The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter I, "The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961," pp.

1-39 (Boston: Beaco n Press, 1971) Section 1, pp. 1-39 Summary and Analysis When Kennedy took office, the prospect of an eventual crisi s in Vietnam had been widely recognized in the government, although nothing much had yet been done about it. Our Ambassador in Saigon had been sending worried c ables for a year, and twice in recent months [in September 1960 and again in Dec ember] had ended an appraisal of the situation by cautiously raising the questio n of whether the U.S. would not sooner or later have to move to replace Diem. Ba rely a week after taking office, Kennedy received and approved a Counter-Insurge ncy Plan (CIP) which, at what seems to have been a rather leisurely pace, had be en going through drafting and staffing for the previous eight months. The CIP wa s a most modest program by the standard we have become accustomed to in Vietnam. It offered Diem financial support for a 20,000 man increase in his army, which then stood at 150,000; plus support for about half of the counter-guerrilla auxi liary force known as the Civil Guard. In return, it asked Diem for a number of r eforms which appeared to the American side as merely common sense--such as strai ghtening out command arrangements for the army under which 42 different official s directly responsible to Diem (38 province chiefs, 3 regional commanders, and a Chief of Staff) shared operational command. The CIP was superseded in May by an enlarged version of the same program, and the only longer term significance the original program held was that it presumably offered the Administration a lesso n in dealing with Diem (and perhaps, although it was not foreseen then, a lesson in dealing with Vietnamese governments generally). The negotiations dragged on and on; the U.S. military and eventually most of the civilians both in Saigon an d Washington grew impatient for getting on with the war; Diem promised action on some of the American points, and finally even issued some decrees, none of whic h were really followed up. For practical purposes, the list of "essential reform s" proposed as part of the CIP, including those Diem had given the impression he agreed to, could have been substituted unchanged for the list of reforms the U. S. requested at the end of the year, with equal effect, as the quid pro quo dema nded for the much enlarged U.S. aid offer that followed the Taylor Mission.

Negotiations with Diem came to an end in May, not because the issues had been re solved, but because the U.S. decided to forget trying to pressure Diem for a whi le and instead try to coax him into reforming by winning his confidence. Partly, no doubt, this reflected the view that pressure was getting nowhere, and the al ternative approach might do better. Mainly, however, the changed policy, and the somewhat enlarged aid program that accompanied it, reflected the pressures crea ted by the situation in neighboring Laos. (We will see that there is a strong ca se to be made that even the Fall, post-Taylor Mission decisions were essentially dominated by the impact of Laos. But in May the situation was unambiguous. Laos , not anything happening in Vietnam, was the driving force.) A preliminary step came April 20. Immediately following the Bay of Pigs disaster, and with the pros pect of a disaster in Laos on the very near horizon, Kennedy asked Deputy Secret ary of Defense Gilpatric to work up a program for saving Vietnam. The program wa s delivered, as requested, a week later. It was a somewhat enlarged version of t he CIP, with the implication, not spelled out in the paper, that the new effort would be put into effect without making any demands on Diem. (Simultaneously, Am bassador Durbow, who had been in Vietnam for four years, was being replaced by N olting, and this added to the hope that a new start might be made with Diem.) Th ere is nothing to suggest that anything more was expected of Gilpatric's program , and indeed all the evidence suggests that the main point of the exercise was t o work General Lansdale into the role of government-wide coordinator and manager of the country's first major test in the new art of counter-insurgency. Lansdal e served as Executive Officer of the Task Force which Gilpatric organized and wh ich he proposed should be given a continuing, dominant role in managing the Viet namese enterprise. By the time the report was submitted on April 27 when the Lao s crisis was reaching its peak, a new Geneva conference had been agreed upon. Bu t there were serious doubts that the pro-western side in Laos would be left with anything to negotiate about by the time the conference opened. Even the U.S.-fa vored settlement (a coalition government) represented a major, if prudent, retre at from the previous U.S. position taken during the closing months of the Eisenh ower Administration.) So the situation in Laos was bad, if unavoidable; and it f ollowed right on the heels of the Bay of Pigs, and at a time when the Soviets we re threatening to move against Berlin. The emphasis of the Gilpatric Task Force shifted from shaping up the counter-insurgency aid program for Vietnam, to findi ng ways to demonstrate to the South Vietnamese (and others) that a further retre at in Laos would not foreshadow an imminent retreat in Vietnam. On April 28, an annex to the Task Force report proposed to counter the impact of Laos with U.S. support for an increase in South Vietnamese forces (the original report had prop osed only more generous financial support for forces already planned under the C IP) and, further, a modest commitment of U.S. ground combat units in South Vietn am, with the nominal mission of establishing two training centers. On April 29, Kennedy endorsed the proposals of the original draft, but took no action on the far more significant proposals in the annex. On May 1, a revised Task Force draf t came out, incorporating the Laos Annex proposals, and adding a recommendation that the U.S. make clear an intent to intervene in Vietnam to the extent needed to prevent a Viet Cong victory. At this point,

practical control of the Task Force appears to have shifted out of Gilpatric's ( and Defense's) hands to State (and, apparently, George Ball.) A State redraft of the report came out May 3, which eliminated the special role laid out for Lansd ale, shifted the chairmanship of the continuing Task Force to State, and blurred , without wholly eliminating, the Defense-drafted recommendations for sending U. S. combat units to Vietnam and for public U.S. commitments to save South Vietnam from Communism. But even the State re-draft recommended consideration of statio ning American troops in Vietnam, for missions not involving combat with the Viet Cong, and a bilateral U.S.SVN security treaty. On May 4 and 5, still acting und er the pressure of the Laos crisis, the Administration implied (through a statem ent by Senator Fulbright at the White House following a meeting with Kennedy, an d at Kennedy's press conference the next day) that it was considering stationing American forces in Vietnam. On May 6, a final draft of the Task Force report ca me out, essentially following the State draft of May 3. On May 8, Kennedy signed a letter to Diem, to be delivered by Vice President Johnson the next week, whic h promised Diem strong U.S. support, but did not go beyond the program outlined in the original Task Force report; it offered neither to finance expanded South Vietnamese forces, nor to station American troops in Vietnam. On May 11, the rec ommendations of the final, essentially State-drafted, report were formalized. Bu t by now, the hoped for cease-fire in Laos had come off. Vice President Johnson in Saigon on the 12th of May followed through on his instructions to proclaim st rong U.S. support for and confidence in Diem. When Diem talked of his worries ab out U.S. policy in Laos, Johnson, obviously acting on instructions, raised the p ossibility of stationing American troops in Vietnam or of a bilateral treaty. Bu t Diem wanted neither at that time. Johnson's instructions were not available to this study, so we do not know how he would have responded if Diem had asked for either troops or a treaty, although the language of the Task Force report impli es he would only have indicated a U.S. willingness to talk about these things. W ith Johnson, came the new Ambassador, Fritz Nolting, whose principal instruction was to "get on Diem's wavelength" in contrast to the pressure tactics of his pr edecessor. A few weeks later, in June, Diem, responding to an invitation Kennedy had sent through Johnson, dispatched an aide to Washington with a letter outlin ing Saigon's "essential military needs." It asked for a large increase in U.S. s upport for Vietnamese forces (sufficient to raise ARVN strength from 170,000 to 270,000 men), and also for the dispatch of "selected elements of the American Ar med Forces", both to establish training centers for the Vietnamese and as a symb ol of American commitment to Vietnam. The proposal, Diem said, had been worked o ut with the advice of MAAG Saigon, whose chief, along with the JCS and at least some civilian officials, strongly favored getting American troops into Vietnam. The question of increased support for Vietnamese forces was resolved through the use of the Staley Mission. This was normally a group of economic experts intend ed to work with a Vietnamese group on questions of economic policy. Particularly at issue was whether the Vietnamese could not be financing a larger share of th eir own defenses. But the economic proposals and programs, all of which turned o ut to be pretty general and fuzzy, comprised a less important part of the report than the discussion of Vietnamese

military requirements. Here the study group reflected the instructions of the tw o governments. On the basis of the Staley Report, the U.S. agreed to support a f urther increase of 30,000 in the RVNAF, but deferred a decision on the balance o f the South Vietnamese request on the grounds that the question might not have t o be faced since by the time the RVNAF reached 200,000 men, sometime late in 196 2, the Viet Cong might already be on the run. The Staley Report also contained w hat by now had already become the usual sorts of nice words about the importance of social, political, and administrative reforms, which turned out to have the usual relevance to reality. The U.S. was still sticking to the May formula of tr ying to coax Diem to reform, instead of the equally unsuccessful January formula of trying to pressure him to reform. The other issue--the request for "elements of the American Armed Forces"--was left completely obscure. From the record ava ilable, we are not sure that Diem really wanted the troops then, or whether Kenn edy really was willing to send them if they were wanted. All we know is that Die m included some language in his letter that made the request a little ambiguous, and that Washington-either on the basis of clarification from Diem's aide who d elivered the letter, or on its own initiative, or some combination of bothinterp reted the letter as not asking for troops, and nothing came of the apparent requ est. A new, and much more serious sense of crisis developed in September. This t ime the problem was not directly Laos, but strong indications of moderate deteri oration of Diem's military position and very substantial deterioration of morale in Saigon. There was a sharp upswing in Viet Cong attacks in September, includi ng a spectacular raid on a province capital 55 miles from Saigon during which th e province chief was publicly beheaded by the insurgents. At the end of Septembe r, Diem surprised Nolting by asking the U.S. for a U.S.GVN defense treaty. By Di em's account the loss of morale in Saigon was due to worries about U.S. policy g rowing out of the Laos situation. Both U.S. officials in Washington and South Vi etnamese other than those closest to Diem, though, put most of the blame on dete rioration within South Vietnam, although the demoralizing effect of Viet Cong su ccesses was unquestionably magnified by uncertainties about the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. In response, President Kennedy sent General Taylor and Walt Rostow, then both on the White House staff, to Vietnam, accompanied by some less promine nt officials from State and Defense. What Taylor and Rostow reported was that Sa igon faced a dual crisis of confidence, compounded out of doubts arising from La os that the U.S. would stick by South Vietnam, and doubts arising from the Viet Cong successes that Diem's unpopular and inefficient regime could beat the Viet Cong anyway. The report said that a U.S. military commitment in Vietnam was need ed to meet the first difficulty; and that the second could best be met by supply ing a generous infusion of American personnel to all levels of the Vietnamese go vernment and army, who could, it was hoped, instill the Vietnamese with the righ t kind of winning spirit, and reform the regime "from the bottom up" despite Die m's weaknesses. The report recommended the dispatch of helicopter companies and other forms of combat support, but without great emphasis on these units. Probab ly, although the record does not specifically say so, there was a general unders tanding that

such units would be sent even before the report was submitted, and that is why t here is relatively little emphasis on the need for them. The crucial issue was w hat form the American military commitment had to take to be effective. Taylor, i n an eyes only cable to the President, argued strongly for a task force in the d elta, consisting mainly of army engineers to work where there had been a major f lood. The delta was also where the VC were strongest, and Taylor warned the Pres ident that the force would have to conduct some combat operations and expect to take casualties. But Taylor argued that the balance of the program, less this ta sk force, would be insufficient, for we had to "convince Diem that we are willin g to join him in a showdown with the Viet Cong ...." We do not know what advice President Kennedy received from State: Sorenson claims all the President's advis ors on Vietnam favored sending the ground force; but George Ball, at least, who may not have been part of the formal decision group, is widely reported to have opposed such a move; so did Galbraith, then Ambassador to India, who happened to be in Washington; and perhaps some others. From Defense, the President received a memo from McNamara for himself, Gilpatric, and the JCS, stating that they wer e "inclined to recommend" the Taylor program, but only on the understanding that it would be followed up with more troops as needed, and with a willingness to a ttack North Vietnam. (The JCS estimated that 40,000 American troops would be nee ded to "clean up" the Viet Cong.) The Taylor Mission Report, and Taylor's own ca bles, had also stressed a probable need to attack, or at least threaten to attac k, North Vietnam. The McNamara memo was sent November 8. But on November 11, Rus k and McNamara signed a joint memo that reversed McNamara's earlier position: it recommended deferring, at least for the time being, the dispatch of combat unit s. This obviously suited Kennedy perfectly, and the NSAM embodying the decisions was taken essentially verbatim from the recommendations of the Rusk/McNamara pa per, except that a recommendation that the U.S. was cornmiting itself to prevent the loss of Vietnam was deleted. But where the Taylor Report had implied a cont inuation of the May policy of trying to coax Diem into cooperating with the U.S. , the new program was made contingent on Diem's acceptance of a list of reforms; further Diem was to be informed that if he accepted the program the U.S. would expect to "share in decision-making" . . . rather than "advise only." Thus, the effect of the decision was to give Diem less than he was expecting (no symbolic commitment of ground forces) but to accompany this limited offer with demands fo r which Diem was obviously both unprepared and unwilling to accede to. On top of this, there was the enormous (and not always recognized) extent to which U.S. p olicy was driven by the unthinkability of avoidably risking another defeat in So utheast Asia hard on the heels of the Laos retreat. Consequently, the U.S. barga ining position was feeble. Further, Gaibraith at least, and probably others, adv ised Kennedy that there was not much point to bargaining with Diem anyway, since he would never follow through on any promises he made. (Galbraith

favored promoting an anti-Diem military coup at the earliest convienient moment. ) Kennedy ended up settling for a set of promises that fell well short of any se rious effort to make the aid program really contingent on reforms by Diem. Since the war soon thereafter began to look better, Kennedy never had any occasion to reconsider his decision on combat troops; and no urgent reason to consider Galb raith's advice on getting rid of Diem until late 1963. End of Summary and Analys is CHRONOLOGY 1960-1961 Situation in Vietnam According to Ambassador Durbrow the re was widespread popular dissatisfaction with the Diem Government and a growing guerrilla threat. At the same time, there had been a very gradual growth of U.S . involvement in assisting the GVN to counter the VC. In the U.S. two questions influenced decisions about Vietnam: first, what should the U.S. give Diem to cou nter the communists; secondly, what-if anydemands should be posed as a quid pro quo for assistance? US-Soviet Relations The problems of dealing with Moscow were far more pressing than those related to Vietnam. A feeling that America's posit ion in the world had been eroded by the USSR prevailed; Kennedy was particularly determined to regain American strength, prestige and influence. Anything which could be construed as American weakness vis-a-vis the USSR was to be avoided. Th is affected policy toward Vietnam. Situation in Laos The US-backed, pro-American faction under Phoumi Nosavan was losing to the proCommunist/neutralist faction supported by the Soviet Union. Commitment of U.S. forces was rejected and on May 2, 1961 a cease-fire was declared. President Kennedy decided to support a coali tion solution, even though the odds on coalition leader Souvanna Phouma's stayin g in power were very low. As a consequence of this decision, Washington believed that Southeast Asian leaders doubted the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to th e area, and the U.S. felt compelled to do something to restore confidence, demon strate U.S. resolve and dispel any idea Moscow might have that the U.S. intended to withdraw from Southeast Asia. Laos was thus particularly influential in deve lopment of policy toward Vietnam. 20 Jan 1961 President Kennedy Inaugurated

28 Jan 1961 Kennedy Approves the Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) for Vietnam Gradua lly developed during 1961, the CIP was to be the basis for expanded U.S. assista nce to Vietnam. Kennedy automatically approved its main provisions; negotiations with Diem about the CIP began 13 February and continued through May of 1961. Th e U.S. offered $28.4 million to support a 20,000-man increase in the ARVN (for a new total of 170,000); to train, equip and supply a 32,000-man Civil Guard at $ 12.7 million. The full package added less than $42 million to the current $220 m illion aid program. The CIP called for consolidation of the RVNAF chain of comma nd (never fully accomplished under Diem.) No agreement was reached on the questi on of strategy during this period. (Diem wanted "strategic" outposts, Agrovilles , lines of strength throughout the country; the MAAG favored a "net and spear" c oncept- small units operating out of pacified areas to find the enemy, call in r eserve forces, gradually extend security to all of Vietnam.) Civil reforms inclu ded urging Diem to broaden his government, include opposition political leaders in the cabinet, give the National Assembly some power, institute civic action to win hearts, minds and loyalty of the peasants. The CIP assumed the GVN had the potential to cope with the VC if necessary corrective measures were taken and if adequate forces were provided. The implicit bargain of the plan: the U.S. would support "adequate forces" if Diem would institute "necessary corrective measure s." Again, although sociopolitical reforms were sought through the CIP and other plans, they were not realized during the early Kennedy years. Mid-Jan 1961 A La nsdale Report on Vietnam Following a trip to Vietnam, Major General E. G. Lansda le called for strong support for Diem and recommended the U.S. demonstrate that support immediately. Only if Diem's confidence in the U.S. were restored would U .S. influence be effective, said Lansdale. He recommended the immediate transfer of Durbrow (he was "too close to the forest" and was not trusted by the GVN) an d immediate adoption of social, economic, political and military programs to pro ve U.S. backing for Diem as well as help Diem stabilize the countryside. Februar y-May 1961 Durbrow Negotiations with Diem on the CIP Diem stalled the implementa tion of his "major promises" (to establish a central intelligence organization, put operational control for counterinsurgency operations under the military comm and system, reform the cabinet and governmental administration). Washington held up the "green light" on aid as long as Diem stalled-although the JCS and MAAG i n Saigon were impatient to get on with the war and were annoyed by the delay. Fi nally, in mid-May (after Durbrow had ended his four-year tour in Vietnam) Diem i mplemented some "major promises" by decree. But nothing changed. 12 Apr 1961 Ros tow Memorandum for President Kennedy

W. W. Rostow suggested several ways for "gearing-up the whole Vietnam operation. " These included: assigning a first-rate, full-time backstop man in Washington t o Vietnam affairs (Lansdale); a Vice Presidential visist in Southeast Asia; expl oring ways to use new American techniques and gadgets in the fight against the V C; replacing the ICA (AID) chief; high-level discussion of tactics for persuadin g Diem to broaden his government; a Presidential letter to Diem in which Kennedy would reaffirm support for him but express the urgency attached to finding a "m ore effective political and morale setting" for military operations. 20 Apr 1961 The Presidential Program for Vietnam Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric was directed to appraise the current status and future prospects of the VC drive in South Vietnam, then recommend a series of actions to prevent communist dominatio n of the GVN. (At this same time: the Bay of Pigs invasion force surrendered and the Laos crisis was coming to a head.) Gilpatric and Lansdale headed a Task For ce established immediately to carry out these instructions. 27 Apr 1961 Gilpatri c Task Force Report Submitted; the NSC Meets This first Task Force draft called for a moderate acceleration of the CIP program approved in January, with stress on vigor, enthusiasm and strong leadership. The report recommended building on p resent US-GVN programs, infusing them with a new sense of urgency and creating a ction programs in almost every field to create a viable and increasingly democra tic government in SVN to prevent communist domination. No ARVN increase beyond t he already-authorized 20,000-man addition was recommended; a modest MAAG increas e was proposed. The US would support the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps. Emp hasis was on stabilizing the countryside, not on pressing Diem for political or administrative reforms. (Gilpatric wanted Lansdale to go to Vietnam immediately after the program was approved to consult with Vietnamese and US leaders and mak e further recommendations for action; but McNamara made Lansdale's mission conti ngent upon an invitation from the US Ambassador in Saigon--an invitation that ne ver came.) The NSC was to discuss this report but the 27 April meeting was domin ated by the acute Laotian crisis. 28 Apr 1961 Laos Annex to (first) Task Force R eport A report--a response, really--concerning the critical situation in Laos an d its effect on Vietnam was prepared for the NSC on 28 April. It recommended a t wo-division ARVN increase and deployment of 3600 US troops to Vietnam (two 1600man teams to train each new division; 400 Special Forces troops to speed overall ARVN counterinsurgency

training). Rationale: to enable ARVN to guard against conventional invasion of S outh Vietnam. (Both the increased forces and their justification were different from two earlier reports. Lansdale had advocated no ARVN increase but felt some US force build-up was called for as a demonstration of American support for the GVN. Gilpatric's military aide, Colonel E. F. Black, wrote the other report whic h saw no need for more US troops but recommended expansion of ARVN to meet the t hreat of increased infiltration. These views were rejected in favor of Black's s econd paper which advocated more ARVN troops--to counter overt aggression, not i ncreased infiltration-and commitment of US troops for training purposes --not fo r political reassurance or demonstration of US resolve. Black's second paper was sent to the NSC.) 29 April 1961 Kennedy Decisions on the Draft Report Kennedy d id not act on the Laos Annex. He approved only the limited military proposals co ntained in the first Gilpatric Task Force report. The 685-man MAAG would be incr eased to 785 to enable it to train the approved 20,000 new ARVN troops. Kennedy also authorized the MAAG to support and advise the Self Defense Corps (40,000 me n); authorized MAP support for the entire Civil Guard of 68,000 (vice 32,000 pre viously supported); ordered installation of radar surveillance equipment and oka yed MAP support and training for the Vietnamese Junk Force. 1 May 1961 NSC Meets ; New Draft of the Task Force Report Issued Kennedy again deferred decision on s ending troops into Laos apparently because the feeling that the US would not mak e such a move was now firm. The 1 May draft report was little different from the 28 April version. The Laos Annex was incorporated into the main paper; the US w as to make known its readiness to "intervene unilaterally" in Southeast Asia to fulfill SEATO commitments (vice intervene in conjunction with SEATO forces). ARV N increases were now justified by the threat of overt aggression as well as incr eased infiltration. 3 May 1961 State (George Ball) Revision of Task Force Report This draft was very different from the original. Lansdale's role was eliminated ; the Gilpatric-Lansdale Task Force was to be replaced by a new group chaired by Ball, then Undersecretary of State. (Lansdale reacted with a "strong recommenda tion" that Defense stay out of the directorship proposed by State and said the " US past performance and theory of action, which State apparently desires to cont inue, simply offers no sound basis for winning. . .") In State's rewritten polit ical section of the report, the Defense recommendation to make clear US determin ation to intervene unilaterally if necessary to save South Vietnam from communis m was replaced by a proposal to explore new bilateral treaty arrangements with D iem (arrangements which might mean intervention against the guerrillas but might mean intervention only against DRV attack). The need for new arrangements was t ied to the "loss" of Laos. State incorporated unchanged the Defense draft as the military section of its revised report, but implied "further study"

would be given to some Defense recommendations. Overall, the State revision trie d to tone down commitments to Vietnam suggested in the Defense version. It left the President a great deal of room to maneuver without explicitly overruling rec ommendations presented him. 5 May 1961 NSC Meeting Again, Laos was the main subj ect. Most agreed the chance for salvaging anything out of the cease-fire and coa lition government was slim indeed. Ways in which to reassure Vietnam and Thailan d were sought. The Vice President's trip to Southeast Asia was announced after t he meeting. 6 May 1961 Second State Re-Draft of the Task Force Report Here, mili tary actions were contained in an annex; the political section reflected less pa nic over the loss of Laos; deployment of US troops was less definite-called some thing which "might result from an NSC decision following discussions between Vic e President Johnson and President Diem." The matter is being studied, said the d raft. The report said: Diem "is not now fully confident of US support," that it is "essential (his) full confidence in and communication with the United States be restored promptly." (Lansdale's recommendations of January, April, etc.) The report called for a "major alteration in the present government structure," "bel ieved" a combination of inducements plus discreet pressures might work, but it w as unenthusiastic both about Diem, and his chances of success. The Diem-is-the-o nly-avail able-leader syndrome is evident here. l0 May 1961 JCSM 320-61 "Assumin g the political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the communist sphere, " the JCS emphatically recommended deployment of sufficient US forces to provide a visible deterrent to potential DRV/CHICOM action, release ARVN from static to active counterinsurgency operations, assist training and indicate US firmness. (In JCSM 311-61 of 9 May, the Chiefs recommended deployment of US forces to Thai land also.) 11 May 1961 NSAM 52 Directed "full examination" by DOD of a study on the size and composition of forces which might comprise a possible commitment o f troops to Southeast Asia. In effect, Kennedy "took note" of the study but made no decision on the issue of troop commitment. The Ambassador in Saigon was empo wered to open negotiations about a bilateral treaty but was directed to make no commitments without further review by the President. These recommendations from the May 6 Task Force report were approved: help the GVN increase border patrol a nd counterinsurgency capability through aerial surveillance and new technologica l devices; help set up a center to test new weapons and techniques; help ARVN im plement health, welfare and public work projects; deploy a 400-man special force s group to Nha Trang to accelerate ARVN training; instruct JCS,

CINCPAC, MAAG to assess the military utility of an increase in ARVN from 170,000 to 200,000 (the two-division increase recommended previously). 9-15 May 1961 Vi ce President Johnson Visits Southeast Asia Purpose: to reassure Asian leaders th at despite Laos, the United States could be counted on to support them. Johnson reported the mission had halted the decline of confidence in the United States, but did not restore confidence already lost. Johnson strongly believed that fait h must be restored, the "battle against communism must be joined in Southeast As ia with strength and determination" (or the US would be reduced to a fortress Am erica with defenses pulled back to California's shores); he believed there was n o alternative to US leadership in Southeast Asia but that any help extended--mil itary, economic, social-must be part of a mutual effort and contingent upon Asia n willingness to "take the necessary measures to make our aid effective." He rep orted that American troops were neither required nor desired by Asian leaders at this time. Calling Thailand and Vietnam the most immediate, most immediate, mos t important trouble spots, the Vice President said the US "must decide whether t o support Diem--or let Vietnam fall," opted for supporting Diem, said "the most important thing is imaginative, creative, American management of our military ai d program," and reported $50 million in military and economic assistance "will b e needed if we decide to support Vietnam." The same amount was recommended for T hailand. The Vice President concluded by posing this as the fundamental decision : "whether . . . to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast A sia or throw in the towel." Cautioning that "heavy and continuing costs" would b e required, that sometime the US "may be faced with the further decision of whet her we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withd raw should our other efforts fail," Johnson recommended "we proceed with a clear -cut and strong program of action." l8 May 1961 Lansdale Memorandum for Gilpatri c Landsdale noted Diem's rejection of US combat forces per se at this time but p ointed out Diem seemed willing to accept troops for training purposes only. At t his same time, MAAG Chief McGarr requested 16,000 US troops (combat units) be se nt, nominally to establish centers to train RVNAF divisions. If Diem would not a ccept 16,000, McGarr would settle for 10,000 men. 5 June 1961 Rostow Note to McN amara Saying "we must think of the kind of forces for Thailand now, Vietnam late r," Rostow suggested "aircraft, helicopters, communications, men, Special Forces , militia teachers, etc." would be needed to support a "counter-guerrilla war in Vietnam." Rostow does not mention combat units. 9 June 1961 Diem Letter to Kenn edy

Here, in response to Vice President Johnson's request that he outline military n eeds, Diem did request US troops explicitly for training RVNAF "officers and tec hnical specialists"-not entire divisions. He proposed ARVN be increased from 170 ,000 to 270,000 to "counter the ominous threat of communist domination"--a threa t he documented by inflated infiltration figures and words about the "perilous" situation created by the Laos solution. To train these 100,000 new. ARVN troops Diem asked for "considerable expansion" of the MAAG in the form of "selected ele ments of the American Armed Forces." Mid-June to July 1961 The Staley Mission A team headed by Eugene Staley (Stanford Research Insitute) was to work with Vietn amese officials in an effort to resolve the continuing problem of how Vietnam wa s to finance its own war effort (deficit financing, inflation, the commodity imp ort program, piaster/dollar exchange rates, all presented difficulties). But the Staley group became the vehicle for force level discussions and economic issues were treated rather perfunctorily. The group "does not consider itself competen t to make specific recommendations as to desired force levels" but adopted two a lternative levels for "economic planning purposes": 200,000 if the insurgency in Vietnam remains at present levels, if Laos does not fall; 270,000 if the Vietco ng significantly increase the insurgency and if the communists win de facto cont rol of Laos. 11 Aug 1961 Kennedy Decision NSAM 65 President Kennedy agreed with the Staley Report (of 4 August) that security requirements demanded first priori ty, that economic and social programs had to be accelerated, that it was in the US interest to promote a viable Vietnam. He agreed to support an ARVN increase t o 200,000 if Diem in turn agreed to a plan for using these forces. The 270,000 l evel was thus disapproved. But the plan for using ARVN forces had not yet been d rawn. Diem had not yet designed--much less implemented--social reforms supposedl y required in return for US assistance. 15 Aug 1961 NIE 14-3/53.61 Although coll apse of the Saigon regime might come by a coup or from Diem's death, its fall be cause of a "prolonged and difficult" struggle was not predicted. Late Aug 1961 T heodore White Reports "The situation gets worse almost week by week . . ." parti cularly the military situation in the delta. If the U.S. decides it must interve ne, White asked if we had the people, instruments or clear objectives to make it successful. 1 Sep 1961 General McGarr Reports

The ARVN has displayed increased efficiency, a spirit of renewed confidence is " beginning to permeate the people, the GVN and the Armed Forces." 27 Sep 1961 Nol ting Reports Nolting was "unable report . . . progress toward attaining task for ce goals of creating viable and increasingly democratic society," called the gov ernment and civil situation unchanged from early September. A series of large sc ale VC attacks in central Vietnam, the day-long VC seizure of Phuoc Vinh, capita l of [former] Phuoc Thanh Province--55 miles from Saigon--in which the VC public ly beheaded Diem's province chief and escaped before government troops arrived a nd increased infiltration through Laos demonstrated "that the tide has not yet t urned" militarily. 1 Oct 1961 Diem Request Diem requested a bilateral treaty wit h the U.S. This surprised Nolting but probably did not surprise the White House, already warned by White of the grave military situation. 1 Oct 1961 State "Firs t 12-Month Report" This political assessment mirrored Nolting's "no progress" re port but State found the military situation more serious than Embassy reports ha d indicated. 5 Oct 1961 The "Rostow Proposal" Suggested a 25,000-man SEATO force be put into Vietnam to guard the Vietnam/Laos border between the DMZ and Cambod ia. (The Pathet Lao had gained during September, as had VC infiltration through Laos to the GVN. This prompted plans for U.S. action.) 9 Oct 1961 JCSM 717-61 Th e JCS rejected the Rostow proposal: forces would be stretched thin, they could n ot stop infiltration, and would be at the worst place to oppose potential DRV'CH ICOM invasion. The Chiefs wanted to make a "concentrated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken saving all or substantially all of Laos which would, at the same time, protect Thailand and protect the borders of South Vietnam." But i f this were "politically unacceptable" the Chiefs "provided... ....a possible li mited interim course of action": deployment of about 20,000 troops to the centra l highlands near Pleiku to assist the GVN and free certain GVN forces for offens ive action against the VC. 10 Oct 1961 "Concept of Intervention in Vietnam" Draf ted by Alexis Johnson, the paper blended Rostow's border control proposal with t he JCS win-control-of-the-highlands counterproposal for the initial mission of U .S. forces in Vietnam. "The real and ultimate objective" of U.S. troops was also addressed. To defeat the Vietcong and render Vietnam secure under a non-Communi st government, Johnson

"guessed" three divisions would be the ultimate force required in support of the "real objective." The paper estimated a satisfactory settlement in Laos would r educe but not eliminate infiltration into South Vietnam, that even if infiltrati on were cut down, there was no assurance that the GVN could "in the foreseeable future be able to defeat the Viet Cong." Unilateral U.S. action would probably b e necessary. The plan's viability was dependent on the degree in which the GVN a ccelerated "political and military action in its own defense." 11 Oct 1961 NSC M eeting on Vietnam The NSC considered four papers: the Alexis Johnson draft; an N IE estimate that SEATO action would be opposed by the DRV, Viet Cong and the Sov iet Union (airlift), that these forces stood a good chance of thwarting the SEAT O intervention; third, a JCS estimate that 40,000 U.S. troops would be required to "clean up the Viet Cong threat" and another 128,000 men would be needed to op pose DRV/CHICOM intervention (draining 3 to 4 reserve divisions). Finally, a mem orandum from William Bundy to McNamara which said "it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Viet Cong," and gave "an early and hard-hitting operation" a 70 percent chance of doing that. Bundy added, the chan ce of cleaning up the situation "depends on Diem's effectiveness, which is very problematical," favored going in with 70-30 odds but figured the odds would slid e down if the U.S. "let, say, a month go by" before moving. 13 Oct 1961 Saigon M essage 488 Reversing his previous position, Diem requested an additional fighter -bomber squadron, civilian pilots for helicopters and C-47 transports and U.S. c ombat units for a "combattraining" mission near the DMZ, possibly also in the hi ghlands. He asked consideration be given a possible request for a division of Ch iang Kai-shek's troops to support the GVN. Nolting recommended "serious and prom pt" attention for the requests. 14 Oct 1961 New York Times In an article leaked by the government--perhaps by Kennedy himself--leaders were called reluctant to send U.S. combat units into Southeast Asia. Obviously untrue, the leak was proba bly designed to end speculation about troop deployment and guard Kennedy's freed om of action. 20 Oct 1961 CINCPAC Recommendation Admiral Felt felt the pros and cons of U.S. troop deployment added up in favor of no deployment until other mea ns of helping Diem had been exhausted. 18-24 Oct 1961 Taylor Mission to Vietnam

On the 18th, Diem said he wanted no U.S. combat troops for any mission. He repea ted his request for a bilateral defense treaty, more support for ARVN and combat -support equipment (helicopters, aircraft, etc.). 23 Oct 1961 Ch MAAG Message Ge neral McGarr suggested that the serious Mekong River flood could provide a cover for U.S. troop deployment: combat units could be disguised as humanitarian reli ef forces and be dispatched to the delta. 25 Oct 1961 Saigon Message 536 Taylor reported the pervasive crisis of confidence and serious loss in Vietnamese natio nal morale created by Laos and the flood, weakened the war effort. To cope with this Taylor recommended: Improvement of intelligence on the VC; building ARVN mo bility; blocking infiltration into the highlands by organizing a border ranger f orce; introduction of U.S. forces either for emergency, short-term assistance, o r for more substantial, longterm support (a flood relief plus military reserve t ask force). Diem had reacted favorably "on all points." 1 Nov 1961 BAGUIO Messag e 0005 Taylor told the President, Rusk and McNamara "we should put in a task for ce (6-8,000 men) consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of part icipating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a U.S. military pres ence in Vietnam capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a milit ary showdown with the Viet Cong 1 Nov 1961 BAGUIO 0006 EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDE NT Taylor concluded that the communist strategy of taking over Southeast Asia by guerrilla warfare was "well on the way to success in Vietnam"; he said the GVN was caught in "interlocking circles" of bad tactics and bad administrative arran gements which allow VC gains and invite a political crisis. He recommended more U.S. support for paramilitary groups and ARVN mobility; the MAAG should be reorg anized and increased and the task force introduced to "conduct such combat opera tions as are necessary for selfdefense and for the security of the area in which (it) is stationed," among other things. Taylor felt the disadvantages of deploy ment were outweighted by gains, said SVN is "not an excessively difficult or unp leasant place to operate" and the "risks of backing into a major Asian war by wa y of SVN" are not impressive: North Vietnam "is extremely vulnerable to conventi onal bombing . . . there is no case for fearing a mass onslaught of communist ma npower . . . particularly if our air power is allowed a free hand against logist ical targets . . ." 3 Nov 1961 Taylor Report

The "Evaluation and Summary" section suggested urgency and optimism: SVN is in t rouble, major U.S. interests are at stake; prompt and energetic U.S. action--mil itary, economic, political--can lead to victory without a U.S. take-over of the war, can cure weaknesses in the Diem regime. That the Vietnamese must win the wa r was a unanimous view--but most mission participants believed all Vietnamese op erations could be substantially improved by America's "limited partnership" with the GVN. The GVN is cast in the best possible light; any suggestion that the U. S. should limit rather than expand its commitment--or face the need to enter the battle in full force at this time-is avoided. Underlying the summary was the no tion that "graduated measures on the DRV (applied) with weapons of our own choos ing" could reverse any adverse trend in the South. And ground troops were always possible. The Taylor Report recommended the U.S. make obvious its readiness to act, develop reserve strength in the U.S "to cover action in Southeast Asia up t o the nuclear threshold in that area" and thereby sober the enemy and discourage escalation. However, bombing was a more likely Vietnam contingency than was use of ground troops; the latter option was tied to a U.S. response to renewed figh ting in Laos and/or overt invasion of South Vietnam. But Taylor suggested troops be sent to Diem; the Taylor Report and cables recommend combat troop deployment to Vietnam. (A message from Nolting summarizing the Diem-Taylor meeting on whic h the recommendations apparently rest [Saigon message 541, 25 Oct 61] does not i ndicate any enthusiasm on Diem's part to deployment of troops, however. He hinte d U.S. troops for training might be requested, then dropped the subject.) Append ices to the Taylor Report written by members of the group give a slightly differ ent picture. There is less optimism about the GVN's chances of success, less opt imism about chances of U.S action--political or military--tipping the balance. F or example: William Jordan (State) said almost all Vietnamese interviewed had em phasized the gravity of the situation, growing VC successes and loss of confiden ce in Diem. The ARVN lacked aggressiveness, was devoid of any sense of urgency, short of able leaders. Sterling Cottrell (State) said: It is an open question wh ether the G\TN can succeed even with U.S. assistance. Thus it would be a mistake to make an irrevocable U.S. commitment to defeat communists in South Vietnam. F oreign military forces cannot win the battle at the village level--where it must be joined; the primary responsibility for saving Vietnam must rest with the GVN . For these reasons Cottrell argued against a treaty which would either shift ul timate responsibility to the U.S. or engage a full U.S. commitment to defeat the Vietcong. Nov 1961 SNIE 10-4-61 This estimated the DRV would respond to an incr eased U.S troop commitment by increasing support to the Vietcong. If U.S. commit ment to the GVN grew, so would DRV support to the VC. Four possible U.S. courses were given: airlift plus more help for ARVN; deployment of 8-10,000 troops as a flood relief task force; deployment of 25-40,000 combat troops; with each cours e, warn Hanoi of U.S. determination to hold SVN and U.S. intention to bomb the D RV if its support for the VC did not cease. The SNIE estimated air attacks again st the North would not cause its VC support to stop and figured Moscow and Pekin g would react strongly to air attacks.

8 Nov 1961 McNamara Memorandum for the President Secretary McNamara, Gilpatric a nd the JCS were "inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S. to the clear o bjective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism and that we suppor t this commitment by the necessary military actions." The memorandum said the fa ll of Vietnam would create "extremely serious" strategic implications worldwide, that chances were "probably sharply against" preventing that fall without a U.S . troop commitment but that even with major-troop deployment (205,000 was the ma ximum number of ground forces estimated necessary to deal with a large overt inv asion from the DRV and/or China) the U.S. would still be at the mercy of externa l forces--Diem, Laos, domestic political problems, etc.--and thus success could not be guaranteed. McNamara recommended against deployment of a task force (the 8,000-man group mentioned in the Taylor Report) "unless we are willing to make a n affirmative decision" to fully support a commiment to save South Vietnam. 11 N ov 1961 Rusk/McNamara Memorandum for the President This may have been prepared a t Kennedy's specific instruction; it recommended what Kennedy wanted to hear: th at the decision to commit major ground forces could be deferred. In this paper, rhetoric is escalated from that of McNamara's 8 November memorandum but U.S. act ions recommended are far less significant, less committing. Military courses are divided into two phrases: first, promptly deploy support troops and equipment ( helicopters, transport aircraft, maritime equipment and trainers, special intell igence and air reconnaissance groups, other men and materiel to improve training , logistics, economic and other assistance programs). Then study and possibly de ploy major ground combat forces at a later date. Despite the clear warning that even deployment of major U.S. units could not assure success against communism, the memorandum's initial recommendation was that the U.S. "commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism," be prepar ed to send troops and to "strike at the source of aggression in North Vietnam." A number of diplomatic moves (in the U.N., in NATO and SEATO councils, etc.) are suggested to signal U.S. determination; economic, social and other programs des igned to help South Vietnam are suggested; ways to elicit improvements from Diem are recommended. 14 Nov 1961 DEPTEL 619 to Saigon This was Nolting's guidance, based on the Rusk/McNamara memorandum. Nolting was told the anti-guerrilla effor t "must essentially be a GVN task . . . No amount of extra aid can be substitute d for GVN taking measures to permit [it] to assume offensive and strengthen the administrative and political bases of government....Do not propose to introduce into GVN the U.S. combat troops now but propose a phase of intense public and di plomatic activity to focus on inifitration from North. Shall decide later on cou rse of action should infiltration not be radically reduced." Diem's taking neces sary measures--political, military, economic--to improve his government and rela tions with the people were a prerequisite to further U.S. assistance: "Package s hould be presented as first steps in a

partnership in which the U.S. is prepared to do more as joint study of facts and GVN performance makes increased U.S. aid possible and productive." Strictly for his own information, Nolting was told Defense was "preparing plans for the use of U.S. combat forces in SVN under various contingencies, including stepped up i nfiltration as well as organized ....(military) intervention. However, objective of our policy is to do all possible to accomplish purpose without use of U.S. c ombat forces." And, Nolting was to tell Diem: "We would expect to share in the d ecision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they af fect the security situation." 22 Nov 1961 NSAM 111 Called the "First Phase of Vi etnam Program" this NSAM approved all Rusk/McNamara recommendations of 11 Novemb er except the first one: their initial recommendation that the U.S. commit itsel f to saving South Vietnam was omitted. 7 Dec. 1961 Alexis Johnson/Rostow Redraft ("Clarification") of Nolting's 14 November Guidance "What we have in mind is th at in operations directly related to the security situation, partnership will be so close that one party will not take decisions or actions affecting the other without full and frank prior consultation." This is different from the idea that American involvement should be so intimate that the GVN would be reformed "from the bottom up"--despite Diem. (Although Washington gave in--or gave up--on the kind and degree of pressure to exert on Diem, Washington did not soften on Lansd ale. Despite four requests from Diem and the recommendations from Cottrell, the Taylor Report and William Bundy that Lansdale be sent to Saigon, he did not get there until late 1965.) 11 Dec 1961 New York Times Two U.S. helicopter companies (33 H-2lCs, 400 men) arrived in Vietnam, the first direct U.S. military support for the GVN. ICC reaction: shall we continue functioning here in the face of U. S. assistance (increase barred by the Geneva Accords)? 15 Dec. 1961 New York Tim es Reported the formal exchange of letters between Kennedy and Diem announcing a stepped-up aid program for Vietnam. I. BACKGROUND A. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1959, it was hard to find an American official worried about Vi etnam. This was not because things were going well. They were not. A National In telligence Estimate published in August portrayed Diem as unpopular, his economy as developing less rapidly than its rival in the North, and his government unde r pressure from guerrillas encouraged and in part supported from the North. Neve rtheless, the NIE suggested no crisis then or for the foreseeable future. What t he NIE called "harassment" (i.e., support for the VC) from the North would conti nue, but overt invasion seemed most unlikely. Neither communist nor anti-communi st enemies within South Vietnam were seen as an immediate threat. Diem would rem ain as President, said the NIE, "for many years." In sum, the NIE saw the situat ion in Vietnam as unhappy, but not unstable. That was to be about as close to go od news as we would hear from South Vietnam for a long time. From then on, the c lassified record through the end of 1961 shows a succession of bleak appraisals of the regime's support in the cities, and among the military, almost always acc ompanied by increasingly bleak estimates of increased VC strength and activity i n the countryside. A dispatch from our Embassy in Saigon in March, 1960, describ ed the situation in grave terms, but ended on the hopeful note that as of Januar y Diem was recognizing his problems and promising to do something about them. In August, an NIE analysis reported a "marked deterioration since January." In Nov ember, a military coup barely failed to overthrow Diem. In January, 1961 an old counterinsurgency hand, General Edward Lansdale, went to Vietnam to look things over for the Secretary of Defense. He returned with a report that "the Viet Cong hope to win back Vietnam south of the 17th parallel this year, if at all possib le, and are much further along towards accomplishing this goal than I had realiz ed from reading the reports received in Washington." Nevertheless, the situation was never seen as nearly so grave as these reports, read years later, might sug gest. We will see that at least up until the fall of 1961, while appraisals of t he situation sometimes suggested imminent crisis, the recommendations made to th e President (by the authors of these frightening appraisals) always implied a le ss pessimistic view. The top levels of the Kennedy Administration dealt only int ermittently with the problem of Vietnam during 1961. There was a flurry of activ ity in late April and early May, which we will see was essentially an offshoot o f the Laos crisis which had come to a head at that time. A much more thorough re view was undertaken in the fall, following General Taylor's mission to Saigon, w hich then led to an important expansion of the American effort in Vietnam. No fu ndamental new American decisions on Vietnam were made until the Buddhist unrest in the last half of 1963, and no major new military decisions were made until 19 65. Consequently, the decisions in the fall of 1961 (essentially, to provide com bat support-for example, helicopter companies-but to defer any decision on direc t combat troops) have come to seem very important. This paper tries to describe what led up to those decisions, what alternatives were available and what the im plications of the choices were.

The story is a fairly complicated one. For although it is hard to recall that co ntext today, Vietnam in 1961 was a peripheral crisis. Even within Southeast Asia it received far less of the Administration's and the world's attention than did Laos. The New York Times Index for 1961 has eight columns of Vietnam, twenty-si x on Laos. Decisions about Vietnam were greatly influenced by what was happening elsewhere. In the narrow Vietnamese context, the weaknesses and peculiarities o f the Diem government had a substantial, if not always obvious, impact on the be havior of both the Vietnamese officials seeking Amencan aid and the American dec ision-makers pondering the nature and terms of the aid they would offer. As it h appens, the Eisenhower Administration was never faced with a need for high-level decisions affecting the crisis developing in Vietnam during 1960. A formal Coun terinsurgency Plan, intended to be the basis of an expanded program of assistanc e to Vietnam, was being worked on through most of that year, but (presumably ref lecting a subdued sense of urgency), it took eight months to reach the White Hou se. By that time, a new Administration had just taken office. President Kennedy promptly approved the plan, but this merely set off lengthy negotiations with th e Vietnamese about whether and when they would do their share of the CIP. In Apr il, though, a crisis atmosphere developed, not because of anything fresh out of Vietnam, but because of a need to shore up the Vietnamese and others in Southeas t Asia in the face of a likely collapse of the U.S. position in Laos. This led t o a U.S. offer to discuss putting American troops into Vietnam, or perhaps negot iate a bilateral security treaty with the Vietnamese. When, however, Vice Presid ent Johnson mentioned the possibility of troops to Diem in May, Diem said he wan ted no troops yet. The idea of a bilateral treaty similarly slipped out of sight . Consequently, although the United States had itself indicated a willingness in May to discuss a deeper commitment, the South Vietnamese did not take up the op portunity, and the Administration had no occasion to face up to really hard deci sions. But by October, the situation in Vietnam had worsened. The VC were becomi ng disturbingly aggressive. Now, Diem did raise the question of a treaty. This r equest, coming after the American offer in May to consider such steps and in the context of a worsening situation in Vietnam, could hardly be ignored. The Taylo r Mission and the Presidential review and decisions of November followed. The pr esent paper is organized around these natural climaxes in the policy process. Th e balance of Part I describes the situation inherited by the new Administration. Part II covers the period through the May peak. Part III covers the fall crisis . B. THE CONTEXT In January, 1961, there were five issues that were going to aff ect American policy toward Vietnam. They turned on: 1. The VC Insurgency Itself

An illustration of the growth of the insurgency, but also of the limits of U.S. concern can be seen in the 1960 CINCPAC Command History. For several years prior to 1960, CINCPAC histories do not mention the VC insurgency at all. In 1960, th e development of a counterinsurgency plan for Vietnam (and simultaneously one fo r Laos) received a fair amount of attention. But when, in April, MAAG in Saigon asked for additional transports and helicopters for the counterinsurgency effort , CINCPAC turned down the requests for transports, and OSD overruled the recomme ndation CINCPAC forwarded for 6 helicopters. By December, OSD was willing to app rove sending 11 helicopters (of 16 newly requested) on an "emergency" basis. But the emergency was partly a matter of reassuring Diem after the November coup, a nd the degree of emergency is suggested by the rate of delivery: 4 in December, and the balance over the next three months. The record, in general, indicates a level of concern such as that illustrated by the helicopter decisions: growing g radually through 1960, but still pretty much of a backburner issue so far as the attention and sense of urgency it commanded among policylevel officials. As we will see, the new Kennedy Administration gave it more attention, as the Eisenhow er Administration undoubtedly would have had it remained in office. But it is im portant (though hard, now that Vietnam has loomed so large) to keep in mind how secondary an issue the VC threat to Vietnam seemed to be in early 1961. 2. Probl ems with the Diem Government Yet, although the VC gains were not seen--even in t he dispatches from Saigon--as serious enough to threaten the immediate collapse of the Diem government, those gains did have the effect of raising difficult que stions about our relations with Diem that we had never had to face before. For b y late 1960, it was a quite widely held view that the Diem government was probab ly going to be overthrown sooner or later, barring major changes from within. In contrast to the May 1959 NIE's confident statement that Diem "almost certainly" would remain president "for many years," we find the August 1960 NIE predicting that the recent "adverse trends," if continued, would "almost certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's regime." The simple, unhappy fact was that whateve r his triumphs in 1955 and 1956, by the end of the 1950s the feeling was growing that the best thing that could be said for Diem was that he was holding the cou ntry together and keeping it from succumbing to the communists. Once even this c ame into doubt, talk among Vietnamese and eventually among Americans of whether it might be better to look for alternative leadership became inevitable. The sen se of trouble shows through even among the optimists. We find Kenneth Young, U.S . Ambassador to Thailand and a strong believer in Diem, warning him in October, 1960 that "there seems to be somewhat of a crisis of confidence in Vietnam." But the long list of measures Young suggested were all tactical in nature, and requ ired no basic changes in the regime.

Our Ambassador in Saigon (Eldridge Durbrow) was more pessimistic: ....situation in Viet-Nam [December, 1960] is highly dangerous to US interests. Communists are engaged in large-scale guerrilla effort to take over countryside and oust Diem' s Government. Their activities have steadily increased in intensity throughout t his year. In addition, Diem is faced with widespread popular dissatisfaction wit h his government's inability to stem the communist tide and its own heavy-handed methods of operation. It seems clear that if he is to remain in power he must m eet these two challenges by improvements in his methods of conducting war agains t communists and in vigorous action to build greater popular support. We should help and encourage him to take effective action. Should he not do so, we may wel l be forced, in not too distant future, to undertake difficult task of identifyi ng and supporting alternate leadership. But the difficulties (and risks) of that task looked forbidding. During the November, 1960 coup attempt the U.S. had app arently used its influence to get the coup leaders to negotiate with Diem for re forms, allowing Diem to retain his position with reduced powers. Whether because of their own indecision or U.S. pressure, the coup leaders allowed a delay that let Diem bring loyalist troops in to regain control. (Three years later, a lead er of the November, 1963 coup "somewhat emphatically" told an American agent tha t "it would do no good to send anyone around to attempt to stop things, as happe ned in November, 1960.") The situation that was left--with a number of American officials unhappy with Diem and doubtful that he was capable of winning the war, yet unwilling to risk a coup--produced strains within the American government. Short of encouraging a coup, we seemed to have two alternatives: attempt to pres sure Diem or attempt to so win his confidence that he would accept our advice wi llingly. The only effective form of U.S. pressure, however, was to withhold aid, and doing so would sooner or later weaken the war effort. Consequently a divisi on developed, mainly (but not purely) along the lines of Defense against State, about the advisability of using pressure. The division was particularly sharp si nce Diem seemed willing to go part way, at least, in meeting our military sugges tions, so that the Defense view tended to be that the U.S. would be weakening th e war effort if aid were withheld to seek to gain civil reforms that not many pe ople in Defense regarded as crucial. Besides, it was argued, Diem would not succ umb to pressure anyway. We would just encourage another coup, and the communists would exploit it. Given this sort of argument, there would always (at least thr ough 1961) be at least two layers to decisions about aid to Vietnam: What should the U.S. be willing to give? and What, if any, demands should be made on Diem i n return for the aid? 3. Problems with the Soviets But from Washington, both pro blems within Vietnam--how to deal with Viet Cong, and how to deal with Diem--see med quite inconsequential tred to the problems of dealing with the Soviets. Ther e were two elements to the Soviet problem. The first, which only

indirectly affected Vietnam, was the generally aggressive and confident posture of the Russians at that time, and generally defensive position of the Americans. To use W.W. Rostow's terminolgy the Soviets were then entering the third year o f their "post-sputnik" offensive, and their aggressiveness would continue throug h the Cuban missile crisis. On the U.S. side there was dismay even among Republi cans (openly, for example, by Rockefeller; necessarily subdued by Nixon, but rep orted by any number of journalists on the basis of private conversations) at wha t seemed to be an erosion of the American position in the world. The Coolidge Co mmission, appointed by the President, warned him in January, 1960, to, among oth er steps "close the missile gap" and generally strengthen our defenses. Kennedy, of course, made erosion of our position in the world a major campaign issue. Al l of this made 1961 a peculiarly difficult year for Americans to make concession s, or give ground to the Soviets when it could be avoided, or even postponed. Th at was clear in January, and everything thereafter that was, or could be interpr eted to be a weak U.S. response, only strengthened the pressure to hold on in Vi etnam. A further element of the Soviet problem impinged directly on Vietnam. The new Administration, even before taking office, was inclined to believe that unc onventional warfare was likely to be terrifically important in the 1960s. In Jan uary 1961, Krushchev seconded that view with his speech pledging Soviet support to "wars of national liberation." Vietnam was where such a war was actually goin g on. Indeed, since the war in Laos had moved far beyond the insurgency stage, V ietnam was the only place in the world where the Administration faced a well-dev eloped Communist effort to topple a pro-Western government with an externally-ai ded pro-communist insurgency. It was a challenge that could hardly be ignored. 4 . The Situation in Laos Meanwhile, within Southeast Asia itself there was the pe culiar problem of Laos, where the Western position was in the process of falling apart as Kennedy took office. The Eisenhower Administration had been giving str ong support to a pro-American faction in Laos. As a consequence, the neutralist faction had joined in an alliance with the procommunist faction. The Soviets wer e sending aid to the neutralist/communist alliance, which they recognized as the legitimate government in Laos; the U.S. recognized and aided the pro-western fa ction. Unfortunately, it turned out that the neutralist/communist forces were fa r more effective than those favored by the U.S., and so it became clear that onl y by putting an American army into Laos could the pro-Western faction be kept in power. Indeed, it was doubtful that even a coalition government headed by the n eutralists (the choice the U.S. adopted) could be salvaged. The coalition govern ment solution would raise problems for other countries in Southeast Asia: there would be doubts about U.S. commitments in that part of the world, and (since it was obvious that the communist forces would be left with de facto control of eas tern Laos), the settlement would create direct security threats for Thailand and Vietnam. These problems would accompany a "good" outcome in Laos (the coalition government); if the Pathet Lao chose to simply overrun the country outright (as , short of direct American intervention, they had the power to do), the problem elsewhere in Southeast Asia would be so much the worse.

Consequently, throughout 1961, we find the effects of the Laos situation spillin g over onto Vietnam. 5. The Special American Commitment to Vietnam Finally, in t his review of factors that would affect policy-making on Vietnam, we must note t hat South Vietnam, (unlike any of the other countries in Southeast Asia) was ess entially the creation of the United States. Without U.S. support Diem almost cer tainly could not have consolidated his hold on the South during 1955 and 1956. W ithout the threat of U.S. intervention, South Vietnam could not have refused to even discuss the elections called for in 1956 under the Geneva settlement withou t being immediately overrun by the Viet Minh armies. Without U.S. aid in the yea rs following, the Diem regime certainly, and an independent South Vietnam almost as certainly, could not have survived. Further, from 1954 on there had been rep eated statements of U.S. support for South Vietnam of a sort that we would not f ind in our dealings with other countries in this part of the world. It is true t here was nothing unqualified about this support: it was always economic, and occ asionally accompanied by statements suggesting that the Diem regime had incurred an obligation to undertake reforms in return for our assistance. But then, unti l 1961, there was no occasion to consider any assistance that went beyond econom ic support and the usual sort of military equipment and advice, and no suggestio n that our continued support was in doubt. Consequently, the U.S. had gradually developed a special commitment in South Vietnam. It was certainly not absolutely binding, even at the level of assistance existing at the start of 1961, much le ss at any higher level the South Vietnamese might come to need or request. But t he commitment was there; to let it slip would be awkward, at the least. Whether it really had any impact on later decisions is hard to say. Given the other fact ors already discussed, it is not hard to believe that in its absence, U.S. polic y might have followed exactly the same course it has followed. On the other hand , in the absence of a pre-existing special relation with South Vietnam, the U.S. in 1961 possibly would have at least considered a coalition government for Viet nam as well as Laos, and chosen to limit direct U.S. involvement to Thailand and other countries in the area historically independent of both Hanoi and Peking. But that is the mootest sort of question. For if there had been no pre-existing commitment to South Vietnam in 1961, there would not have been a South Vietnam t o worry about anyway. C. SUMMARY Looking over the context we have been reviewing , it seems like a situation in which mistakes would be easy to make. The Viet Co ng threat was serious enough to demand

action; but not serious enough to compete with other crises and problems for the attention of senior decision-makers. A sound decision on tactics and levels of commitment to deal with the Viet Cong involved as much a judgment on the interna l politics of noncommunists in Vietnam as it did a judgment of the guerrillas' s trength, and character, and relation with Hanoi. (Even a judgement that the war could be treated as a strictly military problem after all, involved at least an implicit judgement, and a controversial one, about Vietnamese politics.) Even if Diem looked not worth supporting it would be painful to make a decision to let him sink, and especially so in the world context of 1961. Faced with a challenge to deal with wars of national liberation, it would be hard to decide that the f irst one we happened to meet was "not our style." And after the U.S. stepped bac k in Laos, it might be hard to persuade the Russians that we intended to stand f irm anywhere if we then gave up on Vietnam. Finally, if the U.S. suspected that the best course in Vietnam was to seek immediately an alternative to Diem, no on e knew who the alternative might he, or whether getting rid of Diem would really make things better. Such was the prospect of Vietnam as 1961 began, and a new A dministration took office. II. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY PLAN A. WINTER, 1961 The Vi etnam Counter-Insurgency Plan which was being worked on through most of 1960 fin ally reached the White House in late January, apparently just after Kennedy took office. We do not have a document showing the exact date, but we know that Kenn edy approved the main provisions of the Plan after a meeting on January 28th, an d negotiations with Diem began February 13. The provisions of the CIP tell a goo d deal about how the Viet Cong threat looked to American and Vietnamese official s at the beginning of 1961, for there is nothing in the record to suggest that a nyone-either in Saigon or Washington, Vietnamese or Americanjudged the CIP to be an inadequate response to the VC threat. The U.S. offered Diem equipment and su pplies to outfit a 20,000 man increase in his army. The cost was estimated at $2 8.4 million. The U.S. also offered to train, outfit and supply 32,000 men of the Civil Guard (a counterguerrilla auxiliary) at a cost of $12.7 million. These tw o moves would help Diem expand the RVNAF to a total of 170,000 men, and expand t he Civil Guard to a total of 68,000 men. There were some further odds and ends t otalling less than another million. The full package added up to less than $42 m illion, which was a substantial but not enormous increment to on-going U.S. aid to Vietnam of about $220 million a year. (Since most of these costs were for ini tial outfitting for new forces, the package was mainly a one-time shot in the ar m.) For their part, the Vietnamese were supposed to pay the local currency costs of the new forces, and carry out a number of military and civil reforms.

The key military reforms were to straighten out the chain of command, and to dev elop an agreed overall plan of operations. The chain of command problem was that control of the counterinsurgency effort in the provinces was divided between th e local military commander and the Province Chief, a personal appointee of Diem, and reporting directly to Diem. Even at a higher level, 3 regional field comman ds reported directly to Diem, by-passing the Chief of Staff. So a total of 42 of ficials with some substantial (and overlapping) control of the war effort report ed directly to Diem: 38 Province Chiefs, 3 regional commanders, and the Chief of Staff. The "reform" eventually gotten from Diem put the regional commanders und er the Chief of Staff, and combined the office of Province Chief (usually a mili tary man in any event) and local field commander. But the Province Chiefs still were personally responsible to Diem, and could appeal directly to him outside th e nominal chain of command. Diem's reform, consequently, turned out to be essent ially meaningless. His reluctance to move on this issue was not surprising. Afte r all, the division and confusion of military authority served a real purpose fo r a ruler like Diem, with no broad base of support: it lessened the chance of a coup that would throw him out. The overall plan issue, on which not even a paper agreement was reached during the period covered by this account, was really an argument over strategy. It has a familiar ring. Diem seemed oriented very much t owards maintaining at least the pretense of control over all of South Vietnam. C onsequently, he favored maintaining military outposts (and concentrating the pop ulation in Agrovilles, the predecessors of the strategic hamlets) along "lines o f strength" (generally main roads) which stretched throughout the country. To as sert at least nominal control over the countryside between these lines of streng th, the military forces would periodically organize a sweep. In contrast to this , the American plan stressed what MAAG called a "net and spear" concept. Small u nits would scour the jungles beyond the pacified area. When this "net" found an enemy unit, they would call in reserves (the spear) for a concentrated attempt t o destroy the unit. As new areas were thus cleared, the net would be pushed furt her out into previously uncontested areas. It is not clear how well refined eith er concept was, or (with hindsight) whether the American plan was really a great deal more realistic than Diem's. But the American interest is getting Diem to a gree to a plan does seem to have been primarily oriented to getting him to agree to some systematic procedure for using forces to clear areas of VC control, ins tead of tying up most of his forces defending fixed installations, with periodic uneventful sweeps through the hinterland. On the civil side, the stress in the CIP was on trying to shore up the regime's support within the cities by such ste ps as bringing opposition leaders into the government, and giving the National A ssembly the power to investigate charges of mismanagement and corruption in the executive. The Plan also called for "civic action" and other steps to increase t he change of winning positive loyalty from the peasants.

A good deal of bureaucratic compromise had gone into the CIP. Ambassador Durbrow only reluctantly conceded any real need for the 20,000 man force increase. The stress on civil reforms, in particular on civil reforms as part of a quid pro qu o, came into the plan only after the Saigon Embassy became involved, although th ere were general allusions to such things even in the original military draft of the CIP. Nevertheless, there was at least a paper agreement, and so far as the record shows, substantial real agreement as well. No one complained the plan was inadequate. It would, "if properly implemented," "turn the tide." And, by impli cation, it would do so without any major increase in American personnel in Vietn am, and indeed, aside from the oneshot outfitting of the new units, without even any major increase in American aid. None of this meant that the warnings that w e have seen in the Saigon Embassy's dispatches or in the August SNIE were not se riously intended. What it did mean was that, as of early 1961, the view that was presented to senior officials in Washington essentially showed the VC threat as a problem which could be pretty confidently handled, given a little more muscle for the army and some shaping up by the Vietnamese administration. Any doubts e xpressed went to the will and comptence of the Diem regime, not to the strength of the VC, the role of Hanoi, or the adequacy of U.S. aid. Consequently, among t he assumptions listed as underlying the CIP, we find (with emphasis added): That the Government of Viet-Nam has the basic potential to cope with the Viet Cong g uerrilla threat if necessary corrective measures are taken and adequate forces a re provided. That of course was the heart of the CIP bargain: the U.S. would pro vide support for the "adequate forces" if Diem would take the "necessary correct ive steps." The hinted corollary was that our commitment to Diem should be conti ngent on his performance: That at the present time the Diem government offers th e best hope for defeating the Viet Cong. B. LANSDALE'S REPORT Running against th ese suggestions (of a firm bargaining position contingent On Diem s performance) , was concern that if Diem were overthrown his successors might be no better; an d that the VC might exploit the confusion and perhaps even civil war following a coup. Further, there was an argument that part of Diem's reluctance to move on reforms was that he was afraid to make any concession that might weaken his grip : consequently the U.S. needed to reassure him that he could count on our firm s upport to him personally. A strong statement of this point of view is contained in a report submitted in January by Brig. General Edward Lansdale, then the Assi stant to the Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations. Lansdale had become famous for his work in the Philippines a dvising on the successful campaign against the Huk insurgents. In 1955 and 1956, he was a key figure in installing and establishing Diem as President of South V ietnam. As mentioned in the Introduction, Lansdaie visited Vietnam in early Janu ary. Here, from his report, are a few extracts On Diem and how Lansdale felt he should be handled: We must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong executive can replace him legally. President Diem feels that Americans have attacked him a lmost as viciously as the Communists, and he has withdrawn into a shell for self -protection. We have to show him by deeds, not words alone, that we are his frie nd. This will make our influence effective again. ....If the next American offic ial to talk to President Diem would have the good sense to see him as a human be ing who has been through a lot of hell for years-and not as an opponent to be be aten to his knees-we would start regaining our influence with him in a healthy w ay. Whatever else we might think of him, he has been unselfish in devoting his l ife to his country and has little in personal belongings to show for it. If we d on't like the heavy influence of Brother Nhu, then let's move someone of ours in close. This someone, however, must be able to look at problems with understandi ng, suggest better solutions than does Nhu, earn a position of influence.... Amb assador Durbrow should be transferred in the immediate future. He has been in th e "forest of tigers" which is Vietnam for nearly four years now and I doubt that he himself realizes how tired he has become or how close he is to the individua l trees in this big woods. Correctly or not, the recognized government of Vietna m does not look upon him as a friend, believing he sympathized strongly with the coup leaders of 11 November. ....Ngo Dinh Diem is still the only Vietnamese wit h executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President. I believe there will be another attempt to get rid of him soon, unless the U.S. makes it clear that we are backing him as the elected top man. If the 11 Novemb er coup had been successful, I believe that a number of highly selfish and medio cre people would be squabbling among themselves for power while the Communists t ook over. The Communists will be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt.... Lansdale's view was not immediately taken up, even though Hilsman reports that his presentation impressed Kennedy enough to start the President thinking about sending the General to Saigon as our next Ambassador. Instead, Kennedy made what was under the circumstances the easiest, least time-consuming decision, which w as simply to let the Ambassador he had inherited from the Eisenhower Administrat ion go forward and make a try with the plan and negotiating tactics already prep ared. Durbrow's guidance specifically tells him (in instructions he certainly fo und suited his own view perfectly):

....considered U.S. view (is) that success requires implementation entire plan . . . If Ambassador considers GVN does not provide necessary cooperation, he shou ld inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension U.S. cont ribution. C. NEGOTIATING THE CIP Kennedy's approval of the CIP apparently was se en as quite a routine action. None of the memoirs of the period give it any part icular attention. And, although both Schlesinger and Hilsman refer to General La nsdale's report as shocking the President about the state of things in Vietnam, that report itself does not criticize the CIP, or the adequacy of its programs. The guidance to Durbrow assumed agreement could be reached "within two weeks." T his choice of language in the guidance cable implies that we believed Diem would quickly agree on the terms of the CIP, and the question of using pressure again st him ("suspension of U.S. contribution") would only arise later, should he fai l to follow through on his part of the agreement. As it turned out, Durbrow's ef forts took a more complicated form. Even reaching a nominal agreement on the Cip took about 6 weeks. Then, Durbrow recommended holding up what is constantly ref erred to as "the green light" on increased aid until Diem had actually signed de crees implementing his major promises. On March 8 (in response to a Washington s uggestion for stepping up some aid prior to agreement on the CIP), Saigon cabled that: ....despite pressure of Embassy and MAAG, GVN has not decreed the require d measures and will continue to delay unless highly pressured to act. But by the 16th both the MAAG Chief and the Ambassador were taking a gentler line. Durbrow 's cable of that date reports that agreement on military reforms had reached a p oint "which MAAG considers it can live with provided GVN follows through with pr oper implementation." He was more concerned about the civil reforms, but neverth eless concluded the cable with: Comments: Diem was most affable, exuded confiden ce and for first time expressed some gratitude our CIP efforts which he promised implement as best he could. Again before giving full green light believe we sho uld await outcome detail discussion by GVN-US officials. In meantime MAAG quietl y ordering some equipment for 20,000 increase. And a week later, Washington repl ied, agreeing that the "green light" should be held up until the CIP was approve d, but also noting that since success depended on the willing cooperation of the Vietnamese, the Embassy ought not to push Diem too hard in the negotiations.

Following this, the CIP negotiations dragged on inconclusively, and there is a g hostly quality to it all. There are cables giving encouraging progress reports w hich, in fact, seem limited to vague promises which, with hindsight, we know to have been quite meaningless, MAAG (and eventually the JCS in Washington) grew in creasingly impatient with Durbrow's insistence on further holding up the "green light." They wanted to get on with the war. By the end, Durbrow was simply holdi ng out for Diem to actually complete the paperwork on some steps he had long ago said he intended to take. His very last cable (May 3) gives a good feeling for the flavor of the negotiations that had been going on between Diem and Durbrow f or the nearly 3 months since the CIP talks began (and indeed it gives the flavor of Durbrow's relations with Diem at least since the previous October). During t he inauguration reception at Palace April 29, Diem took me aside and asked if I had given green light for US implementation of our part of counter insurgency pl an (CIP). I replied frankly that I had not and noted that as stated in my letter of February 13 certain minimum actions must be taken by the GVN first if CIP is to produce results. I listed following actions: (1) Establishment of a central intelligence organization; (2) assignment of operational control for counter ins urgency operations within military chain of command; and (3) implementation of r eforms announced by Diem on February 6. Diem replied that he would do all these things, but that time was required to work out details. He said various GVN Cabi net members and Joint General Staff studying proposals and have different ideas. Since he wants to be sure that whatever done is well thought out, will be succe ssful and not have to be changed in future he letting responsible officials thor oughly consider proposals. Diem stated that Secretary Thuan working on detailed statute for central intelligence organization, but it required more work and nee ds to be polished up. I replied that frankly time was slipping by and as yet the re no action on these three points, which essential before I can give "green lig ht" on equipment for 20,000 increase in armed forces. In connection Diem remarks , Vice President Tho told me April 28 that he had not seen CIP, although he had heard of its existence, and he does not believe other Ministers have seen it eit her. Question thus arises as to whether Diem's statement that various Cabinet me mbers studying CIP refers only to Thuan. I gave Tho fairly detailed fill-in on C IP contents. Tho said action now by President, at least implementation of reform s, needed in order capitalize on present upswing in popular feeling about situat ion following GVN success in carrying out elections despite VC efforts to disrup t. Stating he did not know when if ever reforms will be implemented, he commente d that failure take such action after so many promises would lose all momentum g ained from elections. Tho added that, aside from psychological impact, reforms l ikely take (sic; make) little change unless Diem himself changes his methods of operating. He noticed that if "super ministers" without real authority they like ly become just additional level in bureaucracy without making GVN more effective .

On May 2 in course my formal farewell call I asked Diem if decrees yet signed on intelligence organization, chain of command and reforms. Diem stated he working on these matters but went through usual citation of difficulties including prob lem of convincing available personnel that they capable and qualified carry out responsibilities. He stated he already named Colonel Nguyen Van Yankee to head i ntelligence organization, Colonel Yankee has selected building for his headquart ers and in process recruiting staff, while Secretary Thuan working on statute fo r organization. Re chain of command, I strongly emphasized that this one of most important factors in CIP, GVN must organize itself to follow national plan with one man in charge operational control and not waste time chasing will of wisps. Diem replied that he not feeling well (he has cold) and with inauguration he ha s not had time focus on this question but he will do it. He stated that he reali zes only effective way is to place counter insurgency operations under Joint Gen eral Staff, but that his generals disagreed as to exactly how this should be don e. Diem, referring Sihanouk's Vietiane press conference (Vientiane's 1979), stat ed he did not believe there would be 14-nation conference and he afraid Laos alm ost lost already. Diem argued that since PL occupy almost all of southern Laos, we must agree increase in RVNAF to provide additional personnel to train self de fense corps which in very bad shape. Comment: Although Thuan has indicated to (M AAG Chief) General McGarr decree designating single officer to conduct counter i nsurgency operations being signed imminently, I asked him morning May 3 when see ing off Harriman and Lemnitzer whether I would receive before departure "present " he has long promised me. He replied presents often come when least expected, w hich apparently means Diem not yet ready sign decree. While we should proceed wi th procurement equipment for 20,000 increase as recommended my 1606, I do not be lieve GVN should be informed of this green light, particularly until above decre e signed. Durbrow. The February 6 reforms referred to involved a cabinet re-orga nization Diem had announced before the start of the CIP negotiations. The intell igence reorganization was to consolidate the 7 existing services. The chain of c ommand problem has been discussed above. Diem finally issued decrees on all thes e points a few days after Durbrow went home. The decrees were essentially meanin gless: exactly these same issues remained high on the list of "necessary reforms " called for after the Taylor Mission, and indeed throughout the rest of Diem's life. D. DURBROW'S TACTICS Did Durbrow's tactics make sense? There is an argumen t to be made both ways. Certainly if Durbrow's focus was on the pro forma paperw ork, then they did not. Mere formal organizational re-arrangements (unifying the then 7 intelligence services into 1, setting up at least a nominal chain of com mand for the war) often change very little even when they

are seriously intended. To the extent they are not seriously intended, they are almost certain to be meaningless. Vice President Tho, of course, is cited in the cable as making exactly that point. The very fact that Durbrow chose to include this remark in the cable (Without questioning it) suggests he agreed. But if sq ueezing the formal decrees out of Diem really did not mean much, then what was t he point of exacerbating relations with Diem (not to mention relations with the military members of the U.S. mission) to get them? In hindsight, we can say ther e was none, unless the U.S. really meant what it had said about making U.S. supp ort for Diem Contingent on his taking "corrective measures." Then the function o f those tactics would not have been to squeeze a probably meaningless concession from Diem; for the cable quoted alone makes it pretty clear that it would have been naive to expect much follow-through from Diem. The purpose would have been to begin the process of separating U.S. support for Vietnam from support for the Diem regime, and to lay the basis for stronger such signals in the future unles s Diem underwent some miraculous reformation. That, of course, is exactly the ta ck the U.S. followed in the fall of 1963, once the Administration had really dec ided that we could not go on with the Diem regime as it then existed. All this c an be said with hindsight. It is not clear how much of this line of thinking sho uld be attributed to American officials in Washington or Saigon at the time. The re is no hint in the cables we have that Durbrow was thinking this way. Rather h e seems to have felt that the concessions he was wringing from Diem represented real progress, but that we would have to keep up the pressure (presumably with t hreats to suspend aid--as his guidance considered--even after the "green light" was given) to keep goading Diem in the right direction. Meanwhile, the predomina nt view (pushed most strongly, but hardly exclusively by the military) was that we should, and could effectively get on with the war with as much cooperation as we could get from Diem short of interfering with the war effort: it was all rig ht to try for a quid pro quo on aid, but not very hard. The Lansdale view went e ven further, stressing the need for a demonstration of positive, essentially unq ualified support for Diem if only to discourage a further coup attempt, which La nsdale saw as the main short-run danger. In a significant way, Lansdale's view w as not very different in its analysis of tactics from the view that Diem was hop eless. Both Lansdale, with his strong pro-Diem view, and men like Gaibraith with a strong anti-Diem view, agreed that Diem could not be pressured into reforming this regime. ("He won't change, because he can't change," wrote Galbraith in a cable we will quote in more detail later.) Where the Lansdale and Gaibraith view s differed--a fundamental difference, of course,-was in their estimate of the ba lance of risks of a coup. Lansdale, and obviously his view carried the day, beli eved that a coup was much more likely to make things worse than make things bett er. This must have been an especially hard view to argue against in 1961, when D iem did not look as hopeless as he would later, and when a strong argument could be made that the U.S. just could not afford at that time to risk the collapse o f a proWestern government in Vietnam. It must have seemed essentially irresistib le to take the route or at least postponing, as seemed quite feasible, a decisio n on such a tough and risky course as holding back on support for Diem. The Pres ident, after all, could

remember the charges that the Truman Administration had given away China by hold ing back on aid to Chiang to try to pressure him toward reform. As a young Congr essman, he had even joined the chorus. Meanwhile Durbrow was about to come home (he had been in Vietnam for 4 years); security problems in Vietnam were, at best , not improving; and the repercussions of Laos were spilling over and would make further moves on Vietnam an urgent matter. By the middle of April, the Administ ration was undertaking its first close look at the problem in Vietnam (in contra st to the almost automatic approval of the CIP during the opening days of the ne w Administration). III. THE SPRING DECISIONS--I A. THE "PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM" Th e development of what eventually came to be called "The Presidential Program for Vietnam" formally began with this memorandum from McNamara to Gilpatric: 20 April 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE This will confirm o ur discussion of this morning during which I stated that the President has asked that you: a. Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Viet-Nam. b. Recommend a series of actions (military, po litical and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which, in your opinion, will preve nt Communist domination of that country. The President would like to receive you r report on or before Thursday, April 27. During the course of your study, you s hould draw, to the extent you believe necessary, upon the views and resources of the State L partment and CIA. Mr. Chester Bowles was present when the President discussed the matter with me, and I have reviewed the project with Mr. Allen Du lles. Further, the President stated that Mr. Walt Rostow would be available to c ounsel with you. Gilpatric, although obviously given a completely free hand under the terms of th e memo, nevertheless set up an interagency task force to work on the report. A d raft was ready April 26, and Gilpatric sent it to the President the following da y. But this turned out to be only the first, and relatively unimportant phase of the effort. For the Laos crisis came to a boil just as the first Gilpatric repo rt was finished, and the Task Force was continued with the essentially new missi on of a recommending additional measure to keep our position from falling apart in the wake of what was happening in Laos. Consequently, to

understand these late-April, early-May decisions, we have to treat separately th e initial Gilpatric effort and the later, primarily State-drafted revision, date d May 6. The same general factors were in the background of both efforts, althou gh Laos was only one of the things that influenced the April 26 effort, while it became the overwhelming element in the May 6 effort. It is worth setting out th ese influencing factors, specifically: 1. The security situation in Vietnam. 2. The Administration's special interest in counter-insurgency. 3. The apparent fut ility and divisiveness of the Durbrow (pressure) tactics for dealing with Diem. 4. Eventually most important, and substantially narrowing the range of options r ealistically open to the Administration, the weakness of US policy in Laos, and the consequent strongly felt need for a signal of firm policy in Vietnam. 1. The Security Situation in Vietnam The VC threat in Vietnam looked worse in April th an it had in January. We will see that Gilpatric's report painted a bleak pictur e. Yet, there is no hint in the record that concern about the immediate situatio n in Vietnam was a major factor in the decision to formulate a new program. VC s trength was estimated at 3-15,000 in Lansdale's January memorandum; 8-10,000 in a March NIE; 10,000 in an April briefing paper (apparently by Landsdale) immedia tely preceding--and recommending--the Gilpatric Task Force; then 12,000 one week later in the Gilpatric report proper. VC incidents were reported high for April (according to the Task Force report, 650 per month, 4 times higher than January ), but an upsurge in activity had long been predicted to coincide with the Vietn amese elections. As would happen in the future, the failure of the VC to prevent the elections was considered a sign of government strength. On the basis of the Task Force statistics, we could assume that the situation was deteriorating rap idly: taken literally, they indicate an increase in VC strength of 20 percent in about a week, plus the large increase in incidents. But neither cables from the field, nor the Washington files show any sense of a sharply deteriorating situa tion. And, as we will see, the initial Task Force Report, despite its crisis ton e, recommended no increase in miltary strength for the Vietnamese, only more gen erous US financial aid to forces already planned under the CIP. 2. The Administr ation's Special Interest in Counter-insurgency A more important impetus to the G ilpatric effort than any sense of deterioration in Vietnam seems to have been th e Administration's general interest in doing something about counter-insurgency warfare, combined with an interest in finding more informal and more efficient m eans of supervising policy than the Eisenhower Administration's elaborate Nation al Security structure. The effort in Vietnam obviously required some coordinatio n of separate efforts by at least State, Defense, CIA, and ICA (a predecessor

of AID). Further, once a coordinated program was worked out, the idea appears to have been to focus responsibility for seeing to it that the program was carried out on some clearly identified individual. This search for a better way to orga nize Gilpatric effort, although it became inconsequential after the original sub mission. 3. The Apparent Futility and Divisiveness of the Durbrow (Pressure) Tac tics for Dealing With Diem Late April was a peculiarly appropriate time to under take the sort of sharpening up of policy and its organization just described. It was probably clear by then that Durbrow's pressure tactics were not really acco mplishing much with Diem. Besides, Durbrow had been in Vietnam for four years by April, and a new Ambassador would normally have been sent in any event. Fritz N olting had been chosen by early April, and he was scheduled to take over in earl y May. Further, Diem had just been reelected, an essentially meaningless formali ty to be sure, but still one more thing that helped make late April a logical ti me for taking a fresh look at US relations with Diem. And even to people who bel ieved that a continuation of Durbrow's pressure tactics might be the best approa ch to Diem, events elsewhere and especially in Laos must have raised questions a bout whether it was a politic time to be threatening to withhold aid. 4. The Wea kness of US Policy in Laos, and the Need for a Signal of Firm Policy in Vietnam The situation in the world that April seemed to create an urgent requirement for the US to do something to demonstrate firmness, and especially so in Southeast Asia. The Task Force was set up the day after the Bay of Pigs invasion force sur rendered, and at a tinie when the Laos crisis was obviously coming to head. Ther e had been implicit agreement in principle between the US and the Soviets to see k a cease fire in Laos and to organize a neutral coalition government. But it wa s not clear at all that the cease-fire would come while there was anything left worth arguing about in the hands of the pro-Western faction. Gilpatric's initial Task Force report reached the President the day of a crisis meeting in Laos, an d the more important second phase of the effort began then, in an atmosphere who lly dominated by Laos. But even before the Laos crisis reached its peak, there w as a sense in Washington and generally in the world that put strong pressures on the Administration to look for ways to take a firm stand somewhere; and if it w as not to be in Laos, then Vietnam was next under the gun. Something of the mood of the time can be sensed in these quotes, one from a March 28 NIE on Southeast Asia, another from Lansdale's notes, and finally a significant question from a Kennedy press conference: From the NIE:

There is a deep awareness among the countries of Southeast Asia that development s in the Laotian crisis, and its outcome, have a profound impact on their future . The governments of the area tend to regard the Laotian crisis as a symbolic te st of strengths between the major powers of the West and the Communist bloc. Fro m Lansdale's notes (about April 21): 1. Psychological--VN believed always they m ain target. Now it comes--"when our turn comes, will we be treated the same as L aos?" Main task GVN confidence in US. And suggesting the more general tone of th e time (even a week before the Bay of Pigs, prompted by the Soviet orbiting of a man in space) this question at Kennedy's April 12 news conference: Mr. Presiden t, this question might better be asked at a history class than at a news confere nce, but here it is anyway. The Communists seem to be putting us on the defensiv e on a number of fronts--now, again, in space. Wars aside, do you think there is a danger that their system is going to prove more durable than ours. The Presid ent answered with cautious reassurance. Eight days later, after the Bay of Pigs, and the day he ordered the Task Force to go ahead, he told the Association of N ewspaper Editors: ....it is clearer than ever that we face a relentless struggle in every corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies, or even nuclear armaments. The armies are there. But they serve primarily as the shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics steadily adva nce, picking off vulnerable areas one by one in situations that do not permit ou r own armed intervention. . . . We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the ne w tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it-whether in Cuba or S outh Vietnam. (Notice Kennedy's explicit assumption about US armed intervention as a means of dealing with insurgencies. Not too much can be read into his remar k, for it probably was inspired primarily by criticism of his refusal to try to save the Bay of Pigs contingent. But the balance of the record adds significance to the comment.) B. THE APRIL 26 REPORT The available Gilpatric file consists m ostly of drafts of the report and memos from Lansdale. It contains a memorandum dated April 13, in which Lansdale advised Gilpatric of a meeting with Rostow, at which Rostow showed Lansdale a copy of a memorandum to Kennedy recommending a f resh crack at the Vietnam situation. Here is Rostow's memorandum: April 12, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM: WWR Now that the Viet-Nam election is over, I believe we must turn to gearing up the whole Viet-Nam operation. Among the possi ble lines of action that might be considered at an early high level meeting are the following: 1. The appointment of a full time first-rate back-stop man in Was hington. McNamara, as well as your staff, believes this to be essential. 2. The briefing of our new Ambassador, Fritz Nolting, including sufficient talk with yo urself so that he fully understands the priority you attach to the Viet-Nam prob lem. 3. A possible visit to Viet-Nam in the near future by the Vice President. 4 . A possible visit to the United States of Mr. Thuan, acting Defense Minister, a nd one of the few men around Diem with operational capacity and vigor. 5. The se nding to Viet-Nam of a research and development and military hardware team which would explore with General McGarr which of the various techniques and gadgets n ow available or being explored might be relevant and useful in the Viet-Nam oper ation. 6. The raising of the MAAG ceiling, which involves some diplomacy, unless we can find an alternative way of introducing into the Viet-Nam operation a sub stantial number of Special Forces types. 7. The question of replacing the presen t ICA Chief in Viet-Nam, who, by all accounts, has expended his capital. We need a vigorous man who can work well with the military, since some of the rural dev elopment problems relate closely to guerrilla operations. 8. Settling the questi on of the extra funds for Diem. 9. The tactics of persuading Diem to move more r apidly to broaden the base of his government, as well as to decrease its central ization and improve its efficiency. Against the background of decisions we shoul d urgently take on these matters, you may wish to prepare a letter to Diem which would not only congratulate him, reaffirm our support, and specify new initiati ves we are prepared to take, but would make clear to him the urgency you attach to a more effective political and morale setting for his military operation, now that the elections are successfully behind him. Neither this memo, nor other available papers, give us a basis for judging how f ar the stress on the importance of Vietnam was already influenced by development s in Laos, and how much it reflects a separable interest in taking on the challe nge of "wars of liberation." Both were undoubtedly important. But this Rostow me mo turned out to be pretty close to an agenda for the initial Task Force report. It seems very safe to assume that the "full-time, first-rate, backstop man in W ashington" Rostow had in mind was Lansdale. (Gilpatric himself obviously could n ot be expected to spend full-time on Vietnam.) Presumably the President's reques t for the Gilpatric report was intended as either a method of easing Lansdale in to that role, or at least of trying him out in it.

Following the description of the Rostow memo, Gilpatric's file contains several carbon copies of a long paper, unsigned but certainly by Lansdale, which among o ther things recommends that the President set up a Task Force for Vietnam which would lay out a detailed program of action and go on to supervise the implementa tion of that program. The date on the paper is April 19, but a draft must have b een prepared some days earlier, probably about the time of Lansdale's discussion with Rostow on the 13th, since the available copies recommended that the Task F orce submit its report to the President by April 21. The paper explicitly foresa w a major role for General Lansdale both in the Task Force, and thereafter in su pervising the implementation of the report. This Task Force was apparently inten ded to supersede what the paper refers to as "one of the customary working group s in Washington" which was "being called together next week by John Steeves, Act ing Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs." In view of all this, it is not surprising to find that the first phase of the Task Force effort appea rs, from the record, to have been very much a GilpatricLansdale show. The first meeting of the group (which included State and CIA representatives) was apparent ly held April 24, four days after Gilpatric was told to go ahead. Present files do not show whether there was another full meeting of the group before the first version of the report (dated April 26) was sent to the President on the 27th. H ere are the opening sections, which introduce the list of proposed actions which make up the program. A PROGRAM OF ACTION TO PREVENT COMMUNIST DOMINATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM APPRAISAL O F THE SITUATION After meeting in Hanoi on 13 May 1959, the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention "to smash" the government of President Diem. Following this decision, the Viet Cong have s ignificantly increased their program of infiltration, subversion, sabotage and a ssassination designed to achieve this end. At the North Vietnamese Communist Par ty Congress in September 1960, the earlier declaration of underground war by the Party's Control Committee was reaffirmed. This action by the Party Congress too k place only a month after Kong Le's coup in Laos. Scarcely two months later the re was a military uprising in Saigon. The turmoil created throughout the area by this rapid succession of events provides an ideal environment for the Communist "master plan" to take over all of Southeast Asia. Since that time, as can be se en from the attached map, the internal security situation in South Vietnam has b ecome critical. What amounts to a state of active guerrilla warfare now exists t hroughout the country. The number of Viet Cong hard-core Communists has

increased from 4400 in early 1960 to an estimated 12,000 today. The number of vi olent incidents per month now averages 650. Casualties on both sides totaled mor e than 4500 during the first three months of this year. Fifty-eight percent of t he country is under some degree of Communist control, ranging from harassment an d night raids to almost complete administrative jurisdiction in the Communist "s ecure areas." The Viet Cong over the past two years have succeeded in stepping u p the pace and intensity of their attacks to the point where South Vietnam is ne aring the decisive phase in its battle for survival. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the Communists will be able to press on to their strategic goal of establishing a rival "National Liberation Front" government in one of these " secure areas" thereby plunging the nation into open civil war. They have publicl y announced that they will "take over the country before the end of 1961." This situation is thus critical, but is not hopeless. The Vietnamese Government, with American aid, has increased its capabilities to fight its attackers, and provid es a base upon which the necessary additional effort can be founded to defeat th e Communist attack. Should the Communist effort increase, either directly or as a result of a collapse of Laos, additional measures beyond those proposed herein would be necessary. In short, the situation in South Vietnam has reached the po int where, at least for the time being, primary emphasis should be placed on pro viding a solution to the internal security problem. The US Objective: To create a viable and increasingly democratic society in South Vietnam and to prevent Com munist domination of the country. Concept of Operations: To initiate on an accel erated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective. In so doing, it is intended to use, and where appropriate extend, expedite or b uild upon the existing US and Government of Vietnam [GVN} programs already under way in South Vietnam. There is neither the time available nor any sound justific ation for "starting from scratch." Rather the need is to focus the US effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal security problem; to infuse it with a se nse of urgency and a dedication to the overall US objective; to achieve, through cooperative inter-departmental support both in the field and in Washington, the operational flexibility needed to apply the available US assets in a manner bes t calculated to achieve our objective in Vietnam; and, finally, to impress on ou r friends, the Vietnamese, and on our foes, the Viet Cong, that come what may, t he US intends to win this battle. The program that followed this strongly worded introduction was very modest, not merely compared to current US involvement, but to the effort the US undertook f ollowing the Taylor Mission in the fall. The program is essentially simply a mod erate

acceleration of the CIP program approved in January, with a great deal of stress on vigor, enthusiasm, and strong leadership in carrying out the program. In par ticular, the program proposes no increase in the Vietnamese army, and only a mod erate (in hindsight, inconsequential) increase in the size of our MAAG mission. The main military measures were for the US to provide financial support for the 20,000-man increase in the RVNAF and to provide support for the full complement of counterinsurgency auxiliary forces (Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps) plann ed by Diem. Both were modest steps. For under the CIP we were already planning t o pay support costs for 150,000 men of the RVNAF and 32,000 men of the Civil Gua rd. This Task Force proposal, which had been urged for some weeks by MAAG in Sai gon, simply said that we would provide the same support for all the Vietnamese f orces that we had already planned to provide for most of them. For the rest, the Presidential Program in its final form, issued May 19, turned out (after a grea t deal of stirring around) to be close to that proposed in the April 26 draft. T wo comments are needed on this material. First, the program Lansdale and Gilpatr ic proposed was not so narrowly military as the repeated emphasis on priority fo r the internal security problem might suggest. Rather, the emphasis was on stabi lizing the countryside, in contrast to pressing Diem on political and administra tive reforms mainly of interest to Diem's urban critics. This reflected both Lan sdale's judgments on counterinsurgency, which look good in hindsight, and his st rongly pro-Diem orientation, which looks much less good. Second, the reference t o a communist "master plan" for Southeast Asia (and similar language is found in a number of other staff papers through the balance of 1961) suggests a view of the situation which has been much criticized recently by men like Galbraith and Kennan. Public comments by those who were closely involved (both those critical of policy since 1965, such as Sorenson and Hilsman, and those supporting the Adm inistration, such as William Bundy) suggest a more sophisticated view of the pro blem. Here we simply note that the formal staff work available strongly supports Galbraith and Kennan, although this does not necessarily imply that the senior members of the Administration shared the view that North Vietnam was operating ( in the words of another staff paper) as the "implementing agent of Bloc policy" rather than in fairly conventional, mainly non-ideological pursuit of its own na tional interest. C. LANSDALE'S ROLE In his April 27 memorandum transmitting the Report to the President, Gilpatric noted that: ....in the short time available t o the Task Force it was not possible to develop the program in complete detail. However, there has been prepared a plan for mutually supporting actions of a pol itical, military, economic, psychological, and covert character which can be ref ined periodically on the basis of further recommendations from the field.

Toward this end, Brigadier General E.G. Lansdale, USAF, who has been designated Operations Officer for the Task Force, will proceed to Vietnam immediately after the program receives Presidential approval. Following on the spot discussions w ith US and Vietnamese officials, he will forward to the Director of the Task For ce specific recommendations for action in support of the attached program. This appears to have been the high point of Lansdale's role in Vietnam policy. Lansda l by this time had already sent (with Gilpatric's approval) messages requesting various people to meet him in Saigon, May 5. This is from a memorandum he sent t o Richard Bissell, then still a Deputy Director of the CIA, requesting the servi ces of one of his colleagues from the 1955-1956 experience in Vietnam: I realize Redick is committed to an important job in Laos and that this is a difficult ti me in that trouble spot. I do feel, however, that we may yet save Vietnam and th at our best effort should be put into it. Redick, in my opinion, is now so much a part of the uninhibited communications between President Diem and myself that it goes far beyond the question of having an interpreter. His particular facilit y for appreciating my meaning in words and the thoughts of Diem in return is pra ctically indispensable to me in the role I am assigned in seeking President Kenn edy's goal for Vietnam. But none of this was to be. Present files contain a ther mofax of McNamara's copy of the memorandum Gilpatric sent to the President. In M cNamara's handwriting the words (Lansdale) "will proceed to Vietnam immediately" are changed to "will proceed to Vietnam when requested by the Ambassador." As w e will see below, when the Task Force Report was redrafted the next week, Lansda le's key role disappeard entirely, at the request of the State Department, but p resumably with the concurrence of the White House. D. KENNEDY'S APRIL 29 DECISIO NS Although our record is not clear, it appears that the cover memorandum was se nt to the President as Gilpatric had signed it, and that McNamara's correction r eflected a decision made after the paper went to the President, rather than a ch ange in the language of the memo. In any event, at a meeting on April 29, Presid ent Kennedy approved only the quite limited military proposals of the draft repo rt it transmitted. Decisions were deferred on the balance of the paper, which no w included an annex issued April 28 on much more substantial additional military aid believed required by the situation in Laos. The military measures approved during this first go-around were: (1) Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure t he effective implemention of the military portion of the program including the t raining of a 20,000-man addition to the present GVN armed forces of 150,000. Ini tial appaisal of new tasks assigned CHMAAG indicates that approximately 100 addi tional military personnel will be required immediately in addition to the presen t complement of 685.

(2) Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to provide support and adv ice to the Self Defense Corps with a strength of approximately (3) Authority MAP support for the entire Civil Guard Forces of 68,000 MAP support is now authorit ized for 32,000; the remaining 36,000 are not now adequately trained and equippe d. (4) Install as a matter of priority a radar surveillance capability which wil l enable the GVN to obtain warning of Communist over-flights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air supply purposes. Initially, this capability sho uld be provided from US mobile radar capability. (5) Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force as a means of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into South Vietnam by water. MAP support, which was not provided i n the Counterinsurgency Plan, will include training of junk crews in Vietnam or at US bases by US Navy Personnel. The only substantial significance that can be read into these April 29 decisions is that they signalled a willingness to go be yond the 685-man limit on the size of the US military mission in Saigon, which, if it were done openly, would be the first formal breech of the Geneva Agreement s. For the rest, we were providing somewhat more generous support to the Vietnam ese than proposed in the CIP. But the overall size of the Vietnamese forces woul d be no higher than those already approved. (The 20,000-man increase was already part of the CIP.) No one proposed in this initial draft that the Administration even consider sending American troops (other than the 100-odd additional adviso rs). It was not, by any interpretation, a crisis response. Indeed, even if Kenne dy had approved the whole April 26 program, it would have seemed (in hindsight) most notable for the "come what may, we intend to win" rhetoric in its introduct ion and for the supreme role granted to Task Force (and indirectly to Lansdale a s its operations officer) in control of Vietnam policy. Lansdale's memoranda lea ve no real doubt that he saw the Report exactly that way-which presumably was wh y he made no effort to risk stirring up trouble by putting his more controversia l views into the paper. For example, although Lansdale believed the key new item in Vietnam policy was a need for emphatic support for Diem, only the barest hin t of this view appears in the paper (and it is not even hinted at in Lansdale's preliminary draft of the report distributed at the April 24th meeting of the Tas k Force). That is when this opening phase of the Task Force effort has to be sep arated from what followed. As just noted, it was remarkable mainly for the stren gth of the commitment implied to South Vietnam, which the President never did un ambiguously endorse, and for the organizational arrangement it proposed, with th e key role for Lansdale and Gilpatric, which was eliminated from the later draft s. All of the factors behind the May reappraisal (cited at the beginning of this chapter) undoubtedly contributed to the decision to set up the Task Force. But Rostow's memorandum and the modest dimensions of the resulting proposals suggest the main idea really was to sharpen up existing policy and its administration, rather than to work out a new policy on the assumption that the existing program had become substantially obsolete. Immediately after April 27, this changes. Al though Gilpatric and Lansdale continued to head up the Task Force through the

Presidential decisions of May 11, their personal role became increasingly unimpo rtant. The significance no longer was in putting new people in charge of a new s tyle for running the program, but in developing a new program that would offset the impact of Laos. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter I, "The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961," pp. 40-98 (Boston: Beac on Press, 1971) Section 2, pp. 40-98 E. THE LAOS ANNEX On April 28, an annex had been issued to the basic report whic h went far beyond the modest military proposals in the original. The most reason able assumption is that the annex was drawn up in response to comments at the Ap ril 27 NSC meeting at which the Report was to have been considered, but which tu rned out to be devoted to the by-then acute state of the crisis in Laos. On the grounds that the neutralization of Laos would solidify communists de facto contr ol of eastern Laos (including the mountain passes which were the historic invasi on route to southern Vietnam), the annex advocated U.S. support for a two-divisi on increase in the RVNAF. To rapidly train these forces, there was now a recomme ndation on U.S. manpower commitments that dwarted the previous recommendation fo r a MAAG increase: specifically, a 1600-man training team for each of the two ne w divisions, plus a 400-man special forces contingent to speed up counterinsurge ncy training fot the South Vietnamese forces: a total of 3600 men, not counting the MAAG increase already authorized. It is interesting that in the annex this f orce increase (and the bulk of the U.S. troop commitment) was specifically justi fied as insurance against a conventional invasion of South Vietnam. Some earlier drafts show the evolution of this concept. There is an alternate draft, apparen tly by Lansdale, which was not used but which recommended a U.S. troop commitmen t as reassurance to the Vietnamese of U.S. determination to stand by them. It di d not recommend any increase in South Vietnamese forces. Instead, it stressed ve ry heavily the damage to U.S. prestige and the credibility of our guarantees to other countries in Southeast Asia should we go through with the Laos settlement without taking some strong action to demonstrate that we were finally drawing a line in Southeast Asia. Contrasting sharply with Lansdale's draft was the first draft of the paper that was finally issued. This was by Gilpatric's military aid e, Col. E.F. Black. It concludes that South Vietnamese forces would have to be i ncreased by two divisions, mainly to deal with threat of increased infiltration. Black stressed that the President would have to decide that

the US would no longer be bound by the limitations of the 1954 Geneva Agreements (which Defense had long been lobbying against). But his paper recommends no sub stantial troop commitment. The reference to the Geneva Agreements apparently ref erred to a relatively modest increase in manpower beyond the 685-man ceiling, an d to the introduction of new types of equipment not in Vietnam in 1954. So the r ecord contains three versions of the Annex-Black's first draft, Lansdale's alter nate draft, and then Black's revised paper, which was finally issure as the anne x to the Report. The effect of considering them all is an odd one. The initial B lack paper recommends an increase in Vietnamese forces to deal with the infiltra tion problem, but no substantial US troop commitment. The Lansdale alternative r ecommends a substantial US troop commitment, but no increase in Vietnamese force s. The final paper recommends both the RVNAF increase and the US troop commitmen ts, but changes the reason for each: the reason for the RVNAF increase became a need for better protection against overt invasion, not an increased infiltration threat. And the reason for the US troop commitment became a desire to rapidly t rain the new Vietnamese troops, not for political reassurance. If taken literall y, all of this implies an extraordinarily rapid series of reappraisals and rever sals of judgment. But surely, the only realistic interpretation is that in this case (because a series of rough drafts happens to be included in the available f ile) we are getting a glimpse at the way such staff paperwork really gets drafte d, as opposed to the much more orderly impression that is given if we saw only t he finished products. Gilpatric (undoubtedly in consultation with at least McNam ara, although the files do not show any record of this) was presumably intereste d primarily in what recommendations to make to the President, and secondarily in providing a bureaucratically suitable rationale for those recommendations. This rationale may, or may not, have coincided with whatever more private explanatio n of the recommendations that McNamara or Gilpatric may have conveyed to the Pre sident or people like McGeorge Bundy and Rostow on the White House staff. The le sson in this, which will not come as a surprise to anyone who has ever had conta ct with the policy-making process, is that the rationales given in such pieces o f paper (intended for fairly wide circulation among the bureaucracy, as opposed to tightly held memoranda limited to those closest to the decision-maker) do not reliably indicate why recommendations were made the way they were. F. THE MAY 1 REVIEW Meanwhile, Kennedy, as noted earlier, did not act on the annex at the Ap ril 29 meeting when he approved the much more modest military proposals of the b asic Report. But on that day, there was a cable alerting CINCPAC to be ready to move 5000-men task forces to Udorn, Thailand, and to Touraine, (Da Nang), South Vietnam. Classified records available for this study do not explain this alert. But the public memoirs indirectly refer to it, and as would be expected, the ale rt was intended as a threat to intervene in Laos if the communists failed to go through with the cease fire which was to precede the Geneva Conference. Here is the cable:

From: JCS TO: CINCPAC INFRO: CHMAAG VIENTIANE CHJUSMAAG BANGKOK THAILAND CHMAAG SAIGON VIETNAM JCS DA 995131 From JCS. 1. Request you prepare plans to move brig ade size forces of approximately 5,000 each into Udorn or vicinity and into Tour ane or vicinity. Forces should include all arms and appropriate air elements. Pl ans should be based solely on US forces at this time. 2. Decision to make these deployments not firm. It is expected that decision as to Thailand will be made a t meeting tentatively scheduled here on Monday. Decision regarding Vietnam will be even later due to consideration of Geneva Accords. 3. It is hoped that these movements can be given SEATO cover but such possibility must be explored before becoming a firm element of your planning. State is taking action to explore this aspect. 4. Decision was not repeat not reached today concerning implementation of SEATO Plan 5/60. The crisis in Laos was now at its peak. According to Schlesinger's account, repo rts reached Washington April 26 that the Pathet Lao were attacking strongly, wit h the apparent intention of grabbing most of the country before the cease-fire w ent into effect. At 10 p.m. that night, the JCS sent out a "general advisory" to major commands around the world, and specifically alerted CINCPAC to be prepare d to undertake airstrikes against North Vietnam, and possibly southern China. Th e next day-the day the Task Force Report came to the President-there were prolon ged crisis meetings in the White House. The President later called in Congressio nal leaders, who advised against putting troops into Laos. Schlesinger quotes Ro stow as telling him the NSC meeting that day was "the worst White House meeting he had ever attended in the entire Kennedy administration." The Laos annex to th e Gilpatric Report was issued on the 28th, in an atmosphere wholly dominated by the crisis in Laos. On the 29th, Kennedy's go-ahead on the Task Force's original military recommendations was squeezed into a day overwhelmingly devoted to Laos . This was the day of the cable, just cited, alerting CINCPAC for troop movement s to Thailand and possibly Vietnam. The "SEATO Plan 5/60" referred to in the clo sing paragraph of the cable was the plan for moving major units into Laos.

On May 1 (the Monday meeting referred to in the cable), Kennedy again deferred a ny decision on putting troops into Laos. According to available accounts, there is a strong sense by now (although no formal decision) that the U.S. would not g o into Laos: that if the cease-fire failed, we would make a strong stand, instea d, in Thailand and Vietnam. (On the 28th, in a speech to a Democratic dinner in Chicago, the President had hinted at this: We are prepared to meet our obligatio ns, but we can only defend the freedom of those who are determined to be free th emselves. We can assist them-we will bear more than our share of the burden, but we can only help those who are ready to bear their share of the burden themselv es. Reasonable qualifications, undoubtedly, but ones that seemed to suggest that intervention in Laos would be futile. On Sunday (the 30th), another hint came i n remarks by Senator Fulbright on a TV interview show: he opposed intervention i n Laos, and said he was confident the government was seeking "another solution." So the decision anticipated Monday, May I, in the JCS cable to CINCPAC was not made that day after all. But that day a new draft of the Task Force Report was i ssued. It contained only the significant change (other than blending the April 2 8 annex into the basic paper). The original draft contained a paragraph (under " political objectives") recommending we "obtain the political agreement [presumab ly from the SEATO membership] needed to permit the prompt implementation of SEAT O contingency plans providing for military intervention in South Vietnam should this become necessary to prevent the loss of the country to Communism." In the M ay 1 revision, the following sentence was added to the paragraph: "The United St ates should be prepared to intervene unilaterally in fulfillment of its commitme nt under Article IV, 2. of Manila Pact, and should make its determination to do so clear through appropriate public statements, diplomatic discussions, troop de ployments, or other means." (The cited clause in the Manila (SEATO) Pact, which the paper did not quote, If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolabi lity or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independe nce of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threate ned in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fa ct or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall co nsult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for th e common defense.) The May 1 draft also cleared up, or papered over, part of the confusion described earlier regarding the rationale for the military measures r ecommended in the Laos annex: the increased RVNAF force levels were attributed n ow both to concern over increased infiltration and to concern over overt invasio n. But the US troop commitments are still described solely as for training, with no mention of the original political rationale.

G. STATE'S REDRAFT Lansdale circulated the May 1 draft among the Task Force, wit h a note that comments should be in May 2, with a final Task Force review schedu led the morning of May 3, all in anticipation of an NSC meeting on the paper May 4. George Ball, then Deputy Under Secretary of State, asked to postpone the mee ting for a day. Lansdale sent Gilpatric a memorandum opposing the postponement. "It seems to me that George Ball could appoint someone to represent him at the m eeting, and if he has personal or further comments they could come to us later i n the day at his convenience." But Gilpatric delayed the meeting a day, and Stat e produced a drastic revision of the paper. On the organizational issues, the St ate draft was brutally clearcut. It proposed a new version of the Gilpatric memo randum transmtiting the Report, in which: 1. The paragraph (quoted earlier) desc ribing Lansdale's special role is deleted. 2. A new paragraph is added to the en d of the memorandum, in which Gilpatric is made to say: "Having completed its as signment . . . I recommend that the present Task Force be now dissolved." Later sections of the paper were revised accordingly, giving responsibility for coordi nating Vietnam policy to a new Task Force with George Ball as chairman. (In the final version, the Task Force has a State Department director, but no longer inc luded Presidential appointees representing their departments. The whole Task For ce idea had been downgraded to a conventional interagency working group. Althoug h it continued to function for several years, there will be little occasion to m ention it again in this paper.) State's proposal on organization prevailed. From the record available, the only thing that can be said definitely is that State objected, successfully, to having an Ambassador report to a Task Force chaired b y the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and with a second defense official (Lansdale) as executive officer. There may have been more to it. We know Lansdale's experi ence and his approach to guerrilla warfare initially won him a good deal of favo r at the White House. But his memorandum suggest that his ideas on a number of i ssues (support for Phoumi in Laos, liberation of North Vietnam, essentially unqu alified support for Diem in South Vietnam) went well beyond what the Administrat ion judged reasonable. So it is quite possible that the President would have had second thoughts on Lansdale, aside from State's objections on bureaucratic grou nds. In any event, Lansdale's reaction to State's proposal on organization was t o advise McNamara and Gilpatric that: My strong recommendation is that Defense s tay completely out of the Task Force directorship as now proposed by State . . . Having a Defense officer, myself or someone else, placed in a position of only partial influence and of no decision permissibility would be only to provide Sta te with a scapegoat to share the blame when we have a flop . . . The

US past performance and theory of action, which State apparently desires to cont inue, simply offers no sound basis for winning, as desired by President Kennedy. But the final version of the Task Force Report, dated May 6, followed very clos ely the State revision submitted May 3, including the shift in control of the Ta sk Force. [see also Doc. 87] H. WIDENING THE OPTIONS What is most striking about the revised drafts is that they excluded a tone of almost unqualified commitmen t to Vietnam, yet on the really important issues included qualifications which l eft the President a great deal of freedom to decide whatever he pleased without having to formally overrule the Task Force Report. For example, the assertion (f rom the April draft) that the US should impress on friend and foe that "come wha t may, we intend to win" remained in the final paper. But this hortatory languag e is from the introduction; it described one of the effects the program in the b alance of the paper was supposed to achieve, but did not ask the President to do or say anything not spelled out in the body of the paper. (We will see, when we come to the fall decisions, that the wisdom of an unqualified commitment to sav e Vietnam from Communism is treated afresh, with no suggestion that any such dec ision had already been made in May.) On the other hand, the explicit recommendat ion in the Defense draft that we make clear our "determination . . . to interven e unilaterally . . . should this become necessary to save the country from commu nism . . ." was dropped. Instead, there is a recommendation for exploring a "new bilateral arrangement" which might (the text is not explicit) extend to fightin g the guerrillas, if that should become necessary to save the country, but also might only cover overt North Vietnamese invasion. Further, the need for these ar rangements was now tied to the "loss" of Laos. The May 3 draft suggests we "unde rtake military security arrangements which establish beyond doubt our intention to stand behind Vietnam's resistance to Communism . . ." since "it is doubtful w hether the Vietnamese Government can weather the pressures which are certain to be generated from the loss of Laos without prompt, and dramatic support for its security from the U.S." In the May 6 final draft, "establish beyond doubt" was t oned down to "emphasize" and the flat reference to the loss of Laos was changed to "if Laos were lost." Similarly, the recommendations on the two new South Viet namese divisions, and the two 1600-man US combat units to train them was describ ed as a firm recommendation in the military section of the May 3 draft (which St ate left untouched from the Defense version), but were indirectly referred to as something for study in State's re-drafted political section. In the final paper , they were still firm recommendations in a military annex, but not in the main paper, where Defense was only described as studying this and

other uses for US troops short of direct commitment against the guerrillas. US t roop commitments were no longer recommended, only referred to as something "whic h might result from an NSC decision following discussions between Vice President Johnson [whose mission to Asia had been announced May 5] and President Diem." Y et an interesting aspect of the State redraft is that, although its main impact was to soften the commitments implied in the Defense draft, a quick reading migh t give the contrary impression. We will see this same effect in the political se ctions to be discussed below. What seems to happen is that the very detail of th e State treatment creates a strong impression, even though the actual proposals are less drastic and more qualified than those proposed by Defense. The contrast is all the sharper because the Defense draft leaned the other way. For example, the profoundly significant recommendation that the US commit itself to interven e unilaterally, if necessary, to prevent a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam, i s tossed into the Defense version most casually, with a reference to the Manila Treaty that makes it sound as if such a commitment, in fact, already existed. In contrast, here is the State language referring to the proposed bilateral treaty (which in effect is a substitute for the Defense proposed unlimited unilateral commitment): The Geneva Accords have been totally inadequate in protecting South Vietnam against Communist infiltration and insurgency. Moreover, with increased Communist success in Laos dramatic US actions in stiffening up its physical sup port of Vietnam and the remainder of Southeast Asia may be needed to bolster the will to continue to resist the Communists. The inhibitions imposed on such acti on by certain parts of the Geneva Accords, which have been violated with impunit y by the Communists, should not prevent our action. We should consider joining w ith the Vietnamese in a clear-cut defensive alliance which might include station ing of US forces on Vietnainese soil. As a variant of this arrangement certain S EATO troops might also be employed. Bilateral military assistance by the United States pursuant to a request by South Vietnam along the lines of that undertaken during 1958 in response to the request by Lebanon for military assistance, woul d be in keeping with international law and treaty provisions. The provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954, which prohibited the introduction of additional mili tary arms and personnel into Vietnam, would not be a bar to the measures contemp lated. The obvious, large-scale and continuous violation of these provisions of the Geneva Accords by North Vietnam in introducing large numbers of armed guerri llas into South Vietnam would justify the corresponding non-observance of these provisions by South Vietnam. Indeed, authorization for changing PEO Laos into an ordinary MAAG was justified on this legal theory. It should be recognized that the foregoing proposals require careful and detailed consideration and preparati on particularly with regard to the precise mission of US forces used. In additio n to the previously cited advantages such an action might have at least two othe r important political and military advantages:

(a) It could release a portion of the ARVN from relatively static military funct ions to pursue the war against the insurgents and (b) It would place the Sino-So viet Bloc in the position of risking direct intervention in a situation where US forces were already in place, accepting the consequence of such action. This is in direct contrast to the current situation in Laos. Alternatively, there are s everal potential political and military disadvantages to such an action, princip al among these being: (a) Some of the neutrals, notably india, might well be opp osed, and the attitude of the UK and France is uncertain. (b) This would provide the Communists with a major propaganda opportunity. (c) The danger that a troop contribution would provoke a DRV/ CHICOM reaction with the risk of involving a significant commitment of US force in the Pacific to the Asian mainland. The Fre nch tied up some 200,000 troops during the unsuccessful Indo-China effort. This might significantly weaken the Diem regime in the long run, having in mind the p arallel of Rhee in Korea. This language is not solely the State Department's. In a Gilpatric memo to be cited shortly, we will see that the JCS, for example, ha d a hand in describing the role for US troops. Even so, the overall effect of th e draft, as already noted, tones down very drastically the commitment implied by the May 1 Defense version: 1. The proposal is no longer for a unilateral, unlim ited commitment to save Vietnam from communism. It only proposes consideration o f a new treaty with South Vietnam (unlike the Defense draft which proposed readi ng a unilateral commitment into the existing Manila Treaty); and its purpose is to "bolster the will" of the South Vietnamese to resist the communists, not (as the Defense draft apparently meant) to guarantee that the US would join the war should the South Vietnamese effort prove inadequate. 2. It gives pro and con arg uments for sending US troops, in contrast to the Defense draft which included a flat recommendation to send at least the 3600 men of the two division training t eams and the special forces training team. A reasonable judgment, consequently, is that State thought the Defense draft went too far in committing the US on Vie tnam. (And in view of the positions he would take in 1965, George Ball's role as senior State representative on the Task Force obviously further encourages that interpretation.) But that is only a judgment. It is also possible to argue, in contrast, that perhaps State (or State plus whatever White House influence may h ave gone into the draft) simply was tidying up the Defense proposals: for exampl e, that the redrafters felt that a new bilateral treaty would be a firmer basis for a commitment to save Vietnam than would reliance on a reinterpretation of th e SEATO Treaty. Similar arguments can be made on the other points noted above.

Consequently, on any question about the intent of the redrafters, only a judgmen t and not a statement of fact can be provided. But on the question of the effect of the redraft, a stronger statement can be made: for whatever the intent of th e redrafters, the effect certainly was to weaken the commitments implied by the Defense draft, and leave the President a great deal of room for maneuver without having to explicitly overrule the recommendations presented to him. 1. THE TROO P ISSUE To return to a question of judgement, it is difficult to assess how far this gradual hedging of proposals for very strong commitments to Vietnam simply reflected a desire (very probably encouraged by the White House) to leave the Pr esident freedom of action. To some extent it surely reflects a growing hope that perhaps the Laos cease-fire would come off; the country would not be flatly los t; and consequently, that the May 1 Defense draft, and even the May 3 State draf t, reflected a somewhat panicky overestimate of how far we needed to go to keep Southeast Asia from falling apart. The two motives obviously overlapped. There a re indications that, as late as May 5, the estimate for saving something out of Laos remained bleak. On May 4, after a visit to the President, Senator Fullbrigh t (who had opposed intervention in Laos along with other Congressional leaders) announced from the steps of the White House that he would support troop commitme nts to Thailand and Vietnam. An NSC meeting the following day (May 5) was devote d to discussing steps to reassure Vietnam and Thailand. Then in the afternoon, t he President announced Vice President Johnson's visit to Asia at a press confere nce, which included this garbled exchange: Q. Mr. President, there have been rep orts that you would be prepared to send American forces into South Vietnam if th at became necessary to prevent Communist domination of that country. Could you t ell us whether that is correct, and also anything else you have regarding plans for that country? A. Well, we have had a group working in the government and we have had a Security Council meeting about the problems which are faced in Vietna m by the guerrillas and by the barrage which the present government is being sub jected to. The problem of troops is a matter-the matter of what we are going to do to assist Vietnam to obtain [retain?] its independence is a matter under cons ideration. There are a good many [issues?] which I think can most usefully wait until we have had consultations with the government, which up to the present tim e-which will be one of the matters which Vice President Johnson will deal with; the problem of consultations with the Government of Vietnam as to what further s teps could most usefully be taken. On May 8, the reconstituted International Con trol Commission (established by the Geneva Agreement of 1954) arrived in Laos, h oping to supervise a cease-fire. The ceasefire had been agreed to in principle b y both sides as early as May 1. The question was

whether the Pathet Lao would really stop advancing. Aside from American interven tion, a cease-fire was the only hope of the larger, but less effective, pro-West ern forces led by Phoumi. Certainly hopes were higher by the 8th than they were a week earlier, but this might not be saying much. The documentary record is amb iguous. The final draft of the letter Vice President Johnson would deliver to Di em was dated May 8, and in this letter Kennedy did not go much beyond the propos als in the April 27 version of the task force report. There was no mention of U. S. troop commitments, nor of a bilateral treaty. Even on the question of a furth er increase (beyond 170,000) in the RVNAF, Kennedy promised Diem only that this will be "considered carefully with you, if developments should so warrant." But the same day, Gilpatric sent a memo to the JCS asking their views on U.S. troops in Vietnam: ....In preparation for the possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vi etnam, it is desired that you give further review and study of the military advi sability of such action, as well as to the size and composition of such U.S. for ces. Your views, which I hope could include some expression from CINCPAC, would be valuable for consideration prior to the NSC meeting this week (currently sche duled for Friday, May 12). This in turn was based on a statement in the May 6 Ta sk Force draft, which said that such a study was being carried out, with particu lar consideration being given to deploying to South Vietnam ....two U.S. battle groups (with necessary command and logistics units), plus an engineer (construct ion-combat) battalion. These units would be located in the "high plateau" region , remote from the major population center of Saigon-Cholon, under the command of the Chief, MAAG. To help accelerate the training of the G.V.N. army, they would establish two divisional field training areas. The engineer battalion would und ertake construction of roads, air-landing strips and other facilities essential to the logistical support of the U.S. and Vietnamese forces there. The purpose o f these forces (again, from the May 6 draft) would be to ....provide maximum psy chological impact in deterrence of further Communist aggression from North Vietn am, China, or the Soviet Union, while rallying the morale of the Vietnamese and encouraging the support of SEATO and neutral nations for Vietnam's defense; --re lease Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense positions to permit the ir fuller commitment to counterinsurgency actions; --provide maximum training to approved Vietnamese forces; and --provide significant military resistance to po tential North Vietnam Communist and/or Chinese Communist action.

The JCS reply, dated May 10, deferred details on the composition of U.S. forces, but quite emphatically recommended that we do send them, "assuming the politica l decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the communist sphere." Here is the JCS memo: In considering the possible commitment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam , the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the overall critical situation in Sout heast Asia with particular emphasis upon the present highly flammable situation in South Vietnam. In this connection the question, however, of South Vietnam sho uld not be considered in isolation but rather in conjunction with Thailand and t heir overall relationship to the security of Southeast Asia. The views of the Jo int Chiefs of Staff on the question regarding the development of U.S. forces int o Thailand were provided to you BY JCSM-311-61, dated 9 May 1961. The current po tentially dangerous military and political situation in Laos, of course, is the focal point in this area. Assuming that the political decision is to hold Southe ast Asia outside the Communist sphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opin ion that U.S. forces should be deployed immediately to South Vietnam; such actio n should be taken primarily to prevent the Vietnamese from being subjected to th e same situation as presently exists in Laos, which would then required deployme nt of U.S. forces into an already existing combat situation. In view of the fore going, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the decision be made to deploy s uitable U.S. forces to South Vietnam. Sufficient forces should be deployed to ac complish the following purposes: Provide a visible deterrent to potential North Vietnam and/or Chinese Communist action; Release Vietnamese forces from advanced and static defense positions to permit their fuller commitment to counterinsurg ency actions; Assist in training the Vietnamese forces to the maximum extent pos sible consistent with their mission; Provide a nucleus for the support of any ad ditional U.S. or SEATO military operation in Southeast Asia; and Indicate the fi rmness of our intent to all Asian nations. In order to maintain U.S. flexibility in the Pacific, it is envisioned that some or all of the forces deployed to Sou th Vietnam would come from the United States. The movement of these troops could be accomplished in an administrative manner and thus not tax the limited lift c apabilities of CINCPAC. In order to accomplish the foregoing the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: President Diem be encouraged to request that the United S tates fulfill its SEATO obligation, in view of the new threat now posed by the L aotian situation, by the immediate deployment of appropriate U.S forces to South Vietnam;

Upon receipt of this request, suitable forces could be immediately deployed to S outh Vietnam in order to accomplish the above-mentioned purpose. Details of size and composition of these forces must include the views of both CINCPAC and CHMA AG which are not yet available. The NSC meeting that dealt with the Task Force R eport was held the next day (the 11th, rather than the 12th as originally antici pated). The President avoided committing himself on the troop issue any further than he had already been committed by the time of his May 5 press conference. Th e resulting NSAM 52 [Doc. 88] (signed by McGeorge Bundy) states only that: The P resident directs full examination by the Defense Department under the guidance o f the Director of the continuing Task Force on Vietnam, of the size and composit ion of forces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U .S. forces to Vietnam." (The Task Force Director at this point referred to Sterl ing Cottrell, a Foreign Service Officer, rather than to Gilpatric.) So the Presi dent went no further, really, than to take note of a study that was already well underway. The record does not help us judge what significance to attach to the qualification that the study be done under the guidance of the State Department officer now heading the Task Force. On other issues relating to our military com mitments the President again, with minor alterations, endorsed the proposals of the May 6 draft. On the question of a formal alliance with South Vietnam NSAM 52 reports that: The Ambassador is authorized to begin negotiations looking toward a new bilateral arrangement with Vietnam, but no firm commitment will be made t o such an arrangement without further review by the President. The President als o "confirmed" the decisions quoted earlier accepting the April 27 military recom mendations, and accepted the following further recommendations (all from the May 6 report) "with the objective of meeting the increased security threat resultin g from the new situation along the frontier between Laos and Vietnam." 1. Assist the G.V.N. armed forces to increase their border patrol and insurgency suppress ion capabilities by establishing an effective border intelligence and patrol sys tem, by instituting regular aerial surveillance over the entire frontier area, a nd by applying modern technological area-denial techniques to control the roads and trails along Vietnam's borders. A special staff element (approximately 6 U.S . personnel), to concentrate upon solutions to the unique problems of Vietnam's borders, will be activated in MAAG, Vietnam, to assist a similar special unit in the RVNAF which the G.V.N. will be encouraged to establish; these two elements working as an integrated team will help the G.V.N. gain the support of nomadic t ribes and other border inhabitants, as well as introduce advanced techniques and equipment to strengthen the security of South Vietnam's frontiers.

2. Assist the G.V.N. to establish a Combat Development and Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of modern technology, new techniques for use a gainst the Viet Cong forces (approximately 4 U.S. personnel). 3. Assist the G.V. N. forces with health, welfare and public work projects by providing U.S. Army c ivic action mobile training teams, coordinated with the similar civilian effort (approximately 14 U.S. personnel). 4. Deploy a Special Forces Group (approximate ly 400 personnel) to Nha Trang in order to accelerate G.V.N. Special Forces trai ning. The first increment, for immediate deployment to Vietnam, should be a Spec ial Forces company (52 personnel). 5. Instruct JCS, CINCPAC, and MAAG to underta ke an assessment of the military utility of a further increase in the G.V.N. for ces from 170,000 to 200,000 in order to create two new division equivalents for deployment to the northeast border region. The parallel political and fiscal imp lications should be assessed. In general Kennedy did not seem to have committed the U.S., by these decisions, significantly further than the U.S. had already be en committed by the President's public speeches and remarks at press conferences . In the expanded military aid program approved by the President, there was no i tem that committed the U.S. any further than we had gone in the case of Laos (th at is, beyond providing advisors, materiel, and some covert combat assistance). A debatable exception was the decision to send 400 special forces troops to spee d training of their South Vietnamese counterparts. The idea of sending some Gree n Berets antedates the Task Force effort. Rostow mentioned it in his April 12 me mo, quoted above. It can be argued whether it was really prudent to view this de cision as separable from the "combat troops" issue (which also were being consid ered nominally, at least, for training, not necessarily combat). But obviously t he President was sold on their going, and since the Vietnamese Special Forces we re themselves supported by CIA rather than the regular military aid program, it was possible to handle these troops covertly. In any event, althought there woul d eventually be 1200 Green Berets in Vietnam (before the first commitment of U.S . combat units) they were apparently never cited as a precedent for or a commitm ent to a more overt role in the war. These, then, were the measures relating to military commitments undertaken as a result of the April/May review. The princip le objective of these measures (together with the nonmilitary elements of the pr ogram) as stated in the Task Force report, and formally adopted in the NSAM, was "to prevent Communist domination of Vietnam." There was no uncertainty about wh y these steps were taken: quite aside from the Administration's strong feelings that we had to deal with the challenge of wars of national liberation, the progr am adopted seems quite minimal as a response to what was--even after the ceasefi re was confirmed--a serious setback in Laos. No one in the government, and no on e of substantial influence outside it, questioned the need for some action to ho ld things together in Southeast Asia.

For the fact was that our stake in Vietnam had increased because of what had bee n happening in Laos, quite aside from anything that we did or said. Collapse in Vietnam would be worse after Laos than it might have seemed before. And to do no thing after Laos would not really have made the U.S. look better if Vietnam fell ; it would only have increased the likelihood both that that would happen, and g reatly increased the extent to which the U.S. (and within U.S. politics, the Ken nedy Administration) would be blamed for the collapse. The Laotian situation did not even provide, then, a precedent for seeking to settle the Vietnamese situat ion through the same coalition government route. For in Laos, the proU.S. factio n was plainly being defeated militarily in open battle despite a good deal of U. S. aid. The only U.S. alternative to accepting the coalition solution was to tak e over the war ourselves. Further, there was a strong neutralist faction in Laos , which could provide a premier for the government and at least a veneer of hope that the settlement might be something more than a face-saving way of handing t he country over to the communist faction. Neither of these conditions held for V ietnam, aside from all the other factors reviewed in the introduction to this pa per which left the Administration no realistic option in the neutralist directio n, even assuming that there was any temptation at that time to move in that dire ction. To have simply given up on Vietnam at that point, before any major effort had been attempted to at least see if the situation could be saved at reasonabl e cost, seems to have been, even with the hindsight we now have, essentially out of the question. That is why, in the context of the time, the commitments Kenne dy actually made seem like a near-minimal response which avoided any real deepen ing of our stake in Vietnam. There is far more of a problem with the things that we decided to talk about (troops, and a formal treaty with Vietnam) than with t he measures Kennedy fully endorsed. Certainly putting troops into Vietnam would increase our stake in the outcome, rather than merely help protect the stake we already had. So, surely, would a formal treaty, even if the treaty nominally req uired U.S. support only in the case of overt invasion. How much so would depend on the nature of the troop commitments and the nature of the treaty. But, as we will see in the next chapter (in reviewing Vice President Johnson's visit) Diem turned out to want neither troops nor a treaty for the time being. And so these issues were deferred until the fall. Aside from questions relating to our commit ments to Vietnam, there were also the parallel questions relating to our commitm ent, if any, to Diem. As noted in the introduction, discussions about Vietnam al ways had this dual aspect, and this part of the problem was treated with increas ing explicitness as time went on (and as the Administration got to know Diem bet ter). In the CIP, it was treated essentially by implication. In the Gilpatric/La nsdale draft of April 26, it was also handled that way: no explicit statement of a change in our relations with Diem was offered, although by implication it was there.

Where the CIP (by implication) saw our increased aid as contingent on Diem's per formance, the April 26 program left out any suggestion of a quid pro quo. To the contrary, it simply states that "those portions of the plan which are agreed to by the G.V.N. will be implemented as rapidly as possible." And where the CIP sa w Diem's government as our best hope "at the present time" this note of limited commitment to Diem is dropped in the April 26 draft. Instead we have a bland sta tement that we will "assist the GVN under President Diem to develop within the c ountry the widest consensus of public support for a government dedicated to resi sting communist domination." [emphasis added] The May 3 State draft and the May 6 final draft dealt with this issue much as they had with the questions of milit ary commitments: that is, these did not so much conspicuously weaken the proposa ls of the Gilpatric/Lansdale version, as to qualify and elaborate on them in way s that in effect (again, we cannot make a statement on intent) left the Presiden t a ready option to reconsider his position. State explicitly asserted that we w ere changing our policy on Diem, and spelled out some reasons for doing so. Here are some extracts from the May 6 final draft; (the language is essentially the same in the May 3 draft). ....we must continue to work through the present Vietn amese government despite its acknowledged weakness. No other remotely feasible a lternative exists at this point in time which does not involve an unacceptable d egree of risk. . . . Diem is not now fully confident of United States support. T his confidence has been undermined partly by our vigorous efforts to get him to mend his ways, and partly by the equivocal attitude he is convinced we took at t he time of the November 11, 1960, attempted coup. It is essential that President Diem's full confidence in and communication with the United States be restored promptly . . . Given Diem's personality and character and the abrasive nature of our recent relationships, success or failure in this regard will depend very he avily on Ambassador Nolting's ability to get on the same wavelength with Diem... . The chief threat to the viability of President Diem's administration is, witho ut a doubt, the fact of communist insurgency and the government's inability to p rotect its own people. Thus military measures must have the highest priority. Th ere is, nevertheless, strong discontent with the government among not only the e lite but among peasants, labor, and business. Criticism focuses on the dynastic aspects of the Diem rule, on its clandestine political apparatus, and on the met hods through which the President exercises his leadership. This is aggravated by Communist attempts to discredit the President and weaken his government's autho rity. All this is made the easier because of a communications void existing betw een the government and the people. For many months United States efforts have be en directed toward persuading Diem to adopt political, social, and economic chan ges designed to correct this serious defect. Many of these changes are included in the Counterinsurgency Plan. Our success has been only partial. There are thos e who consider that Diem will not succeed in the battle to win men's minds in Vi etnam.

Thus in giving priority emphasis to the need for internal security, we must not relax in our efforts to persuade Diem of the need for political social and econo mic progress. If his efforts are inadequate in this field our overall objective could be seriously endangered and we might once more find ourselves in the posit ion of shoring a leader who had lost the support of his people. Although the pap er expresses the hope that through "very astute dealings" ("a combination of pos itive inducements plus points at which discreet pressure can be exercised") Diem could be successfully worked with, the net effect of the State draft is hardly enthusiastic. The paper tells the President that his Task Force "believes" that the policy will work. But it is a large order: for the aim had been referred to as nothing less than "a major alteration in the present government structure or in its objectives." In effect, the silence on Diem in the Gilpatric/Lansdale dra ft was replaced by a detailed statement which, in the course of reaffirming the need to take prompt steps to show confidence in Diem, nevertheless leaves the st rong impression that we really did not have much confidence in him at all. Suppo rt for Diem became tactical: based explicitly on the hope that he might reform, and implicitly on the fact that trying to overthrow him would be terribly risky in the aftermath of Laos, even if the U.S. had someone to overthrow him with. Fu rther, although the paper explicitly conceded first priority to military needs, there was a strong argument that military efforts alone will not be enough. It w as apparently this equivocal attitude toward Diem (aside from any personal consi derations) that led to Lansdale's prediction that State could never "win this ba ttle." Thus in the main paper of the May 6 draft the general political objective was stated as: Develop political and economic conditions which will create a so lid and widespread support among the key political groups and the general popula tion for a Vietnam which has the will to resist Communist encroachment and which in turn stems from a stake in a freer and more democratic society. Lansdale, in a pencilled comment to Gilpatric, complained: The elected President of Vietnam is ignored in this statement as the base to build upon in countering the communi sts. This will have the U.S. pitted against Diem as first priority, the communis ts as second. Nevertheless, it seems that the May program went a very long way i n Lansdale's preferred direction: although the U.S. was expanding its contributi on to the Vietnamese effort it was no longer asking for any quid pro quo. The U. S. envisioned "discreet pressure" but certainly not, for then anyway, any hint o f withholding aid. The U.S. flatly asserted that it saw no "remotely acceptable alternative to Diem," for the time being, any way. The U.S. thought it vital tha t Diem do better, but increasing his confidence in the U.S. had top priority. Th e strongest guidance given the new Ambassador was to "get on Diem's wavelength."

More of this tentative adoption of the Lansdale approach can be seen in the disc ussion of Vice President Johnson's trip (from the May 6 draft): The Vice Preside nt's visit will provide the added incentive needed to give the GVN the motivatio n and confidence it needs to carry on the struggle. We believe that meetings bet ween the Vice President and President Diem will act as a catalytic agent to prod uce broad agreement on the need for accelerated joint Vietnamese-U.S. actions to resist Communist encroachment in SEA. These meetings will also serve to get acr oss to President Diem our confidence in him as a man of great stature and as one of the strong figures in SEA on whom we are placing our reliance. At the same t ime, these conferences should impress Diem with the degree of importance we atta ch to certain political and economic reforms in Vietnam which are an essential e lement in frustrating Communist encroachments. Recognizing the difficulties we h ave had in the past in persuading Diem to take effective action on such reforms, as specific an understanding as possible should be solicited from Diem on this point. It was this sort of guidance (plus, perhaps, a memo from Lansdale describ ing President Diem in terms that bear comparison with those Jack Valenti would l ater use in connection with another President) that accounts for Johnson's famou s reference to Diem as the Churchill of Asia. In sum, what emerges from the fina l version of the report is a sense that the U.S. had decided to take a crack at the Lansdale approach of trying to win Diem over with a strong display of person al confidence in him. What does not emerge is any strong sense that the Administ ration believed this new approach really had much hope of working, but undoubted ly this pessimistic reading is influenced by the hindsight now available. The dr afters of the paper very probably saw themselves as hedging against the possible failure of the policy, rather than implying that it probably would not work. If we go beyond the paperwork, and ask what judgments might be made about the inte nt of the senior decision-makers, and particularly the President, it seems that here, even more than in connection with the military commitments discussed earli er, the Administration adopted a course which, whether in hindsight the wisest a vailable or not, probably seemed to have no practical alternative. Presumably th e top level of the Administration believed there was at least some chance that t he new policy toward Diem might produce useful results. But even to the extent t his prospect seemed dim, there were political advantages (or at least political risks) avoided in giving this plan a try, and there must not have seemed (as eve n now there does not seem) to have been much cost in doing so. Finally, whatever the President thought of the prospects and political advantages of this approac h to Diem, it might have been hard at that time to see any drastically different alternative anyway. After all, the heart of the Laos embarrassment was that the U.S was (with some face-saving cover) dropping an anti-communist leader who had come into

power with the indispensable assistance of the U.S. This dropping of Phoumi in L aos in favor of support for the neutralist government Phoumi had overthrown with U.S. encouragement and assistance remained an essential part of whatever outcom e developed in Laos. In the wake of this embarrassment, the U.S. was now trying to reassure other governments in Southeast Asia. Was it possible to carry out th is reassurance while threatening Diem, another anti-communist leader totally dep endent on U.S. support, with withdrawal of our support (our only available form of pressure) unless he reformed himself according to U.S. prescription? Was this a prudent time to risk a coup in South Vietnam, which was the widely predicted effect of any show of lack of confidence in Diem? It is obviously impossible for us to strike a balance among these reasons (or perhaps some others) why the dec isions were made the way they were. More interesting, though, is that it seems t o have been unnecessary for even the decision-maker himself to strike such a bal ance. For it seems that whatever his view, the policy of trying to reassure Diem (rather than pressure him, or dissociating from him) seemed like a sensible tac tic for the moment, and very possible the only sensible tactic for that particul ar moment. IV. FROM MAY TO SEPTEMBER At the end of September, Admiral Harry Felt , Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, stopped off in Saigon on his way to a SEATO meeting in Bangkok. Felt, Ambassador Nolting, and several of the ir senior aides met with Diem at Independence Palace, on the evening of the 29th . According to Nolting's cable the following day: In course of long discussion . . . Diem pointed the question. He asked for a bilateral defense treaty with the U.S. This rather large and unexpected request seemed to have been dragged in by the heels at the end of a far-ranging discussion, but we discovered upon questi oning that it was seriously intended . Although the available record does not ex plicitly say so, this request presumably triggered the intensive attention to Vi etnam planning that began early in October (Nolting's cable arrived October 1) a nd led to the decision on the 11th to send the Taylor Mission. The balance of th is chapter reviews the major developments between the Presidential decisions on the Task Force Report (May 11) and the arrival of Nolting's cable on the treaty request (October 1). A. THE JOHNSON MISSION The available record tells us almost nothing about the Vice President's visit to Saigon beyond what is described in the public memoirs. We know from Nolting's cables that Johnson brought up the po ssibility of U.S. troops in Vietnam and of a bilateral treaty after Diem (in an after-dinner conversation) began to talk about the problems that communist gains in Laos would create for him. We know that Diem replied that he wanted U.S.

combat troops only in the event of open invasion and that he also did not show i nterest in a treaty. But we do not know what, if anything, Johnson was authorize d to say if Diem had reacted affirmatively. And this could have ranged anywhere from attempting to discourage Diem if he did show interest, to offering some spe cific proposal and timetable. No strong inference can be drawn from the fact tha t Johnson, rather than Diem, raised the issue. Even if the President had decided against making troop commitments to Vietnam at that time, there would have been nothing outrageous about instructing Johnson to refer to such a possibility onc e Diem began to talk about his concerns due to Laos. After all, the whole point of the Johnson mission was to reassure Diem and other Asian leaders, that the U. S. could, despite Laos, be counted on in Asia. Simply reading the American newsp apers would have told Diem that at least as of May 5, the Administration was ser iously considering sending American troops to Vietnam, and that Johnson was expe cted to discuss this with Diem. A quite reasonable tactical judgment would have been that nothing would have been more likely to make Diem ask for U.S. troops t han for Johnson to remain eerily silent on this issue. Consequently, on the reco rd available, we can do no more than guess what would have happened if Diem reac ted affirmatively at the time of Johnson's visit. The most reasonable guess is p robably that the Taylor Mission, or something equivalent, would have been undert aken in the spring, rather than in the fall, and nothing very much would have be en different in the long run. But that is only a reasonable guess. For the rest, here are some extracts from a report Johnson wrote after his return. Essentiall y, Johnson argued for prompt moves by the U.S. to show support for noncommunist governments in Southeast Asia. He had in mind expanded conventional military and economic aid, and perhaps a new treaty to replace SEATO. But despite the shock of U.S. willingness to accept a coalition government in Laos, Johnson reported t hat U.S. troops were neither desired nor required. And although this might not a lways be the case, Johnson recommended that the U.S. "must remain master of this decision." The Impact of Laos There is no mistaking the deep--and long lasting-impact of recent developments in Laos. Country to country, the degree differs b ut Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United States thro ughout Southeast Asia. No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this . The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like m anner in Geneva. Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less accep t that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at Geneva. Their charity extend s no farther. The Impact of the Mission

Beyond question, your judgement about the timing of our mission was correct. Eac h leader--except Nehru--publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this missi on. Chiang said--and all others privately concurred--that the mission had the ef fect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast Asian nations. What happene d, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want--as long as they can--to remain as friends or allies of the United States. The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically weakened the ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neutralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, antiAmerican election demagoguery in the Philippines were all developing prior to ou r visit. The show of strength and sincerity--partly because you had sent the Vic e President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you ha d sent your sister--gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer. Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United States. It did not--in my judgment--restore any confidence already lost. The le aders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it cl ear that deeds must follow words--soon. We didn't buy time--we were given it. If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know--without bothering t o ask--that there would be no further extensions on my note. **** The Importance of Follow-Through I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of follow ing up this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At th e moment--because of Laos--these nations are hypersensitive to the possibility o f American hypocrisy toward Asia. Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev-w hich, to the Asian mind, emphasize Western rather than Asian concerns--and consi dering the negative line of various domestic American editorials about this miss ion, I strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit imme diately. Personal Conclusions from the Mission I took to Southeast Asia some bas ic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there--and to India and Pakistan --with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned. I have also reached certain other conclusio ns which I believe may be of value as guidance for those responsible in formulat ing policies. These conclusions are as follows: 1. The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve suce ss there-or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take u p our defenses on our own shores. Asian Communism is compromised

and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without th is inhibitory influence, the island outposts--Philippines, Japan, Taiwan--have n o security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea. 2. The struggle is far from l ost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding a nd turning the Communist surge. The will to resist--while now the target of subv ersive attack--is there. The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southea st Asian freedom is confidence in the United States. 3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countrie s--or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians-rests on th e knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding. 4. SEATO i s not now and probably never will be the answer because of British and French un willingness to support decisive action. Asian distrust of the British and French is outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva w ould terminate SEATO's meaningfulness. In the latter event, we must be ready wit h a new approach to collective security in the area. We should consider an allia nce of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forc es in defense of their freedom. Such an organization should: a) have a clear-cut command authority b) also devote attention to measures and programs of social j ustice, housing, land reform, etc. 5. Asian leaders--at this time--do not want A merican troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions. Ameri can combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Poss ibly Americans fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peop les would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the ret urn this soon of Western troops. To the extent that fear of ground troop involve ment dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seem s most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing fears in confidence, on the str ength of the individual statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. This does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack would bring call s for U.S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack seems scant , and we might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of co mbat troop commitment could be lessened domestically. 6. Any help--economic as w ell as military--we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their fre edom must be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to tak e the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be--and must be-unsti nting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we ha ve--

for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations--what we expect or r equire of them. 7. In large measure, the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers t o nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself , rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must-whatever strategies we evolve--keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in such ente rprises. 8. Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate--and most important--trouble spots, critical to the U.S. These areas require the attention of our very best t alents--under the very closest Washington direction--on matters economic, milita ry and political. The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide w hether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and [a] "Fortress Americ a" concept. More important, we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I r ecommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countri es defend themselves. I consider the key here is to get our best MAAG people to control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid program. In Vietna m and Thailand, we must move forward together. a. In Vietnam, Diem is a complex figure beset by many problems. He has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the people, is surrounded by persons less admirable and capable than he. The co untry can be saved-if we move quickly and wisely. We must decide whether to supp ort Diem- or let Vietnam fall. We must have coordination of purpose in our count ry team, diplomatic and military. The Saigon Embassy, USIS, MAAG and related ope rations leave much to be desired. They should be brought up to maximum efficienc y. The most important thing is imaginative, creative, American management of our military aid program. The Vietnamese and our MAAG estimate that $50 million of U.S. military and economic assistance will be needed if we decide to support Vie tnam. This is the best information available to us at the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington military judgment it should be supported. S ince you proposed and Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be appo inted and proceed forthwith. b. In Thailand, the Thais and our own MAAG estimate probably as much is needed as in Vietnam-about $50 million of military and econ omic assistance. Again, should our best military judgment concur, I believe we s hould support such a program. Sarit is more strongly and staunchly pro-Western t han many of his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the consequence to his country of a communist-controlled Laos. If Sarit is to stand firm against n eutralism, he must have--soon--concrete evidence to show his people of United St ates military and economic support. He believes that his armed forces should be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to Washington to discuss ai d matters.

**** To recapitulate, these are the main impressions I have brought back from my trip. The fundamental decision required of the United States-and time is of the greatest importance-is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Commu nist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a fu ll realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money , of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge th at at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master in this decision. What we do in South east Asia should be part of a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributi ons to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I rec ommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action. B. DIEM'S JUNE LETTER During his visit Johnson, on behalf of Kennedy, invited Diem to prepare a set of proposals on South Vietnamese military needs for consideration by Washin gton. In a letter May 15, Diem told Kennedy that the definitive study would be r eady in a few weeks. (He appreciated this invitation, Diem told Kennedy, "partic ularly because we have not become accustomed to being asked for our own views on our needs.)" On June 9, Diem signed the promised letter. It was carried to Wash ington by a key Diem aide (Nguyen Dinh Thuan) and delivered on the 14th. (Thuan played a key role on the Vietnamese side throughout 1961. He was the man Durbrow , in the cable quoted in full earlier, suspected was the only cabinet member Die m had told about the CIP. In a memo to Gilpatric, Lansdale described him as Diem 's "Secretary of Security, Defense, Interior, etc.") In the letter, Diem propose d an increase in the RVNAF to 270,000 men, or to double the 150,000 strength aut horized at the start of 1961, and 100,000 men more than envisioned under the CIP . That was a large request: for up until the end of April, the U.S. and South Vi etnamese were still haggling over the go-ahead for a 20,000-man increase. Furthe r, Diem made it clear that he saw this force requirement as a semi-permanent inc rease in South Vietnamese strength, which would continue to be needed even shoul d he eliminate the Viet Cong. Here are some extracts from Diem's letter: [The] s ituation . . . has become very much more perilous following the events in Laos, the more and more equivocal attitude of Cambodia and the intensification of the activities of aggression of international communism which wants to take the maxi mum advantage to accelerate the conquest of Southeast Asia. It is apparent that one of the major obstacles to

the communist expansion on this area of the globe is Free Vietnam because with y our firm support, we are resolved to oppose it with all our energies. Consequent ly, now and henceforth, we constitute the first target for the communists to ove rthrow at any cost. The enormous accumulation of Russian war material in North V ietnam is aimed, in the judgment of foreign observers, more at South Vietnam tha n at Laos. We clearly realize this dangerous situation but I want to reiterate t o you here, in my personal name and in the name of the entire Vietnamese people, our indomitable will to win. On the second of May, my council of generals met t o evaluate the current situation and to determine the needs of the Republic of V ietnam to meet this situation. Their objective evaluation shows that the militar y situation at present is to the advantage of the communists and that most of th e Vietnamese Armed Forces are already committed to internal security and the pro tection of our 12 million inhabitants. For many months the communist-inspired fr atricidal war has taken nearly one thousand casualties a month on both sides. Do cuments obtained in a recent operation, along route No. 9 which runs from Laos t o Vietnam, contain definite proof that 2,860 armed agents have infiltrated among us in the course of the last four months.* It is certain that this number rises each day. However, the Vietnamese people are * Diem's number implies an infiltr ation rate about 4 times as high as that estimated by U.S. intelligence in 1961, and twice as high as the hindsight revised 1961 estimates now in use. showing t he world that they are willing to fight and die for their freedom, notwithstandi ng the temptations to neutralism and its false promises of peace being drummed i nto their ears daily by the communists. In the light of this situation, the coun cil of generals concluded that additional forces numbering slightly over 100,000 more than our new force level of 170,000 will be required to encounter the omin ous threat of communist domination . After considering the recommendations of ou r generals and consulting with our American military advisors, we now conclude t hat to provide even minimum initial resistance to the threat, two new divisions of approximately 10,000 strength each are required to be activated at the earlie st possible date. Our lightly held defensive positions along the demilitarized z one at our Northern border is even today being outflanked by communist forces wh ich have defeated the Royal Laotian Army garrisons in Tchepone and other cities in Southern Laos. Our ARVN forces are so thoroughly committed to internal anti-g uerrilla operations that we have no effective forces with which to counter this threat from Southern Laos. Thus, we need immediately one division for the First Army Corps and one for the Second Army Corps to provide at least some token resi stance to the size-able forces the communists are capable of bringing to bear ag ainst our Laotian frontier. Failing this, we would have no recourse but to withd raw our forces southward from the demilitarized zone and sacrifice progressively greater areas of our

country to the communists. These divisions should be mobilized and equipped, tog ether with initial logistic support units, immediately after completion of activ ation of the presently contemplated increase of 20,000 which you have offered to support. Following the activation of these units, which should begin in about f ive months, we must carry on the program of activation of additional units until over a period of two years we will have achieved a force of 14 infantry divisio ns, an expanded airborne brigade of approximately division strength and accompan ying (support?) . . . The mission of this total 270,000 man force remains the sa me, namely, to overcome the insurgency which has risen to the scale of a bloody, communist-inspired civil war within our borders and to provide initial resistan ce to overt, external aggression until free world forces under the SEATO agreeme nt can come to our aid. The question naturally arises as to how long we shall ha ve to carry the burden of so sizeable a military force. Unfortunately, I can see no early prospects for the reduction of such a force once it has been establish ed; for even though we may be successful in liquidating the insurgency within ou r borders, communist pressure in Southeast Asia and the external military threat to our country must be expected to increase, I fear, before it diminishes. This means that we must be prepared to maintain a strong defensive military posture for at least the foreseeable future in order that we may not become one of the s o-called "soft spots" which traditionally have attracted communist aggression. W e shall therefore continue to need material support to maintain this force whose requirements far exceed the capacity of our economy to support.... To accomplis h this 100,000 man expansion of our military forces, which is perfectly feasible from a manpower viewpoint, will require a great intensification of our training programs in order to produce, in the minimum of time, those qualified combat le aders and technical specialists needed to fill the new units and to provide to t hem the technical and logistic support required to insure their complete effecti veness. For this purpose a considerable expansion of the United States Military Advisory Group is an essential requirement. Such an expansion, in the form of se lected elements of the American Armed Forces to establish training centers for t he Vietnamese Armed Forces, would serve the dual purpose of providing an express ion of the United States' determination to halt the tide of communist aggression and of preparing our forces in the minimum of time. While the Government and pe ople of Vietnam are prepared to carry the heavy manpower burden required to save our country, we well know that we cannot afford to pay, equip, train and mainta in such forces as I have described. To make this effort possible, we would need to have assurances that this needed material support would be provided. The reco rd is unclear on the immediate response to this letter. In particular, we have n o record of the conversations Thuan had in Washington when he delivered the requ ests. The issue of the RVNAF increases somehow became part of the business of an economic mission then about to leave for Vietnam (the Staley Mission, discussed in the following section). The request for "selected elements of the American A rmed Forces," raised in the next-to-last quoted paragraph, is left thoroughly ob scure in the records we have-to the point where we are not at all sure either wh at Diem meant by it or how the

Administration reacted to it. But, as will be seen in the section below on "U.S. Troops," nothing came of it. C. THE STALEY MISSION One of the continuing negoti ating items through most of 1961 was the extent to which the South Vietnamese sh ould finance their own effort. The U.S. view was that the South Vietnamese were not doing enough. The result was American pressure on Diem to undertake what was called tax "reform." Diem was most reluctant to move. It is pretty clear that a large part of Diem's reluctance to move flowed from the same (well-founded) sen se of personal insecurity that made him avoid establishing a clear military chai n of command. On the latter issue, the risk of weakening the war effort obviousl y struck him as less dangerous than the risk of making a coup easier by concentr ating military authority in his generals instead of dividing it between the gene rals and the 38 province chiefs. Similarly, for a ruler so unsure of his hold on the country, a serious effort at imposing austerity looked more risky than hold ing out for the Americans to provide a few more millions out of their vast resou rces. But Diem, of course, was hardly likely to admit such reasons to the Americ ans, assuming he admitted them to himself. Consequently, on these issues (as on many others) the record is a long story of tediously extracted promises, excuses for inaction, and American complaints about Diem's administrative style. On the economic issue, the substance of the argument was this: The deficit between wha t Diem raised in taxes and what his budget required was made up by the U.S. thro ugh a commercial import program. The regime sold the goods provided by the U.S. to South Vietnamese businessmen, and used the piasters thus acquired mainly to m eet the local currency costs (mostly food and pay) for the armed forces. U.S. di ssatisfaction with the South Vietnamese effort showed clearly in the decision to ask the South Vietnamese themselves to provide the local currency costs for the 20,000 man force increase proposed in the CIP, although the U.S. had been payin g these costs (through the import program) for the balance of the forces. The So uth Vietnamese insisted, for the outset, that they could not raise the piasters required. The basic question of whether the South Vietnamese were bearing a reas onable share of the burden devolved into a number of technical issues, such as t he effect of the program on inflation in South Vietnam, and the piaster/dollar e xchange rate. The Gilpatric/Lansdale draft of the Task Force Report proposed tha t Diem be flatly assured that the U.S. would make up any deficit in the Vietname se budget. But State objected from the start to giving any such assurance. Inste ad a joint commission of U.S. and South Vietnamese economic experts was proposed to work out a joint program dealing with these economic issues. This was one of the proposals Vice President Johnson carried with him on his mission. Diem acce pted the proposal. And the U.S. team, headed by Eugene Staley (president of the Stanford Research Institute) was dispatched to South Vietnam in mid-June.

By the time the Staley Mission left, though, Diem had written the letter just qu oted asking for U.S. support for a large further increase in his forces. Staley' s group, with its Vietnamese counterpart, found themselves serving as the vehicl e for the discussions on force levels. The report they issued is mostly about mi litary issues, on which the economists stated they simply reflected instructions passed on by their respective governments. Here are some excerpts on the milita ry issues (in addition, the report of course contained a discussion, rather vagu e as it turned out, of the economic issues which were nominally its purpose, and it also contained a good deal of very fine, vigorous language on the need for " crash programs" of economic and social developing). Viet Nam is today under atta ck in a bitter, total struggle which involves its survival as a free nation. Its enemy, the Viet Cong, is ruthless, resourceful, and elusive. This enemy is supp lied, reinforced, and centrally directed by the international Communist apparatu s operating through Hanoi. To defeat it requires the mobilization of the entire economic, military psychological, and social resources of the country and vigoro us support from the United States. The intensified program which we recommend ou r two countries adopt as a basis for mutual actions over the next several years is designed not just to hold the line but to achieve a real breakthrough. Our jo int efforts must surpass the critical threshold of the enemy's resistance, there by puting an end to his destructive attacks, and at the same time we must make a decisive impact on the economic, social, and ideological front. The turn of eve nts in Laos has created further serious problems with regard to the maintenance of the GVN as a free and sovereign non-Communist nation. In particular, the unco vering of the Laotian-Viet Nam border to DRV or DRV-supported forces creates a s erious threat of increased covert infiltration of personnel, supplies, and equip ment to the Viet Cong. With such increased support, the Viet Cong undoubtedly ho pe to seize firm military control of a geographic area and announce the establis hment therein of a "rebel" government for South Viet Nam which would then be rec ognized by and receive military support from the DRV, Communist China, and Sovie t Russia. (Example: The present situation in Laos.) The joint VN-US group does n ot consider itself competent to make specific recommendations as to desired forc e levels for the defense of Viet Nam. They have, however, after consultation wit h their respective military authorities, adopted for economic planning purposes certain estimated strength figures for the GVN armed forces under two alternativ e assumptions. Alternative A assumes that the Communist-led insurgency effort re mains at approximately its present level of intensity and the Government of Laos maintains sufficient independence from the Communist Bloc to deny authority for the transit of DVN or Communist Chinese troops across its borders. Alternative B assumes that the Viet Cong are able to significantly increase their insurgency campaign within Viet Nam and that the situation in Laos continues to deteriorat e to the point where the Communists gain de facto control of that country.

Alternative A called for a build-up of Diem's forces to 200,000 (vs. 170,000 the n authorized. Alternative B called for continuing the build-up to 270,000. On th is basis, Kennedy agreed to provide support for the increase to 200,000. The 200 ,000-man approval was supposed to be contingent on South Vietnamese agreement to a plan for using the forces. The question of a further increase to 270,000 was deferred, since it did not need to be faced until the lower figure was being app roached, sometime late in 1962. A consequence of the Staley Mission was the Sout h Vietnamese troop levels needed little attention in the fall review: the U.S. s imply decided to support the increase to 200,000 even though the agreed plan for using the forces did not yet exist (as in May the U.S. had agreed to support th e increase to 170,000 which also, it will be recalled, was supposed to have been contingent on such a plan). A few points about the Staley Mission seem useful t o keep in mind in reviewing the fall process: 1. It is another reminder of the p revailing (although not universal) overoptimism of U.S. appraisals of the Vietna m problem. 2. One of the follow-on actions to the report was supposed to be a Vi etnamese announcement of a program of social reform. Producing this piece of pap er (and in the end it was not much more than a piece of paper) took months. It w as experiences such as this that gave questions about the viability of the Diem regime greater prominence in the fall review than they had received during April and May. 3. The U.S. was still continuing to deal with Diem most gently. Nothin g more was asked of Diem as a quid pro quo than that he finally work up a plan f or the counterinsurgency. The President explicitly accepted the assumptions of t he Joint Plan worked out by the Staley Mission and their Vietnamese counterparts . This is from the formal record of decision: Joint Program of Action With the Government of Vietnam (Staley Report) August 4, 1961 The President agrees with the three basic tenets on which the recommendati ons contained in the Joint Action Program are based, namely: a. Security require ments must, for the present, be given first priority. b. Military operations wil l not achieve lasting results unless economic and social programs are continued and accelerated.

c. It is in our joint interest to accelerate measures to achieve a selfsustainin g economy and a free and peaceful society in Viet-Nam. Similar language was used at the time of the May decisions. So it is not new. It is only that, in the light of Diem's inactivity, the phrases implying that nonm ilitary efforts are also important had come to sound a little hollow. D. U.S. CO MBAT TROOPS From the time of the Laos Annex to the original Gilpatric/Lansdale d raft of the Task Force Report (April 28). The record shows persistent activity o n some level or other on the issue of sending U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. At the time of the Task Force review, it will be recalled, Defense recommended send ing two 1600-man combat units to Vietnam to set up two training centers for the Vietnamese in the highlands. In later drafts of the Task Force report, this prop osal was broadened to consider sending American troops for wider purposes, short of direct combat against the Viet Cong. But the proposal was downgraded to a su bject for study and was no longer a definite recommendation. Here is a summary o f the items (on the issue of U.S. combat troops) in the record available to this study following Kennedy's decisions on the Task Force Report (May 11). On May 1 2 Vice President Johnson discussed the question with Diem, as described in an ea rlier section. This seems to have resolved the issue (negatively) so far as John son was concerned, and possibly as far as President Kennedy was concerned. But i f it did, the President's view was not very emphatically passed on to subordinat e members of the Administration. For a week later, Lansdale sent a memo to Gilpa trick noting that Diem did not want U.S. combat units as such, but that he might accept these units if they had a mission of training South Vietnamese forces: A mbassador Nolting [said] that President Diem would welcome as many U.S. military personnel as needed for training and advising Vietnamese forces [MAAG Chief] Ge neral McGarr, who was also present at this discussion [between Johnson and Diem] , reported that while President Diem would not want U.S. combat forces for the p urpose of fighting Communists in South Vietnam, he would accept deployment of U. S. combat forces as trainers for the Vietnamese forces at any time. This languag e leaves it unclear whether McGarr was merely stating his opinion (which support ed his own desire to bring in U.S. combat units), or reporting what he understoo d Diem to have said. (About the same day of Lansdale's memo--May 18--the JCS had restated its recommendation of May 10 that combat troops should be sent to Viet nam; and McGarr, from Saigon, had recommended sending a 16,000 man force, or if Diem would not accept

that, a 10,000 man force with the nominal mission of establishing training cente rs for the Vietnamese. The similar recommendation made in the Task Force drafts had suggested 3200 men for the force.) In any event, Lansdale's memo makes it qu ite clear that he (along with McGarr and the JCS) were primarily interested in g etting U.S. combat units into Vietnam, with the training mission a possible devi ce for getting Diem to accept them. After a discussion of JCS and CINCPAC planni ng and of alternative locations for the troops, Lansdale comments: ....any of th e above locations have good areas for training of Vietnamese forces, if this wer e to be a mission of the U.S. forces. In the available papers, no one at this ti me talked about using American units to directly fight the Viet Cong. Rather it was mainly in terms of relieving Vietnamese units to undertake offensive action. We can only guess what people were really thinking. As the training-the-Vietnam ese rationale seems essentially a device for getting Diem to accept the units, t he non-combatant role for U.S. troops may have been (and probably was in the min ds of at least some of the planners) mainly a device for calming those members o f the Administration who were reluctant to involve American units in fighting th e Viet Cong. Certainly in hindsight, it seems most unrealistic to suppose that A merican combat units could have been stationed in a center of Viet Cong activity (a number of papers postulate the insurgents were attempting to establish a "li berated area" in the high plateau, which was the principal local discussed) with out themselves becoming involved in the fighting. Lansdale concluded his memo by reminding Gilpatric that Diem was sending Thuan ("Secretary of Security, Defens e, Interior, etc.") to Washington to deliver his letter on Vietnam's "definitive military needs." Lansdale recommended that Gilpatric take up the question of wh ether Diem would accept U.S. troops with Thuan. "With concrete information, you will then have a firm position for further decisions." But apparently someone di d not want to wait for Thuan. For on May 27, Nolting reported that he had brough t up the question of what Diem meant in his conversation with Johnson directly w ith Diem, and that Diem did not then want U.S. combat units "for this or any oth er reason." Nevertheless, on June 9, Diem signed the letter to Kennedy that, as quoted above, asked for: ....selected elements of the American Armed Forces to e stablish training centers for the Vietnamese Armed Forces.... a move which Diem stated:

would serve the dual purpose of providing an expression of the United States' de termination to halt the tide of communist aggression and of preparing our forces in the minimum of time. This certainly sounded very much like the recommendatio n of the Task Force draft, or McGarr's later expanded version of that proposal; particularly since Diem explicitly stated that he had McGarr's advice in draftin g the proposals. But where the American proposals were for training whole South Vietnamese divisions, Diem said the training centers would be for combat leaders and technical specialists. Consequently, it seems that Diem did not have the sa me thing in mind in referring to "selected elements of the American Armed Forces " as did McGarr and others interested in bringing in American combat units. It m ay be that Diem agreed to put in this request that sounded like what McGarr want ed as a concession to the Americans in return for support of the large increase in the RVNAF he was asking. Presumably this was clarified during the discussions Thuan had after delivering the letter. But, as noted earlier, we have no record of the conversations. In any event, nothing came of the proposal. (A summary of Diem's letter, cabled to the American mission in Saigon the day after the lette r was received in Washington, did not use the phrase "selected elements of the A merican Armed Forces." Instead it said that Diem asked for an increase of "Ameri can personnel" to establish the training centers. The crucial issue, of course, was whether Americans would be sent to Vietnam in the form of organized combat u nits, capable of, if not explicitly intended, for conducting combat operations. We do not know whether the wording of the summary reflected Thuan's clarificatio n of the proposal when he arrived in Washington, or a high level Administration decision to interpret Diem's letter as not asking for combat units, or merely sl oppy drafting of the cable.) It seems clear that either Diem (despite the langua ge of the letter he signed) really did not want American units, or that Kennedy (despite the activity of his subordinates) did not want to send those units, or both. Sorenson, in his memoir, says that in May Kennedy decided against sending combat units despite the recommendations he received at the time of the Task For ce Report. But his account of the Task Force is in error on a number of details, and so it is hard to know how much to credit his recollection. But there is a f inal item apparently from this period that seems to support Sorenson. It is a ha ndwritten undated note on a piece of scratch paper from Rostow to McNamara. It l ooks like a note passed at a meeting. From its location in the file, it was prob ably written about June 5, that is, a few days before Thuan arrived with Diem's letter. It reads: Bob:

We must think of the kind of forces and missions for Thailand now, Vietnam later . We need a guerrilla deterrence operation in Thailand's northeast. We shall nee d forces to support a counter-guerrilla war in Vietnam: aircraft helicopters com munications men special forces militia teachers etc. WWR Two things are striking about this note: first, it is a quite exact description of the sort of military assistance Kennedy finally dispatched to Vietnam (i.e., combat support and advisors but not American units capable of independent combat against the guerrillas). Second, it certainly suggests that despite what Lansda le, McGarr, and others were doing, those close to the President were not at this time thinking about sending American combat units to Vietnam (or any American f orces, for even the units Rostow lists are for "later" in contrast to "Thailand now"). Nevertheless on July 20, McGarr again raised the question of combat units for training with Diem, and reported again that he did not want them. In genera l, we seem to be seeing here a pattern that first began to emerge in the handlin g of the Task Force Report and which will be even more strikingly evident in the President's handling of the Taylor Report. Someone or other is frequently promo ting the idea of sending U.S. combat units. Kennedy never makes a clear-cut deci sion but some way or other action is always deferred on any move that would prob ably lead to engagements on the ground between American units and the Viet Cong. We have no unambiguous basis for judging just what had really happened in each case. But we do see a similar pattern at least twice and possibly three differen t times: in May, perhaps again in June (depending on details of Thuan's talks in Washington not available to this study), and as we will report shortly, again i n November. In each case, the record seems to be moving toward a decision to sen d troops, or at least to a Presidential decision that, in principal, troops shou ld be sent if Diem can be persuaded to accept them. But no such decision is ever reached. The record never shows the President himself as the controlling figure . In June, there does not seem to be any record of what happened, at least in th e files available to this study. In May and, as we will see, in November, the Pr esident conveniently receives a revised draft of the recommendations which no lo nger requires him to commit himself.

No reliable inference can be drawn from this about how Kennedy would have behave d in 1965 and beyond had he lived. (One of those who had advised retaining freed om of action on the issue of sending U.S. combat troops was Lyndon Johnson.) It does not prove that Kennedy behaved soundly in 1961. Many people will think so; but others will argue that the most difficult problem of recent years might have been avoided if the U.S. had made a hard commitment on the ground in South Viet nam in 1961. E. THE TREATY REQUEST As to Diem, we have, of course, even less in the way of a record from which to judge what he really thought he was doing. But it is not hard to understand why he should be reluctant to accept U.S. combat t roops. His stated reason was always that sending U.S. combat units would signal the end of the Geneva Accords. But this explanation explains little. Diem though t the Geneva Accords were betrayal of Vietnam in 1954, and a farce, freely viola ted by the communists, later. Consequently, he would be concerned about their de mise only if North Vietnam could use this as a pretext for an overt invasion. Bu t North Vietnam had long had a suitable pretext for an invasion in Diem's refusa l to discuss the elections called for under the Geneva Accords. Diem's shield wa s the threat of U.S. intervention, not the Geneva Accords, and it is mighty hard to see how this shield could be weakened by putting American troops on the grou nd in South Vietnam. But there were other reasons for Diem to be wary of U.S. tr oops. For one thing, not even Diem's severest critics questioned his commitment to Vietnamese nationalism. The idea of inviting foreign troops back into Vietnam must surely have been distasteful even once he decided it was unavoidable. Furt her, the presence of American troops in Vietnam had a very ambivalent effect on the risk to Diem of a military coup. To the extent American troops increased the sense of security, they would lessen the likelihood of a coup, which the miJita ry rationalized mainly on the grounds that they could not win the war under Diem . But the larger the American military presence in the country, the more Diem wo uld have to worry about American ability and temptation to encourage a coup if D iem incurred American displeasure. The net impact of these conflicting effects w ould depend on the security situation in Vietnam. If Diem felt strong, he would probably not want American troops; if he felt weak, he might see no choice but t o risk inviting the Americans in. Even at the time of the Taylor mission, we wil l see Diem is most erratic on this issue. Against this background, it is easy to understand why Diem, when the situation got worse in September, should have "po inted the question" at whether the U.S. would give him a treaty, rather than whe ther the U.S. would send in troops. As far as we can see, he was mostly concerne d about what the latest VC attacks were doing to confidence in his regime, rathe r than any fear that the VC, still estimated at fewer than 20,000 strong, were g oing to defeat the quarter million regulars and auxiliaries in his own forces. W hat he probably wanted was an unambiguous public commitment that the Americans w ould not let Vietnam fall. For this would meet his immediate concern about confi dence in his regime, perhaps even more effectively than the dispatch of American troops, and without

the disadvantages that would come with accepting American troops. For Diem, a cl earcut treaty probably seemed the best possible combination of maximizing the Am erican commitment while minimizing American leverage. And that, of course, would help explain why the Administration was not terribly attracted to such a propos al. F. THE SITUATION IN SEPTEMBER So far as the available record shows, there wa s no sense of imminent crisis in the official reporting to Washington as fall of 1961 began. An NIE published in mid-August concluded that Diem faced a "prolong ed and difficult struggle" against the insurgency, and noted that "the French wi th their memories of the Indochina that was and the British with their experienc e in Malaya tend to be pessimistic regarding GVN prospects for combating the ins urgency." But the NIE also reported that Diem's army had been performing better in 1961 than in 1960. Warning of possible trouble looked months, rather than wee ks, ahead. The danger foreseen was a coup: "if the fight against the Viet Cong g oes poorly during the next year or the South Vietnamese Army suffers heavy casua lties, the chances of a military coup would substantially increase." The judgmen t of the NIE on the effects of such a coup was entirely negative: If there is a serious disruption of GVN leadership as a result of Diem's death or as the resul t of a military coup, any momentum of GVN's counterinsurgency efforts had achiev ed will be halted or reversed, at least for a time. The confusion and suspicion attending a coup effort could provide the communists with an opportunity to seiz e control of the government. There is no mention of any offsetting hope for a co up leading to more effective prosecution of the war. The overall impression left by the NIE is that Diem is not a very effective leader, but that he is getting along well enough to make the risks of a coup look more dangerous than the risks of the war being unwinnable under his leadership. In particular, a coup (or Die m's death) were seen as the only thing that could bring a quick collapse of the Saigon regime, as opposed to the loss over time of a "prolonged and difficult" s truggle. MAAG Chief McGarr, in a report dated September 1, spoke of the "enhance d sense of urgency and offensive spirit now present within both the RVNAF and th e Government of Vietnam . . ." Under the heading "Outlook for Next Year," he rep orted: With the increased effectiveness of the Armed Forces beginning to be demo nstrated by the recent operations in the Delta Region and the manifest intent of the U.S. to continue and even step up its vital support of the Vietnamese in th eir struggle against Communism, there is a spirit of renewed confidence beginnin g to permeate the people, the GVN, and the Armed Forces.

The political reporting from Saigon was less optimistic. Generally, these report s argued that Diem was not doing much to strengthen his support. But there was n o disagreement with McGarr's fairly optimistic assessment of the military situat ion and no sense of crisis. Through unofficial channels, though, the White House was receiving a far bleaker view of the situation. Schlesinger reports: "The si tuation gets worse almost week by week," Theodore H. White wrote us in August. " . . . The guerrillas now control almost all the southern delta-so much so that I could find no American who would drive me outside Saigon in his car even by day without military convoy." He reported a "political breakdown of formidable prop ortions: . . . what perplexes hell out of me is that the Commies, on their side, seem to be able to find people willing to die for their cause . . . I find it d iscouraging to spend a night in a Saigon nightclub full of young fellows of 20 a nd 25 dancing and jitterbugging (they are called 'la jeunesse cowboy') while twe nty miles away their Communist contemporaries are terrorizing the countryside." An old China hand, White was reminded of Chungking in the Second World War, comp lete with Madame Nhu in the role of Madame Chiang Kaishek. "If a defeat in South Vietnam is to be considered our defeat, if we are responsible for holding that area, then we must have authority to act. And that means intervention in Vietnam politics....If we do decide so to intervene, have we the proper personnel, the proper instruments, the proper clarity of objectives to intervene successfully?" It did not take long to confirm White's pessimism, although this must have made the dilemma of what to do about it seem all the more acute. In September, the n umber of VC attacks jumped to nearly triple the level (about 450 vs. 150) that h ad prevailed for some months previously. The most spectacular attack, which seem s to have had a shattering effect in Saigon, was the seizure of Phuoc Thanh, a p rovincial capital only 55 miles from Saigon. The insurgents held the town a good part of the day, publicly beheaded Diem's province chief, and departed before g overnment troops arrived. The official reporting to Washington by the end of the month pictured the situation as stagnating, if not dangerously deteriorating, a lthough there continued to be no sense of the imminent crisis that Theodore Whit e foresaw. Here is an end-of-month report that Nolting sent just prior to the me eting at which Diem asked for the treaty: Status report on political items as of Sept. 28: General: Governmental and civil situation at end of month much same a s at beginning. While neither of these gave open signs of deterioration, Diem go vernment did not significantly improve its political position among people or su bstantially further national unity. On positive side several fifty-man district level reconstruction teams were sent to each of 4 provinces, and there was comme ndable amount country-side travel by ministers. On other hand, report was receiv ed of high-level bickering over powers and authority of new central intelligence organization, and Diem expressed dissatisfaction with pace of field command's p lanning of counter-insurgency operations, but he has still not delegated suffici ent authority to field command. All in all we unable report that Sept.

saw progress toward attainment task force goals of creating viable and increasin gly democratic society. Some such "shot in arm" as proposed joint communique see ms desirable. Series large scale VC attacks in various areas central Vietnam dur ing month highlighted increased VC infiltrations through Laos and underscored ur gency of free world policy toward Laos which would bring this situation under co ntrol. These VC actions plus temporary VC seizure of provincial capital of Phuoc Thanh demonstrated that tide not yet turned in guerrilla war.... The "shot in t he arm" Nolting referred to was the communique on social reforms that was agreed to some weeks earlier at the time of the Staley Mission; it would finally be is sued, in a watered down form, early in January. The contrast between White's and Nolting's reporting is sharp: White obviously would not have seen the issuing o f a communique as a significant "shot in the arm," or commented on the VC show o f strength in such mild terms as demonstrating "that tide not yet turned." Conse quently, although Diem's request for a treaty [Doc. 91] (a day after this cable was sent) surprised Nolting, its effect at the White House was presumably to con firm the warning that had already been received through White. The State Departm ent's view of the situation seems also to have been graver than that of the Emba ssy in Saigon. We have a situation summary on Southeast Asia that refers to Nolt ing's cable but not to Diem's treaty request, and which consequently must have b een distributed about October 1. On the political situation in South Vietnam, th e summary quotes Nolting's "no progress" comments. But the military situation is described more bleakly than Nolting did. SOUTH VIET-NAM--MILITARY 1. Although G VN military capabilities have increased, Viet Cong capabilities are increasing a t more rapid rate and Viet Cong attacks have increased in size. 2. Viet Cong "re gular" forces have increased from about 7,000 at beginning of year to approximat ely 17,000. 3. Viet Cong have moved from stage of small hands to large units. Du ring September Viet Cong mounted three attacks with over 1,000 men in each. Viet Cong strategy may be directed at "liberating" an area in which a "government" c ould be installed. 4. Although vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local or igin, the infiltration of Viet Cong cadres from North Viet-Nam via Laos, the dem ilitarized zone, and by sea appears to be increasing. However, there is little e vidence of major supplies from outside sources, most arms apparently being captu red or stolen from GVN forces or from the French during the Indo-China war. On L aos, the situation summary showed no such pessimism. But, overall the absence of bad news from Laos only added to the worry about South Vietnam. For the paper r eported:

There probably have been some Viet Minh withdrawals from northern Laos but Viet Minh movement into Southern Laos bordering on South Vietnam has increased. Thus it appears enemy may be accepting stalemate for time being within Laos and givin g priority to stepping up offensive action against South Vietnam. Two final item s are worth bearing in mind in trying to see the Vietnamese problem as it might have appeared to the White House in the fall of 1961. First, this warning of the effect of U.S. policy in Vietnam, from the August 15 NIE quoted earlier: Intern ational Attitudes. In providing the GVN a maximum of encouragement and extensive support in its struggle against the Communists, the US will inevitably become i dentified with the GVN's success or failure. The US will be under heavy pressure from other members of the non-Communist world, many of whom view the Vietnam st ruggle in differing terms. For example, the neighboring countries, such as Thail and, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nationalist China, have al l to some extent viewed developments in Laos as a gauge of US willingness and ab ility to help an antiCommunist Asian government stand against a Communist "natio nal liberation" campaign. They will almost certainly look upon the struggle for Vietnam as a critical test of such US willingness and ability. All of them, incl uding the neutrals, would probably suffer demoralization and loss of confidence in their prospects for maintaining their independence if the Communists were to gain control of South Vietnam. This loss of confidence might even extend to Indi a. Second, a couple of newspaper quotes may serve as a reminder of the extent to which the Kennedy Administration had been under a constant sense of foreign pol icy crisis throughout its first year, with every evidence of more to come. In la te September, in a review piece on Congressional appraisals of Kennedy's first y ear, Russell Baker comments that not even Congress seems much interested in deba te about Kennedy's effectiveness in pushing through legislation: What makes it p articularly irrelevant this autumn is that Congress itself has been far more con cerned ever since January with the President's performance as guardian of the na tional security than with how he came out as chief warrior for a legislative pro gram. From Laos to Cuba to Vienna to Berlin to the Soviet nuclear testing site a t Semipalatinsk to New York's East River, crisis after crisis has fallen across the White House with a rapidity and gravity that has absorbed Mr. Kennedy's ener gy since his inauguration and reduced the Congressional program to secondary imp ortance. And a couple of days later, James Reston, describing the imminent risk of a nuclear crisis over Berlin, reported: Specifically, Khrushchev told one of Mr. Kennedy's political emissaries that once Krushchev signs a separate peace tr eaty with the Communist East Germans, not only all of the West's rights in Berli n will cease, but all traffic to Berlin will cease until the West negotiates new rights of access with the East German regime.

Khrushchev was questioned minutely on this key point. His reply was unequivocal: Not one truck, or barge, or train, or plane would leave from West Germany for W est Berlin after the separate peace treaty until the new arrangements with the E ast Germans were negotiated. Now, this is not precisely the same as Mr. Gromyko' s bland assurances. This is blockade, and blockade is an act of war. Washington has made clear that it is not going to get stirred up if the East Germans merely replace the Russians on the borders between East and West Germany and approve t he flow of adequate supplies. But Mr. Khrushchev did not support this procedure, and went on to threaten that any effort to break his blockade by force would le ad to war. Since Khrushchev had repeatedly pledged to sign the East German treat y by the end of the year, the showdown was not far off. V. THE FALL DECISIONS-I A. THE DECISION TO SEND TAYLOR As of early October, there were several proposals for more active intervention in Southeast Asia on the table. One was the JCS-fa vored plan to intervene on the ground in Laos to seize and hold major portions o f the country, principally to protect the borders of South Vietnam and Thailand. A second plan (referred to in a staff paper as the "Rostow proposal") would hav e put a SEATO force of about 25,000 men into Vietnam to try to mount a guard on the Vietnam/Laos border between the DMZ and Cambodia. Finally, there were variou s schemes, dating from the Task Force review, for putting a U.S. force into the highlands, or at DaNang with or without a nominal mission of training South Viet namese troops. Except for the Rostow proposal all these plans pre-dated the spur t of Viet Cong activity in September and Diem's subsequent request for a treaty. The record does not tell when and why the Rostow proposal was drawn up. It was probably a direct response to Diem's request, but it may have been simply a part of the on-going Laos contingency planning. In any event, Rostow's proposal was submitted to the JCS for Comment October 5. On the 9th, the JCS responded with a counter-proposal for a substantial (initially about 20,000 men, but expected to grow) commitment of U.S. forces in Vietnam, centered on Pleiku in the highlands . In hindsight, the JCS reasoning in rejecting the Rostow proposal looks unchall engeable. The JCS stated: a. SEATO forces will be deployed over a border of seve ral hundred miles, and will be attacked piecemeal or by-passed at the Viet Cong' s own choice. b. It may reduce but cannot stop infiltration of Viet Cong personn el and material. c. It deploys SEATO forces in the weakest defense points should DRV or CHICOM

forces intervene. d. It compounds the problems of communications and logistical support. The Chiefs also argued against an alternative border proposal to put th e SEATO force along the 17th parallel. Their first preference, very emphatically , was to go into Laos: As stated in your [Gilpatric's] memorandum, the proposed concept set forth must be analyzed in the total context of the defense of Southe ast Asia. Any concept which deals with the defense of Southeast Asia that does n ot include all or a substantial portion of Laos is, from a military standpoint, unsound. To concede the majority of northern and central Laos would leave threequarters of the border of Thailand exposed and thus invite an expansion of commu nist military action. To concede southern Laos would open the flanks of both Tha iland and South Vietnam as well as expose Cambodia. Any attempt to combat insurg ency in South Vietnam, while holding areas in Laos essential to the defense of T hailand and South Vietnam and, at the same time, putting troops in Thailand, wou ld require an effort on the part of the United States alone on the order of magn itude of at least three divisions plus supporting units. This would require an a dditional two divisions from the United States. What is needed is not the spread ing out of our forces throughout Southeast Asia, but rather a concentrated effor t in Laos where a firm stand can be taken saving all or substantially all of Lao s which would, at the same time, protect Thailand and protect the borders of Sou th Vietnam. But, if the Laos plan was "politically unacceptable at this time," t he Chiefs "provided" (but did not explicitly recommend) "a possible limited inte rim course of action" which could.... provide a degree of assistance to the Gove rnment of South Vietnam to regain control of its own territory, and could free c ertain South Vietnamese forces for offensive actions against the Viet Cong. Whil e the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that implementation of this limited course of action would not provide for the defense of Thailand or Laos, nor contribute sub stantially or permanently to solution of the overall problem of defense of South east Asia, they consider the Plan preferable to either of the two military possi bilities described in referenced memorandum. The following day, there appeared a new paper called "Concept of Intervention in Vietnam." The paper, according to a pencilled note on the available copy, was drafted mainly by Alexis Johnson, wh o was then a Deputy Under Secretary of State. We know from a note William Bundy (then principal Deputy to Paul Nitze, who was then Assistant Secretary of Defens e, ISA) sent to McNamara that a "talking paper" by Johnson was to be discussed a t a meeting that included, at least, Rusk and McNamara on the afternoon of the 1 0th. But we do not know whether the draft we have available is the "talking pape r" or a revision put together later in the day, after the meeting.

