Aristotle Prior Analytics translated by A. J.

Jenkinson

Book I 1 We must first state the subject of our inquiry and the faculty to which it belongs its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrati!e science. We must ne"t define a #remiss$ a term$ and a syllogism$ and the nature of a #erfect and of an im#erfect syllogism% and after that$ the inclusion or noninclusion of one term in another as in a whole$ and what we mean by #redicating one term of all$ or none$ of another. A #remiss then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. &his is either uni!ersal or #articular or indefinite. By uni!ersal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else% by #articular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all% by indefinite that it does or does not belong$ without any mark to show whether it is uni!ersal or #articular$ e.g. 'contraries are subjects of the same science($ or '#leasure is not good(. &he demonstrati!e #remiss differs from the dialectical$ because the demonstrati!e #remiss is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements )the demonstrator does not ask for his #remiss$ but lays it down*$ whereas the dialectical #remiss de#ends on the ad!ersary(s choice between two contradictories. But this will make no difference to the #roduction of a syllogism in either case% for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to something else. &herefore a syllogistic #remiss without qualification will be an affirmation or denial of something concerning something else in the way we ha!e described% it will be demonstrati!e$ if it is true and obtained through the first #rinci#les of its science% while a dialectical #remiss is the gi!ing of a choice between two contradictories$ when a man is #roceeding by question$ but when he is syllogi+ing it is the assertion of that which is a##arent and generally admitted$ as has been said in the &o#ics. &he nature then of a #remiss and the difference between syllogistic$ demonstrati!e$ and dialectical #remisses$ may be taken as sufficiently defined by us in relation to our #resent need$ but will be stated accurately in the sequel. I call that a term into which the #remiss is resol!ed$ i.e. both the #redicate and that of which it is #redicated$ 'being( being added and 'not being( remo!ed$ or !ice !ersa. A syllogism is discourse in which$ certain things being stated$ something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so. I mean by the last #hrase that they #roduce the consequence$ and by this$ that no further term is required from without in order to make the consequence necessary. I call that a #erfect syllogism which needs nothing other than what has been stated to make #lain what necessarily follows% a syllogism is im#erfect$ if it needs either one or more #ro#ositions$ which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms set down$ but ha!e not been e"#ressly stated as #remisses. &hat one term should be included in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be #redicated of all of the first. And we say that one term is #redicated of all of another$ whene!er no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted 'to be #redicated of none( must be understood in the same way. 1

, -!ery #remiss states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else% of #remisses of these three kinds some are affirmati!e$ others negati!e$ in res#ect of each of the three modes of attribution% again some affirmati!e and negati!e #remisses are uni!ersal$ others #articular$ others indefinite. It is necessary then that in uni!ersal attribution the terms of the negati!e #remiss should be con!ertible$ e.g. if no #leasure is good$ then no good will be #leasure% the terms of the affirmati!e must be con!ertible$ not howe!er$ uni!ersally$ but in #art$ e.g. if e!ery #leasure$is good$ some good must be #leasure% the #articular affirmati!e must con!ert in #art )for if some #leasure is good$ then some good will be #leasure*% but the #articular negati!e need not con!ert$ for if some animal is not man$ it does not follow that some man is not animal. .irst then take a uni!ersal negati!e with the terms A and B. If no B is A$ neither can any A be B. .or if some A )say /* were B$ it would not be true that no B is A% for / is a B. But if e!ery B is A then some A is B. .or if no A were B$ then no B could be A. But we assumed that e!ery B is A. 0imilarly too$ if the #remiss is #articular. .or if some B is A$ then some of the As must be B. .or if none were$ then no B would be A. But if some B is not A$ there is no necessity that some of the As should not be B% e.g. let B stand for animal and A for man. 1ot e!ery animal is a man% but e!ery man is an animal. 2 &he same manner of con!ersion will hold good also in res#ect of necessary #remisses. &he uni!ersal negati!e con!erts uni!ersally% each of the affirmati!es con!erts into a #articular. If it is necessary that no B is A$ it is necessary also that no A is B. .or if it is #ossible that some A is B$ it would be #ossible also that some B is A. If all or some B is A of necessity$ it is necessary also that some A is B for if there were no necessity$ neither would some of the Bs be A necessarily. But the #articular negati!e does not con!ert$ for the same reason which we ha!e already stated. In res#ect of #ossible #remisses$ since #ossibility is used in se!eral senses )for we say that what is necessary and what is not necessary and what is #otential is #ossible*$ affirmati!e statements will all con!ert in a manner similar to those described. .or if it is #ossible that all or some B is A$ it will be #ossible that some A is B. .or if that were not #ossible$ then no B could #ossibly be A. &his has been already #ro!ed. But in negati!e statements the case is different. Whate!er is said to be #ossible$ either because B necessarily is A$ or because B is not necessarily A$ admits of con!ersion like other negati!e statements$ e.g. if one should say$ it is #ossible that man is not horse$ or that no garment is white. .or in the former case the one term necessarily does not belong to the other% in the latter there is no necessity that it should and the #remiss con!erts like other negati!e statements. .or if it is #ossible for no man to be a horse$ it is also admissible for no horse to be a man% and if it is admissible for no garment to be white$ it is also admissible for nothing white to be a garment. .or if any white thing must be a garment$ then some garment will necessarily be white. &his has been already #ro!ed. &he #articular negati!e also must be treated like those dealt with abo!e. But if anything is said to be #ossible because it is the general rule and natural )and it is in this way we define the #ossible*$ the negati!e #remisses can no longer be con!erted like the sim#le negati!es% the uni!ersal negati!e #remiss does not con!ert$ and the #articular does. &his will be #lain when we s#eak about the #ossible. At #resent we may take this much as clear in addition to what has been said the statement that it is #ossible that no B is A or some B is not A is affirmati!e in form for the e"#ression 'is #ossible( ranks along with 'is($ and ,

'is( makes an affirmation always and in e!ery case$ whate!er the terms to which it is added$ in #redication$ e.g. 'it is not3good( or 'it is not3white( or in a word 'it is not3this(. But this also will be #ro!ed in the sequel. In con!ersion these #remisses will beha!e like the other affirmati!e #ro#ositions. 4 After these distinctions we now state by what means$ when$ and how e!ery syllogism is #roduced% subsequently we must s#eak of demonstration. 0yllogism should be discussed before demonstration because syllogism is the general the demonstration is a sort of syllogism$ but not e!ery syllogism is a demonstration. Whene!er three terms are so related to one another that the last is contained in the middle as in a whole$ and the middle is either contained in$ or e"cluded from$ the first as in or from a whole$ the e"tremes must be related by a #erfect syllogism. I call that term middle which is itself contained in another and contains another in itself in #osition also this comes in the middle. By e"tremes I mean both that term which is itself contained in another and that in which another is contained. If A is #redicated of all B$ and B of all /$ A must be #redicated of all / we ha!e already e"#lained what we mean by '#redicated of all(. 0imilarly also$ if A is #redicated of no B$ and B of all /$ it is necessary that no / will be A. But if the first term belongs to all the middle$ but the middle to none of the last term$ there will be no syllogism in res#ect of the e"tremes% for nothing necessary follows from the terms being so related% for it is #ossible that the first should belong either to all or to none of the last$ so that neither a #articular nor a uni!ersal conclusion is necessary. But if there is no necessary consequence$ there cannot be a syllogism by means of these #remisses. As an e"am#le of a uni!ersal affirmati!e relation between the e"tremes we may take the terms animal$ man$ horse% of a uni!ersal negati!e relation$ the terms animal$ man$ stone. 1or again can syllogism be formed when neither the first term belongs to any of the middle$ nor the middle to any of the last. As an e"am#le of a #ositi!e relation between the e"tremes take the terms science$ line$ medicine of a negati!e relation science$ line$ unit. If then the terms are uni!ersally related$ it is clear in this figure when a syllogism will be #ossible and when not$ and that if a syllogism is #ossible the terms must be related as described$ and if they are so related there will be a syllogism. But if one term is related uni!ersally$ the other in #art only$ to its subject$ there must be a #erfect syllogism whene!er uni!ersality is #osited with reference to the major term either affirmati!ely or negati!ely$ and #articularity with reference to the minor term affirmati!ely but whene!er the uni!ersality is #osited in relation to the minor term$ or the terms are related in any other way$ a syllogism is im#ossible. I call that term the major in which the middle is contained and that term the minor which comes under the middle. 5et all B be A and some / be B. &hen if '#redicated of all( means what was said abo!e$ it is necessary that some / is A. And if no B is A but some / is B$ it is necessary that some / is not A. &he meaning of '#redicated of none( has also been defined. 0o there will be a #erfect syllogism. &his holds good also if the #remiss B/ should be indefinite$ #ro!ided that it is affirmati!e for we shall ha!e the same syllogism whether the #remiss is indefinite or #articular. But if the uni!ersality is #osited with res#ect to the minor term either affirmati!ely or negati!ely$ a syllogism will not be #ossible$ whether the major #remiss is #ositi!e or negati!e$ indefinite or #articular e.g. if some B is or is not A$ and all / is B. As an e"am#le of a #ositi!e relation between the e"tremes take the terms good$ state$ wisdom of a negati!e relation$ good$ state$ 2

ignorance. Again if no / is B$ but some B is or is not A or not e!ery B is A$ there cannot be a syllogism. &ake the terms white$ horse$ swan white$ horse$ ra!en. &he same terms may be taken also if the #remiss BA is indefinite. 1or when the major #remiss is uni!ersal$ whether affirmati!e or negati!e$ and the minor #remiss is negati!e and #articular$ can there be a syllogism$ whether the minor #remiss be indefinite or #articular e.g. if all B is A and some / is not B$ or if not all / is B. .or the major term may be #redicable both of all and of none of the minor$ to some of which the middle term cannot be attributed. 0u##ose the terms are animal$ man$ white ne"t take some of the white things of which man is not #redicated 6 swan and snow animal is #redicated of all of the one$ but of none of the other. /onsequently there cannot be a syllogism. Again let no B be A$ but let some / not be B. &ake the terms inanimate$ man$ white then take some white things of which man is not #redicated 6 swan and snow the term inanimate is #redicated of all of the one$ of none of the other. .urther since it is indefinite to say some / is not B$ and it is true that some / is not B$ whether no / is B$ or not all / is B$ and since if terms are assumed such that no / is B$ no syllogism follows )this has already been stated* it is clear that this arrangement of terms will not afford a syllogism otherwise one would ha!e been #ossible with a uni!ersal negati!e minor #remiss. A similar #roof may also be gi!en if the uni!ersal #remiss is negati!e. 1or can there in any way be a syllogism if both the relations of subject and #redicate are #articular$ either #ositi!ely or negati!ely$ or the one negati!e and the other affirmati!e$ or one indefinite and the other definite$ or both indefinite. &erms common to all the abo!e are animal$ white$ horse animal$ white$ stone. It is clear then from what has been said that if there is a syllogism in this figure with a #articular conclusion$ the terms must be related as we ha!e stated if they are related otherwise$ no syllogism is #ossible anyhow. It is e!ident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are #erfect )for they are all com#leted by means of the #remisses originally taken* and that all conclusions are #ro!ed by this figure$ !i+. uni!ersal and #articular$ affirmati!e and negati!e. 0uch a figure I call the first. 7 Whene!er the same thing belongs to all of one subject$ and to none of another$ or to all of each subject or to none of either$ I call such a figure the second% by middle term in it I mean that which is #redicated of both subjects$ by e"tremes the terms of which this is said$ by major e"treme that which lies near the middle$ by minor that which is further away from the middle. &he middle term stands outside the e"tremes$ and is first in #osition. A syllogism cannot be #erfect anyhow in this figure$ but it may be !alid whether the terms are related uni!ersally or not. If then the terms are related uni!ersally a syllogism will be #ossible$ whene!er the middle belongs to all of one subject and to none of another )it does not matter which has the negati!e relation*$ but in no other way. 5et 8 be #redicated of no 1$ but of all 9. 0ince$ then$ the negati!e relation is con!ertible$ 1 will belong to no 8 but 8 was assumed to belong to all 9 consequently 1 will belong to no 9. &his has already been #ro!ed. Again if 8 belongs to all 1$ but to no 9$ then 1 will belong to no 9. .or if 8 belongs to no 9$ 9 belongs to no 8 but 8 )as was said* belongs to all 1 9 then will belong to no 1 for the first figure has again been formed. But since the negati!e relation is con!ertible$ 1 will belong to no 9. &hus it will be the same syllogism that #ro!es both conclusions. It is #ossible to #ro!e these results also by reductio ad im#ossibile. 4

It is clear then that a syllogism is formed when the terms are so related$ but not a #erfect syllogism% for necessity is not #erfectly established merely from the original #remisses% others also are needed. But if 8 is #redicated of e!ery 1 and 9$ there cannot be a syllogism. &erms to illustrate a #ositi!e relation between the e"tremes are substance$ animal$ man% a negati!e relation$ substance$ animal$ number 6 substance being the middle term. 1or is a syllogism #ossible when 8 is #redicated neither of any 1 nor of any 9. &erms to illustrate a #ositi!e relation are line$ animal$ man a negati!e relation$ line$ animal$ stone. It is clear then that if a syllogism is formed when the terms are uni!ersally related$ the terms must be related as we stated at the outset for if they are otherwise related no necessary consequence follows. If the middle term is related uni!ersally to one of the e"tremes$ a #articular negati!e syllogism must result whene!er the middle term is related uni!ersally to the major whether #ositi!ely or negati!ely$ and #articularly to the minor and in a manner o##osite to that of the uni!ersal statement by 'an o##osite manner( I mean$ if the uni!ersal statement is negati!e$ the #articular is affirmati!e if the uni!ersal is affirmati!e$ the #articular is negati!e. .or if 8 belongs to no 1$ but to some 9$ it is necessary that 1 does not belong to some 9. .or since the negati!e statement is con!ertible$ 1 will belong to no 8 but 8 was admitted to belong to some 9 therefore 1 will not belong to some 9 for the result is reached by means of the first figure. Again if 8 belongs to all 1$ but not to some 9$ it is necessary that 1 does not belong to some 9 for if 1 belongs to all 9$ and 8 is #redicated also of all 1$ 8 must belong to all 9 but we assumed that 8 does not belong to some 9. And if 8 belongs to all 1 but not to all 9$ we shall conclude that 1 does not belong to all 9 the #roof is the same as the abo!e. But if 8 is #redicated of all 9$ but not of all 1$ there will be no syllogism. &ake the terms animal$ substance$ ra!en% animal$ white$ ra!en. 1or will there be a conclusion when 8 is #redicated of no 9$ but of some 1. &erms to illustrate a #ositi!e relation between the e"tremes are animal$ substance$ unit a negati!e relation$ animal$ substance$ science. If then the uni!ersal statement is o##osed to the #articular$ we ha!e stated when a syllogism will be #ossible and when not but if the #remisses are similar in form$ I mean both negati!e or both affirmati!e$ a syllogism will not be #ossible anyhow. .irst let them be negati!e$ and let the major #remiss be uni!ersal$ e.g. let 8 belong to no 1$ and not to some 9. It is #ossible then for 1 to belong either to all 9 or to no 9. &erms to illustrate the negati!e relation are black$ snow$ animal. But it is not #ossible to find terms of which the e"tremes are related #ositi!ely and uni!ersally$ if 8 belongs to some 9$ and does not belong to some 9. .or if 1 belonged to all 9$ but 8 to no 1$ then 8 would belong to no 9 but we assumed that it belongs to some 9. In this way then it is not admissible to take terms our #oint must be #ro!ed from the indefinite nature of the #articular statement. .or since it is true that 8 does not belong to some 9$ e!en if it belongs to no 9$ and since if it belongs to no 9 a syllogism is )as we ha!e seen* not #ossible$ clearly it will not be #ossible now either. Again let the #remisses be affirmati!e$ and let the major #remiss as before be uni!ersal$ e.g. let 8 belong to all 1 and to some 9. It is #ossible then for 1 to belong to all 9 or to no 9. &erms to illustrate the negati!e relation are white$ swan$ stone. But it is not #ossible to take terms to illustrate the uni!ersal affirmati!e relation$ for the reason already stated the #oint must be #ro!ed from the indefinite nature of the #articular statement. But if the minor #remiss is uni!ersal$ and 8 belongs to no 9$ and not to some 1$ it is #ossible for 1 to belong either to all 9 or to no 9. &erms for the #ositi!e relation are white$ animal$ ra!en for the negati!e relation$ white$ stone$ ra!en. If the #remisses are affirmati!e$ terms for the negati!e relation are white$ animal$ snow% for the 7

#ositi!e relation$ white$ animal$ swan. -!idently then$ whene!er the #remisses are similar in form$ and one is uni!ersal$ the other #articular$ a syllogism can$ not be formed anyhow. 1or is one #ossible if the middle term belongs to some of each of the e"tremes$ or does not belong to some of either$ or belongs to some of the one$ not to some of the other$ or belongs to neither uni!ersally$ or is related to them indefinitely. /ommon terms for all the abo!e are white$ animal$ man white$ animal$ inanimate. It is clear then from what has been said that if the terms are related to one another in the way stated$ a syllogism results of necessity% and if there is a syllogism$ the terms must be so related. But it is e!ident also that all the syllogisms in this figure are im#erfect for all are made #erfect by certain su##lementary statements$ which either are contained in the terms of necessity or are assumed as hy#otheses$ i.e. when we #ro!e #er im#ossibile. And it is e!ident that an affirmati!e conclusion is not attained by means of this figure$ but all are negati!e$ whether uni!ersal or #articular. : But if one term belongs to all$ and another to none$ of a third$ or if both belong to all$ or to none$ of it$ I call such a figure the third% by middle term in it I mean that of which both the #redicates are #redicated$ by e"tremes I mean the #redicates$ by the major e"treme that which is further from the middle$ by the minor that which is nearer to it. &he middle term stands outside the e"tremes$ and is last in #osition. A syllogism cannot be #erfect in this figure either$ but it may be !alid whether the terms are related uni!ersally or not to the middle term. If they are uni!ersal$ whene!er both P and ; belong to 0$ it follows that P will necessarily belong to some ;. .or$ since the affirmati!e statement is con!ertible$ 0 will belong to some ; consequently since P belongs to all 0$ and 0 to some ;$ P must belong to some ; for a syllogism in the first figure is #roduced. It is #ossible to demonstrate this also #er im#ossibile and by e"#osition. .or if both P and ; belong to all 0$ should one of the 0s$ e.g. 1$ be taken$ both P and ; will belong to this$ and thus P will belong to some ;. If ; belongs to all 0$ and P to no 0$ there will be a syllogism to #ro!e that P will necessarily not belong to some ;. &his may be demonstrated in the same way as before by con!erting the #remiss ;0. It might be #ro!ed also #er im#ossibile$ as in the former cases. But if ; belongs to no 0$ P to all 0$ there will be no syllogism. &erms for the #ositi!e relation are animal$ horse$ man for the negati!e relation animal$ inanimate$ man. 1or can there be a syllogism when both terms are asserted of no 0. &erms for the #ositi!e relation are animal$ horse$ inanimate% for the negati!e relation man$ horse$ inanimate 6inanimate being the middle term. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be #ossible and when not$ if the terms are related uni!ersally. .or whene!er both the terms are affirmati!e$ there will be a syllogism to #ro!e that one e"treme belongs to some of the other% but when they are negati!e$ no syllogism will be #ossible. But when one is negati!e$ the other affirmati!e$ if the major is negati!e$ the minor affirmati!e$ there will be a syllogism to #ro!e that the one e"treme does not belong to some of the other but if the relation is re!ersed$ no syllogism will be #ossible. If one term is related uni!ersally to the middle$ the other in #art only$ when both are affirmati!e there must be a syllogism$ no matter which of the #remisses is uni!ersal. .or if ; belongs to all 0$ P to some 0$ P must belong to some ;. .or since the affirmati!e statement is con!ertible 0 will belong to some P consequently since ; belongs to all 0$ and 0 to some P$ ; must also belong to some P therefore P must belong to some ;.

Again if ; belongs to some 0$ and P to all 0$ P must belong to some ;. &his may be demonstrated in the same way as the #receding. And it is #ossible to demonstrate it also #er im#ossibile and by e"#osition$ as in the former cases. But if one term is affirmati!e$ the other negati!e$ and if the affirmati!e is uni!ersal$ a syllogism will be #ossible whene!er the minor term is affirmati!e. .or if ; belongs to all 0$ but P does not belong to some 0$ it is necessary that P does not belong to some ;. .or if P belongs to all ;$ and ; belongs to all 0$ then P will belong to all 0 but we assumed that it did not. Proof is #ossible also without reduction ad im#ossibile$ if one of the 0s be taken to which P does not belong. But whene!er the major is affirmati!e$ no syllogism will be #ossible$ e.g. if P belongs to all 0 and ; does not belong to some 0. &erms for the uni!ersal affirmati!e relation are animate$ man$ animal. .or the uni!ersal negati!e relation it is not #ossible to get terms$ if ; belongs to some 0$ and does not belong to some 0. .or if P belongs to all 0$ and ; to some 0$ then P will belong to some ; but we assumed that it belongs to no ;. We must #ut the matter as before.( 0ince the e"#ression 'it does not belong to some( is indefinite$ it may be used truly of that also which belongs to none. But if ; belongs to no 0$ no syllogism is #ossible$ as has been shown. /learly then no syllogism will be #ossible here. But if the negati!e term is uni!ersal$ whene!er the major is negati!e and the minor affirmati!e there will be a syllogism. .or if P belongs to no 0$ and ; belongs to some 0$ P will not belong to some ; for we shall ha!e the first figure again$ if the #remiss ;0 is con!erted. But when the minor is negati!e$ there will be no syllogism. &erms for the #ositi!e relation are animal$ man$ wild for the negati!e relation$ animal$ science$ wild 6 the middle in both being the term wild. 1or is a syllogism #ossible when both are stated in the negati!e$ but one is uni!ersal$ the other #articular. When the minor is related uni!ersally to the middle$ take the terms animal$ science$ wild% animal$ man$ wild. When the major is related uni!ersally to the middle$ take as terms for a negati!e relation ra!en$ snow$ white. .or a #ositi!e relation terms cannot be found$ if ; belongs to some 0$ and does not belong to some 0. .or if P belongs to all ;$ and ; to some 0$ then P belongs to some 0 but we assumed that it belongs to no 0. 9ur #oint$ then$ must be #ro!ed from the indefinite nature of the #articular statement. 1or is a syllogism #ossible anyhow$ if each of the e"tremes belongs to some of the middle or does not belong$ or one belongs and the other does not to some of the middle$ or one belongs to some of the middle$ the other not to all$ or if the #remisses are indefinite. /ommon terms for all are animal$ man$ white animal$ inanimate$ white. It is clear then in this figure also when a syllogism will be #ossible$ and when not% and that if the terms are as stated$ a syllogism results of necessity$ and if there is a syllogism$ the terms must be so related. It is clear also that all the syllogisms in this figure are im#erfect )for all are made #erfect by certain su##lementary assum#tions*$ and that it will not be #ossible to reach a uni!ersal conclusion by means of this figure$ whether negati!e or affirmati!e. < It is e!ident also that in all the figures$ whene!er a #ro#er syllogism does not result$ if both the terms are affirmati!e or negati!e nothing necessary follows at all$ but if one is affirmati!e$ the other negati!e$ and if the negati!e is stated uni!ersally$ a syllogism always results relating the minor to the major term$ e.g. if A belongs to all or some B$ and B belongs to no / for if the #remisses are con!erted it is necessary that / does not belong to some A. 0imilarly also in the other figures a syllogism always results by means of con!ersion. It is e!ident also that the <

substitution of an indefinite for a #articular affirmati!e will effect the same syllogism in all the figures. It is clear too that all the im#erfect syllogisms are made #erfect by means of the first figure. .or all are brought to a conclusion either ostensi!ely or #er im#ossibile. In both ways the first figure is formed if they are made #erfect ostensi!ely$ because )as we saw* all are brought to a conclusion by means of con!ersion$ and con!ersion #roduces the first figure if they are #ro!ed #er im#ossibile$ because on the assum#tion of the false statement the syllogism comes about by means of the first figure$ e.g. in the last figure$ if A and B belong to all /$ it follows that A belongs to some B for if A belonged to no B$ and B belongs to all /$ A would belong to no / but )as we stated* it belongs to all /. 0imilarly also with the rest. It is #ossible also to reduce all syllogisms to the uni!ersal syllogisms in the first figure. &hose in the second figure are clearly made #erfect by these$ though not all in the same way% the uni!ersal syllogisms are made #erfect by con!erting the negati!e #remiss$ each of the #articular syllogisms by reductio ad im#ossibile. In the first figure #articular syllogisms are indeed made #erfect by themsel!es$ but it is #ossible also to #ro!e them by means of the second figure$ reducing them ad im#ossibile$ e.g. if A belongs to all B$ and B to some /$ it follows that A belongs to some /. .or if it belonged to no /$ and belongs to all B$ then B will belong to no / this we know by means of the second figure. 0imilarly also demonstration will be #ossible in the case of the negati!e. .or if A belongs to no B$ and B belongs to some /$ A will not belong to some / for if it belonged to all /$ and belongs to no B$ then B will belong to no / and this )as we saw* is the middle figure. /onsequently$ since all syllogisms in the middle figure can be reduced to uni!ersal syllogisms in the first figure$ and since #articular syllogisms in the first figure can be reduced to syllogisms in the middle figure$ it is clear that #articular syllogisms can be reduced to uni!ersal syllogisms in the first figure. 0yllogisms in the third figure$ if the terms are uni!ersal$ are directly made #erfect by means of those syllogisms% but$ when one of the #remisses is #articular$ by means of the #articular syllogisms in the first figure and these )we ha!e seen* may be reduced to the uni!ersal syllogisms in the first figure consequently also the #articular syllogisms in the third figure may be so reduced. It is clear then that all syllogisms may be reduced to the uni!ersal syllogisms in the first figure. We ha!e stated then how syllogisms which #ro!e that something belongs or does not belong to something else are constituted$ both how syllogisms of the same figure are constituted in themsel!es$ and how syllogisms of different figures are related to one another. = 0ince there is a difference according as something belongs$ necessarily belongs$ or may belong to something else )for many things belong indeed$ but not necessarily$ others neither necessarily nor indeed at all$ but it is #ossible for them to belong*$ it is clear that there will be different syllogisms to #ro!e each of these relations$ and syllogisms with differently related terms$ one syllogism concluding from what is necessary$ another from what is$ a third from what is #ossible. &here is hardly any difference between syllogisms from necessary #remisses and syllogisms from #remisses which merely assert. When the terms are #ut in the same way$ then$ whether something belongs or necessarily belongs )or does not belong* to something else$ a syllogism will or will not result alike in both cases$ the only difference being the addition of the e"#ression 'necessarily( to the terms. .or the negati!e statement is con!ertible alike in both cases$ and we should gi!e the same account of the e"#ressions 'to be contained in something as in a whole( and 'to be #redicated of all of something(. With the e"ce#tions to be made below$ the conclusion will be =

