NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE:

EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Daron Acemoglu
James A. Robinson
Rafael Santos
Working Paper 15578
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15578
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
December 2009
We would particularly like to thank Jack Snyder for his suggestions about how to interpret the evidence
of the impact of paramilitaries on elections. We also greatly benefitted from the suggestions of many
seminar particiants and scholars, particularly George Akerlof, Lee Alston, Ana Arjona, Isaas Chaves,
Malcolm Deas, Jorge Dominguez, Gustavo Duncan, June Erlick, Francisco Gallego, Francisco Gutirrez
Sann, Macartan Humphries, Stathis Kalyvas, Sebastin Mazzuca, Jos Antonio Ocampo, Rafael Pardo,
Gina Parody, Diana Rodriguez-Franco, Fabio Snchez, Abbey Steel and Hernn Vallejo. We are also
grateful to Miriam Golden for her advice on the Italian literature. Finally we thank Mara Anglica
Bautista, Lorena Correa, Leopoldo Fergusson and Pablo Querubn for their superb assistance with
this research. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
2009 by Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Rafael Santos. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including notice, is given to the source.
The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia
Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Rafael Santos
NBER Working Paper No. 15578
December 2009
JEL No. D7,H11
ABSTRACT
Many states in Latin America, Africa and Asia lack the monopoly of violence, identified by Max Weber
as the foundation of the state, and thus the capacity to govern effectively. In this paper we develop
a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence and the formation of the state.
We build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate non-state armed actors (paramilitaries)
in a democracy. The model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence
elections. Since paramilitaries have preferences over policies, this reduces the incentives of the politicians
they favor to eliminate them. The model also shows that while in non-paramilitary areas policies are
targeted at citizens, in paramilitary controlled areas they are targeted at paramilitaries. We then investigate
the predictions of our model using data from Colombia between 1991 and 2006. We first present regression
and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects
on elections for the legislature and the executive. Next, we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent
with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes
to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in
areas where the Presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well. These results illustrate
that, consistent with our model, there appears to be a symbiotic relationship between some executives
and paramilitaries. Finally, we use roll-call votes to illustrate a possible quid pro quo between the
executive and paramilitaries in Colombia.
Daron Acemoglu
Department of Economics
MIT, E52-380B
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142-1347
and NBER, CIFAR
daron@mit.edu
James A. Robinson
Harvard University
Department of Government
N309, 1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER, CIFAR
jrobinson@gov.harvard.edu
Rafael Santos
Yale University
rafael.santosvillagran@yale.edu
Iolilical powoi giows oul of lho Laiiol of a gun."Mao Zooong.
1 Introduction
Many scholais havo aiguoo lhal oiloioncos in slalo capacily aio a koy facloi in compaialivo
oconomic ano polilical oovolopmonl (soo foi inslanco Lvans, Iuoschomoyoi ano Skocpol, 108,
Lvans, 1080, 100, Kohli, 2004). Allhough slalo capacily is mulli-facoloo, il inovilaLly iolios
on WoLoi`s famous nolion of lho slalo as a human communily lhal (succossfully) claims lho
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force wilhin a givon loiiiloiy" (1046, p. 78). Slalos
vaiy gioally in lhoii capacilios ano wholhoi oi nol lhoy havo such a monopoly of violonco, ano
lhoio is lilllo ovioonco lhal lhis vaiialion has oocioasoo ovoi lho ioconl pasl. Foi oxamplo, in lho
1000s lho slalo in Somalia, Sioiia Loono, LiLoiia, lho Congo ano Iwanoa, complololy collapsoo
ano gavo up any piolonco of unooilaking lho lasks lhal wo associalo wilh slalos. In Lalin Amoiica,
ColomLia, Ioiu, Gualomala, Ll Salvaooi, ano Nicaiagua havo all ioconlly oxpoiioncoo oi aio now
oxpoiioncing piolongoo civil wais, wilh lho wiil of lho slalo Loing aLsonl fiom laigo pails of lho
counliy. In Iakislan lho conlial slalo in IslamaLao has lilllo conliol of lho liiLal aioas` such as
Waziiislan. Similaily, lho Iiaqi slalo in Laghoao oxoicisos lilllo aulhoiily in Kuioislan.
Why oo somo slalos fail lo oslaLlish lhis monopoly 1ho social scionco liloialuio omphasizos
sovoial koy iooas, foi inslanco, lho inaLilily of slalos lo oslaLlish such monopoly Locauso of
oimcull googiaphy` (HoiLsl, 2000), iough loiiain` (Foaion ano Lailin, 2008), oi simply povoily
(Foaion ano Lailin, 2008). Il has also suggosloo lhal inloi-slalo compolilion ano waifaio (Hinlzo,
107, 1illy, 107, 1000, Liowoi, 1088, HoiLsl, 2000, Lalos, 2001, Conlono, 2002) ano oomoslic
polilical compolilion inluonco lho inconlivos of polilicians lo Luilo slalo capacily (Acomoglu,
1icchi, Vinoigni, 2006, Losloy ano Ioisson, 2007). Common lo all of lhoso oxplanalions is a lypo
of moooinizalion` viow, suggosling lhal as socioly moooinizos ano giows iichoi, slalo capacily
will simullanoously oovolop. In pailiculai slalo foimalion` involvos oliminaling aimoo aclois
ano oslaLlishing a monopoly of violonco, in lho samo way lhal afloi lho Wais of lho Iosos lho
vicloiious 1uoois oisaimoo lho Lnglish aiislociacy (Sloioy, 1068).
Yol sovoial of lho oxamplos aLovo aio quilo puzzling fiom lhis poinl of viow. In lho caso of
Iakislan, lho liiLal aioas havo oxisloo sinco lho foimalion of lho counliy in 1047, ano ovon lhough
lhoy havo Loon laigoly oul of lho conliol of lho conlial slalo, lhoy havo also Loon iopiosonloo
wilhin il. Unooi lho 1078 Conslilulion lho liiLal aioas hao 8 iopiosonlalivos in lho Nalional
AssomLly olocloo Ly lho liiLal oloois, oi lho Maliks. Unooi Gonoial Mushaiiaf`s iogimo lhis was
incioasoo lo 12. In Iiaq, whilo lho poshmoiga mililia conliol lho sliools of Mosul, a coalilion of
Kuioish polilical pailios koops lho govoinmonl in powoi in Laghoao. In ColomLia, as wo shall
soo, as much as ono lhiio of lho logislaluio may havo Loon olocloo in oloclions hoavily inluoncoo
1
Ly aimoo paiamililaiy gioups. Afloi many of lhoso woio aiiosloo Ly lho Supiomo Couil, lho
ColomLian Iiosioonl oio lilllo lo slop lhoii alloinalos fiom voling in lhoii aLsonco.
1hoso oxamplos poinl lo a oiloionl palh of slalo foimalion lhan lho ono lakon Ly Lnglano
unooi lho 1uoois ano suLsoquonlly onshiinoo in lho social scionco liloialuio. Insloao, lhoy sug-
gosl lhal slalo foimalion can lako placo wilhoul a monopoly of violonco Loing oslaLlishoo. In lhis
papoi wo oovolop a now poispoclivo on slalo foimalion, omphasizing lho iooa lhal aspocls of slalo
woaknoss, pailiculaily lho lack of monopoly of violonco in poiiphoial aioas, can Lo an oquiliLiium
oulcomo. Moioovoi, in conliasl lo lho implicil nolion common in lho piovious liloialuio, moo-
oinizalion` nooo nol aulomalically oiaoicalo non-slalo aimoo aclois. Allhough wo Loliovo lhal
lho iooas pioposoo in lhis papoi havo iolovanco Lolh in oomocialic oi non-oomocialic conloxls,
wo oovolop a moool foimalizing lhoso nolions in lho conloxl of a oomocialic counliy. Wo lhon
invosligalo sovoial of implicalions of lhis moool using oala fiom ColomLia.
Oui moool Logins fiom lho oLsoivalion lhal in a oomociacy non-slalo aimoo aclois (in oui
conloxl, paiamililaiios) can conliol cilizons` voling Lohavioi. Sinco paiamililaiios naluially havo
piofoioncos ovoi policios, whon lhoy chooso lo Locomo involvoo in polilics, lhis iooucos lho incon-
livos of lho polilicians lhoy favoi lo oliminalo lhom. 1ho moool piooicls lhal in non-paiamililaiy
aioas policios aio laigoloo al cilizons whilo in paiamililaiy aioas lhoy caloi lo lho piofoioncos of
paiamililaiios. 1his implios lhal in paiamililaiy aioas cilizons oLlain fowoi puLlic gooos (ano
olhoi policios lhoy valuo). 1ho moool fuilhoi implios lhal paiamililaiios will lono lo poisisl lo
lho oxlonl lhal lhoy oolivoi volos lo polilicians lhoy piofoiin lho ColomLian caso, lo Iiosi-
oonl

Alvaio UiiLoano lhal lhis olocl is sliongoi in aioas whoio lhoso polilicians woulo havo
olhoiwiso nol oono as woll. 1hus non-slalo aimoo aclois can poisisl Locauso lhoy can Lo in
a symLiolic iolalionship wilh spocilc polilicians holoing powoi: paiamililaiios oolivoi volos lo
polilicians wilh piofoioncos iolalivoly closo lo lhoiis, whilo polilicians lhoy holpoo olocl implicilly
oi oxplicilly suppoil laws ano policios lhal lhoy piofoi.
Wo ompiiically invosligalo lho implicalions of oui moool using lho ioconl ColomLian oxpoii-
onco, whoio lwo main non-slalo aimoo aclois, lho lofl-wing` guoiiillas Fuoizas Aimaoas Iovolu-
cionaiias oo ColomLia (FAIC1ho Iovolulionaiy Aimoo Foicos of ColomLia) ano iighl-wing`
paiamililaiy foicos, which in 1007 coaloscoo inlo lho Aulooofonsas Unioas oo ColomLia (AUC
Uniloo Solf-Dofonso Oiganizalion of ColomLia), havo shapoo lho ioconl polilical lanoscapo. Wo
lisl piovioo ovioonco lhal paiamililaiios, lhough inloioslingly nol lho FAIC, havo syslomalically
inluoncoo olocloial oulcomos. In pailiculai, afloi lho AUC gol involvoo in polilics in 2001, lho
piosonco of paiamililaiios in a municipalily is coiiolaloo wilh lho iiso of non-liaoilional lhiio
pailios` (lhal is, pailios olhoi lhan lho LiLoials, lho Consoivalivos, ano lho Socialisls), which aio
wiooly iocognizoo lo Lo oflon oiioclly oi inoiioclly associaloo wilh lho paiamililaiios (o.g., Lopoz,
2007, Valoncia, 2007). Wo also lno lhal paiamililaiy piosonco is also associaloo wilh a gioaloi
conconlialion of volos wilhin a municipalily in logislalivo oloclions ano wilh gioaloi suppoil foi
2
Iiosioonl

Alvaio UiiLo, who has onacloo sovoial koy policios in lino wilh lho piofoioncos of lho
paiamililaiios, in lho piosioonlial oloclions.
1ho olocl of paiamililaiios on lho oloclions is fuilhoi suLslanlialoo Ly lho facl lhal whon a
sonaloi`s lisl iocoivos a gioaloi piopoilion of ils volos in aioas wilh high paiamililaiy piosonco,
lho sonaloi is moio likoly lo Lo suLsoquonlly aiiosloo foi illogal connoclions wilh paiamililaiios
ano lo suppoil lho lwo clausos of lho Juslico ano Ioaco Law lhal woio highly lonionl lowaios
lho paiamililaiios.
1
1aLlo 1 oopicls somo of lho iolovanl infoimalion. On il wo placoo lho 20
sonalois whoso lisl gol lho gioalosl shaio of lhoii volos in aioas wilh high paiamililaiy piosonco.
2
Column 1 shows lhal 4/ of lhoso sonalois Lolong lo lhiio polilical pailios`. Column 4 shows
lhal lho lwo sonalois wilh lho highosl volo shaios havo Loon aiiosloo ano founo guilly of links
wilh paiamililaiy gioups. As of May 2000 anolhoi 4 sonalois aio unooi aiiosl, whilo a fuilhoi
8 aio unooi invosligalion, all foi links wilh paiamililaiios. Column 8 shows lhal lho majoiily of
lhoso in omco al lho limo also suppoiloo lho clausos of lho Juslico ano Ioaco Law.
1ho ovioonco monlionoo so fai is consislonl wilh lho assumplions of oui moool, lhal paiamil-
ilaiios woio aclivoly involvoo in inluoncing oloclions. 1ho main piooiclion of oui moool is lhal
paiamililaiios shoulo poisisl moio whoio lhoy oolivoi volos lo lho oxoculivo lhal lhoy piofoi,
pailiculaily in aioas whoio lhis polilician woulo olhoiwiso nol oo woll. 1his is Locauso olimi-
naling paiamililaiios woulo implicilly cosl valuaLlo volos in lho oloclion. Wo also show lhal lho
coiiolalions in lho oala aio Lioaoly consislonl wilh lhis piooiclion.
Finally, wo oxamino lho ioll-call volos in lho Sonalo on lho logislalion foi changing lho Con-
slilulion lo iomovo lho ono-loim limil ano allow piosioonlial io-oloclion lo illuslialo a possiLlo
channol foi lho quio pio quo` Lolwoon logislalois olocloo fiom high paiamililaiy aioas ano lho
oxoculivo. Wo lno ovioonco lhal lho gioaloi was lho piopoilion of volos a sonaloi`s lisl oLlainoo
in high paiamililaiy aioas, lho gioaloi was lho likolihooo of lho sonaloi lo volo in favoi of iomov-
ing lho loim limil. Column 2 of 1aLlo 1 shows lhal of lhoso who voloo all Lul lhioo of oui lop
20` sonalois voloo in favoi of io-oloclion.
3
Oui oconomoliic analysis piocooos unooi lho assumplion lhal oui moasuios of lho piosonco of
paiamililaiios ano guoiillas aio oxogonous. Wo aio lhoiofoio caulious aLoul giving causal inloi-
piolalions lo lho conoilional coiiolalions wo uncovoi. Foi oxamplo, il may Lo lhal paiamililaiios
1
These clauses, supported by President Uribe, reduced the penalties that could be applied to former combatants
and removed the possibility of extraditing them (to the United States). They were deemed to be `pro-paramilitary'
by international legal analysts and human rights NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
2
Table 1 uses our main measures of paramilitary presence using data on attacks and conict incidents. Appendix
Table A1 reproduces Table 1 using a dierent measure of paramilitary presence, with very similar results.
3
There is no direct evidence that President Uribe is in some formal `coalition' with paramilitaries, and we do not
argue or believe that he is; in fact, the politicians in our theoretical model are not in such a coalition either. What
matters is that President Uribe's relatively conservative policies are closer to those preferred by the paramilitaries,
who have strong conservative leanings and thus naturally have an interest in maintaining him in power. Some of
our theoretical and empirical results then exploit the fact that he may take this into account in several of his key
decisions.
8
solocl inlo aioas whoio pooplo`s piofoioncos aio consoivalivo` ano woulo naluially suppoil lho now
lhiio pailios` oi Iiosioonl UiiLo, lhus cioaling a posilivo associalion Lolwoon lhoso vaiiaLlos ano
paiamililaiy piosonco. Novoilholoss, mosl of oui lnoings como fiom panol oala moools wilh lxoo
olocls, so lhal if lhoio aio limo-invaiianl oiloioncos in polilical piofoioncos acioss municipalilios,
lhoso will nol inluonco oui iosulls. In aooilion, wo uso oiiocl conliols foi how consoivalivo`
oiloionl municipalilios aio, ano as alioaoy monlionoo aLovo, in lho iogiossions on lho poisislonco
of lho paiamililaiios ovoi limo, wo soo paiamililaiios poisisl piocisoly in placos which, in lho aL-
sonco of paiamililaiy cooicion, woio iolalivoly unlikoly lo havo voloo foi Iiosioonl UiiLo. Finally,
lho facl lhal paiamililaiy piosonco piooicls lho aiiosls of sonalois suggosls lhal polilicians aio
nol simply lho poifocl agonls of unooilying voloi piofoioncos, Lul aio in facl implicaloo wilh lho
non-slalo aimoo aclois, as lho caso sluoy liloialuio also suggosls.
Oui ompiiical ovioonco comos fiom a spocilc counliy, ColomLia; wo musl lhus oxoiciso caulion
in making claims aLoul oxloinal valioily.
4
Nonolholoss, wo Loliovo lho polilical mochanisms
omphasizoo in lhis papoi aio usoful in Luiloing a iichoi polilical oxplanalion foi why many moooin
(ano in facl oomocialic) slalos oo nol oslaLlish a monopoly of violonco in lhoii loiiiloiy.
5
Al lho
voiy loasl, lho lhooiolical iooas ano lho ompiiical ovioonco piosonloo hoio show lhal lho implicil
nolion lhal moooinizalion` in loss-oovolopoo oconomios will naluially loao lo lho foimalion of
a WoLoiian slalo, mimicking lho Luiopoan oxpoiionco, nooos lo Lo iovisoo, iolnoo oi poihaps
ovon aLanoonoo. ColomLia has oxpoiioncoo ovoi a conluiy of suslainoo incioasos in GDI poi-
capila, laigo incioasos in ooucalional allainmonl, iapio uiLanizalion, inoooo all of lho foaluios of
moooinizalion (IoLinson ano Uiiulia oo., 2007). Yol lho slalo has nol oslaLlishoo a monopoly
of violonco.
In aooilion lo lho liloialuio ciloo aLovo, lho aigumonls in lhis papoi aio iolaloo lo lho ioconl
polilical oconomy liloialuio on lho ooloiminanls of slalo capacily. Foi oxamplo, Acomoglu (200)
concoplualizos slalo capacily as lho aLilily lo lax cilizons, ano oxaminos lho consoquoncos of
slalo capacily foi oconomic giowlh ano wolfaio. Acomoglu, 1icchi ano Vinoigni (2006) moool lho
onoogonous cioalion of capacily Ly an olilo facing oomocializalion. 1hoy aiguo lhal lho olilo may
havo an inconlivo lo chooso inomcionl slalo inslilulions lo limil lho amounl of iooisliiLulion lhoy
4
It can also be argued that the political equilibrium of the last decade in Colombia will ultimately pave the way
to a modern Weberian state. Whether this is the case or not has no direct bearing on our analysis. Nevertheless,
we suspect that the symbiotic relationship between the executive and non-state armed groups is not a transient
phenomenon. Chaves, Fergusson and Robinson (2009) show that the outcome of the 1922 Presidential election
was determined by fraud and violence with regional patterns strikingly similar to those seen in 2002 or 2006. In
this light, the mechanisms we isolate here may be the most recent incarnation of a process whose roots lie deep
in Colombian history. In this interpretation, it may have been the prior absence of state presence and authority
that led to the formation of the AUC in the rst place, but in doing so it may have reproduced the same historical
pattern of behavior.
5
Naturally, it is possible that the mechanism that we identify here may be less important in non-democratic
regimes, though even dictators require support. Recall, for example, that as noted above it was General Musharraf,
not any of the democratic Pakistani governments, who increased the number of representatives of the tribal areas
in the National Assembly.
4
will faco unooi oomociacy. In a iolaloo papoi, Losloy ano Ioisson (2000) oovolop a moool whoio
polilicians havo lo oocioo wholhoi lo Luilo lscal capacily. Nono of lhoso papois aio concoinoo
wilh lho issuo of oslaLlishing a monopoly of violonco, which is lho focus of oui papoi.
Wilhin polilical scionco oui woik iolalos lo lho liloialuio on suLnalional aulhoiilaiianism`
which has omphasizoo how oomocializalion al lho nalional lovol can cooxisl wilh highly aulhoi-
ilaiian local piaclicos (O`Donnoll, 1008, GiLson, 200, Mickoy, 2000). 1his iosoaich has givon
oxamplos of somo of lho mochanisms conlainoo in oui moool, Lul has nol oovolopoo lhoso iooas
foimally, has nol nolicoo lho koy piooiclions lhal oui moool oovolops, oi pioviooo an oconomoliic
invosligalion of lhoso iooas.
1ho liloialuio on civil wai aooiossos somo of lho issuos wo omphasizo hoio implicilly, foi
oxamplo, in ils slioss on lho woaknoss of lho slalo (o.g., Foaion ano Lailin, 2008). Novoilholoss,
mosl of lho iosoaich on civil wai focusos on lho molivalions which lio Lohino lho oocisions of
pooplo lo lako up aims againsl lhoii govoinmonls (soo, o.g., lho oxcollonl suivoy Ly Llallman,
ano Miguol, 2008). In lhis woik lho facl lhal a slalo ooos nol havo a monopoly of violonco aiisos
Locauso givon lho oxpocloo Lonoll of allocaling iosouicos lo lghling ioLols oi insuigonls, il is nol
woilh paying lho cosl of oliminaling lhom.
6
Oui woik owos a gioal ooLl lo lho jouinalisls, scholais ano puLlic omcials who havo playoo koy
iolos in Liinging lo lighl lho involvomonl of paiamililaiios ano lho AUC in polilics in ColomLia.
Iailiculaily impoilanl has Loon lho woik of lho iosoaichois whoso ossays appoai in Iomoio
(2007). Sanchoz ano Ialau (2006) also show lhal polilical compolilion is nogalivoly coiiolaloo
wilh muioois of polilicians in municipal oloclions.
1ho papoi piocooos as follows. In lho noxl soclion wo oovolop a lhooiolical moool lo oxamino
lho inconlivos of polilicians conliolling lho conlial slalo lo oliminalo oi livo wilh non-slalo aimoo
aclois ooponoing on wholhoi lhoy iocoivo olocloial suppoil fiom lhoso gioups. Soclion 8 piovioos
a Liiof ovoiviow of lho hisloiy ano naluio of non-slalo aimoo aclois in ColomLia. Soclion 4
oosciiLos lho oala wo uso ano piovioos somo Lasic oosciiplivo slalislics. Soclion piovioos
iogiossion ovioonco consislonl wilh lho olocls of paiamililaiios on olocloial oulcomos. Soclion 6
oxaminos lho koy piooiclion of oui lhooiolical moool, lhal paiamililaiios shoulo poisisl moio in
aioas whoio lhoy oolivoi volos lo lho oxoculivo ano whoio lhoy woulo nol havo olhoiwiso oono
as woll. Soclion 7 piovioos somo suggoslivo ovioonco on anolhoi implicalion of oui moool, lho
symLiolic iolalionship Lolwoon lho oxoculivo ano lho paiamililaiios. Soclion 8 concluoos.
6
There is also a large literature about the origins of conict in Colombia (see Bergquist, Pe~ naranda, Sanchez
eds. 1992, 2001, Deas, 1999, and Posada Carbo, 2003). Inuenced by the wider academic literature on civil wars,
this work has emphasized the importance of state weakness in the Colombian context as well (e.g., Waldmann,
2007). We do not deny that this is important, for example with respect to the persistence of the FARC. Instead,
we emphasize that state weakness in Colombia is not simply about inability to eliminate non-state armed actors;
it is also about the lack of incentives to do so.

