive may be attributed to the Spartans
30. The great-souled man's forgetfulness of his dependence on others argues against Holloway's claim that "boththe magnanimous man and the Christiancan recognize that their virtues are not simply due to themselves, that in fact their virtues are for the most part due to someone else" ("Christianity,Magnanimity, and Statesmanship,"p. 595). 31. Thus Michael Davis writes in Aristotle'sPoetics:ThePoetryof Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992) that "the formula for a 'tragic error"' is "to mistake a spurious whole for a whole" (p. 60). Davis's development of this idea is echoed in other recent scholarship on the Poetics; see Jacob Howland, "Aristotle on Tragedy: Rediscovering the Poetics," 22 (1995): 359-403. Interpretation

48

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

in their approach to the Athenians.32Neither the greatest of the gods nor the greatest Greek city is fully self-sufficient, but neither is willing openly to acknowledge this state of affairs.Hence Thetis and the Spartans speak of the occasions on which they have been benefited, but are careful to omit mention of the benefits they themselves have bestowed. Those who seek the help of the greatsouled man, Aristotle implies, ought to speak to him in a similar way, for to do otherwise would be to risk offending him. This means that, while the great-souled man speaks frankly to others, he is incapable of attending thoughtfully to frank speech about If he is unable to acknowledge benefits received because himself.33 to do so would undermine his sense of superiority,he will also be unable to accept the gift of well-intentioned criticism. At least where his own virtue concerned, he lacks the "small thing" that Socrates tells Theaetetus is the only thing he knows, namely, how "to take a speech from another who is wise and accept it in a measured way" (Plato Theaetetus 161b4-5). Yet this is in truth a that great men like Oedipus, Ajax, and big thing-the very thing Hector cannot do. The unwillingness to acknowledge one's dependence on others, and the insensitivity to criticism that is connected with this character trait, is frequently presented as a source of tragic error in epic and dramatic poetry. "He who forgets benefits he has received," Ajax's concubine Tecmessa tells him in the course of trying to dissuade him from suicide, "would no longer be a noble man" (Sophocles Ajax 523-524). Ajax's intransigence may be compared with that of Creon in Sophocles' Antigone, whose insistence upon executing Antigone is connected with his refusal to heed the advice of his son Haemon: "But for a man, even if he be someone wise, to learn many things is in no way shameful" (Antigone710-711).So, too, Hector's decision to sacrifice his city for the sake of his own reputation springs from his unwillingness
a 32. The referenceto the Spartansis opaque; see Gauthierand Jolif,L'Ethique Nicomaque, p. 287. 33. That this limitation is the flip side of the great-souled man's frankness is in "speak[ing] hinted at by Montaigne, who claims to follow the megalopsuchos with entire freedom" but subsequently admits that "theremay be some touch of pride and self-will in holding oneself so without reserve and candid as I do" (The The Heritage Press, trans.George B. Ives [New York: EssaysofMicheldeMontaigne, 1946], pp. 876, 878).

GREAT-SOULEDMAN

49

to be indebted to another for good advice or to hear the truth from men whom he regards as inferior. As Achilles advances against him, he reasons thus:
If I take cover slipping inside the gate and wall, the first to accuse me for it will be Poulydamus, he who told me I should lead the Trojans back to the city on that cursed night Akhilleus joined the battle. No, I would not, would not, wiser though it would have been. Now troops have perished for my foolish pride, I am ashamed to face townsmen and women. Someone inferior to me might say: 'He kept his pride and lost his men, this Hektor!' (Iliad 22.99-107).3