The proposal ("an effort to arrest and hopefully reverse the deteriorating situa tion in Vietnam") was a blend of Rostow's border force and the Chief's "possible limited interim course of action." Johnson's paper listed both the Rostow missi on of the force (attempt to close the border) and that of the Chiefs (win contro l of the central highlands); otherwise the paper followed the JCS plan. What pro bably happened, considering the haste with which the paper must have been drafte d, was that Johnson simply blended the two proposals together and assumed the fi ne points could be worked out later. For if the paper is somewhat confusing on t he immediate military proposal, it is clear on the long-run thinking that underl ays the proposal. And this long-run thinking made the immediate military mission relatively inconsequential, since as with the earlier combat-troops-fortraining proposals, it was pretty clear that the main idea was to get some American comb at troops into Vietnam, with the nominal excuse for doing so quite secondary. Th e plan was described under the heading "Initial Phase." A subsequent section, ti tled "Anticipated Later Phases" states: This initial action cannot be taken with out accepting as our real and ultimate objective the defeat of the Viet Cong, an d making Vietnam secure in the hands of an anti-Communist government. Thus suppl emental military action must be envisaged at the earliest stage that is politica lly feasible. The ultimate force requirements cannot be estimated with any preci sion. JCS are now considering. Three divisions would be a guess . Earlier the pa per, in a similar vein, had remarked: While a satisfactory political settlement in Laos would considerably reduce Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam, it would not entirely eliminate it. While such a reduction would mater ially assist the GVN in meeting the Viet Cong threat, there is no assurance that , even under these circumstances, the GVN will in the foreseeable future be able to defeat the Viet Cong. Under these circumstances, although the need of South Vietnam for outside assistance such as proposed in this plan would probably stil l be very strong, it would be much more difficult to find a political base upon which to execute this plan. This judgment was probably influenced by a special N IE issued October 5th, which stated that 80-90% of the estimated 17,000 VC had b een locally recruited, and that there was little evidence that the VC relied on external supplies. The relation of this paper to Diem's request for treaty can o nly be guessed at. The paper never mentions Diem, or any South Vietnamese reques t for further assistance. But the paper supplemented one published about a week or so earlier (probably prior to Diem's request) titled "Limited Holding Actions in Southeast Asia." This earlier paper discussed various steps short of major t roop deployments. The impression is that both papers were part of contingency pl anning (short of major intervention in Laos) for saving something in Southeast A sia should the Laos negotiations continue to drag on with no satisfactory resolu tion. Thus although the timing

of the Vietnam paper was surely influenced and probably triggered by Diem's requ est for a treaty, it looks essentially like a suggestion (but not a formal recom mendation) to the President that if he is unwilling to intervene to try to save Laos, he should at least take strong and unambiguous action to make sure that Vi etnam would not also be lost. In this interpretation it is easy to make sense of the emphasis on a deteriorating situation in Vietnam, and the implied warning t hat it might be best to set this plan in motion before a settlement is reached i n Laos, when it seemed relatively easy to provide a politically plausible basis for the action. (In a recent column, Joseph Alsop quoted Averill Harriman as tel ling him that Kennedy had told Harriman to get whatever settlement he could on L aos, but that the U.S. really intended to make its stand in Vietnam.) At the end of the Vietnam paper there is a list of "Specific Actions to be Taken Now" whic h goes no further [on Vietnam] than to list: Use of U.S. naval aircraft and ship s to assist GVN in interdiction of sea traffic, to assist self defense of GVN. T his is to some extent camouflagable. If necessity arises, use of U.S. military a ircraft for logistic support, including troop lift within Laos and South Vietnam . Further, there is a long list of pros and cons, with no judgment stated on the balance. This (and other statements to be cited below) suggests, again, that th e paper was prepared for a discussion on Southeast Asia planning in the NSC, rat her than in response to a request for a set of recommendations. Three other poin ts need to be mentioned: 1. The paper, although nominally presenting a SEATO pla n, explicitly assumes that "planning would have to be on the basis of proceeding with whichever SEATO Allies would participate." 2. The paper warns (in the bala nce of the paragraph quoted earlier) that the ultimate force requirements would "much depend" on the capabilities and leadership of the SEATO forces . . . and a bove all on whether the effort leads to much more better fighting by Diem's forc es. They alone can win in the end. 3. Very clearly foreshadowing the Taylor miss ion (and perhaps indicating a White House hand in the drafting) the paper states : The viability of this plan would be dependent on the degree to which it could and would also result in the GVN accelerating political and military action in i ts own defense. A judgment on this can only be reached after thorough exploratio n on the spot with the country team and the GVN.

Finally, here is the list of pros and cons presented (but not evaluated) in the paper. Cons 1. The plan would not in itself solve the underlying problem of ridd ing SVN of communist guerrillas. 2. It would not seal off the borders of SVN exc ept for the limited area of operations. 3. It breaks the Geneva Accords and puts responsibility on the U.S. for rationalizing the action before the U.N. and the world. 4. It raises questions of U.S. troop relationships with the Vietnamese p easants, montagnards, GVN and its army. 5. The use of SEATO forces in SVN distor ts Plan Five [for major intervention in Laos] although these forces are not a ne t subtraction. 6. The risk of being regarded as interlopers a la the French must be considered. 7. Communist change of tactics back to small-scale operations mi ght leave this force in a stagnant position. Pros 1. The effect on GVN morale of SEATO engagement in their struggle could be most heartening. 2. It could preven t the Viet Cong move to the next stage of battalion-size, formal organization to challenge the ARVN. 3. The relatively sophisticated SEATO arms, air power, comm unications and intelligence might spark a real transformation in ARVN tactics an d action. 4. Capitalizing on U.S. intelligence sources now unavailable to the GV N could lead to effective attacks on Viet Cong nerve centers of command and comm unications. 5. The SEATO force commitment could be used to get from Diem a packa ge of actions McGarr feels are needed to step up the GVN effort [mainly the fami liar items of clarifying the chain of command and establishing an overall plan]. 6. Introducing SEATO forces would give us for the first time some bargaining po sition with the Russians for a settlement in Vietnam. 7. If we go into South Vie tnam now with SEATO, the costs would be much less than if we wait and go in late r, or lose SVN. The available record shows three other papers prepared prior to the NSC meeting, October 11, at which this paper was considered: 1. A special NI E commented on the plan in terms that were a lot less than encouraging: In the s ituation assumed, we believe that the DRV would seek at first to test the seriou sness and effectiveness of the SEATO effort by subjecting the SEATO forces and t heir lines of communication to harassment, ambush, and guerrilla attack. The Com munists would probably estimate that by using their Viet Cong apparatus in South Vietnam, and by committing experienced guerrilla forces from North Vietnam in g uerrilla operations in territory long familiar to them, and by exploiting the op portunities

offered by the sizable junk traffic in coastal waters, they could severely haras s the SEATO land forces and penetrate the SEATO blockade. The Communists would e xpect worthwhile political and psychological rewards from successful harassment and guerrilla operations against SEATO forces, including lowered GVN morale and increased tensions among the SEATO members. While seeking to test the SEATO forc es, the DRV would probably not relax its Viet Cong campaign against the GVN to a ny significant extent. Meanwhile, Communist strength in south Laos would probabl y be increased by forces from North Vietnam to guard against an effort to partit ion Laos or an attack against the Pathet Lao forces. The Soviet airlift would pr obably be increased with a heavier flow of military supply into south Laos, and the Communists would probably intensify their efforts to establish a secure rout e for motor traffic into the south. The establishment of a coalition government in Laos under Souvanna Phouma probably would not significantly reduce Communist infiltration of men and equipment from North to South Vietnam through Laos. If t he Seato action appeared to be proving effective in reducing the present scale o f infiltration the Communist probably would increase their use of the mountain t rail system through Cambodia. This is a longer and more difficult route but its use could keep at least minimum support flowing to the Viet Cong. At the same ti me, in order to reduce the apparent success of the SEATO action, they could inte nsify small unit attacks, assassinations, and local terrorism in South Vietnam; they could also commit more DRV irregular personnel for the harassment of the SE ATO forces. In any event, the SEATO commitment in South Vietnam would probably h ave to be continued over a prolonged period. It might be part of Communist tacti cs to play upon possible SEATO weariness over maintaining substantial forces and accepting losses, in South Vietnam over a long period of time.... The reaction to the assumed SEATO action among concerned non-Communist governments would vary widely. The Asian members of SEATO would find renewed confidence in the organiz ation and the US, if the plan were to go well. If, on the other hand, the SEATO action were to become costly, prolonged, or to involve heavy casualties, the Asi an members would soon become disenchanted and look to the US to "do something" t o lessen the burden and to solve the problem. The UK and France would be likely to oppose the assumed SEATO action, and their reluctance to participate could be overcome only with great difficulty, if at all. In this instance, and as we wil l see, later, the Intelligence Community's estimates of the likely results of U. S. moves are conspicuously more pessimistic (and more realistic) than the other staff papers presented to the President. This SNIE was based on an assumption th at the SEATO force would total about 25,000 men. It is hard to imagine a more sh arp contrast than between this paper, which foresees no serious impact on the in surgency from proposed intervention, and Supplemental Note 2, to be quoted next.

2. "Supplemental Note 2" to the paper, issued the day of the NSC meeting, contai ned, among other comments, a JCS estimate of the size of the American force need ed "to clean up the Viet Cong threat." It reads: Wider Military Implications. As the basic paper indicates, the likelihood of massive DRV and Chicom interventio n cannot be estimated with precision. The SNIE covers only the initial phase whe n action might be limited to 20-25,000 men. At later stages, when the JCS estima te that 40,000 US forces will be needed to clean up the Viet Cong threat, the ch ances of such massive intervention might well become substantial, with the Sovie ts finding it a good opportunity to tie down major US forces in a long action, p erhaps as part of a multi-prong action involving Berlin and such additional area s as Korea and Iran. Because of this possibility of major Bloc intervention, the maximum possible force needs must be frankly faced. Assuming present estimates of about 40,000 US forces for the stated military objective in South Vietnam, pl us 128,000 US forces for meeting North Vietnam and Chicom intervention, the drai n on US-based reserve forces could be on the order of 3 or 4 divisions and other forces as well. The impact on naval capabilities for blockade plans (to meet Be rlin) would also be major. In light of present Berlin contingency plans, and com bat attrition, including scarce items of equipment, the initiation of the Vietna m action in itself should dictate a step up in the present mobilization, possibl y of major proportions. 3. Finally, there is the following memo from William Bun dy (then acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA) to McNamara. It is of inter est because it is the only piece of paper available for this period that gives a nyone's candid recommendations to his boss, as opposed to the more formal staff papers: Even if the decision at tomorrow's meeting is only preliminary--to explo re with Diem and the British, Australians, and New Zealanders would be my guess-it is clearly of the greatest possible importance. Above all, action must proce ed fast. For what one man's feel is worth, mine--based on very close touch with Indochina in the 1954 war and civil war afterwards till Diem took hold--is that it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Viet C ong. Walt Rostow made the point yesterday that the Viet Cong are about to move, by every indication, from the small unit basis to a moderate battalion-size basi s. Intelligence also suggests that they may try to set up a "provisional governm ent" like Xieng Khuang (though less legitimate appearing) in the very Kontum are a into which the present initial plan would move SEATO forces. If the Viet Cong movement "blooms" in this way, it will almost certainly attract all the back-the -winner sentiment that understandably prevails in such cases and that beat the F rench in early 1954 and came within an ace of beating Diem in early 1955. An ear ly and hard-hitting operation has a good chance (70% would be my guess) of arres ting things and giving Diem a chance to do better and clean up. Even if we follo w up hard, on the lines the JCS are working out after yesterday's meeting, howev er, the chances are not much better that we will in fact be able to clean up the situation. It all

depends on Diem's effectiveness, which is very problematical. The 30% chance is that we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of fight. On a 70-30 basis, I would myself favor going in. But if we let, say, a mo nth go by before we move, the odds will slide (both short-term shock effect and long-term chance) down to 60-40, 50-50 and so on. Laos under a Souvanna Phouma d eal is more likely than not to go sour, and will more and more make things diffi cult in South Viet-Nam, which again underscores the element of time. Minutes of the NSC meeting of October 11 were not available for this study. But we have the following Gilpatric memorandum for the record. (The JUNGLE JIM squadron--12 pla nes--was an Air Force unit specially trained for counterinsurgency welfare. Shor t of engaging in combat itself, presumably it would be used to train Vietnamese pilots): At this morning's meeting with the President the following course of ac tion was agreed upon with relation to South Vietnam: 1. The Defense Department i s authorized to send the Air Force's Jungle Jim Squadron into Vietnam to serve u nder the MAAG as a training mission and not for combat at the present time. 2. G eneral Maxwell Taylor accompanied by Dr. Rostow from the White House, General La nsdale, a representative of JCS, Mr. Cottrell from State and probably someone fr om ISA will leave for Vietnam over the weekend on a Presidential mission (to be announced by the President at this afternoon's press conference as an economic s urvey) to look into the feasibility from both political and military standpoints of the following: (a) the plan for military intervention discussed at this morn ing's meeting on the basis of the Vietnam task force paper entitled "Concept for Intervention in Vietnam"; (b) an alternative plan for stationing in Vietnam few er U.S. combat forces than those called for under the plan referred to in (a) ab ove and with a more limited objective than dealing with the Viet Cong; in other words, such a small force would probably go in at Tourane [DaNang] and possibly another southern port principally for the purpose of establishing a U.S. "presen ce" in Vietnam; (c) Other alternatives in lieu of putting any U.S. combat forces in Vietnam, i.e. stepping up U.S. assistance and training of Vietnam units, fur nishing of more U.S. equipment, particularly helicopters and other light aircraf t, trucks and other ground transport, etc. 3. During the two or three weeks that will be required for the completion of General Taylor's mission, State will pus h ahead with the following political actions: (a) protest to the ICC on the step -up in North Vietnamese support of Viet Cong activities, (b) tabling at the UN a white paper based on Mr. William Jordan's report concerning Communist violation s of the Geneva Accords, and (c) consultation with our SEATO allies, principally the British and Australians, regarding SEATO actions in support of the deterior ating situation in Vietnam.

That afternoon, the President announced the Taylor Mission, but he did not make the hardly credible claim that he was sending his personal military advisor to V ietnam to do an economic survey. He made a general announcement, and was non-com mittal when asked whether Taylor was going to consider the need for combat troop s (there had been leaked stories in the newspapers a few days earlier that the A dministration was considering such a move.) Nevertheless, the newspaper stories the next day flatly asserted that the President had said Taylor was going to stu dy the need for U.S. combat troops, which was, of course, true, although not exa ctly what the President had said. B. THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE CABLES The day after Kennedy's announcement of the Taylor mission, Reuters sent this dispatch from S aigon: Saigon, Vietnam, Oct. 12 [Reuters]-South Vietnamese military sources welc omed today President Kennedy's decision to send his military adviser, General Ta ylor, here this week. Sources close to President Ngo Dinh Diem said he did not f eel there was a need here yet for troops of the United States or Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The sources said the South Vietnamese President was convinc ed that Vietnam's Army increased in size and better equipped by increased United States aid can defeat the Communists. But a day later, the public position of t he Vietnamese had shifted noticeably. From a New York Times dispatch from Saigon : One question receiving considerable attention here in the light of the Taylor mission is the desirability of sending United States troops to South Vietnam. Th e prospect of United States troop involvement is understood to have advanced a s tep here in the sense that the South Vietnamese Government is reported to be wil ling to consider such involvement which it had formerly rejected. However, it is understood that South Vietnamese deliberations still fall far short of the stag e wherein Saigon would be ready to request United States forces. But in private discussions with the U.S. ambassador, Diem had turned around completely. From No lting's cable [Doc. 93]: Following major requests: (1) An additional squadron of AD-6 fighter bombers (in lieu of programmed T-28's) and delivery as soon as pos sible. (2) The sending of US civilian contract pilots for helicopters and transp ort plans (C-47s), for "non-combat" operations.

(3) US combat unit or uints to be introduced into SVN as "combat-trainer units". Proposed use would be to station a part of this force in northern part of SVN n ear 17th parallel to free ARVN forces presently there for anti-guerrilla combat in high plateau. Thuan also suggested possibility stationing some US forces in s everal provincial seats in highlands of central Vietnam. (4) US reaction to prop osal to request govt Nationalist China to send one division of combat troops for operations in southwest provinces. *** When Thuan raised question of US combattrainer units, I asked specifically whether this was President's considered requ est, mentioning his oft-repeated views re US combat forces here. Thuan confirmed that this was considered request from President; confirmed that Diem's views ha d changed in light of worsening situation. Idea was to have "symbolic" US streng th near 17th parallel, which would serve to prevent attack there and free up GVN forces now stationed there for combat operations; Thuan said President Diem als o thought similar purpose could be achieved by stationing US combat units in sev eral provincial seats in highlands, thus freeing ARVN guard forces there. I told him this represented major request coming on heels of President Diem's request for bilateral security treaty with United States. I asked whether this request w as in lieu of the security treaty. Thuan first said that it represented a first step, which would be quicker than a treaty, and that time was of essence. After some discussion of the pro's and con's of a possible defense treaty (effect on S EATO, ICC, ratification procedures, etc.), Thuan said he felt that proposal for stationing token US forces in SVN would satisfy GVN and would serve the purpose better than a mutual defense treaty. (He had evidently not thought through this nor discussed it with Diem.) *** Nolting then indicated he reacted skeptically t o Diem's suggestion of bringing in Chiang's forces, and comments to Washington t hat he thought "this was a trial balloon only." He concluded the cable: The abov e questions will undoubtedly be raised with Gen Taylor. While it is obvious that GVN is losing no opportunity to ask for additional support as result our greate r interest and concern this area, situation here, both militarily and psychologi cally, has moved in my judgment to point where serious and prompt consideration should be given to these requests. This cable arrived in Washington the night of October 13. The following day an unidentified source provided the New York Time s with a detailed explanation of what the Taylor Mission was to do. From the way the Times handled the story it is plain that it came from a source authorized t o speak for the President, and probably from the President himself. The gist of the story was that Taylor was going to Saigon to look into all sorts of things, one of which, near the bottom of the list, was the question of U.S. troops at so me time in the indefinite future. Along with a lot of more immediate questions

about intelligence and such, Taylor was expected to ". . . recommend long-range programs, including possible military actions, but stressing broad economic and social measures." Furthermore, the Times was told, Military leaders at the Penta gon, no less than General Taylor himself are understood to be reluctant to send organized U.S. combat units into Southeast Asia. Pentagon plans for this area st ress the importance of countering Communist guerrillas with troops from the affe cted countries, perhaps trained and equipped by the U.S., but not supplanted by U.S. troops. In the light of the recommendations quoted throughout this paper, a nd particularly of the staff papers just described that led up to the Taylor Mis sion, most of this was simply untrue. It is just about inconceivable that this s tory could have been given out except at the direction of the President, or by h im personally. It appears, consequently, the President was less than delighted b y Diem's request for troops. He may have suspected, quite reasonably, that Diem' s request was prompted by the stories out of Washington that Taylor was coming t o discuss troops; or he may have wished to put a quick stop to expectations (and leaks) that troops were about to be sent, or both. This does not mean the Presi dent had already decided not to send combat units. Presumably he had not. But he apparently did not want to have his hands tied. The Times story had the apparen tly desired effect. Speculation about combat troops almost disappeared from news stories, and Diem never again raised the question of combat troops: the initiat ive from now on came from Taylor and Nolting, and their recommendations were ver y closely held. C. CINCPAC RECOMMENDS "NOT NOW" On the way to Saigon, Taylor sto pped off in Hawaii to talk to Admiral Felt at CINCPAC. Felt did not give Taylor a fiat recommendation on combat troops at the time. But a couple of days later h e cabled Washington a list of pros and cons: A. Pro (1) Presence of U.S. forces in SVN, particularly if deployed to important defensive areas such as plateau re gion, would mean to Communists that overt aggression against SVN will involve US forces from the outset. This eliminates possibility of sudden victory by overt aggression in SVN before US could react. This would settle the question for SVN, and SE Asians as a whole, as to whether we would come to their help. Further, a greement by SEATO to principle of force introduction would strengthen SEATO in w orld eyes. (2) Presence of strong U.S. combat forces will influence greatly Sout h Vietnamese will to eliminate the Viet Cong.

(3) If we use U.S. engineers with U.S. military protection to finish Dakto-Ban N etAttapeu Road in order to enable US to operate near plateau border area, a mili tary corridor of sorts will cut an important part of VC pipeline from north. (4) U.S. forces will make available larger number ARVN forces for employment agains t VC. RVNAF tasks accomplished by U.S. forces will decrease proportionately cert ain RVNAF deficiencies, particularly in logistics, communications, and air suppo rt. (5) U.S. forces in SVN would tend to strengthen Diem's government against pr o-Red coup, but would not necessarily preclude non-Communist coup attempts. (6) Dividends would accrue from fact our troops could provide variety training for A RVN forces, broadening base now provided by MAAG. B. Con (1) Would stir up big f uss throughout Asia about reintroduction of forces of white colonialism into SE Asia. Little question that a propaganda issue will be made of this in all world forums including UN. (2) Action could trigger intensification of Commie aggressi on against SE Asia. This may not be all-out overt aggression, but could consist, for example, of the DRV moving full blown combat units through the mountain pas ses into southern Laos under excuse that we initiated invasion of SE Asia and th ey are protecting the flank of North Vietnam. (3) Politically, presence of U.S. forces could hasten Commies to establish so called "representative government" i n South Vietnam. (4) Aside from offering Viet Cong a political target, US troops would constitute provocative military one, inducing VC to attack/harass it in m anner/degree where issue might ultimately force American units active military c ampaign, or suffer defensive alternative of being pot-shot at to point of embarr assment. (5) Presence of US troops could induce Commies to resort to related act ions such as introduction of Red Air Force elements in North Vietnam and acceler ate modernization of DRV military forces. (6) This would probably mean garrisoni ng a U.S. division in SE Asia for an extended period of time in same sense as Ar my divisions in Korea. However, circumstances differ from Korea. For example, na ture of VC warfare such that US units cannot remain long in isolation from confl ict realities. Ultimately, they likely to be forced into varying forms of milita ry engagement with VC if only for security against attacks ranging from assassin ation/sabotage to tactical harassment. In short, we should accept fact that like lihood our troops becoming combat engaged increases in proportion to duration of their stay.

2. A summary of the above appears to me to add up in favor of our not introducin g U.S. combat forces until we have exhausted other means for helping Diem. D. TA YLOR IN SAIGON The Taylor Mission arrived in Saigon on the 18th. They had barely arrived when Diem went before his National Assembly to declare that the increas ing gravity of the Viet Cong threat now required a formal proclamation of a Stat e of Emergency. Diem then went off to meet with the Americans, and after such a spectacular opening shot must have then astonished his visitors by indicating th at he did not want American combat troops after all. What he wanted, he said, wa s the treaty, American support for larger GVN forces, and a list of combat suppo rt items that nicely paralleled those Rostow listed in the note to McNamara quot ed earlier. It was Taylor (according to Nolting's cable 516, 20 October) who bro ught up the question of American combat troops. Taylor said he understood there had been recent discussions of introduction of American or SEATO forces into Vie t-Nam and asked why change had occurred in earlier GVN attitude. Diem succinctly replied because of Laos situation. Noting it will take time to build up GVN for ces he pointed to enemy's reinforcements through infiltration and increased acti vities in central Viet-Nam and expressed belief that enemy is trying to escalate proportionally to increase in GVN forces so that GVN will not gain advantage. H e asked specifically for tactical aviation, helicopter companies, coastal patrol forces and logistic support (ground transport). Diem indicated he thought there would be no particular adverse psychological effect internally from introducing American forces since in his view Vietnamese people regard Communist attack on Viet-Nam as international problem. Rostow inquired whether internal and external political aspects such move could be helped if it were shown clearly to world t hat this is international problem. Diem gave no direct comment on this suggestio n. He indicated two main aspects of this problem: (1) Vietnamese people are worr ied about absence formal commitment by US to VietNam. They fear that if situatio n deteriorates Viet-Nam might be abandoned by US. If troops are introduced witho ut a formal commitment they can be withdrawn at any time and thus formal commitm ent is even more important in psychological sense. (2) Contingency plan should b e prepared re use American forces in Viet-Nam at any time this may become necess ary. In this connection Diem seemed to be talking about combat forces. While it was not completely clear what Diem has in mind at present time he seemed to be s aying that he wants bilateral defense treaty and preparation of plans for use Am erican forces (whatever is appropriate) but under questioning he did not repeat his earlier idea relayed to me by Thuan that he wanted combat forces. Here, as e arlier, we get no explicit statement on Washington's attitude toward a treaty. F urther, no strong conclusion can be drawn from the fact that Taylor took the ini tiative in raising the issue of troops, since it might have been awkward not to mention the issue at all after Thuan's presentation to Nolting a few days previo us.

But on the 23rd, we find this in a cable from MAAG Chief McGarr: Serious flood i n Mekong delta area . . . (worse since 1937) raises possibility that flood relie f could be justification for moving in US military personnel for humanitarian pu rposes with subsequent retention if desirable. Gen. Taylor and Ambassador evalua ting feasibility and desirability. Taylor met with Diem and Thuan again the foll owing day, the 24th. Taylor provided the Vietnamese a written summary of items h e described as "personal ideas to which I was seeking their reaction." Item E wa s headed ~Introduction of U.S. Combat troops." It proposed "a flood relief task force, largely military in composition, to work with GVN over an extended period of rehabilitation of areas. Such a force might contain engineer, medical, signa l, and transportation elements as well as combat troops for the protection of re lief operations." Diem now seems to have changed his mind again on combat troops . Here is the cable: 1. The essential conclusions which we have reached at the e nd of a week of briefings, consultations, and field trips follow: A. There is a critical political-military situation in SVN brought on by western policy in Lao s and by the continued build-up of the VC and their recent successful attacks. T hese circumstances coupled with the major flood disaster in the southwestern pro vinces have combined to create a deep and pervasive crisis of confidence and a s erious loss in national morale. B. In the field, the military operations against the VC are ineffective because of the absence of reliable intelligence on the e nemy, an unclear and unresponsive channel of command responsibility in the Armed Forces, and the tactical immobility of the VN ground forces. This immobility le ads to a system of passive, fragmented defense conceding the initiative to the e nemy and leaving him free to pick the targets of attack. The harassed population exposed to these attacks turn to the government for better protection and the l atter responds by assigning more static missions to the Army units, thus adding to their immobility. In the end, the Army is allowed neither to train nor to fig ht but awaits enemy attacks in relative inaction. C. The situation in the Saigon is volatile but, while morale is down and complaints against the government are rife, there is not hard evidence of a likely coup against Diem. He still has no visible rival or replacement. 2. To cope with the foregoing situation, we are c onsidering recommending a number of possible forms of GVN-US cooperation to reve rse the present downward trend, stimulate an offensive spirit and buildup morale . In company with Ambassador Nolting, Dr. Rostow and Mr. Mendenhall, I discussed some of these Oct 24 with Diem and Thuan, advancing them as personal ideas to w hich I was seeking their informal reaction. The following outline, distributed i n French translation at the start of the interview, indicates the scope of the d iscussion.

A. Improvement of intelligence on V.C.: the available intelligence on V.C. insur gency is inadequate both for tactical requirements and for basis of judgment of situation at governmental levels. A joint GVN-US effort should be able to improv e organization, techniques and end product to mutual advantage both parties. B. Joint survey of security situation at provincial level: The current situation ca n best be appraised at provincial level where the basic intelligence is found, t he incidents occur, and the defenses are tested. The problems vary from province to province and hence require local analysis on the spot. Such a survey should result in better understanding of such important matters as quality of basic int elligence on V.C., needs of civil guard and self defense corps, command relation ships between provincial and Army officials and conditions under which assumptio n of offensive might be possible. C. Improvement of Army mobility: it appears th at size of ARVN can not be much increased before end 1962; to make it more effec tive and allowing it to cope with increasing number of V.C., it must be given gr eater mobility. Such mobility can come from two sources. (1) moving Army from st atic missions and (2) making available to it improved means of transport, notabl y helicopters and light aircraft. Both methods should be considered. D. Blocking infiltration into high plateau: increase in enemy forces in high plateau requir es special measures for defense and for counter-guerrilla actions. It is suggest ed that a carefully tailored "frontier ranger force" be organized from existing ranger units and introduced into the difficult terrain along the Laos/Vietnam fr ontier for attack and defense against the Viet Cong. This force should be traine d and equipped for extended service on the frontier and for operations against t he communications lines of the VC who have infiltrated into the high plateau and adjacent areas. E. Introduction of U.S. Military Forces: GVN is faced with majo r civil problem arising from flood devastation in western provinces. The allies should offer help to GVN according to their means. In the case of U.S., two ways of rendering help should be considered. One is of emergency type, such as offer of U.S. military helicopters for reconnaissance of conditions of flooded areas and for emergency delivery medical supplies and like. A more significant contrib ution might be a flood relief task force, largely military in composition, to wo rk with GVN over an extended period for rehabilitation of area. Such a force mig ht contain engineer, medical, signal, and transportation elements as well as com bat troops for the protection of relief operations. Obviously, such a military s ource would also provide U.S. military presence in Viet Nam and would constitute military reserve in case of heightened military crisis. F. Actions to emphasize national emergency and beginning of a new phase in the war: we should consider jointly all possible measures to emphasize turning point has been reached in dea ling with Communist aggression. Possible actions might include appeal to United Nations, an assessment by GVN of governmental changes to cope with crisis and ex change of letters between the two heads of State expressing their partnership in a common cause.

3. Dien's reaction on all points was favorable. He expressed satisfaction with i dea of introducing U.S. forces in connection with flood relief activities, obser ving that even the opposition elements in this crisis had joined with the majori ty in supporting need for presence of U.S. forces. In the course of the meeting, nothing was formally proposed or agreed but the consensus was that the points c onsidered might form agenda for a program of increased GVN-US cooperation offeri ng promise of overcoming many of the current difficulties of GVN. There were no exact figures discussed with regard to such matters as troop strengths, equipmen t, or flood relief *** 5. Because of the importance of acting rapidly once we ha ve made up our minds, I will cable my recommendations to Washington enroute home . Simultaneously with this cable, Taylor sent a second "eyes only" for the Presi dent, Chairman of the JCS, Director of CIA, McNamara, and Rusk and Alexis Johnso n at State. The cable is a little confusing; for although it sets out to comment on "U.S. military forces" it concerns only the flood Task Force, not mentioning the various other types of military forces (helicopter companies, etc.) which w ere envisioned. The same slight confusion appears in the "eyes only for the Pres ident" cable on this issue to be quoted shortly. The impression Taylor's choice of language leaves is that the support forces (helicopter companies, expanded MA AG, etc.) he was recommending were essentially already agreed to by the Presiden t before Taylor left Washington, and consequently his detailed justification wen t only to the kind of forces on which a decision was yet to be made-that is, gro und forces liable to become involved in direct engagements with the Viet Cong. H ere is the cable from Saigon, followed by the two "Eyes only for the President" from the Philippines which sum up his "fundamental conclusions." FROM SAIGON WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT STATE EYES ONLY FOR RUSK AND UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON DEFENSE EYES ONLY SECRETARY McNAMARA JCS EYES ONLY GENE RAL LEMNITZER FROM GENERAL TAYLOR *** With regard to the critical question of in troducing U.S. military forces into VN: My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating i n flood relief and at the same time of providing a U.S. military

presence in VN capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a milita ry showdown with the Viet Cong or Viet Minh. To relate the introduction of these troops to the needs of flood relief seems to me to offer considerable advantage s in VN and abroad. It gives a specific humanitarian task as the prime reason fo r the coming of our troops and avoids any suggestion that we are taking over res ponsibility for the security of the country. As the task is a specific one, we c an extricate our troops when it is done if we so desire. Alternatively, we can p hase them into other activities if we wish to remain longer. The strength of the force I have in mind on the order of 6-8000 troops. Its initial composition sho uld be worked out here after study of the possible requirements and conditions f or its use and subsequent modifications made with experience. In addition to the logistical component, it will be necessary to include some combat troops for th e protection of logistical operations and the defense of the area occupied by U. S. forces. Any troops coming to VN may expect to take casualties. Needless to sa y, this kind of task force will exercise little direct influence on the campaign against the V.C. It will, however, give a much needed shot in the arm to nation al morale, particularly if combined with other actions showing that a more effec tive working relationship in the common cause has been established between the G VN and the U.S. FROM THE PHILIPPINES EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GENERAL TAYLOR 1. Transmit ted herewith are a summary of the fundamental conclusions of my group and my per sonal recommendations in response to the letter of the President to me dated 13 October 1961. * * * * * * * 2. It is concluded that: a. Communist strategy aims to gain control of Southeast Asia by methods of subversion and guerrilla war whi ch by-pass conventional U.S. and indigenous strength on the ground. The interim Communist goal--en route to total take-over--appears to be a neutral Southeast A sia, detached from U.S. protection. This strategy is well on the way to success in Vietnam. b. In Vietnam (and Southeast Asia) there is a double crisis in confi dence: doubt that U.S. is determined to save Southeast Asia; doubt that Diem's m ethods can frustrate and defeat Communist purposes and methods. The Vietnamese ( and Southeast Asians) will undoubtedly draw-rightly or wrongly-definitive conclu sions in coming weeks and months concerning the probable outcome and will adjust their behavior accordingly. What the U.S. does or fails to do will be decisive to the end result.

c. Aside from the morale factor, the Vietnamese Government is caught in interloc king circles of bad tactics and bad administrative arrangements which pin their forces on the defensive in ways which permit a relatively small Viet-Cong force (about one-tenth the size of the GVN regulars) to create conditions of frustrati on and terror certain to lead to a political crisis, if a positive turning point is not soon achieved. The following recommendations are designed to achieve tha t favorable turn, to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Vie tnam, and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its inde pendence. 3 . It is recommended: General a. That upon request from the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to come to its aid in resisting the increasing aggressions of the Viet-Co ng and in repairing the ravages of the Delta flood which, in combination, threat en the lives of its citizens and the security of the country, the U.S. Governmen t offer to join the GV in a massive joint effort as a part of a total mobilizati on of GVN resources to cope with both the Viet-Cong (VC) and the ravages of the flood. The U.S. representatives will participate actively in this effort, partic ularly in the fields of government administration, military plans and operations , intelligence, and flood relief, going beyond the advisory role which they have observed in the past. Specific b. That in support of the foregoing broad commit ment to a joint effort with Diem, the following specific measures be undertaken: (1) The U.S. Government will be prepared to provide individual administrators f or insertion into the governmental machinery of South Vietnam in types and numbe rs to be worked out with President Diem. (2) A joint effort will be made to impr ove the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the government and armed forces to the Central Int elligence Organization. (3) The U.S. Government will engage in a joint survey of the conditions in the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency in ord er to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them. As this survey will consume time, it should not hold back th e immediate actions which are clearly needed regardless of its outcome. (4) A jo int effort will be made to free the Army for mobile, offensive operations. This effort will be based upon improving the training and equipping of the Civil Guar d and the

Self-Defense Corps, relieving the regular Army of static missions, raising the l evel of the mobility of Army Forces by the provision of considerably more helico pters and light aviation, and organizing a Border Ranger Force for a long-term c ampaign on the Laotian border against the VietCong infiltrators. The U.S. Govern ment will support this effort with equipment and with military units and personn el to do those tasks which the Armed Forces of Vietnam cannot perform in time. S uch tasks include air reconnaissance and photography, airlift (beyond the presen t capacity of SVN forces), special intelligence, and airground support technique s. (5) The U.S. Government will assist the GVN in effective surveillance and con trol over the coastal waters and inland waterways, furnishing such advisors, ope rating personnel and small craft as may be necessary for quick and effective ope rations. (6) The MAAG, Vietnam, will be reorganized and increased in size as may be necessary by the implementation of these recommendations. (7) The U.S. Gover nment will offer to introduce into South Vietnam a military Task Force to operat e under U.S. control for the following purposes: (a) Provide a U.S. military pre sence capable of raising national morale and of showing to Southeast Asia the se riousness of the U.S. intent to resist a Communist take-over. (b) Conduct logist ical operations in support of military and flood relief operations. (c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense and for the security of the area in which they are stationed. (d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces of the GVN in the case of a heightened military crisis. (e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be introduced if CINCPA C or SEATO contingency plans are invoked. (8) The U.S. Government will review it s economic aid program to take into account the needs of flood relief and to giv e priority to those projects in support of the expanded counterinsurgency progra m. FROM THE PHILIPPINES EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GENERAL TAYLOR This messag e is for the purpose of presenting my reasons for recommending the introduction of a U.S. military force into South Vietnam (SVN). I have reached the conclusion that this is an essential action if we are to reverse the present downward tren d of events in spite of a full recognition of the following disadvantages:

a. The strategic reserve of U.S. forces is presently so weak that we can ill aff ord any detachment of forces to a peripheral area of the Communist bloc where th ey will be pinned down for an uncertain duration. b. Although U.S. prestige is a lready engaged in SVN, it will become more so by the sending of troops. c. If th e first contingent is not enough to accomplish the necessary results, it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce. If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers and the clean-up of the insurgents within SVN, the re is no limit to our possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi) . d. The introduction of U.S. forces may increase tensions and risk escalation i nto a major war in Asia. On the other side of the argument, there can be no acti on so convincing of U.S. seriousness of purpose and hence so reassuring to the p eople and Government of SVN and to our other friends and allies in SEA as the in troduction of U.S. forces into SVN. The views of indigenous and U.S. officials c onsulted on our trip were unanimous on this point. I have just seen Saigon 545 t o State and suggest that it be read in connection with this message. The size of the U.S. force introduced need not be great to provide the military presence ne cessary to produce the desired effect on national morale in SVN and on internati onal opinion. A bare token, however, will not suffice; it must have a significan t value. The kinds of tasks which it might undertake which would have a signific ant value are suggested in BAGU5 (previous cable, 3.b.(7)). They are: (a) Provid e a US military presence capable of raising national morale and of showing to So utheast Asia the seriousness of the US intent to resist a Communist take-over. ( b) Conduct logistical operations in support of military and flood relief operati ons. (c) Conduct such combat operations as are necessary for self-defense and fo r the security of the area in which they are stationed. (d) Provide an emergency reserve to back up the Armed Forces of the GVN in the case of a heightened mili tary crisis. (e) Act as an advance party of such additional forces as may be int roduced if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are invoked. It is noteworthy that this force is not proposed to clear the jungles and forest s of Viet Cong guerrillas. That should be the primary task of the Armed Forces o f Vietnam for which they should be specifically organized, trained, and stiffene d with ample U.S.

advisors down to combat battalion levels. However, the U.S. troops may be called upon to engage in combat to protect themselves, their working parties, and the area in which they live. As a general reserve, they might be thrown into action (with U.S. agreement) against large, formed guerrilla bands which have abandoned the forests for attacks on major targets. But in general, our forces should not engage in small-scale guerrilla operations in the jungle. As an area for the op erations of U.S. troops, SVN is not an excessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate. While the border areas are rugged and heavily forested, the terrain is comparable to parts of Korea where U.S. troops learned to live and work with out too much effort. However, these border areas, for reasons stated above, are not the places to engage our forces. In the High Plateau and in the coastal plai n where U.S. troops would probably be stationed, these jungle-forest conditions do not exist to any great extent. The most unpleasant feature in the coastal are as would be the heat and, in the Delta, the mud left behind by the flood. The Hi gh Plateau offers no particular obstacle to the stationing of U.S. troops. The e xtent to which the Task Force would engage in flood relief activities in the Del ta will depend upon further study of the problem there. As reported in Saigon 53 7, I see considerable advantages in playing up this aspect of the Task Force mis sion. I am presently inclined to favor a dual mission, initially help to the flo od area and subsequently use in any other area of SVN where its resources can be used effectively to give tangible support in the struggle against the Viet Cong . However, the possibility of emphasizing the humanitarian mission will wane if we wait long in moving in our forces or in linking our stated purpose with the e mergency conditions created by the flood. The risks of backing into a major Asia n war by way of SVN are present but are not impressive. NVN is extremely vulnera ble to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay off SVN. Both the DRV and the Chicoms would face sev ere logistical difficulties in trying to maintain strong forces in the field in SEA, difficulties which we share but by no means to the same degree. There is no case for fearing a mass onslaught of Communist manpower into SVN and its neighb oring states, particularly if our airpower is allowed a free hand against logist ical targets. Finally, the starvation conditions in China should discourage Comm unist leaders there from being militarily venturesome for some time to come. By the foregoing line of reasoning, I have reached the conclusion that the introduc tion of a U.S. military Task Force without delay offers definitely more advantag e than it creates risks and difficulties. In fact, I do not believe that our pro gram to save SVN will succeed without it. If the concept is approved, the exact size and composition of the force should be determined by the Secretary of Defen se in consultation with the JCS, the Chief MAAG, and CINCPAC. My own feeling is that the initial size should not exceed about 8000, of which a preponderant numb er would be in logistical-type units. After acquiring experience in operating in SVN, this initial force will require reorganization and adjustment to the local scene.

As CINCPAC will point out, any forces committed to SVN will need to be replaced by additional forces to his area from the strategic reserve in the U.S. Also, an y troops to SVN are in addition to those which may be required to execute SEATO Plan 5 in Laos. Both facts should be taken into account in current consideration s of the FY 1963 budget which bear upon the permanent increase which should be m ade in the U.S. military establishment to maintain our strategic position for th e long pull. These cables, it will be noticed, are rather sharply focused on the insurgency as a problem reducible to fairly conventional military technique and tactics. Together with the cables from Saigon, the impression is given that the major needs are getting the Army to take the offensive, building up a much bett er intelligence setup, and persuading Diem to loosen up Administrative impedimen ts to effective use of his forces. E. The Taylor Report A report of the Taylor M ission was published November 3, in the form of a black looseleaf notebook conta ining a letter of transmittal of more than routine significance, a 25page "Evalu ation and Conclusions," then a series of memoranda by members of the mission. Of these, the most important, of course, were the Taylor cables, which, being "Eye s only for the President," were deleted from all but one or a very few copies of the report. There is no separate paper from Rostow, and his views presumably ar e reflected in the unsigned summary paper. The impression the "Evaluation" paper gives is more easily summarized than its details. For the impression is clearly one of urgency combined with optimism. Essentially, it says South Vietnam is in serious trouble; major interests of the United States are at stake; but if the U.S. promptly and energetically takes up the challenge, a victory can be had wit hout a U.S. take-over of the war. For example: Despite the intellectuals who sit on the side lines and complain; despite serious dissidence among the Montagnard s, the sects, and certain old Viet Minh areas; despite the apathy and fear of th e Viet-Cong in the countryside, the atmosphere in South Vietnam is, on balance, one of frustrated energy rather than passive acceptance of inevitable defeat. It cannot be emphasized too strongly, however, that time has nearly run out for co nverting these assets into the bases for victory. Diem himself--and all concerne d with the fate of the country--are looking to American guidance and aid to achi eve a turning point in Vietnam's affairs. From all quarters in Southeast Asia th e message on Vietnam is the same: vigorous American action is needed to buy time for Vietnam to mobilize and organize its real assets; but the time for such a t urn around has nearly run out. And if Vietnam goes, it will be exceedingly diffi cult if not impossible to hold Southeast Asia. What will be lost is not merely a crucial piece of real estate, but the faith that the U.S. has the will and the capacity to deal with the Communist offensive in that area.

The report, drawing on the appendices, includes a wide range of proposals. [Doc. 94] But the major emphasis, very emphatically, is on two ideas: First, there mu st be a firm, unambiguous military commitment to remove doubts about U.S. resolv e arising out of the Laos negotiations; second, there is great emphasis on the i dea that the Diem regime's own evident weaknesses--from "the famous problem of D iem as administrator" to the Army's lack of offensive spirit--could be cured if enough dedicated Americans, civilian and military, became involved in South Viet nam to show the South Vietnamese, at all levels, how to get on and win the war. The much-urged military Task Force, for example, was mainly to serve the first p urpose, but partly also to serve the second: "the presence of American military forces in the [flood] area should also give us an opportunity to work intensivel y with the civil guards and with other local military elements and to explore th e possibility of suffusing them with an offensive spirit and tactics." Here are a few extracts which give the flavor of the discussion: "It is evident that mora le in Vietnam will rapidly crumble--and in Southeast Asia only slightly less qui ckly--if the sequence of expectations set in motion by Vice President Johnson's visit and climaxed by General Taylor's mission are not soon followed by a hard U .S. commitment to the ground in Vietnam. [Emphasis added] The elements required for buying time and assuming the offensive in Vietnam are, in the view of this m ission, the following: 1. A quick U.S. response to the present crisis which woul d demonstrate by deeds--not merely words--the American commitment seriously to h elp save Vietnam rather than to disengage in the most convenient manner possible . To be persuasive this commitment must include the sending to Vietnam of some U .S. military forces. 2. A shift in the American relation to the Vietnamese effor t from advice to limited partnership. The present character and scale of the war in South Vietnam decree that only the Vietnamese can defeat the Viet Cong; but at all levels Americans must, as friends and partners-not as arms-length advisor s-show them how the job might be done-not tell them or do it for them. *** "Perh aps the most striking aspect of this mission's effort is the unanimity of view-i ndividually arrived at by the specialists involved--that what is now required is a shift from U.S. advice to limited partnership and working collaboration with the Vietnamese. The present war cannot be won by direct U.S. action; it must be won by the Vietnamese. But there is a general conviction among us that the Vietn amese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems. Moreover , there is evidence that Diem is, in principle, prepared for this step, and that most--not all--elements in his establishment are eagerly awaiting it.

Here is a section titled "Reforming Diem's Administrative Method": The famous pr oblem of Diem as an administrator and politician could be resolved in a number o f ways: --By his removal in favor of a military dictatorship which would give do minance to the military chain of command. --By his removal in favor of a figure of more dilute power (e.g., Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho) who would delegate a uthority to act to both military and civil leaders. --By bringing about a series of de facto administrative changes via persuasion at high levels; collaboration with Diem's aides who want improved administration; and by a U.S. operating pre sence at many working levels, using the U.S. presence (e.g., control over the he licopter squadrons) for forcing the Vietnamese to get their house in order in on e area after another. We have opted for the third choice, on the basis of both m erit and feasibility. Our reasons for these: First, it would be dangerous for us to engineer a coup under present tense circumstances, since it is by no means c ertain that we could control its consequences and potentialities for Communist e xploitation. Second, we are convinced that a part of the complaint about Diem's administrative methods conceals a lack of firstrate executives who can get thing s done. In the endless debate between Diem and his subordinates (Diem complainin g of limited executive material; his subordinates, of Diem's bottleneck methods) both have hold of a piece of the truth. The proposed strategy of limited partne rship is designed both to force clear delegation of authority in key areas and t o beef up Vietnamese administration until they can surface and develop the men t o take over. This is a difficult course to adopt. We can anticipate some frictio n and reluctance until it is proved that Americans can be helpful partners and t hat the techniques will not undermine Diem's political position. Shifts in U.S. attitudes and methods of administration as well as Vietnamese are required. But we are confident that it is the right way to proceed at this stage; and, as note d earlier, there is reason for confidence if the right men are sent to do the ri ght jobs. On many points the tone, and sometimes the substance, of the appendice s by the lesser members of the Mission (with the exception of one by Lansdale) a re in sharp contrast to the summary paper. William Jorden of State begins a disc ussion of "the present situation" by reporting: One after another, Vietnamese of ficials, military men and ordinary citizens spoke to me of the situation in thei r country as "grave" and "deteriorating." They are distressed at the evidence of growing Viet Cong successes. They have lost confidence in President Diem and in his leadership. Men who only one or two months ago would have hesitated to say

anything critical of Diem, now explode in angry denunciation of the man, his fam ily, and his methods. And after a page of details, Jorden sums up with: Intrigue , nepotism and even corruption might be accepted, for a time, if combined with e fficiency and visible progress. When they accompany administrative paralysis and steady deterioration, they become intolerable. But the summary paper, under the heading of "The Assets of South Vietnam," lists: With all his weaknesses, Diem has extraordinary ability, stubbornness, and guts. Despite their acute frustrati on, the men of the Armed Forces and the administration respect Diem to a degree which gives their grumbling (and perhaps some plotting) a somewhat half-hearted character; and they are willing--by and large--to work for him, if he gives them a chance to do their jobs. The military annex contains this summary comment on the South Vietnamese Army: The performance of the ARVN is disappointing and gene rally is characterized by a lack of aggressiveness and at most levels is devoid of a sense or urgency. The Army is short of able young trained leaders, both in the officer and NCO ranks. The basic soldier, as a result, is poorly trained, in adequately oriented, lacking in desire to close with the enemy and for the most part unaware of the serious inroads communist guerrillas are making in his count ry. But the main paper, again in the summary of South Vietnamese assets, reports that the South Vietnamese regulars are "of better quality than the Viet Cong Gu errillas." The point is not that the summary flatly contradicts the appendices. For example, the statement about the superior quality of ARVN, compared to the V iet Cong, is qualified with the remark "if it can bring the Communists to engage ment," and can be explained to mean only that the more heavily armed ARVN could defeat a VC force in a set-piece battle. But the persistence tendency of the sum mary is to put Saigon's weaknesses in the best light, and avoid anything that mi ght suggest that perhaps the U.S. should consider limiting, rather than increasi ng, its commitments to the Diem regime, or alternatively face up to a need to op enly take over the war. In contrast, the appendices contemplate (if they do not always recommend) the more drastic alternatives. The military appendix argues (i n a paraphrase of the JCS position quoted earlier) that the U.S. ought to move i nto Southeast Asia, preferably Laos, in force. The appendix by Sterling Cottrell of State (chairman of the Vietnam Task Force) suggests an opposite view:

Since it is an open question whether the GVN can succeed even with U.S. assistan ce, it would be a mistake for the U.S. to commit itself irrevocably to the defea t of the communists in SVN. And Cottrell, in the only explicit statement in the available record on why the U.S. would not want to give Diem the treaty he had a sked for, states: The Communist operation starts from the lowest social level-th e villages. The battle must be joined and won at this point. If not, the Communi sts will ultimately control all but the relatively few areas of strong military concentrations. Foreign military forces cannot themselves win the battle at the village level. Therefore, the primary responsibility for saving the country must rest with the GVN. For the above reason, the U.S. should assist the GVN. This r ules out any treaty or pact which either shifts ultimate responsibility to the U .S., or engages any full U.S. commitment to eliminate the Viet Cong threat. (And a treaty which did not apply to the Viet Cong threat would hardly be a very rea ssuring thing to Saigon; while one that did would face an uncertain future when it came to the Senate for ratification.) Yet, Jorden and Cottrell had nothing mu ch to recommend that was particularly different from what was recommended in the summary. The effect of their papers is to throw doubt on the prospects for succ ess of the intervention proposed. But their recommendations come out about the s ame way, so that if their papers seem more realistic in hindsight than the main paper, they also seem more confused. Cottrell, after recommending that the U.S. avoid committing itself irrevocably to winning in South Vietnam, goes on to reco mmend: The world should continue to be impressed that this situation of overt DR V aggression, below the level of conventional warfare, must be stopped in the be st interest of every free nation. The idea that, if worse comes to worst, the U. S. could probably save its position in Vietnam by bombing the north, seems to un derlie a good deal of the optimism that pervades the summary paper. And even Cot trell, in the last of his recommendations, states: If the combined U.S./GVN effo rts are insufficient to reverse the trend, we should then move to the "Rostow Pl an" of applying graduated measures on the DRV with weapons of our own choosing. Taylor, in his personal recommendations to the President (the cables from Baguio quoted earlier), spoke of the "extreme vulnerability of North Vietnam to conven tional bombing."

The summary paper, in its contrast between the current war and the war the Frenc h lost, states: Finally, the Communists now not only have something to gain--the South--but a base to lose--the North--if war should come. Bombing was not viewe d as the answer to all problems. If things did not go well, the report saw a pos sible requirement for a substantial commitment of U.S. ground troops. In a secti on on South Vietnamese reserves, there is the comment that ....it is an evident requirement that the United States review quick action contingency plans to move into Vietnam, should the scale of the Vietnam [Viet Cong?] offensive radically increase at a time when Vietnamese reserves are inadequate to cope with it. Such action might be designed to take over the responsibility for the security of ce rtain relatively quiet areas, if the battle remained at the guerrilla level, or to fight the Communists if open war were attempted. And the concluding paragraph s of the summary state that: One of the major issues raised by this report is th e need to develop the reserve strength in the U.S. establishment required to cov er action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear threshold in that area, as it is n ow envisaged. The call up of additional support forces may be required. In our v iew, nothing is more calculated to sober the enemy and to discourage escalation in the face of the limited initiatives proposed here than the knowledge that the United States has prepared itself soundly to deal with aggression in Southeast Asia at any level. But these warnings were directed to an unexpectedly strong Vi et Cong showing during the period of buildup of ARVN, and more still to deterrin g the likelihood of a Communist resumption of their offensive in Laos, or of an overt invasion of South Vietnam. The Vietnam contingencies; in particular, were not viewed as likely. But the possibility of bombing the North was viewed otherw ise. The clearest statements are in General Taylor's letter of transmittal: Whil e we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi deci des to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to contin ue the irregular war declared of South Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltrati on and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will t hen have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, train ing, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strik e the source of aggression, after the fact of external aggression is clearly

established? It is our view that our government should undertake with the Vietna mese the measures outlined herein, but should then consider and face the broader question beyond. We cannot refrain from expressing, having seen the situation o n the ground, our common sense of outrage at the burden which this kind of aggre ssion imposes on a new country, only seven years old, with a difficult historica l heritage to overcome, confronting the inevitable problems of political, social , and economic transition to modernization. It is easy and cheap to destroy such a country whereas it is difficult undisturbed to build a nation coming out of a complex past without carrying the burden of a guerrilla war. We were similarly struck in Thailand with the injustice of subjecting this promising nation in tra nsition to the heavy military burdens it faces in fulfilling its role in SEATO s ecurity planning along with the guerrilla challenge beginning to form up on its northeast frontier. It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Krushchev's "wars of liberation" which are really para-wars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous Commun ist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. W hile the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me th at the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam and imp ose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which i s commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter I, "The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961," pp. 98-127 (Boston: Bea con Press, 1971) Section 3, pp. 98-127 F. SOME CABLES FROM SAIGON To a current reader, and very likely to the officials in Washington who had access to the full Taylor Mission Report (including Taylo r's personal recommendations), there really seem to be three reports, not one. 1 . Taylor's own cables read like, as of course they were, a soldier's crisp, dire ct analysis of the military problem facing the Saigon government. With regard to the Diem regime, the emphasis is on a need to build up intelligence capabilitie s, clear up administrative drags on efficient action, and take the offensive in seeking out and destroying VC units.

2. The main paper in the Report (the "Evaluations and Conclusions") incorporates General Taylor's views on the military problems. But, it is much broader, givin g primary emphasis to the military problem, but also some attention to what we n ow call the "other war," and even more to conveying an essentially optimistic pi cture of the opportunities for a vigorous American effort to provide the South V ietnamese government and army with the elan and style needed to win. This paper was presumably drafted mainly by Rostow, with contributions from other members o f the party. It is consistent with Rostow's emphasis before and since on the Vie t Cong problem as a pretty straight-forward case of external aggression. There i s no indication of the doubts expressed in the Alexis Johnson "Concept of Interv ention in Vietnam" paper that Diem might not be able to defeat the Viet Cong eve n if infiltration were largely cut off. At one point, for example, the paper tel ls its readers: It must be remembered that the 1959 political decision in Hanoi to launch the guerrilla and political campaign of 1960-61 arose because of Diem' s increasing success in stabilizing his rule and moving his country forward in t he several preceding years. On the very next page (perhaps reflecting the vagari es of committee papers) the paper does not itself "remember" this description of conditions when the war started. For it states: The military frustration of the past two months has . . . made acute, throughout his administration, dissatisfa ction with Diem's method of rule, with his lack of identification with his peopl e, and with his strategy which has been endemic for some years. But that seems o nly a momentary lapse from the general line of the paper, which is fairly reflec ted in the recommendation that we tell Moscow to: use its influence with Ho Chi Minh to call his dogs off, mind his business, and feed his people. 3. Finally, t here were the appendices by the military and especially the State representative s on the Mission which, as indicated by the extracts given in the previous secti on, paint a much darker picture than the reader gets from the main paper. Even w hen, as is frequently the case, their recommendations are not much different fro m the main paper, the tone is one of trying to make the best of a bad situation, rather than of seizing an opportunity. Because of these distinctions between th e different parts of the Report, two people reading the full Report could come a way with far different impressions of what sort of problem the U.S. was facing i n Vietnam, depending on which parts of the Report seemed to them to ring truest. Presumably, officials' judgments here were influenced by their reading of the s eries of cables that arrived during and just after the Taylor visit, many of whi ch touch on critical points of the report.

Here are some samples. The day Taylor left, Nolting sent a cable describing the immediate mood in Saigon in pretty desperate terms. All parts of the Taylor Repo rt, including the main paper, did the same. The distinctions in describing the s ituation were in how deep-rooted the immediate malaise was seen. The main effect of this cable from Nolting was presumably to add weight to the warning of the R eport that something dramatic had to be done if the U.S. were not ready to risk a collapse in Saigon within a few months. As the Taylor Report stressed and the cable implies, the very fact of the Taylor Mission would have a very negative im pact if nothing came out of it. There has been noticeable rise in Saigon's polit ical temperature during past week. Taylor visit, though reassuring in some respe cts, has been interpreted by many persons as demonstrating critical stage which VC insurgency has reached . . . Following deterioration of general security cond itions over past two months cancellation October 26 national day celebrations to devote resources to flood relief and terse, dramatic declaration national emerg ency caught an unprepared public by surprise and contributed additional unsettli ng elements to growing atmosphere of uneasiness...... This growing public disqui etude accompanied by increasing dissatisfaction with Diem's methods of administr ation on part senior GVN officials. There is considerable cabinet level criticis m and growing though still inchoate determination force organizational reforms o n President. Similar attitude seems be developing in ARVN upper levels. Though t rend of thinking these groups taking parallel courses, there nothing indicate at this moment that collaboration between them taking place. Beginnings of this wo uld, of course, be serious indicator something brewing. At same time CAS also ha s from Vietnamese government sources reports (C-3) of movement of certain platoo n to company-size VC units (totalling perhaps 200-500 men toward Saigon to profi t from any disturbances or confusion which may occur. Knowledge these reports wi thin GVN apparently tending deter disaffected officials from developing radical pace at this moment. Situation here thus one of insecurity, uneasiness and emerg ent instability. A genuine and important military victory over VC would do more than anything else to redress balance and allay for moment high-level mutterings of need for change. On other hand, further deterioration of situation over next few weeks or months or new VC success similar Phuoc Hhanh incident might well b ring situation to head. From MAAG Chief McGarr, Washington received an account o f Taylor's meeting with "Big Minh," then Chief of Staff, later Head of State for a while after Diem was overthrown. It is interesting because it was one of the very few reports from Saigon in the available record suggesting that the Diem re gime might be in need of more than administrative reforms. Minh complains that t he Vietnamese army was "losing the support of the people" as indicated by a "mar ked decrease in the amount of information given by the population." He warned, f urther, that "GVN should discontinue favoring

certain religions . . ." But McGarr stressed the administrative problems, partic ularly the need for an "overall plan." His reaction explicitly concerns what he saw as the "military" aspects of Minh's complaints. But Ambassador Nolting's cab les and the main paper of the Report show a very similar tendency to take note o f political problems, but put almost all the emphasis on the need for better mil itary tactics and more efficient administrative arrangements. ....Big Minh was p essimistic and clearly and frankly outlined his personal feeling that the milita ry was not being properly supported. He said not only Viet Cong grown alarmingly , but that Vietnamese armed forces were losing support of the people. As example , he pointed out marked decrease in amount of information given by population. M inh said GVN should discontinue favoring certain religions, and correct present system of selecting province chiefs. At this point Minh was extremely caustic in commenting on lack of ability, military and administrative, of certain province chiefs. Minh was bitter about province chief's role in military chain of comman d saying that although Gen. McGarr had fought for and won on the single . . . co mmand which had worked for few months, old habits were now returning. Also, on u rging from Gen. McGarr he had gone on offensive, but province chiefs had not coo perated to extent necessary. He discussed his inability to get cooperation from GVN agencies on developing overall plans for conduct of counterinsurgency. Minh also discussed need to bring sects back into fold as these are anti-communist. A lthough above not new Minh seemed particularly discouraged....When analyzed, mos t of Minh's comments in military field are occasioned by lack of overall coordin ation and cooperation. This re-emphasizes absolute necessity for overall plan wh ich would clearly delineate responsibility and create a team effort.... Nolting concerned himself, of course, with the civil as well as military arrangements, b ut with much the same stress on organizational and administrative formalities. A striking example was when Nolting reported that Diem was willing to consider (i n response to American urging of top level administrative reforms) creating a Na tional Executive Council patterned after the U.S. National Security Council. Nol ting was favorably impressed. His cable notes no concern that under Diem's propo sal, Diem's brother Nhu would be chairman of the NEC, although a year earlier (a nd of course even more urgently a year or so later) getting Nhu, and his wife, o ut of the picture entirely had been seen as the best real hope of saving the Die m regime. The report Nolting sent on Taylor's final meeting with Diem also conta ins some interesting material. It leaves the impression that Diem was still not really anxious to get American troops deeply involved in his country, despite hi s favorable reaction at the meeting of the 24th, which, in turn, was a reversal of his reaction at the meeting on the 19th. Because of this, the impression left by the whole record is that Taylor came to the conclusion that some sort of gro und troop commitment was needed mainly because of what he heard from Diem's coll eagues and his military people, rather than from Diem himself. According to Nolt ing's cabled account, Diem, although raising half a dozen issues relating to inc reased American military aid, did not mention the flood task force, or

anything else that might imply a special interest in getting some sort of ground troops commitment. As seemed the case earlier, it was the Americans who pressed the idea of getting American military people involved in combat. In the only ex change Nolting reported touching on this issue, he said: 1. Diem stressed import ance of reinforcement of aviation: particularly helicopters. Taylor and I [Nolti ng] used this opportunity to make clear to Diem that we envisaged helicopters pi loted by Americans and constituting American units under American commanders whi ch would cooperate with Vietnamese military commands. (At a meeting with McGarr November 9, Diem again raised the helicopter question, this time taking the init iative in saying he needed American pilots, but he did not mention the flood tas k force, or anything else that might imply a request for ground troops.) On the question of better performance by Diem's regime, we have this exchange, which do es not seem likely to have prepared Diem for the fairly substantial quid pro quo which turned out to be part of the package proposed by Washington: ....3. Taylo r told Diem it would be useful if he and I could develop specifics with respect to political-psychological point in paper which Taylor presented to Diem October 24. Taylor pointed out this would be very useful to him in Washington because h e will be faced with question that, if program he proposes is adopted, what will be chances of early success. In response Thuan's question asking for exact mean ing of this point in Taylor's paper, latter said there has been loss of confiden ce among both Vietnamese and American people about situation in Vietnam and we n eed to determine together what measures can be taken to restore confidence. Rost ow commented that secret of turning point is offensive action. Diem stated compl ete psychological mobilization required so that everything can be done to raise potential GVN forces and damage enemy's potential. He referred to GVN efforts in past to collaborate more closely with US in military planning and said these ef forts had run up against wall of secrecy surrounding US and SEATO military plans .... Finally, there was this exchange, which does not appear to provide much sup port for the high hopes expressed in the Taylor Report that Diem was anxious for U.S. guidance and "in principle" ready to grant a role for Americans in his adm inistration and army. ....4. Taylor referred to Diem's comments in earlier talk about shortage of capable personnel and suggested US might assist by lending per sonnel. Diem replied that US could help in this respect in training field. Thuan then brought up dilemma facing GVN re instructors at Thui Duc Reserve Officers' School VI. THE FALL DECISIONS-II A. CONTEXT

Taylor's formal report, as noted, was dated November 3, a day after the Mission came back to Washington. (A good deal of it had been written during the stopover at Baguio, in the Philippines, when Taylor's personal cables to the President h ad also been written and sent.) The submission of Taylor's Report was followed b y prominent news stories the next morning flatly stating (but without attributio n to a source) that the President "remains strongly opposed to the dispatch of A merican combat troops to South Vietnam" and strongly implying that General Taylo r had not recommended such a commitment. Apparently, only a few people, aside fr om Taylor, Rostow and a handful of very senior officials, realized that this was not exactly accurate-for the summary paper of the Report had not been very expl icit on just what was meant by "a hard commitment to the ground." Thus only thos e who knew about the "Eyes Only" cables would know just what Taylor was recommen ding. Diem himself had given one of his rare on-the-record interviews to the New York Times correspondent in Saigon while Taylor was on his way home, and he too gave the impression that the further American aid he expected would not include ground troops. Consequently, the general outline of the American aid that would be sent following the Taylor Mission was common knowledge for over a week befor e any formal decision was made. The decisions, when they were announced stirred very little fuss, and (considering the retrospective importance) not even much i nterest. The Taylor Mission had received much less attention in the press than s everal other crises at the UN, in the Congo, on nuclear testing, and most of all in Berlin, where there had just been a symbolic confrontation of Soviet and Ame rican tanks. The Administration was so concerned about public reaction to Soviet aggressiveness and apparent American inability to deal with it that a campaign was begun (as usual in matters of this sort, reported in the Times without speci fic attribution) to "counter-attack against what unnamed 'high officials' called a 'rising mood of national frustration.'" The Administration's message, the Tim es reported, was that a "mature foreign policy" rather than "belligerence of def eatism" was what was needed. What is interesting about such a message is what th e necessity to send it reveals about the mood of the times. In this sort of cont ext, there was no real debate about whether the U.S. ought to do anything reason able it could to prevent Vietnam from going the way of Laos. There is no hint of a suggestion otherwise in the classified record, and there was no real public d ebate on this point. What was seen as an issue was whether the limits of reasona ble U.S. aid extended to the point of sending American troops to fight the Viet Cong. But even this was subdued. There had been, as noted before, the leaked sto ries playing down the prospects that combat troops would be sent, and then, imme diately on Taylor's return, the unattributed but obviously authoritative stories that Kennedy was opposed to sending troops and Taylor was not recommending them . In a most important sense, this situation distorts the story told in this acco unt. For this account inevitably devotes a great deal of space to the decision t hat was not made--that of sending ground troops--and very little space to the im portant decisions that were made. There is simply nothing much to say about thes e latter decisions: except that they were

apparently taken for granted at the time. Even today, with all the hindsight ava ilable, it is very hard to imagine Kennedy or any other President responding to the situation faced in 1961 by doing significantly less about Vietnam than he di d. The only choices seen then, as indeed even today the only choices seem to hav e been, whether to do more. And it is on how that question was resolved, inevita bly, that any account of the period will be focused. The Administration faced (c ontrary to the impression given to the public both before and after the decision s) two major issues when Taylor returned. 1. What conditions, if any, would be a ttached to new American aid? The Taylor Report implicitly recommended none. But the leaked stories in the press following Taylor's return showed that some in th e Administration inclined to a much harder line on Diem than the summary paper o f the report. For example, a Times dispatch of November 5, from its Pentagon cor respondent, reported that Diem would be expected to "undertake major economic, s ocial, and military reforms to provide a basis for increased U.S. support." 2. W ould the limited commitment of ground forces recommended by Taylor be undertaken ? The news stories suggested they would, although this would be apparent only to those who had seen Taylor's "Eyes Only" cables. The story appearing the day aft er the report was submitted, despite the flat statements against the use of comb at troops, also stated that Taylor had recommended "the dispatch of more special ists in antiguerrilla warfare to train Vietnamese troops, communications and tra nsportation specialists, and army engineers to help the Vietnamese government co mbat its flood problems." The November 5 story was more explicit. It is noted th at officials seemed to rule out the use of U.S. combat forces, "the move conside red here a few weeks ago." But "at the same time it appears that Army engineers, perhaps in unusually large numbers, may be sent to help on flood control work a nd other civil projects and to fight if necessary." This last phrase was explici tly (and correctly) linked to the fact that the area in which the floods had tak en place (the Delta) was precisely the area of greatest Viet Cong strength. A fi nal question of great importance did not have to be resolved during this review: for although the Taylor Report had stressed the idea of eventually bombing the north, no immediate decision or commitment on this was recommended. On the first of these issues (the quid pro quo for U.S. aid) our record tells us that demand s were made on Diem, as we will see when we come to the actual decision. The new spaper stories strongly suggest that the decision to ask for a quid pro quo was made, at the latest, immediately following the return of the Taylor Mission. But the record does not show anything about the reasoning behind this effort to pre ssure Diem to agree to reforms as a condition for increased U.S. aid, nor of wha t the point of it was. It certainly conflicted with the main drive of the Taylor Mission Report. The report not only suggested no such thing, but put a great de al of stress on a cordial, intimate relationship with the Diem regime. Pressure for reform (especially when publicly made, as they

essentially were in the leaked stories) was hardly likely to promote cordiality. Durbrow's experience earlier in the year had shown that pressure would have the opposite result. Consequently, the President's handling of this issue had the e ffect of undermining from the start what appeared to have been a major premise o f the strategy recommended to the President: that Diem was "in principle" prepar ed for what plainly amounted to a "limited partnership," with the U.S. in runnin g his country and his Army. The advantages, from the American view, of the Presi dent's decision to place demands on Diem were presumably that it might (contrary to realistic expectations) actually push Diem in the right direction; and that if this did not work, it would somewhat limit the American commitment to Diem. T he limit would come by making clear that the U.S. saw a good deal of the problem as Diem's own responsibility, and not just a simple matter of external aggressi on. The balance of this judgment would turn substantially on whether whoever was making the decision judged that the "limited partnership" idea was really much more realistic than the trying to pressure Diem, and on whether he wanted to lim it the U.S. commitment, rather than make it unambiguous. Further, the cables fro m Saigon had clearly shown that many South Vietnamese were hoping the Americans would put pressure on Diem, so that although such tactics would prejudice relati ons with Diem, they would not necessarily harm relations with others of influenc e in the country, in particular his generals. Finally, although Kennedy's decisi ons here were contrary to the implications of the summary paper in the Taylor Re port, they were not particularly inconsistent with the appendices by the State r epresentatives. For these, as noted, took a far less rosy view of Diem's prospec ts than appeared in the summary. On the second issue--the U.S. combat military t ask force--the available record tells us only the positions of Taylor and of the Defense Department. We are not sure what the position of State was-although Sor enson claims that all the President's senior advisors had recommended going ahea d with sending some ground troops. Even Taylor's position is slightly ambiguous. It is conceivable that he argued for the Task Force mainly because he thought t hat the numbers of U.S. personnel that might be sent as advisors, pilots, and ot her specialists would not add up to a large enough increment to have much of a p sychological impact on South Vietnamese morale. But his choice of language indic ates that a mere question of numbers was not the real issue. Rather Taylor's arg ument seems to have been that specifically ground forces (not necessarily all or even mainly infantrymen, but ground soldiers who would be out in the countrysid e where they could be shot at and shoot back) were what was needed. Combat engin eers to work in the VC-infested flood area in the Delta would meet that need. He licopter pilots and mechanics and advisors, who might accompany Vietnamese opera tions, but could not undertake ground operations on their own apparently would n ot. There is only one easily imagined reason for seeing this as a crucial distin ction. And that would be if a critical object of the stepped up American program was to be exactly what Taylor said it should

be in his final cable from Saigon: ". . . assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Viet Cong . . ." Thus the flood task force was essentially different from the balance of the military program. It did not f ill an urgent need for military specialists or expertise not adequately availabl e within Vietnam; it was an implicit commitment to deny the Viet Cong a victory even if major American ground forces should be required. Taylor clearly did not see the need for large U.S. ground involvement as at all probable. ("The risks o f backing into a major Asian war because SVN are present but are not impressive, " in large part because "NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing.") At another point, Taylor warns the President, "If the first contingent is not en ough, . . . it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce. If the ult imate result sought is the closing of the frontiers and the cleanup of the insur gents within SVN, there is no limit to our possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi.)" We have a good record of the DOD staff work, which prece ded the President's decision on this issue, but only a bit from State and none f rom the White House. Rusk, in a cable from Japan on November 1, contributed this note of caution (which also bears on the previous discussion of demands on Diem for a quid pro quo for increased American aid): Since General Taylor may give f irst full report prior my return, believe special attention should be given to c ritical question whether Diem is prepared take necessary measures to give us som ething worth supporting. If Diem unwilling trust military commanders to get job done and take steps to consolidate non-communist elements into serious national effort, difficult to see how handful American troops can have decisive influence . While attaching greatest possible importance to security in SEA, I would be re luctant to see U.S. make major additional commitment American prestige to a losi ng horse. Suggest Department carefully review all Southeast Asia measures we exp ect from Diem if our assistance forces us to assume de facto direction South Vie tnamese affairs. But the view of the U.S. Mission in Saigon contained no such do ubts, nor did most Vietnamese, according to this cable Nolting sent while Taylor was enroute home: Our conversations over past ten days with Vietnamese in vario us walks of life show virtually unanimous desire for introduction U.S. forces in to Viet-Nam. This based on unsolicited remarks from cabinet ministers, National Assembly Deputies, University professors, students, shop-keepers, and opposition ists. Dr. Tran Dinh De, level-headed Minister of Health, told Embassy officer Oc t. 29 that while GVN could continue resist communists for while longer if US tro ops not introduced, it could not win alone against commies. National Assembly me mbers, according to Lai Tu, leader Personalist Community, unanimously in favor e ntry US forces. Diem told us while General Taylor was here that he had consulted National Assembly Committee on this question and had received favorable respons e. Even an oppositionist like Ex-Foreign Minister Tran Van Do has told us US for ces are needed and is apparently so strongly convinced of this that

he did not suggest any conditions precedent about political changes by Diem. AmConsul Hue reports that opinion among intellectuals and government officials in that city is also almost unanimously in favor of introduction of American combat troops. MAAG believes on basis private conversations and general attitude Vietn amese military personnel toward us that Vietnamese armed forces would likewise w elcome introduction US forces. General Vietnamese desire for introduction US for ces arises from serious morale decline among populace during recent weeks becaus e of deterioration in security and horrible death through torture and mutilation to which Col Nam subjected. Expanded VC infiltration has brought fully home to Vietnamese the fact that US has not intervened militarily in Laos to come to res cue of anti-communists. Now that they see Viet-Nam approaching its own crucial p eriod, paramount question in their minds is whether it will back down when chips are down. Vietnamese thus want US forces introduced in order to demonstrate US determination to stick it out with them against Communists. They do not want to be victims of political settlement with communists. This is especially true of t hose publicly identified as anti-communist like Dean Vu Quoc Thue who collaborat ed with Dr. Eugene Staley on Joint Experts Report. Most Vietnamese whose thought s on this subject have been developed are not thinking in terms of US troops to fight guerrillas but rather of a reassuring presence of US forces in Viet-Nam. T hese persons undoubtedly feel, however, that if war in Viet-Nam continues to mov e toward overt conventional aggression as opposed to its guerrilla character, co mbat role for US troops could eventually arise. The special commitment involved in committing even a small force of ground troops was generally recognized. We h ave notes on an ISA staff paper, for example, which ranked the various types of increased U.S. military aid in ascending order of commitment, and of course, pla ced the flood task force at the top. According to the notes, Any combat elements , such as in the task force, would come under attack and would need to defend th emselves, committing U.S. prestige deeply. U.S. troops would then be fighting in South Vietnam and could not withdraw under fire. Thus, the introduction of U.S. troops in South Vietnam would be a decisive act and must be sent to achieve a c ompletely decisive mission. This mission would probably require, over time, incr eased numbers of U.S. troops; DRV intervention would probably increase until a l arge number of U.S. troops were required, three or more divisions. This assessme nt differed from that in General Taylor's cables only in not stressing the hope that a U.S. willingness to bomb the north would deter North Vietnamese escalatio n of its own commitment. A special NIE prepared at this time reached essentially the same conclusions. This SNIE, incidentally, is the only staff paper found in the available record which treats communist reactions primarily in terms of the separate national interests of Hanoi, Moscow, and Peiping, rather than primaril y in terms of an overall communist strategy for

which Hanoi, is acting as an agent. In particular, the Gilpatric Task Force Repo rt, it will be recalled, began with references to a communist 'master plan' for taking over Southeast Asia. The Taylor Mission Report, similarly, began with a s ection on "Communist Strategy in Southeast Asia" and opening: At the present tim e, the Communists are pursuing a clear and systematic strategy in Southeast Asia . It is a strategy of extending Communist power and influence in ways which bypa ss U.S. nuclear strength, U.S. conventional naval, air, and ground forces, and t he conventional strength of indigenous forces in the area. Their strategy is roo ted in the fact that international law and practice does not yet recognize the m ounting of guerrilla war across borders as aggression justifying counterattack a t the source. The November 5 SNIE presumably indicates the principal courses of action that were under formal review at the time: The courses of action here con sidered were given to the intelligence community for the purposes of this estima te and were not intended to represent the full range of possible courses of acti on. The given courses of action are: A. The introduction of a US airlift into an d within South Vietnam, increased logistics support, and an increase in MAAG str ength to provide US advisers down to battalion level; B. The introduction into S outh Vietnam of a US force of about 8,000-10,000 troops, mostly engineers with s ome combat support, in response to an appeal from President Diem for assistance in flood relief; C. The introduction into the area of a US combat force of 25,00 0 to 40,000 to engage with South Vietnamese forces in ground, air, and naval ope rations against the Viet Cong; and D. An announcement by the US of its determina tion to hold South Vietnam and a warning, either private or public, that North V ietnamese support of the Viet Cong must cease or the US would launch air attacks against North Vietnam. This action would be taken in conjunction with Course A, B, or C. These proposed courses of action correspond to those outlined for cons ideration by the Taylor Mission, with the exception that the flood task force pr oposed by Taylor has been substituted for the former "intermediate" solution of stationing a token U.S. force at DaNang, and that an opinion is asked on the pro spects of threats to bomb the north, again reflecting the Taylor Mission Report. The gist of the SNIE was that North Vietnamese would respond to an increased U. S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated support for the Viet Co ng. Thus, the main difference in the estimated communist reaction to Courses A, B, and C was that each would be stronger than its predecessor. On the prospects for bombing the north, the

SNIE implies that threats to bomb would not cause Hanoi to stop its support for the Viet Cong, and that actual attacks on the North would bring a strong respons e from Moscow and Peiping, who would "regard the defense of North Vietnam agains t such an attack as imperative." B. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS On November 8, McNamar a sent the following memorandum on behalf of himself, Gilpatric, and the JCS: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whet her the U.S. shall: a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fa ll of South Vietnam to Communism, and b. Support this commitment by necessary im mediate military actions and preparations for possible later actions. The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatric, and I have reached the following conclusions: 1. The fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Commu nist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland So utheast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularl y in the Orient, would be extremely serious. 2. The chances are against, probabl y sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introductio n of U.S. forces on a substantial scale. We accept General Taylor's judgment tha t the various measures proposed by him short of this are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to win ning his fight. 3. The introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude of an initi al 8,000 men in a flood relief context will be of great help to Diem. However, i t will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Pe iping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it probably will not tip the s cales decisively. We would be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in a n inconclusive struggle. 4. The other side can be convinced we mean business onl y if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the fu ll objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hano i that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation agai nst North Vietnam. 5. If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In

view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can assu me that the maximum U.S. forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia will no t exceed 6 divisions, or about 205,000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32-59, Phase IV). Our m ilitary posture is, or with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interfe rence with our present Berlin plans. 6. To accept the stated objective is of cou rse a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend on factors many of which ~re not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem himself and oth'~ leaders in the area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestik polit ical implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is our feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are s ure to involve casualties. The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need c areful weighing and may well be mixed; however, permitting South Vietnam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly. 7. In sum: a. We do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced in South Vietnam unless we are willing to make an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum. b. We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S. to the c lear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions. c. If such a commitme nt is agreed upon, we support the recommendations of General Taylor as the first steps toward its fulfillment. Sgd: Robert S. McNamara A number of things are striking about this memorandum, including of course the j udgment that the "maximum" U.S. ground forces required, even in the case of over t intervention by not only North Vietnam, but China as well, would "not exceed" 205,000 men. This estimate of the requirement to deal with a large scale overt i nvasion is consistent with the Chief's earlier estimate that the addition of 40, 000 U.S. troops to the South Vietnamese forces would be sufficient to "clean up" the Viet Cong. But the strongest message to the President in the memorandum (gr owing out of points 3, 4, and 7c) was surely that if he agreed to sending the mi litary task force, he should be prepared for follow-up recommendations for re-en forcements and to threaten Hanoi with bombing. Unless the SNIE was wholly wrong, threats to bomb Hanoi would not turn off the war, and Hanoi would increase its infiltration in response to U.S. commitments of

troops. Even should Hanoi not react with counter-escalation, the President knew that the Chiefs, at least, were already on record as desiring a prompt build-up to 40,000 ground troops. In short, the President was being told that the issue w as not whether to send an 8,000-man task force, but whether or not to embark on a course that, without some extraordinary good luck, would lead to combat involv ement in Southeast Asia on a very substantial scale. On the other hand, he was b eing warned that anything less than sending the task force was very likely to fa il to prevent the fall of Vietnam, since "the odds are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any means short of the introduction of U.S. fo rces on a substantial scale" (of which the task force would be the first increme nt). Although the Chief's position here is clear, because their views are on rec ord in other memoranda, McNamara's own position remains a little ambiguous. For the paper does not flatly recommend going ahead; it only states he and his colle agues are "inclined" to recommend going ahead. Three days later McNamara joined Rusk in a quite different recommendation, and one obviously more to the Presiden t's liking (and, in the nature of such things, quite possibly drawn up tot/he Pr esident's specifications). As with the May revision of the Gilpatric Report, thi s paper combines an escalation of the rhetoric with a toning down of the actions the President is asked to take. Since the NSAM formalizing the President's deci sions was taken essentially verbatim from this paper, the complete text is repri nted here. (The NSAM consisted of the Recommendations section of this memorandum , except that Point 1 of the recommendations was deleted.) Of particular importa nce in this second memorandum to the President was Section 4, with its explicit sorting of U.S. military aid into Category A, support forces, which were to be s ent promptly; and Category B, "larger organized units with actual or potential d irect military missions" on which no immediate decision was recommended. There i s no explicit reference in the paper to the flood relief task force; it simply d oes not appear in the list of recommended actions, presumably on the grounds tha t it goes in Category B. Category B forces, the paper notes, "involve a certain dilemma: if there is a strong South Vietnamese effort, they may not be needed; i f there is not such an effort, United States forces could not accomplish their m ission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population." If McNamara's earlie r memorandum is read carefully, the same sort of warning is found, although it s ounds much more perfunctory. But that such warnings were included shows a striki ng contrast with the last go-around in May. Then, the original Defense version o f the Gilpatric Task Force Report contained no hint of such a qualification, and there was only a quite vague warning in the State revisions. Part of the reason , undoubtedly, was the 6 month's additional experience in dealing with Diem. A l arger part, though, almost certainly flowed from the fact that the insurgency ha d by now shown enough strength so that there was now in everyone's minds the pos sibility that the U.S. might someday face the choice of giving up on Vietnam or taking over a major part of the war.

These warnings (that even a major U.S. commitment to the ground war would not as sure success) were obviously in some conflict with the recommendations both pape rs made for a clear-cut U.S. commitment to save South Vietnam. The contrast is a ll the sharper in the joint Rusk/McNamara memorandum, where the warning is so fo rcefully given. Here is the Rusk/McNamara memorandum. November 11, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: South Viet-Nam 1. United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam. The deteriorating situation in Sou th Viet-Nam requires attention to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involv e the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Commu nist. bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless any further discussi oq about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have\ to f ace the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation wit hin the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty. Addition ally, in a formal statement at the conclusion session of the 1954 Geneva Confere nce, the United States representative stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression . . . with grave concern and seriously threatening international peace and security." The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism woul d not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitm ents elsewhere. Further, loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration. 2. The Problem of Saving So uth Viet-Nam. It seems, on the face of it, absurd to think that a nation of 20 m illion people can be subverted by 15-20 thousand active guerrillas if the Govern ment and people of that country do not wish to be subverted. South Viet-Nam is n ot, however, a highly organized society with an effective governing apparatus an d a population accustomed to carrying civic responsibility. Public apathy is enc ouraged by the inability of most citizens to act directly as well as by the tact ics of terror employed by the guerrillas throughout the countryside. Inept admin istration and the absence of a strong non-Communist political coalition have mad e it difficult to bring available resources to bear upon the guerrilla problem a nd to make the most effective use of available external aid. Under the best of

conditions the threat posed by the presence of 15-20 thousand guerrillas, well d isciplined under well-trained cadres, would be difficult to meet. 3. The United States' Objective in South Viet-Nam. The United States should commit itself to t he clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism. The ba sic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of Sout h VietNam into a position to win its own war against the guerrillas. We must ins ist that that Government itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange for large-scale United States assistance in the military, economic and political fields. At the same time we must recognize that it will probably not b e possible for the GVN to win this war as long as the flow of men and supplies f rom North Viet-Nam continues unchecked and the guerrillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in neighboring territory. We should be prepared to introduce United States comb at forces if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the circum stances, it may also be necessary for United States forces to strike at the sour ce of the aggression in North Viet-Nam. 4. The Use of United States Forces in So uth Viet-Nam. The commitment of United States forces to South Viet-Nam involves two different categories: (A) Units of modest size required for the direct suppo rt of South Viet-Namese military effort, such as communications, helicopter and other forms of airlift, reconnaissance aircraft, naval patrols, intelligence uni ts, etc., and (B) larger organized units with actual or potential direct militar y missions. Category (A) should be introduced as speedily as possible. Category (B) units pose a more serious problem in that they are much more significant fro m the point of view of domestic and international political factors and greatly increase the probabilities of Communist bloc escalation. Further, the employment of United States comat forces (in the absence of Communist bloc escalation) inv olves a certain dilemma: if there is a strong South-Vietnamese effort, they may not be needed; if there is not such an effort, United States forces could not ac complish their mission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population. Under present circumstances, therefore, the question of injecting United States and S EATO combat forces should in large part be considered as a contribution to the m orale of the South Viet-Namese in their own effort to do the principal job thems elves. 5. Probable Extent of the Commitment of United States Forces. If we commi t Category (B) forces to South Viet-Nam the ultimate possible extent of our mili tary commitment in Southeast Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Hanoi and Peiping may overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the logistic difficu lties faced by the other side, we can assume that the maximum United States forc es required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or a bout 205,000 men (CINCPAC Plan 32/59 PHASE IV). This would be in addition to loc al forces and such SEATO forces as

may be engaged. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Ch iefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with the addition of more Nation al Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these force s and support them in action without serious interference with our present Berli n plans. 6. Relation to Laos. It must be understood that the introduction of Ame rican combat forces into Viet-Nam prior to a Laotian settlement would run a cons iderable risk of stimulating a Communist breach of the cease fire and a resumpti on of hostilities in Laos. This could present us with a choice between the use o f combat forces in Laos or an abandonment of that country to full Communist cont rol. At the present time, there is at least a chance that a settlement can be re ached in Laos on the basis of a weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Phouma Governme nt. The prospective agreement on Laos includes a provision that Laos will not be used as a transit area or as a base for interfering in the affairs of other cou ntries such as South Viet-Nam. After a Laotian settlement, the introduction of U nited States forces into Viet-Nam could serve to stabilize the position both in Viet-Nam and in Laos by registering our determination to see to it that the Laot ian settlement was as far as the United States would be willing to see Communist influence in Southeast Asia develop. 7. The Need for Multilateral Action. From the political point of view, both domestic and international, it would seem impo rtant to involve forces from other nations alongside of United States Category ( B) forces in Viet-Nam. It should be difficult to explain to our own people why n o effort had been made to invoke SEATO or why the United States undertook to car ry this burden unilaterally. Our position would be greatly strengthened if the i ntroduction of forces could be taken as a SEATO action, accompanied by units of other SEATO countries, with a full SEATO report to the United Nations of the pur poses of the action itself. Apart from the armed forces, there would be politica l advantage in enlisting the interest of other nations, including neutrals, in t he security and well-being of South Viet-Nam. This might be done by seeking such assistance as Malayan police officials (recently offered Diem by the Tunku) and by technical assistance personnel in other fields, either bilaterally or throug h international organizations. 8. Initial Diplomatic Action by the United States . If the recommendations, below, are approved, the United States should consult intensively with other SEATO governments to obtain their full support of the cou rse of action contemplated. At the appropriate stage, a direct approach should b e made by the United States to Moscow, through normal or special channels, point ing out that we cannot accept the movement of cadres, arms and other supplies in to South Viet-Nam in support of the guerrillas. We should also discuss the probl em with neutral governments in the general area and get them to face up to their own interests in the security of South Viet-Nam; these governments will be conc erned about (a) the introduction of United

States combat forces and (b) the withdrawal of United States support from Southe ast Asia; their concern, therefore, might be usefully expressed either to Commun ist bloc countries or in political support for what may prove necessary in South Viet-Nam itself. RECOMMENDATIONS In the light of the foregoing, the Secretary o f State and the Secretary of Defense recommend that: 1. We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam t o Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (Howev er, if it is necessary to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing objecti ve our decision to introduce United States forces should not be contingent upon unanimous SEATO agreement thereto.) 2. The Department of Defense be prepared wit h plans for the use of United States forces in South Viet-Nam under one or more of the following purposes: (a) Use of a significant number of United States forc es to signify United States determination to defend South Viet-Nam and to boost South Viet-Nam morale. (b) Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North Viet-Nam. (c) Use of Unit ed States forces to deal with the situation if there is organized Communist mili tary intervention. 3. We immediately undertake the following actions in support of the GVN: (a) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopt ers, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by U nited States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control. (b ) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence. (c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operat ing personnel as may be necessary for quick and effective operations in effectin g surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways. (d) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations. (e) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to improve the militarypolitical intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and the arme d forces to the Central Intelligence Organization. (f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military f orces as are required for increased United States participation in

the direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under these recommendations. (g) Provide such increased economic aid as may be required to permit the GVN to pur sue a vigorous flood relief and rehabilitation program, to supply material in su pport of the security effort, and to give priority to projects in support of thi s expanded counterinsurgency program. (This could include increases in military pay, a full suppy of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, t ransportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where mat erial help could assist the GVN in winning the war against the Viet Cong.) (h) E ncourage and support (including financial support) a request by the GVN to the F AO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistan ce in the relief and rehabilitation of the flood area. (i) Provide individual ad ministrators and advisers for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments. (j) Pro vide personnel for a joint survey with the GVN of conditions in each of the prov inces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearin g on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency program in order to reach a commo n estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them. 4. Ambassador Nolting be instructed to make an immediate approach to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to cope with the Viet Cong threat and the ravages of the flood as set forth under 3., above, if, on its part, the Government of VietNam is prepared to carry out an effective and total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human, for the same end. Before setting in motion the United States proposals listed above, the Unit ed States Government would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to insure the success of this joint effort. On the part of the United States, it would be expected that these GVN undertakings could include, in accordance with the detailed recommendations of [line missing] (a) Prompt and appropriate legis lative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobil ize its entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and broadening of the Government so as to realize the full potential of all nonCommunist elemen ts in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle.) (b) The establi shment of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to p erform their functions effectively. (c) Overhaul of the military establishment a nd command structure so as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war. 5. Very shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the first increments of United States military personnel and equipment proposed under 3., above, that would exceed the Geneva Accord ceilings, publish the "Jord en report" as a United States "white paper," transmitting it as simultaneously a s possible to the Governments of all countries with which we have diplomatic rel ations, including the Communist states.

6. Simultaneous with the publication of the "Jorden report," release an exchange of letters between Diem and the President. (a) Diem's letter would include refe rence to the DRV violations of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 24 GVN letter to the ICC and other documents; pertinent references to GVN statements w ith respect to its intent to observe the Geneva Accords; reference to its need f or flood relief and rehabilitation; reference to previous United States aid and the compliance hitherto by both countries with the Geneva Accords; reference to the USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords were signed; the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of the Accords in view of the DRV violations thereo f; the lack of aggressive intent with respect to the DRV: GVN intent to return t o strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV violations ceased ; and request for additional United States assistance in framework foregoing pol icy. The letter should also set forth in appropriate general terms steps Diem ha s taken and is taking to reform Governmental structure. (b) The President's repl y would be responsive to Diem's request for additional assistance and acknowledg e and agree to Diem's statements on the intent promptly to return to strict comp liance with the Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations have ceased. 7. Simulta neous with steps 5 and 6, above, make a private approach to the Soviet Union tha t would include: our determination to prevent the f all of South Viet-Nam to Com munism by whatever means is necessary; our concern over dangers to peace present ed by the aggressive DRV policy with respect to South Viet-Nam; our intent to re turn to full compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV does so; the distinction we draw between Laos and South Viet-Nam; and our expectation that th e Soviet Union will exercise its influence on the CHICOMS and the DRV. 8. A spec ial diplomatic approach made to the United Kingdom in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference requesting that the United Kingdom seek the support of th e Soviet co-Chairman for a cessation of DRV aggression against South Viet-Nam. 9 . A special diplomatic approach also to be made to India, both in its role as Ch airman of the ICC and as a power having relations with Peiping and Hanoi. This a pproach should be made immediately prior to public release of the "Jorden report " and the exchange of letters between Diem and the President. 10. Immediately pr ior to the release of the "Jorden report" and the exchange of letters between Di em and the President, special diplomatic approaches also to be made to Canada, a s well as Burma, Indonesia. Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAR, and Yugoslavia. SEATO, NA TO, and OAS members should be informed through those organizations, with selecte d members also informed individually. The possibility of some special approach t o Poland as a member of the ICC should also be considered.

When we reach this memorandum in the record, the decision seems essentially seal ed. Kennedy, by every indication in the press at the time and according to the r ecollections of all the memoirs, was, at the least, very reluctant to send Ameri can ground forces to Vietnam, and quite possibly every bit as "strongly opposed" as the leaked news stories depicted him. He now had a joint recommendation from his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense telling him just what he surely wanted to hear: that a decision on combat forces could be deferred. Consequentl y, Kennedy's decision on this point can hardly be considered in doubt beyond Nov ember 11, although a formal NSC meeting on the question was not held until the 1 5th. On the question of demands on Diem, again there is no reason to suspect the issue was in doubt any later, at most, than the 11th. The only questions which are in doubt are the extent to which the Rusk/ McNamara memorandum simply happen ed to come to the President in such convenient form, or whether the President ar ranged it so; and if so, how far this formal paper differed from the real recomm endations of the President's senior advisors. The record available gives no basi s for even guessing about this. As noted earlier, even McNamara, who is on recor d with a previous, quite different memorandum, cannot be flatly said to have cha nged his mind (or been overruled). There is too much room for uncertainty about what he was really up to when he signed the memorandum. In any event, Kennedy es sentially adopted the Rusk/McNamara set of recommendations, although the record is not entirely clear on when he did so. There was an NSC meeting November 5; bu t although at least the Chairman of the JCS was there, the record shows that eve n after this meeting there was some uncertainty (or perhaps reluctance) in the J CS about whether the decision had been made. The record shows that McNamara phon ed General Lemnitzer to assure him that this was the case. But the cables transm itting the decision to Saigon were dated November 14, the day before the NSC mee ting. The formal decision paper (NSAM 111) was not signed until November 22nd. A s noted earlier, the NSAM is essentially the recommendations section of the Rusk / McNamara paper, but with the initial recommendation (committing the U.S. to sa ve Vietnam) deleted. The NSAM was headed "First Phase of Vietnam Program," which , of course, implied that a further decision to send combat troops was in prospe ct. Both Sorenson and Hilsman claim this was really a ruse by the President, who had no intention of going ahead with combat troops but did not choose to argue the point with his advisors. Schlesinger, apparently writing from diary notes, s ays the President talked to him about the combat troops recommendations at the t ime, describing the proposed first increment as like an alcoholic's first drink: The Taylor-Rostow report was a careful and thoughtful document, and the Preside nt read it with interest. He was impressed by its description of the situation a s serious but not hopeless and attracted by the idea of stiffening the Diem regi me through an infusion of American advisers. He did not, however, like the propo sal of a direct American military commitment. "They want a force of American tro ops," he told me early in November. "They say it's necessary in order to restore confidence and maintain morale. But it will be

just like Berlin. The troops will march in; the bands will play; the crowds will cheer; and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we will be told we h ave to send in more troops. It's like taking a drink. The effect wears off, and you have to take another." The war in Vietnam, he added, could be won only so lo ng as it was their war. If it were ever converted into a white man's war, we wou ld lose as the French had lost a decade earlier. Whether, in fact, Kennedy had s uch a firm position in mind at the time cannot be surmised, though, from the off icial record itself. It is easy to believe that he did, for as Sorenson points o ut, Kennedy had strong views on the difficulties of foreign troops putting down an insurgency dating from his bleak, but correct, appraisals of French prospects in Vietnam as early as 1951, and again in Algeria in the late 1950's. And he wa s hardly alone in such sentiments, as shown in columns of the period by Reston a nd Lippman, and in a private communication from Galbraith to be quoted shortly. But, Kennedy did not, need to have such a firm position in mind to make the deci sions he did. There was a case to be made for deferring the combat troops decisi on even if the President accepted the view that U.S. troops commitments were alm ost certainly needed in Vietnam and that putting them in sooner would be better than waiting. There was, in particular, the arguments in the Rusk/McNamara memor andum that putting combat troops into Vietnam just then would upset the Laos neg otiations, and the unstated but obvious argument that the U.S. perhaps ought to hold back on the combat troop commitment to gain leverage on Diem. General Taylo r's advice, as shown in the record, gave a different ground for delaying. Taylor argued that the ground troop commitment was essentially for its psychological, not military, impact. Taylor's judgment was that it was "very doubtful" that any thing short of a prompt commitment of ground troops would restore South Vietname se morale. But such a commitment would obviously be a costly stop. The President was thoroughly forewarned that such a move would lead both to continual pressur e to send more troops and to political difficulties at home that would inevitabl y flow from the significant casualties that had to be expected to accompany a gr ound troop commitment. The risk of delaying the ground troop commitment might ea sily have been judged not worth the certain costs that would accompany it. And o f course, in hindsight, we know that the limited program approved by the Preside nt was sufficient to put off any imminent collapse of the Diem regime. Consequen tly, Kennedy's decisions do not tell us just what his view was, and indeed he di d not need to have a firmly settled view to make the decision, which after all, was only to put off, not to foreclose a decision to send ground troops. He had o nly to decide that, on balance, the risks of deferring the troop decisions were no worse than the costs of making it, and he could have reached that judgment by any number of routes. The reasons stated in the various papers may or may not a ccurately reflect the President's state of mind. The only thing we can he sure o f is that they conveyed his judgment of the tactically most suitable rationale t o put in writing. The most detailed record we have of this rationale and explana tion of is the following cable to Nolting: .....Review of Taylor Report has resu lted in following basic decisions:

1. Must essentially be a GVN task to contain and reduce the VC threat at present level of capability. Means organizing to go on offensive. We are prepared to co ntemplate further assistance after joint assessment establishes needs and possib ilities of aid more precisely. 2. No amount of extra aid can be substitute for G VN taking measures to permit them to assume offensive and strengthen the adminis trative and political bases of government. 3. Do not propose to introduce into G VN and US combat troops now, but propose a phase of intense public and diplomati c activity to focus on infiltration from North. Shall decide later on course of action should infiltration not be radically reduced. 4. On flood, decide best co urse to treat as primarily civil problem, and occasion should be used to draw in as many nationals of other countries as can be used in GVN flood plan. Have bee n encouraged this course on advice of Desai of Indian Foreign Office who observe d a good thing if some Indians and Burmese involved constructively in SVN and su bject to VC attack. We prepared to put maximum pressure on FAO. Do not exclude a d hoc US military aid in flood area. 5. Diplomatically position that the violati ons to be documented in Jorden report and strong references to DRV attack agains t SVN in DM's letter to Kennedy, need not confirm to the world and Communists th at Geneva accords are being disregarded by our increased aid. Need not accuse ou rselves publicly, make Communist job easier. GVN should be advised to counter ch arges by leveling charges against DRV and insisting that if ICC investigates in SVN must equally investigate in NVN. Appreciate approach will make ICC task diff icult but will explain position to Canadians and Indians to get their support. 6 . A crucial element in USG willingness to move forward is concrete demonstration by Diem that he is now prepared to work in an orderly way on his subordinates a nd broaden the political base of his regime. 7. Package should be presented as f irst steps in a partnership in which US is prepared to do more as joint study of facts and GVN performance makes increased US aid possible and productive. 8. St ill possible Laotian settlement can be reached pertaining our minimum objective of independent Laos on the basis of a neutral coalition, (although weak and unsa tisfactory), headed by Souvanna. Would include provision Laos not he used as tra nsit area or base for interference in SVN. Therefore must keep in mind impact of action in SVN or prospects for acceptable Laos settlement. 9. Introduction of U S or Seato forces into SVN before Laotian settlement might wreck changes for agr eement, lead to break up of Geneva conference, break Laos cease fire by communis ts with resumption of hostilities.

10. Decision to introduce US combat forces in GVN would have to be taken in ligh t of GVN effort, including support from people, Laotian situation, Berlin crisis , readiness of allies or sharply increased tension with Bloc, and enormous respo nsibilities which would have to be borne by US in event of escalation SEA or oth er areas. 11. Hope measures outlined in instructions will galvanize and suppleme nt GVN effort, making decision on use of US combat forces unnecessary and no nee d for decision in effect to shift primary responsibility for defense of SVN to U SG. 12. We are fully cognizant of extent to which decisions if implemented throu gh Diem's acceptance will sharply increase the commitment of our prestige strugg le to save SVN. 13. Very strictly for your own information, DOD has been instruc ted to prepare plans for the use of US combat forces in SVN under various contin gencies, including stepped up infiltration as well as organized inventory (sic) [military] intervention. However objective of our policy is to do all possible t o accomplish purpose without use of US combat forces. An accompanying cable also provided this additional comment on troops question: .....4. It is anticipated that one of the first questions President Diem will raise with you after your pr esentation of the above joint proposals will be that of introducing U.S. combat troops. You are authorized to remind him that the actions we already have in min d involve a substantial number of U.S. military personnel for operational duties in Viet-Nam and that we believe that these forces performing crucial missions c an greatly increase the capacity of GVN forces to win their war against the Viet Cong. You can also tell him that we believe that the missions being undertaken by our forces, under present circumstances, are more suitable for white foreign troops than garrison duty or missions involving the seeking out of Viet Cong per sonnel submerged in the Viet-Nam population. You can assure him that the USG at highest levels will be in daily contact with the situation in Viet-Nam and will be in constant touch with him about requirements of the situation. C. AFTERMATH The President's decisions were apparently sent to Nolting on the 14th, in a cabl e that is taken essentially verbatim from the description of the Rusk/ McNamara memorandum (paragraphs 3 and 4) of the program the U.S. was offering and the res ponse expected from Diem. But the cable added some new language, putting still m ore emphasis on pressuring Diem: ....It is most important that Diem come forth w ith changes which will be recognized as having real substance and meaning. Right ly or wrongly, his regime is widely criticized abroad and in the U.S., and if we are to give our substantial support we must be able to point to real administra tive political and social reforms and a real effort to widen its base that will give maximum confidence to the American people, as well as to world opinion

that our efforts are not directed towards the support of an unpopular or ineffec tive regime, but rather towards supporting the combined efforts of all the non-C ommunist people of the GVN against a Communist take-over. You should make this q uite clear, and indicate that the U.S. contribution to the proposed joint effort depends heavily upon his response to this point. You should inform Diem that, i n our minds, the concept of the joint undertaking envisages a much closer relati onship than the present one of acting in an advisory capacity only. We would exp ect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and milit ary fields as they affect the security situation. Overall, then, what Kennedy en ded up doing was to offer Diem a good deal less than he was expecting, and never theless to couple this offer with demands on Diem for which, on the basis of the available record, we can only assume he was totally unprepared. Nolting's first cable, though, reported Diem listened quietly and "took our proposals rather be tter than I expected." Here are some extracts: As anticipated [by Washington], h is first question was re introduction US combat troops. I replied along line par a 4 reftel.... Diem said that he presumed I realized that our proposals involved the question of the responsibility of the Government of Viet Nam. Viet Nam, he said, did not want to be a protectorate. I said that this was well understood; w e for our part did not wish to make it one. Diem also pointed out that GVN was c onstantly in process of making reforms but major action could not be taken witho ut thorough consideration and without having always in mind that there was a war to be won. Object was to restore order, not to create disorder. I said I recogn ized that this was a delicate judgment, in my opinion, as a friend of his countr y and of him, his greater risk was to stand pat, or act too cautiously.... On th e whole, I am not discouraged at Diem's reaction. In fact, he took our proposals rather better than I had expected. He has promised to call me as soon as he has been able to reflect upon our proposals and, until we have heard his considered reaction, I think it would be idle to speculate on outcome . On the 20th, Nolti ng met with Thuan, who among other things said the U.S. offer had set Diem to wo ndering "whether U.S. getting ready to back out on Vietnam . . . as we had done in Laos." Nolting hoped Thuan's bleak report was only a bargaining tactic. Thuan said that Diem had not yet discussed fully with him US proposals presented last Friday; but had given him impression of being "very sad and very disappointed." Thuan said Diem had said he now hesitates to put proposals before even his cabi net ministers, fearing that they would be disappointed and lose heart. He had in tended to discuss US

proposals with both cabinet and selected members of assembly who had been consul ted re advisability of US forces at time of Taylor Mission, but now thought cont rast between his earlier question and our proposals too striking. Thuan conveyed impression that Diem is brooding over US proposals and has made no move yet to develop specific ideas on actions GVN expected to take. Thuan said President's a ttitude seemed to be that US asking great concessions of GVN in realm its sovere ignty, in exchange for little additional help; that this is great disappointment after discussions with General Taylor involving, in particular, concept of Delt a Task Force; that Diem seemed to wonder whether US was getting ready to back ou t on Viet Nam, as he suggested, we had done in Laos. There followed a long discu ssion in which Thuan described all the difficulties that would be involved in do ing what the U.S. was asking, including the risk of looking like a U.S. puppet. There is nothing in our record to indicate any U.S. reconsideration of the decis ion against sending the military task force. Thus, if Diem and Thuan's response was a bargaining tactic to get the task force, it failed. On the other hand, if Diem was using disappointment over the failure to send the task force as a barga ining counter to get the U.S. to relent on its demands for reforms, then he got just what he wanted. But what amounted to a complete U.S. reversal on these dema nds also may have been influenced by the advice Kennedy received from John Kenne th Galbraith at this time. Kennedy had asked Galbraith to stop by Saigon on his return to India. Galbraith did so, and after three days cabled back, among other things, the advice that it was a waste of effort to bargain with Diem. On the 2 0th, the day of Thuan's meeting with Nolting, Galbraith cabled the President: Th ere is scarcely the slightest practical chance that the administrative and polit ical reforms now being pressed upon Diem will result in real change . . . there is no solution that does not involve a change in government. On the insurgency, though, Galbraith was optimistic, provided Diem was replaced: While situation is indubitably bad military aspects seem to me out of perspective. A comparatively well-equipped army with paramilitary formations number a quarter million men is facing a maximum of 15-18,000 lightly armed men. If this were equality, the Uni ted States would hardly be safe against the Sioux. I know the theories about thi s kind of warfare. ....Given even a moderately effective government and putting the relative military power into perspective, I can't help thinking the insurgen cy might very soon be settled. The following day, Gaibraith, now in New Delhi, s ent a more detailed appraisal, covering essentially the same ground. Here are so me extracts.

.... The Viet Cong insurrection is still growing in effect. The outbreak on the Northern Highlands is matched by a potentially even more damaging impact on the economy and especially on the movement of rice to Saigon. In the absence of know ledge of the admixture of terror and economic and social evangelism we had best assume that it is employing both. We must not forever be guided by those who mis understand the dynamics of revolution and imagine that because the communists do not appeal to us they are abhorrent to everyone. In our enthusiasm to prove out side intervention before world opinion we have unquestionably exaggerated the ro le of material assistance especially in the main area of insurrection in the far South. That leaders and radio guidance come in we know. But the amount of ammun ition and weaponry that a man can carry on his back for several hundred kilomete rs over jungle trails was not increased appreciably by Marx. No major conflict c an depend on such logistic support. A maximum of 18,000 lightly armed men are in volved in the insurrection. These are GVN estimates and the factor of exaggerati on is unquestionably considerable. Ten thousand is more probable. What we have i n opposition involves a heavy theological dispute. Diem it is said is a great bu t defamed leader. It is also said he has lost touch with the masses, is in polit ical disrepute and otherwise no good. This debate can be bypassed by agreed poin ts. It is agreed that administratively Diem is exceedingly bad. He holds far too much power in his own hands, employs his army badly, has no intelligence organi zation worthy of the name, has arbitrary or incompetent subordinates in the prov inces and some achievements notwithstanding, has a poor economic policy. He has also effectively resisted improvement for a long while in face of heavy deterior ation. This is enough. Whether his political posture is nepotic, despotic, out o f touch with the villagers and hence damaging or whether this damage is the figm ent of Saigon intellectuals does not bear on our immediate policy and may be bypassed at least in part. The SVN Army numbers 170,000 and with paramilitary unit s of the civil guard and home defense forces a quarter of a million. Were this w ell deployed on behalf of an effective government it should be obvious that the Viet Cong would have no chance of success or takeover. Washington is currently h aving an intellectual orgasm on the unbeatability of guerrilla war. Were guerril las effective in a ratio of one to fifteen or twenty-five, it is obvious that no government would be safe. The Viet Cong, it should be noted, is strongest in th e Southern Delta which is not jungle but open rice paddy. The fundamental diffic ulties in countering the insurgency, apart from absence of intelligence, are two -fold. First is the poor command, deployment, training, morale and other weaknes ses of the army and paramilitary forces. And second while they can operate-sweep -through any part of the country and clear out any visible insurgents, they cann ot guarantee security afterwards. The Viet Cong comes back and puts the arm on a ll who have collaborated. This fact is very important in relation to requests fr om American manpower. Our forces would conduct the round-up operations which the RVN Army can already do. We couldn't conceivably send enough men to provide saf ety for the villages

as a substitute for an effectively trained civil guard and home defense force an d, perhaps, a politically cooperative community. The key and inescapable point, then, is the ineffectuality (abetted debatably by the unpopularity) of the Diem government. This is the strategic factor. Nor can anyone accept the statement of those who have been either too long or too little in Asia that his is the inevi table posture of the Asian mandarin. For one thing it isn't true, but were it so the only possible conclusion would be that there is no future for mandarins. Th e communists don't favor them. I come now to a lesser miscalculation, the allege d weakening emphasis of the Mekong flood. Floods in this part of the world are a n old trap for western non-agriculturists. They are judged by what the Ohio does to its towns. Now as the flood waters recede it is already evident that this fl ood conforms to the Asian pattern, one repeated every year in India. The mud vil lages will soon grow again. Some upland rice was drowned because the water rose too rapidly. Nearer the coast the pressure on the brackish water will probably b ring an offsetting improvement. Next year's crop will be much better for the sil t. I come now to policy, first the box we are in partly as the result of recent moves and second how we get out without a takeover. We have just proposed to hel p Diem in various ways in return for a promise of administrative and political r eforms. Since the administrative (and possibly political) ineffectuality are the strategic factors for success the ability to get reforms is decisive. With them the new aid and gadgetry will be useful. Without them the helicopters, planes a nd adviser's won't make appreciable difference. In my completely considered view , as stated yesterday, Diem will not reform either administratively or political ly in any effective way. That is because he cannot. It is politically naive to e xpect it. He senses that he cannot let power go because he would be thrown out. He may disguise this even from himself with the statement that he lacks effectiv e subordinates but the circumstance remains unchanged. He probably senses that h is greatest danger is from the army. Hence the reform that will bring effective use of his manpower, though the most urgent may be the most improbable. The poli tical reforms are even more unlikely but the issue is academic. Once the image o f a politician is fixed, whether among opposition intellectuals or peasants, it is not changed . . . Diem's image would not be changed by his taking in other no n-communists, initiating some social reforms or otherwise meeting the requiremen ts of our demarche. However having started on this hopeless game we have no alte rnative, but to play it out for a minimum time. Those who think there is hope of reform will have to be persuaded. *** It is a cliche that there is no alternati ve to Diem's regime. This is politically naive. Where one man has dominated the scene for good or ill there never seems to be. No one

considered Truman an alternative to Roosevelt. There is none for Nehru. There wa s none I imagine for Rhee. This is an optical illusion arising from the fact tha t the eye is fixed on the visible figures. It is a better rule that nothing succ eeds like successors. We should not be alarmed by the Army as an alternative. It would buy time and get a fresh dynamic. It is not ideal; civilian rule is ordin arily more durable and more saleable to the world. But a change and a new start is of the essence and in considering opinion we may note that Diem's flavor is n ot markedly good in Asia. A time of crisis in our policy on South Vietnam will c ome when it becomes evident that the reforms we have asked have not come off and that our presently proferred aid is not accomplishing anything. Troops will be urged to back up Diem. It will be sufficiently clear that I think this must be r esisted. Our soldiers would not deal with the vital weakness. They could perpetu ate it. They would enable Diem to continue to concentrate on protecting his own position at the expense of countering the insurgency. Last spring, following the Vice President's promise of more aid, proposals for increased and reform taxes which were well advanced were promptly dropped. The parallel on administrative a nd political reform could be close. It will be said that we need troops for a sh ow of strength and determination in the area. Since the troops will not deal wit h fundamental faults--since there can't be enough of them to give security to th e countryside--their failure to provide security could create a worse crisis of confidence. You will be aware of my general reluctance to move in troops. On the other hand I would note that it is those of us who have worked in the political vineyard and who have committed our hearts most strongly to the political fortu nes of the New Frontier who worry most about its bright promise being sunk under the rice fields. Dulles in 1954 saw the dangers in this area. Dean Acheson knew he could not invest men in Chiang. *** My overall feeling is that despite the e rror implicit in this last move and the supposition that Diem can be reformed, t he situation is not hopeless. It is only hopeless if we marry our course to that of a man who must spend more time protecting his own position and excluding tho se who threaten it than in fighting the insurgency. Diem's calculation instincti ve or deliberate is evident. He has already been deposed once and not by the Com munists. He can see his clear and present danger as well as anyone. Two things a re particularly worth noting about Galbraith's advice: the first, to the extent it had an influence on Kennedy, it counselled him to avoid sending troops, but a lso not to take seriously the quid pro quo with Diem because Diem was not going to do anything anyway. Consequently, Galbraith, with a limitlessly bleak view of the prospects for success under Diem, really had no quarrel with those who argu ed against putting pressure on Diem and for trying to win his confidence. He had no argument, because he thought both approaches (pressure and no pressure) were equally hopeless. And indeed, both had been tried during the year--the pressure approach in the CIP negotiations; the "get on his

wave length" approach following the Task Force review--and both produced an iden tical lack of results. Second, Gaibraith's analysis of the situation really has a good deal in common with that of the Taylor Mission. Obviously, he thought we must be rid of Diem, and he apparently thought it was a mistake to put this move off by making new aid offers to Diem rather than letting word get around that w e would be prepared to offer more support to Vietnam if Diem should be removed. But at this time, even people like Galbraith (and Schlesinger, as is clear from his memoir) saw no alternative to continuing to support Vietnam, although not to continuing to support Diem personally. Gaibraith was, if anything, more optimis tic about the chances of putting down the insurgency (given a change in Saigon) than was the Taylor Report. For his optimism was not at all contingent on any ho pes of the efficacy of bombing threats against the north. For all we know, he ma y have been right in supposing any "moderately effective" Saigon government coul d do all right against the insurgents; but we now know all too well how over-opt imistic was his fairly confident expectation that a military replacement of the Diem regime would be at least moderately effective. To return to the negotiation s in Saigon, in late November, we now had the following situation: 1. It was cle ar that Diem was, to say the least, disappointed with the bargain Kennedy had pr oposed. 2. Kennedy was obviously aware that he had offered Diem less than Diem e xpected, and demanded much more in return. 3. Both supporters of Diem, like Lans dale and Kenneth Young, and his severest critics, like Gaibraith, were agreed th at it was futile to try to force Diem to reform. Kennedy had already had his own experiences with such efforts earlier in the year. 4. Presumably, although we h ave nothing to show it in the available record, there was some unrest within the Administration about the limited offer that was being made, the demands being p ressed, and the delay it was all causing. To put off an agreement too long raise d the dual threat of an awkward public squabble and renewed pressure on the Pres ident to send the task force after all. It is hard to think of any realistic cou nter-arguments to the case for settling the dispute and get on with either tryin g to do better in the war, or get rid of Diem. The next phase was a brief flurry of anti-American stories in the government-controlled Saigon press. The U.S. wa s accused, among other things, of trying to use Vietnam as a "pawn of capitalist imperialism." Nolting went to Diem to complain about the damage that such stori es would do to U.S-Vietnamese relations. But Diem disclaimed responsibility, and suggested they were an understandable reaction of the South Vietnamese to what they had learned about the U.S. proposals from U.S. press reports. Nolting's fin al comment in his report on this meeting was a suggestion that the U.S. concentr ate on "efficiency in GVN rather than on more nebulous and particularly offensiv e to Diem concept of political reform." The impression given by the cable is tha t

Nolting felt on the defensive, which was probably the case since the package Was hington had proposed must have been disappointing to him as well as to Diem. It did not take long for Washington to back away from any hard demands on Diem. A s entence from the original guidance telegram stated "we would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as th ey affected the security situation" . . . as opposed to the previous arrangement of "acting in an advisory capacity only." Alexis Johnson and Rostow drafted a c able on December 7 that "clarified" this and a number of other points to which D iem had strongly objected, in this case to explain that, ....what we have in min d is that, in operations directly related to the security situation, partnership will be so close that one party will not take decisions or actions affecting th e other without full and frank prior consultations.... This was quite a comedown from the idea that American involvement in the Vietnamese government should be so intimate that the government could be reformed "from the bottom up" despite D iem. Once the U.S. backed away from any tough interpretation of its proposals, a greement was fairly easily reached with Diem, and one of the usual fine sounding statements of agreed principles and measures was drawn up. On one seemingly mod est request from Diem, Washington was curiously firm. Diem repeatedly, both whil e the Taylor Mission was in Saigon, and after its return, asked for Lansdale to be sent. (Our record shows four such requests, one directly by Diem to Taylor; a second from Thuan; and in a memorandum to McNamara William Bundy referred to tw o further requests relayed through McGarr.) Cottrell, the senior State represent ative on the Taylor Mission, strongly endorsed sending Lansdale, and the main pa per of the Taylor Report seemed to endorse the idea. William Bundy was in favor of sending Lansdale, and Lansdale wanted to go. But nothing happened. Lansdale n ever got to Vietnam until Cabot Lodge brought him out later in 1965. The first c ontingents of helicopters arrived in Saigon December 11 (having been put to sea several weeks earlier). On the following day a New York Times dispatch from Saig on began: Two United States Army helicopter companies arrived here today. The he licopters, to be flown and serviced by United States troops, are the first direc t military support by the United States for South Vietnam's war against Communis t guerrilla forces. The craft will be assigned to the South Vietnamese Army in t he field, but they will remain under United States Army control and operation. A t least 33 H-21C twin-rotor helicopters, their pilots and ground crews, an estim ated total of 400 men, arrived aboard the Military Sea Transportation Service ai rcraft ferry Core.

The Times story ended by describing the force as "the first fruits" of the Taylo r Mission, with more to come. The Times did not find the story important enough to put it on the front page. A day later, the Times published a story about the ICC reaction to the arrival of the helicopters. It began: The International Cont rol Commission for Vietnam was reported today to be considering whether to conti nue functioning here in the face of an increase in United States assistance to S outh Vietnam's struggle against Communist guerrillas. The Commission, made up of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland, has been holding emergency sessio ns since the arrival here yesterday of a United States vessel loaded with at lea st 33 helicopters and operating and maintenance crews. A few paragraphs later, t he dispatch noted that: With the arrival yesterday of the Core, a former escort carrier, bearing the helicopters, four single-engine training planes and about 4 00 men, the United States military personnel here now are believed to total abou t 1,500. Many more are expected. Again, the Times ran the story on an inside pag e. Finally, on the 15th, a formal exchange of letters between Presidents Diem an d Kennedy was published, announcing in general terms a stepped-up U.S. aid progr am for Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 2, "The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963," pp. 128-159 (Boston: Beaco n Press, 1971) Summary and Analysis A specific strategy by which the U.S. and GVN would attempt to end the insurgency in South Vietnam had never been agreed upon at the time t hat the U.S. decided, late in 1961, to increase materially its assistance to GVN and to expand its advisory effort into one which would implement a "limited par tnership." By early 1962, however, there was apparent consensus among the princi pal participants that the Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came to be called, rep resented the unifying concept for a strategy designed to pacify rural Vietnam (t he Viet Cong's chosen battleground) and to develop support among the peasants fo r the central government.

The Strategic Hamlet Program was much broader than the construction of strategic hamlets per se. It envisioned sequential phases which, beginning with clearing the insurgents from an area and protecting the rural populace, progressed throug h the establishment of GVN infrastructure and thence to the provision of service s which would lead the peasants to identify with their government. The strategic hamlet program was, in short, an attempt to translate the newly articulated the ory of counter-insurgency into operational reality. The objective was political though the means to its realization were a mixture of military, social, psycholo gical, economic and political measures. The effect of these sequential steps to pacification was to make it very difficult to make intermediate assessments of p rogress. One could not really be sure how one was doing until one was done. Phys ical security by itself (the so-called "clear and hold" initial step) was a nece ssary condition for pacification, not a sufficient one. The establishment of gov ernmental functions was not, by itself, necessarily conducive to a successful ef fort; the quality of those functions and their responsiveness to locally felt ne eds was critical. This inherent difficulty in assessing progress did not simply mean that it was difficult to identify problems and to make improvements as one went along--which it was. It also meant that it was quite possible to conclude t hat the program as a whole was progressing well (or badly) according to evidence relating only to a single phase or a part of a phase. A related problem arose f rom the uniqueness of this program in American experiencepacification by proxy. The theory of sequential phases could be variously interpreted. This is not the problem of the three blind men describing the elephant; it is the problem of men with different perspectives each moulding his own conception of a proper body t o the same skeleton. If the final product were to have some semblance of coheren ce and mutual satisfaction it was necessary that the shapers came to agreement o n substance and operational procedure, not just that they agree on the proper sk eleton upon which to work. The problem with the apparent consensus which emerged early in 1962 was that the principal participants did view it with different pe rspectives and expectations. On the U.S. side, military advisors had a set of pr eferences which affected their approach to the Strategic Hamlet Program. They wa nted to make RVNAF more mobile, more aggressive, and better organized to take th e offensive against the Viet Cong. They were, consequently, extremely leery of p roposals which might lead it to be tied down in strategic defenses ("holding" af ter "clearing" had been completed) or diverted too much to military civic action undertakings. The American political leadership, insofar as a generalization ma y be attempted, may be said to have been most concerned with the later phases of the program--those in which GVN services were provided, local governments estab lished, and the economy bolstered. Military clearing operations were, to them, a distasteful, expensive, but necessary precondition to the really critical and i mportant phases of the effort. Both of these U.S. groups had perspectives differ ent from those of the Diem administration. In the U.S. view the insurgents were only one of Diem's enemies; he

himself was the other. In this view the process of pacification could proceed su ccessfully only if Diem reformed his own government. It was precisely to achieve these goals simultaneously that the U.S. agreed to enter a "limited partnership " with GVN in the counter-insurgent effort. The Strategic Hamlet Program became the operational symbol of this effort. President Diem--unsurprisingly--had a ver y different view. His need, as he saw it, was to get the U.S. committed to South Vietnam (and to his administration) without surrendering his independence. He k new that his nation would fall without U.S. support; he feared that his governme nt would fall if he either appeared to toady to U.S. wishes or allowed any singl e group too much potential power-particularly coercive power. The Strategic Haml et Program offered a vehicle by which he could direct the counterinsurgent effor t as he thought it should be directed and without giving up either his prerogati ves to the U.S. or his mantle to his restless generals. The program, in the form of a plan for pacification of the Delta, was formally proposed to Diem in Novem ber 1961 by R. G. K. Thompson, head of the newly arrived British Advisory Missio n. U.S. military advisors favored at that time an ARVN penetration of the VC red oubt in War Zone D prior to any operations aimed specifically at pacification. B ut U.S. political desires to start some local operation which could achieve conc rete gains combined with Diem's preference for a pacification effort in an area of strategic importance led to the initial effort in March 1962, "Operation SUNR ISE," in Binh Duong Province north of Saigon. This was a heavily VC-influltrated area rather than one of mini-mat penetration, as Thompson had urged. But planni ng--as distinct from operations--continued on the Delta plan and strategic hamle ts were constructed in a variegated, uncoordinated pattern throughout the spring and early summer. The U.S. had little or no influence over these activities; th e primary impetus was traceable directly to the President's brother and politica l counsellor, Ngo Dinh Nhu. In August 1962, GVN produced its long awaited nation al pacification plan with four priority areas and specified priorities within ea ch area. At the same time, however, it indicated that over 2,500 strategic hamle ts had already been completed and that work was already underway on more than 2, 500 more. Although it was not until October 1962, that GVN explicitly announced the Strategic Hamlet Program to be the unifying concept of its pacification and counterinsurgent effort it was clear earlier that the program had assumed this c entral position. Three important implications of this early progress (or, more p recisely, reported progress) are also clear in retrospect. These implications se em not to have impressed themselves acutely upon U.S. observers at the time. Fir st, the program was truly one of GVN initiative rather than one embodying priori ties and time phasing recommended by the U.S. Diem was running with his own ball in programmatic terms, no matter who articulated the theory of the approach. Th e geographic dispersion of hamlets already reported to be completed indicated th at there was, in fact, a conscious effort to implement this phase almost simulta neously throughout the entire nation rather than to build slowly as Diem's forei gn advisors (both U.S. and British) recommended.

Finally, the physical aspects of Diem's program were similar if not identical to earlier population resettlement and control efforts practiced by the French and by Diem. The long history of these efforts was marked by consistency in resuits as well as in techniques: all failed dismally because they ran into resentment if not active resistance on the part of the peasants at whose control and safety , then loyalty, they were aimed. U.S. desires to begin an effective process of p acification had fastened onto security as a necessary precondition and slighted the historic record of rural resistance to resettlement. President Diem and his brother, for their part, had decided to emphasize control of the rural populatio n as the precondition to winning loyalty. The record is inconclusive with respec t to their weighing the record of the past but it appears that they, too, paid i t scant attention. Thus the early operational efforts indicated a danger of peas ant resistance, on one hand, and of divergent approaches between, in the initial steps, the U.S. (focused on security measures) and Diem (concerned more with co ntrol measures). Since the physical actions to achieve security and those to imp ose control are in many respects the same, there was generated yet another area in which assessments of progress would be inconclusive and difficult to make. U. S. attention, once an apparent consensus had been forged concentrated on program management efforts in two categories: to convince GVN to proceed at a more meas ured, coherent pace with a qualitative improvement in the physical construction of strategic hamlets; and to schedule material assistance (fortification materia ls, etc.) and training for local defense forces to match the rate of desired ham let construction. U.S. assessments, at the same time, concentrated on the physic al aspects of the program and on VC activity in areas where strategic hamlets ha d been constructed. Assessments tended to be favorable from a security (or contr ol) viewpoint and uneven with respect to political development. The general conc lusion was almost always one of cautious optimism when security (control) was em phasized, one of hopeful pessimism when political follow-up was stressed. The im pression in Washington was typically slanted toward the more optimistic appraisa ls if for no other reason than that hamlet construction and security arrangement s were the first chronological steps in the long process to pacification. Was it not, after all, "progress" to have moved from doing nothing to doing something even though the something was being done imperfectly? These U.S. assessments cha nged only marginally throughout the life of the program. By the time, in 1963, t hat the hopeful pessimist voices were clearer, it was also much clearer that the Ngo brothers had made the Strategic Hamlet Program into one closely identified with their regime and with Diem's rather esoterically phrased "personalist revol ution." Fears grew that Diem was attempting to impose loyalty from the top throu gh control rather than to build it from the bottom by deeds. These fears were no t limited to the Strategic Hamlet Program, however; they extended to urban as we B as rural phases of South Vietnamese life and were subsumed, as the Buddhist qu estion moved to the fore, by the general issue of the viability of Diem's regime . President Diem grew increasingly unwilling to meet U.S. demands for reform. He believed that to do so would cause his government to fail. U.S. observers held that failure

to do so would cause the nation, not just the government to fall. In the event t he government fell and the nation's counterinsurgent program took a definite tur n for the worse, but the nation did not fall. The Strategic Hamlet Program did. Closely identified with the Ngo brothers, it was almost bound to suffer their fo rtunes; when they died it died, too. The new government of generals, presumably realizing the extent of peasant displeasure with resettlement and control measur es, did nothing to save it. A number of contributory reasons can be cited for th e failure of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Over-expansion of construction and po or quality of defenses forms one category. This reason concentrates only on the initial phase of the program, however. While valid, it does little to explain wh y the entire program collapsed rather than only some hamlets within it. Rural an tagonisms which identified the program with its sponsors in the central governme nt are more suggestive of the basis for the complete collapse as Diem and Nhu de parted the scene. The reasons why they departed are traceable in part to the dif ferent expectations which combined in the apparent consensus at the program's be ginning: to Diem's insistence on material assistance and independence, to U.S. w illingness to provide assistance only if its advice was heeded, and to the failu re to resolve this question either by persuasion or leverage. Having said this, it does not automatically follow that the program would have succeeded even if D iem had met U.S. demands for change. To point to the causes of failure is one th ing; to assume that changes of style would have led to success is quite another. It may well be that the program was doomed from the outset because of peasant r esistance to measures which changed the pattern of rural life--whether aimed at security or control. It might have been possible, on the other hand, for a wellexecuted program eventually to have achieved some measure of success. The early demise of the program does not permit a conclusive evaluation. The weight of evi dence suggests that the Strategic Hamlet Program was fatally flawed in its conce ption by the unintended consequence of alienating many of those whose loyalty it aimed to win. This inconclusive finding, in turn, suggests that the sequential phases embodied in the doctrine of counterinsurgency may slight some very import ant problem areas. The evidence is not sufficient for an indictment; still less is one able to validate the counterinsurgent doctrine with reference to a progra m that failed. The only verdict that may be given at this time with respect to t he validity of the doctrine is that used by Scots courts--"case not proved." End of Summary and Analysis CHRONOLOGY 1953-1959 French and GVN early attempts at p opulation resettlement into defended communities to create secure zones.

1959 Rural Community Development Centers (Agroville) Program initiated by GVN. L ate 1960 USMAAG Counterinsurgency Plan Vietnam completed. Early 1961 Agroville P rogram modified by construction of "Agro-Hamlets" to meet peasant objections. Ma y 1961 Vice President Johnson's visit to RVN. July 1961 Staley Group report on i ncreased economic aid and increase in RVNAF strength. 15 Sep 1961 USMAAG Geograp hically Phased National Level Operation Plan for Counterinsurgency. 18 Oct 1961 General Taylor arrives in RVN; President Diem declares national emergency. 27 Oc t 1961 R. G. K. Thompson submits to President Diem his Appreciation of Vietnam, November 1961-1962. 3 Nov 1961 General Taylor submits his report and recommendat ions to President Kennedy. 13 Nov 1961 R. G. K. Thompson submits his draft plan for pacification of the Delta to President Diem. 15 Nov 1961

NSC drafts NSAM 111. Cable to Ambassador Nolting, instructing him to meet with D iem, lays out proposed U.S. assistance and expected GVN effort. 22 Nov 1961 NSAM 111. 15 Dec 1961 First Secretary of Defense Conference, Honolulu. 2 Feb 1962 Ro ger Hilsman's A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam. 3 Feb 1962 Diem creates Int er-Ministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets. 19 Mar 1962 Diem approves Thompso n's "Delta Plan" for execution. 22 Mar 1962 "Operation SUNRISE" commences in Bin h Duong Province. 8 Aug 1962 GVN National Strategic Hamlet Construction Plan. 28 Oct 1962 GVN devotes entire issue of The Times of Vietnam to "The Year of the S trategic Hamlet." 8 May 1962 Buddhist controversy erupts when GVN troops fire on demonstrators in Hue. 24 Aug 1963 State to Lodge, Message 243, says that U.S. c an no longer tolerate Nhu's continuation in power. 10 Sept 1963

General Krulak and Mr. Mendenhall give contradictory reports on progress of war to NSC. 2 Oct 1963 Secretary McNamara reports to President Kennedy following his visit to RVN with General Taylor. 1 Nov 1963 Coup d'etat by group of generals a gainst President Diem. I. INTRODUCTION A. SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY The Strategic Ha mlet Program in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)-articulated and carried forward fr om late 1961 until late 1963-has created some confusion because of terminology. One source of confusion stems from the similarity between the physical aspects o f the program and earlier fortified communities of one kind or another. Another source of confusion rises because of the loose usage of "hamlet" as compared to "village" and because of the practice of referring to these communities as "defe nded," "secure," and "fortified" as well as "strategic." But the greatest source of confusion lies in the distinction between a strategic hamlet per se and the strategic hamlet program. The hamlet is the smallest organized community in rura l South Vietnam. Several hamlets (typically 3-5) comprise a village. During the strategic hamlet program both hamlets and villages were fortified. The distincti on is unimportant for the present analysis, except as it bears on the defensibil ity of the community protected. The several adjectives coupled with hamlet or vi llage were occasionally used to differentiate communities according to the exten t of their defenses or the initial presumed loyalty of their inhabitants. More o ften no such distinction was made; the terms were used interchangeably. Where a distinction exists, the following account explains it. The phrase Strategic Haml et Program when used to represent the program is much broader than the phrase ap plied to the hamlets themselves. The program, as explained below, envisioned a p rocess of pacification of which the construction of strategic hamlets was but pa rt of one phase, albeit a very important part. This paper examines the program, not just the hamlets. B. ANTECEDENTS Population relocation into defended village s was by no means a recent development in Southeast Asia. Parts of South Vietnam had experience with the physical aspects of fortified communities going back ma ny years. As the intellectual godfather of the

Strategic Hamlet Program has put it, the concept's use as one of the measures to defeat communist insurgency ". . . has only meant that the lessons of the past had to be relearnt." The administration of President Diem had relearned these le ssons much earlier than late 1961. There was, in fact, no need to relearn them b ecause they had never been forgotten. The French had made resettlement and the d evelopment of "secure zones" an important element in their effort near the end o f the war with the Viet Minh. The government of newly-created South Vietnam, hea ded since 1954 by President Diem, had continued resettlement schemes to accommod ate displaced persons, to control suspected rural populations, and to safeguard loyal peasants in the threatened areas. None of these efforts involving resettle ment had succeeded. Each had inspired antagonism among the peasants who were mov ed from their ancestral lands and away from family burial plots. Diem's actions in late 1961 were thus inescapably tied to earlier actions by proximity in time, place, and the personal experiences of many peasants. Chief among the earlier p rograms was that of the so-called Agrovilles or "Rural Community Development Cen ters," launched in 1959. The Agrovilles, groupments of 300-500 families, were de signed to afford the peasantry the social benefits of city life (schools and ser vices), to increase their physical security, and to control certain key location s by denying them to the communists. They were designed to improve simultaneousl y the security and wellbeing of their inhabitants and the government's control o ver the rural population and rural areas. The Agroville program was generally un successful. The peasants had many complaints about it ranging from clumsy, disho nest administration to the physical hardship of being too far from their fields and the psychological wrench of being separated from ancestral homes and burial plots. By 1960, President Diem had slowed the program in response to peasant com plaints and the Viet Cong's ability to exploit this dissatisfaction. The transit ion from Agrovilles to strategic hamlets in 1961 was marked by the so-called "Ag ro-hamlet" which attempted to meet some of the peasants' objections: The smaller 100 family Agro-hamlet was located more closely to lands tilled by the occupant s. Construction was carried out at a slower pace filled to the peasant's plantin g and harvesting schedule. . . By the end of 1961, the Agro-hamlet had become th e prototype of a vast civil defense scheme known as strategic hamlets, Ap Chien Luoc. It was inevitable, given this lineage, that the strategic hamlet program b e regarded by the peasants as old wine in newly-labelled bottles. The successes and failures of the past were bound to condition its acceptance and by late 1961 the Diem government was having more failures than successes. C. THE SITUATION I N LATE 1961 By late 1961, if not earlier, it had become clear in both Saigon and Washington that the yellow star of the Viet Cong was in the ascendancy. Followi ng the 1960 North

Vietnamese announcement of the twin goals of ousting President Diem and reunifyi ng Vietnam under communist rule, the Viet Cong began sharply to increase its gue rrilla, subversive, and political warfare. Viet Cong regular forces, now estimat ed to have grown to 25,000, had been organized into larger formations and employ ed with increasing frequency. The terrorist-guerrilla organization had grown to an estimated 17,000 by November 1961. During the first half of 1961, terrorists and guerrillas had assassinated over 500 local officials and civilians, kidnappe d more than 1,000, and killed almost 1,500 RVNAF personnel. The VC continued to hold the initiative in the countryside, controlling major portions of the popula ce and drawing an increasingly tight cinch around Saigon. The operative question was not whether the Diem government as it was then moving could defeat the insu rgents, but whether it could save itself. Much of this deterioration of the situ ation in RVN was attributable, in U.S. eyes, to the manner in which President Di em had organized his government. The struggle-whether viewed as one to gain loya lty or simply to assert control-was focused in and around the villages and hamle ts in the countryside. It was precisely in those areas that the bilineal GVN org anization (ARVN and civilian province chiefs) most lacked the capability for con certed and cohesive action. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was devel oping a potentially effective institutional framework under U.S. tutelage, but t hat effectiveness against the VC, Diem realized, could potentially be transferre d into effectiveness against himself. The abortive coup of late 1960 had made Di em even more reluctant than he had earlier been to permit power (especially coer cive power) to be gathered into one set of hands other than his own. Still, the establishment of an effective military chain of command which could operate wher e necessary in the countryside remained the prime objective of U.S. military adv isors. A unitary chain of command had recently been ordered into effect within A RVN, but this had not solved the operational problems, for military operations w ere inescapably conducted in areas under the control of an independent political organization with its own military forces and influence on operations of all ki nds-military, paramilitary, and civic action. The province chiefs, personally se lected by President Diem and presumably loyal to him, controlled politically the territory in dispute with the VC and within which ARVN must operate. They also controlled territorial forces comprising the Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense C orps (SDC). For President Diem's purposes this bilineal organization offered an opportunity to counterbalance the power (and coup potential) of the generals by the power of the province chiefs. It was a device for survival. But the natural byproduct of this duality, in terms of the effectiveness of actions against the VC, was poor coordination and imperfect cooperation in intelligence collection a nd production, in planning, and in operational execution in the countryside, whe re the battles were fought-both the "battle for men's minds" and the more easily understood battles for control of the hamlets, villages, districts, and provinc es. The U.S. and GVN were agreed that in order to defeat the insurgency it was n ecessary that the rural populace identify with at least the local representative s of the central

government. They were agreed, too, that some measure of physical security must b e provided the rural population if this end were to be achieved. Both agreed tha t the GVN must be the principal agent to carry out the actions which would bring the insurgency to an end. The high level U.S.-GVN discussions held during Presi dent Kennedy's first year in office focused on what the U.S. could provide GVN t o assist the latter's counterinsurgency efforts and on what GVN should do organi zationally to make its efforts more effective. A subsidiary and related discussi on revolved around the U.S. advisory organization to parallel the GVN reorganiza tion. The problem of how additional resources in some improved organizational fr amework were to be applied operationally was fragmented into many sub-issues ran ging from securing the border to building social infrastructure. The story of th e Strategic Hamlet Program, as it came to be called, is one in which an operatio nal concept specifying a sequence of concrete steps was introduced by an articul ate advocate, nominally accepted by all of the principal actors, and advanced to a position of apparent centrality in which it became the operational blueprint for ending the insurgency. But it is also the story of an apparent consensus bui lt on differing, sometimes competing, expectations and of an effort which was, i n retrospect, doomed by the failure to resolve in one context the problem it was designed to alleviate in another-the problem of GVN stability. II. THE FORMULAT ION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM A. U.S.-GVN CONSULTATIONS Beginning in May 1 961, the U.S. and GVN conducted a series of high level conferences to fashion re sponses to the insurgent challenge. The first of these was the visit to Saigon b y the Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson. The Vice President's consultations were designed to reinforce the U.S. commitment to RVN and to improve the image of Pr esident Diem's government. In a communique issued jointly in Saigon, it was agre ed that the RVNAF was to be increased to 150,000 men, that the U.S. would suppor t the entire Civil Guard with military assistance funds, that Vietnamese and u.s . military specialists would be used to support village-level health and public works activities, and that the two governments would "discuss [material missing] the reserve forces if possible as they come up to defend; and to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build, by the assassination of officials an d the sabotage of public works. The purpose of this military strategy, Taylor as serted, was apparently not to capture the nation by force. Rather, in concert wi th non-military means, it was to produce a political

crisis which would topple the government and bring to power a group willing to c ontemplate the unification of Vietnam on Hanoi's terms. It was in the U.S. inter est, Taylor reasoned, to act vigorously-with advice as well as aid-in order to b uy the necessary time for Vietnam to mobilize and to organize its real assets so that the Vietnamese themselves might "turn the tide" and assume the offensive. But U.S. aid and U.S. advice on where to use it were not enough. The Diem Govern ment itself had to be reformed in order to permit it to mobilize the nation. Die m had, in Taylor's assessment, allowed two vicious circles to develop which viti ated government effectiveness. In the first of these circles poor military intel ligence led to a defensive stance designed primarily to guard against attacks, w hich in turn meant that most of the military forces came under the control of th e province chiefs whose responsibility it was to protect the populace and instal lations. This control by province chiefs meant that reserves could not, because of tangled lines of command and control, be moved and controlled quickly enough to be effective. The effect of high losses in unsuccessful defensive battles ser ved further to dry up the basic sources of intelligence. The second vicious circ le stemmed from Diem's instinctive attempts to centralize power in his own hands while fragmenting it beneath him. His excessive mistrust of many intellectuals and younger Vietnamese, individuals badly needed to give his administration vita lity, served only to alienate them and led them to stand aside from constructive participation--thereby further increasing Diem's mistrust. This administrative style fed back, too, into the military equation and through it, created another potentially explosive political-military problem: The inability to mobilize inte lligence effectively for operational purposes directly flows from this fact [Die m's administrative practicel as do the generally poor relations between the Prov ince Chiefs and the military commanders, the former being Diem's reliable agents , the latter a power base he fears. The consequent frustration of Diem's militar y commanders--a frustration well-known to Diem and heightened by the November 19 60 coup-leads him to actions which further complicate his problem; e.g., his unw illingness to delegate military operations clearly to his generals. General Tayl or's recommended actions for the U.S. were designed to demonstrate U.S. commitme nt in order to strengthen Diem's stand and, to broaden U.S. participation in the hope of bringing about necessary reforms in Diem's regime. The President's emis sary rejected the alternatives of a military takeover which would make the gener als dominant in all fields. He rejected, too, the alternative of replacing Diem with a weaker figure who would be willing to delegate authority to both military and civil leaders. The first course would emphasize the solution to only one se t of problems while slighting others; the second would permit action, but not co ordinated action. B. "LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" In order to move in a coordinated way on the intermingled military, political, economic, and social problems facing S outh Vietnam, General Taylor recommended that the U.S.

initiate a "limited partnership" which would stop short of direct U.S. action bu t would also, through persuasion at many levels judiciously mixed with U.S. leve rage, ". . . force the Vietnamese to get their house in order in one area after another." Increased material assistance from the U.S. would be accompanied with increased U.S. participation at all levels of government in which the American a dvisors must ". . . as friends and partners-not as arms-length advisors--show th em how the job might be done--not tell them or do it for them." If strongly moti vated, tactful Americans were assigned primarily outside Saigon, thus avoiding t he establishment of large headquarters not actually engaged in operational tasks , Taylor thought that this increased U.S. participation would not be "counter-pr oductive"; e.g., lend substance to claims of U.S. imperialism and dominance of t he Diem Government. Thus, Taylor consciously opted for a U.S. course of action i n which the major thrust of effort would be to induce Diem to dQ the things that the U.S. thought should be done: to draw the disaffected into the national effo rt and to organize and equip so that effective action would be possible. General Taylor did not argue explicitly that success would follow automatically if Diem 's practices could he reformed and his operational capabilities upgraded, but he implied this outcome. The question of an overall strategy to defeat the insurge ncy came very close to being regarded as a problem in the organization and manag ement of resources. Since GVN had no national plan, efforts were concentrated on inducing them to produce one. There was much less concern about the substance o f the non-existent GVN plan. It was almost as though there had to be something t o endorse or to criticize before substantive issues could be treated as relevant . C. U.S.-PROPOSED NATIONAL PLANS This priority of business is reflected in the U.S. plans which were proposed to GVN for adoption by the latter. In late 1960 t he U.S. Country Team in Saigon produced an agreed "Counterinsurgency Plan for Vi et-Nam" (CIP). The plan was an attempt to specify roles and relationships within GVN in the counterinsurgency effort, to persuade Diem to abandon his bilineal c hain of command in favor of a single command line with integrated effort at all levels within the government, and to create the governmental machinery for coord inated national planning. It was recognized that these recommendations were not palatable to President Diem, but reorganization along the lines specified was re garded as essential to successful accomplishment of the counterinsurgent effort. The CIP was an indictment of GVN failure to organize effectively and to produce coordinated national plans. It advanced no operational concepts for adoption by GVN. This obvious omission was corrected in the "Geographically Phased National Level Operation Plan for Counterinsurgency" which MAAG Vietnam published on 15 September 1961. Not only did this plan specify the areas of primary interest for pacification operations--as its title indicates--it also set forth a conceptual outline of the three sequential phases of actions which must be undertaken. In the first, "preparatory phase," the intelligence effort was to be concentrated i n the priority target areas, surveys were to be made to pinpoint needed economic and political reforms, plans were to be drawn up, and military and political ca dres were to be trained for the specific objective

area. The second, or "military phase," would be devoted to clearing the objectiv e area with regular forces, then handing local security responsibility over to t he Civil Guard (CG) and to establishing GVN presence. In the final, "security ph ase," the Self Defense Corps (SDC) would assume the civil action-local security mission, the populace was to be "reoriented," political control was to pass to c ivilian hands, and economic and social programs were to be initiated to consolid ate government control. Military units would be withdrawn as security was achiev ed and the target area would be "secured" by the loyalty of its inhabitants--a l oyalty attributable to GVN's successful responses to the felt needs of the inhab itants. First priority in this plan (1962 operations) was to go to six provinces around Saigon and to the Kontum area. Second priority (1963) would be given to expansion southward into the Delta and southward in the Central Highlands from K ontum. Third priority (1964) would continue the spread of GVN control in the hig hlands and shift the emphasis in the south to the provinces north and east of Sa igon. Before any of these priority actions were undertaken, however, it was prop osed to conduct an ARVN sweep in War Zone D, in the jungles northeast of Saigon, to reduce the danger to the capital and to increase ARVN's self-confidence. The geographically phased plan complemented the earlier CIP. Together, these two U. S. efforts constituted an outline blueprint for action. It is, of course, arguab le that this was the best conceivable blueprint, but it was at least a comprehen sive basis for refinement-for arguments for different priorities or a changed "s eries of events" in the process of pacification. D. INITIAL VIETNAMESE REACTIONS This is not how matters proceeded, in the event. Ambassador Durbrow, Genera! Mc Garr, and others urged acceptance of the CIP upon President Diem, but with only partial success. Diem stoutly resisted the adoption of a single, integrated chai n of operational command, showed no enthusiasm for detailed prior planning, cont inued his practice of centralized decision-making (sometimes tantamount to decis ion pigeonholing), and continued to play off the province chiefs against the gen erals. Some aspects of the CIP were accepted, but the basic organizational issue s remained unresolved and the strategic approach unresolved by default. The unsu ccessful U.S. attempts to secure organizational reforms within the Diem governme nt had assumed psychological primacy by the time of General Taylor's October 196 1 mission to Saigon. The American position was essentially that no operational p lan could succeed unless GVN were reorganized to permit effective implementation . It was reorganization that Taylor emphasized, as detailed above. But General T aylor did bring up the need for some coordinated operational plan in his talks w ith President Diem. Diem's response is described in a cable to Washington by Amb assador Nolting: Taylor several times stressed importance of overall plan--milit ary, political, economic, psychological, etc.--for dealing with guerrillas. Diem tended avoid clear response this

suggestion but finally indicated that he has a new strategic plan of his own. Si nce it was not very clear in spite efforts to draw him out what this plan is, Ta ylor asked him to let us have a copy in writing. E. THOMPSON'S COUNTERPROPOSALS President Diem may have been whistling in the dark about a new plan of his own. It is likely, however, that he was already conversant with the ideas of a new hi gh level advisor who had been in Saigon for several weeks and whose approach to prosecuting the war he would soon endorse officially as his own. The advisor was RGK Thompson, a British civil servant who had come from the position of Permane nt Secretary of Defense in Malaya. Thompson's British Advisory Mission was in Sa igon in response to Diem's request for experienced third country nationals to as sist him in his counterinsurgent operations. There had been some initial U.S. ob jection to British "advice without responsibility," but fears had been temporari ly allayed when it was agreed that Thompson's charter would be limited to civic action matters. Thompson provided Diem his initial "appreciation" (or, in U.S. t erminology, "estimate of the situation") in October 1961. His assessment was wel l received by the President, who asked him to follow it up with a specific plan. Thompson's response, an outline plan for the pacification of the Delta area, wa s given to the President on 13 November. Thus, Thompson was in the process of ar ticulating one potentially comprehensive strategic approach at the same time tha t the U.S. was deeply involved in fashioning a major new phase in U.S.-GVN relat ions in which major new U.S. aid would be tied to Diem's acceptance of specified reforms and, inferentially, to his willingness to pursue some agreed, coordinat ed strategy. Thompson's plan was, in short, a potential rival to the American-ad vanced plans represented by the CIP and the geographically phased MAAG plan of S eptember 1961. In order to assess the similarities and differences between the U .S. plans and that advanced by the British Advisory Mission, it is necessary to summarize Thompson's argument and proposals. Like Taylor (with whom he talked an d to whom he gave a copy of his initial "appreciation" at the latter's request), Thompson saw the VC objective to be one of political denouement by combined mil itary and political action rather than a military takeover of the entire nation. Like McGarr and the other U.S. military advisors, he recognized the probability and danger of VC attempts to control the unpopulated areas and to use them both as a base from which to project an image of political strength and as secure ar eas from which (in the case of War Zone D., northeast of Saigon) to threaten the capital. But unlike the U.S. military advisors, Thompson viewed the primary thr eat to be to the political stabiliy of the populated rural areas. Consequently, he regarded McGarr's proposed initial operation in War Zone D to be a step in th e wrong direction. The main government target, Thompson argued, should not be si mply the destruction of VC forces. Rather, it should be to offer an attractive a nd constructive alternative to communist appeals. This could only be done by emp hasizing national reconstruction and development in the populated rural areas. T o do so would require extensive and stringent

security measures, to be sure, but these measures required primarily police rath er than regular military forces. The police could establish a close rapport with the populace; the army could not. The army should have the mission to keep the VC off balance by mobile action in order to prevent insurgent attacks on the lim ited areas in which GVN would concentrate its initial pacification efforts. This line of argument was more fully developed in Thompson's draft plan for the paci fication of the Delta area, given to President Diem on 11 November. The objectiv e of the plan was to win loyalties rather than to kill insurgents. For that reas on Thompson selected a populous area with relatively little VC main force activi ty. The thrust of his proposal was that "clear and hold" operations should repla ce "search and destroy" sweeps. ARVN might be used to protect the villages while the villages were organizing to protect themselves and mobile ARVN forces must be available to reinforce local defense units, but the process should be abandon ed of "sweeping" through an area-and then leaving it. The peasants must be given the assurance of physical security so that economic and social improvements, th e real object of the plan, could proceed without interruption. The means by whic h the villagers would be protected was the "strategic hamlet," a lightly guarded village because it was-by definition-in a relatively low risk area. More heavil y defended centers, called "defended hamlets" and involving more relocation, wou ld be employed in areas under more VC influence, particularly along the Cambodia n border. To control this effort in the Delta, Thompson recommended that the ARV N III Corps Headquarters be reinforced with paramilitary and civil components, r elieved of its responsibility for the area around and north of Saigon, and funct ion under the immediate supervision of the National Security Countil-presided ov er by President Diem. The province chiefs, already under Diem's personal directi on, would be responsible on all emergency matters to the reinforced III Corps He adquarters (to be called the Combined Headquarters), but continue as before with respect to routine administration. Thompson presented this Delta plan as a prog ram of wide potential: ....It should lead by stages to a reorganization of the g overnment machinery for directing and coordinating all action against the commun ists and to the production of an overall strategic operational plan for the coun try as a whole defining responsibilities, tasks and priorities. At the same time it will lead to the establishment of a static security framework which can be d eveloped eventually into a National Police force into which can be incorporated a single security intelligence organization for the direction and coordination o f all intelligence activities against the communists. I agree with Your Excellen cy that it would be too disruptive at the present moment to try to achieve these immediately and that they should be developed gradually. Using a medical analog y, the remedy should be clinical rather than surgical. III. DEVELOPING A CONSENS US AMONG THE ADVISORS

A. INITIAL REACTION OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS It is not difficult to imagine the shocked reaction to Thompson's proposals, especially in U.S. military circles. In fact, one need not imagine them; General McGarr has recorded a detailed rejoi nder to Thompson's proposals. He was, to begin with, upset about the lack of pri or coordination: Following Mr. Thompson's medical analogy . . . we have the case of a doctor called in for consultation on a clinical case, actually performing an amputation without consulting the resident physician--and without being requi red to assume the overall responsibility for the patient. General McGarr's unhap piness with Thompson was not simply a case of injured feelings. He had four rela ted categories of disagreements with the plan proposed by the British Advisory M ission. First, Thompson's recommended command arrangements, if adopted, would de molish the prospect of a unitary chain of command within ARVN, an objective towa rd which McGarr had been working for over a year. Additionally, the Thompson pro posals would leave Diem as the ultimate manager of an operation dealing with onl y a portion (the Delta) of RVN. The elimination of practices such as this had be en an explicit objective of the entire U.S. advisory effort for a long time. Sec ond, the proposed priority in the Delta clashed with McGarr's priorities which p laced War Zone D first, the area around Saigon second, and the Delta third. Ther e was a lack of unanimity among the U.S. advisors about the relative importance of the War Zone D operation but the military in particular, were looking for an important operation to help the (hopefully) revitalized ARVN demonstrate its off ensive spirit and mobile capabilities. This desire gave rise to the third and fo urth objections--or fears. The "static security framework" in the villages to wh ich. Thompson referred struck General McGarr as an unwarranted downgrading of th e need for a size-able conventional military force to play an important role in pacification. Thompson's stated desire to emphasize police forces in lieu of reg ular military forces was regarded by the U.S. military advisory chief as unreali stic--a transferral of Malayan experience to a locale in which the existing tool s of policy were very different. Related to this objection was a final set of di sagreements. Thompson had wanted to go slowly and to let a new GVN organization grow from the effort. The U.S. military advisory chief also wanted to go slowly-but not that slowly. Not only would the Viet Cong not wait, it was simply unsou nd policy not to use the tools at hand. It would not do to reduce the ARVN and i ncrease police forces while the VC continued their successes. It was necessary, in sum, to act in a limited area but to act quickly. Thompson's recommendations did not look to quick action, emphasized the wrong area, were designed to emphas ize the wrong operational agency, and proposed unacceptable command lines.

It is important to note that in spite of these explicit disagreements there were broad areas of apparent agreement between Thompson and his U.S. counterparts. ( Apparent, because the "areas of agreement" concealed differences, too.) The U.S MAAG was amenable to the development of strategic hamlets, General McGarr claime d. Indeed, MAAG's long, diffuse doctrinal "handbook" for advisors in the field d id devote three pages--without any particular emphasis--to the "secure village c oncept." MAAG did not stress the centrality of strategic hamlets per se, but nei ther did Thompson. Strategic hamlets were to Thompson a way station enroute to h is real objective--winning the loyalty of the rural peasants. This was apparentl y compatible with the sequential steps to pacification outlined in MAAG's own Ge ographically Phased Counterinsurgency Plan. If the competing approaches of the U .S. and British advisors had not been made compatible, there was, at least, some agreed ground from which to launch the effort to make them compatible. B. REACT IONS IN WASHINGTON That such ground existed was fortunate, for Thompson's evolut ionary plan was not only finding a warm reception at the Presidential Palace, it was also winning an attentive ear in Washington. As already mentioned, Thompson talked with General Taylor during the latter's October 1961 mission to Saigon a nd provided Taylor a copy of the initial British "appreciation." Copies of the T hompson memorandum on the Delta were also forwarded to Taylor at the latter's re quest. Then in January 1962, Thompson, again responding to Taylor's request, sen t the latter a long letter outlining his views. In less than a month, General Ta ylor could present to President Kennedy a plan entitled "A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam" by Roger Hilsman which was an unabashed restatement of most of T hompson's major points and toward which President Kennedy had, not incidentally, already expressed a favorable disposition. Hilsman's "strategic concept" avowed ly flowed from three basic principles: that the problem in Vietnam presented by the VC was political rather than military in its essence; that an effective coun terinsurgency plan must provide the people and villages with protection and phys ical security; and that counter guerrilla forces must adopt the same tactics as those used by the guerrilla himself. To translate these principles into operatio nal reality, Hilsman called for "strategic villages" and "defended villages" a l a Thompson, with first priority to the most populous areas: i.e., the Delta and in the vicinity of Hue. ARVN would, much as in Thompson's proposal, secure the i nitial effort, when necessary, and be employed to keep the VC off balance in tho se areas already under Viet Cong control. The plan envisaged a three-phase proce ss by which GVN control would progressively be expanded from the least heavily V C-penetrated provinces with large populations (phase I), into the more heavily p enetrated population centers (phase II), and finally into the areas along the La otian and Cambodian borders (phase III). Hilsman eschewed use of the "oil spot" analogy but the process and rationale he put forth were the same. His plan moved "strategic villages" to a place of prominence greater than that in Thompson's D elta plan and far in excess of the offhanded acceptance which had thus far been afforded them by U.S. military advisors.

Strategic hamlets were not the heart of the Hilsman plan-civic action was that-b ut they were the symbol, the easily recognizable, easily grasped initial step by which GVN could begin, following Hilsman's second principle, to "provide the pe ople and the villages with protection and physical security." C. THE ADVISORS RE ACH AGREEMENT Thompson's basic ideas were gaining wide dissemination at the high est level within the U.S. government in early 1962. What of his relations with t he U.S. MAAG in Saigon? These had been significantly improved as the result of a meeting between Thompson, Ambassador Nolting, and British Ambassador Hohier. Th ompson agreed to revise his paper so as to remove the objection to his proposed command arrangements. Ambassador Nolting reported that Thompson was now working "closely and amicably" with MAAG. This took care of one of McGarr's objections. Thompson had apparently decided, too, to allow the issue to drop for the time be ing of police primacy in pacification vis-a-vis ARVN. It was not, after all, a c hange that could be made quickly; President Diem was convinced that some start w as needed to save his administration. That had been his reason, after all, in re luctantly inviting increased American participation in the war. Secretary McNama ra played an important role in disposing of still another issue in dispute--that of where to begin. In mid-December 1961, after President Kennedy had decided to adopt essentially all of General Taylor's November recommendations except the i ntroduction of major U.S. forces in Vietnam, Secretary McNamara met in Honolulu with the U.S. principals in Vietnam to discuss future plans. A central question was that of what could be done in the short term future. The Secretary of Defens e made it clear that RVN had "number one priority." McNamara urged concentration on one province: "I'll guarantee it (the money and equipment) provided you have a plan based on one province. Take one place, sweep it and hold it in a plan." Or, put another way, let us demonstrate that in some place, in some way, we can achieve demonstrable gains. General McGarr, immediately upon his return to Saigo n, wrote to Secretary Thuan and passed on this proposal: I would like to suggest that you may wish to set aside one specific area, say a province, and use it as a "test area," in establishing this type "pacification infrastructure." My thin king is that all the various elements of this anti-VC groundwork be designated i mmediately by your government and trained as a team or teams for the actual reoc cupation and holding of the designated communist infiltrated area when it has be en cleared by RVNAF military action. Such teams would embrace, McGarr suggested, police, intelligence, financial, psychological, agricultural, medical, civic ac tion, and civil political functions. IV. THE ADVISORS "SELL" DIEM (OR VICE VERSA ) A. WHERE TO BEGIN?

GVN did indeed have a province in mind. It was not a Delta province, however. No r was it a province relatively secure from VC infiltration. Quite to the contrar y, Binh Duong Province, extending north and northwest of Saigon, had been heavil y infiltrated. Its main communications axis (National Highway 13, extending nort hward from Saigon into Cambodia) sliced directly between War Zone D and War Zone C. The province was crossed by important routes of communications, liaison, and supply between two insurgent redoubts. Hardly the logical place to begin, one m ight say, but "logic" was being driven by events and desires more than by abstra ct reasoning. One desire was the widely held wish to do something concrete and p roductive as a symbol of U.S. determination and GVN vitality. Another desire was GVN's wish to commit the Americans to support of Diem's government on terms whi ch would be in fact acceptable to that government and would--equally important-appear to be U.S. support for GVN-initiated actions. If one were Vietnamese one might reason that Binh Duong was an area of unquestionable strategic importanceand one in which GVN had already initiated some pacification efforts. If the Ame ricans wish to concentrate in one province and if they are willing to underwrite the effort with resources, why not begin in an important strategic area where w ork is already underway? GVN had initiated, in August 1961, a "Rural Reconstruct ion Campaign" in the Eastern Region of South Vietnam to secure the provinces of Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Tuy. Most of the effort prior to December 1961 h ad been concentrated in the Cu Chi District of Binh Duong. Xom Hue Hamlet of Tan An Hoi was, during December, in the process of being fortified as a strategic h amlet. General McGarr was under the impression that "considerable progress" had already been made in these three provinces in the establishment of the GVN villa ge level activities so necessary to winning popular support. In mid-January Gene ral McGarr met (just prior to his departure for Honolulu) with President Diem an d Secretary Thuan to discuss pacification plans. As McGarr told Secretary McNama ra, Diem stressed that the MAAG-endorsed military operation in War Zone D might merely close the string on an empty bag. Such a failure would be detrimental to ARVN morale. Besides, the President observed echoing Thompson, "sweeps" solved n othing; the problem was to hold an area and to separate the VC from the rest of the populace. Diem preferred a concentrated effort in Binh Duong, a heavily infi ltrated province, close to Saigon, of great strategic importance, and in which o nly 10 of 46 villages were under GVN control-but in which the groundwork for a s ound government infrastructure had already been laid. The discussions at the Sec retary of Defense's Conference in Honolulu turned on whether or not the War Zone D operation offered more hope for a concrete gain than a "single province" paci fication scheme. McNamara concluded that it did not. General McGarr dissented mi ldly from the selection of Binh Duong. He would have favored Phuoc Tuy (where U. S. troops were scheduled to land if a decision were ever made to commit them.) B ut Binh Duong was GVN's plan and the "limited partners" finally agreed to back D iem's preferred attempt. Thus, the U.S. came to a roundabout decision to support as a "test" of

what would later be called the "strategic hamlet program" an operation about who se details they knew little, in an area that all recognized to be difficult, bec ause it allegedly represented a long-sought example of GVN initiative in plannin g and civil-military preparation. Much of the public image of the strategic haml et program was to be established by this operation, as it turned out. Its name w as "Operation Sunrise." But it was not--U.S. desires to the contrary--the only s trategic hamlet effort to be carried forward during this period. It was only one of several-and several grew very quickly into many. B. CONCURRENT GVN ACTIVITY It has already been suggested that President Diem responded with some enthusiasm to the early proposals from Thompson's British Advisory Mission. In mid-Februar y 1962, President Diem approved orally Thompson's "Delta Pacification Plan" and said he would like to see it executed without delay. Earlier, on 3 February, he had created by presidential decree the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets (IMCSH), comprising the heads of various ministries (Defense, Interior, Education, Civic Action, Rural Affairs, etc.). The IMCSH was, as its membership indicates, a coordinating body designed to give national direction and guidance to the program. Its importance is not in its work--for it apparently did very l ittle--but as an indicator of Diem's early 1962 thinking of strategic hamlets as a national program and of the central role which his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, wou ld play in this program. Nhu was the real driving force behind GVN's uneven but discernible movement toward adoption of the strategic hamlet theme as a unifying concept in its pacification efforts. In the early period under discussion he ma sked his central role, however. He was not announced as the Chairman of the IMCS H (nobody was), but the committee was responsible to him. He did not, however, l ead it actively. As two American observers remarked at the time, "Nhu seems to h ave consulted the committee seldom and to have shared his policy-making power wi th it even less frequently." C. EARLY SIGNS OF GVN EXPECTATIONS But although bro ther Nhu was behind the scenes in late 1961 and early 1962, an occasional fleeti ng glimpse of his thinking and the direction in which he was heading has still m anaged to show through. A CIA report from Saigon summarized Nhu's instructions t o a dozen province chiefs from the Delta in a meeting held on 14 December 1961. Primary emphasis was to be placed on the strategic hamlet program, Nhu said, and this program was to be coupled with a "social revolution" against "Viet-Nam's t hree enemies: divisive forces, low standard of living, and communism." The CIA T ask Force-Vietnam observed, in forwarding this report, that Nhu's "social revolu tion and strategic hamlets appear to be fuzzy concepts with little value in the fight against the Communists." No doubt these concepts seemed fuzzy at the end o f 1961. But within another twelve months, as events would prove, they would be w idely recognized as the twin spearheads of GVN's counterinsurgent effort, fuzzy or not. The strategic hamlet program would have

broad support within the U.S. government and financial resources to underpin tha t support. The "social revolution" to which Nhu referred in December 1961 would be surfaced as Diem's "personalism" drive. The important thing for the present a nalysis is that all of the expectations of the several participant groups--both U.S. and GVN--were identifiable by very early 1962 at the latest, and that the c oncept of the strategic hamlet program in the broad sense had been fully adumbra ted. The skeleton--the rationale--was complete; the body--operational programs-had not yet taken form. Each group could, however, work toward construction of a slightly different body (and for differing reasons) and claim with some plausib ility to be working from the same skeleton. V. DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES AND EXPECT ATIONS Three somewhat different views may be categorized which are of interest t o the present inquiry: those of the U.S. military advisors, of the U.S. politica l leadership, and of the Diem government's leaders. Such generalizations are adm ittedly risky and easily overdrawn; there were, of course, differences between t he perceptions and expectations of, say, the U.S. military advisors. For example , those farthest from Saigon tended to be less patient--with Diem and in expecti ng results--than were those closer to the area of operations. Still, discernible differences of outlook and expectations may be said to represent the prevailing views in each of these three groups. A. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS The U.S. militar y advisors mistrusted arguments which stressed the Vietnamese struggle as essent ially political rather than military. They were quite willing to concede that th e struggle was multi-dimensional but they feared instinctively any line of reaso ning which might appear to argue that military considerations were relatively un important in Vietnam. So, too, they were wary of schemes which might lead ARVN t o perpetuate its defensive tactical stance. Both dangers were present in the str ategic hamlet program. The same military advisors were more forceful than others in stressing the need for the Diem regime to rationalize its command arrangemen ts and to plan comprehensively and in detail from the highest to lowest levels. Their operational interest concentrated on making ARVN not just more mobile but more aggressive. Their creed, developed through years of experience and training (or vicarious experience) was to "close with and destroy the enemy." One could expect them, then, to be more than willing to turn over the job of static defens e to the CDC and CG at the earliest opportunity, to keep a weather eye out for o pportunities to engage major VC formations in decisive battle, and to chafe unde r the painfully slow evolutionary process which was implicit even in their own 1 961 geographically phased plan. B. U.S. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP The U.S. political leadership, and to varying degrees the leaders in the Saigon Embassy and in USOM , were more attuned to the political problems-both with respect to GVNU.S. relat ions and to the problem of winning broad support among the Vietnamese for the Di em administration. This made members of this group inherently more sympathetic t o

proposals such as the Thompson plan for the Delta than they were, for instance, to increasing ARVN's size and capabilities. They found compelling the logic of a nalyses such as Hilsman's which cut to the political root rather than treating o nly the military symptoms. One suspects--though documentation would never be fou nd to support it--that they were attracted by an argument which did suggest some hope for "demilitarizing" the war, de-emphasizing U.S. operational participatio n, and increasing GVN's ability to solve its own internal problems using primari ly its own human resources. C. PRESIDENT DIEM Ngo Dinh Diem's perspective and ex pectations were the most different of all. U.S. groups differed in degree; Diem' s expectations were different in kind. He wanted, first of all, to obtain unequi vocal U.S. support, not just to his nation but to his administration. It was ess ential, in his eyes, that this support not compromise his authority or Vietnames e sovereignty. He did not want to give credence to communist claims that he was a puppet of the U.S., on one hand, or concentrate the coercive instruments of po wer in the hand of potential antagonists, on the other. A revealing assessment o f Diem's frame of mind is provided by Ambassador Nolting. Diem invited increased U.S. aid and U.S. participation because he feared that, especially with an impe nding settlement in Laos, South Vietnam would come under increasing communist pr essures. If Diem's government could not win over these pressures-and Diem feared it could not-it had only the choice of going down fighting or of being overthro wn by a coup. Thus, in requesting additional U.S. help, Diem had "adopted an exp edient which runs against his own convictions, and he is apparently willing to a ccept the attendant diminution of his own stature as an independent and selfreli ant national leader." But when Ambassador Nolting presented to Diem the U.S. qui d pro quo for its "limited partnership," this apparent acceptance of decreased s tature and independence suddenly seemed less apparent. Then, as Nolting reported , President Diem feared the reaction even among his own cabinet aides. Secretary Thuan, in whom Diem did confide, said that the President was brooding over the fact that the U.S. was asking great concessions of GVN in the realm of its sover eignty in exchange for little additional help. Diem argued that U.S. influence o ver his government, once it was known, would play directly into the communists' hands. The first priority task, he added, was to give the people security, not t o make the government more popular. To try it the other way around was to place the cart before the horse. Diem saw himself caught in a dilemma in which he was doomed if he did not get outside assistance and doomed if he got it only at the price of surrendering his independence. To him the trick was to get the U.S. com mitted without surrendering his independence. One possible solution lay in getti ng U.S. material aid for a program that would be almost wholly GVN-implemented: The strategic hamlet program offered a convenient vehicle for this purpose and o ne which was also appealing for other reasons, It put achieving security before winning loyalty-in an operational context in which it was difficult to

differentiate between security for the rural populace and control of that popula ce, since many of the actions to achieve one were almost identical to the acts t o realize the other. D. THE CENTRAL ISSUE The U.S., for its part, was asking Die m to forego independence by accepting the wisdom of the American recommendations for reform. The central question was whether he would--or could--do so. Among t hose who responded to this question in the negative, J. Kenneth Gaibraith was mo st trenchant: In my completely considered view . . . Diem will not reform admini stratively or politically in any effective way. That is because he cannot. It is politically naive to expect it. He senses that he cannot let power go because h e would be thrown out. The U.S. decided that Diem could make meaningful reforms and that he would do so--or at least it decided that it was likely enough that h e would do so and that support for his administration constituted the best avail able policy alternative. E. THE PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT The differences in perspec tives and expectations outlined above are important in their own right. They loo m even larger, however, when one considers the difficulty of assessing progress in the program about to be undertaken. These groups were about to embark upon a long, arduous joint voyage. Their only chart had never been to sea. This was the newly-articulated and imperfectly understood doctrine of counterinsurgency whic h stressed the interaction and interdependence of political, military, social, a nd psychological factors. It posited the necessity for certain actions to follow immediately and successfully behind others in order for the process of pacifica tion to succeed. Above all--and this point cannot be overstressed--while this do ctrine recognized the need for both the carrot and the stick (for coercive contr ol and appealing programs) it made gaining broad popular acceptance the single u ltimate criterion of success. Neither kill ratios nor construction rates nor the frequency of incidents was conclusive, yet these were all indicators applicable to phases within the larger process. The gains of doing well in one phase, howe ver, could be wiped out by inactivity or mistakes in a subsequent phase. It was, in short, very difficult to know how well one was doing until one was done. VI. THE NATIONAL PLAN EMERGES A. AWARENESS OF THE UNIFYING POTENTIAL Before examini ng the quality of execution of the operational programs for which some detailed record is available it will be useful to outline the process by which the strate gic hamlet program became--by late 1962--a comprehensive national program embody ing the major effort of GVN in pacification.

"Operation Sunrise" in Binh Duong Province was launched on 22 March 1962 in what was initially called the "Ben Cat Project." The Delta project, however, languis hed in a "planning stage" until May, when it first became known that Diem was co nsidering incorporating it into the Strategic Hamlet Program. By August the IMCS H proposed a priority plan for the construction of strategic hamlets on a nation -wide basis. Later the same month, the U.S. Inter-Agency Committee for Province Rehabilitation concurred in this plan (with minor reservations) as a basis for p lanning and utilization of U.S. assistance. By October, the Diem government had made the Strategic Hamlet Program the explicit focus and unifying concept of its pacification effort. The governmentcontrolled Times of Viet Nam devoted an enti re issue to "1962: The Year of Strategic Hamlets." Ngo Dinh Nhu was unveiled as the "architect and prime mover" of the program which was the Vietnamese answer t o communist strategy. As Nhu proclaimed: "Strategic hamlets seek to assure the s ecurity of the people in order that the success of the political, social, and mi litary revolution might be assured by the enthusiastic movement of solidarity an d self-sufficiency." President Diem had earlier put the same thought to an Ameri can visitor in clearer words: The importance of the strategic hamlets goes beyon d the concept of hamlet self defense. They are a means to institute basic democr acy in Vietnam. Through the Strategic Hamlet Program, the government intends to give back to the hamlet the right of self-government with its own charter and sy stem of community law. This will realize the ideas of the constitution on a loca l scale which the people can understand. By this time, too, influential American circles regarded the Strategic Hamlet Program as the shorthand designation for a process which represented a sensible and sound GVN effort. Roger Hilsman had s aid so in February to President Kennedy, and found the latter highly receptive. He continued to say so. As he advised Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harri man in late 1962, "The government of Vietnam has finally developed, and is now a cting upon, an effective strategic concept." [Doc. 119] Even so lukewarm an enth usiast as the CJCS, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer could report that ". . . the Stra tegic Hamlet Program promises solid benefits, and may well be the vital key to s uccess of the pacification program." The public record also shows early support from high U.S. officials for the Strategic Hamlet Program and recognition of its central role in GVN's pacification campaign. Speaking in late April 1962, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, commented favorably in the progressive devel opment of strategic hamlets throughout RVN as a method of combating insurgency a nd as a means of bringing the entire nation "under control of the government." S ecretary McNamara told members of the press, upon his return to Washington from a Pacific meeting in July 1962, that the Strategic Hamlet Program was the "backb one of President Diem's program for countering subversion directed against his s tate." It is reasonable to conclude from the evidence that official U.S. awarene ss kept abreast of Diem's progressive adoption of the Strategic Hamlet Program a s the "unifying concept" in his counterinsurgent effort. The same officials were constantly bombarded by a series

of reports from a variety of sources describing the progress of the hamlet progr am and assessing its efficacy. B. "OPERATION SUNRISE" The first operational effo rt in which the U.S. had a hand, "Operation Sunrise," got under way in Binh Duon g Province on 22 March 1962 when work commenced on Ben Tuong, the first of five hamlets to be constructed for relocated peasants in the Ben Cat District in and around the Lai Khe rubber plantation. Phase I of the operation--the military cle aring phase--was conducted by forces of the 5th ARVN Division reinforced by rang er companies, a reconnaissance company, two reinforced CG companies, and a psych ological warfare company. The Viet Cong simply melted into the jungles. With the Viet Cong out of the way--at least for the time being--the relocation and const ruction of the new hamlet commenced. The new program got off to a bad start. The government was able to persuade only seventy families to volunteer for resettle ment. The 135 other families in the half dozen settlements were herded forcibly from their homes. Little of the $300,000 in local currency provided by USOM had reached the peasants; the money was being withheld until the resettled families indicated they would not bolt the new hamlet. Some of them came with most of the ir meager belongings. Others had little but the clothes on their backs. Their ol d dwellings--and many of their possessions--were burned behind them. Only 120 ma les of an age to bear arms were found among the more than 200 families--indicati ng very clearly that a large number had gone over to the VC, whether by choice o r as a result of intimidation. C. OTHER EARLY PROGRAMS Progress in Binh Duong co ntinued at a steady pace, beset by difficulties. By midsummer 2900 persons had b een regrouped into three strategic hamlets. Elsewhere, the pace quickened. Altho ugh the Delta Plan, as a coordinated effort, had not been implemented by the sum mer of 1962, Secretary McNamara found in May an aggressive effort under way with out U.S. help near Ca Mao: Here the commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment had gone into an area 95% controlled by the VC, declared martial law, and resettled 11,000 people (some under duress) in 9 strategic hamlets, while fighting the VC wherever he found them. Since inception of the program, none of his villages hav e been attacked, and the freedom from VC taxation (extortion) is proving most ap pealing to the people. It is the commander's hope (doubtless optimistic) that he will be able to turn the whole area over to the civil guard and self defense co rps within 6 months. These resettlement efforts in areas which had been under VC domination were not the extent of the early hamlet "program," however. Many exi sting hamlets and villages were "fortified" in one degree or another early in 19 62 following no discernible pattern. This appears to have been the natural produ ct of the varied response to Nhu's injunction to emphasize strategic hamlets. In April, the GVN Ministry of the Interior informed the U.S.

that 1300 such hamlets were already completed. "Operation Sunrise" had by this t ime been broadened to embrace efforts in several provinces. Several other Strate gic Hamlet Programs were begun: "Operation Hai Yen II" (Sea Swallow) in Phu Yen Province with a goal of 281 hamlets, 157 of which were reported as completed wit hin two months: "Operation Dang Tien" (Let's go) in Binh Dinh Province with a go al of 328 strategic hamlets in its first year; and "Operation Phuong Hoang" (Roy al Phoenix) in Quang Nai Province with a goal of 125 strategic hamlets by the en d of 1962. D. AT LAST--A NATIONAL PLAN The GVN drew all of the partialistic prog rams together in its August 1962 national priority plan mentioned earlier. The n ation was divided into four priority zones. First priority was assigned to the e leven provinces around Saigon. This included essentially the area of the Thompso n Delta plan plus the original area of "Operation Sunrise" plus Gia Dinh Provinc e. Priorities within each zone were further specified. Within the zone of first national priority, for example, the provinces of Vinh Long, Long An, and Phuoc T ry were assigned the highest priority; Binh Duong--where operations were already in progress-was given priority three. By the end of the summer of 1962 GVN clai med that 3,225 of the planned 11,316 hamlets had already been completed and that over 33 percent of the nation's total population was already living in complete d hamlets. October 1962, when Diem made the Strategic Hamlet Program the avowed focus of his counterinsurgent campaign, marks the second watershed in the develo pment and implementation of the program. The first such watershed had been the c onsensus, on the potential value of such a program, which had been developed at the end of 1961 and early 1962. There would be no others until the program died with Diem. E. EFFECT ON U.S. PERCEPTIONS The effect of the GVN's concentration o n strategic hamlets was to make U.S. assessments focus on several sub-aspects of the problem. Attention tended to be directed toward how well hamlets were being fortified and whether or not Table 1 GVN Report on Status of Strategic Hamlets As of 30 September 1962* Strategic Strategic Strategic Hamlets Hamlets Hamlets U nder Planned Completed Construction 105 115 Population in Completed Hamlets 261, 470 Area SOUTHERN: Saigon 433

Eastern Provinces Western Provinces SUB-TOTAL CENTRAL: Central Lowlands High Pla teau SUB-TOTAL GRAND TOTAL 1,595 4,728 6,756 3,630 930 4,560 11,316 291 1,236 1,632 1,490 103 1,593 3,225 501 702 1,318 682 217 899 2,217 423,060 1,874,790 2,559,320 1,654,470 108,244 1,762,714 4,322,034 --Percentage of planned hamlets completed: 28.49% --Percentage of total populati on in completed hamlets: 33.39% * Adapted from The Times of Vietnam, 28 October 1962, p. 17. the implementation phase was well managed; i.e., whether peasants w ere paid for their labor, reimbursed for their losses, and given adequate opport unity to attend their crops. Conversely, attention was directed away from the di fficult-to-assess question of whether the follow-up actions to hamlet security w ere taking place-the actions which would convert the peasantry from apathy (if n ot opposition) to identification with their central government. This focusing on details which diverted attention from the ultimate objective took the form of r eports, primarily statistical, which set forth the construction rate for strateg ic hamlets, the incident rate of VC activities, and the geographical areas in wh ich GVN control was and was not in the ascendancy. These "specifics" were couple d to generalized assessments which almost invariably pointed to shortcomings in GVN's execution of the program. The shortcomings, however, were treated as probl ems in efficient management and operational organization; the ineluctability of increased control (or security) leading somehow to popular identification by a p rocess akin to the economic assumption of "flotation to stability through develo pment" went unchallenged as a basic assumption. Critics pointed to needed improv ements; the question of whether or not these could be accomplished, or why, almo st never was raised. "Operation Sunrise," for example, was criticized in some de tail by the US MAAG. Much better planning and coordination was needed in order t o relocate effectively: Aerial surveys were necessary to pinpoint the number of families to be relocated; unanticipated expenditures needed to be provided for; preparation of sites should begin before the

peasants were moved; and GVN resource commitments should be carefully checked by U.S. advisors at all levels. There was no discussion of the vulnerability of th e strategic hamlets to VC inifitration (as against VC attacks) or of the subsequ ent steps to winning support. That was not, one may assume, the military's prime concern. Political observers who examined this follow-on aspect were cautiously optimistic: The strategic hamlet program is the heart of our effort and deserve s top priority. While it has not--and probably will not--bring democracy to rura l Vietnam, it provides truly local administration for the first time. Coupled wi th measures to increase rice production and farmer income, these local administr ations can work a revolution in rural Vietnam. The same tone was reflected in Mi chael Forrestal's report to President Kennedy in February 1963 following his vis it to Vietnam with Roger Hilsman [Doc. 120]. The visitors found Ambassador Nolti ng and his deputy, William C. Trueheart, optimistic about the results which the program might achieve once the materials for it, then just beginning to come in, reached full volume. The Department of Defense was devoting considerable effort to insuring that these materials did reach Vietnam in, the quantities needed an d in timely fashion. Secretary McNamara had been stuck with this problem during his May 1962 visit to "Operation Sunrise." He saw especially a need to program S DC, CG, and Youth Corps training so that it would match the role of hamlet build ing and to insure the provision of proper communications for warning purposes. A substantial amount of the MAAG-DoD effort subsequently went into programming. T he Agency for International Development had agreed to fund the "Strategic Hamlet Kits" (building materials, barbed wire and stakes, light weapons, ammunition, a nd communication equipment), but in August 1962 it demurred, stating that suppor ting assistance funds in the MAP were inadequate for the purpose. Secretary McNa mara agreed to undertake the financing for 1500 kits (13 million) but asked if t he additional 3500 kits requested were really necessary and, if so, on what deli very schedule. The target levels and delivery dates underwent more or less conti nuous revision from then until the question became irrelevant in late 1963. A se parate but related effort went into expediting the procurement, delivery, and in stallation of radios in the strategic hamlets so that each would have the capabi lity to sound the alarm and request the employment of mobile reserves when attac ked. F. DIFFERENCES BEGIN TO EMERGE All of these "program management" activities were based on the unstated assumption that the strategic hamlet program would l ead to effective pacification if only Diem would make it work. As it turned out, there was some disagreement between what the U.S. considered needed to be done and what President Diem knew very well he was doing. He was using the Strategic Hamlet Program to carry forward his "personalist philosophy." As brother Nhu vis ibly took the reins controlling the program and began to solidify control over t he Youth Corps it became increasingly clear that Diem was emphasizing government control of the peasantry at the expense (at least in U.S. eyes) of pacification .

