Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics translated by W. D.

Ross

Book I 1 Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and ursuit, is thou!ht to aim at some !ood" and #or this reason the !ood has ri!htly been declared to be that at $hich all thin!s aim. But a certain di##erence is #ound amon! ends" some are activities, others are roducts a art #rom the activities that roduce them. Where there are ends a art #rom the actions, it is the nature o# the roducts to be better than the activities. No$, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many" the end o# the medical art is health, that o# shi buildin! a vessel, that o# strate!y victory, that o# economics $ealth. But $here such arts #all under a sin!le ca acity % as bridle&makin! and the other arts concerned $ith the equi ment o# horses #all under the art o# ridin!, and this and every military action under strate!y, in the same $ay other arts #all under yet others % in all o# these the ends o# the master arts are to be re#erred to all the subordinate ends" #or it is #or the sake o# the #ormer that the latter are ursued. It makes no di##erence $hether the activities themselves are the ends o# the actions, or somethin! else a art #rom the activities, as in the case o# the sciences 'ust mentioned. ( I#, then, there is some end o# the thin!s $e do, $hich $e desire #or its o$n sake )everythin! else bein! desired #or the sake o# this*, and i# $e do not choose everythin! #or the sake o# somethin! else )#or at that rate the rocess $ould !o on to in#inity, so that our desire $ould be em ty and vain*, clearly this must be the !ood and the chie# !ood. Will not the kno$led!e o# it, then, have a !reat in#luence on li#e+ ,hall $e not, like archers $ho have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit u on $hat is ri!ht+ I# so, $e must try, in outline at least, to determine $hat it is, and o# $hich o# the sciences or ca acities it is the ob'ect. It $ould seem to belon! to the most authoritative art and that $hich is most truly the master art. And olitics a ears to be o# this nature" #or it is this that ordains $hich o# the sciences should be studied in a state, and $hich each class o# citi-ens should learn and u to $hat oint they should learn them" and $e see even the most hi!hly esteemed o# ca acities to #all under this, e.!. strate!y, economics, rhetoric" no$, since olitics uses the rest o# the sciences, and since, a!ain, it le!islates as to $hat $e are to do and $hat $e are to abstain #rom, the end o# this science must include those o# the others, so that this end must be the !ood #or man. .or even i# the end is the same #or a sin!le man and #or a state, that o# the state seems at all events somethin! !reater and more com lete $hether to attain or to reserve" thou!h it is $orth $hile to attain the end merely #or one man, it is #iner and more !odlike to attain it #or a nation or #or city&states. /hese, then, are the ends at $hich our inquiry aims, since it is olitical science, in one sense o# that term.

0 1ur discussion $ill be adequate i# it has as much clearness as the sub'ect&matter admits o#, #or recision is not to be sou!ht #or alike in all discussions, any more than in all the roducts o# the cra#ts. No$ #ine and 'ust actions, $hich olitical science investi!ates, admit o# much variety and #luctuation o# o inion, so that they may be thou!ht to e2ist only by convention, and not by nature. And !oods also !ive rise to a similar #luctuation because they brin! harm to many eo le" #or be#ore no$ men have been undone by reason o# their $ealth, and others by reason o# their coura!e. We must be content, then, in s eakin! o# such sub'ects and $ith such remisses to indicate the truth rou!hly and in outline, and in s eakin! about thin!s $hich are only #or the most art true and $ith remisses o# the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same s irit, there#ore, should each ty e o# statement be received" #or it is the mark o# an educated man to look #or recision in each class o# thin!s 'ust so #ar as the nature o# the sub'ect admits" it is evidently equally #oolish to acce t robable reasonin! #rom a mathematician and to demand #rom a rhetorician scienti#ic roo#s. No$ each man 'ud!es $ell the thin!s he kno$s, and o# these he is a !ood 'ud!e. And so the man $ho has been educated in a sub'ect is a !ood 'ud!e o# that sub'ect, and the man $ho has received an all&round education is a !ood 'ud!e in !eneral. 3ence a youn! man is not a ro er hearer o# lectures on olitical science" #or he is ine2 erienced in the actions that occur in li#e, but its discussions start #rom these and are about these" and, #urther, since he tends to #ollo$ his assions, his study $ill be vain and un ro#itable, because the end aimed at is not kno$led!e but action. And it makes no di##erence $hether he is youn! in years or youth#ul in character" the de#ect does not de end on time, but on his livin!, and ursuin! each successive ob'ect, as assion directs. .or to such ersons, as to the incontinent, kno$led!e brin!s no ro#it" but to those $ho desire and act in accordance $ith a rational rinci le kno$led!e about such matters $ill be o# !reat bene#it. /hese remarks about the student, the sort o# treatment to be e2 ected, and the ur ose o# the inquiry, may be taken as our re#ace. 4 5et us resume our inquiry and state, in vie$ o# the #act that all kno$led!e and every ursuit aims at some !ood, $hat it is that $e say olitical science aims at and $hat is the hi!hest o# all !oods achievable by action. 6erbally there is very !eneral a!reement" #or both the !eneral run o# men and eo le o# su erior re#inement say that it is ha iness, and identi#y livin! $ell and doin! $ell $ith bein! ha y" but $ith re!ard to $hat ha iness is they di##er, and the many do not !ive the same account as the $ise. .or the #ormer think it is some lain and obvious thin!, like leasure, $ealth, or honour" they di##er, ho$ever, #rom one another % and o#ten even the same man identi#ies it $ith di##erent thin!s, $ith health $hen he is ill, $ith $ealth $hen he is oor" but, conscious o# their i!norance, they admire those $ho roclaim some !reat ideal that is above their com rehension. No$ some thou!ht that a art #rom these many !oods there is another $hich is sel#&subsistent and causes the !oodness o# all these as $ell. /o e2amine all the o inions that have been held $ere erha s some$hat #ruitless" enou!h to e2amine those that are most revalent or that seem to be ar!uable. 5et us not #ail to notice, ho$ever, that there is a di##erence bet$een ar!uments #rom and those to the #irst rinci les. .or 7lato, too, $as ri!ht in raisin! this question and askin!, as he used to do, 8are $e on the $ay #rom or to the #irst rinci les+9 /here is a di##erence, as there is in a race& course bet$een the course #rom the 'ud!es to the turnin!& oint and the $ay back. .or, $hile $e (

must be!in $ith $hat is kno$n, thin!s are ob'ects o# kno$led!e in t$o senses % some to us, some $ithout quali#ication. 7resumably, then, $e must be!in $ith thin!s kno$n to us. 3ence any one $ho is to listen intelli!ently to lectures about $hat is noble and 'ust, and !enerally, about the sub'ects o# olitical science must have been brou!ht u in !ood habits. .or the #act is the startin!& oint, and i# this is su##iciently lain to him, he $ill not at the start need the reason as $ell" and the man $ho has been $ell brou!ht u has or can easily !et startin! oints. And as #or him $ho neither has nor can !et them, let him hear the $ords o# 3esiod: .ar best is he $ho kno$s all thin!s himsel#" ;ood, he that hearkens $hen men counsel ri!ht" But he $ho neither kno$s, nor lays to heart Another9s $isdom, is a useless $i!ht. < 5et us, ho$ever, resume our discussion #rom the oint at $hich $e di!ressed. /o 'ud!e #rom the lives that men lead, most men, and men o# the most vul!ar ty e, seem )not $ithout some !round* to identi#y the !ood, or ha iness, $ith leasure" $hich is the reason $hy they love the li#e o# en'oyment. .or there are, $e may say, three rominent ty es o# li#e % that 'ust mentioned, the olitical, and thirdly the contem lative li#e. No$ the mass o# mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, re#errin! a li#e suitable to beasts, but they !et some !round #or their vie$ #rom the #act that many o# those in hi!h laces share the tastes o# ,ardana allus. A consideration o# the rominent ty es o# li#e sho$s that eo le o# su erior re#inement and o# active dis osition identi#y ha iness $ith honour" #or this is, rou!hly s eakin!, the end o# the olitical li#e. But it seems too su er#icial to be $hat $e are lookin! #or, since it is thou!ht to de end on those $ho besto$ honour rather than on him $ho receives it, but the !ood $e divine to be somethin! ro er to a man and not easily taken #rom him. .urther, men seem to ursue honour in order that they may be assured o# their !oodness" at least it is by men o# ractical $isdom that they seek to be honoured, and amon! those $ho kno$ them, and on the !round o# their virtue" clearly, then, accordin! to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And erha s one mi!ht even su ose this to be, rather than honour, the end o# the olitical li#e. But even this a ears some$hat incom lete" #or ossession o# virtue seems actually com atible $ith bein! aslee , or $ith li#elon! inactivity, and, #urther, $ith the !reatest su##erin!s and mis#ortunes" but a man $ho $as livin! so no one $ould call ha y, unless he $ere maintainin! a thesis at all costs. But enou!h o# this" #or the sub'ect has been su##iciently treated even in the current discussions. /hird comes the contem lative li#e, $hich $e shall consider later. /he li#e o# money&makin! is one undertaken under com ulsion, and $ealth is evidently not the !ood $e are seekin!" #or it is merely use#ul and #or the sake o# somethin! else. And so one mi!ht rather take the a#orenamed ob'ects to be ends" #or they are loved #or themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends" yet many ar!uments have been thro$n a$ay in su ort o# them. 5et us leave this sub'ect, then. = We had erha s better consider the universal !ood and discuss thorou!hly $hat is meant by it, althou!h such an inquiry is made an u hill one by the #act that the .orms have been introduced by #riends o# our o$n. >et it $ould erha s be thou!ht to be better, indeed to be our duty, #or the sake o# maintainin! the truth even to destroy $hat touches us closely, es ecially as $e are 0

hiloso hers or lovers o# $isdom" #or, $hile both are dear, iety requires us to honour truth above our #riends. /he men $ho introduced this doctrine did not osit Ideas o# classes $ithin $hich they reco!ni-ed riority and osteriority )$hich is the reason $hy they did not maintain the e2istence o# an Idea embracin! all numbers*" but the term 8!ood9 is used both in the cate!ory o# substance and in that o# quality and in that o# relation, and that $hich is er se, i.e. substance, is rior in nature to the relative )#or the latter is like an o## shoot and accident o# bein!*" so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these !oods. .urther, since 8!ood9 has as many senses as 8bein!9 )#or it is redicated both in the cate!ory o# substance, as o# ;od and o# reason, and in quality, i.e. o# the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. o# that $hich is moderate, and in relation, i.e. o# the use#ul, and in time, i.e. o# the ri!ht o ortunity, and in lace, i.e. o# the ri!ht locality and the like*, clearly it cannot be somethin! universally resent in all cases and sin!le" #or then it could not have been redicated in all the cate!ories but in one only. .urther, since o# the thin!s ans$erin! to one Idea there is one science, there $ould have been one science o# all the !oods" but as it is there are many sciences even o# the thin!s that #all under one cate!ory, e.!. o# o ortunity, #or o ortunity in $ar is studied by strate!ics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in #ood is studied by medicine and in e2ercise by the science o# !ymnastics. And one mi!ht ask the question, $hat in the $orld they mean by 8a thin! itsel#9, is )as is the case* in 8man himsel#9 and in a articular man the account o# man is one and the same. .or in so #ar as they are man, they $ill in no res ect di##er" and i# this is so, neither $ill 8!ood itsel#9 and articular !oods, in so #ar as they are !ood. But a!ain it $ill not be !ood any the more #or bein! eternal, since that $hich lasts lon! is no $hiter than that $hich erishes in a day. /he 7ytha!oreans seem to !ive a more lausible account o# the !ood, $hen they lace the one in the column o# !oods" and it is they that , eusi us seems to have #ollo$ed. But let us discuss these matters else$here" an ob'ection to $hat $e have said, ho$ever, may be discerned in the #act that the 7latonists have not been s eakin! about all !oods, and that the !oods that are ursued and loved #or themselves are called !ood by re#erence to a sin!le .orm, $hile those $hich tend to roduce or to reserve these someho$ or to revent their contraries are called so by re#erence to these, and in a secondary sense. ?learly, then, !oods must be s oken o# in t$o $ays, and some must be !ood in themselves, the others by reason o# these. 5et us se arate, then, thin!s !ood in themselves #rom thin!s use#ul, and consider $hether the #ormer are called !ood by re#erence to a sin!le Idea. What sort o# !oods $ould one call !ood in themselves+ Is it those that are ursued even $hen isolated #rom others, such as intelli!ence, si!ht, and certain leasures and honours+ ?ertainly, i# $e ursue these also #or the sake o# somethin! else, yet one $ould lace them amon! thin!s !ood in themselves. 1r is nothin! other than the Idea o# !ood !ood in itsel#+ In that case the .orm $ill be em ty. But i# the thin!s $e have named are also thin!s !ood in themselves, the account o# the !ood $ill have to a ear as somethin! identical in them all, as that o# $hiteness is identical in sno$ and in $hite lead. But o# honour, $isdom, and leasure, 'ust in res ect o# their !oodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. /he !ood, there#ore, is not some common element ans$erin! to one Idea. But $hat then do $e mean by the !ood+ It is surely not like the thin!s that only chance to have the same name. Are !oods one, then, by bein! derived #rom one !ood or by all contributin! to one !ood, or are they rather one by analo!y+ ?ertainly as si!ht is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But erha s these sub'ects had better be dismissed #or the resent" #or er#ect recision about them $ould be more a ro riate to another branch o# hiloso hy. And similarly $ith re!ard to the Idea" even i# there is some one !ood $hich is universally redicable o# !oods or is ca able o# se arate and inde endent e2istence, clearly it could not be achieved or 4

attained by man" but $e are no$ seekin! somethin! attainable. 7erha s, ho$ever, some one mi!ht think it $orth $hile to reco!ni-e this $ith a vie$ to the !oods that are attainable and achievable" #or havin! this as a sort o# attern $e shall kno$ better the !oods that are !ood #or us, and i# $e kno$ them shall attain them. /his ar!ument has some lausibility, but seems to clash $ith the rocedure o# the sciences" #or all o# these, thou!h they aim at some !ood and seek to su ly the de#iciency o# it, leave on one side the kno$led!e o# the !ood. >et that all the e2 onents o# the arts should be i!norant o#, and should not even seek, so !reat an aid is not robable. It is hard, too, to see ho$ a $eaver or a car enter $ill be bene#ited in re!ard to his o$n cra#t by kno$in! this 8!ood itsel#9, or ho$ the man $ho has vie$ed the Idea itsel# $ill be a better doctor or !eneral thereby. .or a doctor seems not even to study health in this $ay, but the health o# man, or erha s rather the health o# a articular man" it is individuals that he is healin!. But enou!h o# these to ics. @ 5et us a!ain return to the !ood $e are seekin!, and ask $hat it can be. It seems di##erent in di##erent actions and arts" it is di##erent in medicine, in strate!y, and in the other arts like$ise. What then is the !ood o# each+ ,urely that #or $hose sake everythin! else is done. In medicine this is health, in strate!y victory, in architecture a house, in any other s here somethin! else, and in every action and ursuit the end" #or it is #or the sake o# this that all men do $hatever else they do. /here#ore, i# there is an end #or all that $e do, this $ill be the !ood achievable by action, and i# there are more than one, these $ill be the !oods achievable by action. ,o the ar!ument has by a di##erent course reached the same oint" but $e must try to state this even more clearly. ,ince there are evidently more than one end, and $e choose some o# these )e.!. $ealth, #lutes, and in !eneral instruments* #or the sake o# somethin! else, clearly not all ends are #inal ends" but the chie# !ood is evidently somethin! #inal. /here#ore, i# there is only one #inal end, this $ill be $hat $e are seekin!, and i# there are more than one, the most #inal o# these $ill be $hat $e are seekin!. No$ $e call that $hich is in itsel# $orthy o# ursuit more #inal than that $hich is $orthy o# ursuit #or the sake o# somethin! else, and that $hich is never desirable #or the sake o# somethin! else more #inal than the thin!s that are desirable both in themselves and #or the sake o# that other thin!, and there#ore $e call #inal $ithout quali#ication that $hich is al$ays desirable in itsel# and never #or the sake o# somethin! else. No$ such a thin! ha iness, above all else, is held to be" #or this $e choose al$ays #or sel# and never #or the sake o# somethin! else, but honour, leasure, reason, and every virtue $e choose indeed #or themselves )#or i# nothin! resulted #rom them $e should still choose each o# them*, but $e choose them also #or the sake o# ha iness, 'ud!in! that by means o# them $e shall be ha y. 3a iness, on the other hand, no one chooses #or the sake o# these, nor, in !eneral, #or anythin! other than itsel#. .rom the oint o# vie$ o# sel#&su##iciency the same result seems to #ollo$" #or the #inal !ood is thou!ht to be sel#&su##icient. No$ by sel#&su##icient $e do not mean that $hich is su##icient #or a man by himsel#, #or one $ho lives a solitary li#e, but also #or arents, children, $i#e, and in !eneral #or his #riends and #ello$ citi-ens, since man is born #or citi-enshi . But some limit must be set to this" #or i# $e e2tend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and #riends9 #riends $e are in #or an in#inite series. 5et us e2amine this question, ho$ever, on another occasion" the sel#&su##icient $e no$ de#ine as that $hich $hen isolated makes li#e desirable and lackin! in nothin!" and such $e think ha iness to be" and #urther $e think it most desirable o# all thin!s, $ithout bein! counted as one !ood thin! amon! others % i# it $ere so counted it $ould clearly be <

made more desirable by the addition o# even the least o# !oods" #or that $hich is added becomes an e2cess o# !oods, and o# !oods the !reater is al$ays more desirable. 3a iness, then, is somethin! #inal and sel#&su##icient, and is the end o# action. 7resumably, ho$ever, to say that ha iness is the chie# !ood seems a latitude, and a clearer account o# $hat it is still desired. /his mi!ht erha s be !iven, i# $e could #irst ascertain the #unction o# man. .or 'ust as #or a #lute& layer, a scul tor, or an artist, and, in !eneral, #or all thin!s that have a #unction or activity, the !ood and the 8$ell9 is thou!ht to reside in the #unction, so $ould it seem to be #or man, i# he has a #unction. 3ave the car enter, then, and the tanner certain #unctions or activities, and has man none+ Is he born $ithout a #unction+ 1r as eye, hand, #oot, and in !eneral each o# the arts evidently has a #unction, may one lay it do$n that man similarly has a #unction a art #rom all these+ What then can this be+ 5i#e seems to be common even to lants, but $e are seekin! $hat is eculiar to man. 5et us e2clude, there#ore, the li#e o# nutrition and !ro$th. Ne2t there $ould be a li#e o# erce tion, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the o2, and every animal. /here remains, then, an active li#e o# the element that has a rational rinci le" o# this, one art has such a rinci le in the sense o# bein! obedient to one, the other in the sense o# ossessin! one and e2ercisin! thou!ht. And, as 8li#e o# the rational element9 also has t$o meanin!s, $e must state that li#e in the sense o# activity is $hat $e mean" #or this seems to be the more ro er sense o# the term. No$ i# the #unction o# man is an activity o# soul $hich #ollo$s or im lies a rational rinci le, and i# $e say 8so&and&so&and 8a !ood so& and&so9 have a #unction $hich is the same in kind, e.!. a lyre, and a !ood lyre& layer, and so $ithout quali#ication in all cases, eminence in res ect o# !oodness bein! idded to the name o# the #unction )#or the #unction o# a lyre& layer is to lay the lyre, and that o# a !ood lyre& layer is to do so $ell*: i# this is the case, and $e state the #unction o# man to be a certain kind o# li#e, and this to be an activity or actions o# the soul im lyin! a rational rinci le, and the #unction o# a !ood man to be the !ood and noble er#ormance o# these, and i# any action is $ell er#ormed $hen it is er#ormed in accordance $ith the a ro riate e2cellence: i# this is the case, human !ood turns out to be activity o# soul in accordance $ith virtue, and i# there are more than one virtue, in accordance $ith the best and most com lete. But $e must add 8in a com lete li#e.9 .or one s$allo$ does not make a summer, nor does one day" and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and ha y. 5et this serve as an outline o# the !ood" #or $e must resumably #irst sketch it rou!hly, and then later #ill in the details. But it $ould seem that any one is ca able o# carryin! on and articulatin! $hat has once been $ell outlined, and that time is a !ood discoverer or artner in such a $ork" to $hich #acts the advances o# the arts are due" #or any one can add $hat is lackin!. And $e must also remember $hat has been said be#ore, and not look #or recision in all thin!s alike, but in each class o# thin!s such recision as accords $ith the sub'ect&matter, and so much as is a ro riate to the inquiry. .or a car enter and a !eometer investi!ate the ri!ht an!le in di##erent $ays" the #ormer does so in so #ar as the ri!ht an!le is use#ul #or his $ork, $hile the latter inquires $hat it is or $hat sort o# thin! it is" #or he is a s ectator o# the truth. We must act in the same $ay, then, in all other matters as $ell, that our main task may not be subordinated to minor questions. Nor must $e demand the cause in all matters alike" it is enou!h in some cases that the #act be $ell established, as in the case o# the #irst rinci les" the #act is the rimary thin! or #irst rinci le. No$ o# #irst rinci les $e see some by induction, some by erce tion, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other $ays. But each set o# rinci les $e must try to investi!ate in the natural $ay, and $e must take ains to state them de#initely, since they have a !reat in#luence on $hat #ollo$s. .or the be!innin! is thou!ht to be more than hal# o# the $hole, and many o# the questions $e ask are cleared u by it. =

A We must consider it, ho$ever, in the li!ht not only o# our conclusion and our remisses, but also o# $hat is commonly said about it" #or $ith a true vie$ all the data harmoni-e, but $ith a #alse one the #acts soon clash. No$ !oods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as e2ternal, others as relatin! to soul or to body" $e call those that relate to soul most ro erly and truly !oods, and sychical actions and activities $e class as relatin! to soul. /here#ore our account must be sound, at least accordin! to this vie$, $hich is an old one and a!reed on by hiloso hers. It is correct also in that $e identi#y the end $ith certain actions and activities" #or thus it #alls amon! !oods o# the soul and not amon! e2ternal !oods. Another belie# $hich harmoni-es $ith our account is that the ha y man lives $ell and does $ell" #or $e have ractically de#ined ha iness as a sort o# !ood li#e and !ood action. /he characteristics that are looked #or in ha iness seem also, all o# them, to belon! to $hat $e have de#ined ha iness as bein!. .or some identi#y ha iness $ith virtue, some $ith ractical $isdom, others $ith a kind o# hiloso hic $isdom, others $ith these, or one o# these, accom anied by leasure or not $ithout leasure" $hile others include also e2ternal ros erity. No$ some o# these vie$s have been held by many men and men o# old, others by a #e$ eminent ersons" and it is not robable that either o# these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be ri!ht in at least some one res ect or even in most res ects. With those $ho identi#y ha iness $ith virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony" #or to virtue belon!s virtuous activity. But it makes, erha s, no small di##erence $hether $e lace the chie# !ood in ossession or in use, in state o# mind or in activity. .or the state o# mind may e2ist $ithout roducin! any !ood result, as in a man $ho is aslee or in some other $ay quite inactive, but the activity cannot" #or one $ho has the activity $ill o# necessity be actin!, and actin! $ell. And as in the 1lym ic ;ames it is not the most beauti#ul and the stron!est that are cro$ned but those $ho com ete )#or it is some o# these that are victorious*, so those $ho act $in, and ri!htly $in, the noble and !ood thin!s in li#e. /heir li#e is also in itsel# leasant. .or leasure is a state o# soul, and to each man that $hich he is said to be a lover o# is leasant" e.!. not only is a horse leasant to the lover o# horses, and a s ectacle to the lover o# si!hts, but also in the same $ay 'ust acts are leasant to the lover o# 'ustice and in !eneral virtuous acts to the lover o# virtue. No$ #or most men their leasures are in con#lict $ith one another because these are not by nature leasant, but the lovers o# $hat is noble #ind leasant the thin!s that are by nature leasant" and virtuous actions are such, so that these are leasant #or such men as $ell as in their o$n nature. /heir li#e, there#ore, has no #urther need o# leasure as a sort o# adventitious charm, but has its leasure in itsel#. .or, besides $hat $e have said, the man $ho does not re'oice in noble actions is not even !ood" since no one $ould call a man 'ust $ho did not en'oy actin! 'ustly, nor any man liberal $ho did not en'oy liberal actions" and similarly in all other cases. I# this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves leasant. But they are also !ood and noble, and have each o# these attributes in the hi!hest de!ree, since the !ood man 'ud!es $ell about these attributes" his 'ud!ement is such as $e have described. 3a iness then is the best, noblest, and most leasant thin! in the $orld, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscri tion at Delos: Bost noble is that $hich is 'ustest, and best is health" But leasantest is it to $in $hat $e love. .or all these ro erties belon! to the best activities" and these, or one % the best % o# these, $e identi#y $ith ha iness. @

>et evidently, as $e said, it needs the e2ternal !oods as $ell" #or it is im ossible, or not easy, to do noble acts $ithout the ro er equi ment. In many actions $e use #riends and riches and olitical o$er as instruments" and there are some thin!s the lack o# $hich takes the lustre #rom ha iness, as !ood birth, !oodly children, beauty" #or the man $ho is very u!ly in a earance or ill&born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be ha y, and erha s a man $ould be still less likely i# he had thorou!hly bad children or #riends or had lost !ood children or #riends by death. As $e said, then, ha iness seems to need this sort o# ros erity in addition" #or $hich reason some identi#y ha iness $ith !ood #ortune, thou!h others identi#y it $ith virtue. C .or this reason also the question is asked, $hether ha iness is to be acquired by learnin! or by habituation or some other sort o# trainin!, or comes in virtue o# some divine rovidence or a!ain by chance. No$ i# there is any !i#t o# the !ods to men, it is reasonable that ha iness should be !od&!iven, and most surely !od&!iven o# all human thin!s inasmuch as it is the best. But this question $ould erha s be more a ro riate to another inquiry" ha iness seems, ho$ever, even i# it is not !od&sent but comes as a result o# virtue and some rocess o# learnin! or trainin!, to be amon! the most !odlike thin!s" #or that $hich is the ri-e and end o# virtue seems to be the best thin! in the $orld, and somethin! !odlike and blessed. It $ill also on this vie$ be very !enerally shared" #or all $ho are not maimed as re!ards their otentiality #or virtue may $in it by a certain kind o# study and care. But i# it is better to be ha y thus than by chance, it is reasonable that the #acts should be so, since everythin! that de ends on the action o# nature is by nature as !ood as it can be, and similarly everythin! that de ends on art or any rational cause, and es ecially i# it de ends on the best o# all causes. /o entrust to chance $hat is !reatest and most noble $ould be a very de#ective arran!ement. /he ans$er to the question $e are askin! is lain also #rom the de#inition o# ha iness" #or it has been said to be a virtuous activity o# soul, o# a certain kind. 1# the remainin! !oods, some must necessarily re&e2ist as conditions o# ha iness, and others are naturally co&o erative and use#ul as instruments. And this $ill be #ound to a!ree $ith $hat $e said at the outset" #or $e stated the end o# olitical science to be the best end, and olitical science s ends most o# its ains on makin! the citi-ens to be o# a certain character, vi-. !ood and ca able o# noble acts. It is natural, then, that $e call neither o2 nor horse nor any other o# the animals ha y" #or none o# them is ca able o# sharin! in such activity. .or this reason also a boy is not ha y" #or he is not yet ca able o# such acts, o$in! to his a!e" and boys $ho are called ha y are bein! con!ratulated by reason o# the ho es $e have #or them. .or there is required, as $e said, not only com lete virtue but also a com lete li#e, since many chan!es occur in li#e, and all manner o# chances, and the most ros erous may #all into !reat mis#ortunes in old a!e, as is told o# 7riam in the /ro'an ?ycle" and one $ho has e2 erienced such chances and has ended $retchedly no one calls ha y. 1D Bust no one at all, then, be called ha y $hile he lives" must $e, as ,olon says, see the end+ Even i# $e are to lay do$n this doctrine, is it also the case that a man is ha y $hen he is dead+ 1r is not this quite absurd, es ecially #or us $ho say that ha iness is an activity+ But i# $e do not call the dead man ha y, and i# ,olon does not mean this, but that one can then sa#ely call a man blessed as bein! at last beyond evils and mis#ortunes, this also a##ords matter #or discussion" #or both evil and !ood are thou!ht to e2ist #or a dead man, as much as #or one $ho is alive but not A

a$are o# them" e.!. honours and dishonours and the !ood or bad #ortunes o# children and in !eneral o# descendants. And this also resents a roblem" #or thou!h a man has lived ha ily u to old a!e and has had a death $orthy o# his li#e, many reverses may be#all his descendants % some o# them may be !ood and attain the li#e they deserve, $hile $ith others the o osite may be the case" and clearly too the de!rees o# relationshi bet$een them and their ancestors may vary inde#initely. It $ould be odd, then, i# the dead man $ere to share in these chan!es and become at one time ha y, at another $retched" $hile it $ould also be odd i# the #ortunes o# the descendants did not #or some time have some e##ect on the ha iness o# their ancestors. But $e must return to our #irst di##iculty" #or erha s by a consideration o# it our resent roblem mi!ht be solved. No$ i# $e must see the end and only then call a man ha y, not as bein! ha y but as havin! been so be#ore, surely this is a arado2, that $hen he is ha y the attribute that belon!s to him is not to be truly redicated o# him because $e do not $ish to call livin! men ha y, on account o# the chan!es that may be#all them, and because $e have assumed ha iness to be somethin! ermanent and by no means easily chan!ed, $hile a sin!le man may su##er many turns o# #ortune9s $heel. .or clearly i# $e $ere to kee ace $ith his #ortunes, $e should o#ten call the same man ha y and a!ain $retched, makin! the ha y man out to be chameleon and insecurely based. 1r is this kee in! ace $ith his #ortunes quite $ron!+ ,uccess or #ailure in li#e does not de end on these, but human li#e, as $e said, needs these as mere additions, $hile virtuous activities or their o osites are $hat constitute ha iness or the reverse. /he question $e have no$ discussed con#irms our de#inition. .or no #unction o# man has so much ermanence as virtuous activities )these are thou!ht to be more durable even than kno$led!e o# the sciences*, and o# these themselves the most valuable are more durable because those $ho are ha y s end their li#e most readily and most continuously in these" #or this seems to be the reason $hy $e do not #or!et them. /he attribute in question, then, $ill belon! to the ha y man, and he $ill be ha y throu!hout his li#e" #or al$ays, or by re#erence to everythin! else, he $ill be en!a!ed in virtuous action and contem lation, and he $ill bear the chances o# li#e most nobly and alto!ether decorously, i# he is 8truly !ood9 and 8#oursquare beyond re roach9. No$ many events ha en by chance, and events di##erin! in im ortance" small ieces o# !ood #ortune or o# its o osite clearly do not $ei!h do$n the scales o# li#e one $ay or the other, but a multitude o# !reat events i# they turn out $ell $ill make li#e ha ier )#or not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to li#e, but the $ay a man deals $ith them may be noble and !ood*, $hile i# they turn out ill they crush and maim ha iness" #or they both brin! ain $ith them and hinder many activities. >et even in these nobility shines throu!h, $hen a man bears $ith resi!nation many !reat mis#ortunes, not throu!h insensibility to ain but throu!h nobility and !reatness o# soul. I# activities are, as $e said, $hat !ives li#e its character, no ha y man can become miserable" #or he $ill never do the acts that are hate#ul and mean. .or the man $ho is truly !ood and $ise, $e think, bears all the chances li#e becomin!ly and al$ays makes the best o# circumstances, as a !ood !eneral makes the best military use o# the army at his command and a !ood shoemaker makes the best shoes out o# the hides that are !iven him" and so $ith all other cra#tsmen. And i# this is the case, the ha y man can never become miserable" thou!h he $ill not reach blessedness, i# he meet $ith #ortunes like those o# 7riam. Nor, a!ain, is he many&coloured and chan!eable" #or neither $ill he be moved #rom his ha y state easily or by any ordinary misadventures, but only by many !reat ones, nor, i# he has had many !reat misadventures, $ill he recover his ha iness in a short time, but i# at all, only in a lon! and com lete one in $hich he has attained many s lendid successes.

When then should $e not say that he is ha y $ho is active in accordance $ith com lete virtue and is su##iciently equi ed $ith e2ternal !oods, not #or some chance eriod but throu!hout a com lete li#e+ 1r must $e add 8and $ho is destined to live thus and die as be#its his li#e9+ ?ertainly the #uture is obscure to us, $hile ha iness, $e claim, is an end and somethin! in every $ay #inal. I# so, $e shall call ha y those amon! livin! men in $hom these conditions are, and are to be, #ul#illed % but ha y men. ,o much #or these questions. 11 /hat the #ortunes o# descendants and o# all a man9s #riends should not a##ect his ha iness at all seems a very un#riendly doctrine, and one o osed to the o inions men hold" but since the events that ha en are numerous and admit o# all sorts o# di##erence, and some come more near to us and others less so, it seems a lon! % nay, an in#inite % task to discuss each in detail" a !eneral outline $ill erha s su##ice. I#, then, as some o# a man9s o$n misadventures have a certain $ei!ht and in#luence on li#e $hile others are, as it $ere, li!hter, so too there are di##erences amon! the misadventures o# our #riends taken as a $hole, and it makes a di##erence $hether the various su##erin! be#all the livin! or the dead )much more even than $hether la$less and terrible deeds are resu osed in a tra!edy or done on the sta!e*, this di##erence also must be taken into account" or rather, erha s, the #act that doubt is #elt $hether the dead share in any !ood or evil. .or it seems, #rom these considerations, that even i# anythin! $hether !ood or evil enetrates to them, it must be somethin! $eak and ne!li!ible, either in itsel# or #or them, or i# not, at least it must be such in de!ree and kind as not to make ha y those $ho are not ha y nor to take a$ay their blessedness #rom those $ho are. /he !ood or bad #ortunes o# #riends, then, seem to have some e##ects on the dead, but e##ects o# such a kind and de!ree as neither to make the ha y unha y nor to roduce any other chan!e o# the kind. 1( /hese questions havin! been de#initely ans$ered, let us consider $hether ha iness is amon! the thin!s that are raised or rather amon! the thin!s that are ri-ed" #or clearly it is not to be laced amon! otentialities. Everythin! that is raised seems to be raised because it is o# a certain kind and is related someho$ to somethin! else" #or $e raise the 'ust or brave man and in !eneral both the !ood man and virtue itsel# because o# the actions and #unctions involved, and $e raise the stron! man, the !ood runner, and so on, because he is o# a certain kind and is related in a certain $ay to somethin! !ood and im ortant. /his is clear also #rom the raises o# the !ods" #or it seems absurd that the !ods should be re#erred to our standard, but this is done because raise involves a re#erence, to somethin! else. But i# i# raise is #or thin!s such as $e have described, clearly $hat a lies to the best thin!s is not raise, but somethin! !reater and better, as is indeed obvious" #or $hat $e do to the !ods and the most !odlike o# men is to call them blessed and ha y. And so too $ith !ood thin!s" no one raises ha iness as he does 'ustice, but rather calls it blessed, as bein! somethin! more divine and better. Eudo2us also seems to have been ri!ht in his method o# advocatin! the su remacy o# leasure" he thou!ht that the #act that, thou!h a !ood, it is not raised indicated it to be better than the thin!s that are raised, and that this is $hat ;od and the !ood are" #or by re#erence to these all other thin!s are 'ud!ed. 7raise is a ro riate to virtue, #or as a result o# virtue men tend to do noble deeds, but encomia are besto$ed on acts, $hether o# the body or o# the soul. But erha s nicety in these matters is more ro er to those $ho have made a study o# encomia" to us it is clear #rom 1D

$hat has been said that ha iness is amon! the thin!s that are ri-ed and er#ect. It seems to be so also #rom the #act that it is a #irst rinci le" #or it is #or the sake o# this that $e all do all that $e do, and the #irst rinci le and cause o# !oods is, $e claim, somethin! ri-ed and divine. 10 ,ince ha iness is an activity o# soul in accordance $ith er#ect virtue, $e must consider the nature o# virtue" #or erha s $e shall thus see better the nature o# ha iness. /he true student o# olitics, too, is thou!ht to have studied virtue above all thin!s" #or he $ishes to make his #ello$ citi-ens !ood and obedient to the la$s. As an e2am le o# this $e have the la$!ivers o# the ?retans and the , artans, and any others o# the kind that there may have been. And i# this inquiry belon!s to olitical science, clearly the ursuit o# it $ill be in accordance $ith our ori!inal lan. But clearly the virtue $e must study is human virtue" #or the !ood $e $ere seekin! $as human !ood and the ha iness human ha iness. By human virtue $e mean not that o# the body but that o# the soul" and ha iness also $e call an activity o# soul. But i# this is so, clearly the student o# olitics must kno$ someho$ the #acts about soul, as the man $ho is to heal the eyes or the body as a $hole must kno$ about the eyes or the body" and all the more since olitics is more ri-ed and better than medicine" but even amon! doctors the best educated s end much labour on acquirin! kno$led!e o# the body. /he student o# olitics, then, must study the soul, and must study it $ith these ob'ects in vie$, and do so 'ust to the e2tent $hich is su##icient #or the questions $e are discussin!" #or #urther recision is erha s somethin! more laborious than our ur oses require. ,ome thin!s are said about it, adequately enou!h, even in the discussions outside our school, and $e must use these" e.!. that one element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational rinci le. Whether these are se arated as the arts o# the body or o# anythin! divisible are, or are distinct by de#inition but by nature inse arable, like conve2 and concave in the circum#erence o# a circle, does not a##ect the resent question. 1# the irrational element one division seems to be $idely distributed, and ve!etative in its nature, I mean that $hich causes nutrition and !ro$th" #or it is this kind o# o$er o# the soul that one must assi!n to all nurslin!s and to embryos, and this same o$er to #ull!ro$n creatures" this is more reasonable than to assi!n some di##erent o$er to them. No$ the e2cellence o# this seems to be common to all s ecies and not s eci#ically human" #or this art or #aculty seems to #unction most in slee , $hile !oodness and badness are least mani#est in slee )$hence comes the sayin! that the ha y are not better o## than the $retched #or hal# their lives" and this ha ens naturally enou!h, since slee is an inactivity o# the soul in that res ect in $hich it is called !ood or bad*, unless erha s to a small e2tent some o# the movements actually enetrate to the soul, and in this res ect the dreams o# !ood men are better than those o# ordinary eo le. Enou!h o# this sub'ect, ho$ever" let us leave the nutritive #aculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in human e2cellence. /here seems to be also another irrational element in the soul&one $hich in a sense, ho$ever, shares in a rational rinci le. .or $e raise the rational rinci le o# the continent man and o# the incontinent, and the art o# their soul that has such a rinci le, since it ur!es them ari!ht and to$ards the best ob'ects" but there is #ound in them also another element naturally o osed to the rational rinci le, $hich #i!hts a!ainst and resists that rinci le. .or e2actly as aralysed limbs $hen $e intend to move them to the ri!ht turn on the contrary to the le#t, so is it $ith the soul" the im ulses o# incontinent eo le move in contrary directions. But $hile in the body $e see that $hich moves astray, in the soul $e do not. No doubt, ho$ever, $e must none the less su ose 11

that in the soul too there is somethin! contrary to the rational rinci le, resistin! and o osin! it. In $hat sense it is distinct #rom the other elements does not concern us. No$ even this seems to have a share in a rational rinci le, as $e said" at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational rinci le and resumably in the tem erate and brave man it is still more obedient" #or in him it s eaks, on all matters, $ith the same voice as the rational rinci le. /here#ore the irrational element also a ears to be t$o&#old. .or the ve!etative element in no $ay shares in a rational rinci le, but the a etitive and in !eneral the desirin! element in a sense shares in it, in so #ar as it listens to and obeys it" this is the sense in $hich $e s eak o# 8takin! account9 o# one9s #ather or one9s #riends, not that in $hich $e s eak o# 8accountin! #or a mathematical ro erty. /hat the irrational element is in some sense ersuaded by a rational rinci le is indicated also by the !ivin! o# advice and by all re roo# and e2hortation. And i# this element also must be said to have a rational rinci le, that $hich has a rational rinci le )as $ell as that $hich has not* $ill be t$o#old, one subdivision havin! it in the strict sense and in itsel#, and the other havin! a tendency to obey as one does one9s #ather. 6irtue too is distin!uished into kinds in accordance $ith this di##erence" #or $e say that some o# the virtues are intellectual and others moral, hiloso hic $isdom and understandin! and ractical $isdom bein! intellectual, liberality and tem erance moral. .or in s eakin! about a man9s character $e do not say that he is $ise or has understandin! but that he is !ood&tem ered or tem erate" yet $e raise the $ise man also $ith res ect to his state o# mind" and o# states o# mind $e call those $hich merit raise virtues.

Book II 1 6irtue, then, bein! o# t$o kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main o$es both its birth and its !ro$th to teachin! )#or $hich reason it requires e2 erience and time*, $hile moral virtue comes about as a result o# habit, $hence also its name )ethike* is one that is #ormed by a sli!ht variation #rom the $ord ethos )habit*. .rom this it is also lain that none o# the moral virtues arises in us by nature" #or nothin! that e2ists by nature can #orm a habit contrary to its nature. .or instance the stone $hich by nature moves do$n$ards cannot be habituated to move u $ards, not even i# one tries to train it by thro$in! it u ten thousand times" nor can #ire be habituated to move do$n$ards, nor can anythin! else that by nature behaves in one $ay be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us" rather $e are ada ted by nature to receive them, and are made er#ect by habit. A!ain, o# all the thin!s that come to us by nature $e #irst acquire the otentiality and later e2hibit the activity )this is lain in the case o# the senses" #or it $as not by o#ten seein! or o#ten hearin! that $e !ot these senses, but on the contrary $e had them be#ore $e used them, and did not come to have them by usin! them*" but the virtues $e !et by #irst e2ercisin! them, as also ha ens in the case o# the arts as $ell. .or the thin!s $e have to learn be#ore $e can do them, $e learn by doin! them, e.!. men become builders by buildin! and lyre layers by layin! the lyre" so too $e become 'ust by doin! 'ust acts, tem erate by doin! tem erate acts, brave by doin! brave acts. /his is con#irmed by $hat ha ens in states" #or le!islators make the citi-ens !ood by #ormin! habits in them, and this is the $ish o# every le!islator, and those $ho do not e##ect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a !ood constitution di##ers #rom a bad one. 1(

A!ain, it is #rom the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both roduced and destroyed, and similarly every art" #or it is #rom layin! the lyre that both !ood and bad lyre& layers are roduced. And the corres ondin! statement is true o# builders and o# all the rest" men $ill be !ood or bad builders as a result o# buildin! $ell or badly. .or i# this $ere not so, there $ould have been no need o# a teacher, but all men $ould have been born !ood or bad at their cra#t. /his, then, is the case $ith the virtues also" by doin! the acts that $e do in our transactions $ith other men $e become 'ust or un'ust, and by doin! the acts that $e do in the resence o# dan!er, and bein! habituated to #eel #ear or con#idence, $e become brave or co$ardly. /he same is true o# a etites and #eelin!s o# an!er" some men become tem erate and !ood&tem ered, others sel#&indul!ent and irascible, by behavin! in one $ay or the other in the a ro riate circumstances. /hus, in one $ord, states o# character arise out o# like activities. /his is $hy the activities $e e2hibit must be o# a certain kind" it is because the states o# character corres ond to the di##erences bet$een these. It makes no small di##erence, then, $hether $e #orm habits o# one kind or o# another #rom our very youth" it makes a very !reat di##erence, or rather all the di##erence. ( ,ince, then, the resent inquiry does not aim at theoretical kno$led!e like the others )#or $e are inquirin! not in order to kno$ $hat virtue is, but in order to become !ood, since other$ise our inquiry $ould have been o# no use*, $e must e2amine the nature o# actions, namely ho$ $e ou!ht to do them" #or these determine also the nature o# the states o# character that are roduced, as $e have said. No$, that $e must act accordin! to the ri!ht rule is a common rinci le and must be assumed % it $ill be discussed later, i.e. both $hat the ri!ht rule is, and ho$ it is related to the other virtues. But this must be a!reed u on be#orehand, that the $hole account o# matters o# conduct must be !iven in outline and not recisely, as $e said at the very be!innin! that the accounts $e demand must be in accordance $ith the sub'ect&matter" matters concerned $ith conduct and questions o# $hat is !ood #or us have no #i2ity, any more than matters o# health. /he !eneral account bein! o# this nature, the account o# articular cases is yet more lackin! in e2actness" #or they do not #all under any art or rece t but the a!ents themselves must in each case consider $hat is a ro riate to the occasion, as ha ens also in the art o# medicine or o# navi!ation. But thou!h our resent account is o# this nature $e must !ive $hat hel $e can. .irst, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature o# such thin!s to be destroyed by de#ect and e2cess, as $e see in the case o# stren!th and o# health )#or to !ain li!ht on thin!s im erce tible $e must use the evidence o# sensible thin!s*" both e2cessive and de#ective e2ercise destroys the stren!th, and similarly drink or #ood $hich is above or belo$ a certain amount destroys the health, $hile that $hich is ro ortionate both roduces and increases and reserves it. ,o too is it, then, in the case o# tem erance and coura!e and the other virtues. .or the man $ho #lies #rom and #ears everythin! and does not stand his !round a!ainst anythin! becomes a co$ard, and the man $ho #ears nothin! at all but !oes to meet every dan!er becomes rash" and similarly the man $ho indul!es in every leasure and abstains #rom none becomes sel#&indul!ent, $hile the man $ho shuns every leasure, as boors do, becomes in a $ay insensible" tem erance and coura!e, then, are destroyed by e2cess and de#ect, and reserved by the mean. But not only are the sources and causes o# their ori!ination and !ro$th the same as those o# their destruction, but also the s here o# their actuali-ation $ill be the same" #or this is also true o# the thin!s $hich are more evident to sense, e.!. o# stren!th" it is roduced by takin! much #ood and 10

under!oin! much e2ertion, and it is the stron! man that $ill be most able to do these thin!s. ,o too is it $ith the virtues" by abstainin! #rom leasures $e become tem erate, and it is $hen $e have become so that $e are most able to abstain #rom them" and similarly too in the case o# coura!e" #or by bein! habituated to des ise thin!s that are terrible and to stand our !round a!ainst them $e become brave, and it is $hen $e have become so that $e shall be most able to stand our !round a!ainst them. 0 We must take as a si!n o# states o# character the leasure or ain that ensues on acts" #or the man $ho abstains #rom bodily leasures and deli!hts in this very #act is tem erate, $hile the man $ho is annoyed at it is sel#&indul!ent, and he $ho stands his !round a!ainst thin!s that are terrible and deli!hts in this or at least is not ained is brave, $hile the man $ho is ained is a co$ard. .or moral e2cellence is concerned $ith leasures and ains" it is on account o# the leasure that $e do bad thin!s, and on account o# the ain that $e abstain #rom noble ones. 3ence $e ou!ht to have been brou!ht u in a articular $ay #rom our very youth, as 7lato says, so as both to deli!ht in and to be ained by the thin!s that $e ou!ht" #or this is the ri!ht education. A!ain, i# the virtues are concerned $ith actions and assions, and every assion and every action is accom anied by leasure and ain, #or this reason also virtue $ill be concerned $ith leasures and ains. /his is indicated also by the #act that unishment is in#licted by these means" #or it is a kind o# cure, and it is the nature o# cures to be e##ected by contraries. A!ain, as $e said but lately, every state o# soul has a nature relative to and concerned $ith the kind o# thin!s by $hich it tends to be made $orse or better" but it is by reason o# leasures and ains that men become bad, by ursuin! and avoidin! these % either the leasures and ains they ou!ht not or $hen they ou!ht not or as they ou!ht not, or by !oin! $ron! in one o# the other similar $ays that may be distin!uished. 3ence men even de#ine the virtues as certain states o# im assivity and rest" not $ell, ho$ever, because they s eak absolutely, and do not say 8as one ou!ht9 and 8as one ou!ht not9 and 8$hen one ou!ht or ou!ht not9, and the other thin!s that may be added. We assume, then, that this kind o# e2cellence tends to do $hat is best $ith re!ard to leasures and ains, and vice does the contrary. /he #ollo$in! #acts also may sho$ us that virtue and vice are concerned $ith these same thin!s. /here bein! three ob'ects o# choice and three o# avoidance, the noble, the advanta!eous, the leasant, and their contraries, the base, the in'urious, the ain#ul, about all o# these the !ood man tends to !o ri!ht and the bad man to !o $ron!, and es ecially about leasure" #or this is common to the animals, and also it accom anies all ob'ects o# choice" #or even the noble and the advanta!eous a ear leasant. A!ain, it has !ro$n u $ith us all #rom our in#ancy" this is $hy it is di##icult to rub o## this assion, en!rained as it is in our li#e. And $e measure even our actions, some o# us more and others less, by the rule o# leasure and ain. .or this reason, then, our $hole inquiry must be about these" #or to #eel deli!ht and ain ri!htly or $ron!ly has no small e##ect on our actions. A!ain, it is harder to #i!ht $ith leasure than $ith an!er, to use 3eraclitus9 hrase9, but both art and virtue are al$ays concerned $ith $hat is harder" #or even the !ood is better $hen it is harder. /here#ore #or this reason also the $hole concern both o# virtue and o# olitical science is $ith leasures and ains" #or the man $ho uses these $ell $ill be !ood, he $ho uses them badly bad. /hat virtue, then, is concerned $ith leasures and ains, and that by the acts #rom $hich it arises it is both increased and, i# they are done di##erently, destroyed, and that the acts #rom $hich it arose are those in $hich it actuali-es itsel# % let this be taken as said. 14

4 /he question mi!ht be asked," $hat $e mean by sayin! that $e must become 'ust by doin! 'ust acts, and tem erate by doin! tem erate acts" #or i# men do 'ust and tem erate acts, they are already 'ust and tem erate, e2actly as, i# they do $hat is in accordance $ith the la$s o# !rammar and o# music, they are !rammarians and musicians. 1r is this not true even o# the arts+ It is ossible to do somethin! that is in accordance $ith the la$s o# !rammar, either by chance or at the su!!estion o# another. A man $ill be a !rammarian, then, only $hen he has both done somethin! !rammatical and done it !rammatically" and this means doin! it in accordance $ith the !rammatical kno$led!e in himsel#. A!ain, the case o# the arts and that o# the virtues are not similar" #or the roducts o# the arts have their !oodness in themselves, so that it is enou!h that they should have a certain character, but i# the acts that are in accordance $ith the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not #ollo$ that they are done 'ustly or tem erately. /he a!ent also must be in a certain condition $hen he does them" in the #irst lace he must have kno$led!e, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them #or their o$n sakes, and thirdly his action must roceed #rom a #irm and unchan!eable character. /hese are not reckoned in as conditions o# the ossession o# the arts, e2ce t the bare kno$led!e" but as a condition o# the ossession o# the virtues kno$led!e has little or no $ei!ht, $hile the other conditions count not #or a little but #or everythin!, i.e. the very conditions $hich result #rom o#ten doin! 'ust and tem erate acts. Actions, then, are called 'ust and tem erate $hen they are such as the 'ust or the tem erate man $ould do" but it is not the man $ho does these that is 'ust and tem erate, but the man $ho also does them as 'ust and tem erate men do them. It is $ell said, then, that it is by doin! 'ust acts that the 'ust man is roduced, and by doin! tem erate acts the tem erate man" $ithout doin! these no one $ould have even a ros ect o# becomin! !ood. But most eo le do not do these, but take re#u!e in theory and think they are bein! hiloso hers and $ill become !ood in this $ay, behavin! some$hat like atients $ho listen attentively to their doctors, but do none o# the thin!s they are ordered to do. As the latter $ill not be made $ell in body by such a course o# treatment, the #ormer $ill not be made $ell in soul by such a course o# hiloso hy. < Ne2t $e must consider $hat virtue is. ,ince thin!s that are #ound in the soul are o# three kinds % assions, #aculties, states o# character, virtue must be one o# these. By assions I mean a etite, an!er, #ear, con#idence, envy, 'oy, #riendly #eelin!, hatred, lon!in!, emulation, ity, and in !eneral the #eelin!s that are accom anied by leasure or ain" by #aculties the thin!s in virtue o# $hich $e are said to be ca able o# #eelin! these, e.!. o# becomin! an!ry or bein! ained or #eelin! ity" by states o# character the thin!s in virtue o# $hich $e stand $ell or badly $ith re#erence to the assions, e.!. $ith re#erence to an!er $e stand badly i# $e #eel it violently or too $eakly, and $ell i# $e #eel it moderately" and similarly $ith re#erence to the other assions. No$ neither the virtues nor the vices are assions, because $e are not called !ood or bad on the !round o# our assions, but are so called on the !round o# our virtues and our vices, and because $e are neither raised nor blamed #or our assions )#or the man $ho #eels #ear or an!er is not raised, nor is the man $ho sim ly #eels an!er blamed, but the man $ho #eels it in a certain $ay*, but #or our virtues and our vices $e are raised or blamed. 1<