By quoting the first lines of the latter speech in the context of his discussion of political courage (3.8.1116a21-23),Aristotle calls attention to the tragic implications of an excessive love of honor and fear of shame. The danger for the great-souled man is somewhat different: it springs not so much from his fear of dishonor as from his unyielding attachment to the idea of his own perfection. Put in terms of the three Hesiodic classes to which Aristotle adverts at the beginning of the Ethics (1.4.1095b10-13), the great-souled man's assumption that he is a member of the first Hesiodic class-the class epitomized by he who is "best of all" because he "knows all things by himself"-militates against his displaying the modesty and openness to moral learning that characterizes the members of the second class, in which reside those who are "persuaded by one who speaks well." If the greatsouled man should happen to be less than perfect in virtue, he will thus be unable to learn from another about the noble, the good, or the just; in this decisive respect, he will come to resemble the "worthless man" of the third Hesiodic class-the man who "neither knows by himself nor, hearkening to another, takes his speech to heart."35

34. Translation of RobertFitzgerald,TheIliad(New York: Anchor Books, 1989). 35. The question of whether one is a member of the first or the third Hesiodic class seems analogous to the question of whether he who is without a polis is a beast or a god (Pol. 1.1.1253a28-29).Cf. EN 7.1.1145a15-27, where Aristotle's observation that virtue and vice exist neither in beasts nor in gods is introduced immediately after he mentions Hector's heroic and godlike virtue.

50

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS I I I I Friendship and Virtue

Thequestionof the great-souled man'svirtueand capacityto accept correctionbrings us finally to the matterof friendship. Whereas Aristotle states in the context of his discussion of greatness of soul that honor is the greatest external good he laterclaimsthatfriendshipseems to deserve (4.3.1123b20-21), this distinction is so important Indeed,friendship (9.9.1169b9-10). that it can hardlybe consideredalongsideothermerelyexternal goods. Foras Aristotle's analysisin books8 and 9 makesclear,its benefitsareessentiallyinternal: friendshipfurnishesthe primary contextwithinwhich humanbeingsmay growin self-knowledge and virtue. Insidethe protecting walls of a friendship, we may withdraw fromthepressures of publicexpectations and standards and open an interior of reflection Plato Alcibiades (cf. up space independent I 118b). To be sure, some have taken the great-souled man's indifference to honor as evidence of just the sort of the thatfriendshipseems independenceof judgmentand interiority to provide.36 some pointtoAristotle's statement that Furthermore, "thegreat-souled manis not ableto adjust his lifeto another, unless it be a friend, for to do so is slavish" (4.3.1124b31-1125al) as evidence that the great-souled man is indeed capable of Yet one wonders about the characterof any true friendship.37 (as friendship opposed to a friendshipof utility or pleasure)in which the great-souled man could becomeengaged.Sucha man believes thatno honoris adequateto, and no dishonoris merited he could 11-12).Presumably by, his perfectvirtue (4.3.1124a7-8, not consider anyone as a friend whom he did not regard as whose belongingto the classof morallyseriousmen or spoudaioi, with the This leaves us he values most (4.3.1124a5-9). recognition to serious. Since he of who is count as regards morally question his own virtue as perfect,the great-souledman must consider
und Tugend:ZurMegalopsychiader aristotelischen 36. ErnstA.Schmidt,"Ehre derPhilosophie 49 (1967):149-68;see esp. pp. 164-68. Ethik,"ArchivfiirGeschichte 37. Lordclaims that the great-souledman's situationis "notinherentlytragic," insofar as "friendshipaffords the great-souled man the satisfaction of his need for honorand communitywithout compromisinghis attachmentto virtue.""Aristotle," in History of Political Philosophy,3rd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 130.