As awareness in Washington increased that strategic hamlets could serve several purposes, there developed also a divergent interpretation of whether or not the GVN was "winning the war." When General Krulak, SACSA, and Joseph Mendenhall, an excounselor in Saigon then at State, visited RVN in September 1963, President K ennedy wryly asked upon receiving their conflicting reports, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" The answer is that they had, but the general stre ssed that the military war was going well while the diplomat asserted that the p olitical war was being lost. The argument was not, it should be stressed, one be tween the generals and the diplomats; experienced diplomats disagreed fundamenta lly with Mendenhall. The disagreement was between those who pointed to signs of progress and those who held up examples of poor planning, corruption, and aliena tion of the peasants whose loyalty was the object of the exercise. Criticisms-fr equently accompanied by counterbalancing assertions that "limited progress" was being achieved-mentioned corvee labor, GVN failures to reimburse the farmers for losses due to resettlement, the dishonesty of some officials, and Diem's stress on exhortations rather than on the provision of desirable social services. Thos e who emphasized that the program was showing real progress--usually with a cave at or two that there was considerable room for improvement--stressed statistical evidence to portray the exponential increase in strategic hamlet construction ( Table 2), the declining trend in Viet Cong-initiated incidents (Table 3), the ri se in VC defections (Table 4), and the slow but steady increase in GVN control o f rural areas (Table 5). The JCS observation with respect to the establishment o f strategic hamlets, for instance, was that since fewer than two tenths of one p ercent (0.2%) of them had been overrun by the VC, "The Vietnamese people must su rely be finding in them a measure of the tranquility which they seek." RGK Thomp son later claimed that the very absence of attacks was an indicator that the VC had succeeded in infiltrating the hamlets. The point is not Thompson's prescienc e but the difficulty of reasoned assessment to which this analysis has already p ointed. The U.S. course, in the face of these cautiously optimistic and hopefull y pessimistic reports, was to continue its established program of material suppo rt coupled with attempts to influence Diem to make desired changes. VII. THE PAT H TO THE END A. DIEM'S POSITION HARDENS The obvious U.S. alternatives, by mid-19 63, remained the same as they were in late 1961: (1) to induce changes within th e Strategic Hamlet Program (among other) by convincing Diem to make such changes ; (2) to allow Diem to run things his own way and hope for the best; and (3) to find an alternative to President Diem. The U.S. continued to pursue the first co urse; Diem insisted increasingly on the second. Finally, due to pressures from a reas other than the Strategic Hamlet Program, the U.S. pursued the third alterna tive. The Strategic Hamlet Program, in the event, died with its sponsors.

Far from becoming more reasonable, in U.S. eyes, President Diem by mid-1963 had become more intractable. He insisted, for example, that the U.S. cease to have a n operational voice in the Strategic Hamlet Program. The multiplication of U.S. advisors at many levels, he claimed, was the source of friction and dissension. The remedy was to remove the advisors. The essence of Diem's position was that T aylor's "limited partnership" would not work.

Other U.S. missions visited Vietnam to assess the conduct of the war. The result was much the same as reported by Krulak and Mendenhall. This was essentially th e findings of the McNamara-Taylor mission in September: the military campaign is progressing, political disaffection is growing; U.S. leverage is questionable. [Doc. 142] B. THE PROGRAM DIES WITH THE NGOS The rest may be summarized: the U.S . attempted to insist on a program with more emphasis on broad appeal rather tha n control; Diem, finding himself increasingly embroiled in the Buddhist controve rsy, increased repressive measures; a coup toppled the Diem regime on 1 November ; the deposed President and his brother Nhu, "architect of the Strategic Hamlet Program," were killed. The Strategic Hamlet Program--or at least the program und er that name which they had made the unifying theme of their counterinsurgent ef fort--died with them. The inhabitants who had wanted to leave the hamlets did so in the absence of an effective government. The VC took advantage of the confusi on to attack and overrun others. Some offered little or no resistance. The rulin g junta attempted to resuscitate the program as "New Life Hamlets" early in 1964 , but the

failures of the past provided a poor psychological basis upon which to base hope s for the future. VIII. AN INCONCLUSIVE SUMMARY The dominant U.S. view has been that the Strategic Hamlet Program failed because of over-expansion and the estab lishment of hamlets in basically insecure areas. That there was overexpansion an d the establishment of many poorly defended hamlets is not questioned. This cont ributed, beyond doubt, to the failure of the program. But this view finesses the problem of the process for which the strategic hamlets were but the tangible sy mbol. The present analysis has sought to emphasize both the essentially politica l nature of the objective of the Strategic Hamlet Program and the political natu re of the context in which the process evolved-of expectations, bargaining, and attempts to exert influence on other participants in policy formulation and impl ementation. In this context it is the U.S. inability to exert leverage on Presid ent Diem (or Diem's inability to reform) that emerges as the principal cause of failure. Yet, both of these attempts to pinpoint the reasons why the strategic h amlet program did not succeed fail to get at another whole issue: the validity o f that body of writings which one may call the theory and doctrine of counterins urgency. Neither the military nor the political aspects of this doctrine can be upheld (or proved false) by an examination of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Quit e aside from whether or not Diem was able to broaden the program's appeal to the peasantry, what would have occurred had he made a determined and sustained effo rt to do so? Would this have led in some more-or-less direct way to stability or to even greater dissatisfaction? We simply do not know. The question is as unan swerable as whether the appetite grows with the eating or is satisfied by it. Th e contention here is that claims of mismanagement are not sufficient to conclude that better management would necessarily have produced the desired results. In the military sphere the unanswerable questions are different. It is said that th e military phase of the Strategic Hamlet Program progressed reasonably well in m any areas; the failure was in the political end of the process. But did the mili tary actions succeed? Might failures to develop adequate intelligence and to wee d out VC infrastructure in these hamlets not as easily be attributable to the fa ct that the inhabitants knew they were not really safe from VC intimidation and reprisals? Does the analogy to an "oil spot" have operational meaning when small bands can carry out hit and run raids or when many small bands can concentrate in one location and achieve surprise? Where is the key to this vicious circle--o r is there a key? In conclusion, while the abortive Strategic Hamlet Program of 1961-1963 may teach one something, the available record does not permit one to c onclude either that the program fell because of the failure of a given phase or that other phases were, in fact, adequate to the challenge. One may say that the program was doomed by poor execution and by the inability of the Ngo family to reform coupled with the inability of the U.S. to induce them to reform. The evid ence does not warrant one to proceed further.

The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 3, "Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, 1962-1964," pp. 160-200. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) Summary A formal planning and budgetary process for the phased withdrawal of U.S . forces from Vietnam was begun amid the euphoria and optimism of July 1962, and was ended in the pessimism of March 1964. Initially, the specific objectives we re: (1) to draw down U.S. military personnel then engaged in advisory, training, and support efforts from a FY 64 peak of 12,000 to a FY 68 bottoming out of 1,5 00 (just HQ, MAAG); and (2) to reduce MAP from a FY 64 peak of $180 million to a FY 69 base of $40.8 million. South Vietnamese forces were to be trained to perf orm all the functions then being carried out by U.S. personnel. What the U.S.G. was actually trying to accomplish during this period can be described in either or both of two ways: (1) a real desire and attempt to extricate the U.S. from di rect military involvement in the war and to make it a war which the GVN would ha ve to learn to win, and (2) straightforward contingency planning and the use of a political-managerial technique to slow down pressures for greater U.S. inputs. A blend of the wish embodied in the first explanation and the hard-headedness o f the second seems plausible. Needless to say, the phase-out never came to pass. The Diem coup with the resulting political instability and deterioration of the military situation soon were to lead U.S. decision-makers to set aside this pla nning process. An ostensible cut-back of 1000 men did take place in December 196 3, but this was essentially an accounting exercise--and the U.S. force level pri or to the reduction had already reached 16,732 in October 1963. By December 1964 , U.S. strength had risen to 23,000 and further deployments were on the way. Wha t, then, did the whole phased-withdrawal exercise accomplish? It may have impede d demands for more men and money, but this is doubtful. If the optimistic report s on the situation in SVN were to be believed, and they apparently were, little more would have been requested. It may have frightened the GVN, but it did not i nduce Diem or his successors to reform the political apparatus or make RVNAF fig ht harder. It may have contributed, however, to public charges about the Adminis tration's credibility and overoptimism about the end of the conflict. Despite th e carefully worded White House announcement of the phase-out policy on October 2 , 1963, tentative Johnson Administration judgments came to be regarded by the pu blic as firm predictions. While this announcement made clear that the U.S. effor t would continue "until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the GVN are capable of suppressing it," the public tended to focus on the prognosis which followed--"Secretary McNamara and General Taylor r eported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be comp leted by the end of 1965 In August 1964, Mr. McNamara

further explained the policy: "We have said--as a matter of fact, I say today--a s our training missions are completed, we will bring back the training forces." Quite apart from what was actually accomplished by the phase-out policy and the costs in terms of domestic political perceptions of Administration statements on Vietnam, there are some important lessons to be learned from this exercise. Wha t was the U.S. rationale behind the policy? Was it sound, feasible, and consiste nt with statements of national objectives? By what policy and programmatic means were we trying to bring about the desired results? Were these, in fact, the mos t appropriate and effective vehicles? How did the intelligence and reporting sys tem in Vietnam help or hinder policy formulation? Why was not the Diem coup in i ts darkening aftermath grasped as the opportunity to reexamine policy and unambi guously to decide to phase out, or to do whatever was deemed necessary? The rati onale behind the phased withdrawal policy was by and large internally consistent and sensible. --To put Vietnam in the perspective of other U.S. world interests . Vietnam, at this time, was not the focal point of attention in Washington; Ber lin and Cuba were. Part of this exercise was to make clear that U.S. interests i n Europe and in the western hemisphere came first. Even in terms of Southeast As ia itself, Laos, not Vietnam, was the central concern. So, the phase-out policy made the kind of sense that goes along with the structuring of priorities. --To avoid an open-ended Asian mainland land war. Even though violated by U.S. involv ement in the Korean war, this was a central tenet of U.S. national security poli cy and domestic politics. The notion of the bottomless Asian pit, the difference in outlook about a human life, were well understood. --To plan for the continge ncy that events might force withdrawal upon us. Seen in this light, the planning process was prudential preparation. --To treat the insurgency as fundamentally a Vietnamese matter, best solved by the Vietnamese themselves. Most U.S. decisio n-makers had well-developed doubts about the efficacy of using "white faced" sol diers to fight Asians. This view was invariably coupled publicly and privately w ith statements like this one made by Secretary McNamara: "I personally believe t hat this is a war that the Vietnamese must fight . . . I don't believe we can ta ke on that combat task for them. I do believe we can carry out training. We can provide advice and logistical assistance." --To increase the pressure on the GVN to make the necessary reforms and to make RVNAF fight harder by making the exte nt and future of U.S. support a little more tenuous. This was explicitly stated in State's instructions to Ambassador Lodge on how to handle the White House sta tement of October, 1963: "Actions are designed to indicate to Diem Government ou r displeasure at its political policies and activities and to create significant uncertainty in that government and in key Vietnamese groups as to future

intentions of United States." In other words, phased withdrawal was thought of a s a bargaining counter with the GVN. --To put the lid on inevitable bureaucratic and political pressures for increased U.S. involvement and inputs into Vietnam. It was to be expected and anticipated that those intimately involved in the Vie tnam problem would be wanting more U.S. resources to handle that problem. Pressu res for greater effort, it was reasoned, eventually would come into play unless counteracted. What Secretary McNamara did was to force all theater justification s for force build-ups into tension with long-term phase-down plans. On 21 Decemb er, 1963, in a memo to the President after the Diem coup, Mr. McNamara urged hol ding the line: "U.S. resources and personnel cannot usefully be substantially in creased...." --To deal with international and domestic criticism and pressures. While Vietnam was not a front burner item, there were those who already had begu n to question and offer nonconsensus alternatives. During 1963, for example, bot h General de Gaulle and Senator Mansfield were strongly urging the neutralizatio n of Vietnam. It is difficult to sort out the relative importance of these varyi ng rationales; all were important. Paramount, perhaps, were the desires to limit U.S. involvement, and to put pressure on the GVN for greater efforts. And, the rationales were all consistent with one another. But they did not appear as bein g wholly consistent with other statements of our national objectives in Southeas t Asia. For example, on July 17, 1963, President Kennedy said: "We are not going to withdraw from [bringing about a stable government there, carrying on a strug gle to maintain its national independence]. In my opinion, for us to withdraw fr om that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast As ia." He added: "We can think of Vietnam as a piece of strategic real estate. It' s on the corner of mainland Asia, across the East-West trade routes, and in a po sition that would make it an excellent base for further Communist aggression aga inst the rest of free Asia." In a September 9, 1963 interview, the President sta ted: "I believe ['the domino theory']. I think that the struggle is close enough . China is so large, looms up high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guer rilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists." One could argue that su ch an unequivocally strong statement of strategic importance would not be consis tent with any sort of phase-out proposal short of a clear-cut victory over the c ommunists. Despite the caveats about it being essentially a South Vietnamese str uggle, President Kennedy's statements were very strong. And, insofar as the U.S. was interested in greater leverage on the GVN, these statements tended to reduc e U.S. bargaining power because of the explicit and vital nature of the commitme nt. The rationales behind the phased withdrawal policy were incorporated into a formal programming and planning process that began in July 1962 and ended on 27 March 1964. It was at the Honolulu Conference on 23 July 1962, the same day that the 14-nation neutralization declaration on Laos was formally signed, that the Secretary of Defense on guidance from the President put the planning machine in motion. Noting that

"tremendous progress" had been made in South Vietnam and that it might be diffic ult to retain public support for U.S. operations in Vietnam indefinitely, Mr. Mc Namara directed that a comprehensive long range program be developed for buildin g up SVN military capability and for phasing-out the U.S. role. He asked that th e planners assume that it would require approximately three years, that is, the end of 1965, for the RVNAF to be trained to the point that it could cope with th e VC. On 26 July, the JCS formally directed CINCPAC to develop a Comprehensive P lan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) in accordance with the Secretary's directives. Thu s began an intricate, involved and sometimes arbitrary bargaining process, invol ving mainly MACV, the Joint Staff, and ISA. There were two main pegs that persis ted throughout this process: MAP planning for the support and build-up of RVNAF, and draw-downs on U.S. advisory and training personnel. The first COMUSMACV CPS VN was floated on 19 January 1963. It envisioned MAP for FY 1963-1964 at a total of $405 million. The total for FY 1965-1968 was $673 million. The RVNAF force l evel was to peak in FY 64 at 458,000 men. U.S. personnel in SVN were to drop fro m a high of 12.2 thousand in FY 65 to 5.9 thousand in FY 66, bottoming out in FY 68 at 1.5 thousand (Hq MAAG). No sooner was this first CPSVN cranked into the p olicy machinery than it conflicted with similar OSD/ISA planning. This conflict between ISA/OSD guidance and COMUSMACV/Joint Staff planning was to be continued throughout the life of the CPSVN. Secretary McNamara opposed General Harkins ver sion of the plan for a variety of reasons: (1) it programmed too many RVNAF than were trainable and supportable; (2) it involved weaponry that was too sophistic ated; (3) it did not fully take account of the fact that if the insurgency came into control in FY 65 as anticipated, the U.S. MAP investment thereafter should be held at no more than $50 million per year; (4) the U.S. phaseout was too slow , and the RVNAF training had to be speeded up. In other words, Mr. McNamara want ed both a more rapid U.S. withdrawal of personnel, and a faster reduction in U.S . military/economic support. The Secretary's views prevailed. The embodiment of Mr. McNamara's desire to quicken the pace of phase-out planning was embodied fir st in a Model M plan prepared by the JCS and later in what came to be called the Accelerated Model Plan of the CPSVN. The Accelerated Plan provided for a rapid phaseout of the bulk of U.S. military personnel. It also provided for building u p GVN forces at a faster pace, but at a more reduced scale. MAP costs for FY 196 5-1969 totaled $399.4 million, or nearly $300 million lower than the original pr ojection. All of this planning began to take on a kind of absurd quality as the situation in Vietnam deteriorated drastically and visibly. Strangely, as a resul t of the public White House promise in October and the power of the wheels set i n motion, the U.S. did effect a 1000 man withdrawal in December of 1963. All the planning for phase-out, however, was either ignored or caught up in the new thi nking of January to March 1964 that preceded NSAM 288. The thrust of this docume nt was that greater U.S. support was needed in SVN. Mr. McNamara identified thes e measures as those that "will involve a limited increase in U.S. personnel and in direct Defense Department costs." He added: "More

significantly they involve significant increases in Military Assistance Program costs plus "additional U.S. economic aid to support the increased GVN budget." O n 27 March 1964, CINCPAC was instructed not to take any further action on the Ac celerated Plan. Quickly, requests for more U.S. personnel poured into Washington . The planning process was over, but not forgotten. Secretary McNamara stated in his August 1964 testimony on the Tonkin Gulf crisis that even today "if our tra ining missions are completed, we will bring back the training forces." While the phase-out policy was overtaken by the sinking after-effects of the Diem coup, i t is important to understand that the vehicles chosen to effect that policy--MAP planning, RVNAF and U.S. force levels--were the right ones. They were programma tic and, therefore, concrete and visible. No better way could have been found to convince those in our own government and the leaders of the GVN that we were se rious about limiting the U.S. commitment and throwing the burden onto the South Vietnamese themselves. The public announcement of the policy, on October 2, 1963 , after the McNamara-Taylor trip to Vietnam was also a wise choice. Even though this announcement may have contributed to the so-called "credibility gap," publi cation was a necessity. Without it, the formal and classified planning process w ould have seemed to be nothing more than a drill. While the choice of means was appropriate for getting a handle on the problem, it proceeded from some basic un realities. First, only the most Micawberesque predictions could have led decisio n-makers in Washington to believe that the fight. against the guerrillas would h ave clearly turned the corner by FY 65. Other nations' experience in internal wa rfare pointed plainly in the other direction. With more propitious circumstances , e.g. isolation from sanctuaries, the Philippine and Malayan insurgencies each took the better part of a dozen years to bring to an end. Second, there was an u nrealistic contradiction within the CPSVN itself. As directed by Secretary McNam ara, U.S. MAP was to decrease as RVNAF increased. In practical terms, MAP costs should have been programmed to increase as the South Vietnamese Army increased, and as they themselves began to bear most of the burden. The desire to keep MAP costs down after FY 65 could, at best, be perceived as a budgeting or program gi mmick not a serious policy. Three, the political situation in South Vietnam itse lf should have prompted more realistic contingency plans against failure of the Vietnamese, in order to give the U.S. some options other than what appeared as p recipitous withdrawal. The intelligence and reporting systems for Vietnam during this period must bear a principal responsibility for the unfounded optimism of U.S. policy. Except for some very tenuous caveats, the picture was repeatedly pa inted in terms of progress and success. In the July 1962 Honolulu Conference the tone was set. Secretary McNamara asked COMUSMACV how long it would take before the VC could be expected to be eliminated as a significant force. In reply, COMU SMACV estimated about one year from the time RVNAF and other forces became fully operational and began to press the VC in

all areas. Mr. McNamara was told and believed that there had been "tremendous pr ogress" in the past six months. This theme was re-echoed in April of 1963 by COM USMACV and by the intelligence community through an NIE. All the statistics and evaluations pointed to GVN improvement. While noting general progress, the NIE s tated that the situation remains flexible. Even as late as July 1963 a rosy pict ure was being painted by DIA and SACSA. The first suggestion of a contrary evalu ation within the bureaucracy came from INR. Noting disquieting statistical trend s since July, an unpopular INR memo stated that the "pattern showed steady decli ne over a period of more than three months duration." It was greeted with a stor m of disagreement, and in the end was disregarded. The first, more balanced eval uation came with the McNamara-Taylor trip report late in September and October, 1963. While it called the political situation "deeply serious," even this report was basically optimistic about the situation, and saw little danger of the poli tical crisis affecting the prosecution of the war. Not until after the Diem coup , the assassination of President Kennedy, and the December Vietnam trip of Secre tary McNamara was the Vietnam situation accurately assessed. In Secretary McNama ra's December memo to the President, after his trip, he wrote: "The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will l ead to a neutralization at best and more likely to a communist-controlled state. " One of the most serious deficiencies he found was a "grave reporting weakness on the U.S. side." Mr. McNamara's judgment, apparently, was not predominant. He noted in the concluding paragraph of his memo that he "may be overly pessimistic , inasmuch as the ambassador, COMUSMACV, and General Minh were not discouraged a nd look forward to significant improvements in January." By 6 March 1964 when an other major Secretary of Defense Conference convened at CINCPAC Headquarters, th e consensus was that the military situation was definitely deteriorating. The is sue was no longer whether there was or was not satisfactory progress; the questi on was how much of a setback had there been and what was needed to make up for i t. Mr. McNamara observed that attention should now be focused on near term objec tives of providing for necessary greater U.S. support. It was finally agreed tha t the insurgency could be expected to go beyond 1965. The intelligence and repor ting problem during this period cannot be explained away. In behalf of the evalu ators and assessors, it can be argued that their reporting up until the Diem cou p had some basis in fact. The situation may not have been too bad until December 1963. Honest and trained men in Vietnam looking at the problems were reporting what they believed reality to be. In retrospect, they were not only wrong, but m ore importantly, they were influential. The Washington decision-makers could not help but be guided by these continued reports of progress. Phased withdrawal wa s a good policy that was being reasonably well executed. In the way of our Vietn am involvement, it was overtaken by events. Not borne of deep conviction in the necessity for a U.S. withdrawal or in the necessity of forcing the GVN

to truly carry the load, it was bound to be submerged in the rush of events. A p olicy more determined might have used the pretext and the fact of the Diem coup and its aftermath as reason to push for the continuation of withdrawal. Instead, the instability and fear of collapse resulting from the Diem coup brought the U .S. to a decision for greater commitment. End of Summary CHRONOLOGY 23 Jul 62 Ge neva Accords on Laos 14-Nation declaration on the neutrality of Laos. 23 Jul 62 Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference, Honolulu Called to examine present and fu ture developments in South Vietnam--which looked good. Mr. McNamara initiated im mediate planning for the phase-out of U.S. military involvement by 1965 and deve lopment of a program to build a GVN military capability strong enough to take ov er full defense responsibilities by 1965. 26 Jul 62 JCS Message to CINCPAC CINCP AC was formally instructed to develop a "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" ( CPSVN) in line with instructions given at Honolulu. 14 Aug 62 CINCPAC Message to MACV MACV was directed to draw up a CPSVN designed to ensure GVN military and p aramilitary strength commensurate with its sovereign responsibilities. The CPSVN was to assume the insurgency would be under control in three years, that extens ive US support would be available during the three-year period; that those items essential to development of full RVNAF capability would be (largely) available through the military assistance program (MAP). Oct-Nov. 1962 GVN National Campai gn Plan developed In addition to the CPSVN, MACV prepared an outline for an inte grated, nationwide offensive military campaign to destroy the insurgency and res tore GVN control in South Vietnam. The concept was adopted by the GVN in Novembe r. 26 Nov 62 Military Reorganization Decreed Diem ordered realignment of militar y chain of command, reorganization of RVNAF, establishment of four CTZ's and a J oint Operations Center to centralize control over current military operations. ( JOC became operational on 20 December 1962.)

7 Dec 62 First Draft of CPSVN Completed CINCPAC disapproved first draft because of high costs and inadequate training provisions. 19 Jan 63 MACV Letter to C!NCP AC, 3010 Ser 0021 MACV submitted a revised CPSVN. Extended through FY 1968 and c oncurred in by the Ambassador, it called for GVN military forces to peak at 458, 000 in FY 1964 (RVNAF strength would be 230,900 in FY 1964); cost projected over six years would total $978 million. 22 Jan 63 OSD(ISA) Message to CINCPAC MAP-V ietnam dollar guide lines issued. Ceilings considerably different from and lower than those in CPSVN. 25 Jan 63 CINCPAC Letter to JCS, 1010, Ser 0079 Approved t he CPSVN, supported and justified the higher MAP costs projected by it. 7 Mar 63 JCSM 190-63 JCS recommended SecDef approve the CPSVN; supporting the higher MAP costs, JCS proposed CPSVN be the basis for revision of FY 1964 MAP and developm ent of FY 1965-69 programs. 20 Mar 63 USMACV "Summary of Highlights, 9 Feb 62-7 Feb 63" Reported continuing, growing RVNAF effectiveness, increased GVN strength economically and politically. The strategic hamlet program looked especially go od. MACV forecast winning the military phase in 1963-barring "greatly increased" VC reinforcement and resupply. 17 Apr 63 NIE 53-63 Although "fragile," the situ ation in SVN did not appear serious; general progress was reported in most areas . 6 May 63 Seventh SecDef Honolulu Conference Called to [word illegible] the CPS VN. Largely because of prevailing optimism over Vietnam, Mr. McNamara found the CPSVN assistance too costly, the planned withdrawal of U.S. forces too slow and RVNAF development misdirected. 9 May 63 Buddhist Crisis Begins

GVN forces fired on worshipers celebrating Buddha's birthday (several killed, mo re wounded) for no good cause. Long standing antipathy toward GVN quickly turned into active opposition. 8 May 63 Two SecDef Memoranda for ASD/ISA First: Direct ed joint ISA/JCS development of plans to replace US forces with GVN troops as so on as possible and to plan the withdrawal of 1,000 US troops by the end of 1963. Second: Requested the Office, Director of Military Assistance, ISA, "completely rework" the MAP program recommended in the CPSVN and submit new guidelines by 1 September. The Secretary felt CPSVN totals were too high (e.g., expenditures pr oposed for FY's 1965-68 could be cut by $270 Million in his view). 9 May 63 JCS Message 9820 to CINCPAC Directed CINCPAC to revise the CPSVN and program the wit h drawal of 1,000 men by the end of 1963. Force reduction was to be by US units (not individuals); units were to be replaced by specially trained RVNAF units. W ithdrawal plans were to be contingent upon continued progress in the counterinsu rgency campaign. 11 May 63 CINCPAC Letter to JCS, 3010 Ser 00447-63 CINCPAC reco mmended some changes, then approved MACV's revision of the CPSVN and the MACV pl an for withdrawal of 1,000 men. As instructed, those 1,000 men were drawn from l ogistic and service support slots; actual operations would be unaffected by thei r absence. 17 May 63 ASD/JSA Memorandum for the Secretary ISA's proposed MAP-Vie tnam program based on the Secretary's instructions was rejected as still too hig h. 29 May 63 OSD/JSA Message to CJNCPAC CINCPAC was directed to develop three al ternative MAP plans for FYs 1965-69 based on these levels: $585 M (CPSVN recomme ndation) $450 M (Compromise) $365 M (SecDef goal) MAP for FY 1964 had been set a t $180 M. 16 Jun 63 GVN-Buddhist Truce (State Airgram A-781 to Embassy Saigon, 1 0 June)

Reflected temporary and tenuous abatement of GVN-Buddhist hostilities which flar ed up in May. The truce was repudiated almost immediately by both sides. Buddhis t alienation from the GVN polarized; hostilities spread. 17 Jul 63 DIA Intellige nce Summary Reported the military situation was unaffected by the political cris is; GVN prospects for continued counterinsurgency progress were "certainly bette r" than in 1962; VC activity was reduced but VC capability essentially unimpaire d. 18 Jul 63 CINCPAC-proposed MAP program submitted to JCS CINCPAC suggested mil itary assistance programs at the three levels set by the JCS but recommended ado ption of a fourth Plan developed by CINCPAC. "Plan J" totalled $450.9 M over the five year period. 4 Aug 63 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Rather suddenly, Viet Cong offensive actions were reported high for the third consecutive week; the implic ation was that the VC were capitalizing on the political crisis and might step u p the insurgency. 14 Aug 63 SACSA Memorandum for the Secretary Discounted the im portance of increased VC activity; the comparative magnitude of attacks was low; developments did not yet seem salient or lasting. 20 Aug 63 Diem declared marti al law; ordered attacks on Buddhist pagodas This decree plus repressive measures against the Buddhists shattered hopes of reconciliation, and irrevocably isolat ed the Diem government. 20 Aug 63 JCSM629-63 CINCPAC/MACV proposed plan for 1,00 0-man withdrawal in three to four increments for planning purposes only; recomme nded final decision on withdrawal be delayed until October. 21 Aug 63 Director, DIA Memorandum for SecDef Estimated that Diem's acts will have "serious repercus sions" throughout SVN: foresaw more coup and counter-coup activity. But reported military operations were so far unaffected by these events. 27 Aug 63 JCSM 64063

JCS added yet a fifth "Model M" Plan to CINCPAC's four alternative MAP levels. P roviding for higher force levels termed necessary by the JCS, the Model M total was close to $400 M. JCS recommended the Model M Plan be approved. 30 Aug 63 OSD /JSA Memorandum for the Secretary Recommended approval of JCSM 629-63. But noted many "units" to be withdrawn were ad hoc creations of expendable support person nel, cautioned that public reaction to "phony" withdrawal would be damaging: sug gested actual strength and authorized ceiling levels be publicized and monitored . 3 Sep 63 SecDef Memorandum to CJCS Approved JCSM-629-63. Advised JCS against c reating special units as a means to cut back unnecessary personnel; requested th e projected US strength figures through 1963. 5 Sep 63 ASD/JSA Memorandum to the Secretary Concurred in JCS recommendation with minor reservations that the Mode l M Plan for military assistance to SVN be approved. 6 Sep 63 SecDef Memorandum for C/CS Approved Model M Plan as the basis for FY 65-69 MAP planning; advised t hat US materiel turned over to RVNAF must be charged to and absorbed by the auth orized Model M Plan ceilings. 11 Sep 63 C/CS Memorandum for SecDef Forwarded the military strength figures (August thru December) to SecDef; advised that the 1, 000-man withdrawal would be counted against the peak October strength (16,732). First increment was scheduled for withdrawal in November, the rest in December. 21 Sep 63 Presidential Memorandum for the SecDef Directed McNamara and Taylor (C JCS) to personally assess the critical situation in SVN--both political and mili tary; to determine what GVN action was required for change and what the US shoul d do to produce such action. 27 Sep 63 ASD/ISA (ODMA) "MAP Vietnam: Manpower and Financial Summary" Approved MAP totals reflected the Model M Plan: FY 1964: $18 0.6 M FY 1965-69: $211.6 M

Total: $392.2M The GVN force levels proposed were substantially below the Januar y CPSVN (from a peak strength in FY 1964 of 442,500, levels were to fall to 120, 200 in FY 1969). 26 Sep- 2 Oct 63 SecDef C/CS Mission to South Vietnam Positive detailed evidence presented in numerous briefings indicated conditions were good and would improve. Hence, the Secretary ordered acceleration of the planned U.S . force phase-out. 2 Oct 63 McNamara-Taylor Briefing for the President, and late r, the NSC Concluded the military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress, but warned that further Diem-Nhu repression could change the "pres ent favorable military trends." 3 Oct 63 McNamara-Taylor met with President and NSC The President approved the military recommendations made by the Secretary an d Chairman: --that MACV and Diem review changes necessary to complete the milita ry campaign in I, II, and III Corps by the end of 1964, in IV Corps by 1965: --t hat a training program be established to enable RVNAF to take over military func tions from the US by the end of 1965 when the bulk of US personnel could be with drawn: --that DOD informally announce plans to withdraw 1,000 men by the end of 1963. no further reductions in US strength would be made until requirements of t he 1964 campaign were clear. 11 Oct 63 NSAM 263 Approved the military recommenda tions contained in the McNamara-Taylor Report; directed no formal announcement b e made of implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 men by the end of 1963. 22 O ct 63 State Department INR Memo RFE-90 Assessed trends since July 1963 as eviden ce of an unfavorable shift in military balance. (This was one of the first indic ations that all was not as rosy as MACV et al had led McNamara and Taylor to bel ieve.) 1 Nov 63 Diem Government Overthrown

The feared political chaos, civil war and collapse of the war did not materializ e immediately; US Government was uncertain as to what the new circumstances mean t. General Minh headed the junta responsible for the coup. 20 Nov 63 All-agency Conference on Vietnam, Honolulu Ambassador Lodge assessed prospects as hopeful; recommended US continue the policy of eventual military withdrawal from SVN; sai d announced 1,000-man withdrawal was having salutary effects. MACV agreed. In th is light, officials agreed that the Accelerated Plan (speed-up of force withdraw al by six months directed by McNamara in October) should be maintained. McNamara wanted MAP spending held close to OSD's $175.5 million ceiling (because of acce leration, a FY 64 MAP of $187.7 million looked possible). 22 Nov 63 President Ke nnedy Assassinated One result: US Government policies in general were maintained for the sake of continuity, to allow the new administration time to settle and adjust. This tendency to reinforce existing policies arbitrarily, just to keep t hem going, extended the phase-out, withdrawal and MAP concepts-probably for too long. 23 Nov 63 SecDef Memorandum for the President Calling GVN political stabil ity vital to the war and calling attention to GVN financial straits, the Secreta ry said the US must be prepared to increase aid to Saigon. Funding well above cu rrent MAP plans was envisaged. 26 Nov 63 NSAM 273 President Johnson approved rec ommendations to continue current policy toward Vietnam put forward at the 20 Nov ember Honolulu meeting: reaffirmed US objectives on withdrawal. 3 Dec 63 [materi al missing] Region/ISA Memorandum for the ASD/ISA [words missing] nam developmen ts, for a "fresh new look" at the problem, second echelon leaders outlined a bro ad interdepartmental "Review of the South Vietnam Situation." This systematic ef fort did not culminate in high level national reassessment of specific policy re -orientation. 5 Dec 63 CINCPAC Message to JCS Submitted the Accelerated Model Pl an version of CPSVN. From a total of 15,200 in FY 1964, US military strength in Vietnam would drop to 11,500 in FY 1965 (vice 13,100

recommended by the Model M Plan), to about 3,200 in FY 1966 and 2,600 in FY 1967 . GVN force levels were a bit lower but GVN force build-up a bit faster than rec ommended by the Model M Plan. MAP costs for FYs 1965-1969 totalled $399.4 millio n (vice $392.2 million under Model M Plan). 11 Dec 63 CM 1079-63 for SecDef The adjusted year-end strength figure was 15,394. Although 1,000 men were technicall y withdrawn, no actual reduction of US strength was achieved. The December figur e was not 1,000 less than the peak October level. 13 Dec 63 Director, DIA Memora ndum for the Secretary Reported the VC had improved combat effectiveness and for ce posture during 1963, that VC capability was unimpaired. (Quite a different pi cture had been painted by SACSA in late October: "An Overview of the Vietnam War , 1960-1963," personally directed to the Secretary, was a glowing account of ste ady militaryprogress.) 30 Jan 64 Second Coup in Saigon General Minh's military r egime was replaced by a junta headed by General Khanh. 10, 11, 14, 19 Feb 64 Dep uty Director, CIA Memoranda for SecDef, SecState, et al Suspicious of progress r eports, CIA sent a special group to "look at" South Vietnam. Its independent eva luation revealed a seriousand steadily deteriorating GVN situation. Vietcong gai ns and, significantly, the quality and quantity of VC arms had increased. The St rategic Hamlet Program was "at virtual standstill." The insurgency tide seemed t o be "going against GVN" in all four Corps. 6 Mar 64 Eighth SecDef Conference on Vietnam, Honolulu Participants agreed that the military situation was definitel y deteriorating, that insurgency would probably continue beyond 1965, that the U S must immediately determine what had to be done to make up for the setback(s). 9-16 Mar 64 McNamara/Taylor Trip to Vietnam Personally confirmed the gravity of the Vietnam situation. 16 Mar 64 SecDef Memorandum for the President: "Report on Trip to Vietnam" Mr. McNamara reported the situation was "unquestionably" worse than in September. (RVNAF desertion rates were up: GVN military position was we ak and the Vietcong, with increased NVN support, was strong.) Concluding that mo re US support was necessary, the Secretary made twelve ecommendations. These inc luded:

--More economic assistance, military training, equipment and advisory assistance , as needed. --Continued high-level US overflights of GVN borders; authorization for "hot pursuit" and ground operations in Laos. --Prepare to initiate--on 72 h ours' notice--Laos and Cambodia border control operations and retaliatory action s against North Vietnam. --Make plans to initiate--on 30 days' notice--a "progra m of Graduated Overt Military Pressures" against North Vietnam. Mr. McNamara cal led the policy of reducing existing US personnel where South Vietnamese could as sume their functions "still sound" but said no major reductions could be expecte d in the near future. He felt US training personnel could be substantially reduc ed before the end of 1965. 17 Mar 64 NSAM 299 The President approved the twelve recommendations presented by Mr. McNamara and directed all agencies concerned to carry them out promptly. [material missing] forces was superseded by the policy of providing South Vietnam assistance and support as long as required to bring aggression and terrorism under control (as per NSAM 288). 6 May 64 CINCPAC Messa ge to MACV Indicated growing US military commitment: this 1500-man augmentation raised the total authorized level to 17,000. 1-2 Jun 64 Special Meeting on South east Asia, Honolulu Called in part to examine the GVN National Campaign Plan--wh ich was failing. The conferees agreed to increase RVNAF effectiveness by extendi ng and intensifying the US advisory effort as MACV recommended. 25 Jun 64 MACV M essage 325390 to JCS Formal MACV request for 900 additional advisory personnel. His justification for advisors at the battalion level and for more advisors at d istrict and sector levels was included. Also, 80 USN advisors were requested to establish a Junk Force and other maritime counterinsurgency measures. 4 Jul 64 C JNCPAC Message to JCS CINCPAC recommended approval of the MACV proposal for inte nsification of US advisory efforts.

15 Jul 64 Saigon EMBTEL 108 Ambassador Taylor reported that revised VC strength estimates now put the enemy force between 28,000 and 34,000. No cause for alarm, he said the new estimate did demonstrate the magnitude of the problem and the n eed to raise the level of US/GVN efforts. Taylor thought a US strength increase to 21,000 by the end of the year would be sufficient. 16 Jul 64 MACV Message 618 0 to CINCPAC MACV requested 3,200 personnel to support the expansion (by 900) of US advisory efforts-or 4,200 more men over the next nine months. 17 Jul 64 EMBT EL Ambassador Taylor concurred in MACV's proposed increase, recommended prompt a pproval and action. 21 Jul 64 State 205 to Saigon Reported Presidential approval (at the 21 July NSC meeting) of the MACV deployment package. Dec 64 Further inc reases Total US strength was 23,000: further deployments were on the way I. 1962 A. EARLY 1962 From mid-1962 to early 1964 the U.S. government went through a fo rmal planning process, ostensibly designed to disengage the U.S. from direct and large-scale military involvement in Vietnam. In retrospect, this experience fal ls into place as a more or less isolated episode of secondary importance; eventu ally abortive, it had little impact on the evolution of the Vietnam war. It does , however, serve as a vehicle for understanding one long phase of the war and th e U.S. role in it. The genesis lay in a conjuncture of circumstances during the first half of 1962 that prompted the U.S. to shift its Vietnam perspective from the hitherto restricted one of largely tactical responses to current, localized, and situational requirements, to fitting these to more strategic and purposeful long-range courses of action. The expanded perspective was programmatic in outl ook, and oriented toward specific goals-end the insurgency and withdraw militari ly from Vietnam.

At the outset, the motivation for the idea of phased withdrawal of U.S. forces w as threefold: in part, the belief that developments in Vietnam itself were going well; in part, doubt over the efficacy of using U.S. forces in an internal war; and in part, the demands of other crises in the world that were more important to Washington than Vietnam. In the course of materializing into policy and assum ing form as plans, these premises were transformed into conclusions, desiderata institutionalized as objectives, and wish took on the character and force of imp erative. For example, in March 1962, Secretary McNamara testified before Congres s that he was "optimistic" over prospects for U.S. success in aiding Vietnam, an d "encouraged at the progress the South Vietnamese are making." He expressed con viction that the U.S. would attain its objectives there. But he emphasized that the U.S. strategy was to avoid participating directly in the war while seeking a n early military conclusion: I would say definitely we are approaching it from t he point of view of trying to clean it up, and terminating subversion, covert ag gression, and combat operations.... .....We are wise to carry on the operations against the Communists in that area by assisting native forces rather than by us ing U.S. forces for combat. Not only does that release U.S. forces for use elsew here in the world or for stationing in the United States, but also it is probabl y the most effective way to combat the Communist subversion and covert aggressio n. To introduce white forces--U.S. forces--in large numbers there today, while i t might have an initial favorable military impact would almost certainly lead to adverse political and in the long run adverse military operations. And therefor e, we think the program we are carrying out is the most effective one and certai nly it is directed toward termination of operations as rapidly as possible. In l ate spring of 1962, the military situation in South Vietnam showed hopeful signs of at last having turned a corner. The various programs under way, initiated th e previous fall as a result of decisions in NSAM No. 111, appeared to be bearing out the basic soundness of the new approach. Assessments and evaluations being reported from the field indicated a pattern of progress on a broad front, and th eir consistency through time reinforced the impression. By midyear the prospects looked bright. Continuing favorable developments flOW held forth the promise of eventual success, and to many the end of the insurgency seemed in sight. This o ptimism was not without the recognition that there were unsolved political probl ems and serious soft spots in certain areas of the military effort. But U.S. lea dership, both on the scene in Vietnam as well as in Washington, was confident an d cautiously optimistic. In some quarters, even a measure of euphoria obtained. At the same time, events outside Vietnam, some of them ostensibly unrelated, wer e asserting a direct and immediate relevance for U.S. policy and strategy in Vie tnam. As competing priorities, they far overshadowed Vietnam. In the larger sche me of things, an indefinite military commitment in Southeast Asia was being rele gated perforce to a parenthetical diversion the nation could then ill afford. Mo re central issues in Berlin, Cuba, and in Laos were at stake, perhaps even to th e extent of survival.

Looming foremost was the Berlin problem. Fraught with grave overtones of potenti al nuclear confrontation with the USSR, it reached crisis proportions in the spr ing of 1962 over the air corridor issue, and after a temporary lull, flared anew in early summer. By the first of July it was again as tense as ever. U.S. reser ves had been recalled to active duty, additional forces were deployed to Europe, and domestic Civil Defense activities, including shelter construction programs, were accelerated. The burgeoning Cuba problem too was taking on a pressing urge ncy by virtue of both its proximity and growing magnitude. The Castro aspects al one were becoming more than a vexing localized embarrassment. Given the volatile Caribbean political climate, Cuban inspired mischief could raise tensions to th e flash point momentarily. Moreover, by early summer of 1962 increasing evidence of Soviet machinations to exploit Cuba militarily was rapidly adding an alarmin g strategic dimension. Though the nature and full significance of these latter d evelopments would not be revealed until the climactic Cuban Missile Crisis a few months later, the U.S. was already apprehensive of serious danger on its very d oorstep. Official interpretive evaluations at the time saw an intimate causal ne xus between Berlin and Cuba. Finally, another set of factors altering the strate gic configuration in Southeast Asia and affecting the U.S. position there also c ame to a head in mid-summer of 1962. These were developments regarding Laos, whi ch impinged upon and helped reshape the U.S. relationship toward Vietnam. In the fall of 1961 and through the spring of 1962 the U.S., its objectives frustrated in Laos, had decided to salvage as much as possible by settling for neutralizat ion. After lengthy and complex diplomatic maneuvering, this was essentially achi eved by early summer. On 23 July 1962 the 14-nation declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos was signed formally, ending the 15-month Geneva Conferenc e on Laos. The outcome had at once the effect of extricating the U.S. from one i nsoluble dilemma and serving as a stark object lesson for another. The Laos sett lement now both allowed the U.S. a free hand to concentrate on Vietnam and provi ded the incentive and determination to bring to a close its military commitment there as well-but this time successfully. It was in this spirit and context that the U.S. decided to pursue actively the policy objective of divesting itself of direct military involvement of U.S. per-sonnet in the Vietnam insurgency. The a im was to create militarily favorable conditions so that further U.S. military i nvolvement would no longer be needed. To this end, two prerequisites had to be s atisfied: bringing the insurgency effectively under control; and simultaneously, developing a militarily viable South Vietnam capable of carrying its own defens e burden without U.S. military help. In phase with the progress toward both thes e goals, there then could be proportionate reductions in U.S. forces. B. THE SEC RETARY OF DEFENSE HONOLULU DECISIONS OF JULY 1962 In July 1962, as the prospect of the neutralization of Laos by the Geneva Conference became imminent, policy a ttention deliberately turned toward the remaining Vietnam problem. At the behest of the President, the Secretary of Defense undertook to reexamine

the situation there and address himself to its future-with a view to assuring th at it be brought to a successful conclusion within a reasonable time. Accordingl y, he called a full-dress conference on Vietnam at CINCPAC Headquarters in Hawai i. On 23 July, the same day that the 14-nation neutralization declaration on Lao s was formally signed in Geneva, the Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference conve ned in Honolulu. The series of briefings and progress reports presented at the c onference depicted a generally favorable situation. Things were steadily improvi ng and promised to continue. Most programs underway were moving forward, as the statistical indicators clearly demonstrated. Those directly related to prosecuti on of the counterinsurgency effort showed measurable advances being made toward winning the war. Programs for expanding and improving RVNAF capability were like wise coming along well, and in most cases were ahead of schedule. Confidence and optimism prevailed. Impressed, Mr. McNamara acknowledged that the "tremendous p rogress" in the past six months was gratifying. He noted, however, that these ac hievements had been the result of short-term ad hoc actions on a crash basis. Wh at was needed now was to conceive a longrange concerted program of systematic me asures for training and equipping the RVNAF and for phasing out major U.S. advis ory and logistic support activities. The Secretary then asked how long a period it would take before the VC could be expected to be eliminated as a significant force. COMUSMACV, in reply to the direct question, estimated about one year from the time the RVNAF, the Civil Guard, and the SelfDefense Corps became fully ope rational and began to press the VC in all areas. The Secretary said that a conse rvative view had to be taken and to assume it would take three years instead of one, that is, by the latter part of 1965. He observed that it might be difficult to retain public support for U.S. operations in Vietnam indefinitely. Political pressures would build up as losses continued. Therefore, he concluded, planning must be undertaken now and a program devised to phase out U.S. military involve ment. He, therefore, directed that a comprehensive long-range program be develop ed for building up South Vietnamese military capability for taking over defense responsibilities and phasing out the U.S. role, assuming that it would require a pproximately three years (end 1965) for the RVNAF to be trained to the point tha t they could cope with the VC. The program was to include training requirements, equipment requirements, U.S. advisory requirements, and U.S. units. For the rec ord, the formulation of the decisions made and the directives for action to be t aken resulting from the Conference was as follows: a. Prepare plans for the grad ual scaling down of USMACV during the next 3-year period, eliminating U.S. units and detachments as Vietnamese were trained to perform their functions. b. Prepa re programs with the objective of giving South Vietnam an adequate military capa bility without the need for special U.S. military assistance, to include (1) a l ongrange training program to establish an officer corps able to manage GVN milit ary

operations, and (2) a long-range program and requirements to provide the necessa ry materiel to make possible a turnover to RVNAF three years from July 1962. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, had been augmented in 1961 by aviation, communications, and intelligence units, as well as by Special Forces and other advisers. The Secretary of Defense plainly intended that plans be devi sed for terminating the mission of the augmenting units. Three days later on 26 July, the JCS formally directed CINCPAC to develop a Comprehensive Plan for Sout h Vietnam (CPSVN) in accordance with the Secretary's decisions of 23 July. CINCP AC, in turn, so instructed COMUSMACV on 14 August, at the same time furnishing a dditional guidance and terms of reference elaborating on the original SecDef dec isions at Honolulu and the JCS directive. The stated objective of the CPSVN was given as: Develop a capability within military and para-military forces of the G VN by the end of CY 65 that will help the GVN to achieve the strength necessary to exercise permanent and continued sovereignty over that part of Vietnam which lies below the demarcation line without the need for continued U.S. special mili tary assistance. Development of the plan was to be based on the following assump tions: a. The insurgency will be under control at the end of three years (end of CY 65). b. Extensive U.S. support will continue to be required during the three year period, both to bring the insurgency under control and to prepare GVN forc es for early take-over of U.S. activities. c. Previous MAP funding ceilings for SVN are not applicable. Program those items essential to do this job. C. NATIONA L CAMPAIGN PLAN Planning, in two complementary modes, got underway, immediately. Concurrently with development of the unilateral U.S. CPSVN, USMACV planners pre pared a concept and proposed outline of a GVN National Campaign Plan (NCP) for l aunching an integrated nation-wide campaign of offensive military operations to eliminate the insurgency and restore the country to GVN control. A central purpo se was to reorganize and redispose the VNAF and streamline the chain of command, in order to improve responsiveness, coordination, and general effectiveness of the military effort against the VC. Greater authority would be centralized in th e Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS); Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs) would be inc reased from three to four; and each CTZ would have its own direct air and naval support. Over and above organizational considerations, the NCP provided for syst ematic intensification of aggressive operations in all CTZs to keep the VC off b alance, while simultaneously conducting clear and hold operations in support of the expanding

Strategic Hamlet Program. Priority of military tasks was first to concentrate on areas north of Saigon, then gradually shift toward the south to Saigon and the Delta. The proposed NCP was submitted to the GVN in October and a month later wa s adopted in concept and outline. On 26 November, President Diem promulgated the necessary implementing decrees and directives to effect the reorganization of t he SVN armed forces and realign the chain of command. An integrated Joint Operat ions Center (JOC) was also established and became operational on 20 December, wi th representation from JGS and its counterpart in USMACV to centralize control o ver current operations. The following January the draft of a detailed implementi ng plan for the NCP itself was completed and subsequently approved. II. 1963 A. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SOUTH VIETNAM Meanwhile, the first cut at the CPSVN was a lso completed by the MACV planners. It was forwarded to CINCPAC on 7 December, b ut CINCPAC, upon reviewing the proposed plan, considered it infeasible because o f the high costs involved and the marginal capacity of the RVNAF to train the ne cessary personnel in the required skills within the time frame specified. As a r esult of CINCPAC's reaction to the initial version, the CPSVN was revised and re submitted by COMUSMACV on 19 January 1963. The new CPSVN covered the period FY 1 963-1968. In transmitting it, COMUSMACV recommended that future Military Assista nce Programs (MAPs) be keyed therefore to the CPSVN. He also indicated that the CPSVN had been coordinated with the Ambassador, who concurred in it. Force level s laid out in the CPSVN provided for total personnel increases reaching a peak o f 458,000 (regular and para-military) in FY 64, with RVNAF manning strength rais ed from 215,000 to a peak of 230,000 in the same FY period and remaining on that plateau thereafter. Order of magnitude costs (in $ millions) of the CPSVN would come to: FY63 187 FY64 218 FY65 153 FY66 138 FY67 169 FY68 113 Total 978 CINCPAC approved the CPSVN as submitted and sent it on to the JCS. However, in t he interim, OSD had issued dollar guidelines for MAP planning for Vietnam. The c eilings indicated therein were significantly at variance with the costing figure s employed by MACV in developing the CPSVN. When CINCPAC forwarded the plan, the refore, he went to considerable lengths to explain the discrepancies and to supp ort and justify the higher costs. Comparison of the DOD dollar guidelines with t he CPSVN, projected through FY 69, showed a net difference of approximately 66 m illion dollars, with the preponderance of the increase occurring in FY 64. Most of this difference was accounted for by additional Packing-Crating-Handling-Tran sportation (PCHT) costs associated with the CPSVN but not accommodated in the DO D guideline figures.

The body of the CPSVN laid out the costs in relation to the DOD dollar guideline s, as follows: CPSVN-DOD DOLLAR GUIDELINES COST COMPARISON ($ millions) FY64 CPS VN * 218 DOD Guidelines 160 Difference +58 PORT Added +11 Difference +69 * Exclu des PCHT. The rationale offered was that, in order to prosecute the counter-insu rgency to a successful conclusion, while at the same time building up GVN capabi lity to allow early withdrawal of U.S. forces, the major costs of the program ha d to be compressed into the FY 63-65 time frame, with a particular increase in F Y 64 and another following U.S. withdrawal in FY 67. But clearly most of the gre ater cost throughout the period reflected PCHT. The pattern of force levels for all South Vietnamese forces that the CPSVN provided for, including the separate non-MAP funded Civilian Irregular Defense Group, is shown in Figure 1. [Figure 1 missing.] Since the ultimate objective of the CPSVN was early withdrawal of U.S . special military assistance, the plan provided for phasing out U.S. advisory f orces. The affected major commands of USMACV that would largely not be required after FY 66 were: 1. The U.S. Marine Element which provided helicopter transport ation support. 2. The 2d Air Division which provided the USAF portion of the spe cial military assistance support performed in SVN. This support included "Farmga te" (Fighter), "Mule Train" (Transportation), and "Able Mable" (Reconnaissance). It also provided USAF administration and logistical support for USAF personnel and equipment engaged in special military assistance to SVN. 3. U.S. Army Suppor t Group Vietnam (USASGV) which provided the U.S. Army portion of the special mil itary assistance support for SVN (except that performed by MAAG and Headquarters MACV), including helicopter and fixed wing air transportation, signal communica tions, and special forces. It also provided U.S. administrative and logistical s upport for assigned and attached personnel and equipment engaged in the special military assistance. FY65 153 165 -12 +11 -1 FY66 138 160 -22 +11 -11 FY67 169 1 50 +19 +11 +30 FY 68 113 140 -27 +10 -17 FY 69 110 122 -12 +8 -4 Total 901 897 + 4 +62 +66

4. Headquarters Support Activity Saigon (HSAS) which provided administrative sup port to the U.S. Headquarters and other U.S. government sponsored agencies and a ctivities located in Saigon. 5. MAAG Vietnam would have its strength reduced by one-half after FY 65. Only 1,500 MAAG personnel were to remain in country after FY 68. The target schedule for U.S. force withdrawal, as then forecast, is conta ined in Figure 2. FIGURE 2 CPSVN - Forecast of Phase-Out of U.S. Forces (thousan ds) Organization HQ USMACV HQ MAAG 2D Air DIV USASG (V) USMC Helicopter Unit HSA S TOTAL FY 63 .3 3.0 2.2 5.1 .5 .5 11.6 FY 64 .4 3.0 2.3 5.5 .5 .5 12.2 FY 65 .4 3.0 2.3 5.5 .5 .5 12.2 FY 66 .1 1.7 1.1 2.7 .0 .3 5.9 FY 67 .0 1.6 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.6 FY 68 .0 1.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.5 On 7 March 1963, the JCS accepted the MACV CPSVN in toto and forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense. They recommended approval, and proposed that it be the ba sis for both revising the FY 64 MAP and development of the FY 65-69 MAPs. They r equested an early decision on the CPSVN because the greatest increase would occu r in the FY 64 MAP. The JCS fully supported the higher costs of the CPSVN above the DOD dollar guidelines. In OSD, the proposed CPSVN underwent staffing review in ISA MA Plans and elsewhere. Draft responses to the JCS were prepared and then withdrawn. Secretary McNamara was not satisfied with either the high funding le vels or the adequacy of the plan regarding exactly how the RVN forces were to ta ke over from the U.S. to effect the desired phase-out of the U.S. military commi tment. In mid-April he decided to withhold action pending full review of the CPS VN at another Honolulu conference which he expressly scheduled for that purpose for 6 May. Meantime, the various OSD agencies concerned were instructed to prepa re detailed analyses and background studies for him. The main focus of interest of the Secretary of Defense was on the policy objective behind the CPSVN, namely , to reduce systematically the scale of U.S. involvement until phased out comple tely. However, the beginnings of a counter-current were already evident. New dem ands for increases all around were to overwhelm the phasing out objective. Ad ho c requirements for more U.S. forces were being generated piecemeal, each in its own right

sufficiently reasonable and so honored. This current, counter-current dynamic ca n be illustrated well by Mr. McNamara's decisions of late March. As part of the Secretary's policy of demanding strict accounting and tight control on authorize d U.S. in-country strength ceilings, he asked for the latest reading on projecte d U.S. military strength to be reached in Vietnam. He was reassured by the Chair man, JCS, that the estimated peak would not exceed 15,640 personnel. Yet, on thi s very same day, the Secretary approved a substantial force augmentation, reques ted earlier, for FARMGATE and airlift support, involving 111 additional aircraft and a total of approximately 1475 additional personnel. Other similar special r equirements and ad hoc approvals soon were to follow. Assessments of continuing favorable developments in the improving Vietnam situation in the spring of 1963 seemed to warrant more than ever going ahead with the planned phase out. The gen eral tenor of appraisals at the USMACV level were that the RVNAF had regained th e initiative from the VC and that the GVN position had improved militarily, econ omically, and politically. Evaluations expressed in the "Summary of Highlights" covering the first year of MACV's existence cited in detail the record of the in creasing scale, frequency, and effectiveness of RVNAF operations, while those of the VC were declining. Casualty ratios favored RVNAF by more than two to one, a nd the balance of weapons captured vs weapons lost had also shifted to the GVN s ide. Cited as perhaps the most significant progress was the Strategic Hamlet Pro gram. The future looked even brighter, e.g., ". . . barring greatly increased re supply and reinforcement of the Viet Cong by infiltration, the military phase of the war can be virtually won in 1963." Other evaluations, though more conservat ive, still tended to corroborate this optimism. NIE 53-63, issued 17 April 1963, found no particular deterioration or serious problems in the military situation in South Vietnam; on the contrary, it saw some noticeable improvements and gene ral progress over the past year. The worst that it could say was that the situat ion "remains fragile." B. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HONOLULU DECISIONS OF MAY 1963 At the 6 May Honolulu Conference, briefing reports again confirmed gratifying prog ress in the military situation. Addressing the CPSVN, Mr. McNamara questioned th e need for more Vietnamese forces in FY 68 (224.4 thousand) than the present lev el of 215 thousand. His reasoning was that a poor nation of 12 million like Viet nam could not support that many men under arms. Qualitatively, furthermore, the planned evolution of VNAF seemed over-ambitious in terms of sophisticated weapon ry such as fighter aircraft. In sum, the Secretary felt the CPSVN assumed an unr ealistically high force level for the SVN military establishment and assigned it equipment that was both unduly complicated to operate and expensive to procure and maintain. Based on these considerations, the Secretary of Defense concluded that, if the insurgency came under control in FY 65 as anticipated, the U.S. MAP investment in SVN thereafter should not be more than at the rate of about $50 m illion per year. In his view, thus, the $573 million MAP proposed in the CPSVN f or the period FY 65 through FY 68 was at least $270 million higher than an accep table program.

With regard to phasing out U.S. forces, the Secretary of Defense stated that the pace contemplated in the CPSVN was too slow. He wanted it revised to accomplish a more rapid withdrawal by accelerating training programs in order to speed up replacement of U.S. units by GVN units as fast as possible. While recognizing th at the build-up of RVNAF was inherently a slow process, he stressed that in the instance of some U.S. units which had been in SVN since 1961, it would be possib le more rapidly to transfer functions to Vietnamese. Specifically toward this en d, he decided that 1,000 U.S. military personnel should be withdrawn from South Vietnam by the end of CY 63 and directed that concrete plans be so drawn up. On returning to Washington the Secretary of Defense instructed the ASD(ISA) on 8 Ma y to develop, in coordination with the Joint Staff, a plan for replacing U.S. fo rces currently deployed in Vietnam with indigenous SVN forces as rapidly as poss ible, and particularly, to prepare a plan for withdrawing 1,000 U.S. troops befo re the end of 1965. In another memorandum the same day to the ASD(ISA) regarding the MAP, he noted that "the plan needs to be completely reworked." He therefore instructed ISA also to develop a new, lower MAP for Vietnam for the period FY 6 5 through 69, requesting that the ISA recommendations be submitted by the first of September. A day later, on 9 May, the JCS formally directed CINCPAC to take t he necessary actions resulting from the Honolulu Conference and revise the CPSVN . Guidance and terms of reference were provided reflecting the Secretary of Defe nse reactions and specifying the decisions reached. Singled out especially was t he requirement for U.S. force withdrawal. The JCS directive read: As a matter or urgency a plan for the withdrawal of about 1,000 U.S. troops before the end of the year should be developed based upon the assumption that the progress of the counterinsurgency campaign would warrant such a move. Plans should be based upon withdrawal of US units (as opposed to individuals) by replacing them with selec ted and specially trained RVNAF units. COMUSMACV in turn was tasked to draft the revised CPSVN and prepare a plan for the 1000-man reduction. CINCPAC, after som e changes and revisions, concurred in the proposed plans and forwarded them to t he JCS on 11 May. The revised outline CPSVN now provided for the following SVN f orce levels (in thousands): FY64 FY65 FY66 FY67 FY68 FY69 Total Military and Par amilitary 447.4 445.5 362.9 317.1 268.8 214.7 MAP levels provided for were as follows (in $ millions): FY 64 178.9 FY 65 149.0 FY 66 130.3 FY 67 120.4 FY 68 100.5 FY 69 85.0 Grand Total 764.1

The proposed plan for withdrawal of the first increment of U.S. forces, in compl iance with instructions, emphasized units rather than individuals, but the list of so-called "units" scheduled to be included were all smaller than company size . All Services were represented. The criteria employed, also based on earlier gu idance, were to select most of the personnel from service support and ogistics s kills most easily spared and whose release would have least effect on )perations . The total came to 1,003 U.S. military personnel to be withdrawn rom South Viet nam by the end of December 1963. 7. MAP PLANNING ISA meanwhile developed tentati ve dollar guidelines for MAP planning for Vietnam. The first cut, based on the S ecretary of Defense's own suggested total for the FY 65-69 period, was rejected by the Secretary of Defense as too high and returned, with various desired reduc tions entered by the Secretary of Defense. Reconciling the MAP with the CPSVN pr oved to be a difficult problem. As CPSVN succeeded, it was logical that MAP woul d have to increase; yet CPSVN tried to cut back MAP as well. For instance, the c ontemplated phase-out of U.S. artillery-spotter aircraft squadrons entailed an a dd-on to MAP to accommodate the squadron's equipment and maintenance after trans ferral to the Vietnamese. [Material missing] therefore would have to be absorbed within the authorized Model Plan ceilings. Nonetheless, there were still furthe r refinements made. As finally published, the approved MAP reflecting the Model M Plan version of the CPSVN provided for the following SVN active military stren gth levels (in thousands): FY64 FY65 FY66 FY67 FY68 FY69 207.5 201.3 177.5 124.5 104.8 103.9 ARVN Total (All Services regular 442.5 437.0 340.2 142.1 122.2 120.2 and para-mi litary) Costing levels were as follows (in $ millions): FY64 180.6 FY65 153.0 FY 66 107.7 FY67 46.2 FY68 44.6 FY69 40.7 Total 392.2 This final product represented a radical reduction in both force levels and fina ncial investment after FY 66, consistent with the Administration's original poli cy goal of ending the war and the U.S. military involvement by December 1965. D. 1000-MAN WITHDRAWAL PLAN

Meanwhile, planning for the 1000-man withdrawal directed by the Secretary of Def ense on 6 May was split off from the CPSVN proper and the MAP, and was being tre ated as a separate entity. On 20 August, the JCS, concurring in the proposed pla n developed by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense. They recommended approval at this time for planning purposes only; final decisio n was to depend upon circumstances as they developed. The JCS also seconded CINC PAC's added proposal to withdraw the 1000 troops in three or four increments, ra ther than all at one time. The reasons given were that this would be more practi cal and efficient for the U.S., would minimize the impact on on-going military o perational activities within South Vietnam, and would afford the opportunity for "news prominence and coverage over an extended period of time." ISA, with certa in reservations, recommended approval of the withdrawal plan submitted by JCS. I SA pointed out to the Secretary of Defense that the plan as it stood would not d raw all of the 1000 troops from U.S. units that were to be relieved by adequatel y trained SVN units, as had been intended. Many of the so-called "units" designa ted therein actually were not bona fide existing units but were specially formed "service support units" made up of random individuals most easily spared throug hout USMACV. ISA cautioned that the arbitrary creation of such ad hoc "units" so lely for the purpose of the withdrawal might backfire in press reaction. ISA als o recommended, in order to show credibly that the final year-end U.S. in-country strength had dropped by 1000 from peak strength, that U.S. military strength fi gures in Vietnam be made public, and that the actual strength as well as the aut horized ceilings at any given time be carefully monitored to insure that the des ired reductions were indeed achieved. A few days later the Secretary of Defense approved the 1000-man withdrawal plan forwarded in JCSM-629-63 as recommended. H e agreed, however. with ISA and advised the JCS against creating special units i f their only purpose was to be a holding unit as a vehicle for withdrawal of ind ividuals. He also requested that he be provided with a projection of U.S. milita ry strength in South Vietnam, by month, for the period September through Decembe r 1963. The following week the Chairman, JCS, responded to the Secretary of Defe nse's request and furnished the following projection of end-of-month U.S. milita ry strengths in South Vietnam: August: 16,201 September: 16,483 October: 16,732 November: 16,456 December: 15,732 It was noted that the planned 1000-man withdra wal would represent a reduction based on the October peak strength. The first in crement of 276 personnel would be withdrawn during November and the remaining in crements in December. This, as it turned out, was destined to be changed somewha t before the withdrawal was executed.

E. THE BUDDHIST CRISIS While the CPSVN-MAP and withdrawal planning were going on , significant developments altering the character of the entire situation to whi ch the plan-fling effort was addressed--in fact threatening to invalidate the ve ry premises from which the planning sprung--were occurring within South Vietnam. The Buddhist crisis was rocking the foundations of what precarious political st ability the Diem government enjoyed and there was growing concern about its effe ct on the prosecution of the war against the VC and on improvements of RVNAF. A series of incidents beginning early in May revealed the deep divisions between m ilitant Buddhist factions, who purported to speak for the bulk of the South Viet namese population, and the Government. Lack of popular support for the Diem regi me had now turned to open opposition. As passions flared and Buddhist activism w as met with increasingly severe countermeasures, violence spread and grew more s erious. A tenuous truce was reached briefly between Buddhist leaders and the GVN on 10 June (formally signed on 16 June) in a mutual effort to reduce tensions-b ut proved short-lived. Almost immediately the actions of both sides repudiated t he agreements. The U.S. began to be apprehensive about the possible consequences of the Diem government falling as the result of a coup. By early July, the cris is was recognized as serious at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Throu gh mid-July assessments remained reasonably reassuring. There was little evidenc e of impact on the military sector. In fact, indications pointed to the military situation continuing to improve. DIA reported on 17 July that the general level of VC-initiated actions during the first six months of 1963 was considerably lo wer than for the same period the year before. Battalion and company-size attacks were at about half the 1962 level. It was noted, however, that despite reduced activity, VC capability remained essentially unimpaired. Regarding the progress of South Vietnamese counterinsurgency efforts, the DIA evaluation was cautiously optimistic: though there was still a long way to go, GVN prospects "are certain ly better than they were one year ago." Quite abruptly, a disturbing element beg an to emerge. Little more than two weeks later, the DIA Intelligence Bulletin of 4 August reported a significant increase in the level of VC offensive actions. Moreover, the rate was high for the third week in a row since midJuly. The clear implication was that the VC at last were taking advantage of the opportunity pr esented by the Buddhist crisis. It had been expected--and feared--that they woul d seek to hasten political collapse and exploit whatever military vulnerabilitie s there were. The U.S. was thus justifiably concerned lest the recent revived VC aggressiveness be the opening phase of a stepped up insurgency. Within ten days of this DIA report, however, a reevaluation of the significance to be attached to the increased rate of enemy actions allayed fears somewhat. On 14 August, SAC SA, reporting to the Secretary of Defense, discounted the upsurge in VC activity over the past month. Its magnitude, comparatively, was below the average of the preceding year and fell far short of the

previous high. In this perspective, SACSA saw no cause to read undue implication s into developments that were as yet neither particularly salient nor of long du ration. The political crisis meanwhile took a turn for the worse. President Diem , in an attempt to regain control, declared martial law on 20 August. The decree was accompanied by forcible entry into pagodas and mass arrests of Buddhist lea ders and laity, and was immediately followed by a series of preemptory repressiv e measures. Any hope of reconciliation was now shattered, and the Diem governmen t was irrevocably isolated. The Director, DIA, in a special report to the Secret ary of Defense, expressed concern that the declaration of martial law "will have serious repercussions throughout the country." He foresaw further coup or count er-coup activity in the making, though for the time being the military had effec tively assumed full control. So far, he saw little military effect on the war ef fort; relatively few troops had been withdrawn from normal missions. At an Augus t 31 review of the problem for Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk a nd Secretary McNamara agreed that U.S. planning had to be based on two principle s--that the U.S. would not pull out of Vietnam until the war were won, and that it would not participate in a coup d'etat against Diem. For the next month, as t he precarious political situation balanced on the brink of imminent disaster, U. S. anxieties mounted. The Administration was confronted by a dilemma. It was hel pless to ameliorate conditions as long as Diem remained in power-nor did it want to approve and support such a regime. Yet at the same time, it was equally help less to encourage a change of government-there was no feasible replacement anywh ere on the South Vietnamese political horizon. The upshot was an ambivalent poli cy of watchful waiting toward the GVN, while the main preoccupation and focus of attention was on the conduct of the South Vietnamese military forces and the pr ogress of the counterinsurgency programs. These still remained the first order o f business. F. MCNAMARA-TAYLOR MISSION TO SOUTH VIETNAM, OCTOBER 1963 By the mid dle of September, the President was deeply concerned over the critical political situation, but more importantly, over its effect on the war. A decision junctur e had been reached. At issue was the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam; a redirection of U.S. policy and objectives might be required. On 21 September, the President directed the Secretary of Defense, in company with the Chairman, J CS, to proceed to South Vietnam for a personal examination of the military aspec ts of the situation. The President gave as the purpose of the trip ". . . my des ire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of the military and para-mil itary effort to defeat the Viet Cong." He stated that there had been, at least u ntil recently, "heartening results," but that political deterioration since May had raised serious questions about the continued effectiveness of these efforts and the prospects for success. The President, therefore, needed an assessment of the present situation, and if the McNamara-Taylor prognosis were not hopeful, t hey were to recommend needed actions by the SVN and steps the U.S. should take t o bring about those actions. [Doc. 139]

The Secretary of Defense and the CJCS, accompanied by a team of civilian and mil itary assistants to help in the survey, arrived in South Vietnam on 26 September and returned to Washington on 2 October. During their visit, detailed data were compiled for them, presentations prepared, extensive briefings given, conferenc es convened, and consultations held. Emerging from the investigations and apprai sals was a body of positive evidence indicating that conditions were good and pr ospects improving. In fact, in the course of these reassurances, the Secretary o f Defense decided to order a speed up of the planned program for release of U.S. forces. In guidance furnished at the time, he directed that the projected sched ules for force reduction provided for in the currently approved Model M Plan ver sion of the CPSVN be accelerated by approximately six months. Accordingly, neces sary planning revisions were undertaken immediately on a priority basis. In cont rast to the generally favorable military situation, however, there were grave mi sgivings about the political state of affairs. Earlier, a draft text of a propos ed letter from the President of the United States to President Diem of the RVN h ad been forwarded by cable to the Secretary of Defense and the Ambassador, with a request for their reaction and comments. President Kennedy himself thought the letter too extreme, and would reluctantly resort to it only if the situation wa s found so serious that such direct US Presidential pressure was necessary. The text of the proposed letter was characterized by harsh, blunt candor. In effect it laid down an ultimatum: unless the GVN changed the repressive policies, metho ds, and actions practiced by some individual officials and gained for itself a b road base of popular political support, the United States might have to consider disassociating itself from the Diem Government, and further US support of Vietn am might become impossible. The Secretary of Defense and the Ambassador promptly responded with a strong recommendation against transmitting the proposed letter . Both agreed that the situation was indeed very serious, but that it was not li kely to be influenced by such a letter to Diem. The proposed Presidential letter was not sent. Instead, many of the points were conveyed in conversations with D iem, and, just before the departure of the McNamara-Taylor Mission from Vietnam, another letter to President Diem was composed and sent in its place. The new ve rsion was not only much softer in tone and more circumspect but went out over th e signature of General Taylor as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The letter was dated 1 October 1963, but was delivered on 2 October, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the US Ambassador to Vietnam (L odge). In this letter the CJCS offered his personal, professional comments on th e military situation, in response to Diem's earlier expressed interest in receiv ing them. After acknowledging the encouraging military progress over the precedi ng two years, the CJCS stated, "It was not until the recent political disturbanc es beginning in May and continuing through August and beyond that I personally h ad any doubt as to the ultimate success of our campaign against the Viet Cong." He then added:

Now, as Secretary McNamara has told you, a serious doubt hangs over our hopes fo r the future. Can we win together in the face of the reaction to the measures ta ken by your Government against the Buddhists and the students? As a military man I would say that we can win providing there are no further political setbacks. The military indicators are still generally favorable and can be made more so by actions readily within the power of your Government. If you will allow me, I wo uld mention a few of the military actions which I believe necessary for this imp rovement. The Chairman noted that though the military situation in I, II, and II I Corps areas was generally good, some of the hard-core war zones of the Viet Co ng remained virtually untouched. There were not enough offensive actions against the enemy in the field and, in his opinion, the full potential of the military units was not being exploited, for ". . . only a ruthless, tireless offensive ca n win the war." The principal military problems, he pointed out, were now in the Delta, and the time had come to concentrate efforts there. An overhaul of the S trategic Hamlet Program was needed. For it to succeed, there must be a related c lear-and-hold campaign by the combat units of IV Corps, and the tactics should b e oriented to the waterways that were a natural characteristic of the region. Fu rthermore, infantry line units would have to operate at full strength, without d iversion of combat power to rear echelon functions. The CJCS suggested that this latter problem was the case in ARVN generally, which President Diem might want to examine closely. Finally he summed up what was intended as the statement of t he US position: In closing, Mr. President, may I give you my most important over all impression? Up to now, the battle against the Viet Cong has seemed endless; no one has been willing to set a date for its successful conclusion. After talki ng to scores of officers, Vietnamese and American, I am convinced that the Viet Cong insurgency in the north and center can be reduced to little more than spora dic incidents by the end of 1964. The Delta will take longer but should be compl eted by the end of 1965. But for these predictions to be valid, certain conditio ns must be met. Your Government should be prepared to energize all agencies, mil itary and civil, to a higher output of activity than up to now. Ineffective comm anders and province officials must be replaced as soon as identified. Finally, t here should be a restoration of domestic tranquility on the homefront if politic al tensions are to be allayed and external criticism is to abate. Conditions are needed for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to an effective campaign dir ected at the objective, vital to both of us, of defeating the Viet Cong and of r estoring peace to your community. The results of the survey conducted by the McN amara-Taylor mission were consolidated into a lengthy, formal report to the Pres ident containing specific findings, general evaluations, and recommendations. Th e substance of the report was presented in an hourlong, oral briefing to the Pre sident immediately upon the return of the mission on the morning of 2 October. A ttending the briefing were the Under Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Director of the CIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Following the personal report, t he

President called a special meeting of the full National Security Council, which was held from six to seven that same evening. The McNamara-Taylor Report general ly was optimistic about the military situation and saw little direct effect of t he political crisis on the prosecution of the war. Their conclusions, inter alia , were that despite serious political tensions and the increasing unpopularity o f the Diem-Nhu regime, "The military campaign has made great progress and contin ues to progress." GVN military officers, though hostile to the government and it s repressive policies, continued to perform their military duties in the larger cause of fighting the Viet Cong enemy. This reassuring evaluation, however, was caveated to the effect that ". . . further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu co uld change the present favorable military trends." Specific findings in their ap praisal of the military situation bore out the general evaluation. In the body o f the report they stated: With allowances for all uncertainties, it is our firm conclusion that the GVN military program has made great progress in the last yea r and a half, and that the progress has continued at a fairly steady rate in the past six months even through the period of greatest political unrest in Saigon. The tactics and techniques employed by the Vietnamese under U.S. monitor-ship a re sound and give promise of ultimate victory. Especially noteworthy, in their v iew, was the progress clearly being achieved in the northern areas (I and II) Co rps. Their appraisal of the progress of the Strategic Hamlet Program was also la rgely favorable. In both connections, they cited the effectiveness of the U.S. m ilitary advisory and support effort. Included among their military recommendatio ns were: a. General Harkins [COMUSMACV] review with Diem the military changes ne cessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 196 5. b. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions n ow performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by tha t time. c. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to t ake over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impa irment of the war effort. Germane to the above recommendations, however, it was stated elsewhere in the report, "No further reductions should be made until the requirements of the 1964 campaign become firm."

Following the NSC meeting of 2 October, the White House issued a formal purlic a nnouncement of the major policy aspects of the McNamara-Taylor Mission Report. T he White House statement is reproduced below. U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963 Secretary [of De fense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the Presid ent this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their repo rt included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be th e subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United State s policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge. 1. The security of South Viet -Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adh ere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and su pported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performan ce in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam. 2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in pri nciple, though improvements are being energetically sought. 3. Major U.S. assist ance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor r eported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be comp leted by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a l imited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the poi nt where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdra wn. 4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The Uni ted States had made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the mili tary effort, they could do so in the future. 5. It remains the policy of the Uni ted States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the eff orts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

Considerable emphasis was given to the White House statement, and to the McNamar aTaylor Mission generally, in news media. Played up particularly was the U.S. fo rce withdrawal, especially the prospective 1000-man reduction. Three days later, on 5 October, in another meeting with the President, followed by another NSC me eting, the McNamara-Taylor recommendations themselves were addressed. The Presid ent "approved the military recommendations contained in the report." The Preside nt also directed, in line with their suggestion, that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel fro m South Vietnam by the end of 1963. The effect of the McNamara-Taylor mission, t hus, was to revalidate the existing U.S. policy position regarding Vietnam. Reaf firmed were the military objectives, courses of action, and programs essentially as they were laid out by the Secretary of Defense at the Honolulu Conference ov er a year earlier on 23 July 1962. The underlying premises and soundness of the rationale seemed more cogent than ever. In fact, a new impetus was thereby given to pursing the same goals with even greater thrust and purpose. Such an outcome could have been forecast, as noted earlier, when Mr. McNamara set in motion ano ther CPSVN planning cycle to revise the Model M Plan and develop an accelerated plan to withdraw U.S. forces. Part of the motivation behind the stress placed on U.S. force withdrawal, and particularly the seemingly arbitrary desire to effec t the 1000-man reduction by the end of 1963, apparently was as a signal to influ ence both the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese and set the stage for po ssible later steps that would help bring the insurgency to an end. With regard t o the SVN, the demonstration of determination to pull out U.S. forces was intend ed to induce the South Vietnamese to increase the effectiveness of their militar y effort. State's instructions to Ambassador Lodge resulting from NSC action on the McNamara-Taylor mission indicated that: Actions are designed to indicate to Diem Government our displeasure at its political policies and activities and to create significant uncertainty in that government and in key Vietnamese groups a s to future intentions of United States. At same time, actions are designed to h ave at most slight impact on military or counterinsurgency effort against Viet C ong, at least in short term.... With respect to Hanoi, it might present an oppor tunity for a demarche--exploiting withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam b y a specified date as exchange for North Vietnam's abandoning its aggression aga inst South Vietnam. But events were already conspiring otherwise, and would soon frustrate such expectations and intentions as developed. The internal SVN situa tion was about to undergo rapid transformation. By late October, there was incre asing skepticism in some quarters about the military situation in South Vietnam. Indeed, it was beginning to be suspected that reports of progress by U.S. milit ary sources actually cloaked a situation that was not only bleak, but deteriorat ing. A State Department intelligence evaluation of 22 October showed

markedly pessimistic statistical trends since July 1963, in most areas of enemyfriendly relative progress measurement, indicating an unfavorable shift in the m ilitary balance. What was disquieting was that the pattern showed steady decline over a period of more than three months' duration. Circulation of the INR evalu ation occasioned controversy and no little recrimination. Substantive difference s degenerated into a procedural issue. The outcome was a personal memorandum fro m the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense on 8 November, amounting to an apology for the incident. The Secretary of State stated in regard to INR's R FE-90 of 22 October: ....It is not the policy of the State Department to issue m ilitary appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department. I have r equested that any memoranda given interdepartmental circulation which include mi litary appraisals be coordinated with your Department. G. THE NOVEMBER COUP AND OVERTHROW OF DIEM On 1 November, the political situation fell apart. The long-an ticipated coup occurred. The Diem regime was overthrown, and both Diem and Nhu w ere assassinated. A military junta of politically inexperienced generals took ov er the government as their successors. The significance of the great change, for good or ill, was not readily apparent. Over the next three weeks the feared pol itical chaos, civil war, and collapse of the war effort following a coup did not seem to be materializing. For the United States, the important question was wha t did the new circumstances mean militarily for existing policy and plans orient ed to bringing the insurgency under control and to phasing out US force commitme nts. On 20 November, at the President's direction, a special all-agencies confer ence on Vietnam was convened in Honolulu for a "full-scale review" in depth of a ll aspects of the situation and to reassess U.S. plans and policies in the polit ical, military, economic and information fields since the change of government. Attending were some 45 senior U.S. officials, military and civilian, including: the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman, JCS, Director of CIA, CINCPAC, ambassa dor to Vietnam, and COMUSMACV. Ambassador Lodge assessed the prospects for Vietn am as hopeful. In his estimation the new government was not without promise. Vie tnamese military leadership appeared to be united and determined to step up the war effort. The Ambassador advocated continuing to pursue the goal of setting da tes for phasing out U.S. activities and turning them over to the Vietnamese, and he volunteered that the announced withdrawal of 1000 troops by the end of 1963 was already having a salutary effect. COMUSMACV agreed with the Ambassador that the conduct of the war against the VC was coming along satisfactorily. Admitting that the VC-incidents rate shot up 300 to 400 percent after the coup, he noted that since 6 November, however, it had dropped down to "normal" and remained so to the present. Military operational statistics now generally showed a more or l ess favorable

balance. In short, the briefings and assessments received at the conference cons tituted "an encouraging outlook for the principal objective of joint U.S.-Vietna mese policy in South Vietnam-the successful prosecution of the war against the V iet Cong communists." Moreover, "excellent working relations between U.S. offici als and the members of the new Vietnamese government" had been established. All plans for the U.S. phasing out were to go ahead as scheduled. In this light the U.S. military plans and programs for Vietnam were addressed. The revision of the Model M Plan of the CPSVN, ordered by the Secretary of Defense during his last visit to Vietnam in October was progressing apace and the finished Accelerated P lan was expected to be forwarded shortly. It would cost $6.4 million more than t he Model Plan, however. Indications were that the FY 64 MAP would also cost more because of the acceleration-to a total now of $187.5 million. The Secretary of Defense made it clear that he felt that the proposed CINCPAC MAP could be cut ba ck and directed that the program be reviewed to refine it and cut costs to stay as close as possible to the OSD ceiling of $175.5 million. He was equally emphat ic, however, that while he would not tolerate fat or inefficiency in the program he was prepared to provide whatever funds might be required under MAP to suppor t the GVN. In fact, he observed that the GVN was already running into "tremendou s financial deficits," and opined that neither AID nor MAP had budgeted enough t o provide for the emergencies which were likely to arise during 1964. H. ASSASSI NATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY On 22 November 1963, President Kennedy was assassina ted. The consequences were to set an institutional freeze on the direction and m omentum of U.S. Vietnam policy. Universally operative was a desire to avoid chan ge of any kind during the critical interregnum period of the new Johnson Adminis tration. Both the President and the governmental establishment consciously strov e for continuity, with respect to Vietnam no less than in other areas. In Vietna m this continuity meant that the phase-out concept, the CPSVN withrdawal plan, a nd the MAP programs probably survived beyond the point they might have otherwise . The immediate Johnson stamp on the Kennedy policy came on 26 November. At a NS C meeting convened to consider the results of the 20 November Honolulu Conferenc e, the President "reaffirmed that U.S. objectives with respect to withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963." The only hint that something might be different from on-going plans c ame in a Secretary of Defense memo for the President three days prior to this NS C meeting. In that memo, Mr. McNamara said that the new South Vietnamese governm ent was confronted by serious financial problems, and that the U.S. must be prep ared to raise planned MAP levels. In early December, the President began to have , if not second thoughts, at least a sense of uneasiness about Vietnam. In discu ssions with his advisors, he set in motion what he hoped would be a major policy review, fully staffed in depth, by Administration principals. The President wan ted "a fresh new look taken" at the whole problem. In

preparation for such a basic reappraisal, an interdepartmental meeting of second -echelon principals accordingly convened on 3 December and laid out a broad outl ine of basic topics to be addressed and staff papers to be developed by various departments and agencies. This attempt at a systematic and comprehensive reexami nation, however, did not culminate in a fundamental national reassessment. I. AC CELERATED MODEL PLAN OF THE CPSVN With no indication of policy change in the off ing, U.S. military planning thus went forward with hardly a break in stride. On 5 December CINCPAC submitted the Accelerated Model Plan to the JCS. It was the r evision to the Model M Plan version of the CPSVN that the Secretary of Defense h ad ordered during his early October visit to Vietnam. The Accelerated Plan provi ded for more rapid phase-out of the bulk of U.S. military personnel and units an d a decrease in the residual strength remaining thereafter. It also provided for building up GVN forces at a faster pace but on a more reduced scale, then cutti ng back from peak sooner and leveling out somewhat lower. MAP costs for the FY 1 965-69 period would be little higher than the $392.2 million under the Model M P lan, coming to $399.4 million in the Acelerated Plan. J. THE 1000-MAN WITHDRAWAL OF DECEMBER 1963 During the month of December, the planned 1000-man reduction w as executed. It proved essentially an accounting exercise. Technically, more tha n a thousand U.S. personnel did leave, but many of these were part of the normal turnover cycle, inasmuch as rotation policy alone, not to mention medical evacu ation or administrative reasons, resulted in an average rate of well over a thou sand returnees per month. Though the replacement pipeline was slowed somewhat, y ear-end total in-country strength nevertheless was close to 16,000. This did not even represent a decline of 1000 from the October peak of 16,732. That the avow ed goal of 1000 would not be reached had in fact been anticipated and acknowledg ed before mid-December. Despite close monitoring of authorized ceilings and actu al strengths, the force level kept rising. On 11 December, for example, the esti mate of projected year-end U.S. strength in Vietnam had to be revised upward to reflect additional deployments approved since September. The adjusted figure now came to 15,894, a net increase of 162 over the earlier estimate. This new stren gth ceiling was what would be left after the 1000-man withdrawal then in progres s was completed. III. 1964 A. THE VIETNAM SITUATION WORSENS In December conflict ing estimates of the situation in Vietnam indicated that the bright hopes and pr edictions of the past were increasingly less than realistic. A McNamara memo to the President written following a trip to Vietnam of 21 December, was laden with gloom. [Doc. 156] He wrote:. "The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely

to a communist-controlled state." He went on to note that "the new government is the greatest source of concern," and that "it is indecisive and drifting." The Country Team, he added, "lacks leadership, and has been poorly informed." One of the most serious deficiencies be found was a "grave reporting weakness" on the U.S. side. "Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in th e countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realize because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting." Mr. McNamara clearly conclu ded that none of these conditions could be reversed by the influx of more Americ an personnel, nor did he even mention that the U.S could continue to withdraw tr oops at all or as scheduled. His proposal was to hold the line: "U.S. resources and personnel," he said, "cannot usefully be substantially increased although he did announce his intention to increase staffs "to sizes that will give us a rel iable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations." In his concludin g paragraph, however, the Secretary of Defense admitted that his own estimate "m ay be overly pessimistic," inasmuch as the Ambassador, COMUSMACV, and General Mi nh were not discouraged and looked forward to significant improvements in Januar y. [Doc. 156] Vestiges of optimism still persisted in one degree or another in s ome quarters. The earlier sense of confidence that had been established was deep -rooted and not easily shaken. A retrospective evaluation of the Vietnam situati on ostensibly covering the period 1960 through 1963, prepared by SACSA (General Krulak) is indicative. Although intended as a broad overview (and so called), an d though actually cut off as of sometime in October 1963, it was forwarded in la te October or November directly to the Secretary of Defense. The SACSA report pr esented nothing less than a glowing account of steady progress across the board in the military situation. Significantly, it contained no hint that the rate of progress possibly might have temporarily slowed somewhat in the second half of 1 963, despite the fact that it expressly treated events as late as October. Yet b y this time, other evaluations giving a quite different picture were already ass erting themselves. Near the close of 1963 the Director, DIA, reported to the Sec retary of Defense that year-end review and reassessment of the enemy situation r evealed VC capabilities had not been impaired over the past year. On the contrar y, the VC had in many regards improved in combat effectiveness and now enjoyed a generally improved force posture for insurgency. Hopeful bias alone does not ex plain the endurance of past firmly rooted optimism--such as the SACSA overview. The difference between those who stressed the positive and those who saw decline was, in part, the product of viewing the situation in greater or shorter time f rames. Those who applied a macroscopic perspective, believed-and not without cer tain logic-that current unfavorable reports were, at worse, a temporary lapse in the larger curve of progress over the years. Those who took spot checks tended to be more impressed by the immediate situation, and at this time, the immediate situation was critical. The feelings of this latter group were buttressed when on 30 January another coup, this time largely bloodless, ousted the ruling Minh government. It was a factional power struggle in which one military group replac ed another, this time with General Khanh emerging as Premier. The latest develop ment held forth little promise of giving

the country the political stability so desperately needed in the midst of a war for survival. The event would prove only symptomatic as part of a sequence of si milar government upheavals that were to follow. In the U.S., the coincidence of domestic tragedy and patent instability in Vietnam evoked a chorus urging a Laos -like resolution of the Vietnam conflict. In late August, 1963, President de Gau lle had issued a policy statement on Vietnam which was subsequently officially i nterpreted as a proposal for "independence and neutrality" for Vietnammeaning ev entual U.S. withdrawal. In the aftermath of the assassinations, speculation turn ed increasingly to this solution. For example, Senator Mansfield wrote to Presid ent Johnson to propose a division of Vietnam between the GVN and the Viet Cong, coupled with a U.S. withdrawal. In early January, 1964, Secretary McNamara furni shed the President the following counters to Senator Mansfield's arguments: 1. W e should certainly stress that the war is essentially a Vietnamese responsibilit y, and this we have repeatedly done, particularly in our announced policy on U.S . troop withdrawal. At the same time we cannot disengage U.S. prestige to any si gnificant degree..... 2. The security situation is serious, but we can still win , even on present ground rules.... 3 .....Any deal either to divide the present territory of South Vietnam or to "neutralize" South Vietnam would inevitably mea n a new government in Saigon that would in short order become Communist-dominate d. 4. The consequences of a Communist-dominated South Vietnam are extremely seri ous both for the rest of Southeast Asia and for the U.S. position in the rest of Asia and indeed in other key areas of the world..... 5. Thus, the stakes in pre serving an anti-Communist South Vietnam are so high that, in our judgment, we mu st go on bending every effort to win.....And, I am confident that the American p eople are by and large in favor of a policy of firmness and strength in such sit uations. Secretary McNamara in his testimony before Congress on the fiscal year 1965 budget in early February, 1964, declined to link the previously planned U.S . withdrawals with either "pessimism" or "optimism" regarding events in Vietnam, saying simply that the withdrawals had all along been conditioned upon Vietname se capability to assume full responsibility from the U.S. trainers, and that the re would be a "substantial reduction in our force as we train them." Further: La st fall . . . I wasn't as optimistic perhaps about the course of the war as I wa s about being able to bring back our personnel in certain numbers by the end of last year and also in increments between then and the end of 1965.

I still am hopeful of doing that. We did, of course, bring back 1,000 men toward the latter part of last year. I am hopeful we can bring back additional numbers of men later this year and certainly next year. I say this because I personally believe that this is a war that the Vietnamese must fight . . . I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them. I do believe we can carry out trainin g. We can provide advice and logistical assistance. But after all, the training, by the very nature of the work, comes to an end at a certain point. We will hav e started this expanded training and carried it out for a period of 4 years, by the end of next year. We started at the end of 1961. The end of next year will h ave been 4 years later and certainly we should have completed the majority of th e training task by that time. This, in General Taylor's view and mine, is what w e should be able to do. If we do, we should bring our men back. I don't believe we should leave our men there to substitute for Vietnamese men who are qualified to carry out the task, and this is really the heart of our proposal. I think it was a sound proposal then and I think so now..... Unsureness about the actual s tate of affairs in Washington spread eventually to the highest levels of governm ent, and prompted the dispatching to South Vietnam in early February of a CIA "S pecial CAS Group" for an independent evaluation of the military situation. A ser ies of four reports, dated 10, 11, 14 and 18 February 1964, were produced, each transmitted by the Deputy Director, CIA, to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and others as soon as it came out. Instead of finding progress, these reported a serious and steadily deteriorating situation. Cited were VC gains in the past several months, and particularly noted was that VC arms were increasing in quantity and quality. As for the Strategic Hamlet Program, they found it "at present at virutal standstill." The Special CAS Group's concluding appraisal wa s pessimistic: "Tide of insurgency in all four corps areas appears to be going a gainst GVN." COMUSMACV (who had no prior knowledge of the Special CAS Group's re ports) took issue with the Group's findings, contesting less the date used than the conclusions, especially the "personal" evaluational opinions as to degree of deterioration. He suggested that in the future such reports be first coordinate d before being dispatched. On 6 March a major Secretary of Defense Conference ag ain convened at CINCPAC headquarters for a broad reassessment. The consensus was that the military situation was definitely deteriorating. No longer was the iss ue whether it was progressing satisfactorily or not. The question now was how mu ch of a setback had there been and what was needed to make up for it. An opinion shared by many was that the insurgency could be expected to go beyond 1965. Thi s general reorientation of perspective was reflected in the Secretary of Defense 's observation that attention should be focused on the near-term objectives of p roviding the greater U.S. support that would be necessary, and suspending for th e time being consideration of longer-range concerns such as 5-year MAP projectio ns. The visit to Vietnam on 8 March corroborated the gravity of the immediate pr oblems at hand.

Following his return from Vietnam, Mr. McNamara, on 16 March, submitted to the P resident a formal report. In it the Secretary of Defense acknowledged, "The situ ation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September." RVNAF de sertion rates were increasing, and the GVN military position generally was weake ning noticeably. The VC position, on the other hand, showed signs of improving. He referred pointedly to the increase in North Vietnamese support. The conclusio n was that greater U.S. support was needed. In describing what was required to i mprove the situation in South Vietnam, Mr. McNamara identified measures that "wi ll involve a limited increase in U.S. personnel and in direct Defense Department costs. More significantly they involve significant increases in Military Assist ance Program costs plus "additional U.S. economic aid to support the increased G VN budget." The estimated additional annual MAP costs would come to between $30 and $40 million each year, plus a one-time additional cost of $20 million for mi litary equipment. In the recommendation section of the report, the Secretary lis ted the following 12 items: 1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the ins urgency under control. 2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh gover nment and are opposed to any further coups. 3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war f ooting. 4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus p aramilitary) by at least 50,000 men. 5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a gre atly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and haml et levels. 6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the para-milita ry forces and to increase their compensation. 7. To assist the Vietnamese to cre ate an offensive guerrilla force. 8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T-28s. 9. To provide the Vietnamese army a dditional M-1 13 armored personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), addi tional river boats, and approximately $5-b million of other additional material. 10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view wi thin two years to trebling the amount of fertilizer made available. 11. To autho rize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to aut horize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian lin e for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involvi ng units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of So uvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia. 12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 7 2 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Cont rol" actions (beyond those authorized in paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliator y Action" against North Vietnam, and to be in a

position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam. As for the future of the phased-withdrawal pla ns, the Secretary of Defense's report contained the following: The U.S. policy o f reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still sound. Its application will not lead to any major reduct ions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Su bstantial reductions in the numbers of U.S. military training personnel should b e possible before the end of 1965. However, the U.S. should continue to reiterat e that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job rega rdless of how long it takes. [Doc. 158] By formal decision at the NSC session of 17 March, the President approved the Secretary of Defense report of 16 March 19 64 and directed all agencies to carry out the 12 recommendations contained there in. A White House statement, reproduced below, was issued the same day. March 17, 1964 IMMEDIATE RELEASE Office of the White House Press Secretary THE W HITE HOUSE Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, following their initial oral r eport of Friday, today reported fully to President Johnson and the members of th e National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Vietnam, the measures being taken by General Khanh and his government, and the need for U nited States assistance to supplement and support these measures. There was also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Vietnam. At the close of the meeting the President accepted the repor t and its principal recommendations, which had the support of the National Secur ity Council and Ambassador Lodge. Comparing the situation to last October, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it, there have unqu estionably been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of two chan ges of government, and of more long-standing difficulties, including a serious w eakness and over-extension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet pro gram. The supply of arms and cadres from the north has continued; careful and so phisticated control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent; and evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi is clear and unmistakable.

To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously an d effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for the prosecution of th e war, recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of econo mic and social, as well as military, action to ensure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom. To carry out this plan, General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Vietnam, partly to augment t he strength of his anti-guerrilla forces, but particularly to provide the admini strators, health workers, teachers and others who must follow up in cleared area s. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable and common basis of servic e, General Khanh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of s ervice in appropriate jobs for all able-bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages. In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces and to create a highly trained guerrilla forc e that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground. Finally, limited but significan t additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the m obile forces. In short, where the South Vietnamese Government now has the power to clear any part of its territory, General Khanh's new program is designed to c lear and to hold, step by step and province by province. This program will invol ve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on United States economic aid. Additional, though less substanti al, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased United States train ing activity both on the civil and military side. The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vi etnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the po licy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under con trol. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion th at with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months. B. DEMISE OF THE CPSVN Before the month of March was over the CPSVN, as well as the MAP plan-fling that had been such an integral part of it, finally received t he coup de grace. Sacrificed to the U.S. desire "to make it clear that we fully support" the GVN, they were formally terminated, for the record, on 27 March in the OSD message reproduced below: Date: 27 March 1964

FROM: OSD WASH DC DEF 963208 (Col. W. J. Yates) TO: CINCPAC REFS: a. CINCPAC Mar 64 b. DEF 959615 DTG Mar 64 1. As indicated in ref. b., ceiling for Vietnam FY 66 MAP is $143.0 million against $143.1 million for FY 65. Requirements above th ese program levels should be identified as separate packages. 2. Submission of f ive-year programs FY 66-70 for Vietnam is suspended until further notice.. Your best estimates of FY 66 requirements are necessary inasmuch line detail as feasi ble by 1 Jul 64 in order that (a) the Military Departments can review for pricin g, lead time, availabilities, and prepare for procurement action and (b) require ments can be processed within DoD, State/AID and BoB for budget/Congressional Pr esentation purposes. 3. Previous guidance re Model Plan projection for phasedown of U.S. forces and GVN forces is superseded. Policy is as announced by White Ho use 17 Mar 64: Quote The policy should continue of withdrawing U.S. personnel wh ere their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the U.S. to furnish assistance and support of South Vietnam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggr ession and terrorism under control. Unquote. 4. No further action required or be ing taken here relative to accelerated model plan. Thus ended de jure the policy of phase out and withdrawal and all the plans and programs oriented to it. Shortly, they would be cancelled out de facto. C. BUILD -UP OF THE U.S. FORCE COMMITMENT Soon the whole evolutionary direction of the U. S. military commitment began to change. Rather than diminishing, the magnitude r ose thereafter. In early May the approved U.S. military strength ceiling for Sou th Vietnam was raised by more than 1500 so that total incountry authorization ca me to over 17,000. Further increases were in sight. As the military situation in Vietnam failed to show signs of ameliorating, pressures began to develop in lat e spring for an even more significant increase in U.S. forces. A special meeting on Southeast Asia was called at PACOM Headquarters in Honolulu for 1-2 June bec ause of the unsatisfactory progress in execution of the National Pacification Pl an. There, COMUSMACV proposed extending and intensifying the U.S. advisory effor t in order to improve the operational effectiveness of the VNAF performance gene rally. The idea was discussed and supported in principle, and a staff working pa per outlining the concept was prepared by the conferees. Near the end of June, C OMUSMACV submitted to JCS (info CINCPAC, DOD, State, White House) his formal

proposal recommending enlargement of the advisory assistance program. He reitera ted, and offered further justification for, the need to augment the current advi sory detachments at the battalion level and to extend the advisory effort at bot h the district and sector levels. His detailed breakout of primary personnel req uirements came to a total of 9000 more advisors as the net in-country increase, but conceded that additional administrative and logistic support requirements wo uld be substantial and would be submitted separately. Also, approximately 80 add itional U.S. Navy advisors would be requested, in connection with recommendation s made earlier in the "Bucklew Report" for a Junk Force and other measures to co unter infiltration by sea. CINCPAC indicated concurrence and recommended approva l of the proposal on 4 July. In the middle of July, the new U.S. Ambassador to V ietnam, General Maxwell Taylor, sent an evaluation of the military situation to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and JCS that lent strong support t o COMUSMACV's proposal. The Ambassador advised that formal estimates of regular VC strength in South Vietnam had been revised and now were raised to between 28, 000 and 34,000. He explained that this did not reflect a sudden dramatic increas e, but had been suspected for the past two or three years, though confirmatory e vidence had become available only in the last few months. There was thus no occa sion for alarm, but the new estimate emphasized the growing magnitude of the pro blem and the need to increase the level of U.S./GVN efforts. Therefore, addition al requirements were being formulated, including U.S. military personnel require ments, to support U.S. plans during the ensuing months to cope with the new unde rstanding of the realities of the situation. He forecast an increase in U.S. mil itary strength to around 21,000 over the next six-month period to meet projected needs. Immediately the size of the estimated force requirements connected with the proposed expansion of the advisory effort began to climb. On 16 July COMUSMA CV submitted the support requirements associated with the program. For the next year he would need, over and above the original 900 additional advisors requeste d, more than 3200 other personnel, for a total gross military strength increase of about 4200. The Ambassador in Saigon concurred in COMUSMACV's proposed increa se in U.S. military strength by 4200 over the next nine months, bringing the tot al in-country to nearly 22,000, and he urged prompt action. The Secretary of Sta te also recommended approval, as did CINCPAC and JCS, and on 20 July, at the JCS -SecDef meeting, overall support was given to the COMUSMACV requested deployment package. The following day, at the NSC meeting of 21 July, the President gave i t final approval, though that action was not included in the NSAM issued the nex t day. As eventually refined, the total force increment actually came to over 49 00 U.S. personnel. In addition, other requirements not directly related to the a dvisory effort itself were being generated and met independently. By the close o f 1964 the year-end U.S. incountry strength figure had climbed to approximately 23,000 personnel and further authorized deployments were under way or in prepara tion. The actual effect of "phased withdrawals" was minimal. Though 1,000 spaces among the personnel authorized MACV were eliminated in 1963, add-ons overtook c ut-backs. As an

example, U.S. Army strength in Vietnam--the bulk of the advisory effort--was all ocated as follows: PERCENTAGE OF U.S. ARMY STRENGTH IN VIETNAM Total Hq & Aviati on Communication Special Other Army Spt Units Units Forces Advisers Strength Uni ts Nov 10,000 63 Mar 10,000 64 Nov 14,000 64 17 19 28 35 34 30 15 13 12 6 7 8 27 27 22 D. POSTSCRIPT TO WITHDRAWAL PLANNING The official termination of formal planning towards withdrawal by no means ended its attraction as one issue in the growing public debate over Vietnam policy. In August, 1964, the Tonkin Gulf crisis brou ght Congressmen back in perplexity to Secretary McNamara's statements on withdra wals, and elicited the following exchange: ....[Secretary McNamara, you] have ag ain always indicated that you hoped that by the end of this year there would hav e been a substantial reduction. . . Where we had a planned reduction of the numb er of troops, and what appeared to be a withdrawal of the United States from the area, then this attack comes, which would put us firmly in the area, or at leas t change our mind. The whole thing, to me, is completely, at least, not understa nding. SECRETARY McNAMARA: The period, December 1961, through the summer of 1963 was a period of great progress within South Vietnam, in countering the effort o f the Viet Cong to overthrow that government. However, starting in May, 1963, yo u will recall, a series of religious riots developed, controversy within the cou ntry developed, leading eventually upon November 2nd to the overthrow of the Die m government. Prior to that time in September, 1963, General Taylor and I had ad vised and visited that country. At that time, the progress of the counter insurg ency effort was so great it appeared that we would be able to withdraw much of o ur training force by the end of 1965, and not 1964, and we would-we so stated up on our return. But following that-and I should also mention that in that same st atement, we made in September, 1963, we pointed out the very serious nature of t he political difficulties that were building up in South Vietnam, because of the conflict between the Buddhists and the Catholics, and the government. In any ev ent, as I say, in November, 1963, the government was overthrown. There was anoth er change of government January 30th, and this completely changed the outlook an d the political instability that followed the two coups has given the Viet Cong an

opportunity to take advantage of the political and military weakness. They have taken advantage of it. It is now necessary to add further U.S. military assistan ce to counter that Viet Cong offensive.... We have never made the statement sinc e September, 1963, that we believed we could bring the bulk of the training forc es out by the end of 1965, because the actions in November and January made it q uite clear that would not be possible. We have said--as a matter of fact, I say today--as our training missions are completed, we will bring back the training f orces. I think this is only good sense, and good judgment. We have certain train ing missions that I hope we can complete this year, and others next year, and th e forces associated with those missions should be brought back. We have forces t here training the Vietnamese to fly spotter aircraft, for artillery spotting pur poses. I am very hopeful that we can bring the U.S. forces out as the Vietnamese acquire that capability. On the other hand, the Vietnamese quite clearly need a dditional assistance in training for counter guerilla operations, because of the increased guerrilla activities of the Viet Cong, and we are sending additional special forces to Vietnam for that purpose. There will be a flow in both directi ons, but I am certain in the next several months the net flow will be strongly t oward South Vietnam. After Tonkin Gulf, the policy objective of gradual disengag ement from Vietnam was no longer relevant. The hope, as well as the concept of p hase out and withdrawal, dwindled, since such withdrawal was now seen as tantamo unt to surrendering SVN to Hanoi. The issue for the future would no longer be wi thdrawals, but what additional U.S. forces would be required to stem the tide- a nd how fast they would have to be thrown into the breach. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 4, "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963," pp. 201-276. (B oston: Beacon Press, 1971) Section 1, pp. 201-232 Summary and Analysis The Diem coup was one of those critical events in the histo ry of U.S. policy that could have altered our commitment. The choices were there : (1) continue to plod along in a

limited fashion with Diem--despite his and Nhu's growing unpopularity; (2) encou rage or tacitly support the overthrow of Diem, taking the risk that the GVN migh t crumble and/or acommodate to the VC; and (3) grasp the opportunity--with the o bvious risks--of the political instability in South Vietnam to disengage. The fi rst option was rejected because of the belief that we could not win with Diem-Nh u. The third was very seriously considered a policy alternative because of the a ssumption that an independent, noncommunist SVN was too important a strategic in terest to abandon-and because the situation was not sufficiently drastic to call into question so basic an assumption. The second course was chosen mainly for t he reasons the first was rejected-Vietnam was thought too important; we wanted t o win; and the rebellious generals seemed to offer that prospect. In making the choice to do nothing to prevent the coup and to tacitly support it, the U.S. ina dvertently deepened its involvement. The inadvertence is the key factor. It was a situation without good alternatives. While Diem's government offered some semb lance of stability and authority, its repressive actions against the Buddhists h ad permanently alientated popular support, with a high probability of victory fo r the Viet Cong. As efficient as the military coup leaders appeared, they were w ithout a manageable base of political support. When they came to power and when the lid was taken off the DiemNhu reporting system, the GVN position was reveale d as weak and deteriorating. And, by virtue of its interference in internal Viet namese affairs, the U.S. had assumed a significant responsibility for the new re gime, a responsibility which heightened our commitment and deepened our involvem ent. The catalytic event that precipitated the protracted crisis which ended in the downfall of the Diem regime was a badly handled Buddhist religious protest i n Hue on May 8, 1963. In and of itself the incident was hardly something to shak e the foundations of power of most modern rulers, but the manner in which Diem r esponded to it, and the subsequent protests which it generated, was precisely th e one most likely to aggravate not alleviate the situation. At stake, of course, was far more than a religious issue. The Buddhist protest had a profoundly poli tical character from the beginning. It sprang and fed upon the feelings of polit ical frustration and repression Diem's autocratic rule had engendered. The begin ning of the end for Diem can, then, be traced through events to the regime's vio lent suppression of a Buddhist protest demonstration in Hue on Buddha's birthday , May 8, in which nine people were killed and another fourteen injured. Although Buddhists had theretofore been wholly quiescent politically, in subsequent week s, a fullblown Buddhist "struggle" movement demonstrated a sophisticated command of public protest techniques by a cohesive and disciplined organization, somewh at belying the notion that the movement was an outraged, spontaneous response to religious repression and discrimination. Nonetheless, by June it was clear that the regime was confronted not with a dissident religious minority, but with a g rave crisis of public confidence. The Buddhist protest had become a vehicle for mobilizing the widespread popular resentment of an arbitrary and often oppressiv e rule. It had become the focal point of political opposition to Diem. Under str ong U.S. pressure and in the face of an outraged world opinion, the regime reach ed ostensible agreement with the Buddhists on June 16. But the

agreement merely papered over the crisis, without any serious concessions by Die m. This intransigence was reinforced by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wi fe, who bitterly attacked the Buddhists throughout the summer. By mid-August the crisis was reaching a breaking point. The Buddhists' demonstrations and protest created a crisis for American policy as well. The U.S. policy of support for So uth Vietnam's struggle against the Hanoi-supported Viet Cong insurgency was foun ded on unequivocal support of Diem, whom the U.S. had long regarded as the only national leader capable of unifying his people for their internal war. When the Buddhist protest revealed widespread public disaffection, the U.S. made repeated attempts to persuade Diem to redress the Buddhist grievances, to repair his pub lic image, and to win back public support. But the Ngos were unwilling to bend. Diem, in true mandarin style, was preoccupied with questions of face and surviva l-not popular support. He did not understand the profound changes his country ha d experienced under stress, nor did he understand the requirement for popular su pport that the new sense of nationalism had created. The U.S. Ambassador, Freder ick Nolting, had conducted a low-key diplomacy toward Diem, designed to bring hi m to the American way of thinking through reason and persuasion. He approached t he regime during the first weeks of the Buddhist crisis in the same manner, but got no results. When he left on vacation at the end of May, his DCM, William Tru ehart, abandoned the soft sell for a tough line. He took U.S. views to Diem not as expressions of opinion, but as demands for action. Diem, however, remained as obdurate and evasive as ever. Not even the U.S. threat to dissociate itself fro m GVN actions in the Buddhist crisis brought movement. In late June, with Noltin g still on leave, President Kennedy announced the appointment of Henry Cabot Lod ge as Ambassador to Vietnam to replace Nolting in September. In the policy delib erations then taking place in Washington, consideration was being given for the first time to what effect a coup against Diem would have. But Nolting returned, first to Washington and then to Saigon, to argue that the only alternative to Di em was chaos. The U.S. military too, convinced that the war effort was going wel l, felt that nothing should be done to upset the apple cart. So Nolting was give n another chance to talk Diem into conciliating the Buddhists. The Ambassador wo rked assiduously at the task through July and the first part of August, but Diem would agree only to gestures and halfmeasures that could not stop the grave det erioration of the political situation. Nolting left Vietnam permanently in mid-A ugust with vague assurances from Diem that he would seek to improve the climate of relations with the Buddhists. Less than a week later, Nolting was betrayed by Nhu's dramatic August 21 midnight raids on Buddhist pagodas throughout Vietnam. One of the important lessons of the American involvement in South Vietnam in su pport of Diem was that a policy of unreserved commitment to a particular leaders hip placed us in a weak and manipulable position on important internal issues. T he view that there were "no alternatives" to Diem greatly limited the extent of our influence over the regime and ruled out over the years a number of kinds of leverage that we might usefully have employed or threatened to employ. Furthermo re, it placed the U.S. in the unfortunate role of suitor to a fickle lover. Awar e of our fundamental

commitment to him, Diem could with relative impunity ignore our wishes. It rever sed the real power relationship between the two countries. Coupled with Diem's p ersistent and ruthless elimination of all potential political opposition, it lef t us with rather stark alternatives indeed when a crisis on which we could not a llow delay and equivocation finally occurred. For better or worse, the August 12 pagoda raids decided the issue for us. The raids, themselves, were carefully ti med by Nhu to be carried out when the U.S. was without an Ambassador, and only a fter a decree placing the country under military martial law had been issued. Th ey were conducted by combat police and special forces units taking orders direct ly from Nhu, not through the Army chain of command. The sweeping attacks resulte d in the wounding of about 30 monks, the arrest of over 1,400 Buddhists and the closing of the pagodas (after they had been damaged and looted in the raids). In their brutality and their blunt repudiation of Diem's solemn word to Nolting, t hey were a direct, impudent slap in the face for the U.S. Nhu expected that in c rushing the Buddhists he could confront the new U.S. Ambassador with a fait acco mpli in which the U.S. would complainingly acquiesce, as we had in so many of th e regime's actions which we opposed. Moreover, he attempted to fix blame for the raids on the senior Army generals. Getting word of the attacks in Honolulu, whe re he was conferring with Nolting and Hilsman, Lodge flew directly to Saigon. He immediately let it be known that the U.S. completely dissociated itself from th e raids and could not tolerate such behavior. In Washington the morning after, w hile much confusion reigned about who was responsible for the raids, a statement repudiating them was promptly released. Only after several days did the U.S. fi nally establish Nhu's culpability in the attacks and publicly exonerate the Army . On August 23, the first contact with a U.S. representative was made by general s who had begun to plan a coup against Diem. The generals wanted a clear indicat ion of where the U.S. stood. State in its subsequently controversial reply, draf ted and cleared on a weekend when several of the principal Presidential advisors were absent from Washington, affirmed that Nhu's continuation in a power positi on within the regime was intolerable (words missing) and did not, "then, we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved." This message was t o be communicated to the generals, and Diem was to be warned that Nhu must go. L odge agreed with the approach to the generals, but felt it was futile to present Diem with an ultimatum he would only ignore and one that might tip off the pala ce to the coup plans. Lodge proceeded to inform only the generals. They were tol d that the U.S. could no longer support a regime which included Nhu, but that ke eping Diem was entirely up to them. This was communicated to the generals on Aug ust 27. The President and some of his advisors, however, had begun to have secon d thoughts abought switching horses so suddenly, and with so little information on whether the coup could succeed, and if it did, what kind of government it wou ld bring to power. As it turned out, Washington's anxiety was for naught, the pl ot was premature, and after several uncertain days, its demise was finally recog nized on August 31. Thus by the end of August, we found ourselves without a lead ership to support and without a policy to follow in our relations with the GVN. In this context a month-long

policy review took place in Washington and in Vietnam. It was fundamentally a se arch for alternatives. In both places the issue was joined between those who saw no realistic alternatives to Diem and felt that his policies were having only a marginal effect on the war effort, which they wanted to get on with by renewing our support and communication with Diem; and those who felt that the war agains t the VC would not possibly be won with Diem in power and preferred therefore to push for a coup of some kind. The first view was primarily supported by the mil itary and the CIA both in Saigon and in Washington, while the latter was held by the U.S. Mission, the State Department and members of the White House staff. In the end, a third alternative was selected, namely to use pressure on Diem to ge t him to remove Nhu from the scene and to end his repressive policies. Through S eptember, however, the debate continued with growing intensity. Tactical conside rations, such as another Lodge approach to Diem about removing the Nhus and the effect of Senator Church's resolution calling for an aid suspension, focused the discussion at times, but the issue of whether to renew our support for Diem rem ained. The decision hinged on the assessment of how seriously the political dete rioration was affecting the war effort. In the course of these policy debates, s everal participants pursued the logical but painful conclusion that if the war c ould not be won with Diem, and if his removal would lead to political chaos and also jeopardize the war effort, then the war was probably unwinnable. If that we re the case, the argument went, then the U.S. should really be facing a more bas ic decision on either an orderly disengagement from an irretrievable situation, or a major escalation of the U.S. involvement, including the use of U.S. combat troops. These prophetic minority voices were, however, raising an unpleasant pro spect that the Administration was unprepared to face at that time. In hindsight, however, it is clear that this was one of the times in the history of our Vietn am involvement when we were making fundamental choices. The option to disengage honorably at that time now appears an attractively low-cost one. But for the Ken nedy Administration then, the costs no doubt appeared much higher. In any event, it proved to be unwilling to accept the implications of predictions for a bleak future. The Administration hewed to the belief that if the U.S. be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately always have its way in world affairs. Nonetheless, in view of the widely divergent views of the principals in Saigon, the Administration sought independent judgments with two successive fact-findin g missions. The first of these whirlwind inspections, by General Victor Krulak, JCS SACSA, and a State Department Vietnam expert, Joseph Mendenhall, from Septem ber 7-10, resulted in diametrically opposing reports to the President on the con ditions and situation and was, as a result, futile. The Krulak-Mendenhall diverg ence was significant because it typifies the deficient analysis of both the U.S. civilian and military missions in Vietnam with respect to the overall political situation in the country. The U.S. civilian observers, for their part, failed t o fully appreciate the impact Diem had had in preventing the emergence of any ot her political forces. The Buddhists, while a cohesive and effective minority pro test movement, lacked a program or the means to achieve power. The labor unions were entirely urban-based and appealed to only a small segment of the population . The clandestine political parties were small, urban, and usually elitist. The religious sects had

a narrow appeal and were based on ethnic minorities. Only the Viet Cong had any real support and influence on a broad base in the countryside. The only real alt ernative source of political power was the Army since it had a large, discipline d organization spanning the country, with an independent communications and tran sportation system and a strong superiority to any other group in coercive power. In its reports on the Army, however, General Harkins and the U.S. military had failed to appreciate the deeply corrosive effect on internal allegiance and disc ipline in the Army that Diem's loyalty based promotion and assignment policies h ad had. They did not foresee that in the wake of a coup senior officers would la ck the cohesiveness to hang together and that the temptations of power would pro mote a devisive internal competition among ambitious men at the expense of the w ar against the Viet Cong. Two weeks after the fruitless Krulak-Mendenhall missio n, with the Washington discussions still stalemated, it was the turn of Secretar y McNamara and General Taylor, the Chairman of the JCS, to assess the problem. T hey left for Vietnam on September 23 with the Presidential instruction to apprai se the condition of the war effort and the impact on it of the Buddhist politica l turmoil and to recommend a course of action for the GVN and the U.S. They retu rned to Washington on October 2. Their report was a somewhat contradictory compr omise between the views of the civilian and military staffs. It affirmed that th e war was being won, and that it would be successfully concluded in the first th ree corps areas by the end of 1964, and in the Delta by 1965, thereby permitting the withdrawal of American advisors, although it noted that the political tensi ons were starting to have an adverse effect on it. But, more importantly, it rec ommended a series of measures to coerce Diem into compliance with American wishe s that included a selective suspension of U.S. economic aid, an end to aid for t he special forces units used in the August 21 raids unless they were subordinate d to the Joint General Staff, and the continuation of Lodge's cool official aloo fness from the regime. It recommended the public announcement of the U.S. intent ion to withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of the year, but suggested that the aid suspensions not be announced in order to give Diem a chance to respond without a public loss of face. It concluded by recommending against active U.S. encourage ment of a coup, in spite of the fact that an aid suspension was the one step the generals had asked for in August as a sign of U.S. condemnation of Diem and sup port for a change of government. The report was quickly adopted by Kennedy in th e NSC and a brief, and subsequently much rued, statement was released to the pre ss on October 2, announcing the planned withdrawal of 1,000 troops by year's end . The McNamara-Taylor mission, like the Krulak-Mendenhall mission before and the Honolulu Conference in November after the coup, points up the great difficulty encountered by high level fact-finding missions and conferences in getting at th e "facts" of a complex policy problem like Vietnam in a short time. It is hard t o believe that hasty visits by harried high level officials with overloaded itin eraries really add much in the way of additional data or lucid insight. And beca use they become a focal point of worldwide press coverage, they often raise publ ic expectations or anxieties that may only create additional problems for the Pr esident. There were many such high level conferences over Vietnam.

Of the recommendations of the McNamara-Taylor mission, the proposal for selectiv e suspension of economic aid, in particular the suspension of the commercial imp ort program, was the most significant both in terms of its effect, as an example of the adroit use or denial of American assistance to achieve foreign policy ob jectives. In this instance economic sanctions, in the form selected aid suspensi ons in those programs to which the regime would be most sensitive but that would have no immediate adverse effect on the war effort, were used constructively to influence events rather than negatively to punish those who had violated our wi shes, our usual reaction to coups in Latin America. The proposal itself had been under consideration since the abortive coup plot of August. At that time, Lodge had been authorized to suspend aid if he thought it would enhance the likelihoo d of the success of a coup. Later in September he was again given specific contr ol over the delay or suspension of any of the pending aid programs. On both occa sions, however, he had expressed doubt about the utility of such a step. In fact , renewal of the commercial import program had been pending since early in Septe mber, so that the adoption of the McNamara-Taylor proposal merely formalized the existing situation into policy. As might have been expected (although the recor d leaves ambiguous whether this was a conscious aim of the Administration), the Vietnamese generals interpreted the suspension as a green light to proceed with a coup. While this policy was being applied in October, Lodge shunned all contac t with the regime that did not come at Diem's initiative. He wanted it clearly u nderstood that they must come to him prepared to adopt our advice before he woul d recommend to Washington a change in U.S. policy. Lodge performed with great sk ill, but inevitably frictions developed within the Mission as different viewpoin ts and proposals came forward. In particular, Lodge's disagreements and disputes with General Harkins during October when the coup plot was maturing and later w ere to be of considerable embarrassment to Washington when they leaked to the pr ess. Lodge had carefully cultivated the press, and when the stories of friction appeared, it was invariably Harkins or Richardson or someone else who was the vi llian. No sooner had the McNamara-Taylor mission returned to Washington and repo rted its recommendations than the generals reopened contact with the Mission ind icating that once again they were preparing to strike against the regime. Washin gton's immediate reaction on October 5 was to reiterate the decision of the NSC on the McNamara-Taylor report, i.e., no U.S. encouragement of a coup. Lodge was instructed, however, to maintain contact with the generals and to monitor their plans as they emerged. These periodic contacts continued and by October 25, Lodg e had come to believe that Diem was unlikely to respond to our pressure and that we should therefore not thwart the coup forces. Harkins disagreed, believing th at we still had not given Diem a real chance to rid himself of Nhu and that we s hould present him with such an ultimatum and test his response before going ahea d with a coup. He, furthermore, had reservations about the strength of the coup forces when compared with those likely to remain loyal to the regime. All this l eft Washington anxious and doubtful. Lodge was cautioned to seek fuller informat ion on the coup plot, including a line-up of forces and the proposed plan of act ion. The U.S. could not base its policy on support for a coup attempt that did n ot offer a strong prospect of success. Lodge was counseled to consider ways of d elaying or preventing the coup if he doubted its prospects for success. By this juncture, however,

Lodge felt committed and, furthermore, felt the matter was no longer in our hand s. The generals were taking the action on their own initiative and we could only prevent it now by denouncing them to Diem. While this debate was still going on , the generals struck. Shortly after Ambassador Lodge and Admiral Felt had calle d on Diem on November 1, the generals made their move, culminating a summer and fall of complex intrigue. The coup was led by General Minh, the most respected o f the senior generals, together with Generals Don, Kim and Khiem. They convoked a meeting of all but a few senior officers at JGS headquarters at noon on the da y of the coup, announced their plans and got the support of their compatriots. T he coup itself was executed with skill and swiftness. They had devoted special a ttention to ensuring that the major potentially loyal forces were isolated and t heir leaders neutralized at the outset of the operation. By the late afternoon o f November 1, only the palace guard remained to defend the two brothers. At 4:30 p.m., Diem called Lodge to ask where the U.S. stood. Lodge was noncommital and confined himself to concern for Diem's physical safety. The conversation ended i nconclusively. The generals made repeated calls to the palace offering the broth ers safe conduct out of the country if they surrendered, but the two held out ho pe until the very end. Sometime that evening they secretly slipped out of the pa lace through an underground escape passage and went to a hide-away in Cholon. Th ere they were captured the following morning after their whereabouts was learned when the palace fell. Shortly the two brothers were murdered in the back of an armored personnel carrier en route to JGS headquarters. Having successfully carr ied off their coup, the generals began to make arrangements for a civilian gover nment. Vice President Tho was named to head a largely civilian cabinet, but Gene ral Minh became President and Chairman of the shadow Military Revolutionary Coun cil. After having delayed an appropriate period, the U.S. recognized the new gov ernment on November 8. As the euphoria of the first days of liberation from the heavy hand of the Diem regime wore off, however, the real gravity of the economi c situation and the lack of expertise in the new government became apparent to b oth Vietnamese and American officials. The deterioration of the military situati on and the strategic hamlet program also came more and more clearly into perspec tive. These topics dominated the discussions at the Honolulu Conference on Novem ber 20 when Lodge and the country team met with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bell, an d Bundy. But the meeting ended inconclusively. After Lodge had conferred with th e President a few days later in Washington, the White House tried to pull togeth er some conclusions and offer some guidance for our continuing and now deeper in volvement in Vietnam. The instructions contained in NSAM 273, however, did not r eflect the truly dire situation as it was to come to light in succeeding weeks. The reappraisals forced by the new information would swiftly make it irrelevant as it was "overtaken by events." For the military coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh D iem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of t he Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government. In O ctober we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a

green light to the generals. We maintained clandestine contact with them through out the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operationa l plans and proposed new government. Thus, as the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities a nd our commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam. End of Summary and Analy sis CHRONOLOGY 8 May 1963 Hue incident Government troops fire on a Buddhist prot est demonstration, killing nine and wounding fourteen. The incident triggers a n ationwide Buddhisst protest and a crisis of popular confidence for the Diem regi me. GVN maintains the incident was an act of VC terrorism. 10 May 1963 Manifesto of Buddhist clergy A five point demand by the Buddhist clergy is transmitted to the Government. It calls for freedom to fly the Buddhist flag, legal qaulity wi th the Catholic Church, an end of arrests, punishment of the perpetrators of the May 8 incident, and indemnification of its victims. 18 May 1963 Nolting meeting with Diem: Embassy Saigon message 1038 U.S. Ambassador Nolting meets with Diem and outlines the steps the U.S. wants Diem to take to refress the Buddhist griev ances and recapture public confidence. These include an admission of responsibil ity for the Hue incident, compensation of the victims, and a reaffirmation of re ligious equality and non-discrimination. 30 May 1963 Buddhist demonstrations 350 Buddhist monks demonstrate in front of the National Assmebly and announce a 48h our hunger strike. 4 Jun 1963 Truehart meeting with Thuan With Nolting on leave, charge d'affaires Truehart meets with Secretary of State Tuan and on insruction from the State Department, warns that U.S. support for the GVN could not be mai ntained if there were another bloody suppression of Buddhists. 4 Jun 1963 Tho Co mmittee appointed Later that day the Government announces the appointment of an inter-ministerial committee headed by Vice President Tho to resolve the religiou s issue. 5 Jun 1963 The committee meets Buddhists

The first meeting between the Tho committee and the Buddhist leadership takes pl ace, after which each side publicly questions the other's good faith in the nego tiations. 8 Jun 1963 Madame Nhu atacks Buddhists Madame Nhu, wife of Diem's powe rful brother, publicly accuses the Buddhists of being infiltrated with communist agents Later on the same day, Truehart protests Mme. Nhu's remarks to Diem and threatens to dissociate the U.S. from any future repressive measures against the Buddhists. 11 Jun 1963 First Buddhist suicide by fire At noon in the middle of a downtown intersection, a Buddhist monk, Thich Quang Duc, is immersed in gasoli ne and sets himself afire. His fiery protest is photographed and is front page m aterial in the world's newspapers. Shock and indignation are universal. Mme. Nhu subsequently refers to it as a "barbecue." 12 Jun 1963 Truehart repeats U.S. di ssociation threat Truehart sees Diem again to protest his lack of action on the Buddhist problem and says that Quang Duc's suicide has shocked the world. If Die m does not act, the U.S. will be forced to dissociate itself from him. 14 Jun 19 63 Tho committee meets again with Buddhists Under U.S. pressure, negotiations be tween Vice President Tho's committee and the Buddhist leadership reopen in appar ent earnest. 16 Jun 1963 GVN-Buddhist communique A joint GVN-Buddhist communique is released as a product of the negotiations that outlines the elements of a se ttlement, but affixes no responsibility for the May 8 Hue incident. Late June- J uly Buddhist protest intensifies Buddhists protest activities intensify as leade rship passes from the discredited moderate, older leaders to younger militants. The Saigon press corps is actively cultivated. 27 June 1963 Kennedy announces Lo dge appointment President Kennedy, visiting in Ireland, announces the appointmen t of Henry Cabot Lodge as the new U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, effective in September. 3 Jul 1963 Tho committee absolves regime

Vice President Tho's committee announces that a preliminary investigation of the May 8 incident has confirmed that the deaths were the result of an act of VC te rrorism. 4 Jul 1963 White House meeting on Vietnamese situation At a State Depar tment briefing for the President it is generally agreed that Diem will not volun tarily remove Nhu. A discussion of the likely consequences of a coup reveals div ergent views. 5 Jul 1963 Nolting in Washington Having cut short his vacation to return to Washington for consultations, Nolting confers with Under Secretary of State George Ball and voices the fear that an attempt to overthrow Diem would re sult in a protracted religious civil war that would open the door to the Viet Co ng. We should not abandon Diem yet. While in Washington he also sees Secretary M cNamara. 10 Jul 1963 SNIE 53-2-63 This special intelligence estimate notes coup rumors in Vietnam and warns that a coup would disrupt the war effort and perhaps give the Viet Cong the opportunity for gains they had been hoping for. It concl udes, however, that if Diem does nothing to implement the June 16 agreements, Bu ddhist unrest will continue through the summer and increase the likelihood of a coup attempt. 11 Jul 1963 Nolting's return to Saigon Nolting returns to Vietnam with Washington's blessing to make one last attempt to persuade Diem to concilia te the Buddhists. The hope is to draw on the good will that Nolting has built up in his two years of service. 11 Jul 1963 Nhu squelches coup plotting At a speci al meeting for all senior generals, Nhu attacks their loyalty to the regime for not having thwarted the numerous coup plots that had been reported. The meeting apparently forestalls any immediae threat to the family. 15 Jul 1963 Embassy Sai gon message 85 Deeply resentful of Truehart's tough pressure tactics, Nolting me ets with Diem and attempts to mollify him. He convinces Diem to make a nationwid e radio address with concessions to the Buddhists. 19 Jul 1963 Diem speaks on ra dio

Complying with the letter but not the spirit of Nolting's request, Diem delivers a brief cold radio address that makes only very minor concessions to the Buddhi sts and asks for harmony and support of the Government. McNamara press conferenc e At a press conference, Secretary McNamara says the war is progressing well and the Buddhist crisis has not yet affected it. 5 Aug 1963 Second Buddhist suicide A second Buddhist monk commits suicide by burning himself to death in the conti nuing protest against the Diem regime. 14 Aug 1963 Nolting-Diem meeting In their final meeting before Nolting's departure from Vietnam, Diem promises to make a public statement repudiating Mme Nhu's inflammatory denunciations of the Buddhis ts. Nolting left the next day. 15 Aug 1963 New York Herald Tribune article by Ma rguerite Higgins Diem's promised public statement takes the form of an interview with Marguerite Higgins, conservative correspondent of the New York Herald Trib une. Diem asserts that conciliation has been his policy toward the Buddhists all along and the family is pleased with Lodge's appointment. 18 Aug 1963 Generals decide on martial law Ten senior Army generals meet and decide that in view of t he deteriorating political situation, they will ask Diem for a declaration of ma rtial law to permit them to return monks from outside Saigon to their own provin ces and pagodas and thus reduce tensions in the capital. 20 Aug 1963 Generals pr opose martial law to Nhu and Diem A small group of generals meets first with Nhu and then with Diem to propose that martial law be decreed forthwith. Diem appro ves the proposal and the decree takes effect at midnight. 21 Aug 1963 Nhu's forc es attack pagodas Under the cover of the military martial law, shortly after mid night, forces loyal to Nhu and under his orders attack pagodas throughout Vietna m, arresting monks and sacking the sacred buildings. Over 30 Buddhists are injur ed and over 1400 arrested. The attack is a shattering repudiation of Diem's prom ises to Nolting. The Embassy is taken by surprise.

Lodge confers with Nolting and Hilsman First news of the attacks reaches Lodge i n Honolulu where he is conferring with Nolting and Assistant Secretary of State Hilsman. He is dispatched immediately to Vietnam. Washington reaction At 9:30 a. m. a stiff statement is released by State deploring the raids as a direct violat ion of Diem's assurances to the U.S. But first intelligence places the blame for them on the Army, not Nhu. 22 Aug 1963 Lodge arrives in Saigon After a brief st op in Tokyo, Lodge arrives in Saigon at 9:30 p.m. The situation still remains co nfused. 23 Aug 1963 CIA information Report TDCS DB-3/656,252 General Don, armed forces commander under the martial law decree, has contacted a CAS officer and a sked why the U.S. was broadcasting the erroneous story that the Army had conduct ed the pagoda raids. Nhu's special forces were responsible. The U.S. should make its position known. A separate contact by another general with a member of the mission had brought another inquiry as to the U.S. position. The query is clear. Would we support the Army if it acted against Nhu and/or Diem? Student demonstr ations Large student protest demonstrations on behalf of the imprisoned Buddhist s take place at the faculties of medicine and pharmacy at the University of Saig on. They are a dramatic break with the tradition of student apathy to politics i n Vietnam. The regime reacts with massive arrests. 24 Aug 1963 Embassy Saigon me ssage 316, Lodge to Hilsman Lodge lays the blame for the raids at Nhu's feet and states that his influence is significantly increased. But, in view of the loyal ty of Saigon area commanders, a coup attempt would be a "shot in the dark." Stat e message 243, State to Lodge Subsequently known as the "Aug 24 cable," this con troversial message acknowledges Nhu's responsibility for the raids and says that U.S. can no longer tolerate his continuation in power. If Diem is unable or unw illing to remove him, the generals are to be told that the U.S. will be prepared to discontinue economic and military support, accept the obvious implication an d will promise assistance to them in any period of

interim breakdown of the GVN. Lodge's permission is requested for a VOA broadcas t exonerating the Army of responsibility for the Aug 21 raids. 25 Aug 1963 Embas sy Saigon message Lodge approves the proposed course of action but sees no reaso n to approach Diem first. Diem will not remove the Nhus and it would merely tip off the palace to the impending military action. CAS Saigon message 0292 Lodge, Harkins, and Richardson meet and agree on an approach to the generals with the i nformation in State's 243. 26 Aug 1963 VOA broadcast Early on this Monday mornin g, VOA in South Vietnam broadcasts the press stories placing blame for the Aug 2 1 raids on Nhu and absolving the Army. It also broadcast press speculation that the U.S. is contemplating an aid suspension. Lodge presents credentials to Diem Later the same morning, Lodge presents his credentials to Diem, after an early m orning meeting with Harkins and Richardson, at which they agree on the details o f the approach to the generals. NSC meeting The Aug 24 cable of instructions had been drafted, cleared and sent on a weekend with McNamara, McCone, Rusk and the President all out of town. The NSC meeting on Monday morning reveals that these top advisors have reservations about proceeding hastily with a coup when we lac k so much basic information about its leadership and chances. Lodge is asked for more details. 27 Aug 1963 CAS agents meet generals CAS agents Conein and Spera meet with Generals Khiem and Khanh respectively. Khiem tells Conein that other p articipants are Generals Minh, Kim, Thieu and Le, and that General Don was aware of the plot and approved, but was too exposed to participate. Embassy Saigon me ssage 364 Lodge gives an optimistic appraisal of the balance of forces for a cou p and expresses confidence in the identified leaders.

NSC meeting At the now daily NSC meeting in Washington, the State Department par ticipants generally favor going ahead with the coup, while the Defense Departmen t, both civilian and military, prefers another try with Diem. 28 Aug 1963 MACV m essage 1557 Harkins goes on record with doubts about the line-up of forces for t he coup and sees no reason for our "rush approval." State message 269, President to Lodge; and JCS message 3385, Taylor to Harkins Concerned by the differing vi ews of Lodge and Harkins, as well as the division of opinion in Washington, the President asks the Ambassador and MACV for their separate appraisals. 29 Aug 196 3 CAS agents meet Minh At this meeting, arranged by Minh, he asks for clear evid ence that the U.S. will not betray them to Nhu. He is unwilling to discuss the d etails of his plan. When asked what would constitute a sign of U.S. support, he replies that the U.S. should suspend economic aid to the regime. Embassy Saigon message 375 Lodge replies to the Presidential query that the U.S. is irrevocably committed to the generals. He recommends showing the CAS messages to them to es tablish our good faith and if that is insufficient, he recommends a suspension o f economic aid as they requested. MACV message 1566 Harkins reply to Taylor sugg ests that one last effort be made with Diem in the form of an ultimatum demandin g Nhu's removal. Such a move he feels will strengthen the hand of the generals, not imperil them. NSC meeting Another inconclusive meeting is held with the divi sion of opinion on a U.S. course of action still strong. The result is to leave policy making in Lodge's hands. State message 272 Lodge is authorized to have Ha rkins show the CAS messages to the generals in exchange for a look at their deta iled plans. He is further authorized to suspend U.S. aid at his discretion.

31 Aug 1963 MACV message 1583; Embassy Saigon message 391; and CAS Saigon messag e 0499 Harkins meets with Khiem who tells him that Minh has called off the coup. Military was unable to achieve a favorable balance of forces in the Saigon area and doubts about whether the U.S. had leaked their plans to Nhu were the decidi ng factors. A future attempt is not ruled out. NSC meeting; MGen Victor C. Krula k, Memo for the Record, Vietnam Meeting at the State Dept. With the demise of th e coup plot confirmed, the NSC (without the President) meets to try to chart a n ew policy for Vietnam. The discussion reveals the divergence between the militar y desire to get on with the war and repair relations with Diem, and the State De partment view that continued support for Diem will eventually mean a loss of the war as more and more of the South Vietnamese are alienated from it. No decision s are taken. 2 Sep 1963 Kennedy TV interview The President, in a TV interview wi th CBS News' Walter Cronkite, expresses his disappointment with Diem's handling of the Buddhist crisis and concern that a greater effort is needed by the GVN to win popular support. This can be done, he feels, "with change in policy and per haps with personnel . . ." Lodge meets with Nhu Avoiding any contact with Diem, Lodge nonetheless meets with Nhu who announces his intention to quit the Governm ent as a sign of the progress of the campaign against the VC. Mme Nhu and Archbi shop Thuc, another of Diem's brothers, are to leave the country on extended trip s shortly. 6 Sep 1963 NSC meeting The NSC decides to instruct Lodge to reopen "t ough" negotiations with Diem and to start by clarifying to him the U.S. position . Robert Kennedy speculates that if the war can be won neither with Diem nor in the event of a disruptive coup, we should perhaps be considering a U.S. disengag ement. Secretary McNamara proposes a fact-finding trip by General Krulak, and St ate suggests including Joseph Mendenhall, a senior FSO with Vietnam experience. They leave later the same day. 7 Sep 1963 Archbishop Thuc leaves Vietnam With th e intercession of the Vatican and the Papal Delegate in Saigon, Archbishop Thuc leaves the country for Rome on an extended visit. 8 Sep 1963 AID Director Bell T V interview

In a televised interview, AID Director Bell expresses concern that Congress migh t cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem Government does not change its repressive policies. 9 Sep 1963 Mme Nhu leaves Vietnam Mme Nhu departs from Saigon to atte nd the World Parliamentarians Conference in Belgrade and then to take an extende dtrip through Europe and possibly the U.S. Kennedy TV interview Appearing on the inaugural program of the NBC Huntley-Brinkley News, the President says he does not believe an aid cut-off would be helpful in achieving American purposes in Vi etnam at present. 10 Sep 1963 NSC meeting Krulak and Mendenhall return from Viet nam after a whirlwind four day trip and make their report to the NSC. With them are John Mecklin, USIS Director in Saigon, and Rufus Phillips, USOM's Director o f Rural Programs. Krulak's report stresses that the war is being won and, while there is some dissatisfaction in the military with Diem, no one would risk his n eck to remove him. A continuation of present policies under Diem will yield vict ory. Mendenhall presents a completely contradictory view of the situation. A bre akdown of civil administration was possible and a religious civil war could not be excluded if Diem was not replaced. The war certainly could not be won with Di em. Phillips and Mecklin support Mendenhall with variations. Nolting agrees with Krulak. All the disagreement prompts the President to ask the two emissaries, " You two did visit the same country, didn't you?" 11 Sep 1963 Embassy Saigon mess age 478 Lodge reverses himself in suggesting a complete study of kinds of econom ic aid suspension that might be used to topple the regime. White House meeting W hite House decides to hold economic aid renewal in abeyance pending a complete e xamination of how it might be used to pressure Diem. tion in the Senate condemni ng the South Vietnamese Government for its repressive handling of the Buddhist p roblem and calling for an end to U.S. aid unless the repressions are abandoned. 12 Sep 1963 Senator Church's Resolution With White House approval, Senator Churc h introduces a resolution in the Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Governme nt for its repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an end to U.S. aid unless the repressions are abandoned.

14 Sep 1963 State message 411 Lodge is informed that approval of the $18.5 milli on commercial import program is deferred until basic policy decisions on Vietnam have been made. 16 Sep 1963 Martial law ends Martial law is ended throughout th e country. 17 Sep 1963 NSC meeting Two alternative proposals for dealing with Di em are considered. The first would use an escalatory set of pressures to get him to do our bidding. The second would involve acquiescence in recent GVN actions, recognition that Diem and Nhu are inseparable, and an attempt to salvage as muc h as possible from a bad situation. A decision is taken to adopt the first as po licy, and also to send Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on a fact-gathering mission. 21 Sep 1963 White House press release The forthcoming McNamara-Taylor mission is announced to the press by the White House. White House instructions t o McNamara-Taylor The White House instructions for the mission ask the two men t o (1) appraise the status of the military effort; (2) assess the impact on the w ar effort of the Buddhist crisis; (3) recommend a course of action for the GVN t o redress the problem and for the US. to get them to do it; and (4) examine how our aid can further no. 3. 23 Sep 1963 McNamara-Taylor mission departs The McNam ara-Taylor party leaves Washington for its ten day trip to Vietnam. 25 Sep 1963 Opening meeting of McNamara-Taylor with country team The disagreement between Ha rkins and Lodge about the situation in-country and the progress of the war surfa ces immediately in this first conference. McNamara spends several subsequent day s touring various parts of Vietnam to appraise the war first hand and talk with U.S. and Vietnamese officers. 27 Sep 1963 National Assembly elections As announc ed earlier, and at the end of a pro forma one week campaign, the GVN holds natio n-wide elections for the National Assembly with predictably high turnouts and ma jorities for Government candidates.

Embassy Saigon messages 602 and 608 Aware that McNamara and Taylor are tasked to recommend uses of the aid program to pressure Diem, both Lodge and Brent, the U SOM Director, go on record against them. 29 Sep 1963 McNamara, Taylor and Lodge see Diem In their protocol call on Diem, and after his two-hour monologue, McNam ara is able to pointedly stress that the political unrest and Government repress ive measures against the Buddhists were undermining the U.S. war effort. Diem se ems unimpressed, but does ask Taylor for his appraisal, as a military man, of th e progress of the war. 30 Sep 1963 McNamara, Taylor and Lodge meet Vice Presiden t Tho Tho stresses to the two visitors the gravity of the political deterioratio n and the negative effect it was having on war. He questions the success of the strategic hamlet program. Later that day, the McNamara-Taylor party leaves South Vietnam for Honolulu. 2 Oct 1963 SecDef Memo for the President: Report of the M cNamara-Taylor mission After a day in Honolulu to prepare a report, McNamara and Taylor return to Washington and present their findings and recommendations to a morning NSC meeting. Their long report represents a compromise between the mili tary and the civilian views. It confirms the progress of the war, but warns of t he dangers inherent in the current political turmoil and recommends pressures ag ainst Diem to bring changes. Militarily, it calls for greater GVN effort, especi ally in the Delta and in clear and hold operations, and a consolidation of the s trategic hamlet program. It proposes the announcement of the plans to withdraw 1 ,000 American troops by year's end. To put political pressure on Diem to institu te the reforms we want, it recommends a selective aid suspension, an end of supp ort for the special forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and a continuation of Lodge's aloofness from the regime. It recommends against a coup, but qualifie s this by suggesting that an alternative leadership be identified and cultivated . The recommendations are promptly approved by the President. White House press release A statement following the meeting is released as recommended by McNamara and Taylor that reiterates the U.S. commitment to the struggle against the VC, announces the 1,000 man troop withdrawal, and dissociates the U.S. from Diem's r epressive policies. It does not, however, announce the aid suspensions. CAS Saig on message 1385 CAS agent Conein "accidentally" meets General Don at Tan Son Nhu t. Don asks him to come to Nha Trang that evening. With Embassy approval Conein keeps the appointment. Don states that there is an active plot among the general s for a coup, and that General

Minh wants to see Conein on Oct 5 to discuss details. The key to the plan, accor ding to Don, is the conversion of III Corps Commander, General Dinh. 5 Oct 1963 NSC meeting The President approves detailed recommendations of the McNamara-Tayl or mission for transmission to Lodge. CAP message 63560 President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup. There should, however, be urgent covert effort . . . t o identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as and when i t appears." CAS Saigon message 1445 With Lodge's approval, and probably before r eceipt of foregoing message, Conein meets with General Minh. Minh says he must k now the U.S. position on a coup in the near future. The GVN's loss of popular su pport is endangering the whole war effort. Three possible plans are mentioned, o ne involving assassination. Conein is noncommital. CAS Saigon message 34026 Lodg e recommends that when Conein is contacted again, he be authorized to say that t he U.S. will not thwart a coup, that we are willing to review plans, and that we will continue support to a successor regime. Richardson recalled His identity h aving been compromised in recent press stories about internal policy struggles i n the U.S. mission, CIA Chief of Station, John Richardson, is recalled to Washin gton. 6 Oct 1963 CAP message 63560 Washington clarifies its views on a coup by s tating that the U.S. will not thwart such a move if it offers prospects of a mor e effective fight against the VC. Security and deniability of all contacts is pa ramount. 7 Oct 1963 National Assembly convenes The newly elected National Assemb ly convenes to hear Diem's State of the Union address. Diem speaks mainly of Vie tnam's past progress under his rule, playing down the current political crisis a nd making only scant reference to U.S. aid.

Mme Nhu arrives in U.S. Mme Nhu arrives in the U.S. from Europe for a three-week speaking tour. She immediately launches into vituperative attacks on the U.S. a nd its role in Vietnam. Oct 1963 UN General Assembly vote The UN General Assembl y, after a strong debate with many voices denouncing Diem's anti-Buddhist policy , votes to send a fact-finding team to Saigon to investigate the charges of repr ession. Oct 1963 CAS officer meets Minh A CAS officer reportedly meets with Minh and conveys the U.S. position that it will neither encourage nor thwart a coup attempt, but would hope to be informed about it. 17 Oct 1963 GVN informed of aid cut-off to special forces Acting for the Ambassador, General Stillwell, MACV J3, informs Secretary Thuan that U.S. aid for the special forces units responsibl e for the Aug 21 raids is being suspended until they are transferred to the fiel d and placed under JGS command. 22 Oct 1963 Department of State, JNR Research Me mo RFE9O The State Department publishes a controversial research memorandum whic h takes issue with the Pentagon's optimistic reading of the statistical indicato rs on the progress of the war. The memo states that certain definitely negative and ominous trends can be identified. Harkins sees Don General Harkins sees Gene ral Don, and in a conversation whose interpretation is subsequently disputed, te lls him that U.S. officers should not be approached about a coup as it distracts them from their job, fighting the VC. Don takes it as U.S. discouragement of a coup. 23 Oct 1963 CAS agent meets Don General Don renews contact with Conein to ask for clarification of U.S. policy after Harkins' statement to him of the prev ious day. Conein repeats Washington guidance, which relieves Don. Conein asks fo r proof of the existence of the coup and its plan; Don promises to provide polit i [material missing] 24 Oct 1963 Diem invites Lodge to Dalat

Diem extends an invitation to Lodge and his wife to spend Sunday, Oct 27, with h im at his villa in Dalat. Lodge is pleased, Diem has come to him. 1st CAS agent meeting with Don Conein meets with Don in the morning and the latter reports tha t Harkins had corrected his previous remarks and apologized for any misunderstan ding. The coup is set to take place before Nov 2 and he will meet Conein later t hat day to review the plans. 2nd CAS agent meeting with Don In the evening, Don tells Conein that the coup committee voted not to reveal any plans because of co ncern about security leaks. He promises to turn over to Conein for Lodge's Eyes Only the operation plan two days before the coup occurs. UN fact-finding team ar rives in Saigon The UN fact-finding team arrives in Saigon and begins its invest igation. 25 Oct 1963 CAS Saigon message 1964 Lodge argues that the time has come to go ahead with a coup and we should not thwart the maturing plot. He takes st rong exception to Harkins reservations about the determination and ability of th e plotters to carry off the coup. CAP message 63590 Bundy, replying for the Whit e House, is concerned about the dangers of U.S. support for a coup that fails. W e must be in a position to judge the prospects for the coup plan and discourage any effort with likelihood of failure. 26 Oct 1963 Vietnamese National Day Diem reviews the troops in the National Day parade before scant crowds with Lodge and all other diplomatic personnel in attendance. The coup had originally been sche duled for this day. 27 Oct 1963 Lodge-Diem meeting As planned, Lodge travels to Dalat with Diem and engages in a day-long conversation that produces little resu lts. Diem makes his standard complaints against the U.S., and whenever Lodge ask s what he is planning to do about specific U.S. requests, he changes the subject . At one point, he does inquire, however, about resumption of the commercial imp ort program. Lodge asks what movement he will make on our requests. Diem changes the subject. Lodge's feelings of frustration confirm his conviction that we can not work with Diem.

Buddhist suicide A seventh Buddhist monk commits suicide by fire. 28 Oct 1963 Do n contacts Lodge At the airport in the morning prior to departing for the dedica tion of an atomic energy facility in Dalat, General Don approaches Lodge and ask s if Conein is authorized to speak for the U.S. Lodge says yes. Don then affirms the need for the coup to be completely Vietnamese. Lodge agrees, but when he as ks about timing, Don replies that the generals are not yet ready. CAS agent meet s Don That evening Conein meets Don again and the latter says that the plans may be available for Lodge only four hours before the coup. Lodge should not change his plans to go to Washington on Oct 31 as this would tip off the palace. Some details of the organization of the coup committee are discussed. 29 Oct 1963 CJN CPAC alerts task force CINCPAC alerts a naval and air task force to stand off Vi etnam for possible evacuation of American dependents and civilians if required. NSC meeting A decision is made at the NSC meeting to have Lodge fully inform Har kins on the coup plotting and arrangements, since if Lodge leaves, Harkins will be in charge. Concern is also registered at the differing views of the two men t oward a coup. Special forces transferred from Saigon In the first preparatory ac t of the coup, General Dinh orders Colonel Tung's special forces out of Saigon f or maneuvers. It is unclear whether the action came as a part of the generals' c oup or Nhu's psuedo coup. 30 Oct 1963 MACV messages 2028, 2033, and 2034 Belated ly apprised of the continuing contacts with the generals and the U.S. role in th e coup plotting, General Harkins dispatches three angry cables to Taylor in whic h he disagrees with Lodge's interpretation of the U.S. policy. He understands it to be no active covert encouragement. He opposes personally a coup and doesn't think the generals have the forces to pull one off. CAS Washington message 79109

The White House is now genuinely concerned at the Saigon dispute and tells Lodge it believes we still have the power to call off the coup if we choose to. CAS S aigon message 2063 Lodge replies to Washington that he is powerless to stop the coup, the matter is entirely in Vietnamese hands. Harkins does not concur. CAS W ashington message 79407 To clear the air and redefine U.S. policy, Washington se nt another cable to Lodge. The U.S. cannot accept as a policy position that it h as no power to prevent the coup. If the coup does not have high prospects of suc cess, Lodge should intercede with the generals to have it delayed or called off. More detailed information on the plans is urgently requested. Specific instruct ions to guide U.S. action during a coup are issued. They prescribe strict noninv olvement and somewhat less strict neutrality. 31 Oct 1963 Lodge defers departure Lodge, who had been scheduled to leave for Washington for high-level conference s, defers his departure because of the tense atmosphere and the apparent immenen ce of the coup. 1 Nov 1963 Lodge and Felt meet with Diem 10:00 a.m. Admiral Felt , who is visiting, and Lodge call on Diem, who reiterates many of the points he made to McNamara a month earlier. At the end of the meeting, Diem takes Lodge as ide and indicates he is ready to talk about what the U.S. wants him to do. Felt leaves Saigon after the meeting. Late morning Coup units begin to deploy The fir st coup units begin to deploy in and around Saigon. 12:00 a.m. Officers meet at JGS The coup committee has convened a meeting of all senior Vietnamese officers except Generals Dinh and Cao at JGS. There they are informed of the coup and ask ed to support it. All except Colonel Tung do. Their pledges of support are taped . Tung is taken into custody later to be executed. The CNO was killed en route b y an escort. A CAS officer is invited to the JGS and maintains telephone contact with the Embassy throughout the coup. 1:45 p.m. U.S. notified

General Don calls General Stillwell, J-3 to General Harkins, and informs him tha t the coup is under way. 2:00 p.m. Key installations taken About his time coup f orces are seizing the key installations in Saigon, including the post office, po lice headquarters, radio stations, airport, naval headquarters, etc. They were a lso deploying for attacks on the palace and the palace guard barracks and to blo ck any counter-attack from outside the city. 4:00 p.m. First skirmishes, Diem to ld to surrender By about this time the first skirmish was taking place at the pa lace and guard barracks. Failing to reach General Dinh, Diem and Nhu realize the coup is serious. The generals called shortly after this and told the two brothe rs to surrender. They refused. 4:30 p.m. Coup broadcast, Diem calls Lodge The ge nerals go on radio, announce the coup and demand the resignation of Diem and Nhu . At the same time, Diem is calling Lodge. He asks Lodge where the U.S. stands. Lodge replies that the U.S. cannot yet have a view. He exprsses concern for Diem 's safety, and the conversation ends there. 5:00 p.m. Generals again call Diem t o demand surrender Repeated calls are now made to the palace to get Diem to surr ender. All the generals try. Colonel Tung is put on the phone and tells Diem he is a captive. Tung is then taken outside and executed. Diem and Nhu now frantica lly call all unit commanders but can find none loyal. Outside sporadic firing co ntinues. 8:00 p.m. Diem and Nhu flee Sometime in the early evening, probably abo ut eight o'clock, the two brothers escape from the palace through one of the sec ret underground passages constructed for just such emergencies. They are met by a Chinese friend who takes them to a previously prepared hideaway in Cholon. The re they spend the night in telephone contact with the palace. 9:00 p.m. Palace b ombarded At about nine o'clock, the attackers launch an artillery and armored ba rrage on the palace and its defenders which lasts through the night. 2 Nov 1963 3:30 a.m. Assault on the palace begins The tank and infantry assault on the Gia Long palace begins.

6: 20 a.m. Diem calls generals to surrender Diem calls General Don from the Chol on hideout to surrender, but does not tell his location. 6:30 a.m. Palace falls Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, Diem issues a cease fire order to t he palace guard and the palace falls to the insurgents. Colonel Thao, the comman der of the attacking forces, learns of Diem's whereabouts and with JGS permissio n goes to arrest him. 6: 45 a.m. Diem and Nhu again escape Arriving at the Cholo n house, Thao calls JGS and is overheard by the brothers who escape to a nearby Catholic church. 6:50 a.m. Diem and Nhu are captured Diem again calls General Do n and surrenders, this time unconditionally. He and Nhu are taken prisoner short ly thereafter and are murdered in the back of an armored personnel carrier en ro ute to JGS. afternoon Vice President Tho confers on new government Vice Presiden t Tho enters into intensive conferences and negotiations with the coup committee on the composition of a new interim government which he will head. 3 Nov 1963 L odge meets with Generals Don and Kim Generals Don and Kim call on Lodge at the E mbassy and apologize for the absence of Minh who is closeted with Tho working on the composition of the new government. A two-tiered government is expected. A m ilitary committee chaired by General Minh will supervise a largely civilian cabi net under Tho's Prime Ministership. Lodge promises the immediate restoration of aid programs and assures the generals of forthcoming U.S. recognition. 4 Nov 196 3 Lodge meets with General Minh On instructions from Washington, Lodge meets wit h Minh and Don and urges them to make a clarifying statement on the deaths of Di em and Nhu to allay anxieties about the new leaders. Minh promises to do so and to announce the new government soon. 5 Nov 1963 New government announced

The new government is announced with Minh as President and Chief of the Military Committee. Tho is Premier, Minister of Economy and Minister of Finance. Don is Minister of Defense and Dinh is Minister of Security. Most other posts are fille d by civilians, but there is a noticeable absence of well-known opponents to Die m. A later announcement suspends the 1956 constitution, and outlines the structu re and functions of the new interim government. 6 Nov 1963 Composition of the Mi litary Revolutionary Council announced Saigon Radio announces the composition of the new Military Revolutionary Council with Minh as Chairman and including all important generals except Khanh. 7 Nov 1963 NLF makes post-coup policy statement In a post-coup policy statement, the NLF lists eight demands of the new regime, all but one of which the Minh-Tho Government was going to do anyway. Brent meet s with Tho on U.S. aid USOM Director Brent meets with Tho who indicated that all economic aid questions would be handled directly by his office. It was further agreed that a high-level Vietnamese commission would work with a similar group i n the U.S. mission to establish economic and aid policies and levels. 8 Nov 1963 U.S. recognizes new government Lodge calls on the new Foreign Minister, Pham Da ng Lam, and presents a note of U.S. recognition. The new government will be heav ily dependent on the U.S. in all areas. 9 Nov 1963 Embassy Saigon message 986 In the weekly progress report, the mission notes the greatly increased VC activity in the week following the coup. The return of coup units to the field will reve rse this trend, it is hoped. 12 Nov 1963 CJNCPAC message to JCS 120604Z 63 CINCP AC takes note that the statistical indicators for the war (VC attacks, weapons l oss ratio, VC defections) show deterioration dating back to the summer. 17 Nov 1 963 NLF releases stronger set of demands Its first set of demands having been ef fectively preempted by the new Minh Government, the NLF release a new and strong er set of demands including that the U.S. influence be eliminated, the fighting be halted and that a coalition government be established. For the first time the NLF states that reunification of Vietnam is an objective.

20 Nov 1963 Honolulu Conference The entire country team meets with Rusk, McNamar a, Taylor, Bundy, and Bell to review the current situation. Lodge voices optimis m about the new government, but notes the inexperience of the new leaders. We sh ould not press them too hard. We should secondly pledge aid to them in at least the amounts we were giving it to Diem. Brent notes the economic naivety of the g enerals and indicates the need for greater U.S. technical assistance to the gove rnment. Harkins' assessment is guardedly optimistic, taking note of the higher t han average VC activity in the week after the coup. The determination of the new leaders impressed him, but he was concerned about the disruptions that wholesal e replacements of province and district chiefs might have. Press release after H onolulu Conference The press release gives few details but does reiterate the U. S. intention to withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of the year. 22 Nov 1963 Lodge confers with the President Having flown to Washington the day after the conferen ce, Lodge meets with the President and presumably continues the kind of report g iven in Honolulu. 23 Nov 1963 NSAM 273 Drawing together the results of the Honol ulu Conference and Lodge's meeting with the President, NSAM 273 reaffirms the U. S. commitment to defeat the VC in South Vietnam. It reiterates the plan to withd raw 1,000 troops by year's end and to end the war in the first three corps areas by the end of 1964 and in the Delta by the end of 1965. U.S. support for the ne w regime is confirmed and aid in at least the amounts given to Diem is guarantee d. The Delta is to be the area of concentration for all military, political, eco nomic and social efforts. And clandestine operations against the North and into Laos are authorized. I. INTRODUCTION In the spring of 1963, the regime of Ngo Di nh Diem seemed to exhibit no more signs of advanced decay or imminent demise tha n might have been discerned since 1958 or 1959. Only in hindsight can certain de velopments be identified as salient. Of these, certainly the steadily increasing influence of the Nhus was the most ominous. Nhu came more and more to dominate Diem in the last year of the Diem rule. But as his power increased, Nhu's grip o n reality seems to have slipped and he was reported in that last year to have be en smoking opium and to have been mentally ill. Meanwhile, Mrne. Nhu was develop ing a power obsession of her own. The catastrophic effect of their influence dur ing the ensuing crisis, however, was impossible to have predicted. As one percep tive observer noted, the Ngo family "had come to power with a well-developed per secution complex and had subsequently developed a positive mania for survival."

Another source of concern should have been the regime's self-imposed isolation f rom the populace. It had left the peasants apathetic, a cause for real concern i n a struggle with the zealous, doctrinaire Viet Cong; but, more importantly, it had alienated large portions of the restive urban population who felt most direc tly the impact of the regime's arbitrary rule. The regime, in fact, had no real base of political support and relied on the loyalty of a handful of key military commanders to keep it in power by forestalling any overthrow. The loyalty of th ese men was bought with promotions and favors. Graft and corruption should also have drawn concern, even if governmental dishonesty was endemic in Asia, and pro bably not disproportionate at that time in South Vietnam. It was not, however, t he strains that these problems had placed on the Vietnamese political structure that were ultimately decisive. The fundamental weakness of the Diem regime was t he curious rigidity and political insensitivity of its mandarin style in the fac e of a dramatic crisis of popular confidence. With regard to the war, the consen sus of the U.S. military mission and the U.S. intelligence community in the spri ng of 1963 was that the military situation in South Vietnam was steadily improvi ng and the war was beginning to be won. A National Intelligence Estimate in Apri l 1963 concluded that the infusion of U.S. advisors had begun to have the desire d effect of strengthening the ARVN and increasing its aggressiveness. [Doc. 121] The Viet Cong retained good strength, but could be contained by the ARVN if the y did not receive a great increase in external support. Statistical indices show ed a decline in Viet Cong attacks from the previous year, increased ARVN offensi ve activity, and improvement in the weapons loss ratio. Continuing problems were Diem's loyalty-based officer promotion policy, ARVN desertions and AWOL's, poor intelligence, and low grade NCO's and company grade officers. Nonetheless, the overall outlook was sanguine. Particular reason for encouragement was the adopti on in February 1963 of the National Campaign Plan urged by the U.S. The hopeful prospects were summarized for Secretary McNamara in a briefing paper for the Hon olulu Conference of May 6: The over-all situation in Vietnam is improving. In th e military sector of the counterinsurgency, we are winning. Evidences of improve ment are clearly visible, as the combined impact of the programs which involve a long lead time begin to have effect on the Viet Cong. Even as seasoned an obser ver of insurgency as Sir Robert Thompson, Chief of the British Advisory Mission, was able to report that, "Now, in March 1963, I can say, and in this I am suppo rted by all members of the mission, that the Government is beginning to win the shooting war against the Viet Cong." One reason for the optimism of these apprai sals was the vigor with which the government, under the direction of Nhu, was pu shing the Strategic Hamlet Program. Nhu had been initially cool to the idea, but once he established the U.S. willingness to fund the program, he focused on it as the principal vehicle of the counterinsurgency campaign and as an excellent m eans of extending the oligarchy's control into the countryside. In

April the GVN claimed it had completed 5,000 strategic hamlets and had another 2 ,000 under construction. There was already official U.S. misgiving, however, abo ut the quality of many of the hamlets and about overextension of the country's l imited human resources in the program's frantic rate of expansion. Nevertheless, field reports seemed to support the success of the program which was seen as th e key to the struggle against the Viet Cong. U.S.-GVN relations in the spring of 1963 were beginning to show signs of accumulating stress. As the U.S. commitmen t and involvement deepened, frictions between American advisors and Vietnamese c ounterparts at all levels increased. Diem, under the influence of Nhu, complaine d about the quantity and zeal of U.S. advisors. They were creating a colonial im pression among the people, he said. Diem chose to dramatize his complaint by del aying agreement on the commitment of South Vietnamese funds for joint counterins urgency projects. The issue was eventually resolved, but the sensitivity to the growing U.S. presence remained and as the long crisis summer wore on, it gradual ly became a deep-seated suspicion of U.S. motives. The report of the Mansfield m ission, published in March, further exacerbated relations between the two countr ies. Diem and Nhu were particularly incensed by its praise of Cambodian neutrali sm and criticism of their regime. Coup rumors began to circulate again that spri ng, and the prevailing palace state of mind hearkened back to suspicions of U.S. complicity in the abortive 1960 coup. Mme. Nhu's ascorbic public criticism of t he United States was a further source of friction. By May 1963, these problems i n U.S.GVN relations were already substantial enough to preoccupy officials of bo th governments. Within a matter of weeks, however, events thrust them into the b ackground of a far more serious crisis. II. THE BUDDHIST CRISIS: MAY 8-AUGUST 21 A. THE CRISIS ERUPTS The incident in Hue on May 8, 1963, that precipitated what came to be called the Buddhist crisis, and that started the chain of events tha t ultimately led to the overthrow of the Diem regime and the murder of the Ngo b rothers, happened both inadvertently and unexpectedly. No one then foresaw that it would generate a national opposition movement capable of rallying virtually a ll non-communist dissidence in South Vietnam. More importantly, no one then appr eciated the degree of alienation of Vietnam's people from their government, nor the extent of the political decay within the regime, a regime no longer capable of coping with popular discontent. The religious origins of the incident are tra ceable to the massive flight of Catholic refugees from North Vietnam after the F rench defeat in 1954. An estimated one million Catholics fled the North and rese ttled in the South. Diem, animated, no doubt, by religious as well as humanitari an sympathy, and with an eye to recruiting political support from his coreligion ists, accorded these Catholic refugees preferential treatment in land redistribu tion, relief and assistance, commercial and export-import licenses,

government employment, and other GVN largess. Because Diem could rely on their l oyalty, they came to fill almost all important civilian and military positions. As an institution, the Catholic Church enjoyed a special legal status. The Catho lic primate, Ngo Dinh Thuc, was Diem's brother and advisor. But prior to 1962, t here had been no outright discrimination against Buddhists. However, among South Vietnam's 3-4 million practicing Buddhists and the 80% of the population who we re nominal Buddhists, the regime's favoritism, authoritarianism, and discriminat ion created a smoldering resentment. In April 1963, the government ordered provi ncial officials to enforce a longstanding but generally ignored ban on the publi c display of religious flags. The order came just after the officially encourage d celebrations in Hue commemorating the 25th anniversary of the ordination of Ng o Dinh Thuc, the Archbishop of Hue, during which Papal flags had been prominentl y flown. The order also came, as it happened, just prior to Buddha's birthday (M ay 8)-a major Buddhist festival. Hue, an old provincial capital of Vietnam, was the only real center of Buddhist learning and scholarship in Vietnam and its uni versity had long been a center of left-wing dissidence. Not surprisingly, then, the Buddhists in Hue defiantly flew their flags in spite of the order and, when the local administration appeared to have backed down on the ban, were emboldene d to hold a previously scheduled mass meeting on May 8 to commemorate Buddha's b irthday. Seeing the demonstration as a challenge to family prestige (Hue was als o the capital of the political fief of another Diem brother, Ngo Dinh Can) and t o government authority, local officials tried to disperse the crowds. When preli minary efforts produced no results, the Catholic deputy province chief ordered h is troops to fire. In the ensuing melee, nine persons were killed, including som e children, and fourteen were injured. Armored vehicles allegedly crushed some o f the victims. The Diem government subsequently put out a story that a Viet Cong agent had thrown a grenade into the crowd and that the victims had been crushed in a stampede. It steadfastly refused to admit responsibility even when neutral observers produced films showing government troops firing on the crowd. Diem's mandarin character would not permit him to handle this crisis with the kind of f lexibility and finesse it required. He was incapable of publicly acknowledging r esponsibility for the tragedy and seeking to conciliate the angry Buddhists. He was convinced that such a public loss of face would undermine his authority to r ule, oblivious to the fact that no modern ruler can long ignore massive popular disaffection whatever his own particular personal virtues may be. So the governm ent clung tenaciously to its version of what had occurred. The following day in Hue over 10,000 people demonstrated in protest of the killings. It was the first of the long series of protest activities with which the Buddhists were to press ure the regime in the next four months. The Buddhists rapidly organized themselv es, and on May 10, a manifesto of the Buddhist clergy was transmitted to the gov ernment demanding freedom to fly their flag, legal equality with the Catholic Ch urch, an end of arrests and freedom to practice their beliefs, and indemnificati on of the victims of the May 8th incident with punishment for its perpetrators. These five demands were officially presented to President Diem on May 15, and th e Buddhists held their first press

conference after the meeting. Publicized hunger strikes and meetings continued t hroughout May, but Diem continued to drag his feet on placating the dissenters o r settling issues. On May 30, about 350 Buddhist monks demonstrated in front of the National Assembly in Saigon, and a 48-hour hunger strike was announced. On J une 3, a demonstration in Hue was broken up with tear gas and several people wer e burned, prompting charges that the troops had used mustard gas. On June 4, the government announced the appointment of an interministerial committee headed by Vice President Tho to resolve the religious issue, but by this time such gestur es were probably too late. Large portions of the urban population had rallied to the Buddhist protest, recognizing in it the beginnings of genuine political opp osition to Diem. On June 8, Mme. Nhu exacerbated the problem by announcing that the Buddhists were infiltrated by communists. Throughout the early days of the c risis, the U.S. press had closely covered the events and brought them to the att ention of the world. On June 11, the press was tipped off to be at a downtown in tersection at noon. Expecting another protest demonstration, they were horrified to witness the first burning suicide by a Buddhist monk. Thich Quang Duc's fier y death shocked the world and electrified South Vietnam. Negotiations had been t aking place between Vice President Tho's committee and the Buddhists since June 5, with considerable acrimonious public questioning of good faith by both sides. After the suicide, the U.S. intensified its already considerable pressure on th e government to mollify the Buddhists, and to bring the deteriorating political situation under control. Finally, on June 16, a joint GVN-Buddhist communique wa s released outlining the elements of a settlement, but affixing no responsibilit y for the May 8 incident. Violent suppression by the GVN of rioting the next day , however, abrogated the spirit of the agreement. The Nhus, for their part, imme diately undertook to sabotage the agreement by secretly calling on the GVN-spons ored youth organizations to denounce it. By late June, it was apparent that the agreement was not meant as a genuine gesture of conciliation by Diem, but was on ly an effort to appease the U.S. and paper over a steadily widening fissure in i nternal politics. The evident lack of faith on the part of the government in the June 16 agreement discredited the conciliatory policy of moderation that the ol der Buddhist leadership had followed until that time. In late June, leadership o f the Buddhist movement passed to a younger, more radical set of monks, with mor e far-reaching political objectives. They made intelligent and skillful politica l use of a rising tide of popular support. Carefully planned mass meetings and d emonstrations were accompanied with an aggressive press campaign of opposition t o the regime. Seizing on the importance of American news media, they cultivated U.S. newsmen, tipped them off to demonstrations and rallies, and carefully timed their activities to get maximum press coverage. Not surprisingly, the Ngo famil y reacted with ever more severe suppression to the Buddhist activists, and with acrimonious criticism and even threats to the American newsmen. Early in July, V ice President Tho's committee announced that a preliminary investigation of the May 8 incident had confirmed that the deaths were the result of an act of Viet C ong

terrorism. Outraged, the Buddhists denounced the findings and intensified their protest activities. On July 19, under U.S. pressure, Diem made a brief two-minut e radio address, ostensibly an expression of conciliation to the Buddhists, but so written and coldly delivered as to destroy in advance any effect its announce d minor concessions might have had. Within the regime, Nhu and his wife were sev erely criticizing Diem for caving in under Buddhist pressure. Mme. Nhu publicly ridiculed the Buddhist suicide as a "barbecue," accused the Buddhist leaders of being infiltrated with communists, and construed the protest movement as Viet Co ng inspired. Both Nhu and his wife worked publicly and privately to undermine Di em's feeble efforts at compromise with the Buddhists, and rumors that Nhu was co nsidering a coup against his brother began to circulate in July. A U.S. Special National Intelligence Estimate on July 10 concluded with the perceptive predicti on that if the Diem regime did nothing to implement the June 16 agreement and to appease the Buddhists, the likelihood of a summer of demonstrations was great, with the strong possibility of a non-communist coup attempt. [Doc. 21] By mid-Au gust a week before Nhu launched general raids on Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and elsewhere, the CIA had begun to note malaise in the bureaucracy and the army: Si nce the Buddhist dispute with the Diem government erupted on 8 May, there have b een a series of reports indicating not only intensified plotting and grumbling a mong Diem's traditional non-Communist critics, but renewed restiveness and growi ng disaffection in official civilian and military circles over Diem's handling o f the dispute. This estimate went on to detail numerous rumors of coup plots in existence since at least late June. But Nhu, in a bold move designed to frighten coup plotters, and to throw them off guard, had called in the senior generals o n July 11, reprimanded them for not having taken action to squelch revolt, and q uestioned their loyalty to the regime. Nhu's move seemed to have temporarily set back all plans for an overthrow. CIA also reported rumors that Nhu himself was planning a "false coup" to draw out and then crush the Buddhists. In August, Bud dhist militancy reached new intensity; monks burned themselves to death on the 5 th, 15th, and 18th. The taut political atmosphere in Saigon in mid-August should have suggested to U.S. observers that a showdown was on the way. When the showd own came, however, in the August 21 raids on the pagodas, the U.S. mission was a pparently caught almost completely off guard. B. THE U.S. "NO ALTERNATIVES TO DI EM" POLICY The explanation of how the U.S. mission became detached from the real ities of the political situation in Saigon in August 1963, is among the most iro nic and tragic of our entire involvement in Vietnam. In dealing with Diem over t he years, the U.S. had tried two radically different but ultimately equally unsu ccessful approaches. Under Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow from the late '50s until 1961, we had used tough pressure tactics to bring Diem to implement programs and ideas we felt necessary to win the war

against the Viet Cong. But Diem soon learned that the U.S. was committed to him as the only Vietnamese leader capable of rallying his country to defeat the comm unists. Armed with this knowledge he could defer action or ignore the Ambassador with relative impunity. He became adept at playing the role of offended lover. Thus by 1961, Durbrow was cut off from the palace, with little information about what was going on and even less influence over events. Under Frederick Nolting as U.S. Ambassador, the U.S. pursued a very different tactic. Forewarned not to allow himself to be isolated, Nolting set out through the patient cultivation of Diem's friendship and trust to secure a role for himself as Diem's close and co nfidential advisor. But there had been no basic change in the American belief th at there was no alternative to Diem, and Diem must have quickly sensed this, for he continued to respond primarily to family interest, at best only listening im patiently to Nolting's carefully put complaints, secure in the knowledge that ul timately the U.S. would not abandon him no matter what he did. Both tactics fail ed because of American commitment. No amount of pressure or suasion was likely t o be effective in getting Diem to adopt ideas or policies which he did not find to his liking, since we had communicated our unwillingness to consider the ultim ate sanction--withdrawal of support for his regime. We had ensnared ourselves in a powerless, no alternatives policy. The denouement of this policy, the ultimat e failure of all our efforts to coerce, cajole and coax Diem to be something oth er than the mandarin that he was, came in the midnight attack on the pagodas on August 21. And it created a fundamental dilemma for U.S. policy with respect to Diem. On the one hand, withdrawal of support for his regime was the only lever l ikely to force Diem to redress the Buddhist grievances and to make the political reforms prerequisite for popular support in the common fight against the Viet C ong. On the other hand, withdrawal of U.S. support for Diem would be signal U.S. approval for an anti-Diem coup, with all its potential for political instabilit y and erosion of the war effort. We found ourselves in this predicament not enti rely unexpectedly. In May 1963, though it had failed to anticipate the Buddhist upheaval, the U.S. mission nevertheless quickly recognized the gravity of the th reat to Diem and reported it to Washington. Nolting met with Diem on May 18 and outlined the steps he felt were necessary to retrieve the situation. These inclu ded a government acknowledgment of responsibility for the Hue incident, an offer to compensate the families of the victims, and a reaffirmation of religious equ ality and nondiscrimination. As an alternative, he suggested an investigatory co mmission. Diem's noncommittal response led the Ambassador to think that Diem rea lly believed the Viet Cong had caused the deaths and that the Buddhists had prov oked the incident. Diem felt the U.S. was over-reacting to the events. Thus, at a critical time Nolting, in spite of his two years of careful groundwork, was un able to exercise any real influence over Diem. Nolting left on a well-deserved h oliday and home leave shortly after this frustrating meeting. By the end of May, Washington had become concerned at Diem's failure to act, and at the widening B uddhist protest. The Charg d'Affaires, William True-hart, was instructed to press the GVN for action. Working with Secretary of State for Defense Thuan, Truehart tried to move the government toward negotiations with the Buddhists. After the d emonstrations in Hue on June 3, the State Department instructed Truehart to tell Diem

or Thuan that the U.S. also had a stake in an amicable settlement with the Buddh ists. On the following day, True-hart met with Thuan and told him that U.S. supp ort of South Vietnam could not be maintained if there was bloody repressive acti on in Hue. This seemed to get action. Later that day, Truehart was informed that Nolting's second suggestion had been adopted and a high-level commission had be en named to settle the problem. The commission, headed by Vice President Tho, me t belatedly with the Buddhists on June 5. On June 8, Truehart had an interview w ith Diem to protest Mme. Nhu's public criticism of the Buddhists, which was pois oning the atmosphere for a settlement. When Diem refused to disavow her statemen ts, Truehart threatened a U.S. "dissociation" from any future repressive measure s to suppress demonstrations. Truehart left the meeting with the impression that Diem was more preoccupied with security measures than with negotiations. Noltin g's low-key policy had by now been abandoned, both in Washington and in Saigon, in favor of a new tough line. The situation was dramatically altered by the firs t Buddhist suicide on June 11. Alarmed, the State Department authorized Truehart to tell Diem that un'ess drastic action was taken to meet the Buddhist demands promptly, the U.S. would be forced to state publicly its dissociation from the G VN on the Buddhist issue. Truehart made his demarche on June 12. Diem replied th at any such U.S. announcement would have a disastrous effect on the GVN-Buddhist negotiations. The negotiations finally got under way in earnest June 14 and the joint communique was issued June 16. Truehart made repeated calls on Diem in la te June and early July, urging him in the strongest language to take some action indicating the government's intention to abide in good faith by the June 16 agr eement. His effort's were unavailing. Diem was either noncommittal, or talked in generalities about the difficulties of the problem. On June 27, President Kenne dy named Henry Cabot Lodge to replace Ambassador Nolting effective in September. After a brief stop in Washington, Nolting was hurried back to Saigon on July 11 to make one last effort to get Diem to conciliate the Buddhists. Nolting, evide ntly resenting the pressure tactics used by Truehart, met immediately with Diem and tried to mollify him. He succeeded only in convincing Diem to make the shall ow gesture of the July 19 radio speech. Otherwise, Diem merely persisted in appe als for public harmony and support of the government, without any real attempt t o deal with the Buddhist grievances. Nolting spent his last month in Vietnam try ing to repair U.S.-GVN relations and to move Diem to resolve the Buddhist crisis , but his attempts were continually undercut by the Nhus both publicly and priva tely. They had grown increasingly belligerent about the Buddhists during the sum mer, and by August spoke often of "crushing" them. Washington asked Nolting to p rotest such inflammatory remarks, and began to suspect Diem's capacity to concil iate the Buddhists in the face of Nhu sabotage. Nolting was instructed to sugges t to Diem that Mme. Nhu be removed from the scene. Nolting asked Diem for a publ ic declaration repudiating her remarks but after initially agreeing, Diem

then demurred and postponed it. Finally, as a parting gesture to Nolting, he agr eed on August 14 to make a statement. It came in the form of an interview with M arguerite Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune. Diem asserted that conciliatio n had been his policy all along and that it was "irreversible." He further said, in direct contradiction of a previous remark by Mme. Nhu, that the family was p leased with Lodge's appointment. Washington was apparently satisfied by this sta tement, which Diem viewed merely as a going-away present for Nolting. Less than a week later, Nolting's two years of careful work and an American policy would b e in a shambles, betrayed by Nhu's midnight raid on the pagodas. Underlying the prevailing U.S. view that there was no alternative to Diem was the belief that t he disruptive effect of a coup on the war effort, and the disorganization that w ould follow such a coup, could only benefit the VC, perhaps decisively. Military estimates and reports emanating from MACV through the summer of 1963 continued to reflect an optimistic outlook, indicating good reason to continue our support of Diem even in the face of his inept handling of the Buddhist crisis. In retro spect, it can be seen that by July the GVN position in the war had begun to seri ously deteriorate. At the time, however, this weakening was not yet apparent. Th e then prevailing view also held that the Buddhist crisis had not yet detracted from the war effort, although its potential to do so was recognized. Secretary M cNamara on July 19 told a press conference that the war was progressing well and that the Buddhist crisis had thus far not affected it. The intelligence communi ty, however, had already begun to note depressing effects of the crisis on milit ary and civilian morale. Meanwhile, the U.S. press corps was reporting a far dif ferent view of both the war and the Buddhist crisis, one which was, in retrospec t, nearer the reality. In particular, they were reporting serious failures in th e Delta in both military operations and the Strategic Hamlet Program. Typical of this reporting was an August 15 story in the New York Times by David Halberstam presenting a very negative appraisal of the war in the Delta. Such reports were vehemently refuted within the Administration, most notably by General Krulak, t he JCS Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency. At the lower echelons in the fie ld, however, there were many U.S. advisors who did not share Krulak's sanguine v iew of the war's progress. Within the Administration, no real low-risk alternati ve to Diem had ever been identified, and we had continued our support for his tr oublesome regime because Diem was regarded as the only Vietnamese figure capable of rallying national support in the struggle against the Viet Cong. The Buddhis t crisis shattered our illusions about him, and increased the domestic U.S. poli tical price to Kennedy of supporting Diem. But the only other option for us seem ed a coup, with highly uncertain prospects for post-coup political stability. At a briefing for the President on July 4, the possibilities and prospects for a c oup were discussed. [Doc. 123] It was the consensus that the Nhus could not be r emoved, but that there would surely be coup attempts in the next four months. No lting's reported view, with which then Assistant Secretary of State, Roger Hilsm an, did not entirely agree, was that a coup would most likely produce a civil wa r. Hilsman felt that the likelihood of general chaos in the wake of a coup was l ess than it had been the

preceding year. (Notes on this briefing, reproduced in the Appendix, provide the first documentary evidence of highest level consideration of the ramifications of a coup.) In a meeting at State the following day, July 5, Ambassador Nolting, who had cut short his vacation to return to Washington in the wake of the Buddh ist crisis, told Under Secretary of State George Ball: In his view if a revoluti on occurred in Viet-Nam which grew out of the Buddhist situation, the country wo uld be split between feuding factions and the Americans would have to withdraw a nd the country might be lost to the Communists. This led to the question of how much pressure we could exert on Diem. Mr. Nolting replied that if we repudiated him on this issue his government would fall. The Ambassador believed that Diem w ould live up to the agreement (June 16) unless he believed that he was dealing w ith a political attempt to cause his overthrow. [Doc. 124] Earlier in the same i nterview he had said: ....that although interference by the Nhus was serious, he believed that the GVN would be able to come through this one slowly. As to tact ics, the more Diem was prodded the slower he went. While Nhu was troublesome he was chiefly responsible for gains which had been made in the provincial pacifica tion program. [Doc. 124] Nolting, no doubt, expressed similar views when he met with Secretary McNamara before returning to Saigon. In spite of the mounting pol itical pressure on the President in Congress and in the press because of the Bud dhist repressions, the Administration decided to send Nolting back for another t ry at getting Diem to settle the dispute with the Buddhists. Anxiety in Washingt on mounted as the summer wore on, and Nolting's efforts with Diem produced evide nt progress. By the time of the August 21 raids, Washington's patience with Diem was all but exhausted. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 4, "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963," pp. 201-276. Section 2, pp. 232-276 III. LODGE vs. DIEM: AUGUST 20-OCTOBER 2 A. THE PAGODA RAIDS AND REPERCUSSIONS

Shortly after midnight on August 21, six days after Nolting's frustrated departu re, Nhu, shattering any remaining illusions about the GVN's conciliatory approac h to the Buddhists, and betraying Diem's parting pledge to Nolting, staged a gen eral assault on Buddhist pagodas. In Saigon, Hue, and other coastal cities, the regime's private shock troops-the U.S.-trained Special Forces-and the combat pol ice invaded the pagodas and arrested hundreds of Buddhist monks, effectively des troying an American policy and marking the beginning of the end of the Diem regi me. On August 18, ten senior generals had met and decided that they would ask Di em for a declaration of martial law to permit them to return Buddhist monks from outside Saigon to their own provinces and pagodas, hopefully reducing tensions in the capital. Among those in attendance at the meeting were General Ton That D inh, military governor of Saigon and commander of III Corps suirounding it, and General Huynh Van Cao, IV Corps commander, both of whom owed their positions to their loyalty to the regime. Either or both of them probably reported the outcom e of this meeting to Diem and Nhu. In any case, Nhu had decided to eliminate the Buddhist opposition, and to confront the U.S. with a fait accompli on Lodge's a rrival; he assumed the U.S. would protestingly acquiesce, as it always had in th e past. On the afternoon of the 20th, Nhu met with a small group of generals, in cluding Don, Khiem, and Dinh who presented the martial law proposal to him. Nhu, his own plans for the raids now far advanced, told them to take their proposal to Diem. At a meeting later that evening, Diem acquiesced in the generals' plan and at midnight the decree was published under the signature of General Don, Chi ef of the Joint General Staff. Meanwhile, unbeknown to the generals, Nhu had alr eady alerted Colonel Tung's Special Forces and the combat police. Once the facad e of martial law was in place, so the army would be blamed for the raids, Nhu ga ve the word and the crackdown began. To further implicate the army, some of the combat police wore paratroop uniforms. Pagodas were ransacked in all the major S outh Vietnamese cities, and over 1400 Buddhists, primarily monks, were arrested. In the raid on Xa Loi pagoda in Saigon about thirty monks were wounded or injur ed, and several were subsequently listed as missing; exact casualties were never established. Diem had approved the martial law decree without consulting his ca binet, but it was never established whether he knew of and approved Nhu's plans for the pagoda raids. Significantly, he never subsequently sought to dissociate himself from Nhu or the raids. While the martial law decree gave General Don com mand of all troops, in fact, General Dinh and Colonel Tung took their orders dir ectly from the palace. Thus, when the raids came, General Don was at JGS unaware . In a long discussion on August 23 with a CAS officer, he suggested that the ma rtial law decree was only phase one of a larger Generals' plot. They were thrown off balance, however, by the raids and by General Dinh's rapid assumption of lo cal control of martial law in Saigon. In planning the raids, Nhu had been extrem ely careful not to have word leak to the U.S. mission (although the Buddhists an d the U.S. press corps had been tipped off by their own informants). On the morn ing after the attack, Richardson, the CIA chief and the senior American civilian in Saigon, emphatically denied to Halberstam any

foreknowledge of the plan. To further isolate the U.S. from an accurate assessme nt during the operation, Nhu had the telephone lines to the Embassy and the home s of all senior U.S. personnel cut shortly after the raids got under way. His ef forts had the desired effect. It was several days before the U.S. mission in Sai gon and officials in Washington could piece together what happened. In Washingto n, Harriman and Michael Forrestal, a member of McGeorge Bundy's staff at the Whi te House, drafted a stiff public statement that was released by the State Depart ment at 9:30 the following morning. It deplored the raids as "a direct violation by the Vietnamese Government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of rec onciliation with the Buddhists." But the first U.S. intelligence reports, based on information from Nhu, accepted army responsibility for the raids, and treated their coincidence with the martial law decree as, in effect, a military coup. I n an August 21 memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, the Director of DIA, Gen eral Carroll, wrote, "Although the military moves are based on an alleged presid ential proclamation, the military leaders have, in effect, assumed full control. " When the raids occurred, Lodge, Nolting, and Roger Hilsman, the Assistant Secr etary of State for the Far East, had been conferring in Honolulu. Lodge was imme diately instructed to proceed to Saigon. After a brief stop in Tokyo, Lodge touc hed down in Saigon at 9:30 p.m. on August 22, in an atmosphere charged with tens ion and official U.S. confusion. Awaiting him was a cable from Hilsman asking fo r a clarification of the situation. Had the military taken over and retained Die m as a figurehead; had Diem strengthened his own position by calling in the mili tary; or were the Nhus really calling the shots? Within twenty-four hours, Lodge had sent a preliminary reply: there had been no coup, but there seemed also to be no diminution in the roles of the Nhus, although the power roles within the r egime were unclear. That same day, the first military feelers had been put out f rom the Vietnamese generals to determine what the U.S. reaction would be to a mi litary coup. General Don, the commander of the armed forces under the martial la w decree, had a long, rambling conversation with a CAS officer. He first outline d the true role the army had played in the events of August 20-21 and then inqui red why the U.S. had blamed the army for the raids on the pagodas: General Don h as heard personally that the military is being blamed by Vietnamese public for t he attack on the pagodas. He said that the US Govt is at fault for this misconce ption because VOA announced that the military took action against the pagodas. D on queried why VOA did not admit that Colonel Tung's Special Forces and the Poli ce carried out the action. Don believes this would help the military at this poi nt. Don stated that the USA should now make its position known. In a conversatio n the same day with Rufus Phillips of USOM, General Kim, deputy to General Don, bitterly attacked Nhu, charging him with responsibility for the raids, and deplo ring his dominant role in the government. He said that unless the popular impres sion that the army was responsible for the raids were corrected, the army would be handicapped in its fight against the VC. He stated that a firm U.S. stand for the removal of the Nhus would unify the army and permit it to act against them. These two direct and

obviously reinforcing requests for U.S. support for military action aimed at Nhu 's ouster marked the formal beginning of the U.S. involvement in the protracted plotting against the Diem regime. Two senior civilians in the government, Diem's chef de cabinet, Vo Van Hai, and Secretary of State, Nguyen Dinh Thuan, were si multaneously telling U.S. contacts that Nhu's elimination from the government wa s vital and that the U.S. should take a strong stand against him. On August 24, Lodge cabled his appraisal of the situation to Washington, based on these conver sations. "Nhu," he reported, "probably with full support of Diem, had a large ha nd in planning of action against Buddhists, if he did not fully master-mind it. His influence has also been significantly increased." Nhu had simply taken advan tage of the concern of certain generals, possibly not fully informing the regula r army of the planned action. Nonetheless, none of the important Saigon area tro op commanders (Don, Dinh, and Tung) were presently disaffected with the regime. Furthermore, absence of clear-cut military leadership and troop strength in Saig on for a move against the Nhus would make U.S. support of such an action a "shot in the dark." For the State Department, the problem of clarifying the public re cord about the raids and affixing responsibility for them had become acute by Au gust 24. The press reports emanating from Saigon had from the outset blamed Nhu for the raids, but VOA, with a large audience in Vietnam, continued to report th e official U.S. position that the army was culpable. The accumulating evidence a gainst Nhu and the likelihood of severe damage to army morale if VOA did not bro adcast a clarification seemed to call for retractions. The second issue for Wash ington was Nhu. The generals had asked, in effect, for a green light to move aga inst him, but Lodge had cautioned against it. Hilsman reports that as he, Harrim an, Forrestal, and Ball deliberated over the drafting of a reply on that Saturda y morning, the statement of Thuan to Phillips that "under no circumstance should the United States acquiesce in what the Nhus had done," was given great weight. Admiral Felt telephoned Washington from CINCPAC to support a strong U.S. stand against the Nhus. The unanswered question, of course, was whether the Nhus could be removed without also sacrificing Diem, and if not, whether the resulting pol itical instability would not have an even more detrimental effect on the war eff ort than maintaining Diem. The August 24 cable of instructions to Lodge resultin g from these deliberations outlined an important, and subsequently controversial , new policy approach for the U.S. in South Vietnam. Its opening paragraphs cris ply set forth the new American view: It is now clear that whether military propo sed martial law or whether Nhu tricked them into it, Nhu took advantage of its i mposition to smash pagodas with police and Tung's Special Forces loyal to him, t hus placing onus on military in eyes of world and Vietnamese people. Also clear that Nhu has maneuvered himself into commanding position.