A!ain, $e #eel an!er and #ear $ithout choice, but the virtues are modes o# choice or involve choice. .urther, in res ect o# the assions $e are said to be moved, but in res ect o# the virtues and the vices $e are said not to be moved but to be dis osed in a articular $ay. .or these reasons also they are not #aculties" #or $e are neither called !ood nor bad, nor raised nor blamed, #or the sim le ca acity o# #eelin! the assions" a!ain, $e have the #aculties by nature, but $e are not made !ood or bad by nature" $e have s oken o# this be#ore. I#, then, the virtues are neither assions nor #aculties, all that remains is that they should be states o# character. /hus $e have stated $hat virtue is in res ect o# its !enus. = We must, ho$ever, not only describe virtue as a state o# character, but also say $hat sort o# state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or e2cellence both brin!s into !ood condition the thin! o# $hich it is the e2cellence and makes the $ork o# that thin! be done $ell" e.!. the e2cellence o# the eye makes both the eye and its $ork !ood" #or it is by the e2cellence o# the eye that $e see $ell. ,imilarly the e2cellence o# the horse makes a horse both !ood in itsel# and !ood at runnin! and at carryin! its rider and at a$aitin! the attack o# the enemy. /here#ore, i# this is true in every case, the virtue o# man also $ill be the state o# character $hich makes a man !ood and $hich makes him do his o$n $ork $ell. 3o$ this is to ha en $e have stated already, but it $ill be made lain also by the #ollo$in! consideration o# the s eci#ic nature o# virtue. In everythin! that is continuous and divisible it is ossible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms o# the thin! itsel# or relatively to us" and the equal is an intermediate bet$een e2cess and de#ect. By the intermediate in the ob'ect I mean that $hich is equidistant #rom each o# the e2tremes, $hich is one and the same #or all men" by the intermediate relatively to us that $hich is neither too much nor too little % and this is not one, nor the same #or all. .or instance, i# ten is many and t$o is #e$, si2 is the intermediate, taken in terms o# the ob'ect" #or it e2ceeds and is e2ceeded by an equal amount" this is intermediate accordin! to arithmetical ro ortion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so" i# ten ounds are too much #or a articular erson to eat and t$o too little, it does not #ollo$ that the trainer $ill order si2 ounds" #or this also is erha s too much #or the erson $ho is to take it, or too little % too little #or Bilo, too much #or the be!inner in athletic e2ercises. /he same is true o# runnin! and $restlin!. /hus a master o# any art avoids e2cess and de#ect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this % the intermediate not in the ob'ect but relatively to us. I# it is thus, then, that every art does its $ork $ell % by lookin! to the intermediate and 'ud!lin! its $orks by this standard )so that $e o#ten say o# !ood $orks o# art that it is not ossible either to take a$ay or to add anythin!, im lyin! that e2cess and de#ect destroy the !oodness o# $orks o# art, $hile the mean reserves it" and !ood artists, as $e say, look to this in their $ork*, and i#, #urther, virtue is more e2act and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality o# aimin! at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue" #or it is this that is concerned $ith assions and actions, and in these there is e2cess, de#ect, and the intermediate. .or instance, both #ear and con#idence and a etite and an!er and ity and in !eneral leasure and ain may be #elt both too much and too little, and in both cases not $ell" but to #eel them at the ri!ht times, $ith re#erence to the ri!ht ob'ects, to$ards the ri!ht eo le, $ith the ri!ht motive, and in the ri!ht $ay, is $hat is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic o# virtue. ,imilarly $ith re!ard to actions also there is e2cess, de#ect, and the intermediate. No$ virtue is concerned $ith assions and actions, in $hich e2cess is a #orm o# #ailure, and so is de#ect, $hile the intermediate is raised and is a #orm o# success" and bein! raised and bein! success#ul are both 1=

characteristics o# virtue. /here#ore virtue is a kind o# mean, since, as $e have seen, it aims at $hat is intermediate. A!ain, it is ossible to #ail in many $ays )#or evil belon!s to the class o# the unlimited, as the 7ytha!oreans con'ectured, and !ood to that o# the limited*, $hile to succeed is ossible only in one $ay )#or $hich reason also one is easy and the other di##icult % to miss the mark easy, to hit it di##icult*" #or these reasons also, then, e2cess and de#ect are characteristic o# vice, and the mean o# virtue" .or men are !ood in but one $ay, but bad in many. 6irtue, then, is a state o# character concerned $ith choice, lyin! in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this bein! determined by a rational rinci le, and by that rinci le by $hich the man o# ractical $isdom $ould determine it. No$ it is a mean bet$een t$o vices, that $hich de ends on e2cess and that $hich de ends on de#ect" and a!ain it is a mean because the vices res ectively #all short o# or e2ceed $hat is ri!ht in both assions and actions, $hile virtue both #inds and chooses that $hich is intermediate. 3ence in res ect o# its substance and the de#inition $hich states its essence virtue is a mean, $ith re!ard to $hat is best and ri!ht an e2treme. But not every action nor every assion admits o# a mean" #or some have names that already im ly badness, e.!. s ite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case o# actions adultery, the#t, murder" #or all o# these and suchlike thin!s im ly by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the e2cesses or de#iciencies o# them. It is not ossible, then, ever to be ri!ht $ith re!ard to them" one must al$ays be $ron!. Nor does !oodness or badness $ith re!ard to such thin!s de end on committin! adultery $ith the ri!ht $oman, at the ri!ht time, and in the ri!ht $ay, but sim ly to do any o# them is to !o $ron!. It $ould be equally absurd, then, to e2 ect that in un'ust, co$ardly, and volu tuous action there should be a mean, an e2cess, and a de#iciency" #or at that rate there $ould be a mean o# e2cess and o# de#iciency, an e2cess o# e2cess, and a de#iciency o# de#iciency. But as there is no e2cess and de#iciency o# tem erance and coura!e because $hat is intermediate is in a sense an e2treme, so too o# the actions $e have mentioned there is no mean nor any e2cess and de#iciency, but ho$ever they are done they are $ron!" #or in !eneral there is neither a mean o# e2cess and de#iciency, nor e2cess and de#iciency o# a mean. @ We must, ho$ever, not only make this !eneral statement, but also a ly it to the individual #acts. .or amon! statements about conduct those $hich are !eneral a ly more $idely, but those $hich are articular are more !enuine, since conduct has to do $ith individual cases, and our statements must harmoni-e $ith the #acts in these cases. We may take these cases #rom our table. With re!ard to #eelin!s o# #ear and con#idence coura!e is the mean" o# the eo le $ho e2ceed, he $ho e2ceeds in #earlessness has no name )many o# the states have no name*, $hile the man $ho e2ceeds in con#idence is rash, and he $ho e2ceeds in #ear and #alls short in con#idence is a co$ard. With re!ard to leasures and ains % not all o# them, and not so much $ith re!ard to the ains % the mean is tem erance, the e2cess sel#&indul!ence. 7ersons de#icient $ith re!ard to the leasures are not o#ten #ound" hence such ersons also have received no name. But let us call them 8insensible9. With re!ard to !ivin! and takin! o# money the mean is liberality, the e2cess and the de#ect rodi!ality and meanness. In these actions eo le e2ceed and #all short in contrary $ays" the rodi!al e2ceeds in s endin! and #alls short in takin!, $hile the mean man e2ceeds in takin! and #alls short in s endin!. )At resent $e are !ivin! a mere outline or summary, and are satis#ied $ith this" later these states $ill be more e2actly determined.* With re!ard to money there are also 1@

other dis ositions % a mean, ma!ni#icence )#or the ma!ni#icent man di##ers #rom the liberal man" the #ormer deals $ith lar!e sums, the latter $ith small ones*, an e2cess, tastelessness and vul!arity, and a de#iciency, ni!!ardliness" these di##er #rom the states o osed to liberality, and the mode o# their di##erence $ill be stated later. With re!ard to honour and dishonour the mean is ro er ride, the e2cess is kno$n as a sort o# 8em ty vanity9, and the de#iciency is undue humility" and as $e said liberality $as related to ma!ni#icence, di##erin! #rom it by dealin! $ith small sums, so there is a state similarly related to ro er ride, bein! concerned $ith small honours $hile that is concerned $ith !reat. .or it is ossible to desire honour as one ou!ht, and more than one ou!ht, and less, and the man $ho e2ceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man $ho #alls short unambitious, $hile the intermediate erson has no name. /he dis ositions also are nameless, e2ce t that that o# the ambitious man is called ambition. 3ence the eo le $ho are at the e2tremes lay claim to the middle lace" and $e ourselves sometimes call the intermediate erson ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes raise the ambitious man and sometimes the unambitious. /he reason o# our doin! this $ill be stated in $hat #ollo$s" but no$ let us s eak o# the remainin! states accordin! to the method $hich has been indicated. With re!ard to an!er also there is an e2cess, a de#iciency, and a mean. Althou!h they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since $e call the intermediate erson !ood&tem ered let us call the mean !ood tem er" o# the ersons at the e2tremes let the one $ho e2ceeds be called irascible, and his vice irascibility, and the man $ho #alls short an inirascible sort o# erson, and the de#iciency inirascibility. /here are also three other means, $hich have a certain likeness to one another, but di##er #rom one another: #or they are all concerned $ith intercourse in $ords and actions, but di##er in that one is concerned $ith truth in this s here, the other t$o $ith leasantness" and o# this one kind is e2hibited in !ivin! amusement, the other in all the circumstances o# li#e. We must there#ore s eak o# these too, that $e may the better see that in all thin!s the mean is raise&$orthy, and the e2tremes neither raise$orthy nor ri!ht, but $orthy o# blame. No$ most o# these states also have no names, but $e must try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that $e may be clear and easy to #ollo$. With re!ard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truth#ul sort o# erson and the mean may be called truth#ulness, $hile the retence $hich e2a!!erates is boast#ulness and the erson characteri-ed by it a boaster, and that $hich understates is mock modesty and the erson characteri-ed by it mock&modest. With re!ard to leasantness in the !ivin! o# amusement the intermediate erson is ready&$itted and the dis osition ready $it, the e2cess is bu##oonery and the erson characteri-ed by it a bu##oon, $hile the man $ho #alls short is a sort o# boor and his state is boorishness. With re!ard to the remainin! kind o# leasantness, that $hich is e2hibited in li#e in !eneral, the man $ho is leasant in the ri!ht $ay is #riendly and the mean is #riendliness, $hile the man $ho e2ceeds is an obsequious erson i# he has no end in vie$, a #latterer i# he is aimin! at his o$n advanta!e, and the man $ho #alls short and is un leasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort o# erson. /here are also means in the assions and concerned $ith the assions" since shame is not a virtue, and yet raise is e2tended to the modest man. .or even in these matters one man is said to be intermediate, and another to e2ceed, as #or instance the bash#ul man $ho is ashamed o# everythin!" $hile he $ho #alls short or is not ashamed o# anythin! at all is shameless, and the intermediate erson is modest. Ri!hteous indi!nation is a mean bet$een envy and s ite, and these states are concerned $ith the ain and leasure that are #elt at the #ortunes o# our nei!hbours" the man $ho is characteri-ed by ri!hteous indi!nation is ained at undeserved !ood #ortune, the envious man, !oin! beyond him, is ained at all !ood #ortune, and the s ite#ul man #alls so #ar short o# bein! ained that he even re'oices. But these states there $ill be an 1A

o ortunity o# describin! else$here" $ith re!ard to 'ustice, since it has not one sim le meanin!, $e shall, a#ter describin! the other states, distin!uish its t$o kinds and say ho$ each o# them is a mean" and similarly $e shall treat also o# the rational virtues. A /here are three kinds o# dis osition, then, t$o o# them vices, involvin! e2cess and de#iciency res ectively, and one a virtue, vi-. the mean, and all are in a sense o osed to all" #or the e2treme states are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the e2tremes" as the equal is !reater relatively to the less, less relatively to the !reater, so the middle states are e2cessive relatively to the de#iciencies, de#icient relatively to the e2cesses, both in assions and in actions. .or the brave man a ears rash relatively to the co$ard, and co$ardly relatively to the rash man" and similarly the tem erate man a ears sel#&indul!ent relatively to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the sel#&indul!ent, and the liberal man rodi!al relatively to the mean man, mean relatively to the rodi!al. 3ence also the eo le at the e2tremes ush the intermediate man each over to the other, and the brave man is called rash by the co$ard, co$ardly by the rash man, and corres ondin!ly in the other cases. /hese states bein! thus o osed to one another, the !reatest contrariety is that o# the e2tremes to each other, rather than to the intermediate" #or these are #urther #rom each other than #rom the intermediate, as the !reat is #urther #rom the small and the small #rom the !reat than both are #rom the equal. A!ain, to the intermediate some e2tremes sho$ a certain likeness, as that o# rashness to coura!e and that o# rodi!ality to liberality" but the e2tremes sho$ the !reatest unlikeness to each other" no$ contraries are de#ined as the thin!s that are #urthest #rom each other, so that thin!s that are #urther a art are more contrary. /o the mean in some cases the de#iciency, in some the e2cess is more o osed" e.!. it is not rashness, $hich is an e2cess, but co$ardice, $hich is a de#iciency, that is more o osed to coura!e, and not insensibility, $hich is a de#iciency, but sel#&indul!ence, $hich is an e2cess, that is more o osed to tem erance. /his ha ens #rom t$o reasons, one bein! dra$n #rom the thin! itsel#" #or because one e2treme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, $e o ose not this but rather its contrary to the intermediate. E.!. since rashness is thou!ht liker and nearer to coura!e, and co$ardice more unlike, $e o ose rather the latter to coura!e" #or thin!s that are #urther #rom the intermediate are thou!ht more contrary to it. /his, then, is one cause, dra$n #rom the thin! itsel#" another is dra$n #rom ourselves" #or the thin!s to $hich $e ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate. .or instance, $e ourselves tend more naturally to leasures, and hence are more easily carried a$ay to$ards sel#&indul!ence than to$ards ro riety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the directions in $hich $e more o#ten !o to !reat len!ths" and there#ore sel#&indul!ence, $hich is an e2cess, is the more contrary to tem erance. C /hat moral virtue is a mean, then, and in $hat sense it is so, and that it is a mean bet$een t$o vices, the one involvin! e2cess, the other de#iciency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at $hat is intermediate in assions and in actions, has been su##iciently stated. 3ence also it is no easy task to be !ood. .or in everythin! it is no easy task to #ind the middle, e.!. to #ind the middle o# a circle is not #or every one but #or him $ho kno$s" so, too, any one can !et an!ry % that is easy % or !ive or s end money" but to do this to the ri!ht erson, to the ri!ht e2tent, at the 1C

ri!ht time, $ith the ri!ht motive, and in the ri!ht $ay, that is not #or every one, nor is it easy" $here#ore !oodness is both rare and laudable and noble. 3ence he $ho aims at the intermediate must #irst de art #rom $hat is the more contrary to it, as ?aly so advises: 3old the shi out beyond that sur# and s ray. .or o# the e2tremes one is more erroneous, one less so" there#ore, since to hit the mean is hard in the e2treme, $e must as a second best, as eo le say, take the least o# the evils" and this $ill be done best in the $ay $e describe. But $e must consider the thin!s to$ards $hich $e ourselves also are easily carried a$ay" #or some o# us tend to one thin!, some to another" and this $ill be reco!ni-able #rom the leasure and the ain $e #eel. We must dra! ourselves a$ay to the contrary e2treme" #or $e shall !et into the intermediate state by dra$in! $ell a$ay #rom error, as eo le do in strai!htenin! sticks that are bent. No$ in everythin! the leasant or leasure is most to be !uarded a!ainst" #or $e do not 'ud!e it im artially. We ou!ht, then, to #eel to$ards leasure as the elders o# the eo le #elt to$ards 3elen, and in all circumstances re eat their sayin!" #or i# $e dismiss leasure thus $e are less likely to !o astray. It is by doin! this, then, )to sum the matter u * that $e shall best be able to hit the mean. But this is no doubt di##icult, and es ecially in individual cases" #or or is not easy to determine both ho$ and $ith $hom and on $hat rovocation and ho$ lon! one should be an!ry" #or $e too sometimes raise those $ho #all short and call them !ood&tem ered, but sometimes $e raise those $ho !et an!ry and call them manly. /he man, ho$ever, $ho deviates little #rom !oodness is not blamed, $hether he do so in the direction o# the more or o# the less, but only the man $ho deviates more $idely" #or he does not #ail to be noticed. But u to $hat oint and to $hat e2tent a man must deviate be#ore he becomes blame$orthy it is not easy to determine by reasonin!, any more than anythin! else that is erceived by the senses" such thin!s de end on articular #acts, and the decision rests $ith erce tion. ,o much, then, is lain, that the intermediate state is in all thin!s to be raised, but that $e must incline sometimes to$ards the e2cess, sometimes to$ards the de#iciency" #or so shall $e most easily hit the mean and $hat is ri!ht.

Book III 1 ,ince virtue is concerned $ith assions and actions, and on voluntary assions and actions raise and blame are besto$ed, on those that are involuntary ardon, and sometimes also ity, to distin!uish the voluntary and the involuntary is resumably necessary #or those $ho are studyin! the nature o# virtue, and use#ul also #or le!islators $ith a vie$ to the assi!nin! both o# honours and o# unishments. /hose thin!s, then, are thou!ht&involuntary, $hich take lace under com ulsion or o$in! to i!norance" and that is com ulsory o# $hich the movin! rinci le is outside, bein! a rinci le in $hich nothin! is contributed by the erson $ho is actin! or is #eelin! the assion, e.!. i# he $ere to be carried some$here by a $ind, or by men $ho had him in their o$er. But $ith re!ard to the thin!s that are done #rom #ear o# !reater evils or #or some noble ob'ect )e.!. i# a tyrant $ere to order one to do somethin! base, havin! one9s arents and children in his o$er, and i# one did the action they $ere to be saved, but other$ise $ould be ut to death*, it (D

may be debated $hether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. ,omethin! o# the sort ha ens also $ith re!ard to the thro$in! o# !oods overboard in a storm" #or in the abstract no one thro$s !oods a$ay voluntarily, but on condition o# its securin! the sa#ety o# himsel# and his cre$ any sensible man does so. ,uch actions, then, are mi2ed, but are more like voluntary actions" #or they are $orthy o# choice at the time $hen they are done, and the end o# an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 8voluntary9 and 8involuntary9, must be used $ith re#erence to the moment o# action. No$ the man acts voluntarily" #or the rinci le that moves the instrumental arts o# the body in such actions is in him, and the thin!s o# $hich the movin! rinci le is in a man himsel# are in his o$er to do or not to do. ,uch actions, there#ore, are voluntary, but in the abstract erha s involuntary" #or no one $ould choose any such act in itsel#. .or such actions men are sometimes even raised, $hen they endure somethin! base or ain#ul in return #or !reat and noble ob'ects !ained" in the o osite case they are blamed, since to endure the !reatest indi!nities #or no noble end or #or a tri#lin! end is the mark o# an in#erior erson. 1n some actions raise indeed is not besto$ed, but ardon is, $hen one does $hat he ou!ht not under ressure $hich overstrains human nature and $hich no one could $ithstand. But some acts, erha s, $e cannot be #orced to do, but ou!ht rather to #ace death a#ter the most #ear#ul su##erin!s" #or the thin!s that 8#orced9 Euri ides Alcmaeon to slay his mother seem absurd. It is di##icult sometimes to determine $hat should be chosen at $hat cost, and $hat should be endured in return #or $hat !ain, and yet more di##icult to abide by our decisions" #or as a rule $hat is e2 ected is ain#ul, and $hat $e are #orced to do is base, $hence raise and blame are besto$ed on those $ho have been com elled or have not. What sort o# acts, then, should be called com ulsory+ We ans$er that $ithout quali#ication actions are so $hen the cause is in the e2ternal circumstances and the a!ent contributes nothin!. But the thin!s that in themselves are involuntary, but no$ and in return #or these !ains are $orthy o# choice, and $hose movin! rinci le is in the a!ent, are in themselves involuntary, but no$ and in return #or these !ains voluntary. /hey are more like voluntary acts" #or actions are in the class o# articulars, and the articular acts here are voluntary. What sort o# thin!s are to be chosen, and in return #or $hat, it is not easy to state" #or there are many di##erences in the articular cases. But i# some one $ere to say that leasant and noble ob'ects have a com ellin! o$er, #orcin! us #rom $ithout, all acts $ould be #or him com ulsory" #or it is #or these ob'ects that all men do everythin! they do. And those $ho act under com ulsion and un$illin!ly act $ith ain, but those $ho do acts #or their leasantness and nobility do them $ith leasure" it is absurd to make e2ternal circumstances res onsible, and not onesel#, as bein! easily cau!ht by such attractions, and to make onesel# res onsible #or noble acts but the leasant ob'ects res onsible #or base acts. /he com ulsory, then, seems to be that $hose movin! rinci le is outside, the erson com elled contributin! nothin!. Everythin! that is done by reason o# i!norance is not voluntary" it is only $hat roduces ain and re entance that is involuntary. .or the man $ho has done somethin! o$in! to i!norance, and #eels not the least ve2ation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not kno$ $hat he $as doin!, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not ained. 1# eo le, then, $ho act by reason o# i!norance he $ho re ents is thou!ht an involuntary a!ent, and the man $ho does not re ent may, since he is di##erent, be called a not voluntary a!ent" #or, since he di##ers #rom the other, it is better that he should have a name o# his o$n. Actin! by reason o# i!norance seems also to be di##erent #rom actin! in i!norance" #or the man $ho is drunk or in a ra!e is thou!ht to act as a result not o# i!norance but o# one o# the causes mentioned, yet not kno$in!ly but in i!norance.

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No$ every $icked man is i!norant o# $hat he ou!ht to do and $hat he ou!ht to abstain #rom, and it is by reason o# error o# this kind that men become un'ust and in !eneral bad" but the term 8involuntary9 tends to be used not i# a man is i!norant o# $hat is to his advanta!e % #or it is not mistaken ur ose that causes involuntary action )it leads rather to $ickedness*, nor i!norance o# the universal )#or that men are blamed*, but i!norance o# articulars, i.e. o# the circumstances o# the action and the ob'ects $ith $hich it is concerned. .or it is on these that both ity and ardon de end, since the erson $ho is i!norant o# any o# these acts involuntarily. 7erha s it is 'ust as $ell, there#ore, to determine their nature and number. A man may be i!norant, then, o# $ho he is, $hat he is doin!, $hat or $hom he is actin! on, and sometimes also $hat )e.!. $hat instrument* he is doin! it $ith, and to $hat end )e.!. he may think his act $ill conduce to some one9s sa#ety*, and ho$ he is doin! it )e.!. $hether !ently or violently*. No$ o# all o# these no one could be i!norant unless he $ere mad, and evidently also he could not be i!norant o# the a!ent" #or ho$ could he not kno$ himsel#+ But o# $hat he is doin! a man mi!ht be i!norant, as #or instance eo le say 8it sli ed out o# their mouths as they $ere s eakin!9, or 8they did not kno$ it $as a secret9, as Aeschylus said o# the mysteries, or a man mi!ht say he 8let it !o o## $hen he merely $anted to sho$ its $orkin!9, as the man did $ith the cata ult. A!ain, one mi!ht think one9s son $as an enemy, as Bero e did, or that a ointed s ear had a button on it, or that a stone $as umicestone" or one mi!ht !ive a man a drau!ht to save him, and really kill him" or one mi!ht $ant to touch a man, as eo le do in s arrin!, and really $ound him. /he i!norance may relate, then, to any o# these thin!s, i.e. o# the circumstances o# the action, and the man $ho $as i!norant o# any o# these is thou!ht to have acted involuntarily, and es ecially i# he $as i!norant on the most im ortant oints" and these are thou!ht to be the circumstances o# the action and its end. .urther, the doin! o# an act that is called involuntary in virtue o# i!norance o# this sort must be ain#ul and involve re entance. ,ince that $hich is done under com ulsion or by reason o# i!norance is involuntary, the voluntary $ould seem to be that o# $hich the movin! rinci le is in the a!ent himsel#, he bein! a$are o# the articular circumstances o# the action. 7resumably acts done by reason o# an!er or a etite are not ri!htly called involuntary. .or in the #irst lace, on that sho$in! none o# the other animals $ill act voluntarily, nor $ill children" and secondly, is it meant that $e do not do voluntarily any o# the acts that are due to a etite or an!er, or that $e do the noble acts voluntarily and the base acts involuntarily+ Is not this absurd, $hen one and the same thin! is the cause+ But it $ould surely be odd to describe as involuntary the thin!s one ou!ht to desire" and $e ou!ht both to be an!ry at certain thin!s and to have an a etite #or certain thin!s, e.!. #or health and #or learnin!. Also $hat is involuntary is thou!ht to be ain#ul, but $hat is in accordance $ith a etite is thou!ht to be leasant. A!ain, $hat is the di##erence in res ect o# involuntariness bet$een errors committed u on calculation and those committed in an!er+ Both are to be avoided, but the irrational assions are thou!ht not less human than reason is, and there#ore also the actions $hich roceed #rom an!er or a etite are the man9s actions. It $ould be odd, then, to treat them as involuntary. ( Both the voluntary and the involuntary havin! been delimited, $e must ne2t discuss choice" #or it is thou!ht to be most closely bound u $ith virtue and to discriminate characters better than actions do.

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?hoice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thin! as the voluntary" the latter e2tends more $idely. .or both children and the lo$er animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the s ur o# the moment $e describe as voluntary, but not as chosen. /hose $ho say it is a etite or an!er or $ish or a kind o# o inion do not seem to be ri!ht. .or choice is not common to irrational creatures as $ell, but a etite and an!er are. A!ain, the incontinent man acts $ith a etite, but not $ith choice" $hile the continent man on the contrary acts $ith choice, but not $ith a etite. A!ain, a etite is contrary to choice, but not a etite to a etite. A!ain, a etite relates to the leasant and the ain#ul, choice neither to the ain#ul nor to the leasant. ,till less is it an!er" #or acts due to an!er are thou!ht to be less than any others ob'ects o# choice. But neither is it $ish, thou!h it seems near to it" #or choice cannot relate to im ossibles, and i# any one said he chose them he $ould be thou!ht silly" but there may be a $ish even #or im ossibles, e.!. #or immortality. And $ish may relate to thin!s that could in no $ay be brou!ht about by one9s o$n e##orts, e.!. that a articular actor or athlete should $in in a com etition" but no one chooses such thin!s, but only the thin!s that he thinks could be brou!ht about by his o$n e##orts. A!ain, $ish relates rather to the end, choice to the means" #or instance, $e $ish to be healthy, but $e choose the acts $hich $ill make us healthy, and $e $ish to be ha y and say $e do, but $e cannot $ell say $e choose to be so" #or, in !eneral, choice seems to relate to the thin!s that are in our o$n o$er. .or this reason, too, it cannot be o inion" #or o inion is thou!ht to relate to all kinds o# thin!s, no less to eternal thin!s and im ossible thin!s than to thin!s in our o$n o$er" and it is distin!uished by its #alsity or truth, not by its badness or !oodness, $hile choice is distin!uished rather by these. No$ $ith o inion in !eneral erha s no one even says it is identical. But it is not identical even $ith any kind o# o inion" #or by choosin! $hat is !ood or bad $e are men o# a certain character, $hich $e are not by holdin! certain o inions. And $e choose to !et or avoid somethin! !ood or bad, but $e have o inions about $hat a thin! is or $hom it is !ood #or or ho$ it is !ood #or him" $e can hardly be said to o ine to !et or avoid anythin!. And choice is raised #or bein! related to the ri!ht ob'ect rather than #or bein! ri!htly related to it, o inion #or bein! truly related to its ob'ect. And $e choose $hat $e best kno$ to be !ood, but $e o ine $hat $e do not quite kno$" and it is not the same eo le that are thou!ht to make the best choices and to have the best o inions, but some are thou!ht to have #airly !ood o inions, but by reason o# vice to choose $hat they should not. I# o inion recedes choice or accom anies it, that makes no di##erence" #or it is not this that $e are considerin!, but $hether it is identical $ith some kind o# o inion. What, then, or $hat kind o# thin! is it, since it is none o# the thin!s $e have mentioned+ It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an ob'ect o# choice. Is it, then, $hat has been decided on by revious deliberation+ At any rate choice involves a rational rinci le and thou!ht. Even the name seems to su!!est that it is $hat is chosen be#ore other thin!s. 0 Do $e deliberate about everythin!, and is everythin! a ossible sub'ect o# deliberation, or is deliberation im ossible about some thin!s+ We ou!ht resumably to call not $hat a #ool or a madman $ould deliberate about, but $hat a sensible man $ould deliberate about, a sub'ect o# deliberation. No$ about eternal thin!s no one deliberates, e.!. about the material universe or the incommensurability o# the dia!onal and the side o# a square. But no more do $e deliberate about the thin!s that involve movement but al$ays ha en in the same $ay, $hether o# necessity or by (0

nature or #rom any other cause, e.!. the solstices and the risin!s o# the stars" nor about thin!s that ha en no$ in one $ay, no$ in another, e.!. drou!hts and rains" nor about chance events, like the #indin! o# treasure. But $e do not deliberate even about all human a##airs" #or instance, no , artan deliberates about the best constitution #or the ,cythians. .or none o# these thin!s can be brou!ht about by our o$n e##orts. We deliberate about thin!s that are in our o$er and can be done" and these are in #act $hat is le#t. .or nature, necessity, and chance are thou!ht to be causes, and also reason and everythin! that de ends on man. No$ every class o# men deliberates about the thin!s that can be done by their o$n e##orts. And in the case o# e2act and sel#&contained sciences there is no deliberation, e.!. about the letters o# the al habet )#or $e have no doubt ho$ they should be $ritten*" but the thin!s that are brou!ht about by our o$n e##orts, but not al$ays in the same $ay, are the thin!s about $hich $e deliberate, e.!. questions o# medical treatment or o# money&makin!. And $e do so more in the case o# the art o# navi!ation than in that o# !ymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less e2actly $orked out, and a!ain about other thin!s in the same ratio, and more also in the case o# the arts than in that o# the sciences" #or $e have more doubt about the #ormer. Deliberation is concerned $ith thin!s that ha en in a certain $ay #or the most art, but in $hich the event is obscure, and $ith thin!s in $hich it is indeterminate. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on im ortant questions, distrustin! ourselves as not bein! equal to decidin!. We deliberate not about ends but about means. .or a doctor does not deliberate $hether he shall heal, nor an orator $hether he shall ersuade, nor a statesman $hether he shall roduce la$ and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. /hey assume the end and consider ho$ and by $hat means it is to be attained" and i# it seems to be roduced by several means they consider by $hich it is most easily and best roduced, $hile i# it is achieved by one only they consider ho$ it $ill be achieved by this and by $hat means this $ill be achieved, till they come to the #irst cause, $hich in the order o# discovery is last. .or the erson $ho deliberates seems to investi!ate and analyse in the $ay described as thou!h he $ere analysin! a !eometrical construction )not all investi!ation a ears to be deliberation % #or instance mathematical investi!ations % but all deliberation is investi!ation*, and $hat is last in the order o# analysis seems to be #irst in the order o# becomin!. And i# $e come on an im ossibility, $e !ive u the search, e.!. i# $e need money and this cannot be !ot" but i# a thin! a ears ossible $e try to do it. By 8 ossible9 thin!s I mean thin!s that mi!ht be brou!ht about by our o$n e##orts" and these in a sense include thin!s that can be brou!ht about by the e##orts o# our #riends, since the movin! rinci le is in ourselves. /he sub'ect o# investi!ation is sometimes the instruments, sometimes the use o# them" and similarly in the other cases % sometimes the means, sometimes the mode o# usin! it or the means o# brin!in! it about. It seems, then, as has been said, that man is a movin! rinci le o# actions" no$ deliberation is about the thin!s to be done by the a!ent himsel#, and actions are #or the sake o# thin!s other than themselves. .or the end cannot be a sub'ect o# deliberation, but only the means" nor indeed can the articular #acts be a sub'ect o# it, as $hether this is bread or has been baked as it should" #or these are matters o# erce tion. I# $e are to be al$ays deliberatin!, $e shall have to !o on to in#inity. /he same thin! is deliberated u on and is chosen, e2ce t that the ob'ect o# choice is already determinate, since it is that $hich has been decided u on as a result o# deliberation that is the ob'ect o# choice. .or every one ceases to inquire ho$ he is to act $hen he has brou!ht the movin! rinci le back to himsel# and to the rulin! art o# himsel#" #or this is $hat chooses. /his is lain also #rom the ancient constitutions, $hich 3omer re resented" #or the kin!s announced their choices to the eo le. /he ob'ect o# choice bein! one o# the thin!s in our o$n o$er $hich

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is desired a#ter deliberation, choice $ill be deliberate desire o# thin!s in our o$n o$er" #or $hen $e have decided as a result o# deliberation, $e desire in accordance $ith our deliberation. We may take it, then, that $e have described choice in outline, and stated the nature o# its ob'ects and the #act that it is concerned $ith means. 4 /hat $ish is #or the end has already been stated" some think it is #or the !ood, others #or the a arent !ood. No$ those $ho say that the !ood is the ob'ect o# $ish must admit in consequence that that $hich the man $ho does not choose ari!ht $ishes #or is not an ob'ect o# $ish )#or i# it is to be so, it must also be !ood" but it $as, i# it so ha ened, bad*" $hile those $ho say the a arent !ood is the ob'ect o# $ish must admit that there is no natural ob'ect o# $ish, but only $hat seems !ood to each man. No$ di##erent thin!s a ear !ood to di##erent eo le, and, i# it so ha ens, even contrary thin!s. I# these consequences are un leasin!, are $e to say that absolutely and in truth the !ood is the ob'ect o# $ish, but #or each erson the a arent !ood" that that $hich is in truth an ob'ect o# $ish is an ob'ect o# $ish to the !ood man, $hile any chance thin! may be so the bad man, as in the case o# bodies also the thin!s that are in truth $holesome are $holesome #or bodies $hich are in !ood condition, $hile #or those that are diseased other thin!s are $holesome % or bitter or s$eet or hot or heavy, and so on" since the !ood man 'ud!es each class o# thin!s ri!htly, and in each the truth a ears to him+ .or each state o# character has its o$n ideas o# the noble and the leasant, and erha s the !ood man di##ers #rom others most by seein! the truth in each class o# thin!s, bein! as it $ere the norm and measure o# them. In most thin!s the error seems to be due to leasure" #or it a ears a !ood $hen it is not. We there#ore choose the leasant as a !ood, and avoid ain as an evil. < /he end, then, bein! $hat $e $ish #or, the means $hat $e deliberate about and choose, actions concernin! means must be accordin! to choice and voluntary. No$ the e2ercise o# the virtues is concerned $ith means. /here#ore virtue also is in our o$n o$er, and so too vice. .or $here it is in our o$er to act it is also in our o$er not to act, and vice versa" so that, i# to act, $here this is noble, is in our o$er, not to act, $hich $ill be base, $ill also be in our o$er, and i# not to act, $here this is noble, is in our o$er, to act, $hich $ill be base, $ill also be in our o$er. No$ i# it is in our o$er to do noble or base acts, and like$ise in our o$er not to do them, and this $as $hat bein! !ood or bad meant, then it is in our o$er to be virtuous or vicious. /he sayin! that 8no one is voluntarily $icked nor involuntarily ha y9 seems to be artly #alse and artly true" #or no one is involuntarily ha y, but $ickedness is voluntary. 1r else $e shall have to dis ute $hat has 'ust been said, at any rate, and deny that man is a movin! rinci le or be!etter o# his actions as o# children. But i# these #acts are evident and $e cannot re#er actions to movin! rinci les other than those in ourselves, the acts $hose movin! rinci les are in us must themselves also be in our o$er and voluntary. Witness seems to be borne to this both by individuals in their rivate ca acity and by le!islators themselves" #or these unish and take ven!eance on those $ho do $icked acts )unless they have acted under com ulsion or as a result o# i!norance #or $hich they are not themselves res onsible*, $hile they honour those $ho do noble acts, as thou!h they meant to encoura!e the latter and deter the #ormer. But no one is encoura!ed to do the thin!s that are neither in our o$er (<

nor voluntary" it is assumed that there is no !ain in bein! ersuaded not to be hot or in ain or hun!ry or the like, since $e shall e2 erience these #eelin!s none the less. Indeed, $e unish a man #or his very i!norance, i# he is thou!ht res onsible #or the i!norance, as $hen enalties are doubled in the case o# drunkenness" #or the movin! rinci le is in the man himsel#, since he had the o$er o# not !ettin! drunk and his !ettin! drunk $as the cause o# his i!norance. And $e unish those $ho are i!norant o# anythin! in the la$s that they ou!ht to kno$ and that is not di##icult, and so too in the case o# anythin! else that they are thou!ht to be i!norant o# throu!h carelessness" $e assume that it is in their o$er not to be i!norant, since they have the o$er o# takin! care. But erha s a man is the kind o# man not to take care. ,till they are themselves by their slack lives res onsible #or becomin! men o# that kind, and men make themselves res onsible #or bein! un'ust or sel#&indul!ent, in the one case by cheatin! and in the other by s endin! their time in drinkin! bouts and the like" #or it is activities e2ercised on articular ob'ects that make the corres ondin! character. /his is lain #rom the case o# eo le trainin! #or any contest or action" they ractise the activity the $hole time. No$ not to kno$ that it is #rom the e2ercise o# activities on articular ob'ects that states o# character are roduced is the mark o# a thorou!hly senseless erson. A!ain, it is irrational to su ose that a man $ho acts un'ustly does not $ish to be un'ust or a man $ho acts sel#&indul!ently to be sel#&indul!ent. But i# $ithout bein! i!norant a man does the thin!s $hich $ill make him un'ust, he $ill be un'ust voluntarily. >et it does not #ollo$ that i# he $ishes he $ill cease to be un'ust and $ill be 'ust. .or neither does the man $ho is ill become $ell on those terms. We may su ose a case in $hich he is ill voluntarily, throu!h livin! incontinently and disobeyin! his doctors. In that case it $as then o en to him not to be ill, but not no$, $hen he has thro$n a$ay his chance, 'ust as $hen you have let a stone !o it is too late to recover it" but yet it $as in your o$er to thro$ it, since the movin! rinci le $as in you. ,o, too, to the un'ust and to the sel#&indul!ent man it $as o en at the be!innin! not to become men o# this kind, and so they are un'ust and sel#indul!ent voluntarily" but no$ that they have become so it is not ossible #or them not to be so. But not only are the vices o# the soul voluntary, but those o# the body also #or some men, $hom $e accordin!ly blame" $hile no one blames those $ho are u!ly by nature, $e blame those $ho are so o$in! to $ant o# e2ercise and care. ,o it is, too, $ith res ect to $eakness and in#irmity" no one $ould re roach a man blind #rom birth or by disease or #rom a blo$, but rather ity him, $hile every one $ould blame a man $ho $as blind #rom drunkenness or some other #orm o# sel#& indul!ence. 1# vices o# the body, then, those in our o$n o$er are blamed, those not in our o$er are not. And i# this be so, in the other cases also the vices that are blamed must be in our o$n o$er. No$ some one may say that all men desire the a arent !ood, but have no control over the a earance, but the end a ears to each man in a #orm ans$erin! to his character. We re ly that i# each man is someho$ res onsible #or his state o# mind, he $ill also be himsel# someho$ res onsible #or the a earance" but i# not, no one is res onsible #or his o$n evildoin!, but every one does evil acts throu!h i!norance o# the end, thinkin! that by these he $ill !et $hat is best, and the aimin! at the end is not sel#&chosen but one must be born $ith an eye, as it $ere, by $hich to 'ud!e ri!htly and choose $hat is truly !ood, and he is $ell endo$ed by nature $ho is $ell endo$ed $ith this. .or it is $hat is !reatest and most noble, and $hat $e cannot !et or learn #rom another, but must have 'ust such as it $as $hen !iven us at birth, and to be $ell and nobly endo$ed $ith this $ill be er#ect and true e2cellence o# natural endo$ment. I# this is true, then, ho$ $ill virtue be more voluntary than vice+ /o both men alike, the !ood and the bad, the end

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a ears and is #i2ed by nature or ho$ever it may be, and it is by re#errin! everythin! else to this that men do $hatever they do. Whether, then, it is not by nature that the end a ears to each man such as it does a ear, but somethin! also de ends on him, or the end is natural but because the !ood man ado ts the means voluntarily virtue is voluntary, vice also $ill be none the less voluntary" #or in the case o# the bad man there is equally resent that $hich de ends on himsel# in his actions even i# not in his end. I#, then, as is asserted, the virtues are voluntary )#or $e are ourselves someho$ artly res onsible #or our states o# character, and it is by bein! ersons o# a certain kind that $e assume the end to be so and so*, the vices also $ill be voluntary" #or the same is true o# them. With re!ard to the virtues in !eneral $e have stated their !enus in outline, vi-. that they are means and that they are states o# character, and that they tend, and by their o$n nature, to the doin! o# the acts by $hich they are roduced, and that they are in our o$er and voluntary, and act as the ri!ht rule rescribes. But actions and states o# character are not voluntary in the same $ay" #or $e are masters o# our actions #rom the be!innin! ri!ht to the end, i# $e kno$ the articular #acts, but thou!h $e control the be!innin! o# our states o# character the !radual ro!ress is not obvious any more than it is in illnesses" because it $as in our o$er, ho$ever, to act in this $ay or not in this $ay, there#ore the states are voluntary. 5et us take u the several virtues, ho$ever, and say $hich they are and $hat sort o# thin!s they are concerned $ith and ho$ they are concerned $ith them" at the same time it $ill become lain ho$ many they are. And #irst let us s eak o# coura!e. = /hat it is a mean $ith re!ard to #eelin!s o# #ear and con#idence has already been made evident" and lainly the thin!s $e #ear are terrible thin!s, and these are, to s eak $ithout quali#ication, evils" #or $hich reason eo le even de#ine #ear as e2 ectation o# evil. No$ $e #ear all evils, e.!. dis!race, overty, disease, #riendlessness, death, but the brave man is not thou!ht to be concerned $ith all" #or to #ear some thin!s is even ri!ht and noble, and it is base not to #ear them % e.!. dis!race" he $ho #ears this is !ood and modest, and he $ho does not is shameless. 3e is, ho$ever, by some eo le called brave, by a trans#erence o# the $ord to a ne$ meanin!" #or he has in him somethin! $hich is like the brave man, since the brave man also is a #earless erson. 7overty and disease $e erha s ou!ht not to #ear, nor in !eneral the thin!s that do not roceed #rom vice and are not due to a man himsel#. But not even the man $ho is #earless o# these is brave. >et $e a ly the $ord to him also in virtue o# a similarity" #or some $ho in the dan!ers o# $ar are co$ards are liberal and are con#ident in #ace o# the loss o# money. Nor is a man a co$ard i# he #ears insult to his $i#e and children or envy or anythin! o# the kind" nor brave i# he is con#ident $hen he is about to be #lo!!ed. With $hat sort o# terrible thin!s, then, is the brave man concerned+ ,urely $ith the !reatest" #or no one is more likely than he to stand his !round a!ainst $hat is a$e&ins irin!. No$ death is the most terrible o# all thin!s" #or it is the end, and nothin! is thou!ht to be any lon!er either !ood or bad #or the dead. But the brave man $ould not seem to be concerned even $ith death in all circumstances, e.!. at sea or in disease. In $hat circumstances, then+ ,urely in the noblest. No$ such deaths are those in battle" #or these take lace in the !reatest and noblest dan!er. And these are corres ondin!ly honoured in city&states and at the courts o# monarchs. 7ro erly, then, he $ill be called brave $ho is #earless in #ace o# a noble death, and o# all emer!encies that involve death" and the emer!encies o# $ar are in the hi!hest de!ree o# this kind. >et at sea also, and in disease, the brave man is #earless, but not in the same $ay as the seaman" #or he has !iven u ho e o# sa#ety, and is dislikin! the thou!ht o# death in this (@

sha e, $hile they are ho e#ul because o# their e2 erience. At the same time, $e sho$ coura!e in situations $here there is the o ortunity o# sho$in! ro$ess or $here death is noble" but in these #orms o# death neither o# these conditions is #ul#illed. @ What is terrible is not the same #or all men" but $e say there are thin!s terrible even beyond human stren!th. /hese, then, are terrible to every one % at least to every sensible man" but the terrible thin!s that are not beyond human stren!th di##er in ma!nitude and de!ree, and so too do the thin!s that ins ire con#idence. No$ the brave man is as dauntless as man may be. /here#ore, $hile he $ill #ear even the thin!s that are not beyond human stren!th, he $ill #ace them as he ou!ht and as the rule directs, #or honour9s sake" #or this is the end o# virtue. But it is ossible to #ear these more, or less, and a!ain to #ear thin!s that are not terrible as i# they $ere. 1# the #aults that are committed one consists in #earin! $hat one should not, another in #earin! as $e should not, another in #earin! $hen $e should not, and so on" and so too $ith res ect to the thin!s that ins ire con#idence. /he man, then, $ho #aces and $ho #ears the ri!ht thin!s and #rom the ri!ht motive, in the ri!ht $ay and #rom the ri!ht time, and $ho #eels con#idence under the corres ondin! conditions, is brave" #or the brave man #eels and acts accordin! to the merits o# the case and in $hatever $ay the rule directs. No$ the end o# every activity is con#ormity to the corres ondin! state o# character. /his is true, there#ore, o# the brave man as $ell as o# others. But coura!e is noble. /here#ore the end also is noble" #or each thin! is de#ined by its end. /here#ore it is #or a noble end that the brave man endures and acts as coura!e directs. 1# those $ho !o to e2cess he $ho e2ceeds in #earlessness has no name )$e have said reviously that many states o# character have no names*, but he $ould be a sort o# madman or insensible erson i# he #eared nothin!, neither earthquakes nor the $aves, as they say the ?elts do not" $hile the man $ho e2ceeds in con#idence about $hat really is terrible is rash. /he rash man, ho$ever, is also thou!ht to be boast#ul and only a retender to coura!e" at all events, as the brave man is $ith re!ard to $hat is terrible, so the rash man $ishes to a ear" and so he imitates him in situations $here he can. 3ence also most o# them are a mi2ture o# rashness and co$ardice" #or, $hile in these situations they dis lay con#idence, they do not hold their !round a!ainst $hat is really terrible. /he man $ho e2ceeds in #ear is a co$ard" #or he #ears both $hat he ou!ht not and as he ou!ht not, and all the similar characteri-ations attach to him. 3e is lackin! also in con#idence" but he is more cons icuous #or his e2cess o# #ear in ain#ul situations. /he co$ard, then, is a des airin! sort o# erson" #or he #ears everythin!. /he brave man, on the other hand, has the o osite dis osition" #or con#idence is the mark o# a ho e#ul dis osition. /he co$ard, the rash man, and the brave man, then, are concerned $ith the same ob'ects but are di##erently dis osed to$ards them" #or the #irst t$o e2ceed and #all short, $hile the third holds the middle, $hich is the ri!ht, osition" and rash men are reci itate, and $ish #or dan!ers be#orehand but dra$ back $hen they are in them, $hile brave men are keen in the moment o# action, but quiet be#orehand. As $e have said, then, coura!e is a mean $ith res ect to thin!s that ins ire con#idence or #ear, in the circumstances that have been stated" and it chooses or endures thin!s because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so. But to die to esca e #rom overty or love or anythin! ain#ul is not the mark o# a brave man, but rather o# a co$ard" #or it is so#tness to #ly #rom $hat is troublesome, and such a man endures death not because it is noble but to #ly #rom evil.