GREAT-SOULED GREAT-SOULED MAN MAN

51 51

himself to be the definitive measure of moral seriousness. In accordance with this measure, only other great-souled men will be worthy of his friendship, because only such men will both share his own scale of moral appraisal and be equal to him in virtue.38 The friendship of such men, however, would seem to be little more than a mutual admiration society; as we have seen, the greatsouled man has a heavy emotional investment in the perception that he is self-sufficient and perfect in virtue. He will therefore be inclined to interpretfrank speech about the limits of his greatness as a token of dishonor-and so as something to be ignored, or noticed only insofar as it is proof of the unworthiness of the speaker to be his friend. It is noteworthy that in EN 4.3 Aristotle speaks of moral seriousness but not of phronesis. The two terms are not but interchangeable:tragicprotagonists, for example, are spoudaioi not possessed of practical wisdom, or phronimoi.39 This point is relevant to the issue of friendship. A friendship betweenAjax and Hector, for example, would unite two morally serious men who could learn nothing from each other about the tragic limitations of their own virtue.40 I am suggesting that the only kind of friendship available to the great-souled man would suffer from the same deficiency of self-knowledge Aristotle attributes to the individual megalopsuchos. This suggestion, however, rests on the claim that the great-souled man stands in need of moral correction. Those who dispute this claim will be inclined to argue that the great-souled man is in fact capable of friendship at the highest level-the sort of friendship that obtains between two fully virtuous individuals, and that is described in EN 9.9 when
38. The latter qualificationis necessary given the implied belief that to adjust one's life to an inferioris slavish, together withAristotle's suggestion that friend is someone to whom the great-souled man is willing to adjust his life (4.3.1124b311125al). 39. Poetics1448a26-27,1449b9-10. In the definition of tragicdrama at 1449b2428, tragedy is said to be "the imitation of a serious [spoudaias] action";note also Aristotle's assertion that tragedy is an "imitationof men who are better than us" (1454b8-9). 40.At Iliad7.302,Ajaxand Hector,having dueled, part "infriendship."Hector givesAjax his sword, and receives a belt in exchange. In Sophocles'Ajax,Ajax kills himself by falling on Hector's sword. This gesture points toward the death he should have died-death at the hands of his only equal, who is paradoxically both friend and enemy.

52

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

Aristotle raises the question of whether even the supremely happy man (homakarios) needs friends.41 What can be said in response to this line of interpretation? At issue is whether supremely happy human beings are wholly self-sufficient with respect to virtue. Aristotle suggests that they are not, and that, just as they cannot have become virtuous in the first place without being open to moral correction, they will continue to need friends for the maintenance and improvement of their virtue. Tobegin with,Aristotle makes it clear that gods can be friends neither with each other nor with human beings.42 Hence the friendship of supremely happy men will necessarily involve individuals who fall short of godlike perfection. This observation prepares us for the suggestion with which Aristotle concludes his discussion of friendship in book 9, to the effect that even the best of men may grow better through friendship. "The friendship of equitable men," he writes, "is equitable, and grows together with their association;for they seem to become better and to correct one another by putting their Friends cannot correct friendship into practice"(9.12.1172a10-12). each other, however, if either one lacks the capacity to acknowledge his own imperfection. Aristotle also observes that friends prevent one another from going wrong: "for it is nor to allow characteristicof good men neither to err [hamartanien] their friends to do so" (8.8.1159b6-7; cf. 8.1.1155a12-13). This passage does not suggest that good men cannot err,for the friends of good men must themselves be good men (cf. 8.4.1156b6-24). Aristotle thus reminds us that virtue does not exclude the possibility of tragic error,which he associates earlier in the Ethics in respect to things that with qualified moral weakness (akrasia) are intrinsically good, such as victory, honor, and wealth (7.4.1148a2-4).43 Finally, in raising the question of when a
41. Gauthier,Magnanimite, pp. 99-104. 42. He states explicitly that no friendship is possible between gods and men (8.7.1158b33-36,1159a5-8).The plain implication of his argument that the sole activity of the gods is contemplation (10.8.1178b8-23)is that there is also no friendship between gods and gods. 43. Aristotle's referencesin this context to acting and to the sorrows of Niobe 7.4.1147b33) (7.3.1147a22-2-3, suggest thattragedymay be a subtextof this discussion of hamartia.For further reflection on this passage see Howland, "Aristotle on Tragedy," p. 382.