US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them wit h best military and political personalities available. If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility th at Diem himself cannot be preserved. [Doc. 126] Lodge was instructed to tell the GVN the U.S. could not accept the actions against the Buddhists and that prompt dramatic steps to redress the situation must be taken. The key military leaders were to be privately informed that, ....US would find it impossible to continue support GVN militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediatel y which we recognize requires removal of Nhus from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhus, but if he remains obdurate, then we are p repared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. Yo u may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism. [Doc. 126] Fin ally, the message recognized the need to publicly exonerate the army from the ra ids and asked Lodge to approve a VOA broadcast to that effect. Lodge was request ed, as well, to survey urgently for alternative leadership. Clearance of the dra ft message was complicated by the coincident week-end absence from Washington of most of the top level members of the Administration. The President was in Hyann is Port; Rusk was in New York; and McNamara and McCone were away on vacation. Bo th the President and the Secretary of State were reached, however, and approved the draft. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric approved for Defense, a nd General Taylor for the JCS. Schlesinger, in his account of the incident, sugg ests that the cable was hasty and ill-considered, and that the President immedia tely began to back away from it. Lodge replied the following day endorsing the s trong position but proposing to forego a futile approach to Diem and to state ou r position instead only to the generals, thus throwing all our weight behind a c oup. The cable stated: Believe that chances of Diem's meeting our demands are vi rtually nil. At the same time, by making them we give Nhu chance to forestall or block action by military. Risk, we believe, is not worth taking, with Nhu in co ntrol combat forces Saigon. Therefore, propose we go straight to Generals with o ur demands, without informing Diem. Would tell them we prepared have Diem withou t Nhus but it is in effect up to them whether to keep him. [Doc. 127] Hilsman as serts that the cable also reflected Lodge's view that since our disapproval of G VN action was well known, it was not fitting for the U.S. to go to Diem, it was Diem who should come to us.

In a separate CAS cable the same day, Richardson, the CIA Chief of Station in Sa igon, reported that at a meeting with Lodge and Harkins it had been agreed that Diem would not remove Nhu and that therefore, assuming State's cable of instruct ions on 24 August [Doc. 126] represented Washington's basic policy, the consensu s was that contact should be immediately made with generals such as Minh and Kha nh to assess the degree of unity and determination of senior officers. Minh was considered the best possible interim leader, with Vice President Tho as the most attractive candidate for President among the civilians. The cable concluded wit h the view that a junta would probably operate behind the scenes in the event of a successful coup, and that the U.S. should leave the specific tactics of a cou p up to the generals. There is a hiatus in the available cable traffic at this p oint, but Hilsman indicates that Washington decided on Sunday, August 25, to def er a direct approach to Diem until more was known about the situation. In Lodge' s reply, he had also apparently approved the proposed VOA broadcast to exonerate the army. Hilsman briefed the press on the basis of a previously approved draft statement on August 25. The statement expressed strong U.S. disapproval of the raids, which were attributed to Nhu. In reporting the story, the press speculate d that such a strong statement probably indicated that measures such as aid susp ension were being considered. VOA had been instructed to broadcast only the subs tances of the U.S. statement as provided in the press guidance and nothing more. The instructions somehow got mislaid; and on Monday morning, August 26, just se veral hours before Lodge was to present his credentials to Diem, VOA broadcast i n full a UPI story which flatly asserted that "the US may sharply reduce its aid to Vietnam unless President Diem gets rid of secret police officials responsibl e for the attacks." Lodge was understandably upset, and sent a testy cable rheto rically inquiring whether he really was in charge of tactics as he had been give n to understand. Rusk sent a personal cable of apology to Lodge, and VOA promptl y broadcast a denial of U.S. intent to cut aid, but the initial damage had been done. The Vietnamese reaction to the attack on the pagodas during this time had been dramatic. In the United States, Mme. Nhu's father and mother, respectively the Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S. and the Vietnamese observer at the UN, had both resigned, making bitter public statements denouncing the raids. In South V ietnam, the Foreign Minister, Vo Van Mau, had resigned and shaved his head like a Buddhist monk in protest. On August 23, students at the faculties of medicine and pharmacy at the University of Saigon turned out to stage mass demonstrations on behalf of the Buddhists. The GVN reacted in the only way it seemed to know, with massive arrests. But the demonstrations continued, and when the university was closed, the protest was taken up by high school and junior high school stude nts. These were dramatic evidences indeed of the degree of disaffection with the regime, since most of these students were from the middle class families that f ormed the bureaucracy and the army leadership. Students in Vietnam had no substa ntial record of political activism as was the case with their counterparts in ot her parts of Asia, like Korea. Furthermore, some of the Buddhist leadership had survived the raids and gone underground and were soon passing out leaflets on th e streets again. On the day of the raids, two monks had taken refuge in the USOM building next door to Xa Loi pagoda. The following day, three others, including

the militant young leader Tich Tn Quang, took refuge in the U.S. Embassy, where they were warmly received by Lodge and remained until the successful November co up. B. MIS-COUP Rumors of coup plotting had been a standard part of the Saigon s cene under Diem from the very beginning. And there had been several attempts. In 1957, an assassin fired at Diem at an up-country fair. In November 1960, he had narrowly escaped being overthrown by a military coup by negotiating with the di ssident officers until loyal reinforcements could be moved into Saigon to restor e his control. And in 1962, two disgruntled Air Force pilots had unsuccessfully bombed and strafed the Gia Long Palace. So, when rumors of coup plotting began t o gain currency again in the spring of 1963, they were monitored by the U.S. int elligence community, but not given extraordinary prominence or credence. By midsummer, however, with the Buddhist crisis in full bloom, more serious considerat ion was given to the growing number of reports identifying plotters and schemes. One plot, identified in late June, was led by Dr. Iran Kim Tuyen, Diem's Direct or of Political and Social Studies (national intelligence). It involved elements of the Civic Action Ministry, the Information Ministry, the Secret Police, and some junior army officers. A separate plot involving other elements of the army was reported, and on July 8 General Don indicated to a CAS officer that there wa s support among all but a couple of generals for a coup. Nhu's July 11 meeting w ith the generals, however, seemed to disorient their efforts temporarily. In an August 14 memorandum, the CIA acknowledged some military support for a coup, but doubted that anyone would risk it unless a deterioration of the political situa tion threatened a Viet Cong victory. The pagoda attack was just such a deteriora tion and it precipitated the generals' first approach to the U.S. on August 23 a bout a coup. With State's instructions of 24 August as guidance, Lodge met with Harkins, Truehart, Mecklin, and Richardson on the morning of August 26 before pr esenting his credentials to Diem. They decided that the official U.S. hand shoul d not show--i.e., Harkins should not talk to the generals. It was agreed that Lt . Colonel Conein of the CIA would contact General Khiem, and Mr. Spera (also of CIA) would contact General Khanh, II Corps commander in Pleiku, conveying the fo llowing points to each: a. Solidification of further elaboration of action aspec ts of present thinking and planning. What should be done? b. We in agreement Nhu s must go. c. Question of retaining Diem or not up to them. d. Bonzes and other arrestees must be released immediately and five-point agreement of 16 June be fu lly carried out. e. We will provide direct support during any interim period of breakdown of central government mechanism. f. We cannot be of any help during in itial action of assuming power of the state. Entirely their own action, win or l ose. Don't expect to be bailed out. g. If Nhus do not go and if Buddhists' situa tion is not redressed as indicated, we would find it impossible continue militar y and economic support.

h. It is hoped bloodshed can be avoided or reduced to absolute minimum. i. It is hoped that during process and after, developments conducted in such manner as t o retain and increase the necessary relations between Vietnamese and Americans w hich will allow for progress of country and successful prosecution of the war. C onein met with Khiem on August 27, and after conveying his message learned that Minh was the leader of the cabal, which included also Generals Kim, Khanh, Thieu , and Le. Don was aware of the plot and approved, but was too exposed to partici pate. General Minh was under surveillance, and had asked not to be contacted by the U.S. Khiem recognized the need to neutralize General Cao, the IV Corps comma nder, General Dinh, the III Corps and Saigon Area commander, and Colonel Tung. A separate CAS report indicated that General Kim had charge of plans for the prov isional successor government which would include both civilians and military, wi th Minh as President. Meanwhile, back in Washington, by the time the NSC met on Monday morning, August 26, misgivings about supporting a coup--the policy outlin ed in State's August 24 message--had developed. Hilsman's account credits McNama ra, Taylor, and McCone with second thoughts. Whatever the outcome of Monday's me eting, another was held the next day, after which Lodge was cabled for more deta ils about the coup plans, and an assessment of their chances of success. Reflect ing the reservations in Washington, the message asked what effect delaying the c oup would have. Replying the following day, Lodge gave a favorable assessment of coup prospects; expressed confidence in the generals who were to lead it, espec ially Minh, Khanh, and Kim; and argued, "that chances of success would be dimini shed by delay." A cable from Harkins to Taylor on the same day is the first docu mentary indication of Harkins' reservations about supporting the coup attempt. C ryptically, Harkins indicated that he would offer his full support to the Ambass ador in implementing State's instructions, but noted that, "Reference b. (CINCPA C 2504562 Aug 1963) advises me that reference a. (State 243) embodies CINCPAC op inion and that my support had been volunteered." He would have preferred one las t attempt to persuade Diem to dispense with Nhu. Furthermore, the line-up of for ces did not indicate a clear-cut advantage for the coup plotters. Therefore, he stated, "In my opinion as things stand now I don't believe there is sufficient r eason for a crash approval on our part at this time." He also had concluded that the coup would not take place until we gave the word. In a separate message, Ri chardson, however, described the situation as having "reached the point of no re turn." IlDoc. 1291 Further, he concluded, "Unless the generals are neutralized b efore being able to launch their operation, we believe they will act and that th ey have good chance to win." [Doc. 129] In Washington, State and Defense were di vided on the issue. Nolting, who was regularly attending the daily NSC meetings at the President's request, sided with the Pentagon in the view that prospects f or the coup were not good, and that another effort should be made with Diem. Hil sman, Harriman, and Ball were convinced the U.S. had to get on with the coup, si nce Diem offered no prospect of complying the U.S. wishes. The discussions in th e NSC, reportedly, were increasingly heated and testy. The division of

opinion between Harkins and Lodge concerned the President and upon receipt of th eir respective messages on August 28, he cabled each of them separately for thei r "independent judgment" about the prospects for a coup and their personal advic e on the course the U.S. should pursue. The President was at pains to reiterate his great confidence in both men, and to assure them that differences of opinion in Washington would not prevent the U.S. government from acting as a unit under his direction. In a separate message, State asked Lodge to indicate the latest point at which the operation could be suspended, and with what consequences; sin ce U.S. prestige would be engaged in the venture, the message stated, once the c oup were under way, it had to succeed. Lodge was also asked what actions the U.S . might take to promote the coup. On August 29, Colonel Conein and Mr. Spera met with Generals Khiem and Minh. Minh bluntly said that the generals had to be cau tious until they had clear evidence that the U.S. would not betray them to Nhu. They were unwilling to discuss their plans, and when asked what would constitute a sign of U.S. support, replied that the U.S. should stop economic aid to the r egime. In a subsequent separate contact with Rufus Phillips, General Kim asked f or verification that the Minh-Conein meeting had Lodge's approval. After checkin g with Lodge, Phillips assured Kim who then asked for a meeting to discuss plann ing on the next day. Lodge then authorized CAS to assist in tactical planning. S tressing the generals' reported lack of confidence in U.S. support, Lodge's repl y to Washington asked Presidential permission for Harkins to show CAS messages t o the generals to prove our commitment. If that failed, he reluctantly recommend ed suspension of economic aid as they requested. Typical of the Ambassador's all -out support for the coup is the following summary he gave of the U.S. position: We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: Th e overthrow of the Diem Government. There is no turning back in part because US prestige is already publicly committed to this end in large measure and will bec ome more so as facts leak out. In a more fundamental sense, there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration, still less that Diem or any member of the family can gove rn the country in a way to gain the support of the people who count, i.e., the e ducated class in and out of government service, civil and military-not to mentio n the American people. [Doc. 132] Harkins, on the other hand, felt that there wa s still time to make one last approach to Diem, without endangering the plotters , since their plans did not appear fully mature yet. Diem should be handed an ul timatum that the Nhus must go. This, he felt, would strengthen the hand of the g enerals whose opposition, like ours, was to the Nhus, not Diem. If Diem did not act, there would then be time to back a move by the generals. These views were a ll reviewed at the noon meeting of the NSC on August 29. At the meeting, McNamar a backed Harkins' view in favor of a final approach to Diem, but the issue was n ot decided. Rusk took up the question in a subsequent cable to Lodge, asking Lod ge's opinion about an approach to Diem, possibly by the generals at a time when they would be ready to act, in which they would insist on the removal of the Nhu s, and

threaten withdrawal of U.S. support. [Doc. 131] A separate State cable to Lodge and Harkins authorized the latter to show CAS cables to the generals to prove ou r support. Harkins was instructed to insist on knowing the personnel involved in the coup, and the forces available, and to ask to review the detailed plans, wi thout, however, directly involving himself in the coup planning. Lodge was autho rized to suspend aid to Diem, "at a time and under conditions of your choice." I n his response to Rusk's cable, Lodge stoutly opposed any further contact with D iem, even to present an ultimatum. Agreeing that removal of the Nhus was the pri me objective, Lodge argued, "This surely cannot be done by working through Diem. In fact, Diem will oppose it. He wishes he had more Nhus, not less. The best ch ance of doing it is by the generals taking over the government lock, stock and b arrel. After this has been done, it can then be decided whether to put Diem back in again or go on without him." [Doc. 134] What genuinely concerned Lodge at th at point was the lack of action by the generals, but he was reluctant to use the aid suspension as a lever. Throughout this period, another CAS officer had been in contact with a Colonel Thao, an inspector of strategic hamlets, who was the leader of an independent junior officercivilian plot, On August 30, he told the CAS officer that he was in touch with the generals, and would support any move t hey might make, but that for the moment the plans of his group had stopped becau se the risk of failure was too great. With Lodge's anxiety at the generals' fail ure to act increasing daily, General Harkins met with General Khiem on August 31 . He was told that Minh had called off the coup for the time being because of th e inability to achieve a favorable balance of forces in the Saigon area, and bec ause of continuing anxiety among the generals about Richardson's close identific ation with the Nhus. Both Richardson and Lodge confirmed the end of this coup at tempt on the same day. Apparently unable to win over General Dinh, the Saigon II I Corps area commander, Minh had decided not to risk au indecisive, protracted b lood bath with only a slim likelihood of success. Three factors appear to have b een important in Minh's decision to abort the coup: (1) the failure to win over Dinh, leaving the coup forces at a tactical disadvantage in the Saigon area; (2) continuing doubts about the firmness of the U.S. commitment to Diem's overthrow and the related concern that the U.S. had wittingly or unwittingly tipped off N hu to the plot; and (3) uncertainty about the cohesion of the coup group and the firmness of plans. Lodge concluded somewhat bitterly, ". . . there is neither t he will nor the organization among the generals to accomplish anything." He did not, however, rule out a future attempt. C. TOWARD A NEW POLICY Having at long l ast decided to seek an alternative to the Diem regime by sanctioning a coup, onl y to have the attempt fail, the U.S. found itself at the end of August 1963 with out a policy and with most of its bridges burned. In both Saigon and Washington, the reappraisal and the search for alternatives began anew. In the cable acknow ledging the demise of the coup plot on August 31, Lodge suggested that:

Perhaps an arrangement could be worked out whereby the following could be made t o happen: Madame Nhu to leave the country, Mr. Nhu's functions to be limited ent irely to strategic hamlets; the office of Prime Minister to be created and Mr. T huan to become Prime Minister; Archbishop Thuc to leave the country. In addition , the students and Buddhists would be liberated; Decree Law 10 would be repealed ; the pagodas would be repaired and conciliatory gestures would be made. All of this, if agreed to, might be announced by President in Washington. These suggest ions became the basis of discussion of a "where do we go from here" NSC meeting on the same day. In the absence of the President, Secretary Rusk chaired the mee ting at the State Department, and called for consideration of the Lodge proposal s, but said he felt it was unrealistic to start off by asserting that Nhu must g o. Secretary McNamara urged that we "establish quickly and firmly our line of co mmunication between Lodge, Harkins and the GVN." He pointed out that "at the mom ent our channels of communication are essentially broken" and that "they should be reinstituted at all costs." These considerations were soon submerged, however , in a broader discussion of the negative impact of the regime's actions on the war effort. Hilsman, supported by State's Kattenburg of the Vietnam Working Grou p, argued that we should not continue our support of a Nhudominated regime becau se its repressive policies would eventually have a disastrous effect on the war, even if the statistics did not yet reveal their negative impact. Hilsman and Ka ttenburg pointed to the growing disaffection and restiveness of middle level bur eaucrats and military officers as a factor which would steadily erode the milita ry effort. Unconvinced, both Secretary McNamara and General Taylor asked for evi dence of this development. Kattenburg offered his estimate that we would be thro wn out of the country in six months if the regime remained in power and that the question the meeting should be considering was "the decision to get out honorab ly." Taylor and Nolting immediately took exception to these views and Secretary Rusk remarked that they were "largely speculative." He continued, "that it would be far better for us to start on the firm basis of two things--that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup." Sec retary McNamara and Vice President Johnson supported Rusk's views, the Vice Pres ident saying he had never really seen an alternative to Diem. The meeting ended inconclusively; the only decision taken was to ask for Lodge's advice. [Doc. 135 ] As the only documented meeting during this period of major policy deliberation , the August 31 meeting is significant for the viewpoints it reveals. Rambling i nability to focus the problem, indeed to reach common agreement on the nature of the problem, reflects disorientation in the aftermath of the initial failure. M ore importantly, however, the meeting is the first recorded occasion in which so meone followed to its logical conclusion the negative analysis of the situation-i.e., that the war could not be won with the Diem regime, yet its removal would leave such political instability as to foreclose success in the war: for the fi rst time, it was recognized that the U.S. should be considering methods of honor ably disengaging itself from an irretrievable situation. The

other alternative, not fully appreciated until the year following, was a much gr eater U.S. involvement in and assumption of responsibility for the war. At this point, however, the negative analysis of the impact of the political situation o n the war effort was not shared by McNamara, Taylor, Krulak, nor seemingly by Ru sk. But discussions were overtaken by events. On the following Monday, September 2, the President, appearing on the initial broadcast of the CBS Evening News, w as interviewed by Walter Cronkite: Mr. Cronkite: "Mr. President, the only hot wa r we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties here, quite obviously." President Kennedy: "I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that th e war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipmen t, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it--the peopl e of Viet-Nam--against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist the m, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effor t, and, in my opinion, in the last two months the Government has gotten out of t ouch with the people. "The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for t his very essential struggle." Mr. Cronkite: "Do you think this Government has ti me to regain the support of the people?" President Kennedy: "I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those c hanges, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good." Co nfronted by the necessity of public comment, the President had spoken boldly and forthrightly. The President's call for changes of policy and personnel patently conveyed the message that the Buddhist repressions must end, and the Nhus must go. Later in the same interview, however, the President had said, ". . . I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake." As Hilsman summarized it later, We had embarked on a policy that avoided the extre mes both of withdrawing from Vietnam or of actually taking part in direct action to change the Government. The policy was one of trying to discriminate by conti nuing to support those Vietnamese who were struggling against the Communists but maintaining the tension of our disapproval of Diem's and Nhu's repressive polic ies. It was, in effect, the policy Lodge had proposed.

Meanwhile in Saigon, Lodge had gone ahead with his proposals. He continued to av oid any official contact with Diem, but on September 2 he had his second meeting with Nhu (the first on August 27 was an inconclusive statement of positions on each side) in company with the Italian Ambassador and the Papal Delegate. Nhu, p erhaps encouraged by a collateral intercession of the French Ambassador, announc ed he intended to resign from the government for good and retire to Dalat. A GVN announcement would state that the progress of the program against the Viet Cong permitted his departure. Mme. Nhu was to leave Vietnam for a trip to Yugoslavia , Italy, and possibly the U.S. The Papal Delegate would arrange for Archbishop T huc to leave the country. Some measures to ease Buddhist tensions would he taken and, as a public relations gesture, a prime minister would be appointed. These were all proposals which Lodge had initially advanced. But as the days passed, n othing happened and Lodge grew impatient. Contributing to his concern were the f requent and often contradictory rumors that Nhu was secretly dealing with Hanoi and/or the VC through the French and the Polish Ambassadors, both of whose gover nments favored a neutralist solution between North and South Vietnam. For the re mainder of the week, the Italian Ambassador and the Papal Delegate urged Nhu to act on his promises to Lodge. On Friday, September 6, after they had stressed th e urgency for action created by Senator Church's rumored aid-suspension resoluti on, Nhu went into a tirade and said he would not consider leaving the country. H e did, however, say he would "formally" resign. On the following day, the Papal Delegate, who had condemned Archbishop Thuc's activity to the Vatican and receiv ed the Pope's support, got Thuc out of the country. Mme. Nhu left the country fo r Europe on September 9. The arrests of students by the regime, however, continu ed and stories of torture and atrocities began to circulate. In Washington, the NSC met on September 6 and renewed the discussion of reopening "tough negotiatio ns" with Diem. Lodge, of course, opposed this while continuing his dialogue with Nhu. But others at the meeting (presumably including McNamara on the basis of h is views at the August 31 meeting) urged that Lodge be instructed to make anothe r approach to Diem. Lodge was accordingly instructed to clarify for Diem the U.S . position and explain the difficult position his policy placed us in with respe ct to U.S. and world opinion. Perhaps the most important discussion at the meeti ng was that engendered by Robert Kennedy over the fundamental purpose of the U.S . involvement. According to Hilsman, Robert Kennedy said: As he understood it we were there to help the people resisting a Communist take-over. The first questi on was whether a Communist take-over could be successfully resisted with any gov ernment. If it could not, now was the time to get out of Vietnam entirely, rathe r than waiting. If the answer was that it could, but not with a Diem-Nhu governm ent as it was now constituted, we owed it to the people resisting Communism in V ietnam to give Lodge enough sanctions to bring changes that would permit success ful resistance. But the basic question of whether a Communist takeover could be successfully resisted

with any government had not been answered, and he was not sure that anyone had e nough information to answer it. Kennedy's trenchant analysis, however, did not g enerate a searching reappraisal of U.S. policy. It did stimulate further efforts to get more information on the situation. McNamara proposed sending General Kru lak on an immediate fact-finding trip. It was agreed that a senior Foreign Servi ce Officer with Vietnam experience, Joseph Mendenhall, would accompany him, and that they would bring John Mecklin, the USIS director, and Rufus Phillips, the d irector of rural programs for USOM, back with them to report. Krulak and Mendenh all left later that day. State, for its part, sent Saigon a long comprehensive c able of questions on Vietnamese attitudes at all levels of society. The purpose of the Krulak-Mendenhall mission was to assess, in Krulak's words, "the effect o f recent events upon the attitudes of the Vietnamese in general, and upon the wa r effort against the Viet Cong." In a whirlwind four-day trip, the two men visit ed throughout Vietnam and returned to Washington to report. Krulak went to ten d ifferent locations in all four corps areas and spoke with the Ambassador, Genera l Harkins and his staff, 87 U.S. advisors, and 22 Vietnamese officers. Mendenhal l went to Saigon, Hue, Da Nang, and several other provincial cities and talked p rimarily to old Vietnamese friends. Not surprisingly, their estimates of the sit uation were almost completely opposite. The NSC convened on the morning of Septe mber 10, immediately after their return, to hear their reports. Krulak gave a ve ry optimistic appraisal of the progress of the war and discounted the effect of the political crisis on the army. The following, in his own words, were his gene ral conclusions: The shooting war is still going ahead at an impressive pace. It has been affected adversely by the political crisis, but the impact is not grea t. There is a lot of war left to fight, particularly in the Delta, where the Vie t Cong remain strong. Vietnamese officers of all ranks are well aware of the Bud dhist issue. Most have viewed it in detachment and have not permitted religious differences significantly to affect their internal military relationship. Vietna mese military commanders, at the various echelons, are obedient and could be exp ected to execute any order they view as lawful. The U.S./Vietnamese military rel ationship has not been damaged by the political crisis, in any significant degre e. There is some dissatisfaction, among Vietnamese officers, with the national a dministration. It is focused far more on Ngo Dinh Nhu than on President Diem. Nh u's departure would be hailed, but few officers would extend their necks to brin g it about.

Excluding the very serious political and military factors external to Vietnam, t he Viet Cong war will be won if the current U.S. military and sociological progr ams are pursued, irrespective of the grave defects in the ruling regime. Improve ments in the quality of the Vietnamese Government are not going to be brought ab out by leverage applied through the military. They do not have much, and will pr obably not use what they have. This sanguine view of the situation was forcefull y disputed by Mendenhall. He argued that the disaffection with the regime had re ached the point where a breakdown of civil government was threatened, and the po ssibility of a religious civil war could not be excluded. The war could not be w on with the present regime, he concluded. The polar opposition of these two repo rts prompted Kennedy's now famous query, "You two did visit the same country, di dn't you?" The critical failure of both reports was to understand the fundamenta l political role that the army was coming to play in Vietnam. It was the only po tential force with sufficient power to constitute an alternative to Diem. Diem a nd Nhu fully understood this fact, and had coped with it by usurping the preroga tive of senior officer promotion, and basing those promotions on loyalty to the palace. This had sown deep seeds of distrust among the senior military men, and fragmented their potential power. Krulak failed to see that once the internal po litical situation deteriorated to the point where massive disaffection with the regime threatened a communist victory, the generals would unite and plunge into politics out of common necessity. But more importantly, neither Krulak nor Mende nhall seemed to anticipate that, if the army achieved power, the divisive effect of Diem's preferential promotion politices would surface in an internal army po wer struggle. Nor did they fully understand the negative effect on the war effor t this preoccupation with politics among the generals would have. Nolting took i ssue with Mendenhall's appraisal, noting that Mendenhall had been pessimistic ab out prospects in Vietnam for several years. But John Mecklin, the USIS director, corroborated Mendenhall's view, and pushed it even further, saying that the U.S . should apply direct pressure, such as suspension of nonmilitary aid, to bring about a change of government. In Mecklin's words: This would unavoidably be dang erous. There was no way to be sure how events would develop. It was possible, fo r example, that the Vietnamese forces might fragment into warring factions, or t hat the new government would be so incompetent and/or unstable that the effort a gainst the Viet Cong would collapse. The US should therefore resolve now to intr oduce American combat forces if necessary to present a Communist triumph midst t he debris of the Diem regime. Mecklin appreciated the potential for instability inherent in any army successor regime that Krulak and Mendenhall had not seen. B ut he, nevertheless, concluded that we should proceed to bring about a change of government, accept the consequences, and contemplate the introduction of U.S. c ombat troops to stave off a Viet Cong victory.

The meeting went on to hear Rufus Phillips' dour report on the situation in the Delta, and his doubts about the validity of Krulak's optimistic outlook on the m ilitary situation. Phillips argued that this was primarily a political contest f or the allegiance of people, not a military war, and that the Diem regime was lo sing it. The Strategic Hamlet Program was a shambles in the field, especially in the Delta. The meeting ended on this note and no decisions were made. One cours e of action being given increasing consideration in these meetings, as well as i n Saigon and on Capitol Hill, was a suspension of non-military aid to Diem. Afte r the erroneous VOA announcement of aid suspension on August 26, Lodge had been authorized on August 29, as already noted, to suspend aid at his discretion if i t would facilitate the coup. Lodge had been reluctant to do so. The question had been raised again in a joint State/AID cable to Lodge on September 3 which list ed the items currently up for approval or renewal. Lodge was informed that all a pproval for non-military aid would be temporarily held up but that no suspension was to be announced, since such a policy decision was still pending. Lodge took advantage of this by having the mission, and especially USOM, reply to all GVN inquiries about the status of the aid renewals or approvals that President Diem would have to talk to Lodge about it. Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate began to put pr essure on the Administration to do something about Diem. Hilsman was badgered by the Senate Subcommittee on the Far East, and there were threats of further cuts in the AID bill if something wasn't done. Senator Church informed the Administr ation he intended to introduce soon a resolution condemning Diem's represssions against the Budihists and calling for an end of aid to South Vietnam unless they were abandoned. He agreed to delay its introduction temporarily so as not to em barrass the Administration. The idea of a selective aid suspension to goad Diem into action was actively discussed at State during the Krulak-Mendenhall mission , and later John Mecklin had specifically suggested it to the NSC. On September 8, AID Director David Bell warned in a TV interview that the Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its policies. On Mond ay, September 9, however, the President, in a TV interview for the new Huntley-B rinkley News, said, "I don't think we think that (a reduction of U.S. aid to Sou th Vietnam) would be helpful at this time." On September 11, the day after the P resident received the Krulak-Mendenhall reports, Lodge reversed his previous pos ition, and in a long cable proposed that detailed consideration be given to ways in which non-military aid suspension might be used as a sanction to topple the government. He had concluded we could not get satisfaction from Diem, and had to face up to the unpleasant task of forcing events. This view was reinforced the next day in a long series of cables replying to State's September 7 request for a comprehensive evaluation of South Vietnamese attitudes. Lodge's proposal, and a proposal by Hilsman for a combined set of public and private measures to bring pressure on Diem, formed the basis of a White House meeting on September 11. On the following day, Senator Church was given the green light and introduced his resolution. On September 14, Lodge was informed that approval of the $18.5 milli on remainder of the commercial import program (the principal piastre

support, anti-inflation aid device) was deferred until basic U.S. policy decisio ns had been made. The decision on aid suspension was now absorbed into the broad er consideration of a set of coordinated measures to put pressure on the GVN. Th roughout September, the division of opinion within the U.S. mission in Saigon ha d grown sharper and sharper. Harkins, Richardson, and to a lesser extent Brent ( Director of USOM), did not believe that the Diem government's bungling of the Bu ddhist crisis and loss of popular support were threatening the war effort, or th at the crisis was as serious as Lodge, Mecklin, Mendenhall, et a!., portrayed it . In any case, the situation was not so irretrievable as to require a U.S. aband onment of Diem in a risky venture at coup-making towards an unknown alternative. The opposite view was held by Lodge, Truehart, Meckun, Phillips, and the majori ty of the junior officers in the mission. By midSeptember, the debate had reache d a shrill and acrimonious level, as the following excerpt from a Harkins' cable to Taylor indicates: As everyone else seems to be talking, writing and confusin g the issue here in Vietnam, it behooves me to also get into the act: From most of the reports and articles I read, one would say Vietnam and our programs here are falling apart at the seams. Well, I just thoroughly disagree. The situation was of such concern that CIA dispatched a special officer to reach an independen t evaluation. His conclusion was that we had hastily expended our capability to overthrow the regime, that an aid suspension would not guarantee a constructive result, and that to prevent further political fragmentation we should adopt a "b usiness as usual" policy to buy time. Amidst all this internal U.S. dissension, the GVN announced on September 14 that martial law would end on September 16 and that National Assembly elections would be held September 27. In Washington, the NSC convened again September 17 to consider two alternative proposals for deali ng with Diem prepared by Hilsman. The first, which Hilsman and others at State f avored, was the "pressures and persuasion track," and involved an escalatory lad der of measures both public and private, including selective aid suspension, to coerce Diem into getting rid of Nhu and taking steps to restore the political si tuation. The alternative proposal, the "reconciliation with a rehabilitated GVN track," involved a public posture of acquiescence in recent GVN actions, recogni tion that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and a decision to salvage as much as po ssible from a bad situation. This, of course, would have involved a reopening of the dialogue with Diem, to which Lodge was opposed. Both proposals assumed that for the moment a coup was out of the question. There are no available records o f what transpired in the meeting, but two decisions were clearly made. The first was, in effect, to adopt Hilsman's "pressures and persuasion" proposal. The gui dance cable to Lodge after the meeting, however, came from the White House. It s tated that,

We see no good opportunity for action to remove present government in immediate future; therefore, as your most recent message suggests, we must, for the presen t, apply such pressures as are available to secure whatever modest improvements on the scene may be possible . . . Such a course, moreover, is consistent with m ore drastic effort as and when means became available. [Doc. 136] Lodge was to p ress for a reduction of Nhu's authority and his departure from Saigon, at least temporarily. The cable included a long list of other measures for the GVN to tak e to redress the political situation and gave Lodge complete control over the ai d program to enhance his bargaining position. This authorization specifically in cludes aid actions currently held in abeyance and you are authorized to set thos e in train or hold them up further in your discretion. We leave entirely in your hands decisions on the degree of privacy or publicity you wish to give to this process. [Doc. 136] There is no evidence on the degree of consensus of the princ ipals in this decision. Lodge replied to the new policy guidance on September 19 in a generally negative vein. The proposals for specific actions by the GVN had all been previously suggested to Diem without any results, and Lodge was not op timistic about their adoption now. He specifically felt that he should not be re quired to make a futile overture to Diem. The Ambassador's aloofness was beginni ng to cause official concern at the palace, and he felt he should press views on the Ngo family only when they initiated the contact. He did not think a public relations effort was likely to have any effect on the regime, whose appreciation of questions of public support was virtually nil. Withholding aid was another d elicate matter that did not offer great prospects of success. Lodge was particul arly concerned that such action would impede the war effort or damage the econom y, but have no real effect on the regime. No doubt recalling the generals' previ ous request for an aid suspension as a sign of U.S. support, Lodge expressed his view that any suspension of aid should be timed to coincide with another coup a ttempt and should be used to facilitate it. He was troubled by the opinion expre ssed by both General Minh and Secretary Thuan privately within the previous two days that the war was going very badly and the VC were winning. In general, he f elt that a patient "let them come to me" tactic was more likely to have results, unless a real coup possibility emerged, which he felt we should back. D. THE Mc NAMARA-TAYLOR MISSION The second decision to come out of the September 17 NSC me eting was to adopt a suggestion of Secretary McNamara for another fact-finding m ission, this time by himself and General Taylor, Chairman of the JCS. [Doc. 137] Lodge reacted immediately to othe proposed McNamara-Taylor mission, pointing ou t to the President that such a visit would require a call on Diem that would be construed by the regime as a return to business as usual. Since he had been cons ciously pursuing a

policy of official aloofness, he wondered whether such a high level visit was de sirable. Furthermore, it coincided with the proposed National Assembly elections on September 27, and could not but be construed as an indication of the lack of importance we attached to them. But the President was insistent, and Lodge acqu iesced, suggesting that the public announcement state that Lodge had requested t he visit. [Doc. 138] After an exchange of alternative phraseology, it was agreed that the release would say that the President had decided to send the mission a fter consultation with Lodge. It was so announced on September 21. The President 's instructions to McNamara described the purpose of the mission in the followin g terms: I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on -the-spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet C ong. . . . The events in South Vietnam since May have now raised serious questio ns both about the present prospects for success against the Viet Cong and still more about the future effectiveness of this effort unless there can be important political improvement in the country. It is in this context that I now need you r appraisal of the situation. If the prognosis in your judgment is not hopeful, I would like your views on what action must be taken by the South Vietnamese Gov ernment and what stops our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action. .... I will also expect you to examine with Ambassador Lodge ways and m eans of fashioning all forms of our assistance to South Vietnam so that it will support our foreign policy objectives more precisely. [Doc. 139] The purpose, th us, was fourfold: (1) appraise the war effort; (2) assess the impact on that eff ort of recent political developments; (3) recommend a course of action for the G VN and for the U.S.; and (4) examine with Lodge ways of tailoring our aid to ach ieve our foreign policy objectives. In a statement to the press at Andrews Air F orce Base just before leaving for Vietnam on September 23, Secretary McNamara sa id that the purpose of the trip was, "....to determine whether that military eff ort has been adversely affected by the unrest of the past several weeks." Both S chlesinger and Hilsman, however, contend that Kennedy sent McNamara and Taylor t o Vietnam to convince them of the negative effect on the war effort that the pro tracted political crisis was having, and of the necessity of applying sanctions to the Diem regime to bring about change. According to this argument, the Presid ent felt he could not afford a major policy rift in the Administration over appl ying sanctions, especially the opposition of the powerful JCS, and concluded tha t only McNamara, if convinced, could bring the military along. Whatever the exac t purpose of the trip, the party left Washington on September 23 and returned te n days later, on October 2, after an exhausting trip and a comprehensive review of the situation.

The divergent views of the members of the U.S. mission about the relative progre ss of the war, and the effect on it of the political crisis, were exposed immedi ately in the opening session that McNamara and Taylor held in Saigon with the co untry team on September 25. General Harkins and the MACV staff generally present ed a favorable picture of the war, emphasizing the progress of the strategic ham let program, and the generally improved ARVN position, in spite of recent rises in VC initiated incidents and declines in ARVN operations related to the politic al turmoil. McNamara and Taylor prodded the briefers with questions trying to ge t comparative indicators of the situation over the previous two years. McNamara in particular pressed for details about the Delta. Lodge's and Mecklin's reading of recent events, and their estimate of war progress, differed sharply from tha t of General Harkins. Lodge stressed the more political and intangible aspects o f the conflict and cast doubt on the "hardness" of the statistical data from MAC V. With the Mission's division of opinion exposed and the issues joined, McNamar a left to tour the country. His subsequent itinerary took him throughout the cou ntry interviewing Americans and Vietnamese both at headquarters, and in the fiel d. In Saigon, in the last few days of the visit, he was given extensive briefing s by the civilian side of the Mission and, since he stayed with Lodge, had ample opportunity for discussions with the Ambassador. On September 29, McNamara, Tay lor, Harkins, and Lodge called on Diem, after having previously decided against delivery of a stiff letter from Kennedy. After a two-hour monologue by Diem, McN amara was finally able to stress the U.S. concern that political unrest was unde rmining the war effort. He stressed the problem that repressions were creating f or President Kennedy because of aroused public opinion. But he did not ask for t he removal of the Nhus, a matter Washington had left to his and Lodge's discreti on. All this seems to have had little impact on Diem, however. Diem had asked Ta ylor for his appraisal of the war, and with the approval of McNamara, a long let ter from Taylor was delivered to Diem on October 2. The letter pointedly outline d the major military problems in the Delta, warned of the danger to the war effo rt of the political crisis, and listed many of the specific steps needed to impr ove the military effort that subsequently appeared in the report to the Presiden t. The letter summed up with a terse, tough statement of the U.S. view: In closi ng, Mr. President, may I give you my most important over-all impression? Up to n ow, the battle against the Viet Cong has seemed endless; no one has been willing to set a date for its successful conclusion. After talking to scores of officer s, Vietnamese and American, I am convinced that the Viet Cong insurgency in the north and center can be reduced to little more than sporadic incidents by the en d of 1964. The Delta will take longer but should be completed by the end of 1965 . But for these predictions to be valid, certain conditions must be met. Your Go vernment should be prepared to energize all agencies, military and civil, to a h igher output of activity than up to now. Ineffective commanders and province off icials must be replaced as soon as identified. Finally, there should be a restor ation of domestic tranquility on the home front if political tensions are to be allayed and external criticism is to abate. Conditions are needed for the creati on of

an atmosphere conducive to an effective campaign directed at the objective, vita l to both of us, of defeating the Viet Cong and of restoring peace to your commu nity. On September 30, their last day in Vietnam, McNamara and Taylor, together with Lodge, met with Vice President Tho. Tho said that the U.S., after Taylors r eport in 1961, had responded to the Vietnam situation promptly and efficiently, but that recently we had failed to use our strength and influence intelligently to prevent the current political deterioration. But he had no methods to suggest . Later he sharply questioned the success of the Strategic Hamlet Program, and s aid that increased Viet Cong strength had to be attributed to widespread peasant disaffection with the government. These views, from the man most often mentione d in U.S. circles as an alternative to Diem, coming at the end of the visit as t hey did, must have had an important influence on McNamara's conclusions. Later t hat day the party left Vietnam to return home. During the briefings for McNamara , Lodge had raised again his doubts about the efficacy of aid suspension as a le ver against Diem, but had also expressed his concern that the foreign aid bill w ould be penalized in Congress for Diem's repressions. Lodge reiterated in his ca bles to Washington during the visit his belief that an aid suspension could boom erang and alienate the population as well as the regime. Aware, no doubt, that a n aid suspension was a potential recommendation of the mission, Brent went on re cord against it, too. Both views were important because McNamara and Taylor had been specifically charged by the President with examining ways to make our aid s erve our foreign policy goals, and their briefing papers included a program-by-p rogram consideration of the impact of aid suspension prepared by AID-Washington. After a one-day stop in Honolulu to prepare their report, McNamara and Taylor a rrived back in Washington on October 2 and promptly met with the President and t he NSC. Their report concluded that the "military campaign has made great progre ss and continues to progress." But it warned that the serious political tensions in Saigon and the increasing unpopularity of Diem and Nhu could abet the then l imited restiveness of some ARVN officers and erode the favorable military trends . They reported no evidence of a successful coup in the making, and felt that U. S. pressure would probably only further harden the regime's attitudes. Neverthel ess, "unless such pressures are exerted, they (Diem-Nhu) are almost certain to c ontinue past patterns of behavior." [Doc. 142] The report's military recommendat ions were that General Harkins should review the war effort with Diem with a vie w toward its successful conclusion in I, II, and III Corps by the end of 1964 an d in the Delta by the end of 1965. This would necessitate: (a) a shift in milita ry emphasis and strength to the Delta; (b) an increase tempo of military activit y throughout the country; (c) an emphasis on "clear and hold operations"; (d) a consolidation of the Strategic Hamlet Program with the emphasis on security; and (e) the fleshing out of combat units and better training and arms for the hamle t militia. It was further proposed that an announcement be made of the planned w ithdrawal of 1,000 U.S. troops by the end of 1963 in connection with a program t o train Vietnaniese to replace Americans in all essential functions by 1965.

To bring political pressure on the Diem regime to end its repressive policies, t he following measures were recommended: (a) a continued withholding of funds in the commodity import program, but without formal announcement; (b) suspension of approval of AID loans for the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks and the Saigon Electric Power Project; (c) suspension of support for Colonel Tung's forces unless they w ere transferred to the field and placed under JGS authority; (d) maintenance of purely "correct" relations between the Ambassador and Diem (General Harkins' con tract with the regime not to be suspended, however). In subsequent evaluations o f the success of these sanctions, the report stated: ....the situation must be c losely watched to see what steps Diem is taking to reduce repressive practices a nd to improve the effectiveness of the military effort. We should set no fixed c riteria, but recognize that we would have to decide in 2-4 months, whether to mo ve to more drastic action or try to carry on with Diem even if he had not taken significant steps. Finally, the report recommended against our actively encourag ing a coup, although it recommended seeking "urgently to identify and build cont acts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears." The report is a cur iously contradictory document. It was, no doubt, a compromise between General Ha rkins' view of the war's progress as supported by General Taylor, and Secretary McNamara's growing conviction of the gravity of the political crisis and its dir e potential for the war effort. Its recommendations for aid suspensions and the announcement of U.S. troop withdrawals were obviously designed as measures, shor t of a withdrawal of U.S. support, that would create doubt within the Diem regim e about U.S. intentions and incentives for policy changes. The fact that these s anctions would be seen by the generals as a signal of our willingness to accept alternative leadership--i.e., a coup--does not seem to have figured in the recom mendation, however, because elsewhere the report specifically rules out U.S. enc ouragement of "a change of government." This is an important lapse in view of th e generals' clear statement in August that they would regard an aid suspension a s a coup signal. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Mission met with swift approval at the NSC on October 2, and later that day Secretary McNamara made th e Presidentially approved statement to the press that included the announcement of the 1,000 man troop withdrawal by the end of the year. The statement reiterat ed the U.S. commitment to the struggle against insurgency and aggression in Sout h Vietnam, noted the progress of the war, announced the troop withdrawal, and di ssociated the U.S. from the GVN's repressive policies. It avoided, however, any reference to economic aid suspensions or other sanctions against the regime, the reby giving Diem a chance to come around without a public loss of face. On Octob er 5, the President approved the specific military recommendations of the McNama ra-Taylor report, "but directed that no formal announcement be made of the imple mentation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of

1963." [Doc. 146] The details of how the new policy would be applied were spelle d out in a long cable to Lodge following this meeting. The purpose of the new co urse of action was described at the beginning of the message: Actions are design ed to indicate to Diem Government our displeasure at its political policies and activities and to create significant uncertainty in that government and in key V ietnamese groups as to future intensions of United States. At same time, actions are designed to have at most slight impact on military or counterinsurgency eff ort against Viet Cong, at least in short term. The recommendations on negotiatio ns are concerned with what U.S. is after, i.e., GVN action to increase effective ness of its military effort; to ensure popular support to win war; and to elimin ate strains on U.S. Government and public confidence. The negotiating posture is designed not to lay down specific hard and fast demands or to set a deadline, b ut to produce movement in Vietnamese Government along these lines. In this way w e can test and probe effectiveness of any actions the GVN actually takes and, at the same time, maintain sufficient flexibility to permit U.S. to resume full su pport of Diem regime at any time U.S. Government deems it appropriate. The cable goes on to acknowledge that the proposed sanctions can only be applied for 2-4 months before they begin to adversely affect the military effort, and therefore when that begins to happen recognizes that, ". . . further major decisions will be required." The specific actions to be taken included: (1) suspension of the c ommodity import program without public announcement; (2) selective suspension of PL 480, on an itemby-item, sometimes monthly, basis, after referral to Washingt on for review; (3) suspension of the loans for the Saigon-Cholon Waterworks and the Saigon Electric Power Project; (4) notification to the GVN that financial su pport of Colonel Tung's forces would be contingent on their commitment to field operations under JGS control, again without public announcement. Lodge was instr ucted to maintain his policy of "cool correctness in order to make Diem come to you," but to be prepared to re-establish contact later if it did not work. Speci fically he was to seek improvements in the GVN military effort, as outlined in t he McNamara-Taylor report; in the GVN's internal policies that would restore pop ular confidence; and in the GVN's international (particularly American) public i mage and its attitudes and actions toward the U.S. Once again, however, the disc ussion of this new program of pressures did not allude to their impact on the mi litary nor how a coup initiative by the generals, stemming from such measures, s hould be dealt with. Thus, the Kennedy Administration, after a long month of sea rching deliberations had made a far-reaching decision on American policy toward South Vietnam. It had chosen to take the difficult and risky path of positive pr essures against an ally to obtain from him compliance with our policies. To our good fortune, that policy was to be implemented by an Ambassador who not only su pported it, but was uniquely equipped by background and temperament to make it s ucceed. IV. THE COUP MATURES--OCTOBER 2-NOVEMBER 1

A. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SITUATION IN OCTOBER Through the month of September the GVN resorted to police state tactics ever more frequently. The regime, now more than ever under Nhu's dominance, lifted martial law September 16, but repression s against the Buddhist clergy continued unabated. Students, down to the grade sc hool level, were arrested and detained for the most minor of protests. Civil ser vants came under pressure to avoid contact with Americans, and to demonstrate th eir loyalty to the ruling family. Regime-inspired rumors of impending mob attack s on U.S. facilities, and assassination lists of prominent Americans circulated regularly. Then, on October 5, at noon in the central market place, another Budd hist monk burned himself to death, the first self-immolation since the pagoda ra ids. In this tense atmosphere, elections for the National Assembly were held on September 27 after a pro forma one-week campaign. Predictably, GVN candidates wo n overwhelming victories. The new assembly convened on October 7 to hear Preside nt Diem's state of the union message. Diem spoke mainly of South Vietnam's past and present progress, playing down the internal political crisis, and made only scant reference to U.S. assistance. As might have been expected, he threw the bl ame for the Buddhist crisis on the Communists, foreign adventurers, and the West ern press. On the same day, Mme. Nhu arrived in the U.S. after a month in Europe to begin a threeweek speaking tour. She immediately launched into shrill denunc iations of the Buddhists and of U.S. policy that progressively alienated U.S. pu blic opinion. She was followed around the country by her father, the former Amba ssador to the United States, however, who acted as a one-man truth squad reveali ng the inaccuracies and distortions of her statements. The Administration's dign ified and temperate reaction further discredited her attacks. On October 8, the UN General Assembly voted to send a fact-finding team to South Vietnam to invest igate the changes of repressions against Buddhists. B. THE NEW AMERICAN POLICY L odge's immediate reaction to the new policy approach was enthusiastic, "an excel lent instruction outlining a course of action which should yield constructive re sults." With the exception of the aid suspension, his views, in essence, had pre vailed with both McNamara and the President, the standard public kudos to milita ry progress notwithstanding. His plan was to allow the suspension of the commodi ty import program, the largest and most important of the economic sanctions, to become evident without making any mention of it, and, by maintaining his aloofne ss from official contact, force the regime to come to him. On October 7, however , Lodge expressed some doubts about the real value of the political concessions itemized in State's instructions if our real goal was removal of Nhu, an objecti ve of questionable feasibility under the current circumstances. In view of Nhu's increasing hostility to the U.S. presence and influence, Lodge felt a request f rom the regime for a U.S. withdrawal was a distinct possibility. That same day, the regime's reaction to the aid cut-off hit the streets with banner headlines i n its mouthpiece, the Times of Vietnam: "USOM Freezes Economic Aid

Program." The article accused the U.S. of subverting the war effort, and asserte d that the cut-off had been decided in mid-September. Such fantastic pressure fo r petty reforms would jeopardize the entire revolutionary program of the governm ent, it concluded. Lodge made no comment on the story. In mid-October, Lodge was requested to provide Washington with a weekly evaluation of the effects, both p ositive and negative, of the new policy. Lodge's October 16 reply summarized the situation as follows: "So far we appear to be getting virtually no effect from our actions under DEPTEL 534, but we would not have expected effects this early. " Other reports indicated that the regime was preparing to take a number of belt -tightening measures, including reductions in civil service salaries; that Chine se businessmen and bankers had begun to get jittery about currency stability; an d that the government was planning to draw down its foreign exchange reserves to sustain import levels in the face of the U.S. cut-off of CIP funds. A CIA memor andum concluded that the GVN reaction to the new U.S. policy, particularly the v iolent anti-U.S. campaign in the Times of Vietnam and the surveillance and haras sment of Americans and their employees, indicated that Diem and Nhu were prepari ng for a long fight and were unmoved by the new policy. Under Lodge's instructio ns, General Stillwell (MACV--J-3) met with Secretary Thuan on October 17 and inf ormed him of the impending cut-off of funds for the Special Forces, both MAP and CIA, unless the three CIA-funded companies under Colonel Tung's command were pl aced under JGS control and transferred to the field. Thuan said he would take th e matter up with Diem immediately. Harkins informed Diem directly of this action in a letter on October 18. General Don and Colonel Tung were also personally ad vised of the action, but again no public announcement was made. On October 26 it was learned that Tung and JGS were working on plans to transfer his Special For ces to the Central Highlands. By then, however, coup plans were well advanced an d the significance of this transfer must be understood therein. Militarily, in O ctober while the GVN had taken some minor steps in line with the McNamara-Taylor recommendations (such as agreeing to realign III and IV Corps boundaries to giv e added emphasis to the Delta war), the combat situation continued to worsen. Th e tempo of VC attacks, particularly in the Delta, increased; the weapons-loss ra tio and casualty ratios deteriorated; and GVN "missing in action" increased. In Washington, further doubt was cast on the optimism of previous reports by a cont roversial State Department research study of October 22. The memorandum took iss ue with encouraging conclusions about the progress of the military campaign deri ved from statistical trends, pointing out important unfavorable trends revealed by the same statistical data. In Saigon, MACV continued unsuccessfully to press Diem to take further steps to strengthen the war effort. Meanwhile, the U.S. Mis sion had been feeling the impact of the new policy in internal strains of its ow n. Hilsman reports that Lodge decided early in October that the recall of John R ichardson, the CIA chief in Saigon, would be a useful additional pressure agains t Nhu because they had been closely identified during Nolting's ambassadorship, and

because Richardson was known to favor a more conciliatory approach to the regime . While there are no cables in the available files to confirm it, Hilsman mainta ins that Lodge sent a private message to the President and CIA Director McCone r equesting Richardson's transfer. The President agreed, McCone acquiesced, and Ri chardson was returned to Washington on October 5. Whatever other motives may hav e been involved, Richardson had, in fact, been the specific object of an attack in the U.S. press on October 2 that had accused him of insubordination and had c ompromised his identity. It is not surprising under such circumstances that he s hould have been transferred. Whatever the case, the press interpreted his recall as a slap at the regime, as Hilsman suggests Lodge wanted. This was only an inc ident in the continuing series of stories by U.S. correspondents on divisions wi thin the mission. Lodge's relations with the press, however, remained excellent throughout his tour. He consciously cultivated the U.S. press corps with private luncheons, "backgrounders," and occasional leaks, and it paid off for him perso nally. But the press sharply attacked those in the mission, like Richardson and Harkins, with whom they disagreed about U.S. policy. Washington registered its c oncern that these stories, whatever their origin, were damaging to the official posture of unity the U.S. Government was trying to maintain in the implementatio n of a difficult policy toward South Vietnam. But the stories continued, even af ter the coup. In his weekly evaluation of the impact of the new U.S. policy on O ctober 23, Lodge was not encouraged by the results to date. "Diem/Nhu give every appearance of sitting tight and reacting to U.S. pressure with counter pressure and implying through public statements that they can go it alone." Nevertheless , there were several straws in the wind. Secretary Thuan had reported that Diem was worried and that he had instructed Thuan to ask Lodge if Washington had reac hed any decisions on commercial imports. Lodge also felt that the regime was bei ng more careful about repressive actions. Furthermore, experienced observers fel t the U.S. policy was creating favorable conditions for a coup, although Lodge d id not see anyone seriously considering it. The day after this message was sent, Lodge and his wife were invited by Diem to spend the next Sunday (the day after the National Day celebration) with him at his villa in Dalat, after visiting an agricultural station and a strategic hamlet. Lodge promptly accepted. Diem had made the first move. Washington instructed Lodge to use the occasion of the trip with Diem to test for movement by the GVN on any of the U.S. demands. Lodge was to take advantage of any subject of interest that Diem brought up to determine both the willingness of the government to make concessions and the effect of our selective sanctions. If Diem did not provide such conversational opportunities, Lodge was to assume the initiative. In particular, he was to inquire about chan ges in the military campaign that had been recommended by the McNamara-Taybr mis sion and subsequently pressed by General Harkins; he was to suggest that Diem be cooperative to the UN investigatory team that had arrived in the country on Oct ober 24, and allow them full access to information and people; and he was to inq uire whether Diem did not think it time to end the bitter antiAmerican campaign of the Times of Vietnam and the Nhus.

Lodge's Sunday with Diem on October 27, the day after the National Day celebrati on, was frustrating in almost all respects. Diem did bring up several issues of interest, but gave no indication that he had changed his position or his attitud e about the Buddhists or the U.S. He did inquire about the suspension of the com mercial import program to which Lodge inquired in reply about the release of Bud dhists and students from jail, the reopening of the schools, and the elimination of anti-Buddhist discrimination. Diem offered excuses and complaints as usual. Taking the initiative, Lodge complained to Diem of the public opinion pressure t hat his policies were placing the President under in the U.S. He complained abou t the physical attacks on U.S. newsmen and about Mme Nhu's inflammatory remarks in the U.S. as examples of the kind of thing Diem could prevent that would enhan ce his public image in the U.S. and the world. Lodge describes the end of the co nversation in this manner: When it was evident that the conversation was practic ally over, I said: "Mr. President, every single specific suggestion which I have made, you have rejected. Isn't there some one thing you may think of that is wi thin your capabilities to do and that would favorably impress U.S. opinion?" As on other previous occasions when I asked him similar questions, he gave me a bla nk look and changed the subject. While Lodge saw no movement on the basis of the conversation, he nonetheless suggested that consideration be given in Washingto n to what we would consider adequate response on Diem's part for a resumption of the commercial import program. The following day, after Lodge had related the d isappointing results of the conversation to Secretary Thuan over luncheon, the l atter observed that the U.S. really wasn't asking much and that perhaps the conv ersation with Diem had been a beginning. In retrospect, the comment is ironic, f or with the coup only five days away, the October 27 conversation was in reality a pathetic ending not a hopeful beginning. At one level, attention now turned t o Lodge's scheduled trip to Washington October 31. The exact purpose of the trip remains a mystery. On October 30, he sent a cable to Washington with some sugge stions of steps by the GVN that Washington might consider adequate for resuming the commercial import program under various conditions, steps which he hoped to discuss when he arrived. However, earlier in October, Lodge had sent a private n ote to McGeorge Bundy, asking that the President make him available for a trip t o Vietnam to discuss with Lodge a matter which Lodge did not feel free to enter into through any electronic communication channel. The following cryptic referen ce suggests that whatever the mysterious subject lodge had in mind, it was the p urpose for the planned trip to Washington at the end of October: Regarding my wi re, I appreciate your willingness to send Bundy. Would not have brought this up if I did not have a proposal which I think contains new ideas and which might ju st change the situation here for the better. It cannot be properly handled by te legram or letter and requires a chance for me to have a dialogue with Rusk and/o r Harriman and/or Bundy. I wired Bundy because I cannot leave here immediately, but I could come for one working day to Washington after Vietnamese National Day on

October 26 and dedication of Vietnamese Atomic Energy Plant on October 28, retur ning here immediately thereafter, and would be glad to do it. In order to shorte n Lodge's absence from Saigon and to add flexibility to his departure timing, th e President dispatched a military aircraft to Saigon and left it at his disposal . But as the October 31 date arrived, it coincided with the momentary anticipati on of a move by the generals. Lodge, no doubt preferred to remain in control of U.S. actions during a coup rather than see Harkins take over, as Washington's in structions for his absence stipulated, and so, he postponed his own departure. C . RENEWED COUP PLOTTING While Diem's reaction to the tough new American policy w as hostile, the senior South Vietnamese generals, predictably, interpreted the n ew policy as a green light for a coup. Plotting was reactivated almost immediate ly, if indeed it had ever been completely dormant. On October 2, the day the McN amara-Taylor mission reported to the President, General Don "accidentally" encou ntered Lt Colonel Conein, the CIA contact man in the August plot, at Tan Son Nhu t airport and asked him to meet him that night in Nha Trang. Truehart approved t he contact, instructing Conein to neither encourage nor discourage a coup but on ly to get information. At the meeting, General Don said that General Minh wanted to meet with Concm at 8:00 a.m. on October 5 at JGS headquarters at which time Minh would be able to go into the details of the generals' plan. Don emphaticall y stated that there was a plan, and that essential to it was the conversion of G eneral Dinh, III Corps commander, to the cause. So, with Lodge's approval, Conei n met General Minh on October 5. Getting straight to the point, "General Minh st ated that he must know American Government's position with respect to a change i n the Government of Vietnam within the very near future." The government's loss of popular support was endangering the whole war effort, which was deteriorating rapidly. He did not except any U.S. support, but needed assurances the U.S. wou ld not thwart the attempt. Also involved, he said, were Generals Don, Khiem and Kim. Of three possible and not mutually exclusive plans mentioned by Minh, two i nvolved military action against loyal units in Saigon, and one was an assassinat ion plot against brothers Nhu and Can, but not Diem. Conein remained noncommitta l about both U.S. support and the various plans. Minh then expressed doubt about General Khiem whom he suspected of having played a double role in August, but i ndicated that the generals would have to act soon to forestall abortive attempts by lower echelon officers. Minh hoped to meet with Conein in the near future to go over the detailed plan of operations. Conein was again noncommittal and Minh said he understood. Lodge, with Harkins' concurrence, recommended that when Min h, about whom he was now dubious after his August experience, approached Conein again, he be told: (1) that the U.S. would not thwart his plans; (2) that we wou ld be willing to review his plans, except those for assassinations; and (3) "tha t U.S. aid will be continued to Vietnam under

government which gives promise of gaining support of people and winning the war against the Communists." In pressing Minh for details of the planned composition of a successor regime, Lodge felt we should stress the need for a "good proport ion of well qualified civilian leaders in key positions." A message emanating fr om an NSC meeting was sent to Lodge on the same day and appears to have been dis patched before the arrival of the CAS report on the Conein-Minh meeting and Lodg e's comment. In it the President specifically instructed Lodge to avoid encourag ing a coup. The message stated: ....President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup. There should, however, be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alter native leadership as and when it appears. Essential that this effort be totally secure and fully deniable and separated entirely from normal political analysis and reporting and other activities of country team. We repeat that this effort i s not repeat not to be aimed at active promotion of coup but only at surveillanc e and readiness. In order to provide plausibility to denial suggest you and no o ne else in Embassy issue these instruction orally to Acting Station Chief and ho ld him responsible to you alone for making appropriate contacts and reporting to you alone. [Doc. 143] Responding the next day, October 6, to the report of the Conein-Minh meeting, Washington referred to the preceding day's cable, but, prom pted by Lodge's suggestion, added: While we do not wish to stimulate coup, we al so do not wish to leave impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, ensuring popular support to win war and improving working relations with U.S. We would like to be informed on w hat is being contemplated but we should avoid being drawn into reviewing or advi sing on operational plans or any other act which might tend to identify U.S. too closely with change in government. [Doc. 145] Washington was, further, greatly concerned about the security and deniability of any further contacts and suggest ed to Lodge that someone could be brought in from outside Vietnam for follow-up contacts if he thought it necessary. Lodge apparently did not. An important appa rent lacuna in the available message traffic occurs at this point. By Shaplen's account, a CAS officer met with Minh on October 10 and conveyed the substance of the U.S. position. Whether or not the date is accurate, it is probable that som e such contact took place by mid-October. On October 20 a Colonel Khuong at JGS contacted an American counterpart and reported a coup plot involving Minh, Khiem , Kim, and a fourth unidentified general, plus a number of colonels. He was seek ing assurances of U.S. support following a coup.

There were no further reported contacts with the generals until October 23 when Conein again met with Don at the latter's initiative. In a state of agitation, D on stated that the coup had been scheduled to take advantage of the October 26 N ational Holiday, but that on October 22 Harkins had called on him to report the Khuong contact and to discourage a coup. Don further indicated that the palace h ad learned of Khuong's overtures, implying that Harkins was responsible, and had taken action to ensure that the vital 5th and 7th Divisions would be away from Saigon. Don demanded to know what the U.S. attitude was toward a coup. Conein re iterated the Washington guidance. Apparently relieved, Don asked Conein to assur e Lodge that Khuong was not a member of the coup committee and would be punished . He indicated that the generals had avoided contacting Lodge directly at a part y on October 18 because of the presence of members of Harkins' staff. Conein the n asked for proof of the existence of the coup group and its plan. Don said that if they could meet the following day, he would give Conein, EYES ONLY for Lodge , the political organization plan. In a subsequent conversation with Harkins on the matter, Lodge reported that Harkins confirmed his demarche to Don on October 22, and after they had reviewed CAP 74228, said he had misunderstood the policy and hoped he had not upset any delicate arrangements. Harkins added that he wou ld inform Don that his previous statements did not reflect U.S. Government polic y. By Harkins' account, he had not violated Washington's guidance in his convers ation with Don. He was merely trying to discourage Vietnamese officers from appr oaching U.S. counterparts about coup plots which only detracted from the war eff ort. Furthermore, Don had at no time mentioned coup planning to him. He conclude d by commenting about the renewed plotting by the generals that: Though I am not trying to thwart a change in government, I think we should take a good hard loo k at the group's proposals to see if we think it would be capable of increasing the effectiveness of the military effort. There are so many coup groups making n oises that unless elements of all are included I'm afraid there will be a contin uous effort to upset whoever gains control for sometime out and this to me will interfere with the war effort. This incident once again highlighted the differin g outlooks of the Ambassador and MACV and underscored the lack of close coordina tion between them. Unfortunately, it did not lead to any improvement in the situ ation. The close identification of Harkins with Diem made the Vietnamese general s mistrust him. Lodge, responsive to their great sensitivity about security, ten ded to restrict information about the contacts and coup plans to himself. In res ponse to this contact by Don, Washington reflected mainly concern that he might be acting as an agent of the palace to lead us down the garden path. As he had i ndicated, Don contacted Conein on the morning of the 24th, but not with the prom ised plans. He reported that the previous evening Harkins had spoken to him, cor recting his earlier statements about the nondesirability of a change of governme nt. Don further said he had a scheduled meeting with Lodge that evening (which L odge denied) and that plans were

now far advanced for a coup sometime before November 2. He asked Conein to meet him later that afternoon to discuss the details of the plan. In a separate cable disputing some of Lodges interpretative description of his statement to Don, Ha rkins stated that he had repulsed Don's suggestion that they meet again to discu ss the coup plans. "I told Don that I would not discuss coups that were not my b usiness though I had heard rumors of many. Taylor replied immediately, stating, "View here is that your actions in disengaging from the coup discussion were cor rect and that you should continue to avoid any involvement." At Conein's meeting with Don on the evening of the 24th, the latter indicated he had misunderstood General Harkins and had not seen Lodge. He said that the coup committee had refu sed to release any plans because of its anxiety about breaches of security. He d id promise to turn over to Conein for Lodge's review detailed plans of the opera tion and the proposed successor government two days before the coup, which he re iterated would take place before November 2. At this juncture, the nature of the dialogue between Lodge and the White House began to change. On October 25, Lodg e sent McGeorge Bundy a long cable taking exception to Harkins' reservations abo ut a coup and arguing for a policy of "not thwarting." No successor government c ould bungle the war as badly as Diem had, he argued, and, furthermore, for us to prevent a change of government would be "assuming an undue responsibility for k eeping the incumbents in office." In his reply, Bundy expressed the White House anxiety about reaping the blame for an unsuccessful coup. We are particularly co ncerned about hazard that an unsuccessful coup, however carefully we avoid direc t engagement, will be laid at our door by public opinion almost everywhere. Ther efore, while sharing your view that we should not be in position of thwarting co up, we would like to have option of judging and warning on any plan with poor pr ospects of success. We recognize that this is a large order, but President wants you to know of our concern. [Doc. 153] The discussion of these issues dominated the cable traffic between Lodge and the White House up to the day of the coup, with Washington concerned about detailed plans and prospects for success and Lod ge stressing the irrevocability of our involvement. There were no further contac ts with the coup group until the day after the fruitless LodgeDiem conversations . That Monday, October 28, Lodge and Diem were leaving Saigon for Dalat to dedic ate the Vietnamese Atomic Energy Plant. At the airport before their departure, G eneral Don daringly took Lodge aside and asked if Conein was authorized to speak for him. Lodge assured Don that he was. Don said that the coup must be thorough ly Vietnamese and that the U.S. must not interfere. Lodge agreed, adding that th e U.S. wanted no satellites but would not thwart a coup. When Lodge asked about the timing of the coup, Don replied that the generals were not yet ready. Later that evening Conein met Don by prearrangement at the latter's initiative. When C onein called Don's attention to Lodge's scheduled trip to Washington on October 31, indicating that it was important for him to review the coup plans before his departure,

Don replied that the plans might not be available until four hours in advance, b ut urged that the Ambassador not change his plans as this might be a tip-off. Do n said that nothing would happen in the next 48 hours, but the implication was t hat the coup would pre-empt Lodge's departure. When pressed for details of the p lanning, Don indicated that within the committee, Minh had charge of the militar y plans for the operation, Kim was doing the political planning, and he, Don, wa s the liaison with the Americans. They had surrounded General Dinh with coup sup porters and he would be neutralized. Generals Tn and Khanh were both involved in the planning. General Khiem was being circumspect because he was under palace s uspicion. Minor details of the plan and a list of units supporting the coup were also discussed. Simultaneous separate contacts had confirmed that several impor tant opposition civilians were in contact with the generals, including Phan Huy Quat, Bui Diem, and Tran Trung Dung, and that they expected to play a role in th e post-coup government, which reportedly would be headed by Vice President Tho. In a cable dispatched that same day summarizing the situation, Lodge expressed s ome concern at the possibility of a premature coup by junior officers, but gener ally expressed confidence in the generals while regretting their reluctance for security reasons to provide details of their plans. He concluded in these words: In summary, it would appear that a coup attempt by the Generals' group is immin ent; that whether this coup fails or succeeds, the USG must be prepared to accep t the fact that we will be blamed, however unjustifiably and finally, that no po sitive action by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing Diem and Nhu with all the opprobrium that such an action would entail. Note too Don's sta tement we will only have four hours notice. This rules out my checking with you between time I learn of coup and time that it starts. It means US will not be ab le significantly to influence course of events. Lodge's view was clear. We were committed and it was too late for second thoughts. Moreover, when the balloon we nt up he did not expect to have time to consult Washington. He expected, and pro bably preferred, to guide events himself. In view of the deteriorating situation , instructions were given to Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, to have a task force stand o ff the Vietnamese coast for the possible evacuation of American dependents and c ivilians if events required. This was a re-enactment of a similar alert during t he abortive August coup. In Washington, McNamara and the JCS had become concerne d about the differing views of Lodge and Harkins as to the correct U.S. course o f action. More importantly, they were alarmed at the apparent breakdown of commu nication and coordination between the Ambassador and MACV. The cable traffic ten ded "to form a picture of a relationship which lacks the depth and continuity re quired by the complex circumstances in Saigon." Harkins' suggestions for improvi ng their rapport were invited. After the NSC meeting on October 29, the White Ho use was also concerned and instructed Lodge to show Harkins the relevant cables and be sure he was fully aware of the coup arrangements since during

Lodge's absence in Washington Harkins would have overall responsibility for the U.S. [Doc. 150] These two cables triggered a flurry of strong opposing reactions from Lodge and Harkins. Harkins, belatedly apprised of the recent Conein-Don co ntacts and of Lodge's evaluations and recommendations, took bitter exception to the Ambassador's conclusions in three separate cables on October 30. He particul arly resented Lodge's independent, gloomy assessments of how the war was going, which were at direct odds with his own views, views which he had provided Lodge for inclusion in his weekly reports to Washington. [Doc. 1511 As to U.S. policy toward a coup, he was irate at having been excluded by Lodge from information an d consultation about the continuing contacts with the generals. [Doc. 152] The h eart of the issue, however, was a disagreement about what was, in fact, U.S. pol icy toward a coup as defined by the Washington guidance cables. Harkins outlined the disagreement in a separate October 30 cable to Taylor: There is a basic dif ference apparently between the Ambassador's thinking and mine on the interpretat ion of the guidance contained in CAP 63560 dated 6 October (see Appendix) and th e additional thoughts, I repeat, thoughts expressed in CAS Washington 74228 date d 9 October (Appendix). I interpret CAP 63560 as our basic guidance and that CAS 74228 being additional thoughts did not change the basic guidance in that no in itiative should now be taken to give any active covert encouragement to a coup. The Ambassador feels that 74228 does change 63560 and that a change of governmen t is desired and feels as stated in CAS Saigon 1964 (Appendix) that the only way to bring about such a change is by a coup. I'm not opposed to a change in gover nment, no indeed, but I'm inclined to feel that at this time the change should b e in methods of governing rather than complete change of personnel. I have seen no batting order proposed by any of the coup groups. I think we should take a ha rd look at any proposed list before we make any decisions. In my contacts here I have seen no one with the strength of character of Diem, at least in fighting c ommunists. Certainly there are no Generals qualified to take over in my opinion. I am not a Diem man per se. I certainly see the faults in his character. I am h ere to back 14 million SVN people in their leader at this time. *** I would sugg est we not try to change horses too quickly. That we continue to take persuasive actions that will make the horses change their course and methods of action. Th at we win the military effort as quickly as possible, then let them make any and all the changes they want. After all, rightly or wrongly, we have backed Diem f or eight long hard years. To me it seems incongruous now to get him down, kick h im around, and get rid of him. The US

has been his mother superior and father confessor since he's been in office and he has leaned on us heavily. [Docs. 151 & 152] The first Washington message to L odge on October 30 revealed that White House anxiety about the possible failure of a coup attempt, already evident on October 25 in CAP 63590 (see Appendix), ha d increased. The CIA's evaluation of the balance of forces cast doubt on whether the coup group could pull off a decisive action. With these concerns in mind, W ashington could not accept Lodge's judgment "that no positive action by the USG can prevent a coup attempt . . ." The White House view was that: .... our attitu de to coup group can still have decisive effects on its decisions. We believe th at what we say to coup group can produce delay of coup and that betrayal of coup plans to Diem is not repeat not our only way of stopping coup. In a long reply (in which Harkins did not concur), Lodge was at pains to point out his powerless ness to prevent what was fundamentally a Vietnamese affair, short of revealing i t to the palace. We must, of course, get best possible estimate of chance of cou p's success and this estimate must color our thinking, but do not think we have the power to delay or discourage a coup. Don has made it clear many times that t his is a Vietnamese affair. It is theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would und oubtedly stop the coup and would make traitors out of us. For practical purposes therefore I would say that we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair. In addition, this would place the heads of the Generals, t heir civilian supporters, and lower military officers on the spot, thereby sacri ficing a significant portion of the civilian and military leadership needed to c arry the war against the VC to its successful conclusion. After our efforts not to discourage a coup and this change of heart, we would foreclose any possibilit y of change of the GVN for the better. *** As regards your paragraph 10 (questio n of determination and force of character of coup leaders), I do not know what m ore proof can be offered than the fact these men are obviously prepared to risk their lives and that they want nothing for themselves. If I am any judge of huma n nature, Don's face expressed sincerity and determination on the morning that I spoke to him. Heartily agree that a miscalculation could jeopardize position in Southeast Asia. We also run tremendous risks by doing nothing. [Doc. 154] Wheth er Lodge seriously believed this or merely used it as an argumentative excuse fo r not entertaining the possibility of intervention to delay or stop an unviable attempt is not clear. His defense of the plotters and his support for their goal in this telegraphic dialogue with Washington, however, clearly show his emotion al bias in favor of a coup. Elsewhere in the cable Lodge objected to the designa tion of Harkins as the Chief of Mission in the event of a coup during his absenc e.

The tone and content of these parallel messages from Harkins and Lodge only heig htened White House anxiety and, no doubt, raised concern about the objectivity o f these two principal U.S. observers of the critical Vietnamese situation. In an effort to clear the air, explicitly redefine and restate the policy guidance, a nd clarify the assignment of roles and responsibilities within the Mission, the White House sent still another cable to Saigon later on October 30. Taking point ed issue with Lodge's view, the message stated: We do not accept as a basis for US policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgement, does not clearly give high prospect of success. We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 791 09 explicitly rejected that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that our own position should be on as firm ground a s possible, hence we cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your messa ge that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe th at your standard for intervention should be that stated above. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you shoul d communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to des ist at least until chances are better. In such a communication you should use th e weight of US best advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recogniz e need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of US role in 1960 coup attempt and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advic e given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives. [Doc. 155] Lodge was also urgently requested to obtain more detailed information about the compositi on of the forces the coup leaders expected to have at their disposal so that we could better assess their prospects. With regard to Lodge's absence, the instruc tions placed Truehart in charge unless a coup occurred, in which case Harkins wo uld be Chief of Mission. The desirability of having Lodge on the scene in the ev ent of a coup, however, was stressed and he was encouraged to delay his departur e if he thought the coup was imminent. The following four-point standing instruc tions for U.S. posture in the event of a coup were also given: a. US authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and UScontrolled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or i n support of either side, without authorization from Washington. b. In event of indecisive contest, US authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, such as removal of key personalities or relay of i nformation. In such actions, however, US authorities will strenuously avoid appe arance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or app ear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, US authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obl igation of this sort. We believe, however, that in such a case it would be in ou r interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek prote ction of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point should be made stron gly if need arises. d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, a nd within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the US government that it should succeed. With respect to instruction d., however, no specific actions to support or guarantee the success of a coup were authorized. This message was th e last guidance Lodge received from Washington before the coup began. V. THE COU P AND ITS AFTERMATH--NOVEMBER 1-23 A. THE COUP The atmosphere of Byzantine intri gue in Saigon in the fall of 1963 made it virtually impossible to keep track of all the plots against the regime. In one of his last messages to Washington befo re the coup, Lodge identified ten individual dissident groups in addition to the generals' group. These various plots were highly fluid in composition and quixo tic in character, quickly appearing, disappearing and/or merging with other grou ps. There were, however, two groups that came into existence in the summer and r etained their identity with some mutation until near the end. The first, chronol ogically, was variously identified as the Tuyen or Thao group after its successi ve leaders. It was conceived sometime in June by Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, the Directo r of Political Studies (national intelligence) under Diem, and involved elements of the Ministries of Civic Action and Information and certain elements of the A rmy. When Dr. Tuyen was sent out of the country in September, the group was more or less merged with a separate group of middle level officers headed by Lt. Col onel Phamh Goc Thao. Several dates were established by this group for a coup dur ing the summer and fall, but each time critical military units were temporarily transferred by either the palace or the JGS, under General Don, each of whom was somewhat aware of the group's plans and was interested in frustrating them. In the end, it concerted efforts with the generals as the only alternative with pro spects of success. The second group was, of course, composed of the senior gener als of the Vietnamese Army. Plotting by this group also began in earnest in June . Initially, its leader was identified as General Khiem and later General Don, b ut the de facto leader throughout was, no doubt, General Minh who commanded by f ar the greatest respect and allegiance within the officer corps. The four princi pal members of the group were Generals Minh, Don, Khiem, and Kim, all of whom we re stationed in Saigon without troop command, the latter three at JGS and Genera l Minh as a palace military advisor. Generals Tn and Khanh, I and II Corps comma nders respectively, were secondary members of the generals' group, but were also in touch with the Thao group. The abortive attempt by the generals to launch a coup in August has already been described in detail. Important

lessons seem to have been learned by these men from that experience, for when th ey again began to set their plans and make arrangements it was with great attent ion to detail and with an explicit division of labor. Among the plotters, Genera l Minh had the overall direction of the coup activities, although the group acte d in committee fashion with the members apparently voting at several points on p articular actions. He was also responsible for the military operation of the cou p itself. General Don was the liaison with the Americans and responsible for woo ing General Dinh. General Kim handled planning for the post-coup government and the relations with the civilian groups that were expected to be called on to sup port the coup. General Khiem was to play a critical role at the end of October a s the liaison man with the Thao coup group in working out the details of their s upport and integration into the actual execution of the coup. As already noted, the fundamental problem of the plotters was their lack of troop command in the i mmediate Saigon area. The Ngo family's longstanding fear of military coups, as p reviously discussed, had been the main factor in all military command assignment s and promotion policy. Nowhere was loyalty a more important prerequisite for co mmand than in Saigon, the surrounding III Corps, and the nearby IV Corps, with i ts headquarters only 40 miles away down Highway 4. In addition to the sizable sp ecial forces units in Saigon under Colonel Tung and the various national police and paramilitary units that also took their orders directly from the palace, Die m had appointed the vain, ambitious, and supposedly loyal General Dinh as Comman der of III Corps (whose 5th Division was stationed at nearby Bien Hoa) and the S aigon Military District. Furthermore, the IV Corps was commanded by General Cao, who had saved Diem during the 1960 coup by bringing his loyal 7th Division troo ps up from My Tho. It was on this formidable line-up of forces that the family h ad staked its survival; and not without reason, as the frustrated coup of August demonstrated. Saigon, however, was not entirely without dissident elements. Wit h the exception of their commanders, the Marine battalion, the airborne battalio n, and the Air Force were all sympathetic to a coup. But the plotters knew that a favorable balance of forces could not be achieved or maintained without either the conversion or neutralization of Generals Dinh and Cao. During the August pa goda raids, Dinh had been given overall command of the crackdown, although Tung had taken his instructions as always directly from Nhu in carrying out the attac ks. Thereafter, Dinh, who was a notorious braggart, boasted that he had saved th e country from the Buddhists, Communists, and "foreign adventurers." Carried awa y with himself, he held a news conference on August 27 in which he was harried a nd finally humiliated by antagonistic American journalists. The plotting general s decided that they would play on his vanity and egoism to win him over to their side. With his pride injured at the hands of the newsmen, Dinh was easy prey to Don's suggestion that Nhu had played him for a fool, but that he really was a n ational hero, and that the regime was indebted to him. Don suggested that Dinh g o to Diem with a plan to increase military participation in the government, spec ifically that he, Dinh, be named Minister of

Interior. Don rightly expected that Diem would be outraged at such a brazen requ est, and would reprimand Dinh, further wounding his pride and alienating him fro m the regime. Diem reacted as expected, and ordered Dinh to take a "vacation" in Dalat for a while. Don at this point began his long effort to woo Dinh to the p lotters side against Diem. Dinh, however, lacked self-confidence and vacillated although he does not appear to have played a double roll by revealing the existe nce of the plot to the palace. While the elaborate stratagems for seducing Dinh were taking place, the plotters had carefully surrounded him with supporters of the coup, including his deputy, Colonel Co, whom they felt they could rely on to neutralize him if he showed signs of rallying to the family once the balloon wa s up. By the end of the third week in October, the plotters felt reasonably conf ident that the problem of Dinh had been resolved: he would, as an opportunist, r ally to the coup if he felt it was going to succeed; if he did not, he would be eliminated. At the same time, plans had been under way to neutralize General Cao , the IV Corps commander, since he would certainly betray the plotters to the pa lace if he got word of the plans, or bring his troops to Diem's aid if the coup started while he was still in control of them. To do this, Colonel Co, Dinh's de puty, was sent to the Delta to win the support of the subordinate commanders in IV Corps. In the ultimate plan, Co would be sent with JGS orders to take command of the 7th Division in My Tho on the day before the coup began; he would order all boats to the Saigon side of the Mekong River; and, thus, act as a blocking f orce to General Cao who, stranded in Can Tho on the far side of the Mekong, was then be arrested by dissident officers in his own command. Co apparently was suc cessful in getting the support of the great majority of the subordinate officers , but one loyal officer heard of the plans and immediately tipped off Nhu. Diem and Nhu called in Dinh and revealed what they had learned, attempting to force h is hand. Dinh reacted with feigned shock and suggested that Co be executed immed iately. This convinced Nhu that Dinh was not involved. They preferred to keep Co alive to get more information from him. Nhu then revealed his own elaborate sch eme for a pseudocoup that would pre-empt the plotters and squelch their plans. H is two-part plan was to start with the transfer of Colonel Tung's special forces out of Saigon on maneuvers. The phony coup would then take place with Diem and Nhu escaping to their hideaway at Cap St Jacques. After several days of hooligan ism including the murder of several prominent Vietnamese and some Americans, the loyal 5th Division under Dinh and the 7th under Cao would counterattack the cit y and Diem and Nhu would return as triumphant heroes, more secure than ever. Din h was the key to Nhu's plan. Dinh's role becomes confused at this point. He appa rently was uncertain about the relative balance of forces and decided to coopera te with both sides until he could decide which he felt was going to gain the upp er hand, although he was probably still leaning toward the palace. In any case, if he was trusted by the Nhus, he certainly was not by the generals because they confided in him none of their detailed plans for the operation, and Nhu's plan, in which he would have played the key role, never came to fruition. It was preempted by the real coup the generals had been plotting.

By the last week in October, timing had become critical. The Thao group apparent ly had intended to act on October 24, but were dissuaded by Don and Khiem who ar gued that they had too few forces to guarantee success. It was at this juncture that Khiem brought the Thao group into the plans and worked out joint arrangemen ts with them for the execution of the coup. Shaplen says that the generals' coup was originally planned for November 4. This conflicts, however, with what Don h ad told Conein on October 24, namely that it would occur before November 2. By S haplen's account, Dinh revealed the planned date of the coup to Nhu who instruct ed him to urge that it be advanced to November 1. Nhu still thought somehow he c ould carry off his plan by abandoning the phony coup, by letting the real substi tute for it in the hope that it would be thrown off balance by the advanced date , and by relying on Dinh's loyal troops as supplemented by Cao's to tip the scal e in the family's favor once the chips were down. In allowing the generals to ma ke their move, the principal rebels would all be compromised and Nhu could then act to crush all major dissidence. Whatever the reason, whether by Nhu's intrigu e or by their own timetable, the generals set the coup for November 1. While the y had left a worried U.S. officialdom with only sketchy ideas of the planned ope ration, the generals had themselves devoted great attention to all details of th eir move. When the hour came for execution, the plan was implemented with hardly a hitch, and the fate of the regime was sealed in the first hours of the coup. On October 29, the first preparatory action for a coup was taken. General Dinh o rdered Colonel Tung to move his special forces out of the capital for maneuvers, but whether he was acting as the agent of the generals or the palace is still u nclear. Simultaneously, the chief of intelligence, who had been a member of the Thao plot and was now participating in the generals' plan, passed phony intellig ence of a VC build-up outside Saigon to Diem and Nhu to get them to divert loyal units that could have been used to thwart a coup. The day of the coup itself be gan improbably with an official U.S. call on Diem. Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, had be en visiting General Harkins to review the situation and prior to his departure a t noon, he and Lodge paid a courtesy call on the President. Diem's monologue was little different from what he had said to McNamara and Taylor the month before. As they were leaving, however, he called Lodge aside and they talked privately for twenty minutes. Diem, in a tragically unwitting example of too little too la te, indicated that he wanted to talk to Lodge about what it was the U.S. wanted him to do. The atmosphere of this meeting must have been strained in the extreme in view of Lodge's awareness of the imminence of the coup. After the meeting, F elt went straight to the airport and held a press conference, with a nervous Gen eral Don at his side, before departing at noon unaware of the drama that was alr eady unfolding. While Lodge and Felt had been at the palace, coup units had alre ady begun to deploy in and around Saigon. At the same time, nearly all the gener als and top officers had been convened for a noon meeting at JGS headquarters at Tan Son Nhut. There the coup committee informed them that the coup had begun an d asked for their support. Pledges of support were recorded on tape by all those present who supported the action. They were to be used later over the radio and would implicate the entire senior officer corps of the Army in the event the co up failed. In this way the plotters were able to enlist the support

of several wavering officers. The only senior officers not present were Generals Dinh and Cao, who were not informed of the meeting to prevent their revealing t he coup prematurely to the palace or taking counter action. Also not present was the South Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations, who had been assassinated by a trigger-happy escort enroute. Several officers suspected of being loyal to Diem were taken into immediate custody at JGS, including Colonel Tung, and the comman ders of the Air Force, the airborne brigade, the Marines, the Civil Guard, and t he police force. A CAS officer, presumably Lt Colonel Conein, was also invited t o come to JGS and was authorized to maintain telephone contact with the Embassy during the coup. He provided reliable reporting throughout the next two days. At 1:45 p.m., Don called General Stilwell, Harkins' J-3, and informed him that all the generals were assembled at JGS and that the coup had begun. At the same tim e, coup forces were seizing the post office with its telecommunications faciliti es, the police headquarters, the radio stations, the airport, and the naval head quarters, and were deploying in positions to assault the special forces headquar ters near Tan Son Nhut, the palace, and the barracks of the palace guard. Other units had been deployed in blocking positions to defend against any loyal counte rattack from units outside Saigon. These actions were swift and met with little resistance. The units involved included the Marine and airborne units under the leadership of junior officers, the Air Force under junior officers, and units fr om the 5th Division under orders from Dinh, who had thrown in his lot when he be came aware of the unanimity of the senior officers and their apparent likelihood of success. Later in the day, armor and troops from the 7th Division at My Tho, under the insurgent leadership of Colonel Co, arrived for the assault on the pa lace. As is always the case in this kind of crisis, the quantity of cables quick ly overwhelmed the communications system, and the incompleteness of the reports meant that no clear picture of what was happening could be pieced together until later. As in all such situations, the Embassy became an island linked to outsid e events only by tenuous reports from telephone contacts. In the early afternoon , Colonel Tung, who had been arrested on the morning of November 1, was forced t o call his special forces and tell them to surrender to the coup forces. Not lon g thereafter, the adjacent special forces headquarters fell to the coup units af ter a brief skirmish. When this occurred, the palace was reduced for its defense to the palace guard, since the remainder of the special forces were outside the city and effectively cut off from it, and all other unit commanders had come un der the command of officers involved in the coup. General Cao, the IV Corps comm ander, pledged his support to the coup in the late afternoon, although it is not clear whether this was opportunistic or whether he thought the coup was really Phase I of Nhu's plan. Not trusting him, however, the generals placed him under guard. At 4:30 p.m., the generals went on the radio to announce the coup and dem and the resignation of Diem and Nhu. This was followed by a continuing broadcast of the pledges of support of the senior officers that had been recorded that mo rning. Meanwhile, Air Force transports were dropping prepared leaflets announcin g the coup, and calling on the populace to support it.

At the beginning, Diem and Nhu were apparently fooled by the coup, or had comple tely miscalculated the extent of its support. At the first indications of coup a ctions, Nhu reportedly assured an alarmed official that it was all part of a pal ace plan. When word reached the palace that all key points had fallen, Nhu tried to contact General Dinh. When he could not reach him, he realized that he had b een outfoxed and that the coup was genuine. By this time, fighting was going on between the coup forces and the palace guard at the palace and the nearby guard barracks. When the generals called the two brothers and asked them to surrender, promising them safe conduct out of the country, Diem replied by asking them to come to the palace for "consultations," an obvious attempt to repeat the 1960 ta ctic of delaying the coup long enough for loyal troops to reach the city. The ge nerals, however, were not bargaining--they were demanding. At 4:30 p.m., Diem ca lled Lodge to ask where he stood and the following conversation ensued: Diem: So me units have made a rebellion and I want to know what is the attitude of the US ? Lodge: I do not feel well enough informed to be able to tell you. I have heard the shooting, but am not acquainted with all the facts. Also it is 4:30 a.m. in Washington and the US Government cannot possibly have a view. Diem: But you mus t have some general ideas. After all, I am a Chief of State. I have tried to do my duty. I want to do now what duty and good sense require. I believe in duty ab ove all. Lodge: You have certainly done your duty. As I told you only this morni ng, I admire your courage and your great contributions to your country. No one c an take away from you the credit for all you have done. Now I am worried about y our physical safety. I have a report that those in charge of the current activit y offer you and your brother safe conduct out of the country if you resign. Had you heard this? Diem: No. (And then after a pause) You have my telephone number. Lodge: Yes. If I can do anything for your physical safety, please call me. Diem : I am trying to re-establish order. There is no evidence available as to whethe r Washington issued further instructions with respect to the personal safety of Diem and Nhu at this time. The above conversation was the last that any American had with DIEM. Lodge, as was his custom, retired that night at about 9:30 p.m. Shortly after Diem's call to Lodge, the generals called the palace again and put Colonel Tung on the phone. Tung told Nhu he had surrendered. The generals then demanded the immediate surrender of the brothers or they would put the palace un der air and ground

attack. Each general at JGS, in turn, was put on the phone to assure Diem of saf e conduct if he would resign, but Nhu apparently dissuaded him. General Minh him self made a separate telephone call to Diem in a final attempt to get him to sur render, but Diem hung up. The two brothers now began frantically calling unit co mmanders throughout the country on their private communications system to get th em to come to their aid. In most cases they could not get through, and when they did they were told to surrender by officers who now supported the coup. When th ey could get no help from the regular military, they made a vain effort to enlis t the support of paramilitary units and their Republic Youth groups. Sometime in the early evening, probably by eight o'clock, they recognized the hopelessness of the situation and escaped from the palace, unbeknown to its defenders, throug h one of the secret underground exits connected to the sewer system. They were m et by a Chinese friend who took them to his home in Cholon where they had previo usly set up a communications channel to the palace for just such an emergency. T here they spent their last night. In the face of the brothers' intransigent refu sal to surrender and confident that they were now in control of the entire count ry and that their plans had succeeded, the generals began assembling forces and preparing for the siege of the palace. At about nine o'clock, they opened an art illery barrage of the palace and its defenders. Since the palace was being defen ded by some tanks, an infantry assault with tank support was required to capture it. This began about 3:30 a.m. on November 2, and lasted until about 6:30 a.m., when the palace fell, after Diem had issued a cease-fire order to the palace gu ard from his Cholon hideaway. Throughout the night the brothers had remained in contact with both their loyal supporters at the palace, and periodically with th e insurgents. The latter did not learn that the brothers had fled until the rebe l forces under Colonel Thao invaded the palace. At 6:20 a.m., Diem called JGS an d spoke personally with General Don, offering to surrender in exchange for a gua rantee of safe conduct to the airport and departure from Vietnam. Minh agreed to these terms, but Diem did not reveal his whereabouts, still apparently unable t o grasp the new realities. Colonel Thao learned of the location of the hideaway from a captured officer of the palace guard and received permission from Minh to go there and get the brothers. When he arrived at the house, he telephoned agai n to headquarters to report his location and was overheard by the brothers on an other extension. They escaped to a nearby Catholic church, where once again Diem called General Don at 6:50 a.m. and surrendered unconditionally. He and Nhu wer e taken prisoner shortly thereafter by General Mai Huu Xuan, a long time enemy, who according to most accounts ordered or permitted their murder in the back of an armored personnel carrier enroute to JGS headquarters. The State Department r eacted to news of the coup in terms of the recognition problem with respect to t he new government. Rusk felt that a delay would be useful to the generals in not appearing to be U.S. agents or stooges and would assist us in our public stance of noncomplicity. He further discouraged any large delegation of the generals f rom calling on Lodge as if they were "reporting in." A subsequent message stress ed the need to underscore publicly the fact that this was not so much a coup as an expression of

national will, a fact revealed by the near unanimous support of important milita ry and civilian leaders. It further stressed the importance of Vice President Th o to a quick return to constitutional government and the need, therefore, for th e generals to include him in any interim regime. Lodge replied affirmatively to these views, indicating his opinion that we should encourage other friendly coun tries to recognize the new government first with the assurance that the U.S. wou ld follow suit shortly. Further, we should show our friendly support for the reg ime and without fanfare resume payments in the commercial import program. The ne ws of the brutal and seemingly pointless murder of Diem and Nhu, however, was re ceived in Washington with shock and dismay. President Kennedy was reportedly per sonally stunned at the news, particularly in view of the heavy U.S. involvement in encouraging the coup leaders. Apparently, we had put full confidence in the c oup committee's offers of safe conduct to the brothers and, reluctant to interce de on behalf of Diem and Nhu for fear of appearing to offer support to them or o f reneging on our pledges of non-interference to the generals, we had not apprec iated the degree of hatred of the Ngo family among the generals, nor their fear that if the brothers survived the coup they would somehow, sometime stage a come back. In their first meeting with Lodge after the coup, however, the generals de nied that the assassination had been ordered, and promised to make public their offer of safe conduct to Diem if he would resign. While the callousness of the m urders of Diem and Nhu, their previous repressiveness notwithstanding, horrified the world, the success of the coup and the deaths of the hated brothers were gr eeted with popular jubilation in South Vietnam. Spontaneous street demonstration s by students in a holiday mood ended in the burning of the offices of the Times of Vietnam and the destruction of a statue modeled after Mme. Nhu. The tension released set off celebrations rivaled only by the annual Tet New Year festivitie s. Americans were greeted and received with great enthusiasm, and Lodge was wide ly regarded as the hero of the whole train of events. Vietnamese were heard to r emark that if an election for president were held Lodge would win by a landslide . Thus, the nine-year rule of Ngo Dinh Diem came to a sudden, bloody, and perman ent end, and U.S. policy in Vietnam plunged into the unknown, our complicity in the coup only heightening our responsibilities and our commitment in this strugg ling, leaderless land. We could be certain only that whatever new leadership eme rged would be fragile, untried, and untested. B. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM REG IME Even before the initiation of the coup, the coup committee through General K im had been in touch with civilian political oppositionists and to some extent w ith members of Diem's government. Once the success of the coup was certain, nego tiations with these civilians by the generals' committee began in earnest. On th e night of November 1 and the following day, all ministers of Diem's government were told to submit their resignations and did so, some on U.S. advice. No repri sals were taken against them. Indeed, Vice President Tho entered into intensive negotiations with General Minh on November 2 on

the composition of the interim government. He apparently understood the eagernes s of the generals to have him head a new government to provide continuity, and h e used this knowledge to bargain with them about the composition of the cabinet. He was not to be their pliant tool. While these conferences were taking place, the coup committee, or "Revolutionary Committee" as it was now calling itself, d istributed leaflets and press releases announcing the dissolution of the Nationa l Assembly and the abolition of the Diem-Nhu government based on the constitutio n of 1956, and proclaiming the support of the committee for such democratic prin ciples as free elections, unhampered political opposition, freedom of press, fre edom of religion, and an end to discrimination. They were at pains to explain th at the purpose of the coup was to bolster the fight against the Communists which they pledge themselves to pursue with renewed vigor and determination. On the a fternoon of November 3, the second day after the coup, Generals Don and Kim call ed on Lodge at the Embassy, explaining that General Minh was tied up in conversa tions with Vice President Tho on the new government. The conversation was long a nd touched on many topics. It began with mutual expressions of satisfaction at t he success of the coup, and continued with Lodge's assurance of forthcoming U.S. recognition for their new government. The generals explained that they had deci ded on a two-tiered government structure with a military committee presided over by General Minh overseeing a regular cabinet that would be mostly civilian with Tho as prime minister. Lodge promised to see to the immediate restoration of ce rtain of the aid programs and the speedy resumption of the others when the gover nment was in place. They then dealt with a host of immediate problems including the return of the Nhu children to their mother and the disposition of the rest o f the Ngo family, press censorship, the release of Tri Quang from the Embassy, c urfew, reprisals against former ministers, etc. The generals confirmed the psych ological importance of the commodity import suspension to the success of their p lans. Lodge was elated, both at the efficiency and success of the coup, and the seriousness and determination of the generals to deal with the pressing problems and get on with the war. The following day, on instructions from Washington, Lo dge, in company with Lt Colonel Conein, met with Generals Minh and Don. Washingt on had been anxious for Lodge to urgently convey to the generals the need to mak e a clarifying statement about the deaths of the brothers and to take steps to i nsure humane treatment of other members of the family. The generals were respons ive to Lodge's urgings and promised to see that action was taken on the U.S. req uests. Minh said that the composition of the new government would be announced s hortly. In describing the meeting later, Lodge offered a prophetic description o f Minh: "Minh seemed tired and somewhat frazzled; obviously a good, wellintentio ned man. Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" Lodge closed the cab le by taking exception to State's excessive pre-occupation with the negative pub lic relations problems of the coup and decrying its failure to note the brillian ce with which the coup was planned and executed.

The promised announcement of the new government came on the morning of November 5. It was very much as General Kim had described it to Lodge on November 3. Minh was named President and Chief of the Military Committee; Tho was listed as Prem ier, Minister of Economy, and Minister of Firiance; Don was named Minister of De fense; and General Dinh was named to the Ministry of Security (Interior). Only o ne other general was included in the cabinet of fifteen which was composed prima rily of bureaucrats and civilians with no previous experience. Political figures , either opposed to Diem or not, were conspicuously absent from the cabinet, a f act which would impair the new government's securing the roots in popular suppor t it would need in the long run. The announcement of the new cabinet was followe d by the release of "Provisional Constitutional Act No. 1," signed by General Mm h, formally suspending the 1956 constitution and outlining the structure and fun ctions of the interim government. On November 6, Saigon radio announced the comp osition of the Executive Committee of the Military Revolutionary Council. Minh w as Chairman, Don and Dinh were Deputy Chairmen, and nine other senior generals, including Kim, Khiem, "little" Minh, Chieu, and Thieu were members. Significantl y, General Khanh was not. On October 5, the new Foreign Minister had sent a note to the Embassy informing the Ambassador officially of the change of government, and expressing the hope that relations between the two countries would be conti nued and strengthened. State approved Lodge's proposed reply of recognition the following day, November 6, and, under the pressure of other governments and the press, announced its intention to recognize on November 7 in Washington. The not e of recognition was delivered on November 8, when Lodge called on the new Forei gn Minister, Pham Dang Lam. Lam, emphasizing his own insufficiencies for the job he had been given, asked for Lodge's advice which Lodge was apparently not relu ctant to give on a variety of topics. The primary impression left was that the n ew government would be heavily dependent on U.S. advice and support, not only fo r the war effort, but also in the practical problems of running the country. In the first three weeks of November 1963, three problems preoccupied most American s and Vietnamese in the new political and military situation created by the coup . The first of these was getting the new government started, developing the rela tions between the new Vietnamese officials and their American counterparts, and most importantly shaking down the power relationships within the new regime. The first two aspects of this problem would be self-resolving and were largely a ma tter of time. With respect to the latter, it was clear from the outset that Gene ral Minh was the dominant figure in the new government and was so regarded by ne arly all the military men. Tho, however, had exhibited considerable independence during the negotiations over the cabinet, reflecting his confidence that the ge nerals felt they needed him. The open question, then, was what degree of freedom of action the new cabinet under Tho would have, or alternatively, how deeply th e military council intended to involve itself in running the country. This issue was not resolved in the public statements and communiques of the new regime and ambiguity on the subject was clearly reflected in the lack of decisiveness and vigor of the new ministers and in their general uncertainty as to their authorit y. While the exact reasons for not including any politicians in the cabinet are not known, it is reasonable to assume that neither Tho nor the military were anx ious to see potential political rivals,

with power deriving from popular support, in positions to challenge the authorit y of the new leaders. Whatever the case, it was the irresolution of the power re lationship within the new government that was one of the factors contributing to the next round of coupmaking in January 1964. The second urgent problem of thes e first weeks in November was the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in Vi etnam. The situation had been serious in September, and a large deficit for the 1964 budget had already been forecast. The suspension of the commercial import p ayments and selected PL 480 had aggravated the situation during September and Oc tober. Furthermore, all negotiations on the 1964 budget levels and U.S. support had been suspended and were now seriously behind schedule. Aware of the urgency of the problem, State, on November 2, had asked for Lodge's recommendations on t he resumption of aid and had urged him to identify the people responsible for ec onomic planning in the new government so that negotiations could begin immediate ly. Concern was also expressed at the lack of expertise in this area among the g enerals and Lodge was advised to encourage them to make maximum use of economist s in the previous government who were familiar with the problems. Lodge proposed in response that the government be asked to name a high level commission of eco nomic experts to work with a similar group from the U.S. Mission. This suggestio n had been agreed to in principle the previous day by Tho, through whose office all economic aid matters were to be channeled. Lodge also believed that our aid should be increased as an indication of our support for the new government. But beyond these preliminary discussions, no real progress was made on the economic problems before the Honolulu Conference on November 20. The third problem that w orried Americans was the heightened level of Viet Cong activity in the wake of t he coup and the military dislocations caused by it. Related, but of even more im portance, was the new information that came to light after the coup and in the a tmosphere of free discussion that it generated showing that the military situati on was far worse than we had believed. The overall statistical indicators had no w begun to show deterioration dating back to the summer. The incidence of VC att acks was up over the first six months of 1963, the weapons loss ratio had worsen ed and the rate of VC defections was 'way down. In the immediate wake of the cou p, VC activity had jumped dramatically as MACV had feared it would and there was great concern to return units participating in the coup to the field quickly to forestall any major Communist offensive. Cause for more fundamental concern, ho wever, were the first rumors and indications that under Diem there had been regu lar and substantial falsification in the military reporting system and in report ing on the strategic hamlets that had badly distorted the real military situatio n in Vietnam to make it appear less serious than it was. This, it turned out, wa s the main reason for the previous discrepancies in MACV and U.S. mission evalua tions of the war. In the first flush of self-satisfaction after the coup, Lodge had predicted that the change of regime would shorten the war because of the imp roved morale of the ARVN troops. But as time wore on, the accumulating evidence of the gravity of the military situation displaced these sanguine prognoses.

The only comforting note in the intelligence was the apparent discomfiture of th e National Liberation Front. Throughout the summer and fall, the NLF had seeming ly been unable to capitalize on the Buddhist or student struggle movements. In f act, its principal response to the Diem-Buddhist clash had been increasingly vit uperative attacks on the U.S. Not until November 7th did the NLF issue a post-Di em policy statement, consisting of a list of "eight demands": (1) Destroy all st rategic hamlets . . . and other disguised camps. (2) Release all political detai nees. . (3) Promulgate without delay democratic freedom. . . (4) Root out all ve stiges of the fascist and militarist dictatorial regime. (5) Stop all persecutio n and repression and raiding operations. (6) Dissolve all nepotist organizations . . . (7) Immediately stop forcible conscription. . . (8) Cancel all kinds of un justified taxes. The Duong Van Minh government could claim that it was in the pr ocess of meeting all of these "demands" except one--halting the draft--so that t he NLF was effectively preempted. On November 17, the NLF Central Committee issu ed another series of demands: (1) Eliminate the vestiges of the Diem regime. (2) Establish democratic freedom. (3) Eliminate American influence. (4) Make social and economic reforms. (5) Halt the fighting. (6) Establish a coalition governme nt. The demands were accompanied by a statement affirming the reunification of V ietnam as a goal of the NLF, the first such statement in over two years. Douglas Pike's analysis was unable to resolve the reasons for the inaction of the NLF t hroughout the crisis: Had the NLF leadership wished to do so, it could have used its impressive struggle machine to launch in the name of the Buddha a nation-wi de struggle movement that conceivably could have ended with its long-pursued Gen eral Uprising . . . Knowledgeable Vietnamese attributed its refusal to act an un willingness to involve itself in an alien struggle movement. The NLF and the com munists, ran the argument, avoid activities over which they do not exercise tota l control. . . . The Buddhist leadership made it clear it did not seek NLF help since it wished at all costs to avoid the Communist stigma. Another popular expl anation for the NLF's "sit-tight" policy during the Buddhist troubles was that t he NLF was going to allow the bourgeois revolutionary forces to succeed in toppl ing Diem, after which it would capture the Revolution as the Kerensky Government was captured in the Russian Revolution. No such effort, however, was made by th e NLF. A slanderous but widely bandied explanation among Vietnamese at the time was that the NLF did not want Diem removed, that he and his brothers and sisterin-law were far more valuable to the NLF in office than out. In truth, the NLF p osture during this period remains something of a mystery.

C. THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE AND NSAM 273 Having postponed his planned October 31 visit to Washington because of the imminence of the coup, Lodge apparently sugge sted, in response to a State query, that it be rescheduled for November 10. Rusk proposed a further postponement to insure time for Lodge to establish working r elations with the new government and to take advantage of his own planned trip t o Tokyo later in the month. Accordingly, a meeting with Rusk, Bundy, Bell, McNam ara, and Taylor in Honolulu was scheduled on November 20 for the entire country team. Lodge was invited to proceed on to Washington after the meeting if he felt he needed to talk with the President. In preparation for the conference, State dispatched a long series of specific questions to Lodge on possible methods of b roadening the political base of support of the new government and increasing the effectiveness of the war effort. This was additional to the comprehensive revie w of the situation, including an evaluation of progress on the McNamara-Taylor r ecommendations, that the military was expected to provide and the in-depth asses sment of the new regime and its prospects by the country team. Lodge replied eve n before arriving at the conference that the proposed discussions would require detailed information about the functioning of the new rulers which it was far to o early to obtain. In a broad overview of the new political situation in Vietnam at the plenary session in Honolulu, Lodge voiced his optimism about the actions taken thus far by the new government to consolidate its popular support. In par ticular, he noted the efforts to eliminate forced labor in the strategic hamlets , to curtail arbitrary arrests, to deal with extortion and corruption, to enlist the support of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects, and to consolidate and strengthen the strategic hamlet program. But, he left no doubt that the new leadership was inexperienced and fragile. For this reason, he urged the conferees not to press too much on the government too soon, either in the way of military and economic programs, nor steps to democratize and constitutionalize the country. His secon d major point was the psychological and political, as well as economic, need for U.S. aid to the new government in at least the amount of our aid to Diem, and p referably more. He recognized the domestic political problems in the U.S. with C ongress, but he argued that anything less would be a severe blow to the new rule rs who were still getting their bearings. USOM Director Brent supported these la tter views, but registered his concern about the naivet of the new leaders in the face of an extremely grave economic situation. In response to a direct question from Rusk as to whether an increase in dollars would shorten the war, Lodge demu rred somewhat and replied that what was required was greater motivation. McNamar a immediately disagreed, saying that his understanding of the piaster deficit pr oblem was that it was endangering all the programs, and that both AID and MAP we re in need of increased funding. Concurring in this view, AID Administrator Bell agreed to review the entire AID program. General Harkins' assessment of the mil itary situation took note of the upsurge of Viet Cong activity in the week follo wing the coup, but in general remained optimistic, although more guardedly than in the past. The sharp increase in VC attacks after the coup seemed to have been haphazard, and not part of a well coordinated country-wide response

to the uncertain political situation. And in the week just ended, activity had r eturned to more normal levels. Moreover, he did not show concern about the seemi ng long term deterioration in the statistical indicators. While he was favorably impressed with the determination of the new leaders to prosecute the war and ma ke needed changes, he was worried about the sweeping replacemnt of division and corps commanders and province chiefs. The discontinuities and disruptions create d by wholesale replacement of province chiefs could have a serious negative effe ct on the whole counterinsurgency program. On the positive side, he noted the st rengthened chain of command under General Don as both Defense Minister and Chief of Staff. McNamara pointedly questioned both Harkins and the other military bri efers about conditions in the Delta and seemed skeptical of the official optimis m, although he was equally disinclined to accept undocumented negative judgments . The conference ended inconclusively with respect to the military problem. It d id, however, underscore U.S. support for the new regime and focus U.S. official concern on the urgency and gravity of the economic problem confronting the new g overnment. An uninformative press release after the conference took note of U.S. support for the new government in facing the difficult political and economic p roblems in South Vietnam, and pointedly reiterated the plan to withdraw 1,000 U. S. troops by the end of the year with 300 to leave on December 3. Lodge flew to Washington the following day and conferred with President Johnson. Based on that meeting and the report of the discussions at Honolulu, a National Security Acti on Memorandum was drafted to give guidance and direction to our efforts to impro ve the conduct of the war under the new South Vietnamese leadership. It describe d the purpose of the American involvement in Vietnam as, "to assist the people a nd Government of that country to win their contest against the externally direct ed and supported Communist conspiracy." It defined contribution to that purpose as the test of all U.S. actions in Vietnam. It reiterated the objectives of with drawing 1,000 U.S. troops by the end of 1963 and ending the insurgency in I, II, and III Corps by the end of 1964, and in the Delta by the end of 1965. U.S. sup port for the new regime was confirmed and all U.S. efforts were directed to assi st it to consolidate itself and expand its popular support. In view of the serie s of press stories during November about the disagreements between Harkins and L odge, the President requested "full unity of support for established US policy" both in Saigon and in Washington. NSAM 273 directed the concentration of U.S. an d Vietnamese military, political, economic and social efforts to improve the cou nterinsurgency campaign in the Mekong Delta. It further directed that economic a nd military aid to the new regime should be maintained at the same levels as dur ing Diem's rule. And in conclusion, plans were requested for clandestine operati ons by the GVN against the North and also for operations up to 50 kilometers int o Laos; and, as a justification for such measures, State was directed to develop a strong, documented case "to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and oth er channels." As a policy document, NSAM 273 was to be extremely short lived. In the jargon of the bureaucracy, it was simply overtaken by events. The gravity o f the military situation in

South Vietnam was only hinted at in NSAM 273 and in the discussions in Honolulu. Its full dimensions would rapidly come to light in the remaining weeks of 1963 and force high level reappraisals by year's end. But probably more important, th e deterioration of the Vietnamese position in the countryside and the rapid coll apse of the strategic hamlet program were to confront the fragile new political structure in South Vietnam with difficulties it could not surmount and to set of f rivalries that would fulfill all the dire predictions of political instability made by men as diverse as John Mecklin and Fritz Nolting before Diem's fall. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 5, "US-GVN Relations, 1964-1967," pp. 277-407. Section 1, pp. 277-323 Summary and Analysis 1964-JUNE 1965 In 1964 the U.S. tried to make GVN strong, e ffective, and stable, and it failed. When the U.S. offered more aid, GVN accepte d it without improving; they promised to mobilize, but failed to speed up the sl ow buildup of their forces. When the U.S. offered a firmer commitment to encoura ge them, including possible later bombing of North Vietnam, the GVN tried to pre ssure us to do it sooner. When the U.S. endorsed Khanh, he overplayed his hand, provoked mob violence, and had to back down to a weaker position than before. Wh en Taylor lectured them and threatened them, the ruling generals of GVN defied h im, and allied themselves with the street rioters. After several changes of gove rnment in Vietnam, the U.S. could set no higher goal than GVN stability. During this period, the USG was already starting to think about doing the job ourselves if our Vietnamese ally did not perform. At first the U.S. thought that the powe r of the Vietnamese generals would make GVN strong and effective. In fact, the U .S. preference, at this time, was for military leadership in the GVN. However, t he generals proved to be less than perfectly united. They found they had to bow to the power of student and Buddhist street mobs, and they lacked the will and t he ability to compel the civil government to perform. Yet, the U.S. saw no alter native but to back them-to put up with Vietnamese hypersensitivity, their easy c ompliance combined with non-performance, and their occasional defiance. Moreover , MACV was even less ready to pressure the generals than was the Embassy and the Embassy less willing than Washington. MACV controlled the resources that matter ed most to the South Vietnamese.

Pacification lagged, and the military picture steadily worsened. Planning of pre ssures against the North became more urgent, and the prospect of increasing U.S. inputs to all phases of the war loomed larger. The U.S. was more and more aband oning the hope that the Vietnamese could win the war by them;elves. At the same time, the U.S. was preparing itself internally (NSAM 288 with the objective of a n "independent noncommunist Vietnam") and readyng the American people (the Tonki n Gulf Resolution) for deeper commitments. The period saw six major changes of g overnment. At the end of January, 1964, Khanh seized power from the Minh governm ent. In August, after his attempt to formalize military control, mob violence fo rced him to give way and to join a Triumvirate. It presided over formation of th e civilian High National Council, which wrote a Constitution and elected the civ ilian President Suu and Prime Minister Huong to replace the Triumvirate. In Dece mber the military dissolved the High National Council, and in January 1965 they dismissed Huong, replacing him by Khanh as caretaker. In February, they appointe d a new civilian government, with Suu still President and with Quat as Prime Min ister. In June, Ky took over. Besides all this, coup groups seized Saigon twice before being faced down each time. During the first few months of this period th e U.S. abandoned the plan for the phased withdrawal of most of our military assi stance personnel, and stopped believing that the main-force war would come to a successful end by the close of 1965. With the start of planning pressures agains t the North, the U.S. first hoped that repeated preliminary signals to Hanoi wou ld brmg a response before bombing began; and we hoped that the promise of U.S. f orce commitments would strengthen Vietnamese unity and resolve. Both hopes prove d vain, and we started bombing North Vietnam systematically without getting anyt hing from either Hanoi or GVN. Then the bombing itself failed to stop Hanoi's in tervention. Seeing no other choice, the U.S. poured troops into the country. Thr oughout 1964, the U.S. pursued the objective of a strong, effective GVN like the Holy Grail. Increasingly, we felt we had to reassure our Saigon ally about the U.S. resolve, and hoped that a firm U.S. commitment through extending advisors a nd through bombing would improve GVN performance. Recurrently, we looked to the military as the one coherent, anti-communist force in the country. We leaned on them and on their strongman, who for most of the period was Khanh, at first hopi ng that he or Minh would play the role that Magsaysay did in the Philippines. We were interested in legitimacy and democratic forms only as a long-run deferrabl e proposition; although more and more we recognized the need for broad political support-especially after the Buddhist crisis in August, 1964, had proved its im portance. As early as the Honolulu Conference in June, 1964, we worried about th e possible emergence of a hostile government or anarchy; and the South Vietnames e played effectively on our fears. We lectured them repeatedly on the importance of national unity, both in periods of political calm and in crises. When the mo bs in the streetsfaced down the generals, we then clung to the position that no one should rock the boat.

Yet, well beyond our control, General Khanh was a central figure in most of thes e changes. He took over in a coup in January, 1964, and played one role after an other, for over twelve turbulent months. Then when a coup attempt failed against a newly installed government in February, 1965, the generals turned on Khanh an d exiled him. Only the final coup, in which Ky took over, saw Khanh absent from the scene. Withall, the military improved their hold on GVN machinery. The high turnover of district and province officials around the time of the Khanh coup pu t ARVN officers everywhere; and the corps commanders gradually consolidated thei r power throughout 1964. This tendency reached a climax and received a temporary setback in the rebellion that followed the August constitution. As a result of the successful Buddhist opposition, cabinet changes and the charter of the gover nment in Saigon required Buddhist acquiescence. These problems were aggravated b y the clear and growing lack of legitimacy of GVN. The generals led by Minh, who overthrew Diem, gained an aura of respectability by this act because Diem had s o completely alienated the people. Whatever their "respectability" may have been worth went down the drain, however, when Khanh seized power and then later mane uvered Minh out of the country. Khanh's position as a brash usurper gave him lit tle room for maneuver among Saigon's complex political currents, although for a time the U.S. counted on his "raw power." With subsequent shifts in the form and composition of government, the expediency and lack of legitimacy of GVN grew mo re conspicuous and more debilitating. Leverage U.S. attempts to strengthen the G VN's will to govern and to pacify the countryside failed. Moreover, the attempts , conceived in haste, often backfired. In contrast to the steady discussion of a lternatives among Washington agencies, the Embassy, and MACV on the subject of p ressures on the North, the idea of pressures on GVN seldom surfaced. When it did surface, it was either brushed aside or rushed into. Leverage planning failed t o receive even that quality and quantity of attention that pressures against Nor th Vietnam planning did. As a general rule, Washington was more interested in pu tting pressure on GVN than was the Embassy, with the notable exception of Taylor 's initiatives in December, and MACV was the least interested of all. But these differences were less notable than was the almost universal consensus (most of t he time) that the Vietnamese were too sensitive for such pressures to work, and that we had to accept the GVN's non-performance as the best available. Starting with Rusk's conversation with Khanh at the end of May, 1964, and ending with Tay lor's initiative in early December, the U.S. tried to use the prospect of U.S. f orce commitment as an inducement to the Vietnamese to do better. However, Taylor said that if this inducement were to fail, the U.S. should go ahead with its pr essures against the North anyway. Taking this position meant that the attempted inducement was bluff.

There is every sign, both in their non-performance and in their December-January defiance, that the GVN sized it up that way and called the bluff. Our attempted leverage included both inducements and threats at one time and another; and nei ther worked out well. Rusk's May, 1964, conversation with Khanh, the intensifica tion of pressures planning following the Honolulu Conference in June, and the sh ift of the Chairman, JCS to the post of Ambassador to SVN, all showed U.S. commi tment. We hoped these measures and talks would directly contribute to GVN morale and effectiveness. However, they were followed by the July press leaks and by d irect pressure to bomb North immediately. The July public endorsement of Khanh w as intended to reassure all concerned of our support, and so to strengthen GVN. Then, the Gulf of Tonkin incidents were followed promptly by Khanh's Constitutio n, which backfired against him and against us, weakening rather than strengtheni ng GVN. Taylor's bill of particulars against GVN in December was followed immedi ately by attacks on GVN by the Buddhists, and then shortly by the military, brin ging down the government. Taylor's stern lecture to the Young Turks at this time met only with their defiance. They agreed to a compromise solution to the crisi s when Taylor held up the GVN Defense Budget, and then reversed themselves after he released it. The first Flaming Dart raids, opening the deliberate U.S. bombi ng campaign against the North, were followed shortly by another coup attempt. Th ere was no disagreement among Washington, the Embassy, and MACV that U.S. commit ments should be used to improve GVN's morale and performance. In contrast, howev er, they often disagreed about putting pressure on GVN. In January, 1964, State showed far more interest than did Lodge in using the AID negotiations to press G VN for more effort; in the upshot we gave them an AID increase with no strings a ttached. This disagreement continued for several months. McNamara leaned consist ently toward giving GVN whatever it needed; only later did he begin to mention i ncreasing our influence. But McNamara and JCS did prod Lodge into asking GVN why they were not progressing well. In May, 1964, Sullivan proposed direct entry of U.S. personnel into the Vietnamese chain of command; his idea was watered down considerably in the State Department and disappeared at the Honolulu Conference because of opposition by Lodge and Westmoreland. Other proposals agreed to at th e conference, relating to new actions and improved programs by GVN, interested S tate far more than they did the Embassy and MACV, as revealed in the follow-up. By and large the same contrasts prevailed when Taylor was the Ambassador, althou gh in December he was far more willing to press GVN than Lodge ever was. Even th en, at the peak of the crisis, Taylor expressly rejected sanctions. MACV general ly rejected sanctions also, and seemed less willing to apply leverage in day-today matters than were U.S. civilians in the field. MACV studies on GVN ineffecti veness usually proposed more studies and never proposed pressure on GVN. If U.S. force commitments and the record of GVN non-performance reflect the failure of leverage, what does the record tell us about how leverage could be made to work?

Regrettably, the record tells us nothing about that; it merely shows that everyt hing we tried went wrong. As noted, attempts at leverage or pressure on GVN were seldom thought through and studied carefully. One searches in vain for studies, memoranda, or widespread discussion of alternative techniques for leverage and of what our experience shows about how they might work. Pressures against the No rth, whose results have disappointed us, were a model of planning, foresight, an d detailed consideration, compared to the subject of pressures on GVN. Yet GVN's failure was the heart of our policy problem throughout the period, as many feel it still is. The Embassy's Lack of Political Contact The shifts of political lo yalties, coups, rebellions, and major changes of public figures often caught the Embassy by surprise. It had no effective system, either through overt or covert contacts, for finding out what was going on. CAS people talked to a few officia l contacts, who told them things the Vietnamese wanted the U.S. to believe; but CAS had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and esp ionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, conne ctions, and so on. Moreover, there is no sign that the Embassy understood events after the fact, or saw the connection between what we did and what the Vietname se did next. It appears that the U.S. had few people experienced at maneuvering and manipulating among oriental politicians. In the following cases the Embassy was in the dark. (1) We had no information on the degree of truth of Khanh's cha rges against the four "pro-neutralist" generals plus Minh, and we knew about his coup a day in advance only because he sounded us out on it. (2) During the mont hs of maneuvering between Khanh and Minh after the coup, we had no way to evalua te the coup rumors that always went around, and that peaked around moments of cr isis like the trial of the four generals in May. (3) Khanh's complaints of Vietn amese war-weariness starting in late May, in retrospect a transparent tactic to pressure the U.S. to bomb North, took in the USG completely; we eagerly went ahe ad and planned to bomb "to improve their unity and resolve." (4) Khanh's defiant leaks on cross-border operations in July surprised and perplexed the Embassy; T aylor described them as an attempt to improve his own people's morale, not as an attempt to stampede us. (5) When Khanh asked for our public endorsement and the n talked about "reorganization," we failed to see the connection. When he tried to reorganize Minh out of the government, Taylor made no move to save Minh until after street rioting had broken up the whole plan. (6) The September 13 coup at tempt surprised everybody. (7) The HNC decision to make Suu President and Huong Prime Minister surprised and angered us. (8) Taylor's December plan to strengthe n GVN by lecturing to it about its failures provoked a completely unexpected rea ction; both Buddhists and the military turned against the GVN. Taylor's subseque nt stern lecture to the Young Turks likewise produced the opposite of the desire d result. (9) The generals' January, 1965, moves to renege on the agreed crisis settlement and to dismiss Huong surprised us. (10) The February 19 coup attempt surprised everybody. (11) We did not know what to think of the alleged coup atte mpt in May, 1965.

In some noteworthy cases we did better. (1) Taylor correctly foresaw that Khanh' s August constitution would cause trouble. (2) Westmoreland detected Ky's buddin g coup attempt in November and, with Embassy authority, squelched it. (3) Taylor foresaw (and tacitly accepted) the Ky coup. The MACV Role The MACV organization played an important, mostly hidden, role in US/GVN relations. At every level fr om Saigon to the districts, the advisory structure was the most pervasive instru ment of intergovernmental contact. ARVN officers were accustomed to being spoonfed military advice; so when military dominance of GVN brought these same office rs to high positions in government, the advisor relationship conferred a latent diplomatic role upon MACV. Advisors were used as channels of communications on p olitical matters and became the most reliable sources of information on impendin g coups. (On occasions such as the Rhade uprising and Ky's first attempt at a co up, senior MACV officers openly became diplomatic emissaries.) We have less reco rd than we would like of COMUSMACV's influence. He reported regularly to his mil itary seniors only on strictly military matters. Detailed reports of his routine , daily dealings with counterparts were not required of MACV as they were of the Embassy. From time to time COMUSMACV revealed his own independent objectives. H e sought protection of the ARVN officer corps from political machinations and fr om unfavorable press stories in order to preserve their solidarity and morale; h e pressed zealously for early introduction of U.S. ground forces and for their r apid build-up; he opposed encadrement and combined command with ARVN; he resiste d exclusion of the military from pacification; he rejected sanctions against ARV N; he objected to the initial constraints on the use of American forces and want ed to be free to operate independently of ARVN. General Westmoreland's strong po sition usually assured that his view prevailed. Extension of advisors, increased MAP resources, and the introduction of U.S. ground forces enhanced his relative position. His freedom from detailed reporting of daily contacts was itself an e lement of strength. When he received unwanted advice and directives, he set up s tudies (as in the Civic Action Program) to stall for time; when he lacked author ity to operate freely, he planned ahead with the Vietnamese (as in the use of U. S. forces for independent offensive operations) and then presented the matter to Washington as a virtual fait accompli. Vietnamese Non-Performance and Sensitivi ty Throughout this period the GVN failed to perform in almost every constructive respect. Pacification lagged, when not visibly retreating, even though the GVN was always willing to issue decrees, set up organizations we suggested, and so o n. Khanh's promise to mobilize came to nothing. The VC defeated ARVN in bigger a nd bigger battles, until

the military assessment of the situation permitted Westmoreland to call for over 200,000 U.S. troops. Moreover, on issues purportedly relating to sovereignty or "face," the Vietnamese were and are quite sensitive, and the U.S. was consisten tly afraid to inflame this sensitivity. Both sides avoided many delicate topics. A prime example is the matter of the lack of a bilateral treaty. The U.S. opera ted, and still operates, under a Pentalateral protocol signed by the French and Bao Dai under the U.S. military assistance program to France before 1954. It gav e U.S. advisers and officials virtual diplomatic status, which was reasonable ba ck when there were less than two hundred of them in all Indochina. But it now ap plies to all U.S. personnel, and no one has wanted to stir things up. The sensit ivity problem cropped up often. For a time early in 1964, the GVN backed off fro m an agreement to extend U.S. advisors to district level, and when the GVN did a pprove, they insisted that the advice be strictly military and that the advisors be labelled "subsector." In like manner, the III Marine Expeditionary Force bec ame the III Marine Amphibious Force, because the French had called their Indochi na force "expeditionary." But the GVN, and especially the military, agreed readi ly to new U.S. troop commitments. The Vietnamese would often greet a U.S. repres entative, in moments of tension, with false or exaggerated stories of U.S. deali ngs, such as a complaint in January, 1964, about U.S. training and CIA contacts with the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. In contrast, on cabinet appointments they often as ked the Ambassador's opinion, and he customarily leaned over backward to avoid g iving specific recommendations. Shared sensitivity, closely related to the lack of a treaty governing status of U.S. forces, prevented any move toward joint com mand and U.S. control of all military operations in Vietnam; both Westmoreland a nd the Vietnamese preferred to operate separately. The Embassy looked the other way from repressive police measures and political arrests unless these led to em barrassing press stories. When the Ambassador would raise this type of issue wit h the GVN, it proved always to be touchy. Vietnamese sensitivity sometimes led t o open displays of anti-Americanism. These happened on three main occasions: (1) when Khanh grumbled about being a puppet after the go-North leaks in July, 1964 ; (2) in the open rupture between Khanh and Taylor in December-January; and (3) in the January riots when rioters overran USfS buildings in Saigon and Hue. Viet namese Compliance More in Form Than in Substance The Vietnamese nevertheless sho wed a ready willingness throughout the period to declare new policies, sign decr ees, and engage in joint studies at our request. But as noted above, that did no t mean we got the substance of what we wanted on such matters. The most importan t case of this kind was Khanh's ready agreement in March to "mobilize" South Vie tnam. He promptly made a token announcement; and while students and other potent ial draft-eligibles waited anxiously to learn what he meant (as did we, he delay ed several weeks before any further announcement. Starting in May, he began anno uncing

specifics and signing decrees, and kept the idea live for several months. Howeve r, strength of the RVNAF rose less in 1964 than it did in 1963*, and the talk of non-military mobilization came to nothing. * The end-year figures are as follows: South Vietnam Infantry-type Battalions RV NAF Strength ('000) Total Armed Strength ('000) (Included CIDG, police, etc.) 19 62 1963 1964 107 123 133 397 514 571 526 612 692 Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Tables 1 and 2. The military and the more militant civilians, on whom the U.S. counted most heav ily and regularly supported, turned out to have far more enthusiasm for going No rth and for other external adventures than they did for getting on with the job of effective government and pacification. They promised much on this latter scor e, but could not or would not deliver. Knowing that we had no one else to turn t o, they continued their old habits and often openly did what they pleased about important matters. The go-North problem was particularly troublesome because the militants rejected the permanent division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, uphe ld in practice by the U.S. The following are interesting instances, among many, of their superficial compliance. They agreed readily to use U.S advisers at the ministerial level (the brain trust), although there is no sign that the brain-tr usters accomplished anything. Indeed, on all ten suggestions that accompanied Pr esident Johnson's 1964 New Year's Message to Minh, only the one on amnesty found them hesitant to express their full agreement. They regularly agreed on budgeta ry limits to keep inflation from getting out of hand, but never satisfied us on specifics through 1964 or the first half of 1965. They repeatedly agreed to reli eve ineffective, corrupt commanders and officials, but delayed endlessly on doin g it and generally promoted those whom they relieved. At Westmoreland's request, Khanh created the Hop Tac plan for pacification around Saigon; but it foundered , and eventually the Vietnamese killed it. When Lodge left Vietnam in June, 1964 , he sealed his tour with a general agreement with Khanh on concept, scope, and organization of the pacification efforts; obtaining such agreements presented ab solutely no problem. In December, 1964, the JGS issued a directive containing ev ery MACV suggestion on how RVNAF should help pacification. In July, 1964, Khanh created a National Security Council similar to ours, and it met regularly with t he top group of Embassy people to talk agreeably about pacification and manpower problems. MACV set up joint inspection teams and joint studies with JGS people several times a year. The only thing of this class that had any visible follow-

through was the joint planning group on bombing North and on other cross-border operations. Two battalions specifically declared ineffective by MACV suffered no penalty or improvement. The militants' predilection for external adventures beg an to show in May, 1964, after the Embassy started pressing Khanh about his Marc h agreements with McNamara. Khanh responded within a few days by saying he wante d to declare war, bomb the North with U.S. participation, bring 10,000 U.S. Army Special Forces troops into South Vietnam, "get rid of the politicians," and put Saigon strictly on a war footing. Lodge tried to cool him off, but Khanh brough t up a less extreme version again with Rusk at the end of the month, saying that his government could not win without action outside South Vietnam. When Lodge r eturned from the Honolulu Conference in early June, Khanh responded to discussio ns of ARVN strength by trying to draw Lodge out on actions against the North. Th en, when we did not move fast enough to suit him and Ky, they started a press ca mpaign on the subject, and pressed Taylor more insistently. Finally, in December , when Taylor told GVN all the many ways they should improve to justify further U.S. involvement, their immediate reply included the comment that the U.S. progr am said nothing about Viet Cong use of Cambodia. The press leaks about going Nor th were the first major instance of their defiantly going ahead as they pleased against our wishes. Khanh's August constitution was a less flagrant case, becaus e Taylor's words of caution were comparatively diffident. (Moreover, in the foll owing August-September turbulence, Khanh let himself become clearly dependent on the Embassy when he talked to the Buddhist leaders.) In the December crisis the Young Turks defied Taylor at every turn following their dissolution of the HNC; and after a temporary agreement in January double-crossed Taylor, dismissed Huo ng, and took control of the formation of a new government. They guessed correctl y that we saw no choice but to go along. JUNE 1965-FALL 1967 By the summer of 19 65, the war in Vietnam had dramatically changed its complexion from the previous two years. More and more, with U.S. combat forces pouring into SVN and Rolling Thunder underway, it looked like the U.S. against the DRV. The war was no longer being fought with U.S. advice and aid alone; there was now a massive U.S. prese nce. While official documents still repeated the credo that it was, in the last analysis, a struggle for the G\'N to win or lose, the focus of U.S. concern shif ted. As the U.S. role increased and then predominated, the need for GVN effectiv eness in the now and shortrun received less attention. The U.S. would take care of the war now--defeat the enemy main forces and destroy Hanoi's will to persist --then, the GVN could and would reform and resuscitate itself. Only after the im mediate security threat to the GVN was blunted and forced to subside did we expe ct our South Vietnamese ally to improve its performance on all fronts. Until the n and in order to get to that point, the U.S. would concentrate on what it could do.

This view--a massive U.S. effort in the short-run leading to and enabling a GVN effort in the long-run--set the tone and content of U.S.-GVN relations. In polic y terms, it meant caution in the use of U.S. leverage. There seemed to be no com pelling requirement to be tough with Saigon; it would only prematurely rock the boat. To press for efficiency would be likely, it was reasoned, to generate inst ability. Our objective became simple: if we could not expect more GVN efficiency , we could at least get a more stable and legitimate GVN. Nation-building was th e key phrase. This required a constitution and free elections. Moreover, if we c ould not have the reality, we would start with appearances. U.S. influence was s uccessfully directed at developing a democratic GVN in form. Beginning in Septem ber 1966, a series of free elections were held, first for a Constituent Assembly and later for village officials, the Presidency, House and Senate. U.S.-GVN rel ations from June of 1965 to 1968, then, have to be understood in terms of the ne w parameters of the war. Before this date, our overriding objective had to be an d was governmental stability. After the Diem coup, the GVN underwent six changes in leadership in the space of one and a half years. From June 1965 on, there wa s relative stability. Ky and Thieu, while challenged, proved strong enough to ke ep their power and position. In putting down the Struggle Movement (following Ge neral Thi's dismissal by Ky) in the first half of 1966, and then delivering on t he September, 1966 election, GVN effectively discredited the militant Buddhist l eadership and for the time being ended its threat to political stablility. Conce rn about possible neutralism or anarchy, which had been important in U.S. thinki ng in 1964 and early 1965, subsided accordingly. The uneasy agreement between Th ieu and Ky to run on the same ticket, resulting partly from U.S. pressure for mi litary unity, and the subsequent transition to legitimacy, gave the U.S. a sense of relief and satisfaction, although no one suggested that GVN had yet built a broad political base or had solved its effectiveness problems. This GVN stabilit y made possible the increased attention to pacification and nation-building. The pacification parameter had changed as well. From 1961 to June of 1965, the U.S. flooded SVN with the advisory resources of men and money to keep the GVN afloat and RVNAF fighting. This input lacked a clear plan. After June j 1965, we made a concerted effort to organize pacification. We exacted an agreement from the GV N in the fall of 1966 to shift half of its ground forces into pacification-altho ugh U.S. forces carried a share of this burden and attempted to show RVNAF how t o do it. We tried to centralize pacification programs by creating a new GVN stru cture to control and allocate resources. This was made manifest by the establish ment of a separate Ministry for Revolutionary Development. U.S. moves by stages to the unified civil-military CORDS organization in Vietnam paralleled this supe r-ministry for pacification. And, pacification statistics showed steady increase of GVN control in the countryside, reversing the downward trend of previous yea rs--but, U.S. dissatisfaction with GVN performance also increased nonetheless. B eyond and more important than all this were the U.S. efforts themselves. By the close of 1965, 170,000 U.S. combat forces were in SVN. By the end of 1967, this figure was almost half a million. By mid-1965, U.S. air strikes against North Vi etnam had extended in geographic coverage up to 2030', and approved targets had wi dened beyond LOC's.

Total sorties rose to about 900 per week. By 1968, we were bombing throughout th e North, with very few though important targets still being prohibited. Total so rties per week reached about 4,000. It was in this context that U.S.-GVN relatio ns took shape. Leverage Having suffered several backfires in the attempts to req uire or encourage GVN effectiveness in 1964, the Embassy and Washington generall y preferred to let well enough alone in 1965 through 1967. The U.S. limited itse lf to only a few demands, and usually avoided direct confrontations at the top l evels of government-to-government contact. The U.S. had one repetition of its ol d backfire problem following the Honolulu Conference of February 1966. President Johnson embraced Ky publicly and endorsed his government; Ky then felt strong e nough to move against General Thi, who had been making trouble generally and was almost openly waiting for his chance to take over the GVN. Ky eventually succee ded in removing Thi and getting him out of the country, but at the cost of retur ning to a degree of chaos in May that was in some ways worse than any suffered i n 1964 under Khanh. At the height of the crisis, the U.S. went so far as to use force and the threat of force against both sides to keep the confrontation betwe en GVN and the Struggle Movement within bounds. There was no sign of ill effects from our boldness in this instance. Whatever interest there was in putting pres sure on the top levels of GVN was stronger in Washington than in the Embassy, an d stronger in the Embassy than in MACV, as it had been in the past. But the past failures of such pressures made everyone gunshy. At one point, Washington felt so strongly about the high GVN dollar balances that it sent out its own represen tative to negotiate with GVN, and he freely threatened to cut down U.S. dollar a id. However, neither Washington nor the Embassy suggested doing anything so dras tic as holding up aid payments and projects until a satisfactory agreement could be reached. Confident that the threats were empty, GVN dug in its heels and gav e us nothing but more promises. Although the U.S. played down pressure or levera ge on the top level of GVN, the idea of leverage at lower levels enjoyed a resur gence. Interest in the subject reached a low point in June 1965, when we abandon ed the "troika signoff," which had given U.S. province representatives veto cont rol over the use of AID direct-support commodities. For four months starting Oct ober 1, 1965, MACV experimented with giving its sector advisors a petty cash fun d for urgent projects; however, MACV then dropped the idea. In April 1966, Lodge urged restoration of these types of leverage, and the idea kept coming up there after. Two major studies, one in Saigon in 1966 and one in Washington in 1967, c ame down strongly for regular procedures to use our material support to put pres sure on lower echelons of GVN. They particularly emphasized signoff systems and the like, including U.S. distribution of MAP support within Vietnam. But the fea r that such

methods would prove counter-productive, either by provoking resistance or by mak ing Vietnamese officials more dependent on our people and less able to perform o n their own, prevented adoption of the proposals. In at least three instances, A ID cut off its support to a province in order to pressure the province chief. In September 1965, AID accused the province chief of Binh Tuy of misuse of AID fun ds, and had to withdraw its personnel from the province and cut off support to i t after threats on their lives. The incident got into the papers and embarrassed both GVN and the Embassy; after several weeks GVN moved the accused officer to another job, and AID resumed its program in the province. In June 1966, AID cut off shipments to Kontum province for four days to force the province chief to ac count for the end uses of AID commodities. In August 1967, CORDS cut off shipmen ts to Bien Hoa province for eleven weeks for similar reasons. In contrast, MACV scrupulously avoided withholding MAP support from military units, regardless of circumstances. The single case of record of taking away MAP support involved two fishing boats owned by the Vietnam Navy that were found ineligible for such sup port. In his reaction to the PROVN Report in May 1966, in his directives to advi sers around the time of the ChinhHunnicutt affair in the fall of 1966, and in hi s reaction to Washington inquiries in May 1967, COMUSMACV consistently brushed a side criticism of ARVN and told both his superiors and his subordinates to lay o ff. Whatever interest in leverage there was at lower levels in the field receive d no backing from COMUSMACV. In March 1966, a decision to transfer MAP for Vietn am to service funding had no effect on leverage because MACV continued to put ma terial support in Vietnamese hands as soon as it entered the country. Although A ID tried some leverage in this period, and although the Ambassador, the Mission, and officials tuned to U.S. domestic pressures urged U.S. leverage for GVN refo rms, there is still no documented study of GVN's failures, of the reasons for it , and of the ways that leverage of different types might help improve GVN perman ently. The basic problem of concern is GVN's overall failure to do its civil and military jobs. Leverage in the hands of U.S. personnel might assure that GVN wo uld do particular things we want; but we have no information on what kind of lev erage, if any, would reform GVN. From 1964 onwards, high U.S. officials, includi ng McGeorge Bundy and Secretary McNamara, have said at one time and another that thorough reform of GVN is necessary; but no one has found or even seriously pro posed a way to do it. Encadrement proposals, prominent before June 1965, still r eceived occasional mention; but these proposed to make up for GVN's deficiencies by substituting U.S. control for GVN control, and do not purport to reform GVN itself. If this problem has a solution, we have yet to find it. The Embassy's La ck of Political Contact The turbulent events of 1964 and early 1965 had shown th at the Embassy had no effective system, either through overt or covert contacts, for finding out what was going on. Nothing was done subsequently to correct thi s problem. CAS people talked to a few

official contacts, who told them things the Vietnamese wanted the U.S. to believ e; but the CIA had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intellige nce and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather an d evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corrup tion, connections, and so on. General Thi began sounding out his U.S. contacts o n whether the U.S. appreciated his superior qualities as a potential leader of V ietnam as early as August 1965; and in other ways we had plenty of warning that there would be trouble. However, we showed no feel for cause and effect. Preside nt Johnson's embrace of Ky at Honolulu in February, 1966, could only have had a divisive effect when Ky commanded so little solid support within his own country . On the one hand, civilians and the military had fluoted U.S. wishes so often i n the past that express U.S. support scarcely counted for much; but on the other hand Ky's weakness and Thi's known ambitions tempted Ky to get whatever mileage he could out of our support. In the subsequent turbulence, all parties again fl outed U.S. wishes freely, stopping short only when the U.S. used force and the c redible threat of force to oppose them. The maneuverings of the various politica l groups seemed to surprise the Embassy repeatedly. The same problems arose in t he GVN cabinet split and crisis just before the Manila Conference in October 196 6. The blandly naive language of the "Blueprint for Vietnam" in late 1967, unmod ified by any back channel elaboration, offered no hope of any foreseeable improv ement. The MACV Role The MACV organization played an important, mostly hidden, r ole in U.S.GVN relations. At every level from Saigon to the districts, the advis ory structure was the most pervasive instrument of intergovernmental contact. AR VN officers were accustomed to being spoon-fed military advice; so when military dominance of GVN brought these same officers to high positions in government, t he advisor relationship conferred a latent diplomatic role upon MACV. Advisors w ere used as channels of communications on political and pacification matters. (O n occasions such as the attempts to get Thi to meet Ky or to leave the country, senior MACV officers openly became diplomatic emissaries.) We have less record t han we would like of COMUSMACV's influence. He reported regularly to his militar y seniors only on strictly military matters. Detailed reports of his routine, da ily dealings with counterparts were not required of MACV as they were of the Emb assy. From time to time, COMUSMACV revealed his own independent objectives. He s ought protection of the ARVN officer corps from unfavorable press stories in ord er to preserve their solidarity and morale; he pressed zealously for the rapid b uild-up of U.S. ground forces; he opposed encadrement and combined command with ARVN; he rejected sanctions against ARVN; he objected to the initial constraints on the use of American forces and wanted to be free to operate independently of ARVN. General Westmoreland's strong position usually assured that his view prev ailed. Extension of advisors, increased MAP resources, and the build-up of U.S. ground forces

enhanced his relative position. By October 1966, MACV had numerical superiority of forces over Regular RVNAF; by late 1967, MACV had over 400 square miles of ba ses. His freedom from detailed reporting of daily contacts was itself an element of strength. When he received unwanted advice and directives, he set up studies , and, after a time, proceeded as usual. This tendency was most notable in the c ase of leverage, already noted, and combined command. Likewise, MACV successfull y resisted taking over the bulk of Saigon Port operations, despite pressure from Washington, and delayed for about a year the move to take division commanders o ut of the pacification chain of command. Another instance of MACV independence s howed up when Rusk and Lodge wanted to keep U.S. men and equipment out of the co nfrontation between GVN and the Struggle Movement in I Corps, but they failed to tell MACV about it. On April 5, MACV went ahead and airlifted two battalions of Vietnamese Rangers to Danang; after that Lodge put a stop to it. Vietnamese Non -Performance and Sensitivity Although population control statistics began to imp rove in 1966 and continued to do so in the first half of 1967, and although this seemed partly associated with the creation of the Ministry of Revolutionary Dev elopment and with the emphasis on its programs, few suggested that this progress could be held if U.S. forces withdrew. The drumbeat of criticism from field per sonnel, and the documented cases of non-performance on highlevel matters, made i t clear that there was no real improvement in GVN performance. Corruption and in action showed no signs of improvement; province chiefs and military commanders s ingled out by U.S. advisers as urgently needing removal were simply shuffled aro und, if moved at all, and often promoted. Increasing traffic in the Port of Saig on led to acute congestion problems, which GVN failed to clear up or materially improve. Moreover, on issues purportedly relating to sovereignty or "face," the Vietnamese continued to be quite sensitive, and the U.S. was afraid to inflame t his sensitivity. Both sides avoided many delicate topics. A prime example is the lack of a bilateral treaty. The U.S. presence has always been based on the Pent alateral Protocol of 1950, signed by France, the Bao Dai government, Laos, Cambo dia and the U.S., which gave U.S. advisers and officials virtual diplomatic stat us-an arrangement reasonable back when there were less than two hundred of them in all Indochina, but of dubious applicability to the hundreds of thousands now there. This matter has cropped up from time to time, as in the case of American civilians being tried for currency violations in Vietnamese courts, where they w ere subject to extortion. Both governments cooperated in smoothing things over a fter a momentary disagreement over jurisdiction, and have avoided stirring thing s up. Shared sensitivity (and legitimate concern for an independent RVNAF role), closely related to the lack of a bilateral treaty, prevented any move toward jo int command and U.S. control of all military operations in Vietnam. Both West-mo reland and the Vietnamese preferred to operate either separately or in loosely c oordinated joint operations. The Embassy looked the other way from repressive po lice measures and

political arrests unless these led to embarrassing press stories; and when the A mbassador would raise this type of issue with the GVN, it proved always to be to uchy. Especially under Lodge, the Embassy tried to protect GVN from the press an d to help it build a favorable image. Vietnamese sensitivity sometimes led to op en displays of anti-Americanism. These displays reached a climax in the Struggle Movement crisis in the first half of 1966, when the Buddhists openly accused th e U.S. of helping GVN crush them, and they sacked and burned the U.S. Consulate in Hue. Moreover, newspapers reflecting officials views would occasionally publi sh stories expressing fear of a U.S. sellout in negotiations, anger at U.S. inte rvention in Vietnamese affairs (as happened during the Chinh-Hunnicutt affair), and other anti-American themes. Vietnamese Compliance More in Form Than in Subst ance The Vietnamese, nevertheless, showed a ready willingness to declare new pol icies, sign decrees, and engage in joint studies at our request. But as noted, t hat scarcely means that we got what we wanted on such matters. Ky was always wil ling to issue decrees purporting to clear up the port problem, and to make publi c declarations against corruption. On economic policy, Ky and Hanh gave us one a greement after another promising to control inflation and to run down their doll ar balances. The relations of their military with MACV showed the same pattern. The Vietnamese military, on whom the U.S. counted most heavily, continued as in earlier periods to have far more enthusiasm for external adventures than they di d for getting on with the job of effective government and pacification. They pro mised much on this latter score, but delivered little. Knowing that we had no on e else to turn to, they continued their old habits and often openly did what the y pleased about important matters, such as the airlift of troops to Danang in Ma y, 1966. Examples of superficial compliance are almost too numerous to mention. The Honolulu Conference of February 1966, produced over sixty agreed points betw een the two governments on all areas of mutual interest; getting any follow-up p roved to be like pulling teeth, and then the follow-up we got was nothing more a s a rule than more promises. Likewise, at the Manila Conference much the same th ing happened, where GVN agreed to programs for social revolution, economic progr ess, and so on. However, at our insistence they did go ahead with the constituti on and elections, and they shifted half of ARVN into pacification. How much subs tantive improvement these moves will produce still remains to be seen. GVN taste for foreign adventure showed up in small, irritating ways. In July 1965, Thi pl anned unauthorized operations in the DMZ, but we stopped him. In 1967, we discov ered that GVN had brought in Chinese Nationalists disguised as Nungs, to engage in operations in Laos; also, they sent a group to put an airfield on an island 1 70 miles south of Hainan, apparently without consulting MACV.

Conclusion Increasingly throughout 1967, GVN legitimacy and performance became a domestic political issue in the U.S. as well as a source of concern for policymakers. No matter what issue was raised, the central importance of the GVN remai ned. If we wanted to pacify more, we had to turn to the Vietnamese themselves. I f we desired to push for a negotiated settlement, we had to seriously weigh the possibilities of SVN collapse. In the last analysis, it was and is a war which o nly GVN legitimacy and effectiveness can win. End of Summary and Analysis CHRONO LOGY 1 Jan 64 State to Saigon 1000 30 Dec 63 President's New Year's message to M inh contains reassurance; advice also rendered. Brain trust approved. 10 Jan 64 Lodge to State 1287 10 Jan Lodge and Minh discuss President's advice agree they' re doing fine except on anmesty. GVN backs away from previously agreed extension of advisors to districts. 30 Jan 64 Saigon to State 1433 30 Jan Khanh seizes po wer, arrests four top generals of MRC, but lets Minh continue as President at US G urging. 13 Feb 64 Memorandum to Secretary of State Rostow recommends enforcing NVN compliance with 1962 Geneva agreement. 21 Feb 64 COMUSMACV to CINCPAC Feb 6 4 GVN accepts advisors in 13 districts of the Delta. 21 Feb 64 Saigon to AID 233 4 21 Feb GVN asks USG for rice standby commitment, for the first time. 8 Mar 64 SD PM 16 Mar Sec. III; and Memorandum of Conversation at JGS Hqtrs. 12 Mar Secre tary McNamara arrives in Saigon for several days of talks, including talks with GVN. Goes away pessimistic, recommends more AID and larger RVNAF, plus unqualifi ed backing for Khanh. Khanh promises mobilization.

17 Mar 64 NSAM 288 President approves Secretary of Defense recommendations, dire cts their execution. 20 Mar 64 White House Press Release White House announces K hanh's mobilization plan. 4 Apr 64 State to Saigon 1602 4 Apr Mobilization decre e, dissolution of Council of Notables, promise of eventual Constituent Assembly and civil government. 10 Apr 64 Saigon to State 1964 11 Apr Beginning of AID and related economic negotiations for fiscal 1965. 29 Apr 64 Saigon to State 2089 3 0 Apr Khanh renews request for brain trust; Lodge euphoric. 30 Apr 64 Saigon to State 2091 30 Apr USOM and GVN badger each other on pacification and economic de lays. 4 May 64 Saigon to State 2108 4 May Khanh wants to bomb NVN, have 10,000 U S troops, and set up all-military government in SVN. Lodge says no, no, yes. 13 May 64 Saigon to State 2203 14 May McNamara sees Khanh in Saigon; they reach agr eement on desirability of progress. 13-27 May 64 Saigon to State DTG 271200Z May Forrestal of White House staff "negotiates" AID with GVN, gives GVN AID increas es. 25 May 64 Memorandum to President McGeorge Bundy recommends force against NV N as the only path to success. 27 May 64 State to Saigon 1251 18 Feb. Sullivan d istributes proposal for semi-encadrement of GVN as a necessary step for progress .

28-29 May 64 Saigon to State 2332 and 2338 28 May MRC censures four "neutralist plot" generals that had been arrested in Khanh coup. Keeps Minh, as urged by Lod ge. 30 May 64 CINCPAC to State 372 Jun Rusk sees Khanh, leaves nothing to the im agination on possible US all-the-way commitment, stresses need for GVN unity. 23 Jun 64 Memo for the Record, Special Meeting on SE Asia. CINCPAC 000211 DTG 8 J un and Memo for Secretary (State) "Highlights of Honolulu Conference" from W. P. Bundy DTG 3 Jun Honolulu Conference. Conferees (include Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, Taylor and Westmoreland) agree on increased advisory effort, agree to refine pla ns for pressures on NVN. 4 Jun 64 Saigon to State 2405 4 Jun Lodge hints to Khan h that USG will prepare US public opinion for actions against NVN. 29 Jun 64 COM USMACV Command History 1964, p. 69 AID sets up sector adviser fund, with troika signoff to bypass GVN-Saigon. 30 Jun 64 COMUSMACV 011057Z Jul US and GVN agree t o joint planning for cross-border operations 8 Jul 64 Saigon to State 56 8 Jul A mbassador Taylor presents his credentials to Khanh. 9 Jul 64 Saigon to State 65 9 Jul Ambassador Taylor hears the complaints of civilian cabinet members. 17 Jul 64 Saigon to State 124 17 Jul USOM starts periodic meetings with GVN's National Security Council. 19 Jul 64 Saigon to State 185 23 Jul Khanh and Ky lobby publi cly for cross-border operations and air strikes into Laos and NVN.

23 Jul 64 Saigon to State 185 23 Jul Khanh presses Taylor for action, keeps up t he lobbying. 24 Jul 64 Saigon to State 203 24 Jul Khanh asks Taylor if he (Khanh ) should resign; Taylor says no. Khanh asks for publicly stated US backing and g ets it. 25 Jul 64 Saigon to State 232 27 Jul Khanh promises to quit lobbying, re acts favorably to proposed joint planning for air strikes on NVN, and says he pl ans GVN reorganization. 2-4 Aug 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 269 Gulf of Tonk in incidents, US retaliation. 7 Aug 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 270 Khanh pr oclaims state of emergency, with press censorship. 8 Aug 64 COMUSMACV to CJNCPAC DTG 080715Z Aug Westy and Khanh discuss joint planning, agree not to discuss co mbined command. 12 Aug 64 Saigon to State 393 12 Aug Khanh's "reorganization" is a new constitution with military openly on top, and with Khanh President. Taylo r sceptical, counsels caution. 16 Aug 64 Saigon to State 415 15 Aug Khanh gets M RC approval of constitution after hurried USOM drafting assistance. 18 Aug 64 Sh aplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 270-71 Ambassador Taylor firmly recommends plans for gradual pressures North to start 1 January contingent on improved GVN performan ce, or not contingent if things get bad enough. Suggests the package include Mar ines at Danang. 21-27 Aug 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 272-74 Student demons trations followed by general rioting. 24 Aug 64 Saigon to State 542 24 Aug

Taylor advises Khanh to move fast on new cabinet. 25 Aug 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolu tion, pp. 274-75 One o'clock A.M. Taylor advises Khanh to make some concessions but keep constitution. Khanh does and riots continue. Khanh "resigns." Riots con tinue. 27 Aug 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 275-78 MRC revokes constitution, keeps Khanh now as member of temporary triumvirate (including Minh and Khiem). N ew HNC to be appointed. 29 Aug 64 State to Saigon 555 29 Aug Paratroopers with b ayonets restore order in Saigon. 6 Sep 64 Saigon to State 785 8 Sep Taylor takes off on a trip to Washington. Recommends pressures on NVN to begin 1 December. 1 0 Sep 64 NSAM 314 10 Sep Says strengthen GVN. 13 Sep 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution , pp. 287-290; Saigon to State 836 13 Sep; Saigon to State 878 16 Sep Abortive c oup attempt temporarily captures Saigon. Ky and Thieu back Khanh, defeat coup fo rces. 20 Sep 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 290; Saigon to State 923 22 Sep; 93 6 23 Sep 937, 952, and 954 24 Sep; 985 29 Sep; and 1046 7 Oct.COMUSMACV to CJNCP AC DTG 031137Z Oct Rhade tribesmen in 4 CIDG camps rebel against GVN. 24 Sep 64 Saigon to State 938 24 Sep The new HNC begins deliberations to write a constitut ion. 30 Sep 64 NYTimes Articles W. Bundy predicts publicly that bombing NVN woul d cut down the threat to GVN in a matter of months.

27 Oct 64 Saigon to State 1292 27 Oct; State to Saigon 944 29 Oct. Shaplen Lost Revolution, pp. 290-9 HNC finishes on time, surprises by naming Suu President, n ot Minh. 30 Oct 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 293; State to Saigon 978 1 Nov; CINCPAC to JCS DTG 020400Z Nov; Saigon to State 1382 2 Nov Mortar attack on Bien Hoa airbase. State rejects Taylor's recommendation of immediate reprisal raid o n NVN. 11 Nov 64 Saigon to State 1452 and 1460 10 Nov MRC publishes military reo rganization without MACV review; MACV protests and MRC withdraws it for changes. 26 Nov 64 COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 0260945Z Nov Westmoreland slaps Ky down just before apparent coup attempt. Taylor is in Washington. 7 Dec 64 Embassy to Stat e Airgram A-468 15 Dec Taylor, just back from Washington with fresh guidance, pr esents GVN with a candid statement of its failures and couples demands for progr ess in stated areas to promises of US escalation. 8-20 Dec 64 Shaplen, Lost Revo lution, pp. 294-95 Student and Buddhist demonstrations against Huong government and growing crisis. 20 Dec 64 Saigon to State 1869, 1870, and 1874 20 Dec; MACV to CINCPAC rec'd NMCC 200816Z Dec Khanh and Generals disregard Taylor's protests , dissolve HNC and arrest opposition; "Young Turks" (Ky, Thieu, Thi and Cang) co nsolidate their dominance by creating a small Armed Forces Council (AFC) as the top governing body. Taylor reads them the riot act. 21 Dec 64 Saigon to State 18 81 21 Dec Taylor asks Khanh to resign and leave the country. 23 Dec 64 Saigon to State 1914 23 Dec; 1929 and 1930 24 Dec Young Turks attack Taylor publicly, and privately seek his recall.

24 Dec 64 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 295-97 Taylor tells press that Khanh has outstayed his usefulness. 25 Dec 64 COMUSMACV Command History 1965, p. 229 Viet namese JGS issues Directive A-B 139, at MACV request, on how RVNAF should be emp loyed to improve pacification program 7 Jan 65 Saigon to State 2081 7 Jan 2089 8 Jan 2102 9 Jan AFC Generals decide to give way by restoring civilian government under a new name (i.e. without HNC) leaving Suu-Huong combination in. 9 Jan 65 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 297-98 With Taylor's reluctant concurrence, the AF C announces the 7 January decision. 11 Jan 65 Saigon to State 2112 and 212011 Ja n US and GVN publicly patch up relations. Young Turks will enter cabinet 12 Jan 65 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 298-99 New demonstrations begin, demanding Huon g's resignation. 14 Jan 65 Saigon to State 2155 14 Jan Khanh shows Taylor a new cabinet list; Taylor tries to slow him down. 18 Jan 65 Saigon to State 2176 18 J an Khanh gives Taylor completed cabinet list and schedules installation for the next day. 19 Jan 65 COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 191235Z Jan Khanh tries to reassure Westmoreland on military repercussions of tying up some generals in the cabinet ; then Khanh suddenly "postpones" cabinet installation. 19-24 Jan 65 Shaplen, Lo st Revolution, pp. 298-99 Buddhist demonstrations build up, including sacking of USIS buildings in Saigon and Hue. Buddhist merchants respond to campaign to boy cott Americans. Buddhists demand military take-over. 25 Jan 65 Saigon to State 2 276 and 2283 25 Jan

Khanh tells Deputy Ambassador Alex Johnson that Huong and Suu want to resign and let the military take over. Johnson says no. 27 Jan 65 Shaplen, Lost Revolution , pp. 299-302; Saigon to State 2322 27 Jan; State to Saigon 1542 27 Jan and 1565 29 Jan AFC topples Suu-Huong government, openly puts Khanh back in charge. JCS approves COMUSMACV request to use US jet aircraft in a strike role in-country in emergencies, subject to Embassy approval in each instance. 3-4 Feb 65 Saigon to State 2399 4 Feb McGeorge Bundy visits Saigon, has tea with Khanh and the gener als. 7-12 Feb 65 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 305-6 State to Saigon 1438 6 Feb; Saigon to State 2426 7 Feb 2495 11 Feb Flaming Dart bombings in North Vietnam. All US dependents ordered to leave Vietnam. 7 Feb 65 Memorandum to the President McGeorge Bundy says the military are the backbone of the country, that the Budd hists should be constructive, and that Vietnam needs a social revolution. 16 Feb 65 Saigon to State 2617 16 Feb After two false starts, AFC selects Quat to form a new cabinet. 18 Feb 65 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 306-7 Quat cabinet insta lled; Buddhists acquiesce. 19 Feb 65 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 307-12 New co up groups seizes Saigon, then bows to superior AFC force. 20 Feb 65 Shaplen, Los t Revolution, pp. 307-12 AFC votes Khanh out. 24 Feb 65 Saigon to State 2685 20 Feb; 2698 22 Feb; 2720 23 Feb; 2731 24 Feb; and COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 241600Z Feb Khanh goes abroad; Rolling Thunder rolls. 27 Feb 65 Saigon to State 278727 Feb

USOM resumes action level meetings with GVN; both sides agreed to prepare propos als for accelerating pacification and to go forward together with effective exec ution. 28 Feb 65 Saigon to State 2800 1 Mar State issues White Paper on Vietnam. 6 Mar 65 COMUSMACV Command History, 1965, p. 132 MACV gives budget guidelines t o RVN Ministry of Defense. 8 Mar 65 Saigon to State 2991 8 Mar Quat discusses se nsitive combined-command issue with Taylor. 8-9 Mar 65 Saigon to State 2908 1 Ma r Two battalions of Marines land at Danang. 24 Mar 65 Saigon to State 2065 24 Ma r Ambassador Taylor formulates a 41-point program for stability and pacification . 26 Mar 65 COMUSMACV Commander's Estimate of the Situation 26 Mar Westmoreland issues Commander's Estimate of the Situation, which treads lightly on combined-c ommand issue. 1-2 Apr 65 NSAM 328 6 Apr Taylor (in Washington) talks to Presiden t and NSC, who approve Taylor's 41-point program and General Johnson's 21 recomm endations. 15 Apr 65 Saigon to State 3419 17 Apr Taylor objects to proposed Peer s mission. 15 Apr 65 DOD 9164 15 Apr The 7-point message from State/Defense tell s Saigon to encadre RVNAF/GVN and to expect additional US forces, with new missi ons. 17 Apr 65 Saigon to State 3421, 3422 and 3423 17 Apr Taylor objects to 7-po int message, and Westmoreland objects to encadrement.

19-20 Apr 65 ASD McNaughton's Minutes of Honolulu Meeting 23 Apr Honolulu Confer ence meets to resolve disagreements on 7-point message. Conferees agree on force increase and medcap, scuttle encadrement, and agree on studies of combined comm and. 5 May 65 Saigon to State 3097 and 3100 26 Mar; and 2140 31 Mar AFC dissolve s itself. 20-21 May 65 Saigon to State 3878 25 May Abortive coup attempt alleged by GVN, though not firmly confirmed by US observers. May 22-12 June 65 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 342-45 Suu-Quat disagreement on cabinet changes. 27 May 65 Joint State/ Defense 80466 27 May State/Defense message agrees to defer approac hing GVN on combined command. 12 Jun 65 COMUSMACV MAC 1-3, 19912 to CINCPAC DTG 120828Z Jun Westmoreland presses for commitment of US forces to offensive operat ions, has already planned it hand-in-hand with our Vietnamese ally. 12 Jun 65 Sh aplen, Lost Revolution, pp. 345-46. Saigon to State 4065 4 Jun, 4119 9 Jun, 4156 11 Jun, 4190 14 Jun, 4312 21 Jun Generals fire Suu and Quat, create National Le adership Council of ten Generals chaired by Thieu, and make Ky Prime Minister. T aylor reluctantly acquiesces to Ky's appointment. 22 Jun 65 Memorandum from Vinc ent Puritano to James P. Grant 25 Sep 65, "Joint Provincial Sign-off Authority," with attachment Troika sign-off abandoned. 1 Jul 65 SD PM 1 Jul 65 Sec 8B SecDe f Memorandum to the President recommends more aid for Vietnam. 1 Jul 65 Saigon t o State 14, 2 Jul

Taylor writes a letter to Ky asking him to support constructive USOM/GVN consult ations on economic matters and the port. 8 Jul 65 COMUSMACV to CINCPAC DTG 08002 0Z Jul MACV and RVNAF agree on coordination and cooperation, and do not discuss combined command. 20 Jul 65 SD PM 20 Jul para. 8B SecDef Memorandum to the Presi dent recommends U.S. veto on major GVN commanders and on GVN statements about go ing North. 28 Jul 65 Saigon to State 266, 25 Jul USOM and GVN agree on AID packa ge with no leverage. 15-26 Aug 65 Saigon to State 626, 26 Aug Lodge replaces Tay lor, takes charge of the Embassy. Ky tells Lodge the U.S. forces should hold str ategic points so that RVNAF can concentrate on pacification, and says that the C hieu Hoi Program is a waste of money. 28 Aug 65 Saigon to State 671, 28 Aug Thi tells Lodge he can govern better than Ky can. 22 Sep 65 COMUSMACV Command Histor y 1965, p. 240 COMUSMACV presents proposals for revitalization of Hop Tac to USO M. 1 Oct 65 COMUSMACV Command History 1965, p. 240 MACV begins four-month experi ment with sector and subsector advisor funds. 3 Nov 65 SecDef DPM McNamara urges more active role for U.S. advisors. 15 Dec 65 COMUSMACV Command History 1965, p . 241 JGS Directive AB 140 gives GVN military plan to support 1966 Rural Constru ction program. 24 Dec 65 State to Saigon 1855 31 Dec

Beginning of 37 day bombing pause and peace offensive. 6-8 Feb 66 State to Saigo n 2252 4 Feb "Vietnam: Honolulu Conference Summary of Goals and Status of Activi ty," 30 Mar Honolulu Conference to press GVN for action on pacification and on p olitical and economic reforms. Thieu and Ky obligingly agreed to U.S. demands. V ice-President Humphrey flies with them back to Saigon. 10 Mar 66 Kahin and Lewis , The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 244 and passim; Saigon to State 3260 and 3265 9 Mar Ky persuades military leadership to approve his plan to exile I Corps Commander, G eneral Thi. Thi resigns. 12 Mar 66 Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 245; and Saigon 3333 14 Mar Annamese Buddhists and students begin demonstration in D anang and Hue. 16 Mar 66 Saigon to State 3381 17 Mar Thi permitted to return to Danang to quiet demonstrations. March 1966 COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 51 0 CJNCUSARPAC 240312Z May PROVN Study completed. 3 Apr 66 COMUSMACV Command Hist ory 1966, p. 824 Ky declares Danang to be in Communist hands. 5 Apr 66 COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824; MACV toCINCPAC DTG 051125Z Apr; Saigon to State 2 9865 Apr MACV airlifts two ARVN Ranger battalions to Danang. 1st ARVN division c ommander declares for the Struggle Movement; U.S. advisors withdrawn. 6 Apr 66 C OMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824 Non-essential U.S. civilians removed from Hue. 8 Apr 66 COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824 GVN flies two additional Ra nger battalions to Danang after MACV refused to do so.