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A ?oura!e, then, is somethin! o# this sort, but the name is also a lied to #ive other kinds. .irst comes the coura!e o# the citi-en&soldier" #or this is most like true coura!e. ?iti-en&soldiers seem to #ace dan!ers because o# the enalties im osed by the la$s and the re roaches they $ould other$ise incur, and because o# the honours they $in by such action" and there#ore those eo les seem to be bravest amon! $hom co$ards are held in dishonour and brave men in honour. /his is the kind o# coura!e that 3omer de icts, e.!. in Diomede and in 3ector: .irst $ill 7olydamas be to hea re roach on me then" and .or 3ector one day 8mid the /ro'ans shall utter his vaultin! haran!ue: A#raid $as /ydeides, and #led #rom my #ace. /his kind o# coura!e is most like to that $hich $e described earlier, because it is due to virtue" #or it is due to shame and to desire o# a noble ob'ect )i.e. honour* and avoidance o# dis!race, $hich is i!noble. 1ne mi!ht rank in the same class even those $ho are com elled by their rulers" but they are in#erior, inasmuch as they do $hat they do not #rom shame but #rom #ear, and to avoid not $hat is dis!race#ul but $hat is ain#ul" #or their masters com el them, as 3ector does: But i# I shall s y any dastard that co$ers #ar #rom the #i!ht, 6ainly $ill such an one ho e to esca e #rom the do!s. And those $ho !ive them their osts, and beat them i# they retreat, do the same, and so do those $ho dra$ them u $ith trenches or somethin! o# the sort behind them" all o# these a ly com ulsion. But one ou!ht to be brave not under com ulsion but because it is noble to be so. )(* E2 erience $ith re!ard to articular #acts is also thou!ht to be coura!e" this is indeed the reason $hy ,ocrates thou!ht coura!e $as kno$led!e. 1ther eo le e2hibit this quality in other dan!ers, and ro#essional soldiers e2hibit it in the dan!ers o# $ar" #or there seem to be many em ty alarms in $ar, o# $hich these have had the most com rehensive e2 erience" there#ore they seem brave, because the others do not kno$ the nature o# the #acts. A!ain, their e2 erience makes them most ca able in attack and in de#ence, since they can use their arms and have the kind that are likely to be best both #or attack and #or de#ence" there#ore they #i!ht like armed men a!ainst unarmed or like trained athletes a!ainst amateurs" #or in such contests too it is not the bravest men that #i!ht best, but those $ho are stron!est and have their bodies in the best condition. 7ro#essional soldiers turn co$ards, ho$ever, $hen the dan!er uts too !reat a strain on them and they are in#erior in numbers and equi ment" #or they are the #irst to #ly, $hile citi-en&#orces die at their osts, as in #act ha ened at the tem le o# 3ermes. .or to the latter #li!ht is dis!race#ul and death is re#erable to sa#ety on those terms" $hile the #ormer #rom the very be!innin! #aced the dan!er on the assum tion that they $ere stron!er, and $hen they kno$ the #acts they #ly, #earin! death more than dis!race" but the brave man is not that sort o# erson. )0* 7assion also is sometimes reckoned as coura!e" those $ho act #rom assion, like $ild beasts rushin! at those $ho have $ounded them, are thou!ht to be brave, because brave men also are assionate" #or assion above all thin!s is ea!er to rush on dan!er, and hence 3omer9s 8 ut stren!th into his assion9 and 8aroused their s irit and assion and 8hard he breathed antin!9 and 8his blood boiled9. .or all such e2 ressions seem to indicate the stirrin! and onset o# assion. No$ brave men act #or honour9s sake, but assion aids them" $hile $ild beasts act under the in#luence o# ain" #or they attack because they have been $ounded or because they are a#raid, since i# they are in a #orest they do not come near one. /hus they are not brave because, driven by ain and assion, they rush on dan!er $ithout #oreseein! any o# the erils, since at that rate even asses $ould be brave $hen they are hun!ry" #or blo$s $ill not drive them #rom their #ood" and lust also makes adulterers do many darin! thin!s. )/hose creatures are not brave, then, $hich are

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driven on to dan!er by ain or assion.* /he 8coura!e9 that is due to assion seems to be the most natural, and to be coura!e i# choice and motive be added. Ben, then, as $ell as beasts, su##er ain $hen they are an!ry, and are leased $hen they e2act their reven!e" those $ho #i!ht #or these reasons, ho$ever, are u!nacious but not brave" #or they do not act #or honour9s sake nor as the rule directs, but #rom stren!th o# #eelin!" they have, ho$ever, somethin! akin to coura!e. )4* Nor are san!uine eo le brave" #or they are con#ident in dan!er only because they have conquered o#ten and a!ainst many #oes. >et they closely resemble brave men, because both are con#ident" but brave men are con#ident #or the reasons stated earlier, $hile these are so because they think they are the stron!est and can su##er nothin!. )Drunken men also behave in this $ay" they become san!uine*. When their adventures do not succeed, ho$ever, they run a$ay" but it $as the mark o# a brave man to #ace thin!s that are, and seem, terrible #or a man, because it is noble to do so and dis!race#ul not to do so. 3ence also it is thou!ht the mark o# a braver man to be #earless and undisturbed in sudden alarms than to be so in those that are #oreseen" #or it must have roceeded more #rom a state o# character, because less #rom re aration" acts that are #oreseen may be chosen by calculation and rule, but sudden actions must be in accordance $ith one9s state o# character. )<* 7eo le $ho are i!norant o# the dan!er also a ear brave, and they are not #ar removed #rom those o# a san!uine tem er, but are in#erior inasmuch as they have no sel#&reliance $hile these have. 3ence also the san!uine hold their !round #or a time" but those $ho have been deceived about the #acts #ly i# they kno$ or sus ect that these are di##erent #rom $hat they su osed, as ha ened to the Ar!ives $hen they #ell in $ith the , artans and took them #or ,icyonians. We have, then, described the character both o# brave men and o# those $ho are thou!ht to be brave. C /hou!h coura!e is concerned $ith #eelin!s o# con#idence and o# #ear, it is not concerned $ith both alike, but more $ith the thin!s that ins ire #ear" #or he $ho is undisturbed in #ace o# these and bears himsel# as he should to$ards these is more truly brave than the man $ho does so to$ards the thin!s that ins ire con#idence. It is #or #acin! $hat is ain#ul, then, as has been said, that men are called brave. 3ence also coura!e involves ain, and is 'ustly raised" #or it is harder to #ace $hat is ain#ul than to abstain #rom $hat is leasant. >et the end $hich coura!e sets be#ore it $ould seem to be leasant, but to be concealed by the attendin! circumstances, as ha ens also in athletic contests" #or the end at $hich bo2ers aim is leasant % the cro$n and the honours % but the blo$s they take are distressin! to #lesh and blood, and ain#ul, and so is their $hole e2ertion" and because the blo$s and the e2ertions are many the end, $hich is but small, a ears to have nothin! leasant in it. And so, i# the case o# coura!e is similar, death and $ounds $ill be ain#ul to the brave man and a!ainst his $ill, but he $ill #ace them because it is noble to do so or because it is base not to do so. And the more he is ossessed o# virtue in its entirety and the ha ier he is, the more he $ill be ained at the thou!ht o# death" #or li#e is best $orth livin! #or such a man, and he is kno$in!ly losin! the !reatest !oods, and this is ain#ul. But he is none the less brave, and erha s all the more so, because he chooses noble deeds o# $ar at that cost. It is not the case, then, $ith all the virtues that the e2ercise o# them is leasant, e2ce t in so #ar as it reaches its end. But it is quite ossible that the best soldiers may be not men o# this sort but those $ho are less brave but have no other !ood" #or these are ready to #ace dan!er, and they sell their li#e #or tri#lin! !ains. 0D

,o much, then, #or coura!e" it is not di##icult to !ras its nature in outline, at any rate, #rom $hat has been said. 1D A#ter coura!e let us s eak o# tem erance" #or these seem to be the virtues o# the irrational arts. We have said that tem erance is a mean $ith re!ard to leasures )#or it is less, and not in the same $ay, concerned $ith ains*" sel#&indul!ence also is mani#ested in the same s here. No$, there#ore, let us determine $ith $hat sort o# leasures they are concerned. We may assume the distinction bet$een bodily leasures and those o# the soul, such as love o# honour and love o# learnin!" #or the lover o# each o# these deli!hts in that o# $hich he is a lover, the body bein! in no $ay a##ected, but rather the mind" but men $ho are concerned $ith such leasures are called neither tem erate nor sel#&indul!ent. Nor, a!ain, are those $ho are concerned $ith the other leasures that are not bodily" #or those $ho are #ond o# hearin! and tellin! stories and $ho s end their days on anythin! that turns u are called !ossi s, but not sel#&indul!ent, nor are those $ho are ained at the loss o# money or o# #riends. /em erance must be concerned $ith bodily leasures, but not all even o# these" #or those $ho deli!ht in ob'ects o# vision, such as colours and sha es and aintin!, are called neither tem erate nor sel#&indul!ent" yet it $ould seem ossible to deli!ht even in these either as one should or to e2cess or to a de#icient de!ree. And so too is it $ith ob'ects o# hearin!" no one calls those $ho deli!ht e2trava!antly in music or actin! sel#&indul!ent, nor those $ho do so as they ou!ht tem erate. Nor do $e a ly these names to those $ho deli!ht in odour, unless it be incidentally" $e do not call those sel#&indul!ent $ho deli!ht in the odour o# a les or roses or incense, but rather those $ho deli!ht in the odour o# un!uents or o# dainty dishes" #or sel#&indul!ent eo le deli!ht in these because these remind them o# the ob'ects o# their a etite. And one may see even other eo le, $hen they are hun!ry, deli!htin! in the smell o# #ood" but to deli!ht in this kind o# thin! is the mark o# the sel#&indul!ent man" #or these are ob'ects o# a etite to him. Nor is there in animals other than man any leasure connected $ith these senses, e2ce t incidentally. .or do!s do not deli!ht in the scent o# hares, but in the eatin! o# them, but the scent told them the hares $ere there" nor does the lion deli!ht in the lo$in! o# the o2, but in eatin! it" but he erceived by the lo$in! that it $as near, and there#ore a ears to deli!ht in the lo$in!" and similarly he does not deli!ht because he sees 8a sta! or a $ild !oat9, but because he is !oin! to make a meal o# it. /em erance and sel#&indul!ence, ho$ever, are concerned $ith the kind o# leasures that the other animals share in, $hich there#ore a ear slavish and brutish" these are touch and taste. But even o# taste they a ear to make little or no use" #or the business o# taste is the discriminatin! o# #lavours, $hich is done by $inetasters and eo le $ho season dishes" but they hardly take leasure in makin! these discriminations, or at least sel#&indul!ent eo le do not, but in the actual en'oyment, $hich in all cases comes throu!h touch, both in the case o# #ood and in that o# drink and in that o# se2ual intercourse. /his is $hy a certain !ourmand rayed that his throat mi!ht become lon!er than a crane9s, im lyin! that it $as the contact that he took leasure in. /hus the sense $ith $hich sel#&indul!ence is connected is the most $idely shared o# the senses" and sel#&indul!ence $ould seem to be 'ustly a matter o# re roach, because it attaches to us not as men but as animals. /o deli!ht in such thin!s, then, and to love them above all others, is brutish. .or even o# the leasures o# touch the most liberal have been eliminated, e.!. those roduced in the !ymnasium by rubbin! and by the consequent heat" #or the contact characteristic o# the sel#&indul!ent man does not a##ect the $hole body but only certain arts. 01

11 1# the a etites some seem to be common, others to be eculiar to individuals and acquired" e.!. the a etite #or #ood is natural, since every one $ho is $ithout it craves #or #ood or drink, and sometimes #or both, and #or love also )as 3omer says* i# he is youn! and lusty" but not every one craves #or this or that kind o# nourishment or love, nor #or the same thin!s. 3ence such cravin! a ears to be our very o$n. >et it has o# course somethin! natural about it" #or di##erent thin!s are leasant to di##erent kinds o# eo le, and some thin!s are more leasant to every one than chance ob'ects. No$ in the natural a etites #e$ !o $ron!, and only in one direction, that o# e2cess" #or to eat or drink $hatever o##ers itsel# till one is sur#eited is to e2ceed the natural amount, since natural a etite is the re lenishment o# one9s de#iciency. 3ence these eo le are called belly&!ods, this im lyin! that they #ill their belly beyond $hat is ri!ht. It is eo le o# entirely slavish character that become like this. But $ith re!ard to the leasures eculiar to individuals many eo le !o $ron! and in many $ays. .or $hile the eo le $ho are 8#ond o# so and so9 are so called because they deli!ht either in the $ron! thin!s, or more than most eo le do, or in the $ron! $ay, the sel#&indul!ent e2ceed in all three $ays" they both deli!ht in some thin!s that they ou!ht not to deli!ht in )since they are hate#ul*, and i# one ou!ht to deli!ht in some o# the thin!s they deli!ht in, they do so more than one ou!ht and than most men do. 7lainly, then, e2cess $ith re!ard to leasures is sel#&indul!ence and is cul able" $ith re!ard to ains one is not, as in the case o# coura!e, called tem erate #or #acin! them or sel#&indul!ent #or not doin! so, but the sel#indul!ent man is so called because he is ained more than he ou!ht at not !ettin! leasant thin!s )even his ain bein! caused by leasure*, and the tem erate man is so called because he is not ained at the absence o# $hat is leasant and at his abstinence #rom it. /he sel#&indul!ent man, then, craves #or all leasant thin!s or those that are most leasant, and is led by his a etite to choose these at the cost o# everythin! else" hence he is ained both $hen he #ails to !et them and $hen he is merely cravin! #or them )#or a etite involves ain*" but it seems absurd to be ained #or the sake o# leasure. 7eo le $ho #all short $ith re!ard to leasures and deli!ht in them less than they should are hardly #ound" #or such insensibility is not human. Even the other animals distin!uish di##erent kinds o# #ood and en'oy some and not others" and i# there is any one $ho #inds nothin! leasant and nothin! more attractive than anythin! else, he must be somethin! quite di##erent #rom a man" this sort o# erson has not received a name because he hardly occurs. /he tem erate man occu ies a middle osition $ith re!ard to these ob'ects. .or he neither en'oys the thin!s that the sel#&indul!ent man en'oys most % but rather dislikes them % nor in !eneral the thin!s that he should not, nor anythin! o# this sort to e2cess, nor does he #eel ain or cravin! $hen they are absent, or does so only to a moderate de!ree, and not more than he should, nor $hen he should not, and so on" but the thin!s that, bein! leasant, make #or health or #or !ood condition, he $ill desire moderately and as he should, and also other leasant thin!s i# they are not hindrances to these ends, or contrary to $hat is noble, or beyond his means. .or he $ho ne!lects these conditions loves such leasures more than they are $orth, but the tem erate man is not that sort o# erson, but the sort o# erson that the ri!ht rule rescribes. 1( ,el#&indul!ence is more like a voluntary state than co$ardice. .or the #ormer is actuated by leasure, the latter by ain, o# $hich the one is to be chosen and the other to be avoided" and ain u sets and destroys the nature o# the erson $ho #eels it, $hile leasure does nothin! o# the sort. 0(

/here#ore sel#&indul!ence is more voluntary. 3ence also it is more a matter o# re roach" #or it is easier to become accustomed to its ob'ects, since there are many thin!s o# this sort in li#e, and the rocess o# habituation to them is #ree #rom dan!er, $hile $ith terrible ob'ects the reverse is the case. But co$ardice $ould seem to be voluntary in a di##erent de!ree #rom its articular mani#estations" #or it is itsel# ainless, but in these $e are u set by ain, so that $e even thro$ do$n our arms and dis!race ourselves in other $ays" hence our acts are even thou!ht to be done under com ulsion. .or the sel#&indul!ent man, on the other hand, the articular acts are voluntary )#or he does them $ith cravin! and desire*, but the $hole state is less so" #or no one craves to be sel#&indul!ent. /he name sel#&indul!ence is a lied also to childish #aults" #or they bear a certain resemblance to $hat $e have been considerin!. Which is called a#ter $hich, makes no di##erence to our resent ur ose" lainly, ho$ever, the later is called a#ter the earlier. /he trans#erence o# the name seems not a bad one" #or that $hich desires $hat is base and $hich develo s quickly ou!ht to be ke t in a chastened condition, and these characteristics belon! above all to a etite and to the child, since children in #act live at the beck and call o# a etite, and it is in them that the desire #or $hat is leasant is stron!est. I#, then, it is not !oin! to be obedient and sub'ect to the rulin! rinci le, it $ill !o to !reat len!ths" #or in an irrational bein! the desire #or leasure is insatiable even i# it tries every source o# !rati#ication, and the e2ercise o# a etite increases its innate #orce, and i# a etites are stron! and violent they even e2 el the o$er o# calculation. 3ence they should be moderate and #e$, and should in no $ay o ose the rational rinci le % and this is $hat $e call an obedient and chastened state % and as the child should live accordin! to the direction o# his tutor, so the a etitive element should live accordin! to rational rinci le. 3ence the a etitive element in a tem erate man should harmoni-e $ith the rational rinci le" #or the noble is the mark at $hich both aim, and the tem erate man craves #or the thin!s be ou!ht, as he ou!ht, as $hen he ou!ht" and $hen he ou!ht" and this is $hat rational rinci le directs. 3ere $e conclude our account o# tem erance.

Book I6 1 5et us s eak ne2t o# liberality. It seems to be the mean $ith re!ard to $ealth" #or the liberal man is raised not in res ect o# military matters, nor o# those in res ect o# $hich the temrate man is raised, nor o# 'udicial decisions, but $ith re!ard to the !ivin! and takin! o# $ealth, and es ecially in res ect o# !ivin!. No$ by 8$ealth9 $e mean all the thin!s $hose value is measured by money. .urther, rodi!ality and meanness are e2cesses and de#ects $ith re!ard to $ealth" and meanness $e al$ays im ute to those $ho care more than they ou!ht #or $ealth, but $e sometimes a ly the $ord 8 rodi!ality9 in a com le2 sense" #or $e call those men rodi!als $ho are incontinent and s end money on sel#&indul!ence. 3ence also they are thou!ht the oorest characters" #or they combine more vices than one. /here#ore the a lication o# the $ord to them is not its ro er use" #or a 8 rodi!al9 means a man $ho has a sin!le evil quality, that o# $astin! his substance" since a rodi!al is one $ho is bein! ruined by his o$n #ault, and the $astin! o# substance is thou!ht to be a sort o# ruinin! o# onesel#, li#e bein! held to de end on ossession o# substance.

00

/his, then, is the sense in $hich $e take the $ord 8 rodi!ality9. No$ the thin!s that have a use may be used either $ell or badly" and riches is a use#ul thin!" and everythin! is used best by the man $ho has the virtue concerned $ith it" riches, there#ore, $ill be used best by the man $ho has the virtue concerned $ith $ealth" and this is the liberal man. No$ s endin! and !ivin! seem to be the usin! o# $ealth" takin! and kee in! rather the ossession o# it. 3ence it is more the mark o# the liberal man to !ive to the ri!ht eo le than to take #rom the ri!ht sources and not to take #rom the $ron!. .or it is more characteristic o# virtue to do !ood than to have !ood done to one, and more characteristic to do $hat is noble than not to do $hat is base" and it is not hard to see that !ivin! im lies doin! !ood and doin! $hat is noble, and takin! im lies havin! !ood done to one or not actin! basely. And !ratitude is #elt to$ards him $ho !ives, not to$ards him $ho does not take, and raise also is besto$ed more on him. It is easier, also, not to take than to !ive" #or men are a ter to !ive a$ay their o$n too little than to take $hat is another9s. ;ivers, too, are called liberal" but those $ho do not take are not raised #or liberality but rather #or 'ustice" $hile those $ho take are hardly raised at all. And the liberal are almost the most loved o# all virtuous characters, since they are use#ul" and this de ends on their !ivin!. No$ virtuous actions are noble and done #or the sake o# the noble. /here#ore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, $ill !ive #or the sake o# the noble, and ri!htly" #or he $ill !ive to the ri!ht eo le, the ri!ht amounts, and at the ri!ht time, $ith all the other quali#ications that accom any ri!ht !ivin!" and that too $ith leasure or $ithout ain" #or that $hich is virtuous is leasant or #ree #rom ain % least o# all $ill it be ain#ul. But he $ho !ives to the $ron! eo le or not #or the sake o# the noble but #or some other cause, $ill be called not liberal but by some other name. Nor is he liberal $ho !ives $ith ain" #or he $ould re#er the $ealth to the noble act, and this is not characteristic o# a liberal man. But no more $ill the liberal man take #rom $ron! sources" #or such takin! is not characteristic o# the man $ho sets no store by $ealth. Nor $ill he be a ready asker" #or it is not characteristic o# a man $ho con#ers bene#its to acce t them li!htly. But he $ill take #rom the ri!ht sources, e.!. #rom his o$n ossessions, not as somethin! noble but as a necessity, that he may have somethin! to !ive. Nor $ill he ne!lect his o$n ro erty, since he $ishes by means o# this to hel others. And he $ill re#rain #rom !ivin! to anybody and everybody, that he may have somethin! to !ive to the ri!ht eo le, at the ri!ht time, and $here it is noble to do so. It is hi!hly characteristic o# a liberal man also to !o to e2cess in !ivin!, so that he leaves too little #or himsel#" #or it is the nature o# a liberal man not to look to himsel#. /he term 8liberality9 is used relatively to a man9s substance" #or liberality resides not in the multitude o# the !i#ts but in the state o# character o# the !iver, and this is relative to the !iver9s substance. /here is there#ore nothin! to revent the man $ho !ives less #rom bein! the more liberal man, i# he has less to !ive those are thou!ht to be more liberal $ho have not made their $ealth but inherited it" #or in the #irst lace they have no e2 erience o# $ant, and secondly all men are #onder o# their o$n roductions, as are arents and oets. It is not easy #or the liberal man to be rich, since he is not a t either at takin! or at kee in!, but at !ivin! a$ay, and does not value $ealth #or its o$n sake but as a means to !ivin!. 3ence comes the char!e that is brou!ht a!ainst #ortune, that those $ho deserve riches most !et it least. But it is not unreasonable that it should turn out so" #or he cannot have $ealth, any more than anythin! else, i# he does not take ains to have it. >et he $ill not !ive to the $ron! eo le nor at the $ron! time, and so on" #or he $ould no lon!er be actin! in accordance $ith liberality, and i# he s ent on these ob'ects he $ould have nothin! to s end on the ri!ht ob'ects. .or, as has been said, he is liberal $ho s ends accordin! to his substance and on the ri!ht ob'ects" and he $ho e2ceeds is rodi!al. 3ence $e do not call des ots rodi!al" #or it is thou!ht not easy #or them to !ive and s end beyond the amount o# their ossessions. 5iberality, then, bein! a mean $ith re!ard to !ivin! and takin! o# $ealth, the liberal man $ill both !ive and 04

s end the ri!ht amounts and on the ri!ht ob'ects, alike in small thin!s and in !reat, and that $ith leasure" he $ill also take the ri!ht amounts and #rom the ri!ht sources. .or, the virtue bein! a mean $ith re!ard to both, he $ill do both as he ou!ht" since this sort o# takin! accom anies ro er !ivin!, and that $hich is not o# this sort is contrary to it, and accordin!ly the !ivin! and takin! that accom any each other are resent to!ether in the same man, $hile the contrary kinds evidently are not. But i# he ha ens to s end in a manner contrary to $hat is ri!ht and noble, he $ill be ained, but moderately and as he ou!ht" #or it is the mark o# virtue both to be leased and to be ained at the ri!ht ob'ects and in the ri!ht $ay. .urther, the liberal man is easy to deal $ith in money matters" #or he can be !ot the better o#, since he sets no store by money, and is more annoyed i# he has not s ent somethin! that he ou!ht than ained i# he has s ent somethin! that he ou!ht not, and does not a!ree $ith the sayin! o# ,imonides. /he rodi!al errs in these res ects also" #or he is neither leased nor ained at the ri!ht thin!s or in the ri!ht $ay" this $ill be more evident as $e !o on. We have said that rodi!ality and meanness are e2cesses and de#iciencies, and in t$o thin!s, in !ivin! and in takin!" #or $e include s endin! under !ivin!. No$ rodi!ality e2ceeds in !ivin! and not takin!, $hile meanness #alls short in !ivin!, and e2ceeds in takin!, e2ce t in small thin!s. /he characteristics o# rodi!ality are not o#ten combined" #or it is not easy to !ive to all i# you take #rom none" rivate ersons soon e2haust their substance $ith !ivin!, and it is to these that the name o# rodi!als is a lied % thou!h a man o# this sort $ould seem to be in no small de!ree better than a mean man. .or he is easily cured both by a!e and by overty, and thus he may move to$ards the middle state. .or he has the characteristics o# the liberal man, since he both !ives and re#rains #rom takin!, thou!h he does neither o# these in the ri!ht manner or $ell. /here#ore i# he $ere brou!ht to do so by habituation or in some other $ay, he $ould be liberal" #or he $ill then !ive to the ri!ht eo le, and $ill not take #rom the $ron! sources. /his is $hy he is thou!ht to have not a bad character" it is not the mark o# a $icked or i!noble man to !o to e2cess in !ivin! and not takin!, but only o# a #oolish one. /he man $ho is rodi!al in this $ay is thou!ht much better than the mean man both #or the a#oresaid reasons and because he bene#its many $hile the other bene#its no one, not even himsel#. But most rodi!al eo le, as has been said, also take #rom the $ron! sources, and are in this res ect mean. /hey become a t to take because they $ish to s end and cannot do this easily" #or their ossessions soon run short. /hus they are #orced to rovide means #rom some other source. At the same time, because they care nothin! #or honour, they take recklessly and #rom any source" #or they have an a etite #or !ivin!, and they do not mind ho$ or #rom $hat source. 3ence also their !ivin! is not liberal" #or it is not noble, nor does it aim at nobility, nor is it done in the ri!ht $ay" sometimes they make rich those $ho should be oor, and $ill !ive nothin! to eo le o# res ectable character, and much to #latterers or those $ho rovide them $ith some other leasure. 3ence also most o# them are sel#&indul!ent" #or they s end li!htly and $aste money on their indul!ences, and incline to$ards leasures because they do not live $ith a vie$ to $hat is noble. /he rodi!al man, then, turns into $hat $e have described i# he is le#t untutored, but i# he is treated $ith care he $ill arrive at the intermediate and ri!ht state. But meanness is both incurable )#or old a!e and every disability is thou!ht to make men mean* and more innate in men than rodi!ality" #or most men are #onder o# !ettin! money than o# !ivin!. It also e2tends $idely, and is multi#orm, since there seem to be many kinds o# meanness. .or it consists in t$o thin!s, de#iciency in !ivin! and e2cess in takin!, and is not #ound com lete in all men but is sometimes divided" some men !o to e2cess in takin!, others #all short in !ivin!. /hose $ho are called by such names as 8miserly9, 8close9, 8stin!y9, all #all short in !ivin!, but do 0<

not covet the ossessions o# others nor $ish to !et them. In some this is due to a sort o# honesty and avoidance o# $hat is dis!race#ul )#or some seem, or at least ro#ess, to hoard their money #or this reason, that they may not some day be #orced to do somethin! dis!race#ul" to this class belon! the cheese arer and every one o# the sort" he is so called #rom his e2cess o# un$illin!ness to !ive anythin!*" $hile others a!ain kee their hands o## the ro erty o# others #rom #ear, on the !round that it is not easy, i# one takes the ro erty o# others onesel#, to avoid havin! one9s o$n taken by them" they are there#ore content neither to take nor to !ive. 1thers a!ain e2ceed in res ect o# takin! by takin! anythin! and #rom any source, e.!. those $ho ly sordid trades, im s and all such eo le, and those $ho lend small sums and at hi!h rates. .or all o# these take more than they ou!ht and #rom $ron! sources. What is common to them is evidently sordid love o# !ain" they all ut u $ith a bad name #or the sake o# !ain, and little !ain at that. .or those $ho make !reat !ains but #rom $ron! sources, and not the ri!ht !ains, e.!. des ots $hen they sack cities and s oil tem les, $e do not call mean but rather $icked, im ious, and un'ust. But the !amester and the #oot ad )and the hi!h$ayman* belon! to the class o# the mean, since they have a sordid love o# !ain. .or it is #or !ain that both o# them ly their cra#t and endure the dis!race o# it, and the one #aces the !reatest dan!ers #or the sake o# the booty, $hile the other makes !ain #rom his #riends, to $hom he ou!ht to be !ivin!. Both, then, since they are $illin! to make !ain #rom $ron! sources, are sordid lovers o# !ain" there#ore all such #orms o# takin! are mean. And it is natural that meanness is described as the contrary o# liberality" #or not only is it a !reater evil than rodi!ality, but men err more o#ten in this direction than in the $ay o# rodi!ality as $e have described it. ,o much, then, #or liberality and the o osed vices. ( It $ould seem ro er to discuss ma!ni#icence ne2t. .or this also seems to be a virtue concerned $ith $ealth" but it does not like liberality e2tend to all the actions that are concerned $ith $ealth, but only to those that involve e2 enditure" and in these it sur asses liberality in scale. .or, as the name itsel# su!!ests, it is a #ittin! e2 enditure involvin! lar!eness o# scale. But the scale is relative" #or the e2 ense o# equi in! a trireme is not the same as that o# headin! a sacred embassy. It is $hat is #ittin!, then, in relation to the a!ent, and to the circumstances and the ob'ect. /he man $ho in small or middlin! thin!s s ends accordin! to the merits o# the case is not called ma!ni#icent )e.!. the man $ho can say 8many a !i#t I !ave the $anderer9*, but only the man $ho does so in !reat thin!s. .or the ma!ni#icent man is liberal, but the liberal man is not necessarily ma!ni#icent. /he de#iciency o# this state o# character is called ni!!ardliness, the e2cess vul!arity, lack o# taste, and the like, $hich do not !o to e2cess in the amount s ent on ri!ht ob'ects, but by sho$y e2 enditure in the $ron! circumstances and the $ron! manner" $e shall s eak o# these vices later. /he ma!ni#icent man is like an artist" #or he can see $hat is #ittin! and s end lar!e sums taste#ully. .or, as $e said at the be!inin!, a state o# character is determined by its activities and by its ob'ects. No$ the e2 enses o# the ma!ni#icent man are lar!e and #ittin!. ,uch, there#ore, are also his results" #or thus there $ill be a !reat e2 enditure and one that is #ittin! to its result. /here#ore the result should be $orthy o# the e2 ense, and the e2 ense should be $orthy o# the result, or should even e2ceed it. And the ma!ni#icent man $ill s end such sums #or honour9s sake" #or this is common to the virtues. And #urther he $ill do so !ladly and lavishly" #or nice calculation is a ni!!ardly thin!. And he $ill consider ho$ the result can be made most beauti#ul 0=

and most becomin! rather than #or ho$ much it can be roduced and ho$ it can be roduced most chea ly. It is necessary, then, that the ma!ni#icent man be also liberal. .or the liberal man also $ill s end $hat he ou!ht and as he ou!ht" and it is in these matters that the !reatness im lied in the name o# the ma!ni#icent man % his bi!ness, as it $ere % is mani#ested, since liberality is concerned $ith these matters" and at an equal e2 ense he $ill roduce a more ma!ni#icent $ork o# art. .or a ossession and a $ork o# art have not the same e2cellence. /he most valuable ossession is that $hich is $orth most, e.!. !old, but the most valuable $ork o# art is that $hich is !reat and beauti#ul )#or the contem lation o# such a $ork ins ires admiration, and so does ma!ni#icence*" and a $ork has an e2cellence % vi-. ma!ni#icence % $hich involves ma!nitude. Ba!ni#icence is an attribute o# e2 enditures o# the kind $hich $e call honourable, e.!. those connected $ith the !ods % votive o##erin!s, buildin!s, and sacri#ices % and similarly $ith any #orm o# reli!ious $orshi , and all those that are ro er ob'ects o# ublic&s irited ambition, as $hen eo le think they ou!ht to equi a chorus or a trireme, or entertain the city, in a brilliant $ay. But in all cases, as has been said, $e have re!ard to the a!ent as $ell and ask $ho he is and $hat means he has" #or the e2 enditure should be $orthy o# his means, and suit not only the result but also the roducer. 3ence a oor man cannot be ma!ni#icent, since he has not the means $ith $hich to s end lar!e sums #ittin!ly" and he $ho tries is a #ool, since he s ends beyond $hat can be e2 ected o# him and $hat is ro er, but it is ri!ht e2 enditure that is virtuous. But !reat e2 enditure is becomin! to those $ho have suitable means to start $ith, acquired by their o$n e##orts or #rom ancestors or conne2ions, and to eo le o# hi!h birth or re utation, and so on" #or all these thin!s brin! $ith them !reatness and resti!e. 7rimarily, then, the ma!ni#icent man is o# this sort, and ma!ni#icence is sho$n in e2 enditures o# this sort, as has been said" #or these are the !reatest and most honourable. 1# rivate occasions o# e2 enditure the most suitable are those that take lace once #or all, e.!. a $eddin! or anythin! o# the kind, or anythin! that interests the $hole city or the eo le o# osition in it, and also the receivin! o# #orei!n !uests and the sendin! o# them on their $ay, and !i#ts and counter&!i#ts" #or the ma!ni#icent man s ends not on himsel# but on ublic ob'ects, and !i#ts bear some resemblance to votive o##erin!s. A ma!ni#icent man $ill also #urnish his house suitably to his $ealth )#or even a house is a sort o# ublic ornament*, and $ill s end by re#erence on those $orks that are lastin! )#or these are the most beauti#ul*, and on every class o# thin!s he $ill s end $hat is becomin!" #or the same thin!s are not suitable #or !ods and #or men, nor in a tem le and in a tomb. And since each e2 enditure may be !reat o# its kind, and $hat is most ma!ni#icent absolutely is !reat e2 enditure on a !reat ob'ect, but $hat is ma!ni#icent here is $hat is !reat in these circumstances, and !reatness in the $ork di##ers #rom !reatness in the e2 ense )#or the most beauti#ul ball or bottle is ma!ni#icent as a !i#t to a child, but the rice o# it is small and mean*, % there#ore it is characteristic o# the ma!ni#icent man, $hatever kind o# result he is roducin!, to roduce it ma!ni#icently )#or such a result is not easily sur assed* and to make it $orthy o# the e2 enditure. ,uch, then, is the ma!ni#icent man" the man $ho !oes to e2cess and is vul!ar e2ceeds, as has been said, by s endin! beyond $hat is ri!ht. .or on small ob'ects o# e2 enditure he s ends much and dis lays a tasteless sho$iness" e.!. he !ives a club dinner on the scale o# a $eddin! banquet, and $hen he rovides the chorus #or a comedy he brin!s them on to the sta!e in ur le, as they do at Be!ara. And all such thin!s he $ill do not #or honour9s sake but to sho$ o## his $ealth, and because he thinks he is admired #or these thin!s, and $here he ou!ht to s end much he s ends little and $here little, much. /he ni!!ardly man on the other hand $ill #all short in everythin!, and a#ter s endin! the !reatest sums $ill s oil the beauty o# the result #or a tri#le, and $hatever he is doin! he $ill hesitate and consider ho$ he may s end least, and lament even that, and think he is doin! everythin! on a bi!!er scale than he ou!ht. 0@

/hese states o# character, then, are vices" yet they do not brin! dis!race because they are neither harm#ul to one9s nei!hbour nor very unseemly. 0 7ride seems even #rom its name to be concerned $ith !reat thin!s" $hat sort o# !reat thin!s, is the #irst question $e must try to ans$er. It makes no di##erence $hether $e consider the state o# character or the man characteri-ed by it. No$ the man is thou!ht to be roud $ho thinks himsel# $orthy o# !reat thin!s, bein! $orthy o# them" #or he $ho does so beyond his deserts is a #ool, but no virtuous man is #oolish or silly. /he roud man, then, is the man $e have described. .or he $ho is $orthy o# little and thinks himsel# $orthy o# little is tem erate, but not roud" #or ride im lies !reatness, as beauty im lies a !oodsi-ed body, and little eo le may be neat and $ell& ro ortioned but cannot be beauti#ul. 1n the other hand, he $ho thinks himsel# $orthy o# !reat thin!s, bein! un$orthy o# them, is vain" thou!h not every one $ho thinks himsel# $orthy o# more than he really is $orthy o# in vain. /he man $ho thinks himsel# $orthy o# $orthy o# less than he is really $orthy o# is unduly humble, $hether his deserts be !reat or moderate, or his deserts be small but his claims yet smaller. And the man $hose deserts are !reat $ould seem most unduly humble" #or $hat $ould he have done i# they had been less+ /he roud man, then, is an e2treme in res ect o# the !reatness o# his claims, but a mean in res ect o# the ri!htness o# them" #or he claims $hat is accordance $ith his merits, $hile the others !o to e2cess or #all short. I#, then, he deserves and claims !reat thin!s, and above all the !reat thin!s, he $ill be concerned $ith one thin! in articular. Desert is relative to e2ternal !oods" and the !reatest o# these, $e should say, is that $hich $e render to the !ods, and $hich eo le o# osition most aim at, and $hich is the ri-e a ointed #or the noblest deeds" and this is honour" that is surely the !reatest o# e2ternal !oods. 3onours and dishonours, there#ore, are the ob'ects $ith res ect to $hich the roud man is as he should be. And even a art #rom ar!ument it is $ith honour that roud men a ear to be concerned" #or it is honour that they chie#ly claim, but in accordance $ith their deserts. /he unduly humble man #alls short both in com arison $ith his o$n merits and in com arison $ith the roud man9s claims. /he vain man !oes to e2cess in com arison $ith his o$n merits, but does not e2ceed the roud man9s claims. No$ the roud man, since he deserves most, must be !ood in the hi!hest de!ree" #or the better man al$ays deserves more, and the best man most. /here#ore the truly roud man must be !ood. And !reatness in every virtue $ould seem to be characteristic o# a roud man. And it $ould be most unbecomin! #or a roud man to #ly #rom dan!er, s$in!in! his arms by his sides, or to $ron! another" #or to $hat end should he do dis!race#ul acts, he to $hom nothin! is !reat+ I# $e consider him oint by oint $e shall see the utter absurdity o# a roud man $ho is not !ood. Nor, a!ain, $ould he be $orthy o# honour i# he $ere bad" #or honour is the ri-e o# virtue, and it is to the !ood that it is rendered. 7ride, then, seems to be a sort o# cro$n o# the virtues" #or it makes them !reater, and it is not #ound $ithout them. /here#ore it is hard to be truly roud" #or it is im ossible $ithout nobility and !oodness o# character. It is chie#ly $ith honours and dishonours, then, that the roud man is concerned" and at honours that are !reat and con#erred by !ood men he $ill be moderately 7leased, thinkin! that he is comin! by his o$n or even less than his o$n" #or there can be no honour that is $orthy o# er#ect virtue, yet he $ill at any rate acce t it since they have nothin! !reater to besto$ on him" but honour #rom casual eo le and on tri#lin! !rounds he $ill utterly des ise, since it is not this that he deserves, and dishonour too, since in his case it cannot be 'ust. In the #irst lace, then, as has been said, the roud man is concerned $ith honours" yet he $ill also bear himsel# $ith moderation to$ards $ealth and o$er and all !ood or 0A

evil #ortune, $hatever may be#all him, and $ill be neither over&'oyed by !ood #ortune nor over& ained by evil. .or not even to$ards honour does he bear himsel# as i# it $ere a very !reat thin!. 7o$er and $ealth are desirable #or the sake o# honour )at least those $ho have them $ish to !et honour by means o# them*" and #or him to $hom even honour is a little thin! the others must be so too. 3ence roud men are thou!ht to be disdain#ul. /he !oods o# #ortune also are thou!ht to contribute to$ards ride. .or men $ho are $ell&born are thou!ht $orthy o# honour, and so are those $ho en'oy o$er or $ealth" #or they are in a su erior osition, and everythin! that has a su eriority in somethin! !ood is held in !reater honour. 3ence even such thin!s make men rouder" #or they are honoured by some #or havin! them" but in truth the !ood man alone is to be honoured" he, ho$ever, $ho has both advanta!es is thou!ht the more $orthy o# honour. But those $ho $ithout virtue have such !oods are neither 'usti#ied in makin! !reat claims nor entitled to the name o# 8 roud9" #or these thin!s im ly er#ect virtue. Disdain#ul and insolent, ho$ever, even those $ho have such !oods become. .or $ithout virtue it is not easy to bear !race#ully the !oods o# #ortune" and, bein! unable to bear them, and thinkin! themselves su erior to others, they des ise others and themselves do $hat they lease. /hey imitate the roud man $ithout bein! like him, and this they do $here they can" so they do not act virtuously, but they do des ise others. .or the roud man des ises 'ustly )since he thinks truly*, but the many do so at random. 3e does not run into tri#lin! dan!ers, nor is he #ond o# dan!er, because he honours #e$ thin!s" but he $ill #ace !reat dan!ers, and $hen he is in dan!er he is uns arin! o# his li#e, kno$in! that there are conditions on $hich li#e is not $orth havin!. And he is the sort o# man to con#er bene#its, but he is ashamed o# receivin! them" #or the one is the mark o# a su erior, the other o# an in#erior. And he is a t to con#er !reater bene#its in return" #or thus the ori!inal bene#actor besides bein! aid $ill incur a debt to him, and $ill be the !ainer by the transaction. /hey seem also to remember any service they have done, but not those they have received )#or he $ho receives a service is in#erior to him $ho has done it, but the roud man $ishes to be su erior*, and to hear o# the #ormer $ith leasure, o# the latter $ith dis leasure" this, it seems, is $hy /hetis did not mention to Eeus the services she had done him, and $hy the , artans did not recount their services to the Athenians, but those they had received. It is a mark o# the roud man also to ask #or nothin! or scarcely anythin!, but to !ive hel readily, and to be di!ni#ied to$ards eo le $ho en'oy hi!h osition and !ood #ortune, but unassumin! to$ards those o# the middle class" #or it is a di##icult and lo#ty thin! to be su erior to the #ormer, but easy to be so to the latter, and a lo#ty bearin! over the #ormer is no mark o# ill&breedin!, but amon! humble eo le it is as vul!ar as a dis lay o# stren!th a!ainst the $eak. A!ain, it is characteristic o# the roud man not to aim at the thin!s commonly held in honour, or the thin!s in $hich others e2cel" to be slu!!ish and to hold back e2ce t $here !reat honour or a !reat $ork is at stake, and to be a man o# #e$ deeds, but o# !reat and notable ones. 3e must also be o en in his hate and in his love )#or to conceal one9s #eelin!s, i.e. to care less #or truth than #or $hat eo le $ill think, is a co$ard9s art*, and must s eak and act o enly" #or he is #ree o# s eech because he is contem tuous, and he is !iven to tellin! the truth, e2ce t $hen he s eaks in irony to the vul!ar. 3e must be unable to make his li#e revolve round another, unless it be a #riend" #or this is slavish, and #or this reason all #latterers are servile and eo le lackin! in sel#&res ect are #latterers. Nor is he !iven to admiration" #or nothin! to him is !reat. Nor is he mind#ul o# $ron!s" #or it is not the art o# a roud man to have a lon! memory, es ecially #or $ron!s, but rather to overlook them. Nor is he a !ossi " #or he $ill s eak neither about himsel# nor about another, since he cares not to be raised nor #or others to be blamed" nor a!ain is he !iven to raise" and #or the same reason he is not an evil&s eaker, even about his enemies, e2ce t #rom hau!htiness. With re!ard to necessary or small matters he is least 0C

o# all me !iven to lamentation or the askin! o# #avours" #or it is the art o# one $ho takes such matters seriously to behave so $ith res ect to them. 3e is one $ho $ill ossess beauti#ul and ro#itless thin!s rather than ro#itable and use#ul ones" #or this is more ro er to a character that su##ices to itsel#. .urther, a slo$ ste is thou!ht ro er to the roud man, a dee voice, and a level utterance" #or the man $ho takes #e$ thin!s seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the man $ho thinks nothin! !reat to be e2cited, $hile a shrill voice and a ra id !ait are the results o# hurry and e2citement. ,uch, then, is the roud man" the man $ho #alls short o# him is unduly humble, and the man $ho !oes beyond him is vain. No$ even these are not thou!ht to be bad )#or they are not malicious*, but only mistaken. .or the unduly humble man, bein! $orthy o# !ood thin!s, robs himsel# o# $hat he deserves, and to have somethin! bad about him #rom the #act that he does not think himsel# $orthy o# !ood thin!s, and seems also not to kno$ himsel#" else he $ould have desired the thin!s he $as $orthy o#, since these $ere !ood. >et such eo le are not thou!ht to be #ools, but rather unduly retirin!. ,uch a re utation, ho$ever, seems actually to make them $orse" #or each class o# eo le aims at $hat corres onds to its $orth, and these eo le stand back even #rom noble actions and undertakin!s, deemin! themselves un$orthy, and #rom e2ternal !oods no less. 6ain eo le, on the other hand, are #ools and i!norant o# themselves, and that mani#estly" #or, not bein! $orthy o# them, they attem t honourable undertakin!s, and then are #ound out" and tetadorn themselves $ith clothin! and out$ard sho$ and such thin!s, and $ish their strokes o# !ood #ortune to be made ublic, and s eak about them as i# they $ould be honoured #or them. But undue humility is more o osed to ride than vanity is" #or it is both commoner and $orse. 7ride, then, is concerned $ith honour on the !rand scale, as has been said. 4 /here seems to be in the s here o# honour also, as $as said in our #irst remarks on the sub'ect, a virtue $hich $ould a ear to be related to ride as liberality is to ma!ni#icence. .or neither o# these has anythin! to do $ith the !rand scale, but both dis ose us as is ri!ht $ith re!ard to middlin! and unim ortant ob'ects" as in !ettin! and !ivin! o# $ealth there is a mean and an e2cess and de#ect, so too honour may be desired more than is ri!ht, or less, or #rom the ri!ht sources and in the ri!ht $ay. We blame both the ambitious man as am at honour more than is ri!ht and #rom $ron! sources, and the unambitious man as not $illin! to be honoured even #or noble reasons. But sometimes $e raise the ambitious man as bein! manly and a lover o# $hat is noble, and the unambitious man as bein! moderate and sel#&controlled, as $e said in our #irst treatment o# the sub'ect. Evidently, since 8#ond o# such and such an ob'ect9 has more than one meanin!, $e do not assi!n the term 8ambition9 or 8love o# honour9 al$ays to the same thin!, but $hen $e raise the quality $e think o# the man $ho loves honour more than most eo le, and $hen $e blame it $e think o# him $ho loves it more than is ri!ht. /he mean bein! $ithout a name, the e2tremes seem to dis ute #or its lace as thou!h that $ere vacant by de#ault. But $here there is e2cess and de#ect, there is also an intermediate" no$ men desire honour both more than they should and less" there#ore it is ossible also to do so as one should" at all events this is the state o# character that is raised, bein! an unnamed mean in res ect o# honour. Relatively to ambition it seems to be unambitiousness, and relatively to unambitiousness it seems to be ambition, $hile relatively to both severally it seems in a sense to be both to!ether. /his a ears to be true o# the other virtues also. But in this case the e2tremes seem to be contradictories because the mean has not received a name. 4D

< ;ood tem er is a mean $ith res ect to an!er" the middle state bein! unnamed, and the e2tremes almost $ithout a name as $ell, $e lace !ood tem er in the middle osition, thou!h it inclines to$ards the de#iciency, $hich is $ithout a name. /he e2cess mi!ht called a sort o# 8irascibility9. .or the assion is an!er, $hile its causes are many and diverse. /he man $ho is an!ry at the ri!ht thin!s and $ith the ri!ht eo le, and, #urther, as he ou!ht, $hen he ou!ht, and as lon! as he ou!ht, is raised. /his $ill be the !ood&tem ered man, then, since !ood tem er is raised. .or the !ood&tem ered man tends to be un erturbed and not to be led by assion, but to be an!ry in the manner, at the thin!s, and #or the len!th o# time, that the rule dictates" but he is thou!ht to err rather in the direction o# de#iciency" #or the !ood&tem ered man is not reven!e#ul, but rather tends to make allo$ances. /he de#iciency, $hether it is a sort o# 8inirascibility9 or $hatever it is, is blamed. .or those $ho are not an!ry at the thin!s they should be an!ry at are thou!ht to be #ools, and so are those $ho are not an!ry in the ri!ht $ay, at the ri!ht time, or $ith the ri!ht ersons" #or such a man is thou!ht not to #eel thin!s nor to be ained by them, and, since he does not !et an!ry, he is thou!ht unlikely to de#end himsel#" and to endure bein! insulted and ut u $ith insult to one9s #riends is slavish. /he e2cess can be mani#ested in all the oints that have been named )#or one can be an!ry $ith the $ron! ersons, at the $ron! thin!s, more than is ri!ht, too quickly, or too lon!*" yet all are not #ound in the same erson. Indeed they could not" #or evil destroys even itsel#, and i# it is com lete becomes unbearable. No$ hot&tem ered eo le !et an!ry quickly and $ith the $ron! ersons and at the $ron! thin!s and more than is ri!ht, but their an!er ceases quickly % $hich is the best oint about them. /his ha ens to them because they do not restrain their an!er but retaliate o enly o$in! to their quickness o# tem er, and then their an!er ceases. By reason o# e2cess choleric eo le are quick&tem ered and ready to be an!ry $ith everythin! and on every occasion" $hence their name. ,ulky eo le are hard to a ease, and retain their an!er lon!" #or they re ress their assion. But it ceases $hen they retaliate" #or reven!e relieves them o# their an!er, roducin! in them leasure instead o# ain. I# this does not ha en they retain their burden" #or o$in! to its not bein! obvious no one even reasons $ith them, and to di!est one9s an!er in onesel# takes time. ,uch eo le are most troublesome to themselves and to their dearest #riends. We call bad&tem ered those $ho are an!ry at the $ron! thin!s, more than is ri!ht, and lon!er, and cannot be a eased until they in#lict ven!eance or unishment. /o !ood tem er $e o ose the e2cess rather than the de#ect" #or not only is it commoner since reven!e is the more human*, but bad&tem ered eo le are $orse to live $ith. What $e have said in our earlier treatment o# the sub'ect is lain also #rom $hat $e are no$ sayin!" vi-. that it is not easy to de#ine ho$, $ith $hom, at $hat, and ho$ lon! one should be an!ry, and at $hat oint ri!ht action ceases and $ron! be!ins. .or the man $ho strays a little #rom the ath, either to$ards the more or to$ards the less, is not blamed" since sometimes $e raise those $ho e2hibit the de#iciency, and call them !ood&tem ered, and sometimes $e call an!ry eo le manly, as bein! ca able o# rulin!. 3o$ #ar, there#ore, and ho$ a man must stray be#ore he becomes blame$orthy, it is not easy to state in $ords" #or the decision de ends on the articular #acts and on erce tion. But so much at least is lain, that the middle state is raise$orthy % that in virtue o# $hich $e are an!ry $ith the ri!ht eo le, at the ri!ht thin!s, in the ri!ht $ay, and so on, $hile the e2cesses and de#ects are blame$orthy % sli!htly so i# they are

41

resent in a lo$ de!ree, more i# in a hi!her de!ree, and very much i# in a hi!h de!ree. Evidently, then, $e must clin! to the middle state. % Enou!h o# the states relative to an!er. = In !atherin!s o# men, in social li#e and the interchan!e o# $ords and deeds, some men are thou!ht to be obsequious, vi-. those $ho to !ive leasure raise everythin! and never o ose, but think it their duty 8to !ive no ain to the eo le they meet9" $hile those $ho, on the contrary, o ose everythin! and care not a $hit about !ivin! ain are called churlish and contentious. /hat the states $e have named are cul able is lain enou!h, and that the middle state is laudable % that in virtue o# $hich a man $ill ut u $ith, and $ill resent, the ri!ht thin!s and in the ri!ht $ay" but no name has been assi!ned to it, thou!h it most resembles #riendshi . .or the man $ho corres onds to this middle state is very much $hat, $ith a##ection added, $e call a !ood #riend. But the state in question di##ers #rom #riendshi in that it im lies no assion or a##ection #or one9s associates" since it is not by reason o# lovin! or hatin! that such a man takes everythin! in the ri!ht $ay, but by bein! a man o# a certain kind. .or he $ill behave so alike to$ards those he kno$s and those he does not kno$, to$ards intimates and those $ho are not so, e2ce t that in each o# these cases he $ill behave as is be#ittin!" #or it is not ro er to have the same care #or intimates and #or stran!ers, nor a!ain is it the same conditions that make it ri!ht to !ive ain to them. No$ $e have said !enerally that he $ill associate $ith eo le in the ri!ht $ay" but it is by re#erence to $hat is honourable and e2 edient that he $ill aim at not !ivin! ain or at contributin! leasure. .or he seems to be concerned $ith the leasures and ains o# social li#e" and $herever it is not honourable, or is harm#ul, #or him to contribute leasure, he $ill re#use, and $ill choose rather to !ive ain" also i# his acquiescence in another9s action $ould brin! dis!race, and that in a hi!h de!ree, or in'ury, on that other, $hile his o osition brin!s a little ain, he $ill not acquiesce but $ill decline. 3e $ill associate di##erently $ith eo le in hi!h station and $ith ordinary eo le, $ith closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too $ith re!ard to all other di##erences, renderin! to each class $hat is be#ittin!, and $hile #or its o$n sake he chooses to contribute leasure, and avoids the !ivin! o# ain, he $ill be !uided by the consequences, i# these are !reater, i.e. honour and e2 ediency. .or the sake o# a !reat #uture leasure, too, he $ill in#lict small ains. /he man $ho attains the mean, then, is such as $e have described, but has not received a name" o# those $ho contribute leasure, the man $ho aims at bein! leasant $ith no ulterior ob'ect is obsequious, but the man $ho does so in order that he may !et some advanta!e in the direction o# money or the thin!s that money buys is a #latterer" $hile the man $ho quarrels $ith everythin! is, as has been said, churlish and contentious. And the e2tremes seem to be contradictory to each other because the mean is $ithout a name. @ /he mean o osed to boast#ulness is #ound in almost the same s here" and this also is $ithout a name. It $ill be no bad lan to describe these states as $ell" #or $e shall both kno$ the #acts about character better i# $e !o throu!h them in detail, and $e shall be convinced that the virtues are means i# $e see this to be so in all cases. In the #ield o# social li#e those $ho make the !ivin! o# leasure or ain their ob'ect in associatin! $ith others have been described" let us no$ describe those $ho ursue truth or #alsehood alike in $ords and deeds and in the claims they ut #or$ard. /he boast#ul man, then, is thou!ht to be a t to claim the thin!s that brin! !lory, $hen he 4(

has not !ot them, or to claim more o# them than he has, and the mock&modest man on the other hand to disclaim $hat he has or belittle it, $hile the man $ho observes the mean is one $ho calls a thin! by its o$n name, bein! truth#ul both in li#e and in $ord, o$nin! to $hat he has, and neither more nor less. No$ each o# these courses may be ado ted either $ith or $ithout an ob'ect. But each man s eaks and acts and lives in accordance $ith his character, i# he is not actin! #or some ulterior ob'ect. And #alsehood is in itsel# mean and cul able, and truth noble and $orthy o# raise. /hus the truth#ul man is another case o# a man $ho, bein! in the mean, is $orthy o# raise, and both #orms o# untruth#ul man are cul able, and articularly the boast#ul man. 5et us discuss them both, but #irst o# all the truth#ul man. We are not s eakin! o# the man $ho kee s #aith in his a!reements, i.e. in the thin!s that ertain to 'ustice or in'ustice )#or this $ould belon! to another virtue*, but the man $ho in the matters in $hich nothin! o# this sort is at stake is true both in $ord and in li#e because his character is such. But such a man $ould seem to be as a matter o# #act equitable. .or the man $ho loves truth, and is truth#ul $here nothin! is at stake, $ill still more be truth#ul $here somethin! is at stake" he $ill avoid #alsehood as somethin! base, seein! that he avoided it even #or its o$n sake" and such a man is $orthy o# raise. 3e inclines rather to understate the truth" #or this seems in better taste because e2a!!erations are $earisome. 3e $ho claims more than he has $ith no ulterior ob'ect is a contem tible sort o# #ello$ )other$ise he $ould not have deli!hted in #alsehood*, but seems #utile rather than bad" but i# he does it #or an ob'ect, he $ho does it #or the sake o# re utation or honour is )#or a boaster* not very much to be blamed, but he $ho does it #or money, or the thin!s that lead to money, is an u!lier character )it is not the ca acity that makes the boaster, but the ur ose" #or it is in virtue o# his state o# character and by bein! a man o# a certain kind that he is boaster*" as one man is a liar because he en'oys the lie itsel#, and another because he desires re utation or !ain. No$ those $ho boast #or the sake o# re utation claim such qualities as $ill raise or con!ratulation, but those $hose ob'ect is !ain claim qualities $hich are o# value to one9s nei!hbours and one9s lack o# $hich is not easily detected, e.!. the o$ers o# a seer, a sa!e, or a hysician. .or this reason it is such thin!s as these that most eo le claim and boast about" #or in them the above&mentioned qualities are #ound. Bock&modest eo le, $ho understate thin!s, seem more attractive in character" #or they are thou!ht to s eak not #or !ain but to avoid arade" and here too it is qualities $hich brin! re utation that they disclaim, as ,ocrates used to do. /hose $ho disclaim tri#lin! and obvious qualities are called humbu!s and are more contem tible" and sometimes this seems to be boast#ulness, like the , artan dress" #or both e2cess and !reat de#iciency are boast#ul. But those $ho use understatement $ith moderation and understate about matters that do not very much #orce themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it is the boaster that seems to be o osed to the truth#ul man" #or he is the $orse character. A ,ince li#e includes rest as $ell as activity, and in this is included leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind o# intercourse $hich is taste#ul" there is such a thin! as sayin! % and a!ain listenin! to % $hat one should and as one should. /he kind o# eo le one is s eakin! or listenin! to $ill also make a di##erence. Evidently here also there is both an e2cess and a de#iciency as com ared $ith the mean. /hose $ho carry humour to e2cess are thou!ht to be vul!ar bu##oons, strivin! a#ter humour at all costs, and aimin! rather at raisin! a lau!h than at sayin! $hat is becomin! and at avoidin! ain to the ob'ect o# their #un" $hile those $ho can 40

neither make a 'oke themselves nor ut u $ith those $ho do are thou!ht to be boorish and un olished. But those $ho 'oke in a taste#ul $ay are called ready&$itted, $hich im lies a sort o# readiness to turn this $ay and that" #or such sallies are thou!ht to be movements o# the character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so too are characters. /he ridiculous side o# thin!s is not #ar to seek, ho$ever, and most eo le deli!ht more than they should in amusement and in 'estinly. and so even bu##oons are called ready&$itted because they are #ound attractive" but that they di##er #rom the ready&$itted man, and to no small e2tent, is clear #rom $hat has been said. /o the middle state belon!s also tact" it is the mark o# a tact#ul man to say and listen to such thin!s as be#it a !ood and $ell&bred man" #or there are some thin!s that it be#its such a man to say and to hear by $ay o# 'est, and the $ell&bred man9s 'estin! di##ers #rom that o# a vul!ar man, and the 'okin! o# an educated man #rom that o# an uneducated. 1ne may see this even #rom the old and the ne$ comedies" to the authors o# the #ormer indecency o# lan!ua!e $as amusin!, to those o# the latter innuendo is more so" and these di##er in no small de!ree in res ect o# ro riety. No$ should $e de#ine the man $ho 'okes $ell by his sayin! $hat is not unbecomin! to a $ell&bred man, or by his not !ivin! ain, or even !ivin! deli!ht, to the hearer+ 1r is the latter de#inition, at any rate, itsel# inde#inite, since di##erent thin!s are hate#ul or leasant to di##erent eo le+ /he kind o# 'okes he $ill listen to $ill be the same" #or the kind he can ut u $ith are also the kind he seems to make. /here are, then, 'okes he $ill not make" #or the 'est is a sort o# abuse, and there are thin!s that la$!ivers #orbid us to abuse" and they should, erha s, have #orbidden us even to make a 'est o# such. /he re#ined and $ell&bred man, there#ore, $ill be as $e have described, bein! as it $ere a la$ to himsel#. ,uch, then, is the man $ho observes the mean, $hether he be called tact#ul or ready&$itted. /he bu##oon, on the other hand, is the slave o# his sense o# humour, and s ares neither himsel# nor others i# he can raise a lau!h, and says thin!s none o# $hich a man o# re#inement $ould say, and to some o# $hich he $ould not even listen. /he boor, a!ain, is useless #or such social intercourse" #or he contributes nothin! and #inds #ault $ith everythin!. But rela2ation and amusement are thou!ht to be a necessary element in li#e. /he means in li#e that have been described, then, are three in number, and are all concerned $ith an interchan!e o# $ords and deeds o# some kind. /hey di##er, ho$ever, in that one is concerned $ith truth" and the other t$o $ith leasantness. 1# those concerned $ith leasure, one is dis layed in 'ests, the other in the !eneral social intercourse o# li#e. C ,hame should not be described as a virtue" #or it is more like a #eelin! than a state o# character. It is de#ined, at any rate, as a kind o# #ear o# dishonour, and roduces an e##ect similar to that roduced by #ear o# dan!er" #or eo le $ho #eel dis!raced blush, and those $ho #ear death turn ale. Both, there#ore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, $hich is thou!ht to be characteristic o# #eelin! rather than o# a state o# character. /he #eelin! is not becomin! to every a!e, but only to youth. .or $e think youn! eo le should be rone to the #eelin! o# shame because they live by #eelin! and there#ore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame" and $e raise youn! eo le $ho are rone to this #eelin!, but an older erson no one $ould raise #or bein! rone to the sense o# dis!race, since $e think he should not do anythin! that need cause this sense. .or the sense o# dis!race is not even characteristic o# a !ood man, since it is consequent on bad actions )#or such actions should not be done" and i# some actions are dis!race#ul in very truth and others only accordin! to common o inion, this makes no 44

di##erence" #or neither class o# actions should be done, so that no dis!race should be #elt*" and it is a mark o# a bad man even to be such as to do any dis!race#ul action. /o be so constituted as to #eel dis!raced i# one does such an action, and #or this reason to think onesel# !ood, is absurd" #or it is #or voluntary actions that shame is #elt, and the !ood man $ill never voluntarily do bad actions. But shame may be said to be conditionally a !ood thin!" i# a !ood man does such actions, he $ill #eel dis!raced" but the virtues are not sub'ect to such a quali#ication. And i# shamelessness % not to be ashamed o# doin! base actions % is bad, that does not make it !ood to be ashamed o# doin! such actions. ?ontinence too is not virtue, but a mi2ed sort o# state" this $ill be sho$n later. No$, ho$ever, let us discuss 'ustice.