GREAT-SOULED MAN

53

friendship should be broken off (9.3.1165bl3-22), Aristotle indicates that in extreme cases good men may gradually decline into viciousness. In sum, even the best of men are not perfect with respect to virtue, and will need friends to keep them on occasion from hamartia.To be helped by a friend's good advice, however, one must be able to accept criticism. And this is something that the great-souled man cannot do. Aristotle's teaching on friendship thus helps us to understand the tragic commonplace that even one who is capable of saving a whole city may lack the resources to save himself.44

Conclusion: The Greatness of Socrates

The great-souled man of EN 4.3 is a deeply sympathetic character.He is distinguished by the passionate intensity of his aspiration to that which is highest and best. He takes fully to heart the heroic watchword "always to be the best and to stand above other men" (Iliad6.208). Like Achilles, moreover, his deeds match his aspirations.The great-souled man is even greaterthanAchilles, however, in that he has freed himself from the fear of dishonor and the love of honor. Content in the knowledge of his virtue, he is genuinely indifferent to fortune. In all of the above respects, the great-souled man of EN 4.3 manifests an all-too-rare degree of excellence. Yet his virtue is nonetheless marred by a kind of arrogance. Appearances notwithstanding, the great-souled man's passion for that which is highest and best continues to be limited by his spiritedness. The great-souled man associates the highest and the best with the name of Zeus, and so with godlike self-sufficiency. In so doing, he sees the best through the eyes of nomos-the eyes of the city and its poetic tradition. He furthermore insists upon his claim to
44. David Bolotin notes that "no beings are friends simply because they are good," for "our human friendships [are] a sign of neediness or imperfection as well as of our worth" (Plato's on Friendship [Ithaca,N.Y: CornellUniversity Dialogue Press, 1979], pp. 135, 134). EN 9.9 obscures Aristotle's agreement with this point because it asks whether fully virtuous human beings need friends, but does not ask how such human beings could have become virtuous in the first place. So, too, Aristotle's silence about the origins of the great-souled man's virtue creates a misleading impression of his self-sufficiency.

54

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

have achieved the best. He is therefore doubly blind, for the best according to nomos is not best by nature, nor is it attainable by human beings. Aristotle notes at one point that the great-souled man speaks to the many with ironicalself-depreciation(4.3.1124b30-31), which is to say that he employs a kind of gentle deference in addressing his inferiors. One could summarize my argument thus far by stating that Aristotle himself employs irony in speaking of the great-souled man. He acknowledges that the great-souled man deserves the highest honor from his fellow citizens, for his virtue makes him capable of bestowing the greatest benefits upon the city.Yethe also lets us see that the great-souled man overestimates his excellence, and that he is in danger of falling victim to his own pride. Because he sees himself through the eyes of the city, the great-souled man believes that his virtue is perfect. That which is perfect can only become worse through change, as Socrates observes in the course of attempting to assimilate the Greek gods to the Ideas (Plato Republic 381b-c). Perhaps this is why Aristotle concludes his discussion of greatness of soul by noting that "the of the great-souled man seems to be slow, his voice motion [kinesis] and his deep, speech steady [stasimon]"(1125a12-14). Kinesis is also "change," and stasimonis the adjectival form of stasis, the condition of being at a standstill. In speech and deed, the greatsouled man strives to remain ever the same, as if he wished never to depart from the perfection that he believes he has attained.45 By ending the chapter with a description of the physical and behavioral characteristics of the great-souled man, however, Aristotle seems ironically to underscore his necessary imperfection. For the body is the natural origin of our political interdependence, but this interdependence finds no place within the great-souled man's self-conception. I have argued that the great-souled man's pride is excessive just to the extent that he is ignorant of the fact that he lacks self-knowledge. It is this ignorance that prevents him from following the path of Socratic philosophical development that
45. I owe these observations to Mary Nichols. Cf. 1124b24,where the greatsouled man is said to be "idle"and "given to delay."His inflexibilityis reminiscent of that of Ajax, who chooses suicide to preserve his nobility, and whose anger endures even after his death (cf. Odyssey11.553-567).