9 Apr 66 COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 824 U.S. protest to Struggle Movemen t leaders induces them to pull back howitzers. Two hundred U.S. and third countr y civilians evacuated from Danang. 12 Apr 66 COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 324; Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 256 GVN withdraws its Ranger batta lions from Danang. Relative quiet returns. 14 Apr 66 COMUSMACV Command History 1 966, p. 324; Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 256 The Directorate promise s elections for a constituent assembly with 3-5 months. Buddhists and others cal l off demonstrations. 4 May 66 Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 256; Sai gon to State 4368 4 May and 4605 15 May Ky publicly reneges on promises to hold August elections, says perhaps they will be possible by October. Lodge absent on long trip to Washington. Porter follows State guidance closely. 15 May 66 State to Saigon 3448, 3449, 3450 and 3451 15 May GVN airlifts troops to Danang and Hu e to quell new disorders. U.S. withholds airlift protests GVN failure to consult , withdraws advisors from both sides. 16 May 66 Saigon to State 4627 and 4635 16 May USMC General Walt threatens to use U.S. jets to shoot down any VNAF aircraf t used against dissident ARVN units. The threat succeeds. 21 May 66 State to Sai gon 3575 21 May Lodge returns, tells Ky to be conciliatory, use force with restr aint.He does around Saigon pogodas, but naked force in Hue produces self-immolat ions. U.S. evacuates its consulate and other facilities there. 27 May 66 Saigon to State 4837 21 May 4849 and 4878 23 May, 4943 and 4963 25 May, 4966 26 May, 50 37 27 May, 5073 28 May, 5178 1 Jun, and 1947 7 Jul; Kahin and Lewis ibid. Ky and Thi meet; latter offered unspecified ARVN job. 31 May 66 Saigon to State 5163 a nd 5178 1 Jun

Ky meets leaders of the Buddhist Institute, offers civilian participation in an enlarged Directorate. They appear conciliatory and agree to appointment of Gener al Lam as Commander of I Corps. 1 Jun 66 NYTimes Article Student mob burns U.S. consulate and consular residence in Hue.Struggle Movement fills the streets with Buddhist altars. 5 Jun 66 NYTimes Article Electoral Law Commission presents its proposals. 18 Jun 66 NYTimes Article Piaster devalued to official rate of 80. 1 8 Jun 66 Kahin and Lewis The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 257 Anniversary of Thieu-Ky gov ernment proclaimed a GVN holiday; one-day general strike called by the Buddhists . 19 Jun 66 Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, pp. 258-59 Directorate schedul es elections for the Constituent Assembly for 11 September. 22 Jun 66 Kahin and Lewis, The U.S. in Vietnam, p. 257. Conditions quiet in I Corps; GVN steadily re gaining control. 8-9 Jun 66 NYTimes Article Secretary McNamara visits Honolulu f or talks with CINCPAC. 31 Jul 66 State to Saigon 169429 Jul 2564 3 Aug Thi goes into exile. 13-14 Aug 66 NYTimes Article General Westmoreland reports to the Pre sident at his Texas ranch. 24 Aug 66 "Roles and Missions" Study 24 Aug "Roles an d Missions" Study to the Embassy.

11 Sep 66 NYTimes Article Constituent Assembly elections. 4 Oct 66 Saigon to Sta te 7616 4 Oct, 7732 and 7752 5 Oct, 6043 7 Oct, 8681 17 Oct, 8749 18 Oct, 8833 1 9 Oct, 8839 20 Oct. State to Saigon 66781 14 Oct and 68339 18 Oct GVN cabinet cr isis brews as six civilian ministers, the only Southern members threaten to resi gn. 5 Oct 66 COMUSMACV Command History 1966, p. 526 JGS chairs a high level join t conference to develop a schedule of action to implement road development. 6 Oc t 66 State to Saigon 49294 16 Sep 49399 17 Sep Saigon to State 6997 27 Sep State to Saigon 58092 30 Sep 61330 6 Oct 58280 2 Oct Hanh and Komer reach vague and g eneral agreement on GVN budget and financial matters. 10-13 Oct 66 NYTimes Artic le Secretary McNamara, accompanied by newly appointed Under Secretary of State K atzenback visits Saigon. Saigon Port congestion grows worse. 14 Oct 66 SecDef Me morandum to the President In PM McNamara urges shift of ARVN to pacification, ch ange of US responsibility to MACV, "drastic" reform of GVN. 19 Oct 66 Saigon to State 7616 4 Oct, 7732 and 7752 5 Oct, 8681 17 Oct, 8749 18 Oct, 8833 19 Oct, an d 8839 20 Oct, State to Saigon 66781 14 Oct, 68339 18 Oct Cabinet crisis patched up at least until after Manila Conference. 24-25 Oct 66 NYTimes Article Texts o f Communique and Declarations Signed at Close of Manila Conference 26 Oct Manila conference of the seven nations aiding South Vietnam. Basic problem is still to get GVN commitment to action on nonmilitary measures. 1 Nov 66 Saigon to State 10312 7 Nov, 1195829 Nov

Promised GVN National Reconciliation proclamation fails to appear; instead only vague reference in a speech on other subjects. Ky promised a NR speech and procl amation in "early December." 2 Nov 66 Saigon to State 9963 3 Nov Komer and Porte r in Saigon reach agreement with GVN on foreign exchange. 2 Nov 66 Saigon to Sta te 7815 6 Oct and 8161 1 Oct Ky promises a tough decree on port management. 18 N ov 66 Saigon to State 11249 18 Nov 11431 21 Nov State to Saigon 93314 28 Nov Gen eral Quang, deposed IV Corps Commander, appointed to head the new cabinet portfo lio "Planning and Development." Concern continues in Washington over AID diversi ons. 21 Nov 66 COMUSMACV msg 50331 21 Nov In a policy statement, COMUSMACV tells advisors that deficiencies of non-compliance are to be resolved within RVNAF ch annels. 29 Nov 66 IvfACV Commanders Conference 20 Nov Washington reminds the Mis sion that GVN has not yet delivered on its Manila promises about NR, pacificatio n, and land reform; suggests Lodge press Ky. 2 Dec 66 Saigon to State 12321 2 De c Saigon declines to suggest formation of a joint inspectorate general to follow up AID diversions. December 1966 Saigon to State 14009 22 Dcc, 12733 7 Dec, 129 08 and 12950 1966 9 Dec, 13046 10 Dcc, 14009 and 13023 22 Dec, 14112 23 Dec, 142 30 26 Dec Further GVN-USOM negotiations on the dollar balance problem. 8 Dec 66 COMUSMACV to CJNCPAC 080245Z Dec Ceremonial signing of the 1967 Combined Campaig n Plan by COMUSMACV and Chief, JGS. December 1966 Saigon to State 15569 13 Jan 6 7

Saigon Port congestion grows worse during GVN port commander's "great barge" exp eriment. State authorizes drastic action which Saigon declines to use. 21 Dec 66 COMUSMACV History 1966 pp. 471-72 Chinh-Hunnicutt affair terminated with transf er of the U.S. adviser outside the theatre and issuance of a memorandum by the d ivision commander stating that the past must be forgotten. January 1967 NYTimes Article U Thant advances proposals for peace. President promises careful evaluat ion. Ky forsees negotiations nearing. Lodge predicts sensational military gains in 1967. 2 Jan 67 Saigon to State 14725 2 Jan U.S. Mission estimates GVN inflati onary budget gap at 14-20 billion piasters. 7 Jan 67 NYTimes Article Ky signs la w providing for spring elections in 1000 villages and 4000 hamlets. 13 Jan 67 Sa igon to State 15569 13 Jan Saigon resists Washington suggestion for complete MAC V take over of Saigon port. 20 Jan 67 Saigon to State 16037 20 Jan GVN issues Cy 1967 budget of 75 billion piasters without prior consultation with U.S. 23 Jan 67 State to Saigon 123223 21 Jan Renewed economic negotiations forseen with Hanh in Washington. 24 Jan 67 NYTimes Article JGS Chief of Staff Vien appointed to r eplace corrupt Defense Minister Co, who is informed on visit to Taiwan not to re turn. 20 Feb 67 Saigon to State 18646 22 Feb GVN agrees to work on an interim me morandum of understanding to include implementation of the previous November's f oreign exchange agreements. Komer threatens to reduce CIP; Hanh hints at a raise in the piaster rate. 24 Feb 67 NYTimes Article State to Saigon 140250 19 Feb Sa igon to State18303 18 Feb

Ky postpones U.S. visit to assure free and fair elections. 10 Mar 67 Saigon to S tate 19902 9 Mar, 20053 10 Mar, 20201 13 Mar, State to Saigon 153512 11 Mar U.S. announces military jurisdiction over American civilians, thus skirts the proble ms of corrupt GVN justice and status of forces. 17 Mar 67 State to Saigon 157064 17 Mar Another "Interim Agreement" reached with GVN on foreign exchange. 19 Mar 67 NYTimes Article Constituent Assembly unanimously approves new constitution. Next day it is unanimously approved by the military junta and a copy presented t o President Johnson at Guam meetings between top level GVN-US leadership. 20-21 Mar 67 NYTimes Article Joint Communique Guam Meetings 21 Mar Guam meetings betwe en top level GVN-US leadership. President Johnson introduces the new U.S. team i n Saigon; Bunker to be Ambassador, Locke his deputy, Komer the new pacification czar within the MACV framework. 6 Apr 67 NYTimes Article General Abrams appointe d Deputy to COMUSMACV. 18 Apr 67 Saigon to State 23376 18 Apr GVN issues a Natio nal Reconciliation proclamation that proves to be a mirage; it emphasizes solida rity vice reconciliation. 25 Apr 67 NYTimes Article Saigon to State 23749 23 Apr Lodge completes his stint, leaves Saigon. 27 Apr 67 NYTimes Article General Wes tmoreland confers with LBJ in Washington, addresses Congress the next day. 7 May 67 COMUSMACV MAC J 341 15064 to C1NCPAC 071035Z May

General Westmoreland reports on his command project to improve RVNAF performance , offers $7800 saving in cut-off of MAP support to two VNN fishing boats as sign of progress. ARVN evaluation only partially completed. 12 May 67 NYTimes Articl e Saigon to State 25554 12 May Premier Ky announces he will seek the Presidency. Thieu-Ky rivalry intensifies. 20 Jun 67 Saigon to State 28409 20 Jun Thieu and Ky invited to informal luncheon hosted by Bunker at which unity of the Armed For ces is discussed. 22 Jun 67 State to Saigon 213380 22 Jun Mission estimates rate of inflation in SVN to be 45-50% per year. 29-30 Jun 67 Saigon to State 29258 3 0 Jun The Armed Forces Council of 50-60 officers holds two day continuous sessio n from which emerges the Thieu-Ky ticket. 7-8 Jul 67 NYTimes Article OSD(SA) Mem orandum 25 Jul, "SecDef VN Trip Briefings" Secretary McNamara makes his 9th visi t to SVN. 17 Jul 67 NYTimes Article Saigon to State 1381 to 19 Jul 1475 20 Jul C A approves Thieu-Ky ticket; rejects the threatening Big Minh candidacy. 24-25 Ju l 67 NYTimes Article Clifford-Taylor mission receives Saigon briefings. 12 Aug 6 7 NYTimes Article Army C/S General H. K. Johnson reports we are winning, latest 45,000 man troop increase to be the last. 26 Aug 67 AmEmb Saigon to SecDef, Blue print for Viet-Nam, 26 Aug Mission completes "Blueprint for Vietnam." 3 Sep 67 N YTimes Article Elections for President and Senate.

I. AFTERMATH OF THE DIEM COUP First Half of 1964 A. THE INHERITANCE FROM 1963 Th e top ruling body of the Government of Vietnam at the end of 1963 was a Military Revolutionary Council of twelve generals, under the chairmanship of the affable and popular but weak General Duong Van "Big" Minh. The Council governed through an allcivilian cabinet headed by Premier Tho, having forbade all military offic ers to engage in politics. A Council of Notables served as a pseudo-parliament, with a purely advisory role; it included well-known Vietnamese politicians, but could not claim support of a broad popular base or the main political forces in Vietnam. While Premier Tho's previous connection with the Diem government was no w a political liability, there was a shortage of national figures who were not t arred with this brush one way or another. On the U.S. side, General Harkins, COM USMACV, who had long been known to be proDiem, was clearly on his way out, altho ugh his departure was to be delayed until the middle of 1964. Ambassador Lodge h ad replaced Nolting just before the Diem coup, and was held in that cautious res pect appropriate to the widespread belief among Vietnamese that he had engineere d it. In the last weeks of 1963, the U.S. government reassessed the progress of the counterinsurgency effort and the policy options. Plans for phased withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. advisers by end-1963 went through the motions by concentrating ro tations home in December and letting strength rebound in the subsequent two mont hs. A realistic appraisal by Secretary McNamara showed that the VC were continui ng to gain steadily, especially in the Delta. U.S. policy continued to be to pro vide U.S. resources and personnel to the extent necessary. The tone of USG inter nal documents and of its dealings with GVN was that of a benevolent big brother anxious to see little brother make good on his own- but with the benefit of exte nsive advice. U.S. pressure induced the GVN to break up the palace guard and to move coup-protection Ranger units out into the countryside, though it turned out that other units stayed near Saigon for this purpose. A proposal to put all amm unition stocks in Vietnam under U.S. control surfaced in November, only to sink without a trace. There was gentle pressure to persuade the GVN to allow USOM eco nomics staffs to share the offices of their counterparts, and to let them get in volved extensively in GVN budgeting. The USIS and Ambassador Lodge tried to pers uade General Minh to travel around the countryside to build a following and conv ince the people that the government cared about them, but with little success. T he overall USG appraisal was that the GVN was weak and drifting at the top level , failing to set firm national policies and to issue detailed instructions, and that at lower levels it was in complete turmoil because of the turnover of perso nnel following the coup and because of the lack of firm national leadership.

Whether to push the GVN harder was a subject of disagreement between State and A mbassador Lodge. The State view was that the GVN must prove its resolution to ad opt economic, social and political measures to support the effort against the VC , and must move toward self-support. Moreover, State said: We will obscure the a ctual need for GVN adjustments if we yield too easily at this stage to GVN press ure for more commercial import aid. In contrast, Lodge said it was essential to provide some increase in overall level of economic aid . . . It is in my view po litically unacceptable and psychologically impossible to tell Big Minh that he i s going to get less than Diem. Besides wanting to go easy on the GVN on aid leve rage, he opposed pressure for early elections. Lodge's position is clear from th e Honolulu Conference (November 1963) Report, which stated: The Ambassador . . . considers it essential that the U.S. not press the new government unduly. He st ated that they are in a most delicate state, and are not ready for a system whic h replaces governments by elective process rather than by violence; that this is beyond their horizon at this time and we should not seek to recreate in Vietnam our image of the democratic ideal. Early in January, 1964, Lodge restated this view in a cable: It is obvious that [the Vietnamese generalsi are all we have go t and that we must try as hard to make them into successful politicians as we ar e trying to make them into successful military men. Behind these differences wit hin the USG and between the USG and the GVN lay a certain lack of confidence in future behavior. Some in the U.S. were concerned that the GVN might drift toward a "neutralism" like that of Laos. At the same time, the GVN feared the U.S. wou ld negotiate behind its back or force it to accept an unfavorable settlement. Th ese concerns made it appropriate for the President to issue his New Year's greet ing to the GVN: As we enter the New Year of 1964, I want to wish you, your revol utionary government, and your people full success in the long and arduous war wh ich you are waging so tenaciously and bravely against the Viet Cong forces direc ted and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi....Our aims are, I know, iden tical with yours: to enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the North. As the forces of y our government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, Amer ican military personnel in South Viet-Nam can be progressively withdrawn.

The United States Government shares the view of your government that "neutraliza tion" of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in Nort h VietNam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam wo uld only be another name for a Communist take-over. Peace will return to your co untry just as soon as the authorities in Hanoi cease and desist from their terro rist aggression. In keeping with the attitude of concern but not alarm about the GVN's conduct of the war, SecState's cable transmitting the President's message directed Lodge to offer the following eleven points of confidential advice on b ehalf of the President: 1. It is vitally important to act now to reverse the tre nd of the war as rapidly as possible. 2. We trust that personnel changes are now virtually complete and that both military commanders and province chiefs can no w get down to the job at hand. 3. We hope that General Minh can designate a Chie f of the Joint General Staff and a commander of the III Corps who will have no o ther responsibilities and can devote themselves exclusively to these mammoth tas ks. 4. We assume that, as General Don promised Secretary McNamara, the GVN will make available sufficient troops in the six key provinces in the III Corps to gi ve its forces the necessary numerical superiority. 5. We have been glad to learn of the stress which General Minh places on small-unit actions, particularly in the Mekong Delta. We hope that equal stress will be placed on night actions, bot h for ambushing Viet Cong and for relieving villages under attack. To win the su pport of the population it needs to be emphatically demonstrated that the Viet C ong are being beaten precisely at their own game. 6. We consider it extremely im portant that the necessary civil-military coordinating machinery for clear-and-h old operations, followed by an effective program to give the villages protection and security, be established in Saigon. 7. It is likewise extremely important t hat program directives be issued at an early stage by the central government to lower echelons for proper implementation of all aspects of the program for givin g villagers protection. 8. We also urge early revitalization of the amnesty prog ram. 9. We are encouraged by the exploratory talks which the Vietnamese Governme nt has held with Cambodian Government officials for improving relations between the two countries. We hope that both Governments can proceed to actual negotiati ons for the settlement of their bilateral problems. 10. We accept with pleasure General Minh's invitation to set up an American brain-trust to work with his gov ernment and we are prepared to furnish any personnel needed for this purpose. 11 . General Minh can also be sure that he has the complete support of the United S tates Government as the leader of Viet-Nam. We believe he can magnetically rally the Vietnamese people if he will really try to do so. He should be told leaders hip is an essential political ingredient of victory such as was the case with Ma gsaysay in the Philippines. In this overall context the U.S. had already moved d iscreetly toward greater involvement in Vietnamese administration at lower level s. Late in 1963, the USG and GVN agreed on

a "Decentralization of Action" package. Using AID de facto control of AID commod ities to the province level (even though they passed to Vietnamese ownership at the dock), U.S. advisers could assure that no AID commodities came out to the pr ovince without their consent. They could and did extend this control to cover re leases of these commodities from province warehouses. U.S. officials controlled the distribution of AID commodities because they controlled all Saigon warehouse s set aside for these commodities, even though the warehouses, like the commodit ies, belonged to the Vietnamese. Among the many problems that were to keep recur ring was that of freedom of the press. Following an initial honeymoon period aft er the coup, trouble broke out between GVN and the U.S. press corps. This reache d a climax with the temporary barring of the New York Times from Vietnamese dist ribution channels when it ran a story reporting dissension among the Vietnamese Generals. In general, Lodge sided with GVN on this issue, as shown in his report ed views at the November, 1963, Honolulu Conference: The U.S. press should be in duced to leave the new government alone. They have exerted great influence on ev ents in Vietnam in the past, and can be expected to do so again. Extensive press criticism, at this juncture, could be disastrous. On January 1, 1964, there wer e 15,914 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. Fewer than 2,000 of these wer e advisors to RVNAF, but the advisor structure extended down to ARVN line battal ions, and advisors accompanied combat units on operations. The MAP budget for So uth Vietnam in FY 1964 was $175 million, although it was expected that an additi onal $12.5 million would be required before the end of the year. In summary, the USG's decisions near the end of 1963 started modest changes in our Vietnam prog rams. Program levels held even, and earlier hopes of immediate phasedown faded. The USG moved toward more involvement in Vietnamese day-to-day administration, p articularly at the province level. The move was gentle, and stopped far short of a takeover; nothing of the sort was contemplated at that time. The USG was scep tical of GVN's leadership and administration at all levels, and continued to off er extensive and detailed advice, but had no drastic policy changes in mind. B. THE FIRST MINH GOVERNMENT GOES DOWN, JANUARY, 1964 The year began with increasin g Vietnamese criticism of the Minh government. It had done little to gain popula rity in the country, and felt the sting of accusations of discrimination from bo th Buddhists and Catholics. Buddhists attacked Prime Minister Tho, who was Vice President under Diem. Catholics accused the GVN of having gone too far to placat e the Buddhists in reaction to repressions under Diem. There were also accusatio ns of secret negotiations with the French to neutralize South Vietnam. A spate o f news stories about U.S. advisor disgust over ARVN's timid attitude toward comb at provoked a cable from State to Saigon asking the Ambassador to prevent such s tories in the future. (This standard phrase meant to tell the advisors to stop t alking to the

press.) Thus the Department aligned itself with Lodge's view of bad press storie s, which emphasized news silence rather than corrective action. The Lodge idea o f making politicians out of the members of the Military Revolutionary Council tr anslated into a plan for them to send out carefully watched political action tea ms. (He also suggested ways for the generals to improve their speech-making styl e.) For example, he proposed there should be three teams of eight men each in ea ch district of Long An Province. He pressed the MRC to produce a program along t hese lines with priority attention to security. "The workers would be technicall y government employees, but most of the work they will do would be what we would call political work." On the U.S. role, he said, "U.S. personnel should inspect , without looking as though they were doing it, and see to it that a very high s tandard is set." When discussing general objectives, Lodge and his team got on s moothly with GVN. In a meeting with all the top members of General Minh's govern ment early in January to discuss the eleven points transmitted with President Jo hnson's New Year's greeting, they persuaded Lodge that they were moving effectiv ely on all points except number 8, relating to amnesty. This one evoked little e nthusiasm, but they said they had it under study. The USOM team that discussed e conomic policy matters with GVN economists with the objective of limiting the GV N budget deficit and drawing down its dollar balances found them willing to talk frankly and to examine alternatives freely. GVN was also willing to set up join t working committees to analyze the budget, the import program, and agricultural policy. However, the U.S. team found that getting jointly agreed bench mark dat a and a clear line of authority for policy actions "may yet prove difficult." Mo reover, a snag developed on the previously agreed plan to extend U.S. advisors t o district level. In a one hour meeting January 10 between Ambassador Lodge and General Minh and other top Vietnamese officers and officials, General Kim stress ed the extreme undesirability of Americans going into districts and villages. It would play into the hands of the VC and make the Vietnamese officials look like lackeys. There would be a colonial flavor to the whole pacification effort. Min h added that even in the worst and clumsiest days of the French they never went into the villages or districts. Others present went on to add that they thought the USIS should carry out its work strictly hand-in-hand with the province chief . When Lodge pointed out that most of the USIS teams were Vietnamese, Minh said, "Yes, but they are considered the same as Vietnamese who worked for the Japanes e and the same as the Vietnamese who drive for Americans and break traffic laws. " General Minh went on to complain about the U.S. hand in the training of Cao Da i and Hoa Hao. This was bad because they then became American type soldiers, not Vietnamese soldiers. Later in the discussion, General Minh complained that the ICA had made direct contacts with the above groups. "We simply cannot govern thi s country if this kind of conduct continues," he said. In reply to the report of this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cabled CINCPAC on January 14:

SecDef seriously concerned regarding . . . General Don's earlier agreement on di strict level advisors as well as Minh's assertion that no advisors are desired b eyond the regimental level. The Secretary considers, and JCS agree, that this wo uld be an unacceptable rearward step. State is preparing a response . . . in whi ch SecDef and JCS will have a hand. The State guidance to Lodge on January 17 sa id: We deem it essential to retain advisors down to sector and battalion level a s we now have them, and consider establishment of subsector advisors as highly d esirable improvement from our viewpoint. Such advisors are best assurance that t he U.S. material we supply is used to full advantage. Beyond this, we cannot giv e adequate justification for our great involvement in Vietnam . . . if we are to be denied access to the facts. However, State indicated a willingness to limit subsector advisors to an experimental program in a few districts, as suggested b y Col. Thang, with a review of the question to follow a few weeks later. State s uggested that General Minh's erroneous statement regarding U.S. training of Cao Dai and Hoa Hao deserved prompt refutation. "It is suggested Harkins accompany y ou to meetings where military matters may come up." In contrast to their reticen ce about extending U.S. advisors to lower levels, Minh's government had voluntee red the idea in December of a group of high-level U.S. advisors to work with the top levels of the GVN. The State Department replied enthusiastically: In elabor ation of the brain trust concept suggested by General Minh and accepted by Presi dent Johnson (DepTel 1000), our view is that high-level advisors may be essentia l key to ingredient most sorely lacking in GVN: Efficiency and urgency of action . Minh's invitation to establish brain trust and readiness to accept U.S. advice and cooperate . . . should be seized upon . . . We have in mind advisors workin g directly with VN officials on day-to-day implementation of agreed policy lines . They would of course be completely responsible to you for policy guidance and would in no sense supplant your policy role with top GVN officials nor would the y infringe direct and comprehensive military advisory role of COMUSMACV . . . We recognize such advisors must operate behind the scenes and that their persisten t prodding must be done with great tact.... The guidance continued that the depa rtment specifically had in mind the assignment of three experienced full-time ad visors (and senior assistants) to work with top levels of GVN. One senior FSO wo uld work with Minh and Tho on broad program implementation, one ranking AID offi cial would be with GVN counterinsurgency and economic officials, one high-rankin g military would work with the Minister of Defense and JGS. Both advisors and as sistants would have office space in a GVN building close to the office they woul d advise. Authority was given to discuss this with GVN. Lodge was told to ask th em whom they would like for these positions. Meanwhile, political tension increa sed. Then on January 28, General Nguyen Khanh told his U.S. advisor and friend, Col. Jasper Wilson, that a group of generals, including Minh

and Don, were plotting with the French to stage a pro-neutralist "coup" by Janua ry 31. He asked whether the U.S. would support him in staging a counter-coup whi ch would assure a stepped-up GVN effort against the Viet Cong. There is no recor d of an official U.S. reply before Khanh resolved to act. The evening of January 29, Khanh told Wilson he would take over the GVN at 4 a.m. the next morning. Lo dge informed State, which directed him to keep a hands-off attitude and to make it clear that the USG had nothing to do with the coup. It also directed Lodge to try to keep "Big Minh" in the government, at least as a figurehead. The next mo rning, right on schedule, Khanh took over. C. THE USG ACCEPTS KHANH AND OPENS TH E BIDDING AGAINST THE NORTH, FEBRUARY, 1964 Keeping Minh was to prove difficult. Khanh wanted to try four arrested generals for conspiring with the French to ne utralize SVN; and not only were these officers Minh's close friends, but Khanh s aid Minh was a party to the plot also. The affair was to drag on into September, adding to the political uncertainties and thus to the paralysis of government. To improve government stability, Khanh broadened his government to make the cabi net more representative of all the political and religious groups, and expanded the MRC to include 17 generals and 32 other officers. (By the end of March the M RC had 53 members.) Partly at USOM urging, General Minh travelled around the cou ntry and reportedly gained popularity. The Council of Notables continued in its advisory role. Following the coup, the USG reopened the question of extending U. S. advisors into the districts. On February 7, 1964, the State Department told S aigon: Inasmuch as recently displaced government evidently took no definitive po sition on extension U.S. advisory structure to subsector level . we believe [the ] Ambassador and General Harkins should raise this subject at early date with Ge neral Khanh. It might be useful to point out to Khanh that in addition reasons c ited in our 1072, proposed extension U.S. advisory structure would represent exp ansion U.S. commitment to support GVN in war against VC. State anticipated that Khanh might object but believed the possible harm would be more than counterbala nced by improved effectiveness of GVN operations in countryside: ....if Khanh wi ll not accept subsector advisors on scale originally envisaged he should be urge d to agree at least to their establishment on experimental basis in few district s in order to lay basis for determining whether there is any substantial ill eff ect in political sense from their presence. Two weeks later COMUSMACV reported V ietnamese acceptance of district advisors in 13 districts of central Delta provi nces. MACV J-3 had casually arranged it with General Khiem, apparently without a ny new top-level U.S./GVN discussion.

Khan's government was as receptive at first to top-level U.S. advice as it was t o advisors at lower levels, although the "brain trust" idea dropped between the cracks. General Khanh made two requests for U.S. recommendations of Vietnamese p ersons to be members of his cabinet. Ambassador Lodge furnished a list from whic h a panel could be picked, but refused to make specific recommendations for part icular positions. However, there was still no sign of effective GVN action, with or without U.S. advice. In mid-February JCS recommended a concentrated "counter insurgency offensive" in Long An province to restore GVN control and to make tha t a model for other critical provinces. Deputy Ambassador Nes, in Lodge's absenc e, objected strongly; for he said such a proposal was based on the false assumpt ions that: (1) Indigenous Communist insurgency with full external support could be defeated by an "offensive" of finite duration. (2) GVN had adequate political cohesion, leadership, etc., to launch an offensive. (3) The U.S. Mission had su fficient influence and control over GVN to persuade it to do so. A February 19 r eport from COMUSMACV tells of continuing delay on pacification because the Dien Huang (or Dong Hien) had to be revalidated by the new government. A new plan was presented to General Khanh on the 17th and was to be called Chien Thang ("strug gle for victory"). On February 21, 1964, Ambassador Lodge, Admiral Felt, and Gen eral Harkins saw Khanh with a proposal for creating a corps of civil administrat ors to take over the villages and hamlets as soon as pacification was complete. Khanh replied that he was just about to put into effect a program in the seven k ey provinces around Saigon which would provide the help of doctors, teachers, an d government advisors from Saigon. The subject of funds for ARVN and para-milita ry pay increases came up because counterpart and PL 480 proceeds were U.S. contr ibutions to the GVN budget. Washington requested additional facts and recommenda tions on how added U.S. input could best be channeled but advised that an outrig ht U.S. grant would be highly undesirable. USOM and MAAG were told to analyze th e situation and develop joint U.S./ GVN action to meet the threat of inflation. Saigon replied that their analysis indicated (1) the budget deficits would proba bly be smaller than originally expected, and (2) the economic consequences were extremely difficult to predict. Economic Minister Oanh shunned any immediate "co mplex study" of the economic outlook because he was completely tied up with a se ries of important planning exercises for the government, and Oanh felt the poten tial cost of the pay raise (700 million piasters in 1964) could be absorbed with in the present expenditure levels. The Embassy reported being informed on Februa ry 21 by the Minister of National Economy of a threatened Saigon rice shortage. He requested that the U.S. stand ready to provide 40,000 tons under title II PL 480 for distribution to the Armed Forces. No U.S. commitments were made. Talks w ere exploratory.

Although the USG recognized the weaknesses of GVN, as noted at the end of Sectio n 1, these merely aroused concern at the highest levels, not alarm. An extreme e xample of the emphasis of this period is found in W.W. Rostow's memorandum to th e Secretary of State dated February 13, 1964. In a context emphasizing the impor tance of success in Vietnam to U.S. interests everywhere, Rostow wrote only abou t the role of North Vietnam in the insurgency, relegating South Vietnam's govern mental problems (and those of Laos) to a vague clause in one sentence: South Vie tnam is in danger. The internal position in South Vietnam created by the systema tic operations conducted from North Vietnam is precarious . . . although difficu lt tasks would still be faced in South Vietnam and Laos if North Vietnamese comp liance with the 1962 agreement was enforced, we see no possibility of achieving short-run or long-run stability in the area until it is enforced." In a cable to the President, Lodge expressed the same view. In addition, he compared the sanc tions used against Diem with the sanctions being considered against the North, a nd thus by implication treated the fall of Diem as the end of the problem of goo d government in the South. Rightly or wrongly, the USG viewed North Vietnamese s upport and direction of the insurgency as the overriding problem, not merely in its public posture (as represented by President Johnson's new year's greeting to General Minh, quoted on page 3, above, and by the State White Paper, "Aggressio n From the North," issued February 27), but also in its internal policy discussi ons. Rostow's statement says that there is no way to achieve short-run or long-r un stability in Southeast Asia without putting a stop to this support and direct ion, and gives short shrift to GVN reform. To the extent that this view was acce pted, it tended to set the face of U.S. policy looking outward across South Viet nam's borders, putting South Vietnamese weaknesses in the background, mainly to be dealt with after the 1962 Agreement is enforced. When the issue came up of th e GVN's internal military and political failures, all agreed that these were ser ious, but there was seldom any action. Occasional references (e.g., Honolulu, 19 64), and conversations with some of the principals, make it clear that the expla nation for this lack of action was the fear that the GVN was a house of cards, w hich would collapse if we pushed too hard. This fear of GVN weakness proved to b e a consistent source of strength to GVN in its negotiations with the Embassy an d with the USG. D. McNAMARA'S MARCH TRIP AND NSAM 288 For several days beginning on March 8, 1964, Secretary McNamara conferred with GVN leaders and with U.S. o fficials in Saigon. The trip reinforced his pessimistic views of the previous De cember. In his trip report to the President, he said: C. The situation has unque stionably been growing worse, at least since September: 1. In terms of governmen t control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet Cong cont rol or predominant influence. .

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifferen ce, and there are some signs of frustration within the U.S. contingent: a. The A RVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and increasing. b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energeti cally and effectively. c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defen se Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling. 3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particul arly noticeable. . . 4. The political control structure extending from Saigon do wn into the hamlets dissppeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces had three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of lesser offici als were replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hands twice s ince the November coup. The faith of the peasants has been shaken by the disrupt ions in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In many areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion among the people, and a rising r ate of rural disorders. D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertain viability of the Khanh government . . . After two coups, as was menti oned above, there has been a sharp drop in morale and organization, and Khanh ha s not yet been able to build these up satisfactorily. There is a constant threat of assassination or of another coup, which would drop morale and organization n early to zero. Whether or not French nationals are actively encouraging such a c oup, de Gaulle's position and the continuing pessimism and anti-Americanism of t he French community in South Vietnam provide constant fuel to neutralist sentime nt and the coup possibility. If a coup is set underway, the odds of our detectin g and preventing it in the tactical sense are not high. E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the performance of the Khanh go vernment to date. Although its top layer is thin, it is highly responsive to U.S . advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Co ng. Opposition groups are fragmentary, and Khanh has brought in at least token r epresentation from many key groups hitherto left out. He is keenly aware of the danger of assassination or coup and is taking resourceful steps to minimize thes e risks. All told, these evidences of energy, comprehension, and decision add up to a sufficiently strong chance of Khanh's really taking hold in the next few m onths for us to devote all possible energy and resources to his support. A memor andum of the conversation held at Joint General Staff (JGS) headquarters between Secretary McNamara and General Khanh, the Prime Minister, on March 12, shows th at the U.S. pressed for a national service act. General Khanh agreeably assured the Secretary that the GVN was prepared to embark on a program of national mobil ization. The principal question raised by the Vietnamese was the desirability of raising the Civil Guard to the same relative status as ARVN on such matter as s alary,

pensions, and survivor benefits at a total additional cost of 1 billion piasters . Mr. McNamara's reply that he thought this highly desirable was obviously inter preted by the Vietnamese as an agreement to underwrite much of the bill. After c onsidering various options in his reports, McNamara recommended the following ba sic U.S. posture: 1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it emphaticall y clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control. 2. The U.S. at all levels should c ontinue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are tota lly opposed to any further coups. The ambassador should instruct all elements, i ncluding the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible c oups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Khanh.... 3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan n ow announced by Khanh . . . This socalled "oil spot" theory is excellent, and it s acceptance is a major step forward. However, it is necessary to push hard to g et specific instructions out to the provinces, so that there is real unity of ef fort at all levels. . Many of the actions described in succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the Plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urging of such actions to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the U.S. 4 . To put the whole nation on a war footing . . . a new National Mobilization Pla n (to include a National Service Law) should be urgently developed by the Countr y Team in collaboration with the Khanh Government..... 5. The strength of the Ar med Forces (regular plus paramilitary) must be increased by at least 50,000 men. ... 6. A Civil Administrative Corps is urgently required to work in the provinc ial capitals, the district towns, the villages, and the hamlets....The U.S. shou ld work with the GVN urgently to devise the necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods, and organizational arrangements, and should furn ish training personnel at once, under the auspices of the AID Mission.... 7. The paramilitary forces are now understrength and lacking in effectiveness. They mu st be improved and reorganized. d. Additional U.S. personnel should be assigned to the training of all these paramilitary forces. e. The National Police require special consideration. Their strength in the provinces should be substantially increased and consideration should be given to including them as part of an over all "Popular Defense Force.... 8. An offensive guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control is dominant....

He recommended more military equipment for ARVN, which along with the expansion recommendations above, added up to a total cost to the U.S. of some $50-60 milli on in the first year and $30-40 million thereafter. He reasoned: There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy-the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN action s against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any cas e, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure succe ss in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; the former is essential wit hout regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former. The following are the actions we believe can be take n in order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and over a long er term period. To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be take n by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as "South Vietna m's Program for National Mobilization." Two courses of action that Secretary McN amara considered and rejected were destined to come up time and again. With resp ect to the suggestion that the U.S. furnish an American combat unit to secure Sa igon, the Secretary reported "It is the universal opinion of our senior people i n Saigon, with which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken." On U.S. assumption of command, he said: .....the judgments of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far out-weighted by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the VN running their own war and lay us wide open to hostile pr opaganda both within SVN and outside. Moreoever the present responsiveness of th e GVN to our advice-although it has not yet reduced military reaction time-makes it less urgent. At the same time MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U.S. and GVN operating staff closer together at all levels, including joint operating rooms at key command levels. The President met with the National Security Counc il on March 17 and approved McNamara's recommendations; NSAM 288 of that date di rected all agencies to execute the parts applying to them. To underline one poin t further, State cabled USOM Saigon on March 18 to make sure to report all rumor s of coups heard by any U.S. personnel to the Ambassador at once; and it gave th e Ambassador full reaction authority. Then the President summarized his view of the main thrust of the new policy, in a cable to Lodge on March 20: As we agreed in our previous messages to each other, judgment is reserved for the present on overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon conversations of McN amara mission with General Khanh and you on judgment that movement against the N orth at the present would be premature. We here share General Khanh's judgment t hat

the immediate and essential task is to strengthen the southern base. For this re ason our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at pres ent, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest possible mil itary and political base for possible later action. Anticipating great things, t he White House announced Khanh's "mobilization plan" on March 17, and implied US G support for him: To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are a cting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan....To carry out this plan . . . General Khanh has informed us that he pro-proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan.... The policy s hould continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be a ssumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required.... Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months. In a speech in Wa shington on March 26, Secretary McNamara more explicitly supported the Khanh gov ernment, and gave the accepted priorities of U.S. policy: ....In early 1963, Pre sident Kennedy was able to report to the nation that "the spearpoint of aggressi on has been blunted in South Vietnam." It was evident that the Government had se ized the initiative in most areas from the insurgents. But this progress was int errupted in 1963 by the political crises arising from troubles between the Gover nment and the Buddhists, students, and other non-Communist oppositionists. Presi dent Diem lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; there were accusations of maladministration and injustice. There were two changes of government within three months. The fabric of government was torn. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets virtually disappeared. Of the 41 in cumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last year, 35 were replaced. Nine provi nces had three chiefs in three months; one province had four. Scores of lesser o fficials were replaced. Almost all major military commands changed hands twice. The confidence of the peasants was inevitably shaken by the disruptions in leade rship and the loss of physical security . . . Much therefore depends on the new government under General Khanh, for which we have high hopes.... Today the gover nment of General Khanh is vigorously rebuilding the machinery of administration and reshaping plans to carry the war to the Viet Cong. He is an able and energet ic leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the basic elements-political, econom ic and psychological, as well as military-required to defeat the Viet Cong. He i s planning a program of economic and social advances for the welfare of his peop le. He has brought

into support of the government representatives of key groups previously excluded . He and his colleagues have developed plans for systematic liberation of areas now submissive to Viet Cong duress and for mobilization of all available Vietnam ese resources in the defense of the homeland. At the same time, General Khanh ha s understood the need to improve South Vietnam's relations with its neighbors . . . In short, he has demonstrated the energy, comprehension, and decision requir ed by the difficult circumstances that he faces.... The third option before the President [after withdrawal and neutralization, both rejected] was initiation of military actions outside South Vietnam, particularly against North Vietnam, in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam. This course of action--its implications and ways of carrying it out--has been carefully stud ied. What ever ultimate course of action may be forced upon us by the other side , it is clear that actions under this option would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Vietnam's own borders. The fourth course of action was to concentrate on helping the South Vietnamese win the battle in their own country. This, all agree, is essential no matter what else is done. . . We have reaffirmed U.S. support for South Vietnam's Government and pledged eco nomic assistance and military training and logistical support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control. We will support the Government of S outh Vietnam in carrying out its Anti-Insurgency Plan. The next day McNamara for mally ended the hope of phased withdrawal, by stopping the lower-echelon joint p lanning activities that had aimed at replacing U.S. elements in Vietnam by Vietn amese. Although the Vietnamese knew that the "withdrawal" of 1000 men in Decembe r 1963 had been a pretense, his action now removed any remaining doubt about our intentions. The message was brief: Model Plan projection for phasedown of U.S. forces and GVN forces is superseded. Policy is as announced by White House on 17 March 64. E. OPENING BIDS ON ADVICE, LEVERAGE, AND AID, APRIL-MAY, 1964 Armed w ith our declaration of support and with the promised further material assistance , General Khanh signed a mobilization decree on April 4; at the time the decree satisfied the USG as meeting McNamara's recommendation on the subject. However, Khanh delayed signing implementing decrees for the mobilization decree indefinit ely; and it has never become clear what it would have meant, if implemented. In May, Khanh

purportedly broadened the draft to include older and younger men, and announced formation of a new "Civil Defense Corps"; but neither came to anything. On April 4, Khanh also abolished the Council of Notables. This latter step he did on his own, without prior discussion with Lodge. As noted in section 1, Lodge, who alw ays believed in the need and importance of constitutional government in SVN, fel t no urgency for creating a democratic form of government, although many in Stat e may have wanted to object to Khanh's actions. Such actions without prior consu ltation were to become a sore point later on with both State and the Embassy. Th us, what the USG actually got for the recognition and material support it gave K hanh in March was the dissolution of the Council of Notables. During April, Lodg e and State continued to debate how hard to push GVN using AID leverage. Lodge a greed with the general principle that the Commercial Import Program (CIP) should not be increased until increased GVN expenditures quickened the economy and dro ve imports up. However, he noted that GVN had been given to understand that they could expect at least the $95 million CIP in 1964 that Diem had in 1963, and th at McNamara had said in Saigon and Washington that U.S. assistance to Vietnam wo uld increase by about $50 million. These assurances had spurred Oanh, Minister o f National Economy, to ask for specific increases in CIP. Lodge thought the time unpropitious for detailed joint planning and for austerity measures as conditio ns for the last increment of 1964 CIP. Oanh received credit for being too busy w ith pacification planning and other matters to discuss such matters. Therefore, Lodge proposed to use the planning of the CY 1965 program as the right place to apply leverage. State reacted sharply, questioning whether the USG should let GV N off the hook on its March commitments that easily. Nevertheless, State acknowl edged that "formal negotiations may not be desirable at this time," and settled instead for "constant dialogue to keep GVN aware of U.S. adherence to the new ap proach and of firm desire to see it implemented." The desired GVN actions includ ed drawdown of foreign exchange reserves, promotion of exports, import austerity , and an anti-inflationary domestic policy. USOM then talked to Oanh about the c ommitments on the two sides. USOM felt that Oanh understood that GVN was to move first and be backed up by the USG as needed, but thought that some segments of GVN were dragging their heels to avoid living up to their commitments. USOM esti mated a $15-30 million drawdown of GVN foreign exchange reserves in 1964. In the last week of April, General Khanh asked Lodge for one American expert each in t he fields of Finance-Economics, Foreign Affairs, and Press relations to be assig ned to him personally and to have offices in "a convenient villa . . . We Vietna mese want the Americans to be responsible with us and not merely as advisors." T his request revived the "brain trust" concept discussed with the Minh government around the first of the year. Commenting, Lodge noted that he had opposed pushi ng Americans into GVN because of Colonialist overtones; they would cause resentm ent, and a lessening of effort by the GVN, placing the blame on the U.S. Therefo re, he had avoided raising the idea with

Khanh. However, that Khanh himself now proposed it removed that objection, and L odge felt that the U.S. should respond because it was an urgent necessity. Late in the same meeting, Lodge told Khanh of a State Department proposal for civil a dministrators on a crash basis in partially pacified areas. His quick reply, "Ye s . . . if you will accept losses." Lodge recommended a Civil Administrative adv isor to join the three others mentioned above, but he advised against more. He s aid there was no sense dumping several hundred advisors out there. In view of th e "trail-blazing" nature of the move, he requested a member of the White House s taff, possibly F )rrestal, to come out for a conference. Ordinarily, it would be surprising that Lodge would make such a big issue of Khanh's revival of an idea that GVN had already advanced through Lodge and that the President himself had approved. However, his effusive reaction in this case merely underlines his oft repeated reluctance to push GVN. Lodge presented the first three advisors to Kha nh on May 6. On April 30, Lodge, Westmoreland, and USOM Director Brent met with : several top members of GVN to discuss GVN's failure to disburse operating fund s to the provinces, sectors and divisions and to correct the manpower shortage i n ARVN and the paramilitary units. Lodge argued that the McNamara program was fa iling, not because U.S. support lagged, but because the necessary piaster suppor t was missing. Moreover, he said, there was no shortage of piasters available to GVN. In reply, Oanh of the GVN said they had inherited a bad system from the Fr ench, and that he was now trying to implement new procedures. Khanh replied on t he manpower problem that to raise the strength would require an ultimatum to the Corps Commanders, but then he also said that remedial moves were underway and w ere known to MACV. Khanh countered the budgetary argument by saying that he had still not received money from the U.S. to support increased pay for the paramili tary; Lodge replied that if he went ahead with the increased pay, the U.S. would meet the bill. Overall, the meeting was one of thrust and parry rather than of consultation. This meeting followed prodding from McNamara and JCS in a cable se nt April 29. On May 4, Khanh told Lodge he wanted to declare war, bomb North Vie tnam with U.S. bombers, put the country on a war footing, including "getting rid of the so-called politicians and having . . . a government of technicians," and bring in 10,000 U.S. Army special forces to "cover the whole Cambodian-Laotian frontier." Lodge was noncothmittal on U.S. forces, but said that the war came fi rst and that democratic forms could wait. However, Khanh publicly called for an election by October of a Constitutional Assembly, apparently to bolster his publ ic support; he had his share of rumors and political infighting. On May 13, duri ng a trip to Saigon to review progress on the March decisions, McNamara met with Khanh to express his concern over GVN inaction. McNamara's main complaints were that RVNAF was failing to reach authorized strength levels and that budget dela ys were holding up pacification. He felt that GVN should announce that

failure to disburse funds is a crime. He also expressed concern about the replac ement of incompetent officers, such as the Commanding General of the ARVN Fifth Division. The meeting went agreeably, and produced the following consensus: (1) All present expressed satisfaction at Khanh's having accepted the importance of speeding up disbursements. (2) The case of the commander of the Fifth Division " presented something of an internal problem, but it would be arranged." (This was the second time around for the Fifth Division case. As the result of a personal request from General Harkins, Khanh had agreed on April 25 to change this same officer "immediately." (3) Khanh hoped to spend more time on military and pacifi cation matters if only "this political stomach trouble" that took so much of his time could be quieted. MACV presented McNamara with a proposal to give the prov ince advisors a total of $278,000 in petty cash and "seed money," to be used sol ely at the U.S. advisors' discretion. This initial proposal suggested putting th e money under control of the psychological operations committee. The idea receiv ed mixed reactions, and went on the agenda of the Honolulu Conference in June. M . Forrestal of the White House Staff came with McNamara, and led a negotiating t eam that met Minister Oanh and his staff to discuss budgetary and economic matte rs. The U.S. team wanted GVN to keep its budget under strict control; GVN wanted the USG to increase CIP, and to give it an additional $18 million from fiscal 1 964 funds. On May 27, when the talks ended, the USG had released the requested $ 18 million, and committed itself to a fiscal 1965 CIP of $135 million, $40 milli on more than in fiscal 1964, plus a standby arrangement for an additional $30 mi llion. GVN protested that this commitment was not enough to prevent inflation, a nd did what it pleased about its own budget; the talks ended with an agreement t o disagree. E. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND PREVAILING VIEWS OF THE WAR, MAY 1964 K hanh's "political stomach trouble" was merely a fresh case of a chronic Vietname se problem. His troubles with General Minh over the four jailed generals continu ed, and coup rumors abounded. On May 21, Lodge told him of the harmful effects o f such rumors, and suggested he talk tough with his cabinet. When their conversa tion turned to General Minh, Khanh insisted that Minh could be proved to have co nspired with the others and with the French to make Vietnam neutral. Khanh and t he MRC planned to try the four generals in Dalat by the 29th of May. State then directed Lodge to try to prevent the trial, and failing that to soften its effec ts and prevent Minh's deposition. Lodge put this position to Khanh on May 28, as serting the special need for unity in view of possible cross-border problems wit h Laos; Khanh accepted the point and agreed to soften the blow on the generals. He flew immediately to Dalat, and the next day announced to Lodge an amicable se ttlement of the problem, with lenient treatment of the generals and new-found co mplete unity among the members of the ruling MRC. State and Lodge were gratified , and agreed that the thing to do was to press for unity in support of getting o n with the

war. However, it was soon common knowledge that the "settlement," amounting to c ensure of the accused officers, satisfied no one; and the problem festered on. I n May the first sign appeared of varying emphasis at the highest levels on parti cular necessary steps for success against the VC. In a DPM dated May 25, 1964, M cGeorge Bundy restated the theme of the Rostow memorandum to SecState of Februar y 13: It is recommended that you make a Presidential decision that the U.S. will use selected and carefully graduated military force against North Vietnam . . . on these premises: (1) That the U.S. cannot tolerate the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism; (2) That without a decision to resort to military action if neces sary, the present prospect is not hopeful, in South Vietnam or in Laos. Of cours e, Bundy knew of the GVN's weaknesses and on other occasions asserted the need t o reform GVN; but here he focussed exclusively on using force against NVN. In co ntrast, Chairman Sullivan of the newly-created inter-agency Vietnam Committee sa id in a proposed memorandum for the President (May, 1964, undated): The Vietname se Government is not operating efficiently enough to reverse the adverse trend i n the war with the Viet Cong. The Khanh Government has good intentions; it has a nnounced good general plans and broad programs; but these plans are not being tr anslated into effective action against the Viet Cong on either the military or t he civil side. It has, therefore, become urgently necessary to find a means to i nfuse the efficiency into the governmental system that it now lacks. To remedy t he GVN's lack of efficiency, Sullivan proposed that Americans assume de facto co mmand of GVN's machinery. American personnel, who have hitherto served only as a dvisors, should be integrated into the Vietnamese chain of command, both militar y and civil. They should become direct operational components of the Vietnamese Governmental structure. For cosmetic purposes American personnel would not assum e titles which would show command functions, but would rather be listed as "assi stants" to the Vietnamese principals at the various levels of government .... Am ericans should be integrated to all levels of the Vietnamese Government . . . Am ericans would be integrated into the Central Government to insure that decisions are taken, orders are issued and funds, supplies and personnel are made availab le for their implementation, and execution actually takes place. At the regional level Americans, both military and civilian, would also be introduced . . . Ame ricans would likewise be brought into the government machinery at province and d istrict level to insure that the counterinsurgency programs are actually execute d at the level where the people live.

Aside from the command aspect which Americans would assume, the principal other new element in this concept would be the introduction of American civilians at t he district level. Their purpose would be to insure that programs are put into e ffect at the village and hamlet level to gain the support of the people... Perso nnel at the district level would confront a maximum risk and casualties are virt ually certain. Since the U.S. should take any feasible measure to assure their s ecurity, it is important that Vietnamese units of the Civil Guard and Self-Defen se Corps, which operate at this level, be encadred with an adequate number of Am erican military personnel to insure that they will operate effectively. This DPM also proposed extensive reshuffling of the lines of authority in the GVN itself , including the elimination of divisions from the Vietnamese military structure and placing all authority for pacification, military and civilian, in the hands of the province chiefs under the corps commanders. The Vietnam Committee watered down this proposal immediately, however. On May 27, it went to four high-level addressees as a talking paper, with the second sentence of the above recommendat ion altered to say, "They should become more than advisors, but should not becom e an integral part of the chain of command." (Emphasis added.) Recognizing Vietn amese sensitivities and the GVN's political vulnerability, the revised paper rec ommended a gradual, phased approach. But even the watered-down version was terme d "radical" in the cable putting it on the agenda for the upcoming Honolulu Conf erence. In the new advisory program already underway, MACV reported a big improv ement by late May in the experimental districts with U.S. advisors. People rathe r than messages moved back and forth. Economic and social bonds were reported im proved. Further extension of advisors to districts was put on the agenda. In pre liminary communications, General Taylor, Chairman of the JCS, assumed that their mission would be to supervise unit training, operational performance, and opera tional planning of para-military units in the districts; but he also suggested d iscussion of other ways in which military personnel could be used to advantage i n forwarding the pacification program. The month ended with a Rusk-Khanh meeting that re-emphasized the accepted priorities of U.S. policy, and unquestionably c onfirmed to the Vietnamese how far we were thinking of going. First, Rusk emphas ized to Khanh the effect of Vietnamese quarreling on the U.S. and on other poten tial allies in the struggle. Second, they discussed immediate extensions of the war, such as attacking the Laotian corridor, and the various further extensions that might follow. Third, Khanh pushed hard on the idea, which as noted above ha d already been discussed in Washington, that he could not win without extending the war. Finally, Khanh pledged to keep all these matters secret until the U.S. agreed to overt statement or action. The language of the cable reporting this me eting is candid and revealing:

1. Solidarity Within South Vietnam ....Secretary [Rusk] stated one of main probl ems President faces in justifying to American people whatever course of action m ay be necessary or indicated as matter of internal solidarity of SVN. Secretary noted that if struggle escalates, only U.S. will have the forces to cope with it . This basic reality means President has heavy responsibility of making vital de cisions and leading American public opinion to accept them. Difficult to do this if SVN appears hopelessly divided and rent by internal quarrels. ....Secretary said he was not thinking in terms of displaying solidarity so as to convince Par is that struggle could be won, but rather was thinking in terms of sustaining th e faith in the possibilities of ultimate success of our Vietnamese effort among those nations we hoped "would be in the foxholes with us" if escalation became n ecessary and if enemy forces reacted in strength. For example, UK, Australia, Ne w Zealand. Solidarity and unit of purpose in SVN was keystone of whole effort. W as General Khanh doing all he could to bring about such national unity? Khanh re plied affirmatively, saying he fully aware of importance of unity. His recent ha ndling of the case of the arrested Generals showed this. His clemency showed he was primarily interested in protecting unity of Army. But there were many proble ms. Underlying structure and heritage of country was such that only Army could l ead Nation in unity. Only Army had the requisite organization, cadres, disciplin e, and sense of purpose. The intellectuals would never be able to adopt a common point of view unless it was imposed by a dictatorship--by a party as the Commun ists did, or a "family dictatorship" such as Diem's. This situation was made wor se because of disproportion between measure of political and civil liberties gra nted in wartime situation on one hand and lack of background and sense of respon sibility of recipients on [the] other . . . He was aware he had perhaps given mo re freedom than really prudent handling of situation would have dictated, but he had to be mindful oft-proclaimed democratic goals of the Vietnamese revolution. All in all, this disunity would not be fatal because Army itself was united, an d no potentially disruptive force could hope to oppose Army and overthrow GVN. ( N.B. No reference to religious problems, sects, or labor under this heading.) 2. Need for Action Outside South Vietnam. ....Khanh dwelt at length on this, layin g out some fairly precise ideas about the kind of action that might be taken. Ba sically, he said that despite the pacification plan and some individual successe s he and his government were "on the defensive" against the Viet Cong. He said p retty flatly that they could not win unless action was taken outside South Vietn am, and that this needed a firm U.S. decision for such action. ....He [Khanh] th en said that the "immediate" response should be to clean out the Communists in E astern Laos, who were the same kind of threat to him, and that we should not get bogged down in negotiations but act.

....Secretary then noted we could never predict enemy reaction with certainty. H ow would SVN people react if NVN and China responded by attacking SVN? Khanh rep lied this would have even more favorable effect on SVN national unity and faith in victory, and would mobilize usual patriotic reactions in face of more clearcu t external threat. 3. Timing of Action Against the North and Necessary Prior Act ion Within South Vietnam. Khanh asked if Secretary and Ambassador believed he sh ould proclaim state of war existed during next few days and now that Generals' c ase was settled. Both advised him to wait at least until after Honolulu Conferen ce and in no case ever to take action on such matter without consulting. He agre ed, and remarked that if he proclaimed state of war, NVN would know this was pre paratory to some form of escalation and he would never act unilaterally and ther eby run risk of tipping America's hand. Although the matter was not specifically mentioned, Khanh appeared to accept as entirely natural that he would not neces sarily know in advance if U.S. decided to strike outside VN. ....Some question a s to how enemy camp will react. At various points in conversation Khanh was obvi ously seeking some more definite statement of specific American intentions in im mediate future. Secretary told him he could say nothing on this because he simpl y did not know. The Honolulu meeting would produce some firm recommendations to the President and some plans, but ultimately only President could decide. His de cision would be influenced by consideration of all implications of escalation: O n our forces, on our allies, and perhaps even on mankind itself if nuclear warfa re should result. Only U.S. had the means to cope with problems escalation would pose, and only President could make the ultimate decisions. Nevertheless, Secre tary said he wished to emphasize the following: A. Since 1945 U.S. had taken 165 ,000 casualties in defense of free world against Communist encroachments, and mo st of these casualties were in Asia. B. U.S. would never again get involved in a land war in Asia limited to conventional forces. Our population was 190,000,000 . Mainland China had at least 700,000,000. We would not allow ourselves to be bl ed white fighting them with conventional weapons. C. This meant that if escalati on brought about major Chinese attack, it would also involve use of nuclear arms . Many free world leaders would oppose this. Chiang Kai-Shek had told him ferven tly he did, and so did U Thant. Many Asians seemed to see an element of racial d iscrimination in use of nuclear arms; something we would do to Asians but not to Westerners. Khanh replied he certainly had no quarrel with American use of nucl ear arms, noted that decisive use of Atomic bombs on Japan had in ending war sav ed not only American but also Japanese lives. One must use the force one had; if Chinese used masses of Humanity, we would use superior fire power. D. Regardles s what decisions were reached at Honolulu, their implementation would require po sitioning of our forces. This would take time. Khanh must remember we had

other responsibilities in Asia and must be able react anywhere we had forces or commitments. Not by chance was this Conference being held at Honolulu; the combi ned headquarters of all American forces in Pacific was there. ....6. Comment As can be seen, the Secretary let Khanh develop his ideas fairly fully and do most of the talking.* Khanh talked firmly and effectively, and responded well to * Co mment: Nevertheless, as can be seen, the Secretary spoke freely. the Secretary's several points. He showed clearly that he was aware of the gravity of the decis ions (tho he did seem a touch cavalier about the political problems of hitting e astern Laos at once), and did not seem to want a firm U.S. answer the day after tomorrow. But it seemed clear that he did want it pretty soon, and was now convi nced he could not win in South Vietnam without hitting other areas including the North. He was careful to point out that the pacification campaign was making ga ins and would continue to do so. Still, it was essentially defensive. On the tim ing, the Secretary said that any action would be preceded in any event by some p eriod of time for force deployments. (He did not refer to diplomatic steps re La os, the UN side, the U.S. Congressional problem, or other types of factors.) Kha nh understood this, and also accepted the Secretary's point that we would need t o consult very closely with Khanh himself, try to bring the British and Australi ans aboard (the Secretary referred only to these two possible active participant s), and generally synchronize and work out the whole plan with great care. Thus although the USG had pressed GVN on many details of economic policy, administrat ion, and pacification, contacts at the highest level told GVN that if the Vietna mese leaders would only stick together to prosecute the war, and if we compelled the North Vietnamese to cease and desist, everything would be all right. Provid ed the GVN didn't embarrass the USG too much, there was no limit to how far we w ould go to support them; and apart from "unity" and a reasonable show of effort, there was no onus on them to deliver the goods. Khanh's claim that he could not win without extending the war, and that the Vietnamese were tired of the long d reary grind of pacification, met no U.S. objection. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 5, "US-GVN Relations, 1964-1967," pp. 277-407. (Boston: Beacon Press, 19 71) Section 2, pp. 323-369

G. THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE AND ITS FOLLOW-UP, JUNE, 1964 The Honolulu Conference met on short notice with an air of urgency; principals included McNamara, Rusk, Lodge, Taylor, and Westmoreland. Presentations of the current situation precede d consideration of additional measures to be taken. Lodge briefed those present on the political status. He said the situation could "jog along," but he thought that some external action would be a big lift to South Vietnamese morale. Lodge 's prediction was more optimistic than later events, in August, proved justified ; he said "if we bombed Tchepone or attacked the [NVN torpedo] boats and the Vie tnamese people knew about it, this would . . . unify their efforts and reduce [t heir] quarreling." In reply to a question by Rusk, he opposed the idea of a more formal joint USG/GVN organization at the top; McNamara hoped that a more formal organization would evolve. Lodge felt that the USG/GVN relationship was harmoni ous, and that GVN was responsive to advice. He liked the present methods of deal ing with them. Westmoreland called the military picture "tenuous but not hopeles s" and added that a few victories were badly needed. Both were more optimistic t han was the prevailing Washington view. All present agreed that the emergence of a hostile government or anarchy would be a major threat to the U.S. position. T he fear of this threat undoubtedly helps explain the USG's persistent hesitancy to apply leverage to GVN. Westmoreland circulated a working paper calling for mo derate increases in U.S. personnel, both civilian and military, for eight critic al provinces. He reported that the GVN had recently responded to massive advisor y pressure by increasing the tempo of their military operations. He felt they wo uld similarly respond to a continuing advisory program oriented toward pacificat ion. Both Lodge and Westmoreland rejected, as both unwise and unacceptable to GV N, any major plan for "inter-larding" or "encadrement" which would move U.S. per sonnel directly into decision-making roles. Their opposition ended conference co nsideration of the proposals advanced by the Sullivan memorandum. In a long draf t memorandum, dated June 13, 1964, Sullivan added some further insight into US/G VN relations and into the views of Lodge and Westmoreland about national priorit ies, beyond what is shown in the CINCPAC record of the Conference. In attempting to accomplish many of these programs, we have encountered resistance both from the Vietnamese and from our own U.S. Mission. Ambassador Lodge . . . fears that the increased introduction of Amercans would give a colonial coloration to our p resence there and would cause the Vietnamese to depend more and more on our exec ution of their programs. The Vietnamese . . . have some fear of appearing to be American puppets . . . Finally, there is some indication that they are reluctant to associate themselves too closely with the Americans until they feel more con fident of ultimate American intentions. At the current moment, there is great do ubt and confusion in Vietnam about U.S. determination . . . As a leading Saigon newspaper said on June 12: "We must be vigilant

and we must be ready to meet any eventuality so as to avoid the possible shamefu l sacrifice and dishonor to our country as in the past." Given this sort of atmo sphere in South Vietnam, it is very difficult to persuade the Vietnamese to comm it themselves to sharp military confrontations with the communists if they suspe ct that something in the way of a negotiated deal is being concocted behind thei r backs. Consequently, many of the actions which we are pressing on the South Vi etnamese are flagging because of this uncertainty... Both Ambassador Lodge and G eneral Westmoreland, at the Honolulu Conference expressed the opinion that the s ituation in South Vietnam would "jog along" at the current stalemated pace unles s some dramatic "victory" could be introduced to put new steel and confidence in to the Vietnamese leadership. General Westmoreland defined "victory" as a determ ination to take some new vigorous military commitment, such as air strikes again st Viet Cong installations in the Laos corridor. Ambassador Lodge defined "victo ry" as a willingness to make punitive air strikes against North Vietnam. The sig nificant fact about both . . . suggestions was that they looked toward some Amer ican decision to undertake a commitment which the Vietnamese would interpret as a willingness to raise the military ante and eschew negotiations begun from a po sition of weakness. While it is almost impossible to establish measurements of V ietnamese morale, we are able to say that there is not at the current moment a s ingle galvanized national purpose, expressed in the government leadership and en ergizing all elements of the country with a simple sense of confidence. The sele ctive Westmoreland plan offered hope and was sufficiently general to avoid speci fic opposition. The conference agreed that Saigon should complete the plan and w ork urgently on its implementation. Several more minor decisions were made on un ilateral matters. "Czar" powers for information were put in the hands of Zorthia n. It was agreed that the DCM should be strengthened with a "truly executive man ," and there was to be a clearing-of-decks on the military side in Saigon throug h reductions in social activities and cut-downs in dependents. None of these mea sures was expected to affect the dubious prognosis for the next 3-6 months. The best that could be hoped for was a slight gain by the end of the year. There was serious discussion of military plans and intelligence estimates regarding wider actions outside South Vietnam. Subjects included the conduct of military operat ions in Laos, a major build-up of forces, and planning of possible air strikes a gainst North Vietnam. The conclusion reached was that the somewhat less pessimis tic estimate of the present situation afforded the opportunity to further refine these plans. The conference concluded that the crucial actions for the immediat e future were (1) to prosecute an urgent information effort in the United States toward dispelling the basic

doubts of the value of Southeast Asia which were besetting key members of Congre ss and the public in the budding "great debate," and (2) to start diplomatic eff orts with the Thais, Australians, New Zealanders, Philippines, and the French on matters within their cognizance which impinged on our effort in South Vietnam. Upon his return to Washington, the Secretary of State cabled Saigon a specific l isting of the Washington understanding of the ten actions that were to be taken to expand U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the super-critical provinces. The gi st of the actions is as follows: (1) Move in additional VN troops to assure nume rical superiority over VC. (2) Assign control of all troops in province to provi nce chief. (3) Develop and execute detailed hamlet by hamlet "oil spot" and "cle ar and hold" operations plans for each of the approximate 40 districts. (4) Intr oduce a system of population control (curfews, ID papers, intelligence network). (5) Increase the province police force. (6) Expand the information program. (7) Develop a special economic aid program for each province. (8) Add additional U. S. personnel 320 military province and district advisors 40 USOF province and di strict advisors 74 battalion advisors (2 from each of 37 battalions) ---434 (9) Transfer military personnel to fill existing and future USOM shortages. (10) Est ablish joint US/GVN teams to monitor the program at both national and provincial level. The message concluded by asking Saigon to forward specific proposals to effect these decisions and a time schedule, "earliest." The plan to give provinc e advisors a petty cash fund received so little support that there is no mention of it in either CINCPAC or the State Conference Record. Upon his return to Saig on on June 4 Ambassador Lodge went straight from the airport to call on General Khanh. While Lodge mentions in his report that the subject of low ARVN strength was raised as a matter to be improved upon, the main thrust of his talk with Kha nh was to hint that the USG would in the immediate future be preparing U.S. publ ic opinion for actions against North Vietnam. Khanh was reported to be eager to learn more about the details. On June 13, Saigon replied to the State request fo r specific proposals. A MACV study had been completed on point 1 and the RVNAF w ould be approached. On point 2, it was noted that RF and PF were already under t he province chiefs; ARVN would be approached on province command of regulars. A wordy description of "concept" spoke to the remainder of State's ten points. It provoked a long series of specific questions from Washington about the 8 provinc es, asking in sort, "How soon can action be initiated?"

On June 25, COMUSMACV sent his request to JCS for an increase of 4,200 U.S. pers onnel to implement this expanded advisory effort. He viewed these as efforts to "influence the successful planning and execution of the National Pacification Pl an." Subsector advisors were to be "a general reinforcement of the pacification effort at district level." Consequently, the MACV terms of reference for subsect or advisors were developed to provide that teams would extend the capabilities o f USOM and USIS. Guidance was intentionally not specific. The same day General W estmoreland reported that, with the Ambassador's concurrence, he had called on G eneral Khanh to discUss three military matters: (1) Augmentation of advisors at battalion level and extension of larger advisory teams to most districts; (2) Th e urgent need to coordinate pacification efforts in the provinces surrounding Sa igon; and (3) The necessity of moving a regiment to Long An (the pacification sh ow-case) as soon as possible. General Khanh's reply was very receptive and agree able on all matters. On June 26, Lodge sent his last message as Ambassador repor ting that he and General Westmoreland had that day met with General Khanh and ha d reached "general agreement" on the concept, scope, and organization set forth in the Saigon reply of June 13 (referred to above). Meanwhile the proposal for a province advisors' fund reappeared in a new form, and won quick approval. USOM agreed that AID should spend $200,000 from its contingency funds for direct purc hase of piasters, to allocate to sector advisors for small expenditures (usually less than $25 at a time). The funds were to buy local materials and services fo r projects using AID commodities; and their use was to be coordinated with the V ietnamese Province Chief. By subsequent US/GVN agreement, all uses of these fund s and commodities, and requisitions of the commodities from Saigon warehouses, r equired unanimous approval of a three-man ("troika") Provincial Coordinating Com mittee consisting of the Province Chief, the U.S. AID Provincial Representative and the MACV Sector Advisor. The troika sign-off had already applied to the comm odities, as the means to the U.S. veto on their use mentioned above in Section A . Except for a high-level agreement each year on the size and overall allocation of these resources, Saigon allowed the Provinces full freedom of action in thei r use. The intent of this arrangement was to permit prompt action on urgent proj ects, unaffected by the delays in the GVN administration that plagued regular GV N operations. It also interfered with corrupt misuse of the AID commodities and of purchase piasters. II. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S FIRST SEVEN MONTHS: PLANNING FOR " BOMB NORTH" AMID TURBULENCE IN THE SOUTH A. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S INITIATION, JULY , 1964 Ambassador Taylor arrived in Saigon amid the start of planning to extend the war outside the borders of South Vietnam. Rusk had discussed the options wit h Khanh on June 1, and the participants of the Honolulu Conference had mulled th em over further. Although

there was no formal decision to recommend new operations in Laos or North Vietna m, there was an atmosphere of expectation. A joint State-Defense message on June 27 authorized joint planning with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff for cross border operations in Laos; on June 30, Westmoreland discussed it with General Kh iem, who agreed to initiate joint planning. Taylor came with a letter of support from the President that cleared up any previous doubt about the Ambassador's co ntrol over MACV: I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confid ence but of my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility for the eff ort of the United States in South Vietnam . . . I wish it clearly understood tha t this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietna m and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate . Either the letter was intended to prevent confusion of authority such as exist ed among Lodge, Felt, and Harkins, or the expectation of greater militarization of the war made it appropriate to appoint Taylor Ambassador and to give him unch allenged authority. Taylor met Khanh and presented his credentials on July 8. Kh anh promised him "the frank cooperation of a soldier." He said the U.S. should n ot merely advise, but should participate in making and implementing plans; in th is he still held the view he had expressed to Taylor when he, Khanh, was still a Corps Commander. (By referring to Zorthian's contacts with the Minister of Info rmation, Khanh made it clear he had the brain trust idea in mind.) However, he n oted that this degree of involvement should be kept secret, because of the criti cism it would attract if known. They discussed Minh's trips around the country, and agreed these were useful and constructive. Finally, Taylor stressed the impo rtance of Vietnamese unity and resolve. The next day Taylor called on the three Vice Premiers, Hoan, Do Mau, and Oanh, and received the civilian point of view. Hoan did most of the talking, saying that civilian politicians like himself want ed the Army to be supported by the people, but that Khanh and the MRC were diffi cult to work with: The ruling generals control everything. He said the II Corps Commander lived like a playboy, and that the people were outraged; "ever since w e came to power we have been telling population we are soon going to have change , but it never comes. The people are becoming impatient." Moreover, he said, som ething must be done to raise the standard of behavior of the armed forces toward the population. Taylor received these views diplomatically. For a while there w as a serious effort to go through with close meshing of USOM and GVN planning. O n July 17 USOM met with Khanh, Hoan, Oanh and others as a group, which Khanh des ignated the National Security Council. They discussed joint planning and further meshing of US/GVN organizations, putting the stamp of approval on the arrangeme nt in the Ministry of Information. On July 23 Taylor met Khanh and discussed a s econd meeting of the NSC. Khanh said the Vietnamese had some difficulty in adjus ting their ministerial organization to the requirements of meshing with the U.S.

mission subdivisions. Taylor responded that reciprocal adjustments were possible . Planning and discussion of cross-border operations continued actively. Offensi ve guerrilla operations in Laos were a major idea; small operations had already begun into North Vietnam, under OPLAN 34A. In the meeting on July 23, Khanh told Taylor he wanted to intensify the operations under 34A and to start air strikes against North Vietnam. He said again, as he had to Rusk on June 1, that he didn 't like to look forward to the long, indecisive pull of the in-country pacificat ion program, and doubted that the Army and the people would carry on indefinitel y. The events of July 19-23 made it clear that GVN was straining at the leash; i t started public lobbying for cross-border operations. On July 19 Air Marshal Ky spilled the beans to reporters on plans for operations into Laos. Khanh committ ed a similar indiscretion at a "Unification Rally" on the 19th, and these were f ollowed by GVN press releases and editorials in the Saigon press urging a "march to the North." All these leaks directly violated Khanh's promises to Rusk on Ju ne 1. Taylor spoke to Khanh sharply about them, and pointed out that they could be interpreted as a campaign to force the USG's hand. Khanh insisted that such a campaign was the furthest thing from his mind; and then confirmed that it was e xactly what he had in mind. Following a long, eloquent repetition of his remarks of other occasions on Vietnamese war-weariness, he asked: Why does not the USG recognize that the appearance of North Vietnamese draftees among the prisoners t aken in the I Corps meant that the war had entered a new phase and the USG and G VN must respond with new measures? He said Vietnamese spirits had been raised by President Johnson's firm statements earlier in the year (specifically, Los Ange les, January 21), but that following them nothing had happened. The effect was w earing off, and the communists would conclude they were only words. Then Khanh t ook the offensive and complained to Taylor that U.S. officials were contradictin g him in public statements. For example, MACV had denied that there was an invas ion of I Corps by DRV units, as Khanh had claimed in a speech at Danang. Zorthia n soothed him by saying that MACV merely corrected a misquotation of one of MACV 's own officials; Taylor said no U.S. official would knowingly contradict Khanh. Taylor took all this patiently, as he did an intelligence report that said Khan h was trying to incite the USG to action against North Vietnam. (The report also said that Ky was saying privately that the GVN should go it alone, because the USG was stalling on account of the U.S. election.) USOM conjectured that Goldwat er's nomination had precipitated the "go North" movement. Moreover, within two h ours after Khanh's long meeting with Taylor, the Ministry of Defense let fly ano ther press release in the teeth of USOM disapproval, when Khanh ordered the Mini stry to reject Zorthian's suggested changes. The only explanation offered was th at GVN was extremely sensitive about appearing to be a U.S. puppet. In an analys is of these events, Taylor argued for tolerance and patience with GVN, and showe d no hint of a desire to get tough. He noted that political sniping and maneuver ing pressed Khanh to do something dramatic to bolster his support. Taylor feared the GVN might get tired and want to negotiate if they could not get the U.S. mo re involved. He proposed joint contingency plan-fling for bombing North Vietnam as a means to cool

GVN off and to reopen communications with them. In a long conversation on July 2 4 Khanh discussed his political problems with Taylor and asked him point blank i f he should resign. Taylor flatly said no, that the USG still supported him and definitely wanted no further change in GVN. Khanh then asked for a declaration o f support and for pressure on the generals to continue to support him; Taylor ag reed. (Comment: Much of Khanh's political problem still revolved around Minh, wh o had long had good relations with Taylor. This relationship may have worried Kh anh, and led him to approach Taylor in this way. However, it may have merely bee n a way to keep up the pressure on USG on the matter of bombing North. A couple of days later Khanh was again grumbling publicly about being a U.S. puppet.) In response to Taylor's discussion of GVN motives and of ways to make them happy, S tate authorized him to tell Khanh the USG had considered attacks on North Vietna m that might begin, for example, if the pressure from dissident South Vietnamese factions became too great. He must keep this confidential. It said to tell him that the USG position had not changed, and that it never excluded the possibilit y of wider action. When Taylor brought this matter to Khanh for discussion, they first agreed on a GVN announcement of an increase in U.S. personnel and discuss ed the press leaks on going North. Khanh then took the offensive, complaining to Taylor about press stories suggesting the USG was negotiating with the Chinese through the Pakistani Government, behind the back of GVN. Taylor soothed him by saying that the USG was merely letting China know how firm our policy was. When Taylor asked Khanh his views of U.S. policy, Khanh said he wanted pressure on th e North, meaning a bombing campaign. Taylor replied with the position that State had authorized on joint planning. Khanh acted pleased and surprised, promised t o think it over, and promised to hold it tightly. He also said he wanted to reor ganize GVN to strengthen his own position; Taylor asked for specifics, and urged him not to do anything drastic that would stir up trouble. B. THE TONKIN INCIDE NTS AND THE POLiCY PROGNOSES, AUGUST, 1964 Within a week, North Vietnamese PT bo ats attacked the U.S. destroyer Maddox, in admitted retaliation for an attack by South Vietnamese boats on two North Vietnamese islands. Then a disputed further attack of North Vietnamese PT boats on the Maddox and the Turner Joy on August 4 provoked a U.S. retaliatory raid on the main North Vietnamese PT boat base and its support facilities. The raids lifted GVN's spirits, as expected, and encour aged Khanh to clamp down internally. On August 7, he proclaimed a state of emerg ency, the idea he had been discussing for some time with both Lodge and Taylor. He reimposed censorship and restricted movement; but he left politicians and pot ential coup-plotters alone. Also on August 7, the U.S. Congress in joint session passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. On August 8, Westmoreland discussed overa ll joint planning with Khanh; the question of combined command came up, and West moreland mentioned the example of Korea. Both agreed to postpone this issue.

On August 14, State directed Saigon to avoid actions that could be called provoc ative, like the DESOTO patrols (which the Maddox and the Turner Joy had been doi ng when attacked) and 34A operations. State noted that the U.S. retaliatory raid 's effect on GVN's morale would be temporary, and took a pessimistic view of the USOM reports: Mission's monthly report (Saigon 377) expresses hope of significa nt gains by end of year. But also says Khanh's chances of staying in power are o nly 50-50, that leadership . . . has symptoms defeatism and hates prospect of sl ugging it out within country, that there will be mounting pressures for wider ac tion "which, if resisted, will create frictions and irritations which could lead local politicians to serious consideration negotiated solution or local soldier s to military adventure without U.S. consent" . . . Our actions of last week lif ted . . . morale temporarily, but also aroused expectations, and morale could ea sily sag back again if VC have successes and we do nothing further. The cable we nt on to state that an essential element of U.S. policy was to devise the best p ossible means of action--minimum risks for maximum results in terms of SVN moral e and pressure on DRV. In the context of a possible new Geneva conference on Lao s, its prognosis was that pressure on the North would be the main vehicle for su ccess: Basically solution in both South Vietnam and Laos will require combinatio n military pressure and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peipin g) eventually accept idea of getting out. Negotiation without continued military action will not achieve our objectives in foreseeable future . . . After, but o nly after, we have established clear pattern pressure hurting DRV and leaving no doubts in South Vietnam of our resolve, we could even accept conference broaden ed to include Vietnam issue. (Underlining in original.) On the touchy aspect of US/GVN relations, it simply said: Joint US/GVN planning already covers possible actions against DRV and the Panhandle. It can be used in itself to maintain mora le of GVN leadership, as well as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves . The Taylor reply to the above message differed only in emphasis. ....Underlyin g our analysis is the apparent assumption of DepTel 439 (which we believe is cor rect) that the present in-country pacification plan is not enough in itself to m aintain National morale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual success. Somethi ng must be added in the coming months. Statement of the problem--A. The course w hich U.S. policy in South Vietnam should take during the coming months can be ex pressed in terms of four objectives. The first and most important objective is t o gain time for the Khanh government to develop a certain stability and to give some firm evidence of viability. Since any of the courses of action considered i n this cable carry a considerable measure of risk to the U.S., we should be slow to get too deeply involved in them until we have a better feel of the quality o f our

ally. In particular, if we can avoid it, we should not get involved militarily w ith North Vietnam and possibly with Red China if our base in South Vietnam is in secure and Khanh's Army is tied down everywhere by the VC insurgency. Hence, it is to our interest to gain sufficient time not only to allow Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free Saigon from the VC threat which presently rings it and assure that sufficient GVN ground forces will be available to provide a reasonable measure of defense against any DRV ground reaction which may develop in the execution of our program and thus avoid the possible requirement for a ma jor U.S. ground force commitment. A second objective in this period is the maint enance of morale in South Vietnam, particularly within the Khanh government. Thi s should not be difficult in the case of the government if we can give Khanh ass urance of our readiness to bring added pressure on Hanoi if he provides evidence of ability to do his part. Thirdly, while gaining time for Khanh, we must be ab le to hold the DRV in check and restrain a further buildup of Viet Cong strength by way of infiltration from the North. Finally, throughout this period, we shou ld be developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of p ressure against North Vietnam, using January 1, 1965, as a target D-Day. We must always recognize, however, that events may force us to advance D-Day to a consi derably earlier date.... In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our willingness to Khanh to engage in planning and eventually to exert intense p ressure on North Vietnam, providing certain conditions are met in advance. In th e first place before we would agree to go all out against the DRy, he must stabi lize his Government and make some progress in cleaning up his operational backya rd. Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of the Hop Tac Plan success fully to the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from the doors of Saigon. The overa ll pacification program, including Hop Tac, should progress sufficiently to allo w earmarking at least three division equivalents for the Defense in I Corps if t he DRV step up military operations in that area. Finally, we should reach some f undamental understandings with Khanh and his Government concerning war aims. We must make clear that we will engage in action against North Vietnam only for the purpose of assuring the security and independence of South Vietnam within the t erritory assigned by the 1954 agreements; that we will not repeat not join in a crusade to unify the North and South; that we will not repeat not even seek to o verthrow the Hanoi Regime provided the latter will cease its efforts to take ove r the South by subversive warfare. With these understandings reached, we would b e ready to set in motion the following: (1) Resume at once 34A (with emphasis on Marine operations) and Desoto patrols. These could start without awaiting outco me of discussions with Khanh. (2) Resume U-2 overflights over all NVN. (3) Initi ate air and ground strikes in Laos against infiltration targets as soon as joint plans now being worked out with the Khanh Government are ready....

Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the level of precautionary military readiness (if not already done) by taking such visible measures as intr oducing U.S. hawk units to Danang and Saigon, landing a Marine force at Danang f or defense of the airfield and beefing up MACV's support base. By this time (ass umed to be late fall) we should have some reading on Khanh's performance. Assumi ng that his performance has been satisfactory and that Hanoi has failed to respo nd favorably, it will be time to embark on the final phase of course of action A , a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on NVN, directed primarily at infiltra tion and other military targets . Pros and cons of course of action--A. If succe ssful, course of action A will accomplish the objectives set forth at the outset as essential to the support of U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I will press the K hanh Government into doing its homework in pacification and will limit the diver sion of interest to the out-of-country ventures . . . It gives adequate time for careful preparation estimated at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain internal morale. It also provides ample warning to Hanoi and Peking to allow them to adjust their conduct before becoming over-committed. On the ot her hand, course of action A relies heavily upon the durability of the Khanh Gov ernment. It assumes that there is little danger of its collapse without notice o r of its possible replacement by a weaker or more unreliable successor . . . Als o, because of the drawn-out nature of the program, it is exposed to the danger o f international political pressure to enter into negotiations before NVN is real ly hurting from the pressure directed against it. Statement of the Problem--B. I t may well be that the problem of U.S. policy in SVN is more urgent than that de picted in the foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the present moment th at the Khanh Government can last until January 1, 1965, although the application of course of action A should have the effect of strengthening the Government in ternally and of silencing domestic squabbling. If we assume, however, that we do not have the time available which is implicit in course of action A (several mo nths), we would have to restate the problem in the following terms. Our objectiv e avoid the possible consequences of a collapse of National morale. To accomplis h these purposes, we would have to open the campaign against the DRV without del ay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as possible to desist from aiding the VC a nd to convince the DRV that it must cooperate in calling off the VC insurgency. Course of action--B. To meet this statement of the problem, we need an accelerat ed course of action, seeking to obtain results faster than under course of actio n A. Such an accelerated program would include the following actions: Again we m ust inform Khanh of our intentions, this time expressing a willingness to begin military pressures against Hanoi at once providing that he will undertake to per form as in course of action A. However, U.S. action would not await evidence of performance.

Again we may wish to communicate directly on this subject with Hanoi or awaiting effect of our military actions. The scenario of the ensuing events would be ess entially the same as under Course A but the execution would await only the readi ness of plans to expedite, relying almost exclusively on U.S. military means. Pr os and cons of Course of Action B. This course of action asks virtually nothing from the Khanh Government, primarily because it is assumed that little can be ex pected from it. It avoids the consequence of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Go vernment and gets underway with minimum delay the punitive actions against Hanoi . Thus, it lessens the chance of an interruption of the program by an internatio nal demand for negotiations by presenting a fait accompli to international criti cs. However, it increases the likelihood of U.S. involvement in ground action, s ince Khanh will have almost no available ground forces which can be released fro m pacification employment to mobile resistance of DRV attacks. Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the greater promised achievement of U. S. policy objectives in SVN during the coming months. However, we should always bear in mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to shift quic kly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In either case, we must be militarily ready for any response which may be initiated by NVN or by CHICOMS. M iscellaneous: As indicated above, we believe that 34A operations should resume a t once at maximum tempo, still on a covert basis; similarly, Desoto patrols shou ld begin advance operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a number of VNA F pilots should be trained on B-57's between now and first of year. There should be no change now with regard to policy on evacuation of U.S. dependents. Recomm endations: It is recommended that USG adopt Course of Action A while maintaining readiness to shift to Course of Action B. C. THE RISE AND FALL OF KHANH'S CONST ITUTION In a state of euphoria after the U.S. reprisals, Khanh broached the subj ect of a new constitution with Taylor on August 12; presumably this was what he had in mind on July 27 when he mentioned reorganization (above, p. 328). He prop osed three branches of government beneath the MRC. The Assembly would have 90 ap pointed members and 60 elected; Khanh would be the President (and Minh wouldn't) . Taylor urged Khanh to go slowly, and to handle the matter gently. Taylor feare d renewed political instability if sweeping government changes were announced; b ut Khanh said that the country could not progress under the existing government. Taylor expressed his scepticism, but objected no further than to caution Khanh on the need to explain these changes adequately in advance. On August 14, after an NSC joint planning session, Khanh showed Taylor a rough English translation o f his proposed new constitution. Taylor expressed reservations:

We found it brusque in language and suggested to Khanh that in present form it c ould raise criticism in U.S. and world press. We stressed to him that internal p roblems of acceptance in Vietnam were his own affair, and we could only offer ob servations on the objective issue of international reactions. Khanh allowed Sull ivan and Manful to work briefly with his drafting committee, the same day, but t hey worked in such haste that they had little influence. Taylor commented: We co nclude that Khanh and his military colleagues have decided that this sort of cha nge is indispensable. It is of course still not determined what General Minh's v iew will be. We have considered possibility of seeking legal aid from Washington to review this charter, but feel this would not repeat not be useful because th is document departs so widely from U.S. experience and because time is so short, we have decided that our best efforts would be devoted to (1) making wording of document less brusque and more palatable both in VN and abroad, and (2) assisti ng in proclamation and other sources of public relations nature explaining neces sity for this sort of change. Whether we like it or not, this is the constitutio nal form which the MRC repeat MRC fully intends to impose, and we see no repeat no alternative but to make the best of it. When Khanh secured MRC approval of th e final draft on August 16, they also elected him President, displacing Minh. Kh anh had earlier complained to Taylor that he had kept Minh, a big source of trou ble to him, only at Lodge's urging, as indeed he had. Inasmuch as Khanh had seiz ed power using charges against four generals and using unproved allegations agai nst Minh, and inasmuch as Minh was still a popular figure, Khanh was bound to re gard Minh as a threat to his personal prospects. For several days following the announcement of the new constitution, a head of steam built up among students an d Buddhists. There is no sign that the Embassy did anything to anticipate or hea d off the coming trouble, other than the previously mentioned words of caution t hat Khanh disregarded. On August 21, student demonstrations broke out. Violence built up in the streets, organized and orchestrated by the Buddhists and the VC. Taylor called on Khanh on August 24 in his Dalat retreat to tell him how seriou sly the Embassy viewed the demonstrations. The discussion revolved around "publi c information" and completion of arrangements for the new government. Khanh agre ed to announce the members of the new government by Thursday, the 27th, and to m eet the Buddhist leadership to hear their complaints and to try to enlist their help. He also promised to meet some student demands, to crack down on the demons trations, and to enforce the old mobilization decrees plus new ones. State respo nded to these events with a public announcement of support for Khanh in more dir ect language than any previously used: The United States government fully recogn izes the need for national unity in South Vietnam and is, therefore, supporting the Khanh government as the best means of building such unity at the same time t hat the war effort is being prosecuted. Obviously

anything of a divisive nature is neither in the interest of the Vietnamese gover nment nor its people. That evening Khanh met three top Buddhist leaders in Saigo n, after they refused to go to Dalat. Their principal demands, among eight, were the immediate abrogation of the August 16 charter and the holding of free elect ions by November 1, 1965. Khanh made the mistake of telling them he would have t o consult the Americans. Taylor and others met Khanh at 1:00 a.m. August 25. Obs erving diplomatic propriety, Taylor said his tentative personal views as an inte rested third party were that Khanh should not knuckle under to a minority group on such an important issue as the August 16 charter, especially under an ultimat um. Khanh agreed and proposed to issue a more limited proclamation immediately ( which he did at 5:00 am.) that would meet certain concerns of the Buddhists and students. Khanh's proclamation promised to revise the constitution, diminish cen sorship, rectify local abuses of government, and permit orderly demonstrations. The Buddhists and students were not satisfied; they formed a mob outside his off ice, to which he spoke briefly without further concession. The mob failed to dis perse, and the authorities left them alone. Then without advance notice, militar y headquarters (Khanh) announced that afternoon that Khanh had resigned, that th e August 16 charter would be withdrawn, and that the MRC would meet the next day to choose a new Chief of State and would then dissolve itself. Taylor had made it clear to Minh, Khiem, Lam and Khanh that the U.S. favored retaining Khanh as head of the GVN. Both Tn Quang and Tam Chau, fearing a Dai Viet takeover, suppor ted Khanh. Aligned against Khanh were elements of the military angered by Khanh' s "down with military dictatorship" statement made from a truck top and the Dai Viet (including Khiem, Hoan and Minh) angered by his appeasement of the Buddhist s. On August 26 and 27, the MRC met, while violence erupted in the streets of Sa igon. The evening of the 27th they announced that a triumvirate consisting of Ge nerals Khanh, Minh, and Khiem would rule as an interim government while they tri ed to form a new one. Khanh withdrew to Dalat, and Vice-Premier Oanh became acti ng Prime Minister. Violence continued, and coup rumors became especially active. On August 29, a State Department official briefed the press, interpreting event s. He said Buddhists and students interpreted the August 16 charter as a return to Diemism and repression; in meeting their demands the MRC had worried some Cat holics, but balanced things out by creating the triumvirate with all views repre sented. He said the charter had not been the USG's idea, but that we had been co nsulted and had urged delay. The demonstrations did not contain appreciable anti -Americanism, he said, nor did they arise from differences between the "go North " feelings of the military and refugee Cathotics, on the one hand, and neutralis t sentiments of students and Buddhists, on the other. However, the cable reporti ng the press conference to the Embassy showed concern on both these latter point s.

D. GVN ACQUIRES A CIVILIAN FLAVOR, AND THE USG REVIEWS PRIORITIES On August 29th , Vietnamese paratroopers armed with bayonets restored order in Saigon. Khanh re sted in Dalat; Taylor called on him on the 31st to try to persuade him to return to Saigon quickly to prove he was in charge. West-moreland went to see Khanh th e next day to urge him to keep ARVN on the offensive and to press on with Hop Ta c and other pacification; in exchange for reassurances, Westmoreland revised a p revious position and promised that U.S. advisors through MACV would alert Khanh to unusual troop movements. Westmoreland also obtained reassurances from General Khiem. Rusk suggested a letter from President Johnson urging Khanh to return to Saigon, and then cabled the text of such a letter. A Dai Viet coup attempt was blocked by the junior members of the MRC, who had now become powerful. Several G enerals went to Dalat to persuade Khanh to return as Prime Minister, which he pr omised to do in a few days. Khanh did return to Saigon on September 4. Minh was to be chairman of the triumvirate, and would appoint a new High National Council to represent all elements in the population. The Council was to prepare a new c onstitution and return the government to civilian leadership within a month or s o. Khanh was taking the line that he wanted to get the Army out of politics. Whe n Taylor cautioned Khanh, just before the latter's return to Saigon, that an all -civilian government would be too weak and would tend toward neutralism, Khanh r eplied that the Army would be vigilant. Taylor again advised Khanh to lay the gr oundwork better before any more changes in government structure. When the Triumv irate announced the creation of the NHC, they also ended the state of emergency and press censorship, which they had declared on September 6. On the morning of September 6, as he was leaving for Washington, Taylor sent Rusk a full review of the crisis and of its effects on the Embassy-State military and political appra isal of mid-August. He said that the USG now had to give up on the idea of using a plan for pressures on the North as leverage to get the GVN to press on with p acification, and should go ahead with these pressures in the hope that they woul d raise Vietnamese morale enough to keep up their war effort: ....While we must be disappointed by the political turmoil of recent days, we cannot consider it t otally unexpected. The very nature of the social, political and ethnic confusion in this country makes governmental turbulence of this type a factor which we wi ll always have with us. What has emerged from these recent events is a definitio n within fairly broad limits of the degree to which perfectability in government can be pushed. It should be remembered that the recent fracas started when Khan h sought to make his broad and cumbersome government more tractable and more eff ective. His motives were of the best even though his methods were clumsy. But no w, after this recent experience at government improvement we must accept the fac t that an effective government, much beyond the capacity of that which has exist ed over the past several months, is unlikely to survive. We now have a better fe el for the quality of our ally and for what we can expect from him in terms of a bility to govern. Only the emergence of an exceptional leader could improve the situation and no George Washington is in sight.

Consequently, we can and must anticipate for the future an instrument of governm ent which will have definite limits of performance. At the very worst, it will c ontinue to seek a broadened consensus involving and attempting to encompass all or most of the minority of popular front. This amalgam, if it takes form, may be expected in due course to become susceptible to an accommodation with the liber ation front, which might eventually lead to a collapse of all political energy b ehind the pacification effort. At best, the emerging governmental structure migh t be capable of maintaining a holding operation against the Viet Cong. This leve l of effort could, with good luck and strenuous American efforts, be expanded to produce certain limited pacification successes, for example, in the territory c overed by the Hop Tac plan. But the willingness and ability of such a government to exert itself or to attempt to execute an all-out National pacification plan would be marginal. It would probably be incapable of galvanizing the people to t he heightened level of unity and sacrifice necessary to carry forward the counte r-insurgency program to final success. Instead, it would look increasingly to th e United States to take the major responsibility for prying the Viet Cong and th e North Vietnamese off the backs of the South Vietnamese population. The politic ians in Saigon and Hue feel today that the political hassle is their appropriate arena: The conflict with the VC belongs to the Americans. We may, therefore, ex pect to find ourselves faced with a choice of (A) passively watching the develop ment of a popular front, knowing that this may in due course require the U.S. to leave Vietnam in failure; or (B) actively assuming increased responsibility for the outcome following a time-schedule consistent with our estimate of the limit ed viability of any South Vietnamese government. An examination of our total wor ld responsibilities and the significance of Vietnam in relationship to them clea rly rules out the option of accepting course (A). If we leave Vietnam with our t ail between our legs, the consequences of this defeat in the rest of Asia, Afric a, and Latin America would be disastrous. We therefore would seem to have little choice left except to accept course (B). Our previous views on the right course of action to follow in South Vietnam are set forth in EMBTEL 465. The discussio n in this present cable amounts to a recognition that course of action A repeat A of EMBTEL 465 no longer corresponds with the realities of the situation. Recen t events have revealed the weakness of our ally and have convinced us of the imp robability of attaining the level of governmental performance desired under cour se A before embarking on a campaign of pressure against the DRV. We are forced b ack on course of action B with certain revised views on timing. He went on to re commend that escalating pressures on the DRV begin around December 1. Taylor bro ught with him General Westmoreland's assessment of the military situation; it in cluded a look at the political situation from a completely different viewpoint f rom Taylor's:

....1. In preparation for your trip to Washington, I thought it might be useful to give you my assessment of the military situation. In subsequent paragraphs I outline in some detail the rather substantial progress which we have already mad e and, more importantly, the great potential for additional progress. I also des cribe military problem areas. These, as you know, are many; but all are suscepti ble to solution assuming that political stability can be achieved, and that arme d forces, particularly the Army, remains intact and unified in its purpose. Unde r the present circumstances, however, the continued solidarity of the armed forc es is in doubt. As all else depends on holding the armed forces together, I addr ess this matter first. The Key Military Issue. 2. It seems to me there are certa in conditions which must be met in order to preserve the structure and effective ness of the RVNAF: A. The officers of the RVNAF must be protected against purge, solely by reason of religious or political affiliation. The Commander in Chief, the officers of the Joint General Staff and commanders down the line, must be g iven some assurance that their careers and reputations will not be sacrificed, f or political expediency to the ambitions or interests of political or religious blocs. B. The Officers' Corps must be assured that its members will not be punis hed or expelled from the armed forces if they faithfully execute the orders of c onstituted authority in connection with the maintenance of law and order. They m ust be assured that their superiors will not accede to the arbitrary demands of pressure groups whose interest it is to destroy the discipline of the armed forc es and to render ineffective the forces of law and order. 3. If I interpret corr ectly the events of the past two weeks, neither of these minimum conditions have been met. To the contrary, actions best calculated to destroy the morale, the u nity, the pride and confidence of the armed forces have transpired in a manner w hich leads me to believe that a relative free hand has been given to those who a im to destroy the armed forces. The demands of the Buddhists for the resignation of the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Staff, Commander of II Corps, the Prefe ct of Saigon and the Director of National Police, to name a few, appear to be bl ows directed at the heart of the security forces which stand between the Viet Co ng and victory. I cannot believe that it is in the interests of the Nation to ac cede to these demands. To the contrary, I am persuaded that acceptance is a form ula for political and military disaster. While aware that the insurgency cannot be overcome by military means alone, I am equally aware that without a strong mi litary foundation no program will ever achieve victory. I am concerned that the Government of Vietnam has already moved some distance down the wrong road in dea ling with its Armed Forces. I do not know whether the Armed Forces will collapse or whether, finding the present course intolerable, they will make a desperate move to regain power. Neither course of action is compatible with the objective we seek. In Washington, Taylor, Rusk, McNamara and Wheeler reached a consensus t hat (1) Khanh and GVN were too exhausted to be thinking about moves against the North, (2)

GVN needs reassurance, and (3) Khanh is likely to stay in control, but not to ge t much done on the pacification program. There followed NSAM 314, whose main poi nt was that "first order of business at present is to take actions which will he lp strengthen the fabric of the GVN." E. THE HNC GOES TO WORK AMID FURTHER TURBU LENCE Helping strengthen the fabric of GVN proved to be easier said than done. A nother coup attempt on September 13 failed when Ky and Thi, along with other you ng officers, supported the existing government. The USG opposed the coup, and al so opposed overt violence to suppress it; in particular, USG opposed VNAF bombin g of Saigon, which was threatened at one point when the coup generals gained con trol of much of the city. When Khanh and Ky asked for U.S. Marines, the USG refu sed; State authorized a strong line in favor of the Triumvirate, and against int ernecine war: (A) It is imperative that there not be internecine war within VN A rmed Forces. (B) The picture of petty bickering among VN leaders has created an appalling impression abroad. (C) The U.S. has not provided massive assistance to SVN, in military equipment, economic resources and personnel, in order to subsi dize continuing quarrels among SVN leaders.... (G) Emphasize that VN leaders mus t not take the U.S. for granted. 2. In line with above you should make it emphat ically clear whenever useful, that we do not believe a Phat/Duc government can e ffectively govern the country or command the necessary popular support to carry forward the effort against the VC. U.S. support for the GVN is based on the triu mvirate and its efforts to bring about a broadly based and effective government satisfactorily reflecting the interests and concerns of all groups. After the co up failed, the Embassy pressed Khanh to exile the coup leaders quietly; and in t he upshot they were acquitted of the charges against them. A fresh problem blew up on September 20 when Rhade tribesmen in four CIDG camps advised by U.S. Speci al Forces revolted against Saigon's authority. It arose from a longfestering mis trust and contempt between the Montagnards, encouraged by the VC, and the lowlan d Vietnamese. This problem also vexed US/GVN relations, because the U.S. Special Forces advisors generally got along well with the tribesmen, and some may have sympathized with them; and in particular, it added to Khanh's suspicions of U.S. intentions. Two or three Rhades had become officers in ARVN, and Westmoreland s uggested using them as intermediaries with the rebelling units; but Khanh turned the idea down flat. He also declined to make concessions to Montagnard disconte nt. Then Taylor sent General DePuy as his intermediary to tell the Rhades they w ere off the payroll until they submitted to GVN authority. This move produced a temporary settlement, but trouble continued to boil up for another two or three weeks.

The High National Council began its deliberations on September 24; Taylor took t he occasion to comment that Khanh conceded too much to organized pressure groups . Noting that GVN effectiveness and morale had virtually collapsed, he disliked the purely civilian makeup of the Council, and hoped that it would take its time about writing a permanent constitution. GVN set a deadline of October 27 for th is exercise. Watching on the sidelines, here as at other times, Taylor opposed u nsettling change, and opposed excessive civilian influence because of their pres umed factionalism and lack of fervor in prosecuting the war. F. THE HNC INSTALLS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP, OCTOBER, 1964 The view that bombing the North was the key to success received a fresh airing, this time in a public revelation of what USG was thinking. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy said in a speech deliv ered in Tokyo on September 30 that such bombing would cut down the threat to GVN in a matter of months. Early in October, Khanh succeeded in exiling General Khi em, a member of the triumvirate, whom he had suspected of instigating the Septem ber 13 coup attempt; Khiem became Ambassador to the U.S. As the HNC deliberated, State sent Taylor its guidance on the USG position during the formation of the new government-to-be: 1. We concur that we must . . . avoid any public espousal of charter or people, although we will undoubtedly be charged in any event with considerable responsibility for the selection of the form and personnel of any n ew government . . . We cannot privately disclaim any preference for individuals or form of government because of our intense interest in seeing a new government having sound organization, able members, and broad basis of popular support. We also want to avoid any private impression that we are dumping Khanh and that as far as we are concerned everything is up for grabs.... 2. As seen from here, ev olving political situation in Saigon contains at least two major problems for U. S. EmbTel 1054 strongly suggests HNC is leaning toward parliamentary form of gov ernment with all the weaknesses which were so apparent in the French 4th Republi c. The second problem, highlighted in EmbTel 983, is to avoid a sharp split betw een the only real powers in the country, the military, and the civilian HNC. Thi s split could occur over form of government or its personnel. U.S. must try to b ring stable government of persons acceptable to both military and civilian. Thcn there followed three suggestions on form of government and a paragraph on peopl e. 7. Finally, there is a delicate problem, during this transition period, in ou r relations with General Khanh and his military supporters. The present truth is they hold such power as exists in SVN. Their acceptance is prerequisite to any successful constitution of a new government. Our problem is that we must not aba ndon one horse before there is another horse which can run the course. I would s uggest: That you have full and frank discussion with General Khanh about how he sees the development of the situation so that what we

ourselves do is in consonance with the consensus among military and civilian lea dership which it is now our highest purpose to build . . . The important thing i s that during this period we not find ourselves in a position where there is no one with whom we can work. Meanwhile, Minh allied himself with the High National Council to put provisions for civilian control in the new constitution opposed by Khanh and the now powerful junior membership of the MRC. Taylor tried to pers uade them to resolve their differences quietly, and to make sure a widely accept able document was cleared all around before publication. Thinking that things we re more likely to get worse rather than better, Secretary Rusk suggested that th e USG should prefer Khanh and the "Young Turks" to Minh and the HNC: Bob McNamar a and I have following reaction to political moves you have reported during last week. A struggle seems to be developing between Minh and HNC on one hand and Kh anh and Young Turk military on the other. Between these two groups it seems to u s our best interests are served if Khanh comes out on top . . . Problem is to ge t government with Khanh in a leading role, ideally as chief executive unless som e strong civilian shows up who is not now apparent. At least Khanh should remain as leader of Army with coequal position to civilians in a government, whose man date will run for at least 18 months . . . We believe it should be made clear th at U.S. does not repeat not support Minh as powerful chief executive. This is co nsensus here and we would much appreciate your comment. Once again the policy wa s to limit change and to limit civilian influence. Taylor replied: The views whi ch you and Bob McNamara express . . . are very much the same conclusions we have reached and acted upon here. Minh expected to be the new Chief of State and to name the Prime Minister. Taylor talked to him about the selection problem, sayin g that he wished to be consulted. Minh asked Taylor's view of Saigon's Mayor Huo ng and of Minister of the Interior Vien. Taylor diplomatically gave his very hig h opinion of Vien. State urged Taylor to use his influence freely while he could still influence the shape of the new government. The High National Council fini shed on schedule on October 27, and surprised the Embassy by electing its chairm an, Phan Khac Suu, an elderly and respected politician, to be the new chief of S tate. Religious group leaders pressured the HNC into this decision at the last m inute. Taylor had hoped and expected Minh would be elected; although the action met Khanh's promise in August that the military would get out of politics. Khanh and his cabinet resigned and went into caretaker status. The HNC stayed on as t he legislative body. Taylor tried to make the best of it, but protested to Suu a bout the failure of the HNC to consult him about Suu's election; Suu responded b y discussing the composition of the new cabinet with him, naming Huong as Prime Minister. Taylor also

gave Suu the usual polite lecture about the need for strong government. State we nt along reluctantly with the new government; Khanh and the Young Turks also wen t along. G. A QUIET NOVEMBER, 1964 At the end of October, the VC staged a mortar attack on the Bien Hoa air base, destroying several U.S. aircraft and killing f our Americans. Taylor urged a reprisal bombing like the one in August following the Tonkin Gulf incidents, but Washington declined to approve. Huong told Taylor he hoped the U.S. would respond, in a meeting to consult on Huong's pending cab inet appointments, but the issue was already decided and Taylor had to discourag e the idea. The new cabinet froze out Minh, no doubt to improve the palatability of the new government to the dominant group in the MRC. Minh then packed up and went abroad on a good will tour; Taylor found the cash cost to the U.S. running high, but recommended paying it. In his overall assessment of the balance of po wer in the new government, Taylor thought that the MRC had allowed civilians to get power (as promised in August) because the MRC feared mob violence, and thoug ht it expedient to let the civilians make a mess of it so that military rule wou ld again become acceptable. That is, he hoped and expected that a military retur n to power would become widely acceptable. Taylor thought the overall political prospects were "faintly encouraging." Commenting in reply, State once again emph asized the accepted links between U.S. commitment and GVN morale and efforts: A key element in either the immediate program or the long-range course of action w ill be the nature of our discussions with the GVN. Sullivan has impressed on us the seriousness of SVN doubts as to U.S. intentions....More basically, we believ e no course of action can succeed unless we are able to stiffen GVN to set its h ouse in order and take every possible measure for political stability and to pus h forward the pacification program. These links received a full airing between T aylor and State and between Taylor and Huong. To State, Taylor said: We have had a great deal of discussion here as to the minimum level of government required to justify mounting military pressure against the North. I would describe that m inimum government as one capable of maintaining law and order in the urban areas , of securing vital military bases from VC attacks, and giving its efforts with those of USG. As Reference B indicates we do not expect such a government for 3 to 4 months . . . perhaps .not then if the current attempts to chip away at the Huong government continue. . . . However, if the government falters and gives go od reason to believe that it will never attain the desired level of performance, I would favor going against the North anyway. The purpose of such an attack wou ld be to give pulmotor treatment for a government in extremis and to make sure t hat the DRV does not get off unscathed in any final settlement. In his conversat ion with Huong, the latter requested:

That I obtain a reaffirmation of U.S. policy toward VN. Huong referred to U.S. a ction in Gulf of Tonkin and the lift in morale VN had received at this display o f determination by the U.S. to strike against the North. Subsequently, however, U.S. had appeared to emphasize almost exclusively necessity considering war with in SVN itself. I responded that reciprocal responsibilities were involved. On th e GVN side it was essential that a stable government be established capable of d irecting affairs of the Nation and particularly of directing the national pacifi cation effort....Should his government demonstrate it was capable of achieving s atisfactory degree of government stability and effectiveness a wider range of po ssibilities would undoubtedly be open for discussion . . . Huong indicated his c omplete understanding of the situation. At this time another case of non-consult ation blew up. RVNAF reorganization plans had passed back and forth between the MRC and MACV since July. Then, on November 10, the MRC produced a plan that diff ered materially from the last one MACV had seen, Huong signed it, and it was pub lished on November 11 before MACV could review it. Westmoreland and Taylor both protested to their respective contacts in the strongest terms; the decrees were withdrawn, changed to MACV's satisfaction, and reissued. On November 26, Westmor eland squelched an apparent coup planned by Ky. He heard of unusual activity at VNAF headquarters and asked Ky to his office. Ky bluntly stated a case for a cha nge of leadership. Westmoreland said: After patiently listening to the foregoing , I informed Ky in no uncertain terms that the U.S. government would not support a change of command by other than orderly and legal process. (This statement wa s cleared in advance with Ambassador Johnson.) Ky was obviously impressed by my statement and said that he would not take action for three months, but if the si tuation continued to deteriorate he would be constrained to act in national inte rest. This episode was the first sign of Young Turk action against the new gover nment, and the first recorded sign of Ky's own ambitions. The U.S. reaction unde rlined the USG's opposition to sudden change without broad support, even though it was expected that the military would return to power eventually. H. A LECTURE AND A PROGRAM FOR GVN NSAM 314, September 10, which had called for actions to s trengthen GVN, had set wheels in motion toward spelling out a U.S. program withi n SVN to complement the contemplated actions against the North. Taylor returned to Washington for consultations at the end of November. In the NSC, he argued th at a strong message to GVN about its problems would most likely produce the opti mum response. He said a threat by the U.S. to withdraw unless they improve would be too much of a gamble. There was no discussion of intermediate leverage or sa nctions between this extreme threat and none at all. The discussion also highlig hted the fear that GVN might collapse or be replaced by neutralists who would as k the U.S. to withdraw; all agreed that neutralism could not be

accepted, and that the U.S. should minimize this risk by full backing of the exi sting GVN. Taylor returned to Saigon with an approved statement and program for GVN that embodied his principal recommendations. Its public aspect was an across the board increase in the approved strengths of all elements of RVNAF and the p aramilitary, in support of the Hop Tac pacification plan and its out-growths tha t had been in the works since July. Its unannounced aspect included a rationale showing a clear shift of emphasis from the views at the highest levels that had developed in the first half of the year. As presented to GVN, it said: It was th e clear conclusion of the recent review in Washington of the situation in South Vietnam that the unsatisfactory progress being made in the Pacification Program was the result of two primary causes from which many secondary causes stem. The primary cause has been the governmental instability in Saigon, and the second th e continued reinforcement and direction of the Viet Cong by the Government of No rth Vietnam. It was recognized that to change the downward trend of events, it w ill be necessary to deal adequately with both of these factors. However it was t he clear view that these factors are not of equal importance. First and above al l, there must be a stable, effective Vietnamese Government able to conduct a suc cessful campaign against the Viet Cong even if the aid from North Vietnam for th e Viet Cong should end. It was the view that, while the elimination of North Vie tnam intervention would raise morale on our side and make it easier for the Gove rnment of Vietnam to function, it would not in itself bring an end to Viet Cong insurgency. It would rather be an important contributory factor to the creation of conditions favoring a successful campaign against the Viet Cong within South Vietnam. Thus, since action against North Vietnam would only be contributory and not central to winning the war against the Viet Cong, it would not be prudent t o incur the risks which are inherent in an expansion of hostilities until there were a government in Saigon capable of handling the serious problems inevitably involved in such an expansion, and capable of promptly and fully exploiting the favorable effects which may be anticipated if we are successful in terminating t he support and direction of the Viet Cong by North Vietnam. Then it went to the point: ....In the view of the United States, there is a certain minimum conditio n to be brought about in South Vietnam before new measures against North Vietnam would be either justified or practicable. At the minimum, the Government in Sai gon should be able to speak for and to its people who will need special guidance and leadership throughout the coming critical period. The Government should be capable of maintaining law and order in the principal centers of population, ass uring their effective execution by military and police forces completely respons ive to its authority. The Government must have at its

disposal means to cope promptly and effectively with enemy reactions which must be expected to result from any change in the pattern of our operations. To bring about this condition will require a demonstration of far greater national unity against the Communist enemy at this critical time than exists at present. It is a matter of greatest difficulty for the United States Government to require gre at sacrifices by American citizens on behalf of South Vietnam when reports from Saigon repeatedly give evidence of heedless self-interest and shortsightedness a mong so many major political groups. As a quid pro quo, it said: .....While the Government of Vietnam is making progress toward achieving the goals set forth ab ove, the United States Government would be willing to strike harder at infiltrat ion routes in Laos and at sea. With respect to Laos, the United States Governmen t is prepared, in conjunction with the Royal Laos Government, to add United Stat es air power as needed to restrict the use of Laotian territory as a route of in filtration into South Vietnam. With respect to the sea, the United States Govern ment would favor an intensification of those covert maritime operations which ha ve proved their usefulness in harassing the enemy. The United States would regar d the combination of these operations in Laos and at sea as constituting Phase I of a measured increase of military pressures directed toward reducing infiltrat ion and warning the Government of North Vietnam of the risks it is running. .... .If the Government of Vietnam is able to demonstrate its effectiveness and capab ility of achieving the minimum conditions set forth above, the United States Gov ernment is prepared to consider a program of direct military pressure on North V ietnam as Phase II..... As contemplated by the United States Government, Phase I I would, in general terms, constitute a series of air attacks on North Vietnam p rogressively mounting in scope and intensity for the purpose of convincing the l eaders of North Vietnam that it is to their interest to cease aid to the Viet Co ng and respect the independence and security of South Vietnam In short, the USG offered to add some of its aircraft immediately to the Vietnamese ones already b ombing the Laotian corridor, in exchange for a GVN promise of a shift to more en ergy and effectiveness; then when such energy and effectiveness actually became visible, the USG promised, the USG would begin bombing North Vietnam. The progra m included the following areas in which progress would aid pacification and woul d measure the GVN's effectiveness: 1. and 2. Increasing RVNAF, paramilitary, and police to and above existing authorized strengths. 3. Better performance by civ ilian and military officials.

4. Speeding up budgetary procedures and spending in the provinces. 5. Strengthen ing the province chiefs. 6. Strengthening police powers. 7. More vigor in Hop Ta c. 8. After a delay, "review cases of political prisoners from previous regimes. " To leave no doubt about what it wanted, the program said: Better performance i n the prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong needs to be accompanied by ac tions to convince the people of the interest of their government in their well-b eing. Better performance in itself is perhaps the most convincing evidence but c an be supplemented by such actions as frequent visits by officials and ranking m ilitary officers to the provinces for personal orientation and "trouble shooting ." The available information media offer a channel of communication with the peo ple which could be strengthened and more efficiently employed. The physical appe arance of the cities, particularly of Saigon, shows a let-down in civic pride wh ich, if corrected, would convey a message of governmental effectiveness to their inhabitants. Similarly, in the country an expanded rural development program co uld carry the government's presence into every reasonably secure village and ham let. If governmental performance and popular appeal are significantly improved, there will be little difficulty in establishing confidence in the government. Ho wever, this confidence should be expressed, not merely implied. It is particular ly important that the military leaders continue to express public confidence in the government and the firm intention to uphold it. While not giving an impressi on of submitting to pressure, the government might explore honorable ways of con ciliating its most important opponents among the minority groups. The United Sta tes Government is prepared to help by oral statements of support and by further assistance to show our faith in the future of South Vietnam. Taylor, Westmorelan d, and Johnson met Huong, Deputy Premier Vien, and namese group politely suggest ed that they did not know what the USG meant Khanh on December 7 to present them with the new U.S. program. The Viet- (sic) by a stable effective government abl e to campaign successfully against the Viet Cong, and able to speak for and to i ts people. Moreover, they noted that the U.S. program said nothing about Viet Co ng use of Cambodia. At the next meeting, on December 9, Taylor gave them the pap er "Actions Designed to Strengthen the Government of Vietnam," covering the eigh t areas of desired progress and measures of GVN effectiveness listed above. The Prime Minister replied that the issue of political prisoners from previous regim es was a very delicate matter; Khanh said there was no problem about military su pport of the existing government. Taylor cabled President Johnson that the USG p roposals: have been received with an understanding reasonableness in the light o f the current situation but without great enthusiasm since they necessarily omit some of the more dramatic actions which the Vietnamese desire.

The only decisions reached were for joint study and consultation. This was the l ast time the USG tried to set GVN performance preconditions for U.S. force use a nd deployments. Its effect, if any, was the opposite of that intended. I. THE GO VERNMENT'S SUPPORT VANISHES, AND TAYLOR CONFRONTS THE GENERALS A new threat of c risis boiled up immediately; first, the leading Buddhists declared their opposit ion to the government and went on a forty-eight hour hunger strike. Huong stood fast, but then the Young Turks picked a fight through a sudden demand that the H NC dismiss nine generals and thirty other officers. (These included some, like M inh and the "Dalat" generals expelled by Khanh, who no longer had jobs but still held their rank and received Army pay.) Taylor backed Huong and the HNC against all corners, and tried to get Buddhists and others to support them. The HNC ref used to retire the 39 officers. But the Young Turks, playing for Buddhist suppor t, would not be denied. In the early morning hours of Sunday, December 20, they arrested twenty-two or more officials and politicians, including several members of the HNC, and made dozens of other political arrests. They also created an "A rmed Forces Council" over or replacing the MRC, to consolidate their power. Thro ugh Huong and indirect contacts, Taylor found out about the dissolution of the H NC several hours before Khanh announced it at a press conference; and one hour b efore the conference Khanh spoke to Taylor about it. Taylor protested in the str ongest terms, but without effect; Khanh went ahead with the announcement. Taylor and Johnson also met with the Young Turk leaders, Ky, Thieu, Thi, and Cang, and gave them a stern lecture, speaking, as he later put it, "as one soldier to ano ther." As recorded just afterward by the U.S. participants, the meeting went as follows: .....AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Do all of you understand English? (Vietnamese o fficers indicated they did, although the understanding of General Thi was known to be weak.) I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we American s were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because somet hing is wrong with my French because you evidently didn't understand. I made it clear that all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are d ependent on governmental stability. Now you have made a real mess. We cannot car ry you forever if you do things like this. Who speaks for this group? Do you hav e a spokesman? GENERAL KY: I am not the spokesman for the group but I do speak E nglish. I will explain why the Armed Forces took this action last night. We unde rstand English very well. We are aware of our responsibilities, we are aware of the sacrifices of our people over twenty years. We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity.... But still there are rumors of coups and doubts among groups. We think these rumors come from the HNC, not as an organization but from some of its members. Both military

and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the HNC as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence. Recently the Prime Minister showed u s a letter he had received from the Chairman of the HNC. This letter told the Pr ime Minister to beware of the military, and said that maybe the military would w ant to come back to power. Also the HNC illegally sought to block the retirement of the generals that the Armed Forces Council unanimously recommended be retire d in order to improve unity in the Armed Forces. GENERAL THIEU: The HNC cannot b e bosses because of the Constitution. Its members must prove that they want to f ight. GENERAL KY: It looks as though the HNC does not want unity. It does not wa nt to fight the Communists. It has been rumored that our action of last night wa s an intrigue of Khanh against Minh, who must be retired. Why do we seek to reti re these generals? Because they had their chance and did badly..... Yesterday we met, twenty of us, from 1430 to 2030. We reached agreement that we must take so me action. We decided to arrest the bad members of the HNC, bad politicians, bad student leaders, and the leaders of the Committee of National Salvation, which is a Communist organization. We must put the trouble-making organizations out of action and ask the Prime Minister and the Chief of State to stay in office. Aft er we explain to the people why we did this at a press conference, we would like to return to our fighting units. We have no political ambitions. We seek strong , unified, and stable Armed Forces to support the struggle and a stable governme nt. Chief of State Suu agrees with us. General Khanh saw Huong who also agreed. We did what we thought was good for this country; we tried to have a civilian go vernment clean house. If we have achieved it, fine. We are now ready to go back to our units. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: I respect the sincerity of you gentlemen. Now I would like to talk to you about the consequences of what you have done. But fir st, would any of the other officers wish to speak? ADMIRAL CANG: It seems that w e are being treated as though we were guilty. What we did was good and we did it only for the good of the country. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Now let me tell you how I feel about it, what I think the consequences are: first of all, this is a milita ry coup that has destroyed the governmentmaking process that, to the admiration of the whole world, was set up last fall largely through the statesman-like acts of the Armed Forces.

You cannot go back to your units, General Ky. You military are now back in power . You are up to your necks in politics. Your statement makes it clear that you h ave constituted yourselves again substantially as a Military Revolutionary Commi ttee. The dissolution of the HNC was totally illegal. Your decree recognized the Chief of State and the Huong Government but this recognition is something that you could withdraw. This will be interpreted as a return of the military to powe r.... AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Who commands the Armed Forces? General Khanh? GENERAL K Y: Yes, sir.... GENERAL THIEU: In spite of what you say, it should be noted that the Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief is in a special situation. He therefore needs advisors. We do not want to force General Khanh; we advise him. We will do what he orders.... AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Would your officers be willing to come into a government if called upon to do so by Huong? I have been impressed by the high q uality of many Vietnamese officers. I am sure that many of the most able men in this country are in uniform. Last fall when the HNC and Huong Government was bei ng formed, I suggested to General Khanh there should be some military participat ion, but my suggestions were not accepted. It would therefore be natural for som e of them now to be called upon to serve in the government. Would you be willing to do so?.... GENERAL KY: Nonetheless, I would object to the idea of the milita ry going back into the government right away. People will say it is a military c oup. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR and AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: (Together) People will say it any way..... AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: You have destroyed the Charter. The Chief of State w ill still have to prepare for elections. Nobody believes that the Chief of State has either the power or the ability to do this without the HNC or some other ad visory body. If I were the Prime Minister, I would simply overlook the destructi on of the HNC. But we are preserving the HNC itself. You need a legislative bran ch and you need this particular step in the formation of a government with Natio nal Assembly.... AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: It should be noted that Prime Minister Huong has not accepted the dissolution of the HNC.... GENERAL THIEU: What kind of con cession does Huong want from us? Ambassador Taylor again noted the need for the HNC function.

GENERAL KY: Perhaps it is better if we now let General Khanh and Prime Minister Huong talk. GENERAL THIEU: After all, we did not arrest all the members of the H NC. Of nine members we detained only five. These people are not under arrest. Th ey are simply under controlled residence.... AMBASSADOR TAYLOR: Our problem now, gentlemen, is to organize our work for the rest of the day. For one thing, the government will have to issue a communique. GENERAL THIEU: We will still have a press conference this afternoon but only to say why we acted as we did. AMBASSAD OR TAYLOR: I have real troubles on the U.S. side. I don't know whether we will c ontinue to support you after this. Why don't you tell your friends before you ac t? I regret the need for my blunt talk today but we have lots at stake.... AMBAS SADOR TAYLOR: And was it really all that necessary to carry out the arrests that very night? Couldn't this have been put off a day or two? In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: You people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess. Amid the hustle and bustle of meetings between MACV officers, Embassy officials, and their Vietnamese counterp arts, Khanh and the Young Turks, stood fast. On the next day, December 21, Taylo r suggested to Khanh that he resign and leave the country. This meeting brought to a head the Khanh-Taylor personal feud which then became public and continued for the balance of Khanh's tenure. Taylor's report of the meeting said his sugge stion that Khanh leave the country came in response to Khanh's asking whether he should leave. But Khanh told a different story to the AFC, who were still smart ing from the sharp interchange that Ky, Thieu, Thi and Cang had had with Taylor. Immediately they accused Taylor of interfering in GVN affairs. Commenting after ward, he said: If the military get away with this irresponsible intervention in government and with flaunting proclaimed U.S. policy, there will be no living wi th them in the future. State supported Taylor in taking a strong line to bring t he situation under control. It approved a Westmoreland proposal, sent by militar y channels to State, that Huong get the credit for dismissing Khanh and that MAC V should bargain with the Armed Forces Council to offer a quid pro quo for reins tating the HNC. State spelled out the quid pro quo in detail:

In support of your efforts persuade military to at least partially undo damage [ Sunday's] actions, we have also been considering possible leverage we might appl y in event you conclude it was necessary. If dispute continues unresolved, most obvious action might be withholding approval any pending U.S. assistance actions and letting this become known. You are in best position to evaluate whether the se would impress generals or conversely hurt Huong's position. In addition, foll owing steps aimed more specifically at military have occurred to us: 1. Suspend operation Barrel Roll--not certain it would affect generals--might have wrong im pact on Hanoi--obviously generals couldn't be told because that would imply comm itment to resume if they behave. 2. Instruct all or selected Corps or division a dvisors make known our dissatisfaction, perhaps suspending for time being furthe r contacts with counterparts. 3. Stand down FARMGATE. 4. Suspend logistical airl ift where critical supply shortages do not exist. On balance, we inclined believ e none except possibly 1st and 2nd steps would produce desired results. Obviousl y any would hamper over-all war effort, especially if continued for very long. W e have also considered and rejected possibility of cutting essentials POL and di rect military supplies. Similarly we do not favor suspension or interruption CIP , since it would primarily affect civilian confidence in Huong government. Altho ugh Khanh talked to Taylor about travel arrangements for himself and several oth er generals on the 22nd, the Young Turks had their backs up (or were convinced t hey could do what they pleased), and all stood fast. Khanh having rallied the mi litary behind him, attacked Taylor for his undiplomatic actions. He spoke to the nation attacking communism and colonialism, the latter an inference to the domi neering position of Taylor. In a message to the President on the 22nd, Taylor co mmented: Generals acting greatly offended by my disapproval of their recent acti ons privately expressed to four of their number and resent our efforts to streng then Huong government against their pressures. One unfortunate effect has been t o drive them closer to Khanh who has sensed the opportunity to solidify his posi tion. He feared Khanh would air the quarrel publicly. Rusk cabled support: I wis h to compliment you on the vigor with which you have pursued this issue of unity since your return from Washington. But Taylor backed off from the sanctions ide a. Possibly still hoping that Khanh would go, he said there was no need for acti on but that the option should be kept open. In particular, he saw no value in su spending the bombing of Laos.

Also on the 22nd, while talking to Taylor of leaving, Khanh met with the Young T urks and agreed to break openly with Taylor by seeking his recall. State continu ed to back a tough line with them, and rejected Taylor's suggestion of a diversi on in the form of a reprisal bombing on North Vietnam for the Brinks BOQ bombing early in the week. Hanoi would hardly read into it any strong or continuing sig nal in view overall confusion in Saigon . . . There might be suspicion, at least internationally, that BOQ bombing was not in fact done by VC." Taylor urged Huo ng to insist on restoration of the HNC and declare the generals insubordinate if they refused. Khanh and the generals attacked Taylor publicly on December 23, a s Taylor had feared, charging him with insulting them and abusing his power. The n on December 24, Taylor responded in kind, telling the press his version of the December 20 confrontation, and suggesting that Khanh had outstayed his usefulne ss. Khanh then threatened privately to declare Taylor persona non grata; the Emb assy replied that asking Taylor to leave was equivalent to asking the U.S. to le ave. The implied threat of U.S. withdrawal was enough to stop the Khanh move, if he was ever serious about it. Taylor then suggested that Alex Johnson and the g enerals should form an ad hoc joint arbitration committee to resolve the differe nces between Khanh and Taylor. The idea was evidently novel enough to distract K hanh and the generals or to satisfy their dignity; it disconnected the buttons t hat had been pushed when Khanh and Taylor each said he wanted the other to leave the country. The ad hoc committee never met, but the proposal generated calm di scussion between the Embassy and the generals for several days and allowed them to cool off gracefully. However, the basic issue of the future of the HNC and of civilian government remained unresolved. Huong consulted with Taylor continuous ly, and followed some of his advice, but stopped short of taking the strong publ ic stance he urged. On December 31, Taylor said to Washington that the USG might have to accept a military government in Saigon, though he said that Khanh must not head it. He said that plans for "Phase II" (bombing the North) should take i nto account various possibilities within GVN. Although Taylor had earlier favore d the military's return to power, he objected to the means and to the timing of their present action. J. ONGOING PROGRAMS, SECOND HALF 1964 While the political crises of Ambassador Taylor's first six months in Saigon built up to comic opera proportions, MACV and the country team struggled valiantly to conduct business as usual. In March, MACV J-1 had completed a comprehensive review of ARVN person nel policies, the Murday Report, and forwarded it to JGS for action. A tally at the end of the year indicated progress on only 16 of 28 specific recommendations . One that received no response was the suggestion that the officer appointment base be expanded. In May, the Secretary of Defense had ordered COMUSMACV to deve lop, jointly with GVN,

procedures for programming pacification operations with time-phased requirements for manpower and money. A joint, combined (MACV-USOM-GVN) committee was establi shed. It had completed a programming document in June. After approval by RVNAF a nd MACV, joint US-GVN teams visited each Corps to acquaint selected personnel wi th the documents. As of August 31, fewer than half the provinces had submitted p acification plans; so the teams again visited each province to reinstruct provin ce chiefs and sector advisors. All province reports were finally received by Oct ober. In July, the first Senior Advisors Monthly Report (SAME) was submitted. Th ese put MACV in a better position to advise, and in October it sent a detailed l etter of deficiencies to CINCRVNAF. A joint combat effectiveness inspection team started its work, and at year's end the ARVN IG faced the question whether the refresher course at the National Training Center was needed for two battalions d eclared ineffective by COMUSMACV. In October, U.S. advisors to RVNAF units submi tted the first semi-annual report of their personal observations of the treatmen t and use of MAP equipment. Deficiencies were noted in a letter to JGS. In one i nstance it was found that ordnance vans were being converted into rolling quarte rs for generals. After a threat to withdraw the vans, the fault was corrected an d the vans were returned to their authorized use. On October 5, COMUSMACV forwar ded to the Embassy the report of a month-long study instigated by the Ambassador on how to revitalize the entire civic action program. It recommended that a USO M-USIS-MACV study group develop a joint, integrated mechanism to guide and coord inate civic action. The groups' recommendations were to provide a basis for disc ussions with the Vietnamese on how best to channel and revitalize the combined c ivic action effort. On the subject of command relationships, JCS looked ahead to the possible deployment of U.S. ground forces and anticipated operational contr ol of RVN forces in combined operations. However, that idea would be dropped lat er. Following a Taylor-Khanh agreement to launch "Hop Tac" on October 1, USOM an d the Vietnamese NSC met on September 25 to discuss pacification, after which Ta ylor commented: In general, I consider the meeting was satisfactory continuation of our bilateral effort and that top priority is at last being given to Hop Tac operation. Also that general result of meeting focused attention on priority pr oblems. The pay-off will be quality of follow-up. State suggested decentralizati on of pacification control to Corps and Province, to bypass the central governme nt; USOM disagreed. MACV contacted all senior RVNAF officers and found them taki ng a responsible attitude toward continuing the war effort; however, MACV noted that the coup leaders had talked the same way just before the September 13 coup attempt. Therefore MACV was candidly sceptical.

In response, a COMUSMACV memorandum of November 14 entitled "Assumption by US of Operational Control of the Pacification Program in SVN," states his position on the US role and is indicative of his later views on combined command. He recogn ized that any plan to encourage GVN in its efforts should include measures for d eveloping US approved plans, as well as means for controlling money and people d uring execution of plans, and he envisaged an arrangement whereby GVN agencies w ould be provided complete planning guidance. He saw a danger of exerting influen ce over GVN which might be interpreted as excessive and which might boomerang on US interests. Instead, he suggested, "as a less drastic alternative, the Hop Ta c idea might be extended to each of the other three tactical zones." As discusse d more fully in Re-emphasis on Pacification 1965-67, Hop Tac (working together) was formally proposed at a high level in the US government by Ambassador Lodge o n his way home in July 1964. Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland implemen ted the idea. It tied together the pacification plans of the seven provinces aro und Saigon to insure security and extend government control. A headquarters for US Hop Tac elements was established in Saigon. The Vietnamese set up a parallel organization primarily to satisfy the US, for their group had no authority or in fluence. Meanwhile, the US/GVN study and planning activity continued and gave th e impression of accomplishment. A US/GVN Survey Team reviewed RVNAF structure re quirements for supporting the GVN National Pacification Plan. After visits to ea ch corps headquarters, it proposed two alternative force increases, one to achie ve progress in priority one Hop Tac areas, the other to attain more overall prog ress. On November 24, COMUSMACV formally requested approval of the first alterna tive from CINCPAC while at the same time the US Embassy recommended approval to the State Department. Meetings of USOM/NSC mentioned above (pp. 326 and 332) con tinued till December 5, after which the crisis of the Ambassador's return and it s sequel stopped all pretense of joint pacification planning for several weeks. But the Joint General Staff accepted all MACV suggestions on how RVNAF should be employed to improve the pacification program and issued its implementing Direct ive AB 139 as a Christmas present on December 25, 1964, in mid-crisis. The USMAC V staff reviewed the RVN Defense Budget for 1965 and US Mission approval was rec eived in late 1964. However, on order of the Ambassador, due to the political cr isis, MACV withheld the budget from GVN until January 13, 1965. K. JANUARY, 1965 : PRELUDE TO THE BOMBING The first week of January was filled with comings and g oings with the issue of the HNC's dissolution still unresolved. The Embassy supp orted Huong publicly and privately, but stopped short of threatening U.S. withdr awal and admitted indirectly to Huong that the U.S. might be forced to accept mi litary government. Then on January 7, the generals backed off slightly and reach ed a compromise solution, which they announced January 9 amid rumors of a milita ry takeover. The Armed Forces Council and Khanh agreed to

release the HNC prisoners and to continue backing civilian government, referring to their August promises; the civilian GVN would convene a new civilian group t o legislate and write a new constitution, preparatory to Assembly elections. Tay lor saw the statement before its release, and accepted it as the best available compromise. It was followed by a statement agreed on January 11 to patch up US/G VN relations, at which time Khanh agreed also to put several of the Young Turks in the cabinet. The crisis seemed to be over. However, the end was not yet in si ght. The Buddhists started demonstrating and demanding that Huong resign. On Jan uary 14, Taylor reacted to Khanh's proposals on the new cabinet by suggesting th at he was moving with unseemly haste. Taylor received a complete cabinet list on January 18, and Khanh conferred with Westmoreland on the effects of cabinet rol es for the generals on the 19th. Cabinet installation was scheduled for the 19th . However, at almost the last minute Khanh asked for postponement of the cabinet installation, saying afterward that Huong had defaulted on promises to change s ome of the civilian ministers. Leading Buddhists went on another hunger strike, and a new crisis built up; in Hue the USIS building was sacked and burned, and t he USIS building in Saigon was sacked. On the 24th, they demanded that all Vietn amese businessmen, night clubs, etc., refuse to sell to Americans, and a majorit y apparently complied. On the 25th, Khanh, having allied himself with the Buddhi sts, told Deputy Ambassador Johnson that Huong and President Suu wanted to resig n and let the military take over, as demanded by the Buddhists. Johnson replied that the Buddhists must not be allowed to veto the government, and that the mili tary must not take over. Then on January 27, the AFC voted no confidence in the Suu-Huong government and directed Khanh to take charge and resolve the crisis. T aylor's comments to State made it clear that events were entirely out of his con trol; again he objected to the means and to the timing of the military return to power. When he raised the possibility of nonrecognition, State authorized him t o use his own judgment but advised him to play along with Khanh for the time bei ng, while scouting around for fresh options. Although Suu was technically ousted , he stayed on at Khanh's request; and Oanh again became acting Prime Minister. In the midst of the crisis Westmoreland obtained his first authority to use U.S. forces for combat within South Vietnam. Arguing that the VC might go for a spec tacular victory during the disorders, he asked for and received authority to use U.S. jet aircraft in a strike role in emergencies, subject to Embassy approval in each instance. This move finessed all previous ideas of using potential U.S. force commitments as leverage to bring the GVN into line; but these ideas had no doubt been abandoned anyhow. III. THE U.S. ENTERS THE WAR: FLAMING DART TO THE STEADY INFLUX OF U.S. FORCES, JUNE, 1965 A. "PHASE II" BEGINS AND COUPS CONTINUE , FEBRUARY, 1965

While the Embassy stood by doing what little it could to undercut Khanh's person al position, VC attacks on the American advisors' barracks at Pleiku, and on thr ee other installations, provided the pretext for US/VNAF bombing attacks on infi ltration staging areas in the southernmost province of North Vietnam, February 7 -8. Acting Prime Minister Oanh spoke for GVN during the coordination of the atta cks and announcements. (The raids were called reprisals, as was the subsequent r aid on February 12 following the attacks on the American barracks at Quihon.) U. S. dependents were ordered to leave SVN. McGeorge Bundy was in town, and in keep ing with the going tactics, stayed at arms length from Khanh, though meeting him and the generals socially. As an aside at this point, Taylor gave one last blow to the idea that cutting off the flow of help from the North would turn the tid e of the war against the VC: He remarked that perhaps the smell of victory withi n six months would now lead Khanh to take over again. On his return to Washingto n, McGeorge Bundy wrote a Memorandum to the President, dated February 7, 1965. I n evaluating the U.S. team and policy, he stated, "U.S. mission is composed of o utstanding men and U.S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. " However, he proceeded to point out two important differences between his curre nt assessment and that of the mission. Taylor had concluded that: (1) the Khanh government was impossible to work with, and (2) the Buddhists (Khanh's ally in t he recent struggle) must be confronted and faced down, using force if necessary. Bundy disagreed on both points, stating that Khanh was still the best hope in s ight in terms of pursuing the fight against the communists and that the Buddhist s should be accommodated and incorporated rather than confronted. With respect t o the scheduled reprisal actions, he stated, "For immediate purposes, and especi ally for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe the government need by no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of a raw power, while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government can exe cute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US-GVN policy. That is about all it can do." He further stated that reprisal actions t hemselves should produce a favorable reaction which would provide an opportunity for increased U.S. influence in pressing for a more effective government. He ac knowledged the latent anti-American sentiments in the country and their potentia l explosiveness, as had been evidenced in Hue the preceding week. He noted that these feelings limited the pressure that the U.S. could bring to bear on ambitio us forces like Khanh and the Buddhists. On February 9, Taylor again firmly recom mended that the program of continuo~is graduated attacks on North Vietnam should begin. Nothing but political turmoil had followed his early-December attempt to induce the GVN to do better by promising these attacks as a quid pro quo. Now h e disregarded this idea, and spoke only of the hope that the attacks would convi nce North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, and would uni fy and encourage the South Vietnamese. On February 13, State

cabled authority to begin the plan of graduated strikes with Vietnamese particip ation. It directed Taylor to get GVN approval and to get their agreement to appe ar at the UN if that should prove necessary; the condition of stopping the bombi ng would be the halting of aid by North Vietnam to the VC. State's guidance to T aylor on political matters was that the U.S. hand should not be too obvious in t he government-shuffling outcome and that the power of the Buddhists and of the m ilitary must be reflected in the new government being formed. After two politica l hopefuls failed to round up enough support, Quat formed a cabinet starting Feb ruary 16. The AFC chose to keep Suu as Chief of State and appointed a National L egislative Council of twenty members balanced to represent all interests includi ng the military. The Buddhists quietly acquiesced in the new government, install ed just in time to be greeted by a coup attempt. On February 19, a new coup grou p (consisting of Thao and Phat among other neo-Diem proponents) seized most of S aigon, Tan Son Nhut airfield, and the radio station. In this instance, as in Sep tember, 1964, MACV had to intervene to stop Ky's threat of VNAF bombing; this ti me it would have been the airfield, with several thousand Americans in the area. By midnight the leading members of the AFC had rallied forces and faced down th e coup group; and the next day they voted Khanh out. On February 24, Khanh left the country; the Embassy and Saigon settled back in relief. The bombing phase of graduated pressures on the North (Rolling Thunder) began, and the decision to l and Marines at Danang was in the works. Taylor now opposed the introduction of U .S. combat forces in SVN-except for base security. His acquiescence in the Marin e deployment to Danang was in large part due to Westmoreland's strong recommenda tion to do so. B. THE CONTINUING CIVILIAN INTERREGNUM AND FIRST U.S. GROUND FORC ES, MARCH-MAY, 1965 For several weeks an unaccustomed calm settled over US/GVN r elations. The USG white paper on Vietnam issued February 28 without prior cleara nce with GVN caused no visible upset. The proposal to land the first two BLT's o f Marines received prompt approval in an amicable atmopshere in the first few da ys of March, and the III MEF became the III MAF without fanfare. An abortive Bud dhist "peace" movement died away, and religious groups generally laid low. Follo wing a State message expressing renewed concern, the USOM resumed meetings with the Vietnamese Internal Security Council (an enlargement of its old NSC) on Febr uary 27 to discuss pacification. It was agreed that both sides would prepare joi nt proposals for accelerating pacification and for solving manpower problems and go forward together in program for effective execution of agreed programs. At a March 13 meeting, General Thang gave a "pessimistic but realistic" account of B inh Dinh Province, and Quat said measures would be taken to prevent the situatio n from

spreading. The USG and GVN reverted to the pattern of a year earlier of urging a nd advice politely received. Throughout early 1965, it was evident that Pacifica tion plans were failing. Even Hop Tac was at a standstill. When a stop gap alloc ation of 3 million piasters per province was made, pending release of regular fu nds, province chiefs were reluctant to spend the funds. They wanted specific aut hority and direction from higher authorities. Planning continued unabated betwee n MACV and GVN. Development of a revised budget began on March 6, 1965, when gui delines for budget preparation were furnished the RVN Ministry of Defense. The p roposed revision was duly received from RVN. On March 24, Ambassador Taylor form ulated a 41-point program for stability and pacification in preparation for a tr ip to Washington. This program, without any hint of leverage on GVN, in fact put pacification on the back burner, while main attention focused on bombing and de ployments. In April 1965, General "Little" Minh, Minister of Armed Forces, direc ted I, II, and IV Corps commanders to develop Hop Tac plans for their areas. The delay between the COMUSMACV memorandum of the previous December that recommende d the extension and the order itself is not explained, but in May the Vietnamese indicated to the U.S. Ambassador their dissatisfaction with the Hop Tac program . The Vietnamese wanted to make Region A of the Hop Tac area part of the Capital Military Region and the remaining regions part of the III Corps Commander's are a of responsibility. COMUSMACV told the mission council that the Hop Tac organiz ation should be retained for the foreseeable future because Hop Tac had been uni que in providing a forum for military and civil authorities to address common pr oblems. Quiet consultation continued on the evaluation of Vietnamese counterpart s in the provinces, on Third Country Forces, on military and paramilitary pay, a nd so on. Following Taylor's return from Washington early in April, he presented his pacification ideas (now having the stamp of President Johnson's approval), and discreetly got approval for the deployment of the third of the Marine BLT's. Quat discussed the military leadership frankly with Taylor and Westmoreland, an d around the middle of April started considering a move to clip their wings. On May 5, the AFC obligingly dissolved itself, and seemed to give Quat a free hand. The Honolulu Conference of April 20, which rebuffed the idea of encadrement and U.S. takeover (discussed later), approved additional deployments and U.S. force to about 80,000 men and to introduce Korean and Australian troops. After severa l days of hesitation, Quat approved the increases. Pacification, under the new n ame "Rural Construction," still gave no cause for rejoicing; and GVN resisted Ta ylor's proposal to install some civilians as province chiefs.

Analysis by members of the U.S. mission council of a RVNAF J-3 paper, "The Organ ization and Operations of the Pacification System," revealed considerable varian ce between U.S. and GVN views on: (1) The role of the corps commander in pacific ation. (2) The relationship of provinces with a proposed Bureau for Pacification Affairs. (3) The position of Minister of Interior in pacification. MACV forward ed requirements to increase the number of subsector advisory teams to 180, of wh ich 33 in particularly remote locations would be filled initially by Special For ces teams. It was envisioned that in case of escalation by the VC, these teams w ould perform appropriate civil affairs functions, provide intelligence, and supp ort allied forces in many ways. Should the VC refrain from extensive overt actio n, the teams would push vigorous rural construction. In the last half of May, fr esh trouble blew up. After an alleged abortive coup attempt on May 20-21, and di sorders in the streets, Quat tried to reshuffle his cabinet, without first clear ing it with Suu. Suu objected, and the two disagreed on who had the right to dec ide; such a misunderstanding was understandable, in view of the lack of any reco gnized constitution and in view of the chaos of the preceding months. The crisis simmered past the end of May, and Taylor correctly predicted the end of civilia n government, with evident relief. C. FIRST MOVES ON COMMAND AND CONTROL, MARCH AND APRIL, 1965 When the Marines arrived in March, the control measure devised f or the employment was the TAOR. Under the overall suzerainty of the VN Corps Com mander, the Marines were given a well defined geographical area in which U.S. fo rces exercised command authority over military forces and for which the U.S. acc epted defensive responsibility. On March 3, Ambassador Taylor cabled his fears t hat GVN would "shuck off greater responsibility on the USG," and the same day, i n another message, he said he had no idea what the GVN attitude to a Marine Land ing Force might be. The first battalion of Marines splashed ashore at Danang abo ut 0900, March 8. The next day a second battalion came in by air. The trip of Ar my Chief of Staff Johnson to Saigon in mid-March, 1965, signalled the beginning of consideration and planning for the introduction of significant numbers of gro und combat forces. General Johnson observed in closing his report: In order for the USG to evaluate his (COMUSMACV's) request properly when submitted, a policy determination must be made in the very near future that will answer the question , what should the VN be expected to do for themselves and how much more the U.S. must contribute directly to the security of VN.

Secretary McNamara answered on the margin of his copy of the report, "Policy is: Anything that will strengthen the position of the GVN will be sent." On March 8 , Taylor talked with Prime Minister Quat about his concept of joint command, a m atter which had been raised with General Johnson on the occasion of his visit Ma rch 6 (EmbTel 2877). Taylor found Quat's ideas very hazy, but: his purpose was v ery clear. He hopes by some joint command device to bring his maverick generals under the steadying influence of General West-moreland. Taylor told him he sympa thized with motive but had never hit upon a command relationship which offered m uch hope of accomplishing this end. Although Quat's ideas hard to disentangle, h e seems to have in mind a mixed US/ARVN staff element reporting to General Westm oreland and a VN C/Staff. He visualizes the staff element as a clearing house fo r joint studies which would pass recommendations on to the two senior officers. By implication General Westmoreland would have the power of ultimate decision ba sed upon an unofficial understanding which Quat hopes generals would accept. Qua t concedes their acceptance far from certain. Washington was looking toward comb ined command arrangements that would recognize that the U.S. was no longer limit ed to the role of advisors to RVNAF. When asked for his input COMUSMACV replied that gradual transition would be more palatable to GVN and suggested only cooper ation in the initial phase, followed by establishment of a small combined coordi nating staff headed jointly by himself and CINCRVNAF. The staff's powers would b e limited solely to coordinating combined operations. These comments were sketch y, but indicative, for in Saigon COMUSMACV and his staff were putting together t he Commander's Estimate of the Situation, a standard document in the military pl anning process. Started on March 13, the day after General Johnson left Saigon a nd issued on March 26, it more clearly revealed the MACV concept of command. Whi le recognizing that there was no longer an effective ARVN chain of command becau se of the irresponsible game of musical chairs among the top leadership, the est imate cautioned that the Vietnamese generals would accept integrated command onl y to the extent that the United States contributed troops; and it advised agains t U.S. commitment to any rigid arrangement because GVN and RVNAF had not achieve d sufficient political and military maturity. MACV omitted further discussion of the function or authority of such integrated staffs. When command arrangements were covered in the detailed description of the most likely course of action, th e intent was clear. U.S. commanders would control American troops except in cert ain clearly defined zones within which they would also be responsible for "contr olling and coordinating" operations of both U.S. and RVN forces. A collateral fu nction envisioned for each U.S. division command was that of Deputy Command Supp ort to the ARVN Corps Commander. D. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF ENCADREMENT, APRIL, 1965

Ambassador Taylor returned to Washington in late March and was present at the Ap ril 1-2 NSC meeting at which General Johnson's 21 recommendations and Taylor's 4 1 points were approved. Almost as soon as Taylor returned to Saigon wide differe nces of opinion developed on what should happen next. The State/Defense "7 point message" of April 15 to Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland set the pot boiling, following Westmoreland's urgent request via military channels for more forces. The message directed: (1) Experimental encadrement of U.S. troops into R VNAF. (2) The introduction of a brigade force into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau for securit y and later counterinsurgency. (3) The introduction of several additional U.S. b attalions into coastal enclaves. (4) Expansion of Vietnamese recruiting, using p roven U.S. techniques. (5) Expansion of the MEDCAP program using mobile dispensa ries. (6) Experimentation in 2 or 3 provinces with a team of U.S civil affairs p ersonnel. (7) Supplement of low RVNAF pay through provision of a food ration. Ta ylor objected to the new forces, to encadrement, and to the whole tone of the 7 point message. He sent two principal messages with these objections, one setting out a reasoned comment on the message and a second, personal to Mc-George Bundy , saying how he really felt about it: I am greatly troubled by DOD 15 April 15. First, it shows no consideration for the fact that, as a result of decisions tak en in Washington during my visit, this mission is charged with securing implemen tation by the two month old Quat government of a 21 point military program, a 41 point non-military program, a 16 point Rowan USIS program and a 12 point CIA pr ogram. Now this new cable opens up new vistas of further points as if we can win here somehow on a point score. We are going to stall the machine of government if we do not declare a moratorium on new programs for at least six months. Next, it shows a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discer ned in Washington during my recent trip. Although some additional U.S. forces sh ould probably be introduced after we see how the Marines do in counterinsurgency operations, my own attitude is reflected in EmbTel 3384, which I hope was calle d to the attention of the President. My greatest concern arises over para 6 reft el which frankly bewilders me. What do the authors of this cable think mission h as been doing over the months and years? We have presumably the best qualified p ersonnel the Washington agencies (State, AID, DOD, USIA and CIA) can find workin g in the provinces seven days a week at precisely the tasks described in para 6. It is proposed to withdraw these people and replace them by Army civil affairs types operating on the pattern of military occupation? If this is the thought, I would regard such a change in policy which will gain wide publicity, as disastr ous in its likely effects upon pacification in general and on US/GVN relations i n particular.

Mac, can't we be better protected from our friends? I know that everyone wants t o help, but there's such a thing as killing with kindness. In particular, we wan t to stay alive here because we think we're winning--and will continue to win un less helped to death. Another State/Defense message told the Ambassador to discu ss with Quat several possible uses of U.S. combat forces beyond the NSC decision s of April 2. He replied, "I cannot raise these matters with Quat without furthe r guidance....I need a clarification of our purpose for the large scale introduc tion of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit." The plaintive wor ds did not sound convincing to the JCS, for they told SecDef, almost cavalierly, in JCSM 281/65, "JCS is confident the Ambassador will be able to accomplish suc h measures as are required for an appropriate acceptance of these deployments as approved by the highest authority." As directed in the 7 point message, study c ommenced in Saigon on the matter of combined command. The message suggested two approaches: Integration of substantial numbers of U.S. combat personnel (e.g., 5 0) into each of several ARVN battalions (e.g., 10); or combined operations of th ree additional U.S. battalions with three or more ARVN battalions. General Westm oreland asked his Deputy to give detailed study to three methods: (1) Assumption of officer and senior NCO command positions within the ARVN battalion by U.S. p ersonnel. (2) Assignment of U.S. personnel as staff officers, and in technical a nd specialists positions, within the ARVN battalion. (3) Employment of U.S. troo ps as fire support elements within the ARVN battalion. These approaches were stu died in relation to: Language, security, support, mutual US/GVN acceptance, cond itions and capabilities within ARVN units. Problems common to all three were the language barrier, increased exposure of U.S. personnel, difficulty of U.S. pers onnel adapting to ARVN living conditions, and the greatly expanded support requi rement that would be generated. The following conclusions were reached: Method ( 1) was not feasible nor desirable owing to the language barrier, as well as to p robable non-acceptance by GVN. Method (2) would not materially improve ARVN capa bilities. Method (3), therefore, was the only concept that would benefit ARVN an d not detract from GVN morale. A fire support element of six U.S. officers and 4 9 enlisted men was suggested for each ARVN battalion. Because of the difficultie s of supply and service support, medical support, leadership in ARVN battalions, and anticipated morale problems amongst those U.S. personnel assigned to ARVN b attalions, Deputy COMUSMACV opposed the adoption of the principle of encadrement . He recommended that COMUSMACV not support it and that if it were directed, it be initially applied to only one battalion.

At the same time, as a result of the Warrenton conference of mid-January, seriou s consideration was being given in Washington to the use of military government by means of Army civil affairs procedures. A straw in the wind which indicated w hat the Saigon reaction was to be at the forthcoming Honolulu conference was the response by Ambassador Taylor on April 15 to notification that General Peers wa s coming to Saigon. "If GVN gets word of these plans to impose U.S. military gov ernment framework on their country . . . it will have a very serious impact on o ur relations. We are rocking the boat at a time when we have it almost on an eve n keel." E. HONOLULU CONFERENCE, APRIL 19-20, 1965; ENCADREMENT AND COMBINED COM MAND FADE OUT At Honolulu General Westmoreland had his way with respect to milit ary encadrement. Notes of the meetings reveal: General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units neither required nor feasible. Instead the plan was to "brigade" U.S. forces with ARVN troops. Consideration of the issue w as ended with the understanding that General Westmoreland "will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will prevail when U.S. for ces are engaged in offensive combat actions, alone or with Vietnamese or other f orces." The introduction of U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams into the provincial go vernment structure was also considered at Honolulu. It was decided to experiment in three provinces with U.S. teams designed to provide ample civil as well as m ilitary initiative and advice. At least one of the three teams was to be headed by a civilian. Ambassador Taylor was instructed to seek the concurrence of GVN, "recognizing that a large number of questions must be worked out subsequently." Early in May, General Westmoreland submitted his detailed command concept. It tr aced the evolution of the relationship between U.S. and ARVN armed forces. Initi ally, U.S. forces were strictly advisory. In the period from 1960 to 1962 the U. S. had in addition provided military capabilities such as helicopters and tactic al air support. The advisory effort was extended to ARVN battalions, and advisor s accompanied units into combat. With the large scale commitment of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, a logical extension of this evolution was the suggested comma nd concept of coordination and cooperation. Operational control of each nation's forces was normally to be exercised by commanders of that nation. COMUSMACV env isioned that the initial mission of U.S. forces would be security of base areas, a function to be coordinated through senior ARVN commanders. Subsequent deep pa trolling and offensive operations by U.S. forces would occur within specified Ta ctical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR's) with ARVN in separate and clearly define d areas. Eventually, on search and destroy operations, U.S. forces would provide combat

support at the request of the senior RVNAF commander. The U.S. commander would m ove to the RVNAF command post to agree on details, but close and intricate maneu ver of units of the two nations' forces was to be avoided. This Saigon proposal did not settle the matter. SecDef urged formation of a joint command with GVN an d the creation of a "small combined coordinating staff to be jointly headed by C OMUSMACV and CINCRVNAF" as a useful device at this stage of development of the U .S. force structure. There were continuing indications from USG representatives in Saigon of a sensitivity to South Vietnamese criticism that the United States acted as though we were fighting all by ourselves. On May 17, Ambassador Taylor felt it wise to relay to Washington a Saigon Post column to that effect. On May 24, both the Ambassador and COMUSMACV sent lengthy messages to their seniors dis cussing the matter of combined military command. Ambassador Taylor referenced bo th the JCS and MACV proposals and said, "I must say we are far from ready to pro pose to GVN anything like a plan for a more formal combined command authority . . . If USG intends to take the position that U.S. command of GVN forces is a pre requisite to the introduction of more U.S. combat troops, that fact would consti tute an additional strong reason for recommending against bringing in the reinfo rcements." COMUSMACV also voiced strong opposition to the Washington proposal fo r combined command. He recalled recent discussion of the subject with General Mi nh who seemed agreeable at first but then moved perceptibly away from anything s uggestive of a combined headquarters. Press reports of the views of General Thie u and Air Marshall Ky, as well as the recent Saigon Post column,were referenced to substantiate that there was no prospect of such a combined staff evolving. In stead, a U.S. Army brigadier general staff. "The positioning and accrediting of Brig. General Collins is as far as we can go." There appears to have been no str ong objection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In JCSM 5 16-65 they reviewed the co urse of events and recommended augmentation of MACV by seven billets (1 Brigadie r General, 3 officers, and 3 enlisted) to provide "the requisite staff assistanc e on combined and operational planning matters associated with the coordinated o perations of U.S., RVN, and third country forces in Vietnam." A joint State/Defe nse message to Saigon on May 27 deferred any approach to GVN on combined command until it was politically feasible and directed that no planning discussion be u ndertaken with RVNAF without Ambassador Taylor's approval. There were two major battles in late May and early June, Ba Gia and Dong Zoai. Although U.S. troops w ere available to assist in both instances they were not committed and in both ca ses RVNAF were defeated. General Westmoreland continued to press Washington for greater freedom of discretion in the use of U.S. ground forces with RVNAF. A Jun e 12 message recalled the three

stages envisioned in his May 8 discussion of combined command. So far, in view o f statements in Washington by the Secretary of State and by the White House, mov ement from stage 2 to 3 had been deferred, but it sounded as though some measure of joint planning was in progress. The fact is we have moved some distance down the road toward active commitment of U.S. combat forces and have done so hand-i n-hand with our Vietnamese ally. They and we recognize that the time has come wh en such support is essential to the survival of any government of South Vietnam and the integrity of RVNAF. The message concluded with a request for modificatio n of the letters of instructions on use of U.S. troops. A minor note, not unrela ted to combined command, was raised in May when Prime Minister Quat pressed with in GVN for a status of forces agreement. The matter arose because of concern abo ut Vietnamese sovereignty over areas where U.S. forces were stationed. Relations were being governed by the 15 year old Pentalateral agreement, clearly inapplic able to the present situation. U.S. military forces in Vietnam were enjoying vir tual displomatic immunity; so the MACV senior judge advocate developed arguments to demonstrate that raising the issue was not in the interests of either govern ment. They were passed to the SVN source of the information for use at ministeri al meetings on the subject. There is no indication that GVN formally discussed s tatus-of-forces with the Embassy. F. THE KY COUP, JUNE, 1965 After extended nego tiations between Quat, Suu, and other leaders failed to end the government crisi s that started in late May, on June 9 Quat asked the generals to mediate the dis pute. They did. On June 12 they forced Quat to resign and took over the governme nt. After several days of jockeying among themselves, the generals formed a Nati onal Leadership Council of ten members and made Ky Prime Minister. Taylor was ou t of town at the critical time, and the Embassy found out about the main decisio ns after they were taken. However, Taylor was back in time to object unsuccessfu lly to Ky's appointment as Prime Minister before it was announced. Once things h ad settled down and the USG felt it had no choice but to accept the new governme nt, Taylor cabled State: ....It will serve our best interests to strengthen, sup port and endorse this government. IV. THE KY GOVERNMENT'S EARLY MONTHS: THE COUP TO THE EMBRACE AT HONOLULU, FEBRUARY 1966 A. THE KY GOVERNMENT'S INHERITANCE Ng uyen Cao Ky, Commander of the Vietnamese Air Force, joined with other "Young Tur ks" of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to overthrow the civilian government of Prime Minister Quat on June 12, 1965. Attempts at civilian government had limped alon g since

October, 1964, following riots in August-September that had forced the generals to withdraw Khanh's military-dictatorial constitution and to promise civilian ru le. That entire period had been marked by riots, coups, and attempted coups. By June, when Quat and the civilian President Suu found themselves in an impasse, A mbassador Taylor easily acquiesced in the return to direct military rule. Pacifi cation kept lagging, and the dark military picture forced the U.S. to decide in June to pour U.S. troops into the country as fast as they could be deployed. The pattern of GVN civil and military ineffectiveness had led the U.S. Government t o resolve to do it ourselves, and to abandon any hope of forcing or inducing GVN to do the job without us. All concerned knew that the Young Turks now in open c ontrol of GVN had repeatedly defied Ambassador Taylor and had gotten away with i t. Attempts at top-level leverage on GVN had produced a virtual diplomatic ruptu re for a few days at the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, and the U.S. was in no mood to try it again. B. THE KY GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. START THEIR DEALI NGS, JUNE-JULY, 1965 With Vietnam's return to overt military government, the pol itical blocs with their private armies, perhaps exhausted, bided their time. Com munications improved between the U.S. and GVN to a state of cool correctness, gr adually revealing lower-level GVN's intention to go on coasting as it always had and higher-level GVN's intention to serve its own interests. The day after the coup, COMUSMACV cabled CINCPAC in alarm about the military picture, requesting a uthority to send U.S. troops on offensive missions. He recalled that ARVN had lo st five infantry battalions on the battlefield in the last three weeks, and he s tated that the only possible U.S. response was the aggressive employment of U.S. troops together with the Vietnamese general reserve forces: To meet this challe nge successfully, troops must be maneuvered fully, deployed and redeployed as ne cessary. To demonstrate how completely the initiative changes on the subject of combined command, Saigon announced to Washington in mid-June its intention withi n the next few days to conduct a backgrounder on command relationships. A reply from the Secretary of Defense said, As basis for Washington review of proposed W estmoreland back-grounder on command relationships and MACV organizational struc ture, please furnish draft of text he will use In late June, General Westmorelan d was authorized by Washington to "commit U.S. troops to combat, independent of or in conjunction with GVN forces in any situation in which use of such troops i s requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when, in COMUSMACV's judgment, t heir use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces."

Premier Ky, obviously wishing to play down an issue sensitive to both government s, told Ambassador Taylor he saw no particular reason for any drastic change fro m the previous practice of combat support. In any specific situation, he said th at command should be worked out in accordance with "good sense and sound militar y principles." Additional deployments caused no problem, and indeed GVN now aske d for more US/FW forces than could be deployed or were approved. But in response to a query, Taylor waved aside any hope of using deployments for leverage. Disc ussions of combined command avoided joining issue and left matters unchanged. Al though Taylor's initial reaction to Ky was one of apprehension, he was soon impr essed by Ky's aggressive performance including his 26 point program. He doubted Ky's ability to implement the program, but concluded that military government wa s less likely to abandon the war effort and thus should be supported. Early in 1 965, AID had decided to stop buying piasters for U.S.-controlled sector funds, a nd in June agreed with the GVN to change the province procedures. Effective June 22, 1965, the Vietnamese Province Chief would requisition and release AID commo dities on his own authority, and all supporting funds came through regular GVN c hannels. The new procedures included elaborate reporting steps both when the U.S . advisers concurred and when they nonconcurred with the Province Chief's action s. In practice, the change reduced U.S. adviser's leverage. On July 1, Secretary McNamara submitted a memorandum to the President reviewing all aspects of Vietn am policy. However, he naturally concentrated on U.S. deployments, and had littl e to say on GVN's problems. In a section titled, "Initiatives Inside Vietnam," h is only significant recommendations were that we should increase our AID to GVN and that Chieu Hoi Program should be improved. However, in another memorandum to the President on July 20, following a trip to Saigon, McNamara suggested that t he U.S. Government should lay down some terms for its assistance. GVN was again pressing for more U.S. forces than were available. He mentioned rice policy, plu s a "veto on major GVN commanders, statements about invading NVN, and so on." Mc Namara's overall evaluation was deeply pessimistic, making clear why he recommen ded increased U.S. forces at that time: Estimate of the Situation. The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A h ard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces badly . The main VC efforts have been in southern I Corps, northern and central II Cor ps and north of Saigon. The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation Front during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been for ced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken. U.S. combat tro ops deployments and US/VNAF strikes against the North have put to rest most Sout h Vietnamese fears that the United States will forsake them, and US/VNAF air str ikes in-country have probably

shaken VC morale somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to few er and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. Cities an d towns are being isolated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are being isol ated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are usable and power and communicati ons lines are cut. The economy is deteriorating-the war is disrupting rubber pro duction, rice distribution, Dalat vegetable production and the coastal fishing i ndustry, causing the loss of jobs and income, displacement of people and frequen t breakdown or suspension of vital means of transportation and communication; fo reign exchange earnings have fallen; and severe inflation is threatened. In Saig on Ambassador Taylor gave the GVN the first definite sign of U.S. concern about the effects of U.S. deployments on Saigon port operations and on the Vietnamese economy. In a letter to Prime Minister Ky dated July 1, 1965, he said: Your expe rts and ours are in constant contact on [the budgetary deficit] and have always worked effectively together . . . [They] will need your support in carrying out the antiinflation measures which they may recommend from time to time . . . The rice procurement and distribution agency which you have in mind is an important measure of . . . a program which should also include the further development of port capacities. USOM also began talking about devaluing the piaster. These matt ers were to come to a head a year later. At this time, however, the Embassy trea ted these matters routinely and applied no pressure to GVN. GVN officials opened the serious bidding in their meeting with Secretary McNamara on July 16, saying that their gold and foreign exchange reserves had suffered the alarming drop fr om $175 million to $100 million since January, 1964, and requested a big increas e in AID. Ambassador Taylor preferred to limit our counter-demands to get quick agreement; he said, We would avoid giving the impression of asking for new agree ments or imposing conditions for our increase AID . . . We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to require prolonged debate. On Jul y 28, the Embassy and GVN settled it. The agreement touched very lightly on GVN obligations and on joint economic planning. It provided for "joint discussions t o precede policy decisions . . . for control of inflation," etc. On July 8, MACV reviewed its relationships with the military leadership. There was no problem; they agreed that operations involving both U.S. and ARVN troops would use the co ncepts of coordination and cooperation. They did not discuss combined command. H owever, a flap developed late in July when General Thi was reported to be planni ng operations in the DMZ. Both Taylor and Westmoreland took it up with GVN, who reassured them; Thi got back on his leash before it was too late. Such operation s commenced more than a year later. A candid subsequent statement from Saigon sh ows the Vietnamese desired to have the best of both worlds. Ambassador Lodge rep orted to Washington the disparaging reactions of ARVN general officers on the JG S staff to the

U.S. Marine victory south of Chu Lai. "I flag this small straw in the wind as po inting up the importance of portraying our operations here as combined with the GVN in nature." C. QUIET SAILING THROUGH JANUARY, 1966 In August, Ky wanted to m ake a trip to Taiwan, being interested in getting Nationalist Chinese troops int o Vietnam. The U.S. Government objected both to the trip and to its objective, b ut failed to persuade him to give up the trip. Later he brought in some Chinats on the sly. An idea floated in Washington that he or Thieu should visit the Unit ed States was dropped without having been brought up with the GVN. Lodge arrived around the middle of August to replace Taylor. Having avoided the confrontation s with GVN of the type that Taylor had, he came with a residue of good will. Bec ause he was considered responsible for Diem's overthrow, the Buddhists were plea sed, and the militant Catholics dubious. In that connection, State thought it pr udent to direct the Embassy to assure GVN that neither Lodge nor Lansdale, whom he was bringing with him, was going to try to make changes in GVN. On August 26, Ky told Lodge that he thought U.S. forces should "hold strategic points" so tha t the Vietnamese could concentrate on pacification operations. That is, he wante d the United States to take over the main force war. He also said he thought the Chu Hoi program was a waste of money. In early August, Ky established a Ministr y of Rural Construction (MRC and a Central Rural Construction Council (CRCC). Th ese absorbed functions and personnel from predecessor groups and other ministrie s for the announced purpose of providing centralized direction to the pacificati on effort. Nguyen Tat Ung was made Minister of Rural Construction while the Coun cil was chaired by General Co, Minister of War and Defense. Timing and circumsta nces give no evidence of a strong U.S. hand at work. The U.S. Embassy viewed the new organization as the result of political maneuvering, but also hoped the cha nge would promote inter-ministerial cooperation. The move signalled renewed emph asis of pacification by both GVN and the mission. In late August, Ambassador Lod ge announced the appointment of retired General Lansdale as chairman of the U.S. Mission liaison group to the GVN CRCC. There followed a period of shuffling and reorganization during which Ung was killed in a plane crash. Two weeks later Pr ime Minister Ky announced that General Thang would succeed to the Ministry. The appointment was for six months only, and Thang retained his position on the JGS. At the same time, General Co was elevated to Deputy Prime Minister for War and Reconstruction in a realignment that made six ministries including Rural Reconst ruction subordinate to him. On August 28, General Thi told Lodge he thought he c ould do a better job running the government than Ky was doing. He spoke at some length on Ky's political weaknesses, with particular emphasis on his lack of sup port in I Corps, where Thi was strong. As was his usual practice, Lodge politely brushed aside this approach. (Later Thi proved harder and harder to control unt il his dismissal in March.)

In mid-September, Lodge went on an inspection trip to Da Nang and Qui Nhon. On h is return he waxed eloquent about the benefits of the U.S. presence: All reports indicated that the American troops are having a very beneficial effect on VN tr oops, giving them greater confidence and courage. I am always mindful of the pos sibility that the American presence will induce the VN to slump back and "Let Ge orge do it." But there seems to be no sign of this. I wish I could describe the feeling of hope which this great American presence on the ground is bringing. Th ere can no longer be the slightest doubt that persistence will bring success, th at the aggression will be warded off and that for the first time since the end o f WW II, the cause of free men will be on an upward spiral. Lodge's end-of-month appraisal was that civil and political progress lagged behind the military. He felt there would be a political vacuum that the VC would fill if the U.S. pulled out. Therefore, he was trying to start a program to provide security and to gen erate indigenous political activity at the hamlet level. He noted with pleasure that Ky was taking the initiative in bringing his pacification plans to Lansdale , to get U.S. reactions before these plans were too firm to change. By September , a combination of inflation, black-marketeering by U.S. troops and other relate d problems led both governments to agree on important steps. The U.S. introduced military payment certificates, and the GVN agreed to exchange 118 piasters to t he dollar for personal use of troops and U.S. civilians. Official U.S. purchases of piasters continued at the old exchange rate of 35, however. September brough t an evaluation of the three-month three-province pacification experiment during which each was under the unified control of a team chief; one an embassy FSO, o ne a MACV sector adviser, and one an AID province representative. COMUSMACV judg ed that test only partially successful; progress achieved was attributed to the "keen spirit of cooperation" by all team members. Because he believed the result s inconclusive and in view of the existing military situation, General Westmorel and concluded that the team chief concept should not be implemented. The experim ent was officially ended. The U.S. also became deeply involved in the rice trade . Vietnam changed over from a rice exporter in the years through 1964 to a heavy importer from 1965 onwards. AID provided the imported rice under CIP. In Septem ber, 1964, Ambassador Lodge spoke of measures we are taking to control the price of rice; inasmuch as AID provided the imports, USOM had a say in the GVN's poli cies on price control, subsidization, and distribution of rice. During this peri od a problem flared up over a corrupt Province Chief. Lt. Colonel Chi, Province Chief of Binh Tuy, was accused of misuse of $250,000 of AID funds. After pressur e from AID had merely produced threats against the lives of AID personnel in the province, on September 23 AID withdrew them and suspended AID to the province. Chi

was a protege of General Co, the Minister of Defense and Deputy Premier, who him self figured in charges of corruption a year later. On October 5, the story got into the papers, and on the 7th Ky promised publicly to remove Chi. Lodge played no role in starting this episode, and told the Mission Council on October 7 tha t he did not want it repeated. After a six-weeks delay, Ky did remove Chi on Nov ember 25, and gave him a job in the Ministry of Defense. AID to the province res umed. Advisers in the field kept on complaining about the delays in the Vietname se system, and pressed for restoration of some resources of their own. On Octobe r 1, 1965, MACV began giving its sector and subsector advisers piaster funds the y could spend on urgent projects. Each subsector adviser had access to 50,-000 p iasters which could be replenished as necessary. Toward the end of 1965 it becam e obvious that this method was highly successful. Consideration was given to per manent establishment of the revolving fund. However, after the trial period of a bout four months MACV abandoned the plan because of strong opposition by General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development. He argued that under U.S. urging he had been developing an effective, flexible organization that would take care of urgent projects of the type the sector and subsector advisers wanted to promo te; letting them bypass his people would encourage the latter to lapse into thei r old bad habits and thwart both governments' main objectives. USOM also had sec ond thoughts about abandoning the sign-off system. Early in October 1965, the Mi ssion Council approved a plan to restore the "troika sign-off" procedure as it h ad existed prior to June. After the Mission had already reopened the issue with the GVN, the State Department objected, saying that the United States wanted to make the Vietnamese more independent and effective. After a time the frustration s of the advisors began striking a sympathetic chord at the highest levels. In a draft memorandum to the President dated November 3, 1965, Secretary McNamara st ated his own impatience with the GVN and urged a more active role for our advise rs at province and district. There is no sign of such high-level interest earlie r, except as expressed by decisions to extend the advisory system to lower level s; as just noted State objected to the restoration of troika sign-off on October 16, 1965. Some uncertainty and disagreement with respect to pacification develo ped within United States groups in Vietnam. In November, Major General Lansdale, Special Assistant to the Ambassador, asked who on the U.S. side should have the executive role in dealing with the Rural Construction Ministry? Lansdale envisa ged that MACV and JUSPAO would be observers only. COMUSMACV disagreed with the p roposed limitation. USMACV was the only structure advising GVN at all levels; so MACV shared responsibility for pacification. Manpower required for cadre teams would impact directly and seriously on MACV efforts to maintain RVNAF strengths. Minister of Rural Construction was Major General Thang who also was Director of Operations, JGS. He looked to MACV for advice and

assistance on the whole spectrum of pacification problems. On December 15 in a m emorandum to Major General Lansdale, the Ambassador said, I consider the GVN eff ort, in this domain (apart from the military clearing phase) to be primarily civ ilian . . . Consequently, on the American side it is preferable that the two civ ilian agencies, USAID and CAS, be the operating support agencies. The GVN milita ry plan in support of the 1966 Rural Construction plan was given in the JGS Dire ctive AB 140 of December 15, 1965, which had been developed in coordination with MACV and the Ministry of Rural Construction. In November onward, portions of th e 1966 GVN defense budget prepared in accordance with U.S. guidelines were recei ved by MACV. At the time of the Christmas truce, President Johnson launched a pe ace offensive, including a suspension of bombing in North Vietnam that lasted 37 days. The moves were carefully cleared with GVN and with its Ambassador in Wash ington, and caused no significant problems. Lodge's appraisal was that the "offe nsive" achieved all its aims, at no significant cost. However, trouble flared up over a plan to release 20 NVA prisoners across the DMZ; General Thi was not con sulted, and said he would not permit it (in his Corps). Things were smoothed ove r amicably by Tet. One troublesome area was GVN's hawkishness over such issues a s border incidents. Ky kept pressing for action against Cambodian sanctuaries; t he U.S. stood firm on the rule of self-defense in emergencies only, which could mean shooting across the border but not maneuvering troops across it. Ky wanted to encourage a Khmer Serai expedition, which would cause a flare-up with the Cam bodian Government; State directed Lodge to keep him on a tight leash. Coup rumor s started to circulate around the first of the year; Lodge remarked that just be fore Tet was a normal season for that. On December 29 Ky told Lodge of an allege d assassination plot directed at Ky, Co, the Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau, and Lodge. On January 15, VNAF took to the air in nervous reaction to some supposed ly suspicious troop movements; Lodge reported more rumors on January 19, and too k the opportunity to spell out his position: If . . . corridor coup . . . caused directorate members to fall out, consequences could be disastrous . . . A peace ful reshuffle within directorate is a continuing possibility. I would deplore it . We take all rumors and reports of government change very seriously and never m iss an opportunity to make clear U.S. support for, and the need for, governmenta l stability. Around the middle of January 1966, Ky addressed the Armed Forces Co nvention. He announced the prospective formation, after Tet, of a "Democracy Bui lding Council" to serve as a constituent assembly and legislature. It would writ e a new constitution by October, 1966, preparatory to elections in 1967. This wa s the opening shot in what became a big issue within a few weeks.

D. THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 6-8, 1966 By late January, it was clear t hat Lodge's policy of not pushing GVN too hard may have helped keep things amica ble but permitted pacification to keep lagging and permitted economic problems t o grow serious. With conspicuous haste that caused GVN some loss of face, the U. S. summoned Thieu, Ky, and other GVN officials to Honolulu to express renewed an d heightened U.S. concern. The U.S. wanted to re-emphasize pacification, with a corresponding shift of authority from the ARVN line command to the province chie fs; and it wanted strong action to limit inflation, to clear the Saigon Port, an d to limit the unfavorable effect of U.S. deployments on the U.S. balance of pay ments. For the first time in over a year, the U.S. bargained hard with GVN on is sues of these kinds. The GVN agreed to the main U.S. demands on authority for th e provinces chiefs. Moreover, it promised fiscal reform, devaluation, port and c ustoms reform, and the use of GVN dollar balances to finance additional imports. The GVN also agreed that an International Monetary Fund team should be invited to give technical advice on these economic programs. Thieu and Ky promised to go ahead with a new constitution, to be drafted by an appointed Advisory Council, and then ratified by popular vote in late 1966; following that, they promised, t he GVN would create an elected government rooted in the constitution. The U.S. p romised to increase AID imports to $400 million in 1966, plus $150 million in pr oject assistance. Altogether the two governments exchanged over 60 agreed points and assurances, ranging over free world (third country) assistance, rural const ruction (pacification), refugees, political development, Montagnards, Chieu Hoi, health, education, agriculture, and economic and financial programs. This packa ge was far more specific than any previous US/GVN agreement. Their public statem ents after the conference emphasized social justice, the promise of elected gove rnment, and the U.S. lack of interest in bases or permanent alliance in South Vi etnam. In a public appearance at the conference, President Johnson embraced Prim e Minister Ky, before photographers. Although it caused no loss of face directly , in the eyes of many observers this act added to the impression that Ky was tie d to our apron strings. If Lodge sensed this effect, he said nothing about it; c haracteristically, he said to State that the Honolulu Conference was good psycho logically for Vietnam. Directly after the conference USOM remained seriously con cerned with the high and rising black market plaster rate for dollars, which the y and the Vietnamese business community regarded as the bellweather of inflation . Moreover, besides its harmful psychological effect, the high rate tempted U.S. personnel into illegal transactions, causing unfavorable publicity. Inasmuch as GVN refused to sell dollars in the black market to push the rate down, Porter r equested authorization from Washington to do it on the sly with CAS money. The t hrust of the Honolulu Conference was clearly to stimulate nonmilitary pacificati on efforts. Upon his return to Saigon, Lodge issued a memorandum reconstituting the

Mission Liaison Group under Deputy Ambassador Porter. Though charged by the memo randum with the management and control of all U.S. civilian agency activities su pporting Revolutionary Development, Porter saw his responsibility as primarily a coordinating effort. He said he did not intend to get into individual agency ac tivities. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 5, "US-GVN Relations, 1964-1967," pp. 277-407. (Boston: Beacon Press, 19 71) Section 3, pp. 369-407 V. A REBELLION, A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, AND THE HARDSHIPS OF NEGOTIATING WITH A "WEAK" GOVERNMENT A. THE RISE OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT, MARCH, 1966 General Thi, Commander of I Corps, was a thorn in Ky's side as a potential rival. Both priva te and public disagreements showed there was no love lost between them; and Thi had a considerable base of support in his connections with the Buddhist leadersh ip and in his identification with Annamese sensitivities. These factors also mad e the other generals of the Military Directorate (formerly National Leadership C ouncil, etc.) suspicious of Thi; they felt better able to cope with Ky. Armed wi th President Johnson's public support of him, Ky resolved to exile Thi, and he p ersuaded his colleagues to go along with the idea in a meeting on March 10. The day before he told Lodge of his intention, saying that Thi had been culpably ins ubordinate; Lodge replied that he should be sure he could prove the charges, so as to put a good public face on the move, and pave the way carefully. Later in t he day Lodge also advised him to make sure he had the votes in the Directorate, saying that for him to lose on the issue and be replaced as Prime Minister would be catastrophic. Ky was sure of himself, although he admitted he could not prov e his charges. In a later meeting the same day, Thieu told Lodge Thi "had conduc ted himself in a way that was not suitable," and was confident Thi could be dism issed without ill effects. On March 10, when the Directorate voted to fire him, Thi resigned. Ky told Lodge that Thi would go to Da Nang the 11th for the change -of-command ceremony and then leave the country for four months. The same day, T hi told Colonel Sam Wilson that he did not want to leave the country, and that h e had been encouraged by the Director of National Police to stay; Wilson suggest ed that he go gracefully. On the 11th, when the time came for Thi to fly to Da N ang, he was detained at Tan Son Nhut; Ky had got wind of, or

suspected, his intentions. Ky then urgently requested Lodge to invite Thi to the United States for a physical examination. The Annamese Buddhists, led by Tn Qua ng, who had quietly bided their time for about a year, now entered the action. ( Ky later told Lodge that Tn Quang had assented to Thi's dismissal and had then d ouble-crossed him.) They began demonstrations in Da Nang and Hue on March 12, jo ined by the students, and over the next several days gained control of those cit ies as the police stood aside. Again Ky used Lodge's good offices to try to pers uade Thi to leave the country gracefully; but the 16th, Ky and the Directorate d ecided to try to use Thi to restore order, and permitted him to return to Da Nan g. For a few days things quieted down slightly, but the end was not yet in sight . State offered Lodge suggestions on how to get things calmed down. First, he mi ght counsel a firm attitude by GVN, saying it would meet with the Buddhists but not under threats, and that it would not permit disorders. Second, GVN might ste al the initiative from the Buddhists by making a generous public offer of electi ons. Whichever course they followed, State wanted them to be sure it would work and would avoid a head-on collision with the Buddhists. In reply, Lodge agreed o n the need to avoid a head-on collision; as for the means, he, like State, simpl y hoped for the best: We should not settle on one solution or another. Rather it is possible, if not probable, that, unless uncontrollable mass reaction is brou ght about, each side will seek to arrange what can be looked upon as widely acce ptable. On March 22, Lodge and Ky had a long discussion of tactics relating to e lections and constitution-writing. Elections were scheduled to come up for the l argely powerless but symbolic provincial councils (which advised the Province Ch iefs on policy matters), and Ky had reportedly toyed with calling off these elec tions. He was also far behind schedule on the constituent assembly he had public ly promised on January 19 for just after Tet, and as noted had privately promise d the U.S. Government at Honolulu. Lodge reported: 2. . . . He is eager for advi ce and when he received it, he said he agreed with it. Now it remains to be seen whether it will be carried out. 3. My advice was based on careful reflection an d consultation with my associates and was to this effect: 4. The GVN should not cancel provincial elections as I had heard reported. He said that this was not e xactly the case; that there were two provincial councils, which didn't want elec tions. I said in that event these councils should he made to say publicly that t hey didn't want elections so that the onus of not holding these elections would not fall on the Government. A public announcement had been made that the Governm ent was in favor of holding these provincial elections; the offices involved hav e little actual consequence but are of symbolic significance; Washington had bee n informed of this fact; and if there was some reason why in one or two province s they should not be held, then the provinces should make the reason plain. 5. I then advised that he should take the lead and influence opinion, and not be at the mercy of events. I suggested that a list of names for so-called consultative assembly

(which I suggested would be better named "preparatory commission") which aims to draft a constitution, should be confirmed by the Generals. When this had been d one, I suggested that then Ky should make a very carefully written and persuasiv e announcement which would be done on film for use on television and in the movi e theaters. The Vietnamese are great movie-goers and it is a very important medi um here. I said that he should not read it on film with his head bobbing up and down as he looked down at the text, but should have it put on cue card along sid e the camera and read it as he looks right into the lens. 6. His statement shoul d be written in such a way as not to exclude the possibility of elections later on for a constitutional convention. In other words, this should be deliberately fuzzed and left open by implication. I said I much preferred the phrase "constit utional convention" to the pernicious French phrase "constitutent assembly." The constitutiQnal convention would meet, adopt the constitution and disband, where as the constituent assembly stays around and makes trouble for an idefinite peri od. 7. He agreed with all this and seemed to understand it. He said that last ni ght, the Generals had unanimously confirmed the names of the members of the prep aratory committee. He would announce all this as I suggested. I wish he would do it quickly. 8. I suggested that impulsive unprepared statements were most dange rous at this time. Experienced politicians often make statements which seem to b e "off the cuff," but actually are carefully thought out. His unprepared stateme nts always worry me. 9. He agreed with me that certain Buddhists were unwittingl y taking Communist inspired advice, as were the students in Hue who had attacked me . 10. He was absolutely sure that the Buddhists were divided among themselve s-an analysis which I share. He agrees with me that Tn Quang simply has not got the powerful psychological factors working for him now that he had in October '6 3. All the Communist Propaganda in the world cannot alter these facts: That in ' 63, the Buddhists were discriminated against, and now they are not; that in the latter days of '63 the Buddhists were persecuted whereas now they are not; and t hat Tn Quang was an underdog then, and now he is not. Yet Tn Quang is evidently determined. 11. My advice to him was not very drastic and quite simple to do, an d yet I believe that if he follows it conscientiously and expeditiously without procrastination that there may be enough of a budding sense of National interest to start moving things along in the right direction. 12. He thanked me more eff usively and warmly than he has ever done before and said he was so grateful for my interest in his welfare, physical and political. 13. The situation is not yet out of hand. Ky has had offers from Catholics and Southerners for them to enter the fray on his side and start throwing their weight around, which he so far ha s been able to prevent them from doing. This is one of the things which I have b een fearing. I talked in this vein with the Papal delegate and the Archbishop of Saigon yesterday, and they agreed completely. The leadership of the Southerners is not, I fear, as responsible. On March 25, Ky followed Lodge's advice more or less closely, and announced the Constitutional Preparatory Commission and said it would finish its work within two months; elections might follow by the end of 1966. However, he insisted that GVN would exclude "Vietcong or corrupt elements " from the elected assembly. The move

failed to restore order. On March 26, demonstrators in Hue broke out anti-Americ an banners written in English, and an ugly incident followed in which a Marine t ore one down. (After detailed negotiations, an apology was given and accepted.) The radio stations at Da Nang and Hue fell under control of dissident elements. On March 29, Ky told Lodge that he and the generals wanted to move on Hue and Da Nang with military forces, and said that he could show that an unpublicized Bud dhists split had caused the uprising. Lodge concurred in Ky's plan to use forces , but urged him not to try to create an open breach among the Buddhists. Althoug h Lodge had no objection to using force against the Buddhist movement, both he a nd Rusk felt that U.S. men and equipment should stay out of it, to avoid heighte ning anti-American feelings. Rusk told Lodge of his deep concern about Vietnames e internal bickering at a crucial time; he was particularly disturbed by the ant i-American propaganda coming from the Hue radio, which was physically defended b y the U.S. Marines in that general area. He went on to say, We face the fact tha t we ourselves cannot succeed except in support of the South Vietnamese. Unless they are able to mobilize reasonable solidarity, prospects are grim. I appreciat e your frank and realistic reporting and am relying heavily upon your good judgm ent to exert every effort to get us over the present malaise. Lodge replied that his influence with the Catholics had kept them out of it, but that his talks wi th Tn Quang had been unproductive. He estimated that Tri Quang had used the anti -American theme to put pressure on the GVN. (Through an intermediary the Embassy learned that General Thi said that the United States was too committed to leave ; this belief may have led Thi and the Buddhists to feel free to use the theme a s a weapon against GVN.) On March 29, the Catholic leaders in whom Lodge had pla ced his hopes came out against the GVN and demanded a return to civilian rule. B . KY'S FIRST ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT, APRIL, 1966 Events now h appened in rapid succession. Assured of Lodge's sympathy, on April 3 Ky declared that Da Nang was in the hands of Communists. On April 5, despite mild questioni ng from State, MACV airlifted two battalions of Vietnamese Rangers to Da Nang un der personal command of Ky, and they started to seize the city. That same day th e 1st ARVN Division Commander declared for the Struggle Movement, with his offic ers backing him, and U.S. advisers were withdrawn from the Division. On April 6, "non-essential" U.S. civilians withdrew from Hue. On April 8, the GVN flew two more Ranger battalions to Da Nang, using its own airlift after MACV refused to p rovide any. On April 9, U.S. representatives protested to Struggle Movement lead ers about Howitzers under their control positioned within range of the Da Nang a irbase; the leaders agreed to pull them back. Two hundred U.S. and third country civilians evacuated Da Nang.