Book 6 1 With re!ards to 'ustice and in'ustice $e must )1* consider $hat kind o# actions they are concerned $ith, )(* $hat sort o# mean 'ustice is, and )0* bet$een $hat e2tremes the 'ust act is intermediate. 1ur investi!ation shall #ollo$ the same course as the recedin! discussions. We see that all men mean by 'ustice that kind o# state o# character $hich makes eo le dis osed to do $hat is 'ust and makes them act 'ustly and $ish #or $hat is 'ust" and similarly by in'ustice that state $hich makes them act un'ustly and $ish #or $hat is un'ust. 5et us too, then, lay this do$n as a !eneral basis. .or the same is not true o# the sciences and the #aculties as o# states o# character. A #aculty or a science $hich is one and the same is held to relate to contrary ob'ects, but a state o# character $hich is one o# t$o contraries does not roduce the contrary results" e.!. as a result o# health $e do not do $hat is the o osite o# healthy, but only $hat is healthy" #or $e say a man $alks healthily, $hen he $alks as a healthy man $ould. No$ o#ten one contrary state is reco!ni-ed #rom its contrary, and o#ten states are reco!ni-ed #rom the sub'ects that e2hibit them" #or )A* i# !ood condition is kno$n, bad condition also becomes kno$n, and )B* !ood condition is kno$n #rom the thin!s that are in !ood condition, and they #rom it. I# !ood condition is #irmness o# #lesh, it is necessary both that bad condition should be #labbiness o# #lesh and that the $holesome should be that $hich causes #irmness in #lesh. And it #ollo$s #or the most art that i# one contrary is ambi!uous the other also $ill be ambi!uous" e.!. i# 8'ust9 is so, that 8un'ust9 $ill be so too. No$ 8'ustice9 and 8in'ustice9 seem to be ambi!uous, but because their di##erent meanin!s a roach near to one another the ambi!uity esca es notice and is not obvious as it is, com aratively, $hen the meanin!s are #ar a art, e.!. )#or here the di##erence in out$ard #orm is !reat* as the ambi!uity in the use o# kleis #or the collar&bone o# an animal and #or that $ith $hich $e lock a door. 5et us take as a startin!& oint, then, the various meanin!s o# 8an un'ust man9. Both the la$less man and the !ras in! and un#air man are thou!ht to be un'ust, so that evidently both the la$&abidin! and the #air man $ill be 'ust. /he 'ust, then, is the la$#ul and the #air, the un'ust the unla$#ul and the un#air. ,ince the un'ust man is !ras in!, he must be concerned $ith !oods % not all !oods, but those $ith $hich ros erity and adversity have to do, $hich taken absolutely are al$ays !ood, but #or a articular erson are not al$ays !ood. No$ men ray #or and ursue these thin!s" but they should not, but should ray that the thin!s that are !ood absolutely may also be !ood #or them, and should choose the thin!s that are !ood #or them. /he un'ust man does not al$ays choose the 4<

!reater, but also the less % in the case o# thin!s bad absolutely" but because the lesser evil is itsel# thou!ht to be in a sense !ood, and !ras in!ness is directed at the !ood, there#ore he is thou!ht to be !ras in!. And he is un#air" #or this contains and is common to both. ,ince the la$less man $as seen to be un'ust and the la$&abidin! man 'ust, evidently all la$#ul acts are in a sense 'ust acts" #or the acts laid do$n by the le!islative art are la$#ul, and each o# these, $e say, is 'ust. No$ the la$s in their enactments on all sub'ects aim at the common advanta!e either o# all or o# the best or o# those $ho hold o$er, or somethin! o# the sort" so that in one sense $e call those acts 'ust that tend to roduce and reserve ha iness and its com onents #or the olitical society. And the la$ bids us do both the acts o# a brave man )e.!. not to desert our ost nor take to #li!ht nor thro$ a$ay our arms*, and those o# a tem erate man )e.!. not to commit adultery nor to !rati#y one9s lust*, and those o# a !ood&tem ered man )e.!. not to strike another nor to s eak evil*, and similarly $ith re!ard to the other virtues and #orms o# $ickedness, commandin! some acts and #orbiddin! others" and the ri!htly&#ramed la$ does this ri!htly, and the hastily conceived one less $ell. /his #orm o# 'ustice, then, is com lete virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our nei!hbour. And there#ore 'ustice is o#ten thou!ht to be the !reatest o# virtues, and 8neither evenin! nor mornin! star9 is so $onder#ul" and roverbially 8in 'ustice is every virtue com rehended9. And it is com lete virtue in its #ullest sense, because it is the actual e2ercise o# com lete virtue. It is com lete because he $ho ossesses it can e2ercise his virtue not only in himsel# but to$ards his nei!hbour also" #or many men can e2ercise virtue in their o$n a##airs, but not in their relations to their nei!hbour. /his is $hy the sayin! o# Bias is thou!ht to be true, that 8rule $ill sho$ the man9" #or a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men and a member o# a society. .or this same reason 'ustice, alone o# the virtues, is thou!ht to be 8another9s !ood9, because it is related to our nei!hbour" #or it does $hat is advanta!eous to another, either a ruler or a co artner. No$ the $orst man is he $ho e2ercises his $ickedness both to$ards himsel# and to$ards his #riends, and the best man is not he $ho e2ercises his virtue to$ards himsel# but he $ho e2ercises it to$ards another" #or this is a di##icult task. Fustice in this sense, then, is not art o# virtue but virtue entire, nor is the contrary in'ustice a art o# vice but vice entire. What the di##erence is bet$een virtue and 'ustice in this sense is lain #rom $hat $e have said" they are the same but their essence is not the same" $hat, as a relation to one9s nei!hbour, is 'ustice is, as a certain kind o# state $ithout quali#ication, virtue. ( But at all events $hat $e are investi!atin! is the 'ustice $hich is a art o# virtue" #or there is a 'ustice o# this kind, as $e maintain. ,imilarly it is $ith in'ustice in the articular sense that $e are concerned. /hat there is such a thin! is indicated by the #act that $hile the man $ho e2hibits in action the other #orms o# $ickedness acts $ron!ly indeed, but not !ras in!ly )e.!. the man $ho thro$s a$ay his shield throu!h co$ardice or s eaks harshly throu!h bad tem er or #ails to hel a #riend $ith money throu!h meanness*, $hen a man acts !ras in!ly he o#ten e2hibits none o# these vices, % no, nor all to!ether, but certainly $ickedness o# some kind )#or $e blame him* and in'ustice. /here is, then, another kind o# in'ustice $hich is a art o# in'ustice in the $ide sense, and a use o# the $ord 8un'ust9 $hich ans$ers to a art o# $hat is un'ust in the $ide sense o# 8contrary to the la$9. A!ain i# one man commits adultery #or the sake o# !ain and makes money by it, $hile another does so at the biddin! o# a etite thou!h he loses money and is enali-ed #or it, the latter $ould be held to be sel#&indul!ent rather than !ras in!, but the #ormer is un'ust, but not sel#&indul!ent" evidently, there#ore, he is un'ust by reason o# his makin! !ain by his act. 4=

A!ain, all other un'ust acts are ascribed invariably to some articular kind o# $ickedness, e.!. adultery to sel#&indul!ence, the desertion o# a comrade in battle to co$ardice, hysical violence to an!er" but i# a man makes !ain, his action is ascribed to no #orm o# $ickedness but in'ustice. Evidently, there#ore, there is a art #rom in'ustice in the $ide sense another, 8 articular9, in'ustice $hich shares the name and nature o# the #irst, because its de#inition #alls $ithin the same !enus" #or the si!ni#icance o# both consists in a relation to one9s nei!hbour, but the one is concerned $ith honour or money or sa#ety % or that $hich includes all these, i# $e had a sin!le name #or it % and its motive is the leasure that arises #rom !ain" $hile the other is concerned $ith all the ob'ects $ith $hich the !ood man is concerned. It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind o# 'ustice, and that there is one $hich is distinct #rom virtue entire" $e must try to !ras its !enus and di##erentia. /he un'ust has been divided into the unla$#ul and the un#air, and the 'ust into the la$#ul and the #air. /o the unla$#ul ans$ers the a#ore&mentioned sense o# in'ustice. But since un#air and the unla$#ul are not the same, but are di##erent as a art is #rom its $hole )#or all that is un#air is unla$#ul, but not all that is unla$#ul is un#air*, the un'ust and in'ustice in the sense o# the un#air are not the same as but di##erent #rom the #ormer kind, as art #rom $hole" #or in'ustice in this sense is a art o# in'ustice in the $ide sense, and similarly 'ustice in the one sense o# 'ustice in the other. /here#ore $e must s eak also about articular 'ustice and articular and similarly about the 'ust and the un'ust. /he 'ustice, then, $hich ans$ers to the $hole o# virtue, and the corres ondin! in'ustice, one bein! the e2ercise o# virtue as a $hole, and the other that o# vice as a $hole, to$ards one9s nei!hbour, $e may leave on one side. And ho$ the meanin!s o# 8'ust9 and 8un'ust9 $hich ans$er to these are to be distin!uished is evident" #or ractically the ma'ority o# the acts commanded by the la$ are those $hich are rescribed #rom the oint o# vie$ o# virtue taken as a $hole" #or the la$ bids us ractise every virtue and #orbids us to ractise any vice. And the thin!s that tend to roduce virtue taken as a $hole are those o# the acts rescribed by the la$ $hich have been rescribed $ith a vie$ to education #or the common !ood. But $ith re!ard to the education o# the individual as such, $hich makes him $ithout quali#ication a !ood man, $e must determine later $hether this is the #unction o# the olitical art or o# another" #or erha s it is not the same to be a !ood man and a !ood citi-en o# any state taken at random. 1# articular 'ustice and that $hich is 'ust in the corres ondin! sense, )A* one kind is that $hich is mani#ested in distributions o# honour or money or the other thin!s that #all to be divided amon! those $ho have a share in the constitution )#or in these it is ossible #or one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that o# another*, and )B* one is that $hich lays a recti#yin! art in transactions bet$een man and man. 1# this there are t$o divisions" o# transactions )1* some are voluntary and )(* others involuntary % voluntary such transactions as sale, urchase, loan #or consum tion, led!in!, loan #or use, de ositin!, lettin! )they are called voluntary because the ori!in o# these transactions is voluntary*, $hile o# the involuntary )a* some are clandestine, such as the#t, adultery, oisonin!, rocurin!, enticement o# slaves, assassination, #alse $itness, and )b* others are violent, such as assault, im risonment, murder, robbery $ith violence, mutilation, abuse, insult. 0 )A* We have sho$n that both the un'ust man and the un'ust act are un#air or unequal" no$ it is clear that there is also an intermediate bet$een the t$o unequals involved in either case. And this is the equal" #or in any kind o# action in $hich there9s a more and a less there is also $hat is equal. I#, then, the un'ust is unequal, 'ust is equal, as all men su ose it to be, even a art #rom 4@

ar!ument. And since the equal is intermediate, the 'ust $ill be an intermediate. No$ equality im lies at least t$o thin!s. /he 'ust, then, must be both intermediate and equal and relative )i.e. #or certain ersons*. And since the equall intermediate it must be bet$een certain thin!s )$hich are res ectively !reater and less*" equal, it involves t$o thin!s" qua 'ust, it is #or certain eo le. /he 'ust, there#ore, involves at least #our terms" #or the ersons #or $hom it is in #act 'ust are t$o, and the thin!s in $hich it is mani#ested, the ob'ects distributed, are t$o. And the same equality $ill e2ist bet$een the ersons and bet$een the thin!s concerned" #or as the latter the thin!s concerned are related, so are the #ormer" i# they are not equal, they $ill not have $hat is equal, but this is the ori!in o# quarrels and com laints % $hen either equals have and are a$arded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. .urther, this is lain #rom the #act that a$ards should be 8accordin! to merit9" #or all men a!ree that $hat is 'ust in distribution must be accordin! to merit in some sense, thou!h they do not all s eci#y the same sort o# merit, but democrats identi#y it $ith the status o# #reeman, su orters o# oli!archy $ith $ealth )or $ith noble birth*, and su orters o# aristocracy $ith e2cellence. /he 'ust, then, is a s ecies o# the ro ortionate ) ro ortion bein! not a ro erty only o# the kind o# number $hich consists o# abstract units, but o# number in !eneral*. .or ro ortion is equality o# ratios, and involves #our terms at least )that discrete ro ortion involves #our terms is lain, but so does continuous ro ortion, #or it uses one term as t$o and mentions it t$ice" e.!. 8as the line A is to the line B, so is the line B to the line ?9" the line B, then, has been mentioned t$ice, so that i# the line B be assumed t$ice, the ro ortional terms $ill be #our*" and the 'ust, too, involves at least #our terms, and the ratio bet$een one air is the same as that bet$een the other air" #or there is a similar distinction bet$een the ersons and bet$een the thin!s. As the term A, then, is to B, so $ill ? be to D, and there#ore, alternando, as A is to ?, B $ill be to D. /here#ore also the $hole is in the same ratio to the $hole" and this cou lin! the distribution e##ects, and, i# the terms are so combined, e##ects 'ustly. /he con'unction, then, o# the term A $ith ? and o# B $ith D is $hat is 'ust in distribution, and this s ecies o# the 'ust is intermediate, and the un'ust is $hat violates the ro ortion" #or the ro ortional is intermediate, and the 'ust is ro ortional. )Bathematicians call this kind o# ro ortion !eometrical" #or it is in !eometrical ro ortion that it #ollo$s that the $hole is to the $hole as either art is to the corres ondin! art.* /his ro ortion is not continuous" #or $e cannot !et a sin!le term standin! #or a erson and a thin!. /his, then, is $hat the 'ust is % the ro ortional" the un'ust is $hat violates the ro ortion. 3ence one term becomes too !reat, the other too small, as indeed ha ens in ractice" #or the man $ho acts un'ustly has too much, and the man $ho is un'ustly treated too little, o# $hat is !ood. In the case o# evil the reverse is true" #or the lesser evil is reckoned a !ood in com arison $ith the !reater evil, since the lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the !reater, and $hat is $orthy o# choice is !ood, and $hat is $orthier o# choice a !reater !ood. /his, then, is one s ecies o# the 'ust. 4 )B* /he remainin! one is the recti#icatory, $hich arises in conne2ion $ith transactions both voluntary and involuntary. /his #orm o# the 'ust has a di##erent s eci#ic character #rom the #ormer. .or the 'ustice $hich distributes common ossessions is al$ays in accordance $ith the kind o# ro ortion mentioned above )#or in the case also in $hich the distribution is made #rom the common #unds o# a artnershi it $ill be accordin! to the same ratio $hich the #unds ut into the business by the artners bear to one another*" and the in'ustice o osed to this kind o# 'ustice is that $hich violates the ro ortion. But the 'ustice in transactions bet$een man and man is a sort 4A

o# equality indeed, and the in'ustice a sort o# inequality" not accordin! to that kind o# ro ortion, ho$ever, but accordin! to arithmetical ro ortion. .or it makes no di##erence $hether a !ood man has de#rauded a bad man or a bad man a !ood one, nor $hether it is a !ood or a bad man that has committed adultery" the la$ looks only to the distinctive character o# the in'ury, and treats the arties as equal, i# one is in the $ron! and the other is bein! $ron!ed, and i# one in#licted in'ury and the other has received it. /here#ore, this kind o# in'ustice bein! an inequality, the 'ud!e tries to equali-e it" #or in the case also in $hich one has received and the other has in#licted a $ound, or one has slain and the other been slain, the su##erin! and the action have been unequally distributed" but the 'ud!e tries to equali-e by means o# the enalty, takin! a$ay #rom the !ain o# the assailant. .or the term 8!ain9 is a lied !enerally to such cases, even i# it be not a term a ro riate to certain cases, e.!. to the erson $ho in#licts a $oundand 8loss9 to the su##erer" at all events $hen the su##erin! has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other !ain. /here#ore the equal is intermediate bet$een the !reater and the less, but the !ain and the loss are res ectively !reater and less in contrary $ays" more o# the !ood and less o# the evil are !ain, and the contrary is loss" intermediate bet$een them is, as $e sa$, equal, $hich $e say is 'ust" there#ore corrective 'ustice $ill be the intermediate bet$een loss and !ain. /his is $hy, $hen eo le dis ute, they take re#u!e in the 'ud!e" and to !o to the 'ud!e is to !o to 'ustice" #or the nature o# the 'ud!e is to be a sort o# animate 'ustice" and they seek the 'ud!e as an intermediate, and in some states they call 'ud!es mediators, on the assum tion that i# they !et $hat is intermediate they $ill !et $hat is 'ust. /he 'ust, then, is an intermediate, since the 'ud!e is so. No$ the 'ud!e restores equality" it is as thou!h there $ere a line divided into unequal arts, and he took a$ay that by $hich the !reater se!ment e2ceeds the hal#, and added it to the smaller se!ment. And $hen the $hole has been equally divided, then they say they have 8their o$n9 % i.e. $hen they have !ot $hat is equal. /he equal is intermediate bet$een the !reater and the lesser line accordin! to arithmetical ro ortion. It is #or this reason also that it is called 'ust )sikaion*, because it is a division into t$o equal arts )sicha*, 'ust as i# one $ere to call it sichaion" and the 'ud!e )sikastes* is one $ho bisects )sichastes*. .or $hen somethin! is subtracted #rom one o# t$o equals and added to the other, the other is in e2cess by these t$o" since i# $hat $as taken #rom the one had not been added to the other, the latter $ould have been in e2cess by one only. It there#ore e2ceeds the intermediate by one, and the intermediate e2ceeds by one that #rom $hich somethin! $as taken. By this, then, $e shall reco!ni-e both $hat $e must subtract #rom that $hich has more, and $hat $e must add to that $hich has less" $e must add to the latter that by $hich the intermediate e2ceeds it, and subtract #rom the !reatest that by $hich it e2ceeds the intermediate. 5et the lines AA9, BB9, ??9 be equal to one another" #rom the line AA9 let the se!ment AE have been subtracted, and to the line ??9 let the se!ment ?D have been added, so that the $hole line D??9 e2ceeds the line EA9 by the se!ment ?D and the se!ment ?." there#ore it e2ceeds the line BB9 by the se!ment ?D. ),ee dia!ram.* /hese names, both loss and !ain, have come #rom voluntary e2chan!e" #or to have more than one9s o$n is called !ainin!, and to have less than one9s ori!inal share is called losin!, e.!. in buyin! and sellin! and in all other matters in $hich the la$ has le#t eo le #ree to make their o$n terms" but $hen they !et neither more nor less but 'ust $hat belon!s to themselves, they say that they have their o$n and that they neither lose nor !ain. /here#ore the 'ust is intermediate bet$een a sort o# !ain and a sort o# loss, vi-. those $hich are involuntary" it consists in havin! an equal amount be#ore and a#ter the transaction.

4C

< ,ome think that reci rocity is $ithout quali#ication 'ust, as the 7ytha!oreans said" #or they de#ined 'ustice $ithout quali#ication as reci rocity. No$ 8reci rocity9 #its neither distributive nor recti#icatory 'ustice % yet eo le $ant even the 'ustice o# Rhadamanthus to mean this: ,hould a man su##er $hat he did, ri!ht 'ustice $ould be done % #or in many cases reci rocity and recti#icatory 'ustice are not in accord" e.!. )1* i# an o##icial has in#licted a $ound, he should not be $ounded in return, and i# some one has $ounded an o##icial, he ou!ht not to be $ounded only but unished in addition. .urther )(* there is a !reat di##erence bet$een a voluntary and an involuntary act. But in associations #or e2chan!e this sort o# 'ustice does hold men to!ether % reci rocity in accordance $ith a ro ortion and not on the basis o# recisely equal return. .or it is by ro ortionate requital that the city holds to!ether. Ben seek to return either evil #or evil % and i# they cannot do so, think their osition mere slavery % or !ood #or !ood % and i# they cannot do so there is no e2chan!e, but it is by e2chan!e that they hold to!ether. /his is $hy they !ive a rominent lace to the tem le o# the ;races % to romote the requital o# services" #or this is characteristic o# !race % $e should serve in return one $ho has sho$n !race to us, and should another time take the initiative in sho$in! it. No$ ro ortionate return is secured by cross&con'unction. 5et A be a builder, B a shoemaker, ? a house, D a shoe. /he builder, then, must !et #rom the shoemaker the latter9s $ork, and must himsel# !ive him in return his o$n. I#, then, #irst there is ro ortionate equality o# !oods, and then reci rocal action takes lace, the result $e mention $ill be e##ected. I# not, the bar!ain is not equal, and does not hold" #or there is nothin! to revent the $ork o# the one bein! better than that o# the other" they must there#ore be equated. )And this is true o# the other arts also" #or they $ould have been destroyed i# $hat the atient su##ered had not been 'ust $hat the a!ent did, and o# the same amount and kind.* .or it is not t$o doctors that associate #or e2chan!e, but a doctor and a #armer, or in !eneral eo le $ho are di##erent and unequal" but these must be equated. /his is $hy all thin!s that are e2chan!ed must be someho$ com arable. It is #or this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an intermediate" #or it measures all thin!s, and there#ore the e2cess and the de#ect % ho$ many shoes are equal to a house or to a !iven amount o# #ood. /he number o# shoes e2chan!ed #or a house )or #or a !iven amount o# #ood* must there#ore corres ond to the ratio o# builder to shoemaker. .or i# this be not so, there $ill be no e2chan!e and no intercourse. And this ro ortion $ill not be e##ected unless the !oods are someho$ equal. All !oods must there#ore be measured by some one thin!, as $e said be#ore. No$ this unit is in truth demand, $hich holds all thin!s to!ether )#or i# men did not need one another9s !oods at all, or did not need them equally, there $ould be either no e2chan!e or not the same e2chan!e*" but money has become by convention a sort o# re resentative o# demand" and this is $hy it has the name 8money9 )nomisma* % because it e2ists not by nature but by la$ )nomos* and it is in our o$er to chan!e it and make it useless. /here $ill, then, be reci rocity $hen the terms have been equated so that as #armer is to shoemaker, the amount o# the shoemaker9s $ork is to that o# the #armer9s $ork #or $hich it e2chan!es. But $e must not brin! them into a #i!ure o# ro ortion $hen they have already e2chan!ed )other$ise one e2treme $ill have both e2cesses*, but $hen they still have their o$n !oods. /hus they are equals and associates 'ust because this equality can be e##ected in their case. 5et A be a #armer, ? #ood, B a shoemaker, D his roduct equated to ?. I# it had not been ossible #or reci rocity to be thus e##ected, there $ould have been no association o# the arties. /hat demand holds thin!s to!ether as a sin!le unit is sho$n by the #act that $hen men do not need one another, i.e. $hen neither needs the other or one does not need the other, they do not e2chan!e, as $e do $hen some one $ants $hat one has onesel#, e.!. $hen eo le ermit the e2 ortation o# corn in e2chan!e #or <D

$ine. /his equation there#ore must be established. And #or the #uture e2chan!e % that i# $e do not need a thin! no$ $e shall have it i# ever $e do need it % money is as it $ere our surety" #or it must be ossible #or us to !et $hat $e $ant by brin!in! the money. No$ the same thin! ha ens to money itsel# as to !oods % it is not al$ays $orth the same" yet it tends to be steadier. /his is $hy all !oods must have a rice set on them" #or then there $ill al$ays be e2chan!e, and i# so, association o# man $ith man. Boney, then, actin! as a measure, makes !oods commensurate and equates them" #or neither $ould there have been association i# there $ere not e2chan!e, nor e2chan!e i# there $ere not equality, nor equality i# there $ere not commensurability. No$ in truth it is im ossible that thin!s di##erin! so much should become commensurate, but $ith re#erence to demand they may become so su##iciently. /here must, then, be a unit, and that #i2ed by a!reement )#or $hich reason it is called money*" #or it is this that makes all thin!s commensurate, since all thin!s are measured by money. 5et A be a house, B ten minae, ? a bed. A is hal# o# B, i# the house is $orth #ive minae or equal to them" the bed, ?, is a tenth o# B" it is lain, then, ho$ many beds are equal to a house, vi-. #ive. /hat e2chan!e took lace thus be#ore there $as money is lain" #or it makes no di##erence $hether it is #ive beds that e2chan!e #or a house, or the money value o# #ive beds. We have no$ de#ined the un'ust and the 'ust. /hese havin! been marked o## #rom each other, it is lain that 'ust action is intermediate bet$een actin! un'ustly and bein! un'ustly treated" #or the one is to have too much and the other to have too little. Fustice is a kind o# mean, but not in the same $ay as the other virtues, but because it relates to an intermediate amount, $hile in'ustice relates to the e2tremes. And 'ustice is that in virtue o# $hich the 'ust man is said to be a doer, by choice, o# that $hich is 'ust, and one $ho $ill distribute either bet$een himsel# and another or bet$een t$o others not so as to !ive more o# $hat is desirable to himsel# and less to his nei!hbour )and conversely $ith $hat is harm#ul*, but so as to !ive $hat is equal in accordance $ith ro ortion" and similarly in distributin! bet$een t$o other ersons. In'ustice on the other hand is similarly related to the un'ust, $hich is e2cess and de#ect, contrary to ro ortion, o# the use#ul or hurt#ul. .or $hich reason in'ustice is e2cess and de#ect, vi-. because it is roductive o# e2cess and de#ect % in one9s o$n case e2cess o# $hat is in its o$n nature use#ul and de#ect o# $hat is hurt#ul, $hile in the case o# others it is as a $hole like $hat it is in one9s o$n case, but ro ortion may be violated in either direction. In the un'ust act to have too little is to be un'ustly treated" to have too much is to act un'ustly. 5et this be taken as our account o# the nature o# 'ustice and in'ustice, and similarly o# the 'ust and the un'ust in !eneral. = ,ince actin! un'ustly does not necessarily im ly bein! un'ust, $e must ask $hat sort o# un'ust acts im ly that the doer is un'ust $ith res ect to each ty e o# in'ustice, e.!. a thie#, an adulterer, or a bri!and. ,urely the ans$er does not turn on the di##erence bet$een these ty es. .or a man mi!ht even lie $ith a $oman kno$in! $ho she $as, but the ori!in o# his mi!ht be not deliberate choice but assion. 3e acts un'ustly, then, but is not un'ust" e.!. a man is not a thie#, yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery" and similarly in all other cases. No$ $e have reviously stated ho$ the reci rocal is related to the 'ust" but $e must not #or!et that $hat $e are lookin! #or is not only $hat is 'ust $ithout quali#ication but also olitical 'ustice. /his is #ound amon! men $ho share their li#e $ith a vie$ to sel#su##iciency, men $ho are #ree and either ro ortionately or arithmetically equal, so that bet$een those $ho do not #ul#il this condition there is no olitical 'ustice but 'ustice in a s ecial sense and by analo!y. .or 'ustice <1

e2ists only bet$een men $hose mutual relations are !overned by la$" and la$ e2ists #or men bet$een $hom there is in'ustice" #or le!al 'ustice is the discrimination o# the 'ust and the un'ust. And bet$een men bet$een $hom there is in'ustice there is also un'ust action )thou!h there is not in'ustice bet$een all bet$een $hom there is un'ust action*, and this is assi!nin! too much to onesel# o# thin!s !ood in themselves and too little o# thin!s evil in themselves. /his is $hy $e do not allo$ a man to rule, but rational rinci le, because a man behaves thus in his o$n interests and becomes a tyrant. /he ma!istrate on the other hand is the !uardian o# 'ustice, and, i# o# 'ustice, then o# equality also. And since he is assumed to have no more than his share, i# he is 'ust )#or he does not assi!n to himsel# more o# $hat is !ood in itsel#, unless such a share is ro ortional to his merits % so that it is #or others that he labours, and it is #or this reason that men, as $e stated reviously, say that 'ustice is 8another9s !ood9*, there#ore a re$ard must be !iven him, and this is honour and rivile!e" but those #or $hom such thin!s are not enou!h become tyrants. /he 'ustice o# a master and that o# a #ather are not the same as the 'ustice o# citi-ens, thou!h they are like it" #or there can be no in'ustice in the unquali#ied sense to$ards thin! that are one9s o$n, but a man9s chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain a!e and sets u #or itsel#, are as it $ere art o# himsel#, and no one chooses to hurt himsel# )#or $hich reason there can be no in'ustice to$ards onesel#*. /here#ore the 'ustice or in'ustice o# citi-ens is not mani#ested in these relations" #or it $as as $e sa$ accordin! to la$, and bet$een eo le naturally sub'ect to la$, and these as $e sa$9 are eo le $ho have an equal share in rulin! and bein! ruled. 3ence 'ustice can more truly be mani#ested to$ards a $i#e than to$ards children and chattels, #or the #ormer is household 'ustice" but even this is di##erent #rom olitical 'ustice. @ 1# olitical 'ustice art is natural, art le!al, natural, that $hich every$here has the same #orce and does not e2ist by eo le9s thinkin! this or that" le!al, that $hich is ori!inally indi##erent, but $hen it has been laid do$n is not indi##erent, e.!. that a risoner9s ransom shall be a mina, or that a !oat and not t$o shee shall be sacri#iced, and a!ain all the la$s that are assed #or articular cases, e.!. that sacri#ice shall be made in honour o# Brasidas, and the rovisions o# decrees. No$ some think that all 'ustice is o# this sort, because that $hich is by nature is unchan!eable and has every$here the same #orce )as #ire burns both here and in 7ersia*, $hile they see chan!e in the thin!s reco!ni-ed as 'ust. /his, ho$ever, is not true in this unquali#ied $ay, but is true in a sense" or rather, $ith the !ods it is erha s not true at all, $hile $ith us there is somethin! that is 'ust even by nature, yet all o# it is chan!eable" but still some is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident $hich sort o# thin!, amon! thin!s ca able o# bein! other$ise, is by nature, and $hich is not but is le!al and conventional, assumin! that both are equally chan!eable. And in all other thin!s the same distinction $ill a ly" by nature the ri!ht hand is stron!er, yet it is ossible that all men should come to be ambide2trous. /he thin!s $hich are 'ust by virtue o# convention and e2 ediency are like measures" #or $ine and corn measures are not every$here equal, but lar!er in $holesale and smaller in retail markets. ,imilarly, the thin!s $hich are 'ust not by nature but by human enactment are not every$here the same, since constitutions also are not the same, thou!h there is but one $hich is every$here by nature the best. 1# thin!s 'ust and la$#ul each is related as the universal to its articulars" #or the thin!s that are done are many, but o# them each is one, since it is universal. /here is a di##erence bet$een the act o# in'ustice and $hat is un'ust, and bet$een the act o# 'ustice and $hat is 'ust" #or a thin! is un'ust by nature or by enactment" and this very thin!, $hen <(

it has been done, is an act o# in'ustice, but be#ore it is done is not yet that but is un'ust. ,o, too, $ith an act o# 'ustice )thou!h the !eneral term is rather 8'ust action9, and 8act o# 'ustice9 is a lied to the correction o# the act o# in'ustice*. Each o# these must later be e2amined se arately $ith re!ard to the nature and number o# its s ecies and the nature o# the thin!s $ith $hich it is concerned. A Acts 'ust and un'ust bein! as $e have described them, a man acts un'ustly or 'ustly $henever he does such acts voluntarily" $hen involuntarily, he acts neither un'ustly nor 'ustly e2ce t in an incidental $ay" #or he does thin!s $hich ha en to be 'ust or un'ust. Whether an act is or is not one o# in'ustice )or o# 'ustice* is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness" #or $hen it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act o# in'ustice" so that there $ill be thin!s that are un'ust but not yet acts o# in'ustice, i# voluntariness be not resent as $ell. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said be#ore, any o# the thin!s in a man9s o$n o$er $hich he does $ith kno$led!e, i.e. not in i!norance either o# the erson acted on or o# the instrument used or o# the end that $ill be attained )e.!. $hom he is strikin!, $ith $hat, and to $hat end*, each such act bein! done not incidentally nor under com ulsion )e.!. i# A takes B9s hand and there$ith strikes ?, B does not act voluntarily" #or the act $as not in his o$n o$er*. /he erson struck may be the striker9s #ather, and the striker may kno$ that it is a man or one o# the ersons resent, but not kno$ that it is his #ather" a similar distinction may be made in the case o# the end, and $ith re!ard to the $hole action. /here#ore that $hich is done in i!norance, or thou!h not done in i!norance is not in the a!ent9s o$er, or is done under com ulsion, is involuntary )#or many natural rocesses, even, $e kno$in!ly both er#orm and e2 erience, none o# $hich is either voluntary or involuntary" e.!. !ro$in! old or dyin!*. But in the case o# un'ust and 'ust acts alike the in'ustice or 'ustice may be only incidental" #or a man mi!ht return a de osit un$illin!ly and #rom #ear, and then he must not be said either to do $hat is 'ust or to act 'ustly, e2ce t in an incidental $ay. ,imilarly the man $ho under com ulsion and un$illin!ly #ails to return the de osit must be said to act un'ustly, and to do $hat is un'ust, only incidentally. 1# voluntary acts $e do some by choice, others not by choice" by choice those $hich $e do a#ter deliberation, not by choice those $hich $e do $ithout revious deliberation. /hus there are three kinds o# in'ury in transactions bet$een man and man" those done in i!norance are mistakes $hen the erson acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end that $ill be attained is other than the a!ent su osed" the a!ent thou!ht either that he $as not hitin! any one or that he $as not hittin! $ith this missile or not hittin! this erson or to this end, but a result #ollo$ed other than that $hich he thou!ht likely )e.!. he thre$ not $ith intent to $ound but only to rick*, or the erson hit or the missile $as other than he su osed. No$ $hen )1* the in'ury takes lace contrary to reasonable e2 ectation, it is a misadventure. When )(* it is not contrary to reasonable e2 ectation, but does not im ly vice, it is a mistake )#or a man makes a mistake $hen the #ault ori!inates in him, but is the victim o# accident $hen the ori!in lies outside him*. When )0* he acts $ith kno$led!e but not a#ter deliberation, it is an act o# in'ustice % e.!. the acts due to an!er or to other assions necessary or natural to man" #or $hen men do such harm#ul and mistaken acts they act un'ustly, and the acts are acts o# in'ustice, but this does not im ly that the doers are un'ust or $icked" #or the in'ury is not due to vice. But $hen )4* a man acts #rom choice, he is an un'ust man and a vicious man. 3ence acts roceedin! #rom an!er are ri!htly 'ud!ed not to be done o# malice a#orethou!ht" #or it is not the man $ho acts in an!er but he $ho enra!ed him that starts the mischie#. A!ain, the <0

matter in dis ute is not $hether the thin! ha ened or not, but its 'ustice" #or it is a arent in'ustice that occasions ra!e. .or they do not dis ute about the occurrence o# the act % as in commercial transactions $here one o# the t$o arties must be vicious % unless they do so o$in! to #or!et#ulness" but, a!reein! about the #act, they dis ute on $hich side 'ustice lies )$hereas a man $ho has deliberately in'ured another cannot hel kno$in! that he has done so*, so that the one thinks he is bein! treated un'ustly and the other disa!rees. But i# a man harms another by choice, he acts un'ustly" and these are the acts o# in'ustice $hich im ly that the doer is an un'ust man, rovided that the act violates ro ortion or equality. ,imilarly, a man is 'ust $hen he acts 'ustly by choice" but he acts 'ustly i# he merely acts voluntarily. 1# involuntary acts some are e2cusable, others not. .or the mistakes $hich men make not only in i!norance but also #rom i!norance are e2cusable, $hile those $hich men do not #rom i!norance but )thou!h they do them in i!norance* o$in! to a assion $hich is neither natural nor such as man is liable to, are not e2cusable. C Assumin! that $e have su##iciently de#ined the su##erin! and doin! o# in'ustice, it may be asked )1* $hether the truth in e2 ressed in Euri ides9 arado2ical $ords: I sle$ my mother, that9s my tale in brie#. Were you both $illin!, or un$illin! both+ Is it truly ossible to be $illin!ly treated un'ustly, or is all su##erin! o# in'ustice the contrary involuntary, as all un'ust action is voluntary+ And is all su##erin! o# in'ustice o# the latter kind or else all o# the #ormer, or is it sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary+ ,o, too, $ith the case o# bein! 'ustly treated" all 'ust action is voluntary, so that it is reasonable that there should be a similar o osition in either case % that both bein! un'ustly and bein! 'ustly treated should be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary. But it $ould be thou!ht arado2ical even in the case o# bein! 'ustly treated, i# it $ere al$ays voluntary" #or some are un$illin!ly treated 'ustly. )(* 1ne mi!ht raise this question also, $hether every one $ho has su##ered $hat is un'ust is bein! un'ustly treated, or on the other hand it is $ith su##erin! as $ith actin!. In action and in assivity alike it is ossible to artake o# 'ustice incidentally, and similarly )it is lain* o# in'ustice" #or to do $hat is un'ust is not the same as to act un'ustly, nor to su##er $hat is un'ust as to be treated un'ustly, and similarly in the case o# actin! 'ustly and bein! 'ustly treated" #or it is im ossible to be un'ustly treated i# the other does not act un'ustly, or 'ustly treated unless he acts 'ustly. No$ i# to act un'ustly is sim ly to harm some one voluntarily, and 8voluntarily9 means 8kno$in! the erson acted on, the instrument, and the manner o# one9s actin!9, and the incontinent man voluntarily harms himsel#, not only $ill he voluntarily be un'ustly treated but it $ill be ossible to treat onesel# un'ustly. )/his also is one o# the questions in doubt, $hether a man can treat himsel# un'ustly.* A!ain, a man may voluntarily, o$in! to incontinence, be harmed by another $ho acts voluntarily, so that it $ould be ossible to be voluntarily treated un'ustly. 1r is our de#inition incorrect" must $e to 8harmin! another, $ith kno$led!e both o# the erson acted on, o# the instrument, and o# the manner9 add 8contrary to the $ish o# the erson acted on9+ /hen a man may be voluntarily harmed and voluntarily su##er $hat is un'ust, but no one is voluntarily treated un'ustly" #or no one $ishes to be un'ustly treated, not even the incontinent man. 3e acts contrary to his $ish" #or no one $ishes #or $hat he does not think to be !ood, but the incontinent man does do thin!s that he does not think he ou!ht to do. A!ain, one $ho !ives $hat is his o$n, as 3omer says ;laucus !ave Diomede Armour o# !old #or bra-en, the rice o# a hundred beeves #or nine, is <4

not un'ustly treated" #or thou!h to !ive is in his o$er, to be un'ustly treated is not, but there must be some one to treat him un'ustly. It is lain, then, that bein! un'ustly treated is not voluntary. 1# the questions $e intended to discuss t$o still remain #or discussion" )0* $hether it is the man $ho has assi!ned to another more than his share that acts un'ustly, or he $ho has the e2cessive share, and )4* $hether it is ossible to treat onesel# un'ustly. /he questions are connected" #or i# the #ormer alternative is ossible and the distributor acts un'ustly and not the man $ho has the e2cessive share, then i# a man assi!ns more to another than to himsel#, kno$in!ly and voluntarily, he treats himsel# un'ustly" $hich is $hat modest eo le seem to do, since the virtuous man tends to take less than his share. 1r does this statement too need quali#ication+ .or )a* he erha s !ets more than his share o# some other !ood, e.!. o# honour or o# intrinsic nobility. )b* /he question is solved by a lyin! the distinction $e a lied to un'ust action" #or he su##ers nothin! contrary to his o$n $ish, so that he is not un'ustly treated as #ar as this !oes, but at most only su##ers harm. It is lain too that the distributor acts un'ustly, but not al$ays the man $ho has the e2cessive share" #or it is not he to $hom $hat is un'ust a ertains that acts un'ustly, but he to $hom it a ertains to do the un'ust act voluntarily, i.e. the erson in $hom lies the ori!in o# the action, and this lies in the distributor, not in the receiver. A!ain, since the $ord 8do9 is ambi!uous, and there is a sense in $hich li#eless thin!s, or a hand, or a servant $ho obeys an order, may be said to slay, he $ho !ets an e2cessive share does not act un'ustly, thou!h he 8does9 $hat is un'ust. A!ain, i# the distributor !ave his 'ud!ement in i!norance, he does not act un'ustly in res ect o# le!al 'ustice, and his 'ud!ement is not un'ust in this sense, but in a sense it is un'ust )#or le!al 'ustice and rimordial 'ustice are di##erent*" but i# $ith kno$led!e he 'ud!ed un'ustly, he is himsel# aimin! at an e2cessive share either o# !ratitude or o# reven!e. As much, then, as i# he $ere to share in the lunder, the man $ho has 'ud!ed un'ustly #or these reasons has !ot too much" the #act that $hat he !ets is di##erent #rom $hat he distributes makes no di##erence, #or even i# he a$ards land $ith a vie$ to sharin! in the lunder he !ets not land but money. Ben think that actin! un'ustly is in their o$er, and there#ore that bein! 'ust is easy. But it is not" to lie $ith one9s nei!hbour9s $i#e, to $ound another, to deliver a bribe, is easy and in our o$er, but to do these thin!s as a result o# a certain state o# character is neither easy nor in our o$er. ,imilarly to kno$ $hat is 'ust and $hat is un'ust requires, men think, no !reat $isdom, because it is not hard to understand the matters dealt $ith by the la$s )thou!h these are not the thin!s that are 'ust, e2ce t incidentally*" but ho$ actions must be done and distributions e##ected in order to be 'ust, to kno$ this is a !reater achievement than kno$in! $hat is !ood #or the health" thou!h even there, $hile it is easy to kno$ that honey, $ine, hellebore, cautery, and the use o# the kni#e are so, to kno$ ho$, to $hom, and $hen these should be a lied $ith a vie$ to roducin! health, is no less an achievement than that o# bein! a hysician. A!ain, #or this very reason men think that actin! un'ustly is characteristic o# the 'ust man no less than o# the un'ust, because he $ould be not less but even more ca able o# doin! each o# these un'ust acts" #or he could lie $ith a $oman or $ound a nei!hbour" and the brave man could thro$ a$ay his shield and turn to #li!ht in this direction or in that. But to lay the co$ard or to act un'ustly consists not in doin! these thin!s, e2ce t incidentally, but in doin! them as the result o# a certain state o# character, 'ust as to ractise medicine and healin! consists not in a lyin! or not a lyin! the kni#e, in usin! or not usin! medicines, but in doin! so in a certain $ay. Fust acts occur bet$een eo le $ho artici ate in thin!s !ood in themselves and can have too much or too little o# them" #or some bein!s )e.!. resumably the !ods* cannot have too much o# them, and to others, those $ho are incurably bad, not even the smallest share in them is bene#icial

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but all such !oods are harm#ul, $hile to others they are bene#icial u to a oint" there#ore 'ustice is essentially somethin! human. 1D 1ur ne2t sub'ect is equity and the equitable )to e iekes*, and their res ective relations to 'ustice and the 'ust. .or on e2amination they a ear to be neither absolutely the same nor !enerically di##erent" and $hile $e sometime raise $hat is equitable and the equitable man )so that $e a ly the name by $ay o# raise even to instances o# the other virtues, instead o# 8!ood9 meanin! by e ieikestebon that a thin! is better*, at other times, $hen $e reason it out, it seems stran!e i# the equitable, bein! somethin! di##erent #rom the 'ust, is yet raise$orthy" #or either the 'ust or the equitable is not !ood, i# they are di##erent" or, i# both are !ood, they are the same. /hese, then, are retty much the considerations that !ive rise to the roblem about the equitable" they are all in a sense correct and not o osed to one another" #or the equitable, thou!h it is better than one kind o# 'ustice, yet is 'ust, and it is not as bein! a di##erent class o# thin! that it is better than the 'ust. /he same thin!, then, is 'ust and equitable, and $hile both are !ood the equitable is su erior. What creates the roblem is that the equitable is 'ust, but not the le!ally 'ust but a correction o# le!al 'ustice. /he reason is that all la$ is universal but about some thin!s it is not ossible to make a universal statement $hich shall be correct. In those cases, then, in $hich it is necessary to s eak universally, but not ossible to do so correctly, the la$ takes the usual case, thou!h it is not i!norant o# the ossibility o# error. And it is none the less correct" #or the error is in the la$ nor in the le!islator but in the nature o# the thin!, since the matter o# ractical a##airs is o# this kind #rom the start. When the la$ s eaks universally, then, and a case arises on it $hich is not covered by the universal statement, then it is ri!ht, $here the le!islator #ails us and has erred by oversim licity, to correct the omission % to say $hat the le!islator himsel# $ould have said had he been resent, and $ould have ut into his la$ i# he had kno$n. 3ence the equitable is 'ust, and better than one kind o# 'ustice % not better than absolute 'ustice but better than the error that arises #rom the absoluteness o# the statement. And this is the nature o# the equitable, a correction o# la$ $here it is de#ective o$in! to its universality. In #act this is the reason $hy all thin!s are not determined by la$, that about some thin!s it is im ossible to lay do$n a la$, so that a decree is needed. .or $hen the thin! is inde#inite the rule also is inde#inite, like the leaden rule used in makin! the 5esbian mouldin!" the rule ada ts itsel# to the sha e o# the stone and is not ri!id, and so too the decree is ada ted to the #acts. It is lain, then, $hat the equitable is, and that it is 'ust and is better than one kind o# 'ustice. It is evident also #rom this $ho the equitable man is" the man $ho chooses and does such acts, and is no stickler #or his ri!hts in a bad sense but tends to take less than his share thou!h he has the la$ o#t his side, is equitable, and this state o# character is equity, $hich is a sort o# 'ustice and not a di##erent state o# character. 11 Whether a man can treat himsel# un'ustly or not, is evident #rom $hat has been said. .or )a* one class o# 'ust acts are those acts in accordance $ith any virtue $hich are rescribed by the la$" e.!. the la$ does not e2 ressly ermit suicide, and $hat it does not e2 ressly ermit it #orbids. A!ain, $hen a man in violation o# the la$ harms another )other$ise than in retaliation* voluntarily, he acts un'ustly, and a voluntary a!ent is one $ho kno$s both the erson he is a##ectin! by his action and the instrument he is usin!" and he $ho throu!h an!er voluntarily stabs <=

himsel# does this contrary to the ri!ht rule o# li#e, and this the la$ does not allo$" there#ore he is actin! un'ustly. But to$ards $hom+ ,urely to$ards the state, not to$ards himsel#. .or he su##ers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated un'ustly. /his is also the reason $hy the state unishes" a certain loss o# civil ri!hts attaches to the man $ho destroys himsel#, on the !round that he is treatin! the state un'ustly. .urther )b* in that sense o# 8actin! un'ustly9 in $hich the man $ho 8acts un'ustly9 is un'ust only and not bad all round, it is not ossible to treat onesel# un'ustly )this is di##erent #rom the #ormer sense" the un'ust man in one sense o# the term is $icked in a articulari-ed $ay 'ust as the co$ard is, not in the sense o# bein! $icked all round, so that his 8un'ust act9 does not mani#est $ickedness in !eneral*. .or )i* that $ould im ly the ossibility o# the same thin!9s havin! been subtracted #rom and added to the same thin! at the same time" but this is im ossible % the 'ust and the un'ust al$ays involve more than one erson. .urther, )ii* un'ust action is voluntary and done by choice, and takes the initiative )#or the man $ho because he has su##ered does the same in return is not thou!ht to act un'ustly*" but i# a man harms himsel# he su##ers and does the same thin!s at the same time. .urther, )iii* i# a man could treat himsel# un'ustly, he could be voluntarily treated un'ustly. Besides, )iv* no one acts un'ustly $ithout committin! articular acts o# in'ustice" but no one can commit adultery $ith his o$n $i#e or housebreakin! on his o$n house or the#t on his o$n ro erty, In !eneral, the question 8can a man treat himsel# un'ustly+9 is solved also by the distinction $e a lied to the question 8can a man be voluntarily treated un'ustly+9 )It is evident too that both are bad, bein! un'ustly treated and actin! un'ustly" #or the one means havin! less and the other havin! more than the intermediate amount, $hich lays the art here that the healthy does in the medical art, and that !ood condition does in the art o# bodily trainin!. But still actin! un'ustly is the $orse, #or it involves vice and is blame$orthy % involves vice $hich is either o# the com lete and unquali#ied kind or almost so )$e must admit the latter alternative, because not all voluntary un'ust action im lies in'ustice as a state o# character*, $hile bein! un'ustly treated does not involve vice and in'ustice in onesel#. In itsel#, then, bein! un'ustly treated is less bad, but there is nothin! to revent its bein! incidentally a !reater evil. But theory cares nothin! #or this" it calls leurisy a more serious mischie# than a stumble" yet the latter may become incidentally the more serious, i# the #all due to it leads to your bein! taken risoner or ut to death the enemy.* Beta horically and in virtue o# a certain resemblance there is a 'ustice, not indeed bet$een a man and himsel#, but bet$een certain arts o# him" yet not every kind o# 'ustice but that o# master and servant or that o# husband and $i#e. .or these are the ratios in $hich the art o# the soul that has a rational rinci le stands to the irrational art" and it is $ith a vie$ to these arts that eo le also think a man can be un'ust to himsel#, vi-. because these arts are liable to su##er somethin! contrary to their res ective desires" there is there#ore thou!ht to be a mutual 'ustice bet$een them as bet$een ruler and ruled. 5et this be taken as our account o# 'ustice and the other, i.e. the other moral, virtues.

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Book 6I 1 ,ince $e have reviously said that one ou!ht to choose that $hich is intermediate, not the e2cess nor the de#ect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates o# the ri!ht rule, let us discuss the nature o# these dictates. In all the states o# character $e have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to $hich the man $ho has the rule looks, and hei!htens or rela2es his activity accordin!ly, and there is a standard $hich determines the mean states $hich $e say are intermediate bet$een e2cess and de#ect, bein! in accordance $ith the ri!ht rule. But such a statement, thou!h true, is by no means clear" #or not only here but in all other ursuits $hich are ob'ects o# kno$led!e it is indeed true to say that $e must not e2ert ourselves nor rela2 our e##orts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate e2tent and as the ri!ht rule dictates" but i# a man had only this kno$led!e he $ould be none the $iser e.!. $e should not kno$ $hat sort o# medicines to a ly to our body i# some one $ere to say 8all those $hich the medical art rescribes, and $hich a!ree $ith the ractice o# one $ho ossesses the art9. 3ence it is necessary $ith re!ard to the states o# the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it should be determined $hat is the ri!ht rule and $hat is the standard that #i2es it. We divided the virtues o# the soul and a said that some are virtues o# character and others o# intellect. No$ $e have discussed in detail the moral virtues" $ith re!ard to the others let us e2 ress our vie$ as #ollo$s, be!innin! $ith some remarks about the soul. We said be#ore that there are t$o arts o# the soul % that $hich !ras s a rule or rational rinci le, and the irrational" let us no$ dra$ a similar distinction $ithin the art $hich !ras s a rational rinci le. And let it be assumed that there are t$o arts $hich !ras a rational rinci le % one by $hich $e contem late the kind o# thin!s $hose ori!inative causes are invariable, and one by $hich $e contem late variable thin!s" #or $here ob'ects di##er in kind the art o# the soul ans$erin! to each o# the t$o is di##erent in kind, since it is in virtue o# a certain likeness and kinshi $ith their ob'ects that they have the kno$led!e they have. 5et one o# these arts be called the scienti#ic and the other the calculative" #or to deliberate and to calculate are the same thin!, but no one deliberates about the invariable. /here#ore the calculative is one art o# the #aculty $hich !ras s a rational rinci le. We must, then, learn $hat is the best state o# each o# these t$o arts" #or this is the virtue o# each. ( /he virtue o# a thin! is relative to its ro er $ork. No$ there are three thin!s in the soul $hich control action and truth % sensation, reason, desire. 1# these sensation ori!inates no action" this is lain #rom the #act that the lo$er animals have sensation but no share in action. What a##irmation and ne!ation are in thinkin!, ursuit and avoidance are in desire" so that since moral virtue is a state o# character concerned $ith choice, and choice is deliberate desire, there#ore both the reasonin! must be true and the desire ri!ht, i# the choice is to be !ood, and the latter must ursue 'ust $hat the #ormer asserts. No$ this kind o# intellect and o# truth is ractical" o# the intellect $hich is contem lative, not ractical nor roductive, the !ood and the bad state are truth and #alsity res ectively )#or this is the $ork o# everythin! intellectual*" $hile o# the art $hich is ractical and intellectual the !ood state is truth in a!reement $ith ri!ht desire.