2 Model
In lhis soclion, wo piosonl a simplo moool lo foimalizo lho possiLlo channols of inloiaclion Lo-
lwoon conlial govoinmonl ano paiamililaiios.
7
Molivaloo Ly lho ColomLian oxpoiionco, oui focus
will Lo on oomocialic polilics, whoio an incumLonl is facing iooloclion ano oocioos wholhoi lo
ioconquoi somo of lho aioas unooi paiamililaiy conliol. 1ho moool will highlighl how paiamili-
laiy piofoioncos inluonco olocloial oulcomos Locauso paiamililaiios can cooico volois lo suppoil
ono canoioalo ovoi anolhoi. Il will lhon show how lho olocl of paiamililaiios on olocloial oul-
comos inluoncos lho willingnoss of lho oomocialic conlial govoinmonl lo ioconquoi ano iomovo
lho paiamililaiios fiom oiloionl aioaslho conoilions of lho foimalion of lho moooin WoLoiian
slalo wilh a monopoly of violonco ovoi lho onliio counliy. Finally, wo also invosligalo how lho
piosonco of paiamililaiios alocls lho policy choicos of lho paily in powoi. Oui puiposo is lo
communicalo lho main iooas in lho simplosl possiLlo way. Oui ompiiical woik will lhon piovioo
ovioonco showing how paiamililaiios inluonco olocloial oulcomos ano how lhis olocl on oloclions
inloiacls wilh lho poisislonco of paiamililaiios in coilain aioas.
Wo consiooi a lwo-poiioo moool of polilical compolilion Lolwoon lwo pailios. Iaily is
inilially (al t = 0) in powoi ano al t = 1, il compolos in an oloclion againsl paily 1. 1ho counliy
consisls of a laigo oqual-sizoo numLoi, , of iogions, wilh oach iogion inhaLiloo Ly a laigo numLoi
of inoiviouals. Wo oonolo lho colloclion of lhoso iogions Ly A. 1ho paily lhal wins lho majoiily
of lho volos ovoi all iogions wins lho oloclion al t = 1.
8
Iogions oiloi in loims of lhoii policy ano
iooological piofoioncos ano, in aooilion, somo iogions aio unooi paiamililaiy conliol. Wo assumo
as in slanoaio Downsian moools lhal pailios can mako commilmonls lo lhoii policios, Lul lhoii
iooological slanco is lxoo (ano may capluio oimonsions of policios lo which lhoy cannol mako
commilmonls).
2.1 Electoral Competition without Paramilitaries
Wo lisl inlioouco lho oolails of olocloial compolilion al oalo t = 1 ano lhon ioluin lo lho
oocisions al t = 0, in pailiculai, lo lhoso concoining wholhoi lho govoinmonl in powoi will
oxpono lho iosouicos lo ioconquoi somo of lho loiiiloiios unooi paiamililaiy conliol. 1o slail
wilh, lol us ignoio lho iogions lhal aio unooi paiamililaiy conliol (lhoso will Lo inliooucoo Lolow).
1ho ulilily of inoivioual i in iogion , A (i.o. , = 1, ..., ) whon paily q , 1 is in
7
In the empirical work we examine the impact of both the paramilitaries and the FARC on elections. However,
since we do not nd robust eects of the FARC and since case study evidence suggests that the FARC was much
less involved in electoral politics, in the theoretical model we focus on the relationship between politicians and the
paramilitaries. We return to this issue in subsection 2.5.
8
This implies that we are looking at a \presidential system," though the empirical evidence below comes mostly
from votes for senators and congressmen. Focusing on the presidential system simplies the argument without any
major implications for our focus.
6
powoi is givon Ly
l
ij
_
,

0
g
_
= n
j
() 1
_

0
j


0
g
_
-
g
ij
,
whoio Q R
K
is a vocloi of policios, n
j
oonolos lho ulilily of all inoiviouals in iogion ,
ovoi lhis policy vocloi,

0
j
is lho iooological Lliss poinl of lho inoiviouals in iogion , A, so
lhal 1
_

0
j


0
g
_
is a ponally loim foi lho iooological oislanco of lho paily in powoi ano lho
inoivioual (i.o., 1 is a funclion lhal`s incioasing in

0
j


0
g

). 1his iooological oislanco capluios

policy choicos nol incluooo in (ano lo which lho paily cannol mako a commilmonl al lho
oloclion slago). Wo also assumo lhal oach n
j
is sliiclly concavo ano oiloionliaLlo. Finally, -
g
ij
is
an inoivioual-spocilc ulilily loim lhal will play lho iolo of smoolhing iogional piofoioncos ovoi
lho lwo pailios as in slanoaio pioLaLilislic voling moools (LinoLock ano WoiLull, 1087). Wo
assumo lhal
-
A
ij
-
B
ij
= -
ij
,
whoio is a common valanco" loim ooloimining lho iolalivo populaiily of ono paily voisus
anolhoi ano -
ij
is an iio loim. 1o simplify lho oiscussion, wo assumo lhal ano oach -
ij
havo
unifoim oisliiLulions ovoi
_

1
2
,
1
2
_
. 1hoiofoio, conoilional on lho ioalizalion of , lho fiaclion
of inoiviouals in iogion , A who volo foi paily will Lo
1
2
c
_
n
j
_

A
_
n
j
_

B
_
0
j

,
whoio
A
ano
B
aio lho policy voclois of lho lwo pailios, ano
0
j
= 1
_

0
j


0
B
_
1
_

0
j


0
A
_
is lho iooological aovanlago of paily iolalivo lo paily 1 in iogion , A. Now using lho facl
lhal is also unifoimly oisliiLuloo, lho pioLaLilily lhal paily gols olocloo as a funclion of ils
policios, lho policios of lho iival paily, ano ils iooological aovanlago is
1
A
_

A
,
B
[
_
=
1
2

c

j=1
_
n
j
_

A
_
n
j
_

B
_
0
j

,
whoio is lho vocloi of iooological Liasos in favoi of paily . In lho oloclion al limo t = 1, Iaily
`s pioLlom is
max
q2Q
1
A
_
,
B
[
_
1
A
, (1)
whoio 1
A
is paily `s ionl fiom holoing omco. Convoisoly, lho pioLlom of paily 1 is
max
q2Q
_
1 1
A
_

A
, [
_
1
B
, (2)
whoio 1
B
is paily 1`s ionl fiom holoing omco ano wo havo usoo lho facl lhal lho pioLaLilily
of paily 1 coming lo powoi is lho complomonl of lhal foi paily . An electoral equilibrium
7
al limo t = 1 is a luplo
_

A
,
B
_
lhal solvos pioLloms (1) ano (2) simullanoously (givon lho
iooological Liasos ). Givon lho concavily ano oiloionliaLilily assumplions, an oquiliLiium is
uniquoly oolnoo; moioovoi, as long as il is inloiioi, il salislos lho following oqualions
N

j=1
\n
j
_

A
_
= 0 ano
N

j=1
\n
j
_

B
_
= 0, (8)
whoio \n
j
oonolos lho giaoionl of funclion n
j
wilh iospocl lo lho vocloi . Cloaily, (8) may nol
Lo salisloo if lho solulion is nol in lho foasiLlo sol of policios, Q, ano in lhis caso, an oLvious
complomonlaiy slacknoss gonoializalion of (8) holos. Sliicl concavily of oach n
j
immooialoly
implios lhal
A
=
B
=

. Il is also sliaighlfoiwaio lo soo lhal sliicl concavily implios

A
=

B
=

foi somo

, ovon if lho oquiliLiium is nol inloiioi. 1hoiofoio, paily will win lho
oloclion al limo t = 1 wilh pioLaLilily
1
A
(

[ ) =
1
2

c

j=1
0
j
=
1
2
cE0
j
, (4)
whoio E0
j
oonolos lho oxpoclalion oi lho moan of 0
j
acioss all iogions. 1his lhon loaos lo lho
following pioposilion, chaiacloiizing lho oquiliLiium (pioof in lho loxl).
Proposition 1 Without paramilitaries, there exists a unique electoral equilibrium (at t = 1)
where
A
=
B
=

, and

, if interior, satises (3). Party wins the election with probability

given by (4).
1wo impoilanl poinls lo nolo aio as follows. Fiisl, wilhoul paiamililaiy piosonco, nalional
policios aio choson lo caloi lo lho piofoioncos of all volois in all iogions. 1his foaluio is faiily
gonoial, lhough as is woll known lho facl lhal Lolh pailios chooso lho samo policy vocloi (policy
convoigonco) is spocial ano iolios on lho facl lhal lho lwo pailios oo nol lhomsolvos havo piofoi-
oncos ovoi policios. Wholhoi lhoy oo oi nol is nol impoilanl foi lho iosulls hoio, ano wo lhoiofoio
oploo foi lho simploi spocilcalion. Socono, avoiago iooological Lias acioss all iogions ooloiminos
lho pioLaLilily of iooloclion foi paily (which is cuiionlly in powoi). Wo will noxl soo how lhis
iosull changos unooi vaiious oiloionl assumplions aLoul paiamililaiy Lohavioi.
2.2 Elections under Paramilitaries with Exogenous Preferences
Noxl, lol us supposo lhal a suLsol of lho iogions, oonoloo Ly ? A aio unooi paiamililaiy
conliol. Donolo lho lolal numLoi of lhoso iogions Ly 7 ano lhoii fiaclion (lhoii ialio lo lho
numLoi of lolal iogions) Ly .. 1ho koy foaluio of paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas foi oui puiposos
is lhal, as wo will oocumonl in oolail Lolow, voling is nol fioo Lul inluoncoo Ly lho implicil oi
oxplicil piossuio of lho paiamililaiios. 1hioughoul lho iosl of lhis soclion wo imposo lhis foaluio.
8
Wo slail wilh paiamililaiios wilh oxogonous piofoioncos," moaning lhal how lho paiamili-
laiios inluonco lho voling Lohavioi of lho cilizons in lho iogions lhoy conliol is oxogonous. 1his
will conliasl wilh lho caso in which lho suppoil of lho paiamililaiios is onoogonous lo lho policy
choicos, sluoioo in lho noxl suLsoclion. In pailiculai, wo lako lho Lohavioi of lho paiamililaiios
(ano lho voling Lohavioi of lho cilizons in paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas) as givon. In pailic-
ulai, supposo lhal in oach paiamililaiy-conliolloo iogion , ?, a fiaclion :
j
of lho volois
will volo foi paily iogaioloss of policios (so lho voling Lohavioi of lhoso inoiviouals in lhoso
paiamililaiy-conliolloo iogions is insensitive lo policios). Lol us oonolo lho complomonl of lho
sol ? Ly = A? ano lho lolal numLoi of iogions in lhis (non-paiamililaiy-conliolloo) sol Ly
J = 7. Lol us also oolno :
j
= :
j
1,2. 1hon wilh an ioonlical ioasoning lo lhal in lho
piovious suLsoclion, lho pioLaLilily lhal paily will win lho oloclion al limo t = 1 is
1
A
_

A
,
B
[ , m
_
=
1
2

c(1 .)
J

j2J
_
n
j
_

A
_
n
j
_

B
_
0
j

.
7

j2Z
:
j
,
whoio m oonolos lho vocloi of :
j
`s (logolhoi wilh infoimalion on which ,`s aio in lho sol ?).
Wo again assumo lhal Lolh pailios maximizo lho pioLaLilily of coming lo powoi ano oolno
an olocloial oquiliLiium in lho samo way. Wilh an ioonlical aigumonl lo lhal Lofoio, wo oLlain
lho following pioposilion.
Proposition 2 Under paramilitaries with endogenous preferences, there exists a unique electoral
equilibrium (at t = 1) where
A
=
B
=

. If

is interior, it satises

j2J
\n
j
(

) = 0. Party
wins the election with probability
1
A
(

[ , m) =
1
2
c(1 .) E[0
j
[ , [ .E[:
j
[ , ?[ .
1wo foaluios lhal aio nolowoilhy iolalivo lo Iioposilion 1 aio as follows. Fiisl, policios no
longoi caloi lo lho piofoioncos of all iogions. Sinco cilizons in paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas cannol
iowaio oi punish a govoinmonl accoioing lo lho policy pioposals lhal il makos, Lolh pailios only
laigol lhoii policios lo lho volois in lho non-paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas. 1his implios lhal,
onoogonously, puLlic gooos ano olhoi amonilios will Lo iooucoo in lho paiamililaiy-conliolloo
aioas Loyono lho oiiocl olocl of paiamililaiy piosonco.
9
1hus, all olso oqual, wo may oxpocl
paiamililaiy piosonco lo incioaso inoqualily acioss iogions. Socono, olocloial oulcomos will now
Lo ooponoonl on lho inluonco of lho paiamililaiios on voling Lohavioi, which is capluioo Ly lho
lasl loim in 1
A
(

[ , m). If paiamililaiios piofoi paily , moaning lhal E[:

j
[ , ?[ 0,
lhon lho pioLaLilily lhal paily will win lho oloclion (ano slay in powoi) is gioaloi, olhoi lhings
oqual. 1ho moio aioas aio conliolloo Ly lho paiamililaiios, lho sliongoi is lhis olocl. In lho
9
The direct eect may, for example, stem from the fact that such investments and public good delivery become
more expensive, or paramilitaries directly damage infrastructure, law and order and the availability of public goods.
0
ompiiical woik Lolow, wo will piovioo inoiiocl ovioonco consislonl wilh Iioposilion 2 Ly showing
lho inluonco of paiamililaiios on olocloial oulcomos.
1his lasl foaluio alioaoy highlighls how paiamililaiios can havo a majoi inluonco on oomo-
cialic polilics. Novoilholoss, lhis olocl was minimizoo Ly lho moool in lhis suLsoclion Ly assuming
oxogonous piofoioncos foi lho paiamililaiios. Wo will iolax lhis assumplion Lolow. Lul lisl wo
oiscuss how lho olocloial iolo of paiamililaiios alocls lho oocision of lho conlial govoinmonl lo
oxlono (Lioaocasl") ils powoi lo poiiphoial aioas conliolloo Ly lho paiamililaiios.
2.3 The State and the Paramilitaries
1aking lho olocloial oquiliLiium al limo t = 1 as givon, lol us now consiooi lho oocisions of
lho govoinmonl (paily ) al limo t = 0. In pailiculai, as oiscussoo in lho Inlioouclion, a koy
oimonsion of lho piocoss of lho foimalion of lho slalo is lho aLilily ano willingnoss of lho conlial
govoinmonl lo oslaLlish ils monopoly of violonco ano lhus iomovo lho powoi of olhoi gioups wilh
accoss lo guns ano moans of oxoicising (local) violonco. Lol us moool lhis in lho simplosl possiLlo
way ano supposo lhal al limo t = 0, lho oLjoclivo of lho govoining paily is

j2R

j
1
A
_

A
,
B
[
_
1
A
, ()
whoio ? is a suLsol of lho aioas pioviously conliolloo Ly lho paiamililaiy lhal aio iocon-
quoioo" Ly lho conlial govoinmonl, ano
j
is lho nol Lonoll of ioconquoiing aioa , , which
acciuos lo lho govoinmonl al limo t = 0.
10
1his nol Lonoll incluoos lho aooilional lax iovonuos oi
socuiily gains lhal lho conlial govoinmonl will oiivo ano suLliacls lho polonlial ioal" cosl of lho
ioconquosl (sponoing on lho mililaiy, polonlially slaLilily ano loss of lifo). Howovoi, lho oLjoclivo
of lho govoining paily, paily , also incluoos lho pioLaLilily lhal il will iomain in powoi, lhus
onjoying ionls fiom powoi al limo t = 1. In pailiculai, if somo aioa , ? is ioconquoioo, lhon in
lho suLsoquonl olocloial oquiliLiium al limo t = 1, paily will oLlain a fiaclion 1,2 c0
j
of lho
volos fiom lhis iogion as opposoo lo iocoiving :
j
= :
j
1,2 of lho volos hao lhis placo iomainoo
unooi paiamililaiy conliol. A subgame perfect equilibrium of lhis gamo is oolnoo as an olocloial
oquiliLiium al oalo t = 1 logolhoi wilh oocisions Ly paily al oalo t = 0 lhal maximizos ils
ulilily laking lho oalo t = 1 oquiliLiium as givon.
1his analysis in lho piocooing paiagiaph lhon oslaLlishos lho following pioposilion.
Proposition 3 A subgame perfect equilibrium involves the electoral equilibrium characterized in
Proposition 2 at time t = 1, and at time t = 0, Party reconquers
all , ? such that
j
(c0
j
:
j
) 1
A
0
10
One could easily extend this so that these rents accrue both at t = 0 and t = 1, and in that case, the objective
functions will change to
P
j2R
j + P
A

q; q
B
j

h
R
A
+
P
j2R
j
i
, slightly complicating the analysis.
10
and does not reconquer
any , ? such that
j
(c0
j
:
j
) 1
A
< 0.
1his pioposilion is an impoilanl iosull of oui analysis ano will Lo invosligaloo in oui ompiiical
woik. Il implios lhal lho willingnoss of lho slalo lo ioconquoi aioas conliolloo Ly lho paiamili-
laiios, ano lhus oslaLlish lho monopoly of violonco onvisagoo as an ossonlial chaiacloiislic of lho
moooin slalo Ly Max WoLoi, is alocloo nol only Ly lho ioal cosls ano Lonolls of ooing so, Lul
also Ly lho implicalions of lhis oxpansion of lho aulhoiily of lho slalo on olocloial oulcomos. In
pailiculai, if many of lhoso paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas havo :
j
c0
j
, lhon lho slalo, cuiionlly
conliolloo Ly paily , will Lo ioluclanl lo ioconquoi lhoso aioas, Locauso ooing so will mako il
moio oimcull foi lhis paily lo succooo in lho upcoming oloclions (ano moioovoi, lhis olocl will
Lo sliongoi whon ionls fiom powoi al t = 1, 1
A
, aio highoi). Naluially, lho aioas lhal aio mosl
valuaLlo in lho hanos of lho paiamililaiios aio lhoso lhal havo Lolh low 0
j
ano high :
j
; lhal
is, areas that would have otherwise voted for party 1, but paramilitaries are forcing citizens to
vote in favor of party . A govoinmonl lhal ooos nol ioquiio olocloial suppoil (o.g., a puioly
non-oomocialic" govoinmonl) woulo havo oociooo lo ioconquoi all aioas wilh
j
0. 1hoiofoio,
lo lho oxlonl lhal cE[0
j
[ , [ < E[:
j
[ , ?[, i.o., lo lho oxlonl lhal paiamililaiios aio ioo-
ologically closoi lo lho govoinmonl in powoi lhan lho opposilion paily, a oomocialic govoinmonl
may Lo loss willing lo Lioaocasl ils powoi ano ioconquoi aioas unooi paiamililaiy conliol lhan
such a non-oomocialic govoinmonl (oi a govoinmonl lhal is socuio in ils posilion).
11
Nolo an impoilanl implicalion of lho funclional foim assumplions wo havo imposoo so fai,
in pailiculai lho unifoim oisliiLulions of ioiosyncialic piofoionco ano valanco loims: lho valuo
of aooilional volos lo lho paily in powoi is conslanl ano inooponoonl of ils oxpocloo winning
pioLaLilily". As a consoquonco, Iioposilion 8 lakos a simplo foim, whoio lho valuo of paiamililaiy
volos lo lho paily in powoi is inooponoonl of lhis pioLaLilily. Wilh olhoi funclional foims, as
in ioalily, lhis valuo, ano lhus lho Lohavioi of lhis paily lowaios lho paiamililaiy gioups, may
oopono on ils oxpocloo winning pioLaLilily, foi oxamplo, making il loss iosponsivo lo lho volos
oolivoioo Ly lhoso paiamililaiy foicos whon il is ox anlo moio likoly lo win lho oloclion.
12
2.4 Electoral Competition under Paramilitaries with Endogenous Preferences
1ho oiscussion so fai was foi paiamililaiios wilh onoogonous piofoioncos ano lhus look lho voc-
loi m as givon. Naluially, lho willingnoss of lho paiamililaiios lo cooico cilizons lo volo foi
11
Naturally, the net benet of reconquering an area might be dierent for a non-democratic government. For
example, it might be ^ j > j instead of j, because a non-democratic government can impose higher taxes on
certain regions than democratic governments could or would. This would be another incentive for non-democratic
governments to broadcast their power. On the other hand, the cost of doing so may also be higher for non-democratic
governments because they may be unwilling to build a strong army because of the future potential threats that this
may pose to their reign (e.g., Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010). This would then imply ^ j < j.
12
As we discuss in the next section, this feature of a more general model may actually be helpful in understanding
some of the recent experiences in Colombia.
11
ono canoioalo oi anolhoi is also onoogonous ano ooponos on lhoii policy ano iooological piofoi-
oncos. Wo now invosligalo lhoso issuos. Supposo lhal, as wilh lho cilizons, lho piofoioncos of lho
paiamililaiios conliolling iogion , ? aio givon Ly
\
j
(, 0
g
) = n
j
()

1
_

0
j


0
g
_
-
g
j
,
whoio

1 is anolhoi funclion (possiLly lho samo as 1 ) lhal is also incioasing in

0
j


0
g

ano
now

0
j
is lho policy piofoionco of lho gioup of paiamililaiios conliolling iogion ,. Wilh a similai
ioasoning lo lhal aLovo, lol us oolno

0
j
=

1
_

0
j


0
B
_

1
_

0
j


0
A
_
as lho iooological loanings of lho paiamililaiios in iogion , in favoi of paily (wo uso

0
j
insloao
of 0
j
lo highlighl lhal lhis iofois lo lho paiamililaiios). Ano in aooilion, supposo lhal -
A
j
-
B
j
has
a unifoim oisliiLulion ovoi
_

1
2
^

,
1
2
^

_
. 1hon lho pioLaLilily lhal paiamililaiios in iogion , ?
will piofoi paily lo paily 1 is givon Ly
1
2


c
_
n
j
_

A
_
n
j
_

B
_


0
j
_
.
Lol us also assumo lhal paiamililaiios can foico all volois in lhoii sphoio of inluonco lo volo foi
whichovoi paily lhoy piofoi. 1hon lho pioLaLilily lhal paily will win lho oloclion Locomos
1
A
_

A
,
B
[
^

_
=
1
2

c(1 .)
J

j2J
_
n
j
_

A
_
n
j
_

B
_
0
j

c.
7

j2Z
_
n
j
_

A
_
n
j
_

B
_


0
j
_
,
whoio now
^
oonolos lho vocloi of all iooological piofoioncos, incluoing lhoso of lho paiamililaiios.
Naluially, lho moool wilh paiamililaiios wilh oxogonous piofoioncos in lho piovious lwo soclions
is a spocial caso of lhis moool whoio n
j
() = 0 foi all Q, so lhal paiamililaiios oo nol caio
aLoul policy (lhough lhoy may slill caio aLoul lho iooological slanco of lho paily in powoi).
Wilh a similai ioasoning lo oui analysis aLovo, olocloial compolilion will loao lo lho samo
policy choico foi Lolh pailios, ano whon il is inloiioi, lhis vocloi will Lo givon Ly lho solulion lo
lho following sol of oqualions:
c(1 .) \n
j
(

)

c.\n
j
(

) = 0. (6)
Naluially, lhoso oqualions holo in lho complomonlaiy-slacknoss foim whon

may Lo al lho
Lounoaiy of lho foasiLlo policy sol Q.
1hoiofoio, wo oLlain lho following chaiacloiizalion of olocloial oquiliLiium ano oloils Ly lho
slalo lo ioconquoi paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas unooi lho conliol of lho paiamililaiios (pioof in
lho loxl).
12
Proposition 4 Under paramilitaries with endogenous preferences, there exists a unique electoral
equilibrium at t = 1 where
A
=
B
=

. If

is interior, it satises (6). Party wins the

election with probability
1
A
(

[ , m) =
1
2
c(1 .) E[0
j
[ , [ .

cE
_

0
j
[ , ?
_
.
Moreover, the subgame perfect equilibrium involves Party reconquering (at time t = 0)
all , ? such that
j

_
c0
j


c

0
j
_
1
A
0,
and not reconquering
any , ? such that
j

_
c0
j


c

0
j
_
1
A
< 0.
1hoio aio sovoial now foaluios in lhis pioposilion. Fiisl, whon paiamililaiios aojusl lhoii
suppoil ooponoing on lho policios ano iooological slanco of lho lwo pailios, lho pailios lhon
chango lhoii policios in oiooi lo Lo moio alliaclivo lo lho paiamililaiios` policy piofoioncos.
1hal is, ialhoi lhan caloiing lo lho piofoioncos of lho cilizons in lho aioas lhal aio conliolloo
Ly lho paiamililaiios (which lhoy woulo havo oono wilhoul lho paiamililaiios), pailios appoaso
lho paiamililaiios lhomsolvos. 1his iosull is lho Lasis of lho polonlial symbiotic iolalionship
Lolwoon paiamililaiios ano lho oxoculivo monlionoo in lho Inlioouclion. Moioovoi, il can fuilhoi
incioaso lho inoqualily among lho iogions, wilh lho policios choson spocilcally lo suppoil, oi
iofiain fiom lhioaloning, lho paiamililaiios ano lho aioas whoio lho paiamililaiios aio sliongosl.
1wo foaluios ooloimino how slanloo lowaios lho paiamililaiios oquiliLiium policios aio. 1hoso
aio: lho sizo of lho paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas (lho gioaloi is ., lho moio inluonlial aio lho
paiamililaiios in shaping oquiliLiium policy) ano lho iolalivo iosponsivonoss of lho paiamililaiios
lo policy concossions (lho gioaloi is

c iolalivo lo c, lho moio iosponsivo aio policios lo paiamililaiy
piofoioncos iolalivo lo cilizon piofoioncos). In aooilion, Locauso olocloial compolilion makos
Lolh pailios caloi lo lho wishos of lho paiamililaiios, al lho ono lho paiamililaiios iooological
piofoioncos play a conlial iolo in wholhoi lhoy foico lho populalion lo volo foi paily oi paily
1.
13
Finally, wo can also allow Lolh pailios oi ono of lho pailios lo mooify ils iooological slanco
(in a ciooiLlo fashion). 1ho samo analysis as hoio will lhon imply lhal in oiooi lo alliacl volos
fiom paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas, ono oi Lolh pailios may oocioo lo panooi lo lho iooological
piofoioncos of lho paiamililaiios.
13
The result that both parties modify their policies to partly cater to the wishes of the paramilitaries has an
obvious similarity, and an identical mathematical logic, to Baron's (1994) result concerning the eects of a lobby
on the platforms of two competing parties.
18
2.5 Importance of Non-National Ambitions
An impoilanl quoslion in lho conloxl of ColomLian polilics is why iighl-wing paiamililaiy gioups
havo Locomo moio involvoo in inluoncing oloclions lhan lofl-wing guoiiillas, in pailiculai, moio so
lhan lho iolalivoly woll-oiganizoo FAIC. Ono possiLlo answoi is lhal in conliasl lo lho guoiiillas,
lho paiamililaiios oo nol havo nalional amLilions, making a coalilion Lolwoon lhom ano lho
oxoculivo conliolling lho conlial slalo moio foasiLlo. 1ho moool piosonloo so fai has implicilly
maoo lhis assumplion, sinco wo oio nol inlioouco lho iisk lhal lho non-slalo aimoo aclois may
lako ovoi lho conlial slalo.
A simplo way of inliooucing lhis possiLilily woulo Lo lo havo a pioLaLilily 1(.) lhal lho non-
slalo aimoo aclois woulo Locomo sliong onough lo challongo lho conlial slalo, poihaps ovoilhiow
il. Such an ovoilhiow of lho conlial govoinmonl Ly non-slalo aimoo aclois is nol uncommon in
woak Afiican slalos, such as Somalia, Sioiia Loono oi LiLoiia, ano has coilainly Loon lho oLjoclivo
of lho FAIC. Naluially, wo woulo oxpocl 1(.) lo Lo incioasing in ., so lhal whon lhoso gioups
conliol moio aioas, lhoy aio moio likoly lo poso such a nalional challongo. In lhal caso, wo woulo
nooo lo chango lho oLjoclivo funclion of paily lo incoipoialo lhis possiLilily. Foi oxamplo,
oqualion () coulo Lo mooiloo lo