Washington played little role in all this. From time to time it offered mild adv ice, but Lodge had a free hand. It was his decision to withhold any further U.S. airlift on April 8, although after he acted State agreed by urging him to push GVN toward a political rather than a military solution: Accordingly we believe y ou should not repeat not urge immediate Da Nang operations at present, but rathe r that entire focus of your efforts at all levels should be to get political pro cess started. (It was at this time that Lodge wrote his long cable, discussed in the next section below, saying that the U.S. does not have enough influence in Vietnam, and that it should set up a leverage system that bypasses Saigon and wo rks at the Province level.) Lodge accepted the fact of Buddhist power, and wante d to avoid bloodshed, but as always his sympathies were squarely with the milita ry leadership: The political crisis which has been gripping VN is now almost one month old. The situation has deteriorated steadily as the Buddhist opposition h as increased pressure on the GVN. Buddhist demands, when stripped of hypocrisy [ and,] . . . boil down to a naked grab for power. Throughout this period we have sought certain fundamental objectives: A. To preserve the VN nation, and thus, t he present government. B. To provide for an orderly political evolution from mil itary to civil government. C. To preserve the Armed Forces as an effective shiel d against VC. D. To guard and expand all our political, economic, social and mil itary gains, notably those which flowed from the Honolulu declaration. E. To mai ntain the effectiveness of the Free World forces in VN. On April 12, GVN found a face-saving formula and withdrew its Ranger battalions from Da Nang to Saigon, and the streets became relatively quiet. On the 14th, the Directorate gave way t o the demands for elected civilian government by promising elections for a Const ituent Assembly within three to five months. For the time being the Buddhists an d other political groups, while making additional demands, called off the demons trations on condition that Ky honor his promises. On April 23, Lodge reviewed fo r State all the leverage available that might be used to help bring the I Corps area under government authority, and rejected using any of it. We have considere d possibility of using U.S. control over economic and military commodities in I Corps to foster re-establishment of government authority in the areas. The bulk of USAID-controlled commodities are scheduled for use in rural areas. Comparativ ely little anti-government activity is carried on by the rural population....

The Hue-DaNang area currently is relatively well stocked with basic commodities. There is an estimated four month supply of rice on hand and the countryside is now starting the harvesting of a rice crop.... The U.S. currently controls, thro ugh the USAID, the following: (A) Warehouses in the part of DaNang containing qu antities of construction material and PL-480 foodstuffs . . . (B) Three deep dra ft vessels and one coastal vessel now in the DaNang harbor with CIP cement, rice , fertilizer, and miscellaneous commercial cargo . . . (C) Nine chartered coasta l vessels . . . operated for USAID..... With respect to military commodities, RV NAF maintains a 30-60 day supply of expendable combat items while their rice sto cks are maintained at a 30-day level. However, under rationing these rice stocks can be extended to 60 days. The RVNAF items which are in short supply throughou t Vietnam, as well as in the Hue-DaNang area, include vehicle batteries, brake s hoes, and POL. We consider it unwise to interfere with the flow of supplies to R VNAF at this time since it would limit effectiveness of operations against Viet Cong forces.... Indeed any U.S. effort to withhold resources which it controls i n this area may stimulate excesses by the struggle movement even though an attem pt is made to conceal the U.S. role in the imposition of sanctions. C. VIOLENCE EXPLODES IN MAY, 1966 After promising the elections by August 15, against Lodge' s public disagreement, Ky said in a public statement on May 4 that "we will try to hold elections by October." In Lodge's absence, on a long trip to Washington, Porter protested privately to Ky that once he had made a public commitment on e lection timing he was risking further disorders to appear to shirk it. Neverthel ess, Ky added to the flames by a further public statement that he expected to re main in office for another year. New disorders broke out, and DaNang and Hue aga in fell under overt control of the Struggle Movement. Without consulting the Emb assy, the Directorate laid plans for several days and then on May 15 airlifted t roops to DaNang and then to Hue. State first reaction showed unrestrained fury, and sanctioned "rough talk" to stop the fighting: This may require rough talk bu t U.S. cannot accept this insane bickering do your best in next few hours. Intol erable that Ky should . . . move.... against DaNang without consultation with us . Urgent now to insist that fighting stop. State did not, at first, sanction the threat of force; for example, it said Gen. Walt should continue to harbor the d issident General Dinh in III MAF Headquarters, and that Walt should tell GVN he "can't foresee the U.S. Government reaction" if GVN forces should break into his Headquarters. Its overall guidance was to use

persuasion, withdrawal of advisers, and a public posture of non-intervention, wi th the following specifics: 1. Announce that the U.S. was not consulted, gave no help. Ky's use of T39 routine, "not material assistance." 2. Furnish no airlift . 3. Withdraw all advisers from I CTZ, including from loyal GVN units, except fo r any clearly in position to fight VC. Keep U.S. forces out, except maybe to fig ht VC. 4. Inasmuch as withdrawal of civilians and military from DaNang in early April had a sobering effect, State authorized withdrawing them again (including combat forces). 5. Exception to 3: Keep contacts with Thi and 1st Division, and make other like exceptions. (Purpose of withdrawal is to avoid appearance of inv olvement.) 6. Use contacts to get a compromise that avoids bloodshed. 7. Find ou t "soonest" the effect on election preparations. 8. Do not throw U.S. weight beh ind GVN effort. However, the "rough talk" actually used did reach the point of a clear threat of force. General Walt heard of a possible VNAF attack on dissiden t ARVN units in their compounds, and threatened to use U.S. jets to shoot down t he VNAF aircraft if they did. (The pretext was that U.S. advisers would be threa tened if they did, and did not apply to VNAF self-defense against dissident ARVN units closing on DaNang.) If such an attack was planned, the threat succeeded. Porter followed State's guidance closely; he put it strongly to Ky and Thieu tha t the failure to consult was unacceptable, withheld airlift from GVN and withdre w advisers from units on both sides, and obtained from Thieu the assurance that the election would be held as promised. He refused to give public backing or opp osition to either side, and tried to mediate. State sent several more messages w ith guidance along the same lines, and directed him to tell both sides of USG's impatience with Vietnamese factionalism: The American people are becoming fed up with the games they are playing while the Americans are being asked to sustain such major burdens. On May 17, a U.S. helicopter received small arms fire from a dissident ARVN unit when carrying a GVN officer to parley with them; the helico pter returned the fire, causing several casualties. In a stormy meeting the next day with Corcoran, the U.S. Consul in Hue, Tri Quang accused the U.S. of joinin g forces with GVN in attacking his people, and threatened violence against U.S. forces and facilities. Corcoran stood firm, saying that U.S. forces would defend themselves. State's guidance the same day, reaffirming the previous guidance, w as to limit U.S. assistance to administrative aircraft, and then only when GVN h ad none available, to reassure Thi and the leaders of the Struggle Movement abou t U.S. support for free elections, to bring opposite sides (especially Ky and T' hi) to face to face discussions, and to intervene as needed to end the squabblin g. On May 20, Tri Quang complained to another U.S. official about the administra tive aircraft who pointed out to him that the U.S. also provided such aircraft t o Thi and other dissident military officers. That same day a dissident leader th reatened to attack GVN forces at

DaNang, and State directed that he be reminded that the U.S. forces also in DaNa ng would have to defend themselves. State also authorized the threat of total U. S. withdrawal. On Lodge's return to Vietnam at this time, he received detailed g uidance from State, very similar to that previously given to Porter, for his fir st meeting with Ky. The guidance reemphasized the demand for prior consultation by GVN before it made any important move, and directed him to urge GVN to be con ciliatory and to use its forces with the utmost restraint: 1. We must have absol ute candor from Ky as to his plans, and opportunity to comment before significan t actions. 2. Tell him to leave pagodas alone, except for surveillance and encir clement. 3. Keep ARVN out of Saigon demonstrations. 4. Elections vs military rol e: Sound out. 5. Encourage election progress. 6. Keep GVN in contact with Buddhi st leaders. 7. HelpKymeetThi. 8. Consider further the suggestion of withdrawal f rom DaNang and Hue. 9. Give us "your judgment as to whether we ought to move for cefully and drastically to assert our power" to end strife. 10. Suggest broadeni ng the Directorate with civilians. By this time, Ky had begun leaning over backw ard to consult Porter, and then Lodge, before every move. GVN forces overpowered roadblocks and controlled DaNang, but demonstrators were operating freely from pagodas in Saigon, and the Struggle Movement had absolute control of Hue, where in the next few days they surrounded and blockaded the consulate. In Saigon GVN followed Lodge's advice and neutralized the pagodas by surrounding them without violating them; but in the I Corps he was preparing to occupy Hue forcefully as he had DaNang. The Buddhists began a series of self-immolations. Amid mounting t hreats, the U.S. evacuated the consulate and its other facilities in Hue. Lodge was unreservedly sympathetic to Ky, as in April, and viewed the Buddhists as equ ivalent to card-carrying Communists; but he followed instructions and pressed Ky to be conciliatory. When Ky would blurt out fire-eating statements and whittle down his previous promises on elections, Lodge would patiently urge him to avoid off-the-cuff statements and to limit himself to prepared statements on radio an d TV. Lodge and Westmoreland repeatedly pressed Ky and Thi to get together, whic h they did on May 27; Ky offered Thi and Dinh unspecified Army jobs. State was g ratified, but cautious. D. KY RESTORES GVN CONTROL IN I CORPS, JUNE, 1966 One of the main subjects of Lodge's conferences in Washington was what the U.S. Govern ment position should be on elections for the Constituent Assembly. Having finish ed deliberations and drafting after Lodge returned to Saigon, State cabled the p rinciples it thought should guide the Mission's operations on election matters:

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF U.S. ACTION The U.S. Mission should seek to exert maxim um influence toward the achievement of the substantive objectives stated in B. b elow. At the same time, this must be done with recognition that a key objective is to avoid anti-Americanism becoming a major issue; we shall be accused of inte rferences in any event, but it is vitally important not to give potential anti-A merican elements (or the press and outside observers) any clear handle to hit us with. B. OBJECTIVES 1. Elections should be held as announced by GVN on April 15 th, that is by September 15 of this year. 2. The issue of anti-Americanism shoul d be kept out of the election campaign as far as possible. 3. The question as to whether the constitutional assembly will only have the role of drafting the con stitution or will have some further function should not be allowed to become an active pre-election issue and the U.S. should take no position on this question. 4. The elections should be conducted so as to produce a constitutional assembly fairly representing the various regions and groups within South Vietnam (except those actively participating with the Viet Cong), including the Army, Montagnar ds, Khmer minorities, et. a!. 5. The elections should be conducted so as to gain a maximum improvement in the image of the GVN in the United States and internat ionally; this calls for a wide turnout, scrupulously correct conduct of the voti ng and counting process, as little political limitation on voter eligibility as possible and vigorous efforts to avoid voter intimidation from any quarter. Idea s to be explored are a brief election period ceasefire, international observatio n of the elections, students participating as poll watchers, etc. 6. The emphasi s in the campaign should be on the selection of good men to draft the constituti on; political parties are not expected to play a major role although the campaig n may provide the occasion for laying foundations for future party organization. 7. Unless new developments change our assessment, major efforts should be devot ed not to stimulating the formation of a large nationalist party but rather to t he adoption of the concept that these elections bring together all non-communist groups who are pledged, among other things, to their country's independence and the continuing need to defend it with American help. Specifically, efforts shou ld not be made to split the Buddhists or isolate the militant Buddhist faction. 8. The election process should be a vehicle for educating and engaging the popul ation in the democratic process and it should be used to launch political and ps ychological initiatives with youth groups, students, labor, etc. 9. Restore as f ar as possible the unity of the Directorate and promote a reconciliation between Generals Ky and Thi. However, discourage efforts by the Directorate to form a g overnment party designed purely to perpetuate the Directorate in power to the ex clusion of other significant political groups.

At the end of May things seemed to settle down. McNamara sounded out the Embassy about a trip in early June, but Lodge talked him out of it on the grounds that it might tempt the Buddhists to start demonstrating again. Ky met Buddhist Insti tute leaders on May 31 and offered civilian participation in an enlarged Directo rate. He reported that the Buddhists accepted this along with reassurances about elections, and agreed with Ky's new appointment of General Lam as Commander of I Corps. Lodge was skeptical: The above is what Ky said and it stood up to quest ioning. It sounds too good to be true, and we will await next steps. The next da y, June 1, a mob of students burned the consulate and consular residence in Hue. When GVN forces prepared to move on Hue, the Struggle Movement filled the stree ts with Buddhist altars, serving as roadblocks the GVN forces hesitated to distu rb, while dissident ARVN units deployed in the city. The directorate's April 14 promise of elections of a Constituent Assembly on August 15 had led to the creat ion of an Electoral Law Commission, which the Buddhists boycotted as a result of the subsequent disagreements. The Commission presented its proposals on June 5, and they included several features unacceptable to the Directorate, especially those related to the powers and tenure of the Assembly. Ky reacted publicly on J une 7, saying that if military-civil unity proceeded smoothly enough over the ne xt few months it would be possible to postpone elections. Demonstrations continu ed in Saigon, while a combination of negotiations and force gradually brought Hu e under GVN control. On June 15, Ky made it clear that the Assembly would not be permitted to continue and to legislate after drafting a constitution, and that the Military Directorate would continue in power until promulgation of the new c onstitution and the seating of a subsequently elected Assembly in 1967. (Note th at Lodge backed this attitude.) The Buddhist Institute called a general strike i n response to the GVN declaration that June 18, the anniversary of the Thieu-Ky government, would be a national holiday. On June 19, the Directorate scheduled t he elections for the Constituent Assembly for September 11, 1966. The announceme nt had a calming effect, and the disorders came under control within a few days. The approved electoral law gave the Directorate ample scope to exclude unwanted candidates, and prevented the Buddhists from putting their symbol, the red lotu s, on the ballot. (Again, note Lodge's concurrence.) On July 31, Thi went into e xile. E. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, MARCH-JUNE, 1966 To help implement the incre ased emphasis given pacification at Honolulu, President Johnson in late March ap pointed Robert Komer as his Special Assistant for "peaceful reconstruction." The creation of a high level focal point for pacification planning and coordinating had the effect of supplanting the interagency Vietnam Coordinating Committee (c reated in 1964 and originally headed by William Sullivan). Though Komer's charte r was more limited than that of the VNCC, his direct access to the

President conferred particular importance to this position. To his desk came the MACV and Mission reports on the progress of pacification that struck the same g loomy note month after month. The Status Report of March 30 on the Honolulu agre ements said: 1. Assure that Province Chief actually retains op con over necessar y military forces to support program in his Province. Status: In Long An Provinc e two regiments of the 25th Division are under Province control. This is encoura ging, but tactical situation elsewhere makes it difficult. MACV plans to augment regular forces by 120 companies in 1966-67 (approximately 47 will go to priorit y areas.) This augmentation if successful will be major step forward. 2. Areas w here the program is underway and four priority areas in particular should be pla ced under superior Province Chiefs who should not be removed while program is un derway without serious cause. Status: Since Honolulu, eight Province Chiefs have been replaced. Most fall within category mentioned by General Co at Honolulu wh en he said GVN was about to make several changes to strengthen their ability to achieve plans. The Mission continues to emphasize at every level the need for co ntinuity, but in most cases it is dangerous for U.S. to go down the line in supp ort of individual Province Chiefs. The Mission report on the status of "Revoluti onary Development" for April said: RD remains behind schedule with progress slow . As reported in March, lack of effective leadership, military as well as govern mental, marginal local security, and late availability RD cadre teams, continue to hamper program accomplishments. The corresponding report for May said: Lack o f effective low-level leadership and lack of local security continued to have ad verse effects on RD program . . . progress primarily reflects consolidation of h amlets and population already under a lesser degree of GVN control rather than d irect gains from VC control. There was no appreciable expansion in secured area or reduction in VC-controlled population. An incident in June highlighted the fr ustrations of U.S. field representatives, and showed that leverage could work, a t least on procedural matters. In Kontum, the Province Chief flatly refused to s et up any end-use control procedures (filling out requisitions, etc.) for USAID commodities. This refusal could not be accepted, and AID suspended all commodity shipments to the Province. After four days, the Province Chief gave in, and AID resumed shipments. Meanwhile, the GVN was going nothing about its Honolulu prom ises in the areas of administration, economic reform, and dollar balances. There were several U.S. Government reactions to these failures and continuing weaknes ses. There was a series of studies and proposals for leverage, and there was ris ing pressure for renewed direct negotiations with GVN.

An example of the studies was the U.S. Army's "Program for the Pacification and LongTerm Development of South Vietnam," (PROVN). The PROVN study was completed i n March 1966 by a Department of the Army staff team and briefed on May 17 at CIN CPAC Headquarters during a visit by COMUSMACV to Hawaii. His comments at that ti me were that most of the recommendations already had been acted on. He emphasize d that particular care should be exercised to avoid conditions which would cause RVN officials to be branded as U.S. puppets. The study results were presented i n the MACV conference room on May 21. In response to a JCS request, COMUSMACV co mmented in detail on May 27. He noted that PROVN recommended two major initiativ es: (1) creation of an organization to integrate the total U.S. civil-military e ffort, and (2) exercise of greatly increased U.S. involvement in GVN activities. COMUSMACV agreed with the first recommendation but felt it was already being ac complished. COMUSMACV agreed that immediate and substantially increased U.S. inv olvement in GVN activities, in the form of constructive influence and manipulati ons was essential to achievement of U.S. objectives in Vietnam. He felt there wa s great danger that the involvement envisioned would become excessive and boomer ang on U.S. interests; U.S. manipulations could become an American takeover just ified by U.S. compulsion to get the job done. COMUSMACV saw the advantages in re moving ARVN divisions from positions of command over provinces, and attaching so me of their units to provinces, but this action would require a major shift of V ietnamese attitudes. Assignment of AR\'N units to provinces in the past had had limited success because of restrictions on employment and command jealousies. Ac cordingly MACV recommended that PROVN, reduced primarily to a conceptual documen t, carrying forward the main thrusts and goals of the study, be presented to the National Security Council for use in developing concepts, policies, and actions to improve effectiveness of the American effort in Vietnam. Subsequently, JCS i nquired about Revolutionary Development effectiveness. They asked why RD objecti ves could not be more effectively achieved with the program under military execu tion. COMUSMACV'S reply repeated the views of the Ambassador's December memorand um to Lansdale and said the program was primarily civilian. F. LODGE FAVORS DECE NTRALIZED LEVERAGE Embassy officials, meanwhile, continued to press for the rest oration of the leverage that was lost with the dropping of the troika sign-off i n June, 1965. There is no indication that the issue of sign-off came up at Honol ulu, very likely because of disagreement on it between State and Saigon. But in April, Ambassador Lodge went on the record in favor of the sign-off system, and against civil encadrement in the Ministries.

Experience and study have made it apparent that the United States has not the in fluence which it should have in Viet Nam and also that [we] could be organized s o as to be relatively much more immune from some of the worst effects of changes of government in Saigon. I refer to influence in the provinces, and lower units of government~ and not to our influence at the top of the Government in Saigon, which is just about as good as it can be. The GVN in Saigon sometimes disagrees , often agrees, and is rarely able to get much done.... An error was made in giv ing up our right to withhold funds from USAID projects until we have conducted a successful bargain with the Vietnamese in which they agreed to carry out certai n things which we wanted....There are two ways of not solving this problem of co ntact: (a) One is for a US agency head with big administrative responsibilities to pop over to the ministry to argue briefly and intensely, Americanfashion, wit h the Minister-a system which is almost guaranteed not to produce results. (b) N or do I believe the problem is solved by putting American offices in the Vietnam ese Ministries. This was the French practice, and it too does not prevent bureau cratic paralysis.... We should always be on the lookout for Americans who have t he sympathy with and the knack of getting along with these people, and we might find some good material among the young men who are in the provinces. Another id ea is to bring about a situation where we are really economic partners of the GV N and not merely the people who pay for the CIP Program without effective partic ipation in the use of the piaster proceeds of that program. At present we have v ery little say in the disposition of such piaster funds. Somewhere along the lin e we gave up this very important leverage. In fact, we are now trying to recover joint authority over those funds, but progress is difficult . . . If we had thi s joint GVN/US authority, we could get at corruption, provided we also had advis ers with the Ministries who were really "persona grata." In the first week of Ma y, Porter put the sector fund idea to Ky, who rebuffed him. Lodge tried to keep the idea alive, but without success. G. THE MILITARY ADVISORY PROGRAM, MARCH-JUL Y, 1966 COMUSMACV's concern over declining present for combat strength of ARVN u nits resulted in a study which showed that as of February 28, only 62% of their authorized strength were mustered for operations. There were two principal reaso ns: (1) Division and regimental commanders had organized non-TOE units such as s trike/recon, recon and security, recruiting teams, and (2) Large numbers of dese rters, long-term hospital patients, and KIA had not been removed from rolls. MAC V instructed JGS to disband non-TOE units and give increased attention to improv ing administrative procedures. Senior advisers were told to monitor their counte rparts and use their influence to bring present for operations strengths up to a t least 450 men (75%) per battalion.

At the same time, MACV had a study made to determine the need for reconnaissance units. When field advisers were asked, all replies were favorable; so JGS was a sked to develop the organization for a regimental reconnaissance company. Traini ng was another problem. One adviser stated, "It is more accurate to describe the training program as non-existent instead of unsatisfactory." Another said, "It appears that the battalion commander desires the deterioration of the training s tatus of the battalion so that higher authority will place the unit in a trainin g center to be retrained." COMUSMACV wrote to the Chief JGS in March on the subj ect of training, but training progress did not change appreciably through 1966 f rom the level recorded during the first four months. There was a question of wha t to do about units which advisers rated ineffective. The combat effectiveness o f the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions was the subject of a staff study completed Apr il 19. Five courses of action were considered: (1) Deactivate division headquart ers and place subordinate units under province chiefs. (2) Exchange the division s with two other divisions from different CTZ's. (3) Relieve the key leaders at all levels who were marginal or unsatisfactory. (4) Relieve the divisions of the ir primary responsibility of fighting VC and leave them to pacification. (5) By expression of COMUSMACV's concern, encourage intensification of adviser efforts to solve the divisions' underlying problems. If there there were no improvement, withdraw all advisers. If there were still no improvement, withdraw all MAP sup port. COMUSMACV vetoed the last proposal and had it removed from the study. His guidance was to avoid sanctions against GVN, to intensify the effort to associat e and integrate the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions with the 1st and 25th U.S. Divis ion, and to consider the possibility of greater U.S. participation in pacificati on in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong provinces. In April, a study based on exhaustive analysis of field adviser reports and interviews was presented to RVNAF. It conc erned itself with several major problem areas: Leadership, discipline, and perso nnel management. RVNAF reacted positively and quickly to the recommendations by establishing a committee to develop a leadership program. In response to COMUSMA CV guidance in May, J-5 studied courses of action to produce more dynamic progre ss in the counterinsurgency effort in RVN. It recommended establishing a Deputy COMUSMACV for RVNAF matters as a way to influence RVNAF more. General Westmorela nd said in his endorsement that this step had already been taken with the appoin tment of Brigadier General Freund as Deputy Assistant to COMUSMACV. At the same time, he directed J-5 to review Brigadier General Freund's Terms of Reference an d recommend changes or extensions. The completed J-5 study was forwarded to Chie f of Staff Army on July 23, recommending that the Special Assistant to COMUSMACV not be given responsibility for any portion of the U.S. Advisory effort.

Low personnel strength was another critical factor in ARVN effectiveness. Only o ne of 22 battalions rated combat ineffective or marginally effective in July did not report a shortage of personnel. COMUSMACV advised Chief JGS to form an insp ection team at general officer level to inspect the strength situation of ARVN d ivision. The Inspector General, JGS, headed the team and was assisted by COMUSMA CV's personal representative. The team began its inspection with the 25th Divisi on. H. ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE PORT OF SAIGON, APRIL-JUNE, 1966 As noted, this p eriod saw rising pressure for renewed direct negotiations with GVN. When the fir st phase of the Struggle Movement ended in mid-April, Washington was thoroughly dissatisfied with accumulated delays on the economic program agreed at Honolulu. The USG had gone ahead and delivered on its side of the bargain, but GVN had do ne nothing. State proposed the threat of sanctions; without apparently going tha t far, Lodge persuaded GVN to cooperate fully with the IMF team, then on its way , to work out an anti-inflationary and balance-of-payments program. The IMF team worked through late May and at the end of the month agreed with GVN on a progra m with the following main points: (1) The exchange rate for imports, including t ariff, would be increased from 60 to 118 piasters to the dollar except for rice, which would be brought in at 80. Purchases of piasters by U.S. troops and civil ians, and other "invisibles," would have the 118 rate in both directions. (2) A new tax on beverages would raise about 1.5 billion piasters in revenue. (3) The GVN would sell gold to jewelers to push the price down closer into line with bla ck market dollar exchange rate. (4) The GVN would raise wages and salaries of it s employees by 20% immediately, with a further 10% to follow in six months if ne cessary. The GVN asked the USG for assurance on the following points: (1) The GV N/IMF plan would substitute for the fiscal and customs reforms promised at Honol ulu. (2) The USG would liberalize the Commodity Imports Program to cover all imp orters' requests. (3) The USG would buy all its piasters for official programs a t the exchange rate of 80 (versus the previous 35). (4) All appropriated Commodi ty Import Funds not used up would be applied to economic development projects in Vietnam. The USG raised no problem about points (1) and (3) of the GVN requests , but for obvious reasons could give only vague and non-committal assurances on the amount of AID that Congress would authorize and reprogram. However, it made other concessions to increase total economic aid. The two governments reached pr ompt agreement on these points, and the piaster was devalued as proposed on June 18, along with the associated

fiscal reforms. The GVN's promise to hold down its dollar holdings (given at Hon olulu) remained "binding," although the generous AID package of the previous Jul y was now raising GVN's dollar balances at a rate of about $100 million per year . These decisions overrode a proposal from OSD (Systems Analysis) to get tough w ith GVN and to get deeper and more enforceable reforms. The DASD (Economics) pre dicted that the GVN would fail to carry out any reforms other than changing the exchange rate, and proposed to force the GVN to maximize its legal revenues from CIP by threatening to curtail the program. Without reform of the licensing, hig h market prices for CIP commodities yielded extortionate profits to those mercha nts who could get licenses, with a presumption of kickbacks to the licensing age ncies. The proposed reform was to auction the licenses in the presence of US obs ervers. He also proposed direct US purchases of piasters, in a "grey" market. Up on settling the devaluation package, the Embassy immediately pressed for drastic changes in Saigon port management; the pile-up of civilian cargoes had grown so much as to add to the already serious congestion. Lodge proposed a complete MAC V takeover of the port and warehouses with a Vietnamese general to be appointed as figurehead port director. However, the Mission backed away from the idea of c omplete takeover for the time being, and settled for MACV handling of AID direct assistance commodities, not including CIP. The agreement reached with GVN at th e end of June said: The United States Military Agency appointed by COMUSMACV.... shall forthwith assume responsibility and all necessary authority for..... A. Th e receipt and discharge of all AID-financed commodities consigned to CPA. B. The obtaining of customs clearances and all other clearances . . . for such commodi ties. C. The storage and warehousing of such commodities intransit as necessary. D. The transport of such commodities to such first destinations, including GVN holding areas and/or CPA/ministerial depots as may be designated by USAID/CPA. I . POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE THIRD QUARTER, 1966 This period was comparatively qui et, and transactions between the two governments were routine. Late in June, Ky had brought up with Lodge the idea of a cabinet reshuffle, and Lodge had advised him to go slow. In July, Ky agreed to put it off. In August Ky volunteered to d o something about the most corrupt generals in the Directorate, especially Co an d Quang. Again, Lodge, who had frankly given up on corruption in the highest pla ces, cautioned him to go slow, and Ky decided to put off any action until after the September elections. Lodge's advice, with State concurrence, concentrated on making sure Ky had definitive evidence of the alleged corruption; Lodge was sur e that following this advice would delay things sufficiently. Late in August, Ky received an invitation to talk to a press group in Los Angeles, and Ky tentativ ely accepted. Both Lodge and State

panicked, especially when the group started to set up a debate between Ky and Se nator Fulbright; and in the upshot they talked Ky out of going. GVN launched its transition to legitimate government on September 11, electing the long-promised Constituent Assembly. Although GVN systematically excluded from the elections a ll persons connected with the Struggle Movement, and although the Buddhists decl ared a boycott, the electorate turned out in large numbers and the results grati fied the Embassy. State had reservations about the exclusion of Struggle Movemen t people, but Lodge unreservedly backed this exclusion, on the ground that GVN " should not be discouraged from taking moderate measures to prevent elections fro m being used as a vehicle for a Communist takeover of the country." As the elect ion approached, Washington and the Embassy began to think about what they wanted to see in the new constitution. Lodge's view listed the following minimum essen tials for the US best interests: A. A strong, stable executive. B. Executive con trol of the military. C. Emergency powers, so that the legislature can't hamstri ng the executive during the war emergency. D. Appropriate provision for the peop le's aspirations and rights. E. Minority group representation. Lodge also listed lower priority requirements for the new constitution: A. Relative ease of amend ment of the constitution. B. Removal of either the President or the Legislature should be very difficult. C. A limited term for the President. D. Appropriate pr ovision for establishment and improvement of the judiciary. E. A superior court for constitutional review of laws and decrees. F. Expansion of the powers of pro vincial councils and other forms of local government. State expressed broad agre ement with Lodge's views, with reservations about emergency powers and about con stitutional provisions to forbid communism and neutralism. J. THE ROLES AND MISS IONS STUDY In response to a May 27 directive from Deputy Ambassador Porter, the Director JUSPAO had named Colonel George Jacobson chairman of a study group to d efine RD strategy and the roles and missions of the various elements. The group submitted its report on August 24, 1966. The major recommendations of Roles and Missions Study were: (1) The many elements and echelons charged with destroying VC infrastructure are confusing. The National Police should have the primary mis sion and responsibility for this goal.

(2) Reforms in basic GVN attitudes are necessary. Many rural residents believe t hat the US condones corrupt practices. This must be changed. (3) ARVN forces sho uld be encouraged to increase participation in pacification activities. (4) PF/R F should be developed into a constabulary-type organization. (5) PF/RF should be transferred from the Ministry of Security to the Ministry of Revolutionary Deve lopment. (6) CIDG should be stationed only in remote areas. (7) The Vietnamese I nformation Service is not effective at local level. It should assume supporting role to propaganda activities of other agencies. (8) A Directorate of Intelligen ce should be established to coordinate all intelligence activities. (9) Reinstit ution of the MACV Subsector Advisor Fund is urged. (10) ARVN Divisions (eventual ly Corps as well) should be removed from the chain of command in RD affairs. For instance, there were no USAID, JUSPAO, or CAS representatives at ARVN division headquarters. (11) Because of generally bad behavior of ARVN Ranger units, they should be disbanded with Rangers reassigned as individuals throughout the Army. (12) The physical and attitudinal consequences of present air and artillery empl oyment policies should be studied. (13) A logistic system which provides for US government control until delivery of material to end users should be substituted for the present MAP procedures. (14) The Provincial Committee "signoff" provisi on should be reinstated for the Revolutionary Development budget. On September 7 COMUSMACV made the following comments with respect to the Roles and Missions St udy: (1) Action had been taken to increase ARVN participation in RD, but removal of Division from the chain of command in RD activities appeared illogical. If A RVN combat battalions were dispersed to all 43 provinces, the Corps span of cont rol would be ineffective and this arrangement would risk having these units defe ated in detail. The proposed placement of battalions under sector commanders was feasible only in some areas-to be considered on an individual basis. The 1967 C ombined Campaign Plan would clarify the functions of ARVN. Other things such as the buddy system with US units were the realistic ways of accomplishing the goal . (2) The recommended disbandment of Ranger Battalions would seriously reduce AR VN combat strength. They should be retained and reorganized under new commanders . (3) Recruitment of PF personnel for RD would weaken hamlet security. (4) Altho ugh the study recommended giving primary responsibility for intelligence to the National Police, the nature of the problem dictated that all US and GVN military and quasimilitary elements contribute to this important goal. (5) The idea of a single intelligence director seems sound theoretically, but it is not realistic when DIA and CIA are not amalgamated in Washington. (6) RD requires both milita ry and civil participation. Continued emphasis on military participation would b e given but the major change in the MACV organization suggested by the study did not seem necessary.

One of the year's changes that could have led to implementation of a major recom mendation of the Roles and Missions Study, but didn't, was the March decision in Washington to transfer the support of FWMAF and RVNAF from MAP funding to servi ce funding. Studies were made by MACV on how best to implement this change, whic h became effective in September. It was decided that only the logistic advisory function would be transferred to USARV. Programming budgeting and executing prog rams remained under MACV. Most important, MAP goods were still put into RVNAF lo gistic channels, although under the new funding they could have been held in US channels down to the receiving unit. K. ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE PORT, THIRD QUAR TER, 1966 Although in political affairs there was no significant friction betwee n IJSG and GVN in the Third Quarter, GVN's accumulation of dollar balances and i ts inaction on economic matters caused growing impatience in USOM and in Washing ton. In late July, 1966, Komer and Ambassador Lodge laid the basis for the US po sition, including a suggestion that from now on USOM should make sure it has the means to monitor and enforce GVN compliance with its commitments. Komer said: D evaluation, port takeover, CIP expansion, RD reorganization if all skillfully me shed-could yet have early impact on VN public and do much in these critical week s to refurbish GVN image at home and abroad. So far, however, GVN has failed to move aggressively enough with supplies in country to curb rice and port speculat ion; has been unwilling to try to develop wage restraint policy in private secto r, has dithered on promulgating and carrying out promised regulations re Warehou se removals; has gone about moving expanded CIP goods up country on business as usual basis; has shuffled about on RD reorganization, and Thang's or Ky's famous report to the nation. Lodge proposed specific means to monitor GVN, and wished to urge the GVN to fund Revolutionary Development with counterpart piasters, so that USG could assure that the funding was adequate. Komer agreed with these pro posals. Porter further proposed: We intend using budget review process and count erpart releases on leverage on GVN CY 67 programs and to seek GVN acceptance of both overall ceiling and commitment to essential revolutionary development progr ams before we agree to support any part of the budget. Note degree our effective ness dependent on credibility our leverage by GVN, which may not be great. But P orter opposed a complete takeover of the Saigon port, proposed by Komer.

VI. A SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE, LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, AND HIGH HOPES FOR THE FUT URE, OCTOBER, 1966-SEPTEMBER, 1967 A. THE MANILA CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1966 In the first week of October, just as planning was beginning for a seven-nation confer ence at Manila on Southeast Asia, latent mistrust betwen Southerners and Northerne rs in Ky's cabinet broke into an open split. A Northerner persuaded Colonel Loan , the Police Director, to arrest one of the Southerners, and although Loan relea sed him on Ky's order a few hours later, six Southerners took it as an affront t o all of them and threatened to resign from the cabinet. While conference planni ng was going forward, the crisis simmered on for almost three weeks, up to the e ve of the conference. Lodge tried to mediate, but the six proved difficult to mo llify; he conjectured that they were trying to get all the mileage they could ou t of the embarrassment the crisis would cause Thieu and Ky if it were not resolv ed before the conference. It was patched up at the last minute. In preparing for the conference, Lodge was particularly concerned that Ky or Thieu, if put in th e limelight through the opening speech to the conference, should avoid embarrass ing the USG: One crucial factor must be degree to which you believe they can be persuaded to make constructive and reasonable speech, avoiding talk of invasion of the North or any other subjects that put us openly at variance with each othe r . . . We hope that the GVN can delegate Tran Van Do and Bai Diem as its drafti ng representatives so that even before they arrive in Manila we would be a long way toward common agreement on the kinds of language we need. The USG was also c oncerned that GVN should announce a broad and attractive program that would put a good face on itself and its prosecution of the war: We welcome your news that Tran Van Do and Bai Diem will arrive Manila October 21.... Since this gives us a t least a solid day, the 22d, to refine drafts, we are inclined here not repeat not to ask you to work with GVN on detailed submissions . . . Rather and absolut ely vital to favorable conference result, we believe you should be working with Ky to get his concurrence on the following list of action areas in which we beli eve forthcoming statement by GVN is not only wise in itself, but essential to US strong and successful public statement from the conference. A. Land Reform B. C onstitutional Evolution C. National Reconciliation D. Economic Stabilization

E. Improved Local Government F. Radically Increased Emphasis on RD/Pacification G. Postwar Planning H. Corruption I. Port Congestion J. GVN Reserves In each of above categories, basic problem is to get GVN commitment and willingness to stat e its intentions. Secretary McNamara put down his views on priorities in a Memor andum to the President on October 14. He noted that the US had not yet found the formula for training and inspiring the Vietnamese. The main thrust of the memor andum concerned shifting ARVN more into pacification and shifting the US pacific ation responsibility to MACV. But in disucssing GVN's weaknesses, he commented, "drastic reform is needed." He let that one drop without any recommendation. The conferees met in Manila on October 24-25, 1966, and after due deliberation issu ed a long communique on policies for Southeast Asia in general and South Vietnam in particular. They backed the defense of South Vietnam against North Vietnames e aggression, and supported the major outlines of US policy. The GVN emphasized its promises of social revolution, economic progress, and political freedom. The y concluded with the declaration of intent to withdraw all US and Free World for ces under specified conditions: 29. In particular, they declared that allied for ces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggress ion and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggr ession. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side wit hdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence t hus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later t han six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled. B. BARGAINING BEG INS ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, OCTOBERDECEMBER, 1966 The USG, having chafed at the lack of action on the Chie Hoi Program, wanted GVN to broaden it to attract high-level defectors by offering them posts comparable to their existing ones in the VC organization. This idea went down poorly with the Vietnamese. Lodge was pressing the idea from the beginning of October, and although they were reluctan t, Thieu and Ky finally agreed on October 20 to proclaim the new program, called "National Reconciliation," on November 1, a national holiday. As noted above, W ashington wanted and got a public commitment on this subject at Manila. Then on November 1, the promised proclamation failed to appear; instead, there was a vag ue reference to it in a speech on other subjects. When the Embassy inquired, Ky said the speech had to be prepared very carefully, and that he had not had time before

November 1; he promised he would have the speech and proclamation ready in early December. Lodge found this explanation hard to swallow, but had to accept it. W hen "early December" arrived, there was a dead silence; and the end of this exer cise was not yet in sight. C. MORE HARD BARGAINING ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE PO RT, OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1966 Economic policy negotiations had the same flavor as t hose relating to National Reconciliation. The USG was dissatisfied, in the third quarter 1966, as noted, on the lack of GVN follow-up on budgetary and foreign e xchange promise in June following the IMF agreement. And in the fall, the Saigon Port congestion problem grew serious again; the June agreement had not gone far enough. At the end of September, Governor Hanh of the RVN National Bank came to Washington to negotiate specifics on economic policy. During the negotiations, Komer cabled Lodge: [We are pressing GVN] hard to agree to spend rapidly growing foreign exchange reserves on imports. Otherwise, it will appear and rightly so, that GVN is getting rich at US taxpayer's expense. It is apparent that GVN's ch ief reluctance on this score is that Thanh/ Hanh want to squirrel away reserves for postwar rehabilitation in case US goes away and leaves them. In the upshot, however, they reached only a vague and general agreement, on October 6, the most specific item being that GVN would limit its inflationary gap to 10 billion pia sters in 1967. Dollar balances were deferred to later negotiations. There was so me effort to resolve disagreements on economic matters and the Port just before the Manila Conference, but no progress. Komer went to Saigon after the Conferenc e and, assisting Porter in the negotiations, reached the following agreement wit h GVN on November 2: (1) GVN will use all gold and foreign exchange available to it in excess of $250 million, not including commercial bank working balances, t o finance invisibles and imports, including import categories now financed by th e US. (2) GVN will place at least $120 million of its reserves in US dollar inst ruments of at least 2 year maturity. (3) During US FY 67 USG will make available at least $350 million of grant aid for imports4 not including PL 480 Title 1 Co mmodities. Any portion of the $350 million not required for such imports will be used during the US FY 67 as grant assistance for economic development projects. (4) Within the balance of payments accounts, the amounts or categories to be fi nanced by each of the governments will be determined through joint consultation on a quarterly basis.

The putting of GVN dollar reserves into US two-year or longer-term bonds would t echnically improve the US balance of payments, though the gain would be more nom inal than real. The agreement left plenty of room for further problems and State recognized that each item would probably have to be pressed again. Following th is agreement, the Embassy prepared to negotiate a GVN budgetary ceiling and rela ted matters. The strategy would be to seek agreement on a firm budget ceiling fo r GVN without committing the USG on its spending in Vietnam. But the Embassy had misgivings about this approach: ....It deprives US of the monetary gap analysis as a hinge on which stabilization agreements can be hung . . . Note that KomerHanh memorandum signed in Washington used 10 Billion gap figure as objective. GV N officials are anxious to resume discussions. Prime Minister now has on his des k proposed GVN CY 67 budget of 100 billion piasters. The differences between tha t figure and acceptable one is much greater than the differences in US ceiling e stimates last discussed here during McNamara's visit. State cabled its agreement that showing GVN the US plan to limit its own piaster spending would help get G VN to accept tight ceilings itself. In December, Embassy negotiators tried to pi n down GVN on the means to limit its accumulation of dollar balances, talking ma inly with Governor Hanh. To evade specific commitment, he repeatedly talked as t hough he could not determine GVN budget policy (which he had negotiated in Washi ngton two months before) and that he could not as a good banker make the bookkee ping transactions that would be required to permit GVN to run them down by buyin g imports. The Embassy negotiators then turned to the idea of asking for a GVN c ontribution of 8 billion piasters to the Free World Forces' operating budget in Vietnam as a cost-sharing arrangement, which would incidentally reduce GVN's rec eipts of dollars and so help run down the balances. GVN's reply was that that wa s impossible. After a series of talks that read like haggling in an Arabian mark etplace, Porter went to Ky about it and got the following understanding: The GVN accepts the principle of contributing to free world forces local expense and wi ll make a contribution of 1 Billion piasters for that purpose at the end of Marc h 1967. The matter of further contribution would be considered at that time. I w ould send him a letter of understanding on that subject. The story was much the same on GVN support for AID projects. The Saigon Port congestion problem led to discussions starting around the 1st of October, which produced nominal, ineffect ive agreements in the first week. When McNamara went to Saigon to discuss new ma jor troop deployments with MACV, he talked to Ky on October 11, Ky kept talking about infiltration whenever McNamara brought up the subject of the Port. Finally , Ky said he had solved the Port problem by telling the

Minister of Finance "to write a decree to get rid of the mafia which was dominat ing the port." That did not solve the problem; the Embassy kept pressing. On Nov ember 2, Ky promised a tough decree on port management and a deliver-or-get-fire d order to the General who had been put in charge of the Port after the June agr eement. (Accepting merely this order would permit further delay before any chang e in the system, of course.) Later on in November, Ky changed port charges and a ccepted some increase in US military personnel there; but both GVN and MACV stro ngly resisted any increase in MACV responsibility for the port. The GVN also ref used to confiscate goods left unclaimed over 30 days in the port warehouses. Fur ther talks in December got nowhere, although State authorized drastic leverage t o move GVN: To this end you might also tell Ky that I have gone so far as to pro pose a two month moratorium on shipment of US financed CIP goods beginning 1 Jan uary to permit backlog in transit warehouses and on barges to be removed. You co uld cite my view as being that if GVN won't clear port, why should US add to con gestion by continuing to ship goods? I recognize that actual moratorium would be draconian measure and perhaps unrealistic, but citing it . . . might help move Ky. D. CORRUPTION BECOMES AN ISSUE AT YEAR'S END The issue of corruption came up in several ways in November and December, 1966. On November 10, Ky told Lodge h e was now prepared to relieve General Quang of his command of IV Corps, followin g up on intentions he first told Lodge about in August. Lodge again urged cautio n, saying Ky should carefully avoid starting "another General Thi incident." But Lodge was satisfied that by this time Ky had prepared well for the move. He had : on November 18, the Embassy got word that General Quang would head a newly-cre ated Ministry of Planning and Development; the Ministry would deal primarily wit h postwar planning. The command changed and Quang moved up on November 23. Possi bly Ky's idea of how to deal with Quang came from an end-October suggestion from the Embassy for a joint postwar study team, to which Ky had agreed and was to a nnounce jointly with the White House. (Creating the Ministry scrambled the plans for the study team and announcement, so the Embassy had to go to work on a new plan.) A couple of weeks later, following allegations of corruption in news stor ies, State cabled the Embassy that the President wanted accelerated efforts both to cope with diversions and to deflate distorted allegations. State was also co nsidering sending a "blue ribbon panel" from Washington to assess the problem of AID misuse. Responding to the stories and to the Washington concern, Ky said he planned a national campaign against corruption. State told the Embassy on Novem ber 25 of suggestions in Washington for a joint US/GVN inspectorate general to f ollow up AID diversions, and asked for a reaction. After a delay due to active t ruce discussions with the VC, Saigon replied on December 2:

There is already an interchange of information on the working level between Ky's investigative staff and our responsible poeple in USAID. We doubt GVN would res pond positively to idea of joint US/GVN inspectorate to work on AID diversions. This would touch very sensitive areas. While we want to expose and cut diversion s to maximum extent possible, we doubt that this rather public way is best suite d to achieve GVN cooperation. On December 3, Lodge and Ky had an "amiable discus sion" on corruption, and Ky agreed to study and consider all these suggestions. E. POLITICAL MATTERS AT YEAR'S END, 1966 Washington and the Saigon Mission watch ed closely as the Constituent Assembly did its work. Concern arose at word that GVN was providing a complete draft constitution either formally or through sympa thetic Deputies, particularly because it provided that ultimate political power would be vested in the Armed Forces Council. Washington, consistent in its champ ioning of National Reconciliation, urged the Mission to make the USG's views kno wn both to GVN and to key CA members before the matter because a major issue. Lo dge spoke with Ky who said he was at that very moment about to leave to talk wit h Thieu on the matter. Lodge further encouraged Ky to state his views on the con stitution to the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and reminded Ky that the Ame rican constitutional expert, Professor Flanz, was available to go to Ky at any t ime to give advice in complete confidence. General Thieu concluded one of his re gular discussions of the military situation with General Westmoreland by making a few pronouncements on political matters. Westmoreland stressed what was to bec ome a persistent American theme, the importance of unity in the GVN leadership. Unabashedly Thieu said that the key question was whether the Army would stay in power and what power they would retain. F. PACIFICATION AND THE SHIFT OF ARVN Ko mer, in Washington, continued to prod the Mission to goad GVN. It seemed time to remind them, he thought, of their Manila promise to give top priority to land r eform. Lodge was asked to press Ky for vigorous application of existing laws. Co ntinuing emphasis on pacification and increased impatience at the lack of progre ss brought another reorganization of the US Mission effort. To unify and streaml ine the civilian side, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was established in l ate November under Deputy Ambassador Porter. An OCO Director in Saigon and a sin gle Director of Civil Affairs for each of the four corps became responsible for the Mission's civil support of Vietnamese Revolutionary Development. Within GVN General Thang not only lasted beyond the originally envisaged six months but was elevated to Commissioner-General for Revolutionary Development with supervision over the Ministries of RD, Public

Works, Agriculture, and Administration (Interior). These changes seemed to enhan ce the chances for substantive improvements. Washington wired, Why not approach Thang and after telling him about your reorganization and new faces you plan to put in region and then provinces, suggest he essay a shake-up too. . . . As I re call, around Tet GVN issues a new promotion list, which usually also entails som e joint shifts. This might provide a good cover. The reply offered now familiar themes as the reasons for inaction, Specifically, if we were to give Thang a lis t of district chiefs and ask that they be removed, we do not think any significa nt change would result. In the past this tactic has proved cumbersome, even coun terproductive, and tends to lead either to reshuffling of positions with little or no positive end result or to the Asian deep freeze treatment. .....At times w e will have to make our views known on particular personalities if we find an in tolerable situation in key leadership positions, as we have done in Long An and the ARVN 25th Div. Basically, however, we will seek to avoid too deep an immersi on in Vietnamese personalities, which can so easily become a quagmire from which there is no escape and concentrate instead on encouraging the GVN/RVNAF to take the initiative in a situation they know best how to tackle in specific tactical terms. Meanwhile, efforts went forward to convert half of ARVN to the primary m ission of supporting Revolutionary Development. On October 5, the Chief of the C entral Training Agency, Major General Vy, chaired the high level joint conferenc e which assigned administrative tasks and developed a schedule of required actio ns. Subsequently, a joint MACV/JGS team visited a few ARVN division headquarters and found that personnel had not understood the July JGS directives and thus ha d not undertaken the actions directed. At about the same time, Revolutionary Dev elopment Minister Thang entered one of his recurring periods of pouting because he considered recent American criticism of slowness to imply their evaluation of the program as a failure. He told Ky he was ready to resign if Americans were s o critical that they wanted to take it over and run it. Lansdale was able to pla cate Thang, but ARVN reluctance continued. The conversion to RD was fraught with criticism on both sides, for the American press continued to suggest that the A RVN shift to pacification meant Americans would bear the brunt of the fighting a nd take the bulk of the casualties. State considered this line tendentious and u rged Lodge and MACV to use "all leverage provided through MAP and advisor progra m" to shift ARVN to RD. G. MILITARY ADVISORY MATTERS AT YEAR'S END, 1966

COMUSMACV backed out of ARVN personnel selection by serving notice in a message to Corps Senior Advisors that only policy matters, not the detailed problems of failure to perform, were to be referred to him. In reviewing the deficiencies di scussed in the Senior Advisor's Monthly Reports, it is noted that many items are correctable in command channels at unit, division, or corps level; yet it is no t apparent that such action is being taken aggressively at local and intermediat e command levels. Deficiencies involving policy are referable appropriately to t his headquarters; deficiencies involving non-compliance with directives, apathy on the part of a command, etc., are to be resolved in RVNAF channels. The role o f the advisor is difficult and often frustrating. It requires military acumen, d edication, selflessness, and perseverance. It is desired that addressees channel the professional abilities of the advisory apparatus into efforts designed to c omplement tactical advice with improvement in the quality, efficiency, and relia bility of the RVNAF structure as a whole. Shortly afterward the Chinh-Hunnicutt affair erupted. As it unfolded it revealed the near impossibility of eliciting s atisfactory performance by means of the existing advisory system. CG 25th Divisi on published an order of the day accusing the Senior Advisor of trying to have t he CG removed, of attempting to dismiss other division officers, of bypassing th e chain of command, and of destroying the "spirit of cooperation between America ns and Vietnamese." The MACV command history describes General Chinh as extremel y weak, afraid to command. The Senior Advisor was a dynamic, competent officer a ssigned to improve effectiveness. He pursued his objective in a firm manner. COM USMACV felt the incident received distorted press coverage in the US where it wa s portrayed as a challenge to the entire position of the US advisory effort. He noted that the Vietnamese were sensitive to real or imagined infringements on th eir sovereignty. Great care had to be exercised to avoid even the appearance of violating their pride; an officer who yielded too readily to US advice was regar ded as a puppet. He felt the most effective way to work with the Vietnamese was to discuss matters with them and then allow them to resolve their problems. CG 2 5th Division did have redeeming qualities. He was considered honest; and for his stand at the coup trials in the early 1960's, when he had accepted punishment w hile many others were running; he had acquired a sizeable following among ARVN o fficers. He was, in addition, a boyhood friend of CG III Corps, who was said to recognize the CG's fault but felt that his hands were tied. Deputy COMUSMACV who enjoyed good rapport with CG 25th ARVN Division, visited General Chinh. In a tw o-hour meeting, the Vietnamese spoke freely and openly. He displayed genuine and extreme concern and admitted his error in issuing the Order of the Day. He had already apologized to CG III Corps. Deputy COMUSMACV received the impression tha t the advisor might have been a little too aggressive with the Vietnamese genera l, who was hypersensitive. Deputy COMUSMACV suggested that a

memorandum be published to the division which would mention that the Order of th e Day had leaked to the press which had taken it out of context and that there w as no intention to disparage the advisory effort. The memorandum was published o n December 21. It said the past must be forgotten and that cadre of all ranks sh ould display warm, courteous, and friendly attitudes toward their American count erparts. General Chinh appeared to turn over a new leaf. Colonel Hunnicutt was r eassigned to an apparent terminal assignment in the United States. COMUSMACV add ressed a letter to all advisors in December, 1966, to again emphasize the import ance of rapport. He said, the key to success or failure was the relationship ach ieved and maintained by the advisor with his counterpart. The natural tendency o f the US professional soldier was toward immediate reaction. He expected the sam e in others, but it was necessary to temper counterpart relationships with patie nce and restraint. General Westmoreland affirmed this view in his remarks at a c onference of his senior subordinate commanders. In order for ARVN to be successf ul, a re-education process is necessary, from the generals on down . . . The att itude of the soldiers toward the people frequently is poor. . . . We must do all we can toward to change this.... In conduct of operations in support of Revolut ionary Development, we will frequently have units buddy up with ARVN units . . . A word on command relations in these combined operations is appropriate. We hav e had great success with our cooperative efforts in the past. We should establis h a proper relationship from a technical command standpoint. Proper types of mis sions are general support and direct support. When conducting operations where w e have the preponderance of forces committed . . . their association will be in direct support or general support of our operations. This is good military termi nology and quite proper for us here. General Vien agrees in this terminology. So metimes ARVN was not receptive to advice. In November, recognizing the validity of a recommendation from the Corps Advisor that an additional battalion be activ ated in the ARVN 23d Battalion, COMUSMACV suggested this to JGS. Inactivation of a marginally effective battalion in another division was suggested as compensat ion. Chief JGS, for reasons of his own, declined to authorize the 23d Division t o have an additional battalion. Still, the effort moved forward. Training of RD Mobile Training Teams from each ARVN Division was conducted in December. The act ual conversion training of divisions started in early 1967, and a similar progra m for RF/PF was planned. In fact, planning was viewed as the surest sign of prog ress. The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan was ceremoniously signed by Generals Westm oreland and Vien on December 8. Its significant innovations were requirements fo r subordinate commands to prepare supporting plans and for quarterly reviews to maintain the plan's viability.

H. CONSTITUTION-WRITING IN JANUARY, 1967 Progress within the Constituent Assembl y and preliminary jockeying over the new constitution were persistent concerns d uring the first quarter of 1967. At times the Assembly seemed remarkably indepen dent. It publicly fought against a law which gave the military junta the right t o over-rule its decisions. The controversy subsided in January with Junta assura nce that it would not use the law. There was considerable discussion within USG circles as to how American influence should be disposed in supporting presidenti al candidates. Marshall Ky was already making noises about running. Washington c autioned Saigon not to automatically oppose a Ky candidacy. While State would pr efer a civilian president, the most important matter was to effect transition to a constitutional government that was strong and unified enough to continue to p rosecute the war effort (or negotiate a peaceful settlement), ....and at the sam e time broadly enough based to attract increasing local and national political s trength away from VC. Ambassador Lodge's reply was, "the continued viability of SVN depends very heavily on the cohesiveness of the military." This had been and remained his ~valuation of the political situation. ....Unity of the military i s essential to government stability in VN. From the standpoint of stability, thi s is the Law and the Prophets. Movement toward a broadly based, truly popular go vernment is impossible without stability. The military is also the chief nationbuilding group in the country. It has education, skills, experience, and discipl ine which no other group can offer. State acquiesced in this argument but contin ued to hope for a government broadly enough based so that the VC would find aven ues to conquest of South Vietnam effectively blocked. ....In our view it is less a question of any civilian candidate controlling the military and more a questi on of the military being educated to accept a sharing of power and responsibilit y with civilians as a necessary elementary political progress. This means a read iness to accept the outcome of a free and open election in which the candidate f avored by the directorate may not win. I. FOREIGN EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GVN BUDGET, JANUARYMARCH, 1967 The problem of GVN dollar balances remained a tho rn. GVN did nothing to carry out its November agreements. With scarcely conceale d impatience, Ambassador Porter offered GVN a tough economic program, in a meeti ng in the first week of January, 1967, with special emphasis on the dollar balan ces. Reporting on the meeting, he said:

We underlined many times the very high level of the US commitment and said that we could not make this commitment unless we had [an] iron-clad guaratee that the GVN would live up [to] the foreign exchange agreement . . . we stated that this was the minimum the US could accept. Hard bargaining continued, including anoth er Hanh trip to Washington. Preliminary to the Conference, Washington considered several steps which might be taken: 1. Agreement on a piaster/dollar rate of 11 8 for official US purchases. 2. US use of all counterpart over P-30 billion. 3. Increase of Assistance In Kind from GVN. 4. Possible transfer of some official p urchases from the 80 to a 118 exchange rate without changing the official rate. 5. Transfer of DoD contracts to the 118 rate. 6. Tying all 80 rate dollars to US procurement. 7. 100% US use of PL 480 sales. Saigon's opinion was that for thes e negotiations there were two main routes: (1) A switch of counterpart funds fro m their use to ours, and (2) A change in the exchange rate. The first seemed pre ferable because it was more negotiable. The second might be counter-productive b y "simply angering Hanh without moving him." On February 20, GVN merely agreed t o work on an "interim memorandum of understanding which would include actions to implement the foreign exchange agreement of last November." When Komer went to Saigon later in February to negotiate, he found it necessary to threaten specifi cally to reduce the CIP program to force down GVN's dollar balances, noting that once the program was cut Congress would be unlikely to restore the cuts. The ne gotiations amply demonstrated the truth of Hanh's remark that Orientals only act after much bargaining. As Komer started to walk out the door after a meeting, H anh hinted at a raise in the official purchase piaster rate from 80 to 118, but made no other concession. (At no time did the USG threaten explicitly to buy pia sters in the open market, as Porter and DASD (Economics) had earlier proposed, a procedure that would knock down GVN dollar balances to whatever extent we wante d while using fewer dollars to get the required piasters.) In an exchange of let ters early in March, Hanh said he understood the US was willing to establish $50 million development fund in return for their purchase of 300 thousand tons of r ice on a 100% US use basis and repayment of $25 million ICA loan. From Komer, no w back in Washington, came this reply, There is in my view no doubt whatever tha t Hanh, and for that matter Ky, understood full well that we did not agree to th e $50 million GVN Development Fund as part of interim package. Nor do I regard o ur credibility as enhanced if we now retreat even more on this issue. Finally, I regard the Development Fund as a sweetener so clearly wanted by the GVN that we need not give it away too cheaply.

While in one sense we have little immediate leverage to use on the GVN so long a s we do not choose to withhold aid in one form or another, in another sense we c learly have the GVN worried. I believe that, either through a definitive solutio n this June or more likely via Salami tactics, we can keep GVN reserves from ris ing too far. In mid-March Komer reached another "Interim Agreement" with GVN on foreign exchange. It provided that: (1) The United States would supply at least an additional 100,000 tons of PL 480 rice and a further 300,000 tons of rice und er terms providing for 100% USG use of proceeds. (2) GVN would make available up to $120 million of foreign exchange for financing commodities previously import ed under the CIP. (3) The United States would make available for economic develo pment projects the balance of FY 67 funds unused as a result of the reduction of the CIP program and would proceed to initiate and make grants for several inter im projects. (4) The United States agreed to the establishment by GVN of a $50 m illion development fund for purchase of US goods and services, such fund to be c onsidered as use of Vietnamese foreign exchange resources under the November 4, 1966 agreement. (5) GVN would repay US loans totalling $53 million. Closely rela ted on the economic front was the GVN budget. Estimates of the CY 1967 inflation ary gap grew during the quarter from 14 to 20 billion piasters. The United State s exercised only spotty influence on their budget, specifically on those items r eceiving direct American support; and general persuasion was used to hold down t he overall limit. Governor Hanh tried to transfer all US counterpart funds to th e military budget with the explanation that only the US military could adequatel y control the South Vietnamese military, but the guessing was that this might al so be his way of freeing GVN civilian agencies from any American interference. W ashington efforts to get more information on the GVN budget only brought euucate d guesses and a reminder that the Mission did not participate in a review of the GVN civil budget as was the practice for the military part. The CY 1967 budget of 75 billion piasters was issued without prior discussion with AID. It was unsa tisfactory. USAID had the leverage to negotiate because of counterpart funds and PL 480 receipts, but the major problem was how to provide AID the necessary fun ding mechanics to implement programs at levels sufficient to meet established re quirements. J. THE SAIGON PORT AGAIN Severe congestion continued to plague the P ort of Saigon. A drop in CIP/GVN cargo discharged in December brought queries fr om Washington. Saigon replied that the drop was due to the GVN port director's a bortive great barge experiment and listed a number of corrective steps taken. In fact all were peripheral to the central problem, the failure of commercial impo rters to remove their goods from crowded warehouses. Saigon warned,

Any additional actions . . . would require high-level government to government a greements which in our estimation would not be appropriate at this time. Highest authorities in Washington remained concerned and pressed for a complete militar y takeover or at least a comprehensive alternate plan which would demonstrably m eet the problem. Saigon held back with the view that progress was being made, th at Ky was persuaded of the need to eliminate port congestion and that he was doi ng his utmost to solve the problem. A US takeover was once again viewed as neith er politically possible nor desirable. CINCPAC chimed in to support strongly the Saigon position, and at the end of the quarter Washington was still peppering S aigon with comment: We here do not take same relaxed view of barge situation Sai gon port as Saigon . . . Highest authorities have been consistently concerned. A t the same time an overlooked aspect of the earlier extension of US control of t he port was being bounced back and forth. MACV clearance of AID financed project and procured commodities was estimated to have made AID liable for one billion piasters for port clearance costs previously financed by GVN. Nobody was quite c ertain how to approach GVN on the matter or how the US should pay the bill withi n existing dollar and piaster ceilings. K. MINOR BUT PRICKLY PROBLEMS, JANUARY-M ARCH, 1967 The clearance costs problem was an example of several minor matters w hich arose between the governments, problems that were often difficult to handle because prestige and sovereignty were involved. GVN National Bank Governor Hanh and the Embassy tangled over GVN issuance of instructions to commercial banks o perating facilities for US military forces. The Embassy became concerned because American civilians, tried and punished in GVN courts on the basis of American-s upplied evidence, were subjected to extortion. The ticklish part of the problem was how to investigate the practice without jeopardizing those in the midst of b uying their way out. Soon there were ill-considered remarks to the press by Brig adier General Loan who said that GVN had sole jurisdiction over civilians. State instructed Saigon to keep mum on the subject. Finally, in March it was publicly announced that the United States would exercise court martial jurisdiction over civilians but "only rarely, in exceptional cases." The US did not question, as a matter of law, the existence of a basis for court martial jurisdiction over ci vilians and indicated that our policy would be to handle the problem of civilian s in other ways. The statement was careful to reaffirm US respect for GVN sovere ignty, so as to avoid the issue of a formal status of forces agreement. Whether GVN could levy requirements for reports and payments upon US contract airlines c aused bantam-like stances on each side. GVN demanded that contract flights pay l anding charges. Porter replied that was improper and offered GVN notification of flights as a sop. Ky's retort was a demand for copies of contracts and schedule s,

restrictions on in-country flights and limitation of loads to personnel and equi pment strictly military. We rejected those terms and the military nature of the problem probably saved a contract flight from becoming the "example" later in Ja nuary when one planeload of Pan American passengers baked in tropical heat for s everal hours while GVN refused them permission to disembark at Tan Son Nhut. Pre mier Ky's implied intention in February to accept an invitation to speak in the United States produced an apprehensive reaction from Washington. Ambassador Lodg e cautioned, "We have twice headed him off and to object a third time might crea te strain." Eventually Ky was able to publicly postpone his visit on the grounds that his presence was needed to insure a free and fair election. Diversion of M AP material remained a closet skeleton to be rattled periodically. In February, MACV performed estimative gymnastics to suggest that no more than 0.3% of MAP ma terial had been so lost. CINCPAC quickly suggested that valid data did not exist and would be hard to compile. He said that the differences between manifests an d the material actually received should be otherwise identified, and his thought s seemed for the moment to take care of a potentially embarrassing need to expla in a $5 million problem without even bothering GVN. Throughout the quarter there were periodic flurries of talks about negotiations with North Vietnam. U Thant was especially active and these maneuvers caused an uneasiness in US/GVN relatio ns because Saigon was never completely certain what role it would have in such d iscussions. L. THE OTHER WAR Top levels in Washington realized that not much pro gress was being made in Revolutionary Development and exhorted Saigon to integra ted, detailed civil/ military planning. COMUSMACV waffled once again on whether ARVN battalions supporting RD should actually be retained under the operational control of the province chief. US Army units continued their work in the densely populated Delta provinces. On one occasion Premier Ky called Colonel Sam Wilson in for his view of progress there as well as to ask for an evaluation of the AR VN 46th Regiment. Wilson was able to say plainly that the unit was poor and that its commander was ineffective and, without a doubt, corrupt. Ky explained that the commander in question was a close friend of the division commander who was a close friend of the corps commander who was a close friend of Ky. That seemed t o explain the matter. The US continued to press national reconciliation upon the Saigon government. Unger and CAS assets worked with the Constituent Assembly to get NR into the constitution. The lack of enthusiasm was alleged to be fear of unilateral US peace action. The present GVN continued, as they had so often befo re, to agree readily in conversations with us to the principle of national recon ciliation; yet any concrete implementation remained illusive even through anothe r top level meeting with the President.

M. GUAM MEETINGS, MARCH 20 AND 21, 1967 President Johnson announced that his pur pose in calling the Conference at Guam was to introduce the newly appointed US t eam to the leaders of GVN. The shift of personnel represented the largest shakeup in US leadership in South Vietnam since August 1965. Ambassador Bunker was de signated as the replacement for Lodge, and Locke took Porter's place. In a move to resolve the controversy over military versus civil control of Revolutionary D evelopment, Robert Komer took charge with the rank of Ambassador under the COMUS MACV organizational structure with czar powers and a strong mandate to produce p rogress. Most happily, the Constituent Assembly completed its work on the consti tution just in time to permit Premier Ky to present a copy to President Johnson at Guam. As had been the case on the two previous occasions of top US/GVN talks, the communique which resulted from the 2-day meeting lay primary emphasis on po litical, economic, and social matters. The military picture was presumed to be s o encouraging and improving as to need no special attention. N. ROUTINE MATTERS, APRIL-SEPTEMBER, 1967 Most of the previous problems persisted during this perio d. By June the rate of inflation was predicted to be 45-50 percent per year, and the piaster gap was to be 17.3 billion greater than projected. Hanh, now GVN Ec onomic Minister, scheduled a September trip to Washington and the list of expect ed topics read very much the same as agendas for many previous such meetings. Ha nh could upon occasion get very excited, as in the case where a suit by a Greek shipping line froze the GVN account in a New York City bank; but despite repeate d urging from Washington, nobody in Saigon could get up courage enough to approa ch GVN on those retroactive port clearing charges. On April 18, GVN finally issu ed a National Reconciliation Proclamation which stated that "All citizens who ra lly to the national cause can be employed by the government in accordance with t heir ability," but the decree proved to be a mirage. It used the Vietnamese word s for solidarity rather than those for reconciliation and the program proceeded in consonance with that distinction. Saigon reminded State that Premier Ky had r ecently told the Ambassador that meaningful progress on national reconciliation could only come after a constitutional government was established. On the MACV s ide, Ambassador Komer was getting organized. In response to a Washington query o n land reform he recalled his consistent position but pointed out that it was no t an important issue in Vietnam. Far more important was the matter of security i n the countryside. The US continued to deliver material assistance to improve th e morale of ARVN troops. A $2.83 million program for 913 ARVN dependent houses w as upgraded to provide more modern structures with utilities. USAID helped the R VNAF commissary system for RVNAF and dependents. Although rice was eliminated to avoid lowering its open market

price, GVN sought compensating increases in the meat and fish supplied. MACV pro grammed over $3 million to the RVNAF Quartermaster Corps which supplied field an d garrison rations. But there were continuing signs that ARVN as a fighting forc e needed propping up. Sporadic efforts at encadrement appeared. The USMC Combine d Action Companies in I Corps were well publicized. In April, the US 25th Divisi on completed studies, and transmitted to General Chinh, still CG ARVN 25th Divis ion, the Combined Lighting Concept. It brought together in one outpost a US squa d, an ARVN squad, and a PF squad. In response to Washington inquiries, General W estmoreland reported by message in May, 1967, "A command project was initiated o n January 26, 1967, to review the performance of RVNAF units and to identify tho se considered ineffective and nonproductive. Units so identified are being evalu ated with a view to withdrawal or reduction of military assistance support unles s improvement in these units is possible. The evaluation will be conducted every six months resulting in a final determination each June and December.... The me thodology for evaluation includes: (1) Identification of units judged ineffectiv e or nonproductive. (2) Evaluation of credibility or feasibility of present plan s to guarantee increased effectiveness. (3) Study of unit performance trends dur ing the past six months. (4) Determination of the availability of plans to train personnel. (5) Evaluation of command interest at all levels for improvement. Un its will be classified as Improvement Probable, Improvement Doubtful, and Improv ement Unlikely. Those in the latter two groups must justify continued military a ssistance or action will be initiated to reduce FY 68 support. Current Status: A ll VNAF and VNMC units are effective and productive. Support to VNN reduced by $ 7800 which reflects discontinuance of support for two fishing boats which are no t configured to support any role assigned to VNN. The evaluation of ARVN is only partially completed. In July, the MACV staff briefed Secretary McNamara in Saig on and touched again on the subject of encadrement. One concept considered was V ATUSA (Vietnamese Augmentation to US Army) whereby two or three Vietnamese would be assigned to each squad in US combat battalions. While this scheme offered th e advantages of improving ARVN skills and of utilizing additional RVN troops wit hout further strains on already limited ARVN leadership, the only real gain for the US was viewed to be a possible reduction in US strength. The disadvantages p ointed out were the political climate, the language barrier, the danger to US un it security, the administrative and disciplinary difficulties and the probable i rritation between VATUSA and regular ARVN unit soldiers. These, it was judged, d ictated against its adoption.

A second concept considered was salting ARVN forces with US leadership in comman d positions. The analysis indicated that for political and psychological reasons , it would probably be best to put two US officers and three US NCO's in an inst ructor's role with each RF company rather than in a command role. Command would be exercised by the RF company commander but he would be required to follow the directions of the US training team leaders. The conclusion reached was to contin ue the "salting" experiment with expansion in view if the initial results were g ood. There is no evidence that anything became of the experiment. None of this s eriously worried top RVNAF leadership; so they indulged in more interesting inte rnational activities. In May, talks started between Lao and GVN military staffs. The occasion was planning for barrier extension westward, but Washington realiz ed at once that there was little the US could do to limit the contacts to that s ubject. In July, it was discovered that GVN was using Chinat agents, disguised s o as to appear to be South Vietnamese with Nung ancestry, on covert operations. JCS disapproved of the effort despite appeals from COMUSMACV. The Chinats appear ed to be the result of a secret bilateral agreement concluded during 1966. In Se ptember, MACV reported that GVN had occupied Pattle Island in the Crescent Group about 170 miles south of Hainan with the intention of constructing an airfield there. Because these islands are already claimed by Communist and Nationalist Ch inas and the Philippines as well, MACV advised against US cooperation in the adv enture. O. THE GVN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTiON Pre-nomination maneuvering and legitima cy of the Presidential campaign were the subjects which occupied American attent ion above all else. The first task facing Ambassador Bunker as he arrived on sta tion in April was to oversee the delicate transition of GVN to a government base d upon a popular election recognized by the world to be fair. Premier Ky was alr eady openly acting like a Presidential candidate in April. General Thieu was inf ormed that the generals had endorsed Ky while Thieu was absent from the scene re covering from an appendectomy. That was not sufficient to scare Thieu from the r ace; so the US Mission became increasingly worried that the Thieu-Ky competition threatened the indispensable unity of the military. Dickering remained behind t he scenes until Ky formally announced his candidacy on May 12. This served only to intensify the rivalry. By mid-June, the Thieu-Ky confrontation showed no sign s of moving toward satisfactory resolution. Basically, Ambassador Bunker believe d in an indirect approach. He did not hesitate to approach Ky and Thieu individu ally on the broader issues of arbitrary press censorship, questionable tactics b eing pursued by Ky supporters six weeks before it was legal to campaign, or unit y of the Armed Forces. But, on the confrontation between the two candidates, Bun ker's ploy was to hold an informal luncheon to which the two principals were inv ited. In the end they had to work out their own solution. They did. At the end o f June the 50-60 officers of the Armed Forces Council met in a 2-day,

continuous session at which both Thieu and Ky performed histrionics. The surpris ing result was that Ky agreed to run for the Vice-Presidency on Thieu's ticket. The Mission sighed in relief and agreed that Bunker's approach had worked. The A mbassador congratulated the candidates, and Thieu obligingly announced that if e lected he would appoint a civilian as Premier. Ky agreed. The RVNAF chief of sta ff had earlier announced that there would be no officially endorsed military can didate; yet the Constituent Assembly conveniently approved a draft article which permitted Thieu and Ky to run without resigning from the Armed Forces. By mid-J uly, the Assembly had voted acceptance of the Thieu-Ky ticket while disallowing one headed by Big Minh who remained in nearby Bangkok as a potential threat to t he younger pair. With only a few hitches, the campaigning proceeded so as to sat isfy American observers that it was acceptably fair; and the resultant Thieu-Ky victory was a surprise only in its smallerthan-expected plurality. P. BLUEPRINT FOR VIETNAM, AUGUST, 1967 State suggested that completion of the election proces s was a proper occasion upon which to consider several proposals, including incr eased leverage, for advancing the total American effort in South Vietnam. Bunker also mentioned this when he transmitted the paper, "Blueprint for Viet-Nam." Th e "Blueprint" ranged widely over all topics and struck a consistently optimistic note: Progress in the war has been steady on all fronts. We can defeat the enem y by patient, continued, and concerted effort. The way to do this is for the GVN and its allies (a) to reinforce and accelerate the progress already made; (b) t o markedly improve the interdiction of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops a nd supplies; (c) to upgrade, accelerate, and coordinate the pacification program in the countryside; and (d) to maintain political and economic stability and su pport the development of the constitutional process. We still have a long way to go. Much of the country is still in VC hands, the enemy can still shell our bas es and commit acts of terrorism in the securest areas, VC units still mount larg e scale attacks, most of the populace has not actively commited itself to the Go vernment, and a VC intrastructure still exists throughout the country. Neverthel ess, the situation has steadily improved since the spring of 1965.... Now, that the initiative is ours and the enemy is beginning to hurt, maximum pressure must be maintained on him by (a) intensifying military activity in the South; (b) de veloping new methods of interdicting infiltration; (c) bombing all targets in th e North connected with the enemy's war effort that do not result in unacceptable risk of uncontrolled escalation; (d) accelerating the program of pacification ( including better security more effective attacks on the infractructure, ' steppe d up National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs, a greater involvement of th e people in solving their own problems at the village and hamlet level; (e) enco uraging reforms in the government structure and continued improvement in the arm ed forces; (f) attacking the problem of corruption; (g) using influence to effec t a strong, freely elected government with political

stability; and (h taking actions necessary to the continued growth and stability of the economy . In a subsequent message Ambassador Bunker stated more specific ally that the United States should use its influence to get GVN to do the follow ing: A. Seek broad based popular support. (1) Appoint prominent civilians includ ing some leading opposition candidates, in new government. (2) Use appointments to insure association of a new government with various religious and political g roups. (3) Adopt a program and identify it with that of a former national hero, "so as to give the new government an idealistic appeal or philosophy which will compete with that declared by the VC." Bunker suggested Nguyen Hue. B. Work on a more continuous, although informal basis with US Mission. Bunker suggests regul ar weekly or semi-monthly lunches. C. Adopt a program to include the following: (1) Public recognition of the (a) Necessity for every Vietnamese to contribute t o the war effort. (b) Need to change draft laws. (2) Reaffirm on-going programs relating to RVNAF, including (a) MACV program of ARVN improvement through merit promotions and a military inspectorate. (b) Elimination of corrupt, inefficient leaders. (c) Expansion of RF/PF and adoption of the MACV recommended system of U S advisory teams operating with RF/PF for 6-month period. (d) Greater integratio n of US forces or joint operations. (e) Reorientation of the concept of the Paci fication Role of ARVN, RF, and PF in accordance with MACV suggestions-from stati c support to mobile, area security with night patrolling and a system of inspect ion and grading to insure implementation. (3) Make the Province Chief the "key" man in pacification--giving him operational control over all military and parami litary forces engaged in pacification. He should appoint district chiefs. He sho uld report to Corps commander on military matters and to central government on c ivil matters. An inspection, training, and rates system should be established.

(4) Centralize all rural development efforts in non-RD hamlets under one coordin ated control in some manner as is now done in the Ministry of Revolutionary Deve lopment for RD hamlets. (5 Construct an adequate number of processing and detent ion centers in provinces and permanent prisons on islands on priority basis toge ther with passing of laws that it is a crime to be a VC civilian cadre. (6) Pay higher salaries to selected GVN officials, including the military, particularly those officials able to control corruption or in a position to be tempted by cor ruption. (7) Reaffirm National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs. (8) Grant villages the power to enforce land rental laws. (9) Adopt the whole of the "oper ation Take-off" pacification program prepared by MACCORDS. (10) Establish joint council procedures over expenditure of counterpart piasters by reinstituting sig n-off by US advisors at province level. (11) Revitalize the veteran's program. ( 12) Increase receipts from domestic taxes and tariffs, and revise monetary polic ies. Q. THE LEVERAGE STUDY On August 31 State transmitted a study by Hans Heyman n and Col. Volney Warner on the subject of leverage. It reviewed the rationale f or leverage and considered a whole array of possible techniques: In anticipating the US/GVN relationship in the post-election period, it is generally agreed tha t the US should find ways to exercise leverage with the Vietnamese government wh ich are more commensurate in degree with the importance of the US effort to Sout h Vietnam's survival and which reflect the climate of growing restiveness in the US . . . In its impatience to get results and make progress, the US has increas ingly resorted to unilateral programs and action with inadequate consultation wi th the Vietnamese. On the other hand, the indiscriminate and careless exercise o f US leverage could undermine the self-respect of the Vietnamese government in i ts own eyes and in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people. ....To be effective, US leverage must be exercised in the context of a relationship of mutual respec t and confidence, and in ways commensurate with the objective sought. It must al so be backed by credible sanctions.

The various tools of leverage available to us are described below. It is not pro posed that all of these tools be used at any given time or that some of them be used at all. However, they represent a selection of arrows that might be placed in the US Mission quiver for use as the Mission Council deems appropriate. It wi ll be particularly important to construct a credible and effective system of US leverage for use as necessary and appropriate in connection with the list of pri ority program objectives which we shall be seeking to achieve with the newly ele cted government in the immediate post-election period. Tools of Leverage A wide range of possible techniques and forms of influence is available at each level o f the American presence in Vietnam. A few of these leverage devices are now in u se, mostly at the initiative of individual Americans on the spot, but not as par t of an organized framework of influence. Other devices have been instituted in the past, only to be subsequently abandoned because of fear of their misuse, act ual misuse, or inadequate understanding of their value. In the following list we array a range of possible instruments of influence that the US might employ, wi th some indication of their applicability. A. Rapport.... B. Joint Planning and Evaluation..... C. Joint Inspection and Audit.... D. Joint Secretariats.... E. T he JCRR approach: Establishing a joint, autonomous, dually-staffed, foundation-l ike organization headed by a board of commissioners appointed by the two heads o f state, to administer all forms of non-military AID.... F. Contingency Funds an d Special Resources.... G. Control Over Expenditure of Counterpart Piasters.... H. Retention of Resources in US Channels.... I. Joint Personnel Management--to i nstitute career incentive, selection, and removal policies.... J. Joint Command. .... K. Policy-level Monitoring System--to monitor the exercise of authority of key officials of the GVN.... L. Withholding US Support--at levels below Saigon, the authority of US senior advisors to cut off or withdraw US civil and military support from Vietnamese activities or operations within their area of responsib ility would constitute powerful leverage..... At the Saigon level, a range of ex tremely tough options is available, encompassing selective withdrawal of US supp ort for Vietnam persuading the GVN that these are in fact available requires the will to use them and the political ability to follow through if our hand is cal led. Options would include halting further troop deployments, standing down US u nit operations, suspending CIP and MAP assistance, and so forth.

Ambassador Komer replied on September 19. He recalled his deep interest is subje ct and discussed at length both present and potential techniques. His views seem ed considerably mitigated by his several months in Saigon, for "rapport" and "pe rsuasion with implied pressure" headed the list of what was presently being done . He concluded by saying, "All of the above forms of leverage, and yet others, c ould be useful at the proper time and in an appropriate way. But they must be ap plied with discretion, and always in such manner as to keep the GVN foremost in the picture presented to its own people and the world at large . . . The exercis e of leverage in a personal manner and hidden from the public view is likely to be most effective, while of the more operational means establishment of combined organization under a JCRR-type concept, to include joint control of resources, would be most desirable. In sum, we're gradually applying more leverage in Pacif ication, but wish to do so in ways that least risk creating more trouble than co nstructive results." R. POSTLOGUE New plans and new hopes marked the immediate p ost-election period. The story of USGVN relations continues, but this narrative must end. In conclusion it seems appropriate to quote from the MACCORDS report c overing Bien Hoa province for the period ending December 31, 1967. 1. Status/or the RD Plan: The GVN in Bien Hoa Province has not met with any measure of succes s in furthering the pacification effort during 1967. Those areas that do represe nt advances (such as road openings or repairs or construction, breaking up of ma in line VC units, etc.) have all been the result of unilateral US actions. It wa s perhaps naively thought that these US accomplishments would stand as an inspir ing example to the GVN and would prompt them to not only continue their efforts but, further, to expand and intensify the fight. However, during 1967 in Bien Ho a Province, this has not been the case. The GVN at all levels has grown weaker, become more corrupt and, today, displays even less vitality and will than it did one year ago.... Advisory Leverage: This subject has been an extremely sensitiv e and controversial issue in both GVN and US circles. However, as painful as it must be to address, the harsh truth is that given a showdown situation or an int olerable divergence between GVN and US methods, the US advisor will lose. CORDS, Bien Hoa has gone to extraordinary lengths in reporting on both corrupt and inc ompetent officials and practices. The reason for these efforts has been to illus trate clearly to higher US authorities, the enormity of the problems facing the advisor on the province/District level. CORDS Bien Hoa, as perhaps all other ech elons of US advisors, is ultimately powerless to rectify or even significantly a lter the GVN intentions and performance. The Vietnamese in the street is firmly convinced that the US totally dominates the GVN and dictates exactly what course shall be followed. However, the bitter and tragic truth is that the US has been kept at such a distance from GVN circles and power that in joint councils or pl ans our views may be heard, some portions of our logic may be endorsed but with confrontations or matters that

represent any truly revolutionary departure from existing GVN practices etc, we are light weights and presently do not possess the leverage or power to carry th e day. ARVN Performance: There are presently two ARVN battalions (3/43 and 2/48) who are directly assigned to support RD in Bien Hoa. With the exception of the 1st Bn, 48th Regt which served in the Phu Hoi Campaign area earlier in the year, ARVN performance has been less than satisfactory. The units have demonstrated t he same age-old ills that have collectively led to our present commitment of US forces.... GVN Officials Interests: The primary interest of GVN officials in Bie n Hoa Province is money. The lucrative US presence with all the various service trades that cater to the soldier, have created a virtual gold mine of wealth whi ch is directly or indirectly syphoned off and pocketed by the officials. Thus, r evolutionary development with all the ultimate implications of broadening the go verning base of this society, is viewed as some sort of necessary device that ne eds to be propped up and nominally catered to by the GVN in order to keep US and Free World's interest and faith intact. However, any serious or meaningful gest ure in support of a program which ultimately is designed to displace the powersto-be (or at least force them to become accountable or share in the power) is no t forthcoming. Infrastructure is not attacked even though the target is known; b udgets are not spent although the funds are available; GVN officials steadfastly refuse to visit their districts or villages or hamlets although it is there tha t most immediate problems exist. The list of limpid, half-hearted efforts to pro secute the war is endless. Material Cutoffs and Shortages: In August after sever al months of negotiation, CORDS, Bien Hoa was forced to cut off further shipment of replenishment stocks into province. The reasons for this action were many bu t could be reduced to sloppy, shoddy and highly questionable logistical practice s and procedures on the part of the GVN. After eleven weeks, the Provincial GVN finally agreed to carry out the reforms and renovations as suggested by CORDS. H owever, that eleven-week gap in the flow of materials (particularly during a per iod most noted for its relatively high degree of GVN action) had a significant e ffect on curbing construction programs and causing even more delays. Then, as so on as this issue was resolved, it was learned that cement and roofing weren't in supply and rationed quotas for the remainder of the year further compounded the damage caused by earlier material shortages. To compensate, in part, for these factors, CORDS has had to increasingly rely on the resources, skills and capabil ities of resident US military units. These units have, without exception, effect ively filled the gaps and their efforts have succeeded in reducing the critical road situation that has been worsening throughout the years. Their action in man y other areas has been highly commendable and CORDS Bien Hoa (as well as the GVN itself) owes a great deal to these units and their commanders who have unselfis hly devoted themselves to furthering pacification. However, for all their effort s, for all the resources either expended or on hand, the disturbing truth in Bie n Hoa is that it still remains for the government, with forceful and meaningful direction from above, to begin to assume the responsibility for prosecuting this war and the pacification effort. Thus far, the GVN has not done this and it is the considered opinion of CORDS Bien Hoa that

unless major revisions are brought about in the factors raised here, there is on ly to be a continuation of the same ordeal with the accompanying frustrations, i naction, corruption and incompetence. A continuation of this does not connotate stability or even maintenance of the status quo; it spells regression and an eve r widening gap of distrust, distaste and disillusionment between the people and the GVN. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 6, "The Advisory Build-Up, 1961-1967," pp. 408-514. (Boston: Beacon Pres s, 1971) Section 1, pp. 408-457 Summary and Analysis The United States decided, shortly after the Geneva Accords and during the period of French withdrawal from Indo-China, to give military as sistance and advice to the newly proclaimed Republic of Vietnam. It might as eas ily have decided not to undertake this effort to prevent South Vietnam from fall ing to communism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were pessimistic. The creation of a Vietnamese Army, they said, might not even lead to internal political stability, much less assure the capability to protect South Vietnam from external aggressi on. The JCS also believed that the limitations imposed by the Geneva agreements on the number of U.S. military personnel would make it impractical to attempt to train a new Army-particularly given the paucity of experienced leaders which wa s the legacy of French colonialism. The President's military advisors did not wi sh to assume the responsibility for failure without the resources and influence which would offer a better chance for success. THE AMERICAN GAMBLE The available record does not indicate any rebuttal of the JCS's appraisal of the situation. What it does indicate is that the U.S. decided to gamble with very limited resou rces because the potential gains seemed well worth a limited risk. "I cannot gua rantee that Vietnam will remain free, even with our aid," General J. Lawton Coll ins reported to the National Security Council, "But I know that without our aid Vietnam will surely be lost to Communism." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was instrumental in deciding for political reasons to undertake a modest progra m of military advice aimed at producing political stability. Once launched, howe ver, the program of advice and assistance came to be dominated by conventional m ilitary conceptions. Insuring internal stability is a "lesser included

capability" of armed force, the reasoning went; the principal purpose of such a force is to protect the territorial integrity of the nation. It was such a conve ntional force that the small USMAAG attempted to produce from 1955 until about 1 960. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was made to "mirror image" the U .S. Army to the extent permitted by differences in equipment and locale. The num ber of U.S. advisors (approximately doubled by "The Equipment Recovery Mission"a thinly veiled device to increase the number of Americans in Vietnam) remained stable throughout this period. ARVN developed into a multidivisional force orien ted primarily toward conventional defense. The later transition to a force desig ned for counterinsurgent warfare was thereby made more difficult. It seemed for a while that the gamble against long odds had succeeded. The Viet Minh were quie scent; the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were markedly better armed a nd trained than they were when the U.S. effort began (at which time they were un armed and untrained), and President Ngo Dinh Diem showed a remarkable ability to put down factions threatening GVN stability and to maintain himself in office. This period of apparent stability disappeared, however, in the events of 1959/61 as the Viet Minh (relabelled Viet Cong--a contraction for Vietnamese Communist) stepped up terrorism, sabotage, and military action by increasingly large units . By mid-1961, the prospect for South Vietnam's independence was at least as dar k as it had been six years earlier. But the U.S. military advisors in Vietnam ha d learned--or at least thought tney had learned--during this period of gradual d isintegration the true nature of the battle in which they were engaged by proxy. This was an unconventional, internal war of counterinsurgency rather than a con ventional struggle against an external foe. It was a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the indigenous (and especially the rural) population rather than a con test to win and hold key terrain features. It was an intermeshed politicaleconom ic-military war rather than one in which political and economic issues were sett led by military victory. U.S. advisors in Vietnam--and U.S. military and civilia n theorists in other places, as well--formulated during this period a rudimentar y doctrine of counterinsurgent warfare. In response to Premier Khrushchev's endo rsement of "wars of national liberation" they proposed to help free world nation s save themselves from communism by a series of sequential actions that dealt wi th the symptoms of social revolution (the insurgency) as well as its causes (the frustration of expectations for social justice). Thus, at almost the same time that the U.S. began its advisory buildup in South Vietnam in late 1961, military and civilian practitioners found themselves in possession of a simple, apparent ly logical, outline sketch of a method by which to counter the communist-capture d insurgency. Physical security from the acts of the insurgents was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success. In addition to security the

Vietnamese government had to establish the services which would link it in class ic terms of legitimacy to its subjects. We would fight fire with fire and we wou ld fight it with water, too. THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP The decisions made by the K ennedy Administration from mid-1961 onward, culminating in the expansion of the U.S. advisory effort following General Maxwell D. Taylor's mission to Saigon in October, did not simply set out to explain this newly-articulated counterinsurge ncy theory and doctrine to the GVN. They attempted to induce the GVN to reform i tself so that identification with its populace would be possible. Beyond this, t hey chose to attempt to help the Vietnamese, in Taylor's words, "as friends and partners--not as arms-length advisors--[and] show them how the job might be done --not tell them or do it them." The "limited partnership" which General Taylor p roposed--and which President Kennedy accepted--was designed to place U.S. adviso rs at many levels within the RVNAF and GVN structure rather than merely at the t op. An earlier proposal, to concentrate on advisors at the top with wide discret ionary authority and to count on influence as the product of the demonstrated co mmitment of a carefully selected handful of men, was rejected in favor of many a dvisors at many levels, each serving normally only for a twelve month period, an d with the advisory manpower furnished through normal personnel selection and as signment processes within the military services. The expectation among U.S. poli cymakers--recorded in NSAM 111--was that the GVN and U.S. would mutually agree u pon necessary steps to end the insurgency. The U.S., for its part, would underwr ite an increase in RVNAF and provide advisors throughout the military structure down to battalion level and in each provincial capital. The GVN would rationaliz e its lines of authority and begin reform measures to bring it closer to the Vie tnamese people. This was, of course, a U.S. expectation, not an agreed quid pro quo. Diem was unwilling to permit the U.S. to share in his formulation of plans. He was even afraid to discuss the U.S. expectations candidly with his own cabin et ministers. It is a matter of record that he did not reform his government. (" He will not reform because he cannot," J. Kenneth Gaibraith cabled President Ken nedy.) What remains in issue is whether he could have done so. If he could not, the U.S. plan to end the insurgency was foredoomed from its inception, for it de pended on Vietnamese initiatives to solve a Vietnamese problem. COMMITMENT AND E XPECTATION Thus the U.S. overall plan to end the insurgency was on shaky ground on the GVN side. Diem needed the U.S. and the U.S. needed a reformed Diem. As U. S. advisors began deploying to Vietnam for service with tactical units in the fi eld, the gamble of the mid-50's was transferred into a broad commitment. Preside nt Kennedy and his advisors were determined to save Vietnam from communism by he lping the Vietnamese to save themselves. One side of the dual U.S. thrust (GVN r eform) was already in trouble. What

of the "friends and partners" who were to share the dangers and tasks of RVNAF i n the field? What was expected of them? What advantages would accrue from their presence in Vietnam? The available record is almost totally devoid of any explic ation (much less any debate) on these questions. General Taylor's report of his mission to Saigon implies an unambiguous convergence of interests between the ad visors and the advised. All that was needed was greater competence. More U.S. ad visors at more places working on problems of Vietnamese training and operations could not but have an overall beneficial effect. It is necessary to surmise the expectations in the policymakers minds of just how this would come about. First, they seem to have expected the increased U.S. advisory presence to lead directl y to increased RVNAF competence in technical and tactical areas. Basic military skills-how to move, shoot, and communicate-could be improved and the improvement s sustained by a continuing U.S. presence at many operational levels. Second, th e U.S. policymakers could receive reports from an omnipresent U.S. "network" whi ch would permit them to become better informed about what was really taking plac e in Vietnam, not only with respect to VC activity but with reference to ARVN pl ans, operations, and problems as well. Finally, the U.S. expected to realize inc reased influence within RVNAF from the presence of advisors. (and it expected, a s NSAM 111 made clear, to realize increased influence with GVN in exchange for i ncreasing its visible commitment to South Vietnamese independence.) Increased in fluence can, of course, be gained in many ways. U.S. advisors could, by example, promote more aggressive Vietnamese leadership and improved standards of conduct . A well-coordinated advisory network could exert persuasive pressure throughout RVNAF to adopt certain policies or practices. And the U.S. providers of the mat erial resources could, if they wished, keep a tight hand on the spigot and contr ol the flow. They could exert influence negatively. The U.S. was anxious to avoi d this last mentioned approach to increased influence. "Leverage," as it is now commonly known, was a subject rarely discussed, much less practiced. The "limite d partnership" finessed the whole issue of sanctions by assuming (or hoping or p retending, one cannot know which) that no problem existed. PACIFICATION AND STRA TEGIC HAMLETS The process of countering insurgency, most commonly called pacific ation, received a great amount of attention and publicity at the same time the U .S. was increasing its field advisors with ARVN from a handful to over 3,000. Ea rlier, in 1960, the USMAAG had pressed upon the GVN a national Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP) which was really an organizational blueprint for reorder ing the GVN-RVNAF lines of command to permit effective action. The nub of the pr oblem was that the political leaders in rural areas (Province and District Chief s-almost all military officers) were responsible to Saigon directly while RVNAF had a separate chain of command. In 1961, the MAAG presented its complementary G eographically Phased Plan which specified the relative priority for clearing out the VC, holding, then building GVN at the "rice roots." The

object, as the U.S. advisors saw it, was to have a workable national plan upon w hich to base the entire US-GVN effort. The Strategic Hamlet Program soon became the unifying vehicle to express the pacification process. The theory was that of physical security first, then government programs to develop popular allegiance . The fact was over-expansion, counter-productive coercion in some areas, widesp read mismanagement, and dishonesty. U.S. policymakers were not, however, aware o f how badly things were going until they became much worse. Optimism dominated o fficial thinking. No need was perceived for new departures. Throughout the perio d of the Strategic Hamlet Program--that is, until Diem's regime was toppled in l ate 1963--the number of U.S. advisors remained relatively stable at its new (196 2) plateau. The expectation that more U.S. advisors would mean better informatio n for U.S. policymakers was not realized. One cannot judge accurately the reason s why U.S. leaders in Vietnam and Washington thought the counterinsurgent effort was making headway, but the fact that it was not is crystal clear in retrospect . The expectation that GVN and U.S. interests were sufficiently parallel to perm it greater U.S. influence solely as a result of a larger U.S. presence foundered on the personalities and the felt necessities of the Ngo brothers. The extent t o which RVNAF technical-tactical competence was increased during this period rem ains a subject of disagreement but it was not increased sufficiently to "turn th e tide" of the war. That much is indisputable. ANOTHER ROUND OF INCREASES After Diem's fall there was a brief period of optimism based on the expectation that t he new military regime in Saigon would be more receptive to U.S. advice than its predecessor had been. By the summer of 1964, when the decision was made to expa nd the advisory effort again, this optimistic hope had foundered on the fact of continued VC victories and instability within the GVN. NSAM 288 had, in March 19 64, stated U.S. objectives in Vietnam in the most unambiguous and sweeping terms . If there had been doubt that the limited risk gamble undertaken by Eisenhower had been transformed into an unlimited commitment under Kennedy, that doubt shou ld have been dispelled internally by NSAM 288's statement of objectives: We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. Thi s assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social mea sures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elemen ts. If we cannot save South Vietnam, the NSAM continued in a classic statement o f the "domino theory," all of Southeast Asia will probably fall and all of the W estern Pacific and South Asian nations will come under increased pressure.

There were at this time several steps which the U.S. could have taken to increas e its assistance to the GVN. Carrying the war to Hanoi was one; introducing U.S. combat forces was another. Neither appealed much, however, in terms of helping the South Vietnamese to win their war. Both were anathema in the midst of Presid ential election year politics. Bombing was discussed and plans laid, but no acti on taken. Troop commitments were not even discussed- at least in the written rec ord of proposals and decisions. Rather, a number of palliative measures to help the GVN economy and RVNAF were adopted and the advisory effort was expanded. The 1964 expansion of the advisory effort consisted of the beefing-up of the battal ion advisory teams and the establishment of district (sub-sector) teams. Thus, a new dimension of American presence was added and the density of U.S. advisors i n operational units was increased. There is nothing in the available record to s uggest either a challenge to the old, unstated assumption that more U.S. advisor s would lead to increased performance or any change in the assumed expectations of U.S. policymakers had changed. The determination remained to advise rather th an to command, to develop Vietnamese leadership rather than to supplant it, and to induce the GVN to take the steps necessary to pacify its own dissident elemen ts. ADVISORS TEMPORARILY FORGOTTEN The expansion to district level placed U.S. m ilitary advisors throughout almost the entire RVNAF hierarchy (from JGS to batta lion, with enough men at the lower level to advise companies on a "when needed" basis) and the political hierarchy as well (sector/province and sub-sector/distr ict). U.S. advisors were not present in large numbers with the old Civil Guard a nd Self-Defense Corps- now relabelled the Regional Forces and Popular Forces und er province and district control respectively-but they advised the military men in political positions who controlled these paramilitary forces. Still the situa tion continued to deteriorate. Political instability within the GVN had by 1965 become a perennial rather than a transitory problem. The U.S. had initiated a co ntinuing series of military air war measures to dissuade North Vietnam from supp ort of the war in the South. The results were obviously inadequate; they may eve n have been opposite to those expected. Then ARVN suffered a series of disastrou s defeats late in the spring of 1965 which led knowledgeable observers to fear a n imminent GVN collapse. U.S. combat units--a few of which were already in-count ry with restrictive missions-began to be deployed to South Vietnam in earnest. W hen the build-up of U.S. combat forces got underway the build-up of U.S. advisor s had already been essentially completed. Being an advisor in the field had been the most challenging assignment a U.S. soldier could seek; being with a U.S. un it in combat now became the aim of most. The advisory effort sank into relative obscurity as the attention of policymakers (and of the press and public) focused on the U.S. force deployments, on building the base complexes from which U.S. m ilitary might could project itself into the countryside, and in exploring the ne w relationships and new opportunities occasioned by the commitment of U.S. land forces to the Asian mainland.

A number of measures which would have changed materially the U.S. advisors relat ionship to their Vietnamese counterparts were examined briefly in mid-1965. Each was dropped. The encadrement of U.S. and ARVN units was favored by President Jo hnson. General Westmoreland opposed it-apparently because of language problems a nd the difficult logistic support problem it would create-and the issue quickly died, except for the experimental Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) formed by the Marines. The subject of a combined U.S.-RVNAF command was brought up. Secretary McNamara was more favorably disposed toward achieving "unity of command" than we re his senior military advisors and the U.S. Mission representatives in Saigon. They were keenly aware of GVN sensitivity to any measures which would explicitly finger the increasing Americanization of the war effort. So combined command wa s shelved, too. The GVN even opposed a joint US-JGS staff to coordinate the war effort. The staff was never formed. PACIFICATION REEMPHASIZED As the build-up of U.S. combat forces reached a level permitting offensive forays against the VC ( and North Vietnamese Army) forces, there gradually evolved a division of respons ibilities between U.S. and Vietnamese forces in which the former were to concent rate on defeating the main forces of the VC/NVA and the latter were to give prim ary emphasis to the pacification program. Half of ARVN was to operate in support of pacification. This division of effort threw most U.S. advisors into pacifica tion--with ARVN units as well as in the province and district advisory teams. It also threw the U.S. military advisors into closer contact--and competition and conflict--with the growing number of advisors on civil functions (many of whom w ere U.S. military men on "loan") representing the CIA, AID, and USIA. The questi on was raised of the optimal internal U.S. organization to support the Vietnames e pacification program. The result of a drawn-out, occasionally acrimonious deba te on this question was an intermixed civil-military organization embracing the entire pacification effort, headed by a civilian of ambassadorial rank under COM USMACV's direction. Called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Suppor t (CORDS), it replaced a bilinear system in which military advisors were control led through a military chain of command and all civilian advisors were controlle d (at least in theory) through an Office of Civil Operations (OCO). The creation of CORDS was hailed as a victory for the "single manager" concept even though s ome very substantial U.S. programs were defined as outside the pacification prog ram and, hence, beyond CORDS' competence. RF/PF ADVISORS The creation of CORDS a ffected only the organizational context of U.S. advice to the South Vietnamese. It did nothing to change the relationship between advisor and advised. U.S. expe ctations continued in the well-worn furrows in which they had travelled from the beginning: better information, more U.S. influence over Vietnamese plans and

actions, and improved GVN (including RVNAF) performance were the hoped for produ cts of the advisory effort. This pattern was repeated in 1967 when an increase o f over 2,000 military advisors was proposed by MACV to assist the Regional and P opular Forces- whose security missions were almost exclusively devoted to suppor t of the pacification program. The RF and PF were, at that time, the only RVNAF components without a sizeable U.S. advisory complement. When the question of imp roving their effectiveness was addressed the old assumption that more U.S. advis ors would equate to improved effectiveness again went unchallenged. The question debated was whether this new dimension of the U.S. advisory effort should be st ructured to give continuing advice to RF companies and PF platoons or should be constituted on a mobile training basis. The decision was to form mobile teams fo r both tactical and logistical support training. Advisors were detached from the ir parent U.S. combat units and detailed to these duties pending the manpower ac counting change which would transfer these individuals to MACV advisory control and replace them in U.S. units with newly deployed fillers. AVOIDED ISSUES This was the situation when the VC/NVA launched a massive series of attacks against u rban population centers and surrounding pacification program forces during the 1 968 lunar new year (Tet) offensive. In the confused aftermath of this radical ch ange in VC/NVA strategy the U.S. announced in Washington its intention to give r enewed attention to modernizing RVNAF so that a larger share of the war effort c ould be turned back to the Vietnamese. This policy decision, following as it did an unprecedented sixyear period of U.S. attempts to wage counterinsurgent war b y proxy, constituted an adequate reason to reexamine the experience of the past and to explore more fully some difficult questions which have been consistently avoided in the desire to assist South Vietnam. The most basic of these questions is whether the U.S. can in any way serve as a makeweight sufficient to change t he continuing unfavorable trend of the war in South Vietnam? Can it, that is, ov ercome the apparent fact that the Viet Cong have "captured" the Vietnamese natio nalist movement while the GVN has become the refuge of Vietnamese who were allie d with the French in the battle against the independence of their nation? Attemp ts to answer this question are complicated, of course, by the difficult issue of Viet Cong allegiance to and control by Communist China. But this is the nature of the situation. The issue of whether the U.S. can energize the GVN has been to o long submerged by repeated assertions that it must do so. A part of any tentat ive answer to this fundamental question will turn on the issue of how the U.S. m ight better promote a more adequate pace of GVN reform and improved RVNAF effect iveness to cope with the VC/NVA threat. (A related question, of course, is wheth er reform and increased effectiveness can proceed simultaneously.) Asking this

question would open for examination two aspects of the advisory program that hav e come to be treated by reflexive response: where are advisors needed and what s hould be the relationship of the advisor to the advised? The continuing U.S. uns tated assumption has been that more advisors somehow equate to better performanc e. This can be traced in the successive expansions of the military advisory effo rt-first to the provinces and down to battalion level within ARVN, then to the d istricts, and most recently to the paramilitary forces within RVNAF. It may be t hat large numbers of advisors are, in fact, the best way to influence events but one cannot reach such a conclusion validly without first asking the question. T he relationship of advisor to advised has gone through recurrent changes relativ e to judging an advisor's performance according to the performance of his counte rpart. It has almost never deviated, however, from the belief that the conscious and continuing use of leverage at many levels would undercut Vietnamese soverei gnty and stultify the development of Vietnamese leadership. Given the results of this policy over a number of years it is fair to ask whether the stick ought no t to be more routinely used in combination with the carrot. Again, the answer is not obvious but it is obvious that there can be no sound answer in the absence of inquiry. Finally, and closely related to any examination of the leverage issu e, there is the question of the adequacy of counterinsurgent theory and doctrine . The progression from physical security through the establishment of socially o riented programs (political and economic) to the objective of earning and winnin g popular allegiance seems both simple and logical. It may also be simplistic, f or its transformation into operational reality bumps head-on into some very diff icult questions. Is security a precondition to loyalty, for instance, or must so me degree of loyalty be realized as a precondition to intelligence information a dequate to make security feasible? This chicken-and-egg argument has been debate d for years without leading to any noticeable consensus on guides to operational action. Seeking answers to any of these questions is a difficult, frustrating b usiness. There exists no "control" by which laboratory comparisons of alternativ e courses can be made. There is almost surely no hard choice which will not carr y with it very real liabilities along with its advantages. But if the lives and effort expended in the U.S. military advisory effort in South Vietnam in the 196 0's are to be justified, a substantial portion of that justification will consis t of a closer examination of past assumptions in order better to guide future po licy. End of Summary and Analysis CHRONOLOGY 21 Jul 54 Geneva Cease-fire Accord Ended fighting between Viet Minh and French; divided Vietnam at 17th parallel; l imited U.S. military personnel in RVN to current level (342).

22 Sep 54 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina U.S. resources could better be used to support countries other than RVN. 11 Oct 54 Letter, J. F. Dulles (Sec State) to C. E. Wilson (SecDef) Only small U.S. tr aining forces to RVN to promote internal stability. 19 Oct 54 Memo, JCS for SecD ef, Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina Opposed U.S. trai ning RVN army. Risk not worth the gamble. 22 Oct 54 Msg, State to Saigon 1679 Se t in motion "crash program" to improve RVN forces. 26 Oct 54 Memo, SecDef to JCS JCS to prepare long-range program to improve RVN forces. 17 Nov 54 Memo, JCS fo r SecDef, Indochina Development of effective forces and prevention of communist takeover cannot be prevented without Vietnamese effort that is probably not fort hcoming. 20 Jan 55 Memo, Gen. J. Lawton Collins for SecState, Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council Vietnam might be "saved" with U.S. aid; would be "lost" without it. 21 Jan 55 Memo, JCS for SecDef, Reconsideration of U.S. Mi litary Program in Southeast Asia Outlines alternative U.S. courses of action in RVN: present program, advice with leverage, U.S. forces, or withdrawal. 24 Oct 5 5-31 Aug 60 Lt Gen Samuel T. Williams, Chief of MAAG to Vietnam. 9 Dec 55 Memo f or SecDef, Raising U.S. Military Personnel Ceiling in MAAG Vietnam MAAG needed t wice the current 342 personnel to train RVNAF. 16 Dec 55 Memo, Director CIA from SecState TERM also to serve as cover for intelligence gathering.

1959 Report, The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assis tance Program Emphasized need for promoting internal security, coined term "mirr or imaging." 7 Jun 59 Msg, State-Defense-ICA-CAS to Saigon 28 Forbids advisors t o participate in combat. 27 Feb 60 Msg, Saigon to State 2525 Abolished TERM but added equal number of spaces to MAAG, Vietnam, increasing it from 342 to 685. 10 Jun 60 U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Study on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam Prepared for Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, descr ibed Viet Cong strategy but deprecated ARVN participation in pacification. 1 Sep 60-5 Mar 62 Lt Gen Lionel C. McGarr, Chief of MAAG to Vietnam. 4 Jan 61 Counter Insurgency Plan for South Vietnam (CIP), enclosure to msg, Saigon to State 276 Blueprint for RVNAF reorganization, containing Gen McGarr's recommendations for integrating ARVN and CG/SDC in a common chain of command to promote internal sec urity. 17 Jan 61 Memo, General Lansdale for SecDef, Vietnam Proposed extra-burea ucratic advisory effort carried out by specially selected and qualified personne l. 15 Mar 61-1 Aug 63 Frederick E. Nolting, Ambassador to South Vietnam 28 Mar 6 1 NIE 50-61, Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia Report that VC controlled most o f countryside. 12 Apr 61 Memo, Walt W. Rostow to the President Suggested appoint ment of Presidential Agent to oversee Vietnam programs in Washington. 19 Apr 61 Memo, Gen. Lansdale to SecDef, Vietnam

Proposed creation of interdepartmental task force on Vietnam. 20 Apr 61 Memo, Se cDef for DepSecDef McNamara asked Gilpatric for program to "prevent communist do mination" of Vietnam, in response to Lansdale proposal. 27 Apr 61 Memo, DepSecDe f for President, Program of Action for Vietnam Recommended expanded U.S. effort in Vietnam, MAAG increase of 100, MAAG takeover of CG/SDC, U.S. advisors in fiel d operations creation of Presidential Task Force. Foreshadowed later decision. 1 May 61 Memo, R. L. Gilpatric for Presidential Task Force Recommended augmenting MAAG by 2 training commands (1600 each) and deploy 400 Special Forces (increasi ng MAAG from 685 to 2285). Marked shift to conventional approach. 3 May 61 Memo, State Department to members of Task Force on Vietnam Recommended revision of Gi lpatric task force, proposed interdepartmental task force under State leadership . 11 May 61 NSAM 52 Recorded President's decision to increase U.S. forces slight ly and re-emphasized U.S. commitment. 15 May 61 Msg. Saigon to State 1743 Record ed Diem's refusal of U.S. combat troops on bilateral treaty. 18 May 61 Memo BG L ansdale for DepSecDef, Vietnam Recorded Diem's acceptance of U.S. forces for tra ining but not for fighting. 23 May 61 Memo, Vice President Johnson for President Kennedy Report from Johnson's trip to Vietnam that "deeds must replace words." 27 May 61 Letter from President to each American Ambassador abroad. (See Memo, P resident for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 29 May 1961, "Responsi bilities of Chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions," Federal Register, Vol. 26 N r 22, 17 Nov 1961, p. 10749 (F.R. Doc. 61-11012).

Set forth coordinating authority for ambassadors. 9 Jun 61 Letter, President Die m to President Kennedy Proposed 100,000 increase in RVNAF and corresponding expa nsion of MAAG. 15 Sep 61 MAAG, Vietnam, Geographically Phased National Level Pla n for Counterinsurgency Suggested operational sequence of priority areas for coo rdinated counterinsurgency effort under single chain of command. 1 Oct 61 Msg, S aigon to State 421 Diem asked for bilateral defense treaty with U.S. Oct 61 JCSM 717-61 JCS proposal to send 20,000 U.S. combat troops to central highlands. 5 O ct 61 DF, Distribution Division, DCSPER, DA to Multiple Addressees, Improvement of Personnel Continuity and Effectiveness in Short Tour Overseas Areas. OSD deci sion to increase tour of duty to 30 months with dependents, 18 without, instead of 24 and 12. Never put into effect. 10 Oct 61 SNIE 10-3-61, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain SEA TO Undertakings in South Vietnam Examined proposal for U.S. troop intervention. 11 Oct 61 Study, Concept of Intervention in South Vietn am, n.d., discussed at NSC meeting, 11 Oct 61 Proposed sending U.S. combat troop s. 11 Oct 61 Memo for Record Roswell Gilpatric Recorded decision to send Taylor to Vietnam and outlined alternatives to be considered. 25 Oct 61 Msg, Saigon to State Diem's assurance that he favored deployment of U.S. troops. 25 Oct 61 Msg, Saigon 537, General Taylor to White House, State, Defense, JCS; Msg, Baguio 005 , 1 Nov 61, Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor

Proposed sending 6-8000 troops under guise of "flood relief." 1 Nov 61 State Dep t, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RFE-3, 1 Nov 61, Communist Threat Mounts in South Vietnam Reported increased VC activity in first half 1961: 500 assassi nations, 1000 kidnappings, 1500 RVNAF KIA. 3 Nov 61 Report on General Taylor's M ission to South Vietnam. Discussed VC strategy and threat and the weaknesses of the Diem regime. Proposed shift in U.S. effort "from advice to limited partnersh ip." 14 Nov 61 Msg, State to Saigon 619 Recorded U.S. expectation of sharing in GVN decision-making. 22 Nov 61 NSAM 111, First Phase of Vietnam Program Outlines U.S. actions and expected improvements in GVN. 22 Nov 61-25 Nov 61 Msg, Saigon to State 687; Msg, Saigon to State 708 Ambassador Nolting reported that Diem ref used to bow to U.S. pressure. Dec 61 Msg, State to Saigon 693 Dropped insistence on explicit U.S. influence on GVN decisions, but assumed such influence as by-p roduct of close partnership. 16 Jan 62 Hq, CINCPAC, Record of Second Secretary o f Defense Conference Recorded decisions of Honolulu Conference: establish battal ion advisory teams, province advisors CG/SDC training. 13 Feb 62-1 Aug 64 Gen. P aul D. Harkins, COMUSMACV 23 Jul 62 Record of 6th Secretary of Defense Conferenc e McNamara plan for phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, based on optimistic 1962 e xpectations. 1 Aug 63-1 Jul 64 Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam. 2 Oct 63 White House Statement

Announcement by President Kennedy of U.S. hopes for planned phased withdrawal of troops. 1 Nov 63 Diem overthrown by military coup d'etat. 1 Nov 63-16 Aug 64 Mi litary Revolutionary Council Duong Van Minh, Chief of State and Chairman, Milita ry Revolutionary Council. 26 Nov 63 NSAM 273 Reaffirmed and continued Kennedy ad ministration policies in Vietnam; placed emphasis on Mekong Delta; maintained mi litary assistance at least as great as to Diem; reiterated plans for troop withd rawal; proposed no new programs nor increased U.S. assistance; authorized operat ions up to 50 km. within Laos. 7 Mar 64 Briefing Paper, Establishment of Critica l District Advisory Teams (C), Briefing Book for McNaughton, Saigon [May 1964] M ACV extended U.S. advisory effort to district level in 13 key districts around S aigon. 17 Mar 64 NSAM 288, Implementation of South Vietnam Programs The situatio n in Vietnam had deteriorated and was grave; VC controlled much of country; Nort h Vietnamese support of V.C. had increased; RVNAF should be increased by 50,000; contingency plans for operations in Laos and Cambodia and overt retaliation aga inst DRV should be developed; however, no major increase of U.S. advisory effort was called for. 17 Apr 64 Memo, DJA for SecDef, Status of the Vietnamese Hamlet Survey Aerial photo reconnaissance revealed far fewer fortified hamlets than pr ovince officials claimed. 22 Apr 64 Memo, DepSecDef for CJCS Secretary insisted that he personally approve every manpower space for MACV. May 64 Briefing Book, Miscellaneous Messages, Status Reports, and Recommendations for Secretary McNama ra, n.d. Reported great instability in province governments, decline in GVN cont rolled population, increase in VC control; important provinces were in "critical condition." 12 May 64 Draft Memo for the Record, Lt. Col. S. B. Berry, Jr., Mu. Asst. to SecDef, n.d., U.S. Embassy Briefing, Saigon.

USOM 25% understrength, half this shortage in rural affairs staff. 12-13 64 May McNamara trip to Saigon Situation appeared critical. 22 May 64 Msg, JCS to COMUS MACV 6448, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps. COMUSMACV asked to stu dy encadrement of CG/SDC with U.S. teams similar to White Star teams in Laos. JC S was examining alternative advisor expansions (1,000, 2,000, 3,000). 23 May 64 Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 230418Z, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps MACV opposed to "flooding" RVN with U.S. personnel; preferred build-up on selective b asis, challenged "encadrement." 25 May 64 Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6473, Vietnamese C ivil Guard and Self Defense Corps JCS plan for 6 Mobile Training Teams in each p rovince and training center, 70 advisors to each critical province, increase of 1000 personnel. 27 May 64 Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 4259, 270045Z Gen. Harkins d isputed the value of U.S. conducted training for CG/SDC and of Mobile Training T eams; proposed advisors be used at district level for operations; accepted 1000 man increase. 27 May 64 Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 270805Z, Vietnamese CG and SDC CINC PAC agreed with COMUSMACV and outlined specific advisory build-up recommended: 9 56 personnel by end CY 65. 27 May 64 Msg, White House to Saigon (Personal for Ge n. Paul Harkins) Gen. Harkins requested to return to U.S. 28 May 64 Msg, Saigon to State 2338 USOM desire for gradual, not rapid, build-up; need for effective l ocal administration and security.

30 May 64 JCSM-464-64, Pilot Program for Provision of Advisory Assistance to Par amilitary Forces in Seven Provinces One of two JCS proposals submitted to McNama ra outlining pilot program for advisory build-up: teams in 49 districts over 6 m onth period, 300 advisors. 30 May 64 JCSM-465-64, U.S. Advisory Assistance to th e Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps. Second proposal-Broader advisor y increase program: 1000 personnel for all 239 districts over 1-1 years. 30 May 64 JCSM-466-64, Provision of U.S. Advisors to Company Level Within Vietnamese Regu lar Ground Forces JCS opposed extending U.S. advisors to company level, because of increased casualties, language problems, ARVN opposition. 1 Jun 64 Honolulu C onference 25 Jun 64 Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MAC 7325380, Extension of U.S. Adviso ry Assistance Elaborated decision of Honolulu conference to expand advisory effo rt to district level, and to increase battalion-level advisory groups to make co mpany level advisory teams available. 1 Jul 64-31 Jul 65 Maxwell Taylor, Ambassa dor to South Vietnam. 17 July 64 Msg, COMUSMA CV to CINCPAC, MA CJ-316180, Suppo rt Requirements for Extension of U.S. Advisory Program. COMUSMACV reached 4200 p ersonnel in addition to 926 battalion and district advisors-"the straw that brok e the camel's back" of the overburdened support base. 28 Jul 64 Msg, COMUSMACV t o JCS, MACJ1 7044, Personnel Augmentation. COMUSMACV requested 4200 personnel by 1 Dec 64 and remainder of 4772 total increase by 1 Feb 65. Jul 64 Hop Tac Idea for Hop Tac, special combined US/GVN effort to secure critical area round Saigon , proposed by Amb. Lodge at Honolulu Conference. 1 Aug 64-30 Jun 68 Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of MACV.

2 Aug 64 Tonkin Gulf Incident U.S.S. Maddox allegedly attacked by North Vietname se torpedo boats. 4 Aug 64 JCSM-665-64, Additional Support in RVN on Accelerated Basis McNamara wanted additional men provided more quickly than Westmoreland's plan. 5 Aug 64 Tonkin Gulf Resolution Congress passed joint resolution supportin g "all necessary action" to protect U.S. forces and assist Vietnam. 7 Aug 64 Mem o, SecDef for GIGS, Additional Support for Republic of Vietnam McNamara directed that accelerated deployment be completed by end of September. 11 Aug 64 Msg, CO MUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ3 7738, Additional Support for RVN Westmoreland replied that he could not absorb build-up in time requested by McNamara. 15 Aug 64 Msg, JCS to GSA, CNO, CSAF et a!, JCS 7953, Additional Support in RVN McNamara cancel led accelerated deployment, services instructed to deploy personnel in accordanc e with Westmoreland's initial recommendations. 16 Aug 64-26 Oct 64 Khanh coup. N guyen Khanh, President, Head of State and Chief, Revolutionary Military Council (30 Jan 64 to 26 Oct 64, 27 Jan 65 to 21 Feb 65). 12 Sep 64 Hop Tac Hop Tac laun ched with a sweep through Gia Dinh Province. Mission aborted following day by co up. 4 Nov 64- 11 Jun 65 Phan Kiac Suu, Chief of State Dec 64 Crisis between Amb. Taylor and Gen. Khanh resulted from Taylor's attempt to use U.S. decision to be gin bombing DRV as lever to get GVN reform. Taylor abandoned further attempts at leverage. Dec 64 "Troika sign-off" for piasters abolished

USOM Director Killen decided to abandon joint sign-off for release of piaster fu nds for pacification-important leverage tool. 23 Jan 65 McNamara approved RVNAF force increase proposal for MAP support. Now strength authorizations: 275,058 Re gular Forces, 137,187 RF and 185,000 PF. (Alternative 1). 7 Feb 65 FLAMING DART reprisal attacks against DRV launched. 22 Feb 65 Gen. Westmoreland recommended s ending two Marine Battalion Landing Teams to DaNang for base security. 26 Feb 65 ROLLING THUNDER, sustained bombing of DRV, initiated. 26 Feb 65 Decision to sen d Marines to DaNang made in Washington. 6 Mar 65 Marines went ashore at DaNang. 16 Mar 65 ICS message 0936 Gen. H. K. Johnson returned from trip to Vietnam with recommendation for deployment of U.S. combat forces and creation of joint comma nd. 20 Mar 65 Westmoreland requested authorization to implement Alternative 2 RV NAF strength increase (greater than alternative 1 by 15,000). 21 Mar 65 COMUSMAC V message 1566 Westmoreland opposed any formal merging of commands, preferred in formal cooperation. 26 Mar 65 MACV "Commander's Estimate of the Situation"

As a strategy alternative, Westmoreland rejected proposal for accelerated RVNAF buildup as insufficient to prevent VC victory. 1-2 Apr 65 Washington strategy co nference with Brig Gen De Puy, Amb. Taylor. 6 Apr 65 NSAM 328 President approved dispatch of two more battalions and an air wing and authorized their employment for active combat missions. 12 Apr 65 MACV Command History 1965 McNamara approv ed JCS recommendation for RVNAF expansion of 17,247 160 additional U.S. advisors approved. 15 Apr 65 Defense Department message 009164, Joint State/Defense Mess age Defense Department sought to have U.S. Army civil affairs officers introduce d in provinces to improve civil administration. Amb. Taylor opposition killed pr oposal. 15 Apr 65 Department of State message 2332 McGeorge Bundy informed Amb. Taylor that President wanted to try "encadrement of U.S. troops with Vietnamese. " 15 Apr 65 DOD message 151233Z DOD requested COMUSMACV's opinion about feasibil ity of encadrement of U.S. officers in ARVN divisions to improve effectiveness. 18 Apr 65 Honolulu Conference, MACV Command History Based on study by Gen. Throc kmorton, encadrement proposals were rejected because of language problem, expand ed support requirement, and adverse effects on South Vietnamese morale. Apr 65 M ACV Command History 1965 Westmoreland suggested joint MACV-JGS staff. Gen. Thieu and Gen. Minh were opposed. 3 May 65 Hop Tac pacification Corps commanders for I, II, IV Corps presented Hop Tac plans for their zones, each to extend "oil blo t" pacification from its headquarters city. (By end of 1965 became scheme for Na tional Priority Areas.)

11 May 65 Viet Cong attached and overran Song Be, capital of Phuoc Long Province , and a U.S. advisory compound in the city. 14 May 65 JCS message 142228Z McNama ra authorized creation of formal combined command in Vietnam and coordinating MA C V-JGS staff. 21 May 65 COMUSMACV message Combined Command; JCS message 240603Z Westmoreland recommended against proposed combined command because of Thieu's a nd Ky's opposition. 26 May 65 CJNCPAC msg to JCS 3027, 260332Z CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's opposition to combined command because of fears of Vietnamese hosti lity. late May 65 VC force ambushed and decimated ARVN 51st Regiment and 2 batta lions near Ba Gia, west of Quang Ngai City. Jun 65 Origin of CAP Several Marines assigned to work with local PF near Phu Bai, I Corps. 7 Jun 65 MACV message to CJNCPAC and JCS 19118 Moratorium on RVNAF build-up required because trainees nee ded as fillers in existing units to replace heavy casualties. Westmoreland reque sted 44 additional U.S. battalions; reported severe ARVN deterioration. 19 Jun 6 5-present Nguyen Van Thieu, Chief of State and Chairman, National present Leader ship Council, 20 Jun 65 to 9 Nov 67, elected President 31 Oct 67. June 65 Viet C ong attacked Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai with more than two regiments. 25 J un 65

VC Central Highlands offensive began, district headquarters at Tou Morong, Kontu m Province, was overrun. 26 Jun 65 MACV Military Report, 19-26 June MACV noted 5 ARVN regiments and 9 battalions combat ineffective. Jul 65 18 US/FW combat mane uver battalions were in Vietnam. Jul 65 MACV Command History, 1965 11 of 15 ARVN training battalions had to be disorganized to provide fillers for line units du e to heavy casualties. 7 Jul 65 Six district capitals had been abandoned or over run. 20 Jul 65 SecDef Memorandum for the President McNamara urged U.S. to lay do wn terms for continuing assistance before introduction of more forces; suggested exercise leverage through control of rice policy. 25 Jul 65 Saigon message 266 Amb. Taylor did not want to appear to impose conditions for increased aid. 28 Ju l 65 President announced expanded U.S. effort and increased troop commitment to Vietnam. 7 Aug 65 MACV Command History 1965 CG III MAF designated as Senior Advi sor to ARVN I CTZ Commander. Sep 65 Lodge Ambassador Lodge returned to Vietnam f or second term as ambassador. Term of office: 31 Jul 65-Apr 67. Sep 65 COMUSMACV evaluated 3-month experiment with "single manager" teams in 3 provinces, found it partially successful but scrapped the idea.

1 Oct 65 MACV Command History, 1965 MACV created separate contingency fund for e ach subsector advisor for urgent projects, in attempt to overcome delays in Viet namese pacification system. 16 Oct 65 State Dept msg 1039 18 Oct 65 Saigon msg 1 324 USOM sought to restore troika sign-off but State Dept. opposed this idea. Th e attempt was abandoned. 21 Oct 65 Commander of HQ Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV ) designated as II CTZ Senior Advisor. (At insistence of ARVN Corps commanders, who felt they would suffer loss of prestige if advised by less than Senior U.S. officer in corps.) 3 Nov 65 SecDef Draft Memorandum for the President McNamara r ecorded impatience with GVN, recommended giving larger role to advisors at provi nce and district level. 5 Nov 65 MACV Command History Westmoreland recommended i ncreased RVNAF force levels for FY 66 and FY 67, to limit of available manpower. Nov 65 CAP Program Agreement between I Corps Commander and CG III MAF permittin g integration of Marine squads into PF platoons in DaNang area to form Combined Action Platoon (CAP): Marine Rifle Squad (14) and PF Platoon (32-38). 28 Nov 65 McNamara trip to Saigon, approves RVNAF force increase recommendation. 15 Dec 65 Lodge memorandum for Gen. Lansdale; MACV Command History Lodge specified that G VN pacification effort was primarily civilian, consequently on U.S. side the two civilian agencies, USAID and CAS, should be generating support agencies. 8-11 J an 66 Warrenton Conference Report

Members of Saigon Mission, Vietnam Coordinating Committee and other senior offic ials met at Warrenton, Virginia, to review pacification problem. It foreshadowed a redirection of advisory effort toward pacification. Jan 66 MACV Analysis of R VNAF for CY 66 At Mission Council meeting, Amb. Lodge expressed concern that the number of U.S. advisors not smother the Vietnamese at all levels. 4 Feb 66 Stat e to Saigon 2252 U.S. requested Honolulu meeting with Thieu, Ky to express conce rn about pacification, economic problems, GVN lack of popular support. 6-8 Feb 6 6 Honolulu Conference LBJ concern about the "other war," Thieu and Ky made pledg es of increased pacification, promised elections. Amb. William Porter was assign ed responsibility for civil support of RD. 28 Feb 66 Mission Council Minutes, Fe b. 28, 1966 Porter described his understanding of his duties to Mission Council: coordinating effort for all civil aspects of revolutionary development, through the Mission Liaison Group. Feb 66 MACV subsector pacification contingency fund abandoned after 4-month trial period due to opposition of GVN RD Minister Thang; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence on U.S. Mar 66 PROVN Study Summary Sta tement, Mar 66 Program for Pacification and Long Term Development of South Vietn am (PROVN) completed for internal army use. Revealed lack of coordination among U.S. agencies in pacification. 23 Apr 66 Saigon to State 4160, Apr 23, 1966; 420 0, Apr 26; 4435, May 7; 5546, June 15 Lodge reviewed prospects for introduction of U.S. leverage in Buddhist "Struggle Movement"; desired to bring dissidents un der GVN control, but saw no way to achieve decisive results. Recommended to Wash ington that a sign-off system be reinstated to reduce corruption and increase U. S. influence at lower levels. Jul 66

"Roles and Missions" Study Group began work for Amb. Porter. Completed in August . Recommendation for support for a reemphasis on pacification. Jul 66 Stepped-up pacification effort: Operation Lam Son, combined RD "Search and Seal" operation s with U.S. 1st Infantry Division and ARVN 5th Division in Binh Duong. U.S. 25th Division "adopted" districts in Han Nghia Province. Sep 66 McNamara proposed th at responsibility for sole management of pacification be assigned to COMUSMACV, who would have a Deputy to command all pacification activities. AID, CIA, USIA o pposed such reorganization; Komer and JCS concurred. 29 Sep 66 Komer, "Memorandu m for Secretary McNamara" Komer stressed that unified management of pacification was needed. 23-25 Oct 66 Manila Conference At Manila Conference Thieu and Ky fo rmally accepted commitment of ARVN to support RD, and "National Reconciliation" program to attract VC back to government was announced. Oct 66 McNamara trip to Saigon. Ky agreed to shift in combat missions for U.S. and RVNAF forces: U.S. to conduct large-scale offensive operations, RVNAF to provide security to RD. 7 No v 66 MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan 1967 (AB 142) Spelled out new division of l abor between U.S. and RVNAF. JGS agreed to keep 53 ARVN battalions (50% of ARVN combat units) assigned to support RD. 7 Nov 66 Memorandum, Amb. Lodge for the Se cretary of State, SecDef and Komer; message, Saigon 11125, Nov. 17. Lodge define d terms of reference for what was established as the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). 8 Dec 66 MACV msg 52414 to CINCPAC

Westmoreland reported to CINCPAC on poor quality and performance of ARVN. First 10 months of 1966, the number of ARVN maneuver battalions with minimally accepta ble operational strength fluctuated from 31 to 78 of total of 121 organized unit s. 17 Dec 66 W. W. Rostow, Memorandum to Secretary of Defense and Acting Secreta ry of State, draft NSAM attached Pacification listed as third strategic objectiv e and five programs concerned with pacification were outlined, heralding reempha sis on pacification in 1967. 27 Dec 66 JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defen se, JCSM-792-66, line-in, lineout revised draft NSAM attached. JCS replied to Ro stow's draft after consulting CINCPAC; stiffening and making more specific U.S. commitment to war, introducing term "revolutionary development," eliminated refe rences to "national reconciliation" for ex-VC, and watered down commitment to co nstitutional-electoral efforts underway. 9 Jan 67 MACV msg 00949 In Dec 1966 a 1 2-officer team from each ARVN had undergone training on RD support so that each might instruct its division on the new duties. The division training programs be gan in Jan 67. 18 Jan 67 MACV msg 02149 to CINCPAC from MACCORDS MACV described new Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to CINCPAC. 20 Jan 67 ASD(ISA) John T. McNaug hton Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Draft NSAM on "Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam;" McNaughton's linein, line-out revised draft and the JCS revision attached. McNaughton draft for Vietnam strategic guidelines in corporated most JCS recommendations, emphasized security, anti-infrastructure an d intelligence in support of R/D; pushed "National Reconciliation." 24 Jan 67 MA CV msg 02916, Westmoreland sends Westmoreland stated that the effectiveness of R VNAF must be increased and that its image must be improved. 28 Jan 67 Deputy Sec Def Cyrus Vance letter to W. W. Rostow Vance sent McNaughton version to Rostow a s Defense Department reply to his memorandum. No NSAM was ever promulgated.

Feb 67 "Pacification Slowdown" Southeast Asia Analysis Report, Feb. 67, OASD(SA) SEA Programs Directorate OASD(SA) reported that pacification effort in 1966 had failed. 18 Mar 67 MACV msg 09101, Westmoreland sends Westmoreland cabled CINCPA C requesting an "optimum force" increase of 42/3 divisions (201,250 men) or as a "minimum essential force," 2 divisions (100,000 men). No major expansion of RVNAF called for: 6,307 more spaces for ARVN, 50,000 more RF/PF. 20-21 Mar 67 Guam Co nference President Johnson met with Thieu and Ky in Guam. They presented draft c onstitution and agreed to a proclamation on National Reconciliation. Johnson dec ided to transfer control of pacification to MACV and send Robert Komer to head n ew operation in Saigon. 25 Mar 67 Embassy Saigon msg 21226, Eyes Only for the Pr esident from Lodge Lodge stressed importance of RVNAF for MACV success, praised Abrams as man to oversee RVNAF improvement. Mar 67 Gen. Creighton Abrams became Westmoreland deputy and assumed responsibility for U.S. advisory effort to RVNAF . 1 Apr 67 New South Vietnamese Constitution promulgated. 24 Apr 67 R. W. Komer Memorandum for the President Komer asserted that decisive contest lay in pacific ation in the South, rejected Westmoreland's request for additional 200,000 troop s, proposed methods to improve RVNAF and pacification, suggested increased press ure on GVN for reforms. 1 May 67 New Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, arrived in Sa igon. 7 May 67 MACV msg 15064

Reported Jan. decision to make a unit by unit effectiveness evaluation and to cu t off support for superfluous or below standard units. Resulted in several warni ngs but no suspension of support. Also reported RVNAF desertions were won for Ja n-Feb 1967 from Jan-Feb 1966. 9 May 67 NSAM 362 Komer's appointment as single ma nager for pacification announced internally. 12 May 67 Embassy Saigon Airgram 62 2, Subject: Revolutionary Development Gloomy account of progress of RD in first three months of 1967. 13 May 67 Ambassador Bunker statements to the press in Sai gon, May 13, 1967 Announcement of transfer of OCO to MACV, Bunker stressed combi ned civil-military nature of pacification. 15 May 67 Embassy Saigon msg. 25839 F irst meeting of Komer with Ky. Ky declined to place GVN RD efforts under JGS. 28 May 67 State Department msg DTG 092304Z; MACV Dir 10-12, 28 May 1967 MACV issue d directive with instructions on new RD organizational arrangements. May 67 JCSM -530-57, Subject: Increase in FY 1968 RVNAF Force Level, 28 Sep 67 (a review of the year's actions) McNamara imposed a temporary ceiling on RVNAF to prevent fur ther inflation in Vietnam, and to arrest some of the balance of payments flow of U.S. 14 Jun 67 Amb. R. W. Komer, Memorandum for General W. C. Westmoreland, Sub ject: Organization for Attack on V.C. Infrastructure Komer recommended consolida tion, under his direction, of U.S. anti-infrastructure intelligence effort. Desi red unified GVN/US, civil/military "management structure targeted on infrastruct ure." ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) structure was developed. 14 Jun 67 Embassy Saigon msg 28095, For the President from Bunker Bunker descri bed MACV actions underway to improve RVNAF: improving leadership, better pay, im proving command structure and equipment of RF/PF training, integrated US/RVNAF o perations, reviews.

17 Jun 67 MA CCORDS, Project Takeoff, prepared by the A CofS, CORDS, Headquarter s MACV Project TAKEOFF contained analysis of reasons for part failure, appraisal of current situation, and recommendations for future emphasis in RD; suggested increased use of U.S. leverage and control. 4 Jul 67 ASD (SA) Alain Enthoven Mem o for the SecDef, Subj: Improvement in RVNAF Force Effectiveness Enthoven claime d that primary reason for RVNAF ineffectiveness was the quantity and quality of leadership and recommended that the Secretary query MACV on leadership problems. 13 July 67 ASD (SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Fallout for SecDef Trip to South Vietnam (TS-SENS-EYES ONLY for Dr. Heyman); and OASD(SA) G eneral Purpose Forces, W. K. Brehm, Memo for the Record, Sub/: SEA Deployments, Jul 14, 1967 In Saigon, McNamara gave planning authorization for U.S. augmentati on up to 525,000 spaces, and civilianization of 10,000 additional spaces to fulf ill Westmoreland's lower force alternative. 14 Aug 67 ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Mem o for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chi efs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Subj: Southeast Asia Depl oyment Program #5 New U.S. force level of 525,000 promulgated as Deployment Prog ram #5. 30 Aug 67 DASD(SA) Memo for the SecDef Amb. Komer complained that the CO RDS advisory element's actual strength was seriously below authorization due to bureaucratic delays. 31 Aug 67 Dept of State Msg 30023 Study of leverage by Hans Heymann and Lt Col Volney Warner recommended increased use. 7 Sep 66 COMUSMACV Memo for Ambassador Lodge Westmoreland disagreed with Roles and Missions Study G roup recommendation to remove division from chain of command below CTZ level and strengthening role of Province Chief. 15 Sep 67 JCSM 505-67, Subj: U.S. Forces Deployment Vietnam (Refined Troop List)

JCS submitted final detailed troop list for Program #5. Contained 2,577 addition al advisors and 666 Special Forces to perform advisor-like functions. 16 Sep 67 Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress, MACV-J341 First published Review and Analysis for RVNAF appeared: long catalogue of RVNAF deficiencies. 19 Sep 67 Embassy Saigon msg 7113 Komer replied to recommendation for increased use of U. S. leverage that it must be done discreetly. Proposed comprehensive system of co untry-wide leverage was never adopted. 28 Sep 67 JCSM-530-67, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RVNAF Force Level JCS forwarded with endorsement the MACV-CINCPAC recom mendation on FY 68 RVNAF force increases: total increase of 63,586; 47,839 for R F/PF and 15,747 for regular forces. MACV requested further increase of 78,204 fo r FY 1969. 7 Oct 67 SecDef Memo for CJCS, Subject: Increase in FY 68 RVNAF Force Level, and attached OASD(SA) memo for the SecDef, 5 Oct 67 McNamara approved th e requested FY 68 augmentations forRVNAF, against the wishes of Enthoven, who wo uld have authorized only half as many. 26 Oct 67 "Information on MATs (Mobile Ad visory Teams) and MALTs (Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams) ," 8 May 1968, working paper prepared by the ACofS MA, MACV MACV conference on RF/PF, convened to stud y problems of RF/PF expansion and to plan for expansion of advisory effort, reco mmended complete reorientation of advisory concept for RF/ PF, establishment of Mobile Advisory Teams to be used on a rotating basis. 15 Dec 67 Westmoreland app roved new RF/PF advisory system: MATs and MALTs, to be phased in during 1968. 31 Jan 68 Tet Offensive VC/NVA initiate massive attacks on population centers thro ughout Vietnam during Lunar New Year (Tet) holiday period. I. ADVISORY STABILITY, 1954-1960

A. THE U.S. GAMBLE WITH LIMITED RESOURCES 1. Origins of the U.S. Involvement in RVN The U.S. decision to attempt, generally within the strictures imposed by the Geneva Accords, to shore up the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and to preven t the new nation's fall into communist hands appears in retrospect to have been, in Wellington's phrase, "a close run thing." The prevalent American attitude in 1954 was that the deployment of large U.S. forces to the mainland of Asia shoul d be permitted "never again." Spending on national security was to be pegged at tolerable levels which would not threaten the well-being of the domestic economy , yet communist expansion was to be deterred by the threat of massive retaliatio n combined with U.S. support for free nations capable of managing their own inte rnal order and insuring that any act of armed aggression would appear as just th at-the unambiguous precondition for nuclear retaliation. 2. Initial Military Rel uctance The policy solution to this problem in national security strategy has be en accurately and exhaustively described in recent literature. It need not be re peated here. The important thing to note is that the attempt to achieve stabilit y in RVN was recognized to be a marginal gamble to retain a small but potentiall y important piece in the larger jig saw puzzle which was U.S. national security policy. As such, it seemed worth the risk of a moderate outlay of assistance and advice. General J. Lawton Collins stated the case succinctly in his assessment for the National Security Council: ....There is at least an even chance that Vie tnam can be saved from Communism if the present programs of its government are f ully implemented. . . . I cannot guarantee that Vietnam will remain free, even w ith our aid. But I know that without our aid Vietnam will surely be lost to Comm unism. The gamble consisted in making available to the GVN that material support and advice which would enable it to assure its own viability. Much of the milit ary equipment was already in RVN, the residue of earlier efforts to support the French war against the Viet Minh. The framework for military advice was present, too, in the form of MAAG Indochina which had assisted (and attempted to influen ce-generally unsuccessfully) the French struggle. The military establishment was not eager, however, to undertake this effort. The JCS feared that the advisory limit imposed by the Geneva Accords (342 military personnel) was too restrictive to permit a successful training program even if all administrative tasks were p erformed by civilians and all military personnel freed for advisory duties in tr aining the army of the new nation. Even this would create a situation, the JCS a rgued, in which the U.S. would have only very limited influence, yet assume the responsibility for failure. The same resource allocations would bring a greater return, in the JCS view, if devoted to the support of military forces in other n ations. The Joint Chiefs were agreed

that the creation of a Vietnamese Army might not even be adequate to the task of establishing a stable GVN, let alone to protecting that nation from external ag gression: The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that the chaotic internal p olitical situation within Vietnam will hamper the development of loyal and effec tive security forces in the support of the Diem Government and that it is probab le that the development of such forces will not result in political and military stability within South Vietnam. Unless the Vietnamese themselves show an inclin ation to make the individual and collective sacrifices required to resist commun ism no amount of external pressure and assistance can long delay a complete Comm unist victory in South Vietnam. Their conclusion, "from a military point of view ," was that the risk was not worth the gamble: [T]he Joint Chiefs of Staff consi der that the United States should not participate in the training of Vietnamese forces in Indochina. However, if it is considered that political considerations are overriding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would agree to the assignment of a tra ining mission to MAAG, Saigon, with safeguards against French interference with the US training effort. 3. The Decision to Gamble with Limited Commitment Politi cal considerations were indeed overriding. Reasonable fears of failure, claims a bout the inadequacy of resources, and caveats on the necessity for Vietnamese in itiatives are inherently inconclusive arguments when one is speaking of a calcul ated gamble. Indeed, low value chips for high stakes made the gamble all the mor e appealing. Secretary of State Dulles' position immediately prevailed: only rel atively small military forces were needed; their principal purpose should be to promote internal stability rather than to guard against external aggression; nat ions acting in concert (under the umbrella of U.S. nuclear superiority) would gu ard against external aggression. On 22 October 1954 Ambassador Heath and General O'Daniel in Saigon were instructed to "collaborate in setting in motion a crash program designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces." Four days later the JCS were directed to prepar e a "long range program for the reorganization and training of the minimum numbe r of Free Vietnamese forces necessary for internal security." The earlier object ions of the JCS were neither refuted nor ignored; they were accepted tacitly as part and parcel of the policy gamble. 4. From Internal to Conventional Defense T he language of this decision to train the Vietnamese National Army (VNA), as it was then called, would indicate that internal (rather than external) security wo uld be the principal purpose of that force. That is not the way it developed, fo r three reasons. First, basic U.S. national strategy (embodied in NSC 162 and NS C 5602 during the period under examination) and Southeast Asia policy (NSC 5429 and NSC 5612) were both ambiguous on a key point: to what degree were indigenous military forces to be expected

to defend against a conventional, "limited war" attack by an aggressor? The cont inuous, unbroken tendency throughout the 1950s was to desire ever more capabilit y for conventional defense. Second, U.S. military forces were unprepared by thei r own experience to assist in the structuring of forces designed for other than conventional warfare. The U.S. advisory experiences that were current in terms o f institutionalized memory were those of aid to Greece and Korea where the job h ad been one of training for technical and tactical competence along conventional lines. It was eminently natural for the U.S. advisory effort to follow in this identifiable path. Indeed, to have expected the advisory effort to have stressed "counter insurgency" early in this period would have been completely unrealisti c: the term had not been invented and its concepts had not been either developed or articulated. This natural tendency to develop conventional forces was not on ly in step with the dominant trend in U.S. military strategy, it was also reinfo rced by a third factor, the generalized assumption that the ability to promote i nternal security was automatically provided for in the creation of forces capabl e to promote external security. The confluence of all three factors led, in fact , to an attempt to create Vietnamese forces along lines which were later called "mirror images" of conventional U.S. force structures. MAAG Vietnam proposed and led in the creation of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) in formations comprising divi sions, regiments, battalions, and companies organized as closely parallel to U.S . organization as local differences in equipment and support would permit. This was not, for the reasons already indicated, an unreasonable or indefensible deve lopment--at least not until about 1959 or 1960--and by that time efforts were un derway to transform the focus of ARVN to internal security. These later efforts were faced with the reality of a sizeable army-conventionally organized, trained , and equippedwhich had been created under different circumstances and for diffe rent purposes. One is forced to wonder, if Vietnamese institutions are as diffic ult to remould as their American counterparts, whether the later advisory effort was not faced from its inception with an almost insurmountable task. 5. The Ear ly MAAG and the Equipment Recovery Mission The number of U.S. advisors to the fl edgling Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were, as already indicated, lim ited by the Geneva Accords. Article 16 of the Accords limited military personnel in Vietnam to the number present at the time the Accords were signed. The magic number was 342. The U.S. MAAG Chief, General O'Daniel, complained that he neede d twice this number to train the new RVNAF and to oversee the redistribution of U.S. equipment already in RVN as a result of U.S. support for the French during the war just ended. The eventual outcome, when it was learned informally that th e Indian Government would instruct its representative on the ICC to interpose no objection, was the creation of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) with 350 military personnel. TERM served as the principal manager for the redist ribution of equipment, assisted in developing RVNAF's embryonic logistical suppo rt system, and provided a convenient cover for a larger intelligence effort.

This combined administrative-advisory force remained stable in size during the p eriod prior to 1961. American military advisors were located physically at only a very few locations in RVN. They were notable by their absence in field units. The U.S. effort was concentrated in training centers and in Saigon. In the forme r it was largely technical; in the latter it consisted primarily of attempts to persuade GVN to adopt measures recommended by the U.S. advisory group. It was es sentially an attempt to give advice from the top. This does not mean that the qu estion of leverage was never considered; it was. Early in our involvement, in Ja nuary 1955, the JCS laid out available U.S. courses of action in South Vietnam a nd urged that a decision be made at "the highest level" to indicate which of the se should be followed: a. To continue aid to South Vietnam as currently being de veloped with the cooperation of the French and Vietnamese. b. To institute a uni lateral program of direct guidance to the Vietnamese government through an "advi sor" system. Under this course of action, the amount of U.S. aid should be depen dent upon Vietnamese adherence to U.S. direction. c. In the event the courses of action in a and b above are not sufficient to insure retention of South Vietnam to the Free World, to deploy self sustaining U.S. forces to South Vietnam eithe r unilaterally, or as a part of a SEACDT [Southeast Asia Common Defense Treaty-a term used prior to SEATO] force. d. To withdraw all U.S. support from South Vi etnam and concentrate on saving the remainder of Southeast Asia. No such decisio n was made. Indeed, as explained in the summary and analysis, there is no reason to believe that the need for such a decision was even seriously considered at " the highest level." MAAG Vietnam was by 1960 still quite small in size, though i t loomed ever larger in importance. (It was the only U.S. MAAG commanded by a Li eutenant General; all of the other MAAG Chiefs were officers of lesser rank.) It was essentially city-bound, training center and Saigon-oriented, devoted to tec hnical-tactical training and high level persuasion aimed at influencing RVNAF or ganization. The personnel limitations imposed upon it resulted in highly central ized advice. But through its efforts and material support this MAAG assisted in the creation of a sizeable (140,000 man) conventional army and of small naval an d air forces of approximately 5,000 men each. The U.S. MAAG was also concerned w ith the establishment and training of paramilitary forces, but it was not as dir ectly concerned as it was with the creation of conventional forces in ARVN. The Civil Guard (CG) and Self Defense Corps (SDC) were at various times under the co ntrol of the Ministry of the Interior or directly under President Diem. In the f ield they were invariably under the direction of the Province Chiefs. The U.S. c ivilian advisors who had been called in to give assistance with police and inter nal security matters tended to favor making these paramilitary forces less milit ary per se and more police intelligence-minded. MAAG tended to favor making them more consciously military and territorially oriented in order to free ARVN for mobile, offensive operations rather than tying its forces down in static defense duties. By 1960, when Civil Guard

training was passed to MAAG control, neither course of action had been followed consistently but it was highly probable that MAAG's views would henceforth preva il. Thus, questions of local physical security would almost inescapably be decid ed with reference to the effect they would have on the functions of ARVN, itself created with an eye to external defense. This may be said to be an awkward stru cture from which to launch an effort aimed primarily at internal security. It wa s, however, the structure that existed. B. THE TRANSITION PERIOD: 1959-1 961 1. Early Steps Toward Emphasis on Internal Security By the time of the Draper Commi ttee (The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance P rogram) in 1958-1959, there was an almost imperceptible but growing U.S. awarene ss of the requirement to promote internal stability. The committee's papers, for instance, sought to popularize military civic action programs and to link them to politically acceptable precedents--such as the U.S. Army's role in the develo pment of the American West. The very term "mirror imaging" was coined in a Drape r Committee staff study. One of the committee's studies questioned even the easy assumption that internal security was a "lesser included capability" of forces structured to promote external security: It is seldom that a government consider s its military forces to have only a mission of maintaining internal security. T heir size, organization, equipment, habitual deployment, and so on, are nearly a lways related to real or supposed requirements of defense against external attac k. They are usually considered capable of performing internal security missions as part of this larger role. However, the requirements of the two missions are d ifferent, if overlapping; and tailoring a military force to the task of counteri ng external aggression--i.e., countering another regular military force--entails some sacrifice of capabilities to counter internal aggression. The latter requi res widespread deployment, rather than concentration. It requires small, mobile, lightly equipped units of the ranger or commando type. It requires different we apons, command systems, communications, logistics..... 2. The McGarr Emphasis on Counterinsurgency These developments were only harbingers of a dawning awarenes s, however, not indicative of a fundamental shift in focus which had already occ urred. The degree to which ARVN and paramilitary forces should be consciously st ructured to deal with internal security rather than to protect against external invasion was the subject of a developing debate rather than a settled issue. It fell to Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr to head the U.S. MAAG during the con 'using period of transition which accompanied this debate. He did not come to Vi etnam unaware of the issues; a long study prepared for him by his staff at the A rmy's Conmand and General Staff College (his post before coming to Saigon) laid out in some detail the Viet Cong's strategy as adapted from the Viet Minh's stru ggle with the French:

This form of warfare permitted the Viet Minh to retain the mobility so essential to jungle and mountain operations, facilitated the gathering of detailed, accur ate, and timely intelligence information, kept the level of violence at a low en ough level to preclude the active intervention of another major power, accomplis hed the slow attrition of the French while permitting the Viet Minh to build the regular forces necessary for the final battles, offset the serious logistics pr oblem by the very primitiveness of transportation methods, and surmounted the ma npower shortage by making political and economic operations inseparable from mil itary operations. One could conclude from this assessment that RVNAF should be r estructured to deal with this essentially internal challenge to South Vietnamese stability. In a statement which may reflect the difficulty of reversing institu tional thought patterns--at the U.S. Army's principal doctrine formulating insti tution, in this instance--it was claimed that pacification operations were undes irable because they detracted from training. The suggestion was that the CG and SDC takeover of pacification should be expedited: The [South Vietnamese] Army is still required to engage from time to time in major pacification (internal secu rity) operations, pending the development of a higher state of operational effec tiveness of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. Since units have conside rable personnel turnover and are filled out with draftees, who have had only bas ic and perhaps advanced individual training before arrival in units, the orderly pursuit of a progressive unit training schedule is essential to unit effectiven ess. Each commitment to an operational (pacification) mission, though of some tr aining value, in general interrupts the planned training of participating units and delays arrival at a satisfactory state of operational readiness. 3. The Coun terinsurgency Plan for South Viet-Nain General McGarr's approach was to give emp hasis in his advice to recommendations designed to integrate the activities of A RVN and the CG/SDC. He consistently (and persistently) recommended the establish ment of a single chain of military command to guide all three forces. He also pu shed for steps which would free ARVN from static security (pacification) mission s in favor of offensive operations against the Viet Cong. The vehicle for the fi rst of McGarr's desired reforms was the "Counterinsurgency Plan for Viet-Nam" (C IP), produced in late 1960. The CIP was a blueprint for RVNAF reorganization, no t an outline of the strategy to be pursued. Not until September 1961 did MAAG pr esent GVN with a set of operational proposals in the form of a "Geographically P hased National Level Operations Plan for Counterinsurgency." The CIP marks somet hing of a halfway house between concern with external defense and internal secur ity. Both military tasks were recognized, but internal security assumed primacy for the first time: Military force, in the form of increased communist insurgenc y, is clearly the immediate threat to the stability of Viet-Nam today. South Vie t-Nam is unique in that it is the only country in the world which is forced to d efend itself against a communist internal

subversion action, while at the same time being subject to the militarily suppor table threat of a conventional external attack from communist North Viet-Nam. Th e RVNAF force basis is inadequate to meet both these threats. The problem is two fold, although at present the counterinsurgency phase is the more dangerous and immediate. In this counterinsurgency fight RVNAF is on the defensive. Approximat ely 75% of ARVN is committed to pacification missions, about half of these being committed to static guard and security roles. . . . The guerrilla problem has [ as a result of fragmented lines of authority] become much more serious than the Civil Guard can manage, thereby requiring a disproportionately large RVNAF commi tment, which has further resulted in a serious weakening of the RVNAF capability for defense against internal or overt attack in force. This last point reflecte d General McCarr's apparently very real concern that ARVN was becoming incapable to meet internal (as well as external) threats posed by the VC in conventional troop formations. As the VC became stronger and formed larger regular units--as distinct from guerrilla bands--the differences between conventional and unconven tional warfare seemed to disappear. The problem, as MAAG viewed it, became one o f guarding against a spectrum of dangers by means of a short run emphasis on mee ting the internal challenge in both its conventional and unconventional (guerril la) form. In this view ARVN should become the conventional offensive and mobile defensive force, the CG should be the static force in support of pacification ef forts. The two should be under a common chain of command, it was argued in the C IP, as should the logistical organization for their support. Such a common chain of command did not exist in 1960-1961: The military chain of command has usuall y been violated at the expense of unity of effort and command. No adequate opera tions control or overall planning system presently exists. . . . The President h as exercised arbitrary control of operations, by-passing command channels of the JGS [Joint General Staff] and often Corps and Division staff. Resources have be en fragmented to provincial control. The above practices appear to have been des igned to divide responsibility in order to guard against the possibility of a mi litary coup through placing too much power in the hands of a single subordinate. Poor organization, then, was seen as the principal roadblock in the way of orga nizing the military and paramilitary forces of South Vietnam into an effective c ombination. Only through a single chain of command could ARVN be freed to take t he offensive, the CG be built up to cope with local guerrillas, and the GVN plac e itself in a position to start developing useful intelligence--a field which wa s judged to have been, thus far, a notable failure. 4. The Supporting Operationa l Plan The Geographically Phased National Plan laid out the priority areas for t his coordinated effort under a single chain of command. A three phase sequence o f actions (preparation, military action to clear and secure, and combined action to establish civilian political

control and consolidate intelligence and security programs) would take place, se quentially, in each of these priority areas. The process would be repeated in ex panding spheres as successive areas became pacified. Together these two American -generated and proposed plans constituted a comprehensive blueprint for GVN acti on to end the insurgency. Two things common to each should be noted for the purp oses of the present inquiry. The first is the simple fact that each was U.S.-gen erated and proposed. The proposals addressed President Diem's persistent fears o f a coup by asking him to ignore those fears. The second point is that neither h ad anything to say about U.S. advisors. Each was an attempt to give advice, but neither recommended that the U.S. advisory effort in RVN be expanded in scope, s ize, or content. 5. Stability in the Number of U.S. Advisors The number of milit ary advisors had remained fairly level throughout this transition period (roughl y, 1959 to mid-1961). TERM had finally been abolished but an approximately equal number of spaces was added to MAAG Vietnam, increasing it from 342 to 685. The ICC agreed that this increase was consistent with the limitations imposed by the Geneva Accords. MAAG advisors had been authorized down to regimental level but expressly forbidden to participate directly in combat operations or to go near t he South Vietnamese national boundary. The U.S. had begun to provide Special For ces teams to GVN in an effort to train Vietnamese ranger companies in anti-guerr illa tactics, but this was regarded as a temporary undertaking. As late as Novem ber 1961, the total U.S. military strength in South Vietnam was only about 900 p ersonnel. Discussions and arguments had been underway for some time, however, wi th a view toward increasing U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. The nature of thi s debate, which took place largely during 1961 and terminated in the decisions a t the end of that year to establish a "limited partnership" with GVN, is importa nt to an account of the U.S. advisory build-up. It was in the shadow of opposing contentions about how to make the U.S. contribution most effective in helping G VN to defeat the insurgents that the advisory build-up was to begin in earnest i n late 1961. These opposing views, in turn, were cast against the situational de velopments already outlined: U.S. military desires to make RVNAF more effective in counterinsurgency by improving the military chain of command, increasing the mobility and effectiveness of ARVN, and upgrading the CG/SDC for the performance of pacification tasks. II. THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-1967 A. THE KENNEDY PROG RAMS (1961-1963) 1. The Context of Decisions By the end of 1961, the U.S. had de cided to double its military advisory effort in South Vietnam by establishing ad visory teams at the province (sector) level and within ARVN's battalions. The de cision to take this step was one of a large number of decisions designed

to "buy time" in RVN so that GVN could mobilize its resources and swing over fro m the defensive to the offensive. All of the major participants appear to have a greed that the situation in RVN was bad and becoming worse, that additional U.S. actions were needed if South Vietnam was to be saved, and that the issue was of sufficient importance in terms of U.S. interest to justify doing whatever was n ecessary. The question was what should be done, not if anything could be done. D efeat was too catastrophic an outcome to bear examination. Moreover, decisions a bout Vietnam in 1961 were, until the very end of the year, made in the shadow of more pressing emergencies--the Berlin crisis and events in Laos. It is most imp ortant to recognize this relative lack of centrality if one is to understand the apparently incomplete process by which decisions on Vietnam were reached. Moreo ver, the dimensions of the Vietnamese problem were clear and agreed to by all. E lusive solutions had to be sought in the interstices, as it were, of the policym akers' limited time. It is difficult to image any responsible individual or grou p, for instance, taking exception to the litany of problems ticked off by Genera l Taylor in his report following his important October 1961 mission to South Vie tnam: Lack of intelligence ARVN's defensive posture Poor command and control Poo r GVN administrative procedures Lack of initiative GVN failure to communicate wi th and mobilize its people, particularly the intellectuals and the young people. But various individuals and groups would stress the importance of different sho rtcomings and propose quite different methods of "persuading" GVN to overcome th em. The prevalent military view, as already suggested in the summary explanation of the CIP and the Geographically Phased Plan, was that organizational reform a nd national planning were prerequisites to effective action. If these could be a chieved, the military foresaw a pacification process which would proceed from th e provision of physical security in the rural areas through the establishment (o r reestablishment) of civilian political administration to a state of political stability. The first nut to crack was that of military security. Political analy sts, including those of the Department of State, emphasized the need for the Die m government to liberalize itself, to attract dissident groups at least into a l oyal active opposition and away from indifference and disaffection. In this view the heart of the matter was essentially political, rather than military. In bot h views, it should be noted, advocates agreed that the GVN must be persuaded to take certain necessary steps. Just how such persuasion was to be achieved was a prime subject for discussion. Who was to persuade whom and in what organizationa l framework was another such subject. But although these subjects were bound to be discussed, neither was the central issue-by late 1961 the question of whether or not to send U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam had clearly earned that titl e.

The U.S. determination of what steps to take was driven as much by events as by arguments. By late 1961 the course of events dictated that physical security wou ld take primacy over governmental liberalization, not because the arguments for security were inherently more persuasive but because of the very real fear that there would be no GVN to save if the U.S. did not do something very quickly. Dur ing the first half of 1961, terrorists and guerrillas had assassinated over 500 local officials and civilians, kidnapped more than 1,000, and killed almost 1,50 0 RVNAF personnel. The VC had gained the upper hand in most of the countryside a nd were drawing an increasingly tight cinch around Saigon. Viet Cong regular for ces were now estimated to number 25,000 and were being organized into increasing ly large regular formations. The terrorist-guerrilla apparatus had grown to embr ace an estimated 17,000. The operative question was not whether the Diem governm ent as it was then moving could defeat the insurgents but whether it could save itself. The deteriorating situation was one reason why the military security arg ument quickly gained the ascendancy. Another reason was the military's recogniti on that, while security was an important precondition, political, economic, and social reforms were necessary to the realization of viability within South Vietn am. Thus, security was recognized as a means to a political end. The process out lined in MAAG's Geographically Phased Plan, described earlier, gave recognition to this fact. This process would shortly become known as the "pacification proce ss," widely accepted throughout important places in the U.S. Government (specifi cally to include what is usually referred to euphemistically as "the highest lev el"). 2. Proposal for Extra-Bureaucratic Advisors If the deteriorating situation and the potential breadth of the military's view of the pacification process bo th augured for at least the short run primacy of security considerations, that s till left the question of how best to enhance security and to lay the groundwork for the governmental programs which would, hopefully, begin to operate behind a geographically expanding security screen. These questions were addressed, but i n a rather one-sided way. An approach to U.S. advice-giving and the organization al context in which it should proceed was tabled as a radical proposal. First th e approach, then the organizational framework were struck down. The U.S. decided to take an opposite advisory approach in a very different organizational contex t as much because of disagreement with the debated proposals as because of reaso ned elaboration of the benefits to be realized from the course which was eventua lly followed. In the process, the difficult question of U.S. leverage got shunte d off to the side. GVN reform was simply stated as an expected quid pro quo for increased U.S. aid. What the U.S. should do if no reforms materialized was appar ently a subject too unpleasant to be considered. The radical proposals were firs t floated in January 1961 by a uniquely qualified professional military officer serving in Secretary McNamara's office: Brigadier General Edward Lansdale. Altho ugh an Air Force officer, Lansdale had worked closely in the Philippines with Ra mon Magsaysay in the latter's successful campaign against the Huk rebellion and served later as head of the U.S. intelligence mission in South Vietnam in

the mid-SO's. He knew President Diem well and was trusted by the GVN leader. He had gained some notoriety as the real-life hero of the pseudo-fictional best sel ler, "The Ugly American." His views on counterinsurgency commanded attention. La nsdale's proposals lend themselves to summarization, not to comprehensive descri ption. That is, he put forward a proposed attitude of mind which should govern U .S. actions, not a program in the usual sense. The thrust of his argument pertai ning to advisors was that the U.S. should select dedicated Americans with empath y for the Vietnamese and send them to advise GVN "with sensitive understanding a nd wisdom." The course of action he recommended was to get such men on the scene , give them total responsibility to match their total commitment, and free them from the encumbrances of the regular bureaucratic machinery (be it military or c ivilian) in order that they might operate effectively according to the situation : When there is an emergency, the wise thing to do is to pick the best people yo u have, people who are experienced in dealing with this precise type of emergenc y, and send them to the spot with orders to remedy the situation. When you get t he people in position and free them to work, you should then back them up in eve ry practical way you can. The real decisions will be made in little daily action s in Vietnam, not in Washington. That's why the best are needed on the spot. Our U.S. team in Vietnam should have a hard core of experienced Americans who know and really like Asia and the Asians, dedicated people who are willing to risk th eir lives for the ideals of freedom, and who will try to influence and guide the Vietnamese towards U.S. policy objectives with the warm friendships and affecti on which our close alliance deserves. We should break the rules of personnel ass ignment, if necessary, to get such U.S. military and civilians to Vietnam. Not o nly should the U.S. depend on advisors who earn the trust of their counterparts, Lansdale argued, it should depend on them to get the job done without coercion and threats. Leverage should be the product of persuasion and trust, not the res ult of control over funds and materiel: .....Many of the Vietnamese in the count ryside who were right up against the Viet Cong terror were full of patriotic spi rit. Those who seemed to be in the hardest circumstances, fighting barefoot with makeshift weapons, had the highest morale. They still can lick the Viet Cong wi th a little help. There's a lesson here on our giving aid. Maybe we should learn that our funds cannot buy friends or a patriotic spirit by mere materialistic g iving. Perhaps we should help those who help themselves, and not have a lot of s trings on that help. If the U.S. could adopt this free-wheeling approach to advi ce, said Lansdale, it would do well to do it at the action level, to get down an d share the risks and discomforts of the ARVN rather than to restrict its advice to paper plans and confrontations in offices:

.....U.S. military men in Vietnam should be freed to work in the combat areas. O ur MAAG has a far greater potential than is now being utilized. U.S. military me n are hardly in a postition to be listened to when they are snug in rear areas a nd give advice to Vietnamese officers who have attended the same U.S. military s chools and who are now in a combat in which few Americans are experienced. MAAG personnel from General McGarr on down expressed desire to get more into real fie ld work; let's give them what they want as far as U.S. permission is concerned a nd let them earn their way into positions of greater influence with the Vietname se military in the field. 3. Back to Normal Channels In sum, General Lansdale ur ged an extra-bureaucratic, uninhibited advisory system consciously built on shar ed U.S.-Vietnamese goals (validated by shared experience) and based on mutual tr ust and admiration. It was--he would be the first to admit--the kind of unstruct ured, unprogrammed, "non-organization" which was antithetical to that which the professional military might be expected to propose and so foreign to the typical views of the State Department, with its traditional anti-operational bias, that diplomats would inevitably regard it as a proposal for power without responsibi lity. Thus, one contemporary account suggests that Lansdale's approach was event ually rejected because of governmental inertia and bureaucratic in-fighting: Whe n Lansdale returned to Washington--after he had submitted his report to his own superiors--he was suddenly summoned one afternoon to the White House and, much t o his surprise, ushered into a conference room where the President was presiding over a mixed group of high Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Co uncil officials. To his further surprise, President Kennedy, after commending hi s report, indicated that Lansdale would be sent back to Vietnam in a high capaci ty. Kennedy's declaration at the meeting obviously raised the hackles of many of ficials whose agencies had been criticized by Lansdale. The upshot was that noth ing further happened about Lansdale's appointment. It is now known that objectio ns to it were raised in the highest levels of the Kennedy administration; in fac t, there were threats of resignation. In the sense that some drastic action in V ietnam should have been taken at this time, whether it involved Lansdale or not, this was another vital turning point in the long and tortuous history of Americ a's Vietnamese involvement. There was still a chance to do something to save the Diem regime, depending largely on getting Nhu out of the country. Difficult as it would have been to achieve at this late date, Lansdale might have been able t o persuade Diem to do it, because he had remained one of the few Americans Diem had ever trusted. More important, some feasible ideas about how to fight a guerr illa war might have been set in motion, and the miscalculation of what had alway s been essentially a revolutionary situation might thereupon have been altered. This account simply does not square with the existence of several cogent objecti ons to Lansdale's proposals for "unfettered quaiity"-though there most certainly was a fair share of bureaucratic in-fighting as the proposals were studied, exp anded, and reshaped. Moreover, it compresses the time frame within which Lansdal e's two major theses were struck down. His first proposal, for selected individu als to act as advisors, implied-at the

very minimum- continuity of personnel selected by an extra-bureaucratic process. Extrabureaucratic selection was dead by mid-1961; the issue of continuity was f inally settled in favor of year-long tours in December 1962 (and has remained in effect since that time). The issue of a supra-departmental organization was fou ght out in mid-1961. It succumbed to an organizational principle with very deep roots. The specific form which Lansdale's supra-departmental organizational prop osal advanced was that of a Presidential Agent to manage the U.S. effort in RVN. On 12 April 1961, Walt W. Rostow sent a memorandum to President Kennedy which s uggested, among other things, that it was imperative to appoint a "fulltime, fir st-rate back-stop man in Washington" to oversee the U.S. involvement in RVN. Lan sdale was either aware of a meaning not conveyed literally by the memorandum or interpreted it to fit his preferences. In any event, he used this springboard to propose, in a 19 April memorandum to Secretary McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, that the President create an interdepartmental task force on Vietnam to "supervise and coordinate the activities of every U.S. agency carrying out o perations . . . in Vietnam to ensure success of the [President's] approved plan. " On the following day Secretary McNamara, presumably after discussing the matte r with the President, requested Gilpatric to prepare within a week a report for the President, setting forth any actions necessary to "prevent communist dominat ion of that country." On 27 April Secretary Gilpatric submitted his recommendati ons. Much of the flavor of the earlier Lansdale pleas for a select, individualis tic advisory effort was missing from this product of an interdepartmental commit tee. The earlier recommendations for an expanded U.S. effort were still there, h owever. These included an RVNAF force increase of 20,000 with a corresponding in crease of 100 MAAG advisors, a MAAG takeover of the entire CG and SDC programs, the employment of U.S. advisors in field operations, the continuation of U.S. Mi ssion efforts to get GVN to carry out reforms, the initiation of covert operatio ns with CIA assistance against lines of communications in Laos and North Vietnam , and a U.S. economic team to help GVN speed up national development. One would be hard pressed to identify any other document which, over six months before the operative decision, so closely foreshadowed the U.S. actions that would be agre ed to at the end of 1961. But beyond these programmatic recommendations (hence, contrary to Lansdale's initial proposals) Gilpatric recommended the creation of a Presidential Task Force to provide "over-all direction, interagency coordinati on and support" for this program of action. Gilpatric was to be Director of the Task Force; Lansdale its operating head in Vietnam. In order to appear not to fl y into the face of Ambassadorial primacy in Saigon the memo was forced into some rather fancy obfuscation: The Ambassador as head of the Country Team is assigne d the authority and the responsibility to see that the Program is carried out in the field and to determine the timing of the actions. He is authorized to advis e the Director of the Task Force of any changes which he believes should be made in the Program.

In carrying out his duties in the field, the operations officer of the Task Forc e will cooperate with the Ambassador. This equivocation charged directly against the mainstream of current thought as it related to the question of integrating operations abroad. The "Country Team" concept of the late 1950's, buttressed by a series of increasingly comprehensive Executive Orders on the subject, assigned clear primacy to the Ambassador. The State Department was not long in asserting its claim to leadership in accordance with this prevailing concept. On 3 May it provided a recommended revision of Gilpatric's task force proposal in which it proposed an interdepartmental task force under State Department leadership to co ordinate the Washington effort and a counterpart task force in Saigon under Ster ling J. Cottrell, then POLAD to CINCPAC. It was this proposal which was incorpor ated into NSAM 52 later in May. In retrospect, the Lansdale-Gilpatric proposal t o conduct the U.S. participation in the Vietnamese war through a supra-departmen tal agency--whether by a Presidential Task Force or by some other means--probabl y never had much of a chance. The Department of Defense had too large an operati onal role to agree to leadership of such an undertaking by anyone other than one of its own principals. (Thus, Gilpatric was acceptable, but few others would ha ve been; Lansdale almost surely was not acceptable as the operating chief in RVN .) The State Department had at stake both the legacy of theoretic interdepartmen tal primacy and the oft-expressed hope of giving this theory more meaning abroad . Indeed, it was during this same month (May 1961) that President Kennedy sent h is oft-quoted letter to each American Ambassador, reminding the recipient of his coordinating duties even while reaffirming that these did not extent (sic) to s upervising operational military forces. The effects in South Vietnam, as distinc t from some other countries, was to preserve claims for independent authority fo r each of the major governmental departments involved. The Presidential letter t o Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting in Saigon read in part: In regard to your pers onal authority and responsibility, I shall count on you to oversee and coordinat e all the activities of the United States Government in the Republic of Vietnam. You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission, and I shall e xpect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the repre sentatives of all other United States agencies which have programs or activities in the Republic of Vietnam. I shall give you full support and backing in carryi ng out your assignment. Needless to say, the representatives of other agencies a re expected to communicate directly with their offices here in Washington, and i n the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they may ask to ha ve the decision reviewed by a higher authority in Washington.

However, it is their responsibility to keep you fully informed of their views an d activities and to abide by your decisions unless in some particular instance y ou and they are notified to the contrary. If in your judgment individual members of the Mission are not functioning effectively, you should take whatever action you feel may be required, reporting the circumstances, of course, to the Depart ment of State. In case the departure from the Republic of Vietnam of any individ ual member of the Mission is indicated in your judgment, I shall expect you to m ake the decision and see that it is carried into effect. Such instances I am con fident will be rare. Now one word about your relations to the military. As you k now, the United States Diplomatic Mission includes Service Attaches, Military As sistance Advisory Groups and other Military components attached to the Mission. It does not, however, include United States military forces operating in the fie ld where such forces are under the command of a United States area military comm ander. The line of authority to these forces runs from me, to the Secretary of D efense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field. Although this means that the chief of the American Diplomatic Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as Chief of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area military commander to assure the f ull exchange of information. If it is your opinion that activities by the United States military forces may adversely affect our over-all relations with the peo ple or governments of the Republic of Vietnam you should promptly discuss the ma tter with the military commander and, if necessary, request a decision by higher authority. It is reasonable to surmise that in mid-1961 events did not seem pre ssing enough to cast aside a developed-if imperfect-concept of operational integ ration in favor of an untried substitute arrangement. In fact, if one wanted fir m leadership one would have had less radical alternatives to which to turn. To m ention two, Secretarial involvement to a degree tantamount to taking charge of t he war (much as Secretary McNamara did in 1962) or the appointment of an Ambassa dor to RVN with such military preeminence that he need not defer to other milita ry judgments (as, General Taylor in 1964). The decision to supervise the America n effort in a more or less conventional way had a direct bearing on the nature o f the advisory buildup then being discussed. It was highly unlikely that General Lansdale's radical advisory proposals would be kindly received under a system m anaged along conventional lines. Even before the Presidential Task Force idea wa s abandoned Lansdale's proposals for a select, committed advisory group had been reshaped by interdepartmental committee. Instead of "old Vietnam hands" in key spots, the discussion turned to the use of existing organizations and much large r numbers of advisors:

Augment the MAAG with two US training commands (comprised of approximately 1600 instructors each) to enable the MAAG to establish in the "high plateau" region o f South Vietnam two divisional field training areas to accelerate the U.S. train ing program for the entire GVN army.... Deploy, as soon as possible, a Special F orces Group (approximately 400 U.S. military personnel) to Nha Trang in order to accelerate GVN Special Forces training. Under this proposal the size of MAAG Vi etnam would be increased from 685 to 2285, not including the Special Forces or t raining commands mentioned above or the 100 man increase already proposed to adv ise the 20,000 men which were to be added to RVNAF. After the shift to thinking in terms of existing military organizations (or, alternatively, of individuals d rawn as it were by "requisitions" in normal channels) and the understandable--if not inevitable--demise of the Gilpatric-Lansdale proposal for supradepartmental direction, U.S. thinking about possible steps in Vietnam remained firmly within conventional channels. There were subsequent attempts to reintroduce an alterna tive advisory scheme and an organizational framework compatible with it but thes e appear to have not been seriously considered. President Kennedy did not permit the Gilpatric Task Force recommendations to commit him to action. Rather, he us ed them in an attempt to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The proof o f this contention is in NSAM 52, which records the President's decisions. Only a bout 14 personnel were to be assigned, for instance, in U.S. Army civic action m obile training teams to assist ARVN with health, welfare, and public works proje cts. Although it was decided to deploy the Special Forces group of 400 men to To urane [Da Nang], this was in support of a CIA-directed effort which could be kep t largely covert. Increased aerial surveillance assistance required only 6 U.S. personnel. The establishment of a Combat Development and Test Center in RVN requ ired only 4 additional U.S. personnel. The point is not how much was done but, i n retrospect, how firmly the probable lines of future actions had been drawn as a result of what it had been agreed not to do. 4. Planning Begins in Earnest The President did, however, issue several "hunting licenses." The Defense Departmen t was directed to examine fully (under the guidance of the State Department's Di rector of the continuing Task Force on Vietnam) "the size and composition of for ces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam." The Ambassador was authorized to sound out Diem on a bilateral def ense treaty. President Kennedy also apparently decided to feel out Diem's reacti on on the subject of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam. Vice President Johnson left almost immediately to visit South Vietnam and other Asian nations. He was empowe red to bring up the question of troops as well as the treaty.