<A

/he ori!in o# action % its e##icient, not its #inal cause % is choice, and that o# choice is desire and reasonin! $ith a vie$ to an end. /his is $hy choice cannot e2ist either $ithout reason and intellect or $ithout a moral state" #or !ood action and its o osite cannot e2ist $ithout a combination o# intellect and character. Intellect itsel#, ho$ever, moves nothin!, but only the intellect $hich aims at an end and is ractical" #or this rules the roductive intellect, as $ell, since every one $ho makes makes #or an end, and that $hich is made is not an end in the unquali#ied sense )but only an end in a articular relation, and the end o# a articular o eration* % only that $hich is done is that" #or !ood action is an end, and desire aims at this. 3ence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an ori!in o# action is a man. )It is to be noted that nothin! that is ast is an ob'ect o# choice, e.!. no one chooses to have sacked /roy" #or no one deliberates about the ast, but about $hat is #uture and ca able o# bein! other$ise, $hile $hat is ast is not ca able o# not havin! taken lace" hence A!athon is ri!ht in sayin! .or this alone is lackin! even to ;od, /o make undone thin!s thathave once been done.* /he $ork o# both the intellectual arts, then, is truth. /here#ore the states that are most strictly those in res ect o# $hich each o# these arts $ill reach truth are the virtues o# the t$o arts. 0 5et us be!in, then, #rom the be!innin!, and discuss these states once more. 5et it be assumed that the states by virtue o# $hich the soul ossesses truth by $ay o# a##irmation or denial are #ive in number, i.e. art, scienti#ic kno$led!e, ractical $isdom, hiloso hic $isdom, intuitive reason" $e do not include 'ud!ement and o inion because in these $e may be mistaken. No$ $hat scienti#ic kno$led!e is, i# $e are to s eak e2actly and not #ollo$ mere similarities, is lain #rom $hat #ollo$s. We all su ose that $hat $e kno$ is not even ca able o# bein! other$ise" o# thin!s ca able o# bein! other$ise $e do not kno$, $hen they have assed outside our observation, $hether they e2ist or not. /here#ore the ob'ect o# scienti#ic kno$led!e is o# necessity. /here#ore it is eternal" #or thin!s that are o# necessity in the unquali#ied sense are all eternal" and thin!s that are eternal are un!enerated and im erishable. A!ain, every science is thou!ht to be ca able o# bein! tau!ht, and its ob'ect o# bein! learned. And all teachin! starts #rom $hat is already kno$n, as $e maintain in the Analytics also" #or it roceeds sometimes throu!h induction and sometimes by syllo!ism. No$ induction is the startin!& oint $hich kno$led!e even o# the universal resu oses, $hile syllo!ism roceeds #rom universals. /here are there#ore startin!& oints #rom $hich syllo!ism roceeds, $hich are not reached by syllo!ism" it is there#ore by induction that they are acquired. ,cienti#ic kno$led!e is, then, a state o# ca acity to demonstrate, and has the other limitin! characteristics $hich $e s eci#y in the Analytics, #or it is $hen a man believes in a certain $ay and the startin!& oints are kno$n to him that he has scienti#ic kno$led!e, since i# they are not better kno$n to him than the conclusion, he $ill have his kno$led!e only incidentally. 5et this, then, be taken as our account o# scienti#ic kno$led!e. 4 In the variable are included both thin!s made and thin!s done" makin! and actin! are di##erent )#or their nature $e treat even the discussions outside our school as reliable*" so that the reasoned state o# ca acity to act is di##erent #rom the reasoned state o# ca acity to make. 3ence too they are not included one in the other" #or neither is actin! makin! nor is makin! actin!. No$ since <C

architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned state o# ca acity to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical $ith a state o# ca acity to make, involvin! a true course o# reasonin!. All art is concerned $ith comin! into bein!, i.e. $ith contrivin! and considerin! ho$ somethin! may come into bein! $hich is ca able o# either bein! or not bein!, and $hose ori!in is in the maker and not in the thin! made" #or art is concerned neither $ith thin!s that are, or come into bein!, by necessity, nor $ith thin!s that do so in accordance $ith nature )since these have their ori!in in themselves*. Bakin! and actin! bein! di##erent, art must be a matter o# makin!, not o# actin!. And in a sense chance and art are concerned $ith the same ob'ects" as A!athon says, 8art loves chance and chance loves art9. Art, then, as has been is a state concerned $ith makin!, involvin! a true course o# reasonin!, and lack o# art on the contrary is a state concerned $ith makin!, involvin! a #alse course o# reasonin!" both are concerned $ith the variable. < Re!ardin! ractical $isdom $e shall !et at the truth by considerin! $ho are the ersons $e credit $ith it. No$ it is thou!ht to be the mark o# a man o# ractical $isdom to be able to deliberate $ell about $hat is !ood and e2 edient #or himsel#, not in some articular res ect, e.!. about $hat sorts o# thin! conduce to health or to stren!th, but about $hat sorts o# thin! conduce to the !ood li#e in !eneral. /his is sho$n by the #act that $e credit men $ith ractical $isdom in some articular res ect $hen they have calculated $ell $ith a vie$ to some !ood end $hich is one o# those that are not the ob'ect o# any art. It #ollo$s that in the !eneral sense also the man $ho is ca able o# deliberatin! has ractical $isdom. No$ no one deliberates about thin!s that are invariable, nor about thin!s that it is im ossible #or him to do. /here#ore, since scienti#ic kno$led!e involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration o# thin!s $hose #irst rinci les are variable )#or all such thin!s mi!ht actually be other$ise*, and since it is im ossible to deliberate about thin!s that are o# necessity, ractical $isdom cannot be scienti#ic kno$led!e nor art" not science because that $hich can be done is ca able o# bein! other$ise, not art because action and makin! are di##erent kinds o# thin!. /he remainin! alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state o# ca acity to act $ith re!ard to the thin!s that are !ood or bad #or man. .or $hile makin! has an end other than itsel#, action cannot" #or !ood action itsel# is its end. It is #or this reason that $e think 7ericles and men like him have ractical $isdom, vi-. because they can see $hat is !ood #or themselves and $hat is !ood #or men in !eneral" $e consider that those can do this $ho are !ood at mana!in! households or states. )/his is $hy $e call tem erance )so hrosune* by this name" $e im ly that it reserves one9s ractical $isdom )so-ousa tan hronsin*. No$ $hat it reserves is a 'ud!ement o# the kind $e have described. .or it is not any and every 'ud!ement that leasant and ain#ul ob'ects destroy and ervert, e.!. the 'ud!ement that the trian!le has or has not its an!les equal to t$o ri!ht an!les, but only 'ud!ements about $hat is to be done. .or the ori!inatin! causes o# the thin!s that are done consist in the end at $hich they are aimed" but the man $ho has been ruined by leasure or ain #orth$ith #ails to see any such ori!inatin! cause % to see that #or the sake o# this or because o# this he ou!ht to choose and do $hatever he chooses and does" #or vice is destructive o# the ori!inatin! cause o# action.* 7ractical $isdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state o# ca acity to act $ith re!ard to human !oods. But #urther, $hile there is such a thin! as e2cellence in art, there is no such thin! as e2cellence in ractical $isdom" and in art he $ho errs $illin!ly is re#erable, but in ractical $isdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse. 7lainly, then, ractical $isdom is a virtue and not an art. /here bein! t$o arts o# the soul that can #ollo$ a course o# reasonin!, it must be the virtue o# one o# the t$o, =D

i.e. o# that art $hich #orms o inions" #or o inion is about the variable and so is ractical $isdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned state" this is sho$n by the #act that a state o# that sort may #or!otten but ractical $isdom cannot. = ,cienti#ic kno$led!e is 'ud!ement about thin!s that are universal and necessary, and the conclusions o# demonstration, and all scienti#ic kno$led!e, #ollo$ #rom #irst rinci les )#or scienti#ic kno$led!e involves a rehension o# a rational !round*. /his bein! so, the #irst rinci le #rom $hich $hat is scienti#ically kno$n #ollo$s cannot be an ob'ect o# scienti#ic kno$led!e, o# art, or o# ractical $isdom" #or that $hich can be scienti#ically kno$n can be demonstrated, and art and ractical $isdom deal $ith thin!s that are variable. Nor are these #irst rinci les the ob'ects o# hiloso hic $isdom, #or it is a mark o# the hiloso her to have demonstration about some thin!s. I#, then, the states o# mind by $hich $e have truth and are never deceived about thin!s invariable or even variable are scienti#ic kno$leded!e, ractical $isdom, hiloso hic $isdom, and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any o# the three )i.e. ractical $isdom, scienti#ic kno$led!e, or hiloso hic $isdom*, the remainin! alternative is that it is intuitive reason that !ras s the #irst rinci les. @ Wisdom )1* in the arts $e ascribe to their most #inished e2 onents, e.!. to 7hidias as a scul tor and to 7olyclitus as a maker o# ortrait&statues, and here $e mean nothin! by $isdom e2ce t e2cellence in art" but )(* $e think that some eo le are $ise in !eneral, not in some articular #ield or in any other limited res ect, as 3omer says in the Bar!ites, 3im did the !ods make neither a di!!er nor yet a lou!hman Nor $ise in anythin! else. /here#ore $isdom must lainly be the most #inished o# the #orms o# kno$led!e. It #ollo$s that the $ise man must not only kno$ $hat #ollo$s #rom the #irst rinci les, but must also ossess truth about the #irst rinci les. /here#ore $isdom must be intuitive reason combined $ith scienti#ic kno$led!e % scienti#ic kno$led!e o# the hi!hest ob'ects $hich has received as it $ere its ro er com letion. 1# the hi!hest ob'ects, $e say" #or it $ould be stran!e to think that the art o# olitics, or ractical $isdom, is the best kno$led!e, since man is not the best thin! in the $orld. No$ i# $hat is healthy or !ood is di##erent #or men and #or #ishes, but $hat is $hite or strai!ht is al$ays the same, any one $ould say that $hat is $ise is the same but $hat is ractically $ise is di##erent" #or it is to that $hich observes $ell the various matters concernin! itsel# that one ascribes ractical $isdom, and it is to this that one $ill entrust such matters. /his is $hy $e say that some even o# the lo$er animals have ractical $isdom, vi-. those $hich are #ound to have a o$er o# #oresi!ht $ith re!ard to their o$n li#e. It is evident also that hiloso hic $isdom and the art o# olitics cannot be the same" #or i# the state o# mind concerned $ith a man9s o$n interests is to be called hiloso hic $isdom, there $ill be many hiloso hic $isdoms" there $ill not be one concerned $ith the !ood o# all animals )any more than there is one art o# medicine #or all e2istin! thin!s*, but a di##erent hiloso hic $isdom about the !ood o# each s ecies. But i# the ar!ument be that man is the best o# the animals, this makes no di##erence" #or there are other thin!s much more divine in their nature even than man, e.!., most cons icuously, the bodies o# $hich the heavens are #ramed. .rom $hat has been said it is lain, then, that hiloso hic $isdom is scienti#ic kno$led!e, combined $ith intuitive reason, o# the thin!s that are hi!hest by =1

nature. /his is $hy $e say Ana2a!oras, /hales, and men like them have hiloso hic but not ractical $isdom, $hen $e see them i!norant o# $hat is to their o$n advanta!e, and $hy $e say that they kno$ thin!s that are remarkable, admirable, di##icult, and divine, but useless" vi-. because it is not human !oods that they seek. 7ractical $isdom on the other hand is concerned $ith thin!s human and thin!s about $hich it is ossible to deliberate" #or $e say this is above all the $ork o# the man o# ractical $isdom, to deliberate $ell, but no one deliberates about thin!s invariable, nor about thin!s $hich have not an end, and that a !ood that can be brou!ht about by action. /he man $ho is $ithout quali#ication !ood at deliberatin! is the man $ho is ca able o# aimin! in accordance $ith calculation at the best #or man o# thin!s attainable by action. Nor is ractical $isdom concerned $ith universals only % it must also reco!ni-e the articulars" #or it is ractical, and ractice is concerned $ith articulars. /his is $hy some $ho do not kno$, and es ecially those $ho have e2 erience, are more ractical than others $ho kno$" #or i# a man kne$ that li!ht meats are di!estible and $holesome, but did not kno$ $hich sorts o# meat are li!ht, he $ould not roduce health, but the man $ho kno$s that chicken is $holesome is more likely to roduce health. No$ ractical $isdom is concerned $ith action" there#ore one should have both #orms o# it, or the latter in re#erence to the #ormer. But o# ractical as o# hiloso hic $isdom there must be a controllin! kind. A 7olitical $isdom and ractical $isdom are the same state o# mind, but their essence is not the same. 1# the $isdom concerned $ith the city, the ractical $isdom $hich lays a controllin! art is le!islative $isdom, $hile that $hich is related to this as articulars to their universal is kno$n by the !eneral name 8 olitical $isdom9" this has to do $ith action and deliberation, #or a decree is a thin! to be carried out in the #orm o# an individual act. /his is $hy the e2 onents o# this art are alone said to 8take art in olitics9" #or these alone 8do thin!s9 as manual labourers 8do thin!s9. 7ractical $isdom also is identi#ied es ecially $ith that #orm o# it $hich is concerned $ith a man himsel# % $ith the individual" and this is kno$n by the !eneral name 8 ractical $isdom9" o# the other kinds one is called household mana!ement, another le!islation, the third olitics, and o# the latter one art is called deliberative and the other 'udicial. No$ kno$in! $hat is !ood #or onesel# $ill be one kind o# kno$led!e, but it is very di##erent #rom the other kinds" and the man $ho kno$s and concerns himsel# $ith his o$n interests is thou!ht to have ractical $isdom, $hile oliticians are thou!ht to be busybodies" hence the $ord o# Euri ides, But ho$ could I be $ise, $ho mi!ht at ease, Numbered amon! the army9s multitude, 3ave had an equal share+ .or those $ho aim too hi!h and do too much. /hose $ho think thus seek their o$n !ood, and consider that one ou!ht to do so. .rom this o inion, then, has come the vie$ that such men have ractical $isdom" yet erha s one9s o$n !ood cannot e2ist $ithout household mana!ement, nor $ithout a #orm o# !overnment. .urther, ho$ one should order one9s o$n a##airs is not clear and needs inquiry. What has been said is con#irmed by the #act that $hile youn! men become !eometricians and mathematicians and $ise in matters like these, it is thou!ht that a youn! man o# ractical $isdom cannot be #ound. /he cause is that such $isdom is concerned not only $ith universals but $ith articulars, $hich become #amiliar #rom e2 erience, but a youn! man has no e2 erience, #or it is len!th o# time that !ives e2 erience" indeed one mi!ht ask this question too, $hy a boy may =(

become a mathematician, but not a hiloso her or a hysicist. It is because the ob'ects o# mathematics e2ist by abstraction, $hile the #irst rinci les o# these other sub'ects come #rom e2 erience, and because youn! men have no conviction about the latter but merely use the ro er lan!ua!e, $hile the essence o# mathematical ob'ects is lain enou!h to them+ .urther, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the articular" $e may #all to kno$ either that all $ater that $ei!hs heavy is bad, or that this articular $ater $ei!hs heavy. /hat ractical $isdom is not scienti#ic kno$led!e is evident" #or it is, as has been said, concerned $ith the ultimate articular #act, since the thin! to be done is o# this nature. It is o osed, then, to intuitive reason" #or intuitive reason is o# the limitin! remisses, #or $hich no reason can be !iven, $hile ractical $isdom is concerned $ith the ultimate articular, $hich is the ob'ect not o# scienti#ic kno$led!e but o# erce tion % not the erce tion o# qualities eculiar to one sense but a erce tion akin to that by $hich $e erceive that the articular #i!ure be#ore us is a trian!le" #or in that direction as $ell as in that o# the ma'or remiss there $ill be a limit. But this is rather erce tion than ractical $isdom, thou!h it is another kind o# erce tion than that o# the qualities eculiar to each sense. C /here is a di##erence bet$een inquiry and deliberation" #or deliberation is inquiry into a articular kind o# thin!. We must !ras the nature o# e2cellence in deliberation as $ell $hether it is a #orm o# scienti#ic kno$led!e, or o inion, or skill in con'ecture, or some other kind o# thin!. ,cienti#ic kno$led!e it is not" #or men do not inquire about the thin!s they kno$ about, but !ood deliberation is a kind o# deliberation, and he $ho deliberates inquires and calculates. Nor is it skill in con'ecture" #or this both involves no reasonin! and is somethin! that is quick in its o eration, $hile men deliberate a lon! time, and they say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions o# one9s deliberation, but should deliberate slo$ly. A!ain, readiness o# mind is di##erent #rom e2cellence in deliberation" it is a sort o# skill in con'ecture. Nor a!ain is e2cellence in deliberation o inion o# any sort. But since the man $ho deliberates badly makes a mistake, $hile he $ho deliberates $ell does so correctly, e2cellence in deliberation is clearly a kind o# correctness, but neither o# kno$led!e nor o# o inion" #or there is no such thin! as correctness o# kno$led!e )since there is no such thin! as error o# kno$led!e*, and correctness o# o inion is truth" and at the same time everythin! that is an ob'ect o# o inion is already determined. But a!ain e2cellence in deliberation involves reasonin!. /he remainin! alternative, then, is that it is correctness o# thinkin!" #or this is not yet assertion, since, $hile even o inion is not inquiry but has reached the sta!e o# assertion, the man $ho is deliberatin!, $hether he does so $ell or ill, is searchin! #or somethin! and calculatin!. But e2cellence in deliberation is a certain correctness o# deliberation" hence $e must #irst inquire $hat deliberation is and $hat it is about. And, there bein! more than one kind o# correctness, lainly e2cellence in deliberation is not any and every kind" #or )1* the incontinent man and the bad man, i# he is clever, $ill reach as a result o# his calculation $hat he sets be#ore himsel#, so that he $ill have deliberated correctly, but he $ill have !ot #or himsel# a !reat evil. No$ to have deliberated $ell is thou!ht to be a !ood thin!" #or it is this kind o# correctness o# deliberation that is e2cellence in deliberation, vi-. that $hich tends to attain $hat is !ood. But )(* it is ossible to attain even !ood by a #alse syllo!ism, and to attain $hat one ou!ht to do but not by the ri!ht means, the middle term bein! #alse" so that this too is not yet e2cellence in deliberation this state in virtue o# $hich one attains $hat one ou!ht but not by the ri!ht means. A!ain )0* it is ossible =0

to attain it by lon! deliberation $hile another man attains it quickly. /here#ore in the #ormer case $e have not yet !ot e2cellence in deliberation, $hich is ri!htness $ith re!ard to the e2 edient % ri!htness in res ect both o# the end, the manner, and the time. )4* .urther it is ossible to have deliberated $ell either in the unquali#ied sense or $ith re#erence to a articular end. E2cellence in deliberation in the unquali#ied sense, then, is that $hich succeeds $ith re#erence to $hat is the end in the unquali#ied sense, and e2cellence in deliberation in a articular sense is that $hich succeeds relatively to a articular end. I#, then, it is characteristic o# men o# ractical $isdom to have deliberated $ell, e2cellence in deliberation $ill be correctness $ith re!ard to $hat conduces to the end o# $hich ractical $isdom is the true a rehension. 1D Gnderstandin!, also, and !oodness o# understandin!, in virtue o# $hich men are said to be men o# understandin! or o# !ood understandin!, are neither entirely the same as o inion or scienti#ic kno$led!e )#or at that rate all men $ould have been men o# understandin!*, nor are they one o# the articular sciences, such as medicine, the science o# thin!s connected $ith health, or !eometry, the science o# s atial ma!nitudes. .or understandin! is neither about thin!s that are al$ays and are unchan!eable, nor about any and every one o# the thin!s that come into bein!, but about thin!s $hich may become sub'ects o# questionin! and deliberation. 3ence it is about the same ob'ects as ractical $isdom" but understandin! and ractical $isdom are not the same. .or ractical $isdom issues commands, since its end is $hat ou!ht to be done or not to be done" but understandin! only 'ud!es. )Gnderstandin! is identical $ith !oodness o# understandin!, men o# understandin! $ith men o# !ood understandin!.* No$ understandin! is neither the havin! nor the acquirin! o# ractical $isdom" but as learnin! is called understandin! $hen it means the e2ercise o# the #aculty o# kno$led!e, so 8understandin!9 is a licable to the e2ercise o# the #aculty o# o inion #or the ur ose o# 'ud!in! o# $hat some one else says about matters $ith $hich ractical $isdom is concerned % and o# 'ud!in! soundly" #or 8$ell9 and 8soundly9 are the same thin!. And #rom this has come the use o# the name 8understandin!9 in virtue o# $hich men are said to be 8o# !ood understandin!9, vi-. #rom the a lication o# the $ord to the !ras in! o# scienti#ic truth" #or $e o#ten call such !ras in! understandin!. 11 What is called 'ud!ement, in virtue o# $hich men are said to 8be sym athetic 'ud!es9 and to 8have 'ud!ement9, is the ri!ht discrimination o# the equitable. /his is sho$n by the #act that $e say the equitable man is above all others a man o# sym athetic 'ud!ement, and identi#y equity $ith sym athetic 'ud!ement about certain #acts. And sym athetic 'ud!ement is 'ud!ement $hich discriminates $hat is equitable and does so correctly" and correct 'ud!ement is that $hich 'ud!es $hat is true. No$ all the states $e have considered conver!e, as mi!ht be e2 ected, to the same oint" #or $hen $e s eak o# 'ud!ement and understandin! and ractical $isdom and intuitive reason $e credit the same eo le $ith ossessin! 'ud!ement and havin! reached years o# reason and $ith havin! ractical $isdom and understandin!. .or all these #aculties deal $ith ultimates, i.e. $ith articulars" and bein! a man o# understandin! and o# !ood or sym athetic 'ud!ement consists in bein! able 'ud!e about the thin!s $ith $hich ractical $isdom is concerned" #or the equities are common to all !ood men in relation to other men. No$ all thin!s $hich have to be done are included amon! articulars or ultimates" #or not only must the man o# ractical $isdom kno$ =4

articular #acts, but understandin! and 'ud!ement are also concerned $ith thin!s to be done, and these are ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned $ith the ultimates in both directions" #or both the #irst terms and the last are ob'ects o# intuitive reason and not o# ar!ument, and the intuitive reason $hich is resu osed by demonstrations !ras s the unchan!eable and #irst terms, $hile the intuitive reason involved in ractical reasonin!s !ras s the last and variable #act, i.e. the minor remiss. .or these variable #acts are the startin!& oints #or the a rehension o# the end, since the universals are reached #rom the articulars" o# these there#ore $e must have erce tion, and this erce tion is intuitive reason. /his is $hy these states are thou!ht to be natural endo$ments % $hy, $hile no one is thou!ht to be a hiloso her by nature, eo le are thou!ht to have by nature 'ud!ement, understandin!, and intuitive reason. /his is sho$n by the #act that $e think our o$ers corres ond to our time o# li#e, and that a articular a!e brin!s $ith it intuitive reason and 'ud!ement" this im lies that nature is the cause. )3ence intuitive reason is both be!innin! and end" #or demonstrations are #rom these and about these.* /here#ore $e ou!ht to attend to the undemonstrated sayin!s and o inions o# e2 erienced and older eo le or o# eo le o# ractical $isdom not less than to demonstrations" #or because e2 erience has !iven them an eye they see ari!ht. We have stated, then, $hat ractical and hiloso hic $isdom are, and $ith $hat each o# them is concerned, and $e have said that each is the virtue o# a di##erent art o# the soul. 1( Di##iculties mi!ht be raised as to the utility o# these qualities o# mind. .or )1* hiloso hic $isdom $ill contem late none o# the thin!s that $ill make a man ha y )#or it is not concerned $ith any comin! into bein!*, and thou!h ractical $isdom has this merit, #or $hat ur ose do $e need it+ 7ractical $isdom is the quality o# mind concerned $ith thin!s 'ust and noble and !ood #or man, but these are the thin!s $hich it is the mark o# a !ood man to do, and $e are none the more able to act #or kno$in! them i# the virtues are states o# character, 'ust as $e are none the better able to act #or kno$in! the thin!s that are healthy and sound, in the sense not o# roducin! but o# issuin! #rom the state o# health" #or $e are none the more able to act #or havin! the art o# medicine or o# !ymnastics. But )(* i# $e are to say that a man should have ractical $isdom not #or the sake o# kno$in! moral truths but #or the sake o# becomin! !ood, ractical $isdom $ill be o# no use to those $ho are !ood" a!ain it is o# no use to those $ho have not virtue" #or it $ill make no di##erence $hether they have ractical $isdom themselves or obey others $ho have it, and it $ould be enou!h #or us to do $hat $e do in the case o# health" thou!h $e $ish to become healthy, yet $e do not learn the art o# medicine. )0* Besides this, it $ould be thou!ht stran!e i# ractical $isdom, bein! in#erior to hiloso hic $isdom, is to be ut in authority over it, as seems to be im lied by the #act that the art $hich roduces anythin! rules and issues commands about that thin!. /hese, then, are the questions $e must discuss" so #ar $e have only stated the di##iculties. )1* No$ #irst let us say that in themselves these states must be $orthy o# choice because they are the virtues o# the t$o arts o# the soul res ectively, even i# neither o# them roduce anythin!. )(* ,econdly, they do roduce somethin!, not as the art o# medicine roduces health, ho$ever, but as health roduces health" so does hiloso hic $isdom roduce ha iness" #or, bein! a art o# virtue entire, by bein! ossessed and by actuali-in! itsel# it makes a man ha y. )0* A!ain, the $ork o# man is achieved only in accordance $ith ractical $isdom as $ell as $ith moral virtue" #or virtue makes us aim at the ri!ht mark, and ractical $isdom makes us take the

=<

ri!ht means. )1# the #ourth art o# the soul % the nutritive % there is no such virtue" #or there is nothin! $hich it is in its o$er to do or not to do.* )4* With re!ard to our bein! none the more able to do because o# our ractical $isdom $hat is noble and 'ust, let us be!in a little #urther back, startin! $ith the #ollo$in! rinci le. As $e say that some eo le $ho do 'ust acts are not necessarily 'ust, i.e. those $ho do the acts ordained by the la$s either un$illin!ly or o$in! to i!norance or #or some other reason and not #or the sake o# the acts themselves )thou!h, to be sure, they do $hat they should and all the thin!s that the !ood man ou!ht*, so is it, it seems, that in order to be !ood one must be in a certain state $hen one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result o# choice and #or the sake o# the acts themselves. No$ virtue makes the choice ri!ht, but the question o# the thin!s $hich should naturally be done to carry out our choice belon!s not to virtue but to another #aculty. We must devote our attention to these matters and !ive a clearer statement about them. /here is a #aculty $hich is called cleverness" and this is such as to be able to do the thin!s that tend to$ards the mark $e have set be#ore ourselves, and to hit it. No$ i# the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but i# the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness" hence $e call even men o# ractical $isdom clever or smart. 7ractical $isdom is not the #aculty, but it does not e2ist $ithout this #aculty. And this eye o# the soul acquires its #ormed state not $ithout the aid o# virtue, as has been said and is lain" #or the syllo!isms $hich deal $ith acts to be done are thin!s $hich involve a startin!& oint, vi-. 8since the end, i.e. $hat is best, is o# such and such a nature9, $hatever it may be )let it #or the sake o# ar!ument be $hat $e lease*" and this is not evident e2ce t to the !ood man" #or $ickedness erverts us and causes us to be deceived about the startin!& oints o# action. /here#ore it is evident that it is im ossible to be ractically $ise $ithout bein! !ood. 10 We must there#ore consider virtue also once more" #or virtue too is similarly related" as ractical $isdom is to cleverness % not the same, but like it % so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense. .or all men think that each ty e o# character belon!s to its ossessors in some sense by nature" #or #rom the very moment o# birth $e are 'ust or #itted #or sel#control or brave or have the other moral qualities" but yet $e seek somethin! else as that $hich is !ood in the strict sense % $e seek #or the resence o# such qualities in another $ay. .or both children and brutes have the natural dis ositions to these qualities, but $ithout reason these are evidently hurt#ul. 1nly $e seem to see this much, that, $hile one may be led astray by them, as a stron! body $hich moves $ithout si!ht may stumble badly because o# its lack o# si!ht, still, i# a man once acquires reason, that makes a di##erence in action" and his state, $hile still like $hat it $as, $ill then be virtue in the strict sense. /here#ore, as in the art o# us $hich #orms o inions there are t$o ty es, cleverness and ractical $isdom, so too in the moral art there are t$o ty es, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and o# these the latter involves ractical $isdom. /his is $hy some say that all the virtues are #orms o# ractical $isdom, and $hy ,ocrates in one res ect $as on the ri!ht track $hile in another he $ent astray" in thinkin! that all the virtues $ere #orms o# ractical $isdom he $as $ron!, but in sayin! they im lied ractical $isdom he $as ri!ht. /his is con#irmed by the #act that even no$ all men, $hen they de#ine virtue, a#ter namin! the state o# character and its ob'ects add 8that )state* $hich is in accordance $ith the ri!ht rule9" no$ the ri!ht rule is that $hich is in accordance $ith ractical $isdom. All men, then, seem someho$ to divine that this kind o# state is virtue, vi-. that $hich is in accordance $ith ractical $isdom. But $e must !o a little #urther. .or it is not merely the state in accordance $ith the ri!ht rule, but the state ==

that im lies the resence o# the ri!ht rule, that is virtue" and ractical $isdom is a ri!ht rule about such matters. ,ocrates, then, thou!ht the virtues $ere rules or rational rinci les )#or he thou!ht they $ere, all o# them, #orms o# scienti#ic kno$led!e*, $hile $e think they involve a rational rinci le. It is clear, then, #rom $hat has been said, that it is not ossible to be !ood in the strict sense $ithout ractical $isdom, nor ractically $ise $ithout moral virtue. But in this $ay $e may also re#ute the dialectical ar!ument $hereby it mi!ht be contended that the virtues e2ist in se aration #rom each other" the same man, it mi!ht be said, is not best equi ed by nature #or all the virtues, so that he $ill have already acquired one $hen he has not yet acquired another. /his is ossible in res ect o# the natural virtues, but not in res ect o# those in res ect o# $hich a man is called $ithout quali#ication !ood" #or $ith the resence o# the one quality, ractical $isdom, $ill be !iven all the virtues. And it is lain that, even i# it $ere o# no ractical value, $e should have needed it because it is the virtue o# the art o# us in question" lain too that the choice $ill not be ri!ht $ithout ractical $isdom any more than $ithout virtue" #or the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do the thin!s that lead to the end. But a!ain it is not su reme over hiloso hic $isdom, i.e. over the su erior art o# us, any more than the art o# medicine is over health" #or it does not use it but rovides #or its comin! into bein!" it issues orders, then, #or its sake, but not to it. .urther, to maintain its su remacy $ould be like sayin! that the art o# olitics rules the !ods because it issues orders about all the a##airs o# the state.

Book 6II 1 5et us no$ make a #resh be!innin! and oint out that o# moral states to be avoided there are three kinds % vice, incontinence, brutishness. /he contraries o# t$o o# these are evident, % one $e call virtue, the other continence" to brutishness it $ould be most #ittin! to o ose su erhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind o# virtue, as 3omer has re resented 7riam sayin! o# 3ector that he $as very !ood, .or he seemed not, he, /he child o# a mortal man, but as one that o# ;od9s seed came. /here#ore i#, as they say, men become !ods by e2cess o# virtue, o# this kind must evidently be the state o osed to the brutish state" #or as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a !od" his state is hi!her than virtue, and that o# a brute is a di##erent kind o# state #rom vice. No$, since it is rarely that a !odlike man is #ound % to use the e ithet o# the , artans, $ho $hen they admire any one hi!hly call him a 8!odlike man9 % so too the brutish ty e is rarely #ound amon! men" it is #ound chie#ly amon! barbarians, but some brutish qualities are also roduced by disease or de#ormity" and $e also call by this evil name those men $ho !o beyond all ordinary standards by reason o# vice. 1# this kind o# dis osition, ho$ever, $e must later make some mention, $hile $e have discussed vice be#ore $e must no$ discuss incontinence and so#tness )or e##eminacy*, and continence and endurance" #or $e must treat each o# the t$o neither as identical $ith virtue or $ickedness, nor as a di##erent !enus. We must, as in all other cases, set the observed #acts be#ore us and, a#ter #irst discussin! the di##iculties, !o on to rove, i# ossible, the truth o# all the common o inions about these a##ections o# the mind, or, #ailin! this, o# the !reater =@

number and the most authoritative" #or i# $e both re#ute the ob'ections and leave the common o inions undisturbed, $e shall have roved the case su##iciently. No$ )1* both continence and endurance are thou!ht to be included amon! thin!s !ood and raise$orthy, and both incontinence and so#t, ness amon! thin!s bad and blame$orthy" and the same man is thou!ht to be continent and ready to abide by the result o# his calculations, or incontinent and ready to abandon them. And )(* the incontinent man, kno$in! that $hat he does is bad, does it as a result o# assion, $hile the continent man, kno$in! that his a etites are bad, re#uses on account o# his rational rinci le to #ollo$ them )0* /he tem erate man all men call continent and dis osed to endurance, $hile the continent man some maintain to be al$ays tem erate but others do not" and some call the sel#&indul!ent man incontinent and the incontinent man sel#indul!ent indiscriminately, $hile others distin!uish them. )4* /he man o# ractical $isdom, they sometimes say, cannot be incontinent, $hile sometimes they say that some $ho are ractically $ise and clever are incontinent. A!ain )<* men are said to be incontinent even $ith res ect to an!er, honour, and !ain. % /hese, then, are the thin!s that are said. ( No$ $e may ask )1* ho$ a man $ho 'ud!es ri!htly can behave incontinently. /hat he should behave so $hen he has kno$led!e, some say is im ossible" #or it $ould be stran!e % so ,ocrates thou!ht % i# $hen kno$led!e $as in a man somethin! else could master it and dra! it about like a slave. .or ,ocrates $as entirely o osed to the vie$ in question, holdin! that there is no such thin! as incontinence" no one, he said, $hen he 'ud!es acts a!ainst $hat he 'ud!es best& eo le act so only by reason o# i!norance. No$ this vie$ lainly contradicts the observed #acts, and $e must inquire about $hat ha ens to such a man" i# he acts by reason o# i!norance, $hat is the manner o# his i!norance+ .or that the man $ho behaves incontinently does not, be#ore he !ets into this state, think he ou!ht to act so, is evident. But there are some $ho concede certain o# ,ocrates9 contentions but not others" that nothin! is stron!er than kno$led!e they admit, but not that on one acts contrary to $hat has seemed to him the better course, and there#ore they say that the incontinent man has not kno$led!e $hen he is mastered by his leasures, but o inion. But i# it is o inion and not kno$led!e, i# it is not a stron! conviction that resists but a $eak one, as in men $ho hesitate, $e sym athi-e $ith their #ailure to stand by such convictions a!ainst stron! a etites" but $e do not sym athi-e $ith $ickedness, nor $ith any o# the other blame$orthy states. Is it then ractical $isdom $hose resistance is mastered+ /hat is the stron!est o# all states. But this is absurd" the same man $ill be at once ractically $ise and incontinent, but no one $ould say that it is the art o# a ractically $ise man to do $illin!ly the basest acts. Besides, it has been sho$n be#ore that the man o# ractical $isdom is one $ho $ill act )#or he is a man concerned $ith the individual #acts* and $ho has the other virtues. )(* .urther, i# continence involves havin! stron! and bad a etites, the tem erate man $ill not be continent nor the continent man tem erate" #or a tem erate man $ill have neither e2cessive nor bad a etites. But the continent man must" #or i# the a etites are !ood, the state o# character that restrains us #rom #ollo$in! them is bad, so that not all continence $ill be !ood" $hile i# they are $eak and not bad, there is nothin! admirable in resistin! them, and i# they are $eak and bad, there is nothin! !reat in resistin! these either. )0* .urther, i# continence makes a man ready to stand by any and every o inion, it is bad, i.e. i# it makes him stand even by a #alse o inion" and i# incontinence makes a man a t to abandon any and every o inion, there $ill be a !ood incontinence, o# $hich ,o hocles9 Neo tolemus in the

=A

7hiloctetes $ill be an instance" #or he is to be raised #or not standin! by $hat 1dysseus ersuaded him to do, because he is ained at tellin! a lie. )4* .urther, the so histic ar!ument resents a di##iculty" the syllo!ism arisin! #rom men9s $ish to e2 ose arado2ical results arisin! #rom an o onent9s vie$, in order that they may be admired $hen they succeed, is one that uts us in a di##iculty )#or thou!ht is bound #ast $hen it $ill not rest because the conclusion does not satis#y it, and cannot advance because it cannot re#ute the ar!ument*. /here is an ar!ument #rom $hich it #ollo$s that #olly cou led $ith incontinence is virtue" #or a man does the o osite o# $hat he 'ud!es, o$in! to incontinence, but 'ud!es $hat is !ood to be evil and somethin! that he should not do, and consequence he $ill do $hat is !ood and not $hat is evil. )<* .urther, he $ho on conviction does and ursues and chooses $hat is leasant $ould be thou!ht to be better than one $ho does so as a result not o# calculation but o# incontinence" #or he is easier to cure since he may be ersuaded to chan!e his mind. But to the incontinent man may be a lied the roverb 8$hen $ater chokes, $hat is one to $ash it do$n $ith+9 I# he had been ersuaded o# the ri!htness o# $hat he does, he $ould have desisted $hen he $as ersuaded to chan!e his mind" but no$ he acts in s ite o# his bein! ersuaded o# somethin! quite di##erent. )=* .urther, i# incontinence and continence are concerned $ith any and every kind o# ob'ect, $ho is it that is incontinent in the unquali#ied sense+ No one has all the #orms o# incontinence, but $e say some eo le are incontinent $ithout quali#ication. 0 1# some such kind are the di##iculties that arise" some o# these oints must be re#uted and the others le#t in ossession o# the #ield" #or the solution o# the di##iculty is the discovery o# the truth. )1* We must consider #irst, then, $hether incontinent eo le act kno$in!ly or not, and in $hat sense kno$in!ly" then )(* $ith $hat sorts o# ob'ect the incontinent and the continent man may be said to be concerned )i.e. $hether $ith any and every leasure and ain or $ith certain determinate kinds*, and $hether the continent man and the man o# endurance are the same or di##erent" and similarly $ith re!ard to the other matters !ermane to this inquiry. /he startin!& oint o# our investi!ation is )a* the question $hether the continent man and the incontinent are di##erentiated by their ob'ects or by their attitude, i.e. $hether the incontinent man is incontinent sim ly by bein! concerned $ith such and such ob'ects, or, instead, by his attitude, or, instead o# that, by both these thin!s" )b* the second question is $hether incontinence and continence are concerned $ith any and every ob'ect or not. /he man $ho is incontinent in the unquali#ied sense is neither concerned $ith any and every ob'ect, but $ith recisely those $ith $hich the sel#& indul!ent man is concerned, nor is he characteri-ed by bein! sim ly related to these )#or then his state $ould be the same as sel#&indul!ence*, but by bein! related to them in a certain $ay. .or the one is led on in accordance $ith his o$n choice, thinkin! that he ou!ht al$ays to ursue the resent leasure" $hile the other does not think so, but yet ursues it. )1* As #or the su!!estion that it is true o inion and not kno$led!e a!ainst $hich $e act incontinently, that makes no di##erence to the ar!ument" #or some eo le $hen in a state o# o inion do not hesitate, but think they kno$ e2actly. I#, then, the notion is that o$in! to their $eak conviction those $ho have o inion are more likely to act a!ainst their 'ud!ement than those $ho kno$, $e ans$er that there need be no di##erence bet$een kno$led!e and o inion in this res ect" #or some men are no less convinced o# $hat they think than others o# $hat they kno$" as is sho$n by the o# 3eraclitus. But )a*, since $e use the $ord 8kno$9 in t$o senses )#or both the man $ho has kno$led!e but is not usin! it and he $ho is usin! it are said to kno$*, it $ill make =C

a di##erence $hether, $hen a man does $hat he should not, he has the kno$led!e but is not e2ercisin! it, or is e2ercisin! it" #or the latter seems stran!e, but not the #ormer. )b* .urther, since there are t$o kinds o# remisses, there is nothin! to revent a man9s havin! both remisses and actin! a!ainst his kno$led!e, rovided that he is usin! only the universal remiss and not the articular" #or it is articular acts that have to be done. And there are also t$o kinds o# universal term" one is redicable o# the a!ent, the other o# the ob'ect" e.!. 8dry #ood is !ood #or every man9, and 8I am a man9, or 8such and such #ood is dry9" but $hether 8this #ood is such and such9, o# this the incontinent man either has not or is not e2ercisin! the kno$led!e. /here $ill, then, be, #irstly, an enormous di##erence bet$een these manners o# kno$in!, so that to kno$ in one $ay $hen $e act incontinently $ould not seem anythin! stran!e, $hile to kno$ in the other $ay $ould be e2traordinary. And #urther )c* the ossession o# kno$led!e in another sense than those 'ust named is somethin! that ha ens to men" #or $ithin the case o# havin! kno$led!e but not usin! it $e see a di##erence o# state, admittin! o# the ossibility o# havin! kno$led!e in a sense and yet not havin! it, as in the instance o# a man aslee , mad, or drunk. But no$ this is 'ust the condition o# men under the in#luence o# assions" #or outbursts o# an!er and se2ual a etites and some other such assions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even roduce #its o# madness. It is lain, then, that incontinent eo le must be said to be in a similar condition to men aslee , mad, or drunk. /he #act that men use the lan!ua!e that #lo$s #rom kno$led!e roves nothin!" #or even men under the in#luence o# these assions utter scienti#ic roo#s and verses o# Em edocles, and those $ho have 'ust be!un to learn a science can strin! to!ether its hrases, but do not yet kno$ it" #or it has to become art o# themselves, and that takes time" so that $e must su ose that the use o# lan!ua!e by men in an incontinent state means no more than its utterance by actors on the sta!e. )d* A!ain, $e may also vie$ the cause as #ollo$s $ith re#erence to the #acts o# human nature. /he one o inion is universal, the other is concerned $ith the articular #acts, and here $e come to somethin! $ithin the s here o# erce tion" $hen a sin!le o inion results #rom the t$o, the soul must in one ty e o# case a##irm the conclusion, $hile in the case o# o inions concerned $ith roduction it must immediately act )e.!. i# 8everythin! s$eet ou!ht to be tasted9, and 8this is s$eet9, in the sense o# bein! one o# the articular s$eet thin!s, the man $ho can act and is not revented must at the same time actually act accordin!ly*. When, then, the universal o inion is resent in us #orbiddin! us to taste, and there is also the o inion that 8everythin! s$eet is leasant9, and that 8this is s$eet9 )no$ this is the o inion that is active*, and $hen a etite ha ens to be resent in us, the one o inion bids us avoid the ob'ect, but a etite leads us to$ards it )#or it can move each o# our bodily arts*" so that it turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the in#luence )in a sense* o# a rule and an o inion, and o# one not contrary in itsel#, but only incidentally % #or the a etite is contrary, not the o inion % to the ri!ht rule. It also #ollo$s that this is the reason $hy the lo$er animals are not incontinent, vi-. because they have no universal 'ud!ement but only ima!ination and memory o# articulars. /he e2 lanation o# ho$ the i!norance is dissolved and the incontinent man re!ains his kno$led!e, is the same as in the case o# the man drunk or aslee and is not eculiar to this condition" $e must !o to the students o# natural science #or it. No$, the last remiss both bein! an o inion about a erce tible ob'ect, and bein! $hat determines our actions this a man either has not $hen he is in the state o# assion, or has it in the sense in $hich havin! kno$led!e did not mean kno$in! but only talkin!, as a drunken man may utter the verses o# Em edocles. And because the last term is not universal nor equally an ob'ect o# scienti#ic kno$led!e $ith the universal term, the osition that ,ocrates sou!ht to establish actually seems to result" #or it is not in the resence o# $hat is thou!ht to be kno$led!e ro er that the a##ection o# incontinence arises @D

)nor is it this that is 8dra!!ed about9 as a result o# the state o# assion*, but in that o# erce tual kno$led!e. /his must su##ice as our ans$er to the question o# action $ith and $ithout kno$led!e, and ho$ it is ossible to behave incontinently $ith kno$led!e. 4 )(* We must ne2t discuss $hether there is any one $ho is incontinent $ithout quali#ication, or all men $ho are incontinent are so in a articular sense, and i# there is, $ith $hat sort o# ob'ects he is concerned. /hat both continent ersons and ersons o# endurance, and incontinent and so#t ersons, are concerned $ith leasures and ains, is evident. No$ o# the thin!s that roduce leasure some are necessary, $hile others are $orthy o# choice in themselves but admit o# e2cess, the bodily causes o# leasure bein! necessary )by such I mean both those concerned $ith #ood and those concerned $ith se2ual intercourse, i.e. the bodily matters $ith $hich $e de#ined sel#&indul!ence and tem erance as bein! concerned*, $hile the others are not necessary but $orthy o# choice in themselves )e.!. victory, honour, $ealth, and !ood and leasant thin!s o# this sort*. /his bein! so, )a* those $ho !o to e2cess $ith re#erence to the latter, contrary to the ri!ht rule $hich is in themselves, are not called incontinent sim ly, but incontinent $ith the quali#ication 8in res ect o# money, !ain, honour, or an!er9, % not sim ly incontinent, on the !round that they are di##erent #rom incontinent eo le and are called incontinent by reason o# a resemblance. )?om are the case o# Anthro os )Ban*, $ho $on a contest at the 1lym ic !ames" in his case the !eneral de#inition o# man di##ered little #rom the de#inition eculiar to him, but yet it $as di##erent.* /his is sho$n by the #act that incontinence either $ithout quali#ication or in res ect o# some articular bodily leasure is blamed not only as a #ault but as a kind o# vice, $hile none o# the eo le $ho are incontinent in these other res ects is so blamed. But )b* o# the eo le $ho are incontinent $ith res ect to bodily en'oyments, $ith $hich $e say the tem erate and the sel#&indul!ent man are concerned, he $ho ursues the e2cesses o# thin!s leasant % and shuns those o# thin!s ain#ul, o# hun!er and thirst and heat and cold and all the ob'ects o# touch and taste % not by choice but contrary to his choice and his 'ud!ement, is called incontinent, not $ith the quali#ication 8in res ect o# this or that9, e.!. o# an!er, but 'ust sim ly. /his is con#irmed by the #act that men are called 8so#t9 $ith re!ard to these leasures, but not $ith re!ard to any o# the others. And #or this reason $e !rou to!ether the incontinent and the sel#& indul!ent, the continent and the tem erate man % but not any o# these other ty es % because they are concerned someho$ $ith the same leasures and ains" but thou!h these are concerned $ith the same ob'ects, they are not similarly related to them, but some o# them make a deliberate choice $hile the others do not. /his is $hy $e should describe as sel#&indul!ent rather the man $ho $ithout a etite or $ith but a sli!ht a etite ursues the e2cesses o# leasure and avoids moderate ains, than the man $ho does so because o# his stron! a etites" #or $hat $ould the #ormer do, i# he had in addition a vi!orous a etite, and a violent ain at the lack o# the 8necessary9 ob'ects+ No$ o# a etites and leasures some belon! to the class o# thin!s !enerically noble and !ood % #or some leasant thin!s are by nature $orthy o# choice, $hile others are contrary to these, and others are intermediate, to ado t our revious distinction % e.!. $ealth, !ain, victory, honour. And $ith re#erence to all ob'ects $hether o# this or o# the intermediate kind men are not blamed #or bein! a##ected by them, #or desirin! and lovin! them, but #or doin! so in a certain $ay, i.e. #or !oin! to e2cess. )/his is $hy all those $ho contrary to the rule either are mastered by or ursue @1

one o# the ob'ects $hich are naturally noble and !ood, e.!. those $ho busy themselves more than they ou!ht about honour or about children and arents, )are not $icked*" #or these too are !ood, and those $ho busy themselves about them are raised" but yet there is an e2cess even in them % i# like Niobe one $ere to #i!ht even a!ainst the !ods, or $ere to be as much devoted to one9s #ather as ,atyrus nicknamed 8the #ilial9, $ho $as thou!ht to be very silly on this oint.* /here is no $ickedness, then, $ith re!ard to these ob'ects, #or the reason named, vi-. because each o# them is by nature a thin! $orthy o# choice #or its o$n sake" yet e2cesses in res ect o# them are bad and to be avoided. ,imilarly there is no incontinence $ith re!ard to them" #or incontinence is not only to be avoided but is also a thin! $orthy o# blame" but o$in! to a similarity in the state o# #eelin! eo le a ly the name incontinence, addin! in each case $hat it is in res ect o#, as $e may describe as a bad doctor or a bad actor one $hom $e should not call bad, sim ly. As, then, in this case $e do not a ly the term $ithout quali#ication because each o# these conditions is no shadness but only analo!ous to it, so it is clear that in the other case also that alone must be taken to be incontinence and continence $hich is concerned $ith the same ob'ects as tem erance and sel#&indul!ence, but $e a ly the term to an!er by virtue o# a resemblance" and this is $hy $e say $ith a quali#ication 8incontinent in res ect o# an!er9 as $e say 8incontinent in res ect o# honour, or o# !ain9. < )1* ,ome thin!s are leasant by nature, and o# these )a* some are so $ithout quali#ication, and )b* others are so $ith re#erence to articular classes either o# animals or o# men" $hile )(* others are not leasant by nature, but )a* some o# them become so by reason o# in'uries to the system, and )b* others by reason o# acquired habits, and )c* others by reason o# ori!inally bad natures. /his bein! so, it is ossible $ith re!ard to each o# the latter kinds to discover similar states o# character to those reco!ni-ed $ith re!ard to the #ormer" I mean )A* the brutish states, as in the case o# the #emale $ho, they say, ri s o en re!nant $omen and devours the in#ants, or o# the thin!s in $hich some o# the tribes about the Black ,ea that have !one sava!e are said to deli!ht % in ra$ meat or in human #lesh, or in lendin! their children to one another to #east u on % or o# the story told o# 7halaris. /hese states are brutish, but )B* others arise as a result o# disease )or, in some cases, o# madness, as $ith the man $ho sacri#iced and ate his mother, or $ith the slave $ho ate the liver o# his #ello$*, and others are morbid states )?* resultin! #rom custom, e.!. the habit o# luckin! out the hair or o# !na$in! the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to these aederasty" #or these arise in some by nature and in others, as in those $ho have been the victims o# lust #rom childhood, #rom habit. No$ those in $hom nature is the cause o# such a state no one $ould call incontinent, any more than one $ould a ly the e ithet to $omen because o# the assive art they lay in co ulation" nor $ould one a ly it to those $ho are in a morbid condition as a result o# habit. /o have these various ty es o# habit is beyond the limits o# vice, as brutishness is too" #or a man $ho has them to master or be mastered by them is not sim le )continence or* incontinence but that $hich is so by analo!y, as the man $ho is in this condition in res ect o# #its o# an!er is to be called incontinent in res ect o# that #eelin! but not incontinent sim ly. .or every e2cessive state $hether o# #olly, o# co$ardice, o# sel#&indul!ence, or o# bad tem er, is either brutish or morbid" the man $ho is by nature a t to #ear everythin!, even the squeak o# a mouse, is co$ardly $ith a brutish co$ardice, $hile the man $ho #eared a $easel did so in consequence o# disease" and o# #oolish eo le those $ho by nature are thou!htless and live by their senses alone are brutish, like some @(

races o# the distant barbarians, $hile those $ho are so as a result o# disease )e.!. o# e ile sy* or o# madness are morbid. 1# these characteristics it is ossible to have some only at times, and not to be mastered by them. e.!. 7halaris may have restrained a desire to eat the #lesh o# a child or an a etite #or unnatural se2ual leasure" but it is also ossible to be mastered, not merely to have the #eelin!s. /hus, as the $ickedness $hich is on the human level is called $ickedness sim ly, $hile that $hich is not is called $ickedness not sim ly but $ith the quali#ication 8brutish9 or 8morbid9, in the same $ay it is lain that some incontinence is brutish and some morbid, $hile only that $hich corres onds to human sel#&indul!ence is incontinence sim ly. /hat incontinence and continence, then, are concerned only $ith the same ob'ects as sel#indul!ence and tem erance and that $hat is concerned $ith other ob'ects is a ty e distinct #rom incontinence, and called incontinence by a meta hor and not sim ly, is lain. = /hat incontinence in res ect o# an!er is less dis!race#ul than that in res ect o# the a etites is $hat $e $ill no$ roceed to see. )1* An!er seems to listen to ar!ument to some e2tent, but to mishear it, as do hasty servants $ho run out be#ore they have heard the $hole o# $hat one says, and then muddle the order, or as do!s bark i# there is but a knock at the door, be#ore lookin! to see i# it is a #riend" so an!er by reason o# the $armth and hastiness o# its nature, thou!h it hears, does not hear an order, and s rin!s to take reven!e. .or ar!ument or ima!ination in#orms us that $e have been insulted or sli!hted, and an!er, reasonin! as it $ere that anythin! like this must be #ou!ht a!ainst, boils u strai!ht$ay" $hile a etite, i# ar!ument or erce tion merely says that an ob'ect is leasant, s rin!s to the en'oyment o# it. /here#ore an!er obeys the ar!ument in a sense, but a etite does not. It is there#ore more dis!race#ul" #or the man $ho is incontinent in res ect o# an!er is in a sense conquered by ar!ument, $hile the other is conquered by a etite and not by ar!ument. )(* .urther, $e ardon eo le more easily #or #ollo$in! natural desires, since $e ardon them more easily #or #ollo$in! such a etites as are common to all men, and in so #ar as they are common" no$ an!er and bad tem er are more natural than the a etites #or e2cess, i.e. #or unnecessary ob'ects. /ake #or instance the man $ho de#ended himsel# on the char!e o# strikin! his #ather by sayin! 8yes, but he struck his #ather, and he struck his, and9 ) ointin! to his child* 8this boy $ill strike me $hen he is a man" it runs in the #amily9" or the man $ho $hen he $as bein! dra!!ed alon! by his son bade him sto at the door$ay, since he himsel# had dra!!ed his #ather only as #ar as that. )(* .urther, those $ho are more !iven to lottin! a!ainst others are more criminal. No$ a assionate man is not !iven to lottin!, nor is an!er itsel# % it is o en" but the nature o# a etite is illustrated by $hat the oets call A hrodite, 8!uile&$eavin! dau!hter o# ?y rus9, and by 3omer9s $ords about her 8embroidered !irdle9: And the $his er o# $ooin! is there, Whose subtlety stealeth the $its o# the $ise, ho$ rudent soe9er. /here#ore i# this #orm o# incontinence is more criminal and dis!race#ul than that in res ect o# an!er, it is both incontinence $ithout quali#ication and in a sense vice. )4* .urther, no one commits $anton outra!e $ith a #eelin! o# ain, but every one $ho acts in an!er acts $ith ain, $hile the man $ho commits outra!e acts $ith leasure. I#, then, those acts at $hich it is most 'ust to be an!ry are more criminal than others, the incontinence $hich is due to a etite is the more criminal" #or there is no $anton outra!e involved in an!er.