#ro!ed to be necessary by means of con!ersion$ in the same manner as in the case of sim#le #redication. But in the middle figure when the uni!ersal statement is affirmati!e$ and the #articular negati!e$ and again in the third figure when the uni!ersal is affirmati!e and the #articular negati!e$ the demonstration will not take the same form$ but it is necessary by the 'e"#osition( of a #art of the subject of the #articular negati!e #ro#osition$ to which the #redicate does not belong$ to make the syllogism in reference to this with terms so chosen the conclusion will necessarily follow. But if the relation is necessary in res#ect of the #art taken$ it must hold of some of that term in which this #art is included for the #art taken is just some of that. And each of the resulting syllogisms is in the a##ro#riate figure. > It ha##ens sometimes also that when one #remiss is necessary the conclusion is necessary$ not howe!er when either #remiss is necessary$ but only when the major is$ e.g. if A is taken as necessarily belonging or not belonging to B$ but B is taken as sim#ly belonging to / for if the #remisses are taken in this way$ A will necessarily belong or not belong to /. .or since necessarily belongs$ or does not belong$ to e!ery B$ and since / is one of the Bs$ it is clear that for / also the #ositi!e or the negati!e relation to A will hold necessarily. But if the major #remiss is not necessary$ but the minor is necessary$ the conclusion will not be necessary. .or if it were$ it would result both through the first figure and through the third that A belongs necessarily to some B. But this is false% for B may be such that it is #ossible that A should belong to none of it. .urther$ an e"am#le also makes it clear that the conclusion not be necessary$ e.g. if A were mo!ement$ B animal$ / man man is an animal necessarily$ but an animal does not mo!e necessarily$ nor does man. 0imilarly also if the major #remiss is negati!e% for the #roof is the same. In #articular syllogisms$ if the uni!ersal #remiss is necessary$ then the conclusion will be necessary% but if the #articular$ the conclusion will not be necessary$ whether the uni!ersal #remiss is negati!e or affirmati!e. .irst let the uni!ersal be necessary$ and let A belong to all B necessarily$ but let B sim#ly belong to some / it is necessary then that A belongs to some / necessarily for / falls under B$ and A was assumed to belong necessarily to all B. 0imilarly also if the syllogism should be negati!e for the #roof will be the same. But if the #articular #remiss is necessary$ the conclusion will not be necessary for from the denial of such a conclusion nothing im#ossible results$ just as it does not in the uni!ersal syllogisms. &he same is true of negati!e syllogisms. &ry the terms mo!ement$ animal$ white. 1? In the second figure$ if the negati!e #remiss is necessary$ then the conclusion will be necessary$ but if the affirmati!e$ not necessary. .irst let the negati!e be necessary% let A be #ossible of no B$ and sim#ly belong to /. 0ince then the negati!e statement is con!ertible$ B is #ossible of no A. But A belongs to all /% consequently B is #ossible of no /. .or / falls under A. &he same result would be obtained if the minor #remiss were negati!e for if A is #ossible be of no /$ / is #ossible of no A but A belongs to all B$ consequently / is #ossible of none of the Bs for again we ha!e obtained the first figure. 1either then is B #ossible of / for con!ersion is #ossible without modifying the relation. But if the affirmati!e #remiss is necessary$ the conclusion will not be necessary. 5et A belong to all B necessarily$ but to no / sim#ly. If then the negati!e #remiss is con!erted$ the first figure >

results. But it has been #ro!ed in the case of the first figure that if the negati!e major #remiss is not necessary the conclusion will not be necessary either. &herefore the same result will obtain here. .urther$ if the conclusion is necessary$ it follows that / necessarily does not belong to some A. .or if B necessarily belongs to no /$ / will necessarily belong to no B. But B at any rate must belong to some A$ if it is true )as was assumed* that A necessarily belongs to all B. /onsequently it is necessary that / does not belong to some A. But nothing #re!ents such an A being taken that it is #ossible for / to belong to all of it. .urther one might show by an e"#osition of terms that the conclusion is not necessary without qualification$ though it is a necessary conclusion from the #remisses. .or e"am#le let A be animal$ B man$ / white$ and let the #remisses be assumed to corres#ond to what we had before it is #ossible that animal should belong to nothing white. 8an then will not belong to anything white$ but not necessarily for it is #ossible for man to be born white$ not howe!er so long as animal belongs to nothing white. /onsequently under these conditions the conclusion will be necessary$ but it is not necessary without qualification. 0imilar results will obtain also in #articular syllogisms. .or whene!er the negati!e #remiss is both uni!ersal and necessary$ then the conclusion will be necessary but whene!er the affirmati!e #remiss is uni!ersal$ the negati!e #articular$ the conclusion will not be necessary. .irst then let the negati!e #remiss be both uni!ersal and necessary let it be #ossible for no B that A should belong to it$ and let A sim#ly belong to some /. 0ince the negati!e statement is con!ertible$ it will be #ossible for no A that B should belong to it but A belongs to some /% consequently B necessarily does not belong to some of the /s. Again let the affirmati!e #remiss be both uni!ersal and necessary$ and let the major #remiss be affirmati!e. If then A necessarily belongs to all B$ but does not belong to some /$ it is clear that B will not belong to some /$ but not necessarily. .or the same terms can be used to demonstrate the #oint$ which were used in the uni!ersal syllogisms. 1or again$ if the negati!e statement is necessary but #articular$ will the conclusion be necessary. &he #oint can be demonstrated by means of the same terms. 11 In the last figure when the terms are related uni!ersally to the middle$ and both #remisses are affirmati!e$ if one of the two is necessary$ then the conclusion will be necessary. But if one is negati!e$ the other affirmati!e$ whene!er the negati!e is necessary the conclusion also will be necessary$ but whene!er the affirmati!e is necessary the conclusion will not be necessary. .irst let both the #remisses be affirmati!e$ and let A and B belong to all /$ and let A/ be necessary. 0ince then B belongs to all /$ / also will belong to some B$ because the uni!ersal is con!ertible into the #articular consequently if A belongs necessarily to all /$ and / belongs to some B$ it is necessary that A should belong to some B also. .or B is under /. &he first figure then is formed. A similar #roof will be gi!en also if B/ is necessary. .or / is con!ertible with some A consequently if B belongs necessarily to all /$ it will belong necessarily also to some A. Again let A/ be negati!e$ B/ affirmati!e$ and let the negati!e #remiss be necessary. 0ince then / is con!ertible with some B$ but A necessarily belongs to no /$ A will necessarily not belong to some B either for B is under /. But if the affirmati!e is necessary$ the conclusion will not be necessary. .or su##ose B/ is affirmati!e and necessary$ while A/ is negati!e and not necessary. 0ince then the affirmati!e is con!ertible$ / also will belong to some B necessarily consequently if A belongs to none of the /s$ while / belongs to some of the Bs$ A will not belong to some of the Bs 6 but not of necessity% for it has been #ro!ed$ in the case of the first figure$ that if the negati!e #remiss is not necessary$ neither will the conclusion be necessary. .urther$ the #oint may be made clear by considering the terms. 5et the term A be 'good($ let that which B signifies be 1?

'animal($ let the term / be 'horse(. It is #ossible then that the term good should belong to no horse$ and it is necessary that the term animal should belong to e!ery horse but it is not necessary that some animal should not be good$ since it is #ossible for e!ery animal to be good. 9r if that is not #ossible$ take as the term 'awake( or 'aslee#( for e!ery animal can acce#t these. If$ then$ the #remisses are uni!ersal$ we ha!e stated when the conclusion will be necessary. But if one #remiss is uni!ersal$ the other #articular$ and if both are affirmati!e$ whene!er the uni!ersal is necessary the conclusion also must be necessary. &he demonstration is the same as before% for the #articular affirmati!e also is con!ertible. If then it is necessary that B should belong to all /$ and A falls under /$ it is necessary that B should belong to some A. But if B must belong to some A$ then A must belong to some B for con!ersion is #ossible. 0imilarly also if A/ should be necessary and uni!ersal for B falls under /. But if the #articular #remiss is necessary$ the conclusion will not be necessary. 5et the #remiss B/ be both #articular and necessary$ and let A belong to all /$ not howe!er necessarily. If the #ro#osition B/ is con!erted the first figure is formed$ and the uni!ersal #remiss is not necessary$ but the #articular is necessary. But when the #remisses were thus$ the conclusion )as we #ro!ed was not necessary consequently it is not here either. .urther$ the #oint is clear if we look at the terms. 5et A be waking$ B bi#ed$ and / animal. It is necessary that B should belong to some /$ but it is #ossible for A to belong to /$ and that A should belong to B is not necessary. .or there is no necessity that some bi#ed should be aslee# or awake. 0imilarly and by means of the same terms #roof can be made$ should the #ro#osition A/ be both #articular and necessary. But if one #remiss is affirmati!e$ the other negati!e$ whene!er the uni!ersal is both negati!e and necessary the conclusion also will be necessary. .or if it is not #ossible that A should belong to any /$ but B belongs to some /$ it is necessary that A should not belong to some B. But whene!er the affirmati!e #ro#osition is necessary$ whether uni!ersal or #articular$ or the negati!e is #articular$ the conclusion will not be necessary. &he #roof of this by reduction will be the same as before% but if terms are wanted$ when the uni!ersal affirmati!e is necessary$ take the terms 'waking( 6 'animal( 6 'man($ 'man( being middle$ and when the affirmati!e is #articular and necessary$ take the terms 'waking( 6 'animal( 6 'white( for it is necessary that animal should belong to some white thing$ but it is #ossible that waking should belong to none$ and it is not necessary that waking should not belong to some animal. But when the negati!e #ro#osition being #articular is necessary$ take the terms 'bi#ed($ 'mo!ing($ 'animal($ 'animal( being middle. 1, It is clear then that a sim#le conclusion is not reached unless both #remisses are sim#le assertions$ but a necessary conclusion is #ossible although one only of the #remisses is necessary. But in both cases$ whether the syllogisms are affirmati!e or negati!e$ it is necessary that one #remiss should be similar to the conclusion. I mean by 'similar($ if the conclusion is a sim#le assertion$ the #remiss must be sim#le% if the conclusion is necessary$ the #remiss must be necessary. /onsequently this also is clear$ that the conclusion will be neither necessary nor sim#le unless a necessary or sim#le #remiss is assumed. 12 Perha#s enough has been said about the #roof of necessity$ how it comes about and how it differs from the #roof of a sim#le statement. We #roceed to discuss that which is #ossible$ when and how and by what means it can be #ro!ed. I use the terms 'to be #ossible( and 'the #ossible( of that 11

which is not necessary but$ being assumed$ results in nothing im#ossible. We say indeed ambiguously of the necessary that it is #ossible. But that my definition of the #ossible is correct is clear from the #hrases by which we deny or on the contrary affirm #ossibility. .or the e"#ressions 'it is not #ossible to belong($ 'it is im#ossible to belong($ and 'it is necessary not to belong( are either identical or follow from one another% consequently their o##osites also$ 'it is #ossible to belong($ 'it is not im#ossible to belong($ and 'it is not necessary not to belong($ will either be identical or follow from one another. .or of e!erything the affirmation or the denial holds good. &hat which is #ossible then will be not necessary and that which is not necessary will be #ossible. It results that all #remisses in the mode of #ossibility are con!ertible into one another. I mean not that the affirmati!e are con!ertible into the negati!e$ but that those which are affirmati!e in form admit of con!ersion by o##osition$ e.g. 'it is #ossible to belong( may be con!erted into 'it is #ossible not to belong($ and 'it is #ossible for A to belong to all B( into 'it is #ossible for A to belong to no B( or 'not to all B($ and 'it is #ossible for A to belong to some B( into 'it is #ossible for A not to belong to some B(. And similarly the other #ro#ositions in this mode can be con!erted. .or since that which is #ossible is not necessary$ and that which is not necessary may #ossibly not belong$ it is clear that if it is #ossible that A should belong to B$ it is #ossible also that it should not belong to B and if it is #ossible that it should belong to all$ it is also #ossible that it should not belong to all. &he same holds good in the case of #articular affirmations for the #roof is identical. And such #remisses are affirmati!e and not negati!e% for 'to be #ossible( is in the same rank as 'to be($ as was said abo!e. @a!ing made these distinctions we ne"t #oint out that the e"#ression 'to be #ossible( is used in two ways. In one it means to ha##en generally and fall short of necessity$ e.g. man(s turning grey or growing or decaying$ or generally what naturally belongs to a thing )for this has not its necessity unbroken$ since man(s e"istence is not continuous for e!er$ although if a man does e"ist$ it comes about either necessarily or generally*. In another sense the e"#ression means the indefinite$ which can be both thus and not thus$ e.g. an animal(s walking or an earthquake(s taking #lace while it is walking$ or generally what ha##ens by chance for none of these inclines by nature in the one way more than in the o##osite. &hat which is #ossible in each of its two senses is con!ertible into its o##osite$ not howe!er in the same way but what is natural is con!ertible because it does not necessarily belong )for in this sense it is #ossible that a man should not grow grey* and what is indefinite is con!ertible because it inclines this way no more than that. 0cience and demonstrati!e syllogism are not concerned with things which are indefinite$ because the middle term is uncertain% but they are concerned with things that are natural$ and as a rule arguments and inquiries are made about things which are #ossible in this sense. 0yllogisms indeed can be made about the former$ but it is unusual at any rate to inquire about them. &hese matters will be treated more definitely in the sequel% our business at #resent is to state the moods and nature of the syllogism made from #ossible #remisses. &he e"#ression 'it is #ossible for this to belong to that( may be understood in two senses 'that( may mean either that to which 'that( belongs or that to which it may belong% for the e"#ression 'A is #ossible of the subject of B( means that it is #ossible either of that of which B is stated or of that of which B may #ossibly be stated. It makes no difference whether we say$ A is #ossible of the subject of B$ or all B admits of A. It is clear then that the e"#ression 'A may #ossibly belong to all B( might be used in two senses. .irst then we must state the nature and characteristics of the syllogism which arises if B is #ossible of the subject of /$ and A is #ossible of the subject of B. .or thus both #remisses are assumed in the mode of #ossibility% but whene!er A is #ossible of that of which B is true$ one

1,

#remiss is a sim#le assertion$ the other a #roblematic. /onsequently we must start from #remisses which are similar in form$ as in the other cases. 14 Whene!er A may #ossibly belong to all B$ and B to all /$ there will be a #erfect syllogism to #ro!e that A may #ossibly belong to all /. &his is clear from the definition for it was in this way that we e"#lained 'to be #ossible for one term to belong to all of another(. 0imilarly if it is #ossible for A to belong no B$ and for B to belong to all /$ then it is #ossible for A to belong to no /. .or the statement that it is #ossible for A not to belong to that of which B may be true means )as we saw* that none of those things which can #ossibly fall under the term B is left out of account. But whene!er A may belong to all B$ and B may belong to no /$ then indeed no syllogism results from the #remisses assumed$ but if the #remiss B/ is con!erted after the manner of #roblematic #ro#ositions$ the same syllogism results as before. .or since it is #ossible that B should belong to no /$ it is #ossible also that it should belong to all /. &his has been stated abo!e. /onsequently if B is #ossible for all /$ and A is #ossible for all B$ the same syllogism again results. 0imilarly if in both the #remisses the negati!e is joined with 'it is #ossible( e.g. if A may belong to none of the Bs$ and B to none of the /s. 1o syllogism results from the assumed #remisses$ but if they are con!erted we shall ha!e the same syllogism as before. It is clear then that if the minor #remiss is negati!e$ or if both #remisses are negati!e$ either no syllogism results$ or if one it is not #erfect. .or the necessity results from the con!ersion. But if one of the #remisses is uni!ersal$ the other #articular$ when the major #remiss is uni!ersal there will be a #erfect syllogism. .or if A is #ossible for all B$ and B for some /$ then A is #ossible for some /. &his is clear from the definition of being #ossible. Again if A may belong to no B$ and B may belong to some of the /s$ it is necessary that A may #ossibly not belong to some of the /s. &he #roof is the same as abo!e. But if the #articular #remiss is negati!e$ and the uni!ersal is affirmati!e$ the major still being uni!ersal and the minor #articular$ e.g. A is #ossible for all B$ B may #ossibly not belong to some /$ then a clear syllogism does not result from the assumed #remisses$ but if the #articular #remiss is con!erted and it is laid down that B #ossibly may belong to some /$ we shall ha!e the same conclusion as before$ as in the cases gi!en at the beginning. But if the major #remiss is the minor uni!ersal$ whether both are affirmati!e$ or negati!e$ or different in quality$ or if both are indefinite or #articular$ in no way will a syllogism be #ossible. .or nothing #re!ents B from reaching beyond A$ so that as #redicates co!er unequal areas. 5et / be that by which B e"tends beyond A. &o / it is not #ossible that A should belong 6 either to all or to none or to some or not to some$ since #remisses in the mode of #ossibility are con!ertible and it is #ossible for B to belong to more things than A can. .urther$ this is ob!ious if we take terms% for if the #remisses are as assumed$ the major term is both #ossible for none of the minor and must belong to all of it. &ake as terms common to all the cases under consideration 'animal( 6 'white( 6 'man($ where the major belongs necessarily to the minor% 'animal( 6 'white( 6 'garment($ where it is not #ossible that the major should belong to the minor. It is clear then that if the terms are related in this manner$ no syllogism results. .or e!ery syllogism #ro!es that something belongs either sim#ly or necessarily or #ossibly. It is clear that there is no #roof of the first or of the second. .or the affirmati!e is destroyed by the negati!e$ and the negati!e by the affirmati!e. &here remains the #roof of #ossibility. But this is im#ossible. .or it has been #ro!ed that if the terms are related in this manner it is both necessary that the major should belong to all

12

the minor and not #ossible that it should belong to any. /onsequently there cannot be a syllogism to #ro!e the #ossibility% for the necessary )as we stated* is not #ossible. It is clear that if the terms are uni!ersal in #ossible #remisses a syllogism always results in the first figure$ whether they are affirmati!e or negati!e$ only a #erfect syllogism results in the first case$ an im#erfect in the second. But #ossibility must be understood according to the definition laid down$ not as co!ering necessity. &his is sometimes forgotten. 17 If one #remiss is a sim#le #ro#osition$ the other a #roblematic$ whene!er the major #remiss indicates #ossibility all the syllogisms will be #erfect and establish #ossibility in the sense defined% but whene!er the minor #remiss indicates #ossibility all the syllogisms will be im#erfect$ and those which are negati!e will establish not #ossibility according to the definition$ but that the major does not necessarily belong to any$ or to all$ of the minor. .or if this is so$ we say it is #ossible that it should belong to none or not to all. 5et A be #ossible for all B$ and let B belong to all /. 0ince / falls under B$ and A is #ossible for all B$ clearly it is #ossible for all / also. 0o a #erfect syllogism results. 5ikewise if the #remiss AB is negati!e$ and the #remiss B/ is affirmati!e$ the former stating #ossible$ the latter sim#le attribution$ a #erfect syllogism results #ro!ing that A #ossibly belongs to no /. It is clear that #erfect syllogisms result if the minor #remiss states sim#le belonging but that syllogisms will result if the modality of the #remisses is re!ersed$ must be #ro!ed #er im#ossibile. At the same time it will be e!ident that they are im#erfect for the #roof #roceeds not from the #remisses assumed. .irst we must state that if B(s being follows necessarily from A(s being$ B(s #ossibility will follow necessarily from A(s #ossibility. 0u##ose$ the terms being so related$ that A is #ossible$ and B is im#ossible. If then that which is #ossible$ when it is #ossible for it to be$ might ha##en$ and if that which is im#ossible$ when it is im#ossible$ could not ha##en$ and if at the same time A is #ossible and B im#ossible$ it would be #ossible for A to ha##en without B$ and if to ha##en$ then to be. .or that which has ha##ened$ when it has ha##ened$ is. But we must take the im#ossible and the #ossible not only in the s#here of becoming$ but also in the s#heres of truth and #redicability$ and the !arious other s#heres in which we s#eak of the #ossible for it will be alike in all. .urther we must understand the statement that B(s being de#ends on A(s being$ not as meaning that if some single thing A is$ B will be for nothing follows of necessity from the being of some one thing$ but from two at least$ i.e. when the #remisses are related in the manner stated to be that of the syllogism. .or if / is #redicated of A$ and A of .$ then / is necessarily #redicated of .. And if each is #ossible$ the conclusion also is #ossible. If then$ for e"am#le$ one should indicate the #remisses by A$ and the conclusion by B$ it would not only result that if A is necessary B is necessary$ but also that if A is #ossible$ B is #ossible. 0ince this is #ro!ed it is e!ident that if a false and not im#ossible assum#tion is made$ the consequence of the assum#tion will also be false and not im#ossible e.g. if A is false$ but not im#ossible$ and if B is the consequence of A$ B also will be false but not im#ossible. .or since it has been #ro!ed that if B(s being is the consequence of A(s being$ then B(s #ossibility will follow from A(s #ossibility )and A is assumed to be #ossible*$ consequently B will be #ossible for if it were im#ossible$ the same thing would at the same time be #ossible and im#ossible. 0ince we ha!e defined these #oints$ let A belong to all B$ and B be #ossible for all / it is necessary then that should be a #ossible attribute for all /. 0u##ose that it is not #ossible$ but assume that B belongs to all / this is false but not im#ossible. If then A is not #ossible for / but 14

B belongs to all /$ then A is not #ossible for all B for a syllogism is formed in the third degree. But it was assumed that A is a #ossible attribute for all B. It is necessary then that A is #ossible for all /. .or though the assum#tion we made is false and not im#ossible$ the conclusion is im#ossible. It is #ossible also in the first figure to bring about the im#ossibility$ by assuming that B belongs to /. .or if B belongs to all /$ and A is #ossible for all B$ then A would be #ossible for all /. But the assum#tion was made that A is not #ossible for all /. We must understand 'that which belongs to all( with no limitation in res#ect of time$ e.g. to the #resent or to a #articular #eriod$ but sim#ly without qualification. .or it is by the hel# of such #remisses that we make syllogisms$ since if the #remiss is understood with reference to the #resent moment$ there cannot be a syllogism. .or nothing #erha#s #re!ents 'man( belonging at a #articular time to e!erything that is mo!ing$ i.e. if nothing else were mo!ing but 'mo!ing( is #ossible for e!ery horse% yet 'man( is #ossible for no horse. .urther let the major term be 'animal($ the middle 'mo!ing($ the the minor 'man(. &he #remisses then will be as before$ but the conclusion necessary$ not #ossible. .or man is necessarily animal. It is clear then that the uni!ersal must be understood sim#ly$ without limitation in res#ect of time. Again let the #remiss AB be uni!ersal and negati!e$ and assume that A belongs to no B$ but B #ossibly belongs to all /. &hese #ro#ositions being laid down$ it is necessary that A #ossibly belongs to no /. 0u##ose that it cannot belong$ and that B belongs to /$ as abo!e. It is necessary then that A belongs to some B for we ha!e a syllogism in the third figure but this is im#ossible. &hus it will be #ossible for A to belong to no /% for if at is su##osed false$ the consequence is an im#ossible one. &his syllogism then does not establish that which is #ossible according to the definition$ but that which does not necessarily belong to any #art of the subject )for this is the contradictory of the assum#tion which was made for it was su##osed that A necessarily belongs to some /$ but the syllogism #er im#ossibile establishes the contradictory which is o##osed to this*. .urther$ it is clear also from an e"am#le that the conclusion will not establish #ossibility. 5et A be 'ra!en($ B 'intelligent($ and / 'man(. A then belongs to no B for no intelligent thing is a ra!en. But B is #ossible for all / for e!ery man may #ossibly be intelligent. But A necessarily belongs to no / so the conclusion does not establish #ossibility. But neither is it always necessary. 5et A be 'mo!ing($ B 'science($ / 'man(. A then will belong to no B% but B is #ossible for all /. And the conclusion will not be necessary. .or it is not necessary that no man should mo!e% rather it is not necessary that any man should mo!e. /learly then the conclusion establishes that one term does not necessarily belong to any instance of another term. But we must take our terms better. If the minor #remiss is negati!e and indicates #ossibility$ from the actual #remisses taken there can be no syllogism$ but if the #roblematic #remiss is con!erted$ a syllogism will be #ossible$ as before. 5et A belong to all B$ and let B #ossibly belong to no /. If the terms are arranged thus$ nothing necessarily follows but if the #ro#osition B/ is con!erted and it is assumed that B is #ossible for all /$ a syllogism results as before for the terms are in the same relati!e #ositions. 5ikewise if both the relations are negati!e$ if the major #remiss states that A does not belong to B$ and the minor #remiss indicates that B may #ossibly belong to no /. &hrough the #remisses actually taken nothing necessary results in any way% but if the #roblematic #remiss is con!erted$ we shall ha!e a syllogism. 0u##ose that A belongs to no B$ and B may #ossibly belong to no /. &hrough these comes nothing necessary. But if B is assumed to be #ossible for all / )and this is true* and if the #remiss AB remains as before$ we shall again ha!e the same syllogism. But if it be assumed that B does not belong to any /$ instead of #ossibly not belonging$ there cannot be a syllogism anyhow$ whether the #remiss AB is negati!e or affirmati!e. As common instances of a necessary and #ositi!e relation we may take the terms white 6 animal 6 snow of a necessary and 17

negati!e relation$ white 6 animal 6 #itch. /learly then if the terms are uni!ersal$ and one of the #remisses is assertoric$ the other #roblematic$ whene!er the minor #remiss is #roblematic a syllogism always results$ only sometimes it results from the #remisses that are taken$ sometimes it requires the con!ersion of one #remiss. We ha!e stated when each of these ha##ens and the reason why. But if one of the relations is uni!ersal$ the other #articular$ then whene!er the major #remiss is uni!ersal and #roblematic$ whether affirmati!e or negati!e$ and the #articular is affirmati!e and assertoric$ there will be a #erfect syllogism$ just as when the terms are uni!ersal. &he demonstration is the same as before. But whene!er the major #remiss is uni!ersal$ but assertoric$ not #roblematic$ and the minor is #articular and #roblematic$ whether both #remisses are negati!e or affirmati!e$ or one is negati!e$ the other affirmati!e$ in all cases there will be an im#erfect syllogism. 9nly some of them will be #ro!ed #er im#ossibile$ others by the con!ersion of the #roblematic #remiss$ as has been shown abo!e. And a syllogism will be #ossible by means of con!ersion when the major #remiss is uni!ersal and assertoric$ whether #ositi!e or negati!e$ and the minor #articular$ negati!e$ and #roblematic$ e.g. if A belongs to all B or to no B$ and B may #ossibly not belong to some /. .or if the #remiss B/ is con!erted in res#ect of #ossibility$ a syllogism results. But whene!er the #articular #remiss is assertoric and negati!e$ there cannot be a syllogism. As instances of the #ositi!e relation we may take the terms white 6 animal 6 snow% of the negati!e$ white 6 animal 6 #itch. .or the demonstration must be made through the indefinite nature of the #articular #remiss. But if the minor #remiss is uni!ersal$ and the major #articular$ whether either #remiss is negati!e or affirmati!e$ #roblematic or assertoric$ nohow is a syllogism #ossible. 1or is a syllogism #ossible when the #remisses are #articular or indefinite$ whether #roblematic or assertoric$ or the one #roblematic$ the other assertoric. &he demonstration is the same as abo!e. As instances of the necessary and #ositi!e relation we may take the terms animal 6 white 6 man% of the necessary and negati!e relation$ animal 6 white 6 garment. It is e!ident then that if the major #remiss is uni!ersal$ a syllogism always results$ but if the minor is uni!ersal nothing at all can e!er be #ro!ed. 1: Whene!er one #remiss is necessary$ the other #roblematic$ there will be a syllogism when the terms are related as before% and a #erfect syllogism when the minor #remiss is necessary. If the #remisses are affirmati!e the conclusion will be #roblematic$ not assertoric$ whether the #remisses are uni!ersal or not but if one is affirmati!e$ the other negati!e$ when the affirmati!e is necessary the conclusion will be #roblematic$ not negati!e assertoric% but when the negati!e is necessary the conclusion will be #roblematic negati!e$ and assertoric negati!e$ whether the #remisses are uni!ersal or not. Possibility in the conclusion must be understood in the same manner as before. &here cannot be an inference to the necessary negati!e #ro#osition for 'not necessarily to belong( is different from 'necessarily not to belong(. If the #remisses are affirmati!e$ clearly the conclusion which follows is not necessary. 0u##ose A necessarily belongs to all B$ and let B be #ossible for all /. We shall ha!e an im#erfect syllogism to #ro!e that A may belong to all /. &hat it is im#erfect is clear from the #roof for it will be #ro!ed in the same manner as abo!e. Again$ let A be #ossible for all B$ and let B necessarily belong to all /. We shall then ha!e a syllogism to #ro!e that A may belong to all /$ not that A does belong to all / and it is #erfect$ not im#erfect for it is com#leted directly through the original #remisses. But if the #remisses are not similar in quality$ su##ose first that the negati!e #remiss is necessary$ and let necessarily A not be #ossible for any B$ but let B be #ossible for all /. It is necessary then 1:

that A belongs to no /. .or su##ose A to belong to all / or to some /. 1ow we assumed that A is not #ossible for any B. 0ince then the negati!e #ro#osition is con!ertible$ B is not #ossible for any A. But A is su##osed to belong to all / or to some /. /onsequently B will not be #ossible for any / or for all /. But it was originally laid down that B is #ossible for all /. And it is clear that the #ossibility of belonging can be inferred$ since the fact of not belonging is inferred. Again$ let the affirmati!e #remiss be necessary$ and let A #ossibly not belong to any B$ and let B necessarily belong to all /. &he syllogism will be #erfect$ but it will establish a #roblematic negati!e$ not an assertoric negati!e. .or the major #remiss was #roblematic$ and further it is not #ossible to #ro!e the assertoric conclusion #er im#ossibile. .or if it were su##osed that A belongs to some /$ and it is laid down that A #ossibly does not belong to any B$ no im#ossible relation between B and / follows from these #remisses. But if the minor #remiss is negati!e$ when it is #roblematic a syllogism is #ossible by con!ersion$ as abo!e% but when it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. 1or again when both #remisses are negati!e$ and the minor is necessary. &he same terms as before ser!e both for the #ositi!e relation 6 white3animal3snow$ and for the negati!e relation 6 white3animal3#itch. &he same relation will obtain in #articular syllogisms. Whene!er the negati!e #ro#osition is necessary$ the conclusion will be negati!e assertoric e.g. if it is not #ossible that A should belong to any B$ but B may belong to some of the /s$ it is necessary that A should not belong to some of the /s. .or if A belongs to all /$ but cannot belong to any B$ neither can B belong to any A. 0o if A belongs to all /$ to none of the /s can B belong. But it was laid down that B may belong to some /. But when the #articular affirmati!e in the negati!e syllogism$ e.g. B/ the minor #remiss$ or the uni!ersal #ro#osition in the affirmati!e syllogism$ e.g. AB the major #remiss$ is necessary$ there will not be an assertoric conclusion. &he demonstration is the same as before. But if the minor #remiss is uni!ersal$ and #roblematic$ whether affirmati!e or negati!e$ and the major #remiss is #articular and necessary$ there cannot be a syllogism. Premisses of this kind are #ossible both where the relation is #ositi!e and necessary$ e.g. animal3white3man$ and where it is necessary and negati!e$ e.g. animal3white3garment. But when the uni!ersal is necessary$ the #articular #roblematic$ if the uni!ersal is negati!e we may take the terms animal3white3ra!en to illustrate the #ositi!e relation$ or animal3white3#itch to illustrate the negati!e% and if the uni!ersal is affirmati!e we may take the terms animal3white3swan to illustrate the #ositi!e relation$ and animal3white3snow to illustrate the negati!e and necessary relation. 1or again is a syllogism #ossible when the #remisses are indefinite$ or both #articular. &erms a##licable in either case to illustrate the #ositi!e relation are animal3white3man to illustrate the negati!e$ animal3white3 inanimate. .or the relation of animal to some white$ and of white to some inanimate$ is both necessary and #ositi!e and necessary and negati!e. 0imilarly if the relation is #roblematic so the terms may be used for all cases. /learly then from what has been said a syllogism results or not from similar relations of the terms whether we are dealing with sim#le e"istence or necessity$ with this e"ce#tion$ that if the negati!e #remiss is assertoric the conclusion is #roblematic$ but if the negati!e #remiss is necessary the conclusion is both #roblematic and negati!e assertoric. BIt is clear also that all the syllogisms are im#erfect and are #erfected by means of the figures abo!e mentioned.C 1< In the second figure whene!er both #remisses are #roblematic$ no syllogism is #ossible$ whether the #remisses are affirmati!e or negati!e$ uni!ersal or #articular. But when one #remiss is assertoric$ the other #roblematic$ if the affirmati!e is assertoric no syllogism is #ossible$ but if the 1<

uni!ersal negati!e is assertoric a conclusion can always be drawn. 0imilarly when one #remiss is necessary$ the other #roblematic. @ere also we must understand the term '#ossible( in the conclusion$ in the same sense as before. .irst we must #oint out that the negati!e #roblematic #ro#osition is not con!ertible$ e.g. if A may belong to no B$ it does not follow that B may belong to no A. .or su##ose it to follow and assume that B may belong to no A. 0ince then #roblematic affirmations are con!ertible with negations$ whether they are contraries or contradictories$ and since B may belong to no A$ it is clear that B may belong to all A. But this is false for if all this can be that$ it does not follow that all that can be this consequently the negati!e #ro#osition is not con!ertible. .urther$ these #ro#ositions are not incom#atible$ 'A may belong to no B($ 'B necessarily does not belong to some of the As(% e.g. it is #ossible that no man should be white )for it is also #ossible that e!ery man should be white*$ but it is not true to say that it is #ossible that no white thing should be a man for many white things are necessarily not men$ and the necessary )as we saw* other than the #ossible. 8oreo!er it is not #ossible to #ro!e the con!ertibility of these #ro#ositions by a reductio ad absurdum$ i.e. by claiming assent to the following argument 'since it is false that B may belong to no A$ it is true that it cannot belong to no A$ for the one statement is the contradictory of the other. But if this is so$ it is true that B necessarily belongs to some of the As consequently A necessarily belongs to some of the Bs. But this is im#ossible.( &he argument cannot be admitted$ for it does not follow that some A is necessarily B$ if it is not #ossible that no A should be B. .or the latter e"#ression is used in two senses$ one if A some is necessarily B$ another if some A is necessarily not B. .or it is not true to say that that which necessarily does not belong to some of the As may #ossibly not belong to any A$ just as it is not true to say that what necessarily belongs to some A may #ossibly belong to all A. If any one then should claim that because it is not #ossible for / to belong to all A$ it necessarily does not belong to some A$ he would make a false assum#tion for it does belong to all A$ but because in some cases it belongs necessarily$ therefore we say that it is not #ossible for it to belong to all. @ence both the #ro#ositions 'A necessarily belongs to some B( and 'A necessarily does not belong to some B( are o##osed to the #ro#osition 'A belongs to all B(. 0imilarly also they are o##osed to the #ro#osition 'A may belong to no B(. It is clear then that in relation to what is #ossible and not #ossible$ in the sense originally defined$ we must assume$ not that A necessarily belongs to some B$ but that A necessarily does not belong to some B. But if this is assumed$ no absurdity results consequently no syllogism. It is clear from what has been said that the negati!e #ro#osition is not con!ertible. &his being #ro!ed$ su##ose it #ossible that A may belong to no B and to all /. By means of con!ersion no syllogism will result for the major #remiss$ as has been said$ is not con!ertible. 1or can a #roof be obtained by a reductio ad absurdum for if it is assumed that B can belong to all /$ no false consequence results for A may belong both to all / and to no /. In general$ if there is a syllogism$ it is clear that its conclusion will be #roblematic because neither of the #remisses is assertoric% and this must be either affirmati!e or negati!e. But neither is #ossible. 0u##ose the conclusion is affirmati!e it will be #ro!ed by an e"am#le that the #redicate cannot belong to the subject. 0u##ose the conclusion is negati!e it will be #ro!ed that it is not #roblematic but necessary. 5et A be white$ B man$ / horse. It is #ossible then for A to belong to all of the one and to none of the other. But it is not #ossible for B to belong nor not to belong to /. &hat it is not #ossible for it to belong$ is clear. .or no horse is a man. 1either is it #ossible for it not to belong. .or it is necessary that no horse should be a man$ but the necessary we found to be different from the #ossible. 1o syllogism then results. A similar #roof can be gi!en if the major #remiss is negati!e$ the minor affirmati!e$ or if both are affirmati!e or negati!e. &he demonstration can be made by means of the same terms. And whene!er one #remiss is uni!ersal$ 1=

the other #articular$ or both are #articular or indefinite$ or in whate!er other way the #remisses can be altered$ the #roof will always #roceed through the same terms. /learly then$ if both the #remisses are #roblematic$ no syllogism results. 1= But if one #remiss is assertoric$ the other #roblematic$ if the affirmati!e is assertoric and the negati!e #roblematic no syllogism will be #ossible$ whether the #remisses are uni!ersal or #articular. &he #roof is the same as abo!e$ and by means of the same terms. But when the affirmati!e #remiss is #roblematic$ and the negati!e assertoric$ we shall ha!e a syllogism. 0u##ose A belongs to no B$ but can belong to all /. If the negati!e #ro#osition is con!erted$ B will belong to no A. But e" hy#othesi can belong to all / so a syllogism is made$ #ro!ing by means of the first figure that B may belong to no /. 0imilarly also if the minor #remiss is negati!e. But if both #remisses are negati!e$ one being assertoric$ the other #roblematic$ nothing follows necessarily from these #remisses as they stand$ but if the #roblematic #remiss is con!erted into its com#lementary affirmati!e a syllogism is formed to #ro!e that B may belong to no /$ as before for we shall again ha!e the first figure. But if both #remisses are affirmati!e$ no syllogism will be #ossible. &his arrangement of terms is #ossible both when the relation is #ositi!e$ e.g. health$ animal$ man$ and when it is negati!e$ e.g. health$ horse$ man. &he same will hold good if the syllogisms are #articular. Whene!er the affirmati!e #ro#osition is assertoric$ whether uni!ersal or #articular$ no syllogism is #ossible )this is #ro!ed similarly and by the same e"am#les as abo!e*$ but when the negati!e #ro#osition is assertoric$ a conclusion can be drawn by means of con!ersion$ as before. Again if both the relations are negati!e$ and the assertoric #ro#osition is uni!ersal$ although no conclusion follows from the actual #remisses$ a syllogism can be obtained by con!erting the #roblematic #remiss into its com#lementary affirmati!e as before. But if the negati!e #ro#osition is assertoric$ but #articular$ no syllogism is #ossible$ whether the other #remiss is affirmati!e or negati!e. 1or can a conclusion be drawn when both #remisses are indefinite$ whether affirmati!e or negati!e$ or #articular. &he #roof is the same and by the same terms. 1> If one of the #remisses is necessary$ the other #roblematic$ then if the negati!e is necessary a syllogistic conclusion can be drawn$ not merely a negati!e #roblematic but also a negati!e assertoric conclusion% but if the affirmati!e #remiss is necessary$ no conclusion is #ossible. 0u##ose that A necessarily belongs to no B$ but may belong to all /. If the negati!e #remiss is con!erted B will belong to no A but A e" hy#othesi is ca#able of belonging to all / so once more a conclusion is drawn by the first figure that B may belong to no /. But at the same time it is clear that B will not belong to any /. .or assume that it does then if A cannot belong to any B$ and B belongs to some of the /s$ A cannot belong to some of the /s but e" hy#othesi it may belong to all. A similar #roof can be gi!en if the minor #remiss is negati!e. Again let the affirmati!e #ro#osition be necessary$ and the other #roblematic% i.e. su##ose that A may belong to no B$ but necessarily belongs to all /. When the terms are arranged in this way$ no syllogism is #ossible. .or )1* it sometimes turns out that B necessarily does not belong to /. 5et A be white$ B man$ / swan. White then necessarily belongs to swan$ but may belong to no man% and man necessarily belongs to no swan% /learly then we cannot draw a #roblematic conclusion% for that which is necessary is admittedly distinct from that which is #ossible. ),* 1or again can we draw a 1>

necessary conclusion for that #resu##oses that both #remisses are necessary$ or at any rate the negati!e #remiss. )2* .urther it is #ossible also$ when the terms are so arranged$ that B should belong to / for nothing #re!ents / falling under B$ A being #ossible for all B$ and necessarily belonging to /% e.g. if / stands for 'awake($ B for 'animal($ A for 'motion(. .or motion necessarily belongs to what is awake$ and is #ossible for e!ery animal and e!erything that is awake is animal. /learly then the conclusion cannot be the negati!e assertion$ if the relation must be #ositi!e when the terms are related as abo!e. 1or can the o##osite affirmations be established consequently no syllogism is #ossible. A similar #roof is #ossible if the major #remiss is affirmati!e. But if the #remisses are similar in quality$ when they are negati!e a syllogism can always be formed by con!erting the #roblematic #remiss into its com#lementary affirmati!e as before. 0u##ose A necessarily does not belong to B$ and #ossibly may not belong to / if the #remisses are con!erted B belongs to no A$ and A may #ossibly belong to all / thus we ha!e the first figure. 0imilarly if the minor #remiss is negati!e. But if the #remisses are affirmati!e there cannot be a syllogism. /learly the conclusion cannot be a negati!e assertoric or a negati!e necessary #ro#osition because no negati!e #remiss has been laid down either in the assertoric or in the necessary mode. 1or can the conclusion be a #roblematic negati!e #ro#osition. .or if the terms are so related$ there are cases in which B necessarily will not belong to /% e.g. su##ose that A is white$ B swan$ / man. 1or can the o##osite affirmations be established$ since we ha!e shown a case in which B necessarily does not belong to /. A syllogism then is not #ossible at all. 0imilar relations will obtain in #articular syllogisms. .or whene!er the negati!e #ro#osition is uni!ersal and necessary$ a syllogism will always be #ossible to #ro!e both a #roblematic and a negati!e assertoric #ro#osition )the #roof #roceeds by con!ersion*% but when the affirmati!e #ro#osition is uni!ersal and necessary$ no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn. &his can be #ro!ed in the same way as for uni!ersal #ro#ositions$ and by the same terms. 1or is a syllogistic conclusion #ossible when both #remisses are affirmati!e this also may be #ro!ed as abo!e. But when both #remisses are negati!e$ and the #remiss that definitely disconnects two terms is uni!ersal and necessary$ though nothing follows necessarily from the #remisses as they are stated$ a conclusion can be drawn as abo!e if the #roblematic #remiss is con!erted into its com#lementary affirmati!e. But if both are indefinite or #articular$ no syllogism can be formed. &he same #roof will ser!e$ and the same terms. It is clear then from what has been said that if the uni!ersal and negati!e #remiss is necessary$ a syllogism is always #ossible$ #ro!ing not merely a negati!e #roblematic$ but also a negati!e assertoric #ro#osition% but if the affirmati!e #remiss is necessary no conclusion can be drawn. It is clear too that a syllogism is #ossible or not under the same conditions whether the mode of the #remisses is assertoric or necessary. And it is clear that all the syllogisms are im#erfect$ and are com#leted by means of the figures mentioned. ,? In the last figure a syllogism is #ossible whether both or only one of the #remisses is #roblematic. When the #remisses are #roblematic the conclusion will be #roblematic% and also when one #remiss is #roblematic$ the other assertoric. But when the other #remiss is necessary$ if it is affirmati!e the conclusion will be neither necessary or assertoric% but if it is negati!e the syllogism will result in a negati!e assertoric #ro#osition$ as abo!e. In these also we must understand the e"#ression '#ossible( in the conclusion in the same way as before.

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.irst let the #remisses be #roblematic and su##ose that both A and B may #ossibly belong to e!ery /. 0ince then the affirmati!e #ro#osition is con!ertible into a #articular$ and B may #ossibly belong to e!ery /$ it follows that / may #ossibly belong to some B. 0o$ if A is #ossible for e!ery /$ and / is #ossible for some of the Bs$ then A is #ossible for some of the Bs. .or we ha!e got the first figure. And A if may #ossibly belong to no /$ but B may #ossibly belong to all /$ it follows that A may #ossibly not belong to some B for we shall ha!e the first figure again by con!ersion. But if both #remisses should be negati!e no necessary consequence will follow from them as they are stated$ but if the #remisses are con!erted into their corres#onding affirmati!es there will be a syllogism as before. .or if A and B may #ossibly not belong to /$ if 'may #ossibly belong( is substituted we shall again ha!e the first figure by means of con!ersion. But if one of the #remisses is uni!ersal$ the other #articular$ a syllogism will be #ossible$ or not$ under the arrangement of the terms as in the case of assertoric #ro#ositions. 0u##ose that A may #ossibly belong to all /$ and B to some /. We shall ha!e the first figure again if the #articular #remiss is con!erted. .or if A is #ossible for all /$ and / for some of the Bs$ then A is #ossible for some of the Bs. 0imilarly if the #ro#osition B/ is uni!ersal. 5ikewise also if the #ro#osition A/ is negati!e$ and the #ro#osition B/ affirmati!e for we shall again ha!e the first figure by con!ersion. But if both #remisses should be negati!e 6 the one uni!ersal and the other #articular 6 although no syllogistic conclusion will follow from the #remisses as they are #ut$ it will follow if they are con!erted$ as abo!e. But when both #remisses are indefinite or #articular$ no syllogism can be formed for A must belong sometimes to all B and sometimes to no B. &o illustrate the affirmati!e relation take the terms animal3man3white% to illustrate the negati!e$ take the terms horse3man3white 6 white being the middle term. ,1 If one #remiss is #ure$ the other #roblematic$ the conclusion will be #roblematic$ not #ure% and a syllogism will be #ossible under the same arrangement of the terms as before. .irst let the #remisses be affirmati!e su##ose that A belongs to all /$ and B may #ossibly belong to all /. If the #ro#osition B/ is con!erted$ we shall ha!e the first figure$ and the conclusion that A may #ossibly belong to some of the Bs. .or when one of the #remisses in the first figure is #roblematic$ the conclusion also )as we saw* is #roblematic. 0imilarly if the #ro#osition B/ is #ure$ A/ #roblematic% or if A/ is negati!e$ B/ affirmati!e$ no matter which of the two is #ure% in both cases the conclusion will be #roblematic for the first figure is obtained once more$ and it has been #ro!ed that if one #remiss is #roblematic in that figure the conclusion also will be #roblematic. But if the minor #remiss B/ is negati!e$ or if both #remisses are negati!e$ no syllogistic conclusion can be drawn from the #remisses as they stand$ but if they are con!erted a syllogism is obtained as before. If one of the #remisses is uni!ersal$ the other #articular$ then when both are affirmati!e$ or when the uni!ersal is negati!e$ the #articular affirmati!e$ we shall ha!e the same sort of syllogisms for all are com#leted by means of the first figure. 0o it is clear that we shall ha!e not a #ure but a #roblematic syllogistic conclusion. But if the affirmati!e #remiss is uni!ersal$ the negati!e #articular$ the #roof will #roceed by a reductio ad im#ossibile. 0u##ose that B belongs to all /$ and A may #ossibly not belong to some / it follows that may #ossibly not belong to some B. .or if A necessarily belongs to all B$ and B )as has been assumed* belongs to all /$ A will necessarily belong to all / for this has been #ro!ed before. But it was assumed at the outset that A may #ossibly not belong to some /.

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Whene!er both #remisses are indefinite or #articular$ no syllogism will be #ossible. &he demonstration is the same as was gi!en in the case of uni!ersal #remisses$ and #roceeds by means of the same terms. ,, If one of the #remisses is necessary$ the other #roblematic$ when the #remisses are affirmati!e a #roblematic affirmati!e conclusion can always be drawn% when one #ro#osition is affirmati!e$ the other negati!e$ if the affirmati!e is necessary a #roblematic negati!e can be inferred% but if the negati!e #ro#osition is necessary both a #roblematic and a #ure negati!e conclusion are #ossible. But a necessary negati!e conclusion will not be #ossible$ any more than in the other figures. 0u##ose first that the #remisses are affirmati!e$ i.e. that A necessarily belongs to all /$ and B may #ossibly belong to all /. 0ince then A must belong to all /$ and / may belong to some B$ it follows that A may )not does* belong to some B for so it resulted in the first figure. A similar #roof may be gi!en if the #ro#osition B/ is necessary$ and A/ is #roblematic. Again su##ose one #ro#osition is affirmati!e$ the other negati!e$ the affirmati!e being necessary i.e. su##ose A may #ossibly belong to no /$ but B necessarily belongs to all /. We shall ha!e the first figure once more and 6 since the negati!e #remiss is #roblematic 6 it is clear that the conclusion will be #roblematic for when the #remisses stand thus in the first figure$ the conclusion )as we found* is #roblematic. But if the negati!e #remiss is necessary$ the conclusion will be not only that A may #ossibly not belong to some B but also that it does not belong to some B. .or su##ose that A necessarily does not belong to /$ but B may belong to all /. If the affirmati!e #ro#osition B/ is con!erted$ we shall ha!e the first figure$ and the negati!e #remiss is necessary. But when the #remisses stood thus$ it resulted that A might #ossibly not belong to some /$ and that it did not belong to some /% consequently here it follows that A does not belong to some B. But when the minor #remiss is negati!e$ if it is #roblematic we shall ha!e a syllogism by altering the #remiss into its com#lementary affirmati!e$ as before% but if it is necessary no syllogism can be formed. .or A sometimes necessarily belongs to all B$ and sometimes cannot #ossibly belong to any B. &o illustrate the former take the terms slee#3slee#ing horse3man% to illustrate the latter take the terms slee#3waking horse3man. 0imilar results will obtain if one of the terms is related uni!ersally to the middle$ the other in #art. If both #remisses are affirmati!e$ the conclusion will be #roblematic$ not #ure% and also when one #remiss is negati!e$ the other affirmati!e$ the latter being necessary. But when the negati!e #remiss is necessary$ the conclusion also will be a #ure negati!e #ro#osition% for the same kind of #roof can be gi!en whether the terms are uni!ersal or not. .or the syllogisms must be made #erfect by means of the first figure$ so that a result which follows in the first figure follows also in the third. But when the minor #remiss is negati!e and uni!ersal$ if it is #roblematic a syllogism can be formed by means of con!ersion% but if it is necessary a syllogism is not #ossible. &he #roof will follow the same course as where the #remisses are uni!ersal% and the same terms may be used. It is clear then in this figure also when and how a syllogism can be formed$ and when the conclusion is #roblematic$ and when it is #ure. It is e!ident also that all syllogisms in this figure are im#erfect$ and that they are made #erfect by means of the first figure.

,,

,2 It is clear from what has been said that the syllogisms in these figures are made #erfect by means of uni!ersal syllogisms in the first figure and are reduced to them. &hat e!ery syllogism without qualification can be so treated$ will be clear #resently$ when it has been #ro!ed that e!ery syllogism is formed through one or other of these figures. It is necessary that e!ery demonstration and e!ery syllogism should #ro!e either that something belongs or that it does not$ and this either uni!ersally or in #art$ and further either ostensi!ely or hy#othetically. 9ne sort of hy#othetical #roof is the reductio ad im#ossibile. 5et us s#eak first of ostensi!e syllogisms for after these ha!e been #ointed out the truth of our contention will be clear with regard to those which are #ro!ed #er im#ossibile$ and in general hy#othetically. If then one wants to #ro!e syllogistically A of B$ either as an attribute of it or as not an attribute of it$ one must assert something of something else. If now A should be asserted of B$ the #ro#osition originally in question will ha!e been assumed. But if A should be asserted of /$ but / should not be asserted of anything$ nor anything of it$ nor anything else of A$ no syllogism will be #ossible. .or nothing necessarily follows from the assertion of some one thing concerning some other single thing. &hus we must take another #remiss as well. If then A be asserted of something else$ or something else of A$ or something different of /$ nothing #re!ents a syllogism being formed$ but it will not be in relation to B through the #remisses taken. 1or when / belongs to something else$ and that to something else and so on$ no conne"ion howe!er being made with B$ will a syllogism be #ossible concerning A in its relation to B. .or in general we stated that no syllogism can establish the attribution of one thing to another$ unless some middle term is taken$ which is somehow related to each by way of #redication. .or the syllogism in general is made out of #remisses$ and a syllogism referring to this out of #remisses with the same reference$ and a syllogism relating this to that #roceeds through #remisses which relate this to that. But it is im#ossible to take a #remiss in reference to B$ if we neither affirm nor deny anything of it% or again to take a #remiss relating A to B$ if we take nothing common$ but affirm or deny #eculiar attributes of each. 0o we must take something midway between the two$ which will connect the #redications$ if we are to ha!e a syllogism relating this to that. If then we must take something common in relation to both$ and this is #ossible in three ways )either by #redicating A of /$ and / of B$ or / of both$ or both of /*$ and these are the figures of which we ha!e s#oken$ it is clear that e!ery syllogism must be made in one or other of these figures. &he argument is the same if se!eral middle terms should be necessary to establish the relation to B% for the figure will be the same whether there is one middle term or many. It is clear then that the ostensi!e syllogisms are effected by means of the aforesaid figures% these considerations will show that reductiones ad also are effected in the same way. .or all who effect an argument #er im#ossibile infer syllogistically what is false$ and #ro!e the original conclusion hy#othetically when something im#ossible results from the assum#tion of its contradictory% e.g. that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side$ because odd numbers are equal to e!ens if it is su##osed to be commensurate. 9ne infers syllogistically that odd numbers come out equal to e!ens$ and one #ro!es hy#othetically the incommensurability of the diagonal$ since a falsehood results through contradicting this. .or this we found to be reasoning #er im#ossibile$ !i+. #ro!ing something im#ossible by means of an hy#othesis conceded at the beginning. /onsequently$ since the falsehood is established in reductions ad im#ossibile by an ostensi!e syllogism$ and the original conclusion is #ro!ed hy#othetically$ and we ha!e already stated that ostensi!e syllogisms are effected by means of these figures$ it is e!ident that syllogisms #er im#ossibile also will be made through these figures. 5ikewise all the other hy#othetical syllogisms for in e!ery case the syllogism leads u# to the #ro#osition that is substituted for the ,2

original thesis% but the original thesis is reached by means of a concession or some other hy#othesis. But if this is true$ e!ery demonstration and e!ery syllogism must be formed by means of the three figures mentioned abo!e. But when this has been shown it is clear that e!ery syllogism is #erfected by means of the first figure and is reducible to the uni!ersal syllogisms in this figure. ,4 .urther in e!ery syllogism one of the #remisses must be affirmati!e$ and uni!ersality must be #resent unless one of the #remisses is uni!ersal either a syllogism will not be #ossible$ or it will not refer to the subject #ro#osed$ or the original #osition will be begged. 0u##ose we ha!e to #ro!e that #leasure in music is good. If one should claim as a #remiss that #leasure is good without adding 'all($ no syllogism will be #ossible% if one should claim that some #leasure is good$ then if it is different from #leasure in music$ it is not rele!ant to the subject #ro#osed% if it is this !ery #leasure$ one is assuming that which was #ro#osed at the outset to be #ro!ed. &his is more ob!ious in geometrical #roofs$ e.g. that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. 0u##ose the lines A and B ha!e been drawn to the centre. If then one should assume that the angle A/ is equal to the angle BA$ without claiming generally that angles of semicircles are equal% and again if one should assume that the angle / is equal to the angle A$ without the additional assum#tion that e!ery angle of a segment is equal to e!ery other angle of the same segment% and further if one should assume that when equal angles are taken from the whole angles$ which are themsel!es equal$ the remainders - and . are equal$ he will beg the thing to be #ro!ed$ unless he also states that when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal. It is clear then that in e!ery syllogism there must be a uni!ersal #remiss$ and that a uni!ersal statement is #ro!ed only when all the #remisses are uni!ersal$ while a #articular statement is #ro!ed both from two uni!ersal #remisses and from one only consequently if the conclusion is uni!ersal$ the #remisses also must be uni!ersal$ but if the #remisses are uni!ersal it is #ossible that the conclusion may not be uni!ersal. And it is clear also that in e!ery syllogism either both or one of the #remisses must be like the conclusion. I mean not only in being affirmati!e or negati!e$ but also in being necessary$ #ure$ #roblematic. We must consider also the other forms of #redication. It is clear also when a syllogism in general can be made and when it cannot% and when a !alid$ when a #erfect syllogism can be formed% and that if a syllogism is formed the terms must be arranged in one of the ways that ha!e been mentioned. ,7 It is clear too that e!ery demonstration will #roceed through three terms and no more$ unless the same conclusion is established by different #airs of #ro#ositions% e.g. the conclusion - may be established through the #ro#ositions A and B$ and through the #ro#ositions / and A$ or through the #ro#ositions A and B$ or A and /$ or B and /. .or nothing #re!ents there being se!eral middles for the same terms. But in that case there is not one but se!eral syllogisms. 9r again when each of the #ro#ositions A and B is obtained by syllogistic inference$ e.g. by means of A and -$ and again B by means of . and D. 9r one may be obtained by syllogistic$ the other by inducti!e inference. But thus also the syllogisms are many% for the conclusions are many$ e.g. A and B and /. But if this can be called one syllogism$ not many$ the same conclusion may be reached by more than three terms in this way$ but it cannot be reached as / is established by ,4