But discussions are one thing; firm commitments are quite another. The range of alternatives that President Kennedy was willing to consider seems clear. What he was willing to do was quite another matter. Unless he was most unlike other pol iticians and unless the many personal accounts of his style are completely erron eous he was willing to do what he believed he had to do--and events in mid-1961 did not force action even though the "drill" that the Administration went throug h was instrumental in defining the probable responses when events did force acti on. As it quickly turned out, President Diem wanted neither U.S. troops nor a tr eaty at that time. He told Vice President Johnson that he wanted troops only in the event of overt invasion and showed no interest in a treaty. Nevertheless, th e Vice President, upon his return, was trenchant in his observations that the ti me for deeds to replace words was fast approaching if the U.S. was to make its d eclared commitment credible: Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in t he United States. It did not--in my judgment--restore any confidence already los t. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in mak ing it clear that deeds must follow words--soon. We didn't buy time--we were giv en it. If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know--without bo thering to ask--that there would be no further extensions on my note. Diem may n ot have been quite so disinterested in U.S. troops as he appeared to be. NSAM 52 of 11 May had discussed, inconclusively, the proposed buildup of RVNAF from 170 ,000 to 200,000 in order to create two new divisions to help seal the Laotian bo rder. When President Diem responded (on 9 June) to Vice President Johnson's invi tation to prepare a set of proposals on South Vietnam's military needs, he recom mended a quantum jump in strength to 270,000 and suggested a substantial increas e in the US MAAG, perhaps even in the form of U.S. units: To accomplish this 100 ,000 man expansion [above the strength recommended in the CIP, which was 20,000 above the existing strength] of our military forces, which is perfectly feasible from a manpower viewpoint, will require a great intensification of our training programs in order to produce, in the minimum of time, those qualified combat le aders and technical specialists needed to fill the new units and to provide to t hem the technical and logistical support required to insure their complete effec tiveness. For this purpose a considerable expansion of the United States Militar y Advisory Group is an essential requirement. Such an expansion, in the form of selected elements of the American Armed Forces to establish training centers for the Vietnamese Armed Forces, would serve the dual purpose of providing an expre ssion of the United States' determination to halt the tide of communist aggressi on and of preparing our forces in the minimum of time. The response to this lett er is not part of the available record. No doubt the initial reaction was one of surprise. The U.S. was not accustomed to GVN initiatives; it seldom sought them . "We have not become accustomed to being asked for our own views on our needs,"

Diem remarked in his letter to Kennedy. But Diem's proposal did certainly strike one appealing chord: the joint benefits of training coupled to demonstrated com mitment through the deployment of existing troop units. As the situation in Sout h Vietnam continued to deteriorate throughout the summer and early fall the issu e of U.S. military advice continued to be addressed in terms of U.S. units. Thes e could, of course, do even more than had been suggested by President Diem: they could fight as units. Diem's generally consistent position, however, continued to be that he would accept U.S. combat forces, but only to train GVN forces. He had said as much to Vice President Johnson: General McGarr, who was also present at this discussion [between Johnson and Diem] reported that while President Die m would not want U.S. combat forces for the purpose of fighting Communists in So uth Vietnam, he would accept deployment of U.S. combat forces as trainers for th e Vietnamese forces at any time. 5. GVN Asks for Additional U.S. Assistance By O ctober the situation within South Vietnam had become sufficiently grim for Presi dent Diem to reverse his earlier sentiments and to ask for a bilateral defense t reaty with the U.S. His new willingness, coupled with the deteriorating situatio n, kicked off a new series of proposals within the U.S. Government. Walt Rostow proposed that the U.S. place an internationalized force of about 25,000 men into RVN to perform a border sealing mission. The JCS responded with a counter propo sal emphasizing Laos and calling for the deployment of a sizeable (initially 20, 000) U.S. contingent to the central highlands. In still another proposal a Speci al National Intelligence Estimate weighed in with a hard look at this rash of pr oposals. The President's reaction, on 11 October, was to decide to send General Taylor on a mission to South Vietnam to examine several alternative courses of a ction: (a) The plan for military intervention discussed at this morning's meetin g on the basis of the Vietnam task force paper entitled "Concept for Interventio n in Vietnam"; (b) An alternative plan for stationing in Vietnam fewer U.S. comb at forces than those called for under the plan referred to in (a) above and with a more limited objective than dealing with the Viet Cong; in other words, such a small force would probably go in at Tourane [Da Nang] and possibly another sou thern port principally for the purpose of establishing a U.S. "presence" in Viet nam; (c) Other alternatives in lieu of putting any U.S. combat forces in Vietnam , i.e. stepping up U.S. assistance and training of Vietnam units, furnishing of more U.S. equipment, particularly helicopters and other light aircraft, trucks a nd other ground transport, etc. 6. The Taylor Mission to Saigon This range of al ternatives suggests, even without "20/20 hindsight," that if something was going to be done, and if the President were to decide not to send U.S. combat units t o Vietnam, there would be an advisory buildup of some kind almost by default. Th is is close enough to what happened to warrant the risk of oversimplification. I t does not do justice to the Taylor Report, of course, but Taylor's mission and his reports have been

covered fully elsewhere. For their impact on the advisory effort, and to place t his in perspective, it is sufficient to describe only a few salient features. Fi rst, the Viet Cong were pursuing, in Taylor's appraisal, a political-military st rategy aimed at overthrowing Diem and opening the way to unification of Vietnam on Hanoi's terms. Military action by the insurgents was aimed at this objective rather than at a complete military victory: The military strategy being pursued is, evidently, to pin down the ARVN on defensive missions; to create a pervasive sense of insecurity and frustration by hit-and-run raids on self-defense corps and militia [CG] units....and to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build. Despite the considerable guerrilla capabilities of the Viet-Cong, Com munist strategy now appears, on balance, to aim at an essentially political deno uement rather than the total military capture of the country, as in the case of Mao's campaign in China. . . . The enemy objective seems to be to produce a poli tical crisis by a combination of military and non-military means out of which wo uld come a South Vietnamese Souvanna Phouma, willing to contemplate unification on terms acceptable to Hanoi, including disengagement from the U.S. In order for the Diem government to defeat this insurgency, General Taylor reasoned, the Sai gon regime must reform itself. It had allowed two vicious circles to develop whi ch vitiated its effectiveness. In the first, poor military intelligence resulted in a defensive military posture which put most of the forces under provincial c ontrol. This, in turn, meant that reserves could not be expeditiously employed. The resultant high losses in unsuccessful defensive battles further dried up the sources of intelligence and completed the circle. The second vicious circle was attributable to Diem's instinctive attempts to centralize power in his own hand s while fragmenting it beneath him. His excessive mistrust of criticism and fear s of a coup caused large elements of society to stand aside from the struggle wh ile the province chiefs and generals were forced into frustrating struggles, fur ther increasing Diem's fears and his inclination to fractionalize authority. The task, then, was to strengthen Diem while, at the same time, inducing him to ref orm so as to break both of these vicious circles. In order to strengthen Diem wi th a U.S. military presence--very much along the lines of the smaller US deploym ent discussed at the NSC meeting prior to his trip--Taylor recommended the deplo yment to South Vietnam of a task force of 6-8,000 troops under the guise of floo d relief work. This task force, primarily logistical, would necessarily become i nvolved in some defensive operation and sustain some casualties, but its deploym ent need not commit the U.S. to a land war on the Asian mainland: As the task is a specific one, we can extricate our troops when it is done if we so desire. Al ternatively, we can phase them into other activities if we wish to remain longer ..... Needless to say, this kind of task force will exercise little direct influ ence on the campaign against the VC. It will, however, give a much needed shot i n the arm to national morale, particularly if combined with other actions showin g that a more

effective working relationship in the common cause has been established between the GVN and the U.S. Taylor had already received President Diem's assurances tha t he favored the deployment of U.S. forces for this purpose. In conjunction with this U.S. troop deployment, Taylor argued that the U.S. should initiate increas ed assistance to GVN in a new relationship: A shift [should occur] in the Americ an relation to the Vietnamese effort from advice to limited partnership. The pre sent character and scale of the war in South Vietnam decree only that the Vietna mese can defeat the VietCong; but at all levels Americans must, as friends and p artners--not as arm's-length advisors--show them how the job might be done--not tell them or do it for them. General Taylor was most explicit that the purpose o f the proposed troop deployments and the new "limited partnership" was to buy ti me for the Vietnamese so that they could marshall their considerable resources a nd assume the offensive against the VC. As mentioned above, this would require i nternal reform in GVN. The limited partnership would contribute to both of these interacting objectives: The present war cannot be won by direct US action; it m ust be won by the Vietnamese. But there is a general conviction among us that th e Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americ ans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems. M oreover, there is evidence that Diem is, in principle, prepared for this step, a nd that most--not all--elements in his establishment are eagerly awaiting it. 7. The Kennedy Decisions: NSAM 111 It is useful to approach the effect of General Taylor's mission on the advisory effort from the simple recollection of what Pre sident Kennedy decided not to do. He decided not to deploy U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam,. This meant--given the U.S. assessment of the importance of RVN and the felt necessity to do something--that the expansion of U.S. assistance wa s a foregone conclusion. This was the general course of action that would be fol lowed as the ineluctable result of having decided not to do something else which was more dramatic, involved more risk, and was more contentious. Given the deci sion not to send troop units, then, the general thrusts of U.S. actions were det ermined--but the specifics were not. Just how did Taylor's "limited partnership, " for instance, propose to influence GVN's attitudes and organization, to develo p initiative matched by competence, and to insure that the Vietnamese would assu me successfully the responsibility for winning the struggle which it was said on ly they could win? How was this expanded U.S. effort to be organized? From whenc e would come the new junior partners of the firm? What would be their preparatio n, their instructions, their duties?

The first of these two groups of questions is more easily answered than the seco nd; the answer to neither of them is retrospectively very satisfying in terms of suggesting that the U.S. entered into its expanded effort at the beginning of 1 962 with its eyes wide open and fully aware of just what it was doing. The avail able record indicates that the U.S. hopefully assumed that material aid and good intentions would be adequate to the task, that a larger U.S. presence would spu r the Vietnamese to effective action without incurring the stigma of a U.S. "tak eover," and that the increase in assistance would be-in and of itself-accepted a s an adequate quid pro quo for the desired reforms within GVN. GVN organizationa l reform would be realized, NASM 111 suggested, by getting Diem to agree to clea n up his lines of authority in exchange for the U.S. commitment to the limited p artnership. One section of the document is a list of approved U.S. actions; anot her sets forth the expected improvements to be accomplished by GVN. Ambassador N olting was instructed to use the substance of these decisions in talks to secure Diem's approval. He found Diem despondent that the U.S. asked so much in return for so little, played into the hands of those who claimed undue American infrin gement upon Vietnamese sovereignty, and placed him in a position where he feared even to make known to his own cabinet the American expectations. Unless the U.S . were to suspend its increased aid, and at the very time it was just gearing up to provide it, Diem had made it clear at the beginning that he would govern Sou th Vietnam in his way and that the U.S. had no choice but to support him wholehe artedly, get out, or find an acceptable alternative to him. The U.S., in turn, h ad refused to consider the last two of these alternatives. It was stuck with sup porting him, at least for the time being. 8. Working Out the Basis for U.S. Advi ce But the U.S. approach was only partially framed to secure Diem's acceptance. There was a parallel suggestion that the existence of U.S. advisors in the field , working hand-inhand in a counterpart relationship with Vietnamese, would refor m GVN from the bottom up. This line of policy was neither spelled out in detail nor thought out in terms of operational implications, risks, and costs. But it c learly existed: Through this working association at all levels, the U.S. must br ing about de facto changes in Diem's method of administration and seek to bring all elements of the Vietnamese Government closer to the Vietnamese people- thus helping break the vicious political circle. By concurrent actions in the fields of intelligence, command and control, mobility, and training, the U.S. must brin g about a situation where an effective reserve is mobilized and brought to bear offensively on clearly established and productive offensive targets--thus helpin g break the vicious military circle.... Behind this concept of a strategy to tur n the tide and to assume the offensive lies a general proposition: when an inter acting process is yielding a degenerative situation, the wisest course of action is to create a positive thrust at as many points as are accessible.

Thus, the U.S. addressed the critical leverage issue as the expected product of its own willingness to increase its participation in the counterinsurgency effor t. It did so, moreover, without any conscious examination of the question beyond stating its expectations. There was no plan to make the provision of additional assistance contingent upon GVN actions, only a statement that GVN actions were expected. There was no willingness, in fact, to consider the conscious exercise of leverage; the situation was too critical, the available time too short, the i ssue too important. The effect of this avoidance of hard choices--for good and u nderstandable reasons, but avoidance nonetheless--was to place a very large burd en on the benefits to be realized by an expansion of the advisory effort. The la nguage of General Taylor's report is reminiscent of Lansdale's earlier proposals for an unstructured, flexible advisory effort comprising totally committed, car efully selected individuals who would earn the respect and cooperation of the Vi etnamese. Lansdale had renewed these proposals at the time the Taylor Report was prepared. But when it was suggested to the GVN that the U.S. would expect to sh are in decisions the Vietnamese reaction led the U.S. almost immediately to modi fy this expectation. The original communication on the subject to Ambassador Nol ting stated that ". . . we would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affected the security sit uation" as compared to the earlier arrangement of "acting in an advisory capacit y only." By early December insistence on this point was quickly dropped in favor of a view which suggested that close collaboration would produce automatic unan imity: What we have in mind is that, in operations directly related to the secur ity situation, partnership will be so close that one party will not take decisio ns or actions affecting the other without full and frank prior consultations. Un less such exchanges invariably resulted in unanimity one of the partners would h ave to give way to the other or inactivity would result. What line to follow if this occurred seems not to have been examined. This simply would not happen. The "close partnership" envisaged by General Taylor--and endorsed by President Kenn edy--suggested something akin to the "total commitment" which General Lansdale h ad earlier urged as one criterion in selecting advisors for South Vietnam. This, in turn, implied at the very minimum a period of long exposure to the operation al problem (and personalities) with which these advisors would deal. In the even t, it was decided to expand both the military and sector (provincial military) a dvisory efforts without any such long term exposure. These questions were settle d in detail when Secretary McNamara met in mid-January 1962 at Honolulu with the principal managers of the U.S. effort. It was decided to establish battalion le vel military advisory teams within ARVN, each to consist of either 5 (infantry b attalion) or 3 (artillery battalion) personnel. Each province (sector) would rec eive 3 U.S. advisors, one officer and 2 enlisted intelligence specialists. The C ivil Guard would be trained in a series of 6 training centers by 120 advisors (2 0 in each center) plus 12 mobile teams of 3 men each. The SDC would be trained i n 30 centers. Secretary McNamara made it clear that he wanted these deployments completed as quickly as possible. He suggested that if an ARVN unit was

not prepared to receive its advisors the designated individuals be sent to RVN a nd placed temporarily with another unit to gain experience. He agreed that tempo rary duty assignments to Vietnam were generally undesirable and asked the JCS to address the question of optimum tour length for advisors. The length of time a military member spent in Vietnam at that time varied slightly from service to se rvice, according to whether or not dependents accompanied the serviceman and whe ther he served in Saigon or in some other part of the country. In October 1961 i t was allegedly decided at OSD level--without consulting the services--to make t he tour of duty 30 months with dependents and 18 without dependents rather than the 24 and 12 month tours that were then typical. The effect of this decision wo uld have been to increase the field advisors' tours of duty from one year to one and a half years. Each of the assignment branches within the Army opposed this change as one which would be inequitable unless reflected in changed tour length for other "unaccompanied" (by dependent) tours. The order was not put into effe ct. Thus, there was some background against which to reexamine the time which ad visors (among others) should spend in RVN. The decision--again based on consider ations of equity in "hardship" assignments, health, and resultant morale issues-was to retain the one year tour in the field.* * It has remained basically unchanged, it should be noted, until the present. An unstructured program of voluntary 6 month extensions was inaugurated throughout Vietnam in 1967, a voluntary extension program begun for "selected officers" in key positions in the same year, and a small program initiated in 1968 by which selected Province Advisors would agree to serve two years in Vietnam, then recei ve almost one year's training prior to deployment. No officers have departed the U.S. under this last program as of the present writing (mid-1968). 9. U.S. Expectations: The Benefits from More Advisors To sum up the decision to expand the advisory effort to battalion and province level, it was one reached w ithout extended study or debate. There was neither opposition to it nor any comp rehensive explication of what would be involved and the benefits to be expected. This was due in large part to the fact that it was a decision made almost offha ndedly in the shadow of a larger issue, the deployment of U.S. combat forces to RVN. When it was decided not to send the combat forces it was a foregone conclus ion that more advisors would be sent. This was consistent with the U.S. desire i n late 1961 to demonstrate its commitment to South Vietnam and apparently compat ible with the oftexpressed belief that only the South Vietnamese could bring the ir struggle to a satisfactory conclusion. But the decision to expand the advisor y effort attempted, at the same time, to finesse the question of leverage. GVN w as informed that the U.S. expected certain reform measures to be adopted in exch ange for increased U.S. assistance. It received no clear signals about withholdi ng U.S. help if these actions were not taken. The U.S. had, in fact, made no

decisions along this line; it had avoided addressing the issue because of confli cting desires to act forcefully, yet to avoid Americanizing the war. Thus, the U .S. did not know what it would do if GVN failed to respond as it was hoped that it would. In this sense the U.S. advisors became potential pawns in a leverage g ame of uncertain intensity with no set rules. This de facto position was in cont inuous potential conflict with the expressed hope that a greater U.S. presence w ould lead--by example, persuasion, and mutual interest--to increased effectivene ss both within ARVN and in the political administration of the provinces governe d by U.S.-advised ARVN officers. Not only did the Kennedy Administration decide to enter in General Taylor's "limited partnership" without a careful examination of the relationships being established, it also apparently did not state or deb ate precisely what benefits were expected as a result of an increased advisory e ffort. There was, it appears, a generalized and unchallenged assumption that mor e Americans in more places addressing Vietnamese training and operations could n ot but have an overall beneficial effect. The available record reflects no expli cit discussion of expected benefits. While oral discussions must have addressed this point at some time, it seems most likely that policymakers agreed tacitly o n three overlapping categories of expectations--each susceptible to varying inte rpretations and degrees of relative importance and emphasis--which were neither clearly stated nor critically examined. The first, and most obvious, was the exp ectation that an increased U.S. military presence with tactical units and at tra ining centers would lead to improved technical-tactical competence within ARVN. The assumption which underlay this expectation was that the teaching of basic mi litary skills was probably a sufficient (rather than merely necessary) condition to enable ARVN to begin to operate more effectively-and more energetically and aggressively. Earlier experience in Greece and Korea would have seemed to valida te this expectation within reasonable limits. Second, U.S. policymakers probably expected the increased military advisory effort to result in a more effective i nformational "network." It must have seemed reasonable to expect that an increas ed but diffuse U.S. presence would not only enhance information on VC actions an d probable plans but also improve U.S. knowledge of ARVN plans and performance. Finally--and most difficult to pinpoint in terms of what policymaker or policyma king group emphasized which aspects--the U.S. expected to gain additional influe nce from an increased advisory effort. General Taylor viewed this as the natural product of individuals with parallel interests working hand-in-glove in the fie ld (as distinct from large headquarters). This would enable them to escape the p etty differences which grow up in the absence of operational responsibility and permit the U.S. advisors to "lead by example" even though they would not be tech nically empowered to lead. Other expectations of increased U.S. influence could take a variety of forms. Improved information, for instance, in a hierarchically ordered U.S. advisory system, would permit the U.S. to push more effectively an y line of endeavor which it wished GVN to adopt.

This potential for improved "salesmanship" was not unrelated to an increased pot ential for coercive influence. What the U.S. would give in material support it m ight also withhold selectively. Influence need not be dependent upon example alo ne. None of these expectations were, however, articulated fully or spelled out i n terms which would provide operational guidelines for the new U.S. advisors who were being deployed to SVN. The expectations of benefits were implicit and gene ralized. The potential existed for a comprehensive, coordinated U.S approach to advising but the potential was not the reality. 10. Implementing the First Build -Up The decision just examined to increase the U.S. advisory effort was preceded by a series of marginal increases in the U.S. military strength in Vietnam. (Ac tual "in-country" strengths are available for only a few months during the early build-up period so it will frequently be necessary to use authorization figures and to realize that newly authorized spaces were generally not filled until som e time had passed after their establishment.) Presidential deciisions in April a nd May 1961, taken in the light of a central concern with Laos rather than Vietn am, increased the authorized size of MAAG Vietnam from 685 to 785. The 100-man i ncrease was divided almost equally between technical advisors and advisors for A RVN's tactical training centers. In October 1961 the authorized strength was inc reased again, to 972, of which 948 spaces were for U.S. Army personnel; 603 of t hese 948 spaces were actually filled by the end of November. The increases in ad visory strength which reflected the NSAM 111 decisions were authorized in Decemb er 1961 and January 1962. By the end of 1961 MAAG's authorized strength had been more than doubled, to 2067. This number was increased again in January to more than 3000. Included in these increases were the new dimensions of U.S. advice: b attalion advisors, province advisors, and an additional 500 Special Forces advis ors (making a new total of 805 in the Special Forces program under CIA control). It has already been noted that Secretary McNamara gave forceful impetus to mann ing these newly created positions in the shortest possible time. They were, inde ed, filled quickly. By April 1962 the total number of Army field advisory person nel in RVN exceeded the authorized number. By this time, too, the authorized tot al for all services had been stabilized at about 3400. This total was reduced in November to 3150, then remained essentially constant until a new round of incre ases was inaugurated in mid-1964. Thus, the build-up associated with the Taylor mission consisted of a fourfold increase in U.S. advisory presence (a much large r increase if one counts U.S. support units). After the build-up was completed, in the spring of 1962, the number of advisors remained stable until many months after the fall of the Diem government. While the total number of advisors remain ed fairly constant, however, shifts occurred in the distribution of advisory per sonnel. From completion of the build-up, for instance, until the coup which over threw Diem, the number of field advisors at corps and division level increased s everalfold and the number of province advisors doubled while other field

advisory strengths remained about the same. These developments are shown in deta il in the tabular summary at the end of this study and summarized in the followi ng table: SELECTED FIELD ADVISORS Activity Advised Corps Division Regiments Batt alions Provinces Schools and Training Centers CG/SDC Total 11. The U.S. View: 19 62-1963 Six months after Diem fell the U.S. would conclude that these advisory l evels were inadequate, but during the Diem area the predominant official attitud e was one of sustained optimism. The war was being won, it was maintained, by ad herence to the newly articulated theory of counterinsurgency. The U.S. even made tentative plans to begin reducing the American presence in Vietnam. By the time the U.S. began seriously to consider attempts to exercise leverage against the Ngo family's conduct of affairs Diem's regime was already well down the road to its eventual overthrow. The Strategic Hamlet Program was the principal operation al vehicle by which the recently articulated theory of counterinsurgency was to be translated into reality. In general, the plan was to begin by providing to th e rural populace a degree of security sufficient to serve as a precondition for further military and political action. In the military field the peasants' incre ased security was to be the wedge by which more effective intelligence gathering could take place. The rural population could not be expected to inform on VC wh ereabouts, it was reasoned, unless it was safe from retaliatory acts by the insu rgents. Political action to promote identification between the central governmen t and the rural population was also to take place in the shadow of these improve d physical security arrangements. Security was viewed, then, as the precondition to the military and political gains at which General Taylor's mission had aimed its recommendations. The evolution and demise of the Strategic Hamlet Program i s examined in another volume of the present series. It is pertinent to the prese nt study, however, to note the points of stress in this program as they pertaine d to RVNAF. Most of the new American advisory effort was directed to improving A RVN, in its equipment and mobility capability and in its aggressiveness. The cen tral U.S. expectation was that a greater capability to move quickly could be com bined with improved leadership so that ARVN April 1962 63 162 150 366 117 212 28 1 1351 November 1963 380 446 134 417 235 201 215 2028

could, on one hand, be capable of responding quickly and in force wherever and w henever the VC chose to concentrate for local superiority and, on the other, be made aggressive enough to beat the Viet Cong at their own game-to "take the nigh t away" from the VC and to use guerrilla techniques to hunt down and defeat the insurgents in their own bailiwicks. The realization of these expectations was de pendent upon several developments, each of which had to occur if ARVN was to bec ome capable of turning the tide in the insurgent battle. First, the CG and SDC h ad to become sufficiently effective to permit ARVN to be used as a mobile reserv e for protective purposes rather than as part of the static protection force. Se cond, ARVN had to be given adequate capability to move quickly, whether in react ing or in seizing the initiative. Finally, both ARVN's leaders and the political leaders to whom they were responsible had to accept and put into operational pr actice spirit of aggressiveness to take advantage of the existing static defense s and the newlygained mobility. 12. The Actuality: 1962-1963 What happened durin g 1962-1963 is that only the second of these developments actually occurred to a ny significant degree. The U.S. provided helicopter companies for rapid tactical transport, small arms and automatic weapons for increased firepower, and tactic al air and artillery support to assure ARVN firepower superiority over the insur gents. There were complaints--as there have been ever since--that individual wea pons were too heavy for the Vietnamese, that one helicopter company for each Cor ps area was too little, and that supporting air and artillery were an inducement to rely on indiscriminate firepower as a substitute for aggressiveness. But the basic tools were provided. The other developments did not take place. Training of the CG and SDC was speeded up at Secretary McNamara's insistence in order to get a more effective protective force quickly in being. Even by cutting the cour se of instruction in half it required the remainder of CY 1962 to give a basic f amiliarization course to even the bulk of the CG and SDC. GVN was not eager to p ut weapons into SDC hands, fearing that the weapons might wind up in the possess ion of the VC. In the event, both forces emerged as something much less effectiv e than had been expected. The strategic hamlets which they were to protect proli ferated in quantity in an uncontrolled manner and varied widely in quality. It n ever really became possible for ARVN to free itself from static defensive duties . Even if it had become possible for ARVN to be cut loose from static duties it is questionable that it could have risen to U.S. expectations. The period in que stion is one in which the Ngo family felt itself constrained constantly to play off the military against the provincial officials (who controlled the CG and SDC ) in order to forestall attempts at a coup d'etat. Military leaders seemed incli ned to rely increasingly on firepower as a substitute for aggressive maneuver. R osy reports from the provinces made it unappealing to sustain casualties engagin g an enemy who was said to have already been driven from the area. The all-too-c ommon result was that ARVN did not improve as the U.S. had

expected it would. U.S. advisors became frustrated and embittered. Even rare opp ortunities for decisive engagement on the ground were allowed to pass or were mi shandled. The debacle at Ap Bac, in____, 1962, stands as a landmark of this cont inued impotence. The failure of ARVN to develop as expected was, however, not of ficially recognized until much later. Even then the reasons for this failure wer e variously interpreted. In mid-1962, after the initial advisory build-up had be en completed, the commander of the recently established U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General Paul D. Harkins, estimated that the U.S. task was simply one of training ARVN leaders on a one-time basis and that the VC coul d be eliminated as a disturbing force within a year after this had been accompli shed. (This was a clear instance of the "technical-tactical competence" expectat ion.) Secretary McNamara-probably wishing also to form prudent contingency plans and to have the capability to exert pressure on the Diem regimedirected that th e U.S. plan for a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over a three year period. Thi s decision and the subsequent plans for its implementation, indicates the extent to which optimistic expectations existed at some high official U.S. levels even while (as we were later to learn) the situation in the countryside continued to deteriorate. This, in turn, helps to explain why the advisory build-up complete d in April 1962 was not followed by any additional increases in advisors for mor e than two years. The central problem in this regard was that the U.S. had neith er a firm grasp on reliable indicators to determine how the war was progressing nor a willingness to accept claims that it was not going well. The second of the se tendencies was attributable to the approach which finally emerged from the de cisions following the Taylor mission: The U.S. would support Diem unstintingly a nd expect, in return, meaningful reforms and improvements within GVN. But it was caught in a dilemma when the expected reforms did not take place. To continue t o support Diem without reforms meant quite simply that he, not we, would determi ne the course of the counterinsurgent effort and that the steps he took to assur e his continuance in power would continue to take priority over all else. To den y him support in any of a variety of ways would erode his power without a viable alternative in sight. The tendency may not have been precisely to "sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem," as Homer Bigart phrased it, but it came very close to this . The inability to know just how things were going presented an even more diffic ult problem. The tendency was to use forces retrained or newly equipped, strateg ic hamlets constructed, and trends in VC activity, as indicators of the progress of the war. But training does not necessarily equal effectiveness, the number o f hamlets constructed does not tell one of the loyalty of their populations, and enemy attacks might be a misleading guide. Were GVN making progress in a contes ted area, for instance, Viet Cong reactions might be expected to increase rather than to diminish in frequency and intensity. Conversely, the insurgents would h ave no good reason to attack populated areas which they had already succeeded in penetrating and over which they had established effective de facto control. Dat a and observations could be variously interpreted-so variously, in fact, that Pr esident Kennedy was led to ask two observers just returned from Vietnam who gave him divergent reports, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?"

13. The Stage Is Set for "Better GVN Receptivity" While the U.S. groped for a be tter way to determine how the counterinsurgent effort was going and debated how (or if) to exercise leverage against Diem, it was overtaken by events. The 1963 Buddhist crisis in RVN was met by increasingly repressive measures by the GVN. T hese developments finally led the U.S. to reassess its support for Diem and to c onsider other non-communist alternatives to his leadership. On 1 November 1963 D iem was overthrown by a military coup d'etat. The pacification effort organized around the Strategic Hamlet Program died with him; the advisory effort was left untouched in terms of size and scope. To the extent that Diem and his family wer e the ones preventing ARVN from meeting the expectations of late 1961, it was re asoned, now was the time for the military advisory system to begin to function m ore effectively. To the extent that ARVN commanders in the field had been unresp onsive to U.S. advice because of indifference and opposition in the Gia Long Pal ace, it was hoped the difficulties of the past might be rectified by the new mil itary regime. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 6, "The Advisory Build-Up, 1961-1967," pp. 408-514. (Boston: Beacon Pres s, 1971) Section 2, pp. 457-514 DISTRICT ADVISORS AND THE BEEF-UP OF BATTALION ADVISORY TEAMS (1964-1965) The in itial U.S. reaction to the Diem coup was thus one of modest optimism. Even given the U.S. disappointment at the death of the Ngo brothers the fact remained that the new regime in the Saigon saddle was expected to be more responsive to U.S. advice than the previous government had been. It was necessary that GVN programs be redirected into more realistic channels, that the efficiency of operations b e increased, that additional steps be taken to seal the infiltration routes thro ugh Laos, and that the U.S. reaffirm its commitment to GVN in a credible way. Th e key to success--the pacification process--had already been discovered; the tas k was one of skillful, sustained execution. Each of these points was addressed b y National Security Action Memorandum 273, approved 26 November 1963. The immedi ate cause for NSAM 273 was the assassination of President Kennedy four days earl ier; newly-installed President Johnson needed to reaffirm or modify the policy l ines pursued by his predecessor. President Johnson quickly chose to reaffirm the Kennedy policies. Emphasis should be placed, the document stated, on the Mekong Delta area, but not only in military terms. Political, economic, social, educat ional, and informational activities must also be pushed: "We should seek to turn

the tide not only of battle but of belief...." Military operations should be ini tiated, under close political control, up to within fifty kilometers inside of L aos. U.S. assistance programs should be maintained at levels at least equal to t hose under the Diem government so that the new GVN would not be tempted to regar d the U.S. as seeking to disengage. The same document also revalidated the plann ed phased withdrawal of U.S. forces announced publicly in broad terms by Preside nt Kennedy shortly before his death: The objective of the United States with res pect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remains as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963. No new programs were proposed or endorsed, no increases in the level or nature of U.S. assistance suggested or foreseen. Th e emphasis was on persuading the new government in Saigon to do well those thing s which the fallen government was considered to have done poorly. 1. Optimism Tu rns to Frustration This attitude of cautious optimism changed gradually by the e arly summer of 1964 to one of deepening gloom. No radical shift marked this tran sition; it was one of a heightened awareness of instability in the central gover nment in Saigon (the Khanh coup and maneuvering for advantage by the generals), of a deteriorating situation in the countryside, and of the discovery that thing s had been worse to begin with than the U.S. had suspected. Not only did events indicate a Viet Cong ascendancy in the countryside; the U.S. was not even able t o determine with assurance just how things stood. The informational returns were inadequate from the existing advisory effort, ARVN had not become an effective fighting force, and the extent of U.S. influence was questionable. This deterior ation of the counterinsurgent effort (including the growing awareness that earli er reports had been unrealistically rosy) was one factor which was to lead to an expansion of the U.S. military advisory effort. A second, and complementary, fa ctor was the increasing conviction in official circles that the struggle in Viet nam was so important that we could not afford to lose it. Although these two fac tors in juxtaposition created a determination to take whatever steps were necess ary to ensure a free non-communist South Vietnam, this commitment operated in th e shadow of an equal determination to work through the GVN rather than around it and to avoid radical policy departures during the Presidential elections. A fur ther buildup in U.S. advisors was not the major product of this determined commi tment. Rather, there was in 1964 a growing conviction that only by consciously e xpanding the war-by "going North" in order to punish and dissuade the DRV from s upport of the insurgency-could the deteriorating situation be arrested and rever sed. Governmental stability in South Vietnam and the reduction, if not the elimi nation, of pressures from the north came to be regarded as desiderata which woul d turn upon

actions outside RVN rather than within it. The decisions to expand the U.S. advi sory effort were overshadowed by plans to carry the war to the DRV.* * The sensitive files of the Secretary of Defense for the period under discussio n consist in large part of detailed plans to bring increasing military pressure against DRV under careful political control and under "scenarios" which would en sure adequate domestic and foreign support. 2. NSAM 288 NSAM 273 had, as described above, limited cross-border operations to an area 50 kilometers within Laos. NSAM 288, published in March 1964, reaffirme d these measures but went considerably further in authorizing contingency prepar ations to be employed in the event that border control operations proved inadequ ate: To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control actions" (beyond those a uthorized . . . above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Ove rt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam. This initial official signal to pre pare to expand the war was cast against a conviction that U.S. objectives in Sou th Vietnam were critically important: We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assista nce as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements. Unless we can achieve this obje ctive in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Co mmunist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall un der the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to bec ome so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with o ur help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would become sh aky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south , and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased. All of these consequences would probably have been true even if the U.S. had no t since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Viet nam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation."

Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high.... The situation h as unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September: 1. In terms of g overnment control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet C ong control or predominant influence. In 22 of the 43 provinces, the Viet Cong c ontrol 50% or more of the land area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duo ng; 75% of Hau Nghia; 90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of Kien Hoa; and 85% of An Xuyen. 2. Large groups of the population are now show ing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration wi thin the U.S. contingent: a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates and parti cularly the latter, are high and increasing. b. Draft dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively. c. The morale of the ham let militia and of the Self Defense Corps, in which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling. 3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the govern ment's position has been particularly noticeable. For example: a. In Quang Nam p rovince, in the I Corps, the militia in 17 hamlets turned in their weapons. b. I n Binh Duong province (III Corps) the hamlet military were disarmed because of s uspected disloyalty. c. In Binh Dinh province, in the II Corps, 75 hamlets were severely damaged by the Viet Cong (in contrast, during the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets were few and none was overrun). d. I n Quang Ngai province, at the northern edge of the II Corps, there were 413 stra tegic hamlets under government control a year ago. Of that number, 335 have been damaged to varying degrees or fallen into disrepair, and only 275 remain under government control. e. Security throughout the IV Corps has deteriorated badly. The Viet Cong control virtually all facets of peasant life in the southernmost p rovinces and the government troops there are reduced to defending the administra tive centers. Except in An Giang province (dominated by the Hoa Hao religious se ct) armed escort is required for almost all movement in both the southern and no rthern areas of the IV Corps. 4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1, 35 have been replaced (nine provinces h ad three province chiefs in three months; one province had four). Scores of less er officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands have changed hand s twice since the November coup. The faith of the peasants has been shaken by th e disruption in experienced leadership and the loss of physical security. In man y areas, power vacuums have developed causing confusion among the people and a r ising rate of rural disorders.

5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing. The major new action under consideration to help achieve critically important U.S. objecti ves in the face of this gloomy recording of recent events was, as already noted, that of carrying the war to North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara, whose memorandum to the President was published en toto as NSAM 288, did not foresee the need at that time for a further major buildup of the advisory effort or for U.S. steps to take greater control of the war. Again, the approach already selected was dee med adequate. Only qualitative improvement was needed: A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN/US effort are generally sound and adequate. . . . Substanti ally more can be done in the effective employment of military forces and in the economic and civic action areas. These improvements may require some selective i ncreases in the U.S. presence, but it does not appear likely that major equipmen t replacement and additions in U.S. personnel are indicated under current policy . B. The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are i n a position to assume the functions is still sound. Its application will not le ad to any major reductions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as s uch has a sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in the numbers of U.S. military train ing personnel should be possible before the end of 1965. However, the U.S. shoul d continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice requi red to do the job regardless of how long it takes. Two actions which were explic itly considered and rejected indicated that the U.S. would still adhere to its o ft-stated (and sometimes ignored) position that the South Vietnamese must win th eir own war through their own efforts: Furnishing a U.S. Combat Unit to Secure t he Saigon Area. It is the universal judgment of our senior people in Saigon, wit h which we concur, that this action would now have serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken. U.S. Taking Over Command. It has bee n suggested that the U.S. move from its present advisory role to a role that wou ld amount in practice to directive command. Again, the judgement of all senior p eople in Saigon, with which we concur, is that the possible military advantages of such action would be far out-weighed by its adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within South Vietnam and outsid e. Moreover, the present responsiveness of the GVN to our advice--although it ha s not yet reduced military reaction time--makes it less urgent. At the same time , MACV is steadily taking actions to bring U.S. and GVN operating staffs closer together at all levels, including joint operating rooms at key command levels.

Thus, it was stated national policy that the critically important struggle in So uth Vietnam must be won by the South Vietnamese, that the U.S. would do all with in its power to help arrest and reverse a deteriorating situation, and that plan s should be made to employ graduated overt military pressures against the suppor ters of the insurrection, the DRV. This was the principal thrust of NSAM 288 eve n though a sizeable portion of the document was devoted to programmatic steps wh ich GVN and the U.S. should take in order better to mobilize South Vietnam's ass ets. Specifically, RVNAF needed to be increased in size by at least 50,000 men, reorganized, and provided with selected items of modern equipment. These program s presaged more U.S. advisors because there would be more RVNAF units to advise, but there was no mention of more advisors for given units or advisors to perfor m new functions. 3. Increasing Political Instability in the Provinces The dark p icture painted in NSAM 288 in March had become even darker by May 1964. Secretar y McNamara visited Saigon on 12 and 13 May to inquire into progress in the "oils pot" national pacification program. What he learned could scarcely be called enc ouraging. A follow-on conference was scheduled for 1 June in Honolulu and the pl anning wheels began to turn-or, more accurately, the wheels began to churn-for t here was barely two weeks' time in which to propose and coordinate U.S. actions acceptable to the GVN which might reverse the downward spiral of events, and "go ing North" was not yet feasible in terms of domestic U.S. politics. Illustrative statistics (the same which Secretary McNamara saw) give the tone of events in S outh Vietnam. In an effort to determine exactly how many rural communities even existed--much less whose control they were under--the Department of Defense had earlier initiated an aerial photographic survey of the rural areas of RVN. Even this expensive undertaking left great factual gaps. In Tay Ninh Province, for ex ample, photointerpreters identified 39 fortified hamlets; U.S. reports from prov incial officials claimed that there were 106. The discrepancy was not one to app eal to those who wished to base policy determinations on solid facts. Other fact s were more easily ascertainable. Since the Diem coup, for instance, only 5 of R VN's 42 provinces had not experienced a change in Province Chief. Change is, of course, inescapable in the aftermath of a coup, but by 8 May 15 provinces were u nder their third chief since 1 November 1964, 7 had their fourth, and 2 province s were governed by the fifth officer since the Diem government fell. Instability in administration was accompanied by a marked GVN decline in numbers of populat ion controlled and a comparable increase in VC population control. These trends were reflected in the official estimates (themselves suspect of being overly opt imistic) of control in the rural villages: COMPARISON, NUMBER OF RURAL VILLAGES CONTROLLED Sep 63 1682 Apr 64 1485 RVN

VC Contested 709 139 866 187 Of the 14 provinces considered critical in terms of location and population, all were reported by their advisors to be in "critical" condition. The prospects in 10 of these were judged to be "poor." Four provinces were regarded to have "fai r" prospects. It was apparent that the U.S. could not depend on eventual actions against DRV to save the day in South Vietnam. By the time such actions were pol itically feasible there might be nothing to save. It was time to take some furth er direct action within South Vietnam itself-and to take it quickly. Increasing U.S. advisors was an obvious and available action. 4. MAC V's Gradualistic Appro ach to Expansion As early as December 1963, MACV had studied the desirability of extending the U.S. advisory effort to district level in 13 certain key district s, mostly around Saigon. No action was taken at that time but the proposal was r evived in February and implemented during late March 1964. Each of the original 13 "key districts" was assigned one Captain and one noncommissioned officer. Of the original 26 persons selected for this pilot project, 21 were newly arrived i n RVN. This gradualistic, experimental approach to expanding the advisory effort typified the method preferred both by the military and civilian agencies in Vie tnam-although for somewhat different reasons. MACV was concerned with the experi ence and skill levels it could command among necessarily lower ranks as it expan ded deeper into ARVN and the political (staffed by ARVN) hierarchy, about increa sed support requirements, and about increased casualties. USOM claimed that its operatives could work effectively at the "spigot" end of the aid pipeline only w here the local administration was energetic and effective and where some modicum of security had already been provided. USOM had severe recruiting difficulties, too. Secretary McNamara discovered on his 12-13 May visit to Saigon that it was about 25 per cent understrength and that approximately half of this personnel s hortage was concentrated in the expanding rural affairs staff. 5. McNamara's Wil lingness to Approve Expansion Thus, the general attitude among the U.S. agencies in Saigon was to go slowly, to avoid the danger, as it was frequently expressed , of "strewing Americans all over the countryside." Secretary McNamara apparentl y had other thoughts after his May visit in Saigon. The available record does no t reflect that he directed an expansion of the advisory effort-but the Joint Sta ff was almost immediately hard at work examining which of several levels of incr ease would be most desirable. The available record leaves little doubt that the Secretary of Defense wanted it made clear that he would approve any reasonable p roposals for personnel, materiel, or funds. Those sections of NSAM 288 which dea lt with recommendations for South Vietnam had concentrated on programs which wou ld assist GVN to mobilize its resources. By May it was clear that the hoped-for actions had not taken effect. The obvious conclusion--given the importance which the

U.S. attached to success in South Vietnam--was that additional steps must be tak en to halt the deterioration in the country-side. 6. The Initial Proposals and R esponses The initial recorded exchange among the planners occurred when COMUSMAC V was asked on 22 May 1964 to provide an input to a JCS study then in progress o n ". . . encadrement of South Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps with U.S. teams along lines of White Star teams in Laos, with objective of making th ese units as effective as possible in Vietnamese pacification plan." The message made it clear that the JCS was examining alternative levels of increased adviso ry effort (1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 personnel), not asking if the advisory effort should be increased. The compressed time frame available for prior coordination on a recommended course of action was also clear: COMUSMACV was asked to provide his comments on the draft JCS proposal by the following day (23 May). "Regret c ircumstances do not permit more time," the message stated. The reply from Saigon , processed through CINCPAC, adhered to the established MACV preference to under take new departures only in a selective, experimental way: I do not think we sho uld flood RVN with number of personnel you mention. Think better solution is to do [this] on selective basis starting with critical districts and provinces and once we get feel of problem expand to remainder of RVN as experience dictates. T hen, in a significant passage, the reply from the field asked in blunt language just what the intended purpose was for the proposed expansion of the advisory ef fort. The "White Star Teams" used in Laos, the message noted, had the purpose an d effect of establishing U.S. control over foreign forces: The question arises a s to whether you mean encadrement or increase of "advisory" effort. Do you want to take control or improve the performance of CG and SDC by step-up within curre nt policy? Although this direct question was never answered, the JCS' initial pr oposal for encadrement was quietly dropped. The U.S. might wish to be in a posit ion to control elements or all of RVNAF but it would not consciously follow any scheme explicitly aimed at such control. Instead, the JCS countered with a plan for six Mobile Training Teams in each province backed up by a Training Center Te am and a small Provincial Training Detachment. This proposal would put an additi onal 70 U.S. training advisors in each selected province in an effort to improve the level of effectiveness of the paramilitary forces. Its recommendation was t hat the U.S. military advisory effort should be increased by 1000 personnel, eno ugh to provide this new dimension of advice in the fourteen critical provinces w hich had experienced so much recent instability. This JCS proposal for Mobile Tr aining Teams for the RVNAF paramilitary forces was tied to an explicit statement of how best to organize this effort without any mention of

how much influence or leverage the U.S. would or could exert through this expand ed system. The problem was treated as one in the development of technical profic iency; the issue of the extent of U.S. control was largely ignored-though surely not forgotten: Concept of US Advisory Effort a. General (1) An underlying princ iple in the oil-spot concept is accordance of maximum flexibility to province of ficials in solving individual province problems which vary widely from province to province. This study recognizes that principle and outlines a plan for assign ment of additional US instructor and training resources to the province to provi de the training and advice needed to improve the effectiveness of the provincial paramilitary forces. (2) The shortage of trained personnel is acute in the para military forces because of the nature of the forces themselves. They are recruit ed at province or district level to perform military tasks in those same regions . While the CG and SDC are considered full-time troops, many of the individuals, in fact, must combine earning their livelihood with military duties. Movement o f these people long distances away from their homes to training centers disrupts their lives, creates morale problems and undoubtedly contributes greatly to the high dessertion rates which have been experienced. It appears appropriate, ther efore, to bring the trainers and training facilities to the areas where the para military forces live and operate. (3) According to US standards, the military tr aining needs of the Vietnamese paramilitary are extremely modest. There is no re quirement for elaborated technical schools or complex instructional courses. Ins tead, the Vietnamese paramilitary require military schooling at the most basic l evels, with emphasis on basic infantry weapons and small unit tactics. Such inst ruction would be provided by the additional numbers of US military personnel. b. Organization for Advisory Effort. The training deficiencies and problems of the paramilitary are as many and varied as the number of provinces and districts in which those forces operate. Needs in Quang Ngai, for example, may be extremely different from those in Dinh Tuong. Within the provinces, each district also may have different training needs. The reasonable method of approaching this proble m, then, appears to be establishment of highly flexible training detachments ope rating under supervision at province level, which can provide local mobile train ing teams, small training centers, and temporary encadrement for the smaller par amilitary units when dictated by a specific situation. 7. MACV Focuses on Operat ions Rather Than Training COMUSMACV and CINCPAC were asked to comment within two days on this study which had been ". . . considered at the highest levels, wher e initial reaction has been

favorable." Their replies, in which the theater commander supported his nominal subordinate in Saigon, contested the value of U.S.-conducted training for RVNAF paramilitary forces, proposed that advisors be used at the district level to ass ist in operations, accepted the 1,000-man magnitude, but stretched out the targe t date 18 months-thereby proposing a gradualistic approach without candidly sayi ng so. General Harkins devoted most of his reply to the question of training tea ms: A. A basic premise of the study is that training at the established centers is at the root of many morale and desertion problems. This premise is incorrect as regards the Civil Guard (Regional Forces). It is in part true with respect to SDC (Popular Forces); but the underlying cause thereof--lack of per diem--is in the process of being removed by the new allowances that are about to be promulg ated. This is not to say there are not formidable morale problems (one manifesta tion of which is desertion) within both categories of forces. These need to be a nd are being tackled. However, basic point is that they do not stem from the pre sent system of training. B. Mobile training teams have been organized under spec ial circumstances when units have had prior combat experience and/or as an exped ient measure only. Experience has proved that units trained by such teams have s ubsequently required formal training at an established training center where pro per facilities are available. The Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps had many un its trained by mobile training teams in 1962 in order to provide an immediate op erational force. Almost all of these units have since been retrained in the comp lete unit poi [program of instruction] because it was determined that the mobile team training was inadequate. The mobile training teams consisted of U.S. perso nnel and Vietnamese interpreters. C. While the training requirements of paramili tary forces are relatively modest by U.S. standards, an adequate poi must be bac ked up by firing ranges, training areas, class rooms, training aids and other fa cilities. These requirements are met by the regional and popular forces training centers. There are five regional force unit training centers; nine regional for ce/ popular force leader training centers; and thirty-seven popular force traini ng centers. They are properly distributed geographically; they are staffed with qualified Vietnamese instructors; and can be expanded, with little difficulty to support programmed force increase. Some augmentation of the U.S. advisory eleme nt at these several centers is desirable, on a selected basis. D. The concept of U.S. personnel conducting training for the paramilitary forces on either a trai ning center or MTT basis (and especially the latter) is not realistic. (1) The V ietnamese have an adequate training base with experienced instructors; the latte r are doing a satisfactory job. For the U.S. to assume the instructional effort, vice the Vietnamese, would generate serious morale problems and would probably be unacceptable. (2) The interpreter support requirements would be prohibitive.

(3) Previous experience (sub-paragraph B above) of using U.S. advisors as instru ctors was unsuccessful due to the inability to communicate. 2. As indicated abov e, the current method of training both the regional and popular forces is adequa te, although we do have under review the length and content of the training. Whe re the U.S. can make its best contribution to the paramilitary forces effectiven ess is in the area of operations. Our formula, discussed in 23 May telecon on th is subject, is to increase greatly the U.S. advisory effort at the district leve l. Therefore, strongly urge that you support our position that approximately 100 0 advisors, in the general proportion of one officer to three NCO's be authorize d as district detachments, with the precise composition and deployment of said t eams left to the determination of COMUSMACV. CINCPAC informed the JCS that he ag reed with COMUSMACV's arguments and quoted the telecon referred to above to expl ain the course of action preferred by the military commanders in the field: 1. O ur comment is based on CG/SDC reorganization concept of 7 May which includes eli mination CG Bn Hq in provinces and establishment 90 man sector Hq in lieu thereo f with TAC CP capability, and sub-sector Hq 16 men at each 239 districts. This i s expected to be accomplished in two to three months. 2. Recommend use of one te am composed of mature company grade officer and other specialist as you suggest (Wpns/Demo, Commo Med) per district. 3. Proposal para 2 represents end requireme nt for 239 teams, totaling 239 officers, 717 enlisted spec aggregate 956 personn el, by end calendar year 65 4. MACV current plans call for 1 officer and 1 NCO a t 116 districts by June 65. Requisitions have been submitted for 100 of these by end CY 64. Two man detachments now assigned to 13 districts. 5. Assume GVN will agree to use US teams at district which represent reasonable security risk. At present time approx 40 of 239 districts are not sufficiently secure to enable us e of US advisors. 8. The JCS Alternative Programs The JCS, given the very few da ys remaining until Secretary McNamara was to meet in Honolulu with COMUSMACV and Ambassador Lodge, did not attempt to reconcile the time-phasing and eventual si ze of the proposed advisory effort at district level. Rather, it submitted to th e Secretary, just prior to his departure for the conference, two separate memora nda: One laid out a prospective program for district advisors throughout RVN; th e other outlined a pilot program at the district level. The purpose of both outl ine advisory efforts was the same--"improving the effectiveness of these paramil itary units in the Vietnamese pacification plan"--but the rate of advisor buildu p differed.

In the proposed "pilot program," for instance, the concept envisaged the phased establishment of teams in 49 districts of seven key provinces during a six-month period. This would require approximately 300 additional advisors. The broader p rogram called for an additional 1,000 advisory personnel, phased over a period o f l-1 years, to cover all 239 districts by the end of CY 1965. The more comprehens ive program estimated that 63 districts (compared to 49 districts in the "pilot program") would be manned by the end of CY 1964. Both were represented as suitab le bases for the Secretary's impending discussions in Honolulu. Both were hurrie dly drawn up alternative schemes for expanding the advisory effort to district l evel. Both, moreover, incorporated the arguments of COMUSMACV: concentration on operations rather than training and a time-phased buildup with due attention to existing security conditions and interpreter availability. The point was also ma de that the total number of additional personnel would necessarily include a sup port slice of approximately 35%. One other question of expansion was addressed b efore the Secretary of Defense's conference in Honolulu in June. The JCS studied the possibility, also in late May, of extending the advisory effort to regular ARVN units at the company level. The JCS agreed with the COMUSMACV and CINCPAC r easoning that such an extension would be undesirable because it would lead to gr eatly increased U.S. casualties, would be unsupportable in terms of necessary la nguage training (one year to 18 months necessary to provide 500 "bilingual" advi sors), and would meet resistance from ARVN commanders faced with strange new rel ationships and potential loss of face. 9. MACV's Preferred Approach Accepted The prevailing military advice, then, when the Secretary met on 1 June with the pri ncipal U.S. managers of the Vietnamese effort, was that it was desirable to expa nd the advisory effort to district level on a careful basis in order to promote better effectiveness in the paramilitary forces engaged in pacification activiti es, but that U.S. advisors should not be extended to company level in the regula r forces. The available record does not make clear the exact positions and argum ents put forward at Honolulu. What is clear is that it was decided, following ba sically the revised estimates proposed by COMUSMACV, to expand the advisory effo rt to district level at some rate (to be worked out later in detail) and to incr ease the size of battalion-level advisory groups by two noncommissioned officers in infantry battalions and cavalry troops and by one commissioned and two nonco mmissioned officers in artillery battalions. The acknowledged effect of the latt er decision was to make company-level advisory teams available on an ad hoc basi s without assigning them on a permanent basis. It is unclear how this scheme sol ved the previous reservations relative to language training, higher casualties, and Vietnamese sensibilities. A likely explanation is that MACV was after a new commander, General Westmoreland, who was more willing to expand the advisory eff ort and less inclined to cite the potential disadvantages of a larger American p resence. General Harkins had already returned to the United States to receive th e Distinguished Service Medal in a ceremony on 24 June and, at the request of Pr esident Johnson, remained in the U.S. until he retired.

At any rate, it was a new COMUSMACV who cabled on 25 June his proposals for the buildup discussed at the beginning of the month in Honolulu. In sum, he asked fo r 900 additional advisors for battalions and districts, suggested a small increa se at province level, and noted that "significant" numbers of personnel would be needed for administrative and logistical support of the new advisors. He also s uggested, in the emphasized portion of the message quoted below, that many of th e district advisory teams could complete their work and be moved to new areas fo r pacification within a year: 1. Augmentation of current US Advisory detachments at the battalion level and further extension of the advisory effort at the dist rict level are necessary now to influence the successful planning and execution of the National Pacification Plan. These additions to the currently authorized a dvisory detachments have been discussed with and agreed to by GVN, and will enab le us to place advisors at the lowest level, as needed, in order to insure that all possible actions are properly coordinated. . . . Extension of US Advisory ef fort to the districts as an initial step toward intensifying the Pacification Pr ogram at the lowest level is essential. This will insure supervision and coordin ation in the employment of paramilitary forces and a general reinforcement of th e pacification effort at district level. Initially, teams of two (2) officers an d three (3) enlisted men [one (1) of whom will be a radio operator] be placed in the forty-five (45) districts of the eight (8) priority provinces. In ten of th ese districts, and in three (3) districts of two other provinces, a limited effo rt is 110w being made by district teams of one (1) officer and one (I) enlisted man; these teams will be increased to full strength district teams. In the provi nces outside of the eight top priority provinces teams will be placed in another sixty-eight (68) districts. Starting 1 Jan 65 it is envisaged that an additiona l fifty (50) teams can be placed, and that by 1 Jul 65 teams from the original d istricts can be placed into the remaining districts in SVN. This extension of US Advisory effort to the district level must be conducted on a phased basis with actual composition and employment as determined by COMUSMACV. Two (2) officers a nd three (3) enlisted men are considered as average team strengths for planning purposes. . . 2. RECAPITULATION OF REQUIREMENTS Capts/Lts E6 123 29 14 90 90 136 136 255 E5/4 123 58 14 45 68 123 Inf Bns (Incl 4 Marine) 29 Arty Bns (Incl 1 Marine) 14 M113 Troops, Armd C4 Sqdns 45 District Adv Teams (Priority province) 68 District Adv Teams (Other pro vinces) TOTAL, adjusted for 13 district teams now in place, 900 (242 officers; 6 58 enlisted) 363 308 3. While this message deals only with the increased advisory effort at the batta lion and district levels consideration is also being given to increases at secto r level, also discussed

at Honolulu. Those recommendations which will be submitted separately will not a pproach the magnitude of the increases recommended in this message for battalion and district levels..... 5. Administrative and logistical support personnel and equipment requirements will be studied separately. From our earlier studies it is apparent that requirements will be significant. 6. An increase of approximate ly eighty (80) US Naval Advisors will also be recommended. Chief US Naval Adviso ry Group, in coordination with CNO VNN, has identified areas in need of addition al advisory effort. I concur in the need and will support recommendation to be s ubmitted separately. 10. Unresolved Issues: Speed and Discretionary Authority Th e decision to increase the advisory effort in the magnitude and fashion just cit ed had already been made in effect. It was necessary, however, for the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense personally to approve every manpower space for M ACV or MAAG Vietnam--not because such decisions could not be delegated but becau se the Secretary chose to reserve them to himself. The questions which remained were, first, how much freedom to adjust numbers to situations (a discretionary a uthority COMUSMACV had consistently requested) would be permitted and, second, t he rate at which the agreed expansion would take place. There could have been ot her questions, of course: should the district advisory effort spread in close ge ographic relation to the pacification plan or follow some other scheme; should t he advisors be conscious agents to increase U.S. leverage or essentially technic al-tactical assistants to their counterparts; how deeply involved should advisor s become in local political administration? There is no indication that these an d other related questions of the advisors' role were brought "up the tape" for e xamination. The principal issue was simply how quickly they should be brought in to South Vietnam and at what level discretionary authority would be granted. The latter question was settled by default. MACV's proposed Joint Table of Distribu tion (JTD) of 15 May 1964, replete with errors and omissions and antedating the decision to expand the advisory effort, became the base line for authorizations to expand. Nobody in the game seemed quite able to keep the detailed numbers str aight. OSD came quickly to focus on the total authorization for U.S. personnel i n Vietnam and, as the papers in the Secretary's files demonstrate, found itself pencilling new numbers in even final draft copies which had undergone several ch ecks and redrafts. The product of this concentration on minutiae at high Washing ton levels was almost complete freedom of employment in the field. The Washingto n policymakers asked how many men were authorized in various activities and how many were assigned. There is no evidence that, once the decision was made to est ablish district advisory teams, these same policymakers probed into priorities o f employment or the roles of these advisors. The rate of the build-up was a much more complicated matter, not because of the additional battalion advisors and t he new district advisors but because the numbers

represented solely by the additional advisors quickly became a relatively small percentage of the total U.S. build-up--all of which was justified as contributin g to the GVN pacification plan and a sizeable portion of which was specifically earmarked to provide administrative and logistical support to the newly arriving advisors. By mid-July COMUSMACV was recommending 4200 personnel in addition to the 926 battalion and district advisors, at least two more helicopter companies, one Caribou company, and numerous major items of equipment as part of the requi red build-up. The increased advisory effort was identified as the cause of this large increase: The increases envisaged . . . will provide for the extension and reinforcement of the advisory effort at the combat unit level and, concurrently , a major extension and reinforcement of the advisory effort at the district lev el in order to improve and accelerate pacification operations. That extension an d augmentation of effort has an immediate impact upon the administrative and log istical support base. In a sense the addition of advisors in this quantity becom es the "straw that broke the camel's back" to an already overburdened support ba se. 11. Secretarial Pressure for a Speed-Up The Secretary of Defense and JCS met on 20 July to discuss these requirements. The JCS supported COMUSMACV. Secretar y McNamara had no argument with the levels of men and equipment requested; his q uestion was why they could not be provided more quickly than indicated by the ti me-phasing in General Westmoreland's detailed breakdown. COMUSMACV had asked for almost 4200 personnel by 1 December 1964 and the balance (comprising only Speci al Forces units) of the 4772 total increase by 1 February 1965. Secretary McNama ra asked the JCS to study the feasibility of accelerating the build-up so that i t would be completed by 30 September. The JCS replied that the advisory personne l could be made available this quickly but that several support unitsparticularl y aviation units-could not reach South Vietnam by 30 September without causing e xtreme difficulties and the degradation of tests of the airmobile concept then i n progress. The Secretary of Defense directed on 7 August that the accelerated d eployment, except for certain critical aviation items and jeeps, be completed by the end of September. He further directed that COMUSMACV be queried as to his a bility to absorb these personnel and units by that date. General Westmoreland's reply stated that he could not reasonably absorb this build-up in the time desir ed by Secretary McNamara. To do so, he said, would generate an unorderly situati on with respect to support facilities and an undesirable hump in personnel rotat ion. The proposed acceleration would not, moreover, satisfy the desired standard s of advisor training or dovetail with the planned expansion of the advisory eff ort: The required training/schooling of Bn/District advisors will be further sac rificed under the proposed compression. A two week in-country orientation is bei ng established to handle the Sep-Oct increments which will not receive CONUS sch ooling prior to arrival. Any further compression would create a requirement for in-country training which is beyond our capability.

Districts must be able to accept advisors based on their status of pacification. The present scheduling of district advisors is phased with the pacification pla n and projected to coincide with its progress.... In summary, the compression of personnel and units would overload our existing facilities and create administr ative problems beyond our capacity to handle in an orderly manner. COMUSMACV has discussed with Amb. Taylor who concurs. 12. MACV's Preference Upheld Again Face d with this reply from the individual responsible for managing the U.S. contribu tion to the advisory and support effort, Secretary McNamara cancelled the accele rated deployment. The military services were instructed to deploy personnel and units to South Vietnam in accordance with General Westmoreland's initial recomme ndation forwarded to Washington a month earlier, in mid-July. The effect of this sequence of decisions stretching from mid-May to mid-August 1964 was to increas e the advisory effort by over 1000 personnel: District Advisors: 553 Battalion A dvisors: 350 Naval (and Marine) Advisory Group: 82 Air Force Advisory Group: 80 TOTAL: 1065 This expansion, and the rate at which it was to proceed, was the pro duct of what may be termed "tacit bargaining" between Washington and Saigon. Was hington typically assumed the initiative in proposing increases and in recommend ing that they be accomplished as quickly as possible. The dominant concern was t he fear that the countryside was being lost to the VC and that the impending U.S . moves to exert direct military pressure against DRV might come too late unless the pacification program could be vitalized. U.S. officials in Saigon tended to prefer to expand gradually and to insure that adequate support facilities were in place before additional advisors were deployed to the field. The product of d esires driven by political awareness of impending failure, on one hand, and desi res driven by managerial awareness of operational conditions, on the other, was an advisory increase almost precisely of the magnitude and rate preferred by the managers in the field. 13. Events Overtake Implementation of the Expansion The really important points to be noted, however, do not concern the relative influe nce of General Westmoreland, Secretary McNamara, the JCS, or other participants in determining the size and rate of this buildup. Rather, the important points a re, first, that the carefully studied decisions did not address some central iss ues and, second, that events acted to overtake the decisions which were made. Th e policymakers did not really

examine how district and additional battalion advisors would improve the executi on of the pacification plan: they simply assumed that a greater U.S. presence wo uld produce beneficial effects. The basis for operational advisors for the param ilitary forces was, quite simply, COMUSMACV's reasoned elaboration of the disuti lity of training advisors. There was no complementary assessment of the usefulne ss of operational advisors. It was necessary to do something in South Vietnam to try to reverse a clearly deteriorating position. The provision of more advisors came very close to being a reflexive response to this situation. The overall ma gnitude of the advisory increase bears directly on the second major point, in wh ich events in RVN overtook the new U.S. response. This is particularly true in t he instance of the new dimension in the advisory effort, the provision of adviso ry teams at the district (subsector) level. Thirteen teams of one officer and on e noncommissioned officer had been deployed in critical districts, it will be re called, in March 1964. The final August decisions to make 553 district advisors available in RVN by 1 December was designed to provide for a larger team (2 offi cers, 3 EM) for each of 113 of the total 239 districts. The MACV plan, then, was to provide U.S. military advisors only to about onehalf of the total number of districts in RVN. By the end of CY 1964 all 113 teams were actually deployed. Th eir total strength at that time was 532 as against the authorized total strength of 565.* By January * The discrepancy between the 553 additional authorization and the total distric t advisor authorization of 565 is accounted for by the transfer of some of the s paces involved in the initial experimental program at district level. 565 is the correct total--113 teams of 5 men each. 1965 the number of district advisors assigned exceeded the number authorized. Th ese teams were deployed, it will be recalled, in the expectation that by some ti me in 1965 a substantial number of them would have worked themselves out of a jo b and be available for reassignment to new areas. This expectation was, to put i t mildly, not validated by events. In February 1965, roughly a month after the l imited expansion to district advisors had been completed, the Khanh government w as replaced by the Quat regime. Over a year of U.S. effort to bring about politi cal stability within the GVN seemed to have been fruitlessly wasted. The U.S. be gan the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam, ROLLING THUNDER, on 26 February. Shortly thereafter, two Marine Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) were la nded at Da Nang for air base security. These measures presaged a growing U.S. ma terial commitment; the trend was heightened by ARVN's performance later in the s pring of 1965. During May and June ARVN suffered a series of near catastrophic d efeats that were instrumental in deciding the Johnson Administration to act on G enera! Westmoreland's recommendation for a greatly expanded U.S. ground combat r ole in the war. On 11 May,

the Viet Cong attacked and overran Song Be, the capita! of Phuoc Long Province, and a U.S. advisory compound in the city with more than a regiment of troops. Bo th the U.S. and Vietnamese took heavy casualties. Before the end of the month, a VC force of undetermined size ambushed and decimated the ARVN 51st Regiment nea r the small outpost of Ba Gia a few kilometers west of Quang Ngai City in I Corp s. The ARVN commander in the area immediately rushed reinforcements to the battl e scene only to have them become victims of a second ambush. The battle dragged on for several days, but ended in a total defeat for ARVN. Two battalions were c ompletely decimated, but more importantly, the ARVN senior commanders on the sce ne had displayed tactical stupidity and cowardice. With a crisis of confidence i n leadership clearly developing within the armed forces, the very real possibili ty of a complete ARVN collapse could not be excluded. COMUSMACV summarized the s ituation in his 7 June cable to CINCPAC: ARVN forces . . . are already experienc ing difficulty in coping with this increased VC capability. Desertion rates are inordinately high. Battle losses have been higher than expected; in fact, four A RVN battalions have been rendered ineffective by VC action in the I and II Corps zones. Therefore, effective fighting strength of many infantry and ranger batta lions is unacceptably low. As a result, ARVN troops are beginning to show signs of reluctance to assume the offensive and in some cases their steadfastness unde r fire is coming into doubt. If anything, Westmoreland's assessment may have bee n too generous. The next week the Viet Cong launched an attack on the new Specia l Forces camp and adjoining district headquarters at Dong Zoai on the northwest corner of War Zone D. ARVN forces were committed piecemeal to the engagement and successively chewed up by more than two regiments of enemy troops. The battle l asted for five days and marked some of the bitterest fighting of the war to that date. The VC summer offensive continued unabated through June and July. On 25 J une, the long expected offensive in the central highlands began when a district headquarters at Tou Morong in Kontum Province was overrun, reportedly by an NVA regiment reinforced with local guerrillas. Other remote district capitals came u nder attack in the following weeks and by 7 July a total of six had been abandon ed or overrun. Casualties soared on both sides; ARVN alone sustained 1,672 in th e second week of June. But the important factor was the dangerous degradation of ARVN unit integrity. By the end of May, the heavy fighting had rendered two ARV N regiments and three battalions combat ineffective by MACV ratings. By 26 June, MACV was forced to rate 5 ARVN regiments and 9 separate battalions ineffective. Losses were so high that in July, 11 of 15 ARVN training battalions had to be t emporarily disorganized to provide fillers for the line units. It was this major degradation of unit effectiveness that evoked the alarm and sense of crisis in Saigon and Washington and constituted the seemingly incontestable arguments in f avor of substantial American forces. ARVN units were defeated in most cases by t heir own tactical ineptness, cowardice, and lack of leadership rather than by ov erall weight of numbers or inferiority of firepower. The U.S. advisory effort ha d sought to strengthen precisely these military intangibles, in addition to equi pping, training and generally supporting ARVN troops. These skills and qualities are, of course, difficult to

teach or impart, but a successful advisory effort must at some point produce a f orce capable of engaging the enemy and defeating him when the ratios of strength and firepower are roughly equal. Far from finding many of its advisory teams fi nishing their task and moving on to new areas or to new units, the U.S. found it self in mid-1965 beginning the commitment of major ground forces to South Vietna m. The deployment of these forces marked the end of a major phase in "advisory w arfare." From this time forward the role of U.S. military and political-military advisors would be determined and practiced in a radically changed environment. C. U.S. COMBAT FORCES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW RELATIONSHIPS (1965) 1. The Abo rtive Limited Expansion of ARVN During the spring of 1965 General Westmoreland's staff prepared a full-blown "Commander's Estimate of the Situation." The estima te, delivered to Washington at the beginning of April, examined three courses of action for dealing with the crisis in South Vietnam. Among these was an acceler ated RVNAF build-up. Even by accelerating the rate of ARVN expansion, COMUSMACV concluded, the ratio of ARVN to VC battalions would decline by the end of 1965 f rom 1.7: 1 to 1.6: 1. General Westmoreland rejected this alternative on the grou nds that it could not prevent a VC victory. It would take too long to accomplish the build-up and there was little assurance that ARVN performance would match t hat of a constantly improving enemy. (His lack of confidence in ARVN is further reflected in his argument for U.S. forces, in which he estimated that one U.S. A rmy battalion is the fighting equivalent of two ARVN battalions and one Marine B LT the equivalent of three ARVN battalions.) These reservations notwithstanding, Westmoreland had requested authorization on 20 March to implement the Alternati ve 2 RVNAF strength increases proposed by him the previous November. After the A pril 1-2 conference in Washington and a review of the "Commander's Estimate," th e JCS recommended approval and Secretary McNamara agreed on 12 April to expand R VNAF by an additional 17,247 spaces. An additional 160 U.S. advisors were approv ed at the same time. In late May, the JCS asked the Secretary of Defense to auth orize MAP support for another 2,369 ARVN spaces to fatten out division bases for the eventual creation of a tenth ARVN division out of existing separate regimen ts. This request was approved on 4 June. Thus, while it was decided not to conti nue to depend exclusively on larger Vietnamese forces with U.S. air and naval su pport, the plan was to conduct a modest expansion of ARVN in conjunction with th e deployment of U.S. forces. In the event, even the modest plans went down the d rain in the aftermath of the heavy casualties sustained in combat during late Ma y and early June. On 7 June, General Westmoreland informed CINCPAC and the JCS t hat a moratorium on RVNAF build-up was unavoidable because trainees in the pipel ine would have to be used as fillers for existing units.

The U.S. build-up continued during the spring and early summer, particularly as a result of ARVN reverses in combat. By the end of July there were 18 US/FW comb at maneuver battalions deployed in South Vietnam. In the same message in which h e advised of the halt in ARVN expansion, General Westmoreland had requested a si gnificant increase in the number of U.S. troops for Vietnam (the famed "44-Batta lion" request). After more than a month of deliberation, the President finally a pproved the request sometime in midJuly. His historic announcement of the expand ed U.S. effort came on 28 July. Understandably, this momentous expansion of the U.S. involvement in the war completely overshadowed the advisory program and the growth of RVNAF during the remainder of 1965. 2. New Possibilities But the depl oyment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam did, however, open up a new range of poss ible relationships which would not have been possible without the presence of su bstantial U.S. combat forces. Each of these relationships might conceivably prom ote one or all of the several purposes which this study has reasoned to be behin d the U.S. military advisory effort: the development of improved tactical and te chnical competence in RVNAF, the generation of better intelligence (both friendl y and enemy), and increased U.S. influence. Two categories of new relationships were considered: the encadrement of U.S. and ARVN units (in several forms) and t he establishment of a joint command to conduct the war. Both of these courses we re rejected by COMUSMACV. In their place General Westmoreland attempted to creat e a Joint US-RVNAF staff to coordinate independent national efforts. The basic a rrangement enabling tactical independence--within limits-was the creation of mut ually exclusive Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs) for each combat maneuve r force. 3. Encadrement Considered and Rejected Deficiencies in ARVN leadership had long been recognized by U.S. military advisors as one of the key impediments to increased ARVN performance. In April, when the first major input of U.S. com bat troops took place, consideration was given to the encadrement of U.S. office rs in ARVN units as a way of solving this problem. The proposal was touched off by a DoD request on 15 April for COMUSMACV's opinion about the feasibility of us ing U.S. cadres to improve effectiveness in the ten ARVN divisions. The same day , McGeorge Bundy sent a personal NODIS message to Ambassador Taylor stating amon g other things, that "The President has repeatedly emphasized his personal desir e for a strong experiment in the encadrement of U.S. troops with the Vietnamese. " General Westmoreland turned the issue over to his deputy, General Throckmorton , for a recommendation. Throckmorton's study considered three alternative encadr ement possibilities: (1) assumption of officer and senior NCO command positions by U.S. personnel within the designated ARVN battalions; (2) assignment of U.S. personnel as staff officers, and in technical and specialist positions within th e battalions; and (3) the employment of U.S. troops as fire support elements

within ARVN-commanded battalions. Two critical difficulties applicable to all of these schemes were identified: the language barrier and the expanded support re quirement that would be generated for U.S. personnel. Another negative factor wa s the expected adverse effect of any such step on South Vietnamese morale. These formed the basis for General Throckmorton's recommendation that encadrement be rejected. COMUSMACV endorsed his deputy's recommendation and the general encadre ment idea was officially pronounced dead during the 18 April Honolulu Conference . Only three days had elapsed from the birth of the proposal to its burial. 4. M arine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) But while general encadrement was effectiv ely killed by COMUSMACV a specific, limited experiment in encadrement was begun later in the year almost off-handedly by the U.S. Marines near Phu Bai. Since th e Marine units had been assigned TAORs larger than they could secure, innovative commanders sought ways to maximize local security resources. In June, a company commander of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines near Phu Bai assigned a few Marines to the villages in his tactical area to work with the Popular Forces platoons. M arine leadership, training, and access to powerful fire support brought measurab le improvement in the PF units. As a result the Commanding General, 1st ARVN Div ision, placed six PF platoons under the operational control of the Marine battal ion. By November, the effort had achieved such results that it was brought to th e attention of the CG III MAF. Later that month an agreement was reached between the I Corps Commander and the CG III MAF permitting the integration of Marine s quads into PF platoons in the Da Nang area to improve their effectiveness and st iffen their combat performance. The basic unit of the new venture was the Combin ed Action Platoon (CAP) formed by adding a Marine Rifle Squad of 14 men plus a N avy corpsman to a PF platoon (32-38 authorized strength). The PF platoon retaine d its own organization and the integrated Marines advised the entire unit, livin g with it, sharing its food, conducting combined patrols, and training counterpa rts. At the end of 1965, there were seven such Combined Action Platoons, but the success of the experiment in enhancing PF performance and extending security pr ompted a rapid expansion during the next year. The Marines have continued to pre ss for expansion of this program and to see in it an effective method by which t o produce increased performance in PF units. Critics have noted that the Marine advisors quickly become de facto leaders of the CAPs and argued that a higher le vel of current performance is purchased at the cost of stultifying the developme nt of South Vietnamese leadership. No general consensus has developed on the rel ative merits of this combined organization. 5. Joint Command Considered and Reje cted The 1965 commitment of U.S. forces also prompted a high level U.S. debate o n the advisability of creating some form of unified combined command. The questi on was first raised in Washington in mid-March when General H. K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, returned from a visit to Vietnam with the recommendation for dep loyment of U.S.

combat forces. The idea had the same conceptual origins as the encadrement propo sals, namely that if RVNAF could be commanded by or associated with U.S. troops it might be molded at last into an effective fighting force. In addition, such a unified allied command would have given the senior commander-presumably COMUSMA CV-far greater freedom to deploy forces and fight the war in the straight-forwar d pursuit of unambiguous objectives, rather than restricting him to coordination with Vietnamese counterparts whose motivations at all times were a compromise o f political and personal as well as military considerations. When queried on the matter, General Westmoreland opposed any formal merging of commands, preferring instead the maintenance of informal cooperation and coordination together with a limited combined staff under an American chief with a Vietnamese deputy. This arrangement would better assuage the GVN's sensitivities to questions of soverei gnty and "neo-colonialism." Full integration of command, General Westmoreland ad vised, should be deferred until some later time when the influx of U.S. forces m ight require it and GVN sensibilities might be more disposed to its acceptance. In May, Secretary McNamara authorized the creation of a formal combined authorit y in Vietnam. But since both Ky and Thieu had just publicly condemned any joint command idea in press interviews, both Ambassador Taylor and General Westmorelan d recommended against the proposed action. CINCPAC backed up COMUSMAC V's concer n about alienating the South Vietnamese: Refs A and B [Saigon message 3855, 24 M ay; and COMUSMACV message 17292, 24 May] again point out the formidable disadvan tages which obstruct early establishment of any formal combined command authorit y in South Vietnam. I am fully in accord with the views of the Ambassador and Ge neral Westmoreland in this regard. The long-range nature of the actions directed by Ref C [JCS msg 3159, 14 May] is recognized. At the same time it is apparent that we should anticipate continued public speculation as to the purpose and mot ive of any consolidation of multi-national forces into a single command if we pu rsue even the most limited measures. Although a combined command might generate an outward illusion of unity, many divisive influences will remain at work benea th the surface to exacerbate claims of American neocolonialism and self-assumed leadership. Conventional operations of Corps-level magnitude, in contrast to cou nterinsurgency operations, would of course require closer coordination and possi bly some form of international command mechanism. Until a combined command is cl early in our best interests we should continue to stimulate RVN resolve to fight a counterinsurgency war which is and must remain their primary responsibility. Premature experimentation with new command arrangements would be counter-product ive should it weaken national unity within the RVNAF or promote a feeling of apa thy in the countryside. 6. TAORs, Senior Advisors, and a Combined Staff

These exchanges effectively ended the question of unified command. In the absenc e of unity of command, General Westmoreland had already accepted the concept of the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), an expedient coordinating mechanism originally worked out between the local ARVN commanders and the Marines defendin g the DaNang perimeter. The concept was a practical one for a war in which there are no front lines and in which military units operate throughout the country. Specific geographic areas were assigned to specific units who then had exclusive authority and responsibility to operate within them. Military units could not e nter or fire into another unit's TAOR without the permission of its commander. S ubsequently, the concept would raise some problems as the' requirement for rapid redeployment and the extensive use of air mobility made such formal, fixed arra ngements awkward. But in 1965 the TAOR provided a simple and effective solution to the coordination problem raised by units under different commands operating t hroughout the country. Its adoption may be viewed as an attempt to provide limit ed, territorial unity of command in the absence of an overall, national unifying mechanism. General Westmoreland attempted to compensate for this absence of uni ty (which he had endorsed for non-military reasons) by the creation of a combine d coordinating staff at the national level and by making the senior U.S. militar y commanders also the senior military advisor within their respective areas of c oncern. In April he decided to raise with the GVN the question of a combined MAC V-JGS staff. (He had already extended the tour in RVN of the general officer he had chosen to head this staff.) Such a staff might have permitted the developmen t of agreed operational plans based upon agreed priorities. It would have been a possible intermediate step toward unity of effort. But the GVN (represented by Generals Thieu and "Little" Minh) resisted any suggestion for an integrating mec hanism of this kind. The proposal was quietly dropped. On the U.S. side, where h is suggestions had the force of orders, General West-moreland took one step to i ntegrate the U.S. combat and advisory functions. The Commanding General, III Mar ine Amphibious Force, the senior U.S. officer in the area, was designated on 7 A ugust as the Senior Advisor to the ARVN I CTZ Commander. The former U.S. Senior Advisor became the Deputy Senior Advisor under CG, III MAF, although no further integration of the advisory structure into the U.S. chain of command was attempt ed. This pattern was soon extended to the other two Corps areas where major U.S. units were operating. The latter changes were made at the insistence of the ARV N Corps Commanders who felt that they would suffer a loss of prestige if they we re "advised" by anyone other than the senior U.S. officer in the zone. Thus, on 21 October, the commander of Hq, Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV), with operationa l control of all U.S. units in II Corps, was also named II Corps Senior Advisor. On 1 December, CG, 1st Infantry Division was named III Corps Senior Advisor, fo llowing the pattern already established. No such arrangement was made, however, in IV Corps since the U.S. had no major units deployed there. Later, when U.S. f orce deployments had led to the establishment of another FFORCEV headquarters, e ach ARVN Corps Commander was advised by a U.S. Lieutenant General with equivalen t U.S. responsibilities and a U.S. general officer was appointed Senior Advisor in the Delta area, which had no U.S. combat maneuver units.

7. Leverage: The Hidden Issue It is relevant to ask why COMUSMACV (backed up wit hout exception by the Ambassador and CINCPAC) uniformly opposed integrative meas ures designed to provide that which was and is almost an article of faith in the military profession-unity of command. U.S. troops in both World Wars and in Kor ea had fought under at least nominal command unity. There had been reservations for national integrity, to be sure, but the principle of unified command was bot h established and generally accepted. Why then did the U.S. military commander i n Vietnam recommend against its adoption? The answer to this question is not to be found by an examination of military factors. The issue, rather, was a politic al one, as CINCPAC's message quoted above makes clear. The U.S. military leaders feared the exacerbations of US- SVN differences which they thought would accomp any an overt Americanization of the war. They wished to increase U.S. influence in the conduct of the war but only as a result of persuasion and example. They t ended to eschew the use of leverage. A unified command arrangement would have pr ovided--assuming that a U.S. officer would have been the overall commander--an o pen and obvious means by which to exercise leverage. The U.S. leaders in Saigon rejected its adoption for this reason. 8. Withdrawing from Overt Influence The r ejection of a unified military command is only one example of the tendency in 19 65 to renounce leverage oriented mechanisms at the very time that the U.S. was c ommitting major land forces to the war. It was as though the U.S. increased its determination to avoid arrangements which smacked of direct, open leverage at th e same time that the inadequacy of earlier, indirect measures was made obvious b y the deployment to South Vietnam of U.S. ground combat forces. This may, in fac t, be what happened. Some sporadic earlier attempts at leverage had not borne th e desired fruit. Ambassador Taylor had had a disastrous experience in trying to use the U.S. decision to commence bombing North Vietnam as a lever to get GVN re form in December 1964. The net outcome was a violent reaction by General Khanh, who very nearly had Taylor thrown out of the country as personna non grata. In t he end, it was Khanh who went, but the political turmoil that this produced in t he first months of 1965, when the course of the war was taking a dramatic turn a gainst the GVN, convinced Taylor that such attempts should not be made again at the national level. Concurrently, one of the most direct U.S. tools for influenc ing policy implementation at lower levels, the joint sign-off for release of pia ster funds for pacification, was also being abandoned. The decision was made in December 1964 by the USOM Director, Mr. Killen. Early in 1965, AID stopped buyin g piasters for the U.5.-controlled sector funds and, in June, agreement was reac hed with the GVN for province chiefs to begin requisitioning and releasing AID c ommodities on their own authority. Thus, the "troika sign-off" came to an end. W hile elaborate arrangements were made for getting reports of U.S. advisor concur rence or non-concurrence, the practical effect was to remove the

advisor's leverage and restrict his influence. In October, USOM began to have se cond thoughts on the wisdom of abandoning control of its resources in the field and proposed a restoration of the "troika sign-off." The Mission Council endorse d the plan and had already launched discussions with the GVN when the State Depa rtment objected to the idea, insisting that it would undermine our efforts to ma ke the Vietnamese more independent and effective. There the matter died. In a so mewhat related effort to overcome the delays in the Vietnamese pacification syst em, MACV acceded to its advisors' recommendations and, on 1 October, created a s eparate contingency fund of 50,000 piasters for each sub-sector (district) advis or to be used for urgent projects. Sector advisors were also given access to spe cial funds. The program was highly successful and toward the end of the year con sideration was given to permanent establishment of such revolving funds. The pla n was abandoned, however, after the four-month trial period due to the strong op position of the GVN Minister for RD, General Thang, who contended that such fund s were undermining the legitimate efforts of his organization to meet urgent pro vince needs; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence on the U.S. But USOM did u se successfully a form of direct, selective leverage in the late summer of 1965. The Province Chief of Binh Tuy Province, Lt Colonel Chi, was accused of misusin g some $250,000 in AID funds. When USOM pressure on the GVN for his removal prod uced no results, aid to the province was suspended on 23 September, and USOM fie ld personnel were withdrawn. In spite of Chi's friendship with the Defense Minis ter and Deputy Premier, General Co, Premier Ky removed him six weeks later. Aid to the province then resumed, but Ambassador Lodge made it clear to the Mission Council that he disapproved of the action and did not want it repeated (particul arly the press coverage). As already indicated, both Ambassadors Taylor (after h is near-disastrous experience in December 1964) and Lodge preferred not to force the GVN or attempt to use high-level pressure to reach solutions we felt necess ary. The fragility of the political arrangements in Saigon at any point in time seemed to dictate against any U.S. action that might precipitate coups or disrup tion from elements even less disposed to be cooperative than the current group, whoever they might be. In this view, the successive Ambassadors were strongly su pported by the State Department. Thus, while we resented the Ky coup in June, we did nothing to exacerbate our delicate relations with Ky. In July, during Secre tary McNamara's visit, the GVN requested a devaluation of the piaster and a heft y increase in aid. Rather than use the request as an opportunity to press the GV N for action on matters of U.S. concern, Ambassador Taylor preferred to restrict our counter-demands in the interest of quick agreement: We would avoid giving t he impression of asking for new agreements or imposing conditions for our increa se AID. . . . We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to require prolonged debate.

Consequently, agreement was reached between the two governments on 28 July, prov iding only for "joint discussions to precede policy decisions . . . for control of inflation," and scarcely mentioning GVN obligations. 9. McNamara's Minority P osition on Leverage The only consistent supporter of increasing and exercising U .S. leverage with the GVN during 1965 was Secretary McNamara. As previously note d, he was one of the principal proponents of the joint command idea and a suppor ter of the encadrement proposals. In April, the Defense Department had launched an ill-fated effort to have U.S. Army civil affairs officers introduced in the p rovinces to assure competent, corruption-free civil administration in the combat zones. Ambassador Taylor's stout opposition had killed the proposal, but the Se cretary continued to push for stronger U.S. action with the GVN. After his July visit to Saigon he sent a memorandum to the President urging the U.S. to lay dow n terms for its continuing assistance before the introduction of more U.S. force s. He suggested that we exercise leverage through our control of rice policy and gain a "veto on major GVN commanders, statements about invading NVN, and so on. " Again in November, McNamara recorded his impatience with the GVN and his belie f that we should give a larger and more active role to our advisors at the provi nce and district level. But the overall U.S. approach to the GVN in 1965 was dom inated by our felt need for any kind of governmental stability which would provi de a base from which to conduct the war. Proposals for taking a tough line were widely regarded as rugs that if pulled out from under the GVN would bring it cra shing down, rather than as levers that might bring effective change. 10. U.S. Pr oposals for GVN Execution: an Example With leverage-oriented arrangements effect ively ruled out, U.S. advisors in South Vietnam were left with the alternatives of advising their counterparts only on how best to conduct a decided course or o f expanding their advice to embrace what ought to be undertaken. The tendency wa s to follow the latter course, to urge upon GVN plans and programs American in c oncept and design for execution by the South Vietnamese. The Chieu Hoi ("Open Ar ms" for VC who return voluntarily to GVN control) program was one example of thi s tendency. The Hop Tac ("cooperation," in Vietnamese) program, to clear and hol d the immediate area around Saigon, is another. Hop Tac's significance with resp ect to U.S. advisory activities resides in the fact that it was the most concert ed attempt to apply the "oil blot" concept to rural pacification since the demis e of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Its failure can be attributed in large measur e to GVN lack of interest in and support for what was widely regarded as an "Ame rican" program. The idea of a special combined US/GVN effort to secure the criti cal area ringing Saigon was first advanced by Ambassador Lodge in July 1964, at the Honolulu Conference. His concern with the problem went back to late 1963 whe n the re-appraisals of the war following Diem's overthrow revealed a dangerous d eterioration in the III Corps area. A special USOM report on Long An Province ha d particularly troubled the Ambassador. In

July 1964, as he was returning from his first tour in Vietnam, he proposed a spe cial effort in eight provinces (Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh T uong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, and Quang Ngia), all but one of which was near Saigon. The proposal was picked up by Ambassador Taylor and the program set in motion d uring the summer of 1964. The initial objective was to stabilize the situation a round Saigon and protect the capital, then extend the zone of security in an eve r widening ring around the city. MACV appointed Colonel Jasper J. Wilson to head the effort and by September 1964 a plan had been produced and the Vietnamese re luctantly induced to set up a special council to coordinate the multiple command s operating in the area. The plan created four roughly concentric zones around t he capital, each to be successively cleared and secured, working from the "insid e of the doughnut out." Conceptually, three phases were involved in each zone: f irst, search and destroy missions to eliminate main force units; then a clearing phase using primarily squad and platoon size forces in patrols and ambushes; an d finally, the securing phase in which ARVN turned over responsibilities for sec urity in a zone to RF/PF and national police and in which heavy emphasis was to be laid on positive rural economic and social development efforts. Hop Tac was l aunched on 12 September 1964, with a sweep through Gia Dinh Province to the west and southwest of Saigon by the ARVN 51st Regiment. The mission was aborted the following day, however, by withdrawal of the forces to participate in a coup. Ne vertheless, organizational efforts continued and more ARVN forces were concentra ted in the Hop Tac area. A special survey of the area by USOM, USIS, and MACV in October revealed that little real progress was being made. In spite of the lack of any visible evidence of genuine momentum, the Ambassador and MACV continued to be encouraged by the modest statistical progress of Hop Tac at a time when ne arly every other activity in the country looked blacker and blacker. The 1964 MA CV Command History reflects the official view: "At the end of 1964, Hop Tac was one of the few pacification areas that showed some success and greater promise." Whether in response to Hop Tac or not, the VC substantially increased their for ces in the Hop Tac area in the first six months of 1965. MACV estimated the grow th at 65 percent and also noted that the new troops were frequently equipped wit h Chinese weapons. This growth in enemy strength in turn prompted some redeploym ent of RVNAF to strengthen capabilities in the Capital Military Region. In Febru ary, 1965, just at the time the U.S. was initiating the sustained bombing of Nor th Vietnam and beginning the first Marine combat deployments in the South, COMUS MACV asked the I and IV Corps senior advisors to review current programs and to develop Hop Tac-like plans for their respective areas as a basis for discussion with their counterparts. General West-moreland hoped to concentrate the availabl e resources of each Corps into its most critical areas at a time when VC activit y and successes were continually mounting and enemy control of the country incre asing dangerously. Again, the operative concept was to be the oil blot. By April General Westmoreland had convinced Minister of the Armed Forces Minh to ask eac h of the ARVN Corps Commanders (except III Corps, in whose area Hop Tac was bein g conducted) to draw up similar plans for their own areas of responsibility.

The U.S. effort was clearly aimed at spurring the practical application of the " oil blot" analogy. The effects, however, were to demonstrate how difficult it wa s to translate simple counterinsurgent theory into practice, how convoluted and personal were the ARVN lines of influence, and how frustrating it was under thes e circumstances to exercise influence by persuasion. In May, the Prime Minister proposed organizational changes in Hop Tac to return much of it to the operation al control of the III Corps commander. These changes were rejected by COMUSMACV, but he did agree that the III Corps commander might be named chairman of the Ho p Tac Council. In June, before anything could be done on this proposal, a coup w ith General Ky at its head returned the military to power. By the summer of 1965 , Hop Tac was being completely overshadowed by the build-up of U.S. forces. In S eptember, Lodge returned to Vietnam for his second stint as Ambassador. He immed iately asked a U.S. Mission officer for a private assessment of the Hop Tac prog ram. The report frankly described Hop Tac as a failure and stressed as reasons t he unrealistic goals of the program, the irrelevance of the concentric circle co ncept to actual areas of GVN and VC strength, the fact that it was an American p lan never really given first priority by the Vietnamese, the area's political vu lnerability to fallout from Saigon political changes, and General Ky's lack of s upport for it. The report recommended letting Hop Tac slowly die. On September 1 5, the Mission Council deliberated inconclusively on the fate of the program: Ge neral Westmoreland said that while Hop Tac could be said only to have been about 50% successful, it had undoubtedly averted a VC siege of Saigon. Ambassador Lod ge then briefly reviewed the original reasons for the emphasis placed on the are a surrounding Saigon and said that they were still valid, primarily because of t he heavy density of population. He noted, however, lack of a clear commitment to Hop Tac on the part of the GVN, possibly due to the fact that the Vietnamese co nsider the program an American scheme. The view was also expressed that the trou ble may also lie in US/GVN differences over some fundamental concepts in Hop Tac . By the end of 1965, the proposal for Hop Tac programs in I, II, and IV Corps h ad refined itself into the scheme for National Priority Areas that became the fo cus of attention in 1966. Hop Tac itself, in the Saigon vicinity, continued on i nto 1966 to be finally phased out at the end of the year and replaced by the III Corps R/D Council and a U.S. military effort to protect the capital known as Op eration FAIRFAX. As a test case for the ever popular oil blot theory of pacifica tion, Hop Tac left much to be desired. It did, however, point up some of the dif ficulties to be encountered in any attempt to implement this appealingly simple-and perhaps simplistic--concept. The oil blot theory, like all abstract analogi es, emphasizes the similarity between phenomena and ignores the differences. The important similarity of the pacification problem to the oil blot is the express ed goal of progressively extending the secure zone until it embraces the entire country. Unlike a blank piece of paper, however, the environment in which

pacification must take place is neither neutral nor passive; and unlike the oil blot, the pacification forces are not impervious. Moreover, implicit in the theo ry is the notion that the secure area, like the oil blot, will expand in all dir ections simultaneously, at roughly the same speed, and that expansion is irrever sible and irrevocable. Further, the analogy fails to take into account unique pr oblems of terrain or variances in government and insurgent strength in different areas. One need not belabor the point; the concept is fine as a theory, but not as a program design. In fairness, it must be said that the idea does focus the need for concentration of resources in priority areas. All this notwithstanding, III Corps was less than the optimum place to test such a program. It contains s everal longtime Viet Cong strongholds and base areas and is extraordinarily sens itive to political changes in Saigon (28 of 31 district chiefs were replaced dur ing the lifetime of Hop Tac). The most important reason for the failure of Hop T ac, however, was the lack of South Vietnamese support for it. From its inception to its demise, it was an American idea, plan, and program. While the GVN adopte d it, established a high-level council to supervise it, and committed some troop s and other resources to it, this was seen as a way of appeasing the Americans. The South Vietnamese never accorded Hop Tac a high priority in their own thinkin g. Moreover, its low status was further emphasized by the massive U.S. force bui ld-up. As this U.S. build-up became relatively routinized, however, the issue of pacification reasserted itself. When it did so, the primary U.S. concern came t o focus on the issue of how best to organize the military, paramilitary, and civ ilian advisory efforts. Since even the civilian advisors in the field were milit ary personnel on loan in many instances, the account of the military advisory bu ild-up decisions became essentially an account of organizing advice for pacifica tion. D. ORGANIZATION AS THE KEY TO EFFECTIVENESS IN PACIFICATION (1966-1967) 1. The Basis for Organizational Preoccupation Several factors contributed to the p ersistent U.S. preoccupation in 1966 and 1967 with reorganizing the advisory eff ort in order better to support pacification activities. First, it had been an ar ticle of faith for several years within U.S. policymaking circles that only by w inning the "other war" of pacification could the U.S. hope to realize its object ives in South Vietnam. Secondly, the pacification struggle was still regarded es sentially as a task to be performed by the GVN--as the "main force war" no longe r was after the introduction of major U.S. combat forces. Reinforcing this belie f was a third factor, the widely held conviction that U.S. forces could best con centrate on the main force war while RVNAF focused on pacification. Such a U.S.RVNAF division of effort, it was reasoned, would permit U.S. forces to take adva ntage of their greater tactical mobility and fire support without endangering ci vilian life and property, employ RVNAF in a manner calculated to minimize the ad verse effects of its persistent inability to generate an offensive-minded esprit , and avoid the cultural acclimitization and language difficulties which would f ace U.S. forces in the pacification role. It seemed, in short, that RVNAF concen tration on pacification and U.S.

concentration on the main force enemy would constitute the optimal use of availa ble resources. This division of effort meant that most U.S. military advisors wo uld be directly involved in pacification-at least periodically if not continuous ly. Advisors to regular ARVN units could expect to spend a considerable portion of their time securing pacification programs. Those advisors whose counterparts had political and administrative responsibilities (e.g., province and district a dvisors) and paramilitary advisors (RF and PF) could expect pacification to be t heir major concern. But while the majority of U.S. military advisors would be en gaged in pacification activities they would not be the only U.S. advisory person nel whose responsibilities focused on pacification programs. Advisors from USOM, CAS, and USIS had overlapping and in some instances competing responsibilities. Thus it was logical for the U.S. to attempt to devise an organizational framewo rk which would serve to coordinate adequately the activities of the large and di verse body of advisors and which would be capable to integrate their overlapping functions. 2. Unresolved Issues At the beginning of 1966, three important issue s concerning the pacification effort were unresolved. Each of these issues was t entatively resolved during late 1966 or in 1967-in the sense that decisions were made rather than that these decisions were final. The remainder of 1967 and ear ly 1968 (until the Tet offensive) constituted a period of consolidation and refi nement based on limited experimentation. The shock caused by the Tet offensive t hen brought to the fore new questions of RVNAF effectiveness and of U.S.-RVNAF r oles and missions. The first of the unresolved issues in 1966 was that of which U.S. agency or group should take the lead in coordinating pacification programs. The role which RVNAF should assume in support of pacification was the second un resolved issue. Finally, the extent to which the U.S. should be willing to exert leverage in order to influence pacification activities was also unresolved at t he beginning of 1966. The following account of the decisions addressed to these three issues may seem to suggest that a master list of problems was somehow appr oached as part of an orderly, comprehensive, logical process. This is not, of co urse, the way it happened. The policy process was confusing and the policymakers were occasionally confused. Decisions were made in the reflection of both U.S. and South Vietnamese domestic pressures and in the shadow of an on-going war. Th ey were affected by personalities on all sides and involved no small amount of b ureaucratic in-fighting. The account that follows attempts to reorder and to exp lain this evolution, not to recreate it. 3. Who Shall Lead? The "reemphasis on p acification," as another study in this series aptly names it, may conveniently b e dated from the Honolulu Conference of February 1966. With the build-

up of U.S. combat forces proceeding rapidly and with expectations high that 1966 would see the U.S. take the offensive, policy attention returned to address the "other war" in which the object was to provide rural security followed by steps to improve living levels and establish a link between the GVN and its populace. President Johnson made it clear in his informal remarks to the conferees at Hon olulu that he wanted concrete results to follow the splendid phrases of the U.S. -GVN communique: Preserve this communique, because it is one we don't want to fo rget. It will be a kind of bible that we are going to follow. When we come back here 90 days from now, or six months from now, we are going to start out to put into effect the announcements that the President, the Chief of State and the Pri me Minister made. . . . You men who are responsible for these departments, you m inisters and the staffs associated with them in both governments, bear in mind w e are going to give you an examination and the "finals" will be on just what you have done. How have you built democracy in the rural areas? How much of it have you built, when and where? Give us dates, times, numbers. .....Larger outputs, more efficient production to improve credit, handicraft, light industry, rural e lectrification-are those just phrases, high-sounding words, or have you "coonski ns on the wall?" All parties regarded it as necessary for some mechanism to coor dinate the U.S. advisory activities which would help the Vietnamese to turn prom ises into solid accomplishments. But they did not agree on how broad should be t he unit of the coordinator. Was he, or his office, to be primus inter pares or a single manager? Did effective coordination require policy primacy or operationa l supervision--or both? Above all, the participants did not agree on which indiv idual or agency should exercise whatever supra-departmental authority was needed . Ambassador Lodge, who had consistently stressed the centrality of the "other w ar," began by assigning responsibility for all civil support for Revolutionary D evelopment (read "pacification") to his deputy, Ambassador Porter. The latter de scribed his concept of his duties in traditionalist Foreign Service Officer term s: Ambassador Porter described briefly his new responsibilities as he sees them in the pacification/rural development area. He pointed out that the basic idea i s to place total responsibility on one senior individual to pull together all of the civil aspects of revolutionary development. He sees this primarily as a coo rdinating effort and does not intend to get into the middle of individual agency activities and responsibilities. As he and his staff perceive areas which requi re attention and action by a responsible agency, he will call this to the attent ion of that agency for the purpose of emphasis; he intends to suggest rather tha n to criticize. Porter's "coordination by suggestion" approach was not only an e xample of extremely limited effective authority, it was also restricted explicit ly to the civil side of support for

pacification. Whether the coordinator-in-chief emerged as a persuader or a direc tor it was clear that his charge had to embrace both military and civil advisors . (In this respect "civil" is more accurate than "civilian", for a sizeable numb er of the civil advisory duties had devolved upon active duty military officers who were "loaned" to other agencies for this purpose.) It is not surprising that MACV viewed itself as preeminent in this area. It was, as General Westmoreland rightly claimed, the only U.S. organization advising the GVN at all levels and-i n one way or another-in all functions. It was to MACV that General Thang, the Mi nister of Rural Construction (read "pacification") looked for advice and assista nce. It is equa'ly unsurprising that Ambassador Lodge was of a different persuas ions as he explained clearly in a memo setting forth his views to General Lansda le in December 1965: I consider the government of Vietnam's effort in this domai n (apart from the military clearing phase) to be primarily civilian, economic, s ocial and political in nature and in its aims. Consequently, on the American sid e, it is preferable that the two civilian agencies most directly concerned, i.e. , USAID and CAS, be the operating support agencies upon whom you should rely for the implementation of the necessary programs as they develop. Other sections of the Mission, including MACV, JUSPAO should consider themselves associated with . . . USAID and CAS, but not as agencies directly responsible for operations. Th e foregoing is intended to insure that the number of persons and agencies contac ting the GVN and particularly the Ministry of Rural Construction, on the subject of pacification and development is reduced, and in fact is limited to yourself or your representative~ plus the representatives of the two operating agencies, USAID and CAS. Operational and coordinative responsibilities remained on this pa rticular wicket throughout most of 1966 while Washington fumed over the slow pac e of pacification. These months saw the development of sufficient frustration in Washington to permit the growth and final acceptance of the proposal that all U .S. advice for pacification be placed under MACV. An account of this development is treated more fully in another document in this series and will only be summa rized here. President Johnson's Washington coordinator for pacification, Robert W. Komer, set forth in August 1966 three alternative organizational approaches: Alternative No. 1--Give [Deputy Ambassadorl Porter operational control over all pacification activity. Alternative No. 2--Retain the present separate civil and military command channels but strengthen the management structure of both MACV a nd the U.S. Mission. Alternative No. 3--Assign responsibility for pacifications civil and military, to COMUSMACV. Mr. Komer's categorization was prescient. Amba ssador Lodge's personal preference and the fact that most pacification advisors were military seemed to rule out the first course of

action. The second alternative described essentially the organization followed u nder the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) from November 1966 until June 1967. By this late date the U.S. decided to follow the third of Komer's alternatives. Th e first of these reorganizations, that which created OCO, was quite literally fo rced upon Ambassador Lodge. Particularly in view of the fact that OCO was to be given only a 90-120 day trial to produce identifiable results, he was not eager to undergo the turmoil and lost motion of one major reorganization only as a pre lude to yet another reorganization. He wanted to retain as much nonmilitary flav or to the pacification effort as possible-regarding it as complementary to milit ary programs, yet separate from them. Military security activities were, in his view, essentially the negative precondition to pacification activities which wer e the positive acts leading the GVN to vitalize itself at the same time that it developed real ties to its own people. 4. CORDS Replaces OCO Thus OCO entered th e world foredoomed by the combination of too short a prescribed life span and th e tendency of some of its unwilling partners to do more than support it tacitly while they maneuvered to get their blue chips into another basket. Secretary McN amara had recommended in October 1966 that MACV take responsibility for pacifica tion. Undersecretary of State Katzenbach had marshalled a strong case against th is step at least until embassy leadership of civil operations was given a chance . The upshot was that it was given half a chance--which may have been worse than none at all. OCO did, however, accomplish the creation and selection of Regiona l Directors and OCO Province Representatives. One individual was made responsibl e for all civil operations in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and in each provinc e. The U.S. military chain of command had already adapted itself to parallel the RVNAF organization, but below Corps level it was more complex. Each division wi thin ARVN was advised by a senior advisor (a colonel) who was given supervisory authority over the military Sector (Province) Advisors within the Divisional Tac tical Area (DTA) for which his division had responsibility. Thus, while civil li nes of authority went directly from corps level (the region) to province, the mi litary advisory chain added an additional link at division. Sector advisors unde r this arrangement found themselves working under a military officer whose advis ory responsibilities were actually military whereas theirs were only partly (and sometimes only nominally) military. OCO attempted to have the ARVN divisions re moved from pacification responsibilities, but without success. When the Office o f Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was established under MACV in mid-1967 as the single manager for all pacification advisors, the issue could not be argued with the same force. For by the time COMUSMACV assume d responsibility for pacification (through a civilian deputy-Ambassador Komer), ARVN had also expanded its role in the pacification effort. The ARVN division, i t could be argued, was as much a part of the pacification effort as were the pro grams supported by the U.S. civil agencies.

But although the argument for removing the Senior Division Advisor from the U.S. chain of command over provincial advisors lost theoretic weight with the creati on of CORDS, the new civilian deputy to COMUSMACV secured General Westmoreland's approval to remove the division advisors from the pacification chain of command and to work to get ARVN to take parallel action. This step illustrates the exte nt to which civil influences were able to operate within this new section of MAC V. CORDS was of such size that it became quasi-independent. One would have to ca rry an issue in dispute all the way to COMUSMACV before it moved outside of CORD S channels. The comprehensiveness of this reorganization may be seen in the foll owing MACV Directive, reproduced in its entirety, and especially in the schemati c diagram laying out the new U.S. command structure for a Corps area: MACV Dir 10-12 HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM A PO San Francisco 96222 28 May 1967 (MACCORDS) DIRECTIVE NUMBER 10-12 ORGANIZATIO NS AND FUNCTIONS FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT 1. P URPOSE. To provide for the integration of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Dev elopment Support activities within MACV. 2. GENERAL. a. To provide for single ma nager direction of all US civil/military Revolutionary Development activities in the Republic of Vietnam, responsibility has been assigned to COMUSMACV. b. The position of Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support to COMUSMACV is established and carries the personal rank of Ambassador. The Deput y for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support to COMUSMACV assist s COMUSMACV in discharging his responsibilities in the field of military and civ ilian support to the GVN's Revolutionary Development Program. Specifically, he i s charged by COMUSMACV with supervising the formulation and execution of all pla ns, policies and programs, military and civilian, which support the GVN's Revolu tionary Development program and related programs.

c. All activities and functions of the former Office of Civil Operations (OCO) a nd the MACV Directorate for Revolutionary Development (RD) Support are combined in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutio nary Development Support (CORDS). d. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Oper ations and Revolutionary Development Support is assigned functions as follows: ( 1) Advises COMUSMACV, MACV staff elements and all US civilian agencies on all as pects of U.S. civil/military support for the Government of Vietnam's RD Program. (2) In conjunction with Government of Vietnam authorities, develops joint and c ombined plans, policies, concepts and programs concerning US civil/military supp ort for Revolutionary Development. (3) Supervises the execution of plans and pro grams for US civil/military support of Revolutionary Development. (4) Provides a dvice and assistance to the Government of Vietnam, including the Ministry of Rev olutionary Development, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Joint General Staff and other GVN agencies on US civil/military support for Revolutionary Developme nt including US advisory and logistical support. (5) Develops requirements for m ilitary and civil assets (US and GVN) to support Revolutionary Development. (6) Serves as the contact point with sponsoring agencies for RD programs. Maintains liaison with sponsoring agencies in representing their interests in civil non-RD programs and activities in the field. Maintains direct operational communicatio ns with field elements for these programs. (7) Is responsible for program coordi nation with the various Mission civil agencies in the planning and implementatio n of non-RD activities as they impinge upon or affect RDrelated activities. (8) Provides MACV focal point for economic warfare to include population and resourc es control, and for civic action by US forces. (9) Evaluates all civil/military RD activities including provision of security for RD by US/FWMA/GVN military for ces and reports on progress, status and problems of RD Support. (10) Acts on all RD Support policy matters pertaining to subordinate echelons. (11) Directs advi sory relationships with GVN on RD and RD-related matters.

3. Implementation a. Integration and consolidation of OCO and RD Support activit ies will be accomplished at all levels: Headquarters MACV, region,/CTZ, province and district. b. Organization for CORDS will conform generally to the schematic organizational diagram attached at Annex A, allowing for differences in the sit uations in the various regions/CTZ's, provinces and districts. c. Additionally, in developing detailed organizations and functions at each level, force commande rs/senior advisors will be guided by the following principles: (1) Region/CTZ. ( a) The OCO regional director will be designated the Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support to the force commander/senior advisor. As such, he will be charged with supervising the formulation and execution of all m ilitary and civilian plans, policies and programs which support the GVN's RD pro gram to include civic action performed by US units. (b) For all matters relating to RVNAF military support for Revolutionary Development, the deputy senior advi sor will operate under the supervision of the Deputy for CORDS. (c) The Deputy O CO regional director will be designated the Assistant Deputy for Civil Operation s and Revolutionary Development Support or the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS. In this capacity, he will head an integrated civil/military staff which parallel s, as appropriate, the MACV CORDS organization. Further, he will direct headquar tersbased RD-related and non-RD technical programs. (d) Except for psychological operations and intelligence, those elements of the staffs of the force commande r/senior advisor and deputy senior advisor engaged primarily in RD Support activ ities will be integrated into the staff of the Assistant Deputy for Civil Operat ions and Revolutionary Development Support or the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORD S. At a later date, after on-going studies are completed, further guidance may b e issued if needed for the integration of civil and military intelligence and ps ychological warfare functions which represent special cases. (2) Province. (a) A t province, an integrated provincial advisory team composed of the current OCO p rovincial team and MACV sector advisory team will be organized. (b) The new prov incial team will continue to carry out all functions currently performed at prov ince. However, the province representative may organize, with the approval of th e Deputy for Revolutionary Development Support at region/CTZ, his personnel and functions as he sees fit.

(c) A single team chief, designated the Senior Provincial Advisor, will be assig ned to each province. The senior provincial advisor will be chosen by the Deputy for CORDS and the force commander/senior advisor, with the concurrence of the D eputy CORDS to COMUSMACV, on the basis of security in the province, civil-milita ry balance in the RD effort and qualifications and experience of the current OCO senior provincial advisor and MACV sector advisor. The individual not selected will serve as the other's deputy as well as being his principal advisor for civi l operations or military support as the case may be. (d) The province senior adv isor will receive operational direction from and report through the Deputy for C ORDS to the force commander/senior advisor. The military element of the provinci al team will receive logistical and administrative support from the division adv isory team. (e) Where RVNAF units are attached to the province chief for direct support of RD, advisors to these units will come under the operational control o f the senior province advisor. (f) The senior province advisor will serve as the Vietnamese province chief's prrncipal advisor. However, technical advice, milit ary or civil, should continue to be given to the province chief or his represent ative by the most qualified member of the provincial team. In all cases, the sen ior province advisor must be aware of the advice given and will set the policies to which advice will conform. (3) District. (a) At district an integrated distr ict advisory team composed of the current MACV subsector team and OCO district r epresentative will be organized. (b) The new district team will be responsible f or civil/military advice to the GVN district organization and for the implementa tion of all US civil and military support programs at district. (c) A single tea m chief, designated Senior District Advisor will be assigned to each district. T he senior district advisor will be chosen by the senior province advisor with th e concurrence of the Deputy CORDS to the force commander/senior advisor on the b asis of security in the district, civil-military balance in the RD effort and qu alifications and experience of the current OCO district representative and MACV sub-sector advisor. The individual not selected will serve as the other's dep ut y as well as being his principal advisor for civil operations or military suppor t as the case may be. (d) Where no OCO district representative is present, the M ACV sub-sector team will become the district Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development staff and the subsector advisor will be designated senior district a dvisor.

(4) The III CTZ organization for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support will conform generally to the schematic organizational diagram attached at Annex B. (5) For the time being there will be no change in the present IV CTZ organization. Implementing instructions for the IV CTZ organization for Civil O perations and Revolutionary Development Support will be provided at a later date . (6) Force commanders/senior advisors will revise their organizations and redra ft their statements of functions to comply with the guidance set out in this dir ective. The revisions will be forwarded to this headquarters for approval by 15 Jun 67. 4. Administrative and Logistics Support a. For the time being, there wil l be no change in administrative and logistics support. Civilian elements of the integrated organization will continue to be supported (funds, personnel, and ot her requirements) by their respective agencies, i.e., Embassy, AID, JUSPAO, USIA and OSA. b. It is intended that a continuing effort be undertaken toward logist ic and administrative economy through consolidation and cross-servicing of appro priate support activities. 5. Reference. State Department MSG 9 May 1967 [see fo llowing page]

5. RVNAF's Role in Pacification It has already been noted that the U.S. graduall y came to espouse a division of effort between U.S. forces and RVNAF in which th e former would concentrate on defeating the main forces of the insurgents in the unpopulated areas while RVNAF concentrated on securing pacification operations in the populated areas. General Westmoreland first informed Washington of his in tention to follow this general division of effort in late August 1966. But his e mphasis was one of degree, he made clear, rather than of mutually exclusive cate gories:

....Our strategy will be one of a general offensive with maximum practical suppo rt to area and population security in further support of Revolutionary Developme nt. The essential tasks of Revolutionary Development and nation building cannot be accomplished if enemy main forces can gain access to the population centers a nd destroy our efforts. US, Free World Forces, with their mobility and in coordi nation with RVNAF, must take the fight to the enemy by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our ability to do this is improving steadily. Maxi mum emphasis will be given to the use of long range patrols and other means to f ind the enemy and locate his bases. Forces and bases thus discovered will be sub jected to either ground attack or quick reaction B-52 and tactical air strikes. When feasible B-52 strikes will be followed by ground forces to search the area. Sustained ground combat operations will maintain pressure on the enemy. The gro wing strength of US/Free World forces will provide the shield that will permit A RVN to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct support of Revolutionary Development. Also, I visualize that a significant numb er of the US/Free World maneuver battalions will be committed to tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) missions. These missions encompass base security and at the same time support Revolutionary Development by spreading security radially froni the bases to protect more of the population. Saturation patrolling, civic action, and close association with ARVN, regional and popular forces to bolster their combat effectiveness are among the tasks of the ground force elements. At the same time ARVN troops will be available if required to reinforce offensive o perations and to serve as reaction forces for outlying security posts and govern ment centers under attack. Our strategy will include opening, constructing and u sing roads, as well as a start toward opening and reconstructing the national ra ilroad. The priority effort of ARVN forces will be in direct support of the Revo lutionary Development program; in many instances, the province chief will exerci se operational control over these Units. This fact notwithstanding the ARVN divi sion structure must be maintained and it is essential that the division commande r enthusiastically support Revolutionary Development. Our highly capable US Divi sion Commanders, who are closely associated with corresponding ARVN commanders, are in a position to influence them to do what is required. We intend to employ all forces to get the best results measured, among other things, in terms of pop ulation secured; territory cleared of enemy influence; VC/NVA bases eliminated; and enemy guerrillas, local forces, and main forces destroyed. Barring unforesee n change in enemy strategy, I visualize that our strategy for South Vietnam will remain essentially the same throughout 1967. General Westmoreland had already r eached agreement with General Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff (JGS), to r eorient ARVN to pacification support. General Tilison, MACV J-3, had briefed the Mission Council in Saigon on the general plan:

In the 1967 campaign plan, we propose to assign ARVN the primary mission of prov iding direct support to RD and US/FW Forces the primary mission of destroying VC / NVA main forces and base areas. Agreement has been reached between General Wes tmoreland and General Vien that, in I, II, and III Corps areas, ARVN will devote at least 50% of its effort directly in support of the RD program. In IV Corps, where there are no US forces, it was agreed that ARVN might have to devote up to 75% of its effort to offensive operatIons. . . General Taylor, now serving as a personal advisor to President Johnson, immediately recognized the importance of this communication. A considered response should be sent to COMUSMACV, he advis ed the President, lest General Westmoreland regard silence as tacit consent for his proposed strategy. Taylor was enthusiastic about the expressed intent to ree mphasize revolutionary development (pacification), seeing in it the best hope fo r bringing the war to a speedier conclusion. But he was uneasy about future char ges that the U.S. had taken over the main war and was sustaining larger numbers of casualties than RVNAF. He was also concerned about involving any U.S. troops in pacification-suggesting that U.S. displacement of GVN leadership would, in th e long run, be counterproductive. Ambassador Lodge, on the other hand, waxed ecs tatic over the involvement of U.S. units in pacification work. The crux of the p roblem, he argued, was security. To promote security U.S. units should be used i n a kind of advisory function. They would energize ARVN by example: To meet this need we must make more U.S. troops available to help out in pacification operat ions as we move to concentrate ARVN effort in this work. U.S. forces would be th e catalyst; would lead by example; and would work with the Vietnamese on the 'bu ddy' system. They would be the 10 percent of the total force of men under arms ( 90 percent of whom would be Vietnamese) which would get the whole thing moving f aster. This has been done on a small scale already by elements of the U.S. Marin es, 1st and 25th U.S. Infantry Divisions, and the Koreans. We think it can be ma de to work and the gains under such a program, while not flashy, would hopefully be solid. Everything depends on whether we can change ARVN habits. Experiments already made indicate that U.S. casualties would be few. General Taylor's doubts about the benefits of involving U.S. troop units in pacification carried some w eight in Washington. State was later to signal Saigon to go slow on U.S. partici pation: We understand General Westmoreland plans use of limited number of US for ces in buddy system principle to guide and motivate RD/P. However, we have serio us doubts about any further involvement US troops beyond that. . . . We fear thi s would tempt Vietnamese to leave this work more and more to us and we believe p acification, with its intimate contact with population, more appropriate for Vie tnamese forces, who must after all as arm of GVN establish constructive relation s with population. Hence we believe

there should be no thought of US taking substantial share of pacification. The u rgent need is to begin eflectively pressing ARVN. 6. The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan The upshot of these exchanges, which illustrate the wide acceptance in U.S. quarters of the proposed division of effort between U.S. forces and RVNAF, was that the MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 (AB 142), published 7 November 1966, reflected "primary missions" for US/FWMAF and RVNAF and implied that few U.S. forces would be committed directly to the pacification effort. The exact nu mber of such forces was not specified; it was left to COMUSMACV's discretion wit hin the restraints already suggested by Washington. The JGS did agree, however, to keep 53 ARVN battalions in support of revolutionary development during 1967. In addition, 230-odd RF companies and over 800 RF platoons were to support the p acification program. Conceptually, the regular ARVN units were to conduct the mo re difficult clearing operations and then turn over responsibility for the "secu ring phase" to the RF/PF outfits. All of this was outlined in considerable detai l in the Combined Campaign Plan, with specific assignments to certain kinds of u nits for each phase of the pacification effort. The pertinent sections of AB 142 follow: 2. (C) ARVN REGULAR FORCES: Phase ARVN Regular Forces Clearing Tasks in direct support of RD activities: 1. Conduct operations to clear VC/NVA main for ce units from provincial priority areas and other critical areas in accordance w ith established provincial RD plans. 2. Conduct, in conjunction with provincial military forces and civil intelligence and police elements, operations to destro y VC guerrillas and infrastructure in specified hamlet or village areas in accor dance with established provincial RD plans. Securing Tasks in direct support of RD activities: 3. Conduct, in conjunction with provincial military forces and ci vil intelligence and police elements, operations to destroy VC guerrillas and in frastructure when provincial forces are inadequate for this task.

4. Provide, in conjunction with provincial military forces and National Police, local area security and security for the population and GVN cadre elements when provincial forces are inadequate for this task. Developing Tasks in direct suppo rt of RD activities: 5. Provide, in conjunction with provincial military forces and National Police, local area security and security for the population and GVN cadre elements when provincial forces are inadequate for this task. All Phases Tasks in direct support of RD activities: 6. Conduct military PSYOP in support o f RD activities with emphasis on operations in support of the Chieu Hoi program. 7. Conduct, in coordination with sector commanders, military civic action to he lp win the support of the people for the government with emphasis on the proper behavior and discipline of troops. 8. Assist sector commanders in the recruiting and training of RF/PF. Related tasks: 9. Conduct offensive search and destroy o perations against VC/NVA main forces to prevent their incursion into areas under going RD. 10. Provide elements for reserve/reaction forces in support of militar y forces in areas undergoing RD. 3. (C) US/FWMAF. Phase US/FWMAF Clearing Tasks in direct support of RD activities: 1. Conduct combined and unilateral operation s to clear VC/ NVA main forces from provincial priority areas and other critical areas in accordance with established provincial RD plans.

2. Conduct combined operations in conjunction with ARVN and/or provincial milita ry forces and police elements, operations to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastru cture in specified hamlet or village areas in accordance with established provin cial RD plans. All Phases Tasks in direct support of RD activities: 3. Conduct o ther combined battalion and smaller unit operations with RVNAF to accomplish spe cific RD tasks in areas undergoing clearing, securing, and developing as appropr iate. 4. Conduct, in coordination with sector and subsector commanders, military civic action to help win the support of the people for the government with emph asis to ensure that credit is given to the GVN. 5. Assist sector commanders in t he training of RF/PF. Related tasks: 6. Conduct combined and unilateral offensiv e search and destroy operations against VC/ NVA main forces to prevent their inc ursion into areas undergoing RD. 4. (C) PROVINCIAL FORCES: a. REGIONAL FORCES (R F). Phase Regional Forces Clearing 1. Assist, within capabilities, ARVN regular forces and/or US/FWMAF to clear VC/NVA main force units from provincial priority areas and other critical areas in accordance with provincial RD plans. 2. Assis t, within capabilities, ARVN regular forces to destroy VC guerrillas and infrast ructure. Securing 3. Conduct, in conjunction with civil intelligence and police elements, operations to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure. 4. Provide loc al area security with priority to major communications complexes and other sensi tive areas.

5. Provide local security for the population and GVN civil cadre elements in ham let and village areas where PF are inadequate for this task. Phase Regional Forc es 6. Assist GVN cadre elements to perform economic and social development proje cts. 7. Assist National Police in population and resources control and/or to mai ntain law and order and protect public safety. 8. Assist in the recruiting and t raining of PF. 9. Assist GVN civil cadre elements to organize and train people's self-defense forces. Developing 10. Continue tasks 4 and 5 until relieved by Na tional Police or other authorized provincial police forces which may be establis hed. 11. Provide elements for reserve/reaction forces to counter the return of V C/NVA main or irregular forces into areas undergoing developing. 12. Continue ta sk 6. 13. Continue task 7 as necessary. b. POPULAR FORCES (PF) Phase Popular For ces Securing 1. Provide local security for the population and GVN civil cadre el ements in hamlet and village areas. 2. Assist RF to provide local area security. 3. Assist GVN civil cadre elements to perform economic and social development p rojects. 4. Assist National Police in population and resources control and/or to maintain law and order and protect public safety. 5. Assist GVN civil cadre ele ments to organize and train people's self-defense forces. Developing

6. Continue tasks 1 and 2 until relieved by National Police or other authorized provincial police forces which may be established. 7. Continue task 3. 8. Contin ue task 4 as necessary. c. NATIONAL POLICE FORCES. Phase National Police Forces Clearing 1. Develop and maintain informant nets and other intelligence nets. 2. Supply intelligence to military forces. 3. Participate with military forces in o perations to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure. Phase National Police For ces Securing 5. Continue tasks 1 through 4 above. 6. Initiate population and res ources control. 7. Maintain law and order and protect public safety. 8. Assist, within capabilities, military forces to provide local area security and security for the population and GVN cadre elements. Developing 9. Maintain population an d resources control. 10. Continue tasks 1, 2, 4 and 7 above. 11. Prevent the reo rganization of the VC infrastructure. 12. Prevent and control riots and sabotage of public security. 13. Relieve military forces, when capable, and provide loca l area security and security for the population and GVN cadre elements.

7. Leverage and Sovereignty The decision to effect a division of effort between RVNAF and US/FWMAF suggests how far U.S. policymakers were willing to go (perhap s "determined" would be more accurate) to carve out an area for independent GVN conduct of at least some major phase of the war. It suggests, too, their relativ e dissatisfaction with RVNAF improvement during the years in which the U.S. advi sory effort had been directed toward such improvement. The question remained whe ther U.S. influence could be brought effectively to bear through example and per suasion or should be back-stopped by more direct measures- by the use of a range of negative measures gathered under the rubric of "leverage." General Taylor's recommendations at the beginning of the U.S. advisory build-up in 1961, it will be remembered, emphasized a "limited partnership" in which U.S. advisors would a ctually work alongside their Vietnamese counterparts instead of merely "advising them at arm's length." By means of this closer working relationship in the fiel d rather than just in various headquarters, Taylor had suggested, RVNAF effectiv eness would become the product of mutually shared goals pursued through mutually shared experiences. Conscious adoption of an alternative course, the use of lev erage, would have changed the relationship from one of nominal "partnership" to one of de facto U.S. leadership- bordering in some instances on U.S. command. Th is, in turn, would have been a very real infringement of Vietnamese sovereignty and an admission that the GVN could not manage adequately its own affairs. It wo uld have undercut Vietnamese independence in both a legal sense and in terms of GVN competence. When the Diem regime did not respond as it had been expected (or hoped) it would, and after Diem's government was overturned, the U.S. again ref used consciously to adopt leverage procedures to compel improved performance. Fi rst with General Minh, then with General Khanh, the hope was that improved recep tivity (as compared to the most recent past experience) on the part of the GVN w ould permit the carrot to work effectively without the stick. The period just en ded in mid-1965 when U.S. troops were committed to South Vietnam marked another occasion to examine the putative advantages and disadvantages of the use of leve rage. Generally speaking, Washington policymakers (less so in the State Departme nt), were prone to suggest the use of leverage in the abstract. The U.S. Mission and MACV tended to oppose such proposals. Field advisors were, as a group, most favorably disposed toward the use of leverage. Those whose dealings included es tablishing a close working relationship with GVN (to include RVNAF) officials fo und that the threat of leverage was a stumbling block to such a relationship. So me also found that the price of acceptance without leverage was the virtual abse nce of influence. Robert Shaplen summarized this phenomenon in a pessimistic 196 5 evaluation of the U.S. advisory effort: The advisory program, while it had bee n a tribute to the politeness of both parties, had failed in its primary aim of persuading the Vietnamese officers to get their men out into

the countryside and to stay there, if necessary, day and night, for weeks on end in order to beat the Communists at their own game. This view of the failure of American efforts at persuasion was privately expressed to me by most of the advi sers I spoke with during my trip through the vital plateau area, and it was rein forced by what advisers from other battle areas told me. The consensus was that the system was inherently anomalous and unworkable in that it reflected the Amer ican predilection for trying to get a difficult and probably impossible job done in what a British friend of mine described as "your typical nice American way." Having rejected proposals for a combined command (presumably under U.S. leaders hip) and for the encadrement of U.S. troops with RVNAF units, the U.S. was left-in late 1965--with the continuing and perplexing issue of whether or not to ado pt the use of leverage in some comprehensive and planned manner. Earlier decisio ns had been to avoid the issue by side-stepping it. But the isolated occasions o n which its use had been attempted did little to substantiate the argument that cries of neocolonialism were simply the price one had to pay for short run effec tiveness. Indeed, some backfires tended to have the opposite effect. Ambassador Taylor, for instance, had had a disastrous experience in trying to use the U.S. decision to commence bombing North Vietnam as a lever to get GVN reform in Decem ber 1964. The net outcome was a violent reaction by General Khanh who very nearl y had Taylor thrown out of the country as personna non grata. In the end, it was Khanh who went, but the political turmoil that this produced in the first month s of 1965, when the course of the war was taking a dramatic turn against the GVN , convinced Taylor that such attempts should not be made again at the national l evel. It was at this time that the "troika sign-off" was abandoned because of cl aims that it stifled GVN development. Then in late 1965 USOM began to have secon d thoughts on the wisdom of abandoning control of its resources in the field and proposed a restoration of the troika sign-off. The Mission Council endorsed the plan and had already launched discussions with the GVN when the State Departmen t objected to the idea, insisting that it would undermine U.S. efforts to make t he Vietnamese more independent and effective. There the matter died. In a relate d effort to overcome delays in the Vietnamese pacification program, MACV acceded to its advisors' recommendations and, in October, created a separate contingenc y fund of 50,000 piasters for each subsector advisor to be used for urgent proje cts. Sector advisors were also given access to special funds. The program was hi ghly successful and toward the end of the year consideration was given to perman ent establishment of such revolving funds. The plan was abandoned, however, afte r the four-month trial period due to the strong opposition of the GVN Minister f or RD, General Thang, who contended such funds were undermining the legitimate e fforts of his organization to meet urgent province needs. They would encourage, he said, Vietnamese dependence on the U.S. But USOM did experiment successfully with one new form of direct, selective leverage in the late summer of 1965. The Province Chief of Binh Tuy Province, Lt Colonel Chi, was accused of misusing som e $250,000 in AID funds. When USOM pressure on the GVN for his removal produced no results, aid to the province was suspended on September 23, and USOM field pe rsonnel were withdrawn. In spite of Chi's friendship

with the Defense Minister and Deputy Premier (General Co) Premier Ky removed him six weeks later. Aid to the province then resumed, but Ambassador Lodge made it clear to the Mission Council that he disapproved of the action and did not want it repeated (particularly the press coverage). As already indicated, both Ambas sadors Taylor (after his experience in December 1964) and Lodge preferred not to force the GVN or attempt to use high-level pressure to reach solutions we felt necessary. The fragility of the political arrangements in Saigon at any point in time seemed to dictate against any U.S. action that might precipitate coups or disruption from elements even less disposed to be cooperative than the current g roup, whoever they might be. In this view, the successive Ambassadors were stron gly supported by the State Department. The one consistent Washington advocate fo r an increased use of leverage was Secretary McNamara. But the Secretary of Defe nse's views did not prevail in this issue as they did in so many others. The ove rall U.S. approach to advice in South Vietnam continued to be dominated by the f elt U.S. need to avoid undercutting governmental stability. U.S. support was fig uratively regarded as a rug which if pulled out from under the GVN would cause i t to fall, not as a lever whose use might spur increased effectiveness. 8. The I nconclusive Debate Over Leverage This persistent U.S. avoidance of the planned u se of leverage was, until about 1966, paralleled by an equally persistent avoida nce of any candid examination of the whole pandora's box which was conjured up b y the mere mention of the subject. But during 1966, and continuing into 1967 and beyond, there were repeated attempts by lower echelons within the policymaking apparatus to promote an internal examination. Those who made such proposals were in favor of some kind of authorized, premeditated use of leverage, of course, e lse they would not have pushed for an examination of this hitherto avoided topic . When operational groups--as distinct from policymakers who could defer when to implement--urged the adoption of leverage measures the recommendations tended t o be summarily struck down. In 1966, for instance, an inquiry by the MACV staff into the poor performance records of the 5th and 25th ARVN Divisions-both statio ned near Saigon-concluded that if other measures failed to improve these units, COMUSMACV should withdraw U.S. advisors and Military Assistance Program (MAP) su pport. General Westmoreland deleted from the study the recommendation for the wi thdrawal of MAP support. He further directed that sanctions against ARVN be avoi ded. The U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions were instructed to assist the two ARVN divisions and to increase their own participation in pacification operation s in Binh Duong and Hau Nghia Provinces. It was clear that the time was not ripe for action; there was no agreed basis upon which action might be taken. But ano ther Army staff effort, the PROVN Study referred to earlier, set out to rectify this omission. Commissioned in mid-1965 by Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, the PROVN group was charged with "developing new sources of action to be

taken in South Vietnam by the United States and its allies, which will, in conju nction with current actions, modified as necessary, lead in due time to successf ul accomplishment of U.S. aims and objectives." After eight months of intensive effort this select group of middle ranking officers produced a comprehensive arg ument calling for emphasis on the pacification effort. A radical decentralizatio n of U.S. and GVN directive authority was held to be necessary for this purpose. And to make sure that national plans were turned into concrete actions at the o perating level, PROVN called for the calculated use of leverage: The situation i n South Vietnam has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to ensure eventual success. "Victory" can only be achieved through bringing the ind ividual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the GVN. The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district, and provincial levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and the obj ect which lies beyond it must be won. The following are the most important speci fic actions required now: --Concentrate U.S. operations on the provincial level to include the delegation of command authority over U.S. operations to the Senio r U.S. Representative at the provincial level. --Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US/GVN combined effort to solidify and extend GVN influence. --Auth orize more direct U.S. involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels adequate to ensure the accomplishment of critical programs. --Delegate to the U .S. Ambassador unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all U.S. activities, resources, and personnel in-country. --Direct the Ambassador to develop a singl e integrated plan for achieving U.S. objectives in SVN. The PROVN Study proposed that leverage be employed at all levels within GVN to achieve U.S. objectives. Noting that past uses had been haphazard, it recommended the employment of a "co ntinuum from subtle interpersonal persuasion to withdrawal of U.S. support" foll owing U.S.-GVN agreement on specific programs. The South Vietnamese would, in sh ort, be aware that leverage would be employed if they failed to live up to agree d obligations. After an initial period during which no discussion of the PROVN S tudy was permitted outside the Army staff, the study finally received wide distr ibution. Secretary McNamara was briefed on it, as were the Joint Chiefs of Staff . MACV's comments were also solicited. The carefully worded reply from Saigon st ated succinctly the case against the use of leverage. MACV is in complete agreem ent with PROVN position that immediate and substantially increased United States direct involvement in GVN ac tivities in form of constructive influence and man ipulation is essential to achievement of U.S. objectives in Vietnam. PROVN empha sizes that "leverage must originate in terms of reference established by governm ent agreement," and "leverage, in all its implications,

must be understood by the Vietnamese if it is to become an effective tool." The direct involvement and leverage envisioned by PROVN could range from skillful di plomatic pressure to U.S. unilateral execution of critical programs. MACV consid ers that there is a great danger that the extent of involvement envisioned could become too great. A government sensitive to its image as champion of national s overeignty profoundly affected by the pressure of militant minorities, and unsur e of its tenure and legitimacy will resent too great involvement by U.S. Excessi ve U.S. involvement may defeat objectives of U.S. policy: development of free, i ndependent non-communist nation. PROVN properly recognizes that success can only be attained through support of Vietnamese people, with support coming from the grass roots up. Insensitive U.S. actions can easily defeat efforts to accomplish this. U.S. manipulations could easily become an American takeover justified by U.S. compulsion to "get the job done." Such tendencies must be resisted. It must be realized that there are substantial difficulties and dangers inherent in imp lementing this or any similar program. 9. No Decision as a Decision Events remai ned stuck on this fundamental disagreement. The subject of leverage came, during 1967, to be discussed more fully, but there was no real authoritative decision to employ it or to reject its use under all circumstances. Thus, when CORDS comp leted its first major study of pacification programs (Project TAKEOFF) in June 1 967, it included some candid discussion of the need for some kind of leverage. E ntitled "U.S. InfluenceThe Necessity, Feasibility and Desirability of Asserting Greater Leverage," the analysis proceeded from problem to alternative courses of action: A. Necessity of Leverage. 1. The most crucial problem in achieving the goals and objectives of the RD program is that the programs must be carried out by the Vietnamese. Present US influence on Vietnamese performance is dependent u pon our ability to persuade, cajole, suggest, or plead. Political and practican considerations usually have argued against developing any systematic use of the various levers of power at our disposal. The potential reaction of the Vietnames e may become even greater now that they appear to be reasserting themselves and when the question of sovereignty is an increasingly sensitive one. 2. However, t he factors of corruption, antique administrative financial procedures and regula tions, and widespread lack of leadership probably can be overcome in the short r un only if the US increases its influence on Vietnamese performance. The increas ing magnitude of corruption and its damage to any program make the need for deve loping and applying a system of leverage which forces the Vietnamese to take U.S . views into account greater now than ever before. Even the best conceived and e xecuted RD program will result in failure in terms of gaining the allegiance of the people so long as such extensive corruption prevails. The study argued that leverage was feasible either at the national level with the GVN leadership in th e classic "oriental" style or on a more systematic basis to be applied

through the control of resources at all levels down to province and district. Th e study concluded: d. Courses of Action. US influence over key decisions must be attained as quickly as possible. We recommend the "oriental" approach. However, should the other alternative of more open exercise of power be selected, the sy stem would have to include US control of resources. As a tactical measure, such control could be associated initially with the introduction of additional resour ces. The introduction of greater US control and the procedures that would be nec essary to ensure an adequate US voice in the decisionmaking process should be ti ed to the "New Team" and the new US organization for RD. For that reason, too lo ng a delay would be unfortunate. Whether or not Komer approved this recommendati on, it did not figure in the presentations of pacification given to Secretary Mc Namara during his 7-8 July visit to Vietnam. The Saigon policymakers were simply not prepared to come down on one agreed line of conduct in this contentious are a. This tendency was exhibited later in the summer of 1967 when a long study on leverage produced in Ambassador Komer's old White House staff office by two staf f members, Dr. Hans Heymann and LTC Volney Warner, was forwarded from State to S aigon: In anticipating the US/GVN relationship in the post-election period, it i s generally agreed that the US should find ways to exercise leverage with the Vi etnamese government which are more commensurate in degree with the importance of the US effort to South Vietnam's survival and which reflect the climate of grow ing restiveness in the US. . . . In its impatience to get results and make progr ess, the US has increasingly resorted to unilateral programs and action with ina dequate consultation with the Vietnamese. On the other hand, the indiscriminate and careless exercise of US leverage could undermine the self-respect of the Vie tnamese government in its own eyes and in the eyes of the South Vietnamese peopl e. To be effective, US leverage must be exercised in the context of a relationsh ip of mutual respect and confidence, and in ways commensurate with the objective sought. It must also be backed by credible sanctions. Might not the post-electi on period, State suggested, be a proper time to consider such a new emphasis on the use of leverage. Ambassador Komer, who had been ardent in his advocacy of le verage while working as a Presidential assistant, replied in tempered language w hich reflected the chastening effect of several months on the firing line in Sai gon. All of the above forms of leverage, and yet others, could be useful at the proper time and in an appropriate way. But they must be applied with discretion, and always in such manner as to keep the GVN foremost in the picture presented to its own people and the word at large. . . . The exercise of leverage in a per sonal manner and hidden from the public view is likely to be most effective, whi le of the more operational means establishment of combined organization under a JCRR-type concept, to include joint

control of resources, would be most desirable. In sum, we're gradually applying more leverage in Pacification, but wish to do so in ways that least risk creatin g more trouble than constructive results. What Komer really meant--as his opinio ns expressed in a time frame later than that embraced by the present inquiry wou ld make clear--was the necessity to reserve the use of leverage for those few oc casions in which all else had failed, in which copious records detailing the fai lure had been accumulated over time, and in which the proven offender could be s evered from responsibility after his shortcomings were presented behind the scen es to his superiors. Thus, the GVN would serve as executioner, the U.S. as obser verrecorder. Leverage would be a last resort rather than a continuing tool. The product of the intermittent debate on leverage was not so much a decision pro or con as it was a decision to resort to leverage when all else had failed. In thi s sense it dodged the difficult choices. 10. Groping Toward Better Information O ne of the programs that came under Komer's jurisdiction after he took over CORDS was the controversial Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Secretary MeNamara had re quested, during his October 1966 visit to Vietnam, the development of some ADP s ystem for evaluating the status of rural security on an on-going basis-data whic h would make possible comparative judgments of progress over time. In November, he sent Mr. George Allen and Colonel Carter Clark to Saigon with a proposal. MAC V revised their suggested system and recommended it to the Mission Council which endorsed it on 13 December. MACV described the new system to CINCPAC in January 1967: HES provides a fully automated procedure for evaluating hamlet Revolution ary Development progress and establishes a hamlet level data base. Data input fo r HES is provided by MACV subsector advisors and district representatives, where assigned, who evaluate all hamlets not under VC control. They record their asse ssments in terms of 18 entries on a hamlet evaluation worksheet utilizing six fa ctors, each with three indicators. Also, eight problem areas are evaluated. The system operated throughout the year as something of a barometer for the entire p acification effort. It also became one of the focal points of criticism of the e xcessive reliance on statistical measures of progress, a criticism favored by th e press in particular. Nevertheless, it was the most systematic attempt to compa re results over time ever used in the assessment of rural security in Vietnam. A s such it is a useful indicator. The following tables give summary data from HES for 1967. The first table shows population distribution according to security a nd development factors. The second table depicts the distribution of hamlets acc ording to different measures of security.

In February 1968 an analysis of 1967 pacification-R/D results as revealed in the HES was published by OSD Systems Analysis. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) repor ts for CY 1967 indicate that pacification progressed slowly during the first hal f of 1967, and lost ground in the second half. Most (60%) of the 1967 gain resul ts from accounting type changes to the HES system, not from pacification progres s; hamlet additions and deletions, and revised population estimates accounted fo r half of the January-June increase and all of the June-December increase. In th e area that really counts--VC-D-E hamlets rising to A-B-C ratings--we actually s uffered a net loss of 10,100 people between June and December 1967. The enemy's offensive appears to have killed the revolutionary development program, as curre ntly conceived. Recent reports state that to a large extent, the VC now control the country-side. Written in the pessimistic atmosphere of the 1968 post-Tet per iod this view may overemphasize negative factors. Ambassador Komer wrote a sting ing dissent that appeared in the next monthly issue of the Systems Analysis Sout heast Asia Analysis Report. Statistical analysis aside, pacification clearly fai led to make the significant strides that the President had hoped for in 1967. It certainly did not initiate any Revolutionary Development likely to transform th e quality of life for the Vietnamese farmer or to alter fundamentally the course of the war.

Concurrently with attempts to improve information on the security programs, MACV exhibited increased interest in 1967 in improving RVNAF effectiveness. Early in the year it was decided to undertake an extensive, unit-by-unit effectiveness e valuation. Units judged to be superfluous or consistently below standard were to be cut off from U.S. support. Decisions on support withdrawal were to be made s emi-annually as new evaluations were received. MACV explained to CINCPAC that th e review would include: ....all VNAF, VNN, VNMC, ARVN tactical and logistical un its, and RF/PF units in the current projected FY 68 force structure. The methodo logy for the evaluation includes: identification of the credibility and feasibil ity of current plans of RVNAF officials to guarantee increased effectiveness; st udy of unit performance trends during the past six months; determination of avai lability of necessary plans to train personnel in the required skills; and evalu ation of the degree of command interest at all levels for improvement of the ine ffective or non-productive units. Considering these factors, units are categoriz ed as improvement probable, doubtful, or unlikely. For those units categorized a s improvement doubtful or unlikely, justification for continued military assista nce will be required or action will be initiated to reduce the FY 68 Military As sistance Program. The first review (completed in March) cut two marginal navy ve ssels from the list of U.S. supported units, but only warned JGS of the unaccept able effectiveness of two marginal ranger battalions and an armored cavalry squa dron. The June review, while producing recommendations from U.S. advisors that a id be suspended in several cases, again resulted only in warnings and threats. T here was no suspension of U.S. support. 11. RVNAF Effectiveness Quantitative eff orts to rate RVNAF effectiveness continued in the field, at MACV, and in Washing ton throughout the year with no clear agreement on what set of statistical indic ators best portrayed RVNAF performance and potential. During 1966 MACV had relie d on a minimum present for duty strength as a means of evaluating ARVN battalion effectiveness. This method permitted wide fluctuations and was unreliable. The 1967 statistics on RVNAF desertions revealed an improving ability of units to ho ld their men. MACV soon began to use this trend as an indicator of effectiveness . In May, for instance, COMUSMACV noted with satisfaction the marked reduction o f January and February 1967 desertions compared to desertions in the same period in 1966. The average improvement for this period was about 50 percent: DESERTIO NS/RATES (PER 1000 ASSIGNED) January 9,251/16.0 5,900/9.6 February 14,110/24.3 5 ,860/9.6 1966 1967

In the same message, MACV noted with satisfaction recent aggressive actions by t he JGS to correct the unacceptably high incidence of desertions, including the s ingling out of three regiments for special warning on their excessive desertion rate. Year-end statistics compiled by OSD Systems Analysis indicate that the fig ures quoted by MACV in May erred on the optimistic side somewhat by undercountin g RF desertions in both months by about 1,000. Nevertheless, the trend to which MACV was pointing was confirmed during the rest of the year. After rising slight ly to 8,127 in March, RVNAF desertion rates leveled off at between about 6,000-7 ,000 per month for the remainder of 1967. Thus, 1967 produced only 80,912 desert ions compared with 117,740 in 1966, an overall reduction of almost one-third. (I t also should be noted in passing, that VC/NVA desertions reached a peak in Marc h and thereafter fell off sharply.) At the Pentagon, Systems Analysis sought mea sures of RVNAF effectiveness in a comparison between the performances of Vietnam ese and American units in selected categories: VC/NVA KIA ratios, battalion days of operations, days of enemy contact, number of operations, weapons loss of rat ios, etc. Summarizing the results of some of these statistical studies, Systems Analysis stated in September 1967: Per man, Vietnamese forces were about half as effective as U.S. forces in killing VC/NVA during the eleven months (Aug 66 thr ough Jun 67) for which detailed data are available. Effectiveness differs widely among Vietnamese units of the same type and between units in differing parts of the country. Poor leadership is the key reason for inefficiency in most cases. The MACV staff rebutted many of the premises on which the statistical comparison s had been based and again revealed the difficulty in developing meaningful stat istical measures with respect to anything Vietnamese. Their most telling critici sm of the Systems Analysis comparison of U.S. and Vietnamese units was the follo wing: (a) It is generally accepted that US maneuver battalions have a combat eff ectiveness ratio of about 3:1 to RVNAF maneuver battalions due to their greater unit firepower and depth of combat support/combat service support forces; RVNAF also lacks the mobility assets available to US units. (b) Approximately one-thir d of the RVNAF maneuver battalions are committed to direct support of Revolution ary Development, a mission which constrains the overall potential to find, fix, and fight the enemy forces. In this analysis an RVNAF unit that is 45 percent as effective as US units which have three times the RVNAF combat effectiveness wou ld appear to be doing very well. In fact, anything over 33 percent would reflect superior performance. But here again one can be misled. One reason that ARVN wa s given the RD support mission in the first place was its demonstrated inability to engage effectively and destroy the enemy main force. RD was regarded as a re sidual and semi-passive role more suited to ARVN capabilities. And so the statis tical arguments raged, partisans marshalling whatever statistics they could to d efend what in most cases were their own preconceived notions.

All of this is not to imply that qualitative estimates, diagnoses, prescriptions , and prognosis were lacking in 1967. At the Guam Conference with the President, General Abrams' appointment as the new Deputy COMUSMACV had been announced alon g with the others already mentioned and his responsibility for overseeing the U. S. advisory effort with RVNAF reemphasized. Upon return to Saigon prior to his o wn departure Lodge sent a message to the President stressing the importance of R VNAF: MACV's success (which means the success of the United States and of all of us) will . . . willy-nilly, be judged not so much on the brilliant performance of the U.S. troops as on its success in getting ARVN, RF and PF quickly to funct ion as a first-class counter terror, counter-guerrilla force. Lodge concluded wi th a glowing endorsement of Abrams as the man to see that RVNAF did become an ef fective force. There is ample evidence that Abrams did work with great energy to do just that. In mid-June, after Abrams' first quarterly review of RVNAF, Bunke r included a report on actions to improve RVNAF in his weekly report to the Pres ident: A) Improving the leadership and enhancing the personnel effectiveness of the ARVN/RF/ PF through such things as improvement in the awarding of commission s and promotions, selection procedures, training of officer candidates, the intr oduction of an effective personnel management and accounting system, tightening up on discipline, improvement in the treatment of veterans in order to clear the rolls of those incapable of further active duty and an expanded advisory effort to support properly the Revolutionary Development program; B) To improve motiva tion and morale through more equitable pay scales, improvement in rations, and r evitalization of the dependent housing program; C) Improvement in the command st ructure and equipment of the Regional/Popular Forces and a revised motivation an d indoctrination program to reflect the role of the PF soldier in Revolutionary Development; D) A comprehensive training effort to improve intelligence and reco nnaissance operations and to improve the combat effectiveness of battalions; tra ining of ARVN/RF/PF for support of Revolutionary Development particularly in pro viding security and support to the civil population; E) Experimentation with var ious forms of integrated US/RVNAF operations . . . [discussed already]; F) Insti tution of quarterly reviews at which time progress is measured against objective s, problems discovered and decisions taken. First of these reviews was held last month. In May, General Abrarns established a Program Review and Analysis System for RVNAF Progress. This was essentially an internal MACV effort to examine the problems facing RVNAF in order that MACV might structure its advisory assistanc e to make the most headway against these problems. The first published review, c overing the JanuaryJune 1967 period, appeared in September. Like many similar ef forts it was a long catalogue of RVNAF deficiencies by U.S. standards. The benef its of these reviews were

supposed to be reaped as they were brought to bear during the quarterly RVNAF se lfreview called for in the Combined Campaign Plan. There is no available informa tion as to how effectively this has worked in practice. This plethora of program s and activities through which we sought either to improve the effectiveness of RVNAF directly or to promote it indirectly by improving the lot and life of the soldier received a full-blown exposition during Secretary McNamara's trip to Sai gon in July. With respect to improving RVNAF morale--in addition to the pay scal e adjustments, improved rations, and provision of dependent housing--the U.S. ha s helped the South Vietnamese develop a miniature U.S. style Cornmissary/PX syst em. The leadership problem received very detailed attention by MACV during the c ourse of 1967. Prior to the Secretary's departure for Vietnam, Alain Enthoven, A ssistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, sent McNamara a memo that fl atly stated, "There are a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness of many of t he RVNAF units, particularly ARVN combat battalions, but the primary one is the quantity and quality of the leadership." After itemizing the contributing factor s to this deficiency, he recommended that the Secretary query MACV in detail on leadership problems during his visit. In the briefings for Secretary McNamara in July, fourteen different MACV/JGS actions or programs were cited as ways in whi ch this problem was being addressed. These ranged from better officer career man agement to regular merit promotion procedures and the publication of leadership materials. One example of the lengths to which we have gone in efforts to remedy the leadership deficit in RVNAF is the replication in South Vietnam of the U.S. elite officer schooling system-a four-year Vietnamese Military Academy, enlarge d Command and General Staff College, and, most recently, a National Defense Coll ege. 12. The Latest Expansion of Advisors COMUSMACV faced difficult choices in d etermining whether he wished to emphasize more U.S. advisors for RVNAF-or adviso rs for new functions- or to stress a build-up of the number of U.S. combat force s in-country. RVNAF strength had increased by 152% from 1960 to 1966, going up b y over 100,000 in the 18 months preceding the beginning of 1967. The table below shows the growth and distribution of RVNAF over the 1965-1967 period. The sligh t decline in forces from January to April 1967, reflects efforts to weed out abs entee personnel still being carried on padded unit rolls. RVNAF STRENGTHS I Jul 65 RVNAF Army Navy Marines 234,139 9,037 6,842 1 Jan66 267,877 14,559 7,380 1 Ju l66 276,473 16,380 6,848 1 Jan 67 283,898 17,349 7,049 30 Apr 67 283,200 16,000 7,100

Air Force Regional Forces Popular Force Sub Total PARAMILITARY National Police C IDG Armed Cmbt Youth Total 12,081 107,652 149,029 518,780 12,778 132,221 136,398 571,213 13,895 141,447 137,689 592,732 14,647 149,844 150,096 622,883 15,600 142,018 142,491 606,405 42,700 21,700 39,000 625,800 52,300 28,400 39,600 691,500 54,600 30,400 22,800 700,500 58,300 34,700 20,000 735,900 63,457 31,477 19,930 721,269 In March, two days before the Guam Conference was to meet, General West-moreland sent an important cable to CINCPAC requesting an "optimum force" increase, abov e and beyond the approved Deployment Program 4, of 4-2/3 U.S. divisions (201,250 personnel spaces), or a "minimum essential force" of an additional 2-1/3 U.S. d ivisions (84,100 spaces). The optimum force would have raised total U.S. manpowe r in Vietnam to over 670,000 troops. This request was to kick off (after Guam, w here it was not specifically addressed) another prolonged internal administratio n debate and review of forces in Vietnam which would eventually culminate in Sec retary McNamara's July trip to Saigon and the subsequent decision to adopt deplo yment Program 5, raising total authorized strength to 525,000. COMUSMACV's orien tation toward RVNAF's role in the war is clearly revealed in this message: Where as deployment of additional US forces in FY 68 will obviate the requirement for a major expansion of the RVNAF, selective increases will be necessary to optimiz e combat effectiveness. Regular forces proposed for FY 68 total 328,322, an incr ease of 6,367 spaces over the FY 67 authorization. As US, Free World and RVNAF o perations are expanded, additional areas will be made available for the conduct of Revolutionary Development operations. Based on experience gained thus far, an increase of 50,000 RF/ PF spaces will be required to provide a planning figure of 350,000 spaces for this force. The increase will accommodate necessary suppor t of Revolutionary Development and concomitantly, will be compatible with requir ements incident to implementation of the constabulary concept. Without going int o detail on the debate and decision on Program 5, from the advisory standpoint t he important development was COMUSMACV's view of RVNAF. In March, RVNAF had been regarded almost as a residual, but by September, when the ambitious U.S. force proposals had been rejected in favor of only a modest increase of about 45,000 C OMUSMACV reasserted the importance of RVNAF and asked for a major increase in it s authorized strength. Slowly, then, the realization that there was a ceiling on the number of U.S. forces which could be deployed without calling up reserves t urned everyone's attention once again to RVNAF.

The one significant increase proposed in the MACV message cited above was the in crease of 50,000 in RF,/PF. This was not to be immediately forthcoming. In May 1 967, Secretary McNamara imposed a temporary ceiling on RVNAF at the level author ized for end FY 66 to prevent further inflation in South Vietnam and to arrest s ome of the balance of payments imbalance stemming from U.S. Vietnam spending. Su bsequently, CINCPAC was authorized to make adjustments among the various compone nts within that limit, thereby permitting augmentation of RF/PF at the expense o f ARVN. The question of additional U.S. troops had refined itself considerably b y the time the Secretary went to Saigon in July. Of the two force increase propo sals presented by MACV at that time, the first was merely a restatement of the o ld "minimum essential force" which would have brought total U.S. troops to 571,0 71 (2-1,/3 division force equivalents); the second proposal was a much smaller r equest for an authorized strength of 535,390 (1-1/3 division force equivalents). Both of these proposals contained a request for 2,577 additional advisors-prima rily to support the anticipated expansion of RF/PF and to flesh out the sector a nd sub-sector advisory teams supporting the pacification effort. The following t able shows the breakdown of the 1967 advisory increases, including the request p resented to McNamara in July and subsequently approved. The large RF/PF advisory element in this request included spaces for 824 RF Company Advisory Teams of tw o men each and 119 Company Training Teams of five men each. Before returning to Washington, the Secretary gave planning authorization for a U.S. augmentation no t to exceed 525,000 spaces, but fulfilling Westmoreland's lower alternative by c ivilianizing an additional 10,000 military spaces. A month later, after approval by President Johnson, this new force level was promulgated as Program #5. The f inal detailed troop list for Program #5 submitted by the JCS on September 15 con tained, in addition to the regular advisory spaces already mentioned, a 666-man Special Forces augmentation to perform advisor-like functions with their Vietnam ese counterparts. Even before the Program #5 troop list was completed by MACV an d submitted by the JCS, however, Ambassador Komer was complaining that the CORDS advisory element actual strength was seriously below its authorization and that bureaucratic delays had forestalled even the deployment of the 100 priority adv isors requested in July. The following day, OSD Systems Analysis advised Secreta ry McNamara that the shortfall in the actual strength of the overall advisory co mplement was a longstanding problem. In March, the advisory program had been und er-strength 600 men while MACV headquarters exceeded its authorization by 473. I n response to Systems Analysis prodding this discrepancy had been partially rect ified, but as late as July the advisory staff was still short 237 while MACV had an overage of 130. Systems Analysis further advised the Secretary that while to tal strength authorizations had been made, MACV's delay in submitting detailed l ists of grades and specialties of desired personnel had, in turn, engendered del ays at this end in filling the billets. Moreover, the requirement that advisors receive preliminary Stateside background and language training further delayed t he actual deployments. Only priority requests could be filled very rapidly, and these necessarily could only constitute a small percentage of the total. C8311 S UPPLEMENTAL DATA SHEET A

SUBJECT: MACV Recognized Advisory Requirements 22 Oct 67 Structural Element Auth Jan 67 Required Required Required Add-ons Add-ons Add-ons Total Feb 67 Apr 67 J un 67 23 30 52 8 6 296 828 517 Joint General 265 Staff Other National 740 Level Naval Advisory 517 Group ARVN a nd RF/PF Corps Hq and 1,147 Support (4) Capital Military 59 District Divisions ( 10 & 24th Special Zone 266 and Support Regiments (31 98 Infantry) Battalions (12 0 613 Infantry) Ranger Command 130 (5 Gps/20Bn) Regional Force 31 Battalions (12 ) Popular Force 122 Taining Centers Armored Cavalry 107 Squadrons (10) Sector Ad visory 853 Teams (Province) Subsector Advisor 969 Teams (District) Regional Forc e Companies Regional Force Camps 29 7 84 12 -143 -12 21 -13 120 1 11 1,176 67 861 110 590 118 52 109 107 56 137 341 294 92 6 2,243 1,342 1,406 2,243 122 20 12 90

(Converted from CIDG) Totals 6,910 251 699 2,577 10,437 In order to study the problems presented by the anticipated expansion of RF/PF a nd to plan for the significant expansion of the U.S. advisory effort tothese for ces, MACV convened a conference on RF/PF matters on 26 October for all intereste d elements of MACV and USARV. The conference recommended a complete reorientatio n of the advisory concept for RF/PF. Rather than assigning teams to RF companies and PF platoons on a permanent basis, the conferees recommended the establishme nt of 354 seven-man Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) to be used on a rotating basis under the direction of the Province Advisor to whom they would be assigned. Furt her, the conference recommended the deployment of an Engineer Advisor to each pr ovince, an Si advisor to all provinces without one, increasing the Administrativ e and Direct Support Logistics (ADSL) companies from three to seven, and creatin g 7 seven-man Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams (MALTs) to support the RF/PF. Alto gether, the conference produced some fifty-odd recommendations from which a 30-p oint package was forwarded to COMUSMACV. On 15 December, General Westmoreland ga ve his approval to the new system which was to be phased in during 1968, the fir st half by the end of March and the rest by the end of that year. By the end of December 1967, MACV was recommending a further increase of 366 advisors for the FY 1969 program, primarily for district level intelligence slots. Meanwhile, on September 28, the JCS had forwarded with their endorsement the MACVCINCPAC recom mendation on RVNAF force increases, of which the RF/PF component was the largest . Requested was an increase in FY 68 RVNAF authorized strength from 622,153 to 6 85,739, a net of 63,586. Of this number, 47,839 were RF/PF spaces, and only 15,7 47 were for the regular forces (of which ARVN's share was 14,966). To achieve th ese higher levels, MACV proposed the reduction of the draft age from 20 to 18 an d the extension of tours of duty for active RVNAF personnel. The advisory suppor t for these new Vietnamese forces had already been provided for by Program #5. I n their concluding paragraph, the JCS took note of a MACV request, to be conside red separately, for an FY 1969 RVNAF authorized strength of 763,953, a further i ncrease of 78,204 over the newly proposed FY 1968 level. Of these new troops, 69 ,000 were to go to RF/PF (including some draftees) and only 9,000 to ARVN. Secre tary McNamara approved these requested FY 1968 augmentations for RVNAF against t he recommendation of his Systems Analyst, Alain Enthoven, who would have authori zed only half of the request pending better justification. But the JCS were info rmed that a judgment on the proposed FY 1969 increase would be reserved until th e military had responded to a series of questions relating to equipment availabi lity, officer supply, costs, and distribution of the new forces between ARVN and RF/PF. Thus, by the fall of 1967, two factors were pushing U.S. leaders toward increasing the size and role of RVNAF in the war-a step which would increase the importance of the U.S. as advisor rather than combatant: (1) the approaching ce iling on U.S. Forces

deployable to Vietnam without mobilization (politically unpalatable in an electi on year); and (2) a growing U.S. Congressional and public clamor for a larger So uth Vietnamese contribution to the war and assumption of burdens. This was essen tially the situation that existed when, on 31 January 1968, the VC/NVA launched a series of major attacks on South Vietnamese population centers. This radical c hange in enemy tactics challenged the efficacy of the division of effort between U.S. forces and RVNAF, shook U.S. public support for the war, and marked the be ginning of a new, uncharted phase in the history of U.S. attempts to advise the government and armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 7, "Re-Emphasis on Pacification: 1965-1967," pp. 515-623. (Boston: Beaco n Press, 1971) Section 1, pp. 515-560 Summary By the summer of 1967, pacification had become a major ingredient of Ame rican strategy in Vietnam, growing steadily in importance and the amount of reso urces devoted to it. The U.S. Mission in Vietnam had been reorganized three time s in 15 months and each reorganization had been designed primarily to improve th e management of the pacification effort and raise its priority within our overal l effort. Pacification--or as it is sometimes called by Americans, Revolutionary Development (RD)--had staged a comeback in priority from the days in 1964 and 1 965 when it was a program with little emphasis, guidance, or support. It has by now almost equalled in priority for the Americans the original priority given th e Strategic Hamlet program in 1962-1963, although the Vietnamese have not yet co nvinced many people that they attach the same importance to it as we do. This st udy traces the climb in pacification's importance during the last two years, unt il it reached its present level of importance, with further growth likely. This study concentrates on American decisions, American discussions, American papers. It will be clear to the reader that, if this version of events is accurate, the Vietnamese played a secondary role in the move to re-emphasize pacification. It is the contention of this paper that this was indeed the case, and that the Ame ricans were the prime movers in the series of events which led to the reemphasis of pacification. This study does not cover

many important events, particularly the progress of the field effort, the CIA-ba cked PAT/ Cadre program, and GVN activity. The process by which the American gov ernment came to increase its support for pacification is disorderly and haphazar d. Individuals like Ambassador Lodge and General Walt and Robert Komer, seem in retrospect to have played important roles, but to each participant in a story st ill unfolding, the sequence may look different. Therefore, it is quite possible that things didn't quite happen the way they are described here, and someone els e, whose actions are not adequately described in the files available for this st udy, was equally important. Nor was there anything resembling a conspiracy invol ved. Indeed, the proponents of what is called so loosely in this paper "pacifica tion" were often in such violent disagreement as to what pacification meant that they quarreled publicly among themselves and overlooked their common interests. At other times, people who disagreed strongly on major issues found themselves temporary allies with a common objective. Moreover, there is the curious problem of the distance between rhetoric and reality. Even during the dark days of 1964 -1965, most Americans paid lip service, particularly in official, on the record statements, to the ultimate importance of pacification. But their public affirma tion of the cliches about "winning the hearts and minds of the people" were not related to any programs or priorities then in existence in Vietnam, and they can mislead the casual observer. The resurgence of pacification was dramatically pu nctuated by three Presidential conferences on Pacific islands with the leaders o f the GVN--Honolulu in February, 1966, Manila in October, 1966 (with five other Chiefs of State also present), and Guam in March, 1967. After each conference th e relative importance of pacification took another leap upward within the U.S. G overnment--reflecting a successful effort within the U.S. Government by its Amer ican proponents--and the U.S. tied the GVN onto Declarations and Communiques whi ch committed them to greater effort. In addition, each conference was followed b y a major re-organization within the U.S. Mission, designed primarily to improve our management of the pacification effort. After Honolulu, Deputy Ambassador Po rter was given broad new authority to run the civilian agencies. After Manila, P orter was directed to reorganize the components of USIA, CIA, and AID internally to create a single Office of Civil Operations (OCO). And after Guam, OCO--redes ignated as CORDS--was put under the control of General Westmoreland, who was giv en a civilian deputy with the personal rank of Ambassador to assist him. The low priority of pacification in 1965 was the understandable result of a situation i n which battles of unprecedented size were taking place in the highlands and alo ng the coast, the air war was moving slowly north towards Hanoi, and the GVN was in a continual state of disarray.

But a series of events and distinct themes were at work which would converge to give pacification a higher priority. They were to meet at the Honolulu conferenc e in February, 1966. I. THREADS THAT MET AT HONOLULU A. HOP TAC The first was th e hold-over program from 1964-1965--pacification's one priority even then, the H op Tac program. It had been suggested first by Lodge on his way home from his fi rst Ambassadorship, and Taylor and Westmoreland had given it recognition as a hi gh priority program. Although Westmoreland judged it repeatedly as a partial suc cess, it appears now to have been a faultily conceived and clumsily executed pro gram. It was conceptually unsound, lacked the support of the Vietnamese, created disagreements within the U.S. Mission which were never resolved, and then faded away. So unsuccessful was it that during its life span the VC were able to orga nize a regiment--165A--in the Gia Dinh area surrounding Saigon, and thus forced MACV in late 1966 to commit three U.S. infantry battalions to Operation FAIRFAX to protect the capital. No one analyzed Hop Tac before starting FAIRFAX. With th e beginning of FAIRFAX, Hop Tac was buried quietly and the United States proceed ed to other matters. B. AMBASSADOR LODGE AND THE "TRUE BELIEVERS" Henry Cabot Lo dge returned as Ambassador in August of 1965, and immediately began to talk of p acification as "the heart of the matter." In telegrams and Mission Council meeti ngs, Lodge told the President, the GVN, and the Mission that pacification deserv ed a higher priority. Because he saw himself as an advocate before the President for his beliefs rather than as the overall manager of the largest overseas civi l-military effort in American history,* Lodge did not try, as Ambassador Maxwell * No other American Ambassador has ever had responsibility and authority even cl ose to that in Saigon; only military commands have exceeded it in size. Taylor had done, to devise an integrated and unified strategy that balanced ever y part of our effort. Instead, he declared, in his first month back in Vietnam ( September, 1965), that "the U.S. military was doing so well now that we face a d istinct possibility that VC main force units will be neutralized, and VC fortres ses destroyed soon," and that therefore we should be ready to give pacification a new push. While his involvement was irregular and inconsistent, Lodge did none theless play a key role in giving pacification a boost. His rhetoric, even if va gue, encouraged other advocates of pacification to speak up. The man he brought with him, Edward Lansdale, gave by his very presence an implicit boost to pacifi cation. C. THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

Meanwhile, to their own amazement, the Marines were discovering that the toughes t war for them was the war in the villages behind them near the Da Nang air base , rather than the war against the main force, which had retreated to the hills t o build up. In the first 12 months of their deployment, the Marines virtually re versed their emphasis, turning away from the enemy to a grueling and painfully s low effort to pacify the villages of the central coast in their three TAORs. It was a job that Americans were not equipped for, and the Marine effort raised som e basic questions about the role of U.S. troops in Vietnam, but nonetheless, the Marines began to try to sell the rest of the U.S. Government on the success and correctness of their still unproved strategy. The result was a major commitment to the pacification strategy by a service of the U.S. Armed Forces, and influen ce on the other services, particularly the Army. D. WASHINGTON GRUMBLES ABOUT TH E EFFORT When Lodge was Ambassador, there was widespread concern about the manag ement of the Mission. Lodge was admittedly not a manager. This concern led to a major conference at Warrenton in January of 1966, during which increased emphasi s on pacification and better organization within the U.S. Mission were the main topics. Improving the Washington organizational structure was raised, but not ad dressed candidly in the final report; Washington seemed far readier to tell Saig on how to reorganize than to set their own house in order. But Warrenton symboli zes the growing dissatisfaction in Washington with the Mission as it was. E. PRE SIDENTIAL EMPHASIS ON THE "OTHER WAR" AND PRESS REACTION Finally, there was the need of the President, for compelling domestic political reasons, to give greate r emphasis to "the other war." With the first full years of major troop commitme nt ending with victory not yet in sight, there was a growing need to point out t o the American public and to the world that the United States was doing a great deal in the midst of war to build a new Vietnam. While this emphasis did not nec essarily have to also become an emphasis on pacification, it did, and thus the P resident in effect gave pacification his personal support--an act which was acut ely felt by Americans in Vietnam. F. MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE WAR... A summary of the MACV Monthly Evaluations and other reports is contained here, showing how th e U.S. command saw its own progress. The summary suggests that MACV foresaw heav y fighting all through 1966, and did not apparently agree with Ambassador Lodge' s predictions and hopes that a major pacification effort could be started, but t he issue was not analyzed before decisions were made. II. HONOLULU A. THE CONFER ENCE-FEBRUARY 1966

The details of the working sessions at the Honolulu conference do not appear, in retrospect, to be nearly as important on the future emphasis on pacification as the public statements that came out of Honolulu, particularly the Declaration i tself. The discussions and the Declaration are summarized, including the Preside nt's final remarks in plenary session. B. PUBLIC IMPACT... The press reaction to the conference is summarized. III. HONOLULU TO MANILA A. SAIGON: PORTER IN CHAR GE The first reorganization now took place, and Deputy Ambassador Porter was put in direct charge of the civilian agencies. His responsibility and his ability t o carry out his responsibility were not equal from the outset, and Porter saw hi s role in different terms than those in Washington who had given him his difficu lt task. A major problem was the lack of full support that Porter received from Ambassador Lodge, who had never been fully in favor of the reorganization. Anoth er problem was the lack of a parallel structure in Washington, so that Porter fo und himself caught between the Washington agencies and their representatives in Saigon, with Komer (see below) as a frequent participant. Nonetheless, Porter ac complished a great deal in the months this arrangement lasted; it just wasn't as much as Washington sought. B. WASHINGTON: KOMER AS THE BLOWTORCH In Washington, the President selected a McGeorge Bundy deputy, R. W. Komer, to be his Special Assistant on non-military activities in Vietnam. Komer did not have the same kin d of authority over the Washington agencies that Porter, in theory, had over the Saigon extensions. Komer pushed pacification hard, and became the first senior official, with apparently ready access to the President, who put forward the pro -pacification position consistently in high level meetings. His mandate was cont ained in a loosely worded NSAM, 343, dated March 28, 1966. During the summer of 1966, Komer applied great pressure to both the Mission and the Washington agenci es (thus earning from Ambassador Lodge the nickname of "Blowtorch"), with a seri es of cables and visits to Vietnam, often using the President's name. C. STUDY G ROUPS AND STRATEGISTS: SUMMER 1966 With Porter and Komer in their new roles, a s eries of Task Forces and Study Groups began to produce papers that gave a better rationale and strategy to pacification. These included the Army study called PR OVN, the Priorities Task Force in Saigon, and the Roles and Missions Study Group s in Saigon. At the same time, Westmoreland, whose year end wrapup message on Ja nuary 1, 1966, had not even mentioned pacification, sent in a new long range str ategy which emphasized pacification, to Lodge's pleasure. MACV

also produced a new position on revamping ARVN, and briefed the Mission Council on it in August, 1966. The Honolulu emphasis was beginning to produce tangible r esults on the U.S. side. D. THE SINGLE MANAGER Despite the movement described in the above three sections, Washington wanted more, and was not satisfied with th e rate of progress. Komer, therefore, in August of 1966 had produced a long pape r which offered three possible changes in the management structure of the Missio n. They were: (1) put all pacification responsibility and assets, including MACV Advisors, under Porter; (2) reorganize the civilian structure to create a singl e office of operations, and strengthen MACV internally, but leave the civilians and the military split; (3) give Westmoreland full pacification responsibility. The Mission rejected all these ideas, offering in their stead the proposal that Washington leave Saigon alone for a while, but the pressure for results and bett er management was too great, and the inadequacies of the Mission too obvious, to leave it alone. Secretary McNamara weighed in at this point with a draft Presid ential memorandum proposing that Westmoreland be given responsibility for pacifi cation. Komer and JCS concurred in it, but State, USIA, AID, and CIA nonconcurre d. McNamara, Katzenbach, and Komer then went to Saigon to take a look at the sit uation. When they returned, Katzenbach, new to the State Department and previous ly uninvolved in the problem, recommended that Porter be told to reorganize the civilians along the lines previously discussed (similar to Komer's Alternative N umber 2). The President agreed, discussing it with Lodge and Westmoreland at Hon olulu. But he added a vital warning: he would give the civilians only about 90 t o 120 days to make the new structure work, and then would reconsider the proposa l to transfer responsibility for pacification to MACV. E. THE MANILA CONFERENCE The decision had not yet been transmitted to Saigon, but it had been made. At Ma nila, with six other heads of state in attendance, the discussion turned to othe r matters. At Manila, in the final Declaration, the GVN announced that they woul d commit half the armed forces to securing operations in support of pacification /RD. This had previously been discussed, but it was the public commitment that r eally mattered, and now it was on the record. IV. OCO TO CORDS A. OCO ON TRIAL: INTRODUCTION The Office of Civil Operations was formed, creating confusion and r esentment among the agencies, but also marking an immediate and major step forwa rd. The example of the civilians moving at this pace also created pressure and c onflict within MACV, which was for the first time confronted with a strong civil ian structure. The GVN indicated that it understood and approved of the new stru cture.

