What Is Egalitarianism

What Is Egalitarianism? Author(s): Samuel Scheffler Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, No.
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SAMUEL SCHEFFLER
Whatis Egalitarianism?
One of the most significant theoriesof distributive justice to have since the of A ustice ofdisis the form emerged publication of Theory has tributive that Elizabeth Anderson "luck dubbed egalitarianism egaliThis theory tarianism."' has different but the centralidea is variants, commonto all ofthesevariants. The coreidea is thatinequalities in the if that are from derive the acceptable they advantages people enjoy choicesthatpeople have voluntarily but that derivmade, inequalities unchosenfeatures of people's circumstances are unjust.Uning from chosen circumstances are takento includesocial factors likethe class ofthefamily and wealth intowhichone isborn.Theyarealso deemedto includenatural factors likeone'snative abilities and intelligence. with Luckegalitarianism but also from the prevailoverlaps diverges in mostliberalsocieties, bothwithrespectto the morality ing political of from unacceptability inequalitiesderiving people's circumstances to theacceptability and withrespect ofinequalities from their deriving choices.Consider first theunacceptability ofinequalities from deriving The prevailing holds thatinpoliticalmorality people'scircumstances. tentional discrimination based on largely unchosenfactors suchas race,
Anearlier version ofthisarticle was presented as the2002SirMalcolmKnoxMemorial at theUniversity werealso presented Lecture ofSt.Andrews. to thePhilosophy Versions at theUniversity ofPennsylvania; to theColloquium in Legaland SocialPhiDepartment at University Address to the 2002 Berkeleylosophy CollegeLondon;and as a Keynote I am grateful Stanford GraduateStudent Conference. forthe helpful comPhilosophy from and suggestions thatI received David ments, questions, manypeople, including Elizabeth SarahBroadie, SamuelFreeman, Archard, Ashford, Kutz, Christopher VWronique MichaelOtsuka,StephenPerry, Eric Rakowski, Thomas Ricketts, Debra Munoz-Dard6, and Jonathan Wallace,Andrew Satz,John Williams, Skorupski, Gopal Sreenivasan, Jay I am particularly indebted to G.A. Cohenfor detailed to Ronald written Wolff. comments; Dworkin for extensive readers for andtothree who & Public discussion; Affairs, Philosophy made many valuablesuggestions for I thank SarahGoldberg for extremely improvement. research assistance.
1. Elizabeth Anderson,"Whatis the Point ofEquality?"Ethicslog (1999): 287-337. Press. Philosophy& Public Affairs 31,no.1 @ 2003 by PrincetonUniversity
& Public Affairs Philosophy
is unjust,and thatdistributive sex,and ethnicity inequalities religion, from such are unjustas well.It also holdsthat discrimination resulting from different socialclassesshouldhaveequal acpeopleofequal talent for whichtheir talents and that cess to thesocialpositions them, qualify resultfrom a society's failure to provide this it is unjustifinequalities luck the with kindofequal opportunity. Thus, prevailing morality agrees from in rejecting certainkindsof inequalities deriving egalitarianism in rejecting all unchosenfeatures ofpeople'scircumstances. However, of from luck circumstances, inequalities advantageresulting differing which, political goes farbeyondtheprevailing morality, egalitarianism of nondiscrimination and equal opportunity, is againsta background from distributive inequalities deriving preparedto toleratesignificant differences oftalentand ability. luckegalitarianism denies Bycontrast, or thata person's natural innovative talent, skill, intelligence, creativity, can be thebasis for entrepreneurial inequalities. ability legitimate nextthe acceptability ofinequalities Consider from deriving people's choices.If some people make more moneythan othersbecause they thentheprevailing choosetowork hours, longer morality certainly agrees that with luckegalitarianism that is notinitself Unlike luck objectionable. theprevailing does not go so however, political egalitarianism, morality far incomederiving from as to saythatanyextra people'schoicesshould, In determining be exempt from in principle, redistributive taxation. one's theprevailing makesno attempt toidentify, taxburden, letalone morality the portionof one's incomethatis traceable to shieldfrom taxation, toone'schoicesas opposedtoone'snatural abilities. specifically The upshotis thatalthough thereare substantial areasofoverlap beand the prevailing luck tweenluck egalitarianism politicalmorality, is in one way much morewillingthan the prevailing egalitarianism to engagein redistributive but also in one waymuch taxation, morality In thissense at least,luckegalitarianism is bothmoreand less willing. less egalitarian thantheprevailing political morality.2
thesetwofactors 2. I do notmeanto imply that canceleach outso that there is no net in theredistributive ofthetwopositions. Luckegalitarians difference differ implications in partbecause they about thehowmuchredistribution is justified, amongthemselves abouttheextent actualinequalities ofdifferences in peoto which are theresult disagree in their as opposed to differences choices.The "prevailing political ple's circumstances ofpositions oflegitimate also encompasses a range on theextent redistribution, morality" oftheprevailing for as I havesaid,adherents haveno principled although, morality objec-
WhatisEgalitarianism?
which became the focus of intensecritical UnlikeRawls'stheory, A as soon as luckegalitariTheory appearedin print, scrutiny ofJustice anismhas been relatively slow to attract critical attention, despitethe levelofinfluence it has attainedand thelively debatesthat impressive have takenplace amongproponents ofitsdifferent variants. This state and in this articleI wish to of affairs has begun to change,however, to theprojectofcritical examination that makea modestcontribution and others have initiated.3 I am indebtedto Anderson's Anderson dismorespecificussionin manyways,some ofwhichI willacknowledge from hers, emphaseswillbe different callyas I proceed.Butmyprimary as to be of and I hope thatmymainpointsare sufficiently independent in their ownright. interest Luckegalitarianism is often as an extension and generalizapresented tionofsome Rawlsian whose substantive Rawls implications arguments to appreciate. is often himself failedfully said Thus,luckegalitarianism thanRawls'sown conceptionofjusticeto by its advocatesto be truer In partbecause ofitsputative some ofhis fundamental Rawlsinsights. ian pedigree, luck have done less perhaps, egalitarianism's supporters thanone might defenseoftheposiexpectto providean independent I arguethatluck tionat thefundamental level.In thisarticle, however, In I present can draw little from Rawls. addition, support egalitarianism whether itis either a plausiblepositionin itsown reasonsfordoubting ora compelling ofegalitarianism. interpretation right In SectionI, I willsummarize is organized as follows. a faMyarticle ofpoliticalphilosophy-a version miliarversionofthe recenthistory in Rawls'sthought thatlocates the originsof luck egalitarianism but
from tionto taxing incomethat derives people'schoices, they disagree amongthemselves In general, and why. abouthowmuchtaxation is justified mostluckegalitarians however, ofcontemporary think that theeconomic liberal societies shouldbe significantly regimes and moreredistribumore redistributive thanthoseregimes haveusually beeninpractice, thantheprevailing wouldallow. AsI notein Section tive II,itis therefore political morality theriseofluckegalitarianism occurred a periodin which liberal socithat during striking muchlessredistributive. etieswerein fact becoming tothepaperofAnderson's citedabove, ReJonathan Wolff, "Fairness, 3. See,in addition
27 (1998): 97-122;Seana Valspect, and the EgalitarianEthos," Philosophy& Public Affairs
andAccommodation," entine Philoso"Paternalism, Shiffrin, Doctrine, Unconscionability

& PublicAffairs 29 (2000): 205-50; TimothyHinton,"Must EgalitariansChoose Between phy Fairness and Respect?" Philosophy& Public Affairs 30 (2001): 72-87. Debra Satz has also
themes inheras yetunpublished work. related pursued
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failsto developtheviewin a consistent or thorinsists thathe himself with I will make clear the way.Although oughgoing mydisagreement I willpostpone ofRawlsas an incipient luckegalitarian, interpretation untilSectionIII. a completeaccountofthebases formydisagreement section(SectionII), I willpresentsome reasonsfor In theintervening the oftheluck-egalitarian doubting plausibility position.In thecourse ofdistributive I willarguethatanyform ofmydiscussion, egalitarianmustbe rootedin a moregeneralconcepism,ifitis to be persuasive, ideal. Withthatargution of equalityas a moralvalue or normative I willreturn in SectionIII to Rawls.I willattempt mentas background, to show thathis work,properly understood, providesno supportfor his positionis better as helpingto illuckegalitarianism; understood how a plausibleform lustrate ofdistributive can be anegalitarianism choredin a conceptionof equalityas a social and politicalideal. Fiin SectionIV,I willconsidersome attempts to demonstrate that nally, can also be anchoredin a broaderconcepprinciples luck-egalitarian tionofequality. I in said thatluckegalitarianism As I havenoted,itis often has itsorigins that Rawls in Rawls's but himself fails to the view a consiswork, develop tentor thoroughgoing to thisinterpretation, Dworkin way.According builds on the basic Rawlsianinsight to providethe first subsequently ofa luck-egalitarian formulation that a formulation systematic position, to Rawls'soriginal than is Rawls's own is morefaithful concepinsight Alternative ofluckegalitarianism tionofjustice. versions arethendevelWillKymlicka to Dworkin and Rawls. a cleardeoffers oped in response "[o]ne of this of ideas. that putative scription progression Kymlicka says
of Rawls's central intuitions ... concerns the distinction between and thatRawlsis "motivated"5' choicesand circumstances,"4 bythe de-
thatis "ambition sensitive" sireto producea theory but"endowment insensitive"-a theorythat makes people's fortunes on their depend choices but not on theirnaturalendowments or otherunchosencircumstances. However,Kymlicka adds, "Rawls seems not to have realized
70.