j2R

j
[1 1(.)[ 1
A
_

A
,
B
[
_
1
A
.
1his spocilcalion makos il cloai lhal whon 1(.) 0, lhoio will Lo sliongoi inconlivos foi paily
lo ioconquoi loiiiloiios conliolloo Ly lhoso non-slalo aimoo gioups (lhus iooucing .). Whon
1(.) is sumcionlly high ano sumcionlly oocioasing in ., lhis olocl can moio lhan componsalo foi
lho olocloial aovanlago lhal local conliol Ly lhoso gioups cioalos foi lho paily in powoi. 1hus
facloiing in lho nalional amLilions of non-slalo aimoo aclois iooucos lho ioom foi a coalilion
oi a symLiolic iolalionship Lolwoon lhoso gioups ano lho oxoculivo. Lxpiossoo oiloionlly, lhis
ioasoning suggosls lhal whon non-slalo aimoo aclois havo nalional amLilions, il will Lo aovanla-
goous foi lho conlial slalo lo oliminalo lhom (soonoi oi laloi), lhus any implicil oi oxplicil policy
piomisos lhal il makos lo such gioups woulo Lo non-ciooiLlo, making a coalilion Lolwoon lhom
impossiLlo. 1his poispoclivo suggosls a naluial ioason foi why, in ColomLia, such a coalilion may
havo Loon much moio likoly lo aiiso Lolwoon lho oxoculivo ano lho paiamililaiios ialhoi lhan
wilh lho FAIC.
2.6 Summary and Empirical Predictions
In lho iosl of lho papoi, wo will invosligalo lho olocl of ColomLian paiamililaiy foicos on lho
olocloial oulcomos in lho oaily 2000s. Oui invosligalion is molivaloo Ly lho lhooiolical iooas
oiscussoo aLovo. In pailiculai, wo will oocumonl lho following Lioao palloins, which, lhough nol
conclusivo pioof of lho iooas oovolopoo hoio, aio highly suggoslivo.
14
1. Consislonl wilh Iioposilion 2, paiamililaiios, onco lhoy Locamo sumcionlly powoiful, slailoo
inluoncing olocloial oulcomos in lho aioas of ColomLia lhoy conliolloo.
2. Consislonl wilh Iioposilion 8, wo will show lhal paiamililaiios localoo in aioas lhal voloo
foi lho cuiionl Iiosioonl in gioal numLois, Lul in pasl oloclions lonooo lo volo foi moio
liLoial polilicians, aio moio likoly lo poisisl.
8. Consislonl wilh Iioposilion 4, wo will show lhal lho Iiosioonl has pioposoo logislalion in
lino wilh lho piofoioncos of lho paiamililaiios, ano lho Sonalois olocloo fiom high paiamil-
ilaiy aioas havo suppoiloo lhis logislalion.
3 A Brief Overview of Non-State Armed Actors in Colombia
3.1 Origins of Colombian Non-State Armed Actors
ColomLia has a long hisloiy of non-slalo aimoo aclois. Duiing lho 10lh conluiy lho counliy was
convulsoo Ly a soiios of civil wais which culminaloo in lho Wai of 1housano Days Lolwoon 1800
ano 1002 (soo Iaioo, 2004, foi an ovoiviow). Iolalivo poaco omoigoo suLsoquonlly (Mazzuca
ano IoLinson, 2000) ano lasloo unlil lho 1040s whon lho counliy again slippoo inlo a muiooious
civil wai known as La Violencia, which slowly camo lo a hall afloi 108 whon lho LiLoial ano
Consoivalivo pailios signoo a poaco lioaly ano io-oslaLlishoo oloclions, alLoil unooi a highly
iosliiclivo sol of powoi shaiing inslilulions known as lho Nalional Fionl (soo Guzman Campos,
Fals Loioa ano Uma na Luna, 1062, Oquisl, 1080, Iocaul, 2001, Ioloan, 2002 on La Violencia
ano Haillyn, 1088, on lho Nalional Fionl). 1hough lho Nalional Fionl Lioughl lo an ono lho 100
yoai conlicl Lolwoon lho LiLoial ano Consoivalivo pailios, il issuoo in mullifaiious now foims
of conlicl. In 1064 oul of lho ashos of vaiious LiLoial ano Communisl guoiillas, was foimoo
lho Fuoizas Aimaoas Iovolucionaiias oo ColomLia (FAIC1ho Iovolulionaiy Aimoo Foicos
of ColomLia). In lho samo yoai lho Ljoicilo oo LiLoiacion Nacional (LLNNalional LiLoialion
Aimy) was also cioaloo. 1hoso lofl-wing` guoiilla gioups woio iolalivoly small ouiing lho 1060s
ano 1070s, Lul Logan lo oxpano iapioly in lho 1080s ano lhoy woio joinoo Ly olhoi lofl-wing
iovolulionaiy movomonls such as lho Movimionlo 10 oo ALiil (M-10Movomonl of Apiil 10)
ano Quinlin Lamo. 1ho 1080s also saw lho iapio oxpansion of iighl-wing` paiamililaiy foicos
which in 1007 coaloscoo inlo lho Aulooofonsas Unioas oo ColomLia (AUCUniloo Solf-Dofonso
Oiganizalion of ColomLia).
1hoso vaiious non-slalo aimoo gioups iangoo ovoi mosl of lho loiiiloiy of ColomLia ano
lhough oslimalos vaiy, may havo hao aiouno 0,000 mon ano womon unooi aims al lho slail
of lho 21sl Conluiy. 1hoy ongagoo in kionapping, massacios of civilians, oiug pioouclion ano
oxpoilalion, ano iogulaily oxpiopiialoo lano ano oxloiloo incomo (collocloo lho laxos`) fiom
ColomLian cilizons. 1hoy also ongagoo in violonl conlicls wilh oach olhoi ano wilh lho aimoo
1
foicos of lho ColomLian slalo. Map 1 in lho Apponoix shows lho oisliiLulion of lho FAICLLN
ano lho AUC acioss ColomLia`s 1,110 municipalilios (using lho allacks` oala, oosciiLoo Lolow,
ovoi lho poiioo 1007-200). 1ho map usos oiloionl shaoos of ioo lo inoicalo municipalilios
in oiloionl quinlilos of lho oisliiLulion of guoiiilla piosonco. 1ho oaikosl ioo inoicalos lho
20/ of placos wilh lho mosl inlonso guoiilla aclivily. Ono can soo lhal lhis covois mosl of
ColomLia. Dopailmonls in lho oasloin planos (Los Llanos`), such as Aiauca ano Casanaio, havo
high guoiilla piosonco as oo municipalilios fuilhoi soulh in Caquola, whoio lho nogolialions look
placo ouiing lho Iiosiooncy of Anoios Iasliana. Howovoi, high guoiilla piosonco can also Lo
soon in lho Noilhoasl, in lho oopailmonl of Noilo oo Sanlanooi, fuilhoi wosl in Anlioquia ano
in lho soulhwosl in Cauca. Map 2 in lho Apponoix oxaminos paiamililaiy piosonco using lho
samo oala. Ono soos high paiamililaiy piosonco, moasuioo in lho samo way as foi lho guoiilla,
in many of lho samo aioas. 1hoso incluoo lho oasloin planos, Noilo oo Sanlanooi ano Anlioquia.
Iaiamililaiy piosonco is also high in municipalilios in lho coaslal oopailmonl of Magoalona ano
in Cosai, inLolwoon Magoalona ano Noilo oo Sanlanooi. 1his is naluial, sinco paiamililaiios
oflon foimoo lo lghl lho lofl-wing guoiiillas.
3.2 Paramilitaries and the AUC
ColomLia`s paiamililaiios aio lhoughl lo oiiginalo fiom 1060s counloiinsuigoncy moasuios ano
Law 48 of 1068 which allowoo lho cioalion of solf-oofonso mililias Ly piivalo cilizons foi lho
puiposos of piolocling lhoii piopoilios ano livos (soo Iomoio, 2000, 2002, Iangol, 200, ano
Duncan, 2007, foi ovoiviows of lho hisloiy ano oiganizalion of lho paiamililaiios). Novoilholoss,
lho poiioo of La Violencia is lilloioo wilh vaiious soils of mililias ano sponlanoous solf-oofonso
gioups (soo Ioloan, 2002, on Anlioquia). Small gioups of paiamililaiios also omoigoo in placos
whoio lhoio woio valuaLlo iosouicos whoso oxploilalion was conlosloo such as in lho omoialo
minos of Muzo, in lho oopailmonl of Loyaca ano lho oiug planlalions on lho coasl noai Sanla
Maila, Magoalona ano in lho noaiLy oopailmonl of La Guajiia.
1ho oscalalion of paiamililaiios in lho oaily 1080s is associaloo wilh lho iiso of lho laigo oiug
cailols in Mooollin ano Cali lhal facoo lhioals of kionapping ano oxloilion fiom lofl-wing gioups.
In 1081 Mailha Niovos Ochoa, lho sisloi of Joigo Luis Ochoa Vazquoz, ono of lho founoois of lho
Mooollin oiug cailol (along wilh his Liolhois, IaLlo LscoLai, Cailos Lohooi ano Joso Gonzalo
Iooiiguoz Gacha), was kionappoo Ly lho guoiilla gioup M-10. In iolalialion, lho cailol foimoo an
aimoo paiamililaiy gioup calloo Muoilo a Socuosliaooios (MASDoalh lo Kionappois) whoso
aim was lo oliminalo kionappois.
As lho woallh of lho oiug cailols giow, many of lhoii momLois Logan lo Luy up lano ano
ianchos in iuial aioas. Hoio lhoii inloiosls Logan lo fuso wilh lhoso of liaoilional iuial olilos who
also wishoo lo piolocl lhomsolvos fiom oxloilion ano kionappois (soo Gulioiioz Sanin ano Laion,
200, foi a sluoy of lhis piocoss in lho Iuoilo Loyaca iogion). 1his loo lo collaLoialion in lho
16
foimalion of paiamililaiy gioups. Ono aioa of iapio oxpansion was lho Magoalona Mooio al lho
oasloin poiiphoiy of lho oopailmonl of Anlioquia which saw lho omoigonco of gioups such as Los
1anguoios foimoo Ly lho Casla no Liolhois (Cailos, Fiool ano Viconlo). Fivo of Cailos Casla no`s
11 siLlings woio killoo Ly guoiiillas, following lho aLouclion ano ooalh of lhoii oaiiy-faimoi falhoi,
Josus Casla no, in 1081. In 1081, FAIC snalchoo lho Casla no`s falhoi ano oomanooo a $7,00
iansom, which was iaisoo Ly moilgaging lho faim. 1hough lho iansom was paio, lho falhoi`s
coipso was founo chainoo lo a lioo. Los 1anguoios was founooo lo iovongo lhis acl.
14
In 1002 pooplo who hao Loon viclimizoo Ly lho oiug loio IaLlo LscoLai founooo a paiamililaiy
oiganizalion calloo Los Iopos` (Ioisoguioos poi IaLlo LscoLai`lhoso poisoculoo Ly IaLlo
LscoLai). 1his gioup, which playoo an impoilanl infoimal iolo in lho hunl foi LscoLai ano his
ooalh in 1008 (Lowoon, 2002) appaionlly incluooo all of lho Casla no Liolhois, ovon lhough lhoy
hao pioviously coopoialoo wilh lho Mooollin cailol. In 1004 lho Liolhois foimoo lho Aulooofonsas
Camposinas oo CoiooLa y UiaLa` (ACCUIoasanl Solf-Dofonso foico of CoiooLa ano UiaLa).
1his fuilhoi oxpansion was facililaloo in lho samo yoai Ly a law piomoloo Ly Iiosioonl Sampoi
lo allow lho cioalion of CONVIVII, a nalional piogiam of noighLoihooo walch gioups. An
impoilanl suppoiloo of lhis piogiam was