@0

7lainly, then, the incontinence concerned $ith a etite is more dis!race#ul than that concerned $ith an!er, and continence and incontinence are concerned $ith bodily a etites and leasures" but $e must !ras the di##erences amon! the latter themselves. .or, as has been said at the be!innin!, some are human and natural both in kind and in ma!nitude, others are brutish, and others are due to or!anic in'uries and diseases. 1nly $ith the #irst o# these are tem erance and sel#&indul!ence concerned" this is $hy $e call the lo$er animals neither tem erate nor sel#& indul!ent e2ce t by a meta hor, and only i# some one race o# animals e2ceeds another as a $hole in $antonness, destructiveness, and omnivorous !reed" these have no o$er o# choice or calculation, but they are de artures #rom the natural norm, as, amon! men, madmen are. No$ brutishness is a less evil than vice, thou!h more alarmin!" #or it is not that the better art has been erverted, as in man, % they have no better art. /hus it is like com arin! a li#eless thin! $ith a livin! in res ect o# badness" #or the badness o# that $hich has no ori!inative source o# movement is al$ays less hurt#ul, and reason is an ori!inative source. /hus it is like com arin! in'ustice in the abstract $ith an un'ust man. Each is in some sense $orse" #or a bad man $ill do ten thousand times as much evil as a brute. @ With re!ard to the leasures and ains and a etites and aversions arisin! throu!h touch and taste, to $hich both sel#&indul!ence and tem erance $ere #ormerly narro$ed do$n, it ossible to be in such a state as to be de#eated even by those o# them $hich most eo le master, or to master even those by $hich most eo le are de#eated" amon! these ossibilities, those relatin! to leasures are incontinence and continence, those relatin! to ains so#tness and endurance. /he state o# most eo le is intermediate, even i# they lean more to$ards the $orse states. No$, since some leasures are necessary $hile others are not, and are necessary u to a oint $hile the e2cesses o# them are not, nor the de#iciencies, and this is equally true o# a etites and ains, the man $ho ursues the e2cesses o# thin!s leasant, or ursues to e2cess necessary ob'ects, and does so by choice, #or their o$n sake and not at all #or the sake o# any result distinct #rom them, is sel#&indul!ent" #or such a man is o# necessity unlikely to re ent, and there#ore incurable, since a man $ho cannot re ent cannot be cured. /he man $ho is de#icient in his ursuit o# them is the o osite o# sel#&indul!ent" the man $ho is intermediate is tem erate. ,imilarly, there is the man $ho avoids bodily ains not because he is de#eated by them but by choice. )1# those $ho do not choose such acts, one kind o# man is led to them as a result o# the leasure involved, another because he avoids the ain arisin! #rom the a etite, so that these ty es di##er #rom one another. No$ any one $ould think $orse o# a man $ith no a etite or $ith $eak a etite $ere he to do somethin! dis!race#ul, than i# he did it under the in#luence o# o$er#ul a etite, and $orse o# him i# he struck a blo$ not in an!er than i# he did it in an!er" #or $hat $ould he have done i# he had been stron!ly a##ected+ /his is $hy the sel#&indul!ent man is $orse than the incontinent.* o# the states named, then, the latter is rather a kind o# so#tness" the #ormer is sel#&indul!ence. While to the incontinent man is o osed the continent, to the so#t is o osed the man o# endurance" #or endurance consists in resistin!, $hile continence consists in conquerin!, and resistin! and conquerin! are di##erent, as not bein! beaten is di##erent #rom $innin!" this is $hy continence is also more $orthy o# choice than endurance. No$ the man $ho is de#ective in res ect o# resistance to the thin!s $hich most men both resist and resist success#ully is so#t and e##eminate" #or e##eminacy too is a kind o# so#tness" such a man trails his cloak to avoid the ain o# li#tin! it, and lays the invalid $ithout thinkin! himsel# $retched, thou!h the man he imitates is a $retched man. @4

/he case is similar $ith re!ard to continence and incontinence. .or i# a man is de#eated by violent and e2cessive leasures or ains, there is nothin! $onder#ul in that" indeed $e are ready to ardon him i# he has resisted, as /heodectes9 7hiloctetes does $hen bitten by the snake, or ?arcinus9 ?ercyon in the Alo e, and as eo le $ho try to restrain their lau!hter burst out into a !u##a$, as ha ened to Heno hantus. But it is sur risin! i# a man is de#eated by and cannot resist leasures or ains $hich most men can hold out a!ainst, $hen this is not due to heredity or disease, like the so#tness that is hereditary $ith the kin!s o# the ,cythians, or that $hich distin!uishes the #emale se2 #rom the male. /he lover o# amusement, too, is thou!ht to be sel#&indul!ent, but is really so#t. .or amusement is a rela2ation, since it is a rest #rom $ork" and the lover o# amusement is one o# the eo le $ho !o to e2cess in this. 1# incontinence one kind is im etuosity, another $eakness. .or some men a#ter deliberatin! #ail, o$in! to their emotion, to stand by the conclusions o# their deliberation, others because they have not deliberated are led by their emotion" since some men )'ust as eo le $ho #irst tickle others are not tickled themselves*, i# they have #irst erceived and seen $hat is comin! and have #irst roused themselves and their calculative #aculty, are not de#eated by their emotion, $hether it be leasant or ain#ul. It is keen and e2citable eo le that su##er es ecially #rom the im etuous #orm o# incontinence" #or the #ormer by reason o# their quickness and the latter by reason o# the violence o# their assions do not a$ait the ar!ument, because they are a t to #ollo$ their ima!ination. A /he sel#&indul!ent man, as $as said, is not a t to re ent" #or he stands by his choice" but incontinent man is likely to re ent. /his is $hy the osition is not as it $as e2 ressed in the #ormulation o# the roblem, but the sel#indul!ent man is incurable and the incontinent man curable" #or $ickedness is like a disease such as dro sy or consum tion, $hile incontinence is like e ile sy" the #ormer is a ermanent, the latter an intermittent badness. And !enerally incontinence and vice are di##erent in kind" vice is unconscious o# itsel#, incontinence is not )o# incontinent men themselves, those $ho become tem orarily beside themselves are better than those $ho have the rational rinci le but do not abide by it, since the latter are de#eated by a $eaker assion, and do not act $ithout revious deliberation like the others*" #or the incontinent man is like the eo le $ho !et drunk quickly and on little $ine, i.e. on less than most eo le. Evidently, then, incontinence is not vice )thou!h erha s it is so in a quali#ied sense*" #or incontinence is contrary to choice $hile vice is in accordance $ith choice" not but $hat they are similar in res ect o# the actions they lead to" as in the sayin! o# Demodocus about the Bilesians, 8the Bilesians are not $ithout sense, but they do the thin!s that senseless eo le do9, so too incontinent eo le are not criminal, but they $ill do criminal acts. No$, since the incontinent man is a t to ursue, not on conviction, bodily leasures that are e2cessive and contrary to the ri!ht rule, $hile the sel#&indul!ent man is convinced because he is the sort o# man to ursue them, it is on the contrary the #ormer that is easily ersuaded to chan!e his mind, $hile the latter is not. .or virtue and vice res ectively reserve and destroy the #irst rinci le, and in actions the #inal cause is the #irst rinci le, as the hy otheses are in mathematics" neither in that case is it ar!ument that teaches the #irst rinci les, nor is it so here % virtue either natural or roduced by habituation is $hat teaches ri!ht o inion about the #irst rinci le. ,uch a man as this, then, is tem erate" his contrary is the sel#&indul!ent. But there is a sort o# man $ho is carried a$ay as a result o# assion and contrary to the ri!ht rule % a man $hom assion masters so that he does not act accordin! to the ri!ht rule, but does not @<

master to the e2tent o# makin! him ready to believe that he ou!ht to ursue such leasures $ithout reserve" this is the incontinent man, $ho is better than the sel#&indul!ent man, and not bad $ithout quali#ication" #or the best thin! in him, the #irst rinci le, is reserved. And contrary to him is another kind o# man, he $ho abides by his convictions and is not carried a$ay, at least as a result o# assion. It is evident #rom these considerations that the latter is a !ood state and the #ormer a bad one. C Is the man continent $ho abides by any and every rule and any and every choice, or the man $ho abides by the ri!ht choice, and is he incontinent $ho abandons any and every choice and any and every rule, or he $ho abandons the rule that is not #alse and the choice that is ri!ht" this is ho$ $e ut it be#ore in our statement o# the roblem. 1r is it incidentally any and every choice but er se the true rule and the ri!ht choice by $hich the one abides and the other does not+ I# any one chooses or ursues this #or the sake o# that, er se he ursues and chooses the latter, but incidentally the #ormer. But $hen $e s eak $ithout quali#ication $e mean $hat is er se. /here#ore in a sense the one abides by, and the other abandons, any and every o inion" but $ithout quali#ication, the true o inion. /here are some $ho are a t to abide by their o inion, $ho are called stron!&headed, vi-. those $ho are hard to ersuade in the #irst instance and are not easily ersuaded to chan!e" these have in them somethin! like the continent man, as the rodi!al is in a $ay like the liberal man and the rash man like the con#ident man" but they are di##erent in many res ects. .or it is to assion and a etite that the one $ill not yield, since on occasion the continent man $ill be easy to ersuade" but it is to ar!ument that the others re#use to yield, #or they do #orm a etites and many o# them are led by their leasures. No$ the eo le $ho are stron!&headed are the o inionated, the i!norant, and the boorish % the o inionated bein! in#luenced by leasure and ain" #or they deli!ht in the victory they !ain i# they are not ersuaded to chan!e, and are ained i# their decisions become null and void as decrees sometimes do" so that they are liker the incontinent than the continent man. But there are some $ho #ail to abide by their resolutions, not as a result o# incontinence, e.!. Neo tolemus in ,o hocles9 7hiloctetes" yet it $as #or the sake o# leasure that he did not stand #ast % but a noble leasure" #or tellin! the truth $as noble to him, but he had been ersuaded by 1dysseus to tell the lie. .or not every one $ho does anythin! #or the sake o# leasure is either sel#&indul!ent or bad or incontinent, but he $ho does it #or a dis!race#ul leasure. ,ince there is also a sort o# man $ho takes less deli!ht than he should in bodily thin!s, and does not abide by the rule, he $ho is intermediate bet$een him and the incontinent man is the continent man" #or the incontinent man #ails to abide by the rule because he deli!hts too much in them, and this man because he deli!hts in them too little" $hile the continent man abides by the rule and does not chan!e on either account. No$ i# continence is !ood, both the contrary states must be bad, as they actually a ear to be" but because the other e2treme is seen in #e$ eo le and seldom, as tem erance is thou!ht to be contrary only to sel#&indul!ence, so is continence to incontinence. ,ince many names are a lied analo!ically, it is by analo!y that $e have come to s eak o# the 8continence9 the tem erate man" #or both the continent man and the tem erate man are such as to do nothin! contrary to the rule #or the sake o# the bodily leasures, but the #ormer has and the latter has not bad a etites, and the latter is such as not to #eel leasure contrary to the rule, $hile the #ormer is such as to #eel leasure but not to be led by it. And the incontinent and the sel#& @=

indul!ent man are also like another" they are di##erent, but both ursue bodily leasures % the latter, ho$ever, also thinkin! that he ou!ht to do so, $hile the #ormer does not think this. 1D Nor can the same man have ractical $isdom and be incontinent" #or it has been sho$n9 that a man is at the same time ractically $ise, and !ood in res ect o# character. .urther, a man has ractical $isdom not by kno$in! only but by bein! able to act" but the incontinent man is unable to act % there is, ho$ever, nothin! to revent a clever man #rom bein! incontinent" this is $hy it is sometimes actually thou!ht that some eo le have ractical $isdom but are incontinent, vi-. because cleverness and ractical $isdom di##er in the $ay $e have described in our #irst discussions, and are near to!ether in res ect o# their reasonin!, but di##er in res ect o# their ur ose % nor yet is the incontinent man like the man $ho kno$s and is contem latin! a truth, but like the man $ho is aslee or drunk. And he acts $illin!ly )#or he acts in a sense $ith kno$led!e both o# $hat he does and o# the end to $hich he does it*, but is not $icked, since his ur ose is !ood" so that he is hal#&$icked. And he is not a criminal" #or he does not act o# malice a#orethou!ht" o# the t$o ty es o# incontinent man the one does not abide by the conclusions o# his deliberation, $hile the e2citable man does not deliberate at all. And thus the incontinent man like a city $hich asses all the ri!ht decrees and has !ood la$s, but makes no use o# them, as in Ana2andrides9 'estin! remark, /he city $illed it, that cares nou!ht #or la$s" but the $icked man is like a city that uses its la$s, but has $icked la$s to use. No$ incontinence and continence are concerned $ith that $hich is in e2cess o# the state characteristic o# most men" #or the continent man abides by his resolutions more and the incontinent man less than most men can. 1# the #orms o# incontinence, that o# e2citable eo le is more curable than that o# those $ho deliberate but do not abide by their decisions, and those $ho are incontinent throu!h habituation are more curable than those in $hom incontinence is innate" #or it is easier to chan!e a habit than to chan!e one9s nature" even habit is hard to chan!e 'ust because it is like nature, as Evenus says: I say that habit9s but a lon! ractice, #riend, And this becomes men9s nature in the end. We have no$ stated $hat continence, incontinence, endurance, and so#tness are, and ho$ these states are related to each other. 11 /he study o# leasure and ain belon!s to the rovince o# the olitical hiloso her" #or he is the architect o# the end, $ith a vie$ to $hich $e call one thin! bad and another !ood $ithout quali#ication. .urther, it is one o# our necessary tasks to consider them" #or not only did $e lay it do$n that moral virtue and vice are concerned $ith ains and leasures, but most eo le say that ha iness involves leasure" this is $hy the blessed man is called by a name derived #rom a $ord meanin! en'oyment. No$ )1* some eo le think that no leasure is a !ood, either in itsel# or incidentally, since the !ood and leasure are not the same" )(* others think that some leasures are !ood but that most are bad. )0* A!ain there is a third vie$, that even i# all leasures are !ood, yet the best thin! in the $orld cannot be leasure. )1* /he reasons !iven #or the vie$ that leasure is not a !ood at all are )a* that every leasure is a erce tible rocess to a natural state, and that no rocess is o# the @@

same kind as its end, e.!. no rocess o# buildin! o# the same kind as a house. )b* A tem erate man avoids leasures. )c* A man o# ractical $isdom ursues $hat is #ree #rom ain, not $hat is leasant. )d* /he leasures are a hindrance to thou!ht, and the more so the more one deli!hts in them, e.!. in se2ual leasure" #or no one could think o# anythin! $hile absorbed in this. )e* /here is no art o# leasure" but every !ood is the roduct o# some art. )#* ?hildren and the brutes ursue leasures. )(* /he reasons #or the vie$ that not all leasures are !ood are that )a* there are leasures that are actually base and ob'ects o# re roach, and )b* there are harm#ul leasures" #or some leasant thin!s are unhealthy. )0* /he reason #or the vie$ that the best thin! in the $orld is not leasure is that leasure is not an end but a rocess. 1( /hese are retty much the thin!s that are said. /hat it does not #ollo$ #rom these !rounds that leasure is not a !ood, or even the chie# !ood, is lain #rom the #ollo$in! considerations. )A* )a* .irst, since that $hich is !ood may be so in either o# t$o senses )one thin! !ood sim ly and another !ood #or a articular erson*, natural constitutions and states o# bein!, and there#ore also the corres ondin! movements and rocesses, $ill be corres ondin!ly divisible. 1# those $hich are thou!ht to be bad some $ill be bad i# taken $ithout quali#ication but not bad #or a articular erson, but $orthy o# his choice, and some $ill not be $orthy o# choice even #or a articular erson, but only at a articular time and #or a short eriod, thou!h not $ithout quali#ication" $hile others are not even leasures, but seem to be so, vi-. all those $hich involve ain and $hose end is curative, e.!. the rocesses that !o on in sick ersons. )b* .urther, one kind o# !ood bein! activity and another bein! state, the rocesses that restore us to our natural state are only incidentally leasant" #or that matter the activity at $ork in the a etites #or them is the activity o# so much o# our state and nature as has remained unim aired" #or there are actually leasures that involve no ain or a etite )e.!. those o# contem lation*, the nature in such a case not bein! de#ective at all. /hat the others are incidental is indicated by the #act that men do not en'oy the same leasant ob'ects $hen their nature is in its settled state as they do $hen it is bein! re lenished, but in the #ormer case they en'oy the thin!s that are leasant $ithout quali#ication, in the latter the contraries o# these as $ell" #or then they en'oy even shar and bitter thin!s, none o# $hich is leasant either by nature or $ithout quali#ication. /he states they roduce, there#ore, are not leasures naturally or $ithout quali#ication" #or as leasant thin!s di##er, so do the leasures arisin! #rom them. )c* A!ain, it is not necessary that there should be somethin! else better than leasure, as some say the end is better than the rocess" #or leasures are not rocesses nor do they all involve rocess % they are activities and ends" nor do they arise $hen $e are becomin! somethin!, but $hen $e are e2ercisin! some #aculty" and not all leasures have an end di##erent #rom themselves, but only the leasures o# ersons $ho are bein! led to the er#ectin! o# their nature. /his is $hy it is not ri!ht to say that leasure is erce tible rocess, but it should rather be called activity o# the natural state, and instead o# 8 erce tible9 8unim eded9. It is thou!ht by some eo le to be rocess 'ust because they think it is in the strict sense !ood" #or they think that activity is rocess, $hich it is not. )B* /he vie$ that leasures are bad because some leasant thin!s are unhealthy is like sayin! that healthy thin!s are bad because some healthy thin!s are bad #or money&makin!" both are bad in the res ect mentioned, but they are not bad #or that reason % indeed, thinkin! itsel# is sometimes in'urious to health.

@A

Neither ractical $isdom nor any state o# bein! is im eded by the leasure arisin! #rom it" it is #orei!n leasures that im ede, #or the leasures arisin! #rom thinkin! and learnin! $ill make us think and learn all the more. )?* /he #act that no leasure is the roduct o# any art arises naturally enou!h" there is no art o# any other activity either, but only o# the corres ondin! #aculty" thou!h #or that matter the arts o# the er#umer and the cook are thou!ht to be arts o# leasure. )D* /he ar!uments based on the !rounds that the tem erate man avoids leasure and that the man o# ractical $isdom ursues the ainless li#e, and that children and the brutes ursue leasure, are all re#uted by the same consideration. We have ointed out in $hat sense leasures are !ood $ithout quali#ication and in $hat sense some are not !ood" no$ both the brutes and children ursue leasures o# the latter kind )and the man o# ractical $isdom ursues tranquil #reedom #rom that kind*, vi-. those $hich im ly a etite and ain, i.e. the bodily leasures )#or it is these that are o# this nature* and the e2cesses o# them, in res ect o# $hich the sel#&indul!ent man is sel#&indulent. /his is $hy the tem erate man avoids these leasures" #or even he has leasures o# his o$n. 10 But #urther )E* it is a!reed that ain is bad and to be avoided" #or some ain is $ithout quali#ication bad, and other ain is bad because it is in some res ect an im ediment to us. No$ the contrary o# that $hich is to be avoided, qua somethin! to be avoided and bad, is !ood. 7leasure, then, is necessarily a !ood. .or the ans$er o# , eusi us, that leasure is contrary both to ain and to !ood, as the !reater is contrary both to the less and to the equal, is not success#ul" since he $ould not say that leasure is essentially 'ust a s ecies o# evil. And ).* i# certain leasures are bad, that does not revent the chie# !ood #rom bein! some leasure, 'ust as the chie# !ood may be some #orm o# kno$led!e thou!h certain kinds o# kno$led!e are bad. 7erha s it is even necessary, i# each dis osition has unim eded activities, that, $hether the activity )i# unim eded* o# all our dis ositions or that o# some one o# them is ha iness, this should be the thin! most $orthy o# our choice" and this activity is leasure. /hus the chie# !ood $ould be some leasure, thou!h most leasures mi!ht erha s be bad $ithout quali#ication. And #or this reason all men think that the ha y li#e is leasant and $eave leasure into their ideal o# ha iness % and reasonably too" #or no activity is er#ect $hen it is im eded, and ha iness is a er#ect thin!" this is $hy the ha y man needs the !oods o# the body and e2ternal !oods, i.e. those o# #ortune, vi-. in order that he may not be im eded in these $ays. /hose $ho say that the victim on the rack or the man $ho #alls into !reat mis#ortunes is ha y i# he is !ood, are, $hether they mean to or not, talkin! nonsense. No$ because $e need #ortune as $ell as other thin!s, some eo le think !ood #ortune the same thin! as ha iness" but it is not that, #or even !ood #ortune itsel# $hen in e2cess is an im ediment, and erha s should then be no lon!er called !ood #ortune" #or its limit is #i2ed by re#erence to ha iness. And indeed the #act that all thin!s, both brutes and men, ursue leasure is an indication o# its bein! someho$ the chie# !ood: No voice is $holly lost that many eo les... But since no one nature or state either is or is thou!ht the best #or all, neither do all ursue the same leasure" yet all ursue leasure. And erha s they actually ursue not the leasure they think they ursue nor that $hich they $ould say they ursue, but the same leasure" #or all thin!s have by nature somethin! divine in them. But the bodily leasures have a ro riated the name both because $e o#tenest steer our course #or them

@C

and because all men share in them" thus because they alone are #amiliar, men think there are no others. It is evident also that i# leasure, i.e. the activity o# our #aculties, is not a !ood, it $ill not be the case that the ha y man lives a leasant li#e" #or to $hat end should he need leasure, i# it is not a !ood but the ha y man may even live a ain#ul li#e+ .or ain is neither an evil nor a !ood, i# leasure is not" $hy then should he avoid it+ /here#ore, too, the li#e o# the !ood man $ill not be leasanter than that o# any one else, i# his activities are not more leasant. 14 );* With re!ard to the bodily leasures, those $ho say that some leasures are very much to be chosen, vi-. the noble leasures, but not the bodily leasures, i.e. those $ith $hich the sel#& indul!ent man is concerned, must consider $hy, then, the contrary ains are bad. .or the contrary o# bad is !ood. Are the necessary leasures !ood in the sense in $hich even that $hich is not bad is !ood+ 1r are they !ood u to a oint+ Is it that $here you have states and rocesses o# $hich there cannot be too much, there cannot be too much o# the corres ondin! leasure, and that $here there can be too much o# the one there can be too much o# the other also+ No$ there can be too much o# bodily !oods, and the bad man is bad by virtue o# ursuin! the e2cess, not by virtue o# ursuin! the necessary leasures )#or all men en'oy in some $ay or other both dainty #oods and $ines and se2ual intercourse, but not all men do so as they ou!ht*. /he contrary is the case $ith ain" #or he does not avoid the e2cess o# it, he avoids it alto!ether" and this is eculiar to him, #or the alternative to e2cess o# leasure is not ain, e2ce t to the man $ho ursues this e2cess. ,ince $e should state not only the truth, but also the cause o# error % #or this contributes to$ards roducin! conviction, since $hen a reasonable e2 lanation is !iven o# $hy the #alse vie$ a ears true, this tends to roduce belie# in the true vie$ % there#ore $e must state $hy the bodily leasures a ear the more $orthy o# choice. )a* .irstly, then, it is because they e2 el ain" o$in! to the e2cesses o# ain that men e2 erience, they ursue e2cessive and in !eneral bodily leasure as bein! a cure #or the ain. No$ curative a!encies roduce intense #eelin! % $hich is the reason $hy they are ursued % because they sho$ u a!ainst the contrary ain. )Indeed leasure is thou!ht not to be !ood #or these t$o reasons, as has been said, vi-. that )a* some o# them are activities belon!in! to a bad nature % either con!enital, as in the case o# a brute, or due to habit, i.e. those o# bad men" $hile )b* others are meant to cure a de#ective nature, and it is better to be in a healthy state than to be !ettin! into it, but these arise durin! the rocess o# bein! made er#ect and are there#ore only incidentally !ood.* )b* .urther, they are ursued because o# their violence by those $ho cannot en'oy other leasures. )At all events they !o out o# their $ay to manu#acture thirsts someho$ #or themselves. When these are harmless, the ractice is irre roachable" $hen they are hurt#ul, it is bad.* .or they have nothin! else to en'oy, and, besides, a neutral state is ain#ul to many eo le because o# their nature. .or the animal nature is al$ays in travail, as the students o# natural science also testi#y, sayin! that si!ht and hearin! are ain#ul" but $e have become used to this, as they maintain. ,imilarly, $hile, in youth, eo le are, o$in! to the !ro$th that is !oin! on, in a situation like that o# drunken men, and youth is leasant, on the other hand eo le o# e2citable nature al$ays need relie#" #or even their body is ever in torment o$in! to its s ecial com osition, and they are al$ays under the in#luence o# violent desire" but ain is driven out both by the contrary leasure, and by any chance leasure i# it be stron!" and #or these reasons they become sel#&indul!ent and bad. But the leasures that do not involve ains do not admit o# e2cess" and these are amon! the thin!s leasant by nature and not incidentally. By thin!s AD

leasant incidentally I mean those that act as cures )#or because as a result eo le are cured, throu!h some action o# the art that remains healthy, #or this reason the rocess is thou!ht leasant*" by thin!s naturally leasant I mean those that stimulate the action o# the healthy nature. /here is no one thin! that is al$ays leasant, because our nature is not sim le but there is another element in us as $ell, inasmuch as $e are erishable creatures, so that i# the one element does somethin!, this is unnatural to the other nature, and $hen the t$o elements are evenly balanced, $hat is done seems neither ain#ul nor leasant" #or i# the nature o# anythin! $ere sim le, the same action $ould al$ays be most leasant to it. /his is $hy ;od al$ays en'oys a sin!le and sim le leasure" #or there is not only an activity o# movement but an activity o# immobility, and leasure is #ound more in rest than in movement. But 8chan!e in all thin!s is s$eet9, as the oet says, because o# some vice" #or as it is the vicious man that is chan!eable, so the nature that needs chan!e is vicious" #or it is not sim le nor !ood. We have no$ discussed continence and incontinence, and leasure and ain, both $hat each is and in $hat sense some o# them are !ood and others bad" it remains to s eak o# #riendshi .

Book 6III 1 A#ter $hat $e have said, a discussion o# #riendshi $ould naturally #ollo$, since it is a virtue or im lies virtue, and is besides most necessary $ith a vie$ to livin!. .or $ithout #riends no one $ould choose to live, thou!h he had all other !oods" even rich men and those in ossession o# o##ice and o# dominatin! o$er are thou!ht to need #riends most o# all" #or $hat is the use o# such ros erity $ithout the o ortunity o# bene#icence, $hich is e2ercised chie#ly and in its most laudable #orm to$ards #riends+ 1r ho$ can ros erity be !uarded and reserved $ithout #riends+ /he !reater it is, the more e2 osed is it to risk. And in overty and in other mis#ortunes men think #riends are the only re#u!e. It hel s the youn!, too, to kee #rom error" it aids older eo le by ministerin! to their needs and su lementin! the activities that are #ailin! #rom $eakness" those in the rime o# li#e it stimulates to noble actions % 8t$o !oin! to!ether9 % #or $ith #riends men are more able both to think and to act. A!ain, arent seems by nature to #eel it #or o##s rin! and o##s rin! #or arent, not only amon! men but amon! birds and amon! most animals" it is #elt mutually by members o# the same race, and es ecially by men, $hence $e raise lovers o# their #ello$men. We may even in our travels ho$ near and dear every man is to every other. .riendshi seems too to hold states to!ether, and la$!ivers to care more #or it than #or 'ustice" #or unanimity seems to be somethin! like #riendshi , and this they aim at most o# all, and e2 el #action as their $orst enemy" and $hen men are #riends they have no need o# 'ustice, $hile $hen they are 'ust they need #riendshi as $ell, and the truest #orm o# 'ustice is thou!ht to be a #riendly quality. But it is not only necessary but also noble" #or $e raise those $ho love their #riends, and it is thou!ht to be a #ine thin! to have many #riends" and a!ain $e think it is the same eo le that are !ood men and are #riends. Not a #e$ thin!s about #riendshi are matters o# debate. ,ome de#ine it as a kind o# likeness and say like eo le are #riends, $hence come the sayin!s 8like to like9, 8birds o# a #eather #lock to!ether9, and so on" others on the contrary say 8t$o o# a trade never a!ree9. 1n this very question they inquire #or dee er and more hysical causes, Euri ides sayin! that 8 arched earth A1

loves the rain, and stately heaven $hen #illed $ith rain loves to #all to earth9, and 3eraclitus that 8it is $hat o oses that hel s9 and 8#rom di##erent tones comes the #airest tune9 and 8all thin!s are roduced throu!h stri#e9" $hile Em edocles, as $ell as others, e2 resses the o osite vie$ that like aims at like. /he hysical roblems $e may leave alone )#or they do not belon! to the resent inquiry*" let us e2amine those $hich are human and involve character and #eelin!, e.!. $hether #riendshi can arise bet$een any t$o eo le or eo le cannot be #riends i# they are $icked, and $hether there is one s ecies o# #riendshi or more than one. /hose $ho think there is only one because it admits o# de!rees have relied on an inadequate indication" #or even thin!s di##erent in s ecies admit o# de!ree. We have discussed this matter reviously. ( /he kinds o# #riendshi may erha s be cleared u i# $e #irst come to kno$ the ob'ect o# love. .or not everythin! seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is !ood, leasant, or use#ul" but it $ould seem to be that by $hich some !ood or leasure is roduced that is use#ul, so that it is the !ood and the use#ul that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the !ood, or $hat is !ood #or them+ /hese sometimes clash. ,o too $ith re!ard to the leasant. No$ it is thou!ht that each loves $hat is !ood #or himsel#, and that the !ood is $ithout quali#ication lovable, and $hat is !ood #or each man is lovable #or him" but each man loves not $hat is !ood #or him but $hat seems !ood. /his ho$ever $ill make no di##erence" $e shall 'ust have to say that this is 8that $hich seems lovable9. No$ there are three !rounds on $hich eo le love" o# the love o# li#eless ob'ects $e do not use the $ord 8#riendshi 9" #or it is not mutual love, nor is there a $ishin! o# !ood to the other )#or it $ould surely be ridiculous to $ish $ine $ell" i# one $ishes anythin! #or it, it is that it may kee , so that one may have it onesel#*" but to a #riend $e say $e ou!ht to $ish $hat is !ood #or his sake. But to those $ho thus $ish !ood $e ascribe only !ood$ill, i# the $ish is not reci rocated" !ood$ill $hen it is reci rocal bein! #riendshi . 1r must $e add 8$hen it is reco!ni-ed9+ .or many eo le have !ood$ill to those $hom they have not seen but 'ud!e to be !ood or use#ul" and one o# these mi!ht return this #eelin!. /hese eo le seem to bear !ood$ill to each other" but ho$ could one call them #riends $hen they do not kno$ their mutual #eelin!s+ /o be #riends, then, the must be mutually reco!ni-ed as bearin! !ood$ill and $ishin! $ell to each other #or one o# the a#oresaid reasons. 0 No$ these reasons di##er #rom each other in kind" so, there#ore, do the corres ondin! #orms o# love and #riendshi . /here are there#ore three kinds o# #riendshi , equal in number to the thin!s that are lovable" #or $ith res ect to each there is a mutual and reco!ni-ed love, and those $ho love each other $ish $ell to each other in that res ect in $hich they love one another. No$ those $ho love each other #or their utility do not love each other #or themselves but in virtue o# some !ood $hich they !et #rom each other. ,o too $ith those $ho love #or the sake o# leasure" it is not #or their character that men love ready&$itted eo le, but because they #ind them leasant. /here#ore those $ho love #or the sake o# utility love #or the sake o# $hat is !ood #or themselves, and those $ho love #or the sake o# leasure do so #or the sake o# $hat is leasant to themselves, and not in so #ar as the other is the erson loved but in so #ar as he is use#ul or leasant. And thus these #riendshi s are only incidental" #or it is not as bein! the man he is that the loved erson is loved, but as rovidin! some !ood or leasure. ,uch #riendshi s, then, are easily dissolved, i# the

A(

arties do not remain like themselves" #or i# the one arty is no lon!er leasant or use#ul the other ceases to love him. No$ the use#ul is not ermanent but is al$ays chan!in!. /hus $hen the motive o# the #riendshi is done a$ay, the #riendshi is dissolved, inasmuch as it e2isted only #or the ends in question. /his kind o# #riendshi seems to e2ist chie#ly bet$een old eo le )#or at that a!e eo le ursue not the leasant but the use#ul* and, o# those $ho are in their rime or youn!, bet$een those $ho ursue utility. And such eo le do not live much $ith each other either" #or sometimes they do not even #ind each other leasant" there#ore they do not need such com anionshi unless they are use#ul to each other" #or they are leasant to each other only in so #ar as they rouse in each other ho es o# somethin! !ood to come. Amon! such #riendshi s eo le also class the #riendshi o# a host and !uest. 1n the other hand the #riendshi o# youn! eo le seems to aim at leasure" #or they live under the !uidance o# emotion, and ursue above all $hat is leasant to themselves and $hat is immediately be#ore them" but $ith increasin! a!e their leasures become di##erent. /his is $hy they quickly become #riends and quickly cease to be so" their #riendshi chan!es $ith the ob'ect that is #ound leasant, and such leasure alters quickly. >oun! eo le are amorous too" #or the !reater art o# the #riendshi o# love de ends on emotion and aims at leasure" this is $hy they #all in love and quickly #all out o# love, chan!in! o#ten $ithin a sin!le day. But these eo le do $ish to s end their days and lives to!ether" #or it is thus that they attain the ur ose o# their #riendshi . 7er#ect #riendshi is the #riendshi o# men $ho are !ood, and alike in virtue" #or these $ish $ell alike to each other qua !ood, and they are !ood themselves. No$ those $ho $ish $ell to their #riends #or their sake are most truly #riends" #or they do this by reason o# o$n nature and not incidentally" there#ore their #riendshi lasts as lon! as they are !ood % and !oodness is an endurin! thin!. And each is !ood $ithout quali#ication and to his #riend, #or the !ood are both !ood $ithout quali#ication and use#ul to each other. ,o too they are leasant" #or the !ood are leasant both $ithout quali#ication and to each other, since to each his o$n activities and others like them are leasurable, and the actions o# the !ood are the same or like. And such a #riendshi is as mi!ht be e2 ected ermanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that #riends should have. .or all #riendshi is #or the sake o# !ood or o# leasure % !ood or leasure either in the abstract or such as $ill be en'oyed by him $ho has the #riendly #eelin! % and is based on a certain resemblance" and to a #riendshi o# !ood men all the qualities $e have named belon! in virtue o# the nature o# the #riends themselves" #or in the case o# this kind o# #riendshi the other qualities also are alike in both #riends, and that $hich is !ood $ithout quali#ication is also $ithout quali#ication leasant, and these are the most lovable qualities. 5ove and #riendshi there#ore are #ound most and in their best #orm bet$een such men. But it is natural that such #riendshi s should be in#requent" #or such men are rare. .urther, such #riendshi requires time and #amiliarity" as the roverb says, men cannot kno$ each other till they have 8eaten salt to!ether9" nor can they admit each other to #riendshi or be #riends till each has been #ound lovable and been trusted by each. /hose $ho quickly sho$ the marks o# #riendshi to each other $ish to be #riends, but are not #riends unless they both are lovable and kno$ the #act" #or a $ish #or #riendshi may arise quickly, but #riendshi does not. 4 /his kind o# #riendshi , then, is er#ect both in res ect o# duration and in all other res ects, and in it each !ets #rom each in all res ects the same as, or somethin! like $hat, he !ives" $hich is $hat ou!ht to ha en bet$een #riends. .riendshi #or the sake o# leasure bears a resemblance to this A0

kind" #or !ood eo le too are leasant to each other. ,o too does #riendshi #or the sake o# utility" #or the !ood are also use#ul to each other. Amon! men o# these in#erior sorts too, #riendshi s are most ermanent $hen the #riends !et the same thin! #rom each other )e.!. leasure*, and not only that but also #rom the same source, as ha ens bet$een ready$itted eo le, not as ha ens bet$een lover and beloved. .or these do not take leasure in the same thin!s, but the one in seein! the beloved and the other in receivin! attentions #rom his lover" and $hen the bloom o# youth is assin! the #riendshi sometimes asses too )#or the one #inds no leasure in the si!ht o# the other, and the other !ets no attentions #rom the #irst*" but many lovers on the other hand are constant, i# #amiliarity has led them to love each other9s characters, these bein! alike. But those $ho e2chan!e not leasure but utility in their amour are both less truly #riends and less constant. /hose $ho are #riends #or the sake o# utility art $hen the advanta!e is at an end" #or they $ere lovers not o# each other but o# ro#it. .or the sake o# leasure or utility, then, even bad men may be #riends o# each other, or !ood men o# bad, or one $ho is neither !ood nor bad may be a #riend to any sort o# erson, but #or their o$n sake clearly only !ood men can be #riends" #or bad men do not deli!ht in each other unless some advanta!e come o# the relation. /he #riendshi o# the !ood too and this alone is roo# a!ainst slander" #or it is not easy to trust any one talk about a man $ho has lon! been tested by onesel#" and it is amon! !ood men that trust and the #eelin! that 8he $ould never $ron! me9 and all the other thin!s that are demanded in true #riendshi are #ound. In the other kinds o# #riendshi , ho$ever, there is nothin! to revent these evils arisin!. .or men a ly the name o# #riends even to those $hose motive is utility, in $hich sense states are said to be #riendly )#or the alliances o# states seem to aim at advanta!e*, and to those $ho love each other #or the sake o# leasure, in $hich sense children are called #riends. /here#ore $e too ou!ht erha s to call such eo le #riends, and say that there are several kinds o# #riendshi % #irstly and in the ro er sense that o# !ood men qua !ood, and by analo!y the other kinds" #or it is in virtue o# somethin! !ood and somethin! akin to $hat is #ound in true #riendshi that they are #riends, since even the leasant is !ood #or the lovers o# leasure. But these t$o kinds o# #riendshi are not o#ten united, nor do the same eo le become #riends #or the sake o# utility and o# leasure" #or thin!s that are only incidentally connected are not o#ten cou led to!ether. .riendshi bein! divided into these kinds, bad men $ill be #riends #or the sake o# leasure or o# utility, bein! in this res ect like each other, but !ood men $ill be #riends #or their o$n sake, i.e. in virtue o# their !oodness. /hese, then, are #riends $ithout quali#ication" the others are #riends incidentally and throu!h a resemblance to these. < As in re!ard to the virtues some men are called !ood in res ect o# a state o# character, others in res ect o# an activity, so too in the case o# #riendshi " #or those $ho live to!ether deli!ht in each other and con#er bene#its on each other, but those $ho are aslee or locally se arated are not er#ormin!, but are dis osed to er#orm, the activities o# #riendshi " distance does not break o## the #riendshi absolutely, but only the activity o# it. But i# the absence is lastin!, it seems actually to make men #or!et their #riendshi " hence the sayin! 8out o# si!ht, out o# mind9. Neither old eo le nor sour eo le seem to make #riends easily" #or there is little that is leasant in them, and no one can s end his days $ith one $hose com any is ain#ul, or not leasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the ain#ul and to aim at the leasant. /hose, ho$ever, $ho a rove o# each other but do not live to!ether seem to be $ell&dis osed rather than actual #riends. .or there A4

is nothin! so characteristic o# #riends as livin! to!ether )since $hile it eo le $ho are in need that desire bene#its, even those $ho are su remely ha y desire to s end their days to!ether" #or solitude suits such eo le least o# all*" but eo le cannot live to!ether i# they are not leasant and do not en'oy the same thin!s, as #riends $ho are com anions seem to do. /he truest #riendshi , then, is that o# the !ood, as $e have #requently said" #or that $hich is $ithout quali#ication !ood or leasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and #or each erson that $hich is !ood or leasant to him" and the !ood man is lovable and desirable to the !ood man #or both these reasons. No$ it looks as i# love $ere a #eelin!, #riendshi a state o# character" #or love may be #elt 'ust as much to$ards li#eless thin!s, but mutual love involves choice and choice s rin!s #rom a state o# character" and men $ish $ell to those $hom they love, #or their sake, not as a result o# #eelin! but as a result o# a state o# character. And in lovin! a #riend men love $hat is !ood #or themselves" #or the !ood man in becomin! a #riend becomes a !ood to his #riend. Each, then, both loves $hat is !ood #or himsel#, and makes an equal return in !ood$ill and in leasantness" #or #riendshi is said to be equality, and both o# these are #ound most in the #riendshi o# the !ood. = Bet$een sour and elderly eo le #riendshi arises less readily, inasmuch as they are less !ood& tem ered and en'oy com anionshi less" #or these are thou to be the !reatest marks o# #riendshi roductive o# it. /his is $hy, $hile men become #riends quickly, old men do not" it is because men do not become #riends $ith those in $hom they do not deli!ht" and similarly sour eo le do not quickly make #riends either. But such men may bear !ood$ill to each other" #or they $ish one another $ell and aid one another in need" but they are hardly #riends because they do not s end their days to!ether nor deli!ht in each other, and these are thou!ht the !reatest marks o# #riendshi . 1ne cannot be a #riend to many eo le in the sense o# havin! #riendshi o# the er#ect ty e $ith them, 'ust as one cannot be in love $ith many eo le at once )#or love is a sort o# e2cess o# #eelin!, and it is the nature o# such only to be #elt to$ards one erson*" and it is not easy #or many eo le at the same time to lease the same erson very !reatly, or erha s even to be !ood in his eyes. 1ne must, too, acquire some e2 erience o# the other erson and become #amiliar $ith him, and that is very hard. But $ith a vie$ to utility or leasure it is ossible that many eo le should lease one" #or many eo le are use#ul or leasant, and these services take little time. 1# these t$o kinds that $hich is #or the sake o# leasure is the more like #riendshi , $hen both arties !et the same thin!s #rom each other and deli!ht in each other or in the thin!s, as in the #riendshi s o# the youn!" #or !enerosity is more #ound in such #riendshi s. .riendshi based on utility is #or the commercially minded. 7eo le $ho are su remely ha y, too, have no need o# use#ul #riends, but do need leasant #riends" #or they $ish to live $ith some one and, thou!h they can endure #or a short time $hat is ain#ul, no one could ut u $ith it continuously, nor even $ith the ;ood itsel# i# it $ere ain#ul to him" this is $hy they look out #or #riends $ho are leasant. 7erha s they should look out #or #riends $ho, bein! leasant, are also !ood, and !ood #or them too" #or so they $ill have all the characteristics that #riends should have. 7eo le in ositions o# authority seem to have #riends $ho #all into distinct classes" some eo le are use#ul to them and others are leasant, but the same eo le are rarely both" #or they seek neither those $hose leasantness is accom anied by virtue nor those $hose utility is $ith a vie$ to noble ob'ects, but in their desire #or leasure they seek #or ready&$itted eo le, and their other #riends they choose as bein! clever at doin! $hat they are told, and these characteristics are A<

rarely combined. No$ $e have said that the !ood man is at the same time leasant and use#ul" but such a man does not become the #riend o# one $ho sur asses him in station, unless he is sur assed also in virtue" i# this is not so, he does not establish equality by bein! ro ortionally e2ceeded in both res ects. But eo le $ho sur ass him in both res ects are not so easy to #ind. 3o$ever that may be, the a#oresaid #riendshi s involve equality" #or the #riends !et the same thin!s #rom one another and $ish the same thin!s #or one another, or e2chan!e one thin! #or another, e.!. leasure #or utility" $e have said, ho$ever, that they are both less truly #riendshi s and less ermanent. But it is #rom their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thin! that they are thou!ht both to be and not to be #riendshi s. It is by their likeness to the #riendshi o# virtue that they seem to be #riendshi s )#or one o# them involves leasure and the other utility, and these characteristics belon! to the #riendshi o# virtue as $ell*" $hile it is because the #riendshi o# virtue is roo# a!ainst slander and ermanent, $hile these quickly chan!e )besides di##erin! #rom the #ormer in many other res ects*, that they a ear not to be #riendshi s" i.e. it is because o# their unlikeness to the #riendshi o# virtue. @ But there is another kind o# #riendshi , vi-. that $hich involves an inequality bet$een the arties, e.!. that o# #ather to son and in !eneral o# elder to youn!er, that o# man to $i#e and in !eneral that o# ruler to sub'ect. And these #riendshi s di##er also #rom each other" #or it is not the same that e2ists bet$een arents and children and bet$een rulers and sub'ects, nor is even that o# #ather to son the same as that o# son to #ather, nor that o# husband to $i#e the same as that o# $i#e to husband. .or the virtue and the #unction o# each o# these is di##erent, and so are the reasons #or $hich they love" the love and the #riendshi are there#ore di##erent also. Each arty, then, neither !ets the same #rom the other, nor ou!ht to seek it" but $hen children render to arents $hat they ou!ht to render to those $ho brou!ht them into the $orld, and arents render $hat they should to their children, the #riendshi o# such ersons $ill be abidin! and e2cellent. In all #riendshi s im lyin! inequality the love also should be ro ortional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves, and so should the more use#ul, and similarly in each o# the other cases" #or $hen the love is in ro ortion to the merit o# the arties, then in a sense arises equality, $hich is certainly held to be characteristic o# #riendshi . But equality does not seem to take the same #orm in acts o# 'ustice and in #riendshi " #or in acts o# 'ustice $hat is equal in the rimary sense is that $hich is in ro ortion to merit, $hile quantitative equality is secondary, but in #riendshi quantitative equality is rimary and ro ortion to merit secondary. /his becomes clear i# there is a !reat interval in res ect o# virtue or vice or $ealth or anythin! else bet$een the arties" #or then they are no lon!er #riends, and do not even e2 ect to be so. And this is most mani#est in the case o# the !ods" #or they sur ass us most decisively in all !ood thin!s. But it is clear also in the case o# kin!s" #or $ith them, too, men $ho are much their in#eriors do not e2 ect to be #riends" nor do men o# no account e2 ect to be #riends $ith the best or $isest men. In such cases it is not ossible to de#ine e2actly u to $hat oint #riends can remain #riends" #or much can be taken a$ay and #riendshi remain, but $hen one arty is removed to a !reat distance, as ;od is, the ossibility o# #riendshi ceases. /his is in #act the ori!in o# the question $hether #riends really $ish #or their #riends the !reatest !oods, e.!. that o# bein! !ods" since in that case their #riends $ill no lon!er be #riends to them, and there#ore $ill not be !ood thin!s #or them )#or #riends are !ood thin!s*. /he ans$er is that i# $e $ere ri!ht in sayin! that #riend $ishes !ood to #riend #or his sake, his #riend must remain the sort o# bein! he A=

is, $hatever that may be" there#ore it is #or him oily so lon! as he remains a man that he $ill $ish the !reatest !oods. But erha s not all the !reatest !oods" #or it is #or himsel# most o# all that each man $ishes $hat is !ood. A Bost eo le seem, o$in! to ambition, to $ish to be loved rather than to love" $hich is $hy most men love #lattery" #or the #latterer is a #riend in an in#erior osition, or retends to be such and to love more than he is loved" and bein! loved seems to be akin to bein! honoured, and this is $hat most eo le aim at. But it seems to be not #or its o$n sake that eo le choose honour, but incidentally. .or most eo le en'oy bein! honoured by those in ositions o# authority because o# their ho es )#or they think that i# they $ant anythin! they $ill !et it #rom them" and there#ore they deli!ht in honour as a token o# #avour to come*" $hile those $ho desire honour #rom !ood men, and men $ho kno$, are aimin! at con#irmin! their o$n o inion o# themselves" they deli!ht in honour, there#ore, because they believe in their o$n !oodness on the stren!th o# the 'ud!ement o# those $ho s eak about them. In bein! loved, on the other hand, eo le deli!ht #or its o$n sake" $hence it $ould seem to be better than bein! honoured, and #riendshi to be desirable in itsel#. But it seems to lie in lovin! rather than in bein! loved, as is indicated by the deli!ht mothers take in lovin!" #or some mothers hand over their children to be brou!ht u , and so lon! as they kno$ their #ate they love them and do not seek to be loved in return )i# they cannot have both*, but seem to be satis#ied i# they see them ros erin!" and they themselves love their children even i# these o$in! to their i!norance !ive them nothin! o# a mother9s due. No$ since #riendshi de ends more on lovin!, and it is those $ho love their #riends that are raised, lovin! seems to be the characteristic virtue o# #riends, so that it is only those in $hom this is #ound in due measure that are lastin! #riends, and only their #riendshi that endures. It is in this $ay more than any other that even unequals can be #riends" they can be equali-ed. No$ equality and likeness are #riendshi , and es ecially the likeness o# those $ho are like in virtue" #or bein! stead#ast in themselves they hold #ast to each other, and neither ask nor !ive base services, but )one may say* even revent them" #or it is characteristic o# !ood men neither to !o $ron! themselves nor to let their #riends do so. But $icked men have no stead#astness )#or they do not remain even like to themselves*, but become #riends #or a short time because they deli!ht in each other9s $ickedness. .riends $ho are use#ul or leasant last lon!er" i.e. as lon! as they rovide each other $ith en'oyments or advanta!es. .riendshi #or utility9s sake seems to be that $hich most easily e2ists bet$een contraries, e.!. bet$een oor and rich, bet$een i!norant and learned" #or $hat a man actually lacks he aims at, and one !ives somethin! else in return. But under this head, too, mi!ht brin! lover and beloved, beauti#ul and u!ly. /his is $hy lovers sometimes seem ridiculous, $hen they demand to be loved as they love" i# they are equally lovable their claim can erha s be 'usti#ied, but $hen they have nothin! lovable about them it is ridiculous. 7erha s, ho$ever, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its o$n nature, but only incidentally, the desire bein! #or $hat is intermediate" #or that is $hat is !ood, e.!. it is !ood #or the dry not to become $et but to come to the intermediate state, and similarly $ith the hot and in all other cases. /hese sub'ects $e may dismiss" #or they are indeed some$hat #orei!n to our inquiry.