Political 4. Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), Kymlicka, Contemporary Philosophy p. 5. Ibid.,p. 76.
thefull ofhis ownargument,"6 for"whileRawlsappeals to implications his difference choices-circumstances violates distinction, th[e] principle 7 it." Bycontrast, he continues, "Dworkin sensitive' acceptsthe'ambition and 'endowment insensitive' goal that motivatedRawls's difference Buthe thinks a different distributive schemecan do a better principle. to that ideal."' up job living Thereare twoprimary work thatareusually citedas aspectsofRawls's his (imperfectly The first is evidencefor developed)luckegalitarianism. ofhis twoprinciples his informal moralargument for thesuperiority of ofnatural Thatrivalscheme "system liberty." justiceto thelaissez-faire theoperation market allowsfor ofa free constrained economy onlybya ofequal liberty and formal Rawls equalityof opportunity. background the ofreobserves that thesystem ofnatural distribution permits liberty sourcesto be "strongly natural attributes and influenced"' by people's thesocial positionsintowhichtheyare born.But thesefactors, he arareso arfrom a moralpointofview."'Because they gues,are"arbitrary we distribution of "to be should not allow the resources impropbitrary, "to mitigate the by" them."Instead,we should strive erlyinfluenced of social contingencies and naturalfortune on distributive influence Rawlsgoes on to saythat thislineofthought does not,"strictly shares."'2 count an for his of sincehe as conception speaking,"'3 argument justice, to developa kindofsocial contract as is undertaking he unand, theory this the "official" his derstands means that for it, arguments conception thatitwouldbe rational for mustbe arguments thatestablish theparties in theoriginal the"unofficial" to chooseit.Nevertheless, moral position I that is often cited as the have sketched formulation initiating argument oftheluck-egalitarian idea that unchosencirfrom inequalities deriving areunjust. cumstances viewthathas been understood as luck The second aspect ofRawls's in its is the to he that makes tendency appeal responsibility egalitarian in thecourseofdefending social as the basis primary goods appropriate
6. Ibid.,p. 72. 7. Ibid.,p. 76. 8. Ibid. A Theory Harvard Rawls, Press, 1971), 9. John (Cambridge: oflustice University P. 72. lo. Ibid. 11.Ibid. 12. Ibid.,p. 73. 13. Ibid.,p.75.
10
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forinterpersonal Some critics comparisons. arguethatprimary goods are not a reasonablebasis forsuch comparisons because a theory that relieson themtakesno accountofvariations in the costsof satisfying different Twopeople with identical bundlesofpripeople'spreferences. have different levels of or welfare because goods may mary very utility one ofthepeople has simpletastesthatcan be inexpensively satisfied whiletheother has preferences thatare very to satisfy. Sincepricostly a theory that uses them goodstakeno accountofthesevariations, mary as thebasis forinterpersonal willtreatthe twopeople as comparisons the same level of and will makeno provision for the enjoying well-being thatthe second person has in satisfying his prefergreater difficulty ences.In response, Rawlsarguesthatwe have "a capacity to assumereforour ends,"14 and that"citizens can regulate and revise sponsibility in thelight their ends and preferences oftheir of expectations primary In a just society, "thosewithless expensive tastes therefore, goods."'5 havepresumably likesand dislikes overthecourseoftheir adjustedtheir livestotheincomeand wealth couldreasonably and itis rethey expect; as now unfair that in should have order less to garded they spareothers from theconsequencesoftheir orself-discipline."'6 lackofforesight This ofthe luck-egalitarian responsehas been citedas an earlyexpression own choicesand that positionthatpeople mustbear the cost of their economicinequalities are therefore arisefrom provided legitimate they in thechoicesthat differences people make.17 inRawls's strands Despitewhathe sees as theluck-egalitarian thought, that own Rawls's of is with Kymlicka argues theory justice incompatible in at least twosignificant luckegalitarianism the differFirst, respects. ence principle does notmakeanyspecialprovision forthosewhohave unchosen special medical needs, even when those needs resultfrom natural sincetheprinciple takesonlyprimary socialgoods, conditions, such as money, into accountwhen assessingindividuals' well-being. treats twoindividuals withidentical bundlesofpriThus,theprinciple social goods as beingequallywell-off, evenifone oftheindividumary als is in normal healthwhiletheother suffers from a congenital medical
14. Rawls,"Social Unityand Primary Goods,"in JohnRawls: Collected Papers,ed. SamuelFreeman Harvard at p. 369. Press, 1999), (Cambridge: University pp.359-97,
15. Ibid., p. 370.
16. Ibid.,pp.369-70. 17. See,for example, Kymlicka, p. 75.
11
What is Egalitarianism?
conditionthatis verycostlyto treat.Second, the difference principle oftheworst-off seeksto maximize socialclass,as measured theposition of goods,evenifthereasonthatsome members byan indexofprimary thatclass have smallsharesofthosegoods is thattheyfreely choose to work shorter hours because of a preference forgreater leisure over In this the income. difference interferes withthe greater way, principle in which differences choices processesby people's may generateeconomicinequalities, some people to bear thecostsofthe and itrequires free choicesmade byothers. ofthedifference are incompatiThe factthatthesefeatures principle has ble witha luck-egalitarian led some to conposition interpreters clude thatRawls'sviewis inconsistent and thathe failsto appreciate theimplications ofhis ownluck-egalitarian and premfully arguments is misleading, ises.I think thatthisinterpretation and thatitis a mistake to construe Rawlsas appealing to a general distinction betweencircumwhichhis difference stancesand choices, thenfailsto respect. principle I do notsee anyevidencethatRawlsrelieson sucha distinction or that he everexpresses the aim ofproducing a theory thatis "endowment inIn myview, sensitive" but "ambition sensitive." thebest explanation of ofjusticedoes notrespect thefact that thedistinction beRawls's theory tweenchoicesand circumstances is thatRawlsis not attempting to redoes notregard thedistinction as havingthekindof spectit.He simply it fundamental that has for luck importance egalitarians. To be sure,Rawls does make the arguments againstthe systemof ofa relianceon primary naturalliberty and in favor goods as thebasis forinterpersonal which have seen as congenialto a been comparisons, But Rawls those in the position. luck-egalitarian arguments deploys ofa viewthatis substantively from service luckegalitariquitedifferent viewhave thesame theoretical anism.Nordoes Rawls's motivations as luck theones articulated Richard for Arneson, by egalitarians. example, whenintroducing his preferred versionofa luck-egalitarian position,'
18. Richard andEqualOpportunity for StudJ. Arneson, Welfare," "Equality Philosophical has abandoned ies56 (1989): Morerecently, Arneson ofluckegalitarianism theversion 77-93. inthisarticle, in favor ofa viewthat he calls"responsibility-catering defended prioritarianism."See,for ofOpportunity for Richard Defended J.Arneson, Welfare example, "Equality andRecanted," and"Luck and Journal 7 (1999): 488-97; ofPolitical Philosophy Egalitarianism In thesecondofthesetwoarticles no (2000):339-49. Ethics Arneson dePrioritarianism," bothas an "(outlier) member scribes oftheluckegalresponsibility-catering prioritarianism itarian family" (p.341). (p.340)and as "a closecousinofluckegalitarianism"
12
says thatit "is addressedto egalitarians"'9and thatit seeks to answer as we care forequality as a distributive thefollowing question:"Insofar is that"theidea of thatwe prize?"20 His reply ideal,what is it exactly ofthe ideal of for welfare is the best interpretation equal opportunity distributive In this and his requestion equality."21 posing developing a Arneson to be into discussion initiated takes himself ply, entering by Rawlsand Dworkin. Their he says,"havedebatedthemerits of writings, of taken as welfare and of resources of interpretations equality equality I willpostponeuntilSectionIV thequestionof theegalitarian ideal."22 howbest to characterize but I believeitis a misDworkin's enterprise, taketo present Rawlsas aimingto persuadean audienceoffellow disis better tributive that of resources a interpretation egalitarians equality As I shall try to show, ofthe egalitarian ideal than equalityofwelfare. and and relies on Rawls's has different aims different ambitions, theory and certainly moralpremises. no signof Thus,it is hardly surprising, his end a different that should content up having inconsistency, theory as well. Rawlshimself Of course,someone mightinsistthatwhatever may a luck-egalitarian think, position does in factfollowfromhis argumentsagainstnaturalliberty and in favorofprimary goods, once the fullimplications of those arguments are properly understood. To the extentthat he fails to recognizethis consequence, his theoryis so In SectionIII, I muchtheworsefor that.I do notfindthisconvincing. willoutlinebriefly thekindofalternative viewthatRawls'sarguments there are certainly seem to me intended to support. areas of Although and luck and albetween Rawls's position overlap egalitarianism, in his workthatluck strandsof argument thoughthereare certainly to as on are bound egalitarians regard congenial, myownviewis that, his own rather than the whole, Rawls'sarguments position support luck egalitarianism.In certain fundamentalrespects, moreover, thanluckegalitarianism. Rawls's positionseemsto me moreattractive For the moment,however,I want to set Rawls'sview to one side about the luckand explainsome of the reasons formyreservations egalitarian position.
and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," 19. Arneson, p. 77. "Equality
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. 22. Ibid.
13
II As I havealready ofluckegalitarianism are suggested, manydiscussions to otheregalitarians. addressedprimarily assume thatan Theysimply ideal ofdistributive has an important roleto playin our thinkequality ingabout distributive justice,and theyask how thatideal is best to be understood.Arnesonmakes the point explicitly. His arguments, he are "addressedto egalitarians, not theiropponents."23 As with writes, ownessay, mostoftheluck-egalitarian literature is devotedto Arneson's twoclosely related The first considering questions. questionis whatexwish to This is formulated as actly egalitarians equalize.24 question often a question about the correct "metric" of equality. The candidatesfor resources, equalizationthathave been debatedincludewelfare, opporfor and access to The others. second welfare, tunity advantage, among ofdisadvantage shouldreceivecompensation questionis whichforms in the name of equality. Here therehas been discussionof physical medicalneeds,limited unfavorable social positions, talents, handicaps, unsuccessful tastes, gambles,expensive expensivereligiouscommitundesirable of and so on. ments, aspects temperament, the debatesabout how best to respondto these questions Although have been intense, it is byno meansclearhow muchthedifferent verin theirpractical, sions of luck egalitarianism differ politicalimplications. ofthechoicebetweensome version of"equalArneson, speaking and his ownpreferred of"equal opportunity ityofresources" principle for concedesthat"thepractical oftheseconflictwelfare," implications be hard to and not much in discern, ing principles may may diverge But if the of the debates is practise."25 practical import intra-egalitarian not alwaysclear,thereis no doubt thatthereare greatdifferences, of considerable betweenluckegalitarians as a group political significance, and nonegalitarians. Yetluckegalitarians havespentrelatively little time the moral core of the defending luck-egalitarian positionagainstskepthisis notonly thefirst butalso 24. Indeed,in someluck-egalitarian writings, question thefirst sentence. for ofTalent" John Roemer, example, beginshis essay"Equality byaskwhatshouldone wantto equalize?"AndRoemer's ing:"Ifone is an egalitarian, essay"A ofResponsibility fortheEgalitarian Planner" Pragmatic Theory begins:"Whatshouldan seektoequalize?" Bothessaysareincluded inRoemer's egalitarian Egalitarian Perspectives
and 179-96,respectively. (NewYork:Cambridge University Press,1994),pp. 119-47 25. Ibid., p. 87. 23. Ibid.