Alvaio UiiLo, lhon Govoinoi of Anlioquia, whoso falhoi
was killoo Ly lho FAIC.
In Apiil 1007 lho AUC was foimoo Ly Cailos Casla no ano il incluooo possiLly 00/ of lho
oxisling paiamililaiy foicos. 1ho cioalion of lhis nalional oiganizalion incioasoo lho oloclivonoss
of lho paiamililaiios consiooiaLly; as a iosull, lho FAIC ano LLN woio lhiown oul of laigo aioas
of lho counliy, lhough as oui oala will show lhoso guoiiilla gioups aio slill aclivo in many pails
of ColomLia (soo Iosliopo, Spagal ano Vaigas, 2004).
15
Soon afloi coming lo powoi in 2002, Iiosioonl UiiLo Logan lo nogolialo lho oomoLilizalion of
lho paiamililaiios, somolhing ho hao piomisoo ouiing his oloclion campaign. Docioo 128 issuoo Ly
lho Iiosioonl in Januaiy 2008 gavo oo faclo amnosly foi paiamililaiios nol unooi invosligalion foi
human iighls violalions ano lhis has Loon applioo lo lho vasl numLoi of oomoLilizalions (aiouno
02/). On July 1, 2008 in Sanla Fo oo Ialilo in CoiooLa lho govoinmonl signoo an agioomonl
wilh mosl of lho gioups of lho AUC lo oisaim Ly lho ono of 200.
16
On NovomLoi 2 2008 aiouno 860 paiamililaiios of Mooollin`s Caciquo NuliLaia Lloc loo Ly
Don Loina` (Diogo Foinanoo Muiillo) oomoLilizoo. 1his piocoss was fuilhoi inslilulionalizoo Ly
lho passing of lho conliovoisial Juslico ano Ioaco Law in Juno 200 which was signoo inlo law
14
There is also evidence suggesting involvement of the army in the training and organization of paramilitary
groups, though in 1989 the Colombian Supreme Court declared that Law 48 was unconstitutional. One month later
President Barco issued Decree 1194 which prohibited the creation, promotion or organization of paramilitary or
self-defense groups and declared such activities illegal.
15
The timing of the creation of the AUC was a consequence of the collapse of the Medelln and Cali drug cartels
which had previously exercised a large amount of control over the organizations.
16
The text of the agreement is available at the web page of the Oce of the High Commissioner for Peace:
www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/acuerdos/index.htm
17
Ly Iiosioonl UiiLo in lho following monlh. Ailiclo 20 of lhis law limils sonloncos lo lhoso founo
guilly of human iighls violalions lo Lolwoon ano 8 yoais. Ailiclo 80 allows lho govoinmonl lo
ooloimino lho placo of oolonlion, which nooo nol Lo a piison. In May 2006 lho ColomLian Con-
slilulional Couil alloioo many aspocls of lho law on lho giounos lhal lhoy woio unconslilulional,
in pailiculai lho Couil slipulaloo lhal oomoLilizing comLalanls hao lo givo a full confossion of
lhoii aclivilios in oiooi foi lho law lo apply lo lhom. Lolh lho oomoLilizalion piocoss ano lho
Juslico ano Ioaco Law havo Loon wiooly ciilicizoo Ly human iighls oiganizalion.
17
1hoio is a gioal ooal of conliovoisy aLoul wholhoi lho paiamililaiy oomoLilizalion is ioal oi
wholhoi il will loao lo now aimoo gioups (oi simply lo lho inslilulionalizalionlogilimalion of
lho powoi of lho AUC; on lhis issuo soo Iaioo, 2007, Inloinalional Ciisis Gioup, 2007, Ioich ano
Iasmusson, 2008).
3.3 The Involvement of Paramilitaries in Politics
Soon afloi lho founoalion of lho AUC in 1007 lhoio appoais lo havo Loon a slialogic oocision lo
inluonco olocloial polilics. 1his chango is liacoo lo a hisloiic mooling in Sanla Fo oo Ialilo in
2001 whoio momLois of lho estado mayor (lho govoining Looy) of lho AUC along wilh polilicians
ano momLois of Congioss signoo a sociol oocumonl calling foi lho iofounoing of lho counliy`.
1hoso who signoo lhis oocumonl incluooo piominonl paiamililaiy loaoois, such as Joigo 40 (Io-
oiigo 1ovai Iupo) ano Diogo Vocino, ano sovoial polilicians suLsoquonlly aiiosloo foi links wilh
paiamililaiios, incluoing Sonalois William Monlos ano Miguol oo la Lspiiolla (soo 1aLlo 1). An
oxplicil aim of lho accoio was lo havo lho AUC play a moio impoilanl iolo in olocloial polilics.
18
17
For instance the 2007 report of the International Federation for Human Rights notes: \The paramilitaries who
do fall under the Justice and Peace Act are tried at so-called \free version" hearings and may be sentenced to
no more than eight years of imprisonment, which they may serve in \work farms." They may even impose their
own conditions for \imprisonment," which ies in the face of the most basic principles of justice in view of the
seriousness of the crimes committed." The report also emphasizes \the lack of true willingness on the part of the
government to bring to trial and dismantle the paramilitary groups," and concludes that: \The paramilitaries
are not forced to confess to their crimes, disclose the truth about who supported their structures, or even show
repentance for their crimes. They have not been forced to turn in all of their weapons or hand over their assets
to compensate the victims, while the latter and their representatives have very limited access to hearings and are
hindered from participating in them....What is more, those victims who have attended the \free version" hearings
have not received adequate protection. Already, sixteen of them have been murdered with absolute impunity." See
also Human Rights Watch (2005) and Amnesty International (2005).
On the issue of handing in weapons the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2007) noted at some key
demobilizations in the department of Cesar that \approximately 800 persons had passed through that circuit on
the previous day, but only 65 rearms were received. It also noted that from the 200 persons passing through the
circuit at La Mesa on the previous day, roughly 25 rearms were received. None of the weapons surrendered were
modern or in good condition" (p. 8).
18
Although the meeting in Ralito was probably the most important one for the subsequent strategy of the
paramilitaries, it was not the only such pact between them and politicians during this period. In the southern
plains, paramilitary leader Hector Buitrago (Martin Llanos) organized a meeting in 2000 with all the candidates
running for the governor's and the mayor's oces and explicitly traded political support against key positions in
the local executive, allocations of public contracts, and a share in the resources of the municipality (\La Sombra
de Martin Llanos" Semana, October 8, 2007). In Puerto Berio, Antioquia, four congressmen from Santander met
with paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso in 2001 for a similar pact. In the Municipalities of Chivolo and Pivijay
18
1his chango in lho slialogy of lho AUC will Lo ciucial lo oui ompiiical appioach, allowing us
lo invosligalo how olocloial oulcomos chango oiloionlially in high paiamililaiy aioas Lofoio ano
afloi lhoii involvomonl in polilics in 2001.
1ho olhoi nolaLlo, ano iolaloo, oovolopmonl ouiing lho 2002 oloclion is lho omoigonco of
Liano now polilical pailios, which wo iofoi lo as lhiio pailios,` such as CamLio Iaoical ano
MIIOL. 1hoso pailios oflon hao oxplicil oi implicil links wilh lho paiamililaiios, ano lho caso
sluoy ovioonco shows lhal paiamililaiy piossuio was oflon lo incioaso lho volo foi lhoso pailios.
In many paiamililaiy-conliolloo aioas lhoy havo ioplacoo lho liaoilional LiLoial ano Consoivalivo
pailios. Wo will uso lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios` as a moasuio of paiamililaiy inluonco on
olocloial oulcomos.
Loginning in 200 lhoio woio incioasing accusalions of involvomonl of lho AUC in lho oloclions
of 2002. Scanoal mounloo fuilhoi wilh lho oomoLilizalion of Joigo 40 ano his 2,000 sliong Llock
on Maich 10, 2006 in La Mosa, Cosai. Joigo 40`s compuloi foll inlo lho hanos of govoinmonl
omcials ano il conlainoo omails oiooiing his mon lo iociuil poasanls lo piolono lo Lo paiamililaiios
ouiing oomoLilizalion coiomonios.
19
1ho compuloi also lisloo ovoi 00 muioois ano oolailoo many
links Lolwoon polilicians ano paiamililaiios. 1hoso accusalions loo lo inlonso sciuliny of lho 2002
oloclion iosulls many of which oxhiLil somo ialhoi oxliaoioinaiy foaluios. 1hoso incluoo massivo
changos in voling palloins ano voiy high conconlialions of volos foi somo canoioalos in pailiculai
municipalilios.
20
Sinco lhon lhoio havo Loon many invosligalions of supposoo links Lolwoon polilicians ano
paiamililaiios ano a laigo caso sluoy liloialuio has omoigoo oocumonling such links (soo in pai-
liculai lho iosoaich of Lopoz, 2007, Valoncia, 2007, ano lho olhoi ossays in Iomoio, 2007, Soiiano
ZaLala, 2007 ano lho woL silo voioaoaLioila.com). As of May 20, 2000, 80 momLois of Congioss
ano lho Sonalo woio unooi invosligalion, 86 woio aiiosloo ano in oolonlion, ano 11 hao Loon founo
guilly of links wilh paiamililaiios.
21
In lolal lhis iopiosonls almosl 18 of ColomLian logislalois.
1hoso pioviously aiiosloo Lul ioloasoo incluoo Maiio UiiLo, Iiosioonl UiiLo`s cousin ano main
polilical aovisoi. 1hoso aiiosloo incluoo Sonaloi Cailos Gaicia, lho Iiosioonl of lho U paily"
(U foi UiiLolhough lhis paily is nol omcially iocognizoo Ly lho Iiosioonl as his paily). 1ho
invosligalion ano aiiosl of lhoso polilicians has Loon unooilakon piimaiily Ly lho Supiomo Couil.
of the department of Magdalena (discussed in the Appendix), the pact with the paramilitaries involved 417 local
politicians that committed to support the candidates linked with the paramilitaries for the legislative elections
of 2002 through a movement called \Movimimiento la Provincia Unida" (Movement United Province) (Semana,
November 6, 2006).
19
See also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2007, p. 5) on the apparently fake demobilizations in
Cesar.
20
See for instance the article in the Colombian weekly Semana \Votaciones atpicas en las elecciones de congreso
del 2002," September 11, 2005.
21
This data is updated regularly on http://www.indepaz.org.co.
10
3.4 Controlling the Vote
1hoio is consiooiaLlo caso sluoy ovioonco lhal following lho mooling in Sanla Fo oo Ialilo,
paiamililaiy gioups aclivoly liioo ano succooooo in inluoncing volos in nalional oloclions (lhal
is, in lho 2002 ano 2006 oloclions). 1ho loslimony of majoi paiamililaiy loaoois suggosls lhal lhoso
gioups ioplacoo lho aulhoiily of lho slalo in many aioas ano many of lho paiamililaiy loaoois
havo Loon quilo ailiculalo aLoul lhoii polilical piojocl`. Of lhoso lho loslimony of Salvaloio
Mancuso is poihaps mosl lolling, noling lhal
Whal I saio is lhal 8/ of lho Congioss was olocloo in aioas whoio lhoio woio
slalos of lho Solf-Dofonso gioups, in lhoso slalos wo woio lho onos collocling laxos,
wo oolivoioo juslico, ano wo hao lho mililaiy ano loiiiloiial conliol of lho iogion ano
all lho pooplo who wanloo lo go inlo polilics hao lo como ano ooal wilh lho polilical
iopiosonlalivos wo hao lhoio." (Salvaloio Mancuso, socono 8 of lho Inloiviow, aulhois
lianslalion)."
22
1ho invosligalion inlo lho 2002 ano 2006 oloclion iosulls ano lho loslimony of oomoLilizoo
paiamililaiios has iovoaloo a laigo numLoi of oiloionl pacls` Lolwoon paiamililaiy loaoois ano
polilicians (oolailoo in Lopoz ano Sovillano, 2008) ano also oomonslialos lhal a laigo numLoi of
oiloionl slialogios woio usoo lo guaianloo lhal canoioalos piofoiioo Ly paiamililaiios won oloc-
lions. A salionl slialogy sooms lo havo Loon lo loiioiizo pooplo inlo voling foi spocilc canoioalos.
In lho municipalily of San Onofio in lho coaslal oopailmonl of Sucio,
23
foi oxamplo, lhis was
aiiangoo Ly lho paiamililaiy loaooi Caoona`.
Foi lho oloclions of 2002, lho liucks sonl Ly Caoona` wonl lhiough noighLoihooos
ano iuial aioas of San Onofio picking pooplo up. Accoioing lo somo pooplo in lhis
municipalily in Sucio, lhousanos of poasanls woio lakon lo lho coiiogimionlo Ilan
Iaiojo` so lhoy coulo soo lho canoioalo foi whom lhoy hao lo volo foi in lho logislalivo
oloclions: Jaiio Moilano foi Sonalo ano Muiiol Lonilo foi lho Houso of Iopiosonlalivos.
Caoona` pul in a Lag all lho namos of lho councilois, ho look lwo ano saio lhal ho
was going lo kill lhom ano olhoi pooplo choson ianoomly if Muiiol oio nol win", says
a poasanl fiom lhis lown. 1ho lhioal sooms lo havo Loon oloclivo: oach canoioalo
oLlainoo 40,000 volos in Sucio."
24
22
The exact words in Spanish are \Lo que dije fue que el 35 % del congreso fue elegido en zonas
donde haban Estados de Autodefensas, en esos Estados nosotros fuimos los que cobramos impuestos,
impartamos justicia, tenemos el control territorial y militar de la region y todas esta personas que
queran hacer poltica tenan que venir y concertar con los representantes polticos que tenamos ah."
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tsaMNqoa k&feature=related
23
Interestingly the mayor and ex-mayor of San Onofre were both signatories of the Pact of Santa Fe de Ralito.
24
Quoted from \Redaccion Nacional" El Tiempo November 11, 2006. In Spanish: \Los camiones enviados por
`Cadena' pasaron por barrios, corregimientos y veredas de San Onofre recogiendo gente. Fue para las elecciones
20
Shooi loiioi sooms lo havo Loon usoo nol jusl lo inouco pooplo lo volo foi pailiculai canoioalos
Lul also lo koop lhom away fiom lho polls so lhal Lallol slumng ano olhoi foims of manipulalion
of volo lolals coulo occui. Lvioonco of lho uso of cooicion lo koop pooplo al homo ano away fiom
lho polls comos fiom La Jagua oo ILiiico in lho oopailmonl of Cosai.
25
Anolhoi slialogy, whoio cooicion also playoo an impoilanl iolo, involvoo collocling pooplo`s
cooulas (nalional ioonlily caios which a poison musl pioouco lo volo) fiom lhoii housos, using
lhom lo collocl lho Lallols (lho laijolon`) ano llling lhom in foi pooplo.
26
Fuilhoi ovioonco on how volos woio oolivoioo omoigoo ouiing lho loslimony of Iafaol Gaicia
1oiios, lho foimoi oiiocloi of infoimalion soivicos foi lho Iiosioonlial inlolligonco soivico, lho
Aominislialivo Socuiily Dopailmonl (DAS). Gaicia, unooi invosligalion foi links wilh paiamili-
laiios, lolo piosoculois lhal ho hao oosignoo a compuloi piogiam lo uso conloonlial infoimalion
lhal lolo us lho lisl of volois Ly any calogoiy, foi oxamplo, Ly polling slalion, zono, municipalily
ano ovon Ly oopailmonls." Wilh lhis infoimalion in hano counloifoil Lallols woio cioaloo so
lhal Ly lho ono of lho oloclions lhoy woulo incluoo fako volos of lho pooplo who oio nol volo,
ano if lhoio woio Lallols favoiing olhoi canoioalos oiloionl fiom lho onos fiom lho paiamililaiy
gioup Lloquo Noilo lhoy woulo Lo ioplacoo Ly Lallols foi oui canoioalos".
27
All in all lho ovioonco inoicalos lhal paiamililaiy gioups usoo a wioo vaiioly of slialogios lo
mako suio lhal lhoii piofoiioo canoioalos gol olocloo. 1his iangoo fiom loiioiizing volois lo volo
in pailiculai ways, loiioiizing lhom lo slay away fiom lho polls so lhoy coulo slul Lallols, voling
insloao of cilizons Ly conlscaling lhoii ioonlify caios, loiioiizing polilicians so lhal lhoy woulo
del 2002 y seg un cuentan algunos habitantes de ese municipio de Sucre, centenares de campesinos fueron llevados
hasta el corregimiento Plan Parejo para que les vieran la cara a los candidatos por los que haba que votar en las
parlamentarias: Jairo Merlano para Senado y Muriel Benito Rebollo para Camara.
Cadena puso en una bolsa los nombres de todos los concejales, saco dos y dijo que los matara a ellos y a otras
personas que iba a escoger al azar si Muriel no ganaba", dice un campesino de esa localidad. La amenaza parece
haber sido efectiva: cada candidato saco 40 mil votos en todo Sucre."
25
From `Un Abrebocasa de estas Elecciones" by Cristina Velez in Votebien.com, February 2006.
26
This phenomenon is discussed in the article \Aqu nadie es un santo" Semana, September 29, 2007.
27
According to the testimony given by Mrs. Judith Esther Salas Vallejo: \The [electoral] juries also marked
ballots, because they were told to do so. And this happened during the afternoon since the turnout was very low that
day and they had to deliver certain number of votes that did not been cast by then." This behavior was also witnessed
in Salamina and Remolino. One of the counsels sent by the paramilitaries told the juries that \the turnout is very low
and we have to deliver the votes they are expecting and therefore the juries had to collaborate. If they did not comply
these demands there would be consequences". See http://www.cambio.com.co/portadacambio/712/ARTICULO-
WEBNOTA INTERIOR CAMBIO-3444866.html.
Other evidence reveals both the extent to which the political project of the paramilitaries was planned and
also how votes were guaranteed. Semana documented how paramilitary leaders and politicians divided up coastal
departments. For instance: \In Cesar, \Jorge 40" aimed to obtain two Senators and four Representatives. The
department was divided into 3 electoral districts, one in the north and one in the south. Each of the candidates
would campaign in only one of those districts and each of these would support two candidates for the House of
Representatives. The third district would be open to free competition. To organize the lists they did everything,
from threats and expropriation of land to kidnappings. They killed Luis Laborde, former mayor of Copey and
candidate to the House of Representatives, who did not want to \play" the rules of the game that were imposed
by the AUC. \\Jorge 40" announced this crime in a meeting in San Angel, in which there were 9 mayors of the
department" says a witness. Since that moment it was completely clear that anyone who did not comply with
\Jorge 40's" rules could not do politics" (Semana, November 25th 2006).
21
nol iun againsl lhoii piofoiioo canoioalos, ano manipulaling suLsoquonl volo lolals oloclionically.
3.5 The Involvement of Other Armed Actors in Politics
Oui ompiiical iosulls will show lhal lho AUC moio lhan any non-slalo aimoo acloi has Loon
signilcanlly inluoncing oloclions in ColomLia. Scalloioo piocos of ovioonco suggosl lhal olhoi
non-slalo aimoo aclois havo Loon involvoo, Lul havo nol puisuoo such a consislonl olocloial
slialogy. Foi inslanco lho oiug loio IaLlo LscoLai gol himsolf olocloo as an alloinalo foi a lisl lo
Congioss in 1082 foi lho LiLoial paily ano il is voiy likoly lhal ho ano momLois of lho Mooollin
oiug cailol hao Lig impacls on oloclions in Anlioquia, lhough lo oui knowloogo lho oala havo
novoi Loon syslomalically analyzoo. Novoilholoss, olocloial slialogios can Lo oangoious. LscoLai`s
oloclion oiow a lol of allonlion lo him, which was pioLaLly nol lo lho aovanlago of his Lusinoss
inloiosls ano no oouLl slionglhonoo lho iosolvo of lho slalo lo movo againsl him. Similaily in lho
1080s whon lho FAIC foimoo a paily lo conlosl oloclions, lho Union Ialiiolica (UI- Ialiiolic
Union) many of lhoii suppoilois ano canoioalos incluoing lhoii Iiosioonlial canoioalos in lho
1086 ano 1000 oloclions woio muiooioo.
1ho FAIC ano LLN havo also coilainly inluoncoo somo oloclions ano havo usoo lhoii powoi
lo sway oi inlimioalo volois in favoi of canoioalos lhoy piofoiioo. 1hoy havo lhioalonoo ano
killoo polilicians. Howovoi, lhoii involvomonl in oloclions has Loon moio limiloo lhan lhal of
lho AUC. Wo conjocluio lhal lhis is moslly Locauso lho FAIC ano LLN havo Loon iooologically
opposoo lo lho inslilulions of lho slalo in ColomLia ano lhoii piojocl was lo ovoilhiow lho
nalional govoinmonl. As also omphasizoo Ly oui lhooiolical oiscussion in suLsoclion 2., lhis
maoo a symLiolic iolalionship Lolwoon lhom ano lho oxoculivo impossiLlo. In conliasl, lho AUC
aio a conlinualion of local paiamililaiy gioups allioo wilh local olilos ano polilicians. Again in
lighl of oui oiscussion in suLsoclion 2., il was impoilanl lhal lho AUC oio nol wanl lo ovoilhiow
lho slalo Lul lo oxoiciso conliol ovoi coilain poiiphoial aioas ano inluonco koy logislalion. 1his
cioaloo a plalfoim foi a symLiolic iolalionship Lolwoon lho conlial slalo ano lho AUC, which
woulo havo Loon impossiLlo foi lho FAIC ano LLN.
3.6 The Colombian Political System
Hoio wo omphasizo a fow inslilulional oolails of lho ColomLian syslom lhal aio impoilanl foi oui
ompiiical slialogy. Unooi lho 1001 Conslilulion lho Iiosioonl of ColomLia was olocloo foi ono
foui yoai loim wilh no possiLilily of io-oloclion. 1hoio has Loon a sliong noim againsl io-oloclion
hisloiically in ColomLia ano lho lasl Iiosioonl lo succooo himsolf was Iafaol N u noz in 1886.
1hough unooi lho 1886 Conslilulion io-oloclion was poimilloo if nol succossivo, il only happonoo
onco wilh Alfonso Lopoz Iumaiojo Loing Iiosioonl Lolwoon 1084 ano 1088 ano again Lolwoon
1042 ano 104 (whon ho onooo his socono loim oaily Ly iosigning). 1ho Iiosioonl is olocloo Ly
a nalional volo ano if no canoioalo iocoivos 0/ of lho volo in lho lisl iouno a iun-ol oloclion
22
is holo Lolwoon lho lwo canoioalos wilh lho laigosl numLoi of volos in lho lisl iouno.
Il is also impoilanl lo nolo lhal liko mosl Iiosioonlial sysloms in Lalin Amoiica, ColomLia`s
foaluios sliong Iiosioonlial oominanco of lho logislaluio wilh Iiosioonls oflon iuling foi long
poiioos Ly issuing oocioos.
Foi lho Sonalo lhoio is a nalional consliluoncy whoio 100 Sonalois aio olocloo fiom lisls. Foi
lho Congioss lhoio aio 82 mulli-momLoi oisliicls wilh oach oisliicl coiiosponoing lo a oopailmonl.
1ho iopiosonlalion of oopailmonls ooponos on lhoii populalion ano lhoio aio 162 Congiossmon
in lolal. Hisloiically in ColomLia ovon liaoilional paily lisls aio voiy poisonalizoo so lho lypical
silualion is ono whoio only ono canoioalo is olocloo fiom oach lisl. 1his silualion oio nol chango
wilh lho 2006 oloclions ovon lhough a iofoim in lho olocloial law slipulaloo lhal lo win a soal
in lho logislaluio a lisl hao lo havo al loasl 2/ of lho volo nalionally. Al lho samo limo as
lhis law was inliooucoo, lho olocloial syslom was changoo lo allow foi opon-lisl piopoilional
iopiosonlalion (wilh piofoionco voling). 1hus ovon lhough lho numLoi of lisls foll oiamalically,
poisonal polilics conlinuoo unaLaloo via piofoionco voling.
1ho oiganizalion of lho Highoi Couils in ColomLia is ialhoi inliicalo. 1hoio aio foui High
Couils: lho Supiomo Couil, lho Consoil o` Llal (Slalo Council), lho Supoiioi Council of lho
Juoiciaiy ano lho Conslilulional Couil. Whilo lho lisl lwo havo Loon in placo sinco lho 1886
ColomLian Conslilulion (allhough wilh somo alloialions), lho lalloi onos woio a cioalion of lho
1001 Conslilulion. Foi lho puiposos of paiamililaiy involvomonl in polilics il is iolovanl lo Liioly
unooislano lho Lasics of lho Supiomo Couil ano lho Conslilulional Couil. 1ho Supiomo Couil`s
main iolo is lo ioviow juogmonls of infoiioi (piovincial) couils ano oocioo wholhoi lhoio has Loon
a coiiocl inloipiolalion of lho law anooi lho facls of lho casos. 1ho Couil is oiviooo in lhioo
soclions: ciiminal, civil ano laLoi. 1ho Ciiminal Soclion of lho Supiomo Couil is also in chaigo
of liying ano juoging lho momLois of lho Congioss: Sonalo ano ChamLoi of Iopiosonlalivos"
(Ailiclo 28 = 8 Conslilulion). 1his givos lho Supiomo Couil lho aulhoiily lo juogo momLois
of Congioss accusoo of having links wilh paiamililaiy gioups. Somo momLois of Congioss, onco
invosligalions foi paiamililaiy links havo slailoo, havo sloppoo oown fiom lhoii puLlic omco lo
avoio lho juiisoiclion of lho Supiomo Couil ano havo suLjocloo lhomsolvos lo oioinaiy piocoouios
unooi lowoi-scalo" piosoculois ano juogos.
1ho Conslilulional Couil has lwo lypos of iolos: on lho ono hano il is in chaigo of ioviowing
lho juogmonl of piovincial ano soclional juogos iogaioing accionos oo lulola,` which is a piocoouio
lhal any poison can slail gonoially againsl puLlic omcials in oiooi lo sook lho pioloclion of
hishoi funoamonlal iighls. On lho olhoi hano lho Conslilulional Couil is in chaigo of juoicial
ioviow of logislalion. In lhis iolo lho Couil ooloiminos wholhoi a pailiculai slalulo (law onacloo Ly
Congioss) is conslilulional. 1ho Conslilulion piovioos lhal somo slalulos shoulo Lo aulomalically
ioviowoo Ly lho Couil, whilo in olhoi casos lho Couil will only inloivono whon a cilizon challongos
lho conslilulionalily of a pailiculai slalulo. In lho caso of lho Juslico ano Ioaco Law, lho
28
Conslilulional Couil ioviowoo ils conslilulionalily lhanks lo a challongo posoo Ly a gioup of
cilizons (unooi Ailiclo 241 of lho 1001 Conslilulion).
1hoio is a iolalivoly high oogioo of aulonomy of lhoso High Couils vis-`a-vis lho Lxoculivo
Lianch, pailiculaily lho Supiomo Couil. 1hoio is no lifo lonuio foi lho Juslicos in ColomLia:
insloao lhoy soivo ouiing ono oighl-yoai loim ano io-oloclion lo lho samo couil is oxplicilly
foiLiooon Ly lho Conslilulion. Whon a Juslico soivos his limo, lho Supiomo Couil is in chaigo of
choosing a ioplacomonl fiom lisls piopaioo Ly lho Aominislialivo Soclion of lho Supoiioi Council
of lho Juoiciaiy (anolhoi High Couil also in chaigo of aominislialivo funclions iogaioing lho
juoiciaiy). In luin, lho juslicos of lho Aominislialivo Soclion aio appoinloo Ly lho Conslilulional
Couil (1 juogo), Ly lho Supiomo Couil (2 juogos) ano Ly lho Consoil o`Llal (8 juogos). 1ho
impacl of lho logislalivo ano oxoculivo Lianchos is lhoiofoio voiy inoiiocl on lho Supiomo Couil.
1hoy can lo somo oxlonl inluonco lhis piocoss. Foi inslanco lho Conslilulional Couil has 0
juogos olocloo foi lifo Ly lho Sonalo. Howovoi, lho oloclion lakos placo ovoi lisls of canoioalos
piosonloo Ly lho Iiosioonl (8 juogos), lho Supiomo Couil (8 juogos) ano lho Consoil o`Llal (8
juogos). 1hus, fiom lho nino juslicos silling on lho Conslilulional Couil in a pailiculai loim,
lhioo of lhom havo como oul fiom lisls piosonloo Ly lho Iiosioonl.
4 The Data
4.1 Data Sources and Construction
1ho mosl impoilanl oala foi lho papoi aio on lho piosonco of non-slalo aimoo aclois, spocilcally
paiamililaiios ano lofl-wing guoiillas. Oui main moasuio of lho piosonco of non-slalo aimoo aclois
is ono Lasoo on conlicl incioonls, which wo iofoi lo as allacks` foi shoil. 1ho oalaLaso of allacks
is fiom Conlio oo Lsluoios soLio Dosaiiollo Lconomico (CLDL) in lho Facullao oo Lconomia al
lho Univoisioao oo Los Anoos in Logola. CLDL collocls oala fiom lho OLsoivaloiy of Human
Iighls of lho Vico-piosiooncy ano lho Nalional Dopailmonl of Ilanning ano aggiogalos vaiiaLlos
in sovoial calogoiios Ly aimoo acloi ano lypo of aclion. 1ho oiiginal oala aio a compilalion of nows
fiom nowspapois ano fiom iopoils of lho nalional polico. Oui moasuio of attacks is consliucloo
Ly aggiogaling ovoi many of lhoso vaiiaLlos. Foi oach aimoo acloi wo simply aoo lho following
vaiiaLlos: oxplosivo loiioiisl acls, inconoiaiy loiioiisl acls, olhoi loiioiisl acls, assaulls lo piivalo
piopoily, allacks on civil oiganizalions, polilical assassinalion allompls, ioao Llockaoos, aimoo
conlacl Lolwoon slalo ano non-slalo aimoo foicos inilialoo Ly lho lalloi, amLushos of civilians,
haiassing (mainly lhioals lo civilians), incuision inlo villagos`, ovoilano piiacy, illogal chockpoinls,
aimoo foicos wounooo Ly lho non-slalo aimoo gioup, muioois of civilians, muioois of polilicians,
massacios, ooalhs of momLois of lho slalo aimoo foicos, kionappings of momLois of lho aimoo
foicos, kionappings of polilicians ano kionappings of civilians. Wo havo lhis vaiiaLlo foi oach yoai
in lho poiioo 1007 lo 200.
24
Wo chock lho ioLuslnoss of oui iosulls wilh an alloinalivo moasuio of lho piosonco of non-
slalo aimoo aclois Lasoo on oisplacoo pooplo. 1ho oalaLaso fiom which wo consliucloo oui
displaced moasuio comos fiom Accion Social an agoncy cioaloo Ly lho piosiooncy. 1his oala is
collocloo fiom pooplo lhal iopoil lhomsolvos ano aio classiloo as oisplacoo in lho Iogislio

Unico
oo IoLlacion Dosplazaoa (uniquo iogisloi of oisplacoo populalion) in oiooi lo oLlain a sol of
suLsioios. 1hoso oala spocify lho municipalily whoio lho oisplacomonl oiiginaloo, lho yoai of lho
oisplacomonl ano lho aimoo acloi lhal oiiginaloo il. Wo havo lhoso oala annually foi lho poiioo
1007 ano 2006.
Wo uso lhoso oala lo consliucl vaiious moasuios of lho piosonco of non-slalo aimoo aclois.
Locauso lho limo soiios vaiialion in Lolh lho allacks ano lho oisplacoo moasuios appoais lo Lo
quilo noisy, wo focus on avoiagos` of lhoso oala, lhough wo also oxploil ovoi-limo vaiialion in somo
spocilcalions. Oui lisl main moasuio of paiamililaiy piosonco, iofoiioo lo as paramilitary attacks,
is lolal paiamililaiy allacks Lolwoon 1007 ano 200 in municipalily : poi 1000 inhaLilanls whoio
lho populalion moasuio is lho avoiago populalion Lolwoon lho 1008 ano 200 consusos. Oui socono
moasuio is a oummy lhal lakos lho valuo of 1 if municipalily : has a valuo of paramilitary attacks
aLovo lho 7lh poiconlilo.
28
Wo also consliucl lwo similai moasuios wilh lho oisplacoo vaiiaLlo
ano ioonlical moasuios foi guoiiilla allacks (FAIC ano LLN comLinoo).
Wo lako oloclions iosulls fiom lho Sonalo, Congioss ano Iiosioonlial oloclions 1001-2006 fiom
lho Iogisliaouiia Nacional ool Lslaoo Civil. Using lho namos of lho polilical pailios lo which
polilicians Lolongoo, wo consliucloo paily volo shaios in oach municipalily. Wo lhon classiloo
pailios inlo lhiio`, lofl` ano liaoilional` (LiLoials oi Consoivalivos) polilical pailios, ano calcu-
laloo lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios in oach municipalily.
29
Foi Iiosioonlial oloclions wo look lho
numLois fiom lho lisl iouno oloclion iosulls.
In aooilion lo lho lhiio paily volo shaio, wo also invosligalo lho olocl of paiamililaiios on
olocloial oulcomos Ly looking al olocloial conconlialion. 1his is molivaloo Ly lho caso sluoy
ovioonco fiom Magoalona, which is oiscussoo in lho Apponoix, which shows how paiamililaiy
inluonco cioalos a highly conconlialoo volo shaio palloin in a fow municipalilios (whoio lhoy
havo piosumaLly usoo cooicion oi manipulaloo lho volo). Electoral concentration is oolnoo as
lho volo shaio of lho mosl populai lisl in a municipalily (foi lho Sonalo oi Congioss, ano in lho
laLlos il is iofoiioo lo as winning volos shaio`).
30
Finally, wo oLlainoo oala fiom lwo ciucial
ioll-call volos fiom lho Gacetas del Senado.
31
28
Less than half of the municipalities have any paramilitary Attacks; in contrast, only two municipalities have
zero Displacements, though several municipalities have very low levels.
29
Given our focus on the impact of the AUC, when we examine votes for third parties, we do not consider parties
in the left-wing coalition, the Polo Democratico (`Democratic pole'), which are unconnected with the paramilitaries,
as `third parties'. See Valencia (2007) for a similar distinction and calculation.
30
The results using a Herndahl index to measure electoral concentration are very similar and omitted to save
space.
31
Roll-calls are not taken for most votes in either the Senate or Congress.
2
As conliols, wo collocloo oala on lho volo shaio of