A@

C .riendshi and 'ustice seem, as $e have said at the outset o# our discussion, to be concerned $ith the same ob'ects and e2hibited bet$een the same ersons. .or in every community there is thou!ht to be some #orm o# 'ustice, and #riendshi too" at least men address as #riends their #ello$&voya!ers and #ello$soldiers, and so too those associated $ith them in any other kind o# community. And the e2tent o# their association is the e2tent o# their #riendshi , as it is the e2tent to $hich 'ustice e2ists bet$een them. And the roverb 8$hat #riends have is common ro erty9 e2 resses the truth" #or #riendshi de ends on community. No$ brothers and comrades have all thin!s in common, but the others to $hom $e have re#erred have de#inite thin!s in common % some more thin!s, others #e$er" #or o# #riendshi s, too, some are more and others less truly #riendshi s. And the claims o# 'ustice di##er too" the duties o# arents to children, and those o# brothers to each other are not the same, nor those o# comrades and those o# #ello$&citi-ens, and so, too, $ith the other kinds o# #riendshi . /here is a di##erence, there#ore, also bet$een the acts that are un'ust to$ards each o# these classes o# associates, and the in'ustice increases by bein! e2hibited to$ards those $ho are #riends in a #uller sense" e.!. it is a more terrible thin! to de#raud a comrade than a #ello$&citi-en, more terrible not to hel a brother than a stran!er, and more terrible to $ound a #ather than any one else. And the demands o# 'ustice also seem to increase $ith the intensity o# the #riendshi , $hich im lies that #riendshi and 'ustice e2ist bet$een the same ersons and have an equal e2tension. No$ all #orms o# community are like arts o# the olitical community" #or men 'ourney to!ether $ith a vie$ to some articular advanta!e, and to rovide somethin! that they need #or the ur oses o# li#e" and it is #or the sake o# advanta!e that the olitical community too seems both to have come to!ether ori!inally and to endure, #or this is $hat le!islators aim at, and they call 'ust that $hich is to the common advanta!e. No$ the other communities aim at advanta!e bit by bit, e.!. sailors at $hat is advanta!eous on a voya!e $ith a vie$ to makin! money or somethin! o# the kind, #ello$&soldiers at $hat is advanta!eous in $ar, $hether it is $ealth or victory or the takin! o# a city that they seek, and members o# tribes and demes act similarly ),ome communities seem to arise #or the sake or leasure, vi-. reli!ious !uilds and social clubs" #or these e2ist res ectively #or the sake o# o##erin! sacri#ice and o# com anionshi . But all these seem to #all under the olitical community" #or it aims not at resent advanta!e but at $hat is advanta!eous #or li#e as a $hole*, o##erin! sacri#ices and arran!in! !atherin!s #or the ur ose, and assi!nin! honours to the !ods, and rovidin! leasant rela2ations #or themselves. .or the ancient sacri#ices and !atherin!s seem to take lace a#ter the harvest as a sort o# #irst#ruits, because it $as at these seasons that eo le had most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to be arts o# the olitical community" and the articular kinds #riendshi $ill corres ond to the articular kinds o# community. 1D /here are three kinds o# constitution, and an equal number o# deviation&#orms % erversions, as it $ere, o# them. /he constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy, and thirdly that $hich is based on a ro erty quali#ication, $hich it seems a ro riate to call timocratic, thou!h most eo le are $ont to call it olity. /he best o# these is monarchy, the $orst timocracy. /he deviation #rom monarchy is tyrany" #or both are #orms o# one&man rule, but there is the !reatest di##erence bet$een them" the tyrant looks to his o$n advanta!e, the kin! to that o# his sub'ects. .or a man is not a kin! unless he is su##icient to himsel# and e2cels his sub'ects in all !ood thin!s" and such a man needs nothin! #urther" there#ore he $ill not look to his o$n interests but to those o# his sub'ects" #or a AA

kin! $ho is not like that $ould be a mere titular kin!. No$ tyranny is the very contrary o# this" the tyrant ursues his o$n !ood. And it is clearer in the case o# tyranny that it is the $orst deviation&#orm" but it is the contrary o# the best that is $orst. Bonarchy asses over into tyranny" #or tyranny is the evil #orm o# one&man rule and the bad kin! becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy asses over into oli!archy by the badness o# the rulers, $ho distribute contrary to equity $hat belon!s to the city % all or most o# the !ood thin!s to themselves, and o##ice al$ays to the same eo le, ayin! most re!ard to $ealth" thus the rulers are #e$ and are bad men instead o# the most $orthy. /imocracy asses over into democracy" #or these are coterminous, since it is the ideal even o# timocracy to be the rule o# the ma'ority, and all $ho have the ro erty quali#ication count as equal. Democracy is the least bad o# the deviations" #or in its case the #orm o# constitution is but a sli!ht deviation. /hese then are the chan!es to $hich constitutions are most sub'ect" #or these are the smallest and easiest transitions. 1ne may #ind resemblances to the constitutions and, as it $ere, atterns o# them even in households. .or the association o# a #ather $ith his sons bears the #orm o# monarchy, since the #ather cares #or his children" and this is $hy 3omer calls Eeus 8#ather9" it is the ideal o# monarchy to be aternal rule. But amon! the 7ersians the rule o# the #ather is tyrannical" they use their sons as slaves. /yrannical too is the rule o# a master over slaves" #or it is the advanta!e o# the master that is brou!ht about in it. No$ this seems to be a correct #orm o# !overnment, but the 7ersian ty e is erverted" #or the modes o# rule a ro riate to di##erent relations are diverse. /he association o# man and $i#e seems to be aristocratic" #or the man rules in accordance $ith his $orth, and in those matters in $hich a man should rule, but the matters that be#it a $oman he hands over to her. I# the man rules in everythin! the relation asses over into oli!archy" #or in doin! so he is not actin! in accordance $ith their res ective $orth, and not rulin! in virtue o# his su eriority. ,ometimes, ho$ever, $omen rule, because they are heiresses" so their rule is not in virtue o# e2cellence but due to $ealth and o$er, as in oli!archies. /he association o# brothers is like timocracy" #or they are equal, e2ce t in so #ar as they di##er in a!e" hence i# they di##er much in a!e, the #riendshi is no lon!er o# the #raternal ty e. Democracy is #ound chie#ly in masterless d$ellin!s )#or here every one is on an equality*, and in those in $hich the ruler is $eak and every one has licence to do as he leases. 11 Each o# the constitutions may be seen to involve #riendshi 'ust in so #ar as it involves 'ustice. /he #riendshi bet$een a kin! and his sub'ects de ends on an e2cess o# bene#its con#erred" #or he con#ers bene#its on his sub'ects i# bein! a !ood man he cares #or them $ith a vie$ to their $ell& bein!, as a she herd does #or his shee )$hence 3omer called A!amemnon 8she herd o# the eo les9*. ,uch too is the #riendshi o# a #ather, thou!h this e2ceeds the other in the !reatness o# the bene#its con#erred" #or he is res onsible #or the e2istence o# his children, $hich is thou!ht the !reatest !ood, and #or their nurture and u brin!in!. /hese thin!s are ascribed to ancestors as $ell. .urther, by nature a #ather tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a kin! over his sub'ects. /hese #riendshi s im ly su eriority o# one arty over the other, $hich is $hy ancestors are honoured. /he 'ustice there#ore that e2ists bet$een ersons so related is not the same on both sides but is in every case ro ortioned to merit" #or that is true o# the #riendshi as $ell. /he #riendshi o# man and $i#e, a!ain, is the same that is #ound in an aristocracy" #or it is in accordance $ith virtue the better !ets more o# $hat is !ood, and each !ets $hat be#its him" and so, too, $ith the 'ustice in these relations. /he #riendshi o# brothers is like that o# comrades" #or they are equal and o# like a!e, and such AC

ersons are #or the most art like in their #eelin!s and their character. 5ike this, too, is the #riendshi a ro riate to timocratic !overnment" #or in such a constitution the ideal is #or the citi-ens to be equal and #air" there#ore rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms" and the #riendshi a ro riate here $ill corres ond. But in the deviation&#orms, as 'ustice hardly e2ists, so too does #riendshi . It e2ists least in the $orst #orm" in tyranny there is little or no #riendshi . .or $here there is nothin! common to ruler and ruled, there is not #riendshi either, since there is not 'ustice" e.!. bet$een cra#tsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave" the latter in each case is bene#ited by that $hich uses it, but there is no #riendshi nor 'ustice to$ards li#eless thin!s. But neither is there #riendshi to$ards a horse or an o2, nor to a slave qua slave. .or there is nothin! common to the t$o arties" the slave is a livin! tool and the tool a li#eless slave. Iua slave then, one cannot be #riends $ith him. But qua man one can" #or there seems to be some 'ustice bet$een any man and any other $ho can share in a system o# la$ or be a arty to an a!reement" there#ore there can also be #riendshi $ith him in so #ar as he is a man. /here#ore $hile in tyrannies #riendshi and 'ustice hardly e2ist, in democracies they e2ist more #ully" #or $here the citi-ens are equal they have much in common. 1( Every #orm o# #riendshi , then, involves association, as has been said. 1ne mi!ht, ho$ever, mark o## #rom the rest both the #riendshi o# kindred and that o# comrades. /hose o# #ello$&citi-ens, #ello$&tribesmen, #ello$&voya!ers, and the like are more like mere #riendshi s o# association" #or they seem to rest on a sort o# com act. With them $e mi!ht class the #riendshi o# host and !uest. /he #riendshi o# kinsmen itsel#, $hile it seems to be o# many kinds, a ears to de end in every case on arental #riendshi " #or arents love their children as bein! a art o# themselves, and children their arents as bein! somethin! ori!inatin! #rom them. No$ )1* arents kno$ their o##s rin! better than there children kno$ that they are their children, and )(* the ori!inator #eels his o##s rin! to be his o$n more than the o##s rin! do their be!etter" #or the roduct belon!s to the roducer )e.!. a tooth or hair or anythin! else to him $hose it is*, but the roducer does not belon! to the roduct, or belon!s in a less de!ree. And )0* the len!th o# time roduces the same result" arents love their children as soon as these are born, but children love their arents only a#ter time has ela sed and they have acquired understandin! or the o$er o# discrimination by the senses. .rom these considerations it is also lain $hy mothers love more than #athers do. 7arents, then, love their children as themselves )#or their issue are by virtue o# their se arate e2istence a sort o# other selves*, $hile children love their arents as bein! born o# them, and brothers love each other as bein! born o# the same arents" #or their identity $ith them makes them identical $ith each other )$hich is the reason $hy eo le talk o# 8the same blood9, 8the same stock9, and so on*. /hey are, there#ore, in a sense the same thin!, thou!h in se arate individuals. /$o thin!s that contribute !reatly to #riendshi are a common u brin!in! and similarity o# a!e" #or 8t$o o# an a!e take to each other9, and eo le brou!ht u to!ether tend to be comrades" $hence the #riendshi o# brothers is akin to that o# comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound u to!ether by derivation #rom brothers, vi-. by bein! derived #rom the same arents. /hey come to be closer to!ether or #arther a art by virtue o# the nearness or distance o# the ori!inal ancestor. /he #riendshi o# children to arents, and o# men to !ods, is a relation to them as to somethin! !ood and su erior" #or they have con#erred the !reatest bene#its, since they are the causes o# their bein! and o# their nourishment, and o# their education #rom their birth" and this kind o# #riendshi ossesses leasantness and utility also, more than that o# stran!ers, inasmuch as their li#e is lived CD

more in common. /he #riendshi o# brothers has the characteristics #ound in that o# comrades )and es ecially $hen these are !ood*, and in !eneral bet$een eo le $ho are like each other, inasmuch as they belon! more to each other and start $ith a love #or each other #rom their very birth, and inasmuch as those born o# the same arents and brou!ht u to!ether and similarly educated are more akin in character" and the test o# time has been a lied most #ully and convincin!ly in their case. Bet$een other kinsmen #riendly relations are #ound in due ro ortion. Bet$een man and $i#e #riendshi seems to e2ist by nature" #or man is naturally inclined to #orm cou les % even more than to #orm cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city, and re roduction is more common to man $ith the animals. With the other animals the union e2tends only to this oint, but human bein!s live to!ether not only #or the sake o# re roduction but also #or the various ur oses o# li#e" #or #rom the start the #unctions are divided, and those o# man and $oman are di##erent" so they hel each other by thro$in! their eculiar !i#ts into the common stock. It is #or these reasons that both utility and leasure seem to be #ound in this kind o# #riendshi . But this #riendshi may be based also on virtue, i# the arties are !ood" #or each has its o$n virtue and they $ill deli!ht in the #act. And children seem to be a bond o# union )$hich is the reason $hy childless eo le art more easily*" #or children are a !ood common to both and $hat is common holds them to!ether. 3o$ man and $i#e and in !eneral #riend and #riend ou!ht mutually to behave seems to be the same question as ho$ it is 'ust #or them to behave" #or a man does not seem to have the same duties to a #riend, a stran!er, a comrade, and a school#ello$. 10 /here are three kinds o# #riendshi , as $e said at the outset o# our inquiry, and in res ect o# each some are #riends on an equality and others by virtue o# a su eriority )#or not only can equally !ood men become #riends but a better man can make #riends $ith a $orse, and similarly in #riendshi s o# leasure or utility the #riends may be equal or unequal in the bene#its they con#er*. /his bein! so, equals must e##ect the required equali-ation on a basis o# equality in love and in all other res ects, $hile unequals must render $hat is in ro ortion to their su eriority or in#eriority. ?om laints and re roaches arise either only or chie#ly in the #riendshi o# utility, and this is only to be e2 ected. .or those $ho are #riends on the !round o# virtue are an2ious to do $ell by each other )since that is a mark o# virtue and o# #riendshi *, and bet$een men $ho are emulatin! each other in this there cannot be com laints or quarrels" no one is o##ended by a man $ho loves him and does $ell by him % i# he is a erson o# nice #eelin! he takes his reven!e by doin! $ell by the other. And the man $ho e2cels the other in the services he renders $ill not com lain o# his #riend, since he !ets $hat he aims at" #or each man desires $hat is !ood. Nor do com laints arise much even in #riendshi s o# leasure" #or both !et at the same time $hat they desire, i# they en'oy s endin! their time to!ether" and even a man $ho com lained o# another #or not a##ordin! him leasure $ould seem ridiculous, since it is in his o$er not to s end his days $ith him. But the #riendshi o# utility is #ull o# com laints" #or as they use each other #or their o$n interests they al$ays $ant to !et the better o# the bar!ain, and think they have !ot less than they should, and blame their artners because they do not !et all they 8$ant and deserve9" and those $ho do $ell by others cannot hel them as much as those $hom they bene#it $ant. No$ it seems that, as 'ustice is o# t$o kinds, one un$ritten and the other le!al, one kind o# #riendshi o# utility is moral and the other le!al. And so com laints arise most o# all $hen men do not dissolve the relation in the s irit o# the same ty e o# #riendshi in $hich they contracted it. C1

/he le!al ty e is that $hich is on #i2ed terms" its urely commercial variety is on the basis o# immediate ayment, $hile the more liberal variety allo$s time but sti ulates #or a de#inite quid ro quo. In this variety the debt is clear and not ambi!uous, but in the ost onement it contains an element o# #riendliness" and so some states do not allo$ suits arisin! out o# such a!reements, but think men $ho have bar!ained on a basis o# credit ou!ht to acce t the consequences. /he moral ty e is not on #i2ed terms" it makes a !i#t, or does $hatever it does, as to a #riend" but one e2 ects to receive as much or more, as havin! not !iven but lent" and i# a man is $orse o## $hen the relation is dissolved than he $as $hen it $as contracted he $ill com lain. /his ha ens because all or most men, $hile they $ish #or $hat is noble, choose $hat is advanta!eous" no$ it is noble to do $ell by another $ithout a vie$ to re ayment, but it is the receivin! o# bene#its that is advanta!eous. /here#ore i# $e can $e should return the equivalent o# $hat $e have received )#or $e must not make a man our #riend a!ainst his $ill" $e must reco!ni-e that $e $ere mistaken at the #irst and took a bene#it #rom a erson $e should not have taken it #rom % since it $as not #rom a #riend, nor #rom one $ho did it 'ust #or the sake o# actin! so % and $e must settle u 'ust as i# $e had been bene#ited on #i2ed terms*. Indeed, one $ould a!ree to re ay i# one could )i# one could not, even the !iver $ould not have e2 ected one to do so*" there#ore i# it is ossible $e must re ay. But at the outset $e must consider the man by $hom $e are bein! bene#ited and on $hat terms he is actin!, in order that $e may acce t the bene#it on these terms, or else decline it. It is dis utable $hether $e ou!ht to measure a service by its utility to the receiver and make the return $ith a vie$ to that, or by the benevolence o# the !iver. .or those $ho have received say they have received #rom their bene#actors $hat meant little to the latter and $hat they mi!ht have !ot #rom others % minimi-in! the service" $hile the !ivers, on the contrary, say it $as the bi!!est thin! they had, and $hat could not have been !ot #rom others, and that it $as !iven in times o# dan!er or similar need. No$ i# the #riendshi is one that aims at utility, surely the advanta!e to the receiver is the measure. .or it is he that asks #or the service, and the other man hel s him on the assum tion that he $ill receive the equivalent" so the assistance has been recisely as !reat as the advanta!e to the receiver, and there#ore he must return as much as he has received, or even more )#or that $ould be nobler*. In #riendshi s based on virtue on the other hand, com laints do not arise, but the ur ose o# the doer is a sort o# measure" #or in ur ose lies the essential element o# virtue and character. 14 Di##erences arise also in #riendshi s based on su eriority" #or each e2 ects to !et more out o# them, but $hen this ha ens the #riendshi is dissolved. Not only does the better man think he ou!ht to !et more, since more should be assi!ned to a !ood man, but the more use#ul similarly e2 ects this" they say a useless man should not !et as much as they should, since it becomes an act o# ublic service and not a #riendshi i# the roceeds o# the #riendshi do not ans$er to the $orth o# the bene#its con#erred. .or they think that, as in a commercial artnershi those $ho ut more in !et more out, so it should be in #riendshi . But the man $ho is in a state o# need and in#eriority makes the o osite claim" they think it is the art o# a !ood #riend to hel those $ho are in need" $hat, they say, is the use o# bein! the #riend o# a !ood man or a o$er#ul man, i# one is to !et nothin! out o# it+ At all events it seems that each arty is 'usti#ied in his claim, and that each should !et more out o# the #riendshi than the other % not more o# the same thin!, ho$ever, but the su erior more honour

C(

and the in#erior more !ain" #or honour is the ri-e o# virtue and o# bene#icence, $hile !ain is the assistance required by in#eriority. It seems to be so in constitutional arran!ements also" the man $ho contributes nothin! !ood to the common stock is not honoured" #or $hat belon!s to the ublic is !iven to the man $ho bene#its the ublic, and honour does belon! to the ublic. It is not ossible to !et $ealth #rom the common stock and at the same time honour. .or no one uts u $ith the smaller share in all thin!s" there#ore to the man $ho loses in $ealth they assi!n honour and to the man $ho is $illin! to be aid, $ealth, since the ro ortion to merit equali-es the arties and reserves the #riendshi , as $e have said. /his then is also the $ay in $hich $e should associate $ith unequals" the man $ho is bene#ited in res ect o# $ealth or virtue must !ive honour in return, re ayin! $hat he can. .or #riendshi asks a man to do $hat he can, not $hat is ro ortional to the merits o# the case" since that cannot al$ays be done, e.!. in honours aid to the !ods or to arents" #or no one could ever return to them the equivalent o# $hat he !ets, but the man $ho serves them to the utmost o# his o$er is thou!ht to be a !ood man. /his is $hy it $ould not seem o en to a man to diso$n his #ather )thou!h a #ather may diso$n his son*" bein! in debt, he should re ay, but there is nothin! by doin! $hich a son $ill have done the equivalent o# $hat he has received, so that he is al$ays in debt. But creditors can remit a debt" and a #ather can there#ore do so too. At the same time it is thou!ht that resumably no one $ould re udiate a son $ho $as not #ar !one in $ickedness" #or a art #rom the natural #riendshi o# #ather and son it is human nature not to re'ect a son9s assistance. But the son, i# he is $icked, $ill naturally avoid aidin! his #ather, or not be -ealous about it" #or most eo le $ish to !et bene#its, but avoid doin! them, as a thin! un ro#itable. % ,o much #or these questions.

Book IH 1 In all #riendshi s bet$een dissimilars it is, as $e have said, ro ortion that equali-es the arties and reserves the #riendshi " e.!. in the olitical #orm o# #riendshi the shoemaker !ets a return #or his shoes in ro ortion to his $orth, and the $eaver and all other cra#tsmen do the same. No$ here a common measure has been rovided in the #orm o# money, and there#ore everythin! is re#erred to this and measured by this" but in the #riendshi o# lovers sometimes the lover com lains that his e2cess o# love is not met by love in return thou!h erha s there is nothin! lovable about him*, $hile o#ten the beloved com lains that the lover $ho #ormerly romised everythin! no$ er#orms nothin!. ,uch incidents ha en $hen the lover loves the beloved #or the sake o# leasure $hile the beloved loves the lover #or the sake o# utility, and they do not both ossess the qualities e2 ected o# them. I# these be the ob'ects o# the #riendshi it is dissolved $hen they do not !et the thin!s that #ormed the motives o# their love" #or each did not love the other erson himsel# but the qualities he had, and these $ere not endurin!" that is $hy the #riendshi s also are transient. But the love o# characters, as has been said, endures because it is sel#&de endent. Di##erences arise $hen $hat they !et is somethin! di##erent and not $hat they desire" #or it is like !ettin! nothin! at all $hen $e do not !et $hat $e aim at" com are the story o# the erson $ho made romises to a lyre& layer, romisin! him the more, the better he san!, but in the mornin!, $hen the other demanded the #ul#ilment o# his romises, said that he had !iven leasure #or leasure. No$ i# this had been $hat each $anted, all $ould have been $ell" C0

but i# the one $anted en'oyment but the other !ain, and the one has $hat he $ants $hile the other has not, the terms o# the association $ill not have been ro erly #ul#illed" #or $hat each in #act $ants is $hat he attends to, and it is #or the sake o# that that that he $ill !ive $hat he has. But $ho is to #i2 the $orth o# the service" he $ho makes the sacri#ice or he $ho has !ot the advanta!e+ At any rate the other seems to leave it to him. /his is $hat they say 7rota!oras used to do" $henever he tau!ht anythin! $hatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value o# the kno$led!e, and acce ted the amount so #i2ed. But in such matters some men a rove o# the sayin! 8let a man have his #i2ed re$ard9. /hose $ho !et the money #irst and then do none o# the thin!s they said they $ould, o$in! to the e2trava!ance o# their romises, naturally #ind themselves the ob'ects o# com laint" #or they do not #ul#il $hat they a!reed to. /he so hists are erha s com elled to do this because no one $ould !ive money #or the thin!s they do kno$. /hese eo le then, i# they do not do $hat they have been aid #or, are naturally made the ob'ects o# com laint. But $here there is no contract o# service, those $ho !ive u somethin! #or the sake o# the other arty cannot )as $e have said* be com lained o# )#or that is the nature o# the #riendshi o# virtue*, and the return to them must be made on the basis o# their ur ose )#or it is ur ose that is the characteristic thin! in a #riend and in virtue*. And so too, it seems, should one make a return to those $ith $hom one has studied hiloso hy" #or their $orth cannot be measured a!ainst money, and they can !et no honour $hich $ill balance their services, but still it is erha s enou!h, as it is $ith the !ods and $ith one9s arents, to !ive them $hat one can. I# the !i#t $as not o# this sort, but $as made $ith a vie$ to a return, it is no doubt re#erable that the return made should be one that seems #air to both arties, but i# this cannot be achieved, it $ould seem not only necessary that the erson $ho !ets the #irst service should #i2 the re$ard, but also 'ust" #or i# the other !ets in return the equivalent o# the advanta!e the bene#iciary has received, or the rice lie $ould have aid #or the leasure, he $ill have !ot $hat is #air as #rom the other. We see this ha enin! too $ith thin!s ut u #or sale, and in some laces there are la$s rovidin! that no actions shall arise out o# voluntary contracts, on the assum tion that one should settle $ith a erson to $hom one has !iven credit, in the s irit in $hich one bar!ained $ith him. /he la$ holds that it is more 'ust that the erson to $hom credit $as !iven should #i2 the terms than that the erson $ho !ave credit should do so. .or most thin!s are not assessed at the same value by those $ho have them and those $ho $ant them" each class values hi!hly $hat is its o$n and $hat it is o##erin!" yet the return is made on the terms #i2ed by the receiver. But no doubt the receiver should assess a thin! not at $hat it seems $orth $hen he has it, but at $hat he assessed it at be#ore he had it. ( A #urther roblem is set by such questions as, $hether one should in all thin!s !ive the re#erence to one9s #ather and obey him, or $hether $hen one is ill one should trust a doctor, and $hen one has to elect a !eneral should elect a man o# military skill" and similarly $hether one should render a service by re#erence to a #riend or to a !ood man, and should sho$ !ratitude to a bene#actor or obli!e a #riend, i# one cannot do both. All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide $ith recision+ .or they admit o# many variations o# all sorts in res ect both o# the ma!nitude o# the service and o# its nobility necessity. But that $e should not !ive the re#erence in all thin!s to the same erson is lain enou!h" and $e must #or the most art return bene#its rather than obli!e #riends, as $e must ay back a loan to C4

a creditor rather than make one to a #riend. But erha s even this is not al$ays true" e.!. should a man $ho has been ransomed out o# the hands o# bri!ands ransom his ransomer in return, $hoever he may be )or ay him i# he has not been ca tured but demands ayment* or should he ransom his #ather+ It $ould seem that he should ransom his #ather in re#erence even to himsel#. As $e have said, then, !enerally the debt should be aid, but i# the !i#t is e2ceedin!ly noble or e2ceedin!ly necessary, one should de#er to these considerations. .or sometimes it is not even #air to return the equivalent o# $hat one has received, $hen the one man has done a service to one $hom he kno$s to be !ood, $hile the other makes a return to one $hom he believes to be bad. .or that matter, one should sometimes not lend in return to one $ho has lent to onesel#" #or the one erson lent to a !ood man, e2 ectin! to recover his loan, $hile the other has no ho e o# recoverin! #rom one $ho is believed to be bad. /here#ore i# the #acts really are so, the demand is not #air" and i# they are not, but eo le think they are, they $ould be held to be doin! nothin! stran!e in re#usin!. As $e have o#ten ointed out, then, discussions about #eelin!s and actions have 'ust as much de#initeness as their sub'ect&matter. /hat $e should not make the same return to every one, nor !ive a #ather the re#erence in everythin!, as one does not sacri#ice everythin! to Eeus, is lain enou!h" but since $e ou!ht to render di##erent thin!s to arents, brothers, comrades, and bene#actors, $e ou!ht to render to each class $hat is a ro riate and becomin!. And this is $hat eo le seem in #act to do" to marria!es they invite their kins#olk" #or these have a art in the #amily and there#ore in the doin!s that a##ect the #amily" and at #unerals also they think that kins#olk, be#ore all others, should meet, #or the same reason. And it $ould be thou!ht that in the matter o# #ood $e should hel our arents be#ore all others, since $e o$e our o$n nourishment to them, and it is more honourable to hel in this res ect the authors o# our bein! even be#ore ourselves" and honour too one should !ive to one9s arents as one does to the !ods, but not any and every honour" #or that matter one should not !ive the same honour to one9s #ather and one9s mother, nor a!ain should one !ive them the honour due to a hiloso her or to a !eneral, but the honour due to a #ather, or a!ain to a mother. /o all older ersons, too, one should !ive honour a ro riate to their a!e, by risin! to receive them and #indin! seats #or them and so on" $hile to comrades and brothers one should allo$ #reedom o# s eech and common use o# all thin!s. /o kinsmen, too, and #ello$&tribesmen and #ello$&citi-ens and to every other class one should al$ays try to assi!n $hat is a ro riate, and to com are the claims o# each class $ith res ect to nearness o# relation and to virtue or use#ulness. /he com arison is easier $hen the ersons belon! to the same class, and more laborious $hen they are di##erent. >et $e must not on that account shrink #rom the task, but decide the question as best $e can. 0 Another question that arises is $hether #riendshi s should or should not be broken o## $hen the other arty does not remain the same. 7erha s $e may say that there is nothin! stran!e in breakin! o## a #riendshi based on utility or leasure, $hen our #riends no lon!er have these attributes. .or it $as o# these attributes that $e $ere the #riends" and $hen these have #ailed it is reasonable to love no lon!er. But one mi!ht com lain o# another i#, $hen he loved us #or our use#ulness or leasantness, he retended to love us #or our character. .or, as $e said at the outset, most di##erences arise bet$een #riends $hen they are not #riends in the s irit in $hich they think they are. ,o $hen a man has deceived himsel# and has thou!ht he $as bein! loved #or his character, $hen the other erson $as doin! nothin! o# the kind, he must blame himsel#" $hen he has been deceived by the retences o# the other erson, it is 'ust that he should com lain a!ainst C<

his deceiver" he $ill com lain $ith more 'ustice than one does a!ainst eo le $ho counter#eit the currency, inasmuch as the $ron!doin! is concerned $ith somethin! more valuable. But i# one acce ts another man as !ood, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him+ ,urely it is im ossible, since not everythin! can be loved, but only $hat is !ood. What is evil neither can nor should be loved" #or it is not one9s duty to be a lover o# evil, nor to become like $hat is bad" and $e have said that like is dear like. Bust the #riendshi , then, be #orth$ith broken o##+ 1r is this not so in all cases, but only $hen one9s #riends are incurable in their $ickedness+ I# they are ca able o# bein! re#ormed one should rather come to the assistance o# their character or their ro erty, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic o# #riendshi . But a man $ho breaks o## such a #riendshi $ould seem to be doin! nothin! stran!e" #or it $as not to a man o# this sort that he $as a #riend" $hen his #riend has chan!ed, there#ore, and he is unable to save him, he !ives him u . But i# one #riend remained the same $hile the other became better and #ar outstri ed him in virtue, should the latter treat the #ormer as a #riend+ ,urely he cannot. When the interval is !reat this becomes most lain, e.!. in the case o# childish #riendshi s" i# one #riend remained a child in intellect $hile the other became a #ully develo ed man, ho$ could they be #riends $hen they neither a roved o# the same thin!s nor deli!hted in and $ere ained by the same thin!s+ .or not even $ith re!ard to each other $ill their tastes a!ree, and $ithout this )as $e sa$* they cannot be #riends" #or they cannot live to!ether. But $e have discussed these matters. ,hould he, then, behave no other$ise to$ards him than he $ould i# he had never been his #riend+ ,urely he should kee a remembrance o# their #ormer intimacy, and as $e think $e ou!ht to obli!e #riends rather than stran!ers, so to those $ho have been our #riends $e ou!ht to make some allo$ance #or our #ormer #riendshi , $hen the breach has not been due to e2cess o# $ickedness. 4 .riendly relations $ith one9s nei!hbours, and the marks by $hich #riendshi s are de#ined, seem to have roceeded #rom a man9s relations to himsel#. .or )1* $e de#ine a #riend as one $ho $ishes and does $hat is !ood, or seems so, #or the sake o# his #riend, or )(* as one $ho $ishes his #riend to e2ist and live, #or his sake" $hich mothers do to their children, and #riends do $ho have come into con#lict. And )0* others de#ine him as one $ho lives $ith and )4* has the same tastes as another, or )<* one $ho !rieves and re'oices $ith his #riend" and this too is #ound in mothers most o# all. It is by some one o# these characterstics that #riendshi too is de#ined. No$ each o# these is true o# the !ood man9s relation to himsel# )and o# all other men in so #ar as they think themselves !ood" virtue and the !ood man seem, as has been said, to be the measure o# every class o# thin!s*. .or his o inions are harmonious, and he desires the same thin!s $ith all his soul" and there#ore he $ishes #or himsel# $hat is !ood and $hat seems so, and does it )#or it is characteristic o# the !ood man to $ork out the !ood*, and does so #or his o$n sake )#or he does it #or the sake o# the intellectual element in him, $hich is thou!ht to be the man himsel#*" and he $ishes himsel# to live and be reserved, and es ecially the element by virtue o# $hich he thinks. .or e2istence is !ood to the virtuous man, and each man $ishes himsel# $hat is !ood, $hile no one chooses to ossess the $hole $orld i# he has #irst to become some one else )#or that matter, even no$ ;od ossesses the !ood*" he $ishes #or this only on condition o# bein! $hatever he is" and the element that thinks $ould seem to be the individual man, or to be so more than any other element in him. And such a man $ishes to live $ith himsel#" #or he does so $ith leasure, since the memories o# his ast acts are deli!ht#ul and his ho es #or the #uture are !ood, and there#ore C=

leasant. 3is mind is $ell stored too $ith sub'ects o# contem lation. And he !rieves and re'oices, more than any other, $ith himsel#" #or the same thin! is al$ays ain#ul, and the same thin! al$ays leasant, and not one thin! at one time and another at another" he has, so to s eak, nothin! to re ent o#. /here#ore, since each o# these characteristics belon!s to the !ood man in relation to himsel#, and he is related to his #riend as to himsel# )#or his #riend is another sel#*, #riendshi too is thou!ht to be one o# these attributes, and those $ho have these attributes to be #riends. Whether there is or is not #riendshi bet$een a man and himsel# is a question $e may dismiss #or the resent" there $ould seem to be #riendshi in so #ar as he is t$o or more, to 'ud!e #rom the a#ore&mentioned attributes o# #riendshi , and #rom the #act that the e2treme o# #riendshi is likened to one9s love #or onesel#. But the attributes named seem to belon! even to the ma'ority o# men, oor creatures thou!h they may be. Are $e to say then that in so #ar as they are satis#ied $ith themselves and think they are !ood, they share in these attributes+ ?ertainly no one $ho is thorou!hly bad and im ious has these attributes, or even seems to do so. /hey hardly belon! even to in#erior eo le" #or they are at variance $ith themselves, and have a etites #or some thin!s and rational desires #or others. /his is true, #or instance, o# incontinent eo le" #or they choose, instead o# the thin!s they themselves think !ood, thin!s that are leasant but hurt#ul" $hile others a!ain, throu!h co$ardice and la-iness, shrink #rom doin! $hat they think best #or themselves. And those $ho have done many terrible deeds and are hated #or their $ickedness even shrink #rom li#e and destroy themselves. And $icked men seek #or eo le $ith $hom to s end their days, and shun themselves" #or they remember many a !revious deed, and antici ate others like them, $hen they are by themselves, but $hen they are $ith others they #or!et. And havin! nothin! lovable in them they have no #eelin! o# love to themselves. /here#ore also such men do not re'oice or !rieve $ith themselves" #or their soul is rent by #action, and one element in it by reason o# its $ickedness !rieves $hen it abstains #rom certain acts, $hile the other art is leased, and one dra$s them this $ay and the other that, as i# they $ere ullin! them in ieces. I# a man cannot at the same time be ained and leased, at all events a#ter a short time he is ained because he $as leased, and he could have $ished that these thin!s had not been leasant to him" #or bad men are laden $ith re entance. /here#ore the bad man does not seem to be amicably dis osed even to himsel#, because there is nothin! in him to love" so that i# to be thus is the hei!ht o# $retchedness, $e should strain every nerve to avoid $ickedness and should endeavour to be !ood" #or so and only so can one be either #riendly to onesel# or a #riend to another. < ;ood$ill is a #riendly sort o# relation, but is not identical $ith #riendshi " #or one may have !ood$ill both to$ards eo le $hom one does not kno$, and $ithout their kno$in! it, but not #riendshi . /his has indeed been said already.9 But !ood$ill is not even #riendly #eelin!. .or it does not involve intensity or desire, $hereas these accom any #riendly #eelin!" and #riendly #eelin! im lies intimacy $hile !ood$ill may arise o# a sudden, as it does to$ards com etitors in a contest" $e come to #eel !ood$ill #or them and to share in their $ishes, but $e $ould not do anythin! $ith them" #or, as $e said, $e #eel !ood$ill suddenly and love them only su er#icially. ;ood$ill seems, then, to be a be!innin! o# #riendshi , as the leasure o# the eye is the be!innin! o# love. .or no one loves i# he has not #irst been deli!hted by the #orm o# the beloved, but he $ho deli!hts in the #orm o# another does not, #or all that, love him, but only does so $hen he also C@

lon!s #or him $hen absent and craves #or his resence" so too it is not ossible #or eo le to be #riends i# they have not come to #eel !ood$ill #or each other, but those $ho #eel !ood$ill are not #or all that #riends" #or they only $ish $ell to those #or $hom they #eel !ood$ill, and $ould not do anythin! $ith them nor take trouble #or them. And so one mi!ht by an e2tension o# the term #riendshi say that !ood$ill is inactive #riendshi , thou!h $hen it is rolon!ed and reaches the oint o# intimacy it becomes #riendshi % not the #riendshi based on utility nor that based on leasure" #or !ood$ill too does not arise on those terms. /he man $ho has received a bene#it besto$s !ood$ill in return #or $hat has been done to him, but in doin! so is only doin! $hat is 'ust" $hile he $ho $ishes some one to ros er because he ho es #or enrichment throu!h him seems to have !ood$ill not to him but rather to himsel#, 'ust as a man is not a #riend to another i# he cherishes him #or the sake o# some use to be made o# him. In !eneral, !ood$ill arises on account o# some e2cellence and $orth, $hen one man seems to another beauti#ul or brave or somethin! o# the sort, as $e ointed out in the case o# com etitors in a contest. = Gnanimity also seems to be a #riendly relation. .or this reason it is not identity o# o inion" #or that mi!ht occur even $ith eo le $ho do not kno$ each other" nor do $e say that eo le $ho have the same vie$s on any and every sub'ect are unanimous, e.!. those $ho a!ree about the heavenly bodies )#or unanimity about these is not a #riendly relation*, but $e do say that a city is unanimous $hen men have the same o inion about $hat is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and do $hat they have resolved in common. It is about thin!s to be done, there#ore, that eo le are said to be unanimous, and, amon! these, about matters o# consequence and in $hich it is ossible #or both or all arties to !et $hat they $ant" e.!. a city is unanimous $hen all its citi-ens think that the o##ices in it should be elective, or that they should #orm an alliance $ith , arta, or that 7ittacus should be their ruler % at a time $hen he himsel# $as also $illin! to rule. But $hen each o# t$o eo le $ishes himsel# to have the thin! in question, like the ca tains in the 7hoenissae, they are in a state o# #action" #or it is not unanimity $hen each o# t$o arties thinks o# the same thin!, $hatever that may be, but only $hen they think o# the same thin! in the same hands, e.!. $hen both the common eo le and those o# the better class $ish the best men to rule" #or thus and thus alone do all !et $hat they aim at. Gnanimity seems, then, to be olitical #riendshi , as indeed it is commonly said to be" #or it is concerned $ith thin!s that are to our interest and have an in#luence on our li#e. No$ such unanimity is #ound amon! !ood men" #or they are unanimous both in themselves and $ith one another, bein!, so to say, o# one mind )#or the $ishes o# such men are constant and not at the mercy o# o osin! currents like a strait o# the sea*, and they $ish #or $hat is 'ust and $hat is advanta!eous, and these are the ob'ects o# their common endeavour as $ell. But bad men cannot be unanimous e2ce t to a small e2tent, any more than they can be #riends, since they aim at !ettin! more than their share o# advanta!es, $hile in labour and ublic service they #all short o# their share" and each man $ishin! #or advanta!e to himsel# critici-es his nei!hbour and stands in his $ay" #or i# eo le do not $atch it care#ully the common $eal is soon destroyed. /he result is that they are in a state o# #action, uttin! com ulsion on each other but un$illin! themselves to do $hat is 'ust.

CA

@ Bene#actors are thou!ht to love those they have bene#ited, more than those $ho have been $ell treated love those that have treated them $ell, and this is discussed as thou!h it $ere arado2ical. Bost eo le think it is because the latter are in the osition o# debtors and the #ormer o# creditors" and there#ore as, in the case o# loans, debtors $ish their creditors did not e2ist, $hile creditors actually take care o# the sa#ety o# their debtors, so it is thou!ht that bene#actors $ish the ob'ects o# their action to e2ist since they $ill then !et their !ratitude, $hile the bene#iciaries take no interest in makin! this return. E icharmus $ould erha s declare that they say this because they 8look at thin!s on their bad side9, but it is quite like human nature" #or most eo le are #or!et#ul, and are more an2ious to be $ell treated than to treat others $ell. But the cause $ould seem to be more dee ly rooted in the nature o# thin!s" the case o# those $ho have lent money is not even analo!ous. .or they have no #riendly #eelin! to their debtors, but only a $ish that they may ke t sa#e $ith a vie$ to $hat is to be !ot #rom them" $hile those $ho have done a service to others #eel #riendshi and love #or those they have served even i# these are not o# any use to them and never $ill be. /his is $hat ha ens $ith cra#tsmen too" every man loves his o$n handi$ork better than he $ould be loved by it i# it came alive" and this ha ens erha s most o# all $ith oets" #or they have an e2cessive love #or their o$n oems, dotin! on them as i# they $ere their children. /his is $hat the osition o# bene#actors is like" #or that $hich they have treated $ell is their handi$ork, and there#ore they love this more than the handi$ork does its maker. /he cause o# this is that e2istence is to all men a thin! to be chosen and loved, and that $e e2ist by virtue o# activity )i.e. by livin! and actin!*, and that the handi$ork is in a sense, the roducer in activity" he loves his handi$ork, there#ore, because he loves e2istence. And this is rooted in the nature o# thin!s" #or $hat he is in otentiality, his handi$ork mani#ests in activity. At the same time to the bene#actor that is noble $hich de ends on his action, so that he deli!hts in the ob'ect o# his action, $hereas to the atient there is nothin! noble in the a!ent, but at most somethin! advanta!eous, and this is less leasant and lovable. What is leasant is the activity o# the resent, the ho e o# the #uture, the memory o# the ast" but most leasant is that $hich de ends on activity, and similarly this is most lovable. No$ #or a man $ho has made somethin! his $ork remains )#or the noble is lastin!*, but #or the erson acted on the utility asses a$ay. And the memory o# noble thin!s is leasant, but that o# use#ul thin!s is not likely to be leasant, or is less so" thou!h the reverse seems true o# e2 ectation. .urther, love is like activity, bein! loved like assivity" and lovin! and its concomitants are attributes o# those $ho are the more active. A!ain, all men love more $hat they have $on by labour" e.!. those $ho have made their money love it more than those $ho have inherited it" and to be $ell treated seems to involve no labour, $hile to treat others $ell is a laborious task. /hese are the reasons, too, $hy mothers are #onder o# their children than #athers" brin!in! them into the $orld costs them more ains, and they kno$ better that the children are their o$n. /his last oint, too, $ould seem to a ly to bene#actors. A /he question is also debated, $hether a man should love himsel# most, or some one else. 7eo le critici-e those $ho love themselves most, and call them sel#&lovers, usin! this as an e ithet o# dis!race, and a bad man seems to do everythin! #or his o$n sake, and the more so the more $icked he is % and so men re roach him, #or instance, $ith doin! nothin! o# his o$n accord % $hile the !ood man acts #or honour9s sake, and the more so the better he is, and acts #or his #riend9s sake, and sacri#ices his o$n interest. CC

But the #acts clash $ith these ar!uments, and this is not sur risin!. .or men say that one ou!ht to love best one9s best #riend, and man9s best #riend is one $ho $ishes $ell to the ob'ect o# his $ish #or his sake, even i# no one is to kno$ o# it" and these attributes are #ound most o# all in a man9s attitude to$ards himsel#, and so are all the other attributes by $hich a #riend is de#ined" #or, as $e have said, it is #rom this relation that all the characteristics o# #riendshi have e2tended to our nei!hbours. All the roverbs, too, a!ree $ith this, e.!. 8a sin!le soul9, and 8$hat #riends have is common ro erty9, and 8#riendshi is equality9, and 8charity be!ins at home9" #or all these marks $ill be #ound most in a man9s relation to himsel#" he is his o$n best #riend and there#ore ou!ht to love himsel# best. It is there#ore a reasonable question, $hich o# the t$o vie$s $e should #ollo$" #or both are lausible. 7erha s $e ou!ht to mark o## such ar!uments #rom each other and determine ho$ #ar and in $hat res ects each vie$ is ri!ht. No$ i# $e !ras the sense in $hich each school uses the hrase 8lover o# sel#9, the truth may become evident. /hose $ho use the term as one o# re roach ascribe sel#& love to eo le $ho assi!n to themselves the !reater share o# $ealth, honours, and bodily leasures" #or these are $hat most eo le desire, and busy themselves about as thou!h they $ere the best o# all thin!s, $hich is the reason, too, $hy they become ob'ects o# com etition. ,o those $ho are !ras in! $ith re!ard to these thin!s !rati#y their a etites and in !eneral their #eelin!s and the irrational element o# the soul" and most men are o# this nature )$hich is the reason $hy the e ithet has come to be used as it is % it takes its meanin! #rom the revailin! ty e o# sel#&love, $hich is a bad one*" it is 'ust, there#ore, that men $ho are lovers o# sel# in this $ay are re roached #or bein! so. /hat it is those $ho !ive themselves the re#erence in re!ard to ob'ects o# this sort that most eo le usually call lovers o# sel# is lain" #or i# a man $ere al$ays an2ious that he himsel#, above all thin!s, should act 'ustly, tem erately, or in accordance $ith any other o# the virtues, and in !eneral $ere al$ays to try to secure #or himsel# the honourable course, no one $ill call such a man a lover o# sel# or blame him. But such a man $ould seem more than the other a lover o# sel#" at all events he assi!ns to himsel# the thin!s that are noblest and best, and !rati#ies the most authoritative element in and in all thin!s obeys this" and 'ust as a city or any other systematic $hole is most ro erly identi#ied $ith the most authoritative element in it, so is a man" and there#ore the man $ho loves this and !rati#ies it is most o# all a lover o# sel#. Besides, a man is said to have or not to have sel#&control accordin! as his reason has or has not the control, on the assum tion that this is the man himsel#" and the thin!s men have done on a rational rinci le are thou!ht most ro erly their o$n acts and voluntary acts. /hat this is the man himsel#, then, or is so more than anythin! else, is lain, and also that the !ood man loves most this art o# him. Whence it #ollo$s that he is most truly a lover o# sel#, o# another ty e than that $hich is a matter o# re roach, and as di##erent #rom that as livin! accordin! to a rational rinci le is #rom livin! as assion dictates, and desirin! $hat is noble #rom desirin! $hat seems advanta!eous. /hose, then, $ho busy themselves in an e2ce tional de!ree $ith noble actions all men a rove and raise" and i# all $ere to strive to$ards $hat is noble and strain every nerve to do the noblest deeds, everythin! $ould be as it should be #or the common $eal, and every one $ould secure #or himsel# the !oods that are !reatest, since virtue is the !reatest o# !oods. /here#ore the !ood man should be a lover o# sel# )#or he $ill both himsel# ro#it by doin! noble acts, and $ill bene#it his #ello$s*, but the $icked man should not" #or he $ill hurt both himsel# and his nei!hbours, #ollo$in! as he does evil assions. .or the $icked man, $hat he does clashes $ith $hat he ou!ht to do, but $hat the !ood man ou!ht to do he does" #or reason in each o# its ossessors chooses $hat is best #or itsel#, and the !ood man obeys his reason. It is true o# the !ood man too that he does many acts #or the sake o# his #riends and his country, and i# necessary 1DD

dies #or them" #or he $ill thro$ a$ay both $ealth and honours and in !eneral the !oods that are ob'ects o# com etition, !ainin! #or himsel# nobility" since he $ould re#er a short eriod o# intense leasure to a lon! one o# mild en'oyment, a t$elvemonth o# noble li#e to many years o# humdrum e2istence, and one !reat and noble action to many trivial ones. No$ those $ho die #or others doubtless attain this result" it is there#ore a !reat ri-e that they choose #or themselves. /hey $ill thro$ a$ay $ealth too on condition that their #riends $ill !ain more" #or $hile a man9s #riend !ains $ealth he himsel# achieves nobility" he is there#ore assi!nin! the !reater !ood to himsel#. /he same too is true o# honour and o##ice" all these thin!s he $ill sacri#ice to his #riend" #or this is noble and laudable #or himsel#. Ri!htly then is he thou!ht to be !ood, since he chooses nobility be#ore all else. But he may even !ive u actions to his #riend" it may be nobler to become the cause o# his #riend9s actin! than to act himsel#. In all the actions, there#ore, that men are raised #or, the !ood man is seen to assi!n to himsel# the !reater share in $hat is noble. In this sense, then, as has been said, a man should be a lover o# sel#" but in the sense in $hich most men are so, he ou!ht not. C It is also dis uted $hether the ha y man $ill need #riends or not. It is said that those $ho are su remely ha y and sel#&su##icient have no need o# #riends" #or they have the thin!s that are !ood, and there#ore bein! sel#&su##icient they need nothin! #urther, $hile a #riend, bein! another sel#, #urnishes $hat a man cannot rovide by his o$n e##ort" $hence the sayin! 8$hen #ortune is kind, $hat need o# #riends+9 But it seems stran!e, $hen one assi!ns all !ood thin!s to the ha y man, not to assi!n #riends, $ho are thou!ht the !reatest o# e2ternal !oods. And i# it is more characteristic o# a #riend to do $ell by another than to be $ell done by, and to con#er bene#its is characteristic o# the !ood man and o# virtue, and it is nobler to do $ell by #riends than by stran!ers, the !ood man $ill need eo le to do $ell by. /his is $hy the question is asked $hether $e need #riends more in ros erity or in adversity, on the assum tion that not only does a man in adversity need eo le to con#er bene#its on him, but also those $ho are ros erin! need eo le to do $ell by. ,urely it is stran!e, too, to make the su remely ha y man a solitary" #or no one $ould choose the $hole $orld on condition o# bein! alone, since man is a olitical creature and one $hose nature is to live $ith others. /here#ore even the ha y man lives $ith others" #or he has the thin!s that are by nature !ood. And lainly it is better to s end his days $ith #riends and !ood men than $ith stran!ers or any chance ersons. /here#ore the ha y man needs #riends. What then is it that the #irst school means, and in $hat res ect is it ri!ht+ Is it that most identi#y #riends $ith use#ul eo le+ 1# such #riends indeed the su remely ha y man $ill have no need, since he already has the thin!s that are !ood" nor $ill he need those $hom one makes one9s #riends because o# their leasantness, or he $ill need them only to a small e2tent )#or his li#e, bein! leasant, has no need o# adventitious leasure*" and because he does not need such #riends he is thou!ht not to need #riends. But that is surely not true. .or $e have said at the outset that ha iness is an activity" and activity lainly comes into bein! and is not resent at the start like a iece o# ro erty. I# )1* ha iness lies in livin! and bein! active, and the !ood man9s activity is virtuous and leasant in itsel#, as $e have said at the outset, and )(* a thin!9s bein! one9s o$n is one o# the attributes that make it leasant, and )0* $e can contem late our nei!hbours better than ourselves and their actions better than our o$n, and i# the actions o# virtuous men $ho are their #riends are leasant to !ood men )since these have both the attributes that are naturally leasant*, % i# this be so, the su remely ha y man $ill need #riends o# this sort, since his ur ose is to contem late $orthy actions and 1D1

actions that are his o$n, and the actions o# a !ood man $ho is his #riend have both these qualities. .urther, men think that the ha y man ou!ht to live leasantly. No$ i# he $ere a solitary, li#e $ould be hard #or him" #or by onesel# it is not easy to be continuously active" but $ith others and to$ards others it is easier. With others there#ore his activity $ill be more continuous, and it is in itsel# leasant, as it ou!ht to be #or the man $ho is su remely ha y" #or a !ood man qua !ood deli!hts in virtuous actions and is ve2ed at vicious ones, as a musical man en'oys beauti#ul tunes but is ained at bad ones. A certain trainin! in virtue arises also #rom the com any o# the !ood, as /heo!nis has said be#ore us. I# $e look dee er into the nature o# thin!s, a virtuous #riend seems to be naturally desirable #or a virtuous man. .or that $hich is !ood by nature, $e have said, is #or the virtuous man !ood and leasant in itsel#. No$ li#e is de#ined in the case o# animals by the o$er o# erce tion in that o# man by the o$er o# erce tion or thou!ht" and a o$er is de#ined by re#erence to the corres ondin! activity, $hich is the essential thin!" there#ore li#e seems to be essentially the act o# erceivin! or thinkin!. And li#e is amon! the thin!s that are !ood and leasant in themselves, since it is determinate and the determinate is o# the nature o# the !ood" and that $hich is !ood by nature is also !ood #or the virtuous man )$hich is the reason $hy li#e seems leasant to all men*" but $e must not a ly this to a $icked and corru t li#e nor to a li#e s ent in ain" #or such a li#e is indeterminate, as are its attributes. /he nature o# ain $ill become lainer in $hat #ollo$s. But i# li#e itsel# is !ood and leasant )$hich it seems to be, #rom the very #act that all men desire it, and articularly those $ho are !ood and su remely ha y" #or to such men li#e is most desirable, and their e2istence is the most su remely ha y* and i# he $ho sees erceives that he sees, and he $ho hears, that he hears, and he $ho $alks, that he $alks, and in the case o# all other activities similarly there is somethin! $hich erceives that $e are active, so that i# $e erceive, $e erceive that $e erceive, and i# $e think, that $e think" and i# to erceive that $e erceive or think is to erceive that $e e2ist )#or e2istence $as de#ined as erceivin! or thinkin!*" and i# erceivin! that one lives is in itsel# one o# the thin!s that are leasant )#or li#e is by nature !ood, and to erceive $hat is !ood resent in onesel# is leasant*" and i# li#e is desirable, and articularly so #or !ood men, because to them e2istence is !ood and leasant #or they are leased at the consciousness o# the resence in them o# $hat is in itsel# !ood*" and i# as the virtuous man is to himsel#, he is to his #riend also )#or his #riend is another sel#*: % i# all this be true, as his o$n bein! is desirable #or each man, so, or almost so, is that o# his #riend. No$ his bein! $as seen to be desirable because he erceived his o$n !oodness, and such erce tion is leasant in itsel#. 3e needs, there#ore, to be conscious o# the e2istence o# his #riend as $ell, and this $ill be reali-ed in their livin! to!ether and sharin! in discussion and thou!ht" #or this is $hat livin! to!ether $ould seem to mean in the case o# man, and not, as in the case o# cattle, #eedin! in the same lace. I#, then, bein! is in itsel# desirable #or the su remely ha y man )since it is by its nature !ood and leasant*, and that o# his #riend is very much the same, a #riend $ill be one o# the thin!s that are desirable. No$ that $hich is desirable #or him he must have, or he $ill be de#icient in this res ect. /he man $ho is to be ha y $ill there#ore need virtuous #riends. 1D ,hould $e, then, make as many #riends as ossible, or % as in the case o# hos itality it is thou!ht to be suitable advice, that one should be 8neither a man o# many !uests nor a man $ith none9 % $ill that a ly to #riendshi as $ell" should a man neither be #riendless nor have an e2cessive number o# #riends+ 1D(

/o #riends made $ith a vie$ to utility this sayin! $ould seem thorou!hly a licable" #or to do services to many eo le in return is a laborious task and li#e is not lon! enou!h #or its er#ormance. /here#ore #riends in e2cess o# those $ho are su##icient #or our o$n li#e are su er#luous, and hindrances to the noble li#e" so that $e have no need o# them. 1# #riends made $ith a vie$ to leasure, also, #e$ are enou!h, as a little seasonin! in #ood is enou!h. But as re!ards !ood #riends, should $e have as many as ossible, or is there a limit to the number o# one9s #riends, as there is to the si-e o# a city+ >ou cannot make a city o# ten men, and i# there are a hundred thousand it is a city no lon!er. But the ro er number is resumably not a sin!le number, but anythin! that #alls bet$een certain #i2ed oints. ,o #or #riends too there is a #i2ed number erha s the lar!est number $ith $hom one can live to!ether )#or that, $e #ound, thou!ht to be very characteristic o# #riendshi *" and that one cannot live $ith many eo le and divide onesel# u amon! them is lain. .urther, they too must be #riends o# one another, i# they are all to s end their days to!ether" and it is a hard business #or this condition to be #ul#illed $ith a lar!e number. It is #ound di##icult, too, to re'oice and to !rieve in an intimate $ay $ith many eo le, #or it may likely ha en that one has at once to be ha y $ith one #riend and to mourn $ith another. 7resumably, then, it is $ell not to seek to have as many #riends as ossible, but as many as are enou!h #or the ur ose o# livin! to!ether" #or it $ould seem actually im ossible to be a !reat #riend to many eo le. /his is $hy one cannot love several eo le" love is ideally a sort o# e2cess o# #riendshi , and that can only be #elt to$ards one erson" there#ore !reat #riendshi too can only be #elt to$ards a #e$ eo le. /his seems to be con#irmed in ractice" #or $e do not #ind many eo le $ho are #riends in the comradely $ay o# #riendshi , and the #amous #riendshi s o# this sort are al$ays bet$een t$o eo le. /hose $ho have many #riends and mi2 intimately $ith them all are thou!ht to be no one9s #riend, e2ce t in the $ay ro er to #ello$&citi-ens, and such eo le are also called obsequious. In the $ay ro er to #ello$&citi-ens, indeed, it is ossible to be the #riend o# many and yet not be obsequious but a !enuinely !ood man" but one cannot have $ith many eo le the #riendshi based on virtue and on the character o# our #riends themselves, and $e must be content i# $e #ind even a #e$ such. 11 Do $e need #riends more in !ood #ortune or in bad+ /hey are sou!ht a#ter in both" #or $hile men in adversity need hel , in ros erity they need eo le to live $ith and to make the ob'ects o# their bene#icence" #or they $ish to do $ell by others. .riendshi , then, is more necessary in bad #ortune, and so it is use#ul #riends that one $ants in this case" but it is more noble in !ood #ortune, and so $e also seek #or !ood men as our #riends, since it is more desirable to con#er bene#its on these and to live $ith these. .or the very resence o# #riends is leasant both in !ood #ortune and also in bad, since !rie# is li!htened $hen #riends sorro$ $ith us. 3ence one mi!ht ask $hether they share as it $ere our burden, or % $ithout that ha enin! % their resence by its leasantness, and the thou!ht o# their !rievin! $ith us, make our ain less. Whether it is #or these reasons or #or some other that our !rie# is li!htened, is a question that may be dismissed" at all events $hat $e have described a ears to take lace. But their resence seems to contain a mi2ture o# various #actors. /he very seein! o# one9s #riends is leasant, es ecially i# one is in adversity, and becomes a sa#e!uard a!ainst !rie# )#or a #riend tends to com#ort us both by the si!ht o# him and by his $ords, i# he is tact#ul, since he kno$s our character and the thin!s that lease or ain us*" but to see him ained at our mis#ortunes is ain#ul" #or every one shuns bein! a cause o# ain to his #riends. .or this reason eo le o# a manly nature !uard a!ainst makin! their #riends !rieve $ith them, and, unless he be 1D0

e2ce tionally insensible to ain, such a man cannot stand the ain that ensues #or his #riends, and in !eneral does not admit #ello$&mourners because he is not himsel# !iven to mournin!" but $omen and $omanly men en'oy sym athisers in their !rie#, and love them as #riends and com anions in sorro$. But in all thin!s one obviously ou!ht to imitate the better ty e o# erson. 1n the other hand, the resence o# #riends in our ros erity im lies both a leasant assin! o# our time and the leasant thou!ht o# their leasure at our o$n !ood #ortune. .or this cause it $ould seem that $e ou!ht to summon our #riends readily to share our !ood #ortunes )#or the bene#icent character is a noble one*, but summon them to our bad #ortunes $ith hesitation" #or $e ou!ht to !ive them as little a share as ossible in our evils $hence the sayin! 8enou!h is my mis#ortune9. We should summon #riends to us most o# all $hen they are likely by su##erin! a #e$ inconveniences to do us a !reat service. ?onversely, it is #ittin! to !o unasked and readily to the aid o# those in adversity )#or it is characteristic o# a #riend to render services, and es ecially to those $ho are in need and have not demanded them" such action is nobler and leasanter #or both ersons*" but $hen our #riends are ros erous $e should 'oin readily in their activities )#or they need #riends #or these too*, but be tardy in comin! #or$ard to be the ob'ects o# their kindness" #or it is not noble to be keen to receive bene#its. ,till, $e must no doubt avoid !ettin! the re utation o# kill&'oys by re ulsin! them" #or that sometimes ha ens. /he resence o# #riends, then, seems desirable in all circumstances. 1( Does it not #ollo$, then, that, as #or lovers the si!ht o# the beloved is the thin! they love most, and they re#er this sense to the others because on it love de ends most #or its bein! and #or its ori!in, so #or #riends the most desirable thin! is livin! to!ether+ .or #riendshi is a artnershi , and as a man is to himsel#, so is he to his #riend" no$ in his o$n case the consciousness o# his bein! is desirable, and so there#ore is the consciousness o# his #riend9s bein!, and the activity o# this consciousness is roduced $hen they live to!ether, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And $hatever e2istence means #or each class o# men, $hatever it is #or $hose sake they value li#e, in that they $ish to occu y themselves $ith their #riends" and so some drink to!ether, others dice to!ether, others 'oin in athletic e2ercises and huntin!, or in the study o# hiloso hy, each class s endin! their days to!ether in $hatever they love most in li#e" #or since they $ish to live $ith their #riends, they do and share in those thin!s $hich !ive them the sense o# livin! to!ether. /hus the #riendshi o# bad men turns out an evil thin! )#or because o# their instability they unite in bad ursuits, and besides they become evil by becomin! like each other*, $hile the #riendshi o# !ood men is !ood, bein! au!mented by their com anionshi " and they are thou!ht to become better too by their activities and by im rovin! each other" #or #rom each other they take the mould o# the characteristics they a rove % $hence the sayin! 8noble deeds #rom noble men9. % ,o much, then, #or #riendshi " our ne2t task must be to discuss leasure.