14
tics and proponentsof otherviews.An analogywould be a debate ofrival in whichthepractiversions ofutilitarianism amongdefenders was made to persuadeothers cal stakeswereunclearand little attempt ofutility someversion was theright that maximizing approachtotakein thefirst place. a place forinternal Of course,thereis certainly discussions, among ofanybroadphilosophical theproponents abouthowthatpoposition, is bestto be interpreted. Utilitarians do in fact sition engagein suchdisas do proponents ofevery otherphilosophical thatis cussions, position a Imto attract wide and diverse of appealingenough group supporters. as theseinternal discussions are,however, portant theydo notobviate and defend thecoreofa philosophical theneed tomotivate, explain, pocase ofluck sitionto thosewho are not yetpersuaded.In the specific in light ofthe thistaskis especially moreover, important egalitarianism, betweenthetheory's stark contrast and thepolitipolitical implications in whichitwas developed. The riseofluckegalitarianism as cal context within which an important took position politicalphilosophy, place thelast twodecades ofthetwentieth coincided roughly during century, witha markedincreasein inequalitiesof income and wealthin the UnitedStatesand otherliberalsocieties.26 Those decades werecharaca intensified the terized trend, Union, collapseoftheSoviet by strong by increased and on toward reliance the and a market, privatization steady erosionin politicalsupportfordistributive ofanykind. egalitarianism was a sharpdisparity Thus there betweentheluckegalitarianism that in philosophical was becomingincreasingly influential discussionsof and theactualdistributive distributive ofthesocieties justice, practices in whichthose discussionstookplace-and thisdespitethe factthat one oftheaimsofluck-egalitarian theorists is to demonstrate thategalitarians need not,in general, be hostile to markets, and mustindeedrely in important theexistence ofa disparity beupon them ways.Ofcourse, and actual tweenluck-egalitarian theory political practicedoes not by itself theluck-egalitarian tellagainst is a normative noJustice position. ofjusticecan be falsified tion,and so no proposedprinciple by simply
26. For some of the relevant U.S. data, see U.S. Census Bureau,IncomeInequality at www.census.gov/hhes/income/incineq/p602o4/. Fordata on other liberal (1967-1998), M. Smeeding, see Timothy IncomeInequality in OECD Coundemocracies, "Changing tries: from theLuxembourg IncomeStudy," IncomeStudy UpdatedResults Luxembourg
Working Paper No. 252 (March 2000).
15
out thatactualpractice does not,in fact, to conform to it.Yet pointing ofthe contrast the starkness betweenluck-egalitarian and contheory to address politicalpracticemakes it especiallyimportant temporary fundamental of the core luckquestionsabout the moraldefensibility idea.Whatneeds to be considered is whether luckegalitariegalitarian ans havelatchedon to an idea ofequality that has realappeal as a social value. and political of addressing The importance thisissue can be brought out in anA I other moment a between debates ago suggested parallel way. among and intra-utilitarian The relation luckegalitarians debates. between luck and utilitarianism is an interesting an inand, I think, egalitarianism structive For those who interpret one, which meritscloser scrutiny. ofluckegalitarianism, Rawlsas an early adherent hisdefense ofprimary basis for as the has been taken to goods interpersonal comparisons place him squarelyon the side of those who advocate equalityof resources,and in oppositionto those who advocate some versionof ofwelfare. YetRawls'defense ofprimary equality goodsis ofcoursepart ofan argument ofwelfare. not His target, utilitarianism, equality against in other that is theposition we shouldmaximize notthat words, welfare, we shouldequalize it.Nowforutilitarians, the notionofutility or welitis interpreted or is fare-whether instead construed as hedonistically in the satisfaction of a double role. it First, consisting preferences-plays oftheutilitarian ofwhatis genuinely valusuppliesthecontent theory able orgood,bothfor an individual and sansphrase. Second,itis treated as the appropriate measureto use in assessingpersonalwell-being. These tworolesarerelated, inasmuchas itis theutilitarian ofthe theory therelianceon utility as themeasureofindividgood thatunderwrites ual well-being. Andbothofthesefeatures ofutilitarianism are distinct from itsthird crucial whichis that theright orjustthing to do is to claim, maximize overall utility. Rawlsis sensitive bothto thedistinctions and to therelations among thesethree features oftheutilitarian He rejects theutilitarian position. oftheindividual as indefensibly monistheory good,whichhe regards in the view that for favor of the an individual contic, pluralistic good sistsin the successful and execution ofa rational development plan of life. Andtheswitch from a monistic to a pluralistic accountofthegood to motivate hisrejection ofutility infavor ofprimary helpsinturn goods as themeasureofpersonal as wellas his rejection ofmaxiwell-being,
16
ofthe idea thatwhatjusticereofjusticein favor mizingconceptions fair framework of cooperation within of a the establishment is quires diverse which plansoflife. people can pursuetheir tomaximize welfare is rethat one ought Whentheposition aggregate to welfare certain the that one levels, position ought equalize placed by Forexample, utilivieware transformed. to themaximizing objections of "utility tarianism is oftensaid to be embarrassed by the possibility effiofpeople who are unusually monsters"-that is, bythepossibility The objectionis thatifthere intoutility. cientat converting resources shouldbe woulddictate thatresources weresuchpeople,utilitarianism forthe distributo them, without channeleddisproportionately regard is replacedby a of such a policy. Whenutilitarianism tiveimplications ofluckegalitarianism, theproblemofutility monsters welfarist version tastes. the is that the of Here is replaced objection by problem expensive ofresources in soifone aimsto equalize welfare, thenthedistribution areunusually and preferences is heldhostagetothosewhosetastes ciety inefficient at conto satisfy-that is,to people who areunusually costly to into Welfarist is said resources imply egalitarianism verting utility. to thesepeople, thatresources shouldbe channeleddisproportionately forthewayin whichdoingso maydepressthelevelsof without regard can achieve. that well-being others In viewoftherelation itwouldbe inbetweenthesetwoobjections, have drawn conclusions thatcritics structive to comparetherespective from them.It would also be usefulto exploreotherconnections beand luckegalitarianism. Butalthough a number tweenutilitarianism of in writers fact the two their have compared positions, luck-egalitarian thepremise thatutilitarianism is most comparisons usually beginfrom ofequality, rather as a theory thanas a teleoplausiblewhenconstrued the good.27Since,as logical view thatis concernedwithmaximizing
Virtue HarvardUniversity makes this claim in Sovereign 27. Dworkin (Cambridge: at length Political PhiPress, 2000),pp. 62-64.Itis developed byKymlicka (Contemporary and Culture Clarendon Press, [Oxford: chap.2 and 3,and Liberalism, Community, losophy, itinto(what be called)his"egalicentric" narrative ofthe 1989], chap.3),whoabsorbs might ofjusticeis motivated that ofpolitical Rawls's philosophy. argues theory Kymlicka history ofequality, in theutilitarian and that ofjusDworkin's conception theory byinadequacies ofequality. theticeis thenmotivated ("Dworkin's conception byinadequaciesin Rawls's to problems in Rawls's ofequality, conception just as Rawls's theory orywas a response intheutilitarian ofequality" Politwas a response toproblems conception [Contemporary theclaiminhis Equal]ustice icalPhilosophy, seemsalso to endorse p. 85].)EricRakowski
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these writers is actually invariably go on to point out, utilitarianism when construed as a of their discusquite implausible theory equality, amount to more than a rehearsalof the advantagesof sions rarely luckegalitarianism. Buttheinterpretation ofutilitarianism as a theory in of equalityis itself and so a less view,28 implausible my narrowly of the relations and luckstructured betweenutilitarian investigation wouldbe welcome. egalitarian principles Discussionsofluckegalitarianism have also done a less thorough job, in general, ofaddressing themostfundamental about the questions justhanutilitarians and their critics tification ofthatposition, have done in theanalogousquestions aboutthejustification ofutilitarianaddressing ism. For example,luck-egalitarian debates betweenwelfarists and resourcistsdo not always distinguish between the question of clearly whether welfarism is an adequate theory ofthegood,and thequestion of whetherit is the individualgood itself, or instead the means of shouldbe seeking to equalize.Andtheidea it,thategalitarians achieving thatjusticerequires theequal distribution ofsomething is often simply takenfor as the of discussion. point granted starting In myview, theluck-egalitarian positionis open to doubton a numberofgrounds. is thatthedegreeof Perhapsthemostobviousdifficulty that the luck on the distinction between places weight egalitarian choicesand circumstances on its both to be seems, face, philosophically dubious and morallyimplausible.Philosophically, the question is whether the distinction is deep enoughto bear thekindofweight that luck egalitarians on it. Some seem implace luck-egalitarian writings to is that whatever to the of unchosen plicitly suggest assigned category
Clarendon (Oxford: Press, Sen,whodoes nothimself 1991), pp.23-25. Amartya putforward a luck-egalitarian butwhoseemphasison thequestion"equality ofwhat"has extheory erted a powerful influence on thedevelopment ofluckegalitarianism, speaksofthe"'hidin utilitarian Reexamined Harden' egalitarianism philosophy" (Inequality [Cambridge: vardUniversity attachesequal Press,1992], p. 13).By thishe means thatutilitarianism to theutilities ofall people,and thatthis"egalitarian foundation is ... quite importance central totheentire utilitarian exercise" to saythat correct thefact that (p.14).Sen is surely utilitarians attach to theinterests ofall people is a very feaequal importance significant tureoftheir itis a further view. that utilitarianism is best However, stepto theconclusion ofsimply as a theory ofequality. Notevery that favors in somerethought theory equality as beingmotivated, ofwhatequality spectis bestinterpreted ultimately, bya conception requires. 28. Forreasonsthatarewellexplained in SamuelFreeman, Deontol"Utilitarianism, andthePriority ofRight," & Public 23 (1994): 313-49. ogy, Philosophy Affairs
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is a contingent whichis not circumstance feature of the causal order, control and does notimplicate his orherpersonundertheindividual's choicesarefully underthecontrol ofindividuhood,whereas voluntary oftheir But this als and constitute contrast is, pureexpressions agency. of course,untenable.In any sense of identity thatactually matters to traits unchosen and the social circumstances into personal people, whichone is bornareimportantly, albeitnotexclusively, constitutive of one's distinctive sense of "voluntary," And, in any ordinary identity.29 choices are routinely influenced people's voluntary by unchosenfeaturesof theirpersonalities, and in the social contexts temperaments, In hisdefense whichthey themselves. ofa version ofluckegalitarifind G. A. Cohen concedesthatrelianceon thedistinction between anism,30 choicesand circumstances leave luck to our necks may "up egalitarians in thefree willproblem," but he says-perhapswithsome irony?-that isjusttough luck."31 Cohenpointsoutthatone oftheachievements "that ofluckegalitarianism is to demonstrate thategalitarians can incorpoidea in thearsenaloftheanti-egalitarian rate"themostpowerful right: theidea ofchoiceand responsibility."32 luckegalitarianYet,in so doing, isminvites theobjection likethepolitical oftheantithat, philosophies it tacitly muchofitsappeal from an implausiderives egalitarian right, ofthemetaphysical ble understanding statusofthecategory ofchoice. This objectionwould be easierto dismissifthe luck-egalitarian acofchoiceweremorally countofthesignificance Butin fact compelling. thataccountseems on its faceto be morally It is morally implausible. forexample,thatjusticerequiresindividuals to be fully implausible, for that derive from of unchosen features compensated disadvantages their butnotto be compensated at all fordisadvantages circumstances thatresult their choices.As Anderson from has argued, it is voluntary that choice should have that or kind of morally implausible significance makethat of difference. On the one there are unchohand, degree many sen personalattributes thatmaybe disadvantageous whichwe but for from do not,in fact, demandcompensation others. On theother hand, thefactthata person's medical needs to his own can be traced urgent
oftheessaysincluded in myBoundaries and Allegiances 29. Thisis a themeofseveral York: Oxford 2001). Press, (New University 31. Ibid., p. 934. 32. Ibid.,p. 933.