Alvaio Gomoz in lho 1086 Iiosioonlial
oloclion lo consliucl a moasuio of lho oxlonl of iighl-wing` suppoil in a municipalily. Gomoz
was lho son of lho iighl wing consoivalivo Iiosioonl Lauioano Gomoz fiom lho oailioi 100s ano
ian on a voiy consoivalivo plalfoim as lho Iiosioonlial canoioalo foi lho Consoivalivo paily.
Similaily, wo uso lho volo shaio of Jaimo Iaioo Loal lho Iiosioonlial canoioalo foi lho Union
Ialiiolica in lho samo oloclion. Sinco lho Union Ialiiolica was lho unomcial polilical wing of lho
FAIC, Iaioo Loal`s volo shaio is a gooo moasuio of lofl-wing` suppoil in a municipalily. In many
of oui iogiossions, wo also incluoo inloiaclions Lolwoon a full sol of limo oummios ano vaiious
municipalily-lovol conliols. 1hoso conliols aio lho lano Gini in 108, lho aioa of lho municipalily,
alliluoo, oislanco lo slalo capilal, avoiago municipalily populalion Lolwoon 1008 ano 200, an
inoox of how iuial lho populalion of lho municipalily is (in 1008), an inoox of unfulllloo Lasic
nooos` in 1008, pioxying foi lho lovol of povoily in lho municipalily, ano oummios foi coca
cullivalion in 1004 ano opium cullivalion in 1004 (lhoso conliols aio fiom lho CLDL oalaLaso).
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
1aLlo 2 shows lho oosciiplivo slalislics. Columns 1 ano 2 iopoil lho moan ano slanoaio oovia-
lion of lho vaiiaLlos foi lho wholo samplo. Columns 8-6 iopoil lho samo lwo vaiiaLlos foi high
paiamililaiy aioas whoio wo uso lho allacks oummy oolnoo in lho lasl soclion lo oocioo wholhoi
oi nol a municipalily has high paiamililaiy piosonco.
1ho lisl lwo sols of iows show lho iapio incioaso in paiamililaiy piosonco Lolwoon 1006-1007
ano 2000-2001 wilh somo ovioonco lhal lhis foll in 2004-200. Inloioslingly, lho noxl sol of iows
show a similai incioaso in guoiilla piosonco (wilh no lonooncy lo fall in lho mosl ioconl poiioo,
oospilo Iiosioonl UiiLo`s inlonsilcalion of lho wai againsl lho FAIC). Looking al columns 8
ano il is ovioonl lhal lhoio is a posilivo coiiolalion Lolwoon paiamililaiy piosonco ano guoiilla
piosonco, which is nol suipiising sinco, as wo oiscussoo aLovo, paiamililaiy unils woio oflon
foimoo lo comLal lho guoiilla.
1hoio aio sovoial nolowoilhy foaluios of lho oala highlighloo Ly 1aLlo 2. Iows 0-12 show a
laigo incioaso in lho shaio of lhiio pailios afloi 2002, ano lhis incioaso is moio pionouncoo in
high paiamililaiy aioas. Oui moasuio of olocloial conconlialion also incioasos afloi 2002, ano
lhis is again laigoly conconlialoo in high paiamililaiy aioas (iows 18-16). Finally, iows 17 ano
18 show a nolicoaLlo incioaso in lho volo shaio of lho winning piosioonlial canoioalo in lho high
paiamililaiy aioas. 1hoso palloins givo a pioviow of oui iogiossion ovioonco lhal will Lo piosonloo
in lho noxl soclion, as pail of lho ovioonco of paiamililaiy involvomonl in polilics.
Iows 10-24 show lhal lhoio aio also somo nolaLlo oiloioncos Lolwoon high ano low paiamili-
laiy aioas in loims of lho covaiialos. Mosl impoilanlly, low paiamililaiy aioas appoai lo Lo moio
iighl-wing`. 1his is ioassuiing in connoclion wilh lho concoins lhal oui moasuio of paiamililaiy
piosonco will capluio lalonl iighl-wing loanings. 1hoio aio also somo oiloioncos in loims of olhoi
26
covaiialos, lhough lhoso appoai iolalivoly small.
5 The Impact of Non-State Actors on Elections
Wo now invosligalo oconomoliically lho impacl of non-slalo aimoo aclois on olocloial oulcomos,
slailing wilh lhoii impacl on lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios. Oui Lasic iogiossions will Lo fiom
a simplo panol oala moool of lho following foim:
j
m;t
= d
t
c
m
c
t
1
m
,
t
G
m
X
0
m;t
-
m;t
, (7)
whoio j
m;t
is lho oulcomo vaiiaLlo in municipalily : al limo t, lho d
t
`s oonolo limo olocls, lho
c
m
`s aio municipalily lxoo olocls, X
m;t
is a vocloi of covaiialos, which conlains lho inloiaclions
Lolwoon vaiious googiaphic ano polilical conliols al lho municipalily lovol (oosciiLoo aLovo) ano a
full sol of limo oummios lhal aio incluooo in somo spocilcalions; -
m;t
is an oiioi loim iopiosonling
all omilloo faclois. Mosl impoilanlly, 1
m
is oui limo-invaiianl moasuio of paiamililaiy piosonco
ano G
m
as lho coiiosponoing moasuio of guoiilla piosonco. 1ho loim c
t
1
m
lhoiofoio oslimalos
a polonlially oiloionlial giowlh olocl foi ovoiy limo poiioo (iolalivo lo lho Laso, inilial oalo).
1his spocilcalion will onaLlo us lo focus on wholhoi lhoio is a chango in an oulcomo vaiiaLlo
(foi oxamplo, lho lhiio paily volo shaio) afloi lho AUC Locomo involvoo in polilics. Oui lisl
ooponoonl vaiiaLlo will Lo lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios, pioxying foi lho oiiocl olocl of lho
AUC in oloclions, ano wo havo lhoso oala foi lho 1001, 1004, 1008, 2002 ano 2006 oloclions.
1his onaLlos us lo incluoo inloiaclions wilh lho 1004, 1008, 2002 ano 2006 oummios ano oui
moasuios of paiamililaiy piosonco as a chock againsl pio-oxisling lionos (1001 oloclion is lho
omilloo calogoiy). Oui woiking hypolhosis lhal lho AUC inluoncoo oloclions ano foicoo cilizons
lo volo foi coilain lisls (oi usoo Lallol slumng) implios c
t
0 afloi 2002.
Wo also oxpoiimonloo wilh ompiiical moools of lho following foim
j
m;t
= d
t
c
m
c
t
1
m;t1
1
m;t1
,
t
G
m;t1
j G
m;t1
X
0
m;t
-
m;t
, (8)
which incluoo Lolh a limo-vaiying main olocl of paiamililaiy ano guoiiilla piosonco, ano focus
on lho inloiaclion Lolwoon yoai olocls ano lho limo-vaiying moasuios. 1ho oisaovanlago of lhis
moool is lhal, as noloo aLovo, yoai-lo-yoai vaiialion in paiamililaiy ano guoiiilla piosonco is oflon
ouo lo moasuiomonl oiioi. 1o minimizo lho impacl of yoai-lo-yoai vaiialions, wo oslimalo (8)
only using lho oloclion yoais foi 1008, 2002 ano 2006 ano consliucl lwo oummy vaiiaLlos 1
m;t1
ano G
m;t1
using lho lwo yoais piioi lo lho oloclion. Wo lhon sol 1
m;t1
= 1 if municipalily : is
aLovo lho 7lh poiconlilo. G
m;t1
is consliucloo similaily. Foi lho 1008 oloclion wo jusl uso lho
1007 oala, foi 2002 wo usoo oala fiom 2000 ano 2001, ano so on. Lqualion (8) also incluoos lho
oiiocl olocls of 1
m;t1
ano G
m;t1
.
27
5.1 Paramilitary Eect on Elections|Third Parties
Wo lisl invosligalo lho impacl of paiamililaiy piosonco on lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios in lho
Sonalo oloclions. Moio spocilcally, wo oslimalo oqualions (7) ano (8), wilh lho ooponoonl vaiiaLlo
j
m;t
coiiosponoing lo lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios in municipalily : in lho oloclions foi Sonalo
al limo t. Oui Lasic iosulls, using lho attacks moasuio, aio iopoiloo in 1aLlo 8. In lhis ano all
suLsoquonl laLlos, all slanoaio oiiois aio fully ioLusl (allowing foi aiLiliaiy soiial coiiolalion al
lho municipalily lovol), ano 1aLlos 8-7 incluoo a full sol of municipalily ano limo oummios in all
spocilcalions.
1aLlo 8 shows a ioLusl posilivo ano signilcanl olocl in Lolh 2002 ano 2006 of paiamililaiy
piosonco on lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios. Foi oxamplo, column 1 oslimalos c
2002
= 20.07 wilh
a slanoaio oiioi of 8.14 ano a similai oslimalo foi 2006, c
2006
= 22.10 (s.o.=8.10). Lolh osli-
malos aio highly slalislically signilcanl ano quanlilalivoly laigo (lho magniluoos will Lo oiscussoo
Lolow).
Column 2 aoos oui Lasic covaiialos (lho lano Gini in 108, lho aioa of lho municipalily,
alliluoo, oislanco lo slalo capilal, avoiago populalion Lolwoon 1008 ano 200, lho inoox of iuialily,
lho inoox of unfulllloo Lasic nooos, oummios foi coca ano opium cullivalion, ano oui moasuios of
iighl ano lofl loanings of lho municipalilios), all inloiacloo wilh a full sol of limo oummios so as
lo allow foi oiloionlial olocls ovoi limo. 1o savo spaco, wo oo nol iopoil lho coomcionls on lhoso
limo inloiaclions. 1ho iosulls in column 2 aio similai lo lhoso in column 1, slighlly smalloi, lhough
slill highly signilcanl (1.88 foi 2002 ano 10.70 foi 2006). In column 8, wo incluoo inloiaclions
wilh guoiiilla piosonco as woll as oui main inloiaclions of paiamililaiy piosonco ano limo. 1hoso
inloiaclions aio insignilcanl, consislonl wilh lho hypolhosis lhal lho lofl-wing guoiiillas havo
playoo a much moio limiloo iolo in nalional polilics.
32
1ho noxl lhioo columns io-oslimalo lho samo moools of lho lisl lhioo columns Lul now
using lho allacks oummy as lho moasuio of paiamililaiy ano guoiilla piosonco. 1ho iosulls aio
voiy similai lo lho lisl lhioo columns. Foi oxamplo, in column 4, wo oslimalo c
2002
= 18.71
(s.o.=1.08) ano c
2006
= 14.4 (s.o.=1.00), which aio again slalislically highly signilcanl. 1ho
oslimalos in columns ano 6 aio voiy similai. 1hoso oslimalos also cloaily show lho quanlilalivo
olocls of paiamililaiy involvomonl. 1hoy imply lhal high paiamililaiy aioas havo, on avoiago,
10 poiconlago poinls highoi volo shaio foi lhiio pailios afloi lho AUC`s involvomonl in polilics.
1his is a voiy sizaLlo olocl, pailiculaily in viow of lho facl lhal lho avoiago volo shaio of lhiio
pailios Lofoio 2001 was aLoul 1 poiconl (1aLlo 2).
Iiioi lo 2002, as lho coomcionls c
1994
ano c
1998
illuslialo lhoio is no ioLusl posilivo iolalion-
ship Lolwoon paiamililaiy piosonco ano lhiio paily volo shaio. 1hough Lolh of lhoso coomcionls
aio posilivo ano signilcanl in column 1, lhoii signilcanco vanishos whon wo aoo lho covaiialos foi
32
This is not because we are focusing on the vote share of third parties. When we repeat these regressions using
the vote share of the socialist coalition of parties, interactions with guerrilla presence are still insignicant.
28
columns 2 ano 8. In column 4 c
1994
is again posilivo ano signilcanl, lhough c
1998
is nol. As wilh
lho allacks oala in lovols lhoso coomcionls Locomo complololy insignilcanl onco lho covaiialos
aio aoooo in columns ano 6.
Ono concoin wilh lho iosulls in columns 1-6 is lhal lho chango in lho coomcionl of lho limo
inloiaclions mighl iolocl lho changing impoilanco of paiamililaiios oi guoiiillas in coilain aioas.
Oui oala aio nol iooal lo invosligalo lhoso issuos, sinco lho yoai-lo-yoai vaiialion in lho mililaiy
ano guoiiilla piosonco aio moasuioo wilh consiooiaLlo oiioi. Novoilholoss, in columns 7 ano 8,
wo oslimalo oqualion (8) lo piovioo somo answois lo lhoso quoslions. 1ho mosl paisimonious
spocilcalion is piosonloo in column 7. 1ho iosulls hoio aio consislonl wilh lhoso in lho lisl 6
columns using oui limo-invaiianl moasuio of paiamililaiy piosonco. 1ho oslimaloo coomcionls aio
c
2002
= 17.81 (s.o.=2.87) ano c
2006
= 18.02 (s.o.=8.01), ano aio highly slalislically signilcanl.
33
1aLlo 4 shows lho iosulls foi lho volos foi lho Congioss. 1ho gonoial palloins ano in facl ovon
lho poinl oslimalos aio voiy similai lo lhoso in 1aLlo 8, wilh high paiamililaiy aioas showing
aLoul a 8 poiconlago poinls highoi volo shaios foi lhiio pailios afloi lho AUC`s involvomonl in
polilics. Novoilholoss, lho iosulls aio woakoi lhan in 1aLlo 8, ano in column 6 whoio wo uso
lho allacks oummy wilh lho full sol of covaiialos ano guoiilla piosonco noilhoi c
2002
nol c
2006
slalislically signilcanl. Impoilanlly, c
1994
ano c
1998
aio small ano slalislically insignilcanl in
all spocilcalions in 1aLlo 4.
1aLlo invosligalos lho ioLuslnoss of lhoso iosulls fuilhoi (focusing on lho volos foi lho
Sonalo; lho iosulls foi lho Congioss aio similai). In lhis laLlo, all spocilcalions incluoo lho
limo inloiaclions wilh lho full sol of covaiialos inliooucoo aLovo, incluoing lho inloiaclions wilh
guoiiilla piosonco (which aio iopoiloo in lho laLlo, whilo olhoi covaiialos aio again nol iopoiloo
lo savo spaco). 1ho lisl column again oslimalos (7), Lul usos lho lovols of oisplacoo pooplo
as lho piosonco moasuio foi Lolh paiamililaiy ano guoiilla piosonco. Now wo soo lhal, loss
suppoilivo of oui hypolhosis, lho oslimalos foi lho inloiaclions Lolwoon all lho limo oummios
ano lho oisplacoo moasuio of paiamililaiy piosonco aio slalislically signilcanl (lhough lho poinl
oslimalos aio oiloionl Locauso lho scalo of lho oisplacoo vaiiaLlo is oiloionl). Howovoi, lhoio
is a laigo incioaso in lho sizo of lho coomcionl in 2002, lhough il halvos in 2006. In column 2
wo uso lho oummy voision of lho oisplacoo moasuio of paiamililaiy piosonco wilh iosulls voiy
similai lo lhoso in column 1 oxcopl lhal now lho quanlilalivo magniluoos of c
2002
ano c
2006
aio
similai. Locauso wo aio now using a oummy vaiiaLlo foi moasuiing paiamililaiy piosonco, lho
quanlilalivo olocls can also Lo oiioclly compaioo lo lhoso in 1aLlo 8. 1ho oslimalos suggosl lhal
high paiamililaiy aioas oxpoiioncoo aLoul 12 poiconlago poinls incioaso in lho volo shaio of lhiio
pailios in 2002 ano 2006, which is Lioaoly consislonl wilh lho quanlilalivo olocls in 1aLlo 8.
33
Notice that the direct eect of paramilitary presence is negative. We conjecture that this is because paramili-
taries appear to have had a very strong eect on elections in departments on the Caribbean coast, such as Magdalena,
Sucre, Corboda and Cesar. The third parties that existed prior to 2002 were not strong in these areas, hence the
negative correlation between paramilitary presence and third party vote share in 1998.
20
In column 8 wo again uso lho oisplacoo moasuio, Lul now oxploil lho limo soiios vaiialion in
lho oala oslimaling moool (8). Hoio lho oslimalos aio impiociso ano insignilcanl, lhough slill
posilivo. In column 4, wo uso a oiloionl slialogy ano oxliacl lho piincipal compononl of lho
allacks ano oisplacoo moasuios, ano uso lhis piincipal compononl as oui moasuio of paiamililaiy
piosonco. 1ho aovanlago of lhis slialogy is lhal Lolh allacks ano oisplacoo numLois aio noisy,
lhus lhoii common compononl may conlain moio infoimalion. 1ho iosulls fiom lhis appioach aio
voiy much in lino wilh lhoso of 1aLlos 8 ano 4. Wo lno no impacl of paiamililaiy piosonco piioi
lo 2002 Lul a posilivo ano highly signilcanl ono afloiwaios. In column , wo uso yol anolhoi
slialogy ano consliucl a oummy lhal lakos lho valuo 1 if in oui oala a municipalily has high
paiamililaiy piosonco accoioing lo Lolh oui allacks oala ano oui oisplacoo oala (accoioing lo
lhis moasuio all aioas foi which wo havo oala foi oisplacoo numLois Lul foi which lho allacks
oala aio missing iocoivo a valuo of zoio). Wo consliucl a similai oummy foi lho guoiilla piosonco
moasuios. 1ho iosulls using lhis comLinoo oummy aio again voiy similai lo oui Lasic lnoing
lhough c
1998
is now slalislically signilcanl. Finally, in column 6, wo oslimalo lho moool (8), Lul
now using a limo-vaiying oummy consliucloo comLining infoimalion fiom allacks ano oisplacoo
numLois as in column . In conliasl lo lho impiociso iosulls in column 8, lho oslimalos now aio
consislonl wilh lho iosl of oui iosulls ano aio highly signilcanl.
A majoi concoin foi oui ompiiical slialogy is lhal paiamililaiy gioups may Lo solocling inlo
spocilc aioas Lasoo on lhoii polilical oi iooological chaiacloiislics; paiamililaiy piosonco may Lo
capluiing a liono lowaios lhiio pailios uniolaloo lo lho paiamililaiios` involvomonl in polilics
(lhis has lo Lo a liono, sinco all spocilcalions incluoo a full sol of municipalily lxoo olocls).
Foi oxamplo, lhoio mighl Lo a liono in consoivalivo iooology` in coilain aioas, ano lho incioasoo
volo shaio of lhiio pailios is a ioloclion of lhis liono in lho aioas whoio lhoy havo silualoo.
Whilo wo cannol iulo oul lhis alloinalivo oxplanalion foi lho palloins shown in 1aLlos 8-, wo
oo nol lno il voiy plausiLlo. Fiisl, lho spocilcalions wilh covaiialos loxiLly conliol foi polonlial
oiloionlial lionos in iighl-wing iooology` Ly inloiacling lho volo shaio of

Alvaio Gomoz in lho
1086 Iiosioonlial oloclion wilh a full sol of limo oummios (as woll as foi polonlial oiloionlial
lionos in lofl-wing iooology`). IomaikaLly, lhis has almosl no olocl on lho oslimalos. Socono,
lho caso sluoy ovioonco oiscussoo in Soclion 8 suppoils oui inloipiolalion.
Ovoiall, 1aLlos 8- piovioo ioLusl coiiolalions consislonl wilh oui Lasic hypolhosis lhal fol-
lowing lho AUC`s oocision lo Locomo involvoo in polilics, paiamililaiios havo syslomalically in-
luoncoo olocloial oulcomos. 1ho noxl lwo suLsoclions piovioo fuilhoi ovioonco consislonl wilh
lhis palloin.
5.2 Results on Electoral Concentration: Senate and Congress
Molivaloo Ly lho caso sluoy ovioonco fiom Magoalona, oiscussoo in lho Apponoix, wo hypolhosizo
lhal paiamililaiy involvomonl also lianslaloo inlo gioaloi electoral concentration (gioaloi volo
80
shaio foi lho winning lisl in lho Sonalo ano Congioss oloclions). 1aLlo 6 invosligalos lhis issuo
Ly oslimaling iogiossions similai lo (7) ano (8), wilh lho ooponoonl vaiiaLlo Loing lho volo shaio
of lho mosl populai lisl in oilhoi lho Sonalo oi lho Congioss in municipalily : al limo t. Foi
lhoso iogiossions, wo again havo oala fiom 1001 lo 2006. 1hioughoul, wo focus on lho allacks
moasuio lo savo spaco (lho iosulls wilh lho oisplacoo moasuioo aio voiy similai ano aio availaLlo
upon ioquosl).
1ho lisl six columns in 1aLlo 6 uso oala fiom lho Sonalo, whilo lho lasl six aio foi lho
Congioss. Lach of lhoso sols of columns is Liokon oown inlo lhioo sols of lwo which uso lisl lho
allacks oala in lovols, lhon lho allacks oummy foi high paiamililaiy ano guoiilla piosonco, ano
lnally lho limo vaiying allacks oummy. All columns incluoo lho full sol of covaiialos (inloiacloo
wilh a full sol of limo oummios).
1his laLlo shows no oiloionlial liono in olocloial conconlialion Lolwoon high ano low paiamil-
ilaiy aioas Lofoio 2002. 1hoio is also no oiloionlial liono al any poinl Lolwoon high ano low
guoiiilla aioas. 1hoio is a laigo spiko in olocloial conconlialion in 2002 in high paiamililaiy aioas,
which is visiLlo in columns 1-4 ano 7-10. 1his olocl oisappoais in 2006, ano is nol visiLlo oi is
only impiocisoly oslimaloo in spocilcalions lhal uso lho limo-vaiying moasuios (lho iogiossion
oqualion (8), cfi. columns , 6, 11 ano 12). 1ho quanlilalivo olocls in 2002 aio laigo, coiiospono-
ing lo aLoul a 4- poiconlago poinls incioaso in lho volo shaio of lho winning canoioalo (lisl).
1his is again a voiy laigo olocl, as lho volo shaio of lho winning lisl in Sonalo ano Congioss
oloclions was aiouno 80 poiconl Lofoio 2001.
An oLvious quoslion is why lhoio is no oiloionlial olocl on olocloial conconlialion in high
paiamililaiy aioas in 2006. 1ho answoi lo lhis quoslion is suggosloo Ly oui oiscussion of lho
ovioonco fiom Magoalona in lho Apponoix ano Ly lho aigumonls aovancoo Ly Valoncia (2007)
ano Lopoz (2007): afloi lho oxpoiionco of 2002, which was suLsoquonlly highly sciulinizoo in
placos such as Magoalona, paiamililaiios Locamo much moio skilloo al manipulaling lho oulcomos
in oiooi lo guaianloo lho oloclion of lhoii canoioalos wilhoul oiawing so much allonlion lo
lhomsolvos. As wo show in lho Apponoix, ovon if olocloial conconlialion foll in Magoalona in
2006, Sonalois suppoiloo Ly lho paiamililaiios woio io-olocloo ano wilh a ialhoi similai numLoi
of volos, Lul now spioao moio ovonly lhioughoul lho oopailmonl. Inoooo, iocalling lho ovioonco
of 1aLlo 1, lho piosonco in lho logislaluio afloi 2006 of so many Sonalois ano Congiossmon
oilhoi unooi invosligalion oi aiiosloo foi connoclions wilh paiamililaiios is oiiocl ovioonco of a
conlinuing impacl of lho paiamililaiios on oloclions. 1his inloipiolalion is also suppoiloo Ly lho
ovioonco piosonloo in lho piovious suLsoclion (1aLlos 8-), which showoo lho ioLusl associalion
Lolwoon paiamililaiy piosonco ano lho iiso of lhiio pailios in lho oloclions of Lolh 2002 ano
2006. Hao lho olocl of lho paiamililaiios on lho olocloial oulcomos woakonoo in 2006, wo woulo
havo soon lhis in a ooclino in lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios. 1ho iosulls fiom lho volos foi lho
oxoculivo, piosonloo in lho noxl suLsoclion, fuilhoi coiioLoialo lhis inloipiolalion.
81
5.3 Results for the Executive
1aLlo 7 piosonls oslimalos fiom iogiossion moools similai lo (7) ano (8) foi lho poiioo 1008-2006,
wilh j
m;t
oolnoo as lho shaio of volos of lho winning Iiosioonlial canoioalo in municipalily : al
limo t. Onco again wo focus on lho allacks moasuio (lho iosulls wilh lho oisplacoo moasuio aio
again voiy similai). 1ho Lasic ioLusl lnoing is lhal in Lolh 2002 ano in 2006 lho volo shaio of lho
winning canoioalo (

Alvaio UiiLo) was syslomalically highoi in high paiamililaiy aioas lhan lho
volo shaio of lho winning canoioalo in 1008 (Iasliana); lhis olocl is in facl consiooiaLly sliongoi
in 2006. Foi oxamplo, lho oslimalo in column 4, 11.4 (s.o. = 1.67) suggosls lhal UiiLo oLlainoo
aLoul 11 poiconlago poinls moio volos in high paiamililaiy aioas lhan Iasliana oio. 1ho samo
olocl is piosonl in moools lhal oxploil lho limo-vaiying moasuios of paiamililaiy piosonco (moools
as in (8)).
1ho palloin wilh a sliongoi olocl in 2006 is plausiLlo. Iiosioonl UiiLo was favoioo Ly
paiamililaiy gioups alioaoy in 2002, Lul afloi his suppoil foi policios in lino wilh lhoso gioups`
inloiosls ouiing his lisl loim, lho suppoil of lho paiamililaiy gioups foi his oloclion Locamo
much sliongoi. 1his palloin is lhus consislonl Lolh wilh lho nolion lhal paiamililaiios conlinuoo
lo hoavily inluonco oloclions afloi 2002, ano also wilh lho hypolhosis, oocumonloo fuilhoi Lolow,
lhal a symLiolic iolalionship Lolwoon lho oxoculivo ano lho paiamililaiios oovolopoo afloi coilain
koy logislalions pioposoo Ly UiiLo.
34
1ho ovioonco in lhis suLsoclion is also pailiculaily impoilanl sinco il suggosls lhal, consislonl
wilh lho assumplions of oui lhooiolical moool, lho oxoculivo, Iiosioonl UiiLo, olocloially Lonolloo
fiom lho piosonco of paiamililaiios.
35
5.4 Predicting Arrests
As noloo in lho Inlioouclion, sinco lho so calloo Iaiapolilica` scanoal lisl Lioko in ColomLia,
many Congiossmon ano Sonalois havo Loon invosligaloo, aiiosloo foi ano ovon founo guilly of links
wilh illogal paiamililaiy oiganizalions. A usoful ioalily chock` on wholhoi lho ovioonco iopoiloo
so fai inoooo iopiosonls lho inluonco of paiamililaiios on oloclion oulcomos is lo soo wholhoi
Sonalois olocloo in aioas unooi paiamililaiy conliol havo oxplicil links wilh lho paiamililaiios
34
Nevertheless, as always, there may be other interpretations of this nding. For instance, to the extent that
President Uribe had been successful in de-mobilizing the paramilitaries, then people who had previously suered
under them might have rewarded the President by supporting his bid for re-election. Although we cannot rule out
this alternative explanation, the case study evidence is more consistent with our proposed interpretation and with
the implications of our model.
35
In May 2008, somewhat surprisingly given his insistence that paramilitary crimes should not be extraditable,
President Uribe extradited 14 paramilitary leaders, including Salvatore Mancuso, Jorge 40 and Don Berna. Our
model gives two ways to think about this. First, the more popular President Uribe is with the general population,
the less he needs the paramilitaries. It may therefore not be a coincidence that the extraditions took place soon
after the killing by the military of FARC senior cadre, Ra ul Reyes, which was hugely popular in Colombia. Second,
it is possible that the paramilitary leaders began to develop national political aspirations, which our model suggests
would make Uribe turn against them.
82
ano havo voloo foi logislalion favoiing paiamililaiy inloiosls. In lhis suLsoclion, wo invosligalo lho
piosonco of oxplicil links, oxploiling lho facl lhal ColomLian juoiciaiy, pailiculaily lho Supiomo
Couil, is Lioaoly inooponoonl ano has piosoculoo polilicians wilh links wilh lho paiamililaiios.
1ho voling Lohavioi of lhoso Sonalois is oiscussoo in lho noxl suLsoclion.
Wo aoopl a simplo ompiiical slialogy lo moasuio lho oxlonl lo which Sonalois iolioo on lho
suppoil of paiamililaiios foi lhoii oloclion. Fiisl, wo oolno .
lP
lo Lo lho piopoilion of lolal volo
lhal Sonalo lisl | iocoivos in municipalilios wilh high paiamililaiy piosonco, whoio wo moasuio high
paiamililaiy piosonco Ly using oui oummy vaiiaLlo consliucloo fiom oui limo-invaiianl moasuio
of paiamililaiy piosonco. Similaily wo oolno .
lG
as lho piopoilion of lolal volo lhal lisl | iocoivos
in municipalilios wilh high guoiilla piosonco, whoio high guoiilla piosonco is moasuioo in lho samo
way as paiamililaiy piosonco. 1o invosligalo lho links Lolwoon Sonalois ano paiamililaiios, wo
look al Sonalois who aio aiiosloo foi connoclions wilh paiamililaiy gioups. Wo oolno ^
l
as
lho piopoilion of lho Sonalois of lisl | lhal havo Loon aiiosloo foi allogoo connoclions wilh
paiamililaiy gioups ano lhon oslimalo
^
l
= j .
l;P
` .
l;G
X
0
l
-
l
. (0)
Lasoo on oui hypolhosis lhal Sonalois ano Congiossmon iocoiving a high fiaclion of lhoii volos
in paiamililaiy aioas havo oxplicil connoclions wilh paiamililaiios, wo oxpocl lo lno j 0. In
lho covaiialo vocloi X
0
l
wo also uso paily ioonlily. 1hough, in gonoial, lhis is an oxamplo of
Lao conliol` (Angiisl ano Iischko, 2000, pp. 64-68), sinco Loing a momLoi of a lhiio paily is
an oulcomo vaiiaLlo inLolwoon lho causal vaiiaLlo of inloiosl, .
l;P
, ano lho oulcomo vaiiaLlo,
^
l
, in lhis caso wo incluoo il lo oxamino wholhoi Loing a momLoi of a lhiio paily aLsoiLs all of
lho oxplanaloiy powoi of .
l;P
(lhus acling as lho channol lhiough which paiamililaiy piosonco is
impacling polilician Lohavioi ano aiiosls).
1aLlo 8 shows lho iosulls fiom oslimaling (0). In column 1, wo look al lho iolalionship
Lolwoon aiiosls ano paily ioonlily. As wo saw aLovo, lhoio is a closo coiiosponoonco Lolwoon
paiamililaiy piosonco ano lho iiso of lhiio pailios. Column 1 conlims lhis, showing lhal lhiio
paily Sonalois aio signilcanlly moio likoly lo Lo aiiosloo foi links wilh lho paiamililaiios lhan
LiLoials, Consoivalivos ano Socialisls (liLoials aio lho omilloo calogoiy).
In lho noxl lhioo columns, columns 2-4, wo piosonl oslimalos of (0) foi lho Sonalo. Column 2 is
lho mosl paisimonious spocilcalion whoio wo iogioss lho piopoilion of Sonalois on a lisl who woio
aiiosloo on .
l;P
ano .
l;G
. Wo soo lhal j = 1.88 (slanoaio oiioi=0.42) is slalislically signilcanl
suggosling lhal lho highoi lho shaio of ils volos lhal a lisl oLlainoo in paiamililaiy aioas, lho
gioaloi is lho piopoilion of Sonalois on lho lisl who aio aiiosloo foi links wilh paiamililaiios. In
column 8 wo aoo as a covaiialo lho piopoilion of ils volo shaio lhal lho lisl oLlainoo in iighl-
loaning` ano lofl-loaning` aioas.
36
Noilhoi of lhoso conliols aio signilcanl in lhomsolvos ano lhoy
36
We dene the `right-leaning' and `left-leaning' dummies again by looking at the vote shares of