means of A and B. 0u##ose that the #ro#osition - is inferred from the #remisses A$ B$ /$ and A. It is necessary then that of these one should be related to another as whole to #art for it has already been #ro!ed that if a syllogism is formed some of its terms must be related in this way. 0u##ose then that A stands in this relation to B. 0ome conclusion then follows from them. It must either be - or one or other of / and A$ or something other than these. )1* If it is - the syllogism will ha!e A and B for its sole #remisses. But if / and A are so related that one is whole$ the other #art$ some conclusion will follow from them also% and it must be either -$ or one or other of the #ro#ositions A and B$ or something other than these. And if it is )i* -$ or )ii* A or B$ either )i* the syllogisms will be more than one$ or )ii* the same thing ha##ens to be inferred by means of se!eral terms only in the sense which we saw to be #ossible. But if )iii* the conclusion is other than - or A or B$ the syllogisms will be many$ and unconnected with one another. But if / is not so related to A as to make a syllogism$ the #ro#ositions will ha!e been assumed to no #ur#ose$ unless for the sake of induction or of obscuring the argument or something of the sort. ),* But if from the #ro#ositions A and B there follows not - but some other conclusion$ and if from / and A either A or B follows or something else$ then there are se!eral syllogisms$ and they do not establish the conclusion #ro#osed for we assumed that the syllogism #ro!ed -. And if no conclusion follows from / and A$ it turns out that these #ro#ositions ha!e been assumed to no #ur#ose$ and the syllogism does not #ro!e the original #ro#osition. 0o it is clear that e!ery demonstration and e!ery syllogism will #roceed through three terms only. &his being e!ident$ it is clear that a syllogistic conclusion follows from two #remisses and not from more than two. .or the three terms make two #remisses$ unless a new #remiss is assumed$ as was said at the beginning$ to #erfect the syllogisms. It is clear therefore that in whate!er syllogistic argument the #remisses through which the main conclusion follows )for some of the #receding conclusions must be #remisses* are not e!en in number$ this argument either has not been drawn syllogistically or it has assumed more than was necessary to establish its thesis. If then syllogisms are taken with res#ect to their main #remisses$ e!ery syllogism will consist of an e!en number of #remisses and an odd number of terms )for the terms e"ceed the #remisses by one*$ and the conclusions will be half the number of the #remisses. But whene!er a conclusion is reached by means of #rosyllogisms or by means of se!eral continuous middle terms$ e.g. the #ro#osition AB by means of the middle terms / and A$ the number of the terms will similarly e"ceed that of the #remisses by one )for the e"tra term must either be added outside or inserted but in either case it follows that the relations of #redication are one fewer than the terms related*$ and the #remisses will be equal in number to the relations of #redication. &he #remisses howe!er will not always be e!en$ the terms odd% but they will alternate 6 when the #remisses are e!en$ the terms must be odd% when the terms are e!en$ the #remisses must be odd for along with one term one #remiss is added$ if a term is added from any quarter. /onsequently since the #remisses were )as we saw* e!en$ and the terms odd$ we must make them alternately e!en and odd at each addition. But the conclusions will not follow the same arrangement either in res#ect to the terms or to the #remisses. .or if one term is added$ conclusions will be added less by one than the #re3 e"isting terms for the conclusion is drawn not in relation to the single term last added$ but in relation to all the rest$ e.g. if to AB/ the term A is added$ two conclusions are thereby added$ one in relation to A$ the other in relation to B. 0imilarly with any further additions. And similarly too if the term is inserted in the middle for in relation to one term only$ a syllogism will not be constructed. /onsequently the conclusions will be much more numerous than the terms or the #remisses.

,7

,: 0ince we understand the subjects with which syllogisms are concerned$ what sort of conclusion is established in each figure$ and in how many moods this is done$ it is e!ident to us both what sort of #roblem is difficult and what sort is easy to #ro!e. .or that which is concluded in many figures and through many moods is easier% that which is concluded in few figures and through few moods is more difficult to attem#t. &he uni!ersal affirmati!e is #ro!ed by means of the first figure only and by this in only one mood% the uni!ersal negati!e is #ro!ed both through the first figure and through the second$ through the first in one mood$ through the second in two. &he #articular affirmati!e is #ro!ed through the first and through the last figure$ in one mood through the first$ in three moods through the last. &he #articular negati!e is #ro!ed in all the figures$ but once in the first$ in two moods in the second$ in three moods in the third. It is clear then that the uni!ersal affirmati!e is most difficult to establish$ most easy to o!erthrow. In general$ uni!ersals are easier game for the destroyer than #articulars for whether the #redicate belongs to none or not to some$ they are destroyed and the #articular negati!e is #ro!ed in all the figures$ the uni!ersal negati!e in two. 0imilarly with uni!ersal negati!es the original statement is destroyed$ whether the #redicate belongs to all or to some and this we found #ossible in two figures. But #articular statements can be refuted in one way only 6 by #ro!ing that the #redicate belongs either to all or to none. But #articular statements are easier to establish for #roof is #ossible in more figures and through more moods. And in general we must not forget that it is #ossible to refute statements by means of one another$ I mean$ uni!ersal statements by means of #articular$ and #articular statements by means of uni!ersal but it is not #ossible to establish uni!ersal statements by means of #articular$ though it is #ossible to establish #articular statements by means of uni!ersal. At the same time it is e!ident that it is easier to refute than to establish. &he manner in which e!ery syllogism is #roduced$ the number of the terms and #remisses through which it #roceeds$ the relation of the #remisses to one another$ the character of the #roblem #ro!ed in each figure$ and the number of the figures a##ro#riate to each #roblem$ all these matters are clear from what has been said. ,< We must now state how we may oursel!es always ha!e a su##ly of syllogisms in reference to the #roblem #ro#osed and by what road we may reach the #rinci#les relati!e to the #roblem for #erha#s we ought not only to in!estigate the construction of syllogisms$ but also to ha!e the #ower of making them. 9f all the things which e"ist some are such that they cannot be #redicated of anything else truly and uni!ersally$ e.g. /leon and /allias$ i.e. the indi!idual and sensible$ but other things may be #redicated of them )for each of these is both man and animal*% and some things are themsel!es #redicated of others$ but nothing #rior is #redicated of them% and some are #redicated of others$ and yet others of them$ e.g. man of /allias and animal of man. It is clear then that some things are naturally not stated of anything for as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be #redicated of anything$ sa!e incidentally for we sometimes say that that white object is 0ocrates$ or that that which a##roaches is /allias. We shall e"#lain in another #lace that there is an u#ward limit also to the #rocess of #redicating for the #resent we must assume this. 9f these ultimate #redicates it is not #ossible to demonstrate another #redicate$ sa!e as a matter of o#inion$ but these may be #redicated of other things. 1either can indi!iduals be #redicated of other things$ though other things can be #redicated of them. Whate!er lies between these limits can be s#oken ,:

of in both ways they may be stated of others$ and others stated of them. And as a rule arguments and inquiries are concerned with these things. We must select the #remisses suitable to each #roblem in this manner first we must lay down the subject and the definitions and the #ro#erties of the thing% ne"t we must lay down those attributes which follow the thing$ and again those which the thing follows$ and those which cannot belong to it. But those to which it cannot belong need not be selected$ because the negati!e statement im#lied abo!e is con!ertible. 9f the attributes which follow we must distinguish those which fall within the definition$ those which are #redicated as #ro#erties$ and those which are #redicated as accidents$ and of the latter those which a##arently and those which really belong. &he larger the su##ly a man has of these$ the more quickly will he reach a conclusion% and in #ro#ortion as he a##rehends those which are truer$ the more cogently will he demonstrate. But he must select not those which follow some #articular but those which follow the thing as a whole$ e.g. not what follows a #articular man but what follows e!ery man for the syllogism #roceeds through uni!ersal #remisses. If the statement is indefinite$ it is uncertain whether the #remiss is uni!ersal$ but if the statement is definite$ the matter is clear. 0imilarly one must select those attributes which the subject follows as wholes$ for the reason gi!en. But that which follows one must not su##ose to follow as a whole$ e.g. that e!ery animal follows man or e!ery science music$ but only that it follows$ without qualification$ and indeed we state it in a #ro#osition for the other statement is useless and im#ossible$ e.g. that e!ery man is e!ery animal or justice is all good. But that which something follows recei!es the mark 'e!ery(. Whene!er the subject$ for which we must obtain the attributes that follow$ is contained by something else$ what follows or does not follow the highest term uni!ersally must not be selected in dealing with the subordinate term )for these attributes ha!e been taken in dealing with the su#erior term% for what follows animal also follows man$ and what does not belong to animal does not belong to man*% but we must choose those attributes which are #eculiar to each subject. .or some things are #eculiar to the s#ecies as distinct from the genus% for s#ecies being distinct there must be attributes #eculiar to each. 1or must we take as things which the su#erior term follows$ those things which the inferior term follows$ e.g. take as subjects of the #redicate 'animal( what are really subjects of the #redicate 'man(. It is necessary indeed$ if animal follows man$ that it should follow all these also. But these belong more #ro#erly to the choice of what concerns man. 9ne must a##rehend also normal consequents and normal antecedents 6 for #ro#ositions which obtain normally are established syllogistically from #remisses which obtain normally$ some if not all of them ha!ing this character of normality. .or the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its #rinci#les. We must not howe!er choose attributes which are consequent u#on all the terms for no syllogism can be made out of such #remisses. &he reason why this is so will be clear in the sequel. ,= If men wish to establish something about some whole$ they must look to the subjects of that which is being established )the subjects of which it ha##ens to be asserted*$ and the attributes which follow that of which it is to be #redicated. .or if any of these subjects is the same as any of these attributes$ the attribute originally in question must belong to the subject originally in question. But if the #ur#ose is to establish not a uni!ersal but a #articular #ro#osition$ they must look for the terms of which the terms in question are #redicable for if any of these are identical$ the attribute in question must belong to some of the subject in question. Whene!er the one term has to belong to none of the other$ one must look to the consequents of the subject$ and to those attributes which cannot #ossibly be #resent in the #redicate in question or con!ersely to the ,<

attributes which cannot #ossibly be #resent in the subject$ and to the consequents of the #redicate. If any members of these grou#s are identical$ one of the terms in question cannot #ossibly belong to any of the other. .or sometimes a syllogism in the first figure results$ sometimes a syllogism in the second. But if the object is to establish a #articular negati!e #ro#osition$ we must find antecedents of the subject in question and attributes which cannot #ossibly belong to the #redicate in question. If any members of these two grou#s are identical$ it follows that one of the terms in question does not belong to some of the other. Perha#s each of these statements will become clearer in the following way. 0u##ose the consequents of A are designated by B$ the antecedents of A by /$ attributes which cannot #ossibly belong to A by A. 0u##ose again that the attributes of - are designated by .$ the antecedents of - by D$ and attributes which cannot belong to - by @. If then one of the /s should be identical with one of the .s$ A must belong to all - for . belongs to all -$ and A to all /$ consequently A belongs to all -. If / and D are identical$ A must belong to some of the -s for A follows /$ and - follows all D. If . and A are identical$ A will belong to none of the -s by a #rosyllogism for since the negati!e #ro#osition is con!ertible$ and . is identical with A$ A will belong to none of the .s$ but . belongs to all -. Again$ if B and @ are identical$ A will belong to none of the -s for B will belong to all A$ but to no - for it was assumed to be identical with @$ and @ belonged to none of the -s. If A and D are identical$ A will not belong to some of the -s for it will not belong to D$ because it does not belong to A but D falls under - consequently A will not belong to some of the -s. If B is identical with D$ there will be a con!erted syllogism for - will belong to all A since B belongs to A and - to B )for B was found to be identical with D* but that A should belong to all - is not necessary$ but it must belong to some - because it is #ossible to con!ert the uni!ersal statement into a #articular. It is clear then that in e!ery #ro#osition which requires #roof we must look to the aforesaid relations of the subject and #redicate in question for all syllogisms #roceed through these. But if we are seeking consequents and antecedents we must look for those which are #rimary and most uni!ersal$ e.g. in reference to - we must look to E. rather than to . alone$ and in reference to A we must look to E/ rather than to / alone. .or if A belongs to E.$ it belongs both to . and to but if it does not follow E.$ it may yet follow .. 0imilarly we must consider the antecedents of A itself for if a term follows the #rimary antecedents$ it will follow those also which are subordinate$ but if it does not follow the former$ it may yet follow the latter. It is clear too that the inquiry #roceeds through the three terms and the two #remisses$ and that all the syllogisms #roceed through the aforesaid figures. .or it is #ro!ed that A belongs to all -$ whene!er an identical term is found among the /s and .s. &his will be the middle term% A and will be the e"tremes. 0o the first figure is formed. And A will belong to some -$ whene!er / and D are a##rehended to be the same. &his is the last figure for D becomes the middle term. And A will belong to no -$ when A and . are identical. &hus we ha!e both the first figure and the middle figure% the first$ because A belongs to no .$ since the negati!e statement is con!ertible$ and . belongs to all - the middle figure because A belongs to no A$ and to all -. And A will not belong to some -$ whene!er A and D are identical. &his is the last figure for A will belong to no D$ and - will belong to all D. /learly then all syllogisms #roceed through the aforesaid figures$ and we must not select consequents of all the terms$ because no syllogism is #roduced from them. .or )as we saw* it is not #ossible at all to establish a #ro#osition from consequents$ and it is not #ossible to refute by means of a consequent of both the terms in question for the middle term must belong to the one$ and not belong to the other. It is clear too that other methods of inquiry by selection of middle terms are useless to #roduce a syllogism$ e.g. if the consequents of the terms in question are identical$ or if the antecedents of A are identical with those attributes which cannot #ossibly belong to -$ or if those attributes are ,=

identical which cannot belong to either term for no syllogism is #roduced by means of these. .or if the consequents are identical$ e.g. B and .$ we ha!e the middle figure with both #remisses affirmati!e if the antecedents of A are identical with attributes which cannot belong to -$ e.g. / with @$ we ha!e the first figure with its minor #remiss negati!e. If attributes which cannot belong to either term are identical$ e.g. / and @$ both #remisses are negati!e$ either in the first or in the middle figure. But no syllogism is #ossible in this way. It is e!ident too that we must find out which terms in this inquiry are identical$ not which are different or contrary$ first because the object of our in!estigation is the middle term$ and the middle term must be not di!erse but identical. 0econdly$ where!er it ha##ens that a syllogism results from taking contraries or terms which cannot belong to the same thing$ all arguments can be reduced to the aforesaid moods$ e.g. if B and . are contraries or cannot belong to the same thing. .or if these are taken$ a syllogism will be formed to #ro!e that A belongs to none of the -s$ not howe!er from the #remisses taken but in the aforesaid mood. .or B will belong to all A and to no -. /onsequently B must be identical with one of the @s. Again$ if B and D cannot belong to the same thing$ it follows that A will not belong to some of the -s for then too we shall ha!e the middle figure for B will belong to all A and to no D. /onsequently B must be identical with some of the @s. .or the fact that B and D cannot belong to the same thing differs in no way from the fact that B is identical with some of the @s for that includes e!erything which cannot belong to -. It is clear then that from the inquiries taken by themsel!es no syllogism results% but if B and . are contraries B must be identical with one of the @s$ and the syllogism results through these terms. It turns out then that those who inquire in this manner are looking gratuitously for some other way than the necessary way because they ha!e failed to obser!e the identity of the Bs with the @s. ,> 0yllogisms which lead to im#ossible conclusions are similar to ostensi!e syllogisms% they also are formed by means of the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question. In both cases the same inquiry is in!ol!ed. .or what is #ro!ed ostensi!ely may also be concluded syllogistically #er im#ossibile by means of the same terms% and what is #ro!ed #er im#ossibile may also be #ro!ed ostensi!ely$ e.g. that A belongs to none of the -s. .or su##ose A to belong to some - then since B belongs to all A and A to some of the -s$ B will belong to some of the -s but it was assumed that it belongs to none. Again we may #ro!e that A belongs to some - for if A belonged to none of the -s$ and - belongs to all D$ A will belong to none of the Ds but it was assumed to belong to all. 0imilarly with the other #ro#ositions requiring #roof. &he #roof #er im#ossibile will always and in all cases be from the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question. Whate!er the #roblem the same inquiry is necessary whether one wishes to use an ostensi!e syllogism or a reduction to im#ossibility. .or both the demonstrations start from the same terms$ e.g. su##ose it has been #ro!ed that A belongs to no -$ because it turns out that otherwise B belongs to some of the -s and this is im#ossible 6 if now it is assumed that B belongs to no - and to all A$ it is clear that A will belong to no -. Again if it has been #ro!ed by an ostensi!e syllogism that A belongs to no -$ assume that A belongs to some - and it will be #ro!ed #er im#ossibile to belong to no -. 0imilarly with the rest. In all cases it is necessary to find some common term other than the subjects of inquiry$ to which the syllogism establishing the false conclusion may relate$ so that if this #remiss is con!erted$ and the other remains as it is$ the syllogism will be ostensi!e by means of the same terms. .or the ostensi!e syllogism differs ,>

from the reductio ad im#ossibile in this in the ostensi!e syllogism both remisses are laid down in accordance with the truth$ in the reductio ad im#ossibile one of the #remisses is assumed falsely. &hese #oints will be made clearer by the sequel$ when we discuss the reduction to im#ossibility at #resent this much must be clear$ that we must look to terms of the kinds mentioned whether we wish to use an ostensi!e syllogism or a reduction to im#ossibility. In the other hy#othetical syllogisms$ I mean those which #roceed by substitution$ or by #ositing a certain quality$ the inquiry will be directed to the terms of the #roblem to be #ro!ed 6 not the terms of the original #roblem$ but the new terms introduced% and the method of the inquiry will be the same as before. But we must consider and determine in how many ways hy#othetical syllogisms are #ossible. -ach of the #roblems then can be #ro!ed in the manner described% but it is #ossible to establish some of them syllogistically in another way$ e.g. uni!ersal #roblems by the inquiry which leads u# to a #articular conclusion$ with the addition of an hy#othesis. .or if the /s and the Ds should be identical$ but - should be assumed to belong to the Ds only$ then A would belong to e!ery and again if the As and the Ds should be identical$ but - should be #redicated of the Ds only$ it follows that A will belong to none of the -s. /learly then we must consider the matter in this way also. &he method is the same whether the relation is necessary or #ossible. .or the inquiry will be the same$ and the syllogism will #roceed through terms arranged in the same order whether a #ossible or a #ure #ro#osition is #ro!ed. We must find in the case of #ossible relations$ as well as terms that belong$ terms which can belong though they actually do not for we ha!e #ro!ed that the syllogism which establishes a #ossible relation #roceeds through these terms as well. 0imilarly also with the other modes of #redication. It is clear then from what has been said not only that all syllogisms can be formed in this way$ but also that they cannot be formed in any other. .or e!ery syllogism has been #ro!ed to be formed through one of the aforementioned figures$ and these cannot be com#osed through other terms than the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question for from these we obtain the #remisses and find the middle term. /onsequently a syllogism cannot be formed by means of other terms. 2? &he method is the same in all cases$ in #hiloso#hy$ in any art or study. We must look for the attributes and the subjects of both our terms$ and we must su##ly oursel!es with as many of these as #ossible$ and consider them by means of the three terms$ refuting statements in one way$ confirming them in another$ in the #ursuit of truth starting from #remisses in which the arrangement of the terms is in accordance with truth$ while if we look for dialectical syllogisms we must start from #robable #remisses. &he #rinci#les of syllogisms ha!e been stated in general terms$ both how they are characteri+ed and how we must hunt for them$ so as not to look to e!erything that is said about the terms of the #roblem or to the same #oints whether we are confirming or refuting$ or again whether we are confirming of all or of some$ and whether we are refuting of all or some. we must look to fewer #oints and they must be definite. We ha!e also stated how we must select with reference to e!erything that is$ e.g. about good or knowledge. But in each science the #rinci#les which are #eculiar are the most numerous. /onsequently it is the business of e"#erience to gi!e the #rinci#les which belong to each subject. I mean for e"am#le that astronomical e"#erience su##lies the #rinci#les of astronomical science for once the #henomena were adequately a##rehended$ the demonstrations of astronomy were disco!ered. 0imilarly with any other art or science. /onsequently$ if the attributes of the thing are a##rehended$ our business will then be to e"hibit readily the demonstrations. .or if none of the 2?

true attributes of things had been omitted in the historical sur!ey$ we should be able to disco!er the #roof and demonstrate e!erything which admitted of #roof$ and to make that clear$ whose nature does not admit of #roof. In general then we ha!e e"#lained fairly well how we must select #remisses we ha!e discussed the matter accurately in the treatise concerning dialectic. 21 It is easy to see that di!ision into classes is a small #art of the method we ha!e described for di!ision is$ so to s#eak$ a weak syllogism% for what it ought to #ro!e$ it begs$ and it always establishes something more general than the attribute in question. .irst$ this !ery #oint had esca#ed all those who used the method of di!ision% and they attem#ted to #ersuade men that it was #ossible to make a demonstration of substance and essence. /onsequently they did not understand what it is #ossible to #ro!e syllogistically by di!ision$ nor did they understand that it was #ossible to #ro!e syllogistically in the manner we ha!e described. In demonstrations$ when there is a need to #ro!e a #ositi!e statement$ the middle term through which the syllogism is formed must always be inferior to and not com#rehend the first of the e"tremes. But di!ision has a contrary intention for it takes the uni!ersal as middle. 5et animal be the term signified by A$ mortal by B$ and immortal by /$ and let man$ whose definition is to be got$ be signified by A. &he man who di!ides assumes that e!ery animal is either mortal or immortal i.e. whate!er is A is all either B or /. Again$ always di!iding$ he lays it down that man is an animal$ so he assumes A of A as belonging to it. 1ow the true conclusion is that e!ery A is either B or /$ consequently man must be either mortal or immortal$ but it is not necessary that man should be a mortal animal 6 this is begged and this is what ought to ha!e been #ro!ed syllogistically. And again$ taking A as mortal animal$ B as footed$ / as footless$ and A as man$ he assumes in the same way that A inheres either in B or in / )for e!ery mortal animal is either footed or footless*$ and he assumes A of A )for he assumed man$ as we saw$ to be a mortal animal*% consequently it is necessary that man should be either a footed or a footless animal% but it is not necessary that man should be footed this he assumes and it is just this again which he ought to ha!e demonstrated. Always di!iding then in this way it turns out that these logicians assume as middle the uni!ersal term$ and as e"tremes that which ought to ha!e been the subject of demonstration and the differentiae. In conclusion$ they do not make it clear$ and show it to be necessary$ that this is man or whate!er the subject of inquiry may be for they #ursue the other method altogether$ ne!er e!en sus#ecting the #resence of the rich su##ly of e!idence which might be used. It is clear that it is neither #ossible to refute a statement by this method of di!ision$ nor to draw a conclusion about an accident or #ro#erty of a thing$ nor about its genus$ nor in cases in which it is unknown whether it is thus or thus$ e.g. whether the diagonal is incommensurate. .or if he assumes that e!ery length is either commensurate or incommensurate$ and the diagonal is a length$ he has #ro!ed that the diagonal is either incommensurate or commensurate. But if he should assume that it is incommensurate$ he will ha!e assumed what he ought to ha!e #ro!ed. @e cannot then #ro!e it for this is his method$ but #roof is not #ossible by this method. 5et A stand for 'incommensurate or commensurate($ B for 'length($ / for 'diagonal(. It is clear then that this method of in!estigation is not suitable for e!ery inquiry$ nor is it useful in those cases in which it is thought to be most suitable. .rom what has been said it is clear from what elements demonstrations are formed and in what manner$ and to what #oints we must look in each #roblem.

21

2, 9ur ne"t business is to state how we can reduce syllogisms to the aforementioned figures for this #art of the inquiry still remains. If we should in!estigate the #roduction of the syllogisms and had the #ower of disco!ering them$ and further if we could resol!e the syllogisms #roduced into the aforementioned figures$ our original #roblem would be brought to a conclusion. It will ha##en at the same time that what has been already said will be confirmed and its truth made clearer by what we are about to say. .or e!erything that is true must in e!ery res#ect agree with itself .irst then we must attem#t to select the two #remisses of the syllogism )for it is easier to di!ide into large #arts than into small$ and the com#osite #arts are larger than the elements out of which they are made*% ne"t we must inquire which are uni!ersal and which #articular$ and if both #remisses ha!e not been stated$ we must oursel!es assume the one which is missing. .or sometimes men #ut forward the uni!ersal #remiss$ but do not #osit the #remiss which is contained in it$ either in writing or in discussion or men #ut forward the #remisses of the #rinci#al syllogism$ but omit those through which they are inferred$ and in!ite the concession of others to no #ur#ose. We must inquire then whether anything unnecessary has been assumed$ or anything necessary has been omitted$ and we must #osit the one and take away the other$ until we ha!e reached the two #remisses for unless we ha!e these$ we cannot reduce arguments #ut forward in the way described. In some arguments it is easy to see what is wanting$ but some esca#e us$ and a##ear to be syllogisms$ because something necessary results from what has been laid down$ e.g. if the assum#tions were made that substance is not annihilated by the annihilation of what is not substance$ and that if the elements out of which a thing is made are annihilated$ then that which is made out of them is destroyed these #ro#ositions being laid down$ it is necessary that any #art of substance is substance% this has not howe!er been drawn by syllogism from the #ro#ositions assumed$ but #remisses are wanting. Again if it is necessary that animal should e"ist$ if man does$ and that substance should e"ist$ if animal does$ it is necessary that substance should e"ist if man does but as yet the conclusion has not been drawn syllogistically for the #remisses are not in the sha#e we required. We are decei!ed in such cases because something necessary results from what is assumed$ since the syllogism also is necessary. But that which is necessary is wider than the syllogism for e!ery syllogism is necessary$ but not e!erything which is necessary is a syllogism. /onsequently$ though something results when certain #ro#ositions are assumed$ we must not try to reduce it directly$ but must first state the two #remisses$ then di!ide them into their terms. We must take that term as middle which is stated in both the remisses for it is necessary that the middle should be found in both #remisses in all the figures. If then the middle term is a #redicate and a subject of #redication$ or if it is a #redicate$ and something else is denied of it$ we shall ha!e the first figure if it both is a #redicate and is denied of something$ the middle figure if other things are #redicated of it$ or one is denied$ the other #redicated$ the last figure. .or it was thus that we found the middle term #laced in each figure. It is #laced similarly too if the #remisses are not uni!ersal for the middle term is determined in the same way. /learly then$ if the same term is not stated more than once in the course of an argument$ a syllogism cannot be made for a middle term has not been taken. 0ince we know what sort of thesis is established in each figure$ and in which the uni!ersal$ in what sort the #articular is described$ clearly we must not look for all the figures$ but for that which is a##ro#riate to the thesis in hand. If the thesis is established in more figures than one$ we shall recogni+e the figure by the #osition of the middle term.