Ethics99 (1989): 906-44. 30. G. A. Cohen, "On the Currencyof EgalitarianJustice,"
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or foolishness or high-risk behavioris not normally seen as negligence it to him the care he Still less do needs. making legitimate deny people outthattheir urforfeit anyclaimto assistanceifitturns automatically ofprudent orwell-considered choicesthatsimgentneedsaretheresult We are neither so systematically out badly.33 alienatedfrom ply turned the unchosenaspectsofourown identities norso uniformly confident ofand identified withourroleas choosersas to regard thepresenceor absence of choice as havingthiskind of make-or-break significance. Thishelpsexplainwhytheappeal ofluckegalitarianism mayseem tacto on form of for a libertarianism, libertarianitly depend metaphysical a basis in metaphysics fora dichotomy ism mayappearto promise that as to be morally wouldotherwise seemso stark untenable.34 writers have sought Someluck-egalitarian to addressthesedifficulties the or itsapplication in byqualifying luck-egalitarian principle limiting variousways.Andsomewriters have suggested thatcertain ofthediffithelinebetweenchoicesand circumcultiescan be avoidedbydrawing in explaining the differences stancesdifferently. forexample, Dworkin, betweenhis viewand Cohen's, that the line should be rootedin argues If the drawn is in this "ordinary people'sethical experience."35 distinction he says,thenvarious thatarenotin any aspectsofone'spersonality way,
is thePoint ofEquality," "What 33. SeeAnderson, pp.296-300. Reactive and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics" 34. In "Responsibility, Attitudes, 21[19921: in Boundaries andAllegiances, & Public 299-323, (Philosophy reprinted pp. Affairs that liberalism has been exposedto conservative attack be12-31),I argued contemporary cause ofa perceived and in philosophy, bothin politics to liberals, tendency amongmany ofindividual on a reduced and responsibility. The pointsmade in rely conception agency thelasttwoparagraphs be taken to suggest has done, that whatluckegalitarianism might in effect, for is to overcompensate that perceived tendency. to Cohentakesup sectionsII through 35. Dworkin's IV of chap. 7 of Sovereign reply Virtue. Thequotedphraseoccurs on pp.289-90.Thereis additional discussion oftheethical interpretation ofthedistinction between choicesand circumstances on pp.322-25. Itis worth inhisoriginal ofhisequality that formulations ofresources Dworkin scheme, noting did notcharacterize as a distinction therelevant distinction between choicesand circumofa distinction theperson stancesat all. He tendedto speakinstead between and his circumstances. for thisby Virtue, See,for example, Sovereign pp. 81and 140.He was criticized IV of"OntheCurrency ofEgalitarian whoargued Cohen(inSection that thereleJustice"), thanpersonality. vantnotionis choicerather In morerecent such as those discussions, citedat thebeginning ofthisnote, Dworkin does indeedcharacterize thedistinction as a distinction between choicesand circumstances buthe preserves a (orchoiceand chance), link with hisearlier that reflect characterization "choices their people's personbyasserting doesnotyield alities" inthetext is that this a distincVirtue, (Sovereign p.322).Myargument tionbetween choicesand circumstances that is helpful toDworkin's position.
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one'sambitions, sense chosen-including tastes, straightforward prefertraits of character-will and nevertheless fallon the ences,convictions, all ofthesefeatures choicesideoftheline.Thereasonsaretwofold. First, arerelevant ofpersonality to thechoicesthatone makes, either because or motives for one's actions because "affect [one's] they they supply purwith suitof"one'sends."6 theseaspects Second,peoplenormally identify to take"consequenoftheir and see themselves as having personalities in thesensethat tialresponsibility" for to havetobear them, expect they thecostsofpossessing them."One conclusion Dworkin this drawsfrom demand compensation is thatpeople cannot normally forexpensive values or tastes.Eventhough such tastesare not actually chosen,they fallon thechoice side oftheline byhis standards, nevertheless at least who takesa similar whenpeople identify with them.EricRakowski, poare "constitutive elements of sition, saysthatpeople'svaluesand beliefs themselves for whichthey mustassumeresponsibility,"" and thateven one does one's one not choose can nevertheless though preferences, so thatthey too areappropriately chooseto strengthen orweakenthem, on thechoicesideoftheline.39 situated thisway ofdrawing theline betweenchoicesand circumHowever, stancesleads to further difficulties. thatDworkinand By the criteria no talents and less Rakowski thantheir ambiabilities, suggest, people's to tionsand preferences, also deserve be situated on the choice side may of theline.After to all, people'stalentsand abilitiesare oftenrelevant theirchoices,eitherbecause theyshape people's motivesor because affect ends.In addition, oftheir they people'spursuit people frequently viewtheir than their values and preferences, no less as importalents, Andeveniftalents oftheir identities. constitutive are themselves tantly choose whether to develop them. unchosen,people can nevertheless Furthermore, responsimanypeople also expectto take"consequential their in thesensethat for believethey are entitled to talents, bility" they thedifferential rewards thatsuch talents mayenable themto secure.If thisis correct, thentheeffect ofbroadening thecategory ofchoicetoincludenotonly theactionsone actually choosesbutalso thevariousconstitutive features ofoneself thatunderlie one's choices,is to cast doubt
36. 37. 38. 39. Dworkin,SovereignVirtue, p. 322. Ibid., p. 290. Rakowski,Equal]ustice, p. 63. Ibid., pp. 57-72.
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on thecapacity ofthedistinction betweenchoicesand circumstances to the substantive that luck favor.40 positions egalitarians support a number ofcritics have made.LuckegalThereis a further pointthat as itis often as beingan itarianism, presented, appearsto treat equality distributive ideal whose fundamental aim is to eliminate the essentially on distribution of"brute luck."Because ofthisconcernto neueffects tralize bruteluck,theluckegalitarian arrives at allocative decisionson thebasis ofjudgments thatarestrongly "inward Thatis,an inlooking." dividual's claimtobe compensated in thename ofequality for some dison a about the source of the disaddepends advantage always judgment an vantagein different aspects of the self.We cannot knowwhether individual's entitles herto egalitarian withdisadvantage compensation out disentangling therespective contributions made byherwill,on the ofhertalents one hand,and byunchosenfeatures and personalcircumstances,on theotherhand,to theprocessesthatput herat thatdisadherto look invantage.Forthisreason,luckegalitarianism encourages wardin deciding whether she has a legitimate claimon fellow citizens, as and Wolff Anderson have it those feland, emphasized,"' encourages low citizens bothto scrutinize thedeepestaspectsofherselfand to arriveat heavilymoralized about the degreeof responsibility judgments herownmisfortune. she bearsfor In all of the respects I have mentioned, the luck-egalitarian conceptionofequality from a morefamiliar that diverges wayofunderstanding value.Equality, as itis morecommonly is not,in thefirst inunderstood, a distributive misforfor stance, ideal,and itsaim is notto compensate tune.Itis,instead, a moralidealgoverning inwhichpeople therelations standto one another. Insteadoffocusing attention on thediffering conofeach person's and other this abilities, traits, circumstances, tingencies
on theimporhimself insists Virtue, 40. Atone point(Sovereign pp. 260-63),Dworkin withaspects of one's unchosencircumtance,forethicalpurposes,of identification stances. which These "parameters," whatcountsas a goodlifefor an individhelpdefine from thosecircumstances thatcountinsteadas "limitations" on ual, are distinguished tolead a goodlife. as Anthony one'sability in hisreview ofSovHowever, Appiahsuggests itis very unclear howa recognition oftheethical roleofparameters is to be Virtue, ereign reconciled withthe assignment offundamental to the distinction between significance choicesand circumstances. ofWhat?" TheNewYork Re(See K.Anthony Appiah, "Equality "What is thePoint ofEquality?" 41. Anderson, (at,for Wolff, "Fairness, example, p. 310); and theEgalitarian Ethos" Respect, (especially pp.113-18).
viewofBooksApril26 [2001]:63-68.)