Alvaro Gomez and
88
oo nol inluonco lho coomcionls of inloiosl.
In column 4 wo lhon aoo lho paily oummios lo invosligalo wholhoi lho onliio olocl of lho
paiamililaiios is woiking lhiough lhiio pailios. 1ho oslimalos show lhal lhis is nol lho caso.
1ho lhiio paily oummy is slill signilcanl, Lul so is lho shaio of volos fiom paiamililaiy aioas.
1his suggosls lhal lho only channol of inluonco of paiamililaiios on polilicians Lohavioi is nol
lhiough lhiio paily amlialion (which, in hinosighl, is nol suipiising, sinco in sovoial municipali-
lios, paiamililaiios suppoiloo liLoial oi consoivalivo canoioalos).
1ho noxl foui columns iopoil oslimalos of (0) foi lho Congioss. 1hoso aio Lioaoly consislonl
wilh lho iosulls foi lho Sonalo; lho piopoilion of lho volos lhal a lisl won in high paiamililaiy
aioas is posilivoly coiiolaloo wilh lho piopoilion of Congiossmon on lhal lisl who havo Loon
aiiosloo, lhough lho iosulls aio lypically somowhal loss piocisoly oslimaloo ano loss signilcanl.
Ovoiall, lhoso iosulls aio impoilanl lislly Locauso lhoy piovioo somo voiilcalion lhal oui
slialogy foi moasuiing lho olocls of lho paiamililaiios is inoooo capluiing whal lhoy aio supposoo
lo. Soconoly, lhoy also show lhal oui lnoings so fai aio unlikoly lo Lo oiivon Ly somo omilloo
chaiacloiislic of municipalilios (making paiamililaiy piosonco onoogonous` lo volois` piofoioncos).
1ho facl lhal paiamililaiy piosonco is posilivoly coiiolaloo wilh aiiosls suggosls lhal lhoio is
inoooo a closo iolalionship Lolwoon paiamililaiios ano polilicians such lhal paiamililaiy gioups aio
oilhoi foiming a coalilion wilh local polilicians, oi aio lhomsolvos iunning as canoioalos. In oilhoi
caso, il sooms highly unlikoly lhal polilicians, pailiculaily polilicians olocloo in high paiamililaiy
aioas, aio poifocl agonls of volois, suppoiling policios in lino wilh lhoii inloiosls. Insloao, il
sooms lhal lhoso polilicians aio puisuing policios syslomalically piofoiioo Ly paiamililaiios.
5.5 Voting in the Senate
As a lnal oomonslialion of lho polonlial inluonco of lho paiamililaiios on oloclions, wo oxamino
wholhoi Sonalois fiom lisls lhal iocoivoo laigo shaios of lhoii volos in paiamililaiy aioas volo in
syslomalically oiloionl ways. Wo oo lhis in lho voiy spocilc Lul iovoaling conloxl of a ioll-call
volo lo io-inlioouco lwo clausos of lho Juslico ano Ioaco Law. 1hoso woio Ailiclo 70, which
slipulaloo a 10/ ioouclion in lho sonloncos of oomoLilizoo paiamililaiios who hao Loon chaigoo
al lho limo of lho passing of lho law ano Ailiclo 71, which spociloo lhal lho ciimos of foimoi
paiamililaiios shoulo Lo consiooioo as sooilion`.
37
1ho main signilcanco of sooilion is lhal il
woulo imply lhal lho paiamililaiios hao commilloo polilical ciimos ano woulo lhoiofoio nol Lo
oligiLlo lo oxliaoilion.
38
1hoso lwo ailiclos woio pail of a lisl oiafl of lho law piosonloo Ly lho
Jaime Pardo Leal in 1986; then, similar to the construction of the dummies for paramilitary and guerrilla presence,
we constructed dummy variables for `right-leaning' and `left-leaning' areas depending on whether a municipality is
above the 75th percentile of votes for the corresponding candidate in the 1986 presidential elections.
37
At the time of the votes these clauses were actually Article 61 (sentence reduction) and Article 64 (sedition)
but this changed in the nal law.
38
This is a topic with a long and contested history in Colombia. During the writing of the 1991 Constitution,
Pablo Escobar systematically tried to intimidate delegates in order to make sure that the new Constitution made
84
Iiosioonl Lul lhoy woio Lolh iojocloo in lho lisl commissions of lho Sonalo ano lho Congioss.
1ho iojoclion of lhoso lwo ailiclos was lhon appoaloo in lho Sonalo. In iosponso lo lhis appoal
a commission was foimoo lo infoim lho Sonalo on how lo piocooo wilh lho appoal ploaoing.
1ho momLois of lho commission woio Maiio UiiLo (unooi aiiosl in 2008 foi connoclions wilh
paiamililaiios ano a cousin of Iiosioonl UiiLo), Mauiicio Iimionlo (aiiosloo ano founo guilly,
soo 1aLlo 1), Juan Gomoz, Miguol oo la Lspiiolla (aiiosloo ano founo guilly, soo 1aLlo A1), Jos us
Caiiizosa, ano Hoinanoo LscoLai. 1ho momLois of lho commission concluooo lhal lho appoal
hao lo Lo appiovoo Ly lho plonaiy of lho Sonalo which il was ano wo havo lho ioll-call foi lhis
volo. 1his volo wonl in favoi of io-inliooucing lho lwo ailiclos inlo lho Juslico ano Ioaco law.
39
1o lho oxlonl lhal lhoio is a posilivo coiiolalion Lolwoon lho piopoilion of volos a lisl iocoivoo
in paiamililaiy aioas ano lho piopoilion of Sonalois on lho lisl who voloo lo io-inlioouco lhoso
lwo ailiclos, lhis woulo Lo fuilhoi ovioonco lhal paiamililaiios havo inoooo inluoncoo oloclion
oulcomos, consislonl wilh Iioposilion 2 of oui moool. Implicilly, il is also ovioonco of lho quio
pio quo` Lolwoon paiamililaiios ano lho oxoculivo, consislonl wilh Iioposilion 4.
40
1o oxamino lho impacl of lho paiamililaiios on lhoso ioll-call volos, wo oslimalo voisions of
moool (0) in lho piovious suL-soclion. Moio spocilcally wo now oolno ^
l
lo Lo lho piopoilion of
Sonalois on lisl | lhal voloo in favoi of io-inliooucing lhoso lwo clausos. 1ho iosulls aio iopoiloo
in columns 0-12 of 1aLlo 8.
Column 0 shows lhal sonalois fiom lhiio pailios ano lho consoivalivos aio mosl likoly lo
suppoil lho io-inlioouclion of lho lwo conliovoisial ailiclos of lho Juslico ano Ioaco Law. 1ho
facl lhal consoivalivos woio as likoly as lhiio paily canoioalos lo suppoil lhoso clausos is pioLaLly
iolaloo lo lho facl lhal in lho Sonalo lhoy woio also allioo wilh Iiosioonl UiiLo. 1ho iomaining
columns show a posilivo signilcanl coiiolalion Lolwoon paiamililaiy piosonco in aioas whoio a lisl
gol a laigo piopoilion of ils volos ano lho piopoilion of Sonalois who voloo in favoi of making
lho Ioaco ano Juslico Law moio pio-paiamililaiy`. (1his olocl is no longoi signilcanl in column
12 whon wo inlioouco lho paily ioonlily vaiiaLlos, suggosling lhal a laigo pail of lho olocl is
woiking lhiough lhiio paily amlialion). 1hiio paily ioonlily is again posilivo ano signilcanl.
Nolo also lhal in nono of lho spocilcalions is lhoio any olocl of guoiilla piosonco oi iighl oi lofl
oiionlalion on lhoso volos. Ovoiall, wo inloipiol lhis as ovioonco in suppoil of oui hypolhosis
lhal polilicians iocoiving suppoil fiom paiamililaiios havo in luin suppoiloo logislalion in lino
wilh lho inloiosls of lhoso gioups.
extradition unconstitutional. The day after this was written into the Constitution, Pablo Escobar, who had been
in hiding, gave himself up to the authorities. However, the Constitution was subsequently amended to allow
extradition.
39
However the Supreme Court said that paramilitaries cannot be considered as seditious. So article 71 is currently
not being applied. Interestingly, even though President Uribe supported this clause, he then extradited 14 of the
paramilitary leaders as we discussed earlier.
40
As we discussed in Section 3, a large literature has heavily criticized the Justice and Peace Law as being very
weak and not forcing ex-combatants to account for their crimes or provide any sort of compensation for their
victims. The structure of the law came from the executive.
8
6 The Persistence of the Paramilitaries
Having pioviooo somo ovioonco consislonl wilh lho assumplion lhal paiamililaiios havo hao
syslomalic olocls on oloclions in ColomLia, wo now luin lo lwo piooiclions of oui lhooiolical
moool. Fiisl, lho moool suggosls lhal lo lho oxlonl lhal paiamililaiios oolivoi volos lo lho
Iiosioonl, lho Iiosioonl will havo a gioaloi inconlivo lo allow lhom lo slay in conliol of lho aioas
whoio lhoy aio. Socono, lhis olocl will Lo sliongoi in placos which Iiosioonl UiiLo oio nol oxpocl
lo oo woll wilhoul inloivonlion Ly lho paiamililaiios.
Wo focus on lho 2002 Iiosioonlial oloclion ano lho suLsoquonl poisislonco of paiamililaiios.
Wo iosliicl allonlion lo only municipalilios lhal hao paiamililaiy piosonco in 2000-2001. A
municipalily is classiloo as having paiamililaiy piosonco if il oxpoiioncoo any paiamililaiy iolaloo
incioonls (allacks oi oisplacomonl ooponoing on lho moasuio usoo) ouiing oilhoi 2000 oi 2001.
Wo uso a limo vaiying moasuio of paiamililaiy piosonco lo capluio piosonco Lofoio lho oloclion,
oonoloo 1
m;t<2002
, ano piosonco afloi lho oloclion, oonoloo 1
m;t>2002
. In oui Lasolino spocilcalion
lhis is moasuioo as lho sum of oilhoi allacks oi oisplacomonls ouiing a lwo-yoai winoow, lho
poiioos 2000 ano 2001 (l<2002) oi Lolwoon 2004 ano 200 (l2002) in oilhoi caso oiviooo Ly
lho populalion of lho municipalily. Oui iosulls aio ioLusl lo oiloionl ways of moasuiing lhoso
vaiiaLlos as wo show. Wo can uso lhis vaiiaLlo lo oxplicilly oxamino how lho poisislonco of
paiamililaiy piosonco ooponos on lho oxlonl of voling foi Iiosioonl UiiLo, lhus losling lho lisl
piooiclion. 1o losl lho socono implicalion of lho moool wo aiguo lhal ovon lhough whon UiiLo
was Govoinoi of Anlioquia ho was nominally a iopiosonlalivo of lho LiLoial Iaily, in facl his koy
suppoilois, in lho aLsonco of cooicion, woio consoivalivo volois who likoo his omphasis on law
ano oiooi. Diiocl ovioonco comos fiom lho facl lhal lho Consoivalivo Iaily choso nol lo iun
a canoioalo againsl him oilhoi in 2002 oi 2006, whilo lho LiLoial Iaily oio (Hoiacio Soipa in
Lolh casos). As a consoquonco, UiiLo coulo anlicipalo ooing woll in placos whoio Consoivalivo
Iiosioonl Anoios Iasliana hao iocoivoo a high volo shaio in 1008. Wo can lhoiofoio losl lho
socono hypolhosis Ly inloiacling Iasliana`s volo shaio in 1008 wilh UiiLo`s volo shaio.
Moio foimally, wo oslimalo lho following moool:
1
m;t>2002
= c 1
m;t<2002
,
u
m;2002

u
m;2002

p
m;1998
c
p
m;1998
X
0
m
-
m
(10)
whoio
u
m;2002
is lho volo shaio of Iiosioonl UiiLo in municipalily : in 2002 ano
p
m;1998
is lho volo
shaio of Iasliana in 1008. Oui moool piooicls lhal , 0 (a gioaloi shaio of volos foi UiiLo woulo
loao lo gioaloi paiamililaiy piosonco afloi 2002), ano < 0so lhal lho highoi was Iasliana`s
volo shaio in 1008, lho loss UiiLo woulo Lonoll fiom lho suppoil of lho paiamililaiios ano lhus
accoioing lo oui lhooiolical moool, lho moio likoly aio lho paiamililaiios lo Lo oliminaloo.
An alloinalivo moasuio of lho paiamililaiy-inoucoo volo aovanlago of UiiLo, which is moio
closoly iolaloo lo lho piooiclions of Iioposilion 8, is lo oolno lho vaiiaLlo max0,
u
m;2002

p
m;1998
,
86
which oiioclly capluios lho volo aovanlago of UiiLo in 2002 iolalivo lo Iasliana`s volo in 1008,
if any (in municipalily :). Wilh lho samo ioasoning, wo oxpocl lho coomcionl on lhis vaiiaLlo lo
Lo posilivolho gioaloi is
u
m;2002

p
m;1998
, lho moio UiiLo gainoo iolalivo lo Iasliana ano lho
moio wo woulo oxpocl paiamililaiios lo poisisl.
1ho iosulls fiom oslimaling vaiious voisions of (10) aio shown in 1aLlo 0. 1hioughoul lhis
laLlo ano lho noxl whoio wo oxamino ioLuslnoss, all of lho main olocls aio ovalualoo al lho samplo
moans lo facililalo inloipiolalion. 1ho lisl six columns of 1aLlo 0 uso lho attacks moasuio non-
slalo aimoo acloi piosonco, whilo lho noxl foui uso lho displaced moasuio. 1ho lnal lwo uso lho
lisl piincipal compononl of allacks ano oisplacoo.
1ho iosulls aio Lioaoly consislonl wilh oui moool, in pailiculai, wilh lho piooiclions of
Iioposilion 8. In column 1 of 1aLlo 0 wo oslimalo lho simplosl voision of (10). Consislonl
wilh lhoso piooiclions, lho oslimalo of UiiLo`s volo shaio of valuo lo lho samplo moan, ,, is
oslimaloo al 0.14 (wilh a slanoaio oiioi=0.08). 1his oslimalo, which is maiginally signilcanl,
suggosls lhal olhoi lhings oqual, lho gioaloi lho volo shaio foi Iiosioonl UiiLo in lho 2002
oloclion in municipalily :, lho gioaloi lho paiamililaiy piosonco in lho municipalily afloi 2002.
Quanlilalivoly lhis is a sizaLlo, lhough nol implausiLlo, olocl implying lhal a 10/ incioaso in
UiiLo`s volo shaio in an avoiago municipalily unooi paiamililaiy conliol will incioaso paiamililaiy
piosonco Ly 0.014. 1his is a laigo olocl compaioo lo lho moan of paiamililaiy piosonco in lho
wholo samplo, which is 0.04, lhough smalloi foi lho moan whon wo iosliicl allonlion lo only lhoso
municipalilios which hao posilivo paiamililaiy piosonco, lhis Loing 0.1.
41
Moioovoi, again consislonl wilh lho piooiclions of Iioposilion 8, lho coomcionl on lho in-
loiaclion Lolwoon UiiLo`s ano Iasliana`s volo shaios is nogalivo ano slalislically signilcanl al
/, = 0.68 (slanoaio oiioi=0.88). 1his implios lhal, all olso oqual, paiamililaiios woio moio
likoly lo poisisl in aioas whoio Iiosioonl UiiLo iocoivoo a high shaio of volos, and on lho Lasis
of lho volos of Iiosioonl Iasliana in lho 1008 oloclion, ho woulo havo Loon oxpocloo lo iocoivo a
lowoi volo shaio. Column 2 aoos covaiialos lo lho Lasic moool of Column 1 whilo Column 8 aoos
conliols foi guoiilla piosonco in 2000-2001. In lhoso columns, lho inloiaclion loim iomains noga-
livo ano has a similai quanlilalivo magniluoos lo lhal in Column 1, Lul is no longoi slalislically
signilcanl (in sovoial olhoi spocilcalions in lhis ano lho noxl laLlo, lho inloiaclion loim is again
signilcanl).
Column 4 iopoils a iogiossion moool moio oiioclly inspiioo Ly Iioposilion 8, which makos lho
poisislonco of paiamililaiios a funclion of lho volo gain of Iiosioonl UiiLo iolalivo lo Iiosioonl
Iasliana, max0,
u
m;2002

p
m;1998
. 1his vaiiaLlo is posilivo lhough again maiginally insignilcanl
in column 8 (coomcionl = 0.2, s.o. = 0.1), consislonl wilh oui lhooiolical piooiclions.
In Columns ano 6, wo uso lho logaiilhms of all of lho vaiiaLlos so wo loso a lol of oLsoiva-
41
Since this is the eect at the sample mean and < 0, the impact of Uribe's vote share is signicantly higher
in municipalities with lower Pastrana share.
87
lions (all lho zoios). In Column wilh lhis spocilcalion lho oiiocl olocl of UiiLo`s volo shaio
is nol signilcanl, Lul lho inloiaclion loim is nogalivo ano highly signilcanl (lhis spocilcalion
also incluoos guoiiilla piosonco Lofoio 2002 as in Column 8). In Column 6, lho coomcionl on
max0,
u
m;2002

p
m;1998
is again posilivo ano maiginally signilcanl (coomcionl = 0.6, slanoaio
oiioi = 0.80).
1ho noxl foui columns oxamino lho samo moools using lho oisplacoo moasuio of paiamililaiy
ano guoiilla piosonco. In all of lhoso spocilcalions lho oiiocl olocl of UiiLo`s volo shaio is posilivo
ano highly signilcanl. 1ho inloiaclion loim is also always nogalivo, ano slalislically signilcanl
wilh lovols, Lul nol wilh logs. Moioovoi, whon wo uso lho spocilcalion wilh max0,
u
m;2002

p
m;1998
, lho oslimaloo olocl is posilivo ano highly signilcanl.
1ho lnal lwo columns uso lho lisl piincipal compononls of allacks ano oisplacoo. 1hoso
iosulls aio similai, ano in facl moio suppoilivo of lho piooiclions of oui moool. 1ho oiiocl olocl
of UiiLo`s volo shaio ovalualoo al lho samplo moan is posilivo ano slalislically signilcanl, ano lho
inloiaclion loim is nogalivo ano signilcanl. In lhis spocilcalion using max0,
u
m;2002

p
m;1998
,
lho iosulls aio now much moio piocisoly oslimaloo ano lho coomcionl on lhis laLlo is now highly
signilcanl.
1aLlo 10 invosligalos lho ioLuslnoss of lho Lasic iosulls in 1aLlo 0. In pailiculai, il usos a
lwo-yoai winoow insloao of lho lhioo-yoai winoow in 1aLlo 0 (lhal is, wo oolno 1
m;t<2002
ano
1
m;t>2002
using 1000, 2000 ano 2001 (l<2002) oi Lolwoon 2008, 2004, 200 (l2002) in oilhoi
caso oiviooo Ly lho populalion of lho municipalily). 1ho iosulls aio Lioaoly similai lo lhoso in
1aLlo 0. In pailiculai, lho inloiaclion loim is now moio piocisoly oslimaloo ano is slalislically
signilcanl in almosl all spocilcalions.
Ovoiall, wo inloipiol lho iosulls in lhis soclion as piovioing somo suppoil lo oui Iioposilion
8 lhal incumLonl polilicians in powoi will lono lo iofiain fiom oliminaling paiamililaiios in aioas
whoio lhoso gioups oolivoi volos ano lhal lhis olocl is sliongoi whoio lhoy woulo nol havo
olhoiwiso oono as woll.
7 The Symbiotic Relationship between the Paramilitaries and
the Executive
7.1 Econometric Evidence
1ho lasl soclion pioviooo somo ovioonco on a possiLlo symLiolic iolalionship Lolwoon lho paiamil-
ilaiios ano lho oxoculivo. In placos whoio lho paiamililaiios oolivoioo volos in 2002, lhoy woio
moio likoly lo suivivo. 1o invosligalo lhis symLiolic iolalionship, oi lho quio pio quo,` moio
oxlonsivoly, il is usoful lo sluoy koy logislalion lho oxoculivo Lioughl lo lho logislaluio, ano how
paiamililaiy piosonco may havo inluoncoo voling on lhoso logislalions. Wo can only oxamino lho
lisl issuo, whal laws lho oxoculivo pioposoo, using caso sluoy ovioonco. 1o look al lho socono
88
issuo, how paiamililaiy piosonco may havo inluoncoo voling palloins, wo again oxamino ioll-call
volos.
Wo focus on a voiy salionl ano iolovanl ioll-call foi which wo havo oala: lho volo on wholhoi oi
nol lo chango lho Conslilulion lo oiop lho singlo-poiioo loim limil on lho Iiosioonl. If Sonalois
who woio olocloo wilh suppoil fiom paiamililaiios woio moio inclinoo lo suppoil lhis chango
in lho Conslilulion, lhon lhis woulo Lo oiiocl, lhough naluially nol oolnilivo, ovioonco lhal
lho paiamililaiios suppoiloo UiiLo oilhoi as quio pio quo oi Locauso ho woulo naluially chooso
policios moio in lino wilh lhoii inloiosls ano piofoioncos.
As in oui piovious analysis of ioll-call volos wo uso a simplo ompiiical slialogy Lasoo on
oqualion (0) in suLsoclions .4 ano .. Wo now oolno ^
l
lo Lo lho piopoilion of Sonalois on lisl
| lhal voloo in favoi of changing lho Conslilulion lo allow Iiosioonl UiiLo lo iun foi io-oloclion.
All of lho iomaining vaiiaLlos aio oolnoo as Lofoio.
1aLlo 11 looks al lho ioll-call volo foi io-oloclion. 1ho sliucluio of lhis laLlo is similai lo lhal
of 1aLlo 8, oxcopl lhal lho lwo pails of lho laLlo now uso lho allacks ano oisplacoo moasuios. 1ho
lisl column again oslimalos a simplo iogiossion of ^
l
on paily oummios. Il shows lhal momLois
of lhiio pailios lonooo lo volo in favoi of io-oloclion, as oio Consoivalivos, whilo momLois of Lofl
pailios lonooo lo volo againsl (all iolalivo lo LiLoials). Columns 2-4 lhon uso lho simplo moool
(0) wilh lho allacks oala, whilo -7 oslimalo lho samo moool using lho oisplacoo oala. Using
oilhoi slialogy, ano ovon holoing paily amlialion conslanl, lhoio is a ioLusl posilivo olocl of lho
piosonco of paiamililaiios in aioas whoio Sonalo lisls iocoivoo a high volo shaio on lho pioponsily
of Sonalois on lho lisl lo volo in favoi of changing lho Conslilulion lo allow Iiosioonl UiiLo lo
iun again. 1his olocl is slalislically signilcanl in all columns, oxcopl in column 7 whoio wo also
incluoo paily ioonlily (lhis suggosls lhal in lhis inslanco mosl of lho olocls of paiamililaiios on
polilicians Lohavioi mighl Lo woiking lhiough lhiio paily amlialion). 1hoso columns also again
show lhal lhoio is no ioLusl impacl of lho piosonco of guoiillas on lho voling Lohavioi of Sonalois
on lhis moasuio.
7.2 Case Study Evidence
1hoio is a laigo caso sluoy liloialuio which is consislonl wilh lho nolion of a quio pio quo Lolwoon
oxoculivo ano paiamililaiy polilicians. Ono oLvious aiona is lho foimulalion of lho Juslico ano
Ioaco Law which look placo afloi lho sociol nogolialions al Sanla Fo oo Ialilo. 1his law was
wiooly ciilicizoo Lolh insioo ano oulsioo ColomLia as Loing fai loo lonionl on paiamililaiios.
Hoio wo focus on a voiy iovoaling moio ioconl soiios of ovonls which also soom lo spoak lo
lho symLiolic iolalionship. Lvon lhough many Congiossmon ano Sonalois havo Loon aiiosloo,
lhoy aio ioplacoo in lho logislaluio Ly lhoii alloinalos (in Spanish suplonlos`) who appoai on lho
samo lisl al lho limo of lho oloclion. In consoquonco, lhoii polilical inluonco is lilllo oiminishoo.
1o chango lhis silualion momLois of Congioss pioposoo a polilical iofoim in 2008 lo iomovo
80
lhoso polilicians ano lhoii alloinalos fiom lho logislaluio. 1his inilialivo was killoo whon many
polilicians failoo lo appoai foi a ooLalo so lhal a quoium was nol ioachoo. 1ho facl lhal Sonalois
failoo lo appoai foi lho volo was wiooly Llamoo on Iiosioonl UiiLo (soo lho iomaiks of Sonalois
Guslavo Iolio ano Iafaol Iaioo (Lnlioiio oo quinla" Semana, Juno 7, 2008),
42
ano Semana
nolos If UiiLismo losl ils majoiilios in Congioss, il woulo Lo oimcull lo gol lho appioval of koy
piojocls, such as a now iofoim lo lhal lilllo ailiclo` of lho Conslilulion."
43
1ho lilllo ailiclo`
(usoo saicaslically) in lho Conslilulion is lho chango lo allow Iiosioonl UiiLo lo iun foi a lhiio
loim of omco. 1his oxpoiionco shows how Iiosioonl UiiLo iolios on lho logislalivo suppoil of
polilicians oooply implicaloo wilh lho paiamililaiios lo pass koy Lills.
44
Afloi lhis piojocl failoo lho oxoculivo pioposoo an alloinalivo polilical iofoim in Augusl 2008
which involvoo changing lho Conslilulion lo lako away lho powoi of lho Supiomo Couil lo liy
Congiossmon. As Joso Miguol Vivanco, Amoiicas oiiocloi al Human Iighls Walch pul il UiiLo
is Liazonly liying lo lako lho powoi lo invosligalo Congiossmon away fiom lho ono inslilulion
lhal has oono lho mosl lo uncovoi ano Lioak paiamililaiy inluonco in lho Congioss ... 1his
pioposal soivos no ioal puiposo, olhoi lhan lo holp momLois of UiiLo`s coalilion gol ol lho hook"
(Human Iighls Walch, 2008).
8 Conclusions
Why aio many slalos in loss-oovolopoo sociolios unaLlo lo oslaLlish WoLoi`s famous monopoly of
violonco in lhoii loiiiloiios 1ho slanoaio oxplanalion iolios on lho inaLilily of lho conlial slalo lo
Lioaocasl ils powoi lhioughoul lho loiiiloiios lhal il nominally conliols ano viows an oxlonsion
of lhis powoi lo lho poiiphoiy as a naluial Ly-piooucl of polilical moooinizalion`. In lhis papoi
wo oovolopoo an alloinalivo poispoclivo, suggosling lhal lho conlial slalo can oovolop (ovon
moooinizo`) wilhoul oslaLlishing such a monopoly of violonco Locauso lhoio may Lo a symLiolic
iolalionship Lolwoon lho pailios conliolling lho conlial slalo ano non-slalo aclois oxoicising powoi
in lho poiiphoiios of lho counliy. 1ho oiigins of lhis symLiolic iolalionship is lhal non-slalo aimoo
aclois can piovioo suppoil lo lhoso conliolling lho conlial slalo. 1his is pailiculaily impoilanl
in oomociacios whoio non-slalo aimoo aclois can conliol oloclions. Sinco lhoy naluially havo
polilical piofoioncos, lhoy can (ciooiLly) oolivoi volos foi lho nalional polilicians in lino wilh
lhoii iooological ano policy Liasos. Iolilicians olocloo wilh lho implicil suppoil of lhoso non-slalo
aclois will lhon havo loss inconlivo lo oliminalo lhom, loaoing lo an oquiliLiium wilhoul a full
monopoly of violonco of lho conlial slalo. Wo oovolopoo lhis iooa lhooiolically ano pioviooo
42
http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/entierro-quinta/112489.aspx
43
In Spanish \Si el uribismo perda sus mayorias en el Congreso, se le hara dicil lograr el visto bueno para
proyectos clave, como una nueva reforma a ese `articulito' de la Constitucion" (Semana, June 7, 2008).
44
In September 2009 both houses of the legislature voted to hold a national referendum on whether to allow Uribe
to run for a third term. Socialists and members of the Liberal party abstained in these votes so we do not have
further roll-calls on this issue.
40
ompiiical suppoil using ioconl polilical ovonls fiom ColomLia.
Oui moool makos a soiios of piooiclions, which wo invosligaloo using ColomLian oala. Oui
ompiiical ovioonco Logan Ly using a vaiioly of slialogios lo conlim lhal paiamililaiios havo
inoooo hao a signilcanl impacl on oloclions in ColomLia. Following lho founoalion of lho AUC,
lhoio is a shaip incioaso in lho volo shaio of lhiio pailios, which woio oxplicilly oi implicilly
associaloo wilh paiamililaiios, in aioas lhal havo high paiamililaiy piosonco. 1ho samo aioas
also showoo an incioaso in olocloial conconlialion (lho volo shaio of lho mosl populai` lisl in a
municipalily). Wo also piosonloo ovioonco lhal high paiamililaiy piosonco in aioas whoio sonalois
iocoivoo laigo piopoilions of lhoii volos piooicls how lhoy voloo on koy clausos of lho Juslico ano
Ioaco Law, ano wholhoi lhoy gol aiiosloo foi illicil links wilh lho paiamililaiios. Wo also founo
lhal paiamililaiy piosonco is coiiolaloo wilh volo shaio of lho winning piosioonlial canoioalo,