1D4

Book H 1 A#ter these matters $e ou!ht erha s ne2t to discuss leasure. .or it is thou!ht to be most intimately connected $ith our human nature, $hich is the reason $hy in educatin! the youn! $e steer them by the rudders o# leasure and ain" it is thou!ht, too, that to en'oy the thin!s $e ou!ht and to hate the thin!s $e ou!ht has the !reatest bearin! on virtue o# character. .or these thin!s e2tend ri!ht throu!h li#e, $ith a $ei!ht and o$er o# their o$n in res ect both to virtue and to the ha y li#e, since men choose $hat is leasant and avoid $hat is ain#ul" and such thin!s, it $ill be thou!ht, $e should least o# all omit to discuss, es ecially since they admit o# much dis ute. .or some say leasure is the !ood, $hile others, on the contrary, say it is thorou!hly bad % some no doubt bein! ersuaded that the #acts are so, and others thinkin! it has a better e##ect on our li#e to e2hibit leasure as a bad thin! even i# it is not" #or most eo le )they think* incline to$ards it and are the slaves o# their leasures, #or $hich reason they ou!ht to lead them in the o osite direction, since thus they $ill reach the middle state. But surely this is not correct. .or ar!uments about matters concerned $ith #eelin!s and actions are less reliable than #acts: and so $hen they clash $ith the #acts o# erce tion they are des ised, and discredit the truth as $ell" i# a man $ho runs do$n leasure is once seen to be almin! at it, his inclinin! to$ards it is thou!ht to im ly that it is all $orthy o# bein! aimed at" #or most eo le are not !ood at dra$in! distinctions. /rue ar!uments seem, then, most use#ul, not only $ith a vie$ to kno$led!e, but $ith a vie$ to li#e also" #or since they harmoni-e $ith the #acts they are believed, and so they stimulate those $ho understand them to live accordin! to them. % Enou!h o# such questions" let us roceed to revie$ the o inions that have been e2 ressed about leasure. ( Eudo2us thou!ht leasure $as the !ood because he sa$ all thin!s, both rational and irrational, aimin! at it, and because in all thin!s that $hich is the ob'ect o# choice is $hat is e2cellent, and that $hich is most the ob'ect o# choice the !reatest !ood" thus the #act that all thin!s moved to$ards the same ob'ect indicated that this $as #or all thin!s the chie# !ood )#or each thin!, he ar!ued, #inds its o$n !ood, as it #inds its o$n nourishment*" and that $hich is !ood #or all thin!s and at $hich all aim $as the !ood. 3is ar!uments $ere credited more because o# the e2cellence o# his character than #or their o$n sake" he $as thou!ht to be remarkably sel#&controlled, and there#ore it $as thou!ht that he $as not sayin! $hat he did say as a #riend o# leasure, but that the #acts really $ere so. 3e believed that the same conclusion #ollo$ed no less lainly #rom a study o# the contrary o# leasure" ain $as in itsel# an ob'ect o# aversion to all thin!s, and there#ore its contrary must be similarly an ob'ect o# choice. And a!ain that is most an ob'ect o# choice $hich $e choose not because or #or the sake o# somethin! else, and leasure is admittedly o# this nature" #or no one asks to $hat end he is leased, thus im lyin! that leasure is in itsel# an ob'ect o# choice. .urther, he ar!ued that leasure $hen added to any !ood, e.!. to 'ust or tem erate action, makes it more $orthy o# choice, and that it is only by itsel# that the !ood can be increased. /his ar!ument seems to sho$ it to be one o# the !oods, and no more a !ood than any other" #or every !ood is more $orthy o# choice alon! $ith another !ood than taken alone. And so it is by an ar!ument o# this kind that 7lato roves the !ood not to be leasure" he ar!ues that the leasant li#e is more desirable $ith $isdom than $ithout, and that i# the mi2ture is better, leasure is not 1D<

the !ood" #or the !ood cannot become more desirable by the addition o# anythin! to it. No$ it is clear that nothin! else, any more than leasure, can be the !ood i# it is made more desirable by the addition o# any o# the thin!s that are !ood in themselves. What, then, is there that satis#ies this criterion, $hich at the same time $e can artici ate in+ It is somethin! o# this sort that $e are lookin! #or. /hose $ho ob'ect that that at $hich all thin!s aim is not necessarily !ood are, $e may surmise, talkin! nonsense. .or $e say that that $hich every one thinks really is so" and the man $ho attacks this belie# $ill hardly have anythin! more credible to maintain instead. I# it is senseless creatures that desire the thin!s in question, there mi!ht be somethin! in $hat they say" but i# intelli!ent creatures do so as $ell, $hat sense can there be in this vie$+ But erha s even in in#erior creatures there is some natural !ood stron!er than themselves $hich aims at their ro er !ood. Nor does the ar!ument about the contrary o# leasure seem to be correct. /hey say that i# ain is an evil it does not #ollo$ that leasure is a !ood" #or evil is o osed to evil and at the same time both are o osed to the neutral state % $hich is correct enou!h but does not a ly to the thin!s in question. .or i# both leasure and ain belon!ed to the class o# evils they ou!ht both to be ob'ects o# aversion, $hile i# they belon!ed to the class o# neutrals neither should be an ob'ect o# aversion or they should both be equally so" but in #act eo le evidently avoid the one as evil and choose the other as !ood" that then must be the nature o# the o osition bet$een them. 0 Nor a!ain, i# leasure is not a quality, does it #ollo$ that it is not a !ood" #or the activities o# virtue are not qualities either, nor is ha iness. /hey say, ho$ever, that the !ood is determinate, $hile leasure is indeterminate, because it admits o# de!rees. No$ i# it is #rom the #eelin! o# leasure that they 'ud!e thus, the same $ill be true o# 'ustice and the other virtues, in res ect o# $hich $e lainly say that eo le o# a certain character are so more or less, and act more or less in accordance $ith these virtues" #or eo le may be more 'ust or brave, and it is ossible also to act 'ustly or tem erately more or less. But i# their 'ud!ement is based on the various leasures, surely they are not statin! the real cause, i# in #act some leasures are unmi2ed and others mi2ed. A!ain, 'ust as health admits o# de!rees $ithout bein! indeterminate, $hy should not leasure+ /he same ro ortion is not #ound in all thin!s, nor a sin!le ro ortion al$ays in the same thin!, but it may be rela2ed and yet ersist u to a oint, and it may di##er in de!ree. /he case o# leasure also may there#ore be o# this kind. A!ain, they assume that the !ood is er#ect $hile movements and comin!s into bein! are im er#ect, and try to e2hibit leasure as bein! a movement and a comin! into bein!. But they do not seem to be ri!ht even in sayin! that it is a movement. .or s eed and slo$ness are thou!ht to be ro er to every movement, and i# a movement, e.!. that o# the heavens, has not s eed or slo$ness in itsel#, it has it in relation to somethin! else" but o# leasure neither o# these thin!s is true. .or $hile $e may become leased quickly as $e may become an!ry quickly, $e cannot be leased quickly, not even in relation to some one else, $hile $e can $alk, or !ro$, or the like, quickly. While, then, $e can chan!e quickly or slo$ly into a state o# leasure, $e cannot quickly e2hibit the activity o# leasure, i.e. be leased. A!ain, ho$ can it be a comin! into bein!+ It is not thou!ht that any chance thin! can come out o# any chance thin!, but that a thin! is dissolved into that out o# $hich it comes into bein!" and ain $ould be the destruction o# that o# $hich leasure is the comin! into bein!. /hey say, too, that ain is the lack o# that $hich is accordin! to nature, and leasure is re lenishment. But these e2 eriences are bodily. I# then leasure is re lenishment $ith that $hich 1D=

is accordin! to nature, that $hich #eels leasure $ill be that in $hich the re lenishment takes lace, i.e. the body" but that is not thou!ht to be the case" there#ore the re lenishment is not leasure, thou!h one $ould be leased $hen re lenishment $as takin! lace, 'ust as one $ould be ained i# one $as bein! o erated on. /his o inion seems to be based on the ains and leasures connected $ith nutrition" on the #act that $hen eo le have been short o# #ood and have #elt ain be#orehand they are leased by the re lenishment. But this does not ha en $ith all leasures" #or the leasures o# learnin! and, amon! the sensuous leasures, those o# smell, and also many sounds and si!hts, and memories and ho es, do not resu ose ain. 1# $hat then $ill these be the comin! into bein!+ /here has not been lack o# anythin! o# $hich they could be the su lyin! ane$. In re ly to those $ho brin! #or$ard the dis!race#ul leasures one may say that these are not leasant" i# thin!s are leasant to eo le o# vicious constitution, $e must not su ose that they are also leasant to others than these, 'ust as $e do not reason so about the thin!s that are $holesome or s$eet or bitter to sick eo le, or ascribe $hiteness to the thin!s that seem $hite to those su##erin! #rom a disease o# the eye. 1r one mi!ht ans$er thus % that the leasures are desirable, but not #rom these sources, as $ealth is desirable, but not as the re$ard o# betrayal, and health, but not at the cost o# eatin! anythin! and everythin!. 1r erha s leasures di##er in kind" #or those derived #rom noble sources are di##erent #rom those derived #rom base sources, and one cannot the leasure o# the 'ust man $ithout bein! 'ust, nor that o# the musical man $ithout bein! musical, and so on. /he #act, too, that a #riend is di##erent #rom a #latterer seems to make it lain that leasure is not a !ood or that leasures are di##erent in kind" #or the one is thou!ht to consort $ith us $ith a vie$ to the !ood, the other $ith a vie$ to our leasure, and the one is re roached #or his conduct $hile the other is raised on the !round that he consorts $ith us #or di##erent ends. And no one $ould choose to live $ith the intellect o# a child throu!hout his li#e, ho$ever much he $ere to be leased at the thin!s that children are leased at, nor to !et en'oyment by doin! some most dis!race#ul deed, thou!h he $ere never to #eel any ain in consequence. And there are many thin!s $e should be keen about even i# they brou!ht no leasure, e.!. seein!, rememberin!, kno$in!, ossessin! the virtues. I# leasures necessarily do accom any these, that makes no odds" $e should choose these even i# no leasure resulted. It seems to be clear, then, that neither is leasure the !ood nor is all leasure desirable, and that some leasures are desirable in themselves, di##erin! in kind or in their sources #rom the others. ,o much #or the thin!s that are said about leasure and ain. 4 What leasure is, or $hat kind o# thin! it is, $ill become lainer i# $e take u the question a!a #rom the be!innin!. ,eein! seems to be at any moment com lete, #or it does not lack anythin! $hich comin! into bein! later $ill com lete its #orm" and leasure also seems to be o# this nature. .or it is a $hole, and at no time can one #ind a leasure $hose #orm $ill be com leted i# the leasure lasts lon!er. .or this reason, too, it is not a movement. .or every movement )e.!. that o# buildin!* takes time and is #or the sake o# an end, and is com lete $hen it has made $hat it aims at. It is com lete, there#ore, only in the $hole time or at that #inal moment. In their arts and durin! the time they occu y, all movements are incom lete, and are di##erent in kind #rom the $hole movement and #rom each other. .or the #ittin! to!ether o# the stones is di##erent #rom the #lutin! o# the column, and these are both di##erent #rom the makin! o# the tem le" and the makin! o# the tem le is com lete )#or it lacks nothin! $ith a vie$ to the end ro osed*, but the makin! 1D@

o# the base or o# the tri!ly h is incom lete" #or each is the makin! o# only a art. /hey di##er in kind, then, and it is not ossible to #ind at any and every time a movement com lete in #orm, but i# at all, only in the $hole time. ,o, too, in the case o# $alkin! and all other movements. .or i# locomotion is a movement #rom to there, it, too, has di##erences in kind % #lyin!, $alkin!, lea in!, and so on. And not only so, but in $alkin! itsel# there are such di##erences" #or the $hence and $hither are not the same in the $hole racecourse and in a art o# it, nor in one art and in another, nor is it the same thin! to traverse this line and that" #or one traverses not only a line but one $hich is in a lace, and this one is in a di##erent lace #rom that. We have discussed movement $ith recision in another $ork, but it seems that it is not com lete at any and every time, but that the many movements are incom lete and di##erent in kind, since the $hence and $hither !ive them their #orm. But o# leasure the #orm is com lete at any and every time. 7lainly, then, leasure and movement must be di##erent #rom each other, and leasure must be one o# the thin!s that are $hole and com lete. /his $ould seem to be the case, too, #rom the #act that it is not ossible to move other$ise than in time, but it is ossible to be leased" #or that $hich takes lace in a moment is a $hole. .rom these considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers are not ri!ht in sayin! there is a movement or a comin! into bein! o# leasure. .or these cannot be ascribed to all thin!s, but only to those that are divisible and not $holes" there is no comin! into bein! o# seein! nor o# a oint nor o# a unit, nor is any o# these a movement or comin! into bein!" there#ore there is no movement or comin! into bein! o# leasure either" #or it is a $hole. ,ince every sense is active in relation to its ob'ect, and a sense $hich is in !ood condition acts er#ectly in relation to the most beauti#ul o# its ob'ects )#or er#ect activity seems to be ideally o# this nature" $hether $e say that it is active, or the or!an in $hich it resides, may be assumed to be immaterial*, it #ollo$s that in the case o# each sense the best activity is that o# the best& conditioned or!an in relation to the #inest o# its ob'ects. And this activity $ill be the most com lete and leasant. .or, $hile there is leasure in res ect o# any sense, and in res ect o# thou!ht and contem lation no less, the most com lete is leasantest, and that o# a $ell& conditioned or!an in relation to the $orthiest o# its ob'ects is the most com lete" and the leasure com letes the activity. But the leasure does not com lete it in the same $ay as the combination o# ob'ect and sense, both !ood, 'ust as health and the doctor are not in the same $ay the cause o# a man9s bein! healthy. )/hat leasure is roduced in res ect to each sense is lain" #or $e s eak o# si!hts and sounds as leasant. It is also lain that it arises most o# all $hen both the sense is at its best and it is active in re#erence to an ob'ect $hich corres onds" $hen both ob'ect and erceiver are o# the best there $ill al$ays be leasure, since the requisite a!ent and atient are both resent.* 7leasure com letes the activity not as the corres ondin! ermanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end $hich su ervenes as the bloom o# youth does on those in the #lo$er o# their a!e. ,o lon!, then, as both the intelli!ible or sensible ob'ect and the discriminatin! or contem lative #aculty are as they should be, the leasure $ill be involved in the activity" #or $hen both the assive and the active #actor are unchan!ed and are related to each other in the same $ay, the same result naturally #ollo$s. 3o$, then, is it that no one is continuously leased+ Is it that $e !ro$ $eary+ ?ertainly all human bein!s are inca able o# continuous activity. /here#ore leasure also is not continuous" #or it accom anies activity. ,ome thin!s deli!ht us $hen they are ne$, but later do so less, #or the same reason" #or at #irst the mind is in a state o# stimulation and intensely active about them, as eo le are $ith res ect to their vision $hen they look hard at a thin!, but a#ter$ards our activity is not o# this kind, but has !ro$n rela2ed" #or $hich reason the leasure also is dulled.

1DA

1ne mi!ht think that all men desire leasure because they all aim at li#e" li#e is an activity, and each man is active about those thin!s and $ith those #aculties that he loves most" e.!. the musician is active $ith his hearin! in re#erence to tunes, the student $ith his mind in re#erence to theoretical questions, and so on in each case" no$ leasure com letes the activities, and there#ore li#e, $hich they desire. It is $ith !ood reason, then, that they aim at leasure too, since #or every one it com letes li#e, $hich is desirable. But $hether $e choose li#e #or the sake o# leasure or leasure #or the sake o# li#e is a question $e may dismiss #or the resent. .or they seem to be bound u to!ether and not to admit o# se aration, since $ithout activity leasure does not arise, and every activity is com leted by the attendant leasure. < .or this reason leasures seem, too, to di##er in kind. .or thin!s di##erent in kind are, $e think, com leted by di##erent thin!s )$e see this to be true both o# natural ob'ects and o# thin!s roduced by art, e.!. animals, trees, a aintin!, a scul ture, a house, an im lement*" and, similarly, $e think that activities di##erin! in kind are com leted by thin!s di##erin! in kind. No$ the activities o# thou!ht di##er #rom those o# the senses, and both di##er amon! themselves, in kind" so, there#ore, do the leasures that com lete them. /his may be seen, too, #rom the #act that each o# the leasures is bound u $ith the activity it com letes. .or an activity is intensi#ied by its ro er leasure, since each class o# thin!s is better 'ud!ed o# and brou!ht to recision by those $ho en!a!e in the activity $ith leasure" e.!. it is those $ho en'oy !eometrical thinkin! that become !eometers and !ras the various ro ositions better, and, similarly, those $ho are #ond o# music or o# buildin!, and so on, make ro!ress in their ro er #unction by en'oyin! it" so the leasures intensi#y the activities, and $hat intensi#ies a thin! is ro er to it, but thin!s di##erent in kind have ro erties di##erent in kind. /his $ill be even more a arent #rom the #act that activities are hindered by leasures arisin! #rom other sources. .or eo le $ho are #ond o# layin! the #lute are inca able o# attendin! to ar!uments i# they overhear some one layin! the #lute, since they en'oy #lute& layin! more than the activity in hand" so the leasure connected $ith #lute layin! destroys the activity concerned $ith ar!ument. /his ha ens, similarly, in all other cases, $hen one is active about t$o thin!s at once" the more leasant activity drives out the other, and i# it is much more leasant does so all the more, so that one even ceases #rom the other. /his is $hy $hen $e en'oy anythin! very much $e do not thro$ ourselves into anythin! else, and do one thin! only $hen $e are not much leased by another" e.!. in the theatre the eo le $ho eat s$eets do so most $hen the actors are oor. No$ since activities are made recise and more endurin! and better by their ro er leasure, and in'ured by alien leasures, evidently the t$o kinds o# leasure are #ar a art. .or alien leasures do retty much $hat ro er ains do, since activities are destroyed by their ro er ains" e.!. i# a man #inds $ritin! or doin! sums un leasant and ain#ul, he does not $rite, or does not do sums, because the activity is ain#ul. ,o an activity su##ers contrary e##ects #rom its ro er leasures and ains, i.e. #rom those that su ervene on it in virtue o# its o$n nature. And alien leasures have been stated to do much the same as ain" they destroy the activity, only not to the same de!ree. No$ since activities di##er in res ect o# !oodness and badness, and some are $orthy to be chosen, others to be avoided, and others neutral, so, too, are the leasures" #or to each activity there is a ro er leasure. /he leasure ro er to a $orthy activity is !ood and that ro er to an un$orthy activity bad" 'ust as the a etites #or noble ob'ects are laudable, those #or base ob'ects cul able. But the leasures involved in activities are more ro er to them than the desires" #or the latter are 1DC

se arated both in time and in nature, $hile the #ormer are close to the activities, and so hard to distin!uish #rom them that it admits o# dis ute $hether the activity is not the same as the leasure. ),till, leasure does not seem to be thou!ht or erce tion % that $ould be stran!e" but because they are not #ound a art they a ear to some eo le the same.* As activities are di##erent, then, so are the corres ondin! leasures. No$ si!ht is su erior to touch in urity, and hearin! and smell to taste" the leasures, there#ore, are similarly su erior, and those o# thou!ht su erior to these, and $ithin each o# the t$o kinds some are su erior to others. Each animal is thou!ht to have a ro er leasure, as it has a ro er #unction" vi-. that $hich corres onds to its activity. I# $e survey them s ecies by s ecies, too, this $ill be evident" horse, do!, and man have di##erent leasures, as 3eraclitus says 8asses $ould re#er s$ee in!s to !old9" #or #ood is leasanter than !old to asses. ,o the leasures o# creatures di##erent in kind di##er in kind, and it is lausible to su ose that those o# a sin!le s ecies do not di##er. But they vary to no small e2tent, in the case o# men at least" the same thin!s deli!ht some eo le and ain others, and are ain#ul and odious to some, and leasant to and liked by others. /his ha ens, too, in the case o# s$eet thin!s" the same thin!s do not seem s$eet to a man in a #ever and a healthy man % nor hot to a $eak man and one in !ood condition. /he same ha ens in other cases. But in all such matters that $hich a ears to the !ood man is thou!ht to be really so. I# this is correct, as it seems to be, and virtue and the !ood man as such are the measure o# each thin!, those also $ill be leasures $hich a ear so to him, and those thin!s leasant $hich he en'oys. I# the thin!s he #inds tiresome seem leasant to some one, that is nothin! sur risin!" #or men may be ruined and s oilt in many $ays" but the thin!s are not leasant, but only leasant to these eo le and to eo le in this condition. /hose $hich are admittedly dis!race#ul lainly should not be said to be leasures, e2ce t to a erverted taste" but o# those that are thou!ht to be !ood $hat kind o# leasure or $hat leasure should be said to be that ro er to man+ Is it not lain #rom the corres ondin! activities+ /he leasures #ollo$ these. Whether, then, the er#ect and su remely ha y man has one or more activities, the leasures that er#ect these $ill be said in the strict sense to be leasures ro er to man, and the rest $ill be so in a secondary and #ractional $ay, as are the activities. = No$ that $e have s oken o# the virtues, the #orms o# #riendshi , and the varieties o# leasure, $hat remains is to discuss in outline the nature o# ha iness, since this is $hat $e state the end o# human nature to be. 1ur discussion $ill be the more concise i# $e #irst sum u $hat $e have said already. We said, then, that it is not a dis osition" #or i# it $ere it mi!ht belon! to some one $ho $as aslee throu!hout his li#e, livin! the li#e o# a lant, or, a!ain, to some one $ho $as su##erin! the !reatest mis#ortunes. I# these im lications are unacce table, and $e must rather class ha iness as an activity, as $e have said be#ore, and i# some activities are necessary, and desirable #or the sake o# somethin! else, $hile others are so in themselves, evidently ha iness must be laced amon! those desirable in themselves, not amon! those desirable #or the sake o# somethin! else" #or ha iness does not lack anythin!, but is sel#&su##icient. No$ those activities are desirable in themselves #rom $hich nothin! is sou!ht beyond the activity. And o# this nature virtuous actions are thou!ht to be" #or to do noble and !ood deeds is a thin! desirable #or its o$n sake. 7leasant amusements also are thou!ht to be o# this nature" $e choose them not #or the sake o# other thin!s" #or $e are in'ured rather than bene#ited by them, since $e are led to ne!lect our bodies and our ro erty. But most o# the eo le $ho are deemed ha y take re#u!e in such 11D

astimes, $hich is the reason $hy those $ho are ready&$itted at them are hi!hly esteemed at the courts o# tyrants" they make themselves leasant com anions in the tyrants9 #avourite ursuits, and that is the sort o# man they $ant. No$ these thin!s are thou!ht to be o# the nature o# ha iness because eo le in des otic ositions s end their leisure in them, but erha s such eo le rove nothin!" #or virtue and reason, #rom $hich !ood activities #lo$, do not de end on des otic osition" nor, i# these eo le, $ho have never tasted ure and !enerous leasure, take re#u!e in the bodily leasures, should these #or that reason be thou!ht more desirable" #or boys, too, think the thin!s that are valued amon! themselves are the best. It is to be e2 ected, then, that, as di##erent thin!s seem valuable to boys and to men, so they should to bad men and to !ood. No$, as $e have o#ten maintained, those thin!s are both valuable and leasant $hich are such to the !ood man" and to each man the activity in accordance $ith his o$n dis osition is most desirable, and, there#ore, to the !ood man that $hich is in accordance $ith virtue. 3a iness, there#ore, does not lie in amusement" it $ould, indeed, be stran!e i# the end $ere amusement, and one $ere to take trouble and su##er hardshi all one9s li#e in order to amuse onesel#. .or, in a $ord, everythin! that $e choose $e choose #or the sake o# somethin! else % e2ce t ha iness, $hich is an end. No$ to e2ert onesel# and $ork #or the sake o# amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse onesel# in order that one may e2ert onesel#, as Anacharsis uts it, seems ri!ht" #or amusement is a sort o# rela2ation, and $e need rela2ation because $e cannot $ork continuously. Rela2ation, then, is not an end" #or it is taken #or the sake o# activity. /he ha y li#e is thou!ht to be virtuous" no$ a virtuous li#e requires e2ertion, and does not consist in amusement. And $e say that serious thin!s are better than lau!hable thin!s and those connected $ith amusement, and that the activity o# the better o# any t$o thin!s % $hether it be t$o elements o# our bein! or t$o men % is the more serious" but the activity o# the better is i so #acto su erior and more o# the nature o# ha iness. And any chance erson % even a slave % can en'oy the bodily leasures no less than the best man" but no one assi!ns to a slave a share in ha iness % unless he assi!ns to him also a share in human li#e. .or ha iness does not lie in such occu ations, but, as $e have said be#ore, in virtuous activities. @ I# ha iness is activity in accordance $ith virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance $ith the hi!hest virtue" and this $ill be that o# the best thin! in us. Whether it be reason or somethin! else that is this element $hich is thou!ht to be our natural ruler and !uide and to take thou!ht o# thin!s noble and divine, $hether it be itsel# also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity o# this in accordance $ith its ro er virtue $ill be er#ect ha iness. /hat this activity is contem lative $e have already said. No$ this $ould seem to be in a!reement both $ith $hat $e said be#ore and $ith the truth. .or, #irstly, this activity is the best )since not only is reason the best thin! in us, but the ob'ects o# reason are the best o# kno$able ob'ects*" and secondly, it is the most continuous, since $e can contem late truth more continuously than $e can do anythin!. And $e think ha iness has leasure min!led $ith it, but the activity o# hiloso hic $isdom is admittedly the leasantest o# virtuous activities" at all events the ursuit o# it is thou!ht to o##er leasures marvellous #or their urity and their endurin!ness, and it is to be e2 ected that those $ho kno$ $ill ass their time more leasantly than those $ho inquire. And the sel#&su##iciency that is s oken o# must belon! most to the contem lative activity. .or $hile a hiloso her, as $ell as a 'ust man or one ossessin! any other virtue, needs the necessaries o# li#e, $hen they are su##iciently equi ed $ith thin!s o# that sort the 'ust man needs eo le to$ards $hom and $ith $hom he shall act 111

'ustly, and the tem erate man, the brave man, and each o# the others is in the same case, but the hiloso her, even $hen by himsel#, can contem late truth, and the better the $iser he is" he can erha s do so better i# he has #ello$&$orkers, but still he is the most sel#&su##icient. And this activity alone $ould seem to be loved #or its o$n sake" #or nothin! arises #rom it a art #rom the contem latin!, $hile #rom ractical activities $e !ain more or less a art #rom the action. And ha iness is thou!ht to de end on leisure" #or $e are busy that $e may have leisure, and make $ar that $e may live in eace. No$ the activity o# the ractical virtues is e2hibited in olitical or military a##airs, but the actions concerned $ith these seem to be unleisurely. Warlike actions are com letely so )#or no one chooses to be at $ar, or rovokes $ar, #or the sake o# bein! at $ar" any one $ould seem absolutely murderous i# he $ere to make enemies o# his #riends in order to brin! about battle and slau!hter*" but the action o# the statesman is also unleisurely, and % a art #rom the olitical action itsel# % aims at des otic o$er and honours, or at all events ha iness, #or him and his #ello$ citi-ens % a ha iness di##erent #rom olitical action, and evidently sou!ht as bein! di##erent. ,o i# amon! virtuous actions olitical and military actions are distin!uished by nobility and !reatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable #or their o$n sake, but the activity o# reason, $hich is contem lative, seems both to be su erior in serious $orth and to aim at no end beyond itsel#, and to have its leasure ro er to itsel# )and this au!ments the activity*, and the sel#&su##iciency, leisureliness, un$eariedness )so #ar as this is ossible #or man*, and all the other attributes ascribed to the su remely ha y man are evidently those connected $ith this activity, it #ollo$s that this $ill be the com lete ha iness o# man, i# it be allo$ed a com lete term o# li#e )#or none o# the attributes o# ha iness is incom lete*. But such a li#e $ould be too hi!h #or man" #or it is not in so #ar as he is man that he $ill live so, but in so #ar as somethin! divine is resent in him" and by so much as this is su erior to our com osite nature is its activity su erior to that $hich is the e2ercise o# the other kind o# virtue. I# reason is divine, then, in com arison $ith man, the li#e accordin! to it is divine in com arison $ith human li#e. But $e must not #ollo$ those $ho advise us, bein! men, to think o# human thin!s, and, bein! mortal, o# mortal thin!s, but must, so #ar as $e can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance $ith the best thin! in us" #or even i# it be small in bulk, much more does it in o$er and $orth sur ass everythin!. /his $ould seem, too, to be each man himsel#, since it is the authoritative and better art o# him. It $ould be stran!e, then, i# he $ere to choose not the li#e o# his sel# but that o# somethin! else. And $hat $e said be#ore9 $ill a ly no$" that $hich is ro er to each thin! is by nature best and most leasant #or each thin!" #or man, there#ore, the li#e accordin! to reason is best and leasantest, since reason more than anythin! else is man. /his li#e there#ore is also the ha iest. A But in a secondary de!ree the li#e in accordance $ith the other kind o# virtue is ha y" #or the activities in accordance $ith this be#it our human estate. Fust and brave acts, and other virtuous acts, $e do in relation to each other, observin! our res ective duties $ith re!ard to contracts and services and all manner o# actions and $ith re!ard to assions" and all o# these seem to be ty ically human. ,ome o# them seem even to arise #rom the body, and virtue o# character to be in many $ays bound u $ith the assions. 7ractical $isdom, too, is linked to virtue o# character, and this to ractical $isdom, since the rinci les o# ractical $isdom are in accordance $ith the moral virtues and ri!htness in morals is in accordance $ith ractical $isdom. Bein! connected $ith the assions also, the moral virtues must belon! to our com osite nature" and the virtues o# our com osite nature are human" so, there#ore, are the li#e and the ha iness $hich corres ond to 11(

these. /he e2cellence o# the reason is a thin! a art" $e must be content to say this much about it, #or to describe it recisely is a task !reater than our ur ose requires. It $ould seem, ho$ever, also to need e2ternal equi ment but little, or less than moral virtue does. ;rant that both need the necessaries, and do so equally, even i# the statesman9s $ork is the more concerned $ith the body and thin!s o# that sort" #or there $ill be little di##erence there" but in $hat they need #or the e2ercise o# their activities there $ill be much di##erence. /he liberal man $ill need money #or the doin! o# his liberal deeds, and the 'ust man too $ill need it #or the returnin! o# services )#or $ishes are hard to discern, and even eo le $ho are not 'ust retend to $ish to act 'ustly*" and the brave man $ill need o$er i# he is to accom lish any o# the acts that corres ond to his virtue, and the tem erate man $ill need o ortunity" #or ho$ else is either he or any o# the others to be reco!ni-ed+ It is debated, too, $hether the $ill or the deed is more essential to virtue, $hich is assumed to involve both" it is surely clear that its er#ection involves both" but #or deeds many thin!s are needed, and more, the !reater and nobler the deeds are. But the man $ho is contem latin! the truth needs no such thin!, at least $ith a vie$ to the e2ercise o# his activity" indeed they are, one may say, even hindrances, at all events to his contem lation" but in so #ar as he is a man and lives $ith a number o# eo le, he chooses to do virtuous acts" he $ill there#ore need such aids to livin! a human li#e. But that er#ect ha iness is a contem lative activity $ill a ear #rom the #ollo$in! consideration as $ell. We assume the !ods to be above all other bein!s blessed and ha y" but $hat sort o# actions must $e assi!n to them+ Acts o# 'ustice+ Will not the !ods seem absurd i# they make contracts and return de osits, and so on+ Acts o# a brave man, then, con#rontin! dan!ers and runnin! risks because it is noble to do so+ 1r liberal acts+ /o $hom $ill they !ive+ It $ill be stran!e i# they are really to have money or anythin! o# the kind. And $hat $ould their tem erate acts be+ Is not such raise tasteless, since they have no bad a etites+ I# $e $ere to run throu!h them all, the circumstances o# action $ould be #ound trivial and un$orthy o# !ods. ,till, every one su oses that they live and there#ore that they are active" $e cannot su ose them to slee like Endymion. No$ i# you take a$ay #rom a livin! bein! action, and still more roduction, $hat is le#t but contem lation+ /here#ore the activity o# ;od, $hich sur asses all others in blessedness, must be contem lative" and o# human activities, there#ore, that $hich is most akin to this must be most o# the nature o# ha iness. /his is indicated, too, by the #act that the other animals have no share in ha iness, bein! com letely de rived o# such activity. .or $hile the $hole li#e o# the !ods is blessed, and that o# men too in so #ar as some likeness o# such activity belon!s to them, none o# the other animals is ha y, since they in no $ay share in contem lation. 3a iness e2tends, then, 'ust so #ar as contem lation does, and those to $hom contem lation more #ully belon!s are more truly ha y, not as a mere concomitant but in virtue o# the contem lation" #or this is in itsel# recious. 3a iness, there#ore, must be some #orm o# contem lation. But, bein! a man, one $ill also need e2ternal ros erity" #or our nature is not sel#&su##icient #or the ur ose o# contem lation, but our body also must be healthy and must have #ood and other attention. ,till, $e must not think that the man $ho is to be ha y $ill need many thin!s or !reat thin!s, merely because he cannot be su remely ha y $ithout e2ternal !oods" #or sel#&su##iciency and action do not involve e2cess, and $e can do noble acts $ithout rulin! earth and sea" #or even $ith moderate advanta!es one can act virtuously )this is mani#est enou!h" #or rivate ersons are thou!ht to do $orthy acts no less than des ots % indeed even more*" and it is enou!h that $e should have so much as that" #or the li#e o# the man $ho is active in accordance $ith virtue $ill be ha y. ,olon, too, $as erha s sketchin! $ell the ha y man $hen he described him as moderately #urnished $ith e2ternals but as havin! done )as ,olon thou!ht* the noblest acts, and 110

lived tem erately" #or one can $ith but moderate ossessions do $hat one ou!ht. Ana2a!oras also seems to have su osed the ha y man not to be rich nor a des ot, $hen he said that he $ould not be sur rised i# the ha y man $ere to seem to most eo le a stran!e erson" #or they 'ud!e by e2ternals, since these are all they erceive. /he o inions o# the $ise seem, then, to harmoni-e $ith our ar!uments. But $hile even such thin!s carry some conviction, the truth in ractical matters is discerned #rom the #acts o# li#e" #or these are the decisive #actor. We must there#ore survey $hat $e have already said, brin!in! it to the test o# the #acts o# li#e, and i# it harmoni-es $ith the #acts $e must acce t it, but i# it clashes $ith them $e must su ose it to be mere theory. No$ he $ho e2ercises his reason and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state o# mind and most dear to the !ods. .or i# the !ods have any care #or human a##airs, as they are thou!ht to have, it $ould be reasonable both that they should deli!ht in that $hich $as best and most akin to them )i.e. reason* and that they should re$ard those $ho love and honour this most, as carin! #or the thin!s that are dear to them and actin! both ri!htly and nobly. And that all these attributes belon! most o# all to the hiloso her is mani#est. 3e, there#ore, is the dearest to the !ods. And he $ho is that $ill resumably be also the ha iest" so that in this $ay too the hiloso her $ill more than any other be ha y. C I# these matters and the virtues, and also #riendshi and leasure, have been dealt $ith su##iciently in outline, are $e to su ose that our ro!ramme has reached its end+ ,urely, as the sayin! !oes, $here there are thin!s to be done the end is not to survey and reco!ni-e the various thin!s, but rather to do them" $ith re!ard to virtue, then, it is not enou!h to kno$, but $e must try to have and use it, or try any other $ay there may be o# becomin! !ood. No$ i# ar!uments $ere in themselves enou!h to make men !ood, they $ould 'ustly, as /heo!nis says, have $on very !reat re$ards, and such re$ards should have been rovided" but as thin!s are, $hile they seem to have o$er to encoura!e and stimulate the !enerous&minded amon! our youth, and to make a character $hich is !ently born, and a true lover o# $hat is noble, ready to be ossessed by virtue, they are not able to encoura!e the many to nobility and !oodness. .or these do not by nature obey the sense o# shame, but only #ear, and do not abstain #rom bad acts because o# their baseness but throu!h #ear o# unishment" livin! by assion they ursue their o$n leasures and the means to them, and and the o osite ains, and have not even a conce tion o# $hat is noble and truly leasant, since they have never tasted it. What ar!ument $ould remould such eo le+ It is hard, i# not im ossible, to remove by ar!ument the traits that have lon! since been incor orated in the character" and erha s $e must be content i#, $hen all the in#luences by $hich $e are thou!ht to become !ood are resent, $e !et some tincture o# virtue. No$ some think that $e are made !ood by nature, others by habituation, others by teachin!. Nature9s art evidently does not de end on us, but as a result o# some divine causes is resent in those $ho are truly #ortunate" $hile ar!ument and teachin!, $e may sus ect, are not o$er#ul $ith all men, but the soul o# the student must #irst have been cultivated by means o# habits #or noble 'oy and noble hatred, like earth $hich is to nourish the seed. .or he $ho lives as assion directs $ill not hear ar!ument that dissuades him, nor understand it i# he does" and ho$ can $e ersuade one in such a state to chan!e his $ays+ And in !eneral assion seems to yield not to ar!ument but to #orce. /he character, then, must someho$ be there already $ith a kinshi to virtue, lovin! $hat is noble and hatin! $hat is base. But it is di##icult to !et #rom youth u a ri!ht trainin! #or virtue i# one has not been brou!ht u under ri!ht la$s" #or to live tem erately and hardily is not leasant to most eo le, es ecially 114

$hen they are youn!. .or this reason their nurture and occu ations should be #i2ed by la$" #or they $ill not be ain#ul $hen they have become customary. But it is surely not enou!h that $hen they are youn! they should !et the ri!ht nurture and attention" since they must, even $hen they are !ro$n u , ractise and be habituated to them, $e shall need la$s #or this as $ell, and !enerally s eakin! to cover the $hole o# li#e" #or most eo le obey necessity rather than ar!ument, and unishments rather than the sense o# $hat is noble. /his is $hy some think that le!islators ou!ht to stimulate men to virtue and ur!e them #or$ard by the motive o# the noble, on the assum tion that those $ho have been $ell advanced by the #ormation o# habits $ill attend to such in#luences" and that unishments and enalties should be im osed on those $ho disobey and are o# in#erior nature, $hile the incurably bad should be com letely banished. A !ood man )they think*, since he lives $ith his mind #i2ed on $hat is noble, $ill submit to ar!ument, $hile a bad man, $hose desire is #or leasure, is corrected by ain like a beast o# burden. /his is, too, $hy they say the ains in#licted should be those that are most o osed to the leasures such men love. 3o$ever that may be, i# )as $e have said* the man $ho is to be !ood must be $ell trained and habituated, and !o on to s end his time in $orthy occu ations and neither $illin!ly nor un$illin!ly do bad actions, and i# this can be brou!ht about i# men live in accordance $ith a sort o# reason and ri!ht order, rovided this has #orce, % i# this be so, the aternal command indeed has not the required #orce or com ulsive o$er )nor in !eneral has the command o# one man, unless he be a kin! or somethin! similar*, but the la$ has com ulsive o$er, $hile it is at the same time a rule roceedin! #rom a sort o# ractical $isdom and reason. And $hile eo le hate men $ho o ose their im ulses, even i# they o ose them ri!htly, the la$ in its ordainin! o# $hat is !ood is not burdensome. In the , artan state alone, or almost alone, the le!islator seems to have aid attention to questions o# nurture and occu ations" in most states such matters have been ne!lected, and each man lives as he leases, ?yclo s&#ashion, 8to his o$n $i#e and children dealin! la$9. No$ it is best that there should be a ublic and ro er care #or such matters" but i# they are ne!lected by the community it $ould seem ri!ht #or each man to hel his children and #riends to$ards virtue, and that they should have the o$er, or at least the $ill, to do this. It $ould seem #rom $hat has been said that he can do this better i# he makes himsel# ca able o# le!islatin!. .or ublic control is lainly e##ected by la$s, and !ood control by !ood la$s" $hether $ritten or un$ritten $ould seem to make no di##erence, nor $hether they are la$s rovidin! #or the education o# individuals or o# !rou s % any more than it does in the case o# music or !ymnastics and other such ursuits. .or as in cities la$s and revailin! ty es o# character have #orce, so in households do the in'unctions and the habits o# the #ather, and these have even more because o# the tie o# blood and the bene#its he con#ers" #or the children start $ith a natural a##ection and dis osition to obey. .urther, rivate education has an advanta!e over ublic, as rivate medical treatment has" #or $hile in !eneral rest and abstinence #rom #ood are !ood #or a man in a #ever, #or a articular man they may not be" and a bo2er resumably does not rescribe the same style o# #i!htin! to all his u ils. It $ould seem, then, that the detail is $orked out $ith more recision i# the control is rivate" #or each erson is more likely to !et $hat suits his case. But the details can be best looked a#ter, one by one, by a doctor or !ymnastic instructor or any one else $ho has the !eneral kno$led!e o# $hat is !ood #or every one or #or eo le o# a certain kind )#or the sciences both are said to be, and are, concerned $ith $hat is universal*" not but $hat some articular detail may erha s be $ell looked a#ter by an unscienti#ic erson, i# he has studied accurately in the li!ht o# e2 erience $hat ha ens in each case, 'ust as some eo le seem 11<

to be their o$n best doctors, thou!h they could !ive no hel to any one else. None the less, it $ill erha s be a!reed that i# a man does $ish to become master o# an art or science he must !o to the universal, and come to kno$ it as $ell as ossible" #or, as $e have said, it is $ith this that the sciences are concerned. And surely he $ho $ants to make men, $hether many or #e$, better by his care must try to become ca able o# le!islatin!, i# it is throu!h la$s that $e can become !ood. .or to !et any one $hatever % any one $ho is ut be#ore us % into the ri!ht condition is not #or the #irst chance comer" i# any one can do it, it is the man $ho kno$s, 'ust as in medicine and all other matters $hich !ive sco e #or care and rudence. Bust $e not, then, ne2t e2amine $hence or ho$ one can learn ho$ to le!islate+ Is it, as in all other cases, #rom statesmen+ ?ertainly it $as thou!ht to be a art o# statesmanshi . 1r is a di##erence a arent bet$een statesmanshi and the other sciences and arts+ In the others the same eo le are #ound o##erin! to teach the arts and ractisin! them, e.!. doctors or ainters" but $hile the so hists ro#ess to teach olitics, it is ractised not by any o# them but by the oliticians, $ho $ould seem to do so by dint o# a certain skill and e2 erience rather than o# thou!ht" #or they are not #ound either $ritin! or s eakin! about such matters )thou!h it $ere a nobler occu ation erha s than com osin! s eeches #or the la$&courts and the assembly*, nor a!ain are they #ound to have made statesmen o# their o$n sons or any other o# their #riends. But it $as to be e2 ected that they should i# they could" #or there is nothin! better than such a skill that they could have le#t to their cities, or could re#er to have #or themselves, or, there#ore, #or those dearest to them. ,till, e2 erience seems to contribute not a little" else they could not have become oliticians by #amiliarity $ith olitics" and so it seems that those $ho aim at kno$in! about the art o# olitics need e2 erience as $ell. But those o# the so hists $ho ro#ess the art seem to be very #ar #rom teachin! it. .or, to ut the matter !enerally, they do not even kno$ $hat kind o# thin! it is nor $hat kinds o# thin!s it is about" other$ise they $ould not have classed it as identical $ith rhetoric or even in#erior to it, nor have thou!ht it easy to le!islate by collectin! the la$s that are thou!ht $ell o#" they say it is ossible to select the best la$s, as thou!h even the selection did not demand intelli!ence and as thou!h ri!ht 'ud!ement $ere not the !reatest thin!, as in matters o# music. .or $hile eo le e2 erienced in any de artment 'ud!e ri!htly the $orks roduced in it, and understand by $hat means or ho$ they are achieved, and $hat harmoni-es $ith $hat, the ine2 erienced must be content i# they do not #ail to see $hether the $ork has been $ell or ill made % as in the case o# aintin!. No$ la$s are as it $ere the9 $orks9 o# the olitical art" ho$ then can one learn #rom them to be a le!islator, or 'ud!e $hich are best+ Even medical men do not seem to be made by a study o# te2t&books. >et eo le try, at any rate, to state not only the treatments, but also ho$ articular classes o# eo le can be cured and should be treated % distin!uishin! the various habits o# body" but $hile this seems use#ul to e2 erienced eo le, to the ine2 erienced it is valueless. ,urely, then, $hile collections o# la$s, and o# constitutions also, may be serviceable to those $ho can study them and 'ud!e $hat is !ood or bad and $hat enactments suit $hat circumstances, those $ho !o throu!h such collections $ithout a ractised #aculty $ill not have ri!ht 'ud!ement )unless it be as a s ontaneous !i#t o# nature*, thou!h they may erha s become more intelli!ent in such matters. No$ our redecessors have le#t the sub'ect o# le!islation to us une2amined" it is erha s best, there#ore, that $e should ourselves study it, and in !eneral study the question o# the constitution, in order to com lete to the best o# our ability our hiloso hy o# human nature. .irst, then, i# anythin! has been said $ell in detail by earlier thinkers, let us try to revie$ it" then in the li!ht o# the constitutions $e have collected let us study $hat sorts o# in#luence reserve and destroy 11=

states, and $hat sorts reserve or destroy the articular kinds o# constitution, and to $hat causes it is due that some are $ell and others ill administered. When these have been studied $e shall erha s be more likely to see $ith a com rehensive vie$, $hich constitution is best, and ho$ each must be ordered, and $hat la$s and customs it must use, i# it is to be at its best. 5et us make a be!innin! o# our discussion.

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