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from theundeniable ideal abstracts differences amongpeople.It claims mustbe conductedon thebasis ofan assumption thathumanrelations lifeis equallyimportant, thateveryone's and thatall members ofa sociAs Anderson in defending a version of insists, etyhave equal standing. so understood thisideal,equality is opposed notto luckbutto oppreshierarchies ofsocial status, to ideas of caste,to class sion,to heritable and therigidstratification ofclasses,and to theundemocratic privilege of power.In contrast distribution to the inward-looking focusofluck it the irrelevance of differences individual egalitarianism, emphasizes for social and political a fundamental As moral ideal,itasserts purposes. and thatthereare some claimsthat thatall people are of equal worth to makeon one another oftheir stapeople areentitled simply byvirtue As a social ideal,itholds thata humansociety mustbe tus as persons. conceived of as a cooperativearrangement among equals, each of As a political whomenjoysthesame social standing. ideal,ithighlights are entitled to makeon one another of theclaimsthatcitizens byvirtue without for a of their statusas citizens, need moralized any accounting the detailsof theirparticular circumstances. Indeed, it insistson the oftheright to be viewedsimply and as a citizen, importance very great to have one's fundamental and privileges on that determined rights reference to one'stalents, decisionbasis,without wisdom, intelligence, social or or ethnic skill, class,religious affiliation, temperament, making ascribed identity. are notquiteso simple. The socialand political ideal Ofcourse, things of equality, has distributive Furtheras I willcall it,itself implications. forcertainpurmore,even if thatideal emphasizesthe importance, of individuals' fromthe differing poses, of abstracting contingencies ofattending itmustalso concedethenecessity to suchdiffersituations, other claim as but encesfor equal rights citizens, purposes.Peoplemay and application ofthoserights willoften theinterpretation dependon of theirindividual circumstances. And special circumstances features one willthink aboutthedisStill, mayat timesgiveriseto specialrights. of tributional luck than implications equality verydifferently egalitariin theend,the relevant anismtempts us to do ifone insists that, question is about the bearing on distributionof a morally-based ideal of human social and political relations-and not about the optimal way of in our economy a metaphysicaldistinctionbetween individureflecting als' choices and theirunchosen circumstances.Granted,the social and
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in different be understood politicalideal of equality mayitself ways.42 in But unless distributive is anchored some versionof egalitarianism that ofequalideal,orin some other comparably general understanding ideal, it will be arbitrary, pointless, ityas a moralvalue or normative for fetishistic: no morecompelling thana preference distribuanyother tivepattern. in mindthe factthatquestionsabout egalitarian Ifone keeps firmly distributive normsmustbe controlled bysome broaderunderstanding ofequality, thentheappeal ofluckegalitarianism seems to me limited. what I have called the As I have already suggested, manypeople accept socialand political ideal ofequality. Thatideal does notsupport theamthe influence of bruteluck fromhuman relations, bitionof purging whichis just as wellsinceone has onlyto describethatambition forits be evident. As Anderson to of distribution imare folly argues, questions forpeople who are committed to thesocial and political value portant, of equality, not because a properly institudesignedset ofdistributive tionscan helpto minimize theinfluence ofluck, butrather because cerkinds of distributive are with thatsocial tain arrangements incongruous and political value.Clearly, for example, people whosebasic needs have notbeen met-people wholackadequatefood,clothing, educashelter, in political lifeor civilsociety tion,or medicalcare-cannot participate on a footing of equality withothers, or can do so onlywithgreatdiffiEvenifbasic needshavebeen met,a society cannotbe considered culty. a society ofequals iftheresources that individuals haveavailableto purends is leftentirely at the mercy of market sue theirmost cherished forces. distributive can all too easily Moreover, significant inequalities ofpowerand statusthatareincompatible withreinequalities generate lationsamong equals. Thus,thosewho accept the social and political willhave compelling ideal ofequality reasonsto avoid excessive variations in people's shares of income and wealth,and this will mean, that have reasonto oppose institutions thatalamongother they things, in people's naturaland social cirlow too much scope fordifferences cumstancesto translate into economic inequalities.But, on the one
is no general is 42. One important issue,aboutwhichthere consensus, interpretative whattheidealimplies abouttherelations ofthesame amongpeoplewhoarenotcitizens or members ofthesame political Debra Satz discussesthisissue in her country society. ofWhatand Between Whom? Whenand Where Does Inunpublished paper,"Inequality Matter? TheCase ofInequality Between Nations." equality
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from different thegeneral oferadicatambition hand,thisis very having of the distributive effects brute on the other luck,and, hand,itdoes ing not assume thatinequalities people's choices are always arisingfrom acceptable. Fromthisperspective, themostimportant questionsconcernnotthe of luck but rather, neutralization forexample,the natureof people's "basicneeds,"thepropercriteria for institutions to use in dispolitical betweengenuineneeds and what are merely tinguishing verystrong the measure for the social and institupreferences, appropriate political tionsofa complexmodernsociety to employ whenassessingthewellinthe degreeof material citizens, and, especially, beingof individual thatis compatible witha conception ofsociety as a fair equality system of cooperation among equals. Dependingon how thesequestionsare to thesocial and political ideal of answered, people who arecommitted a system thattolerates either moreor mayend up supporting equality ofincomeand wealththanluckegalitarianism less inequality does. In will either themotivation for their be different case, however, position the motivation fora luck-egalitarian from outlook.Since the position willhavebeen developedin response that oftheidealfavor adherents to thatdiffer, from theones that at leastin part, luckegalitarians questions willlie in considerations their thatdiffer from ask,thebasis for position theones that luckegalitarians cite.43 III Allofthishelpsto explain to treat Rawls's of whyitis misleading theory luck a kindofincipient Notwithjusticeas representing egalitarianism. of people'snatural his remarks about the moralarbitrariness standing attributes and ofthesocialpositions into whichthey areborn, hisfailure toclaimthat to be for all disadvanjusticerequires people compensated fromunchosen features of theircircumstances is no tages resulting mereoversight. to the effect thathis conDespite occasional remarks
and Justice," in Ideals ofEquality, ed. Andrew Mason (Oxford: Black43. In "Equality David Miller drawsa distinction betweendistributive and well,1998), pp. 21-36, equality I have drawnin thissection, thatis similar to thedistinction social equality although Miller thetwonotions takesa different viewoftherelations between thanI would.In the samevolume, Norman Richard invokes Miller's ("TheSocial BasisofEquality," pp. 37-51) indefending whathe calls"socially-located chapter egalitarianism."
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theaccidentsofnatural endowment and the ceptionofjustice"nullifies in for of social circumstance as counters [a] quest politicontingencies his discussionas a cal and economicadvantage,""44 it is quiteclearfrom wholethattheunderlying motivation for Rawls's ofjusticeis not theory thegeneral oftheinfluence ofbrute luckon distribution. Inelimination own Rawls the differences between his thedeed, explicitly emphasizes ofredress." Thisis "theprinciple that oryand whathe calls"theprinciple ofbirth call forredress; and since inequalities undeserved inequalities and naturalendowment are undeserved, these inequalities are somehowto be compensated for."45 Rawlssaysthattheprinciple ofredress is one thatis to be weighedin plausible"onlyas a primafacieprinciple, His own theory, the balance withothers."46 accordingly, "givessome out the of to the considerations weight principle redress,"47 singled by "notthesame as""1thatprinciple. butitis clearly willminimize Rather thantrying to devisea conception ofjusticethat theeffects ofbrute Rawlsaimsto identify themostreasonableconluck, ofa moderndemocratic thebasic structure ceptionofjusticetoregulate For of is conceivedofas a the this a enterprise,society purposes society. fair and equal people,each ofwhom ofcooperation system amongfree is takento havethecapacity for a senseofjusticeand thecapacity to dea of life which is of his and rational constitutive or her velop pursue plan are rational for different and the Different human people, good. plans Rawlscitesthe"moralarbitrariness" heterogeneous. good is irreducibly ofnatural and social contingencies, notbecause his ultimate attributes aim is to extinguish ofall arbitrary factors theinfluence but rather beofthefactors he citesservesto undercause he thinks thearbitrariness alternative minebothan important to his objectionand an influential The objection is thatthosepeoplewho aremoretalented orintelliview. than othersdeservegreater economic rewards gent or hard-working thanhis theory would permit themto secure.And the alternative that is "thesystem ofnatural manyofthosewho pressthisobjectionfavor which,as we have seen,allowspeople to competein a largely liberty,"