2,

22 8en are frequently decei!ed about syllogisms because the inference is necessary$ as has been said abo!e% sometimes they are decei!ed by the similarity in the #ositing of the terms% and this ought not to esca#e our notice. -.g. if A is stated of B$ and B of / it would seem that a syllogism is #ossible since the terms stand thus but nothing necessary results$ nor does a syllogism. 5et A re#resent the term 'being eternal($ B 'Aristomenes as an object of thought($ / 'Aristomenes(. It is true then that A belongs to B. .or Aristomenes as an object of thought is eternal. But B also belongs to / for Aristomenes is Aristomenes as an object of thought. But A does not belong to / for Aristomenes is #erishable. .or no syllogism was made although the terms stood thus that required that the #remiss AB should be stated uni!ersally. But this is false$ that e!ery Aristomenes who is an object of thought is eternal$ since Aristomenes is #erishable. Again let / stand for '8iccalus($ B for 'musical 8iccalus($ A for '#erishing to3morrow(. It is true to #redicate B of / for 8iccalus is musical 8iccalus. Also A can be #redicated of B for musical 8iccalus might #erish to3morrow. But to state A of / is false at any rate. &his argument then is identical with the former% for it is not true uni!ersally that musical 8iccalus #erishes to3morrow but unless this is assumed$ no syllogism )as we ha!e shown* is #ossible. &his dece#tion then arises through ignoring a small distinction. .or if we acce#t the conclusion as though it made no difference whether we said '&his belong to that( or '&his belongs to all of that(. 24 8en will frequently fall into fallacies through not setting out the terms of the #remiss well$ e.g. su##ose A to be health$ B disease$ / man. It is true to say that A cannot belong to any B )for health belongs to no disease* and again that B belongs to e!ery / )for e!ery man is ca#able of disease*. It would seem to follow that health cannot belong to any man. &he reason for this is that the terms are not set out well in the statement$ since if the things which are in the conditions are substituted$ no syllogism can be made$ e.g. if 'healthy( is substituted for 'health( and 'diseased( for 'disease(. .or it is not true to say that being healthy cannot belong to one who is diseased. But unless this is assumed no conclusion results$ sa!e in res#ect of #ossibility but such a conclusion is not im#ossible for it is #ossible that health should belong to no man. Again the fallacy may occur in a similar way in the middle figure 'it is not #ossible that health should belong to any disease$ but it is #ossible that health should belong to e!ery man$ consequently it is not #ossible that disease should belong to any man(. In the third figure the fallacy results in reference to #ossibility. .or health and diseae and knowledge and ignorance$ and in general contraries$ may #ossibly belong to the same thing$ but cannot belong to one another. &his is not in agreement with what was said before for we stated that when se!eral things could belong to the same thing$ they could belong to one another. It is e!ident then that in all these cases the fallacy arises from the setting out of the terms for if the things that are in the conditions are substituted$ no fallacy arises. It is clear then that in such #remisses what #ossesses the condition ought always to be substituted for the condition and taken as the term. 27 We must not always seek to set out the terms a single word for we shall often ha!e com#le"es of words to which a single name is not gi!en. @ence it is difficult to reduce syllogisms with such terms. 0ometimes too fallacies will result from such a search$ e.g. the belief that syllogism can 22

establish that which has no mean. 5et A stand for two right angles$ B for triangle$ / for isosceles triangle. A then belongs to / because of B but A belongs to B without the mediation of another term for the triangle in !irtue of its own nature contains two right angles$ consequently there will be no middle term for the #ro#osition AB$ although it is demonstrable. .or it is clear that the middle must not always be assumed to be an indi!idual thing$ but sometimes a com#le" of words$ as ha##ens in the case mentioned. 2: &hat the first term belongs to the middle$ and the middle to the e"treme$ must not be understood in the sense that they can always be #redicated of one another or that the first term will be #redicated of the middle in the same way as the middle is #redicated of the last term. &he same holds if the #remisses are negati!e. But we must su##ose the !erb 'to belong( to ha!e as many meanings as the senses in which the !erb 'to be( is used$ and in which the assertion that a thing 'is( may be said to be true. &ake for e"am#le the statement that there is a single science of contraries. 5et A stand for 'there being a single science($ and B for things which are contrary to one another. &hen A belongs to B$ not in the sense that contraries are the fact of there being a single science of them$ but in the sense that it is true to say of the contraries that there is a single science of them. It ha##ens sometimes that the first term is stated of the middle$ but the middle is not stated of the third term$ e.g. if wisdom is knowledge$ and wisdom is of the good$ the conclusion is that there is knowledge of the good. &he good then is not knowledge$ though wisdom is knowledge. 0ometimes the middle term is stated of the third$ but the first is not stated of the middle$ e.g. if there is a science of e!erything that has a quality$ or is a contrary$ and the good both is a contrary and has a quality$ the conclusion is that there is a science of the good$ but the good is not science$ nor is that which has a quality or is a contrary$ though the good is both of these. 0ometimes neither the first term is stated of the middle$ nor the middle of the third$ while the first is sometimes stated of the third$ and sometimes not e.g. if there is a genus of that of which there is a science$ and if there is a science of the good$ we conclude that there is a genus of the good. But nothing is #redicated of anything. And if that of which there is a science is a genus$ and if there is a science of the good$ we conclude that the good is a genus. &he first term then is #redicated of the e"treme$ but in the #remisses one thing is not stated of another. &he same holds good where the relation is negati!e. .or 'that does not belong to this( does not always mean that 'this is not that($ but sometimes that 'this is not of that( or 'for that($ e.g. 'there is not a motion of a motion or a becoming of a becoming$ but there is a becoming of #leasure so #leasure is not a becoming.( 9r again it may be said that there is a sign of laughter$ but there is not a sign of a sign$ consequently laughter is not a sign. &his holds in the other cases too$ in which the thesis is refuted because the genus is asserted in a #articular way$ in relation to the terms of the thesis. Again take the inference 'o##ortunity is not the right time for o##ortunity belongs to Dod$ but the right time does not$ since nothing is useful to Dod(. We must take as terms o##ortunity3right time3Dod but the #remiss must be understood according to the case of the noun. .or we state this uni!ersally without qualification$ that the terms ought always to be stated in the nominati!e$ e.g. man$ good$ contraries$ not in oblique cases$ e.g. of man$ of a good$ of contraries$ but the #remisses ought to be understood with reference to the cases of each term 6 either the dati!e$ e.g. 'equal to this($ or the geniti!e$ e.g. 'double of this($ or the accusati!e$ e.g. 'that which strikes or sees this($ or the nominati!e$ e.g. 'man is an animal($ or in whate!er other way the word falls in the #remiss. 24

2< &he e"#ressions 'this belongs to that( and 'this holds true of that( must be understood in as many ways as there are different categories$ and these categories must be taken either with or without qualification$ and further as sim#le or com#ound the same holds good of the corres#onding negati!e e"#ressions. We must consider these #oints and define them better. 2= A term which is re#eated in the #remisses ought to be joined to the first e"treme$ not to the middle. I mean for e"am#le that if a syllogism should be made #ro!ing that there is knowledge of justice$ that it is good$ the e"#ression 'that it is good( )or 'qua good(* should be joined to the first term. 5et A stand for 'knowledge that it is good($ B for good$ / for justice. It is true to #redicate A of B. .or of the good there is knowledge that it is good. Also it is true to #redicate B of /. .or justice is identical with a good. In this way an analysis of the argument can be made. But if the e"#ression 'that it is good( were added to B$ the conclusion will not follow for A will be true of B$ but B will not be true of /. .or to #redicate of justice the term 'good that it is good( is false and not intelligible. 0imilarly if it should be #ro!ed that the healthy is an object of knowledge qua good$ of goat3stag an object of knowledge qua not e"isting$ or man #erishable qua an object of sense in e!ery case in which an addition is made to the #redicate$ the addition must be joined to the e"treme. &he #osition of the terms is not the same when something is established without qualification and when it is qualified by some attribute or condition$ e.g. when the good is #ro!ed to be an object of knowledge and when it is #ro!ed to be an object of knowledge that it is good. If it has been #ro!ed to be an object of knowledge without qualification$ we must #ut as middle term 'that which is($ but if we add the qualification 'that it is good($ the middle term must be 'that which is something(. 5et A stand for 'knowledge that it is something($ B stand for 'something($ and / stand for 'good(. It is true to #redicate A of B for e" hy#othesi there is a science of that which is something$ that it is something. B too is true of / for that which / re#resents is something. /onsequently A is true of / there will then be knowledge of the good$ that it is good for e" hy#othesi the term 'something( indicates the thing(s s#ecial nature. But if 'being( were taken as middle and 'being( sim#ly were joined to the e"treme$ not 'being something($ we should not ha!e had a syllogism #ro!ing that there is knowledge of the good$ that it is good$ but that it is% e.g. let A stand for knowledge that it is$ B for being$ / for good. /learly then in syllogisms which are thus limited we must take the terms in the way stated. 2> We ought also to e"change terms which ha!e the same !alue$ word for word$ and #hrase for #hrase$ and word and #hrase$ and always take a word in #reference to a #hrase for thus the setting out of the terms will be easier. .or e"am#le if it makes no difference whether we say that the su##osable is not the genus of the o#inable or that the o#inable is not identical with a #articular kind of su##osable )for what is meant is the same in both statements*$ it is better to take as the terms the su##osable and the o#inable in #reference to the #hrase suggested.

27

4? 0ince the e"#ressions '#leasure is good( and '#leasure is the good( are not identical$ we must not set out the terms in the same way% but if the syllogism is to #ro!e that #leasure is the good$ the term must be 'the good($ but if the object is to #ro!e that #leasure is good$ the term will be 'good(. 0imilarly in all other cases. 41 It is not the same$ either in fact or in s#eech$ that A belongs to all of that to which B belongs$ and that A belongs to all of that to all of which B belongs for nothing #re!ents B from belonging to /$ though not to all / e.g. let B stand for beautiful$ and / for white. If beauty belongs to something white$ it is true to say that beauty belongs to that which is white% but not #erha#s to e!erything that is white. If then A belongs to B$ but not to e!erything of which B is #redicated$ then whether B belongs to all / or merely belongs to /$ it is not necessary that A should belong$ I do not say to all /$ but e!en to / at all. But if A belongs to e!erything of which B is truly stated$ it will follow that A can be said of all of that of all of which B is said. If howe!er A is said of that of all of which B may be said$ nothing #re!ents B belonging to /$ and yet A not belonging to all / or to any / at all. If then we take three terms it is clear that the e"#ression 'A is said of all of which B is said( means this$ 'A is said of all the things of which B is said(. And if B is said of all of a third term$ so also is A but if B is not said of all of the third term$ there is no necessity that A should be said of all of it. We must not su##ose that something absurd results through setting out the terms for we do not use the e"istence of this #articular thing$ but imitate the geometrician who says that 'this line a foot long( or 'this straight line( or 'this line without breadth( e"ists although it does not$ but does not use the diagrams in the sense that he reasons from them. .or in general$ if two things are not related as whole to #art and #art to whole$ the #ro!er does not #ro!e from them$ and so no syllogism a is formed. We )I mean the learner* use the #rocess of setting out terms like #erce#tion by sense$ not as though it were im#ossible to demonstrate without these illustrati!e terms$ as it is to demonstrate without the #remisses of the syllogism. 4, We should not forget that in the same syllogism not all conclusions are reached through one figure$ but one through one figure$ another through another. /learly then we must analyse arguments in accordance with this. 0ince not e!ery #roblem is #ro!ed in e!ery figure$ but certain #roblems in each figure$ it is clear from the conclusion in what figure the #remisses should be sought. 42 In reference to those arguments aiming at a definition which ha!e been directed to #ro!e some #art of the definition$ we must take as a term the #oint to which the argument has been directed$ not the whole definition for so we shall be less likely to be disturbed by the length of the term e.g. if a man #ro!es that water is a drinkable liquid$ we must take as terms drinkable and water.

2:

44 .urther we must not try to reduce hy#othetical syllogisms% for with the gi!en #remisses it is not #ossible to reduce them. .or they ha!e not been #ro!ed by syllogism$ but assented to by agreement. .or instance if a man should su##ose that unless there is one faculty of contraries$ there cannot be one science$ and should then argue that not e!ery faculty is of contraries$ e.g. of what is healthy and what is sickly for the same thing will then be at the same time healthy and sickly. @e has shown that there is not one faculty of all contraries$ but he has not #ro!ed that there is not a science. And yet one must agree. But the agreement does not come from a syllogism$ but from an hy#othesis. &his argument cannot be reduced but the #roof that there is not a single faculty can. &he latter argument #erha#s was a syllogism but the former was an hy#othesis. &he same holds good of arguments which are brought to a conclusion #er im#ossibile. &hese cannot be analysed either% but the reduction to what is im#ossible can be analysed since it is #ro!ed by syllogism$ though the rest of the argument cannot$ because the conclusion is reached from an hy#othesis. But these differ from the #re!ious arguments for in the former a #reliminary agreement must be reached if one is to acce#t the conclusion% e.g. an agreement that if there is #ro!ed to be one faculty of contraries$ then contraries fall under the same science% whereas in the latter$ e!en if no #reliminary agreement has been made$ men still acce#t the reasoning$ because the falsity is #atent$ e.g. the falsity of what follows from the assum#tion that the diagonal is commensurate$ !i+. that then odd numbers are equal to e!ens. 8any other arguments are brought to a conclusion by the hel# of an hy#othesis% these we ought to consider and mark out clearly. We shall describe in the sequel their differences$ and the !arious ways in which hy#othetical arguments are formed but at #resent this much must be clear$ that it is not #ossible to resol!e such arguments into the figures. And we ha!e e"#lained the reason. 47 Whate!er #roblems are #ro!ed in more than one figure$ if they ha!e been established in one figure by syllogism$ can be reduced to another figure$ e.g. a negati!e syllogism in the first figure can be reduced to the second$ and a syllogism in the middle figure to the first$ not all howe!er but some only. &he #oint will be clear in the sequel. If A belongs to no B$ and B to all /$ then A belongs to no /. &hus the first figure% but if the negati!e statement is con!erted$ we shall ha!e the middle figure. .or B belongs to no A$ and to all /. 0imilarly if the syllogism is not uni!ersal but #articular$ e.g. if A belongs to no B$ and B to some /. /on!ert the negati!e statement and you will ha!e the middle figure. &he uni!ersal syllogisms in the second figure can be reduced to the first$ but only one of the two #articular syllogisms. 5et A belong to no B and to all /. /on!ert the negati!e statement$ and you will ha!e the first figure. .or B will belong to no A and A to all /. But if the affirmati!e statement concerns B$ and the negati!e /$ / must be made first term. .or / belongs to no A$ and A to all B therefore / belongs to no B. B then belongs to no / for the negati!e statement is con!ertible. But if the syllogism is #articular$ whene!er the negati!e statement concerns the major e"treme$ reduction to the first figure will be #ossible$ e.g. if A belongs to no B and to some / con!ert the negati!e statement and you will ha!e the first figure. .or B will belong to no A and A to some /. But when the affirmati!e statement concerns the major e"treme$ no resolution will be #ossible$ e.g. if A belongs to all B$ but not to all / for the statement AB does not admit of con!ersion$ nor would there be a syllogism if it did.

2<

Again syllogisms in the third figure cannot all be resol!ed into the first$ though all syllogisms in the first figure can be resol!ed into the third. 5et A belong to all B and B to some /. 0ince the #articular affirmati!e is con!ertible$ / will belong to some B but A belonged to all B so that the third figure is formed. 0imilarly if the syllogism is negati!e for the #articular affirmati!e is con!ertible therefore A will belong to no B$ and to some /. 9f the syllogisms in the last figure one only cannot be resol!ed into the first$ !i+. when the negati!e statement is not uni!ersal all the rest can be resol!ed. 5et A and B be affirmed of all / then / can be con!erted #artially with either A or B / then belongs to some B. /onsequently we shall get the first figure$ if A belongs to all /$ and / to some of the Bs. If A belongs to all / and B to some /$ the argument is the same for B is con!ertible in reference to /. But if B belongs to all / and A to some /$ the first term must be B for B belongs to all /$ and / to some A$ therefore B belongs to some A. But since the #articular statement is con!ertible$ A will belong to some B. If the syllogism is negati!e$ when the terms are uni!ersal we must take them in a similar way. 5et B belong to all /$ and A to no / then / will belong to some B$ and A to no /% and so / will be middle term. 0imilarly if the negati!e statement is uni!ersal$ the affirmati!e #articular for A will belong to no /$ and / to some of the Bs. But if the negati!e statement is #articular$ no resolution will be #ossible$ e.g. if B belongs to all /$ and A not belong to some / con!ert the statement B/ and both #remisses will be #articular. It is clear that in order to resol!e the figures into one another the #remiss which concerns the minor e"treme must be con!erted in both the figures for when this #remiss is altered$ the transition to the other figure is made. 9ne of the syllogisms in the middle figure can$ the other cannot$ be resol!ed into the third figure. Whene!er the uni!ersal statement is negati!e$ resolution is #ossible. .or if A belongs to no B and to some /$ both B and / alike are con!ertible in relation to A$ so that B belongs to no A and / to some A. A therefore is middle term. But when A belongs to all B$ and not to some /$ resolution will not be #ossible for neither of the #remisses is uni!ersal after con!ersion. 0yllogisms in the third figure can be resol!ed into the middle figure$ whene!er the negati!e statement is uni!ersal$ e.g. if A belongs to no /$ and B to some or all /. .or / then will belong to no A and to some B. But if the negati!e statement is #articular$ no resolution will be #ossible for the #articular negati!e does not admit of con!ersion. It is clear then that the same syllogisms cannot be resol!ed in these figures which could not be resol!ed into the first figure$ and that when syllogisms are reduced to the first figure these alone are confirmed by reduction to what is im#ossible. It is clear from what we ha!e said how we ought to reduce syllogisms$ and that the figures may be resol!ed into one another. 4: In establishing or refuting$ it makes some difference whether we su##ose the e"#ressions 'not to be this( and 'to be not3this( are identical or different in meaning$ e.g. 'not to be white( and 'to be not3white(. .or they do not mean the same thing$ nor is 'to be not3white( the negation of 'to be white($ but 'not to be white(. &he reason for this is as follows. &he relation of 'he can walk( to 'he can not3walk( is similar to the relation of 'it is white( to 'it is not3white(% so is that of 'he knows what is good( to 'he knows what is not3good(. .or there is no difference between the e"#ressions 'he knows what is good( and 'he is knowing what is good($ or 'he can walk( and 'he is able to walk( therefore there is no difference between their contraries 'he cannot walk(3(he is not able to walk(. If then 'he is not able to walk( means the same as 'he is able not to walk($ ca#acity to walk 2=

and inca#acity to walk will belong at the same time to the same #erson )for the same man can both walk and not3walk$ and is #ossessed of knowledge of what is good and of what is not3good*$ but an affirmation and a denial which are o##osed to one another do not belong at the same time to the same thing. As then 'not to know what is good( is not the same as 'to know what is not good($ so 'to be not3good( is not the same as 'not to be good(. .or when two #airs corres#ond$ if the one #air are different from one another$ the other #air also must be different. 1or is 'to be not3 equal( the same as 'not to be equal( for there is something underlying the one$ !i+. that which is not3equal$ and this is the unequal$ but there is nothing underlying the other. Wherefore not e!erything is either equal or unequal$ but e!erything is equal or is not equal. .urther the e"#ressions 'it is a not3white log( and 'it is not a white log( do not im#ly one another(s truth. .or if 'it is a not3white log($ it must be a log but that which is not a white log need not be a log at all. &herefore it is clear that 'it is not3good( is not the denial of 'it is good(. If then e!ery single statement may truly be said to be either an affirmation or a negation$ if it is not a negation clearly it must in a sense be an affirmation. But e!ery affirmation has a corres#onding negation. &he negation then of 'it is not3good( is 'it is not not3good(. &he relation of these statements to one another is as follows. 5et A stand for 'to be good($ B for 'not to be good($ let / stand for 'to be not3good( and be #laced under B$ and let A stand for not to be not3good( and be #laced under A. &hen either A or B will belong to e!erything$ but they will ne!er belong to the same thing% and either / or A will belong to e!erything$ but they will ne!er belong to the same thing. And B must belong to e!erything to which / belongs. .or if it is true to say 'it is a not3white($ it is true also to say 'it is not white( for it is im#ossible that a thing should simultaneously be white and be not3 white$ or be a not3white log and be a white log% consequently if the affirmation does not belong$ the denial must belong. But / does not always belong to B for what is not a log at all$ cannot be a not3white log either. 9n the other hand A belongs to e!erything to which A belongs. .or either / or A belongs to e!erything to which A belongs. But since a thing cannot be simultaneously not3 white and white$ A must belong to e!erything to which A belongs. .or of that which is white it is true to say that it is not not3white. But A is not true of all A. .or of that which is not a log at all it is not true to say A$ !i+. that it is a white log. /onsequently A is true$ but A is not true$ i.e. that it is a white log. It is clear also that A and / cannot together belong to the same thing$ and that B and A may #ossibly belong to the same thing. Pri!ati!e terms are similarly related #ositi!e ter terms res#ect of this arrangement. 5et A stand for 'equal($ B for 'not equal($ / for 'unequal($ A for 'not unequal(. In many things also$ to some of which something belongs which does not belong to others$ the negation may be true in a similar way$ !i+. that all are not white or that each is not white$ while that each is not3white or all are not3white is false. 0imilarly also 'e!ery animal is not3white( is not the negation of 'e!ery animal is white( )for both are false* the #ro#er negation is 'e!ery animal is not white(. 0ince it is clear that 'it is not3white( and 'it is not white( mean different things$ and one is an affirmation$ the other a denial$ it is e!ident that the method of #ro!ing each cannot be the same$ e.g. that whate!er is an animal is not white or may not be white$ and that it is true to call it not3white% for this means that it is not3white. But we may #ro!e that it is true to call it white or not3white in the same way for both are #ro!ed constructi!ely by means of the first figure. .or the e"#ression 'it is true( stands on a similar footing to 'it is(. .or the negation of 'it is true to call it white( is not 'it is true to call it not3white( but 'it is not true to call it white(. If then it is to be true to say that whate!er is a man is musical or is not3musical$ we must assume that whate!er is an animal either is musical or is not3musical% and the #roof has been made. &hat whate!er is a man is not musical is #ro!ed destructi!ely in the three ways mentioned.

2>

In general whene!er A and B are such that they cannot belong at the same time to the same thing$ and one of the two necessarily belongs to e!erything$ and again / and A are related in the same way$ and A follows / but the relation cannot be re!ersed$ then A must follow B and the relation cannot be re!ersed. And A and A may belong to the same thing$ but B and / cannot. .irst it is clear from the following consideration that A follows B. .or since either / or A necessarily belongs to e!erything% and since / cannot belong to that to which B belongs$ because it carries A along with it and A and B cannot belong to the same thing% it is clear that A must follow B. Again since / does not reci#rocate with but A$ but / or A belongs to e!erything$ it is #ossible that A and A should belong to the same thing. But B and / cannot belong to the same thing$ because A follows /% and so something im#ossible results. It is clear then that B does not reci#rocate with A either$ since it is #ossible that A and A should belong at the same time to the same thing. It results sometimes e!en in such an arrangement of terms that one is decei!ed through not a##rehending the o##osites rightly$ one of which must belong to e!erything$ e.g. we may reason that 'if A and B cannot belong at the same time to the same thing$ but it is necessary that one of them should belong to whate!er the other does not belong to and again / and A are related in the same way$ and follows e!erything which / follows it will result that B belongs necessarily to e!erything to which A belongs( but this is false. 'Assume that . stands for the negation of A and B$ and again that @ stands for the negation of / and A. It is necessary then that either A or . should belong to e!erything for either the affirmation or the denial must belong. And again either / or @ must belong to e!erything for they are related as affirmation and denial. And e" hy#othesi A belongs to e!erything e!er thing to which / belongs. &herefore @ belongs to e!erything to which . belongs. Again since either . or B belongs to e!erything$ and similarly either @ or A$ and since @ follows .$ B must follow A for we know this. If then A follows /$ B must follow A(. But this is false for as we #ro!ed the sequence is re!ersed in terms so constituted. &he fallacy arises because #erha#s it is not necessary that A or . should belong to e!erything$ or that . or B should belong to e!erything for . is not the denial of A. .or not good is the negation of good and not3good is not identical with 'neither good nor not3good(. 0imilarly also with / and A. .or two negations ha!e been assumed in res#ect to one term.

Book II 1 We ha!e already e"#lained the number of the figures$ the character and number of the #remisses$ when and how a syllogism is formed% further what we must look for when a refuting and establishing #ro#ositions$ and how we should in!estigate a gi!en #roblem in any branch of inquiry$ also by what means we shall obtain #rinci#les a##ro#riate to each subject. 0ince some syllogisms are uni!ersal$ others #articular$ all the uni!ersal syllogisms gi!e more than one result$ and of #articular syllogisms the affirmati!e yield more than one$ the negati!e yield only the stated conclusion. .or all #ro#ositions are con!ertible sa!e only the #articular negati!e and the conclusion states one definite thing about another definite thing. /onsequently all syllogisms sa!e the #articular negati!e yield more than one conclusion$ e.g. if A has been #ro!ed to to all or to some B$ then B must belong to some A and if A has been #ro!ed to belong to no B$ then B belongs to no A. &his is a different conclusion from the former. But if A does not belong to some B$ it is not necessary that B should not belong to some A for it may #ossibly belong to all A. 4?