GREAT-SOULEDMAN

55

Given seems to me to be the subtext of the NicomacheanEthics.46 Aristotle's suggestion in the Posterior Analytics that Socrates where does this path lead exemplifies a kind of megalopsuchia, with respect to greatness of soul? Let us conclude with a brief exploration of this question. Insofar as the great-souled man deems himself to be worthy of the greatest things and actually is worthy of them, greatness of soul necessarily involves pride. This raises the prospect of a kind of pride that goes hand-in-hand with Socratic modesty, or with the openness to learning that springs from the knowledge of ignorance. In Plato's Apology,Socrates himself points toward just such a combination of pride and modesty when he claims to be worthy of being boarded in the Prutaneum-a great honor that is normally reserved for public benefactors (36d). This honor is merited, he maintains, because he performs the greatest service for the citizens of Athens by exhorting them to pursue virtue. But this service to the city is itself a consequence of Socrates' knowledge of ignorance. If we put these pieces together, we may say that Socrates' greatness of soul consists, paradoxically, in this: that he deems himself to be worthy of the greatest things, and actually is worthy of them, just to the extent that he knows himself to be "worthnothing [oudenos axios]with respect to wisdom" (Plato Apology23b3-4). On close inspection, it becomes clear that Socrates is in some sense both more modest and more proud than the great-souled man of EN 4.3. The latter believes that he is self-sufficient with regard to virtue. In this respect, he lacks modesty. Yet Socrates' modesty-his ability "to take a speech from another who is wise and accept it in a measured way"-becomes unintelligible in separation from his sense of his own worthiness with respect to that which is truly great. For it is precisely Socrates' knowledge of ignorance, his sense that he is "worth nothing with respect to wisdom," that makes him the "wisest" of human beings (Plato Apology23b2). Put another way, his "human wisdom" (Apology
46. Ronna Burgerdiscerns a similar subtext in the Ethics.In "Health of Soul and Psychic Medicine: on the Psychology of Aristotle's Ethics,"an unpublished lecture delivered at St. John'sCollege inApril of 1997,Burgerargues that "the true peak of the argument of the Ethics"is the emergence in book 9 of the Socraticsoul as "the dialogic self" (p. 18).

56

THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

20d8) consists in his uncompromising attempt to remedy his ignorance by learning through dialogue. And when compared with the Herculean task that Socrates undertakes-the achievement of wisdom as a lasting possession for himself and his friends-even the deeds of which the great-souled man judges himself worthy seem less than absolutely great. The great-souled man acts as if he is a member of the first Hesiodic class, but Aristotle implies that the best and wisest of human beings are, paradoxically, those whose knowledge of ignorance places them in the second class.47In comparison with Socrates, the great-souled man of EN 4.3 rates himself too high and aims too low. The Socratic great-souled man is truly greater, both with respect to his self-knowledge and with respect to his aspirations. The aspirations of the non-Socratic great-souled man are limited by the horizons of nomos,which serve also to cloud his vision of his own limitations. Conversely, it would seem that these same civic horizons obscured the "raremagnanimity" with which Socrates "was and continued to be a midwife...because he perceived that this relation is the highest relation a human being If we may judge by the impression that can have to another."48 Socrates seems to have made on the Athenians, it is a peculiarity of the relationship between philosophy and politics that the truest megalopsuchos must appear to his fellow citizens to be simultaneously vain and self-depreciating. It is Aristotle's appreciation of this point, moreover, that accounts for the complexity and subtlety of his discussion of the great-souled man Ethics. in the Nicomachean

Ethicswhere Aristotle follows 47. This is not the only place in theNicomachean Plato in suggesting that what appears to be second best absolutely is in fact best of with all for human beings. Cf. his referenceto a "second sailing" at 2.9.1109a34-35 300c. 99c-e and Statesman Plato, Phaedo 48. S. Kierkegaard, Johannes inPhilosophical Fragments, Philosophical Fragments, PrincetonUniversity ed. Howard V.Hong and EdnaH. Hong (Princeton: Climacus, Press, 1985), pp. 10, 11.