44. Rawls,A Theory p. 15. offustice, 45. Ibid., p. too. 46. Ibid., p. o101.
47. Ibid., p. too. in myview) thatRawlsrelieson the Rakowski believes(mistakenly, 48. Ibid.,p. o101. ofredress as a premise ofhisargument. See Equal Justice, pp. 112-14. principle
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freemarket, constrained unregulated onlybythe need to respectone basic libertiesand by a requirement another's of formalequalityof opportunity. Rawls believes that the appeal of the systemof naturalliberty is The extent to which the allows matespurious. morally system people's rialprospects to be influenced natural assetsand thesocial cirbytheir cumstances intowhichtheyare bornis indefensible. It is indefensible because itis incongruous with as equals and because the people'sstatus distribution ofthosecontingencies does notitself have anymoralbasis. Ifwe takeseriously theidea thatall citizens haveequal standing in sociand theidea thateach has an equallyimportant in developinterest ety, a rational a fair frameingand pursuing plan oflifewithin cooperative to set up an institutional scheme that work,thenit is inappropriate makespeople'schancesofcarrying out their on plansdependso heavily naturaland social contingencies thatin themselves have no moralauRawls's ofpeople'snatural emphasison themoralarbitrariness thority. and social starting attributes is meant to undercut ourtendency points to treat thosefactors as morally when authoritative, especially doingso wouldcompromise fundamental. something morally Whatis relevant forRawls,in otherwords, is the conjunction of two The first is that the distribution of natural and social conpoints. point lacks moral basis. The second is that a that tingencies any point system allowstheeconomicdistribution to track thedistribution ofthosecontoo closelywill compromise the statusof some citizensas tingencies will for it undermine their to theequallylegitimate equals, ability satisfy interest thateach citizen has in developing and pursuing a rational plan oflifethatis constitutive ofhis or her good. IfRawlsis right, the conofthesetwopointsgives us reasonto reject thesystem ofnatujunction ral liberty, once we conceiveof society as a fairsystem of cooperation of thesepointsneiamongfreeand equal people. Butthe importance ther derives from norcommits Rawlstothegeneral ambition ofneutraleffects ofbad brute luck.ForRawls, whatis izingall ofthedistributive is thestatusofcitizens fundamental as equals,and themoralarbitrariness ofpeople'snatural and social starting because pointsis important ithelpsto clarify thedistributive oftaking implications equal citizenship
seriously. Rawls'sdefense of his reliance on primarygoods as the basis forinterwhen it is personal comparisons of well-being also looks verydifferent
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not seen through the lens ofluck-egalitarian concerns.In sayingthat are for citizens in a well-ordered society expectedto takeresponsibility and revise theirends,in the sense thattheyare expectedto "regulate in thelight oftheir ofprimary their ends and preferences expectations notmaking a claimabout themoralsignifiRawlsis certainly goods,"49 cance ofa putative distinction between choices metaphysical voluntary and unchosen circumstances. Instead,he is makingan observation ofjusticeserve, in effect, about howhis principles to allocateresponsithe between and individual. He writes: society bility This conception[ofjustice]includeswhatwe maycall a social divias a collective sionofresponsibility: thecitizens society, body, accepts the responsibility formaintaining the equal basic liberties and fair ofopportunity, and for a fair shareoftheother priequality providing for within this while citizens inframework, (as mary goods everyone for and associations the and dividuals) accept responsibility revising inviewoftheall-purpose their ends and aspirations means adjusting their and foreseeable situation.50 can expect, present they given ofresponsibility As Rawlsnotes,thisallocation wouldmakeno sense in general, makeon theclaimsthey if, peoplewereunable"tomoderate because theylacked the capacityto adjust their social institutions"'' oftheresources couldexpectto have at their plansin light disposal they ofa fair theallocation undertheterms distribution. Bythesame token, ofresponsibility would makeno sense ifsocietyas a whole lackedthe to establish institutions thebasic libcapable ofguaranteeing capacity In erties and fair of as Rawls itdoes equality opportunity. fact, suggests, to supposethat notseemunreasonable do havethecapeople normally Whatis pacityto adjusttheirplans in lightof theirfairexpectations. is thatthe moreimportant for thepurposesofourdiscussion, however, thattheyhave such a capacityis not a metaphysical thesis suggestion in anycase, does itproabouttherelation ofcausationand thewill, nor, for theallocation ofresponsibility. videthe motivation People are asked for their to acceptresponsibility ends,in Rawls's sense,notbecause the ofthewillmakesitfitting that people shouldbearthecosts metaphysics oftheir because it is reasonableto expect people to choices,butrather
Collected 49. Rawls, Papers, p. 370.
50. Ibid., p. 371. 51. Ibid.
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Andwhatmakessharesfair, to makedo with their fair shares. according for all unchosen disadvanis not that Rawls, theycompensatepeople oftheir themto bear thecosts (orreaptherewards) tageswhileleaving of fair when are a choices. Shares are distributive part voluntary they to pursuetheir free and equal citizens schemethatmakesitpossiblefor within a that of the framework embodiesan diverse conceptions good idealofreciprocity and mutualrespect.52 In addition, Rawlsemphasizesthathis relianceon primary goods as limited to the is thebasis for specialcase of interpersonal comparisons not ... be are to used in maksocialjustice.As he says,"Primary goods in all situations whicharisein rebutonlyin questions ingcomparisons is matter to the structure. It another whether basic entirely primary gard in kinds are an basis other of What is distinccases."53 goods appropriate tiveabout the case of social justiceis thatinterpersonal comparisons foradjudicating mustbe capable ofproviding grounds amongconflictcan recognize as fair. Itfollows, Rawls ingclaimsin a waythatall citizens these a basis for that we need believes, practical making comparisons and thatthisbasis mustlie in features of people'ssituations thatare accessibleand can be appraisedwithout violating people'slibpublicly examination. intrusive As he says, ertiesor subjecting themto unduly in basis of interpersonal "theidea is to finda practicable comparisons to termsof objectivefeatures of citizens'social circumstances open contrast to the inward-looking focusof luck view."54This is in striking the distributive effects Whereasthe aim ofneutralizing egalitarianism. and conceptually of bruteluck requiresintrusive problematic judgtheaim ofadmentsabouttheinner sourcesofpeople'sdisadvantages, fairly amongthe claims of freeand equal citizensrequires judicating and publicbasis. that rest on a practicable judgments viewsarebeyondcriticism. It is None ofthisis to suggest thatRawls's inthat the to for difference possible argue, example, principle perfectly
in thisparagraph, discussed ofthepassagefrom see discussion Rawls 52. Fora related in TheTanner T.M. Scanlon, ofChoice," Lectures on HumanValues, vol. "TheSignificance of UtahPress,1988),pp. 151-216, at McMurrin 8, ed. Sterling (SaltLake City: University for IV of doctrine of"responsibility ends"in section Rawls's 197-201.I have also discussed inPhilosophy and Politics" Reactive and Liberalism Attitudes, (seeBound"Responsibility,
aries andAllegiances, pp. 29-30).
Collected 53. Rawls, Papers, p. 364. "ThePriority ofRight and Ideas oftheGood,"in Collected 54. Rawls, Papers, pp. 449-72 atpp.454-55.
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as measured thosewho are amongtheworst-off, rewards appropriately leisureto because in termsof primary greater theyprefer goods,only incomeand so choose to workat less demanding jobs or notto greater workat all. It is also perfectly possibleto arguethatRawls'srelianceon him incarenders social goods as the measureof well-being primary of justice as an of acceptable theory pable takingadequate account, thatare unmust,ofthosewho have specialmedicalconditions surely to treat. usually costly ofbothofthesecriticisms. concedestheforce Indeed,Rawlshimself he is that he indicates In response tothefirst, despitesome reservations, ofthelistofprimary an expansion to contemplate goodsto inprepared theimto thesecond,he acknowledges cludeleisure time.55In response medical needs but those with for of special portance making provision until after is to be deferred ofextension"56 treats thisas a "problem which has been addressed.This problemcon"thefirst problemofjustice""57 coactiveand fully whoarenormally cernstherelations among"citizens for the over a members of Accordingly, complete society operating life."" idealized Rawlsmakesthe frankly thisproblem, purposeof addressing minimum dethatall citizens have,"atleastto theessential assumption and physical themoral, intellectual, capacitiesthatenablethemto gree, Elsemembersof societyovera completelife.""59 be fully cooperating have physical "that all citizens as assuming himself wherehe describes a certain normal within and psychological range."60He specucapacities ofspecialmedicalneeds can be dealtwith"atthe latesthattheproblem are and kindsofthesemisfortunes stagewhentheprevalence legislative and balanced themcan be ascertained and thecostsoftreating known expenditure."''61 alongwithtotalgovernment linesofresponse Thesetentative mayormaynotproveadequate.Perofa kindthat intuitionistic ad hoc or are too balancing require haps they thecriticisms to to regard Rawlshad hoped to avoid.Butitis a mistake as thethinend ofa wedge:thatis,as leadinginwhich he is responding
21-22,and CollectedPapers,p. 531.
and455. 55. See Rawls,Collected pp.252-53 Papers, Press,1993), ColumbiaUniversity (NewYork: 56. See Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism pp. 57. See Rawls,Collected Papers, pp.259and 368. 58. Ibid.,p. 368. Political Liberalism, 59. Rawls, p. 183. Collected 60o. Rawls, Papers, p. 368. 61. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 184.
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The aim thatinforms to luckegalitarianism. Rawls's exorably response totheproblem ofspecialmedicalneeds,and that wouldalso haveto inform is theaim of"restor[ing] care response, peoplebyhealth anybetter arefully so thatonce againthey ofsociety."62 members This, cooperating once again,is entirely from and does notcommit Rawlsto independent theaimofcompensating for all from unpeople disadvantages resulting chosen circumstances. Instead,the aim of enablingpeople to be fully ofsociety members an independent standard for provides cooperating which should be this standard, disadvantages judging compensated. By shouldbe compensatedeven iftheyresult some disadvantages from bad "optionluck," whereasothers should not be compensated even if result from bad "brute luck." Forexample, thestandard they mayrequire thatpeople be provided with medicalcareeveniftheir need for careresultsfrom choicesthatthey made voluntarily butthatturned outbadly. On theother thatpeople be compensated for hand,it does notrequire because thosetastesresult from tastessimply unchosenfeaexpensive tures oftheir for suchcompensation is notnormally necesupbringing, to be to enable members of As sary people cooperating society. Rawls arose from says,"Wedon'tsaythatbecause thepreferences upbringing and notchoicethatsociety owesus compensation. itis a normal Rather, thepreferences ourupbringing leaves partofbeinghumanto cope with us with."63 In discussing between therelation Rawls's viewand theluck-egalitarian concern has notbeen interpretative. position, myprimary ByemphasizI the differences between the two have positions hoped insteadto ing The first is to the two make clear that accomplish things. philosophical of luck egalitarianism are not to be foundin Rawls's underpinnings work. is to be suppliedwitha compelling Thus,ifluck egalitarianism willneed to come from thatmotivation somewhere motivation, else; it
63. Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism, p. 185n.Of course,luck egalitarians disagreeamong themselves forexpensive as to whether unchosen people shouldreceivecompensation suchtastes for aboutwhether areproperly under theheadsubsumed tastes, they disagree or of"circumstance." as we have seen,assimilates mostpreferDworkin, ingof"choice" encesto the"choice" side oftheluck-egalitarian thefact that are not divide, despite they themselves thatin general is calledfor. no compensation For chosen,and he concludes is notwhether thequestion areproperly subsumed within the Rawls, however, preferences of"choices." The question, is whether for tastes instead, category compensation expensive is necessary in theschemeofsocialcooperation. toenablepeopleto participate
62. Ibid.
31
ridepiggy-back on Rawls'sremarks cannotsimply about the arbitrarior about the nessofthenatural need for citizens to takeresponsilottery for ends. their bility howa plausibleform ofdistribuMysecondaimhas been toillustrate can be anchoredin a more generalconceptionof tiveegalitarianism as a socialand political ideal.Rawls's showshowthiscan equality theory be done. For Rawls, people are conceivedofas freeand equal citizens, whichprinciples of distributive and the aim is to determine justiceare for a moderndemocratic mostappropriate members are whose society In other the so understood. is which of words, question principles jusin modernconditions, ticeare most consistent, withthe freedom and ofpersons.Equality is understood as a socialand political ideal equality in whichpeople stand to one another. thatgoverns the relations The coreofthevalue ofequality does not,according to thisunderstanding, intheidea that there is something consist thatmustbe distributed oraland so theinterpretation locatedequally, ofthevalue does not consist in seekingto ascertainwhat thatsomething is. Instead,the primarily coreofthevalue is a normative of human and the relations, conception wheninterpreting relevant thevalue,is whatsocial,political, question, are compatible and economicarrangements withthatconception.