&his then is the reason common to all syllogisms whether uni!ersal or #articular. But it is #ossible to gi!e another reason concerning those which are uni!ersal. .or all the things that are subordinate to the middle term or to the conclusion may be #ro!ed by the same syllogism$ if the former are #laced in the middle$ the latter in the conclusion% e.g. if the conclusion AB is #ro!ed through /$ whate!er is subordinate to B or / must acce#t the #redicate A for if A is included in B as in a whole$ and B is included in A$ then A will be included in A. Again if - is included in / as in a whole$ and / is included in A$ then - will be included in A. 0imilarly if the syllogism is negati!e. In the second figure it will be #ossible to infer only that which is subordinate to the conclusion$ e.g. if A belongs to no B and to all /% we conclude that B belongs to no /. If then A is subordinate to /$ clearly B does not belong to it. But that B does not belong to what is subordinate to A is not clear by means of the syllogism. And yet B does not belong to -$ if - is subordinate to A. But while it has been #ro!ed through the syllogism that B belongs to no /$ it has been assumed without #roof that B does not belong to A$ consequently it does not result through the syllogism that B does not belong to -. But in #articular syllogisms there will be no necessity of inferring what is subordinate to the conclusion )for a syllogism does not result when this #remiss is #articular*$ but whate!er is subordinate to the middle term may be inferred$ not howe!er through the syllogism$ e.g. if A belongs to all B and B to some /. 1othing can be inferred about that which is subordinate to /% something can be inferred about that which is subordinate to B$ but not through the #receding syllogism. 0imilarly in the other figures. &hat which is subordinate to the conclusion cannot be #ro!ed% the other subordinate can be #ro!ed$ only not through the syllogism$ just as in the uni!ersal syllogisms what is subordinate to the middle term is #ro!ed )as we saw* from a #remiss which is not demonstrated consequently either a conclusion is not #ossible in the case of uni!ersal syllogisms or else it is #ossible also in the case of #articular syllogisms. , It is #ossible for the #remisses of the syllogism to be true$ or to be false$ or to be the one true$ the other false. &he conclusion is either true or false necessarily. .rom true #remisses it is not #ossible to draw a false conclusion$ but a true conclusion may be drawn from false #remisses$ true howe!er only in res#ect to the fact$ not to the reason. &he reason cannot be established from false #remisses why this is so will be e"#lained in the sequel. .irst then that it is not #ossible to draw a false conclusion from true #remisses$ is made clear by this consideration. If it is necessary that B should be when A is$ it is necessary that A should not be when B is not. If then A is true$ B must be true otherwise it will turn out that the same thing both is and is not at the same time. But this is im#ossible. 5et it not$ because A is laid down as a single term$ be su##osed that it is #ossible$ when a single fact is gi!en$ that something should necessarily result. .or that is not #ossible. .or what results necessarily is the conclusion$ and the means by which this comes about are at the least three terms$ and two relations of subject and #redicate or #remisses. If then it is true that A belongs to all that to which B belongs$ and that B belongs to all that to which / belongs$ it is necessary that A should belong to all that to which / belongs$ and this cannot be false for then the same thing will belong and not belong at the same time. 0o A is #osited as one thing$ being two #remisses taken together. &he same holds good of negati!e syllogisms it is not #ossible to #ro!e a false conclusion from true #remisses. But from what is false a true conclusion may be drawn$ whether both the #remisses are false or only one$ #ro!ided that this is not either of the #remisses indifferently$ if it is taken as wholly false but if the #remiss is not taken as wholly false$ it does not matter which of the two is false. 41

)1* 5et A belong to the whole of /$ but to none of the Bs$ neither let B belong to /. &his is #ossible$ e.g. animal belongs to no stone$ nor stone to any man. If then A is taken to belong to all B and B to all /$ A will belong to all /% consequently though both the #remisses are false the conclusion is true for e!ery man is an animal. 0imilarly with the negati!e. .or it is #ossible that neither A nor B should belong to any /$ although A belongs to all B$ e.g. if the same terms are taken and man is #ut as middle for neither animal nor man belongs to any stone$ but animal belongs to e!ery man. /onsequently if one term is taken to belong to none of that to which it does belong$ and the other term is taken to belong to all of that to which it does not belong$ though both the #remisses are false the conclusion will be true. ),* A similar #roof may be gi!en if each #remiss is #artially false. )2* But if one only of the #remisses is false$ when the first #remiss is wholly false$ e.g. AB$ the conclusion will not be true$ but if the #remiss B/ is wholly false$ a true conclusion will be #ossible. I mean by 'wholly false( the contrary of the truth$ e.g. if what belongs to none is assumed to belong to all$ or if what belongs to all is assumed to belong to none. 5et A belong to no B$ and B to all /. If then the #remiss B/ which I take is true$ and the #remiss AB is wholly false$ !i+. that A belongs to all B$ it is im#ossible that the conclusion should be true for A belonged to none of the /s$ since A belonged to nothing to which B belonged$ and B belonged to all /. 0imilarly there cannot be a true conclusion if A belongs to all B$ and B to all /$ but while the true #remiss B/ is assumed$ the wholly false #remiss AB is also assumed$ !i+. that A belongs to nothing to which B belongs here the conclusion must be false. .or A will belong to all /$ since A belongs to e!erything to which B belongs$ and B to all /. It is clear then that when the first #remiss is wholly false$ whether affirmati!e or negati!e$ and the other #remiss is true$ the conclusion cannot be true. )4* But if the #remiss is not wholly false$ a true conclusion is #ossible. .or if A belongs to all / and to some B$ and if B belongs to all /$ e.g. animal to e!ery swan and to some white thing$ and white to e!ery swan$ then if we take as #remisses that A belongs to all B$ and B to all /$ A will belong to all / truly for e!ery swan is an animal. 0imilarly if the statement AB is negati!e. .or it is #ossible that A should belong to some B and to no /$ and that B should belong to all /$ e.g. animal to some white thing$ but to no snow$ and white to all snow. If then one should assume that A belongs to no B$ and B to all /$ then will belong to no /. )7* But if the #remiss AB$ which is assumed$ is wholly true$ and the #remiss B/ is wholly false$ a true syllogism will be #ossible for nothing #re!ents A belonging to all B and to all /$ though B belongs to no /$ e.g. these being s#ecies of the same genus which are not subordinate one to the other for animal belongs both to horse and to man$ but horse to no man. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to all /$ the conclusion will be true$ although the #remiss B/ is wholly false. 0imilarly if the #remiss AB is negati!e. .or it is #ossible that A should belong neither to any B nor to any /$ and that B should not belong to any /$ e.g. a genus to s#ecies of another genus for animal belongs neither to music nor to the art of healing$ nor does music belong to the art of healing. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B$ and B to all /$ the conclusion will be true. ):* And if the #remiss B/ is not wholly false but in #art only$ e!en so the conclusion may be true. .or nothing #re!ents A belonging to the whole of B and of /$ while B belongs to some /$ e.g. a genus to its s#ecies and difference for animal belongs to e!ery man and to e!ery footed thing$ and man to some footed things though not to all. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B$ and B to all /$ A will belong to all / and this e" hy#othesi is true. 0imilarly if the #remiss AB is negati!e. .or it is #ossible that A should neither belong to any B nor to any /$ though B belongs to some /$ e.g. a genus to the s#ecies of another genus and its difference for animal neither 4,

belongs to any wisdom nor to any instance of 's#eculati!e($ but wisdom belongs to some instance of 's#eculati!e(. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no B$ and B to all /$ will belong to no / and this e" hy#othesi is true. In #articular syllogisms it is #ossible when the first #remiss is wholly false$ and the other true$ that the conclusion should be true% also when the first #remiss is false in #art$ and the other true% and when the first is true$ and the #articular is false% and when both are false. )<* .or nothing #re!ents A belonging to no B$ but to some /$ and B to some /$ e.g. animal belongs to no snow$ but to some white thing$ and snow to some white thing. If then snow is taken as middle$ and animal as first term$ and it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B$ and B to some /$ then the #remiss B/ is wholly false$ the #remiss B/ true$ and the conclusion true. 0imilarly if the #remiss AB is negati!e for it is #ossible that A should belong to the whole of B$ but not to some /$ although B belongs to some /$ e.g. animal belongs to e!ery man$ but does not follow some white$ but man belongs to some white% consequently if man be taken as middle term and it is assumed that A belongs to no B but B belongs to some /$ the conclusion will be true although the #remiss AB is wholly false. )If the #remiss AB is false in #art$ the conclusion may be true. .or nothing #re!ents A belonging both to B and to some /$ and B belonging to some /$ e.g. animal to something beautiful and to something great$ and beautiful belonging to something great. If then A is assumed to belong to all B$ and B to some /$ the a #remiss AB will be #artially false$ the #remiss B/ will be true$ and the conclusion true. 0imilarly if the #remiss AB is negati!e. .or the same terms will ser!e$ and in the same #ositions$ to #ro!e the #oint. )>* Again if the #remiss AB is true$ and the #remiss B/ is false$ the conclusion may be true. .or nothing #re!ents A belonging to the whole of B and to some /$ while B belongs to no /$ e.g. animal to e!ery swan and to some black things$ though swan belongs to no black thing. /onsequently if it should be assumed that A belongs to all B$ and B to some /$ the conclusion will be true$ although the statement B/ is false. 0imilarly if the #remiss AB is negati!e. .or it is #ossible that A should belong to no B$ and not to some /$ while B belongs to no /$ e.g. a genus to the s#ecies of another genus and to the accident of its own s#ecies for animal belongs to no number and not to some white things$ and number belongs to nothing white. If then number is taken as middle$ and it is assumed that A belongs to no B$ and B to some /$ then A will not belong to some /$ which e" hy#othesi is true. And the #remiss AB is true$ the #remiss B/ false. )1?* Also if the #remiss AB is #artially false$ and the #remiss B/ is false too$ the conclusion may be true. .or nothing #re!ents A belonging to some B and to some /$ though B belongs to no /$ e.g. if B is the contrary of /$ and both are accidents of the same genus for animal belongs to some white things and to some black things$ but white belongs to no black thing. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B$ and B to some /$ the conclusion will be true. 0imilarly if the #remiss AB is negati!e for the same terms arranged in the same way will ser!e for the #roof. )11* Also though both #remisses are false the conclusion may be true. .or it is #ossible that A may belong to no B and to some /$ while B belongs to no /$ e.g. a genus in relation to the s#ecies of another genus$ and to the accident of its own s#ecies for animal belongs to no number$ but to some white things$ and number to nothing white. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and B to some /$ the conclusion will be true$ though both #remisses are false. 0imilarly also if the #remiss AB is negati!e. .or nothing #re!ents A belonging to the whole of B$ and not to some /$ while B belongs to no /$ e.g. animal belongs to e!ery swan$ and not to some black things$ and swan belongs to nothing black. /onsequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no B$ and B to some /$ then A does not belong to some /. &he conclusion then is true$ but the #remisses arc false.

42

2 In the middle figure it is #ossible in e!ery way to reach a true conclusion through false #remisses$ whether the syllogisms are uni!ersal or #articular$ !i+. when both #remisses are wholly false% when each is #artially false% when one is true$ the other wholly false )it does not matter which of the two #remisses is false*% if both #remisses are #artially false% if one is quite true$ the other #artially false% if one is wholly false$ the other #artially true. .or )1* if A belongs to no B and to all /$ e.g. animal to no stone and to e!ery horse$ then if the #remisses are stated contrariwise and it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no /$ though the #remisses are wholly false they will yield a true conclusion. 0imilarly if A belongs to all B and to no / for we shall ha!e the same syllogism. ),* Again if one #remiss is wholly false$ the other wholly true for nothing #re!ents A belonging to all B and to all /$ though B belongs to no /$ e.g. a genus to its co3ordinate s#ecies. .or animal belongs to e!ery horse and man$ and no man is a horse. If then it is assumed that animal belongs to all of the one$ and none of the other$ the one #remiss will be wholly false$ the other wholly true$ and the conclusion will be true whiche!er term the negati!e statement concerns. )2* Also if one #remiss is #artially false$ the other wholly true. .or it is #ossible that A should belong to some B and to all /$ though B belongs to no /$ e.g. animal to some white things and to e!ery ra!en$ though white belongs to no ra!en. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no B$ but to the whole of /$ the #remiss AB is #artially false$ the #remiss A/ wholly true$ and the conclusion true. 0imilarly if the negati!e statement is trans#osed the #roof can be made by means of the same terms. Also if the affirmati!e #remiss is #artially false$ the negati!e wholly true$ a true conclusion is #ossible. .or nothing #re!ents A belonging to some B$ but not to / as a whole$ while B belongs to no /$ e.g. animal belongs to some white things$ but to no #itch$ and white belongs to no #itch. /onsequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B$ but to no /$ the #remiss AB is #artially false$ the #remiss A/ is wholly true$ and the conclusion is true. )4* And if both the #remisses are #artially false$ the conclusion may be true. .or it is #ossible that A should belong to some B and to some /$ and B to no /$ e.g. animal to some white things and to some black things$ though white belongs to nothing black. If then it is assumed that A belongs to all B and to no /$ both #remisses are #artially false$ but the conclusion is true. 0imilarly$ if the negati!e #remiss is trans#osed$ the #roof can be made by means of the same terms. It is clear also that our thesis holds in #articular syllogisms. .or )7* nothing #re!ents A belonging to all B and to some /$ though B does not belong to some /$ e.g. animal to e!ery man and to some white things$ though man will not belong to some white things. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some /$ the uni!ersal #remiss is wholly false$ the #articular #remiss is true$ and the conclusion is true. 0imilarly if the #remiss AB is affirmati!e for it is #ossible that A should belong to no B$ and not to some /$ though B does not belong to some /$ e.g. animal belongs to nothing lifeless$ and does not belong to some white things$ and lifeless will not belong to some white things. If then it is stated that A belongs to all B and not to some /$ the #remiss AB which is uni!ersal is wholly false$ the #remiss A/ is true$ and the conclusion is true. Also a true conclusion is #ossible when the uni!ersal #remiss is true$ and the #articular is false. .or nothing #re!ents A following neither B nor / at all$ while B does not belong to some /$ e.g. animal belongs to no number nor to anything lifeless$ and number does not follow some lifeless things. If then it is stated that A belongs to no B and to some /$ the conclusion will be true$ and the uni!ersal #remiss true$ but the #articular false. 0imilarly if the #remiss which is stated uni!ersally is affirmati!e. .or it is #ossible that should A belong both to B and to / as wholes$ though B does not follow some /$ e.g. a genus in relation to its s#ecies and difference for animal follows e!ery 44

man and footed things as a whole$ but man does not follow e!ery footed thing. /onsequently if it is assumed that A belongs to the whole of B$ but does not belong to some /$ the uni!ersal #remiss is true$ the #articular false$ and the conclusion true. ):* It is clear too that though both #remisses are false they may yield a true conclusion$ since it is #ossible that A should belong both to B and to / as wholes$ though B does not follow some /. .or if it is assumed that A belongs to no B and to some /$ the #remisses are both false$ but the conclusion is true. 0imilarly if the uni!ersal #remiss is affirmati!e and the #articular negati!e. .or it is #ossible that A should follow no B and all /$ though B does not belong to some /$ e.g. animal follows no science but e!ery man$ though science does not follow e!ery man. If then A is assumed to belong to the whole of B$ and not to follow some /$ the #remisses are false but the conclusion is true. 4 In the last figure a true conclusion may come through what is false$ alike when both #remisses are wholly false$ when each is #artly false$ when one #remiss is wholly true$ the other false$ when one #remiss is #artly false$ the other wholly true$ and !ice !ersa$ and in e!ery other way in which it is #ossible to alter the #remisses. .or )1* nothing #re!ents neither A nor B from belonging to any /$ while A belongs to some B$ e.g. neither man nor footed follows anything lifeless$ though man belongs to some footed things. If then it is assumed that A and B belong to all /$ the #remisses will be wholly false$ but the conclusion true. 0imilarly if one #remiss is negati!e$ the other affirmati!e. .or it is #ossible that B should belong to no /$ but A to all /$ and that should not belong to some B$ e.g. black belongs to no swan$ animal to e!ery swan$ and animal not to e!erything black. /onsequently if it is assumed that B belongs to all /$ and A to no /$ A will not belong to some B and the conclusion is true$ though the #remisses are false. ),* Also if each #remiss is #artly false$ the conclusion may be true. .or nothing #re!ents both A and B from belonging to some / while A belongs to some B$ e.g. white and beautiful belong to some animals$ and white to some beautiful things. If then it is stated that A and B belong to all /$ the #remisses are #artially false$ but the conclusion is true. 0imilarly if the #remiss A/ is stated as negati!e. .or nothing #re!ents A from not belonging$ and B from belonging$ to some /$ while A does not belong to all B$ e.g. white does not belong to some animals$ beautiful belongs to some animals$ and white does not belong to e!erything beautiful. /onsequently if it is assumed that A belongs to no /$ and B to all /$ both #remisses are #artly false$ but the conclusion is true. )2* 0imilarly if one of the #remisses assumed is wholly false$ the other wholly true. .or it is #ossible that both A and B should follow all /$ though A does not belong to some B$ e.g. animal and white follow e!ery swan$ though animal does not belong to e!erything white. &aking these then as terms$ if one assumes that B belongs to the whole of /$ but A does not belong to / at all$ the #remiss B/ will be wholly true$ the #remiss A/ wholly false$ and the conclusion true. 0imilarly if the statement B/ is false$ the statement A/ true$ the conclusion may be true. &he same terms will ser!e for the #roof. Also if both the #remisses assumed are affirmati!e$ the conclusion may be true. .or nothing #re!ents B from following all /$ and A from not belonging to / at all$ though A belongs to some B$ e.g. animal belongs to e!ery swan$ black to no swan$ and black to some animals. /onsequently if it is assumed that A and B belong to e!ery /$ the #remiss B/ is wholly true$ the #remiss A/ is wholly false$ and the conclusion is true. 0imilarly if the #remiss A/ which is assumed is true the #roof can be made through the same terms. )4* Again if one #remiss is wholly true$ the other #artly false$ the conclusion may be true. .or it is #ossible that B should belong to all /$ and A to some /$ while A belongs to some B$ e.g. bi#ed 47

belongs to e!ery man$ beautiful not to e!ery man$ and beautiful to some bi#eds. If then it is assumed that both A and B belong to the whole of /$ the #remiss B/ is wholly true$ the #remiss A/ #artly false$ the conclusion true. 0imilarly if of the #remisses assumed A/ is true and B/ #artly false$ a true conclusion is #ossible this can be #ro!ed$ if the same terms as before are trans#osed. Also the conclusion may be true if one #remiss is negati!e$ the other affirmati!e. .or since it is #ossible that B should belong to the whole of /$ and A to some /$ and$ when they are so$ that A should not belong to all B$ therefore it is assumed that B belongs to the whole of /$ and A to no /$ the negati!e #remiss is #artly false$ the other #remiss wholly true$ and the conclusion is true. Again since it has been #ro!ed that if A belongs to no / and B to some /$ it is #ossible that A should not belong to some /$ it is clear that if the #remiss A/ is wholly true$ and the #remiss B/ #artly false$ it is #ossible that the conclusion should be true. .or if it is assumed that A belongs to no /$ and B to all /$ the #remiss A/ is wholly true$ and the #remiss B/ is #artly false. )7* It is clear also in the case of #articular syllogisms that a true conclusion may come through what is false$ in e!ery #ossible way. .or the same terms must be taken as ha!e been taken when the #remisses are uni!ersal$ #ositi!e terms in #ositi!e syllogisms$ negati!e terms in negati!e. .or it makes no difference to the setting out of the terms$ whether one assumes that what belongs to none belongs to all or that what belongs to some belongs to all. &he same a##lies to negati!e statements. It is clear then that if the conclusion is false$ the #remisses of the argument must be false$ either all or some of them% but when the conclusion is true$ it is not necessary that the #remisses should be true$ either one or all$ yet it is #ossible$ though no #art of the syllogism is true$ that the conclusion may none the less be true% but it is not necessitated. &he reason is that when two things are so related to one another$ that if the one is$ the other necessarily is$ then if the latter is not$ the former will not be either$ but if the latter is$ it is not necessary that the former should be. But it is im#ossible that the same thing should be necessitated by the being and by the not3being of the same thing. I mean$ for e"am#le$ that it is im#ossible that B should necessarily be great since A is white and that B should necessarily be great since A is not white. .or whene!er since this$ A$ is white it is necessary that that$ B$ should be great$ and since B is great that / should not be white$ then it is necessary if is white that / should not be white. And whene!er it is necessary$ since one of two things is$ that the other should be$ it is necessary$ if the latter is not$ that the former )!i+. A* should not be. If then B is not great A cannot be white. But if$ when A is not white$ it is necessary that B should be great$ it necessarily results that if B is not great$ B itself is great. )But this is im#ossible.* .or if B is not great$ A will necessarily not be white. If then when this is not white B must be great$ it results that if B is not great$ it is great$ just as if it were #ro!ed through three terms. 7 /ircular and reci#rocal #roof means #roof by means of the conclusion$ i.e. by con!erting one of the #remisses sim#ly and inferring the #remiss which was assumed in the original syllogism e.g. su##ose it has been necessary to #ro!e that A belongs to all /$ and it has been #ro!ed through B% su##ose that A should now be #ro!ed to belong to B by assuming that A belongs to /$ and / to B 6 so A belongs to B but in the first syllogism the con!erse was assumed$ !i+. that B belongs to /. 9r su##ose it is necessary to #ro!e that B belongs to /$ and A is assumed to belong to /$ which was the conclusion of the first syllogism$ and B to belong to A but the con!erse was assumed in the earlier syllogism$ !i+. that A belongs to B. In no other way is reci#rocal #roof #ossible. If 4:

another term is taken as middle$ the #roof is not circular for neither of the #ro#ositions assumed is the same as before if one of the acce#ted terms is taken as middle$ only one of the #remisses of the first syllogism can be assumed in the second for if both of them are taken the same conclusion as before will result but it must be different. If the terms are not con!ertible$ one of the #remisses from which the syllogism results must be undemonstrated for it is not #ossible to demonstrate through these terms that the third belongs to the middle or the middle to the first. If the terms are con!ertible$ it is #ossible to demonstrate e!erything reci#rocally$ e.g. if A and B and / are con!ertible with one another. 0u##ose the #ro#osition A/ has been demonstrated through B as middle term$ and again the #ro#osition AB through the conclusion and the #remiss B/ con!erted$ and similarly the #ro#osition B/ through the conclusion and the #remiss AB con!erted. But it is necessary to #ro!e both the #remiss /B$ and the #remiss BA for we ha!e used these alone without demonstrating them. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all /$ and / to all A$ we shall ha!e a syllogism relating B to A. Again if it is assumed that / belongs to all A$ and A to all B$ / must belong to all B. In both these syllogisms the #remiss /A has been assumed without being demonstrated the other #remisses had e" hy#othesi been #ro!ed. /onsequently if we succeed in demonstrating this #remiss$ all the #remisses will ha!e been #ro!ed reci#rocally. If then it is assumed that / belongs to all B$ and B to all A$ both the #remisses assumed ha!e been #ro!ed$ and / must belong to A. It is clear then that only if the terms are con!ertible is circular and reci#rocal demonstration #ossible )if the terms are not con!ertible$ the matter stands as we said abo!e*. But it turns out in these also that we use for the demonstration the !ery thing that is being #ro!ed for / is #ro!ed of B$ and B of by assuming that / is said of and / is #ro!ed of A through these #remisses$ so that we use the conclusion for the demonstration. In negati!e syllogisms reci#rocal #roof is as follows. 5et B belong to all /$ and A to none of the Bs we conclude that A belongs to none of the /s. If again it is necessary to #ro!e that A belongs to none of the Bs )which was #re!iously assumed* A must belong to no /$ and / to all B thus the #re!ious #remiss is re!ersed. If it is necessary to #ro!e that B belongs to /$ the #ro#osition AB must no longer be con!erted as before for the #remiss 'B belongs to no A( is identical with the #remiss 'A belongs to no B(. But we must assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which longs. 5et A belong to none of the /s )which was the #re!ious conclusion* and assume that B belongs to all of that to none of which A belongs. It is necessary then that B should belong to all /. /onsequently each of the three #ro#ositions has been made a conclusion$ and this is circular demonstration$ to assume the conclusion and the con!erse of one of the #remisses$ and deduce the remaining #remiss. In #articular syllogisms it is not #ossible to demonstrate the uni!ersal #remiss through the other #ro#ositions$ but the #articular #remiss can be demonstrated. /learly it is im#ossible to demonstrate the uni!ersal #remiss for what is uni!ersal is #ro!ed through #ro#ositions which are uni!ersal$ but the conclusion is not uni!ersal$ and the #roof must start from the conclusion and the other #remiss. .urther a syllogism cannot be made at all if the other #remiss is con!erted for the result is that both #remisses are #articular. But the #articular #remiss may be #ro!ed. 0u##ose that A has been #ro!ed of some / through B. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A and the conclusion is retained$ B will belong to some / for we obtain the first figure and A is middle. But if the syllogism is negati!e$ it is not #ossible to #ro!e the uni!ersal #remiss$ for the reason gi!en abo!e. But it is #ossible to #ro!e the #articular #remiss$ if the #ro#osition AB is con!erted as in the uni!ersal syllogism$ i.e 'B belongs to some of that to some of which A does not belong( otherwise no syllogism results because the #articular #remiss is negati!e.

4<

: In the second figure it is not #ossible to #ro!e an affirmati!e #ro#osition in this way$ but a negati!e #ro#osition may be #ro!ed. An affirmati!e #ro#osition is not #ro!ed because both #remisses of the new syllogism are not affirmati!e )for the conclusion is negati!e* but an affirmati!e #ro#osition is )as we saw* #ro!ed from #remisses which are both affirmati!e. &he negati!e is #ro!ed as follows. 5et A belong to all B$ and to no / we conclude that B belongs to no /. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A$ it is necessary that A should belong to no / for we get the second figure$ with B as middle. But if the #remiss AB was negati!e$ and the other affirmati!e$ we shall ha!e the first figure. .or / belongs to all A and B to no /$ consequently B belongs to no A neither then does A belong to B. &hrough the conclusion$ therefore$ and one #remiss$ we get no syllogism$ but if another #remiss is assumed in addition$ a syllogism will be #ossible. But if the syllogism not uni!ersal$ the uni!ersal #remiss cannot be #ro!ed$ for the same reason as we ga!e abo!e$ but the #articular #remiss can be #ro!ed whene!er the uni!ersal statement is affirmati!e. 5et A belong to all B$ and not to all / the conclusion is B/. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all A$ but not to all /$ A will not belong to some /$ B being middle. But if the uni!ersal #remiss is negati!e$ the #remiss A/ will not be demonstrated by the con!ersion of AB for it turns out that either both or one of the #remisses is negati!e% consequently a syllogism will not be #ossible. But the #roof will #roceed as in the uni!ersal syllogisms$ if it is assumed that A belongs to some of that to some of which B does not belong. < In the third figure$ when both #remisses are taken uni!ersally$ it is not #ossible to #ro!e them reci#rocally for that which is uni!ersal is #ro!ed through statements which are uni!ersal$ but the conclusion in this figure is always #articular$ so that it is clear that it is not #ossible at all to #ro!e through this figure the uni!ersal #remiss. But if one #remiss is uni!ersal$ the other #articular$ #roof of the latter will sometimes be #ossible$ sometimes not. When both the #remisses assumed are affirmati!e$ and the uni!ersal concerns the minor e"treme$ #roof will be #ossible$ but when it concerns the other e"treme$ im#ossible. 5et A belong to all / and B to some / the conclusion is the statement AB. If then it is assumed that / belongs to all A$ it has been #ro!ed that / belongs to some B$ but that B belongs to some / has not been #ro!ed. And yet it is necessary$ if / belongs to some B$ that B should belong to some /. But it is not the same that this should belong to that$ and that to this but we must assume besides that if this belongs to some of that$ that belongs to some of this. But if this is assumed the syllogism no longer results from the conclusion and the other #remiss. But if B belongs to all /$ and A to some /$ it will be #ossible to #ro!e the #ro#osition A/$ when it is assumed that / belongs to all B$ and A to some B. .or if / belongs to all B and A to some B$ it is necessary that A should belong to some /$ B being middle. And whene!er one #remiss is affirmati!e the other negati!e$ and the affirmati!e is uni!ersal$ the other #remiss can be #ro!ed. 5et B belong to all /$ and A not to some / the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. If then it is assumed further that / belongs to all B$ it is necessary that A should not belong to some /$ B being middle. But when the negati!e #remiss is uni!ersal$ the other #remiss is not e"ce#t as before$ !i+. if it is assumed that that belongs to some of that$ to some of which this does not belong$ e.g. if A belongs to no /$ and B to some / the conclusion is that A does not belong to some B. If then it is assumed that / belongs to some of that to some of which does not belong$ it is necessary that / should belong to some of the Bs. In no other way is it #ossible by con!erting the uni!ersal #remiss to #ro!e the other for in no other way can a syllogism be formed. 4=