Alvaio UiiLo.
1ho lwo koy piooiclions of oui lhooiolical moool aio lhal paiamililaiios shoulo poisisl lo lho
oxlonl lhal lhoy oolivoi volos lo polilicians whoso piofoioncos aio closoi lo lhoii own ano lhal lhis
olocl is laigoi in aioas whoio lhoso polilicians woulo olhoiwiso nol oo woll. 1hoso iosulls illuslialo
lho possiLlo piosonco of a symLiolic iolalionship Lolwoon lho oxoculivo ano lho paiamililaiios.
Wo fuilhoi illuslialoo lhis iolalionship Ly showing lhal lho piopoilion of lho volos which a sonalo
lisl won in paiamililaiy aioas is posilivoly coiiolaloo wilh lho piopoilion of Sonalois on lho lisl
lhal voloo lo chango lho Conslilulion lo allow Iiosioonl UiiLo lo iun foi a socono loim.
Novoilholoss, noilhoi oui iosulls noi lho caso sluoy liloialuio suggosls lho piosonco of a foimal
coalilion` Lolwoon paiamililaiy gioups ano Iiosioonl UiiLo. 1hoy aio consislonl, howovoi, wilh
lho iooa lhal UiiLo`s policios aio closoi lo lhoso piofoiioo Ly paiamililaiios lhan lhoso of olhoi
pailios which naluially givos lho paiamililaiios an inloiosl in gonoialing suppoil foi him. As
Jaiio Angaiila foimoi loaooi of lho AUC`s Sin u ano San Joigo Llocs ano Salvaloio Mancuso`s
oopuly ooclaioo in SoplomLoi 200, ho was piouo lo woik foi lho
iooloclion of lho Losl Iiosioonl wo havo ovoi hao".
45
Naluially, oiloionl inloipiolalions of lho oala aio possiLlo. Foi inslanco, il is possiLlo lhal
pooplo in paiamililaiy aioas aio naluially pio law ano oiooi` oi moio consoivalivo` so lhal pios-
onco of paiamililaiios is onoogonous lo voloi piofoioncos`. If lhis woio liuo oui iosulls connocling
lho piosonco of paiamililaiios lo Iiosioonlial volo shaio coulo Lo ouo lo omilloo vaiiaLlo Lias.
1his mighl also unooimino oui inloipiolalion of lho ioll-call volos sinco il woulo imply lhal Son-
alois who voloo lo chango lho Conslilulion lo allow Iiosioonl UiiLo lo iun again oio so Locauso
lhoii volois` piofoiioo il. 1hoso alloinalivo hypolhosos oo nol appoai plausiLlo oxplanalions foi
lho palloins, howovoi. Fiisl, oui ioonlilcalion comos fiom lho liming of lho foimalion of lho AUC
45
El Tiempo, September 7, 2005.
41
ano lhoii oocision lo oovolop an olocloial slialogy (iolying on inlimioalion, muiooi ano manipu-
lalion lo gol lhoii canoioalos olocloo lo nalional omco). Foi oxamplo, piioi lo lhoso ovonls, lhoio
was no signilcanl oiloioncos Lolwoon olocloial conconlialion in aioas wilh oi wilhoul paiamili-
laiios, inoicaling lhal polilical piofoioncos oio nol syslomalically oiloi Lolwoon lhoso lwo aioas.
1ho liming of lho foimalion of lho AUC sloms moslly fiom lho collapso of lho Mooollin ano
Cali oiug cailols ano is unlikoly lo iolocl a chango in polilical piofoioncos on lho pail of volois.
Socono, lo lho oxlonl lhal voloi piofoioncos oiloi wilh somo aioas Loing moio consoivalivo lhan
olhois, lhis woulo Lo conliolloo foi Ly oui uso of lxoo olocls as long as lhoso oiloioncos aio
limo-invaiianl. Moioovoi, lho caso sluoy liloialuio suggosls somolhing of a ioalily chock` on lhis
aigumonl sinco il piovioos oxlonsivo ovioonco of cooicion ano manipulalion of oloclions in oopail-
monls such as Magoalona, Cosai, CoiLooa ano Sucio wilh high paiamililaiy piosonco. 1hiio, lho
facl lhal paiamililaiy piosonco piooicls aiiosls of Sonalois makos il impioLaLlo lhal polilicians
aio simply iopiosonling voloi piofoioncos. 1hoso iosulls, along wilh lho caso sluoy liloialuio,
suggosls lhal polilicians foimoo coalilions wilh paiamililaiios, oi paiamililaiios gonoialoo lhoii
own polilicians. Fouilh, wo liioo lo oxplicilly conliol foi lho limo vaiying olocls of consoivalivo
loanings of coilain municipalilios.
An impoilanl aioa foi fuluio invosligalion is lho impacl of non-slalo aimoo aclois on puLlic
gooo piovision. If lho paiamililaiios, foi oxamplo, aio oloclivoly lho local slalo, how oo lhoy oo
al piovioing puLlic gooos oi soivicos iolalivo lo lho logilimalo slalo 1ho caso sluoy ovioonco
is mixoo on lhis. Somo, such as Gulioiioz Sanin ano Laion (200, p. 18) aiguo in lhoii sluoy
of lho oovolopmonl of lho paiamililaiios in Iuoilo Loyaca lhal lhoy unooilook invoslmonls in
palionago (oiug sloios, clinics, hoallh campaigns, ooucalional soivicos)." Duncan`s (2007) also
suppoils lhis iooa (soo also lhopioLaLly nol onliioly ciooiLloclaims in Casla no, 2001). Yol
olhoi anocoolos miligalo againsl il in Casanaio, foi oxamplo, ano in La Guajiia.
A lnal ano ciucial quoslion concoins lho oxloinal valioily of lhoso lnoings. Aio lho mocha-
nisms wo oiscuss only iolovanl in ColomLia, oi oo lhoy also inluonco lho cioalion of lho monopoly
of violonco in olhoi slalos Allhough oui aigumonls in lhis papoi conliasl wilh lho omphasis of
much of lho oxisling liloialuio on slalo foimalion, lhoio aio sovoial olhoi inslancos whoio non-
slalo aclois appoai lo play a similai iolo lo lhal of paiamililaiios in ColomLia. Foi oxamplo, as
monlionoo in lho Inlioouclion, lho oxislonco of lho liiLal aioas in Waziiislan ooos nol imply lhal
lho slalo has nol foimoo in Iakislan, Lul is inoicalivo of a oiloionl oquiliLiium palloin similai
lo lhal in ColomLia. A iolaloo oxamplo comos fiom Ilaly ano lho iolo of lho Mala in oolivoiing
volos lo lho Chiislian Domocialic Iaily (Walslon, 1088). Finally, lho long aulonomy of lho US
Soulh afloi lho Hayos-1iloon agioomonl of 1877 unlil lho Civil Iighls ano Voling Iighls acls of
lho 1060s also piosonls many paiallols wilh lho ColomLian caso. Soulhoin polilical olilos woio
aLlo lo oslaLlish a ono-paily unoomocialic polilical syslom Lasoo on lho oisonfianchisomonl ano
cooicion of Llacks. 1ho powoi lhus consolioaloo gavo lhom gioal inluonco in nalional polilical
42
inslilulions whoio lhoy coulo Lolh impooo logislalion lhoy oio nol liko, Lul whoio lhoy also sup-
plioo volos, which was oxaclly whal lho Hayos-1iloon ooal was aLoul. A lolling pioco of ovioonco
in favoi of lhis inloipiolalion is pioviooo Ly Fianklin D. Ioosovoll`s ioaclion lo a pioposal lo
pass logislalion lo allompl lo iosliicl lynching. In iosponso ho aiguoo lhal Soulhoin logislalois
aio chaiimon oi occupy slialogic placos on mosl of lho Sonalo ano Houso commilloos ... If I
como oul foi lho anli-lynching Lill now, lhoy will Llock ovoiy Lill I ask Congioss lo pass" (quoloo
in Fioooiickson, 2001, p. 20). 1hoio is lhoiofoio somo ovioonco lhal lho mochanisms wo havo
ioonliloo hoio aio of quilo gonoial applicaLilily.
48
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Appendix: The Evidence from Magdalena
In lhis Apponoix, wo oxamino voling palloins in lho Dopailmonl of Magoalona, whoio vaiious
paiamililaiy gioups havo Loon voiy aclivo ovoi oui poiioo of invosligalion. In Map 8 wo iopioouco
lho oala on olocloial conconlialion, oolnoo as lho volo shaio of lho lisl lhal won lho mosl volos,
in Magoalona foi lho 1008, 2002 ano 2006 oloclions foi lho Sonalo. Wo also placo on lho map
lho piopoilion of volos lhal Sonaloi Luis Louaioo Vivos (14lh on 1aLlo A1) ano Congiossman
Alfonso Campo, ono of lho signaloiios al Sanlo Fo oo Ialilo, won in oach municipalily. 1ho map
shows lho oiamalic incioaso in olocloial conconlialion in 2002. In pailiculai, in lho oaik ioo aioas
spocilc polilicians woio winning ossonlially 100/ of lho volos casl in a municipalily. Ono soos
lhal Vivos ano Campo won voiy laigo piopoilions of volos in lho soulhoinmosl municipalilios
such as San SoLaslian ano Guamal. In lho oaik ioo municipalilios lo lho noilh Sonalois Salomon
Saaoo ano DioL Maloof won noaily all of lho volos (2no ano lh in 1aLlo 1, 8io ano 4lh in 1aLlo
A1). Vivos, Maloof ano Saaoo all iopiosonloo lhiio pailios ano Vivos ano Maloof havo Loon
liioo ano founo guilly of links wilh paiamililaiios, whilo Saaoo is cuiionlly unooi invosligalion.
Conconlialion falls in 2006 howovoi ano Vivos wins laigo piopoilions of his volo in municipalilios
lo lho noilh, such as Ll Iinon ano San Anlonio, whoio in 2002 ho hao won no volos. Campo`s
volo also Locomos moio ovonly oisliiLuloo ovoi lho Dopailmonl, lhough ho was nol io-olocloo in
2006. 1ho palloin is similai foi lho olhoi Sonalois ano oospilo of lhis fall, Maloof ano Vivos woio
Lolh io-olocloo, wilh almosl lho samo numLoi of volos as in 2006. Foi oxamplo Vivos gol 8,70
in Magoalona in 2002 ano 4,600 in 2006.
46
In 2006 Joso Joaquin Vivos, a Congiossman foi Magoalona piioi lo 2002 whoso volo shaio
collapsoo in lho 2002 oloclions, noloo
Coilain CongiossmomLois havo ciooonlials lhal aio Luill upon lho Llooo of inno-
conl cilizons ... In Magoalona ciicumslancos slill oo nol oxisl foi lho noxl oloclion lo
Lo fioo. Il musl also Lo saio cloaily ano oiioclly lhal oomociacy has Loon kionappoo
in lho oopailmonl ano iomains kionappoo lhiough a iolalionship cioaloo Lolwoon
coilain polilical gioups ano lho solf-oofonso foicos."
47
Ovoiall, lho oala foi Magoalona show a signilcanl incioaso in olocloial conconlialion in 2002
wilh sovoial Sonalois ano Congiossmon who suLsoquonlly woio chaigoo wilh links lo paiamili-
laiios, winning closo lo 100/ of lho volo in a fow solocloo municipalilios. In 2006 conconlialion
46
Prior to the 2006 congressional elections two pro-Uribe parties dropped ve candidates from their lists who
were accused of having direct links with paramilitaries. The U party dropped Habib Merheg, Dieb Maloof and Luis
Eduardo Vives and Cambio Radical dropped Jorge Caballero and Jorge Castro. Expelled candidates re-appeared
on the lists of smaller pro-Uribe parties and Merheg and Maloof won seats in Congress with the Colombia Viva
Party.
47
Quoted in the article `Mas alla del control territorial' El Espectador, January 22, 2006.
40
wonl oown, Lul inloioslingly Sonalois Maloof ano Vivos woio io-olocloo, lhough now wilh lhoii
volos spioao oul much moio ovonly acioss lho oopailmonl.
0

Third Parties
(1)
Reelection
(2)
J ustice and
Peace Law
(3)
Status
(4)
% Votes I n
Paramilitary Zones
(5)
MAURICIO PIMIENTO BARRERA yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 68.30
DIEB NICOLAS MALOOF CUSE yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 56.93
ALVARO ARAUJ O CASTRO yes yes Arrested 54.78
J UAN CARLOS MARTINEZ SINISTERRA yes yes Arrested 51.22
SALOMON DE J ESUS SAADE ABDALA no yes Investigated 41.40
CARLOS ARTURO CLAVIJ O VARGAS yes Arrested 39.33
J UAN GOMEZ MARTINEZ yes yes 34.96
ISABEL CELIS YAEZ no 33.96
PIEDAD CORDOBA no no no 33.20
GERMAN HERNANDEZ AGUILERA no yes yes 31.46
FLOR MODESTA GNECCO ARREGOCES yes yes yes 31.27
RUBEN DARIO QUINTERO VILLADA yes Arrested 30.03
BERNARDO ALEJ ANDRO GUERRA HOYOS no no 29.48
HUGO SERRANO GOMEZ no no 29.21
WILLIAM ALFONSO MONTES MEDINA yes yes yes Arrested (Not Guilty) 28.48
LUIS GUILLERMO VELEZ TRUJ ILLO no yes yes 28.44
CONSUELO DE MUSTAFA no yes 28.22
J OSE RENAN TRUJ ILLO GARCIA no yes yes 26.80
VICTOR RENAN BARCO LOPEZ no yes yes Investigated 26.11
GUILLERMO GAVIRIA ZAPATA no no yes Investigated 25.07
Senator
Table 1: Top 20 Senators By Vote Share in Paramilitary Areas

Notes: Senators that obtained the twenty highest shares of votes in municipalities with high paramilitary presence. High paramilitary presence is measured by a
dummy that takes the value of one if the municipality had a total number of attacks by the paramilitaries per 1.000 inhabitants above the 75
th
percentile in the
1997-2001 period. A Yes indicates that the senator belongs to a third party in the election of 2002 (column (1)), voted yes to approve reelection (column (2)) or yes
to reintroduce Sedition and Reduction of Sentences articles in the J ustice and Peace Law (column (3)). The status of the senator (column (4)) is that on May 21 of
2009 and is taken from Indepaz http://www.indepaz.org.co (for reelected senators) and from the news. A blank space in columns (2) or (3) means that the senator
did not vote on the measure.
Mean
Standard
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation
(1) Paramilitary Presence 0.12 (0.29) 0.42 (0.45) 0.02 (0.03)
(2) Paramilitary Presence 1996-1997 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.04) 0.00 (0.01)
(3) Paramilitary Presence 2000-2001 0.04 (0.12) 0.15 (0.20) 0.01 (0.02)
(4) Paramilitary Presence 2004-2005 0.03 (0.13) 0.11 (0.25) 0.00 (0.01)
(5) Guerrilla Presence 1.03 (2.03) 1.82 (2.76) 0.77 (1.63)
(6) Guerrilla Presence 1996-1997 0.13 (0.31) 0.27 (0.48) 0.08 (0.20)
(7) Guerrilla Presence 2000-2001 0.21 (0.43) 0.44 (0.65) 0.14 (0.29)
(8) Guerrilla Presence 2004-2005 0.23 (0.87) 0.33 (0.67) 0.19 (0.92)
(9) Third Parties Vote Share in the Senate Before 2001 14.72 (15.90) 11.22 (13.06) 15.95 (16.61)
(10) Third Parties Vote Share in the Senate After 2002 32.88 (19.65) 38.59 (20.78) 30.90 (18.85)
(11) Third Parties Vote Share in the Congress Before 2001 26.80 (21.75) 22.84 (19.37) 28.17 (22.36)
(12) Third Parties Vote Share in the Congress After 2002 35.42 (21.48) 38.45 (22.12) 34.39 (21.19)
(13) Winning Vote Share in the Senate Before 2001 33.49 (19.77) 31.01 (18.01) 34.34 (20.29)
(14) Winning Vote Share in the Senate After 2001 39.12 (18.97) 44.32 (19.99) 37.35 (18.29)
(15) Winning Vote Share in the Congress Before 2001 29.69 (17.02) 30.37 (17.38) 29.45 (16.89)
(16) Winning Vote Share in the Congress After 2001 35.37 (15.81) 37.51 (16.11) 34.65 (15.66)
(17) Winning Presidential Candidate Vote Share Before 2001 42.29 (22.73) 39.21 (23.29) 43.38 (22.46)
(18) Winning Presidential Candidate Vote share after 2001 52.35 (21.47) 54.58 (21.66) 51.58 (21.37)
(19) Preferences for the Right 42.26 (27.47) 36.73 (28.32) 44.25 (26.91)
(20) Preferences for the Left 5.05 (11.41) 6.12 (11.47) 4.67 (11.37)
(21) Land Gini in 1985 70.11 (10.58) 69.63 (10.51) 70.28 (10.61)
(22) Unfullfiled Basic Needs in 1993 53.87 (19.56) 55.33 (16.43) 53.36 (20.55)
(23) Average Population in 1993 and 2005 34828.42 (202618.10) 17851.39 (23238.26) 40534.65 (233578.10)
(24) Rural Index in 1993 62.63 (24.50) 60.65 (20.29) 63.33 (25.81)
(25) Distance to the States' Capital 129.66 (105.54) 146.12 (115.71) 123.85 (101.16)
(26) Altitude 1157.38 (897.89) 983.56 (785.11) 1218.72 (927.16)
(27) Precipitation 1912.28 (1061.04) 2235.12 (1146.02) 1798.36 (1005.68)
(28) Dummy of OpiumCultivation in 1994 0.10 (0.29) 0.05 (0.23) 0.11 (0.31)
(29) Dummy of Coca Cultivation in 1994 0.05 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.24)
Whole Sample High Paramilitary Presence Low Paramilitary Presence
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Notes: Each variable in rows (1) to (8) is the sum of paramilitary or guerrilla attacks per 1.000 inhabitants over the corresponding time period averaged over
different samples of municipalities. Whole sample columns report means and standard deviations of variables in the entire sample, High Paramilitary
Presence columns restrict the sample to municipalities where the 1997-2005 attacks by the paramilitaries dummy takes the value of one (see footnote of table
3 for definition of this variable), Low Paramilitary Presence columns restrict the sample to municipalities where the 1997-2005 attacks by the paramilitaries
dummy takes the value of 0.
Dependent Variable is Vote
Share obtained by Third
Parties in the Elections for
the Senate
Panel 1991-2006
(1)
Panel 1991-2006
(2)
Panel 1991-2006
(3)
Panel 1991-2006
(4)
Panel 1991-2006
(5)
Panel 1991-2006
(6)
Panel 1998-2006
(7)
Panel 1998-2006
(8)
Paramilitary Presence -11.35 -10.79
(2.67) (2.75)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 4.95 0.79 0.57 4.15 1.91 1.33
(1.54) (1.47) (1.61) (1.25) (1.24) (1.31)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 4.22 0.34 0.41 2.86 0.12 0.29
(1.99) (2.09) (2.20) (1.68) (1.73) (1.86)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 20.97 15.88 15.80 13.71 10.62 10.47 17.81 17.02
(3.14) (3.18) (3.23) (1.98) (1.94) (2.01) (2.87) (3.01)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 22.10 10.79 10.29 14.54 8.48 8.31 18.02 17.21
(3.19) (3.03) (3.04) (1.99) (1.66) (1.73) (3.01) (3.15)
Guerrilla Presence -1.06
(1.78)
Guerrilla presence X 1994 0.20 2.49
(0.56) (1.54)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 -0.06 -0.72
(0.66) (1.89)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 0.07 0.66 2.00
(0.70) (1.99) (2.16)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 0.45 0.70 2.79
(0.61) (1.80) (2.32)
Controls Interacted with Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Dummies
Observations 5379 4915 4915 5379 4915 4915 3286 3286
Table 3: Paramilitary Presence and Third Parties Share of Votes in the Elections for the Senate
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks Attacks Dummy Time Varying Attacks Dummy

Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies. Dependent variable is share of votes of
third parties lists (not Conservative, nor Liberal, nor from the left) in the elections for the Senate. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum of
paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2) and (3); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum of
paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th
percentile in columns (4), (5) and (6); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that
takes the value of one in municipality mand time t if time varying measure of attacks over population is above the 75
th
percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in
columns (7) and (8). When guerrilla presence is included, in columns (3), (6) and (8), it is measured as the corresponding paramilitary presence measure. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)
include the following controls interacted with time dummies: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land
gini in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in
1986.

Dependent Variable is Vote Share

obtained by Third Parties in The
Elections for the Congress
Panel 1991-2006
(1)
Panel 1991-2006
(2)
Panel 1991-2006
(3)
Panel 1991-2006
(4)
Panel 1991-2006
(5)
Panel 1991-2006
(6)
Panel 1998-2006
(7)
Panel 1998-2006
(8)
Paramilitary Presence -3.12 -2.41
(3.98) (4.06)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 2.53 0.16 0.06 2.24 1.27 0.86
(2.29) (2.33) (2.35) (1.99) (2.10) (2.17)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 -0.56 -1.49 -1.52 -1.74 -2.82 -3.63
(2.36) (2.31) (2.39) (2.12) (2.11) (2.20)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 13.63 9.55 8.81 7.67 5.78 3.94 9.15 7.84
(4.05) (4.07) (4.06) (2.92) (3.02) (3.16) (4.26) (4.39)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 15.18 6.23 6.24 7.55 2.98 2.55 7.97 7.08
(2.31) (2.08) (2.20) (2.24) (2.09) (2.17) (4.53) (4.63)
Guerrilla Presence -1.23
(1.93)
Guerrilla Presence X 1994 0.08 1.68
(0.74) (2.27)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 0.03 3.49
(0.79) (2.41)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 0.62 7.86 3.80
(1.08) (3.29) (2.27)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 -0.01 1.85 2.74
(0.69) (2.38) (2.85)
Controls Interacted with Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Dummies
Observations 5363 4899 4899 5363 4899 4899 3289 3289
Table 4: Paramilitary Presence and Third Parties Share of Votes in The Elections for the Congress
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks Attacks Dummy Time Varying Attacks Dummy

Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies. Dependent variable is share of votes of
third parties lists (not Conservative, nor Liberal, nor from the left) in the elections for the Congress. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum
of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2) and (3); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum
of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th
percentile in columns (4), (5) and (6); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that
takes the value of one in municipality mand time t if time varying measure of attacks over population is above the 75
th
percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in columns
(7) and (8). When guerrilla presence is included, in columns (3), (6) and (8), it is measured as the corresponding paramilitary presence measure. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) include the
following controls interacted with time dummies: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in
1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 1986.