IV
AsI havesuggested, ofluckegalitarianism often proponents givetheimof that conceive as an distributive pression they equality essentially the premisethatthereis some currency ideal. They begin from that be and should distributed thenproceedto investigate whatthat equally be. I havearguedthatthisis misguided. form ofdiscurrency might Any if it is all tributive to be at in must be anchored plausible, egalitarianism, of somemoregeneral as a moral or normative value conception equality ideal. This does not by itself luck egalitarianism as the best disqualify form ofdistributive sinceitis open to luckegalitarians to egalitarianism be so anchored. Yet I have we that it can also that once reargue argued thategalitarian member distributive normsmustflowfrom a broader of the of luck is limited. conception equality, appeal egalitarianism It maybe protested thatin developing I have not these arguments, their viewas expressing theintuitive ifsome idea thatitis unfair present
done justice to the luck-egalitarian position. Luck egalitarians often
32
tofactors control." thanothers beyondtheir people areworse-off owing in turn that idea assert this in to And, response myarguments, may they so that is rootedin a conception ofpeople as having equal moralworth, as a does flow from a broader ofequality luckegalitarianism conception as an distributive moralvalue.Itdoes nottreat equality being essentially ideal. ifsome people are worse-off than the idea thatit is unfair However, control othersowingto factors capturesonlypartof the beyondtheir also believethatitis notunLuckegalitarians position. luck-egalitarian thanothers as a result fair ifsomepeople areworse-off of (orbetter-off) claim mustbe that choices.Thus,the luck-egalitarian theirvoluntary these two formulations is the positionthat resultsfromcombining This claim worth. rerootedin a conceptionofpeople as having equal ofjusticepurport to treat Mosttheories people as havquiresargument. Ifluck egalitarians believethat ing equal moralworthor importance. the worth best of of then their is the persons, expression equal position be assumed.Thisis some defense; it cannotsimply thatclaimrequires truebecause itis byno meansclearthatmostpeople actuparticularly to whichluck egalitarians appeal. To be sure, allyhave the intuitions inwhichitdoes seemunfair that there aresome contexts people should as result of circumstances a suffer control, beyondtheir disadvantages in whichitdoes notseem unfair thatpeoare some contexts and there as a result of theirvoluntary choices. disadvantages ple should suffer to establish theintuitive alone do notsuffice creButtheseobservations for luckegalitarianism asserts dentials ofluckegalitarianism, something in general, ifpeople are better itis unfair It claimsthat, moresweeping. in genas a result offactors control and that, orworseoff beyondtheir as a result ifpeople are better or worseoff oftheir eral,it is notunfair in its generalized this clearthat, choices.It is farfrom form, voluntary more or intuitive The common intuclaimenjoys support.65 widespread
see Arneson, and Equal Opportunity for ofthisformulation, 64. Forversions "Equality Oxford Press, Temkin, (NewYork: 1993), Welfare," University Inequality p. 85,and Larry p.
200.
to theequally claimbearsa superficial 65. The generalized similarity luck-egalitarian reto blamepeople,or to judge themmorally claimthatit is inappropriate generalized is ofcoursecentheir Thelatter which for thatarebeyond control. claim, sponsible, things willandresponsibility, is indeedwidely tral todiscussions offree Despitethesuaccepted. there are also important thetwoclaims, differences. between however, similarity perficial a precondition for articulates Theclaimaboutblameandresponsibility responsible agency
33
I believe, is thatthefairness orunfairness ofdifferences in aditive view, on the one factors control hand, from, vantage resulting beyondpeople's choices,is highly and, on theother hand,people'svoluntary dependent on theprevailing and institutional socialcontext setting. ifI have a less successful For example, careeras a philosopher than do because to enable refute all you yoursuperior philosophical gifts you to whatthegeneralized claimmight lead then, myarguments, contrary us to expect,mostpeople would not regard thatas unfair. Nor would itunfair ifa naturally mostthink athlete wereoffered gifted professional a morelucrative thanhis less talented contract teammate. On the other itoutrageous ifan emergency room hand,mostpeople wouldconsider an injured doctor left untreated because thepatient's inpatient simply from few resulted a foolish but decision. And would think voluntary jury on the it acceptable to deny legal counsel to an indigent defendant to payfor an attorney ofpoorfithat herinability was theresult ground on herpart.Ifthisis correct, nancialdecisionmaking thentheintuitive ofluckegalitarianism credentials cannotbe takenforgranted, and itis all themoreimportant for luckegalitarians to explainhow exactly their from a conceptionofpersonsas having positionis supposed to follow worth. equal moral I have arguedthatequalityis mostcompelling when it is Moreover, as a socialand political understood ideal thatincludesbut goes beyond thatall people have equal moralworth. the proposition It is thisideal we invoke that whenwe saythat oursociety shouldbe organized as a sois of The case to human other that ciety equals. analogous relationships for we taketobe governed an ideal of When we by say, example, equality. ofequals,we do thata friendship or a marriage shouldbe a relationship notmeanmerely thattheparticipants areofequal moralworth but also thattheirrelationship should have a certainstructure and character.
mostpeople,upon reflection, thatstrikes as compelling. The luck-egalitarian claim,by is a first-order normative that treats as thedefault distributive contrast, judgment equality from that baselinearejustified ifand only ifa suitable baselineand claimsthat departures is satisfied. As I argueabove,theintuitive ofthatnormacondition ofcontrol plausibility tive cannot be taken for suchplausibility as itdoes havemay Moreover, granted. judgment oftheclaimaboutthepreinmyview, as a natural extension dependon seeingit, wrongly conditions of responsible Thisis relatedto myearlier observation (at pp. 18-19 agency. its appeal on a perception thatit above) thatluckegalitarianism dependfor maytacitly can be validated metaphysically.
34
I believe, ournotionofa society ofequals expresses a normaSimilarly, tiveideal ofhuman relations. musteither Luck egalitarians rejectthis their It is not ideal or arguethatit too supports distributive principles. clear what groundstheyhave forrejecting it,but, as I have already I see no reasonto think thatitsupports thegeneralized luckindicated, I as have neither choiceposition.Since, complete egalitarian argued, norcomplete seemsmorally sensitivity endowment-insensitivity plausiand sinceneither reflects ourintuitive ble initsownright, understanding of equality, ofthe implications we have no reasonto think thateither ofa society ofequals. wouldbe a feature is one writer who can be interpreted as attempting RonaldDworkin to in an ideal of equality anchorluck-egalitarian thatgoes beprinciples thatall people are ofequal worth, buthis ideal of yondtheproposition the the I is same as social and ideal have described. not political equality seeksto answerthequesDworkin statesthata "full ofequality" theory ofdistributive tionofwhatitis to treat people as equals.A theory equalwhich one of this scheme ofdisaddresses aspect question, namely, ity be said to treat as Thus Dworkin tribution people equals. presents may hisequality schemeneither as a setoffirst noras ofresources principles in the idea thatpeople are of equal worth rootedmerely but rather as In of a of the idea of treatment. out he effect, then, equal part spelling as attempting in can be interpreted to anchor principles luck-egalitarian theideal oftreating a moregeneral ideal ofequality-namely, people as equals. them with Dworkin people as equals meanstreating saysthattreating he that concern is concern. the Indeed, says "[e]qual equal sovereign virtue ofpolitical and that"[n]o government is legitimate community" over thatdoes not showequal concernforthefateofall thosecitizens and from whomitclaimsallegiance."'' whomit claimsdominion Some writers have deniedthattheideal ofequal concernreally does support G. A. Cohen,forexample, principles. luck-egalitarian saysthat, contrary to whatDworkin supposes,"it seems quite unclearthata statewhich to pursuea normofstrict distributive refuses forthrightly equalityipso to its with shows failure treat and concern."'67 subjects equal respect facto thatluckegalitarianism fails"themost Anderson goes further, arguing
Press,2000), p. 165. University
66.Dworkin, Virtue, p.i. Sovereign an Egalitarian, HowComeYou're So Rich? Harvard 67.G.A.Cohen, IfYou're (Cambridge:
35
fundamental testany egalitarian mustmeet:thatits principles theory and concern for all citizens."68 equal respect express his distributive or not Dworkin's ideal of equalitysupports Whether is a prior there however, questionabouttheadequacyofthat principles, I think, inhisfamous arItis noteworthy, that idealitself. when, two-part first is Equality?,"69 Dworkin broachesthequestion ofhowthe ticle"What bestbe appliedtoissuesofdistriideal oftreating peopleas equals might manwhois he does so with reference totheexampleofa wealthy bution, to his in his divide wealth how, will, up deciding drawing amonghis chilof whom has different and each needs,ambitions, tastes.He then dren, a putatively moveson to consider analogousquestionthatarisesin "an should thequestionofhow"officials" context," political namely, ordinary ofresources Now aboutthedistribution citizens.70 makedecisions among is an notice is that the model of testator and heirs thefirst to asymthing benefits and the othersremetrical model,withone party distributing ofeconomic them. Thus,whenthismodelis appliedto questions ceiving within citizens are distribution represented, society, again asymmetrias objectsoftreatment bysome kindofcentralized subject.In this cally, of the case, thereare important questionsthatariseabout the identity to suggest, a groupof Is it,as Dworkin's seems at times subject. language Is it,as he suggests at other "thedistributive scheme"it"officials"? times, to the or self?Oris it,as some ofhisformulations appear imply, society as a loas a whole? Andhowis anyofthesetobe understood community Whatever theanswers to thesequestions cus ofagency? maybe, whatis a rethemodeloftestator and heirdoes notdescribe is that really striking will An at all. autocratic write his parent lationship amongequals might in such a wayas to treat all ofhis children as equals in Dworkin's sense, his family intoan egalitarian social unit. but thatwould not transform an autocratic might imposean economicsystem Similarly, government