It is clear then that in the first figure reci#rocal #roof is made both through the third and through the first figure 6 if the conclusion is affirmati!e through the first% if the conclusion is negati!e through the last. .or it is assumed that that belongs to all of that to none of which this belongs. In the middle figure$ when the syllogism is uni!ersal$ #roof is #ossible through the second figure and through the first$ but when #articular through the second and the last. In the third figure all #roofs are made through itself. It is clear also that in the third figure and in the middle figure those syllogisms which are not made through those figures themsel!es either are not of the nature of circular #roof or are im#erfect. = &o con!ert a syllogism means to alter the conclusion and make another syllogism to #ro!e that either the e"treme cannot belong to the middle or the middle to the last term. .or it is necessary$ if the conclusion has been changed into its o##osite and one of the #remisses stands$ that the other #remiss should be destroyed. .or if it should stand$ the conclusion also must stand. It makes a difference whether the conclusion is con!erted into its contradictory or into its contrary. .or the same syllogism does not result whiche!er form the con!ersion takes. &his will be made clear by the sequel. By contradictory o##osition I mean the o##osition of 'to all( to 'not to all($ and of 'to some( to 'to none(% by contrary o##osition I mean the o##osition of 'to all( to 'to none($ and of 'to some( to 'not to some(. 0u##ose that A been #ro!ed of /$ through B as middle term. If then it should be assumed that A belongs to no /$ but to all B$ B will belong to no /. And if A belongs to no /$ and B to all /$ A will belong$ not to no B at all$ but not to all B. .or )as we saw* the uni!ersal is not #ro!ed through the last figure. In a word it is not #ossible to refute uni!ersally by con!ersion the #remiss which concerns the major e"treme for the refutation always #roceeds through the third since it is necessary to take both #remisses in reference to the minor e"treme. 0imilarly if the syllogism is negati!e. 0u##ose it has been #ro!ed that A belongs to no / through B. &hen if it is assumed that A belongs to all /$ and to no B$ B will belong to none of the /s. And if A and B belong to all /$ A will belong to some B but in the original #remiss it belonged to no B. If the conclusion is con!erted into its contradictory$ the syllogisms will be contradictory and not uni!ersal. .or one #remiss is #articular$ so that the conclusion also will be #articular. 5et the syllogism be affirmati!e$ and let it be con!erted as stated. &hen if A belongs not to all /$ but to all B$ B will belong not to all /. And if A belongs not to all /$ but B belongs to all /$ A will belong not to all B. 0imilarly if the syllogism is negati!e. .or if A belongs to some /$ and to no B$ B will belong$ not to no / at all$ but 6 not to some /. And if A belongs to some /$ and B to all /$ as was originally assumed$ A will belong to some B. In #articular syllogisms when the conclusion is con!erted into its contradictory$ both #remisses may be refuted$ but when it is con!erted into its contrary$ neither. .or the result is no longer$ as in the uni!ersal syllogisms$ refutation in which the conclusion reached by 9$ con!ersion lacks uni!ersality$ but no refutation at all. 0u##ose that A has been #ro!ed of some /. If then it is assumed that A belongs to no /$ and B to some /$ A will not belong to some B and if A belongs to no /$ but to all B$ B will belong to no /. &hus both #remisses are refuted. But neither can be refuted if the conclusion is con!erted into its contrary. .or if A does not belong to some /$ but to all B$ then B will not belong to some /. But the original #remiss is not yet refuted for it is #ossible that B should belong to some /$ and should not belong to some /. &he uni!ersal #remiss AB cannot be affected by a syllogism at all for if A does not belong to some of the /s$ but B belongs to some of the /s$ neither of the #remisses is uni!ersal. 0imilarly if the syllogism is 4>

negati!e for if it should be assumed that A belongs to all /$ both #remisses are refuted but if the assum#tion is that A belongs to some /$ neither #remiss is refuted. &he #roof is the same as before. > In the second figure it is not #ossible to refute the #remiss which concerns the major e"treme by establishing something contrary to it$ whiche!er form the con!ersion of the conclusion may take. .or the conclusion of the refutation will always be in the third figure$ and in this figure )as we saw* there is no uni!ersal syllogism. &he other #remiss can be refuted in a manner similar to the con!ersion I mean$ if the conclusion of the first syllogism is con!erted into its contrary$ the conclusion of the refutation will be the contrary of the minor #remiss of the first$ if into its contradictory$ the contradictory. 5et A belong to all B and to no / conclusion B/. If then it is assumed that B belongs to all /$ and the #ro#osition AB stands$ A will belong to all /$ since the first figure is #roduced. If B belongs to all /$ and A to no /$ then A belongs not to all B the figure is the last. But if the conclusion B/ is con!erted into its contradictory$ the #remiss AB will be refuted as before$ the #remiss$ A/ by its contradictory. .or if B belongs to some /$ and A to no /$ then A will not belong to some B. Again if B belongs to some /$ and A to all B$ A will belong to some /$ so that the syllogism results in the contradictory of the minor #remiss. A similar #roof can be gi!en if the #remisses are trans#osed in res#ect of their quality. If the syllogism is #articular$ when the conclusion is con!erted into its contrary neither #remiss can be refuted$ as also ha##ened in the first figure$( if the conclusion is con!erted into its contradictory$ both #remisses can be refuted. 0u##ose that A belongs to no B$ and to some / the conclusion is B/. If then it is assumed that B belongs to some /$ and the statement AB stands$ the conclusion will be that A does not belong to some /. But the original statement has not been refuted for it is #ossible that A should belong to some / and also not to some /. Again if B belongs to some / and A to some /$ no syllogism will be #ossible for neither of the #remisses taken is uni!ersal. /onsequently the #ro#osition AB is not refuted. But if the conclusion is con!erted into its contradictory$ both #remisses can be refuted. .or if B belongs to all /$ and A to no B$ A will belong to no / but it was assumed to belong to some /. Again if B belongs to all / and A to some /$ A will belong to some B. &he same #roof can be gi!en if the uni!ersal statement is affirmati!e. 1? In the third figure when the conclusion is con!erted into its contrary$ neither of the #remisses can be refuted in any of the syllogisms$ but when the conclusion is con!erted into its contradictory$ both #remisses may be refuted and in all the moods. 0u##ose it has been #ro!ed that A belongs to some B$ / being taken as middle$ and the #remisses being uni!ersal. If then it is assumed that A does not belong to some B$ but B belongs to all /$ no syllogism is formed about A and /. 1or if A does not belong to some B$ but belongs to all /$ will a syllogism be #ossible about B and /. A similar #roof can be gi!en if the #remisses are not uni!ersal. .or either both #remisses arri!ed at by the con!ersion must be #articular$ or the uni!ersal #remiss must refer to the minor e"treme. But we found that no syllogism is #ossible thus either in the first or in the middle figure. But if the conclusion is con!erted into its contradictory$ both the #remisses can be refuted. .or if A belongs to no B$ and B to all /$ then A belongs to no / again if A belongs to no B$ and to all /$ B belongs to no /. And similarly if one of the #remisses is not uni!ersal. .or if A belongs to no 7?

B$ and B to some /$ A will not belong to some / if A belongs to no B$ and to /$ B will belong to no /. 0imilarly if the original syllogism is negati!e. 0u##ose it has been #ro!ed that A does not belong to some B$ B/ being affirmati!e$ A/ being negati!e for it was thus that$ as we saw$ a syllogism could be made. Whene!er then the contrary of the conclusion is assumed a syllogism will not be #ossible. .or if A belongs to some B$ and B to all /$ no syllogism is #ossible )as we saw* about A and /. 1or$ if A belongs to some B$ and to no /$ was a syllogism #ossible concerning B and /. &herefore the #remisses are not refuted. But when the contradictory of the conclusion is assumed$ they are refuted. .or if A belongs to all B$ and B to /$ A belongs to all / but A was su##osed originally to belong to no /. Again if A belongs to all B$ and to no /$ then B belongs to no / but it was su##osed to belong to all /. A similar #roof is #ossible if the #remisses are not uni!ersal. .or A/ becomes uni!ersal and negati!e$ the other #remiss #articular and affirmati!e. If then A belongs to all B$ and B to some /$ it results that A belongs to some / but it was su##osed to belong to no /. Again if A belongs to all B$ and to no /$ then B belongs to no / but it was assumed to belong to some /. If A belongs to some B and B to some /$ no syllogism results nor yet if A belongs to some B$ and to no /. &hus in one way the #remisses are refuted$ in the other way they are not. .rom what has been said it is clear how a syllogism results in each figure when the conclusion is con!erted% when a result contrary to the #remiss$ and when a result contradictory to the #remiss$ is obtained. It is clear that in the first figure the syllogisms are formed through the middle and the last figures$ and the #remiss which concerns the minor e"treme is alway refuted through the middle figure$ the #remiss which concerns the major through the last figure. In the second figure syllogisms #roceed through the first and the last figures$ and the #remiss which concerns the minor e"treme is always refuted through the first figure$ the #remiss which concerns the major e"treme through the last. In the third figure the refutation #roceeds through the first and the middle figures% the #remiss which concerns the major is always refuted through the first figure$ the #remiss which concerns the minor through the middle figure. 11 It is clear then what con!ersion is$ how it is effected in each figure$ and what syllogism results. &he syllogism #er im#ossibile is #ro!ed when the contradictory of the conclusion stated and another #remiss is assumed% it can be made in all the figures. .or it resembles con!ersion$ differing only in this con!ersion takes #lace after a syllogism has been formed and both the #remisses ha!e been taken$ but a reduction to the im#ossible takes #lace not because the contradictory has been agreed to already$ but because it is clear that it is true. &he terms are alike in both$ and the #remisses of both are taken in the same way. .or e"am#le if A belongs to all B$ / being middle$ then if it is su##osed that A does not belong to all B or belongs to no B$ but to all / )which was admitted to be true*$ it follows that / belongs to no B or not to all B. But this is im#ossible consequently the su##osition is false its contradictory then is true. 0imilarly in the other figures for whate!er moods admit of con!ersion admit also of the reduction #er im#ossibile. All the #roblems can be #ro!ed #er im#ossibile in all the figures$ e"ce#ting the uni!ersal affirmati!e$ which is #ro!ed in the middle and third figures$ but not in the first. 0u##ose that A belongs not to all B$ or to no B$ and take besides another #remiss concerning either of the terms$ !i+. that / belongs to all A$ or that B belongs to all A% thus we get the first figure. If then it is su##osed that A does not belong to all B$ no syllogism results whiche!er term the assumed 71

#remiss concerns% but if it is su##osed that A belongs to no B$ when the #remiss BA is assumed as well we shall #ro!e syllogistically what is false$ but not the #roblem #ro#osed. .or if A belongs to no B$ and B belongs to all A$ A belongs to no A. 5et this be im#ossible it is false then A belongs to no B. But the uni!ersal affirmati!e is not necessarily true if the uni!ersal negati!e is false. But if the #remiss /A is assumed as well$ no syllogism results$ nor does it do so when it is su##osed that A does not belong to all B. /onsequently it is clear that the uni!ersal affirmati!e cannot be #ro!ed in the first figure #er im#ossibile. But the #articular affirmati!e and the uni!ersal and #articular negati!es can all be #ro!ed. 0u##ose that A belongs to no B$ and let it ha!e been assumed that B belongs to all or to some /. &hen it is necessary that A should belong to no / or not to all /. But this is im#ossible )for let it be true and clear that A belongs to all /* consequently if this is false$ it is necessary that A should belong to some B. But if the other #remiss assumed relates to A$ no syllogism will be #ossible. 1or can a conclusion be drawn when the contrary of the conclusion is su##osed$ e.g. that A does not belong to some B. /learly then we must su##ose the contradictory. Again su##ose that A belongs to some B$ and let it ha!e been assumed that / belongs to all A. It is necessary then that / should belong to some B. But let this be im#ossible$ so that the su##osition is false in that case it is true that A belongs to no B. We may #roceed in the same way if the #ro#osition /A has been taken as negati!e. But if the #remiss assumed concerns B$ no syllogism will be #ossible. If the contrary is su##osed$ we shall ha!e a syllogism and an im#ossible conclusion$ but the #roblem in hand is not #ro!ed. 0u##ose that A belongs to all B$ and let it ha!e been assumed that / belongs to all A. It is necessary then that / should belong to all B. But this is im#ossible$ so that it is false that A belongs to all B. But we ha!e not yet shown it to be necessary that A belongs to no B$ if it does not belong to all B. 0imilarly if the other #remiss taken concerns B% we shall ha!e a syllogism and a conclusion which is im#ossible$ but the hy#othesis is not refuted. &herefore it is the contradictory that we must su##ose. &o #ro!e that A does not belong to all B$ we must su##ose that it belongs to all B for if A belongs to all B$ and / to all A$ then / belongs to all B% so that if this is im#ossible$ the hy#othesis is false. 0imilarly if the other #remiss assumed concerns B. &he same results if the original #ro#osition /A was negati!e for thus also we get a syllogism. But if the negati!e #ro#osition concerns B$ nothing is #ro!ed. If the hy#othesis is that A belongs not to all but to some B$ it is not #ro!ed that A belongs not to all B$ but that it belongs to no B. .or if A belongs to some B$ and / to all A$ then / will belong to some B. If then this is im#ossible$ it is false that A belongs to some B% consequently it is true that A belongs to no B. But if this is #ro!ed$ the truth is refuted as well% for the original conclusion was that A belongs to some B$ and does not belong to some B. .urther the im#ossible does not result from the hy#othesis for then the hy#othesis would be false$ since it is im#ossible to draw a false conclusion from true #remisses but in fact it is true for A belongs to some B. /onsequently we must not su##ose that A belongs to some B$ but that it belongs to all B. 0imilarly if we should be #ro!ing that A does not belong to some B for if 'not to belong to some( and 'to belong not to all( ha!e the same meaning$ the demonstration of both will be identical. It is clear then that not the contrary but the contradictory ought to be su##osed in all the syllogisms. .or thus we shall ha!e necessity of inference$ and the claim we make is one that will be generally acce#ted. .or if of e!erything one or other of two contradictory statements holds good$ then if it is #ro!ed that the negation does not hold$ the affirmation must be true. Again if it is not admitted that the affirmation is true$ the claim that the negation is true will be generally acce#ted. But in neither way does it suit to maintain the contrary for it is not necessary that if the uni!ersal negati!e is false$ the uni!ersal affirmati!e should be true$ nor is it generally acce#ted that if the one is false the other is true. 7,

1, It is clear then that in the first figure all #roblems e"ce#t the uni!ersal affirmati!e are #ro!ed #er im#ossibile. But in the middle and the last figures this also is #ro!ed. 0u##ose that A does not belong to all B$ and let it ha!e been assumed that A belongs to all /. If then A belongs not to all B$ but to all /$ / will not belong to all B. But this is im#ossible )for su##ose it to be clear that / belongs to all B* consequently the hy#othesis is false. It is true then that A belongs to all B. But if the contrary is su##osed$ we shall ha!e a syllogism and a result which is im#ossible but the #roblem in hand is not #ro!ed. .or if A belongs to no B$ and to all /$ / will belong to no B. &his is im#ossible% so that it is false that A belongs to no B. But though this is false$ it does not follow that it is true that A belongs to all B. When A belongs to some B$ su##ose that A belongs to no B$ and let A belong to all /. It is necessary then that / should belong to no B. /onsequently$ if this is im#ossible$ A must belong to some B. But if it is su##osed that A does not belong to some B$ we shall ha!e the same results as in the first figure. Again su##ose that A belongs to some B$ and let A belong to no /. It is necessary then that / should not belong to some B. But originally it belonged to all B$ consequently the hy#othesis is false A then will belong to no B. When A does not belong to an B$ su##ose it does belong to all B$ and to no /. It is necessary then that / should belong to no B. But this is im#ossible so that it is true that A does not belong to all B. It is clear then that all the syllogisms can be formed in the middle figure. 12 0imilarly they can all be formed in the last figure. 0u##ose that A does not belong to some B$ but / belongs to all B then A does not belong to some /. If then this is im#ossible$ it is false that A does not belong to some B% so that it is true that A belongs to all B. But if it is su##osed that A belongs to no B$ we shall ha!e a syllogism and a conclusion which is im#ossible but the #roblem in hand is not #ro!ed for if the contrary is su##osed$ we shall ha!e the same results as before. But to #ro!e that A belongs to some B$ this hy#othesis must be made. If A belongs to no B$ and / to some B$ A will belong not to all /. If then this is false$ it is true that A belongs to some B. When A belongs to no B$ su##ose A belongs to some B$ and let it ha!e been assumed that / belongs to all B. &hen it is necessary that A should belong to some /. But e" hy#othesi it belongs to no /$ so that it is false that A belongs to some B. But if it is su##osed that A belongs to all B$ the #roblem is not #ro!ed. But this hy#othesis must be made if we are #ro!e that A belongs not to all B. .or if A belongs to all B and / to some B$ then A belongs to some /. But this we assumed not to be so$ so it is false that A belongs to all B. But in that case it is true that A belongs not to all B. If howe!er it is assumed that A belongs to some B$ we shall ha!e the same result as before. It is clear then that in all the syllogisms which #roceed #er im#ossibile the contradictory must be assumed. And it is #lain that in the middle figure an affirmati!e conclusion$ and in the last figure a uni!ersal conclusion$ are #ro!ed in a way.

72

14 Aemonstration #er im#ossibile differs from ostensi!e #roof in that it #osits what it wishes to refute by reduction to a statement admitted to be false% whereas ostensi!e #roof starts from admitted #ositions. Both$ indeed$ take two #remisses that are admitted$ but the latter takes the #remisses from which the syllogism starts$ the former takes one of these$ along with the contradictory of the original conclusion. Also in the ostensi!e #roof it is not necessary that the conclusion should be known$ nor that one should su##ose beforehand that it is true or not in the other it is necessary to su##ose beforehand that it is not true. It makes no difference whether the conclusion is affirmati!e or negati!e% the method is the same in both cases. -!erything which is concluded ostensi!ely can be #ro!ed #er im#ossibile$ and that which is #ro!ed #er im#ossibile can be #ro!ed ostensi!ely$ through the same terms. Whene!er the syllogism is formed in the first figure$ the truth will be found in the middle or the last figure$ if negati!e in the middle$ if affirmati!e in the last. Whene!er the syllogism is formed in the middle figure$ the truth will be found in the first$ whate!er the #roblem may be. Whene!er the syllogism is formed in the last figure$ the truth will be found in the first and middle figures$ if affirmati!e in first$ if negati!e in the middle. 0u##ose that A has been #ro!ed to belong to no B$ or not to all B$ through the first figure. &hen the hy#othesis must ha!e been that A belongs to some B$ and the original #remisses that / belongs to all A and to no B. .or thus the syllogism was made and the im#ossible conclusion reached. But this is the middle figure$ if / belongs to all A and to no B. And it is clear from these #remisses that A belongs to no B. 0imilarly if has been #ro!ed not to belong to all B. .or the hy#othesis is that A belongs to all B% and the original #remisses are that / belongs to all A but not to all B. 0imilarly too$ if the #remiss /A should be negati!e for thus also we ha!e the middle figure. Again su##ose it has been #ro!ed that A belongs to some B. &he hy#othesis here is that is that A belongs to no B% and the original #remisses that B belongs to all /$ and A either to all or to some / for in this way we shall get what is im#ossible. But if A and B belong to all /$ we ha!e the last figure. And it is clear from these #remisses that A must belong to some B. 0imilarly if B or A should be assumed to belong to some /. Again su##ose it has been #ro!ed in the middle figure that A belongs to all B. &hen the hy#othesis must ha!e been that A belongs not to all B$ and the original #remisses that A belongs to all /$ and / to all B for thus we shall get what is im#ossible. But if A belongs to all /$ and / to all B$ we ha!e the first figure. 0imilarly if it has been #ro!ed that A belongs to some B for the hy#othesis then must ha!e been that A belongs to no B$ and the original #remisses that A belongs to all /$ and / to some B. If the syllogism is negati!e$ the hy#othesis must ha!e been that A belongs to some B$ and the original #remisses that A belongs to no /$ and / to all B$ so that the first figure results. If the syllogism is not uni!ersal$ but #roof has been gi!en that A does not belong to some B$ we may infer in the same way. &he hy#othesis is that A belongs to all B$ the original #remisses that A belongs to no /$ and / belongs to some B for thus we get the first figure. Again su##ose it has been #ro!ed in the third figure that A belongs to all B. &hen the hy#othesis must ha!e been that A belongs not to all B$ and the original #remisses that / belongs to all B$ and A belongs to all /% for thus we shall get what is im#ossible. And the original #remisses form the first figure. 0imilarly if the demonstration establishes a #articular #ro#osition the hy#othesis then must ha!e been that A belongs to no B$ and the original #remisses that / belongs to some B$ and A to all /. If the syllogism is negati!e$ the hy#othesis must ha!e been that A belongs to some B$ and the original #remisses that / belongs to no A and to all B$ and this is the middle figure. 0imilarly if the demonstration is not uni!ersal. &he hy#othesis will then be that A belongs to all B$ the #remisses that / belongs to no A and to some B and this is the middle figure. 74

It is clear then that it is #ossible through the same terms to #ro!e each of the #roblems ostensi!ely as well. 0imilarly it will be #ossible if the syllogisms are ostensi!e to reduce them ad im#ossibile in the terms which ha!e been taken$ whene!er the contradictory of the conclusion of the ostensi!e syllogism is taken as a #remiss. .or the syllogisms become identical with those which are obtained by means of con!ersion$ so that we obtain immediately the figures through which each #roblem will be sol!ed. It is clear then that e!ery thesis can be #ro!ed in both ways$ i.e. #er im#ossibile and ostensi!ely$ and it is not #ossible to se#arate one method from the other. 17 In what figure it is #ossible to draw a conclusion from #remisses which are o##osed$ and in what figure this is not #ossible$ will be made clear in this way. Ferbally four kinds of o##osition are #ossible$ !i+. uni!ersal affirmati!e to uni!ersal negati!e$ uni!ersal affirmati!e to #articular negati!e$ #articular affirmati!e to uni!ersal negati!e$ and #articular affirmati!e to #articular negati!e but really there are only three for the #articular affirmati!e is only !erbally o##osed to the #articular negati!e. 9f the genuine o##osites I call those which are uni!ersal contraries$ the uni!ersal affirmati!e and the uni!ersal negati!e$ e.g. 'e!ery science is good($ 'no science is good(% the others I call contradictories. In the first figure no syllogism whether affirmati!e or negati!e can be made out of o##osed #remisses no affirmati!e syllogism is #ossible because both #remisses must be affirmati!e$ but o##osites are$ the one affirmati!e$ the other negati!e no negati!e syllogism is #ossible because o##osites affirm and deny the same #redicate of the same subject$ and the middle term in the first figure is not #redicated of both e"tremes$ but one thing is denied of it$ and it is affirmed of something else but such #remisses are not o##osed. In the middle figure a syllogism can be made both o5contradictories and of contraries. 5et A stand for good$ let B and / stand for science. If then one assumes that e!ery science is good$ and no science is good$ A belongs to all B and to no /$ so that B belongs to no / no science then is a science. 0imilarly if after taking 'e!ery science is good( one took 'the science of medicine is not good(% for A belongs to all B but to no /$ so that a #articular science will not be a science. Again$ a #articular science will not be a science if A belongs to all / but to no B$ and B is science$ / medicine$ and A su##osition for after taking 'no science is su##osition($ one has assumed that a #articular science is su##osition. &his syllogism differs from the #receding because the relations between the terms are re!ersed before$ the affirmati!e statement concerned B$ now it concerns /. 0imilarly if one #remiss is not uni!ersal for the middle term is always that which is stated negati!ely of one e"treme$ and affirmati!ely of the other. /onsequently it is #ossible that contradictories may lead to a conclusion$ though not always or in e!ery mood$ but only if the terms subordinate to the middle are such that they are either identical or related as whole to #art. 9therwise it is im#ossible for the #remisses cannot anyhow be either contraries or contradictories. In the third figure an affirmati!e syllogism can ne!er be made out of o##osite #remisses$ for the reason gi!en in reference to the first figure% but a negati!e syllogism is #ossible whether the terms are uni!ersal or not. 5et B and / stand for science$ A for medicine. If then one should assume that all medicine is science and that no medicine is science$ he has assumed that B belongs to all A and / to no A$ so that a #articular science will not be a science. 0imilarly if the #remiss BA is not assumed uni!ersally. .or if some medicine is science and again no medicine is science$ it results that some science is not science$ &he #remisses are contrary if the terms are taken uni!ersally% if one is #articular$ they are contradictory. 77

We must recogni+e that it is #ossible to take o##osites in the way we said$ !i+. 'all science is good( and 'no science is good( or 'some science is not good(. &his does not usually esca#e notice. But it is #ossible to establish one #art of a contradiction through other #remisses$ or to assume it in the way suggested in the &o#ics. 0ince there are three o##ositions to affirmati!e statements$ it follows that o##osite statements may be assumed as #remisses in si" ways% we may ha!e either uni!ersal affirmati!e and negati!e$ or uni!ersal affirmati!e and #articular negati!e$ or #articular affirmati!e and uni!ersal negati!e$ and the relations between the terms may be re!ersed% e.g. A may belong to all B and to no /$ or to all / and to no B$ or to all of the one$ not to all of the other% here too the relation between the terms may be re!ersed. 0imilarly in the third figure. 0o it is clear in how many ways and in what figures a syllogism can be made by means of #remisses which are o##osed. It is clear too that from false #remisses it is #ossible to draw a true conclusion$ as has been said before$ but it is not #ossible if the #remisses are o##osed. .or the syllogism is always contrary to the fact$ e.g. if a thing is good$ it is #ro!ed that it is not good$ if an animal$ that it is not an animal because the syllogism s#rings out of a contradiction and the terms #resu##osed are either identical or related as whole and #art. It is e!ident also that in fallacious reasonings nothing #re!ents a contradiction to the hy#othesis from resulting$ e.g. if something is odd$ it is not odd. .or the syllogism owed its contrariety to its contradictory #remisses% if we assume such #remisses we shall get a result that contradicts our hy#othesis. But we must recogni+e that contraries cannot be inferred from a single syllogism in such a way that we conclude that what is not good is good$ or anything of that sort unless a self3contradictory #remiss is at once assumed$ e.g. 'e!ery animal is white and not white($ and we #roceed 'man is an animal(. -ither we must introduce the contradiction by an additional assum#tion$ assuming$ e.g.$ that e!ery science is su##osition$ and then assuming '8edicine is a science$ but none of it is su##osition( )which is the mode in which refutations are made*$ or we must argue from two syllogisms. In no other way than this$ as was said before$ is it #ossible that the #remisses should be really contrary. 1: &o beg and assume the original question is a s#ecies of failure to demonstrate the #roblem #ro#osed% but this ha##ens in many ways. A man may not reason syllogistically at all$ or he may argue from #remisses which are less known or equally unknown$ or he may establish the antecedent by means of its consequents% for demonstration #roceeds from what is more certain and is #rior. 1ow begging the question is none of these but since we get to know some things naturally through themsel!es$ and other things by means of something else )the first #rinci#les through themsel!es$ what is subordinate to them through something else*$ whene!er a man tries to #ro!e what is not self3e!ident by means of itself$ then he begs the original question. &his may be done by assuming what is in question at once% it is also #ossible to make a transition to other things which would naturally be #ro!ed through the thesis #ro#osed$ and demonstrate it through them$ e.g. if A should be #ro!ed through B$ and B through /$ though it was natural that / should be #ro!ed through A for it turns out that those who reason thus are #ro!ing A by means of itself. &his is what those #ersons do who su##ose that they are constructing #arallel straight lines for they fail to see that they are assuming facts which it is im#ossible to demonstrate unless the #arallels e"ist. 0o it turns out that those who reason thus merely say a #articular thing is$ if it is in this way e!erything will be self3e!ident. But that is im#ossible. If then it is uncertain whether A belongs to /$ and also whether A belongs to B$ and if one should assume that A does belong to B$ it is not yet clear whether he begs the original question$ but it is 7:

e!ident that he is not demonstrating for what is as uncertain as the question to be answered cannot be a #rinci#le of a demonstration. If howe!er B is so related to / that they are identical$ or if they are #lainly con!ertible$ or the one belongs to the other$ the original question is begged. .or one might equally well #ro!e that A belongs to B through those terms if they are con!ertible. But if they are not con!ertible$ it is the fact that they are not that #re!ents such a demonstration$ not the method of demonstrating. But if one were to make the con!ersion$ then he would be doing what we ha!e described and effecting a reci#rocal #roof with three #ro#ositions. 0imilarly if he should assume that B belongs to /$ this being as uncertain as the question whether A belongs to /$ the question is not yet begged$ but no demonstration is made. If howe!er A and B are identical either because they are con!ertible or because A follows B$ then the question is begged for the same reason as before. .or we ha!e e"#lained the meaning of begging the question$ !i+. #ro!ing that which is not self3e!ident by means of itself. If then begging the question is #ro!ing what is not self3e!ident by means of itself$ in other words failing to #ro!e when the failure is due to the thesis to be #ro!ed and the #remiss through which it is #ro!ed being equally uncertain$ either because #redicates which are identical belong to the same subject$ or because the same #redicate belongs to subjects which are identical$ the question may be begged in the middle and third figures in both ways$ though$ if the syllogism is affirmati!e$ only in the third and first figures. If the syllogism is negati!e$ the question is begged when identical #redicates are denied of the same subject% and both #remisses do not beg the question indifferently )in a similar way the question may be begged in the middle figure*$ because the terms in negati!e syllogisms are not con!ertible. In scientific demonstrations the question is begged when the terms are really related in the manner described$ in dialectical arguments when they are according to common o#inion so related. 1< &he objection that 'this is not the reason why the result is false($ which we frequently make in argument$ is made #rimarily in the case of a reductio ad im#ossibile$ to rebut the #ro#osition which was being #ro!ed by the reduction. .or unless a man has contradicted this #ro#osition he will not say$ '.alse cause($ but urge that something false has been assumed in the earlier #arts of the argument% nor will he use the formula in the case of an ostensi!e #roof% for here what one denies is not assumed as a #remiss. .urther when anything is refuted ostensi!ely by the terms AB/$ it cannot be objected that the syllogism does not de#end on the assum#tion laid down. .or we use the e"#ression 'false cause($ when the syllogism is concluded in s#ite of the refutation of this #osition% but that is not #ossible in ostensi!e #roofs since if an assum#tion is refuted$ a syllogism can no longer be drawn in reference to it. It is clear then that the e"#ression 'false cause( can only be used in the case of a reductio ad im#ossibile$ and when the original hy#othesis is so related to the im#ossible conclusion$ that the conclusion results indifferently whether the hy#othesis is made or not. &he most ob!ious case of the irrele!ance of an assum#tion to a conclusion which is false is when a syllogism drawn from middle terms to an im#ossible conclusion is inde#endent of the hy#othesis$ as we ha!e e"#lained in the &o#ics. .or to #ut that which is not the cause as the cause$ is just this e.g. if a man$ wishing to #ro!e that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side$ should try to #ro!e Geno(s theorem that motion is im#ossible$ and so establish a reductio ad im#ossibile for Geno(s false theorem has no conne"ion at all with the original assum#tion. Another case is where the im#ossible conclusion is connected with the hy#othesis$ but does not result from it. &his may ha##en whether one traces the conne"ion u#wards or downwards$ e.g. if it is laid down that A belongs to B$ B to /$ and / to A$ 7<

and it should be false that B belongs to A for if we eliminated A and assumed all the same that B belongs to / and / to A$ the false conclusion would not de#end on the original hy#othesis. 9r again trace the conne"ion u#wards% e.g. su##ose that A belongs to B$ - to A and . to -$ it being false that . belongs to A. In this way too the im#ossible conclusion would result$ though the original hy#othesis were eliminated. But the im#ossible conclusion ought to be connected with the original terms in this way it will de#end on the hy#othesis$ e.g. when one traces the conne"ion downwards$ the im#ossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is #redicate in the hy#othesis for if it is im#ossible that A should belong to A$ the false conclusion will no longer result after A has been eliminated. If one traces the conne"ion u#wards$ the im#ossible conclusion must be connected with that term which is subject in the hy#othesis for if it is im#ossible that . should belong to B$ the im#ossible conclusion will disa##ear if B is eliminated. 0imilarly when the syllogisms are negati!e. It is clear then that when the im#ossibility is not related to the original terms$ the false conclusion does not result on account of the assum#tion. 9r #erha#s e!en so it may sometimes be inde#endent. .or if it were laid down that A belongs not to B but to E$ and that E belongs to / and / to A$ the im#ossible conclusion would still stand. 0imilarly if one takes the terms in an ascending series. /onsequently since the im#ossibility results whether the first assum#tion is su##ressed or not$ it would a##ear to be inde#endent of that assum#tion. 9r #erha#s we ought not to understand the statement that the false conclusion results inde#endently of the assum#tion$ in the sense that if something else were su##osed the im#ossibility would result% but rather we mean that when the first assum#tion is eliminated$ the same im#ossibility results through the remaining #remisses% since it is not #erha#s absurd that the same false result should follow from se!eral hy#otheses$ e.g. that #arallels meet$ both on the assum#tion that the interior angle is greater than the e"terior and on the assum#tion that a triangle contains more than two right angles. 1= A false argument de#ends on the first false statement in it. -!ery syllogism is made out of two or more #remisses. If then the false conclusion is drawn from two #remisses$ one or both of them must be false for )as we #ro!ed* a false syllogism cannot be drawn from two #remisses. But if the #remisses are more than two$ e.g. if / is established through A and B$ and these through A$ -$ .$ and D$ one of these higher #ro#ositions must be false$ and on this the argument de#ends for A and B are inferred by means of A$ -$ .$ and D. &herefore the conclusion and the error results from one of them. 1> In order to a!oid ha!ing a syllogism drawn against us we must take care$ whene!er an o##onent asks us to admit the reason without the conclusions$ not to grant him the same term twice o!er in his #remisses$ since we know that a syllogism cannot be drawn without a middle term$ and that term which is stated more than once is the middle. @ow we ought to watch the middle in reference to each conclusion$ is e!ident from our knowing what kind of thesis is #ro!ed in each figure. &his will not esca#e us since we know how we are maintaining the argument. &hat which we urge men to beware of in their admissions$ they ought in attack to try to conceal. &his will be #ossible first$ if$ instead of drawing the conclusions of #reliminary syllogisms$ they take the necessary #remisses and lea!e the conclusions in the dark% secondly if instead of in!iting assent to #ro#ositions which are closely connected they take as far as #ossible those that are not 7=

connected by middle terms. .or e"am#le su##ose that A is to be inferred to be true of .$ B$ /$ A$ and - being middle terms. 9ne ought then to ask whether A belongs to B$ and ne"t whether A belongs to -$ instead of asking whether B belongs to /% after that he may ask whether B belongs to /$ and so on. If the syllogism is drawn through one middle term$ he ought to begin with that in this way he will most likely decei!e his o##onent. ,? 0ince we know when a syllogism can be formed and how its terms must be related$ it is clear when refutation will be #ossible and when im#ossible. A refutation is #ossible whether e!erything is conceded$ or the answers alternate )one$ I mean$ being affirmati!e$ the other negati!e*. .or as has been shown a syllogism is #ossible whether the terms are related in affirmati!e #ro#ositions or one #ro#osition is affirmati!e$ the other negati!e consequently$ if what is laid down is contrary to the conclusion$ a refutation must take #lace for a refutation is a syllogism which establishes the contradictory. But if nothing is conceded$ a refutation is im#ossible for no syllogism is #ossible )as we saw* when all the terms are negati!e therefore no refutation is #ossible. .or if a refutation were #ossible$ a syllogism must be #ossible% although if a syllogism is #ossible it does not follow that a refutation is #ossible. 0imilarly refutation is not #ossible if nothing is conceded uni!ersally since the fields of refutation and syllogism are defined in the same way. ,1 It sometimes ha##ens that just as we are decei!ed in the arrangement of the terms$ so error may arise in our thought about them$ e.g. if it is #ossible that the same #redicate should belong to more than one subject immediately$ but although knowing the one$ a man may forget the other and think the o##osite true. 0u##ose that A belongs to B and to / in !irtue of their nature$ and that B and / belong to all A in the same way. If then a man thinks that A belongs to all B$ and B to A$ but A to no /$ and / to all A$ he will both know and not know the same thing in res#ect of the same thing. Again if a man were to make a mistake about the members of a single series% e.g. su##ose A belongs to B$ B to /$ and / to A$ but some one thinks that A belongs to all B$ but to no / he will both know that A belongs to A$ and think that it does not. Aoes he then maintain after this sim#ly that what he knows$ he does not thinkH .or he knows in a way that A belongs to / through B$ since the #art is included in the whole% so that what he knows in a way$ this he maintains he does not think at all but that is im#ossible. In the former case$ where the middle term does not belong to the same series$ it is not #ossible to think both the #remisses with reference to each of the two middle terms e.g. that A belongs to all B$ but to no /$ and both B and / belong to all A. .or it turns out that the first #remiss of the one syllogism is either wholly or #artially contrary to the first #remiss of the other. .or if he thinks that A belongs to e!erything to which B belongs$ and he knows that B belongs to A$ then he knows that A belongs to A. /onsequently if again he thinks that A belongs to nothing to which / belongs$ he thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs% but if he thinks that A belongs to e!erything to which B belongs$ and again thinks that A does not belong to some of that to which B belongs$ these beliefs are wholly or #artially contrary. In this way then it is not #ossible to think% but nothing #re!ents a man thinking one #remiss of each syllogism of both #remisses of one of the two syllogisms e.g. A belongs to all B$ and B to A$ and again A belongs to no /. An error of this kind is similar to the error into which we fall concerning #articulars e.g. 7>

if A belongs to all B$ and B to all /$ A will belong to all /. If then a man knows that A belongs to e!erything to which B belongs$ he knows that A belongs to /. But nothing #re!ents his being ignorant that / e"ists% e.g. let A stand for two right angles$ B for triangle$ / for a #articular diagram of a triangle. A man might think that / did not e"ist$ though he knew that e!ery triangle contains two right angles% consequently he will know and not know the same thing at the same time. .or the e"#ression 'to know that e!ery triangle has its angles equal to two right angles( is ambiguous$ meaning to ha!e the knowledge either of the uni!ersal or of the #articulars. &hus then he knows that / contains two right angles with a knowledge of the uni!ersal$ but not with a knowledge of the #articulars% consequently his knowledge will not be contrary to his ignorance. &he argument in the 8eno that learning is recollection may be critici+ed in a similar way. .or it ne!er ha##ens that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the #articular$ but along with the #rocess of being led to see the general #rinci#le he recei!es a knowledge of the #articulars$ by an act )as it were* of recognition. .or we know some things directly% e.g. that the angles are equal to two right angles$ if we know that the figure is a triangle. 0imilarly in all other cases. By a knowledge of the uni!ersal then we see the #articulars$ but we do not know them by the kind of knowledge which is #ro#er to them% consequently it is #ossible that we may make mistakes about them$ but not that we should ha!e the knowledge and error that are contrary to one another rather we ha!e the knowledge of the uni!ersal but make a mistake in a##rehending the #articular. 0imilarly in the cases stated abo!e. &he error in res#ect of the middle term is not contrary to the knowledge obtained through the syllogism$ nor is the thought in res#ect of one middle term contrary to that in res#ect of the other. 1othing #re!ents a man who knows both that A belongs to the whole of B$ and that B again belongs to /$ thinking that A does not belong to /$ e.g. knowing that e!ery mule is sterile and that this is a mule$ and thinking that this animal is with foal for he does not know that A belongs to /$ unless he considers the two #ro#ositions together. 0o it is e!ident that if he knows the one and does not know the other$ he will fall into error. And this is the relation of knowledge of the uni!ersal to knowledge of the #articular. .or we know no sensible thing$ once it has #assed beyond the range of our senses$ e!en if we ha##en to ha!e #ercei!ed it$ e"ce#t by means of the uni!ersal and the #ossession of the knowledge which is #ro#er to the #articular$ but without the actual e"ercise of that knowledge. .or to know is used in three senses it may mean either to ha!e knowledge of the uni!ersal or to ha!e knowledge #ro#er to the matter in hand or to e"ercise such knowledge consequently three kinds of error also are #ossible. 1othing then #re!ents a man both knowing and being mistaken about the same thing$ #ro!ided that his knowledge and his error are not contrary. And this ha##ens also to the man whose knowledge is limited to each of the #remisses and who has not #re!iously considered the #articular question. .or when he thinks that the mule is with foal he has not the knowledge in the sense of its actual e"ercise$ nor on the other hand has his thought caused an error contrary to his knowledge for the error contrary to the knowledge of the uni!ersal would be a syllogism. But he who thinks the essence of good is the essence of bad will think the same thing to be the essence of good and the essence of bad. 5et A stand for the essence of good and B for the essence of bad$ and again / for the essence of good. 0ince then he thinks B and / identical$ he will think that / is B$ and similarly that B is A$ consequently that / is A. .or just as we saw that if B is true of all of which / is true$ and A is true of all of which B is true$ A is true of /$ similarly with the word 'think(. 0imilarly also with the word 'is(% for we saw that if / is the same as B$ and B as A$ / is the same as A. 0imilarly therefore with 'o#ine(. Perha#s then this is necessary if a man will grant the first #oint. But #resumably that is false$ that any one could su##ose the essence of good to be the essence of bad$ sa!e incidentally. .or it is #ossible to think this in many different ways. But we must consider this matter better. :?

,, Whene!er the e"tremes are con!ertible it is necessary that the middle should be con!ertible with both. .or if A belongs to / through B$ then if A and / are con!ertible and / belongs e!erything to which A belongs$ B is con!ertible with A$ and B belongs to e!erything to which A belongs$ through / as middle$ and / is con!ertible with B through A as middle. 0imilarly if the conclusion is negati!e$ e.g. if B belongs to /$ but A does not belong to B$ neither will A belong to /. If then B is con!ertible with A$ / will be con!ertible with A. 0u##ose B does not belong to A% neither then will / for e" hy#othesi B belonged to all /. And if / is con!ertible with B$ B is con!ertible also with A$ for / is said of that of all of which B is said. And if / is con!ertible in relation to A and to B$ B also is con!ertible in relation to A. .or / belongs to that to which B belongs but / does not belong to that to which A belongs. And this alone starts from the conclusion% the #receding moods do not do so as in the affirmati!e syllogism. Again if A and B are con!ertible$ and similarly / and A$ and if A or / must belong to anything whate!er$ then B and A will be such that one or other belongs to anything whate!er. .or since B belongs to that to which A belongs$ and A belongs to that to which / belongs$ and since A or / belongs to e!erything$ but not together$ it is clear that B or A belongs to e!erything$ but not together. .or e"am#le if that which is uncreated is incorru#tible and that which is incorru#tible is uncreated$ it is necessary that what is created should be corru#tible and what is corru#tible should ha!e been created. .or two syllogisms ha!e been #ut together. Again if A or B belongs to e!erything and if / or A belongs to e!erything$ but they cannot belong together$ then when A and / are con!ertible B and A are con!ertible. .or if B does not belong to something to which A belongs$ it is clear that A belongs to it. But if A then / for they are con!ertible. &herefore / and A belong together. But this is im#ossible. When A belongs to the whole of B and to / and is affirmed of nothing else$ and B also belongs to all /$ it is necessary that A and B should be con!ertible for since A is said of B and / only$ and B is affirmed both of itself and of /$ it is clear that B will be said of e!erything of which A is said$ e"ce#t A itself. Again when A and B belong to the whole of /$ and / is con!ertible with B$ it is necessary that A should belong to all B for since A belongs to all /$ and / to B by con!ersion$ A will belong to all B. When$ of two o##osites A and B$ A is #referable to B$ and similarly A is #referable to /$ then if A and / together are #referable to B and A together$ A must be #referable to A. .or A is an object of desire to the same e"tent as B is an object of a!ersion$ since they are o##osites and / is similarly related to A$ since they also are o##osites. If then A is an object of desire to the same e"tent as A$ B is an object of a!ersion to the same e"tent as / )since each is to the same e"tent as each 6 the one an object of a!ersion$ the other an object of desire*. &herefore both A and / together$ and B and A together$ will be equally objects of desire or a!ersion. But since A and / are #referable to B and A$ A cannot be equally desirable with A% for then B along with A would be equally desirable with A along with /. But if A is #referable to A$ then B must be less an object of a!ersion than / for the less is o##osed to the less. But the greater good and lesser e!il are #referable to the lesser good and greater e!il the whole BA then is #referable to the whole A/. But e" hy#othesi this is not so. A then is #referable to A$ and / consequently is less an object of a!ersion than B. If then e!ery lo!er in !irtue of his lo!e would #refer A$ !i+. that the belo!ed should be such as to grant a fa!our$ and yet should not grant it )for which / stands*$ to the belo!ed(s granting the fa!our )re#resented by A* without being such as to grant it )re#resented by B*$ it is clear that A )being of such a nature* is #referable to granting the fa!our. &o recei!e affection then is #referable in lo!e to se"ual intercourse. 5o!e then is more de#endent on :1

friendshi# than on intercourse. And if it is most de#endent on recei!ing affection$ then this is its end. Intercourse then either is not an end at all or is an end relati!e to the further end$ the recei!ing of affection. And indeed the same is true of the other desires and arts. ,2 It is clear then how the terms are related in con!ersion$ and in res#ect of being in a higher degree objects of a!ersion or of desire. We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrati!e syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures$ but also rhetorical syllogisms and in general any form of #ersuasion$ howe!er it may be #resented. .or e!ery belief comes either through syllogism or from induction. 1ow induction$ or rather the syllogism which s#rings out of induction$ consists in establishing syllogistically a relation between one e"treme and the middle by means of the other e"treme$ e.g. if B is the middle term between A and /$ it consists in #ro!ing through / that A belongs to B. .or this is the manner in which we make inductions. .or e"am#le let A stand for long3li!ed$ B for bileless$ and / for the #articular long3li!ed animals$ e.g. man$ horse$ mule. A then belongs to the whole of / for whate!er is bileless is long3li!ed. But B also )'not #ossessing bile(* belongs to all /. If then / is con!ertible with B$ and the middle term is not wider in e"tension$ it is necessary that A should belong to B. .or it has already been #ro!ed that if two things belong to the same thing$ and the e"treme is con!ertible with one of them$ then the other #redicate will belong to the #redicate that is con!erted. But we must a##rehend / as made u# of all the #articulars. .or induction #roceeds through an enumeration of all the cases. 0uch is the syllogism which establishes the first and immediate #remiss for where there is a middle term the syllogism #roceeds through the middle term% when there is no middle term$ through induction. And in a way induction is o##osed to syllogism for the latter #ro!es the major term to belong to the third term by means of the middle$ the former #ro!es the major to belong to the middle by means of the third. In the order of nature$ syllogism through the middle term is #rior and better known$ but syllogism through induction is clearer to us. ,4 We ha!e an 'e"am#le( when the major term is #ro!ed to belong to the middle by means of a term which resembles the third. It ought to be known both that the middle belongs to the third term$ and that the first belongs to that which resembles the third. .or e"am#le let A be e!il$ B making war against neighbours$ / Athenians against &hebans$ A &hebans against Phocians. If then we wish to #ro!e that to fight with the &hebans is an e!il$ we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an e!il. -!idence of this is obtained from similar cases$ e.g. that the war against the Phocians was an e!il to the &hebans. 0ince then to fight against neighbours is an e!il$ and to fight against the &hebans is to fight against neighbours$ it is clear that to fight against the &hebans is an e!il. 1ow it is clear that B belongs to / and to A )for both are cases of making war u#on one(s neighbours* and that A belongs to A )for the war against the Phocians did not turn out well for the &hebans* but that A belongs to B will be #ro!ed through A. 0imilarly if the belief in the relation of the middle term to the e"treme should be #roduced by se!eral similar cases. /learly then to argue by e"am#le is neither like reasoning from #art to whole$ nor like reasoning from whole to #art$ but rather reasoning from #art to #art$ when both #articulars are subordinate to the same term$ and one of them is known. It differs from induction$ because induction starting from all the #articular cases #ro!es )as we saw* that the major term belongs to the middle$ and does not a##ly :,

the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term$ whereas argument by e"am#le does make this a##lication and does not draw its #roof from all the #articular cases. ,7 By reduction we mean an argument in which the first term clearly belongs to the middle$ but the relation of the middle to the last term is uncertain though equally or more #robable than the conclusion% or again an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last term and the middle are few. .or in any of these cases it turns out that we a##roach more nearly to knowledge. .or e"am#le let A stand for what can be taught$ B for knowledge$ / for justice. 1ow it is clear that knowledge can be taught but it is uncertain whether !irtue is knowledge. If now the statement B/ is equally or more #robable than A/$ we ha!e a reduction for we are nearer to knowledge$ since we ha!e taken a new term$ being so far without knowledge that A belongs to /. 9r again su##ose that the terms intermediate between B and / are few for thus too we are nearer knowledge. .or e"am#le let A stand for squaring$ - for rectilinear figure$ . for circle. If there were only one term intermediate between - and . )!i+. that the circle is made equal to a rectilinear figure by the hel# of lunules*$ we should be near to knowledge. But when B/ is not more #robable than A/$ and the intermediate terms are not few$ I do not call this reduction nor again when the statement B/ is immediate for such a statement is knowledge. ,: An objection is a #remiss contrary to a #remiss. It differs from a #remiss$ because it may be #articular$ but a #remiss either cannot be #articular at all or not in uni!ersal syllogisms. An objection is brought in two ways and through two figures% in two ways because e!ery objection is either uni!ersal or #articular$ by two figures because objections are brought in o##osition to the #remiss$ and o##osites can be #ro!ed only in the first and third figures. If a man maintains a uni!ersal affirmati!e$ we re#ly with a uni!ersal or a #articular negati!e% the former is #ro!ed from the first figure$ the latter from the third. .or e"am#le let stand for there being a single science$ B for contraries. If a man #remises that contraries are subjects of a single science$ the objection may be either that o##osites are ne!er subjects of a single science$ and contraries are o##osites$ so that we get the first figure$ or that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of a single science this #roof is in the third figure for it is true of / )the knowable and the unknowable* that they are contraries$ and it is false that they are the subjects of a single science. 0imilarly if the #remiss objected to is negati!e. .or if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of a single science$ we re#ly either that all o##osites or that certain contraries$ e.g. what is healthy and what is sickly$ are subjects of the same science the former argument issues from the first$ the latter from the third figure. In general if a man urges a uni!ersal objection he must frame his contradiction with reference to the uni!ersal of the terms taken by his o##onent$ e.g. if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of the same science$ his o##onent must re#ly that there is a single science of all o##osites. &hus we must ha!e the first figure for the term which embraces the original subject becomes the middle term. If the objection is #articular$ the objector must frame his contradiction with reference to a term relati!ely to which the subject of his o##onent(s #remiss is uni!ersal$ e.g. he will #oint out that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of the same science 'contraries( is uni!ersal :2

relati!ely to these. And we ha!e the third figure for the #articular term assumed is middle$ e.g. the knowable and the unknowable. Premisses from which it is #ossible to draw the contrary conclusion are what we start from when we try to make objections. /onsequently we bring objections in these figures only for in them only are o##osite syllogisms #ossible$ since the second figure cannot #roduce an affirmati!e conclusion. Besides$ an objection in the middle figure would require a fuller argument$ e.g. if it should not be granted that A belongs to B$ because / does not follow B. &his can be made clear only by other #remisses. But an objection ought not to turn off into other things$ but ha!e its new #remiss quite clear immediately. .or this reason also this is the only figure from which #roof by signs cannot be obtained. We must consider later the other kinds of objection$ namely the objection from contraries$ from similars$ and from common o#inion$ and inquire whether a #articular objection cannot be elicited from the first figure or a negati!e objection from the second. ,< A #robability and a sign are not identical$ but a #robability is a generally a##ro!ed #ro#osition what men know to ha##en or not to ha##en$ to be or not to be$ for the most #art thus and thus$ is a #robability$ e.g. 'the en!ious hate($ 'the belo!ed show affection(. A sign means a demonstrati!e #ro#osition necessary or generally a##ro!ed for anything such that when it is another thing is$ or when it has come into being the other has come into being before or after$ is a sign of the other(s being or ha!ing come into being. 1ow an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from #robabilities or signs$ and a sign may be taken in three ways$ corres#onding to the #osition of the middle term in the figures. .or it may be taken as in the first figure or the second or the third. .or e"am#le the #roof that a woman is with child because she has milk is in the first figure for to ha!e milk is the middle term. 5et A re#resent to be with child$ B to ha!e milk$ / woman. &he #roof that wise men are good$ since Pittacus is good$ comes through the last figure. 5et A stand for good$ B for wise men$ / for Pittacus. It is true then to affirm both A and B of / only men do not say the latter$ because they know it$ though they state the former. &he #roof that a woman is with child because she is #ale is meant to come through the middle figure for since #aleness follows women with child and is a concomitant of this woman$ #eo#le su##ose it has been #ro!ed that she is with child. 5et A stand for #aleness$ B for being with child$ / for woman. 1ow if the one #ro#osition is stated$ we ha!e only a sign$ but if the other is stated as well$ a syllogism$ e.g. 'Pittacus is generous$ since ambitious men are generous and Pittacus is ambitious.( 9r again 'Wise men are good$ since Pittacus is not only good but wise.( In this way then syllogisms are formed$ only that which #roceeds through the first figure is irrefutable if it is true )for it is uni!ersal*$ that which #roceeds through the last figure is refutable e!en if the conclusion is true$ since the syllogism is not uni!ersal nor correlati!e to the matter in question for though Pittacus is good$ it is not therefore necessary that all other wise men should be good. But the syllogism which #roceeds through the middle figure is always refutable in any case for a syllogism can ne!er be formed when the terms are related in this way for though a woman with child is #ale$ and this woman also is #ale$ it is not necessary that she should be with child. &ruth then may be found in signs whate!er their kind$ but they ha!e the differences we ha!e stated. We must either di!ide signs in the way stated$ and among them designate the middle term as the inde" )for #eo#le call that the inde" which makes us know$ and the middle term abo!e all has this character*$ or else we must call the arguments deri!ed from the e"tremes signs$ that deri!ed from

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the middle term the inde" for that which is #ro!ed through the first figure is most generally acce#ted and most true. It is #ossible to infer character from features$ if it is granted that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural affections I say 'natural($ for though #erha#s by learning music a man has made some change in his soul$ this is not one of those affections which are natural to us% rather I refer to #assions and desires when I s#eak of natural emotions. If then this were granted and also that for each change there is a corres#onding sign$ and we could state the affection and sign #ro#er to each kind of animal$ we shall be able to infer character from features. .or if there is an affection which belongs #ro#erly to an indi!idual kind$ e.g. courage to lions$ it is necessary that there should be a sign of it for e" hy#othesi body and soul are affected together. 0u##ose this sign is the #ossession of large e"tremities this may belong to other kinds also though not uni!ersally. .or the sign is #ro#er in the sense stated$ because the affection is #ro#er to the whole kind$ though not #ro#er to it alone$ according to our usual manner of s#eaking. &he same thing then will be found in another kind$ and man may be bra!e$ and some other kinds of animal as well. &hey will then ha!e the sign for e" hy#othesi there is one sign corres#onding to each affection. If then this is so$ and we can collect signs of this sort in these animals which ha!e only one affection #ro#er to them 6 but each affection has its sign$ since it is necessary that it should ha!e a single sign 6 we shall then be able to infer character from features. But if the kind as a whole has two #ro#erties$ e.g. if the lion is both bra!e and generous$ how shall we know which of the signs which are its #ro#er concomitants is the sign of a #articular affectionH Perha#s if both belong to some other kind though not to the whole of it$ and if$ in those kinds in which each is found though not in the whole of their members$ some members #ossess one of the affections and not the other e.g. if a man is bra!e but not generous$ but #ossesses$ of the two signs$ large e"tremities$ it is clear that this is the sign of courage in the lion also. &o judge character from features$ then$ is #ossible in the first figure if the middle term is con!ertible with the first e"treme$ but is wider than the third term and not con!ertible with it e.g. let A stand for courage$ B for large e"tremities$ and / for lion. B then belongs to e!erything to which / belongs$ but also to others. But A belongs to e!erything to which B belongs$ and to nothing besides$ but is con!ertible with B otherwise$ there would not be a single sign correlati!e with each affection.

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