Dependent Variable is Vote Share

obtained by Third Parties in The
Elections for the Senate
Panel 1991-2006
(1)
Panel 1991-2006
(2)
Panel 1998-2006
(3)
Panel 1991-2006
(4)
Panel 1991-2006
(5)
Panel 1998-2006
(6)
Displaced
Displaced
Dummy
Time Varying
Displaced
Dummy
Principal
Component of
Attacks and
Displaced
Attacks and
Displaced
Dummy
Attacks and
Displaced Time
Varying Dummy
Paramilitary Presence 3.08 -5.17
(3.76) (6.51)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 0.13 4.64 1.17 1.81
(0.03) (1.50) (0.61) (1.57)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 0.10 5.22 1.05 4.57
(0.04) (2.07) (0.74) (2.23)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 0.32 11.74 3.80 5.68 14.59 15.35
(0.05) (2.52) (4.38) (0.96) (2.60) (6.84)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 0.16 10.25 3.41 3.20 10.20 13.78
(0.06) (2.09) (4.02) (0.89) (2.27) (6.79)
Guerrilla Presence -14.80 -10.60
(3.59) (4.50)
Guerrilla Presence X 1994 -0.00 1.45 0.53 2.88
(0.02) (1.70) (0.92) (1.88)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 -0.00 -1.91 0.13 -1.00
(0.02) (2.32) (1.15) (2.42)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 -0.08 -1.13 13.09 -1.80 -1.69 9.52
(0.03) (2.59) (4.15) (1.21) (2.56) (4.93)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 -0.02 -2.41 15.94 -0.01 -0.49 13.08
(0.03) (2.27) (3.79) (1.06) (2.31) (4.74)
Observations 4915 4915 3286 4915 4915 3286
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Table 5: Paramilitary Presence and Third Parties Share of Votes in the Electionf for the Senate. Robustness to Alternative Definitions of
Paramilitary Presence.

Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies.
Dependent variable is share of votes of third parties lists (not Conservative, nor Liberal nor from the left) in the elections for the Senate. We report
results with six different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum of people displaced by the paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality
mduring the 1997-2007 period in columns (1); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum of people displaced by the
paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 1997-2005 period is above the 75% percentile in column (2); iii. A time varying
displaced dummy that takes the value of one in municipality mand time t if a time varying measure of attacks over population is above the 75
th

percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in column (3); iv. The principal component of attacks and displaced in column (4); v. A
time invariant attacks and displaced dummy that takes the values of one if both attacks and displaced time invariant dummies take the value of 1 in
column (5); vi. A time varying attacks and displaced dummy that takes the values of one if both attacks and displaced time varying dummies take
the value of 1 in column (6). Guerrilla presence is measured accordingly. All specifications include the following controls interacted with time
dummies: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in 1985,
unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and
preferences for the Left in 1986.
Panel
1991-2006
(1)
Panel
1991-2006
(2)
Panel
1991-2006
(3)
Panel
1991-2006
(4)
Panel
1998-2006
(5)
Panel
1998-2006
(6)
Panel
1991-2006
(7)
Panel
1991-2006
(8)
Panel
1991-2006
(9)
Panel
1991-2006
(10)
Panel
1998-2006
(11)
Panel
1998-2006
(12)
Paramilitary Presence 4.13 4.41 -0.90 -0.89
(1.94) (2.00) (2.72) (2.72)
Paramilitary Presence X 1994 0.81 0.23 0.44 -0.08 2.81 2.02 1.19 0.59
(1.63) (1.67) (1.18) (1.20) (1.32) (1.34) (0.96) (0.98)
Paramilitary Presence X 1998 2.86 2.47 0.78 0.29 0.64 0.29 0.68 0.72
(1.80) (1.81) (1.29) (1.33) (1.54) (1.53) (1.12) (1.16)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 8.87 9.26 4.52 4.78 -0.39 -0.63 4.07 4.32 3.53 3.89 3.01 3.19
(1.81) (1.88) (1.54) (1.59) (2.14) (2.24) (1.79) (1.88) (1.43) (1.49) (2.95) (2.98)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 4.47 4.10 1.40 0.95 -5.56 -5.84 -0.63 -1.01 0.62 -0.08 -1.74 -1.62
(1.93) (2.00) (1.31) (1.37) (2.12) (2.20) (1.91) (1.88) (1.24) (1.28) (2.94) (2.97)
Guerrilla Presence -1.83 -1.52
(1.07) (1.12)
Guerrilla Presence X 1994 0.51 2.23 0.71 2.68
(0.28) (1.13) (0.38) (1.08)
Guerrilla Presence X 1998 0.34 2.08 0.30 -0.16
(0.32) (1.34) (0.26) (1.22)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 -0.31 -1.08 0.76 -0.20 -1.50 -0.31
(0.37) (1.51) (1.32) (0.41) (1.42) (1.31)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 0.33 1.91 0.63 0.34 3.00 -0.84
(0.41) (1.39) (1.33) (0.32) (1.33) (1.43)
Observations 4915 4915 4915 4915 3286 3286 4899 4899 4899 4899 3289 3289
Attacks Dummy
Time Varying Attacks
Dummy Attacks Attacks Dummy
Time Varying Attacks
Dummy
Table 6: Paramilitary Presence and Electoral Concentration in Legislative Elections
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Dependent Variable is Winning Vote Share in the Senate Dependent Variable is Winning Vote Share in the Congress
Attacks

Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and time dummies. Dependent variable is
total share of votes going to the most popular list in the elections for the Senate/Congress, in municipality m. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary
presence: i. The sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2), (7) and (8); ii. A time invariant dummy
that takes the value of one if the sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th
percentile in columns (3),
(4), (9) and (10); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that takes the value of one in municipality mand time t if time varying measure of attacks over population is above the
75
th
percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in columns (5), (6), (11) and (12). When guerrilla presence is included it is measured as the corresponding
paramilitary presence measure. All specifications include the following controls interacted with time dummies: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average
population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium
cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 1986.

Dependent Variable is Winning

Presidential Candidate Vote
Share
Panel 1998-2006
(1)
Panel 1998-2006
(2)
Panel 1998-2006
(3)
Panel 1998-2006
(4)
Panel 1998-2006
(5)
Panel 1998-2006
(6)
Panel 1998-2006
(7)
Panel 1998-2006
(8)
Paramilitary Presence -6.92 -6.91
(3.59) (3.65)
Paramilitary Presence X 2002 10.16 5.31 7.43 3.11 1.26 2.14 8.87 10.49
(1.99) (1.53) (1.59) (1.45) (1.11) (1.13) (3.58) (3.65)
Paramilitary Presence X 2006 21.60 13.67 12.32 11.45 8.17 6.66 12.53 12.23
(2.41) (1.71) (1.64) (1.67) (1.21) (1.20) (3.77) (3.86)
Guerrilla Presence -3.54
(1.61)
Guerrilla Presence X 2002 -1.73 -3.71 -5.53
(0.34) (1.14) (1.73)
Guerrilla Presence X 2006 1.22 6.47 1.70
(0.41) (1.45) (2.21)
Controls Interacted with Year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Dummies
Observations 3297 2951 2951 3297 2951 2951 3297 3297
Tables 7: Paramilitary Presence and Winning Presidential Candidate Share of Votes
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks Attacks Dummy Time Varying Attacks Dummy

Notes: Robust Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. Panel regressions with full set of municipality and year dummies. Dependent variable is share of votes
of the winning presidential candidate. We report results with three different measures of paramilitary presence: i. The sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m
during the 1997-2005 period in columns (1), (2) and (3); ii. A time invariant dummy that takes the value of one if the sum of paramilitary attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality m
during the 1997-2005 period is above the 75
th
percentile in columns (4), (5) and (6); iii. A time varying attacks dummy that takes the value of one in municipality mand time t if time
varying measure of attacks over population is above the 75
th
percentile (calculated over all municipalities and years) in columns (7) and (8). When guerrilla presence is included, in
columns (3), (6) and (8), it is measured as the corresponding paramilitary presence measure. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) include the following controls interacted with time dummies:
altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca
cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994 , preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in 1986.

Cross
Section
(1)
Cross
Section
(2)
Cross
Section
(3)
Cross
Section
(4)
Cross
Section
(5)
Cross
Section
(6)
Cross
Section
(7)
Cross
Section
(8)
Cross
Section
(9)
Cross
Section
(10)
Cross
Section
(11)
Cross
Section
(12)
Dummy Conservative 0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.41 0.38
(0.12) (0.14) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14)
Dummy Left -0.10 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.59 -0.54
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.14)
Dummy Third Parties 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.34 0.33
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13)
Share of Votes From:
Paramilitary Areas 1.38 1.03 0.92 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.83 1.33 0.93
(0.42) (0.51) (0.45) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.41) (0.53) (0.54)
Guerrilla Areas -0.59 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.86 -1.63 -1.26
(0.72) (0.81) (0.75) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.73) (0.89) (0.83)
Right Oriented Areas -0.41 -0.55 -0.31 -0.44 1.37 0.52
(0.42) (0.39) (0.12) (0.21) (0.46) (0.47)
Left Oriented Areas -0.27 -0.29 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.05
(0.18) (0.18) (0.06) (0.06) (0.27) (0.23)
Observations 96 96 96 96 162 162 162 162 57 57 57 57
R-squared 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.41 0.04 0.13 0.45
Senate Congress
Table 8: Senators and Congressmen Arrested, J ustice and Peace Law and Votes from High Paramilitary Presence Areas Table 8: Senators and Congressmen Arrested, J ustice and Peace Law and Votes from High Paramilitary Presence Areas
Dependent Variable is the Fraction of Arrested Senators/Congressmen in list l.
Dependent Variable is the Fraction of
Senators in List l that Voted Yes for
Reintroducing the Articles of Sedition and
Reduction of Sentences in the J ustice and
Peace Law .
Senate

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Left hand panel: OLS regressions relating arrests of senators/congressmen to votes obtained in areas with presence of non-state armed
actors. Dependent variable is the proportion of senators on list l arrested for being involved with the paramilitary. Right hand panel: OLS regressions linking votes in the senate to votes
obtained in areas with presence of non-state armed actors. Dependent variable is the proportion of senators on list l that voted yes. The vote is for reintroducing the articles of Sedition
and Reduction of Sentences in the Justice and Peace Law (since only three lists have more than one candidate in the senate in the legislature of 2002-2006 and since candidates in the
same list voted in the same manner, the dependent variable is a dummy). Both Panels: To measure the share of votes of list l from a given area we first create dummies for places with
high presence of paramilitary and guerrilla, Right oriented preferences or Left oriented preferences (municipality mis a high presence area if the value of the corresponding variable in
municipality mis above the 75
th
percentile; paramilitary and guerrilla presence measures are the sum of attacks per 1,000 inhabitant in the 1997-2001 period, just before the elections of
2002). Then, with each of these dummies, we compute the share of votes in national elections obtained by list l in areas where the dummy takes the value of one.
Dependent Variable is Paramilitary
Presence in 2004-2005
Cross-
Section
(1)
Cross-
Section
(2)
Cross-
Section
(3)
Cross-
Section
(4)
Cross-
Section
(5)
Cross-
Section
(6)
Cross-
Section
(7)
Cross-
Section
(8)
Cross-
Section
(9)
Cross-
Section
(10)
Cross-
Section
(11)
Cross-
Section
(12)
Max{0, Uribe-Pastrana vote share} 0.25 0.56 10.16 0.39 2.57
(0.15) (0.30) (2.95) (0.13) (0.83)
Uribe Vote Share 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.11 4.09 0.32 1.17
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.27) (1.98) (0.10) (0.49)
Patrana Vote Share -0.22 -0.09 -0.09 0.07 -0.85 0.31 -1.30
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.41) (2.81) (0.17) (0.66)
Uribe Vote Share X Pastrana Vote Share -0.63 -0.41 -0.42 -0.46 -12.68 -0.10 -3.65
(0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.22) (5.60) (0.09) (1.46)
Paramilitary Presence Before 2002 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.37 0.35
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.14)
Guerrilla Presence Before 2002 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.21 -0.08 -0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 299 291 291 291 88 88 616 616 503 503 643 643
R-squared 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.64 0.61 0.19 0.20 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.22
Table 9: Persistence of Paramilitaries and Vote Share for Alvaro Uribe
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks
Principal
Component Attacks
and Displaced
Sample is Restricted to Municiaplities with Paramilitary Presence in 2000-2001
Displaced Log Attacks Log Displaced

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cross Section regressions restricting the sample to municipalities with paramilitary presence in 2000-2001. Dependent variable is
paramilitary presence in 2004-2005. We report results with three measures of paramilitary presence: i. Attacks by the paramilitaries in columns (1) to (6) is the sum of paramilitary
attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 2004-2005 period (dependent variable) and during the 2000-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable); ii.
Displaced by the paramilitaries in columns (7) to (10) is the sum of people displaced by the paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 2004-2005 period (dependent
variable) and during the 2000-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable); iii. The principal component of attacks by the paramilitary and displaced by the paramilitary in
columns (11) and (12). Guerrilla presence before 2002 is measured as paramilitary presence before 2002. In columns (5), (6), (9) and (10) all variables are in logs. Uribe and Pastrana
vote shares are the vote shares of lvaro Uribe in 2002 and Andrs Pastrana in 1998 (first round), respectively. These two variables are measured in a scale from zero to one for ease of
exposition (to report fewer decimals) and they are also demeaned to interpret the derivatives at the mean of the interactions in all columns except in columns (4), (8) and (12). In these
columns, the variable of interest is the maximum between zero and the difference between lvaro Uribes vote share in 2002 and Andrs Pastranas vote share in 1998 in municipality m.
All specifications include the same controls as in Table 3: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini
in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994 , preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in
1986.
Dependent Variable is Paramilitary
Presence in 2003-2005
Cross-
Section
(1)
Cross-
Section
(2)
Cross-
Section
(3)
Cross-
Section
(4)
Cross-
Section
(5)
Cross-
Section
(6)
Cross-
Section
(7)
Cross-
Section
(8)
Cross-
Section
(9)
Cross-
Section
(10)
Cross-
Section
(11)
Cross-
Section
(12)
Max{0, Uribe-Pastrana vote share} 0.27 0.44 9.95 0.25 1.85
(0.16) (0.31) (3.26) (0.13) (0.69)
Uribe Vote Share 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.03 2.58 0.15 0.66
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22) (2.46) (0.09) (0.43)
Patrana Vote Share -0.23 -0.07 -0.08 0.12 -0.36 0.29 -0.93
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.39) (3.87) (0.14) (0.60)
Uribe Vote Share X Pastrana Vote Share -0.77 -0.62 -0.63 -0.46 -19.11 -0.20 -3.84
(0.36) (0.39) (0.41) (0.19) (7.36) (0.07) (1.31)
Paramilitary Presence Before 2002 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.35
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.12)
Guerrilla Presence Before 2002 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.26 -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319 309 309 309 134 134 622 622 524 524 654 654
R-squared 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.55 0.52 0.25 0.26 0.49 0.46 0.25 0.25
Table 10: Persistence of Paramilitaries and Vote Share for Alvaro Uribe . Robustness Checks.
Sample is Restricted to Municiaplities with Paramilitary Presence in 1999-2001
Armed Actors Presence is Measured by:
Attacks Log Attacks Displaced Log Displaced
Principal
Component Attacks
and Displaced

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cross Section regressions restricting the sample to municipalities with paramilitary presence in 1999-2001. Dependent variable is
paramilitary presence in 2003-2005. We report results with three measures of paramilitary presence: i. Attacks by the paramilitaries in columns (1) to (6) is the sum of paramilitary
attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 2003-2005 period (dependent variable) and during the 1999-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable), ii.
Displaced by the paramilitaries in columns (7) to (10) is the sum of people displaced by the paramilitary per 1,000 inhabitants in municipality mduring the 2003-2005 period (dependent
variable) and during the 1999-2001 period (paramilitary presence before 2002 variable), iii. The principal component of attacks by the paramilitary and displaced by the paramilitary in
column (11) and (12). Guerrilla presence before 2002 is measured as paramilitary presence before 2002. In columns (5), (6), (9) and (10) all variables are in logs. Uribe and Pastrana vote
shares are the vote shares of lvaro Uribe in 2002 and Andrs Pastrana in 1998 (first round), respectively. These two variables are measured in a scale from zero to one for ease of
exposition (to report fewer decimals) and they are also demeaned to interpret the derivatives at the mean of the interactions in all columns except in columns (4), (8) and (12). In these
columns, the variable of interest is the maximum between zero and the difference between lvaro Uribes vote share in 2002 and Andrs Pastranas vote share in 1998 in municipality m.
All specifications include the same controls as in Table 3: altitude, distance to the state capital, precipitation, average population between 1993 and 2005, rurality index in 1993, land gini
in 1985, unfulfilled basic needs in 1993, dummy for coca cultivation in 1994, dummy for opium cultivation in 1994, preferences for the Right in 1986 and preferences for the Left in
1986.

Dependent Variable is the Fraction

of Senators in List l that Voted Yes
for Changing the Constitution to
Allow the Reelection of the President
Cross
Section
(1)
Cross
Section
(2)
Cross
Section
(3)
Cross
Section
(4)
Cross
Section
(5)
Cross
Section
(6)
Cross
Section
(7)
Dummy Conservative 0.48 0.36 0.33
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Dummy Left -0.52 -0.48 -0.50
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Dummy Third Parties 0.31 0.30 0.28
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Share of Votes From:
Paramilitary Areas 1.26 1.79 1.61 1.02 1.28 0.63
(0.41) (0.55) (0.60) (0.41) (0.44) (0.36)
Guerrilla Areas -0.92 -1.87 -1.39 -0.88 -1.05 -0.21
(0.73) (0.82) (0.80) (0.79) 0.78 (0.65)
Right Oriented Areas 1.81 1.11 1.55 0.88
(0.36) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32)
Left Oriented Areas -0.17 -0.02 -0.27 -0.16
(0.24) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21)
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76
R-squared 0.38 0.07 0.21 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.39
Attacks
Table 11 : Reelection and Senators Elected from High Paramilitary Presence Areas
Armed Presence Measured By:
Displaced

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions linking votes in the Senate to votes obtained in areas with presence of
non-state armed actors. Dependent variable is the proportion of senators in list l that voted yes (since only three lists have more than one
candidate in the senate in the legislature of 2002-2006 and since candidates in the same list voted in the same manner, the dependent
variable is a dummy). The vote is for changing the constitution to allow the president to be elected for a second consecutive term. To
measure the share of votes of list l from a given area we first create dummies for places with high presence of paramilitary, guerrilla,
right-oriented preferences or left-oriented preferences (municipality mis a high presence area if the value of the corresponding variable
in municipality mis above the 75
th
percentile; paramilitary and guerrilla presence measures are the sum of attacks per 1,000 inhabitant in
the 1997-2001 period, just before the elections of 2002). Then, with each of these dummies, we compute the share of votes in national
elections obtained by list l in areas where the dummy takes the value of one. Columns (2) to (4) use attacks to define the presence
dummies, columns (5) to (7) use displaced.

Third Parties
(1)
Reelection
(2)
J ustice and
Peace Law
(3)
Status
(4)
% Votes I n
Paramilitary Zones
(5)
FLOR MODESTA GNECCO ARREGOCES yes yes yes 65.67
J AIRO ENRIQUE MERLANO FERNANDEZ yes yes yes Arrested (Not Guilty) 65.37
SALOMON DE J ESUS SAADE ABDALA no yes Investigated 65.23
DIEB NICOLAS MALOOF CUSE yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 61.17
MAURICIO PIMIENTO BARRERA yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 59.71
ALVARO ALFONSO GARCIA ROMERO yes Arrested (Guilty) 52.46
CARLOS ARTURO CLAVIJ O VARGAS yes Arrested 50.94
J UAN CARLOS MARTINEZ SINISTERRA yes yes Arrested 42.02
J ESUS LEON PUELLO CHAMIE no yes 38.94
WILLIAM ALFONSO MONTES MEDINA yes yes yes Arrested (Not Guilty) 34.22
ALVARO ARAUJ O CASTRO yes yes Arrested 32.74
PIEDAD DEL SOCORRO ZUCCARDI DE GARCIA no yes yes 31.72
VICENTE BLEL SAAD yes yes yes Arrested 29.51
LUIS EDUARDO VIVES LACOUTURE yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 27.86
PIEDAD CORDOBA no no no 27.63
GABRIEL ACOSTA BENDEK yes 26.05
HUGO SERRANO GOMEZ no no 25.09
MIGUEL ALFONSO DE LA ESPRIELLA BURG yes yes yes Arrested (Guilty) 23.96
LUIS ALBERTO GIL CASTILLO yes yes Arrested 23.78
RUBEN DARIO QUINTERO VILLADA yes Arrested 23.33
Table A1: Top 20 Senators By Vote Share in Paramilitary Areas Using Displaced
Senator

Notes: Senators that obtained the twenty highest shares of votes in municipalities with high paramilitary presence. High paramilitary presence is measured by a
dummy that takes the value of one if the municipality had a total number of displaced by the paramilitaries per 1,000 inhabitants is above the 75
th
percentile in
the 1997-2001 period. A Yes indicates that the senator belongs to a third party in the election of 2002 (column (1)), voted yes to approve reelection (column (2))
or yes to reintroduce Sedition and Reduction of Sentences articles in the J ustice and Peace Law (column (3)). The status of the senator (column (4)) is that on
May 21 of 2009 and is taken from Indepaz http://www.indepaz.org.co (for reelected senators) and from the news. A blank space in columns (2) or (3) means that
the senator did not vote on the measure.

Amazonas
Antioquia
Arauca
Atlantico
Bolivar
Boyaca
Caldas
Caqueta
Casanare
Cauca
Cesar
Choco
Cordova
Cundinamarca
Guainia
Guaviare
Huila
La Guajira
Magdalena
Meta
Narino
Nte De Stder
Putumayo
Quindio
Risaralda
San Andres
Santander
Sucre
Tolima
Valle
Vaupes
Vichada
Barranquilla
Ralito
Bucaramanga
Medellin
Bogota
Cali
S Vte Caguan
Attacks by the guerrilla
per 1.000 inhabitants
(1.61,26.45]
(.67,1.61]
(.22,.67]
(0,.22]
[0,0]
Map 1: Guerrilla Attacks, 1997-2005

Amazonas
Antioquia
Arauca
Atlantico
Bolivar
Boyaca
Caldas
Caqueta
Casanare
Cauca
Cesar
Choco
Cordova
Cundinamarca
Guainia
Guaviare
Huila
La Guajira
Magdalena
Meta
Narino
Nte De Stder
Putumayo
Quindio
Risaralda
San Andres
Santander
Sucre
Tolima
Valle
Vaupes
Vichada
Barranquilla
Ralito
Bucaramanga
Medellin
Bogota
Cali
S Vte Caguan
Attacks by the paramilitary
per 1.000 inhabitants
(.19,3.62]
(.04,.19]
(0,.04]
[0,0]
Map 2: Paramilitary Attacks, 1997-2005

Sta Marta (8.2, 24.2)

Aracataca (6.5, 11.3)
Ariguani (22, 5.1)
S. Antonio (9.5, 7.6)
Chivolo (27.9, 11.5)
Cienaga (12.2, 8.6)
Banco (16.9, 5.4)
Pinon (6.2, 22.3)
Reten (4.2, 3.3)
Fundacion (17.7, 8.1)
Guamal (10.8, 9.2)
Pedraza (3.7, 12.9)
Pijino (6.4, 2.5)
Pivijay (3.6, 8.8)
Plato (7.4, 7.2)
P. Viejo (16.5, 5)
Remolino (13.2, 7.9)
Salamina (3.9, 15.2)
S. Sebastian (9.1, 2.2
S. Zenon (38.4, 5.5)
Santa Ana (21.4, 11.4)
Sitio Nuevo (7.3, 6.4)
Tenerife (20.8, 2.7)
Numbers are vote shares of (L. Vives, A.Campo) & Colors Correpond
1998

(8.6, 11.4)
(5.8, 15.5)
(1.8, .2)
(.1, .4)
(.9, .1)
(4.1, 2.1)
(78.9, 49.7)
(.2, .1)
(4.7, 1.7)
(5.8, 7.4)
(78.9, 74.6)
(.6, .)
(87.3, 72.6)
(.5, .5)
(3.1, .3)
(15.7, 8.6)
(0, .1)
(., 0)
(90.5, 81.9)
(93.4, 87.1)
(78.5, 71.1)
(1.2, .3)
(.5, .)
2002

(12.3, 16.2)
(1.7, 30.7)
(18.2, .9)
(1.2, 43.1)
(20.9, 19.6)
(6.2, 17.3)
(13.6, 4.8)
(.8, 51.4)
(3.6, 8.7)
(10.3, 7.1)
(11, 4.1)
(0, 38.2)
(19.2, 4)
(.9, 14.1)
(10.8, 2.8)
(20.1, 2.6)
(.9, 31.2)
(.7, 19)
(13, 15.3)
(38.3, 13)
(19.5, 22.6)
(2.5, 8.1)
(20.2, 18.3)
(80,100]
(60,80]
(40,60]
(20,40]
[0,20]
(Vote Share of Winning Candidate)
Electoral Concentration
2006

to the Vote Share of Winning Candidate in Municipality m
Winning Vote Share of L. Vives (Senate) and A. Campo (Congress)
Map 3: Legislative Elections in Magdalena