is thePoint ofEquality?" 68. Anderson, "What p. 289. as chap.I and2 ofSovereign Virtue. 69. Reprinted is nottheonly writer who Virtue, 70. Dworkin, p. 13.Dworkin Sovereign luck-egalitarian toillustrate whatI refer to in thetext belowas an "adand heirs usesthemodeloftestator and Responsibility" ofequality. In his article ministrative (Boston conception" "Equality his Roemer uses thesame modelto illustrate Review 3-7at p. 3),John lo [April/May 19951]: AndRoemer thattheaim ofan egalitarian distributive ownversion theory. sayselsewhere ofResponsibility forthe ofhis theory is to provide "an algorithm" ("APragmatic Theory Planner," (p. 180)to "imp. 182)thatcouldbe used by"anegalitarian planner" Egalitarian ethic" (p.180). plement" (p.182)the"correct egalitarian
36
individuals as equals inDworkin's butthat wouldnot that treated sense,"' In short, into an egalitarian the society transform political community. is not as appliedto questions ofdistribution, ideal ofequality, Dworkin's at it is itself a modelofsocialorpolitical all; compatible equality perfectly inasmuchas it involvesone relatively withsocial hierarchy, powerful how to distribute resources choosing amongthosewithrelatively party itmight is no reasonwhy be protested thatthere less power.72 Ofcourse, ofpower itthesamemodelcouldnotalso be appliedto thedistribution whowouldbe doingthedistributing? self. Butthen Dworkin In fact, does notadvocatetheequal distribution of however, whathe calls"thetwomodesofpower,"73 After imdistinguishing power. "If is he on to a and influence, goes genuinely pact argue, community in theabstract sense-if itacceptstheimperative that a comegalitarian must its with treat members individually equal concollectively munity as themselves cern-then it cannottreatpoliticalimpactor influence to some metric ofequalitytheway to be dividedaccording resources, or investments be divided."74 land or rawmaterials might Accordingly, butnonefor for ofimpact Dworkin wouldallowa "limited place equality The upshotis thatDworkin's ideal of equality of influence."" equality
himself 71. Indeed,Dworkin bringabout "a might saysthata "benevolent tyranny" could"(Sovereign more thana democracy distribution Virtue, p.187). egalitarian ofthispoint, thedeviceoftheauction, 72. In a discussion Stephen Perry objectedthat thandoes themodelof which argument playsa muchmoredevelopedrolein Dworkin's In theauction, ofshipwreck hierarchical. a number and heirs, is notcomparably testator ofclamshells, which islandaregiven an equalnumber use tobid survivors on a desert they for Sinceno roleis envisioned a government, and sinceall ofthe for resources. available in theauction havethesamestatus aside theroleoftheauctioneer), (leaving participants Buttheprito provide a modelofgenuinesocialequality. theauctionmight be thought as Dworkin of describes roleoftheauction, it,is to tellus whatkindofdistribution mary toundercut be countedas an equal distribution. Itis intended resources shouldproperly wanteach personat all timesto have the same the idea thatdistributive egalitarians The auctionis not meantto illustrate a moregeneralideal ofsocial amountofwealth. in theauctionask themselves whatdistributional nordo theparticipants pracequality, ofequals.Indeed, Dworkin no general characterizaticesareappropriate toa society gives aresimply tionatallofthesocialrelations Instead, they stipulated amongtheparticipants. that resources shallbe "divided to accepttheassumption equally amongthem" (Sovereign thataim. Dworkin's idea of Virtue, underlying pp. 66-67),and the auctionpresupposes is the(asymmetrical) idea that a govwhich is notitself illustrated bytheauction, equality, allofitscitizens; is "the for as he insists, mustshowequal concern ernment equal concern virtue ofsovereigns" Virtue, p. 6). (Sovereign specialand indispensable Virtue, 73. Dworkin, Sovereign p. 199.
74. Ibid., pp. 209-10. 75. Ibid., p. 200.
37
does notrequire or evenpermit an equal distribution ofpower;and the kindofequal distribution ofresources thatitdoes require is notincomor even,as he himself patiblewithsocialhierarchy says,with"benevolenttyranny."7' Dworkin has developedhis ideal ofequality in greatdetailovera periodofmanyyears, and he has applieditwithgreat force to an impressiverangeofissues.The observations I have made do not detract from themanyvirtues ofhisview. Butthoseobservations do, I think, suggest thatDworkin's ideal represents whatmight be called an administrative ofequality. A "genuinely he believes, conception egalitarian" community, is one thatacceptstheabstract thatpeople shouldbe treated principle as equals (ortreated withequal concern)and whose"officials" thenadminister social and politicalinstitutions in accordancewiththe best ofwhattreatment as equals requires. But an egalitarianism conception thatbeginsfrom thequestionofhowbestto administer or operationalize an abstract ofequal concern contrasts with an egalprinciple sharply itarianism thatbeginsfrom the questionof whatrelationships among thereto consider whatkindsofsocial equals are likeand goes on from and politicalinstitutions are appropriate to a society of equals." Ifthe
Dworkin wouldofcoursereject a "benevolent for other rea76. Ibid.,p. 187. tyranny" sons.His point(and mine)is merely thatconsiderations ofdistributional do not equality in themselves furnish for grounds doingso. ofDworkin's ofequality as administrative is closely 77. Mycharacterization conception related toG.A. Cohen's ofitas "statocentric" an Egalitarian, How (see IfYou're description ComeYou're So Rich? p. 165).Cohenwrites: Within ofequality, thelocus ofthenorm ofequality . .. is Dworkin's theory proper in therelationship between thestateand thosewhomitclaimstheright to govern. Becauseitclaimsthatright, thestatemusttreat itscitizens withequal respect and on pain of beinga tyranny, and it must therefore distribute resources concern, toitsmembers. Butifthestate fails todo so,thenno analogousduty falls on equally individuals. It is nottheindividual's to treat and (relatives, friends, duty everyone and concern. alike)with strangers equal respect (p.164) Thisis perhaps an appropriate there is a tension within Coplacetorecord mysensethat between his apparent in "OntheCurrency ofEgalitarian hen'sownwritings endorsement, ofchoiceas an inequality-legitimating factor and hiscriticism, in hisTanner LecJustice," tures("Incentives, and Community," in TheTanner Lectures on HumanValues, Inequality, vol.13, ed.Grethe Peterson LakeCity: ofUtahPress, and in [Salt 19921, University pp.263-329) an Egalitarian, How ComeYou're So Rich? ofincentive-based as unjust IfYou're inequalities becauseoftheir I am inclined toviewthis as symptomatic ofa precisely choice-dependence. broader tension between theluck-egalitarian attitude toward choiceand theattitudes associatedwith whatCohencallsan egalitarian "ethos." The emphasis on theimportance ofa ethosis quitecongenial to thesocial and political ideal of choice-constraining egalitarian buttheluck-egalitarian motivation for suchan emphasis islessclear. equality,
38
distribofequality administrative supports conception luck-egalitarian denies and about that the Anderson this is utiveprinciples-and claim version ofluckegalitardoubts-thenDworkin's whichCohenexpresses Butpeoin a moregeneral ideal ofequality. ianismis indeedanchored well need to consider how as of themselves who think egalitarians ple as unthe of value theadministrative equality they conception captures it. derstand It willalready be clearthat,in myview,the social and politicalideal mostpeople.Thisdoes notmean has greater resonancefor ofequality or even forDworno room for distributive there is that egalitarianism ofequality. Butitdoes mean thatthese kin's administrative conception ifthey ideas will be most compelling and administrative distributive rootsin the ideal ofa societyofequals.78 can be shownto have strong in liberalsocietiesseemsto me discourse ofpolitical The recent history notedthattheriseofluckegalitarianism this.I have already to confirm a periodofgiddy took triumphalism place during amongphilosophers with a concern economic thatlargely aboutmarkets equality displaced factthatduringthisvery in manyliberalsocieties.Yet it is a striking ideal continas a social and political thepowerofequality same period, ofliberalsocifelt. One ofthegreat ued to makeitself preoccupations ofdithenormative decades has been with etiesin recent implications differences of how to accommodate about best with questions versity: Andthesequestionshave and ethnicity. culture, race,gender, religion, ifnot explicitly) an (implicitly almostalwaysbeen addressedthrough in been this: Whatmusta central has lens. The effect, issue, egalitarian itself as a do to constitute modernliberalsociety genuinesocietyof will inevitably be highly diversein equals giventhatits membership It is this salient and respects? profoundly normatively manysocially questionthathas animatedthe intensedebates in liberal egalitarian and aboutrace,gender, and multiculturalism; aboutpluralism societies One lessonwe shouldlearn and aboutthepoliticsofidentity. ethnicity; sothe remarkable ofthese debates,and from theveryintensity from of cial changesthathave accompaniedthem,is thecontinuing vitality in turn tells us And this of idea of a the something-or society equals.
ideal in his discussion theimportance ofthat comescloseto recognizing 78. Dworkin emin which he places great in chap.to ofSovereign finance reform ofcampaign Virtue, he ofequality towhich Butthat is notthenotion of"citizen equality." phasison thenotion ofluckegalitarianism. hisversion appealsin defending
39
so it seems to me-about the appeal of distributive egalitarianism. Whatit tellsus is thatthemostcompelling versionsofthatidea, both and philosophically, willbe thosewhose sourcein an ideal of politically social equality can be vividly and convincingly demonstrated.79 genuine
Will moreorless backward in chap. 79. Thus,I believethat when, Kymlicka getsthings and Culture ClarendonPress,1989),he seeks to 9 of Liberalism, (Oxford: Community, a conception ofequality for cultures inDworkin's distribground minority luck-egalitarian utive principles.

What Is Egalitarianism

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What Is Egalitarianism? Author(s): Samuel Scheffler Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, No.

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andAccommodation," entine Philoso"Paternalism, Shiffrin, Doctrine, Unconscionability

themes inheras yetunpublished work. related pursued

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16. Ibid.,pp.369-70. 17. See,for example, Kymlicka, p. 75.

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21. Ibid. 22. Ibid.

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