B. OCO ON TRIAL: TOO LITTLE TOO LATE-OR NOT ENOUGH TIME? Although it was slower than Washington desired, OCO did get off to a start in December of 1966. Wade La thram, who had been USAID Deputy Director, was chosen to head up OCO--a choice t hat was unfortunate, because Lathram, a skilled and cautious bureaucrat, was not the kind of driving and dynamic leader that OCO--in a brink of disaster situati on from its inception--needed. Even worse, Porter was almost immediately diverte d from OCO to pay more attention to other matters. While the planners had hoped that Porter would take OCO in hand and give Lathram direct guidance, instead he left Lathram in control of OCO and was forced to turn his attentions to running the Mission, during a long vacation (one month) by Lodge. The most dramatic acti on that was taken was the selection of the Regional Directors, a move which even attracted newspaper attention. They included Henry Koren, formerly Porter's dep uty; John Paul Vann, the controversial former MACV advisor; and Vince Heymann of the CIA. Slowly, the OCO then turned to picking its province representatives. A ll in all, OCO accomplished many things that had never been done before; given t ime it could no doubt have done much more. But it was plagued from the outset by lack of support from the agencies and their representatives in Saigon, and Wash ington made higher demands than could be met in Saigon. C. TIME RUNS OUT It is n ot clear when the President made the decision to scrap OCO. He communicated his decision to his field commanders at Guam, but there was a two-month delay before the decision was announced publicly or discussed with theGVN. D. THE CORDS REOR GANIZATION As Bunker took over the Mission, there was a considerable turnover in key personnel. Bunker asked Lansdale and Zorthian to stay on, but Porter, Habib , Wehrle, all left just as Locke, Komer, Calhoun, Cooper, and General Abrams all arrived. In the new atmosphere, Komer took the lead, making a series of recomme ndations which maintained the civilian position within MACV, and West-moreland a ccepted them. An example of Komer's influence was the question of the role of th e ARVN divisions in the RD chain of command, and here Westmoreland took Komer's suggestion even though it meant a reversal of the previous MACV position. E. THE MISSION ASSESSMENT AS CORDS BEGINS

The situation inherited by CORDS was not very promising. Measurements of progres s had been irrelevant and misleading, and progress by nearly all standards has b een slow or nonexistent. At this point, the study of CORDS and pacification beco mes current events. End of Summary I. THREADS THAT MET AT HONOLULU A. HOP TAC Wh ile pacification received a low emphasis during troubled 1964-1965, there was on e important exception: the Hop Tac program, designed to put "whatever resources are required" into the area surrounding Saigon to pacify it. The area was chosen by Ambassador Lodge in his last weeks as Ambassador in June, 1964, and Hop Tac deserves study because both its failures and limited achievements had many of th e characteristics of our later pacification efforts--and because, like all pacif ication efforts, there was constant disagreement within the Mission, the press, and the Vietnamese as to how well the program was doing. Hop Tac--an intensive p acification effort in the provinces ringing Saigon--was formally proposed at a h igh level strategy session in Honolulu in July of 1964 by Lodge, then on his way home from his first assignment as Ambassador. In a paper presented to Secretari es Rusk and McNamara and incoming Ambassador Taylor at Honolulu (dated June 19, 1964), Lodge wrote: A combined GVN-US effort to intensify pacification efforts i n critical provinces should be made . . . The eight critical provinces are: Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, and Quang Ngai. Top priority and maximum effort should be concentrated initially in the st rategically important provinces nearest to Saigon, i.e., Long An, Hau Nghia, and Binh Duong. Once real progress has been made in these provinces, the same effor t should be made in the five others. General Taylor and General Westmoreland beg an Hop Tac, setting up a new and additional headquarters in Saigon which was sup posed to tie together the overlapping and quarrelsome commands in the Saigon are a. The Vietnamese set up a parallel, "counterpart" organization, although critic s of Hop Tac were to point out that the Vietnamese Hop Tac headquarters had virt ually no authority or influence, and seemed primarily designed to satisfy the Am ericans. (Ironically, Hop Tac is the Vietnamese word for "cooperation," which tu rned out to be just what Hop Tac lacked.) Hop Tac had a feature previously missi ng from pacification plans: it sought to tie together the pacification plans of a seven-province area (expanded from Lodge's three provinces to include the adja cent provinces of Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Phuoc Thanh, and Gia Dinh, which surround Saigon like a doughnut), into a plan in which each province subordinated its ow n priorities to the concept of building a "giant oil spot" around Saigon. In a p hrase which eventually became a joke in the Mission, the American

heading the Hop Tac Secretariat at its inception, Colonel Jasper Wilson, briefed senior officials on the creation of "rings of steel" which would grow outward f rom Saigon until the area from the Cambodian border to the South China Sea was s ecure. Then, according to the plan, Hop Tac would move into the Delta and North. Colonel Wilson ordered his staff to produce a phased plan in which the area (se e map below) to be pacified was divided into four circles around Saigon. Each ri ng was to be pacified in four months, according to the original plan, which neve r had any chance of success. But Wilson, under great pressure from his superiors , ordered the plan produced, got his Vietnamese counterparts to translate it, an d issued it. The kickoff date for Hop Tac was to be September 12, 1964: the oper ation, a sweep into the VC-controlled pineapple groves just west and southwest o f the city of Saigon--the VC base nearest to the city, which had not been entere d by the GVN since the last outpost had been abandoned in 1960. The operation began on schedule, with elements of the 51st Regiment moving towar d their objective west of Saigon. During the second day of the operation, the un it ran into a minefield and took numerous casualties. Shortly thereafter, instea d of continuing the operation, the unit broke off contact and, to the amazement of its advisors, turned back

towards the city of Saigon. When next located it was in the middle of Saigon par ticipating in the abortive coup d'etat of September 13, 1964. From that point on , Hop Tac was a constant source of dispute within the U.S. Mission. Almost to a man, the civilian agencies "supporting" Hop Tac felt that the program was unnece ssary, repetitive, and doomed. They claimed that they preferred to work through existing channels, although these, in MACV's view, were inadequate. This view wa s not stated openly, however, since the Ambassador and General Westmoreland had committed all U.S. agencies to full support. On October 6, 1964, for example, Ge neral Taylor sent Washington an EXDIS cable in which he discussed and rejected a suggestion to decentralize the pacification effort, and instead listed several actions that the Mission would take. First among these was a "unanimous recommen dation" that the Mission "give full support to Hop Tac Plan, assuring it the nec essary priority to give it every chance to succeed . . . When Hop Tac priorities permit, concentrate on selected weak areas." Thus there was a reluctance to cri ticize the program directly. Deadlines slipped continually; phase lines were rea djusted; the official count of "pacified" hamlets climbed steadily. But a specia l study of the area made in October, 1964, by representatives of USOM, USIS, and MACV concluded: "Generally speaking, Hop Tac, as a program, does not appear to exist as a unified and meaningful operation." The official view of Hop Tac was t hat the new coordinating machinery was doing some good. Thus, during a period in which cables on the general situation were rather gloomy, Ambassador Taylor cou ld tell the President in his weekly NODIS that while "pacification progress thro ughout the rest of Vietnam was minimal at best, largely because of the political climate . . . Some forward movement occurred in the Hop Tac effort growing out of U.S. Mission discussions with the Prime Minister on September 25. The number of operating checkpoints in the Hop Tac area increased markedly; command areas w ere strengthened; available troop strength increased." Minor statistical advance s, taken out of context, were continually being used in the above manner to prov e overall progress. The MACV Command History for 1964 reflects the official view : "At the end of 1964, Hop Tac was one of the few pacification areas that showed some success and greater promise." But subsequent events in the area do not bea r out this view. In February of 1966 for example--18 months after the birth of H op Tac--when the Hop Tac area was designated as one of the four "National Priori ty Areas," the briefers were unable to show Ambassadors Lodge and Porter any pro gress in the preceding year. They could not even produce a plan for the coming y ear. Originally Hop Tac was focused on cleaning out the nearest VC base areas, b ut by February of 1966--with the GVN unable to stop the growing VC build-up, the emphasis was "placed on lines of communications, with special attention to be g iven vital installations including Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut air bases and ammun ition and gasoline depots." The best the briefers could do, in the final briefin g prior to the Honolulu Conference, was to say that they hoped to pacify 72 haml ets in the entire seven-province area, and "consolidate" 144 hamlets in Gia Dinh -which meant the hamlets ringing Saigon, including many which were really part o f the city. Lodge and Porter were

told that day "there has been a lessening of security in Hau Nghia and Gia Dinh provinces. RF and PF units generally are not up to authorized strengths. The new cadre program should be helpful in solving the problem of continued hamlet secu rity after pacification . . . The 1966 plan is not overly optimistic from a mili tary standpoint." (The memorandum recording of this meeting, made by a member of General Lansdale's staff, shows as the only Ambassadorial guidance after this s obering report: "Maps drawn to depict progress of Rural Construction (Pacificati on) should show as the goal only that area to be pacified during the year . . . The U.S. Mission manpower committee should look into the use of refugees in the national labor force.") The Vietnamese were cynical about Hop Tac; it was someth ing, speculation ran, that General Khanh had to do to keep the Americans happy, but it was clearly an American show, clearly run by the United States, and the V ietnamese were reluctant to give it meaningful support. It was one of the first major programs with which the United States became publicly identified (since Di em had always kept the United States in as much of a background role as possible --and its shortcomings were in part derived from this fact. All through Ambassad or Taylor's tenure, Hop Tac was something on which he and the Mission Council pi nned hope. General Westmoreland thought the program had been reasonably successf ul, when he told the Mission Council about Hop Tac's first year: General Westmor eland said that while Hop Tac could be said only to have been about 50% successf ul, it had undoubtedly averted a VC siege of Saigon. This same view was reflecte d in McGeorge Bundy's comments in a memorandum to the President months earlier i n February, 1965, when he said: The Hop Tac program of pacification in this area has not been an unqualified success, but it has not been a failure, and it has certainly prevented any strangling seige of Saigon. We did not have a chance to form an independent judgment on Hop Tac, but we did conclude that whatever its p recise measure of success, it is of great importance that this operation be purs ued with full vigor. This is the current policy of the Mission. There were other s who said that, as a matter of fact, Saigon was almost under seige and that the situation was deteriorating. Westmoreland's own headquarters, for example, sent to Washington in the June Monthly Evaluation from MACV, the following statement which seems to contradict Westmoreland's optimism: The sealing off of Saigon fr om surrounding areas, no matter how incomplete the sealing may be, has had and w ill continue to have serious economic as well as military effects. Shortly after he arrived in Vietnam for his second tour, Lodge asked for a private assessment of Hop Tac from an Embassy officer, who reported to him in early September of 1 965:

1. Hop Tac did not achieve its original goals primarily because they were comple tely unrealistic and did not take into account the difficulty of the task. These goals were set quite arbitrarily and with no regard for the available resources and the strength of the enemy. 2. The second reason for the failures of Hop Tac lies in its strategic concept. The idea of concentric circles outward from Saig on to be pacified in successive waves of clearing, securing and developing may b e sound in macroscopic terms; when the Hop Tac area is looked at carefully, the viability of this strategy breaks down. The concentric phase lines around Saigon do not adequately take into account existing areas of GVN strength and existing Viet Cong base areas; rather they commit the GVN to a continual expansionary ef fort on all sides of Saigon simultaneously, an effort which is beyond its capabi lities. Above all, they ignore the political structure of the area around Saigon . 3. The U.S. Mission has two broad courses of action available in regard to Hop Tac. First, the Mission Council may feel that the area encompassed by Hop Tac r emains the first pacification priority of the U.S. and the GVN. If this is the c onsidered judgment of the Mission Council, then we must seek ways of re-emphasiz ing, re-invigorating and reorienting Hop Tac in order to achieve a dramatic and sustained success in pacification. 4. There is an alternative open to the Missio n Council. Perhaps it would be politically unwise to attempt to commit the GVN t o re-emphasis of Hop Tac at this time. There are several facts which support thi s view: A. The GVN has never considered Hop Tac its own plan and its own number one priority. The staff planning for the plan was done almost entirely by the Un ited States, and then translated into Vietnamese. It is, in the eyes of many Vie tnamese, "the plan of the Americans." B. It is perhaps the most difficult area i n the country in which to attempt pacification. Since it surrounds Saigon (but d oes not include it), every political tremor in the capital is felt in the neighb oring area . . . the High Command has created chains of command in the area whic h are clearly designed primarily to prevent coups, and only secondarily to pacif y the countryside. Another example: in the last 11 months, 24 out of 31 district chiefs and five out of seven province chiefs have been changed. C. Prime Minist er Ky will never feel that Hop Tac is his plan. If he is seeking a major public triumph, and intends to devote his attention to achieving that triumph, it is un likely that he will choose Hop Tac, which as mentioned above, is publicly consid ered an American plan. Moreover, to the extent that any Vietnamese is publicly c onnected with Hop Tac, it is Nguyen Khanh. For this reason, more than any other, the dangers of reemphasizing Hop Tac outweigh the possible gains . The situatio n in the Hop Tac area will not collapse if Hop Tac is not revitalized now. With the available forces, and particularly with the impending arrival of the 1st Inf antry Division to take up a position across the southern arc of Zone D, Saigon i tself is not

going to be threatened any more than it presently is. The threat-which is substa ntialcomes from the enemy within, and the solution does not lie within the respo nsibility of the Hop Tac Council: it is a problem for the Saigon police and inte lligence communities. This threat, serious as it is, is not directly affected by the presence of the Viet Cong's 506th battalion 20 miles away in Hau Nghia, nor by Zone D. The two problems can be dealt with separately, and solution of the i nternal security problems of Saigon are not contingent on the success of clearin g Hau Nghia and Long An. In an effort to reconcile these opposing views about Ho p Tac, Lodge told the September 15 Mission Council that "the original reasons fo r the emphasis placed on the area surrounding Saigon . . . were still valid, pri marily because of the heavy density of population. Lodge noted, however, lack of a clear commitment to Hop Tac on the part of the GVN, possibly due to the fact that the Vietnamese consider the program an American scheme. The view was also e xpressed that the trouble may also lie in US/GVN differences over some fundament al concepts in Hop Tac. Finally, Ambassador Lodge said it was essential that all interested American agencies be agreed on concepts and tactics before an approa ch to the GVN could be made." After this meeting, no significant action was take n, and the matter lapsed. The importance of Hop Tac is still difficult to assess ; it is included here primarily because of its role as the one major pacificatio n program that was tried during the 1964-1965 period when pacification was not r eceiving its present top-level emphasis. Whether or not it averted a seige of Sa igon, as General Westmoreland claimed, is a semantic question: what constitutes a seige in a guerrilla war? Saigon, of course, never was under seige in the clas sic sense of the word, but it is hard to conceive of it ever being literally cut off as Dien Bien Phu or Mafeking were-this would not be a logical objective to the Viet Cong, who wanted to put pressure on the capital but knew they couldn't seal it off (nor would have wanted to, since they got supplies from it). What is important is that the failures of Hop Tac were never adequately reported and an alyzed prior to embarking on other pacification efforts. Thus, at one point Gene ral Westmoreland told each of his Senior Corps Advisors to start a Hop Tac in hi s area-a strange request since Hop Tac was designed to pull together a multiplic ity of commands not duplicated in any other area. Each Corps naturally responded by producing plans which concentrated their pacification assets around the Corp s headquarters-Da Nang, and Can Tho or, in the case of II Corps, Qui Nhon. This in turn led naturally to the later National Priority Area program, but had no ot her value. With MACV reluctant to close down its Hop Tac Secretariat, with the c ivilian Americans giving Hop Tac only verbal support, and with the Vietnamese le aving a powerless staff at the headquarters, Hop Tac could well have survived as an appendix to the normal chain of command, as so many outdated structures surv ive in Vietnam because no one wants to admit their irrelevance. But General West moreland saw a way to dispose of Hop Tac cleanly and quietly in the summer of 19 66, and he took it. At the Mission Council meeting of July 7, 1966:

General Westmoreland then turned to the subject of Hop Tac. He summarized the pu rpose of the Hop Tac concept, which was implemented two years ago, and said that -while it has enjoyed only modest success over the past two years--the situation in the area surrounding Saigon/Cholon would be comparatively worse if we had no t had the Hop Tac arrangement. He noted that recent organizational changes have taken place, which have resulted in the Capital Military Region becoming the Cap ital Military District (as part of the III Corps Tactical Zone) with Saigon rema ining as an autonomous city. In view of these changes, there is some question of the validity of continuing with the original concept. More importantly, III Cor ps has a Revolutionary Development Council and a Hop Tac Council which results i n some duplication of effort. Consequently, the General believes that these two councils should be merged, with the Revolutionary Development Council absorbing the Hop Tac Council. General Westmoreland asked the Mission Council to endorse t his proposal for him to carry out. After brief discussion, Ambassador Lodge indi cated his approval. By this time Hop Tac had long lost the "highest priority" wh ich was supposed to justify it, and both the American and the Vietnamese had tur ned to other matters. But Hop Tac was not adequately analyzed before embarking o n other efforts, and its shortcomings were largely forgotten by the time that th e still-deteriorating situation in Gia Dinh led MACV to commit three U.S. Army b attalions to the inner area surrounding Saigon--the original first phase of Hop Tac--as part of Operation Fairfax in November of 1966. The Mission, with no inst itutional memory, forgot--or never learned--the lessons that Hop Tac could have offered. B. AMBASSADOR LODGE AND THE "TRUE BELIEVERS" Many senior American offic ials have paid varying degrees of lip service to the pacification effort since 1 962--a fact which makes it extremely hard to determine who really pushed pacific ation and who didn't. But about Ambassador Lodge, there can be little question. He had repeatedly called pacification "the heart of the matter," and his unfaili ng belief in the importance of the effort can be clearly shown in his public and private statements and his cables. His emphasis on pacification resumed the day he returned to Saigon in August 1965, when in his arrival statement he said tha t the United States supported the "true revolution" of the Vietnamese people. Hi s continual emphasis on the effort seems to have had a definite impact on the mo od in Washington and in the Mission, and played a role in the events leading up to the Honolulu Conference in February 1966--where pacification was given (or so it seemed to Americans and Vietnamese alike in Vietnam) the President's blessin g. It is true that Ambassador Taylor also felt that pacification was important a nd that it would deserve high emphasis; his push on Hop Tac clearly demonstrates this fact. But because Maxwell Taylor saw that it was his responsibility as Amb assador to reconcile competing requirements for limited resources, and develop a single overall strategy for

the effort, he never let pacification consume too many resources prematurely. Lo dge, on the other hand, did not see himself as an administrator or manager of th e U.S. Mission, but as the President's personal representative and advisor in Sa igon. Thus, he felt no qualms about advocating a certain course of action-in thi s case, pacification. There is no record of Ambassador Lodge worrying about the way his latest proposals would affect the balance of the whole effort. He simply did not see himself as responsible for the actions of the operating agencies wh ich represented AID, USIA, and the CIA, let alone DOD, in Vietnam *--not even af ter receiving * See for example, Lodge's NODIS to the President, February 1, 1966, in which he said: ". . . I have learned of Zorthian's wire to Marks, which, of course, he h as the right to send, since I hold that Zorthian, like U.S. agency chiefs here, has and should have an open channel to his agency. It is a statement of Zorthian 's opinion which, of course, was sent without my approval or direction . . ." (T he subject was apparently a suggestion that Lodge address the United Nations Gen eral Assembly in New York, although Lodge's cable cited does not explicitly stat e what Zorthian's cable said.) a strong letter of authority from President Johnson in July of 1965: As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this express ion of my confidence, and a reaffirmation of my desire that as Ambassador you ex ercise full responsibility for the work of the United States Government in South Vietnam. In general terms this authority is parallel to that set forth in my le tter to Ambassador Taylor of July 2, 1964. * * The letter to Taylor had said, among other points: "I wish it clearly understo od that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appro priate." Given his belief in the fundamental importance of the pacification effort, Lodge was ready to push it at any time he could. He did not examine the possibility t hat certain times were more favorable than others for an effort which needed the full participation of the Vietnamese in order to succeed, and, like many in the government, failed to see that at certain times emphasis on pacification would not only not work but would be harmful to GVN/US relations, and would reduce the chances for a successful joint effort at some more propitious time. Thus, it is not surprising that one of his last major documents at the end of his first tou r as Ambassador proposed Hop Tac--in the face of strong possibilities that the s ituation was not favorable to it--and that on his return in August 1965 he was a dvocating more effort in pacification.

Thus, for example, meeting with his senior officers one month after he arrived, Lodge "began the meeting by stating that in his opinion the United States milita ry was doing so well not that 'we face a distinct possibility that VC main force units will be neutralized and that VC fortresses will be destroyed soon. We sho uld be ready to handle the VC in small units. This gives counter-subversion/terr orism or pacification or counterinsurgency--I am not overly concerned with what we call it--a new urgency for all of us here.'" It is likely that if Lodge had c larified his view of pacification and repeated it continually in public and priv ately, as he did with anything he believed in, his view would eventually have ta ken hold in the United States Mission. But the problem of how pacification shoul d work was-and is-a very difficult one. It raises a number of extremely difficul t questions on which the United States Government has never reached a unified po sition. Sensing that Lodge was receptive to ideas which emphasized pacification but that he had no set views on details, many groups and individuals besieged hi m with a resurgence of ideas and philosophies on pacification. They were all enc ouraged by his verbal support or his glowing cables to Washington. The whole atm osphere in the Mission became more favorable towards pacification and pacifiers; Lansdale, Colonel Serong (the Australian who was to organize the Police Field F orce with support from Lodge), Sir Robert Thompson (whose Malayan experiences ha d led him to emphasize the police), Colonel Bohannon (who began as a Lansdale de puty, but whose views took a different line), the Marines (with their pacificati on efforts and CAP's near Da Nang), the CIA (which produced, with Lodge's strong support, the PAT's-turned RD cadre), USIA and AID (with their small but growing field programs), the Army (which entered the game late but elicited from Lodge on visits to the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and then the 1st Infantry Division, some of his longest and most glowing accounts of pacification in action). These groups and individuals fought about details, sometimes debating minor points li ke medieval monks but also disagreeing on rather basic points-such as whether th e object was to gain the population's support or to control them by force. (A po pular Marine saying, which tried to bridge the gap, went: "Get the people by the balls, and their hearts and minds will follow.") But each group found something that appealed to Lodge, and each in turn gained encouragement from him. The slo w change in mood also affected Washington. In dealing with his role in the re-em phasis of pacification, we must distinguish between Lodge's influence on our ove rall, or grand, strategy--on which he was ultimately to have considerable impact --and his influence on the operational details of the policy. The latter did not interest him on a continuing basis, and it is thus easy to underestimate his in fluence. There was, for example, a tendency in Saigon during his Ambassadorship to minimize his importance, since each agency could ignore him when he told them to do something and usually get away with it. But this popular view overlooked Lodge's impact in encouraging all sorts of people to emerge from parts of the US G with renewed hope for pacification. It overlooked the impact of his cables and statements, which added up to

a massive endorsement of pacification. In his NODIS weeklies to the President, f or example, pacification receives more attention than any other subject. Alone, Lodge could have done little, if anything, to move the USG around. But his influ ence seems clear, more so in retrospect than at the time: at a time when frustra tions were growing, he was emphasizing a different rhetoric and strategy. The be st way to show his emphasis is simply to quote from the cables and memoranda of the period. Each one shows Lodge, either directly or indirectly, putting forth h is general beliefs-sometimes contradictory. They form an important part of the b ackground to Honolulu, where pacification was to get its biggest push to that da te: 1. Lodge at the end of his first tour in Vietnam, defining pacification in h is paper proposing Hop Tac: The first priority after the military have cleared a n area is to bring about the selection of an able man for that area, who will in turn go about creating a basically civilian counterterrorist organization on th e "precinct" level, or equivalent thereof . . . Its prime purpose will be, notab ly with police help, to create security for the local government and free it fro m all intimidation by going through the precinct with a fine-toothed comb....Onc e the local government feels safer, it should move energetically to promote publ ic safety for the people; the people should then rally more to the government; a nd this should create an upward spiral as regards security organization . . . US OM and USIA will support these local "precinct" organizations, will actually wor k through them, and will seek to make it attractive to be one of those who build s such a counterterrorism precinct organization . . . The military should take s pecial precautions in their operations not to injure in any way the non-combatan ts. It must also behave itself so well that the people like the Army...." 2. Lod ge's Ten Point Program for Success: In each city precinct and each rural hamlet immediately adjacent to a thoroughly pacified city (i.e., the smallest unit from a public safety standpoint) the following program should be undertaken in the f ollowing order: 1. Saturate the minds of the people with some socially ConsciouS and attractive ideology, which is susceptible of being carried out. 2. Organize the people politically with a hamlet chief and committee whose actions would be backed by the police or the military using police-type tactics. This committee should have representatives of the political, military, economic and social orga nizations and should have an executive who directs. 3. With the help of the poli ce or military, conduct a census. 4. Issue identification cards. 5. Issue permit s for the movement of goods and people. 6. When necessary, hold a curfew. 7. Tha nks to all these methods, go through each hamlet with a fine-tooth comb to appre hend the terrorists.

8. At the first quiet moment, bring in agricultural experts, school teachers, et c. 9. The hamlet should also be organized for its own defense against small Viet Cong attacks. 10. After all these things have been accomplished, hold elections for local office. COMMENT: Lodge began his second tour as Ambassador where he h ad left off the year before. The above paper, which he also transmitted to the P resident in a NODIS message, again represented no official U.S. position. After writing it and giving it to everyone in the Mission, he let the matter drop, and thus the paper did not assume any official character. Since nothing was changed in the procedures of the Mission, and since the old criteria for pacification s till applied unchanged, Lodge had, in typical fashion, failed to affect the oper ating Mission. 3. The Assignment of Lansdale: Handpicked group of about ten expe rienced counter-subversion/counter terrorism workers under direction of Edward G . Lansdale will be going to Saigon to provide Ambassador Lodge with special oper ating staff in field of political action both at central level and also in conne ction with rural programs. COMMENT: From the beginning, there was misunderstandi ng over Lansdale's role in Lodge's Embassy. The first cable reflects this. The p hrase "countersubversion/counterterrorism workers," seems to contradict the latt er part of the sentence, about "political action." From the start Lodge wanted h im to "get pacification going." Thus, less than a month later, Lodge told the Pr esident: I appointed Edward Lansdale, with his complete approval, to be chairman of the U.S. Mission Liaison Group to the newly created Vietnamese governmental body having to do with what we call "pacification," what they call "rural constr uction," and what means to me socially conscious practical politics, the by-prod uct of which is effective countersubversion/ terrorism. I thought it was importa nt for all concerned for him to have a definite allocation where he would have t he best chance of bringing his talents to bear. I trust that the hopes of some j ournalists that he is here in an adversarial relationship with existing US agenc ies will be nipped in the bud by making him the spokesman for the whole US Missi on in this particular regard. (Italics added) Thus, another action which served to strengthen the pacification priority, although its primary reason probably wa s to get Lansdale working on something other than Saigon politics. 4. Lodge on t he Use of U.S. Troops in Pacification: The presence of American troops does prov ide the opportunity for thorough pacification of the areas in which they are sta tioned and full advantage should be taken of this opportunity. It is a very big divident from our investment of men and money. For example, the Third Marine Div ision has scored impressive successes north, south, and

west of Da Nang....If our American troops can emulate this performance (of the p rotoCAC units) of 60 Americans and 150 Vietnamese, we ought to be a tremendous a mount of small unit nighttime effective pacification, and we would be neglecting an opportunity not to use American troops for this purpose, thereby pacifying t he country and transforming the ARVN, making it into a much more vital and effec tive element of Vietnamese society, able at some not too remote date to carry on by themselves within outside help . . . We are already discussing with the Viet namese the possibility of singling out areas that look like good prospects, that are potentially pretty much over on our side, and then pacifying them so as to get a little smell of across-the-board success in the air . . . I am not ready t o say, "What areas would be chosen for pacification, when should the plan be sta rted, what objectives would be best," but hope to be able to do so soon. I am no w encouraging General Ky to concentrate GVN efforts and enthusiasm on pacificati on so that this can have sustained, wholehearted GVN participation . . . Develop ment of popular electoral processes is part of all our current planning for coun ter subversion/terrorism in "rural construction (pacification) ." COMMENT: Here, for the first time, Lodge addresses a key point: the role of U.S. troops on pac ification. The whole concept of the use of U.S. troops was being worked out duri ng this period (see following section on Marines), and Lodge now began to weigh in with qualified support for the Marine approach, based on an overly optimistic view of the situation. 5. Lansdale's Weekly Report, October 4, 1965: Past week devoted to getting GVN into sound start again on pacification program . . . U.S. Mission Liaison Group shaping up into realistic instrument for working level te amwork on pacification by all U.S. Missions.... COMMENT: Lansdale was responding to the direction given him by Lodge. 6. Lodge on the GVN's Attitude Towards Pac ification: During my talk with General Co, the deputy Prime Minister in charge o f six ministries, I was impressed by the amount of sustained analytical thought which he, with his colleagues, had given to how to organize the government for t he great new job of pacification which confronts them--and which is clearly thei r government's most important single responsibility. COMMENT: Lodge had by this time let the GVN know clearly what tune he wanted to hear, and with their usual skill the Vietnamese--even General Co, who turned out to be worthless on pacific ation--were playing the right song back. 7. When the chance to win over the peop le was missed some years ago, a situation came into being in which it was indisp ensable for the VC large units to be defeated before true community building, wi th its mixture of political and security measures, would be possible. Otherwise, the VC battalions, emerging from untouchable sanctuaries, would

destroy whatever community building had painstakingly been achieved. Now it look s as though the VC know this and has already begun to act on the knowledge, tran sforming themselves into small units and individual terrorists, and into subvers ive political operators. COMMENT: Lodge's sequence of events--destroy the main f orce enemy first, pacify second--is hard to argue with, but his assessment of VC capabilities and intentions falls short of accuracy. As a final note to the exa mination of Lodge's emphasis on pacification, it is worthwhile asking why he has so consistently put such a high priority on the effort--regardless of methodolo gy--to gain control of the villages. The answer may lie in his strong views on t he way the war will end in Vietnam. Lodge doubted that there would ever be meani ngful negotiations with the Viet Cong. An old hand at negotiating with the commu nists, Lodge felt that the most likely end to the war was for the enemy to "fade away" after a prolonged period of conflict. In his view, therefore, control of t he population became the best way to force the fadeaway. Furthermore, in the eve nt that there was some sort of pro forma discussions with the communists at some future date, Lodge felt that there were certain minimum conditions of a "satisf actory outcome" which must be met. An examination of his definition of a satisfa ctory outcome shows the overriding importance of the pacification effort in his mind. The following is from a telegram sent "For the President and the Secretary from Lodge" on October 21, 1965, which Lodge considered one of his most importa nt cables: What we consider a satisfactory outcome to be would, of course, be a very closely kept secret. It would include the following, not necessarily in thi s order: 1. The area around Saigon and south of Saigon (all of the Delta) must b e pacified. This area includes about 55 to 60% of the population of Vietnam. "Pa cified" is defined as the existence of a state of mind among the people that the y have a stake in the government as shown by the holding of local elections. It also means a proper local police force. In brief, a pacified area is economicall y, socially, and politically a part of the RVN. 2. The thickly populated northea stern strip along the coast which includes 25% of the population would be comple tely pacified. 3. The GVN would retain its present control of all cities and all provincial capitals. 4. All principal roads would be open to the Vietnamese mil itary day and night. 5. Those areas not pacified would not be safe havens for th e VC but would be contested by energetic offensive forays to prevent consolidati on of a communist base. 6. The VC disarms; and their weapons and explosives are removed from their hands. Their main force units broken up. 7. North Vietnam sto ps its infiltration. 8. Chieu Hoi rehabilitation would be extended to individual VC who are suitable 9. Hardcore VC to go to North Vietnani. 10. GVN to approve.

COMMENT: This means that we would not be insisting on the complete elimination o f the VC although no safe haven would be allocated them. It would mean that we a nd the GVN would control 80 to 85% of the population and that the VC would be li mited to the jungle and mountainous areas where they would go on as bandits, muc h as their counterparts in Malaya and Luzon--and where the GVN would have the ri ght to pursue them and try to destroy them. Lodge's formula for a satisfactory o utcome is based on the absolute necessity of controlling the villages. In day-to -day terms this meant that, as Ambassador, Lodge had to push pacification as har d as possible. Thus, he was quite pleased with the emphasis that came out of the Honolulu conference in February of 1966. C. THE III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE To what extent the growing Marine emphasis on pacification was a factor during the period before the Honolulu conference is impossible to determine; the timing and evidence would suggest that the impact of the Marine strategy was greatest in t he period after Honolulu, as they became more sure of the rightness of their app roach, and as they garnered more and more publicity for it. Nonetheless, in the first eleven months of their mission in I Corps, the Marines had gotten deeply i nto the pacification program. The Marines thus became the most vocal advocates w ithin the Armed Forces for emphasizing pacification more, and search and destroy less. The Marine deployments and mission are covered in earlier decision studie s in this series and will thus be treated only briefly here. The emphasis of thi s section is not on the influence the Marines had on the Honolulu conference, bu t on the way the Marines gradually moved into their new role, and the difficulti es with it. The material here applied, therefore, equally to the pre- and post-H onolulu periods, throughout which the Marine successes, as they reported them, h ad a growing impact on the thinking of civilian and military alike, in Saigon, C INCPAC, and Washington. The Marines landed their first troops--two Battalion Lan ding Teams--in Da Nang in March of 1965. Their original mission, "to secure encl aves in the northem region of Vietnam containing air and communications installa tions, was simplicity itself." (From "U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-March 1966, a study done by the USMC Historical Branch, here after referred to as MC History; from unpaged draft.) By the time of the Honolul u conference the Marines--by now organized into the III Marine Amphibious Force-had changed their mission considerably, and to a degree then unequalled among o ther American units was deeply engaged in pacification operations. A monthly rep ort issued by General Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, i ndicates the evolution of Marine thinking on their mission. Reviewing the first seven months of their deployment in I Corps, the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, wr ote in September, 1965:

The Mission assigned III MAF was initially confined to airfield security. Subseq uently, a limited offensive responsibility was added, which has gradually grown to an essentially unrestrained authority for offensive operations. Finally, and largely on its own, III MAF has entered the pacification program, with the bulk of its pacification efforts taking place since June. [Emphasis added] One month later, after chronicling their successes, the report indicated the major shift i n strategic thinking which was taking place at General Walt's headquarters in Da Nang, and at General Krulak's in Hawaii: While accomplishing all this the Marin es were feeling, with growing impact, a cardinal counterinsurgency principle: th at if local forces do not move in promptly behind the offensive effort, then fir st line forces must be diverted to provide the essential hamlet security, police and stabilization. The alternative is to risk the development of vacua, into wh ich the VC guerrilla can flow. This condition grew during the period. The Popula r Forces and police were inadequate in numbers and in quality to do their part o f the job, as the Marines did theirs. This operated to complicate the Marines' p roblem by making the civic action effort more difficult, by permitting harassmen t of our forces, and by making possible a suicide attack on the Chu Lao and Marb le Mountain areas. The end of the period saw the 676 square mile III MAF area of influence more stable, more prosperous, and far more hopeful, but it saw also a n urgent need for efficient regional or local forces to take up their proper bur den, so the Marines can maintain the momentum of their search/clear/pacification efforts. It is plain that the most efficient way to bring this about is to give III MAF substantial authority over the RF or PF serving in this area, in order that they may be properly trained and properly led. This summary, written in the headquarters of the man often regarded as the philosopher of the Marine Corps, shows the Marines in the process of swinging their emphasis around--turning away from the offensive against the enemy waiting in the nearby hills, and towards t he people and the VC guerrillas among the people inside their TAOR. It was a cru cial, difficult decision for the men who made it. Significantly, the indications are strong that the decision was made almost entirely inside Marine Corps chann els, through a chain of command that bypassed COMUSMACV and the civilian leaders of our government, and ran from General Greene through General Krulak to Genera l Walt. The files do not reveal discussions of the implications, feasibility, co st, and desirability of the Marine strategy among highranking officials in the E mbassy, MACV headquarters, the Defense and State Departments. Yet in retrospect it seems clear that the strategy the Marines proposed to follow, a strategy abou t which they made no secret, was in sharp variance with the strategy of the othe r U.S. units in the country, with far-ranging political implications that could even affect the ultimate chances for negotiations. It should be clear that the M arine concept of operations has a different implicit time requirement than a mor e enemy-oriented search and destroy effort. It is not within the scope of this p aper to analyze the different requirements, but it does appear that the

Marine strategy, which General Walt sometimes described as the "wringing out of the VC from the land like you wring water out of a sponge," is slow and methodic al, requires vast numbers of troops, runs the risk of turning into an occupation even while being called "pacification,' civic action," and involves Americans d eeply in the politics and traditions of rural Vietnam. The strategy can succeed, perhaps, but if it is to succeed, it must be undertaken with full awareness by the highest levels of the USG of its potential costs in manpower and time, and t he exacting nature of the work. Instead, the documents suggest that the Marines determined their strategy basically on their own, deriving part of it from their own traditions in the "Banana Republics" and China (where Generals Walt, Krulak , Nickerson, and others had served in the 1930's), and partly from an attempt to solve problems of an unprecedented nature which were cropping up inside their T AORs, even on the edge of the great air base at Da Nang. As it was, the Marine s trategy was judged successful, at least by the Marines, long before it had even had a real test. It was applauded by many observers before the VC had begun to r eact to it, and as such, encouraged imitators while it was still unproven. The M arine dilemma was how to support the pacification effort without taking it over. They thought they had succeeded in doing this by "self-effacing support for Vie tnamese rural construction" after August of 1965, but there is much contradictor y evidence on this point. The Marines themselves, according to the classified hi storical study they recently produced, understood that their pacification work h ad "to function through local Vietnamese officials. The tendency to produce Mari ne Corps programs or to work 'democratically' through individuals had to be stri ctly controlled. Only Vietnamese programs could be tolerated and support of thes e programs had to take place through Vietnamese governing officials . . ." But d espite their good intentions to work through the existing GVN structure, the Mar ines found in many cases that the existing structure barely existed, except on p aper, and in other cases that the existing structure was too slow and too corrup t for their requirements. And gradually the Marines got more deeply into the pol itics of rural Vietnam than they had intended, or presumably desired. Their diff iculties were greatest in the area of highest priority, the National Priority Ar ea (as it was to be designated in October 1965) south of Da Nang. In a nine-vill age complex just south of the air base, the Marines urged upon the GVN successfu l completion of a special pacification program which had been designed by them i n close conjunction with the Quang Nam Deputy Province Chief. The nine villages were divided into two groups, and the first phase, scheduled for completion firs t in December of 1965, included only five of the villages, with only 23,000 peop le living in them. By February, 1966, the plan had slipped considerably, and the projected completion date for the first five villages was pushed back to April, 1966. The GVN and the Marines considered their control to extend to over 16,000 of the 23,000 people in the area, but, according to an Embassy evaluation of th e area, only 682 were young men between the ages of 17 and 30. It was clear that the Marines were trying to pacify an area in which the young men no longer live d, having either been drafted, joined the VC, or gone to Da Nang to work for the Americans. "The

basic problem posed by this lack of manpower must be solved before the area can be expected to participate in its own defense," the Embassy report said. "Until it is solved, the Marines and the ARVN will remain tied to defensive mission inv olving them with the population. No one in Quang Nam sees any immediate solution to this dilemma." The report concluded with a description of how over-involved with local politics the Marines were becoming, unintentionally, and said: The pl an, despite the valiant efforts of the Marines, is in trouble, caused by a confu sed and fragmented chain of command, a lack of skilled cadre, inability to recru it locally RF and PF--and the open opposition of the VNQDD. The VNQDD, or Vietna m Quoc Dan Dang, was the political party controlling the provinces of Quang Ngai , Quang Nam, and Quang Tin. The Marines knew little about them, although, accord ing to the study, all the village chiefs in the area were VNQDD members. The VNQ DD were not supporting the priority area plan because they had not been consulte d in its formulation, and for this reason, and others, the report predicted the failure of the plan, despite the heavy Marine commitment. Like Hop Tac, it was a n unusually difficult situation, but it illustrates the problems that the Marine s, and any other U.S. troops that got deeply involved in pacification, confronte d in Vietnam. D. WASHINGTON GRUMBLES ABOUT THE EFFORT Throughout the period of t he buildup in Vietnam, there was a growing chorus of discontent in Washington ov er the management of the U.S. effort in Vietnam, most of it directed at the civi lian agencies--USIA, AID, and the CIA. Unhappiness with the way the Mission ran was to lead to three major reorganizations in the 15-month period from the Honol ulu conference to the arrival of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. The first reorgani zation took place immediately after Honolulu, and assigned to the Deputy Ambassa dor, William J. Porter, specific duties and responsibilities which had previousl y been dispersed throughout the Mission and handled on an ad hoc basis. The seco nd reorganization, which took place in November-December 1966, reorganized the i nternal components of AID, USIA, and the CIA so that the Deputy Ambassador could control directly a single Office of Civil Operation (OCO), bypassing the agency chiefs. The latest reorganization, which was announced in May 1967, transferred responsibility for OCO from the Deputy Ambassador to COMUSMACV, who in turn was given a civilian Deputy with the rank of Ambassador (R. W. Komer). This section outlines events leading to the first reorganization in March 1966, a reorganiza tion which raised the priority of the pacification effort, but left most of the basic problems in the U.S. Mission unsolved. The actual reorganization, and its effects, will be covered below. Efforts to reorganize the Saigon Mission are a r ecurring theme in recent history. The impetus for reorganization has consistentl y come from Washington, and the Mission has usually resisted. Its resistance is not hard to understand, since almost every reorganization

scheme tended to diminish the authority and autonomy of senior members of the Mi ssion Council such as the JUSPAO Director, the USAID Director, and the CIA Stati on Chief. Skeptics have said that whenever things are going poorly, "Americans r eorganize." But the opponents of various reorganization schemes have been unable to defend the existing Mission Council system, which must definitely be rated o ne of Vietnam's casualties. Not since the beginning of the "country team" concep t in the 1950's ("Mission Council" being another term for the same structure) ha d the concept been tested the way it was to be tested in Vietnam. The pressure o f events, the tension, the unprecedented size of the agencies and a host of othe r factors made the system shaky even under the strong manager Maxwell Taylor. Un der the man who didn't want to manage, Lodge, it began to crumble. Each agency h ad its own ideas on what had to be done, its own communication channels with Was hington, its own personnel and administrative structure--and starting in 1964-65 , each agency began to have its own field personnel operating under separate and parallel chains of command. This latter event was ultimately to prove the one w hich gave reorganization efforts such force, since it began to become clear to p eople in Washington and Saigon alike that the Americans in the provinces were no t always working on the same team, and that they were receiving conflicting or o verlapping instructions from a variety of sources in Saigon and Washington. Stil l, while General Taylor was Ambassador, reorganization was not something to be p ushed seriously by Washington. With Lodge back in charge, it was a different sto ry. As a matter of fact, so serious were Lodge's managerial deficiencies that ev en during his first tour, when the U.S. Mission was less than 20,000 men, and th e entire civilian component under 1,000, there was talk of reorganization. In a personal message to Lodge on May 26, 1964, the President made the following prop hetic statement: I have received from [Mike] Forrestal a direct account of your belief that there is need for change and improvement in the civilian side of the country team. We have reached a similar conclusion here, and indeed we believe it is essential for you to have a topranking officer who is wholly acceptable to you as chief of staff for country team operations. My own impression is that th is should be either a newly appointed civilian of wide governmental experience a nd high standing, or General Westmoreland.... This message became irrelevant whe n Lodge suddenly resigned in June of 1964 to assist Governor Scranton's bid for the Republican nomination, but it shows that the President, Lodge, and apparentl y other people in Washington had deep concern with the structure of the Mission at this early date. By sending Taylor and Alexis Johnson--then the State Departm ent's highest-ranking Foreign Service Officer--to Saigon in July of 1964, the Pr esident in effect put off any Washington-initiated reorganizations for the lengt h of Taylor's tour, since no one in Washington could tell the former Chairman of the JCS how to run a mission. Taylor organized the Mission Council--not a new i nvention, but a formalization of the country team into a body which met once a w eek, with agendas, minutes, and records of

decisions. Taylor was particularly concerned that the Mission Council should hav e a "satisfactory meshing with . . . counterpart activities on the GVN side." An d while he was Ambassador the U.S. made a determined effort to make the system w ork without reorganization. In a letter to Elbridge Durbrow, who was once Americ an Ambassador in Saigon himself, Alexis Johnson described the system: Max and I dropped the title "Country Team" and set up what we called the "Mission Council" on a formalized basis. In addition to Max and myself, the members were General Westmoreland, Barry Zorthian as JUSPAO (Joint United States Public Affairs Offic e-this covered both MACV and Embassy info as well as psychological operations in the field and against the DRy), the Director of USOM and the CAS Station Chief. We established an Executive Secretary who was first Bill Sullivan and later Jac k Herfurt, who was charged with the preparation of agenda, the recording of deci sions, and, most importantly, following up and monitoring of decisions that were taken. We met regularly once a week (with occasional special meetings as requir ed), with paper circulated before hand insofar as possible. One of the responsib ilities of the Executive Secretary was to see that issues were worked out before hand at staff level insofar as possible and the remaining issues clearly defined . . . . It was normally our practice to keep all members of the Council fully in formed and to discuss all questions, regardless of their sensitivity. . . . Afte r an informal exchange of views, we took up questions on the agenda, doing our b est to obtain the consensus of all members. When in rare cases this was not achi eved, the Ambassador of course took the decision. We considered the full range o f questions, including such fundamental ones as when and under what circumstance s we should bomb the North . . . etc. . . . Below the Mission Council level we e stablished a series of committees in problem areas involving more than one agenc y of the mission, chaired by the agency of primary interest. These committees we re responsible directly to the Mission Council. . . . We persuaded the GVN, on i ts side, to set up a similar organization that was first called the "Pacificatio n Council" and later the "Rural Construction Council." . . . The GVN Council and the Mission Council met together once a week with an agenda prepared beforehand by the two Executive Secretaries . . . One of my theories, and to a degree I th ink it was borne out in Saigon, was that the Mission Council and the Joint Counc il were important not so much for what was in fact decided at the meetings but f or the fact that their existence, and the necessity of reporting to them, acted as a spur to the staff people to get things done and to resolve issues at their level. Organization structure of course does not assure brilliant performance, b ut I do take some satisfaction in feeling that, due to the organizational struct ure that we established, we established the habit of the Mission elements and th e GVN and the Mission, working together in a more effective way. Whether or not the system described by Ambassador Johnson above really worked the way he says i t was supposed to is not the subject of this study. But it appears that within a few months after Lodge returned as Ambassador the people within the USG advocat ing reorganization as at least a partial solution to the problems of the Mission were once again in full cry.

The relationship of the reorganizers to the pacifiers must be explained. Those w ho advocated restructuring the Mission for more effective management were not ne cessarily the same people advocating a higher emphasis for pacification. But usu ally, since the organization of the Mission was so obviously deficient, both gro ups of people would end up advocating some kind of change- and even if they disa greed on the nature of the change, the most important fact was that they were ge nerally pushing a similar mood of dissatisfaction with the Mission upon the high -ranking officials with whom they might come in contact. (It should be kept in m ind that they were really not groups at all, in the normal sense of the word, bu t a shifting collection of individuals with varying degrees of loyalty to either their parent agency or their own sense of history; and on each individual issue a different set of allies and antagonists might well exist.) The efforts of tho se advocating reorganization began to bear edible fruit in December 1965 and Jan uary 1966, when a conference was held at Warrenton, Va., to which the Mission se nt an impressive collection of Mission Council members: Deputy Ambassador Porter , USAID Mission Director Mann, JUSPAO Director Zorthian, Political Counsellor Ha bib, General Lansdale, CIA Station Chief Jorgenson, and Brigadier General Collin s, representing Westmoreland. From Washington came the second and third echelons of the bureaucracy: Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Rutherf ord Poats, Assistant Administrator of AID; Major General Peers, SACSA; Alvin Fri edman, ISA; William Colby and Peer da Silva, CIA; Chester Cooper, White House; a nd Sanford Marlowe, USIA. Other participants included: Major General Hutchins, C INCPAC; Rufus Phillips of Lansdale's group; Charles Zwick and Henry Rowen of BOB ; George Lodge, the Ambassador's son; Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA; and Leon Goure, o f RAND. The purpose of the meeting was to "bring together senior representatives of the U.S. Mission, Saigon, the Vietnam Coordinating Committee, Washington, an d several other individuals to (a) review the joint GVN-US pacification/rural co nstruction program and seek to promote its more effective operation and (b) addr ess the problem of the increasingly serious shortages and bottlenecks in manpowe r, materials, and transport in Vietnam and to designate priorities and machinery for resources control and allocation." The major unstated purpose, in addition to those mentioned above, was to discuss the organization of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam. Warrenton was to turn out to be a prelude to Honolulu, and as such its reccomendations never were to become an integral part of the Mission's plans an d strategy. But the direction that was developed at Warrenton is significant, be cause it represents the clear and unmistakable thrust that existed at the time i n the "working levels" of both Saigon and Washington. Given the normal time lag before individual thoughts can reach the stage of agreed-upon committee-produced papers, Warrenton, we can assume, reflected the evolution of thinking that had been going on, particularly among the civilians, as the first year of U.S. comba t troop and deployment began to end. Indeed, in its catch-all approach to pacifi cation, Warrenton had something for everyone. The final recommendations from the Warrenton conference were addressed to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Admiral R aborn, Mr. Bell, Mr. Marks, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy,

from the meeting's co-chairmen, Ambassador Unger and Ambassador Porter. The conc lusions included the following points (with comments as required): 1. There was a consensus that the designation of priority rural construction areas for 1966 w as important and that the modest goals set for these areas were realistic. Howev er, it was emphasized that the contrast between the massive imput of U.S. resour ces and the modest priority area goals made success in those areas imperative... . COMMENT: The National Priority Areas did not meet their 1966 goals. 2. In view of the prime importance to the U.S. of success in the four National Priority Ar eas, there was discussion of the need for designating U.S. team chiefs to head t he U.S. advisory effort in those areas. It was agreed that the U.S. Mission Coun cil would consider this matter promptly and report its conclusions to the VNCC. COMMENT: The designation of team chiefs for the priority areas did not take plac e. Here is another example of the Washington effort to reorganize Saigon, with S aigon resisting. 3. There was widespread recognition of the need to provide with in the U.S. Mission a single focus of operational control and management over th e full range of the pertinent U.S. efforts in order to gear all such U.S. activi ties and resources effectively into implementation or the rural construction con cept. However, some concern was expressed that too drastic organizational change s within the U.S. Mission would create problems with the counterpart GVN organiz ation and would not ensure success of rural construction programs. No agreement was reached on the precise form for organization changes but there was general c onsensus that the focal point of control and management had to rest just below t he Ambassador and that there must be a senior Mission official solely concerned with this subject. Disagreement was registered as to: (1) whether the Deputy Amb assador, assisted by a staff, should serve this function or whether another seni or official (perhaps a second Deputy Ambassador) should be appointed; and (2) wh at extent individual agency personnel, funds, and operations devoted to rural co nstruction could and should be broken out of agency organizations and placed und er the direction of the single focal point COMMENT: Here was the compromise word ing on the issue which concerned the participants at Warrenton a great deal. Eac h representative at Warrenton brought with him a proposed organization chart for the Mission (see below), but no agreement could be reached at that time. In the main body of the memorandum to the principals on January 13, 1966, Unger and Po rter wrote: The optimum organization for the U.S. Mission for its support of the rural construction/pacification program-a senior official with a supporting sta ff with full-time responsibility in this field was considered necessary. (Coordi nation is also required with Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Bell on this point.) It wo uld also be desirable for such an

official to have in Washington a high-level point of liaison to assure the exped itious discharge here of urgent Vietnam business in this field.... When he repor ted to the Mission Liaison Group on Warrenton two weeks later, on January 27, 19 66, Porter sharply downplayed the move for reorganization which was coming from Washington and changed the emphasis. He said: a. No decision was reached at Warr enton with respect to a U.S. in-country organization for rural construction, alt hough the possibility of a single manager was discussed. b. The U.S. Mission wil l continue to support Rural Construction with the same organizational structure it is now using, placing particular reliance on the Mission Liaison Group. c. Of ficials in Washington were concerned about teamwork among the U.S. agencies in V ietnam but not about ability to do the job. Differences of opinion are expected, and machinery exists to resolve them. Differences due to personalities cannot b e tolerated. d. It is clearly understood in Washington that military operations alone are not enough, and that effective Rural Construction is imperative. The h ighest levels in the USG are keenly aware of the importance of US/GVN work in Ru ral Construction . . . [Emphasis added] Although not much more than a footnote n ow, the reorganization schemes that were presented at Warrenton deserve brief me ntion. At Warrenton, the participants were still fishing for ways and means, and their proposals reveal to a limited extent the intent of each agency when faced , three months later, with a new structure in both Saigon and Washington--with P orter in charge in Saigon and Komer in business in the White House. Chester Coop er, working for McGeorge Bundy in the White House, proposed a second Deputy Amba ssador for Pacification, with control over CIA, USAID, JUSPAO, and partial contr ol (not clarified) over MACV's Rural Construction advisors. Cooper also wanted a "Washington representative" in Saigon to expedite resource allocation. He was a mbiguous about Lansdale's role. Cooper advocated a unified field chain of comman d. Poats and Mann submitted a joint Washington-Saigon proposal on behalf of AID (another clear indication of the fact that the real chains of command ran throug h agency channels, rather than through the Ambassador to Washington). They advoc ated a complicated arrangement in which a Chief of Staff for Pacification would head up special task forces "drawn from operating agencies but staying in their operational job in their agencies." AID in effect wanted no major change in the Mission, and particularly opposed any change in the multiplicity of chains of co mmand in the provinces. They also advocated a Theater CINC, a resources allocati on committee chaired by the AID Mission Director, and a MACV advisory structure that is partially under the Ambassador and partially separate (not clarified). Z orthian suggested that the Deputy Ambassador coordinate all pacification activit ies but made it clear that he would make no change in the chains of command. Ind eed, he emphasized the direct access of each Mission Council member to the Ambas sador, the separateness of each agency's field program.

SACSA proposed a division of MACV into a tactical unit command and a Pacificatio n command. All civilian elements supporting pacification would be under the Depu ty for Pacification, who in turn would report to the Ambassador and Deputy Ambas sador. The advisory structure would have been split down the middle between tact ical unit advisors and province/district advisors. General Collins suggested no major change in the structure of the Mission, but advocated the information of " Task Groups to deal with specific problems organized on an ad hoc basis from per sonnel provided by interested agencies. The Deputy Ambassador to be relieved of routine duties and to spend substantially all his time on rural construction dut ies . . ." The State Department proposed a "Central Pacification Organization" w hich would have been not more than a coordinating committee for the existing age ncies. What these reorganization proposals seem to suggest, in light of the ulti mate direction that the Mission took, is that when agencies are asked to produce suggestions which may reduce or inhibit their prerogatives, they are unlikely t o do so in a manner responsive to the requirements of their politically-appointe d chieftains. The prerogatives and privileges of the agencies inevitably come fi rst. One does not reorganize voluntarily; the impetus comes from without. This i s also seen in the different attitude that the reorganizers had towards Washingt on and Saigon. Although the same problem in coordination existed (and still exis ts) in Washington as in Saigon, the Washington officials always were ready to te ll Saigon how to clean up its house, but were slow to suggest self-improvements. At Warrenton, perhaps prodded by the Saigon representatives, they did take note of the matter, although they were reluctant to suggest a clear solution: Note w as also taken of the inadequacy of present U.S. Government machinery to handle V ietnam problems quickly and decisively. The need for referral of too large a num ber of problems to the Secretarial level was one of the problems mentioned. Whil e the meeting did not have time to come to any firm conclusions, there was a vie w that the VNCC because of its coordinating, rather than decision-cum-enforcemen t powers could not perform this task except in part. If endowing the VNCC or its Chairman with larger powers, and with a staff associated with no one agency, is not a feasible solution, it was considered that the required directing position might have to be set up at a higher level, perhaps related to the National Secu rity Council. In the Warrenton report, then, all the events of the coming year w ere foreshadowed, and, reading between the lines, one can now see what was comin g. Unfortunately, and obviously, this was not the case at the time-particularly for the Mission in Saigon. E. PRESIDENTIAL EMPHASIS ON THE "OTHER WAR" AND PRESS REACTION At the end of 1965, with the bombing of the north in its tenth month, and our ground forces growing steadily, the Administration was making a determin ed effort to emphasize those American activities in Vietnam which did not direct ly involve guns and fighting. This emphasis on what came to be called the "Other War" reached a high point during the conference at Honolulu in February of 1966 . The emphasis on the other war did not

necessarily have to lead, as it did, to a re-emphasis of pacification; that was a by-product, at least in part, of the renewed support for pacification which ha d been coming from Ambassador Lodge, the Marines, the CIA (with their cadre), an d the advocates of organizational reform (all covered in previous sections). But the two themes merged at Honolulu, and thus, out of the conference, came the fi rst clear statement of Presidential support to pacification. The need of the Adm inistration to emphasize and publicize the nonmilitary aspects of the war needs little amplification. Few documents show this emphasis in the pre-Honolulu perio d, since it was so obvious. In an exception, a joint State-USIA message dated Oc tober 4, 1965, Washington told the Saigon Mission: There is continuing concern a t the highest levels here regarding need to emphasize our non-military programs in Vietnam and give them maximum possible public exposure both in U.S. and abroa d. [Emphasis Added] We recognize that the Mission is fully cognizant of this pro blem and already has underway measures to broaden public knowledge and understan ding of non-military activities . . . We are also conscious of difficulties invo lved in enlisting greater press interest in these developments when it finds mil itary actions more dramatic and newsworthy. Nevertheless, we hope will continue to give non-military programs increasing priority . It is useful to recall the s ituation which existed in February of 1966, when the President went to Honolulu to meet with Ky and Thieu. On January 30, 1966, the bombing of the North began a gain, after a 37-day pause. There were 197,000 American servicemen in Vietnam by February 1. The Washington Post--which supported the Administration-editorializ ed on February 1: It is to be hoped that a new look is being taken at the milita ry tactics in the South so that greater emphasis can be put on the safety of civ ilians, the rehabilitation of the countryside, the furtherance of economic growt h.....Efforts behind the lines at economic and social programs must be increased . Senator Fuibright had launched his public hearings on Vietnam, and on February 4 had subjected David Bell of AID to a nearly four-hour grilling in the committ ee. That same day, the conference was announced. The emphasis at Honolulu was cl ear from before the conference started. In his press conference announcing the m eeting, the President said that he would take Secretary Freeman and Secretary Ga rdner, not previously involved in Vietnam, as well as experts from their staffs. Freeman would go on to Saigon, the President added "to explore and inaugurate c ertain pacification programs in the fields of health, education, and agriculture ." The President then added:

We are going to emphasize, in every way we can, in line with the very fine prono uncements that the Prime Minister [Ky] has made concerning his desires in the fi eld of education and health and agriculture. We want to be sure that we have our best planning and our maximum effort put into it. But we will, of course, go in to the military briefing very thoroughly . . Even before the conference began, t here were early reactions from the press to this emphasis. The New York Times ed itorialized on February 6: Programs in health, education and agriculture of the kind President Johnson evidently has in mind, can make an important contribution . To combat the revolutionary idea the Communists have set loose in Vietnam, a b etter idea is needed. Vigorous social reform-and particularly, land reform, whic h has received little more than lip-service so far--could well be made the price of increased economic aid, which is now to be doubled. But an effort to seek po litical "victory" in South Vietnam is likely to prove as fruitless as the long a ttempt at military "victory." A more limited and realistic objective is essentia l. The conference itself, and its repercussions both in Washington and Vietnam, will be discussed in a following section, so there is little need to dwell on th e pre-Honolulu period. In Saigon, where the word of the conference barely preced ed the departure of the participants, the New York Times bureau chief wrote a pe rceptive article which reflected thinking of many junior and mid-level officials in both the U.S. Mission and the GVN. The theme it stated was not new then, and still has a very familiar ring today: ....There are now 230,000 to 250,000 proCommunist troops in South Vietnam, including the Vietcong guerrillas and about 1 1 tough regiments of the North Vietnamese Army. That is at least twice as many e nemy troops as there were at the start of last year, despite the major United St ates buildup since then. This does not mean that the American build-up has been futile: the build-up was all that saved South Vietnam, in the view of most exper ts. It does mean that no way has yet been found to prevent the enemy from matchi ng an American build-up with a build-up of his own. About 200,000 American troop s are now in South Vietnam along with 550,000 South Vietnamese armed men, of who m about half are well-trained army troops. American and South Vietnamese militar y officers have asked for more American troops, requesting a force of about 400, 000 men by the end of 1966. Not all of this strength has been promised by Presid ent Johnson, but major reinforcements are already in the offing.... But while 19 66 will be an important year militarily, one in which all generals assume that t here will be bloodier fighting, it will also be a year of increased emphasis on the subtle political and social aspects of the struggle.

The Honolulu conference will in fact concentrate largely on economic, social and political problems, according to informed sources. It is felt in Saigon, howeve r, that the Johnson Administration cannot, even with the best of intentions, gua rantee the allegiance of the Vietnamese to their Government merely by pumping mo re money and technical skill into South Vietnam to give people the "better life" of which officials speak. At least 20 to 25 per cent of the country's area is s o firmly in control of the Vietcong guerrillas that no civic and political progr ams are possible there at all. Other large areas are so sharply contested that f or the time being pacification and rural-improvement workers cannot operate. Thu s, rural-pacification work in 1966 is to be concentrated in one-third or fewer o f the rural hamlets that the Government already claims to control. The limitatio n implies an admission that after five years of war the allies are starting from scratch in this field, and that progress must be slow. With American enthusiasm , the United States may wish to speed the pace of pacification, but there will b e serious obstacles. Most of the sadder but wiser veterans of previous programs in Vietnam seem convinced that pressure from Washington for higher and more sedu ctive statistical goals is a major danger. They counsel "slowly but surely." As an example, the South Vietnamese Government is trying to turn 23,000 rural-affai rs workers, most of them originally trained only in armed propaganda work, into more rounded rural-construction workers. It then plans to recruit and train 19,0 00 more workers, for a total of 42,000. In the opinion of some officials, it wil l be very difficult even to reach this goal, and any great expansion carries a r isk of substituting numbers for real training. The present pacification plan is considered imaginative and sound by experts with long experience in Vietnam, but it is considered certain that the plan could be improved at Honolulu. Experienc e has shown that the crucial matter in Vietnam is always execution rather than p lanning. The scarcest resources in the country are manpower and leadership. It i s generally agreed that it would not be enough, say, for the United States to of fer help in improving agriculture in the South Vietnamese countryside. The Ameri cans must also consider, it is felt, whether their suggested plan is one that th e South Vietnamese understand and actually--rather than merely politely--approve , and whether the badly strained South Vietnamese administration can execute the plan. American experts in Saigon also assert that the highly ideological Vietco ng movement cannot be offset merely by offers of a "better life" for the peasant s.

The Vietcong have a loyal, dedicated and highly disciplined underground politica l structure that operates in the heart of Saigon itself and in thousands of haml ets. So far the peasants have shown little inclination to inform on this structu re and to help the Government activity. This is the central problem of the South Vietnamese war.... F. MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE WAR... The re-emphasis of pacifica tion was, of course, a far more disorderly process than any written review can s uggest, and unfortunately must overlook many events and recommendations which we re not central to the re-emphasis of pacification. But it is useful and importan t to review briefly what the Mission was reporting to Washington about the overa ll effort during 1965, since Saigon's reports should have formed an important pa rt of the background for decision. This selection should be read not as the "obj ective" story of what was happening in Vietnam-such an objective study is simply not possible at this time, even if we had access to enemy thinking-but as a ref lection of the beliefs of the Americans in Saigon, and as a reflection of what t he Mission wanted Washington to believe. This selection is entirely direct quota tions from MACV's Monthly Evaluation Report. Each month this report began with a summary of the month's events, and the following items represent the running ev aluation for 1965: [Emphasis Added] January, 1965: Review of military events in January tend to induce a decidedly more optimistic view than has been seen in re cent months. Despite adverse influence exerted by national level political disor ders and localized Buddhist/student rioting, the military experienced the most s uccessful single month of the counterinsurgency effort . . . Pacification made l ittle progress this month. Although some gains were made in the Hop Tac area, ef fort in the remainder of RVN was hampered by political activity and religious an d student disorders . . . If the RVNAF capability can be underwritten by politic al stability and durability, a significant turning point in the war could be for thcoming. February, 1965: . . . GVN forces continued to make progress in III and IV CTZ, maintained a tenuous balance over the VC in I CTZ, and suffered general regression in II CTZ . . . The indicators of RVNAF operational effort . . . all showed a decline. However, losses on both sides remained high due to the violen ce of encounters and VC tenacity....The long term effect of events in February i s impossible to foretell. It is obvious that the complexion of the war has chang ed. The VC appear to be making a concerted effort to isolate the northern portio n of RVN by seizing a salient to the sea in the northern part of II CTZ. Here RV NAF has lost the initiative, at least temporarily. However, US/GVN strikes again st DRV and increased use of U.S. jet aircraft in RVN has had a salutary effect o n both military and civilian morale which may result in a greater national effor t and, hopefully, reverse the downward trend.

March, 1965: Events in March were encouraging . . . RVNAF ground operations were highlighted by renewed operational effort . . . VC activity was considerably be low the norm of the preceding six months and indications were that the enemy was engaged in the re-supply and re-positioning of units possibly in preparation fo r a new offensive, probably in the II Corps area . . . In summary, March has giv en rise to some cautious optimism. The current government appears to be taking c ontrol of the situation and, if the present state of popular morale can be susta ined and strengthened, the GVN, with continued U.S. support, should be able to c ounter future VC offenses successfully. April, 1965: Friendly forces retained th e initiative during April and a review of events reinforces the feeling of optim ism generated last month....In summary, current trends are highly encouraging an d the GVN may have actually turned the tide at long last. However, there are som e disquieting factors which indicate a need to avoid overconfidence. A test of t hese trends should be forthcoming in the next few months if the VC launch their expected counter-offensive and the period may well be one of the most important of the war. May, 1965: The encouraging trends of the past few months did not car ry through into May and there were some serious setbacks. However, it is hoped t hat the high morale and improved discipline and leadership which has developed d uring that period will sustain future GVN efforts.... June, 1965: During June th e military situation in the RVN continued to worsen despite a few bright spots o ccasioned by RVNAF successes. In general, however, the VC . . . retained the ini tiative having launched several well-coordinated, savage attacks in regimental s trength.... July, 1965: An overall analysis of the military situation at the end of July reveals that GVN forces continued to make progress in IV Corps, maintai ned a limited edge in I Corps with the increased USMC effort and suffered a gene ral regression in the northern portion of III Corps as well as in the central hi ghlands of II Corps. The VC monsoon offensive, which was so effective in June, f altered during July as VC casualty figures reached anew high.... August, 1965: A n evaluation of the overall military effort in August reveals several encouragin g facts. The most pronounced is the steady increase in the number of VC casualti es and the number of VC "ralliers" to the GVN . . . In summary, the general incr ease in offensive operations by GVN, U.S. and Third Country forces and a correla tive increase in enemy casualties have kept the VC off balance and prevented his interference with the build-up of U.S. forces. The often spoken of VC "monsoon offensive" has not materialized, and it now appears that the VC have relinquishe d the initiative in the conduct of the war. September, 1965: As the end of the m onsoon season approached, the military situation appears considerably brighter t han in May when the VC threatened to defeat the RVNAF. Since May the build-up of Free World Military Assistance Forces, coupled with

aggressive combat operations, has thwarted VC plans and has laid the foundation for the eventual defeat of the VC.... October, 1965: . . . an increase in magnit ude and tempo of engagements as the GVN/FWF maintained the initiative . . . In s ummary, the military situation during October continued to favor the Allies as t he VC experienced heavy casualties from the overwhelming Allied fire power..... November, 1965: The increasing tempo of the war was reflected in casualty totals which reached new highs for VC/PA VN and friendly forces..... While keeping the enemy generally off balance, GVN/FWMAF were able to maintain and, to some degre e, to increase the scope and intensity of friendly-initiated operations. Decembe r, 1965: Military activity in December was highlighted by an increase in the num ber of VC/PAVN attacks on isolated outposts, hamlets, and districts, towns, and the avoidance of contact with large GVN and Free World Forces. The effectiveness of this strategy was attested by the highest monthly friendly casualty total of the war, by friendly weapons losses in excess of weapons captured for the first time since July, and by 30% fewer VC casualties than in November.... January, 1 966: The Free World peace offensive, coupled with TET festivities and the accomp anying cease-fire, resulted in a period of restricted military activities for bo th friendly and enemy forces....Despite this decrease in activity, GVN and Free World Forces continued to force inroads into areas long conceded as VC territory . . . [Emphasis Added] This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the rep orting of the war, or of the implications of the above-cited evaluations. But se veral points do seem to emerge: 1. The reports are far too optimistic from Janua ry through April, 1965, and a big switch seems to come in June, 1965, when Gener al Westmoreland had already made his 44battalion request and warned of disaster if they were not forth-coming. May's report begins to show the change in mood, b ut its ambiguous evaluation is in sharp contrast to the brief backward look offe red in September. 2. Pacification is mentioned in the January evaluation, but fa des away to virtually nothing in the months of the build-up. 3. The evaluations do not suggest that the main force threat is in any way diminishing by the end o f 1965. Indeed, they accurately predict larger battles in 1966. They do not sugg est, therefore, that the time had come to start emphasizing pacification at the expense of exerting more pressure directly on the enemy. The evaluations do not address this question directly, of course, but they do suggest that if any great er emphasis was to be put on pacification, it could be done only if there was no t a corresponding reduction in the attack effort against the VC. This, in turn, would imply that if pacification was to receive greater emphasis at the beginnin g of 1966, it would require either more Allied troops or else might lead to a le ssening of pressure on the VC.

II. HONOLULU A. THE CONFERENCE-FEBRUARY 1966 The details of the closed meetings at Honolulu do not appear, in retrospect, to be nearly as important on the futur e emphasis on pacification as the mere fact that the public statements of all pa rticipants carried forward the theme that had been enunciated in the Declaration . This may often be true of conferences; it certainly appears true of this one, which was convened hastily and took place without any preparatory staff work on either side of the Pacific. In addition, the political upheavals in the spring o f 1966, which followed the conference closely, contributed to a reduction in the importance of the details of the conference as it related to pacification. Paci fication was discussed frequently during the closed sessions. The first time cam e during the plenary session, when Ambassador Lodge delivered his statement to t he President. Speaking before a large audience which included General Thieu and Air Vice Marshal Ky, Lodge made a general statement about what he called "the su bterranean war," and then discussed the four National Priority Areas which the G VN and the U.S. had established in October 1965: I would like to begin by saying that the successes and the sacrifices of the military, both the Vietnamese and the American military, have created a fresh opportunity to win the so-called "su bterranean war".... .....We can beat up North Vietnamese regiments in the high p lateau for the next twenty years and it will not end the war-unless we and the V ietnamese are able to build simple but solid political institutions under which a proper police can function and a climate created in which economic and social revolution, in freedom, are possible. The GVN has organized itself to do this jo b and you will hear a presentation by General Thang, who is in charge. The Ameri can contribution consists of training and equipping of personnel; advice; and ma terial.... Four priority areas have been chosen. Three are places of great impor tance and difficulty. The fourth is largely pacified and is the place where they want to get the economic and social development program going. We think the are as are well chosen. The three tough ones are close to the Vietnamese and America n armies which means that the military presence helps pacification. And, as paci fication gets going, it improves the base for the military. In the four priority areas are 192 hamlets, including 238,600 people, to be secured by the end of 19 66. But GVN efforts are not limited to these four priority areas. An effort is u nderway which aims to raise the percentage of the whole country which is pacifie d by

about 14%; i.e., from the current figure of about 52% to about 66% by the end of the year ...* * On March 4, 1966, Lodge transmitted the text and charts of this briefing to Se cretary McNamara and apparently at the same time to the White House, at the requ est of Jack Valenti. Lodge wrote: "Dear Bob: "At the request of Jack Valenti, I have put together a book containing the text and maps used in my presentation at the Honolulu Conference. It is intended to serve as a current indicator of paci fication progress being made within the 1966 National Priority Areas.... "I thin k I should call attention to the fact that for Americans, it is natural to set g oals and then work to achieve them by a specific date. "This, however, is not th e traditional Vietnamese way. While they have set a goal of 190 hamlets in the f our priority areas, my guess would be that by the end of 1966, they may have ach ieved somewhat more than this, but not necessarily the ones which are listed her e. In fact, if they ran into unexpectedly heavy opposition in one place and find a particularly good and unexpected opportunity elsewhere, they probably ought t o change the plan...." After the statements of Lodge and Westmoreland (who discu ssed only military matters), the President said: I hope that out of this confere nce we will return with clear views in our own minds as to how we can apply more military pressure and do it better, how we can build democracy in Vietnam and w hat steps must be taken to do it better, how we can search for peace in the worl d, honorable and just peace, and do it better. If we can do the first, namely, d evelop better methods for defeating the Viet Cong and better methods for develop ing a democracy, I have no doubt but that the third will be much easier to do be cause you can bargain much better from strength than you can from weakness. Afte r a short recess, Secretary Rusk then discussed the reasons why Hanoi was not ye t ready to negotiate, and said that if the GVN built "the kind of society which is indestructible," then Hanoi would probably come to the conference table more rapidly. "Anything that can move faster rather than more slowly on our side and your side," he said, "anything that can cause them to realize that an epidemic o f confidence is building in the South and that momentum is gathering could haste n the time when Hanoi will decide to stop this aggression."

The President then said: "I hope that every person here from the U.S. side will bear in mind that before I take that plane back, I want to have the best suggest ion obtainable as to how we can bring better military pressure on Hanoi and from the pacification side how we can bring a better program to the people of South Vietnam, and finally, third, what other efforts we can make to secure a just and honorable peace. Now, I want to have my little briefcase filled with those thre e targets-a better military program, a better pacification program that includes everything, and a better peace program." General Thang then presented the GVN's pacification plans, in a briefing later made public. Thang said: The objective of the whole people of my country is a unified democratic and strong Vietnam . . . To reach this objective, our National Leadership Committee has promoted three main policies: first, military offenses; second, rural pacification; amd third, democracy. ....But it is necessary, Mr. President, to define what this means by pacification. In my opinion, that is a failure of the past government, not to d efine exactly what we mean by pacification.... I think that it is necessary to . . . define pacification as an effort to which aims at improving the standard of living in this area in every respect--political, economic, social. .... the pre requisite is security . . . So our concept of pacification is based on four main points: Point No. 1: The rural pacification operation can only implement restor e the public security first, and carrying out a government policy through the re al solidarity among the people, the armed forces, and the administration.... Poi nt No. 2: Our government should be very clear when it says that it would like to build a new society for a better life in rural areas. That is meaningless to th e peasant if you don't develop that in a concrete package. [At this point, Thang launched into a lengthy explanation of what be meant by a new society. In a vag ue discussion, he described the social, economic, and political attributes of th e new society, all of which were general and idealized statements.] Point No. 3: The clear and realistic policy of the government contributing to a better life in a new society I just mentioned should be widely known among the population an d the cadres.... Point No. 4: Rural pacification operations will open lasting pe ace if the enemy infrastructure is destroyed and permanently followed up, our ow n infrastructure created and supported by the people . . . All provinces have pr omised to the government that 75 percent of the following facts maybe can be acc omplished by the 1st of January 1967:

Pacification of 963 new hamlets; pacification of 1,083 existing hamlets; buildin g of 2251 classrooms; 913 kilometers of roads; 128 bridges; 57 dams; and 119 kil ometers of canals . . . While we have selected four areas of priority, the pacif ication operation has been pushed forward as usual, but with less efforts.... Ru ral pacification will be a long-term operation. We have modest and practical, ra ther than spectacular, goals for 1966.... After General Thang's remarks, the ple nary session records show repeated references to the pacification effort, althou gh there is confusion as to what it means. General Thieu made additional summary remarks on pacification, then Minister Ton gave a briefing on the economic situ ation, followed by David Bell on the same subject. The next day, February 8, the working groups presented their findings to the President. First, Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Do discussed the session on negotiations. Then General Tha ng and Secretary Freeman reported on their session on rural construction. The de tails of the working groups session itself are covered below, but in plenary. Th ang emphasized the following points: Our future should be developed mainly in fo ur priority areas....Handicraft should be introduced and developed in those area s also . . . Rural electrification should be developed and the number of generat ors increased in 1967.... Land reform efforts should be pushed forward.... We as k that construction material and cement be sent to Vietnam as soon as possible s o our school programs can be developed.... The training of officials at hamlet a nd village levels is vital.... Secretary Freeman, who was about to make his firs t trip to Vietnam, summarized for the Americans: Having spent a good deal of tim e yesterday listening to the very eloquent presentations by the Chairman and the Prime Minister, as well as by Minister Ton, this is pretty much what we would c all a nuts and bolts discussion session. One thing that was decided for United S tates purposes, for purposes of phraseology, was that the word "pacification" re ally did not have the right tone. The term "social construction" might better be used.... There was some discussion, considerable, about the selection of provin ce chiefs. It was strongly emphasized that it was important that the men be of i ntegrity and ability, and that they be selected and maintained and backed up.

The Prime Minister, General Thieu, and then General Thang both said that you [Ge neral Thieu] were personally interested in this, and that you were going to sele ct them shortly, that they would have a duration of at least a year, but would b e carefully reviewed and would be changed if they didn't do the job, but wouldn' t be changed for other reasons, which we thought was extremely important and we were gratified to find it out. You also explained to us, your associates General Ky and General Thang, the change of command, saying in the past they were confu sed, and that they were now clear, so that everyone knew exactly what their func tion would be. Then you discussed the training of the cadre.... I want to review the REA question and find out a bit more about why that seemed to have some lag . Finally, we discussed the possibility of a joint training program for the vill age and hamlet chiefs who presumably would be elected, but that some background in the philosophy, purpose and aims of government, and the techniques of governi ng and administration, were felt to be needed by those people. The President the n responded to the remarks of Thang and Freeman by urging "all of you connected with our program . . . to give very special attention to refugee camps and the s chools in the refugee camps." He then turned to Minister Ton and David Bell for a discussion of the economic situation. Then Secretary Gardner, who had co-chair ed a working group on health and education-the distinction between rural constru ction and the health/education programs was not clarified-made his remarks. He s et out perhaps the most clearly-defined objectives of the session (except for th e economic negotiations), describing the new contract with the AMA for training personnel, the new goal for provincial medical teams, and the plans for a new me dical logistics system. In large part his goals were more specific than those of the other working group because the USAID Public Health Chief in Saigon, Major General James Humphries, had already laid groundwork for an excellent program of health services and assistance, and Gardner was able to work from a specific pl an. Gardner went on to discuss education, where his goals and objectives were le ss clear, and the President asked several detailed questions, concluding by aski ng General Ky to ask the Ambassador to request an educational team to go to Saig on after the agricultural team headed by Secretary Freeman returned. The Vietnam ese then thanked the Americans for the conference, and in turn some of the senio r members of the American delegation-in order, Admiral Sharp, Leonard Marks, Gen eral Wheeler, Ambassador Lodge, Ambassador Harriman-made brief statements about the meaning of the conference. The President then made his final statement: .... Preserve this communique, because it is one we don't want to forget. It will be a kind of bible that we are going to follow. When we come back here 90 days from now, or six

months from now, we are going to start out and make reference to the announcemen ts that the President, the Chief of State and the Prime Minister made in paragra ph 1, and what the leaders and advisors reviewed in paragraph 2 . . . You men wh o are responsible for these departments, you ministers, and the staffs associate d with them in both governments, bear in mind we are going to give you an examin ation and the finals will be on just what you have done. In paragraph 5; how hav e you built democracy in the rural areas? How much of it have you built, when an d where? Give us dates, times, numbers. In paragraph 2; larger outputs, more eff icient production to improve credit, handicraft, light industry, rural electrifi cation-are those just phrases, high-sounding words, or have you (sic) coonskins on the wall.... Next is health and education, Mr. Gardner. We don't want to talk about it; we want to do something about it. "The President pledges he will disp atch teams of experts." Well, we better do something besides dispatching. They s hould get out there. We are going to train health personnel. How many? You don't want to be like the fellow who was playing poker and when he made a big bet the y called him and said "what have you got?" He said, "aces" and they asked "how m any" and he said "one aces".... Next is refugees. That is just as hot as a pisto l in my country. You don't want me to raise a white flag and surrender so we hav e to do something about that.... Growing military effectiveness: we have not gon e in because we don't want to overshadow this meeting here with bombs, with mort ars, with hand grenades, with "Masher" movements. I don't know who names your op erations, but "Masher." I get kind of mashed myself. But we haven't gone into th e details of growing military effectiveness for two or three reasons. One, we wa nt to be able to honestly and truthfully say that this has not been a military b uild-up conference of the world here in Honolulu. We have been talking about bui lding a society following the outlines of the Prime Minister's speech yesterday. Second, this is not the place, with 100 people sitting around, to build a milit ary effectiveness. Third, I want to put it off as long as I can, having to make these crucial decisions. I enjoy this agony . . . I don't want to come out of th is meeting that we have come up here and added on X divisions and Y battalions o r Z regiments or D dollars, because one good story about how many bil lions are going to be spent can bring us more inflation that we are talking about in Vietn am. We want to work those out in the quietness of the Cabinet Room after you hav e made your recommendations, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp, when you come to us . . . [Emphasis Added]

The President's remarks candidly indicated the type of pressure and the expectat ions that he had for the effort. But beyond the high-level interest so clearly d emonstrated publicly for the first time at Honolulu, what was accomplished? As m entioned earlier, Honolulu's importance lay in two things: (1) the public suppor t shown for the "other war"; and (2) the sections of the Declaration which commi tted the GVN to the electoral process. If nothing else was accomplished at Honol ulu, that made the conference worthwhile. Thus, it is perhaps petty to criticize the details of the conference. But they do suggest an unfortunate failure to co me to grips with any of the basic issues concerning pacification, and, moreover, a skillful performance by the GVN to please their American hosts. Thang's state ment to the President after the working session, for example, with its emphasis on rural electrification, handicrafts, and the need for "materials and cement"-none of which were major GVN concerns at that time--can best be explained, in re trospect, by the Vietnamese desire to emphasize those things they felt the Secre tary of Agriculture, the co-chairman of the American working group, was most int erested in. Although the inner workings of the conference do not seem to have ha d much importance on the development of the pacification effort, a record does r emain of the "rural construction working group," and it deserves a brief summary . The meeting is useful to examine not because of its ultimate importance, which was marginal, but because it provides us with a record of a type of discussion between Americans and Vietnamese which has been replayed constantly since (and b efore). To some weary participants, the very words used have seemed to be unchan ged since 1962. A summary cannot, unfortunately, recapture the flavor of confusi on which surrounds the memorandum for the record (A-2254, February 15, 1966). Th e meeting began with a discussion of terminology (see footnote on "revolutionary development") in which it was decided to use the phrase "social construction" i n place of pacification in English. Then, according to the memorandum, everyone lapsed back into using the phrase "pacification." The American representatives t hen pressed the issue of the role of the province chief, implying strongly that they thought the province chiefs should have more power and autonomy. The Vietna mese, led by General Co, neatly answered this issue, "referring to the establish ment of Rural Construction Councils and Division and Corps levels, where such ma tters as the disposition and use of military forces are arbitrated and decided u pon." When Leonard Unger, asked if the military commanders would be committed to providing the necessary military forces for the pacification effort, "General C o again responded, saying that in the past senior commanders tended to pull troo ps away from Provincial control for search and destroy operations. This is a nat ural desire on the part of these commanders who tend to feel that this is a more important role for such troops. Now, however, their missions have changed. Thes e senior commanders are now directly involved in the pacification program, are m embers of the respective Rural Construction Councils . . . In other words, thing s have changed for the better. Ambassador Unger continued to pursue his point, s tressing our concern that vestiges of the past may still remain. General Thang r e-entered the discussion, explaining that the GVN now has a new

chain of command, clear and clean from Saigon to the Corps to the Division to th e Province to the District; there is only one channel in the country and it is a military channel . . . Still on the same subject, Mr. Poats raised the question : What is the primary mission of the Division Commander? Is it pacification? Gen eral Thang answered in the affirmative." The discussion continued along these li nes, and the airgram candidly concludes: "Generals Co and Thang were being press ed by rather pointed questions at this juncture and seemed to be trying to indic ate that pacification is a primary task, although other military tasks must cont inue to be performed. It was fairly apparent that troops charged with securing t he pacification area are liable still to be withdrawn on a temporary basis to me et situations which ARVN senior commanders judge to be critical." The meeting th en discussed the cadre program; the renewed emphasis on village government; the role of the province chief (at this point General Co made his statement that the GVN would appoint province chiefs for one year minimum period, a decision which was never carried out); the introduction of troops; the cadre (again); the six areas where the effort needed improvement (agriculture, handicraft, land reform, rural electrification, construction materials, and training of local officials) ; land reform (with Minister Tn presenting his four-month-old plan again, and Po ats expressing "concern about the performance to date"); and the general questio n of pacification goals. And then, after reporting back to the President in the meeting described earlier, the participants broke up, returning to Saigon and Wa shington to give "the other war" a new emphasis; to reorganize the Mission in Sa igon; to appoint a new Special Assistant to the President in Washington; to star t the quest for coonskins (the phrase was in common use in Saigon within a few d ays); to await the public and press reaction (see following section); and to wal k without warning into a major political crisis which almost brought the governm ent down, set back every time-schedule made at Honolulu, forced a postponement o f the next scheduled conference from June-July until October, and-through an iro nic twist of fate--left the GVN stronger than before, following a remarkably suc cessful election. B. IMPACT ON PUBLIC IN U.S., ON U.S. MISSION IN VIETNAM, AND O N VIETNAMESE "This week the word 'pacification' was on everyone's lips at the Ho nolulu conference on Vietnam," wrote Charles Mohr in the New York Times, Februar y 13, 1966, "and many important members of the Johnson Administration embraced t he idea with all the enthusiasm of a horse player with a new betting system. The main purpose of the Honolulu conference was to dramatize this American enthusia sm for the 1966 rural pacification--sometimes called 'rural construction'--progr am of the Government of South Vietnam and to pledge more American assistance for the program." Mohr's article may have been slightly exaggerated, but there can be little doubt that the President's pledge on behalf of the U.S. Government to the pacification effort began a

new period for the U.S. Government in Vietnam. From Honolulu on it was open and unmistakable U.S. policy to support pacification and the "other war," and those who saw these activities as unimportant or secondary had to submerge their senti ments under a cloud of rhetoric. Despite this fact, of course, many heated discu ssions still lay ahead of the Mission on program after program, and many major b attles remained to be fought. Porter and Komer would fight them, as will be show n later. This was the great impact of Honolulu--on pacification. But there were other ramifications of the Honolulu conference which overshadowed the emphasis o n nonmilitary activities in the months that followed. Because of these events--p articularly the political upheavals that rocked Vietnam from March until June--t he follow-up conference tentatively planned for June did not take place, and the growth in pacification's importance was probably set back about six months. Whi le this study does not try to cover the concurrent events of the period, it shou ld be emphasized that the most important parts of the Honolulu Declaration were not those dealing with pacification at all, but rather the sections which commit ted the GVN to "formulate a democratic constitution to the people for discussion and modification; to seek its ratification by secret ballot; to create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government . . ." Wit h these words, the GVN was openly committed, under U.S. pressure, to a process w hich they probably did not desire or appreciate. In the months that followed, th e words of the Honolulu Declaration were used against General Ky by his Buddhist Struggle Movement opponents, to hoist him on his Honolulu petard; but then, in a remarkable about-face, Ky simultaneously cracked down on the Buddhists and hel d successful elections for a Constitutional Assembly (September 11, 1966). The f ollowing collection of newspaper items is selected to show that there were diffe ring opinions within the U.S. Mission and among Vietnamese, but that in general the message from Honolulu did get through to the Mission. Since almost every rep orter in Saigon had sources within some element of the Mission who were telling him their honest feelings (the Saigon Mission, it was once said by Barry Zorthia n, could not keep a secret 24 hours), the stories from Saigon do reflect what th e Mission thought in the days just after Honolulu. The editorials and columnists from Washington indicate to what degree the Administration succeeded in convinc ing the press corps (which is not, of course, the U.S. public) that the emphasis at Honolulu was really on pacification. EDITORIAL: The New York Herald Tribune, February 8: The meeting presents the prospect of our resuming the war in more f avorable circumstances. The meeting of the heads of the American and South Vietn amese governments is a fresh and stronger demonstration of mutual confidence. On this basis they can now proceed to mount measures for dealing with the equally important military and civilian aspects of the war. The two are intimately relat ed . . . the loyalty and support of the peasants in the interior are essential. President Johnson is bidding for them by offering some of the benefits of his Gr eat Society program to the South Vietnamese. It will not be easy, in time of

war, . . . but . . . they must be pursued with the same vigor as we press the wa r on the battlefield. EDITORIAL: The Washington Evening Star, February 7: It is particularly significant that the American delegation included HEW Secretary Gar dner and Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture. Their presence certainly mea ns that a greater "pacification" effort will be made as the fighting goes on . . ." COLUMNIST: Marquis Childs, February 9 (from Honolulu) This conference called by President Johnson is a large blue chip put on the survival value of the wiry , exuberant Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, and the generals who rule with him. It is expected that Ky will not only survive but that with massive economic help from the U.S. the national leadership committee will eventually win the support of the peasant in the countryside . . . Any sensible bookmaker would quote long odds against the bet paying off. But after so many false starts this seems to b e the right direction--a determined drive to raise the level of living in the co untryside and close the gap of indifference and hostility between the peasant an d the sophisticated city dweller . . . Over and over we have been told that only by winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people will we achieve a vict ory that has meaning beyond the grim choice of pulverization of American occupat ion into the indefinite future This is the reason teams of American specialists in agriculture, health, and education are going to Vietnam.... EDITORIAL: The Ne w York Herald Tribune, February 9: Perhaps the most constructive part of the Hon olulu conference was the emphasis it placed on this hitherto badly neglected asp ect of the Viet Nam war [Pacification]. It is unfortunate that Chief of State Th ieu diverted attention from it by heaping more fuel on the controversy over whet her the Viet Cong should or should not sit at a peace conference table.... EDITO RIAL: The New York Times, February 9 and 13: The Honolulu conference has followe d the classic pattern of Summit meetings that are hastily called without thoroug h preparation in advance; it has left confusion in its wake, with more questions raised than answered.....The one important area of agreement at Honolulu, apart from continuation of the military efforts, was on an expanded program of "rural construction." The prospective doubling of American economic aid, however, will be futile unless it is accompanied by a veritable social revolution, including vigorous land reform. Premier Ky cast some doubt in his emphasis on moving slowl y. His Minister of Rural Pacification envisages action in only 1,900 of South Vi etnam's 15,000 hamlets this year.

Vice President Humphrey evidently has his work cut out for him in his follow-up visit to Saigon. Unless some way can be found to give more momentum to this effo rt, the new economic aid program may go down the same drain as all previous prog rams of this kind. It would be a cruel deception for Americans to get the idea t hat social reforms carried out by the Ky government with American money are goin g to make any perceptible difference in the near future to the Vietnamese people or to the course of the war. COLUMNIST: Ted Lewis, New York Daily News, Februar y 10 (from Washington): Why, all of a sudden, has President Johnson begun to com e to grips with the "other war" in South Vietnam? . . . Johnson, with his typica l oratorical flourishes, has given the impression that he launched something tot ally new at Honolulu ....The fact is that for several years this problem of the "other war" has been recognized as vital by the State Department, the Pentagon a nd even by the White House. But nobody did much about it, except in an offhand w ay Johnson is a master of timing. He has definitely gained a political advantage over his Viet policy critics by stressing right now the need of win-fling over the peasants.....[Senator Robert] Kennedy complained in a Senate speech just ten days ago that there were 'many indications that we have not yet even begun to d evelop a program....It is absolutely urgent," the Senator said, "that we now act to institute new programs of education, land reform, public health, political p articipation......" NEWS ANALYSIS: Richard Critchfield in The Washington Evening Star, February 9 (from Saigon): President Johnson's historic decision at Honolu lu backing an American-sponsored brand of social revolution as an alternative to communism in South Vietnam was warmly hailed today by veteran political observe rs. The Honolulu declaration was viewed as ending postwar era of American foreig n policy aimed at stabilizing the status quo in Asia. The key phrase, in the vie w of many diplomats here, was the offer of full American "support to measures of social revolution, including land reform based upon the principle of building u pward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam." .....Johnson's decisions to put political remedies on a par with military action are also regar ded here as a major personal triumph for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and his to p aide, Major General Edward G. Lansdale, the two main advocates of "social revo lution" in South Vietnam.....The Honolulu declaration appears to signify a major shift away from the policy of primarily military support established by Preside nt Kennedy in 1961 and closely identified with General Maxwell Taylor, Defense S ecretary McNamara, and Secretary of State Rusk....The Lodge-Lansdale formula was a striking departure in that it saw the eventual solution not so much in Hanoi' s capitulation as in successful pacification in South Vietnam . . . The Honolulu declaration amounts to almost a point by point acceptance of this formula and b oth its phraseology and philosophy bear Lansdale's unmistakable imprint.....

EDITORIAL: The Baltimore Sun, February 10: Unless there was more substance to th e Honolulu Conference than meets the eye, it could be summed up as much ado-not much ado about nothing but simply much ado . . . It was all spectacular and dive rting but so far as we can see the problem of the war is where it was before the burst of activity began . . . It is probably worthwhile to have a reiteration o f the social and economic measures needed in South Vietnam . . . It is essential to underscore the political nature of the war, along with the continuing milita ry operations. But these matters were generally understood before the Honolulu m eetings. Perhaps events to come will make the purpose of the meeting clearer. ED ITORIAL: The New York Post, February 9: The Hawaii meetings were advertised as t he beginning of a vast new movement of economic and social reform in Vietnam, Pr esident Johnson, we were told, went to Honolulu to launch the new approach with maximum drama. Instead, the session inadvertently underscored the lack of intere st of the junta in Saigon in anything but military conquest of the Viet Cong, to be carried out by stepped up U.S. armed efforts.... NEWS STORY: AP, February 10 (from Honolulu): Vice President Humphrey left for Saigon today with South Vietn am's top leaders to spur action on programs attacking hunger, disease, and ignor ance in that war-torn country.... NEWS ANALYSIS: Charles Mohr, The New York Time s, February 10 (from Saigon): In the atmosphere of Honolulu, there was much emph asis on form, so much that in some ways it may have obscured substance. The Amer icans appeared so delighted with Marshal Ky's "style"--with his showing as a pol itically salable young man with the right instincts rather than as a young warlo rd--that there seemed to be almost no emphasis on the important differences betw een the Governments . . . What Marshal Ky told President Johnson was something h e had often said before: South Vietnamese society is still riddled with social i njustices and political weaknesses; there is not one political party worthy of t he name . . . The South Vietnamese leaders believe that they could not survive a "peaceful settlement" that left the VC political structure in place, even if th e VC guerrilla units were disbanded. Therefore, the South Vietnamese feel that " rural pacification," of which much was said at Honolulu, is necessary not only t o help them achieve military victory but also to prevent a political reversal of that victory . . . As the Vietnamese see pacification, its core is not merely " helping the people to a better life," the aspect on which many American speakers dwelled, it is rather the destruction of the clandestine VC political structure and the creation of an ironlike system of government political control over the population....

But the two governments have never been closer than they are in the aftermath of Honolulu, and the atmosphere of good feeling seems genuine.... NEWS ANALYSIS: R oscoe Drummond, February 14 (from Washington): .....The decisions taken at Honol ulu by President Johnson and Premier Ky go to the heart of winning. They were pr imarily social, economic, and political decisions. They come at a malleable and perhaps decisive turn in the war.... NEWS ANALYSIS: Tom Wicker in The New York T imes, February 13 (from Saigon): Vice President Humphrey . . . has left Saigon r everberating with what he said was the "single message" he had come to deliver. The message was that the war in Vietnam was a war to bring social justice and ec onomic and political progress to the Vietnamese people . . . Humphrey said at a news conference here: "Social and economic revolution does not belong to the V.C . Non-communist forces are the ones forwarding the revolution." The emphasis on social reform could also quiet critics who contend that Washington has concentra ted too much on the military problem and not enough on civic action to win the l oyalty of the Vietnamese people.... NEWS ANALYSIS: Charles Mohr, The New York Ti mes, February 13 (from Saigon): By giving enormous emphasis and publicity to it, an impression was left that pacification is something new. In a sense, there wa s some truth in this. The men running the program, both Vietnamese and American, are new. And the 1966 plan itself is a new one in many respects. Pacification i s vitally important to success in the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. Without it , purely military success becomes empty even if all the battles are "won." NEWS ANALYSIS: Joseph Alsop, February 14 (from Saigon): CART BEFORE HORSE . . . All t hat really mattered at Honolulu was a Presidential decision to provide the force s needed to keep the pressure on the enemy here in Vietnam. The odds are heavy t hat the President, who seems to prefer doing good by stealth, actually took this decision behind the electorate smokescreen of talk about other matters. The que stion remains whether the needed forces will be provided soon enough. One must w ait and see. But at the risk of sounding captious, and for the sake of honesty a nd realism, it must be noted that there was a big Madison Avenue element in all the talk about "pacification" during the Hawaii meeting and Vice President Humph rey's subsequent visit to Vietnam. This does not mean that pacification of the V ietnamese countryside is an unimportant and/or secondary problem. On the contrar y, it will eventually be all-important and

primary. But one need only glance at the list of priority areas marked for pacif ication now, to see the adman's touch in the present commotion. There are: An Gi ang Province, which belongs to the Hoa Hao sect and has been long since pacified by the Hoa Hao; the Hop Tac region near Saigon, where General Harkins experimen ted unhappily with the so-called oil spot technique; parts of Binh Dinh Province along the north-south highway; and the fringes of the Marine enclave at Da Nang . Each area differs from the others. In the case of the nine villages on the fri nges of the Marines' Da Nang enclave, for instance, pacification is needed to in sure airfield security from mortar fire. Most of these villages have been Viet C ong strongholds for over 20 years, and they could be dangerous. .....Pacificatio n by the Marines looks very fine . . . But it takes far too many Marines to do t he job. Nonetheless, the real objections to making a big-immediate show of pacif ication are quite different. The Hop Tac experience tells the story. Here a grea t effort was made by the Vietnamese authorities with the strong support of Gener al Harkins. A good deal was initially accomplished. Boasts began to be heard. Wh ereat the enemy sailed forth from the nearest redoubt area, knocked down everyth ing that had been built up, murdered all the villagers who had worked with the g overnment, and left things much worse than they had been before . . . An attempt to make a big immediate show of pacification needs to be warned against, becaus e of the Washington pressure to do just that. A large element of the U.S. Missio n was called home a month or so ago. And in effect, these men were commanded to produce a plan for making a show as soon as possible. Fortunately, they had the courage to point out that the cart was being put before the horse once again. Fo rtunately, Ambassador Lodge is well aware of the dangers of putting the cart bef ore the horse. The pressure for something showy may continue, but it is likely t o be resisted. If so, the pressure will not be altogether useless. The Vietnames e and the Americans here are getting ready for pacification on a big scale and i n an imaginative way, partly because of that pressure. It is vital to have every thing in readiness to do the job of pacification as soon as favorable circumstan ces arise. But it is also vital to bear in mind that really favorable circumstan ces cannot arise until the enemy's backbone of regular units is at last very clo se to the breaking point, if not actually beginning to break. EDITORIAL: Christi an Science Monitor, February 11: If Saigon and Washington fight South Vietnam's economic and social war as vigorously as they fight its military war, the Commun ist thrust against that country will fail. Yet this

is the biggest "if" of the war. Over and over lip-service has been paid to the i nescapable need of winning over the peasantry. But time and again this has come to naught. We are cautiously encouraged by the latest steps being taken. The str ong emphasis laid in the Honolulu Declaration on civic reforms is a commitment i n the right direction. The sending of Vice-President Humphrey to study South Vie tnamese reform programs on the spot is an even stronger earnest of American's in tention not to let this program slip back into another do-nothing doldrum..... The Pentagon Papers Gravel Edition Volume 2 Chapter 7, "Re-Emphasis on Pacification: 1965-1967," pp. 515-623. IBoston: Beaco n Press, 1971) Section 2, pp. 560-623 III. HONOLULU TO MANILA A. SAIGON: PORTER IN CHARGE Question. Mr. President, whe n you were in Los Angeles reporting on the Honolulu Conference, you listed eleve n items which you said were discussed, and you said that in all these fields you set targets, concrete targets. Would it be possible to get a list of these conc rete targets? Answer. I don't have any. I think what I had in mind there was say ing that we hoped to make certain progress in certain fields and we expect to ha ve another conference after a reasonable length of time, in which we will take t he hits, runs, and errors and see what we have achieved and everybody would be a nswerable, so to speak, as to the progress they have made and whether or not the y are nearing their goals . . . I hope to be in Honolulu in the next few months, maybe in the middle of the year, and see what has been done. I thought it was g ood that we could go there and have the Government and the military leader, Gene ral Westmoreland, and the Ambassador and the Deputy Ambassador, meet with the Vi ce President, the Secretary of Agriculture and technicians, and try to expose to the world for three days what this country is trying to do to feed the hungry, and educate the people, and to improve the life span for people who just live to be 35 now . . . A lot of our folks think it is just a military effort. We don't think it should be that, and we don't want it to be that..... As the President returned to Washington from Honolulu, the Vice President, Secretary Freeman, and McGeorge Bundy headed up a large list of high-rank-

ing officials that went on to Saigon. Bundy, about to leave the government, carr ied with him authority from the President to give the Deputy Ambassador wide aut hority over all aspects of the rural construction program. On February 12, 1966, the President sent Ambassador Lodge a NODIS telegram, which was designed to pav e the way for Bundy's reorganization effort: QUOTE. I hope that you share my own satisfaction with the Honolulu Conference. The opportunity to talk face to face with you, General West-moreland and the Vietnamese leaders has given me a much better appreciation of the problems each of you face, but perhaps even more impo rtantly the opportunities open to us. I was particularly impressed with the appa rent determination of Thieu, Ky and the other Vietnamese Ministers to carry forw ard a social policy of radical and constructive change. However, I full well rea lize the tremendous job that they and we have in putting this into practice. I i ntend to see that our organization back here for supporting this is promptly tig htened and strengthened and I know that you will want to do the same at your end . I was impressed with Ambassador Porter and it seems to me that he probably has the necessary qualifications to give you the support you will need in this fiel d. While I know that he is already doing so, I suggest that your designation of him as being in total charge, under your supervision, of all aspects of the rura l construction program would constitute a clear and visible sign to the Vietname se and to our own people that the Honolulu Conference really marks a new departu re in this vital field of our effort there. We will of course be glad to give pr ompt support with whatever additional personnel or administrative rearrangement this might require within the Mission or Embassy. Please let me know your own th oughts on this. I hope that in June we can have a full report showing real progr ess in our war on social misery in Viet Nam. In the meanwhile, I know that you w ill not hesitate to let me know how we can be of help. UNQUOTE. The President ha s instructed that a copy of this message be given to McGeorge Bundy. The Preside nt also sent General Westmoreland a personal telegram that day, which did not me ntion the matter of civilian organization. To Westmoreland he wrote: QUOTE. I wa nt you to know that I greatly enjoyed the opportunity of talking directly with y ou at Honolulu and I hope you share my own satisfaction on the outcome of that c onference. I was much encouraged by your presentation of the military situation and now have even more pride and confidence in what you and your men are doing. I feel that we are on the right track and you can be sure of my continued suppor t. I know that you share my own views on the equal importance of the war on soci al misery, and hope that what we did at Honolulu will help assure that we and th e Vietnamese move forward with equal vigor and determination on that front. As I have told Ambassador Lodge and am telling Thieu and Ky, I hope that in June I c an have a report of real progress in that field. With continued progress in the military field, we should by that time be able to see ahead more clearly the roa d to victory over both aggression and misery.

You have my complete confidence and genuine admiration and absolute support. I n ever forget that I have a lot riding on you. UNQUOTE. After the mood at the Warr enton Conference, the push for reorganization should have come as no surprise to the higher ranking members of the Mission. Discussions centering around the rol e of the Deputy Ambassador (and earlier, the DCM) as a manager for the mushroomi ng Civilian Mission had been going on for a long time, as Lodge and Porter well knew. With Bundy in Saigon to ease the issue, Lodge answered the President on Fe bruary 15, 1966: I do indeed want to "tighten and strengthen the organization fo r support of the rural construction program at this end," as you tell me you pla n to do at yours. And I applaud your determination to treat "rural construction" (for which there should be a better name) * as an end in itself and on a par wi th the military. * Lodge had for some time been troubled by the phrase "rural construction"--the literal translation of the Vietnamese Xay Dung Nong Thon--which he felt suggeste d bricks and cement, rather than the entire program of "revolutionary uplift" wh ich he advocated. Right after the Honolulu meeting, he asked each member of the Mission Council for suggestions on how better to translate the Vietnamese phrase . Out of the suggestions that he received (including Westmoreland's recommendati on that we ought to leave the phrase alone, just translating the literal meaning of the Vietnamese as accurately as possible), Lodge chose the phrase "Revolutio nary Development." At about the same time, the GVN dropped the word "rural" from the name of the Ministry of Rural Construction (thus, Xay Dung Nong Thon was re placed by Xay Dung). Lodge and Ky then announced that henceforth the Vietnamese Ministry would be known in English as the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, and the overall program called Revolutionary Development (RD). To this day, the semantic gap remains unbridged: the Vietnamese call it the Ministry of Construc tion (Bo Xay Dung), except when they are talking in English to an American; the Americans call it the MORD. The same applies to the program: moreover, the confu sion is often compounded by the fact that in most informal discussions between A mericans and Vietnamese, the term most often used is still "pacification." See, for example, the Working Group session at Honolulu, February 7, 1966: "It is per haps significant that this was the only time in the course of the meeting, i.e., at the outset, that the newly adopted U.S. term was heard. Throughout the remai nder of the Working Group discussion, the term pacification was used almost excl usively. In this connection, the Saigon U.S. representatives present at the meet ing are inclined to doubt the actual appropriateness of the new term ...)" As you say, Ambassador Porter is already putting a great deal of effort into thi s work. I have never made a formal announcement of this fact because it seemed t o me that the arrangement was working pretty well as it was and that public anno uncement was unnecessary. Also, I felt the U.S. Government was getting really en thusiastic work without thought of self from both Porter and Lansdale under pres ent conditions. I felt

public announcements might make Lansdale feel less important without any gain fo r Porter who does not need or want a sense of importance. I believe that America ns are pulling together here as never before and that there is a spirit here whi ch is worth more than organization charts. But I can see the merit of the idea t hat a public designation of Porter as being in total charge of the American aspe cts of the rural construction program would "constitute a clear and visible sign to the Vietnamese and to our own people that the Honolulu Conference really mar ks a new departure." There are pitfalls to be avoided. For example, I assume tha t if Porter's new allocation means that I am so taken up with U.S. visitors that I am in effect separated from "rural construction," then we would take a new lo ok at the whole thing. Much of the most timeconsuming job out here is not rural construction but is the handling and educating of U.S. visitors. Although it mus t be done at the expense of the war effort within Vietnam, it is vitally importa nt. But it was not until the end of January that I was free enough of visitors t o start holding meetings of U.S. "rural construction" workers to probe and to pr od and to develop the "check-up" maps which I showed you at Honolulu. I suggest, therefore that I make the following announcement: "I have today designated Depu ty Ambassador William Porter to take full charge, under my direction, of all asp ects of work of the United States in support of the programs of community buildi ng, presently described as rural construction, agreed at the Honolulu Conference . This includes overcoming by police methods the criminal, as distinct from the military aspect of Viet Cong violence; and the training and installation of heal th, education and agricultural workers and of community organizers. Ambassador P orter will have the support of a small staff drawn from all elements of the U.S. Mission, and he and I will continue to have the help of General Edward Lansdale as senior liaison officer and adviser. Ambassador Porter will continue to serve as my Deputy in the full sense of the word, but he will be relieved as far as p ossible of all routine duties not connected with the Honolulu program. We are de termined that this program for peace and progress shall be carried forward with all the energy and skill of a fully coordinated U.S. Mission effort, always with full recognition that the basic task of nation-building here belongs to the peo ple of Viet Nam and to their government." I know that you appreciate that this i s essentially a Vietnamese program and that what Porter would be supervising wou ld be the American end of it. I recognize the existence of the view that we must in effect impose detailed plans and somehow run the pacification effort ourselv es. But I do not share it. Nothing durable can be accomplished that way. As far as "administrative rearrangement" is concerned, I would like Sam Wilson to take the office now occupied by Porter, with the rank of Minister, and to serve as Mi ssion coordinator. I intend to put Habib in the office now occupied by Chadbourn with the rank of Minister.....

As soon as I receive word from you that this is satisfactory, I intend to make t he announcement about Porter. The other appointments can be announced later. LOD GE From the beginning, Lodge, who felt that "a public announcement was unnecessa ry" except as a "clear and visible sign to the Vietnamese and to our own people that the Honolulu conference really marks a new departure," was not overly enthu siastic about the public designation of his deputy as being "in total charge" of something. The documentation is virtually nonexistent on the question of whethe r Lodge's feelings on this point acted as a constraint on Porter, but it is hard to escape the strong impression that from the outset, Lodge was going along wit h the new authority for Porter only with reluctance--and that Porter had to keep this in mind whenever he considered putting heavy pressure on an agency. Porter also had his reservations about his role. Whether these were caused by a feelin g that the Ambassador was not going to support him in showdowns with the agencie s, or whether his caution came from some more basic feelings, there can be no do ubt that he did not, in the period between Honolulu and Manila, perform in his n ew role as the President and his senior advisors had hoped. And thus once again, at Manila, a reorganization was approved--this time a much broader and far-reac hing one. Porter's intentions were accurately foreshadowed in his first statemen t to the Mission Council on the subject, February 28, 1966. He sought then to al lay the fears which the announcement had raised in the minds of the agency chief s in Vietnam: Ambassador Porter described briefly his new responsibilities as he sees them in the pacification/rural development area. He pointed out that the b asic idea is to place total responsibility on one senior individual to pull toge ther all of the civil aspects of revolutionary development. He sees this primari ly as a coordinating effort and does not intend to get into the middle of indivi dual agency activities and responsibilities. As he and his staff perceive areas which require attention and action by a responsible agency, he will call this to the attention of that agency for the purpose of emphasis; he intends to suggest rather than to criticize . . . Ambassador Porter noted that the non-priority ar eas are still getting the bulk of the resources, which means that we have not ye t really concentrated on the priority areas and which also flags the necessity t o bring the priority areas into higher focus. He will have a great interest in t he allocation of resources such as manpower; yet he recognizes that under wartim e conditions which prevail in Vietnam there will always be some inequity. It is important to emphasize that the appointment of Porter to his new role did indeed improve the organization of the Mission, and that Porter did accomplish some of the things that Washington had hoped he would--but, under the constraints outli ned below, he did not get enough done fast enough to satisfy the growing impatie nce in Washington with the progress of the effort. This impatience was to lead t o the second reorganization and the formation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) after the Manila Conference. Although the impatience of Washington was jus tified, the fact is that under the new and limited mandate Porter had, he did be gin the process of pulling together CIA, USAID,

and JUSPAO, and forcing them to work more closely together. He also tried to foc us General Lansdale's liaison efforts with General Thang more closely on items r elated to our operational objectives. He presented a new and vastly improved ima ge of the civilian mission to the press, many of whom came to regard him as the most competent high official in the Mission. To one semi-official observer, Henr y Kissinger, who visited Vietnam first in October of 1965, and then returned in July, 1966, the situation looked substantially improved: The organization of the Embassy has been vastly improved since my last visit. The plethora of competing agencies, each operating their own program on the basis of partly conflicting a nd largely uncoordinated criteria, has been replaced by an increasingly effectiv e structure under the extremely able leadership of Bill Porter. Porter is on top of his job. It would be idle to pretend that the previous confusion is wholly o vercome. He has replaced competition by coordination; he is well on his way to i mposing effective direction on the basis of carefully considered criteria. At le ast the basic structure for progress exists. Where eight months ago I hardly kne w where to begin, the problem now is how to translate structure into performance -a difficult but no insuperable task. Despite Kissinger's hopeful words, there w as a growing tendency in Washington to demand more out of the mission than it wa s then producing. In a paper written in August, 1966, Robert W. Komer, whose rol e in the re-emphasis of pacification will be discussed in the next section, wrot e: There is a growing consensus that the US/GVN pacification effort needs to be stepped up, that management of our pacification assets is not yet producing an a cceptable rate of return for our heavy support investments, and that pacificatio n operations should be brought more abreast of our developing military effort ag ainst the NVA and VC main force. The President has expressed this view, and so h as Ambassador Lodge among others. Why did Porter not live up to the expectations of Washington? While the documentation is weak on this point, the following rea sons can be deduced from the available evidence, including discussions with peop le who worked in both Saigon and Washington: 1. The Ambassador was not fully bac king his Deputy, and Porter was never sure of Lodge's support in Mission Council meetings, in telegrams, in discussions with the agencies. Many senior officials of the USG, including the President, had told Porter that he had their full sup port, and that they expected him to manage the Mission. But on a day-to-day basi s, Porter had to get along with the Ambassador, who was still (and legitimately so) the boss. The result was a considerable gap between what high officials in W ashington considered Porter's mandate, and what Porter felt he would be able to do without antagonizing the the Ambassador.* * This problem was foreshadowed in a remarkable way in 1963-1964. After visiting Vietnam in December, 1963, the Secretary of Defense sent President Johnson a

memorandum in which he pointed out that the Mission "lacks leadership . . . and is not working to a common plan . . . My impression is that Lodge simply does no t know how to conduct a coordinated administration . . . This has of course been stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by John McCone), and I d o not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a lo ner all his life and cannot readily change now. Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constit ute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador." It is fairly well established that Nes, whatever his own abilit y and shortcomings was unable to establish an "executive committee operating bel ow the level of the Ambassador," and that, as a matter of fact his every attempt to move in the direction indicated by the Secretary further alienated him from the Ambassador. The presumed lesson in the incident was that it is difficult and dangerous to tell one man's deputy that he has to assume broad responsibility a nd authority if the top man does not want this to happen. 2. The agencies involved--AID, USIA, and CIA--were hostile to the new designatio n from the outset. Since every agency paid lip-service to the new role of the De puty Ambassador, it is difficult to document this fact. But it is virtually self -evident: since every agency was being told that its chief representative in Sai gon now worked for the Deputy Ambassador, a career Foreign Service Officer, ther e was unhappiness with the system, in both Saigon and Washington. Men like the D irector of JUSPAO, who had served in Vietnam since January of 1964, and the CIA Station Chief, who retained a completely independent communications channel to W ashington, were not going to yield any portion of their autonomy without some qu iet grumbling and invisible foot-dragging. To overcome this reluctance was not a s easy for Porter as Washington had perhaps hoped, particularly in light of Lodg e's attitude. 3. The Washington organization did not parallel the Saigon structu re it was supposed to support, and in fact actually prevented strong and continu ous support. With legitimate legal and traditional responsibilities for programs overseas, each agency in Washington was understandably reluctant to channel the ir guidance through the Deputy Ambassador, whose authority did not seem to be de rived from the normal letter of authority to all Chiefs of Mission sent by Presi dent Kennedy in 1961. The agencies, moreover, also had a special problem with re gard to Vietnam: Congress was being far more rigorous in its review of the Vietn am program than it was in most other areas. The Moss Subcommittee on Overseas Go vernmental Operations, for example, was sending investigating teams to Saigon re gularly, and issuing well-publicized reports criticizing the AID program across a broad front. The Senatorial group that reviews CIA programs was showing consid erable concern with the nature and size of the cadre and counter-terror programs . And beyond that, there was the normal budgetary process, in which each agency generally handles its own requests through an extremely complex and difficult pr ocess. Each agency was bound to try to communicate as directly as possible with their representatives in Saigon. Thus, while some major conflicting policies whi ch had previously existed were ironed

out through the new system (such as the role of the cadre), many smaller, or sec ond-level matters contained to receive the traditional separate agency approach. A good example of this was the vital issue of improving village/hamlet governme nt. Although consistently identified as a key element in any successful pacifica tion program, improving the war-torn village structure seemed to escape the Miss ion organizationally. Responsibility for advice and assistance to the GVN Minist ry of Interior (later the Commissariat for Administration), rested with the USAI D Public Administration Division, which in turn was at the third level of the US AID, reporting to the USAID Director only through an Assistant Director for Tech nical Services. Within the Public Administration Division (PAD) itself, to make matters worse, improving village/hamlet government was only one of a large numbe r of activities for which PAD was responsibleand in the eyes of many traditional ly-minded professional public administrators, it did not automatically come firs t. Other issues of obvious importance--such as budgeting, strengthening the Mini stry, improving the National Institute of Administration, sending officials to t he U.S. for participant training--all came within the normal PAD program as outl ined in the AID Country Assistance Program (CAP) for FY 67, and, moreover, they required more resources, more Americans, more attention at high levels of AID, t han the village/hamlet government problem. When Ambassador Porter directed AID, in May of 1966, to begin massive efforts to improve village government, his orde rs were obeyed to the extent they could be within the context of previous AID co mmitments. The result was a further stretching of the already taut USAID/PAD sta ff, since no previous commitments or programs were cut back to provide man and/o r money for village government. At the same time, other sections of the Mission which were expected to support the renewed emphasis on local government were not producing as requested. JUSPAO, asked to support the effort with psychological operations, agreed in principle but found its existing list of priorities basica lly unchanged. The Embassy Political Section, which should have supported the ef fort at least to the extent of urging through its political contacts that the GV N revitalize the village structure, simply had better things to do. The CIA was also asked to support the effort; with their cadre assets, they were in a crucia l position on the matter, particularly since some of the critics of the cadre ha d stated that the cadre actually undercut village government instead of strength ening it (as they claimed). Again, the CIA gave lip service to the idea, without making any significant change in their training of the cadre at Vung Tau. In th is situation, Ambassador Porter tried several times to get action, each time rec eived enthusiastic, but generalized, words of agreement and support from everyon e, and finally turned his attention to other matters; with the crush of business , there was always a more immediate crisis. B. WASHINGTON: KOMER AS THE BLOWTORC H

The Warrenton conference had discussed not only the reorganization of the Missio n in Saigon, but--far more gingerly--the need for a more centralized management of the effort in Washington. After the Honolulu conference the President decided to take action to change the Washington structure on Vietnam, but not in quite the way suggested at Warrenton. While many people at Warrenton, particularly the State representative, had hoped that the President would designate one man, wit h an interagency staff, as the overseer of an integrated political-military-dipl omatic-economic policy in Vietnam, the President decided to reduce the scope of the job, and give one man responsibility for what was coming to be called "The O ther War." Thus, for the very first time, there would be a high-ranking official -a Special Assistant to the President-whose job would be to get the highest poss ible priority for non-military activities. In effect, the President had assured a place at the decision councils in Washington for someone with built-in pro-pac ification, pro-civil side bias. This was Robert W. Komer, whose strenuous effort s in the next few months were to earn him the nickname of "The Blowtorch" (given to him by Ambassador Lodge, according to Komer). How much authority the Preside nt intended to give Komer is not clear. It is quite likely that the issue was de liberately left vague, so as to see what authority and what accomplishments Kome r could carve out of an ambiguous NSAM and his ready access to the President. On March 23, 1966--six weeks after Manila--Joseph Califano, Special Assistant to t he President, sent the Secretary of Defense an EYES ONLY draft of the NSAM setti ng up Komer's authority. In the covering note, Califano said, "We would be parti cularly interested in whatever suggestions you would have to strengthen Komer's authority." In response, the Defense Department (the actual person making sugges tion unidentified in documents) suggested only one minor change, and approved th e NSAM. The other departments also suggested minor changes in other parts of the NSAM, and on March 28, 1966, the President issued it as NSAM 343. It said: In t he Declaration of Honolulu I renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Go vernment of the Republic of Vietnam to defense against aggression, to the work o f social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunge r, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. Before the Honoul ulu Conference and since, I have stressed repeatedly that the war on human miser y and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflic t, as our military operations to ward off aggression . . . In my view, it is ess ential to designate a specific focal point for the direction, coordination and s upervision in Washington of U.S. nonmilitary programs relating to Vietnam. I hav e accordingly designated Mr. Robert W. Komer as Special Assistant to me for carr ying out this responsibility. I have charged him and his deputy, Ambassador Will iam Leonhart, to assure that adequate plans are prepared and coordinated coverin g all aspects of such programs, and

that they are promptly and effectively carried out. The responsibility will incl ude the mobilization of U.S. military resources in support of such programs. He will also assure that the Rural Construction/Pacification program and the progra ms for combat force employment and military operations are properly coordinated. His functions will be to ensure and timely support of the U.S. in Saigon on mat ters within his purview.... In addition to working closely with the addressee Ca binet officers he will have direct access to me at all times. Those CIA activiti es related solely to intelligence collection are not affected by this NSAM. Mr. Komer was in business, with a small staff and a mandate, as he saw it, to prod p eople throughout the government, in both Washington and Saigon. Combined with a personality that journalists called "abrasive," his mandate resulted in more pre ssure being put on the civilians associated with Vietnam than ever before, and i n some understandable frictions. Komer's significance in the re-emphasis of paci fication is important, and must be dealt with briefly, although this section doe s not relate his story in detail. First, there was Komer's influence on AID. Wit h little difficulty, he established his ability to guide AID, and began to give them direct instructions on both economic and pacification matters. AID, previou sly with limited influence in the Mission's pacification policy, found its influ ence diminished still further. Of more significance was Komer's emphasis on the RD Cadre program, run by the CIA. Together with Porter, he recommended a prematu re expansion of the program, in an effort to get the program moving faster. On A pril 19, 1966, after his first trip to Vietnam, Komer told the President: Cadre Expansion. While the RD program has some questionable aspects, it seems the most promising approach yet developed. The RD ministry led by General Thang is bette r than most, and the Vung Tau and Montagnard training centers are producing 5500 trained men for insertion in 59-man teams into 93 villages every 15 weeks. But Porter sees even this rate as insufficient to keep up with "the growing military capability to sweep the VC out of key areas." He urges rapid expansion via buil ding another training center (which he'd like to get Sea-bees to build). The aim is roughly to double cadre output from 19,000 to 39,000 trained personnel per y ear. He thinks this rate could be reached by end CY 1966. I agree with Porter an d will press this concept at the Washington end.

Plans were approved, and construction began on the second training center. But b y the end of 1966 it was recognized that the attempt to double cadre training wo uld only weaken their quality, which was shaky to begin with. The construction o f the second center was abruptly halted. Komer and Porter had miscalculated badl y. Komer also sought to influence the military in both Saigon and Washington to give more attention to the pacification effort. In cables to Saigon--most of the m slugged with his name, and thus known as "Komergrams"--Komer sought to prod th e Mission forward on a wide variety of programs. One of his most recurring theme s was the Chieu Hoi program* and in time his urgings did contribute to a more su ccessful program, with a high-ranking * For example: "Porter from Komer: Highest authorities interested in stepping up defection programs. While recognizing limitations Chieu Hoi program and inadequ acies GVN administration, program has achieved impressive results and shown high return in terms modest U.S. support costs. Greatly concerned by two recent admi nistrative decisions taken by GVN . . ." Or: "To Porter from Komer: USIA eager h elp maximize success both Chieu Hoi and RD programs, in which highest authoritie s vitally interested . . ." Or: "For Mann and Casler from Komer: Would appreciat e your following through on coordinated set of action proposals to energize lagg ing Chieu Hoi program . . . We are concerned about drop-off in returnees since A pril . . . Bell and Marks concur." American official in Ambassador Porter's office working on nothing else, in plac e of the previous ad hoc arrangement between JUSPAO and USAID. Another recurring theme was refugees, but here he was less successful, particularly since the U.S . Mission was never able to determine whether or not it desired to stimulate mor e refugees as means of denying the VC manpower. His cables on this complex issue were characterized by an absence of objective, but at least he was addressing f rontally questions few other people would raise at all: For Porter from Komer: W e here deeply concerned by growing number of refugees. Latest reports indicate t hat as of 31 August, a total of 1,361,288 had been processed . . . Of course, in some ways, increased flow of refugees is a plus. It helps deprive VC of recruit ing potential and rice growers, and is partly indicative of growing peasant desi re seek security on our side. Question arises, however, of whether we and GVN ad equately set up to deal with increased refugee flow of this magnitude. AID has p rogrammed much larger refugee program for FY 67, but is it enough? . . . Only Mi ssion would have answers, so intent this cable is merely to pose question, solic it bids for increased support if needed, and assure you I would do all possible generate such support.

On another controversial issue, Land Reform, Komer repeatedly pressed the Missio n for public signs of progress, but by the time he went out to Saigon as General Westmoreland's deputy in 1967, he--and apparently the President--were still uns atisfied. But perhaps the most important role Komer played was to keep the gener al subject of pacification before the President, to encourage Ambassador Lodge t o talk pacification up, and to constitute a one-man, full-time, nonstop lobby fo r pacification within the USG. After his first trip to Vietnam, for example, Kom er reported to the President that "while our splendid military effort is going q uite well, our civil programs lag behind . . . To achieve the necessary results, we must ourselves give higher priority to (and expand) certain key pacification programs, especially cadres and police--if necessary at some expense to the mil itary effort." Komer's memorandum constitutes only a small proportion of the inf ormation and suggestions reaching the President and his senior advisors on Vietn am, and the intention of this paper is not to suggest that they were in any sens e definitive documents which show the direction of U.S. strategy in Vietnam. But it seems clear that Komer was the first senior official in Washington to make a major effort to put pacification near the top of our combined civil-military ef fort, and that he had a particularly advantageous spot from which to try. He had authorized back-channel communications with the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassado r in Saigon, apparent access to the President, and the umbrella of the White Hou se. His memoranda to the President over his year in Washington showed considerab le change in thinking on many issues, but a consistent support for more pacifica tion. A small sample is revealing: Key aspects of pacification deserve highest p riority--and greater emphasis. Unless we and the GVN can secure and hold the cou ntryside cleared by military operations, we either face an ever larger and quasi -permanent military commitment or risk letting the VC infiltrate again . . . I p ersonally favor more attention to the Delta (IV Corps) region, which contains ei ght out of Vietnam's 15 million people and is its chief rice bowl.... Clearly we must dovetail the military's sweep operations and civil pacification. My impres sion is that, since the military are moving ahead faster than the civil side we need to beef up the latter to get it in phase. There's little point in the milit ary clearing areas the civil side can't pacify. On the other hand, security is t he key to pacification; people won't cooperate and the cadre can't function till an area is secure.... Somehow the civil side appears reluctant to call on milit ary resources, which are frequently the best and most readily available. I put e veryone politely on notice that I would have no such hesitations--provided that the case was demonstrable--and that this was the express request of the Secretar y of Defense. [Cited Supra.]

In August of 1966, Komer produced the longest of his papers, and the one he cons idered his most important. Its title was "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification." In addition to discussing the substance of pacification, the paper made some fur ther organizational suggestions, which clearly foreshadowed the second reorganiz ation of the Mission which took place after the Manila conference. It is worth q uoting in some length (all italics are part of the original): There is a growing consensus that the US/GVN pacification effort needs to be stepped up, that mana gement of our pacification assets is not yet producing an acceptable rate of ret urn for our heavy investments, and that pacification operations should be brough t more abreast of our developing military effort against the NVA and VC main for ce. The President has expressed this view, and so has Ambassador Lodge among oth ers. I. What is pacification? In one sense, "pacification" can be used to encomp ass the whole of the military, political, and civil effort in Vietnam. But the t erm needs to be narrowed down for operational purposes, and can be reasonably we ll separated out as a definable problem area. If we divide the US/GVN problem in to four main components, three of them show encouraging progress. The campaign a gainst the major VC/ NVA units is in high gear, the constitutional process seems to be evolving favorably, and we expect to contain inflation while meeting most needs of the civil economy. But there is a fourth problem area, that of securin g the countryside and getting the peasant involved in the struggle against the V iet Cong, where we are lagging way behind. It is this problem area which I would term pacification.... At the risk of over-simplification, I see management of t he pacification problem as involving three main sub-tasks: (1) providing local s ecurity in the countryside-essentially a military/police/cadre task; (2) breakin g the hold of the VC over the people; and (3) positive programs to win the activ e support of the rural population. ....Few argue that we can assure success in V ietnam without also winning the "village war." Chasing the large units around th e boondocks still leaves intact the VC infrastructure, with its local guerrilla capability plus the weapons of terror and intimidation . . . So winning the "vil lage war" which I will loosely call pacification, seems an indispensable ingredi ent of any high-confidence strategy and a necessary precaution to close the guer rilla option. .....Yet another reason for stressing pacification is that the U.S . is supporting a lot of assets in being which are at the moment poorly employed . Even the bulk of ARVN, which increasingly sits back and watches the U.S. take over the more difficult parts of the war against main enemy units and bases, mig ht be more effectively used for this purpose . . . Thus, even if one contends th at pacification as I have defined it is not vital to a win strategy, stepping up this effort would add little to present costs and might produce substantial pay offs.

Beyond this, the time is psychologically ripe for greater emphasis on pacificati on. South Vietnamese confidence is growing as the U.S. turns the tide. New US/FW military forces are arriving to reinforce the campaign against the main force; their presence will release much needed assets to pacification. The GVN, fresh f rom success against the Buddhist led struggle and confidently facing an election process leading toward a constitution, also has been making the kind of tough d ecisions-devaluation, turnover of the Saigon port to military management, etc.-t hat will be needed in pacification, too. In sum, the assets are available, and t he time is ripe for an increased push to win the "village war." III. What is Hol ding Up the Pacification Efforts? The long history of the Vietnam struggle is re plete with efforts to secure the countryside. Most of them, like Diem's strategi c hamlet program, proved abortive. . . . Some of the chief difficulties we confr ont are suggested below: A. We had to go after the major VC/NVA units first . . . It was a matter of first things first . B. The VC/NVA have been able to select the weakest point in any embryonic GVN pacification effort and destroy it with a lightening attack.... C. There are inherent difficulties in the pacification p rocess itself.... D. Lack of high quality assets. Pacification has also had to t ake a back seat in the sense that it generally gets only the lowest grade GVN as sets--and not enough of these.... E. Last but not least, neither the U.S. nor th e GVN have as yet developed an adequate plan, program, or management structure f or dealing with pacification.... 1. The JCS and MACV are so preoccupied, however justifiably, with operations against the major VC/NVA units that they are not a ble to pay enough attention to the local security aspects of pacification.... 2. There is no unified civil/military direction within the GVN..... 3. A similar d ivided responsibility prevails on the U.S. side..... 4. Nor does there yet appea r to be a well-understood chain of command from Porter even to the civilians ope rating in the field.... 5. There is no integrated civil/military plan for pacifi cation on either the U.S. or GVN side.... IV. How do we step up Pacification? . . . It demands a multifaceted civil-military response.... A. Provide more adequa te, continuous security for the locales in which pacification is taking place. T his is the essential prerequisite. None of our civil programs in the countryside can be expected to be effective unless the area is reasonably secure. Nor, unle ss the people are protected, and their attitudes likely to change in favor of th e GVN . . . To provide security requires the assignment on a long term basis of enough assets to defeat these resident VC companies and battalions, in addition to providing 24-hour security to the people until they are able to assist in pro viding their own protection. This

is primarily the task of RF and PF, supported by the RD cadres and police . . . Some knowledgeable experts contend that even if we improve the . . . RF, PF, pol ice, and cadre, they are together insufficiently to extend local security much b eyond existing secured areas. They feel that lacking mobility and heavy firepowe r, those forces must be thickened with a liberal sprinkling of regular ARVN unit s working in the area outside the immediate area undergoing pacification. I do n ot suggest that ARVN regulars gainfully employed in battle against the enemy mai n forces be so diverted. I do urge that those ARVN forces not now fully engaged-a substantial fraction of the total be used to contribute directly to improving local security. B. We must devote more effort to breaking the hold of the VC ov er the people.... C. Carry out positive revolutionary development programs to wi n active popular support. The cliche of winning support by offering the people a better life through a series of interrelated RD programs has great relevance in Vietnam.... D. Establish functioning priorities for pacification.... E. Better Area Priorities . . . A greater stress on pacification logically means greater s tress on the Delta.... F. Concentrate additional resources on pacification . . . Arguments made in the past that pacification is a delicate subject to be approa ched only with care and precision have lost some of their relevance as the inten sity of warfare has increased . . . Increase: Police.... RD Cadre.... Material S upport for Pacification.... The U.S. Agricultural Effort.... Chieu Hoi.... Villa ge/Hamlet Administration..... G. Set more performance goals.... H. Rapidly exten d the security of key roads.... I. Systematize the flow of refugees.... J. Get b etter control over rice.... V. How can Pacification be Managed More Effectively? A. Restructuring the GVN --Place the RD and PF under the RD Military --Establis h a single line of command to the province chiefs --Remove the Division from the pacification chain of command --Strengthen the authority of the Province Chiefs --Appoint civilian chiefs in selected provinces and districts B. Parallel stren gthening of the structure is essential. U.S. leadership has often sparked major pacification steps by the GVN. The structure for managing pacification advice to the GVN, and direct U.S. military,/civilian support, have evolved slowly as the U.S. contributions have grown. Once it was possible to coordinate the U.S. paci fication effort

through an interagency committee for strategic hamlets. Later the Mission Counci l concept was used extensively. In the wake of the Honolulu Conference, the Pres ident appointed Ambassador Porter to take charge of the non-military effort in V ietnam. Several highly qualified people now give Porter the nucleus of a coordin ation and operations staff. However . . . the U.S. management structure must be strengthened considerably more. There are three basic alternatives, each buildin g on the present structure, which could provide the needed result. Two of them a re based on the principle of a "single manager" over both civilian and military assets by assigning command responsibility either to Porter or Westmoreland. The third accepts a continued division between the civil and military sides for num erous practical reasons, but calls for strengthening the management structure of both. Alternative No. 1--Give Porter operational control over all U.S. pacifica tion activity..... Alternative No. 2--Retain the present separate civil and mili tary command channels but strengthen the management structure of both MACV and t he U.S. Mission. This option, recognizing the practical difficulties of putting U.S. civilian and military personnel under a single chief, would be to settle fo r improved coordination at the Saigon level. To facilitate improved coordination , however, it would require strengthening the organization for pacification with in MACV and the U.S. Mission. MACV disposes of by far the greater number of Amer icans working on pacification in the field. It has advisory teams spending most of their time on pacification in 200 out of 230 districts and in all 43 province s. These teams-not counting advisors at division, corps and all tactical units d own to battalion-number about 2000 men compared with about one-eighth this numbe r from all other U.S. agencies combined. However, the senior officer in MACV dea ling with pacification as his principal function is now a colonel heading the J3 3 staff division. Moreover, with 400,000 U.S. troops soon to be committed, Gener al Westmoreland, his subordinate commanders, and his principal staff officers mu st spend increasing time on military operations associated with defeating the VC /NVA main formations. Therefore, management of the tremendous advisory resources with MACV inevitably suffers regardless of General Westmoreland's personal effo rt to give balanced attention to both. Hence there might be merit in COMUSMACV h aving a senior deputy to manage pacification within MACV and pacification advice to the ICS, as well as throughout the Vietnamese military chain of command. Key staff sections, such as J33, Poiwar Directorate, Senior Advisor for RF/PF, coul d be controlled by a chief of staff for pacification responsive to the Deputy. A dvisory teams at corps and division would receive guidance and orders on pacific ation from the Deputy. Province and district advisors would receive all orders, except routine administrative instructions, through the pacification channel.

To parallel the MACV organization and provide a single point of liaison on the c ivil side, Ambassador Porter should have his own field operations office formed by merging USAID Field Operations, JUSPAO Field Services and CAS Covert Action B ranch. Control over the people assigned would be removed, as in Alternative No. 1, from their parent agency. All civilian field personnel in the advisory busine ss would also receive their guidance and orders from the Deputy Ambassador. For this dual civilian-military system to operate effectively, the closest coordinat ion would be required between the offices of the MACV Deputy and the Deputy Amba ssador. Since it is difficult and dangerous to separate military and civilian as pects of pacification at the province level, most policy guidance and instructio ns to the provinces hopefully would be issued jointly and be received by the sen ior military and civilian advisors who would then develop their plans together. I would still favor a single civil/military team chief in the province, even tho ugh he would have two bosses in Saigon talking to him through different and para llel chains of command. Alternatively, since MACV already has a senior advisor i n each province, it would be possible similarly to assign a single civilian as t he Vietnamese province chiefs point of contact on all non-military matters. All other civilians in the province would be under his control. Alternative No. 3--A ssign responsibility for pacification civil and military, to COMUSMACV. This is not a new suggestion, and has a lot to recommend it. In 1964, General Westmorela nd proposed that he be made "executive agent" for pacification. MACV at that tim e had an even greater preponderance of field advisors than it does today, and wa s devoting the bulk of its attention to pacification. Since the military still h as by far the greatest capacity among U.S. agencies in Vietnam for management an d the military advisors outnumber civilians at least 8 to 1 in the field, MACV c ould readily take on responsibility for all pacification matters. Turning over t he entire pacification management task to COMUSMACV would require him to reorgan ize his staff to handle simultaneously the very large military operations busine ss involving U.S., Free World and Vietnamese forces and the civil/military aspec ts of pacification at the same time. The USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS Covert Operation s staffs would come under COMUSMACV's control where they would be used as additi onal "component commands." In this case, it might be desirable to have a civilia n deputy to COMUSMACV for pacification. Also appropriate under this concept woul d be a single U.S. advisory team, under a team chief, at each subordinate echelo n. The result would be a single chain of command to the field and coordinated ci vilian/military pacification planning and operations on the U.S. side. The U.S. Mission would speak to Vietnamese corps and division commanders, province chiefs and district chiefs with a single voice. In the latter part of this lengthy mem orandum, Komer clearly foreshadowed both the formation of OCO after the Manila c onference--his Alternative No. 2--and the merger of

OCO and MACV into MACCORDS after Guam--his Alternative No. 3. But when he sent t he paper to Saigon with his deputy in mid-August, the reaction from Lodge, Porte r, and Westmoreland was uniformly negative: they asked him, in effect, to leave them alone since they were satisfied with their present organization. But Komer had also distributed his paper around Washington, and was lobbying for another c hange in the structure of the Mission, although he remained, in August, vague as to which of the three alternatives he put forward he personally favored. When o ther senior officials of government began to voice feelings that additional orga nizational changes were necessary in the Mission in Saigon, the die was cast. An other major attribute of Komer was his strong public and private optimism. He pr oduced for any journalist willing to hear him out facts and figures that suggest ed strongly that the war was not only winnable, but being won at an accelerating pace. To the President he sounded the same theme: After almost a year full-time in Vietnam, and six trips there, I felt able to learn a good deal more from my 11 days in country, 13-23 February. I return more optimistic than ever before. T he cumulative change since my first visit last April is dramatic, if not yet vis ibly demonstrable in all respects. Indeed, I'll reaffirm even more vigorously my prognosis of last November (which few shared then) that growing momentum would be achieved in 1967 on almost every front in Vietnam. Komer believed in the conc ept of "sheer mass"--that in time we would just overwhelm the Viet Cong: Wastefu lly, expensively, but nonetheless indisputably, we are winning the war in the So uth. Few of our programs--civil or military--are very efficient, but we are grin ding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass. And the cumulative impact of all w e have set in motion is beginning to tell. Pacification still lags the most, yet even it is moving forward. Indeed, my broad feeling, with due allowance for ove r-simplification, is that our side now has in presently programmed levels all th e men, money and other resources needed to achieve success..... In summary, Kome r's 13 months in Washington were spent steadily raising the priority of the paci fication and other non-military efforts in Vietnam. While he never was in a cont rolling position within the Washington bureaucracy, he succeeded in making those who were more aware of the "other war" (a term he used continually until Ambass ador Bunker announced in May of 1967 that he did not recognize that there was su ch a thing). While it can be no more than speculation, it would also appear that Komer played an important role in inserting into high-level discussions, includ ing Presidential discussions, the pacification priority. Thus, when General West moreland visited the President at the LBJ ranch in August, 1966, Komer put befor e the President a series of pacificationrelated subjects to be used during the d iscussions. This happened again at Manila, where

some of the points in final communique were similar to things Korner had been pu shing earlier, as outlined in his August memorandum. C. STUDY GROUPS AND STRATEG ISTS: SUMMER 1966 In the aftermath of Honolulu, task forces and study groups wer e suddenly assembling, producing papers on priorities, on organization of the Mi ssion, on the role and mission of various forces. They were all manifestations o f the new mood that had come over the Mission and Washington on pacification. Th e advocates of pacification-with their widely differing viewpoints-all saw their chance again to put forward their own concepts to a newly interested bureaucrac y, starting with Komer and Porter. The most important of the numerous studies we re: 1. The Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietn am (Short Title: PROVN)--commissiofled by the Army Chief of Staff in July of 196 5, completed and submitted in March 1966; 2. The Priorities Task Force--formed i n Saigon in April 1966 by Deputy Ambassador Porter, completed in July 1966; 3. T he Inter-Agency "Roles and Missions" Study Group--formed by Porter in July 1966, completed in August. While the recommendations of these studies were never acce pted in toto, they all play key roles in the development of strategic thinking i n Washington and Saigon during the latter part of 1966, and they continue to be influential today. PROVN--As early as the summer of 1965, General Johnson saw th e need to select a superior group of officers, and set them to work on a long-te rm study of the problem in Vietnam. The study was intended for internal Army use , and was for a while after its completion treated with such delicacy that Army officers were forbidden even to discuss its existence outside DOD. This was unfo rtunate, because in content it was far-ranging and thoughtful, and set a precede nt for responsible forward planning and analysis which should be duplicated in o ther fields. PROVN was charged with "developing new sources of action to be take n in South Vietnam by the United States and its allies, which will, in conjuncti on with current actions, modified as necessary, lead in due time to successful a ccomplishment of U.S. aims and objectives." With this broad mandate, PROVN staff spent eight months questioning returning officers from Vietnam, studying the hi story of the country, drawing parallels with other countries, analyzing the stru cture of the U.S. Mission; and making recommendations. In the end, the PROVN tea m decided that there was "no unified effective pattern" to the then-current effo rts in Vietnam, and submitted a broad blueprint for action. Its thesis was simpl e: The situation in South Vietnam has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be t he last chance to ensure eventual success. "Victory" can only be achieved throug h bringing the

individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the GVN. The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district, and provinci al levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won. The following are the most important sp ecific actions required now: Concentrate U.S. operations on the provincial level to include the delegation of command authority over U.S. operations to the Seni or U.S. Representative at the provincial level. Reaffirm Rural Construction as t he foremost US/GVN combined effort to solidify and extend GVN influence. Authori ze more direct U.S. involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels ad equate to ensure the accomplishment of critical programs. Delegate to the U.S. A mbassador unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all U.S. activities, reso urces, and personnel in-country. Direct the Ambassador to develop a single integ rated plan for achieving U.S. objectives in SVN. Reaffirm to the world at large the precise terms of the ultimate U.S. objective as stated in NSAM 288: A free a nd independent non-communist South Vietnam.... Beyond this frank and direct summ ary, the study had hundreds of recommendations, ranging from the specific and re alizable to the vague and hortatory. In summary, the PROVN was a major step forw ard in thinking. Although as mentioned above, its value was reduced for a long t ime by the restrictions placed on its dissemination, the candor with which it ad dressed matters was probably possible only because it originated within a single service, and thus did not require the concurrences of an inter-agency study. Fo r example, the PROVN study addressed directly a point of such potential embarras sment to the U.S. Government that it is quite likely an inter-agency group would not have addressed it except perhaps in oblique terms: A PROVN survey . . . rev ealed that no two agencies of the U.S. Government viewed our objectives in the s ame manner. Failure to use that unequivocal statement of our fundamental objecti ve--a free and independent, non-communist South Vietnam--set forth in NSAM 288, hinders effective inter-agency coordination and the integrated application of U. S. support efforts. As for the study's "highest priority" activities, PROVN reco mmended: (1) Combat Operations--the bulk of U.S. and FWMA Forces and designated RVNAF units should be directed against enemy base areas and against their lines of communication in SVN, Laos, and Cambodia as required; the remainder of Allied force assets must ensure adequate momentum to activity in priority Rural Constr uction areas. (2) Rural Construction--in general, the geographic priorities shou ld be, in order, the Delta, the Coastal Lowlands, and the Highlands; currently t he highest priority areas are the densely populated and rich resource Delta prov inces of An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh

Tuong, Go Cong, and the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon. (3) Economic Stability-current emphasis must be directed toward curbing inflation and reducing the exc essive demands for skilled and semiskilled labor imposed upon an overstrained ec onomy . . On the management of the United States effort--which PROVN found extre mely poor-the recommendation was to create a single manager system, with the Amb assador in charge of all assets in Vietnam and the mission of producing a single integrated plan. PROVN suggested major steps in the direction of giving the Amb assador a stronger hold over the military. Of greatest importance--aside from th e reorganizational suggestions--was the PROVN conclusion on the supremacy of Rur al Construction activities over everything else: Rural Construction must be desi gnated unequivocally as the major US/ GVN effort. It will require the commitment of a preponderance of RVNAF and GVN paramilitary forces, together with adequate U.S. support and coordination and assistance. Without question, village and ham let security must be achieved throughout Vietnam . . . RC is the principal means available to broaden the allied base, provide security, develop political and m ilitary leadership, and provide necessary social reform to the people To this en d, PROVN suggested a division of responsibility among the forces: The need to su stain security pervades every ramification of RC . . . The various forces capabl e of providing this environment must be unified....at the province level. They m ust include the ARVN as a major component--as many of its battle-tested units as can possibly be devoted to this mission. These integrated national security for ces must be associated and intermingled with the people on a long-term basis. Th eir capacity to establish and maintain public order and stability must be physic ally and continuously credible. The key to achieving such security lies in the c onduct of effective area saturation tactics, in and around populated areas, whic h deny VC encroachment opportunities. Finally, the study advocated a far stronge r system of leverage for American advisors in the field-"mechanisms for exerting U.S. influence must be built into the U.S. organization and its methods of oper ation." The PROVN study concluded with a massive "Blueprint for National Action" which was never implemented. But the influence of the study was substantial. Wi thin the Army staff, a responsible and select group of officers had recommended top priority for pacification. Even if the Army staff still rejected parts of th e study, they were on notice that a study had been produced within the staff whi ch suggested a substantial revision of priorities. The PROVN study had some majo r gaps. Proceeding from the unstated assumption that our commitment in Vietnam h ad no implicit time limits, it proposed a strategy which it admitted would take years--perhaps well into the 1970's--to carry out. It did not examine

alternative strategies that might be derived from a shorter time limit on the wa r. In fact, the report made no mention of one of the most crucial variables in t he Vietnam equation-U.S. public support for the Administration. Further, the rep ort did little to prove that Vietnam was ready for pacification. This "fact" was taken for granted, it seems--a fault common to most American-produced pacificat ion plans. While PROVN did suggest geographic priorities, they were derived not even in part from the area's receptivity to pacification but exclusively from th e location and strategic importance of the area. Thus, the same sort of error ma de in Hop Tac was being repeated in PROVN's suggestions. MACV analyzed the repor t in May of 1966, calling it "an excellent over-all approach in developing organ ization, concepts and policies . . ." In a lengthy analysis of PROVN, MACV cable d: As seen here, PROVN recommends two major initiatives essential to achieving U .S. objectives in South Vietnam: creation of an organization to integrate total U.S. civilmilitary effort, and exercise of greatly increased direct U.S. involve ment in GVN activities. MACV has long recognized need for the greatest possible unity of effort to gain U.S. objectives in South Vietnam. MACV agrees with PROVN concept to achieve full integration of effort in attaining U.S. objectives in S outh Vietnam. Evolution of U.S. organization in Saigon is heading towards this g oal. Deputy Ambassador now has charge of revolutionary and economic development programs and MACV is charged with military programs. In addition, special task f orce has been established by Deputy Ambassador to draft mission-wide statement o f strategy, objectives, and priorities. In effect, this task force is engaged in integrated planning which under PROVN concept would be performed by supra-agenc y staff. PROVN proposal for designation of a single manager with supra-staff is a quantum jump to achieve the necessary degree of militarycivil integration. Thi s final step cannot be implemented by evolutions here in Saigon. It would have t o be directed and supervised from highest level in Washington. MACV is in comple te agreement with PROVN position that immediate and substantially increased Unit ed States direct involvement in GVN activities in form of constructive influence and manipulation is essential to achievement of U.S. objectives in Vietnam. PRO VN emphasizes that "leverage must originate in terms of reference established by government agreement," and "leverage, in all its implications, must be understo od by the Vietnamese if it is to become an effective tool." The direct involveme nt and leverage envisioned by PROVN could range from skillful diplomatic pressur e to U.S. unilateral execution of critical programs. MACV considers that there i s a great danger that the extent of involvement envisioned could become too grea t. A government sensitive to its image as champion of national sovereignty profo undly affected by the pressure of militant minorities, and unsure of its tenure and legitimacy will resent too great involvement by U.S. Excessive U.S. involvem ent may defeat objectives of U.S. policy: development of free, independent non-c ommunist nation. PROVN properly recognizes that success can only be attained thr ough support of Vietnamese people, with support

coming from the grass roots up. Insensitive U.S. actions can easily defeat effor ts to accomplish this. U.S. manipulations could easily become an American takeov er justified by U.S. compulsion to "get the job done." Such tendencies must be r esisted. It must be realized that there are substantial difficulties and dangers inherent in implementing this or any similar program. Several important aspects of proven concept require comment, further consideration and resolution or emph asis. Some of the more significant are: Regarding U.S. organization, MACV consid ers that any major reorganization such as envisioned by PROVN must be phased and deliberate to avoid confusion and slow-down in ongoing programs.... There appea rs to be an overemphasis on military control in PROVN which may be undesirable. For instance, the study states that all senior U.S. representatives (SUSREPs) in itially will be U.S. military officers. This should not necessarily be stated po licy. The senior U.S. representative, particularly at province level, should be selected on basis of major tasks to be performed, program emphasis in a particul ar area and other local considerations. PROVN also limits U.S. single manager in volvement in military activities. If single manager concept of a fully integrate d civil-military effort is to be successful, military matters, such as roles and missions, force requirements, and deployments must be developed in full coordin ation and be integrated with civil aspects. PROVN proposal for enlarged U.S. org anization for revolutionary development, particularly at sector and sub-sector l evels, will require both military and civilian staff increases. It will necessit ate further civilian recruiting and increased military input. Present shortage o f qualified civilian personnel who desire duty in Vietnam must be considered. It may fall to the military, as it is now happening to some degree, to provide per sonnel not only for added military positions, but also for many of civilian func tions as well. Regardless of what U.S. might desire, however, our efforts to bri ng about new Vietnamese organizational structure must be tempered by continuous evaluation of the pressure such change places on Vietnamese leaders. Our goals c annot be achieved by Vietnamese leaders who are identified as U.S. puppets. The U.S. will must be asserted, but we cannot afford to overwhelm the structure we a re attempting to develop. Accordingly, MACV recommends that PROVN, reduced prima rily to a conceptual document, carrying forward the main thrusts and goals of th e study, be presented to National Security Council for use in developing concept s, policies, and actions to improve effectiveness of the American effort in Viet nam. The "Priorities Task Force"--This group was set up at Ambassador Porter's d irection in April 1966, following Komer's first trip to Vietnam, during which Ko mer had strongly urged that the Mission try to establish a set of interagency pr iorities. The actual work of this task force, which had full interagency represe ntation, was considered disappointing

by almost all its "consumers," particularly Komer, since it failed to come up wi th a final list of priorities from which the Mission and Washington could derive their programs. But it was by far the most ambitious task force the Mission had ever set up, and it provoked considerable thought in the Mission. Its introduct ory section was a rather gloomy assessment of the situation. As such, it was at variance with the then current assessment of the situation--but in retrospect, i t is of far greater interest than the recommendations themselves! After some 15 months of rapidly growing U.S. military and political commitment to offset a maj or enemy military effort, the RVN has been made secure against the danger of mil itary conquest, but at the same time it has been subjected to a series of stress es which threaten to thwart U.S. policy objectives.... The enemy now has a broad span of capability for interfering with progress toward achievement of U.S. obj ectives. He can simultaneously operate offensively through employment of guerril la and organized forces at widely separated points throughout the country, thus tying down friendly forces, while concentrating rehearsed surprise attacks in mu lti-battalion or even multi-regimental strength. . . . The war will probably inc rease in intensity over the planning period (two years) though decisive military victory for either side is not likely. Guerrilla activity will make much of the countryside insecure. More of the rural population will be directly affected, a nd the number of refugees and civilian casualties on both sides seem bound to ri se.... Reasons for lack of success of the overall pacification program-including all the stages from clear and secure operations to sustaining local governmentwere varied. First, the primary hindrance to pacification was the low level of a rea security given active Viet Cong opposition. Second, political instability pr evented continuing and coherent GVN direction and support of any pacification pr ogram. Third, pacification execution has been almost wholly Vietnamese and can b e supported only indirectly by the U.S. This has made it less susceptible to Ame rican influence and more subject to political pressures and the weaknesses of Vi etnamese administration and motivation. Fourth, no pacification concept since th e strategic hamlet program has been sufficiently clear in definition to provide meaningful and consistent operational guidance to those executing the program. F ifth, given the pressure for success and the difficulty of measuring progress th e execution of pacification failed to emphasize the political, social and psycho logical aspects of organizing the people and thus eliciting their active coopera tion. The material aspects, being both visible and less difficult to implement, have received too much attention. Sixth, there was an absence of agreed, definit ely stated pacification roles and missions not only within the GVN and the U.S. Mission but also between the GVN and the U.S. Mission. This absence caused proli feration of various armed and unarmed elements not clearly related to each other . Seventh, a quantitative and qualitative lack of trained and motivated manpower to carry out pacification existed. In addition, insufficient emphasis has been given to training and orientation of local officials associated with the pacific ation program. Eighth, lack of a well defined organizational

structure in the U.S. Mission created some confusion and conflicting direction o f the pacification effort.... During 1965, military plans were developed to supp ort revolutionary development; national priority areas were selected where speci al emphasis would be placed on revolutionary development, and a structure was es tablished by the GVN extending an organizational framework for revolutionary dev elopment from national to district levels. Meanwhile, the U.S. Mission has begun action to centralize direction for revolutionary development to ensure coordina tion of all Mission activities in support of revolutionary development. A new ap proach was also taken in 1965 to bring coherence to the use of cadre in the paci fication process. Drawing on a concept of armed political action teams, whose re lative success locally was at least partly owing to direct U.S. sponsorship and control, a combined cadre team approach was developed. A new organization, the R evolutional Development Cadre, was established, which brought together and repla ced a number of disparate cadre organizations. The combined cadre team approach includes armed units and special skills of relating to and assisting the people. The combined teams form the basis of the present pacification program. While th ese measures have helped to alleviate some of the problem areas which previously frustrated pacification efforts, some areas of major concern remain: First area security where Revolutionary Development is being initiated is not always adequ ate because of manpower problems; second, continued existence of various overlap ping security forces furtherreduces effectiveness; third, approved pacification concepts, roles, and missions agreed to by the U.S. and the GVN are lacking; fou rth, the effectiveness of the new RD cadre teams remain to be tested and evaluat ed; fifth, extensive training of local and other officials associated with RD st ill must be accomplished; sixth, emphasis on rapid expansion and the desire for immediate visible and statistical progress would operate against lasting results ; and, seventh, organizational development and functioning on both the GVN and U .S. sides are as yet incomplete. *** The situation described above suggests that the course of events in Vietnam during the next two years will be significantly influenced by the following principal current trends. The war can be expected t o increase in intensity, but decisive military victory should not be expected. I t will be basically a war of attrition. Troop casualties should increase on both sides, and civilian casualties and refugees as well. The enemy can, if he choos es, increase still further the rate of his semi-covert invasion and the level of combat. The enemy will continue to build up his forces through infiltration fro m NVN and recruitment for main force VC units in SVN to achieve a favorable rela tionship of forces.

At the same time, he will continue to reinforce his capabilities for political a ction in the urban areas, to exploit anticipated future political disturbbances, to increase his terrorist acts in the cities, and to isolate the urban populati on from the countryside. GVN control of the countryside is not now being extende d through pacification to any significant degree and pacification in the rural a reas cannot be expected to proceed at a rapid rate. A new approach to pacificati on has been developed, but it is too early to judge its effectiveness. In additi on, important problems requiring resolution remain.... The Vietnamese will conti nue to face grave problems in creating an effective system of government. Under present conditions we cannot realistically expect a strong GVN to emerge over th e planning period, nor can we expect political unity or a broadening of the base of popular support. The increased American presence, rising inflation and an im age of considerable corruption are issues which will be increasingly exploited b y unfriendly and opportunistic elements. U.S. influence on political events cont inues to be limited while our responsibility for Vietnam's future is increasing. The Task Force divided all activities in Vietnam into categories of imporportan ce, and assigned them priorities in groups. Unfortunately, the divisions were ei ther too vague to be useful, or else they designated specific activities, such a s agriculture, to such a low position that Washington found the selection unacce ptable. In its first rank of importance the Task Force placed: 1. Those activiti es designed to prepare a sound pacification program primarily through strengthen ing the human resources element of pacification, and through coordinated plannin g.... 2. Those activities which draw strength away from the enemy and add to GVN 's strength and image of concern for all its citizens..... 3. Those psychologica l activities that support the war effort.... 4. Those activities that persuade t he people that RVNAF is wholly on the side of the people and acting in their int erests down through: 16. Those activities which develop the leadership and organ ization of non-governmental institutions, particularly youth groups.... It was s carcely a list from which one could assemble a coherent program. Moreover, the a bove list of 16 "highest priority" tasks, was followed by a group of ten "high p riority" tasks--including strengthening provincial governments, autonomous munic ipal governments, better budgetary procedures, better refugee programs, minority programs, and so on. These, in turn, were followed by a nine-point list of "hig h priority programs." Into at least one of the 35 highest, high, or just plain p riority activities, one could fit every program and project then being pursued i n Vietnam. Furthermore, the proposal seemed to confuse inputs and outputs, placi ng in the same category "wishes" like "minimizing the adverse impact of and expl oiting the opportunities provided by the American

presence" (which was only "high priority") with "programs" like "creating a soun d base for agricultural development." The Priorities Task Force recommendations were used, unlike those of PROVN. In the FY 67 Country Assistance Program (CAP), submitted by AID to Congress that fall, the Task Force Strategy statement was u sed as a foreward, with Ambassador Lodge's approval. Moreover, the concept of pr iorities outlined in the final paper was applied to the AID program in Vietnam, with each activity being placed in one of the categories of priority. This did n ot result, however, in the original objective of reducing the size of the progra m and focusing it: instead, the AID program more than doubled in 1967, and a yea r later people were still complaining about the lack of clear-cut priorities. (A s a matter of fact, when Deputy Ambassador Eugene Locke returned to Washington i n September of 1967 with a "Blueprint for Vietnam," he was told that it lacked a ny sense of priorities, and was too much of a "shopping list.") The "Roles and M issions" Study Group--One of the Priority Task Force recommendations was that th e Mission should establish another group to examine the question of the proper r ole of each military and paramilitary and police and civilian force in the count ry. This group was set up, under the chairmanship of Colonel George Jacobson in July of 1966, and submitted its final report to the Mission Council on August 24 . The group was once again interagency, and it produced a paper of considerable value--indeed, a paper which could well have served as a basic policy document f or the Mission and Washington. The Study Group made 81 recommendations, of which 66 were acceptable to all agencies of the Mission. But even these 66 were not i mmediately adopted as basic doctrine. Because of inertia and weariness, rather t han deliberate sabotage, the recommendations were never treated as basic policy, and simply were carried out or not depending on the drive and desire of the ind ividual officials associated with each individual recommendation. The report beg an, as almost all Vietnam studies seem to, with a definition: Revolutionary Deve lopment consists of those military designed to liberate the population of South Vietnam coercion; to restore public security; to initiate economic and civil eff orts from communist and political development; to extend effective GVN authority throughout SVN; and to win the willing support of the people to these ends. Fro m there it developed the most logical and coherent approach to returning an area to GVN control and then gaining its support that had yet been produced by a gro up in either the Mission or Washington. The report was hailed by Porter, by Kome r, and by various mid-level officials. Jacobson himself was to be named Mission Coordinator four months later, a position from which he could present his ideas directly to the Ambassadors. While, as mentioned above, the recommendations were never issued as Mission policy in a group, many of them found their way into th e main stream of the Mission through other

means. Some of the more controversial ones--for example: "that Division be remov ed from the RD Chain of Comand"--remained as potent ideas to be discussed within the government and with the Vietnamese, and to be acted on slowly. Since the re port foreshadowed several major developments in pacification, and since it still has today an intrinsic value of its own, it is worth quoting some of its major points: High hopes are now pinned on the RD cadre, as the critical element of su ccess in RD. Unfortunately, there is a real danger it is being regarded as a pan acea with curative powers it does not, of and by itself, possess. The introducti on of RD Cadre cannot alone achieve success in any of the tasks discussed above. Even cadre such as may be available in six months....cannot compensate for the current failings and limitations of other fundamental elements bearing directly on the RD process. ....RD demands for its success radical reform within the GVN including its Armed Forces. This reform must start at the top . . . These radica l changes in the GVN and RVNAF seem most unlikely to occur without a strong, foc used and coordinated exertion of U.S. influence at high levels.... RECOMMEND:--T hat FWMAF give increased emphasis to improving the performance and conduct of GV N military forces through combined operations.... --That as the increase in FWMA F strength permits, these forces engage with RVNAF in clearing operations in sup port of RD with the primary objective of improving the associated GVN forces.... --That in view of the deployment and capabilities of FWMAF in Vietnam and recog nizing the necessity for increased security support to RD, the bulk of ARVN Divi sional combat battalions be assigned to Sector commanders with only those Divisi onal battalions not so assigned to be under the control of Divisions.... --That the Division be removed from the RD chain of command.... --That Ranger units bec ause of their frequently intolerable conduct toward the populace, be disbanded w ith individual Rangers reassigned....* * This was a recommendation which MACV particularly opposed, arguing that it "wo uld seriously reduce ARVN combat strength." Westmoreland added that he could not countenance the disbanding of units which had just received a Presidential Unit Citation. --That RF and PF become Provincial and stabulary be placed under the Ministry Branch) assume primary responsibility ture".... --That Police Field Force be hat the Vietnamese Information Service re District Constabulary..... --That the Con of RD.... --That National Police (Special for the destruction of the VC "infrastruc integrated into the Constabulary..... --T (VIS) terminate its rural information cad

operations and assume a supporting role . . . for RD Cadre, technical cadre, and hamlet officials .... And so on. What lay behind each recommendation was an eff ort to unify the various GVN agencies and ministries working on pacification, st reamline their operations, and, at the same time, increase U.S. influence over t hose operations. While many items the Study Group recommended have still not bee n carried out, there has been growing acceptance of the bulk of the recommendati ons. In its initial reaction to the paper, MACV's Chief of Staff wrote to Ambass ador Lodge "that many actions have been taken or are being considered by MACV wh ich support and complement the overall objectives envisioned by the report. Ther e are, however, certain recommendations with which we do not agree." The most im portant reservation that MACV had, concerned the allocation of resources for the RD effort: We are confronted with a determined, well-organized force operating in regimental and division strength. As long as this situation exists, it is imp erative that the regular military forces retain first priority for the available manpower. Once the threat of the enemy's regular forces has diminished and the defeat of external aggression is accomplished, then other programs should have t he first priority for recruiting . In addition, MACV opposed the removal of Divi sion from the RD chain of command; suggested a further task force to examine the Constabulary issue in detail; and opposed the suggestion that Special Branch Po lice--which meant on the American side the CIA-take over the anti-infrastructure effort. (On this latter point, the issue was finally resolved by an ingenious c ompromise structure under Westmoreland and Komer called ICEX-Intelligence Coordi nation and Exploitation--in July 1967.) Finally, Westmoreland rejected any inter nal changes in the MACV structure, as suggested by the Study Group. These had in cluded: --the establishment at MACV Division advisory level of a Deputy Senior A dvisor for RD, at Corps a Deputy Senior Advisor for RD, and at COMUSMACV level a Deputy COMUSMACV for the entire MACV advisory effort and for RD..... --changes in the advisory rating system to emphasize the quality of the advice and the acc uracy of reports, rather than the performance of the organization/Vietnamese the y advise.... USAID reacted favorably to the study. In his memo to Lodge, the Act ing USAID Director said that the report "presents an antidote to our having been too indulgent with the GVN in the past to our peril and theirs." Once again, ho wever, as with MACV, USAID added some reservations--and the reservations all fel l in areas in which USAID would have the action responsibility if something was to be done. USAID feared that the report recommended steps that would give the M inistry of RD too much strength, reflecting the worry of their Public Safety Div ision. The Constabulary recommendations,

which had far-reaching implications, were given a particularly rough going-over. For example, to protect its own embryonic structure, the Police Field Force USA ID made the following comment on the recommendation that the PFF be integrated a s units into the Constabulary: USAID concurs with the reservation that PFF remai n a separate entity with its essential police powers. The CIA also thought the r eport was "constructive and helpful," but listed a few "disagreements." Once aga in, these pertained to those items in which the ICA had a strong vested interest . They opposed strenuously, for example, the suggestion that the MACV subsector advisor--the only American at the district level in almost every district--"be g iven primary responsibility for monitoring the activities of the cadre." Using t he argument that everything possible be done to retain the civilian nature of th e cadre, the CIA refused to let the MACV subsector advisors do what they were al ready doing in many cases. The CIA and MACV both opposed the suggestion that a s ingle Director of Intelligence be appointed to command civilian and military int elligence structures. The CIA said that this was "unwieldly and unworkable" beca use "this is not a theater of war." The Political Section of the Embassy also th ought the study was "valuable," but added that "it appears to neglect a number o f political considerations." Beyond that, they supported every specific suggesti on, while noting how hard it would be to carry some of them out. JUSPAO shared t he fears of USAID that the report would concentrate more power in the hands of t he Ministry of RD than it could usefully employ. JUSPAO thought that the Constab ulary should be created, therefore, but placed under the Ministry of Defense. JU SPAO also found the removal of the Division from the RD chain of command "hardly feasible or realistic at this juncture"--begging the issue of whether or not th e United States should seek this as a valuable objective. When the exercise was over, there were many in the Mission in Saigon who felt that the Study Group rec ommendations should have formed a blueprint for action throughout the Mission. T hey pointed out that almost all the recommendations were concurred in by every a gency, and that these could be carried out immediately. The remaining 15 which w ere still not imanimously accepted could then be discussed and perhaps resolved. In Washington, at least one high official, R. W. Komer, felt the same way, and urged the Mission to use the recommendations as policy. But somewhere between Au gust 24, when the paper was submitted, and the end of 1966, the paper was relega ted to the useful but distinctly secondary role of another "study group," as its name suggests. While everyone was complimentary about the paper, no machinery w as set up in Ambassador Porter's office to oversee the implementation of the rec ommendations. While the agencies said that they agreed with most of the recommen dations, the all-important decisions as to how

fast and how hard to push forward with each recommendation was left to whichever agency "had the action" on it. This in effect left some crucial decisions--the variables in our effort--outside the Deputy Ambassador's hands. He had no machin ery for checking to see what the agencies were doing to carry out the suggestion s they said they agreed with. He had virtually no staff to observe how the agenc ies were actually handling each problem, although it was obvious that success or failure on each item lay to a large extent in the method it was handled. Indeed , Porter had no good way to even find out whether the agencies really did accept the recommendations. He was reliant on a knowledgeable but small staff which co uld only meddle in the internal matters of other agencies to a limited degree. I t was these shortcomings in the new mandate to Porter that were becoming evident in the late summer of 1966, and pressure began to build in Washington for anoth er reorganization. The pressure and emphasis on pacification was also producing visible results in MACV. On August 8, 1966, the J-3 of MACV, Major General Tills on, briefed the Mission Council on how MACV intended to "give maximum support to RD." The briefing was general, simplistic, and shallow, but it was a clear indi cation that General Westmoreland and MACV were beginning to respond to the press ure from outside their command that they should give RD more support. As such, i t marked a major step for MACV. Tillson said that "military operations must be u sed to assure the security necessary for RD to begin. All military operations ar e designed towards this goal...." He then went on to trace the degree to which c riticism of ARVN was justified, and examine the suggestion that ARVN be re-orien ted to support RD- something which was to become part of the Manila communique o nly two months later: The ARVN has been at war continuously for a period of over ten years.... The fact that ARVN today even exists as an organized fighting for ce is a tribute to its stamina and morale. Since its inception, ARVN has been or iented, trained, and led towards the task of offensive operations . . . It is di fficult, in a short period of time, to redirect the motivation and training of y ears, and to offset the long indoctrination that offensive action against the VC is the reason for the existence of the Army.... In the 1967 campaign plan, we p ropose to assign ARVN the primary mission of providing direct support to RD and US/FW Forces the primary mission of destroying VC/ NVA main forces and base area s. Agreement has been reached between General Westmoreland and General Vien that , in I, II and III Corps areas, ARVN will devote at least 50% of its effort dire ctly in support of the RD program. In IV Corps, where there are no U.S. forces, it was agreed that ARVN might have to devote up to 75% of its effort to offensiv e operations....

[General Vien has issued a directive that] flatly states that, while some progre ss has been made, desired results are still lacking on RD. It emphasizes that RD efforts must be on a par with efforts to destroy the enemy....These directives of General Vien resulted from his conversations with General Westmoreland . . . [Emphasis Added] This was by far the strongest verbal support that MACV had ever given pacification, and it actually contained the kernel which developed into t he important passage in the Manila communique that committed the RVNAF to suppor t of RD. The change in mood in Saigon among the Americans was reflected by Ambas sador Lodge in his Weekly NODIS to the President. On August 31, 1966, he began h is cable with: The biggest recent American event affecting Vietnam was giving pa cification the highest priority which it has ever had-making it, in effect, the main purpose of all our activities.... The above was brought about in several wa ys-by word in General Westmoreland's "Concept of Military Operations in South Vi etnam" of August 24, and by the deeds of the U.S. 1st and 25th Divisions and the III MAF. There has also been the new MACV proposal to revamp ARVN and turn it i nto a force better suited to pacification. Also at a special meeting of the Miss ion Council a stimulating paper was presented by the "Interagency Roles and Miss ion Study Group" which would take RF and PF, now a part of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, make them into a "constabulary" and call it that. Police Field Force wou ld also be included in the Constabulary under this concept. A week earlier, West moreland had sent forward to CINCPAC and JCS a broad strategy statement for the coming year. He saw the time as "appropriate in light of the fact that we are on the threshold of a new phase in the conflict resulting from recent battlefield successes and from the continuing FWMAF buildup." After reviewing the course of battle since the introduction of U.S. troops, Westmoreland projected his strateg y over the period until May 1, 1967, as "a general offensive with maximum practi cal support to area and population security in further support of RD." He then a dded: The growing strength of US/FW Forces will provide the shield and will perm it ARVN to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to di rect support of RD. Also, I visualize that a significant number of US/FW maneuve r battalions will be committed to tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) missio ns. These missions encompass base security and at the same time support RD by sp reading security radially from the bases to protect more of the population.... T he priority effort of AR\TN forces will be in direct support of the RD program; in many instances the province chief will exercise operational control over thes e units . . . This fact notwithstanding, the ARVN division structure must be mai ntained.... This long message, with its "new look" emphasis on pacification, was sent apparently not for CINCPAC's routine consideration, as would be the normal case in the military chain of command, but for the edification of high-ranking civilian leaders in Washington. It

ended with a comment added by Ambassador Lodge--an unusual procedure in a milita ry message: I wish to stress my agreement with the attention paid in this messag e to the importance of military support for RD. After all, the main purpose of d efeating the enemy through offensive operations against the main forces and base s must be to provide the opportunity through RD to get at the heart of the matte r, which is the population of SVN. The new emphasis on RD/pacification was thus coming from many sources in the late summer of 1966. Porter and Komer, pushing t he civilians harder than they had ever been pushed before, had not only improved their performance, but also to create pressures inside MACV for greater emphasi s on RD. Westmoreland, responding to the pressure, and finding the VC/NVA increa singly reluctant to give battle, was planning a twopronged strategy for late 196 6- early 1967: attack and destroy enemy base areas, and use more forces to prote ct and build up and expand the GVN population centers. D. THE SINGLE MANAGER By the late summer of 1966, as has been shown in detail in the preceding sections, the flaws in the structure of the U.S. Mission had been openly criticized in stu dies or reports by the U.S. Army Staff (in PROVN), by the Priorities Task Force and by the Roles and Missions Study Group in Saigon, by Robert Komer in repeated memoranda, and by various other visitors and observers. In addition to the writ ten record, there were undoubtedly numerous private comments being made both in Saigon and Washington, some of which were reaching senior officials of the gover nment. The options before the USG were, in broad outline, fourfold. The Mission could either remain unchanged, or else it could reorganize along one of the thre e general lines which Komer had outlined in his August 7, 1966 memorandum: Alter native One--Put Porter in charge of all advisory and pacification activities, in cluding the military; Alternative Two--Unify the civilian agencies into a single civilian chain of command, and strengthen the military internally-but leave civ ilian and military separate; Alternative Three--Assign responsibility for pacifi cation to Westmoreland and MACV, and put the civilians in the field under his co mmand. The Mission, as usual, argued for leaving the structure the way it was. T heir arguments in this direction were unfortunate, because in Washington the moo d was certainly in favor of some further changes, and by resisting all suggestio ns uniformly, the Mission was simply causing friction with Washington and reduci ng influence on the ultimate decisions. The issue was joined more rapidly than a nyone in Saigon had expected, because in midSeptember, 1966, the Secretary of De fense weighed in on the issue in a direct way,

producing a Draft Presidential Memorandum which advocated handing over responsib ility for pacification to COMUSMACV. McNamara's draft said: Now that a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam seems to have been thwarted by our emergency actions t aken over the past 18 months, renewed attention should be paid to the longer-run aspects of achieving an end to the war and building a viable nation in South Vi etnam. Central to success, both in ending the war and in winning the peace, is t he pacification program. Past progress in pacification has been negligible. Many factors have contributed, but one major reason for this lack of progress had be en the existence of split responsibility for pacification on the U.S. side. For the sake of efficiency-in clarifying our concept, focusing our energies, and inc reasing the output we can generate on the part of the Vietnamese-this split resp onsibility on the U.S. side must be eliminated. We have considered various alter native methods of consolidating the U.S. pacification effort. The best solution is to place those activities which are primarily part of the pacification progra m, and all persons engaged in such activities, under COMUSMACV . . . In essence, the reorganization would result in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacificalion who would be in command of all pacification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification activities in the field. It is recognized that there are many important aspects of the pacification problem which are not covered in this reco mmendation, which should be reviewed subsequent to the appointment of the Deputy COMASMACV for Pacification to determine whether they should be part of his task -for example, the psychological warfare campaign, and the Chieu Hoi and refugee programs. Equally important, is the question of how to encourage a similar manag ement realignment of the South Vietnamese side, since pacification is regarded a s primarily a Vietnamese task. Also not covered by this recommendation are impor tant related national programs . . . Finally, there is the question of whether a ny organizational modification in Washington is required by the recommended chan ge in Vietnam. I recommend that you approve the reorganization described in this memorandum as a first essential step toward giving a new thrust to pacification . Under Secretary Ball, Administrator Gaud, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director Helms, Director Marks, and Mr. Komer concur in this recommendation. This memoran dum was apparently never sent to the President, but it was distributed, with a r equest for comments and concurrence, to Ball (Rusk being out of the country), Ga ud, the JCS, Helms, Marks, and Komer. Only Komer and the JCS concurred, with the others producing alternate suggestions. The entire question was handled as an " EYES ONLY" matter.

The positions that were taken were: State opposed the recommendation. In informa l discussions with Komer, Alexis Johnson cited the failure of Hop Tac (which see ms irrelevant), the "optics" of militarizing the effort, and the need to check w ith Lodge as reasons against actions. AID agreed that the present program had it s faults, but resisted the idea of a MACV takeover. Instead, they proposed a com plex system of committees and deputies for RD, who would report to a Deputy Amba ssador for Pacification. The JCS found that the proposal "provides an excellent rationale for an approach to the problem of appropriately integrating the civil and military effort in the important field of pacification" and concurred in the idea of a Deputy COMUSMACV for RD. CIA and USIA both opposed the reorganization , although their written comments are not in the files. Komer weighed in with a lengthy rationale supporting the idea. Although he may not have known it at the time, he was talking about the organizational structure he was going to fit into later. After agreeing that the need to get pacification moving was great, and t hat "the military are much better set up to manage a huge pacification effort," he said that 60-70% of "real job of pacification is providing local security. Th is can only be done by the military...."Komer then raised some additional points : 1. The Ambassador should remain in overall charge. 2. MACV should not assume r esponsibility for everything, only the high payoff warrelated activities. 3. Log istic support should remain a multi-agency responsibility. As the discussions on the subject continued, Deputy Ambassador Porter arrived in the United States fo r a combined business-personal trip. When he found out what was being considered , he immediately made strong representations to McNamara, Komer, and Rusk. He al so sent a personal cable back to Lodge, alerting him for the first time to what was afoot in Washington: Principal topic under discussion here is DOD proposal t o bring both U.S. military and U.S. civilian resources needed to advance RD prog ram under direction of Deputy COMUSMACV. This plan will be discussed with you du ring McNamara visit. It would detach all civilian field operations from direct c ontrol of Saigon civilian agencies and would place them under Deputy COMUSMACV f or RD. In addition to controlling civilian field resources, latter would also ma nage U.S. military resources with view to increasing their effectiveness in furt hering RD programs. Deputy COMUSMACV would be responsible to Ambassador or Deput y Ambassador through COMUSMACV. This at least is my understanding of proposal wh ich is being strongly pushed here. I have taken position that this proposal and certain counter proposals put forward by civilian agencies here require careful field study. In its existing form, as I understand it, it does not take into acc ount the fact that militarization of our approach to this important civilian pro gram runs counter to our aim of de-militarizing GVN through constitutional elect oral process....

I have been stressing here that our military are already heavily loaded with res ponsibility for achieving military measures required to further civilian RD prog rams, such as evoking adequate cooperation from RVN....I have emphasized need fo r MACV to grapple with problem of VC guerrilla activity during night, as distinc t from main force activity during daytime which we now know can be dealt with. T hese areas would appear to offer great possibilities for application of military talent and I repeat that in my view question of burdening MACV further with com plex programs (cadre, police, etc.) requires careful field study which I would h ave done promptly, if you agree, by group similar to that which carried out "Rol es and Missions" study. This was the background as Secretary McNamara, Under Sec retary Katzenbach, General Wheeler, and Mr. Komer went to Saigon in October. The issue had been deferred, and when the visitors returned, they would make recomm endations to the President. Katzenbach, making his first trip as Under Secretary , was requested to look at the problem with a new eye and no prior prejudices. W hen they came back from Saigon, Katzenbach and McNamara both sent the President an important memorandum. Katzenbach argued for a strengthening of Ambassador Por ter's role, and a deferral of the question of turning the RD effort over to MACV . McNamara concurred, but with a different emphasis. The memorandums were dated October 14 and 15, 1966, less than two weeks before the Manila conference, and t he recommendations were accepted by the President. Katzenbach's memorandum was, for a first effort after a short VIP trip, an unusually interesting one. Excerpt s: ....I believe decisive, effective RD depends on a clear and precise common un derstanding of the security as we all recognize to be the foundation of success in the "other war." To illustrate the divergency of meanings, let me report brie fly on a conversation I had with a small group of reporters in Saigon. It quickl y degenerated into a debate, not between the reporters and me, but between Ward Just of the Washington Post and Charles Mohr of the New York Times. Just argued heatedly that RD could not begin to be effective unless security were first guar anteed both to the peasants and to RD workers. "An AID man cannot do his job," h e said, "while being shot at by the VC." Mohr responded just as heatedly, that s ecurity could not come first--because security from guerrillas is meaningless an d impossible until the peasant population is motivated to support the GVN and de prive the guerrillas of havens, secrecy, and resources. Obviously, the easy answ er to this circular chicken-egg debate is to say that both are necessary--milita ry protection and public motivation against the VC. And yet even that answer is incomplete for it defines security only in the American frame of reference

I know of no one who believes we have begun effectively to achieve the goal of g aining the population's active support, despite a series of pacification program s and despite even the budding early efforts of Ambassador Porter's new program. The Military Aspect. Secretary McNamara, Mr. Komer, Ambassadors Johnson, Lodge, and Porter, Mr. Gaud, I, and all others who have approached the problem are per fectly agreed that the military aspect of RD has been spindly and weak. *** This probably is the result of the entirely understandable preoccupation by MACV in recent months with the main force military emergency. However justifiable this h as been, a major effect has nonetheless been our failure effectively to press RV NAF to even start meeting their crucial RD responsibilities. (I know of no one w ho believes that these should be met principally by American forces-unless we sh ould wish the whole RD effort to collapse once we leave.) The Civil Aspect. Simi larly, the work of civilian agencies has fallen short-largely, but not only beca use of the failure of RVNAF to provide a military screen behind which to work... . Rather than engage in a civil-military debate, I think we should devote our ef forts toward trying to devise an administrative structure that capitalizes on th e assets each agency can offer to RD. What should be the elements of an ideal or ganization? 1. It should have maximum leverage on RVNAF to engage in clear and h old operations in direct support of RDM efforts. 2. It should have a single Amer ican "negative," anti-VC channel--that is a single commander for all action agai nst communist guerrilla forces. This commander would calibrate and choose among the various force alternatives--depending on whether he believed the need to be military, para-military, or police. This command would include complete responsi bility for all anti-VC intelligence--that is, concerning all VC suspects either in the infrastructure or in guerrilla units. 3. It should have a single, unified channel for all "positive" pro-people aspects of RD, irrespective of the presen t lines of command within civilian agencies, allowing a single commander to cali brate and assign priorities to relevant positive programs on behalf of the peasa ntry. This, too, would include the immediate expansion of and control over all " pro-people" intelligence--that is, detailed district-by-district and province-by -province reporting on the particular gains most wanted by the populace (land re form, for example, in one province; or schools in another; or agricultural assis tance in another).

4. Sensitivity to political inputs and wise political guidance of the whole proc ess are needed to ensure that military programs support rather than negate effor ts to win public support and participation. Failure to assure this---which chara cterized French efforts in Indochina and Algeria, in contrast to civil-led, succ essful, British efforts in Malaya and the Filipino campaign against the Huks-mea ns that the very process of gaining security would be weakened and prolonged, at increased cost in Vietnamese and American lives. Thus, overall civilian command of the RD program is needed for fundamental practical reasons, by no means for considerations of international image alone (though on the latter point, it must be observed that as soon as we put "the other war" under obvious military contr ol, it stops being the other war). In particular, it is important not to block o r reverse--by the way we organize our efforts--the current genuinely hopeful Vie tnamese trend toward increased civilian influence and participation in governmen t. In short, it is not the precise form of organization or the precise choice of flow chart that is important. What is important is: 1. An immediate and effecti ve military screen for RD efforts; and 2. Authoritative and compelling administr ation of the efforts of civilian agencies. I believe we can institute effective administration of the RD program--which Ambassador Lodge has aptly described as the heart of the matter--achieving all of these ideals: 1. Maintain the effect a nd the appearance of civilian control by immediately assigning overall supervisi on of all RD activities to Ambassador Porter (and assigning a second deputy to A mbassador Lodge to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Amba ssador Porter). 2. That the several civilian lines of command within agencies be consolidated into one. Thus, USAID, JUSPAO, USA, and the Embassy personnel assi gned to RD all would continue under the nominal administrative control of their respective agencies but full, unified operational control would rest solely with Ambassador Porter. 3. That Ambassador Porter's authority be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the RD team, including: --relocation of personnel ; --the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities; --and the apportionment of the funds allocated by each agency to Viet-Nam, bounded only b y statutory limitations. 4. That MACV immediately give highest-level command foc us and consolidation to its RD concerns and staff, now that it is no longer so c ompletely distracted from RD by the compelling requirements of main force combat . This would be organized around the thesis that the central need is the most ef fective persuasive power or leverage on RVNAF. This thesis is strengthened subst antially by:

--The firm intent, expressed to us in Saigon last week, of President Thieu and P rime Minister Ky to shift ARVN infantry to revolutionary development work starti ng in January; --The enhanced powers they intend to give to General Thang, alrea dy an able chief of RD for GVN. 5. That the MACV effort embrace at least advisor y control over all levels of forcestarting with ARVN but also including RF, PF, CIDG, and the para-military operations of the RD cadre, PFF, and PRV. These step s would greatly strengthen both the military and civil lines of command. They wo uld contribute significantly to the success of RD. But not even these changes wo uld be decisive without a strong link between them. The civil side requires the capacity to influence military movement which no organizational chart can provid e. The MACV side requires the political and substantive expertise which a milita ry organization does not--and is not expected to--possess. Thus the fundamental recommendation I would make is: 6. To appoint, as principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, a general of the highest possible ability and sta ture--of two, three or even four-star rank. To do so would win the following adv antages: a. Compelling indication of the seriousness with which the Administrati on regards RD. b. The rank, and stature to insure optimum RD performance from MA CV. c. The rank and stature to afford maximum impact on GVN military leaders and capacity to persuade them properly to prod RVNAF when necessary. d. Demonstrate d command administrative capacities with which to assist Ambassador Porter, whil e bridging the inevitable institutional difficulties that might well otherwise d evelop from one arm of MACV's taking orders from a civilian. e. A solution to th e military control image problem, by which the advantages of close military supp ort would be veiled by civilian control. f. The capacity and position to formula te an effective qualitative plan encompassing both military and civil realities. Previous plans have focused on numbers of provinces, volume of RD cadre trained , and so on. They have put an unrealistic premium on quantitative, "statistical" success. Meaningful criteria, however, must be qualitative. I would envision su ch a qualitative plan intended to cover at least the next 12 months. There would be an additional prospective advantage as well. If it should later be found tha t dual lines of authority--even given this strong link--are not successful, then we could more readily fall back to a unitary, military command structure-with t he new RD general taking charge. He would have the benefit, in that situation, o f having been under civilian control and his relationship to RD would already be evident, making the change to military control less abrupt and less susceptible to criticism.

Secretary McNamara's memorandum--sent the day before Katzenbach's--was of greate r importance, and stands out as one of the most far-reaching and thoughtful docu ments in the files. While this study concentrates on pacification, it is necessa ry to view McNamara's remarks about pacification in this memorandum within the c ontext of the entire paper. He said that the military situation had gone "somewh at better" than he had anticipated a year earlier, and that "we have by and larg e blunted the communist military initiative." But he found little cause for hope that the overall situation would turn dramatically in our favor within the next two years. "I see no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon," he said, and described the enemy strategy as one of "keeping us busy and waiting us out ( a strategy of attriting our national will) ." Pacification is a basic disappoint ment. We have good grounds to be pleased by the recent elections, by Ky's 16 mon ths in power, and by the faint signs of development of national political instit utions and of a legitimate civil government. But none of this has translated its elf into political achievements at Province level or below. Pacification has, if anything, gone backward.... Thus, the Secretary found us "no better, and if any thing worse off-from the point of view of the important war (for the complicity of the people) ." He did not think at that time that major increases in U.S. for ce levels or bombing programs would make a big difference in the short run. Rath er, he suggested a series of actions designed to emphasize to Hanoi that we were setting definite limits on the cost in men and money of the war, while settling down for the long haul-"a posture that makes trying to 'wait us out' less attra ctive." His strategy was "five-pronged." First, he suggested that we stabilize U .S. force levels in Vietnam, "barring a dramatic change in the war." The limit h e proposed was the 470,000 total then under consideration. (CINCPAC had requeste d 570,000 by end 1967). This limit would "put us in a position where negotiation s would be more likely to be productive, but if they were not we could pursue th e all-important pacification task with proper attention and resources and withou t the spectre of apparently endless escalation of U.S. deployments." Second, he recommended a barrier near the DMZ and "across the trails of Laos." Third, he su ggested that we "stabilize the Rolling Thunder program against the North." He th us recommended against the increase in the level of bombing and the broader targ et systems that the JCS was then requesting. Again, his reason was to "remove th e prospect of ever-escalating bombing as a factor complicating our political pos ture and distracting from the main job of pacification in South Vietnam." Fourth , he said, we should "pursue a vigorous pacification program."

The large-unit operations war, which we know best how to fight and where we have had our successes, is largely irrelevant to pacification as long as we do not l ose it. By and large, the people in rural areas believe that the GVN when it com es will not stay but that the VC will; that cooperation with the GVN will be pun ished by the VC; that the GVN is really indifferent to the people's welfare; tha t the low-level GVN are tools of the local rich; and that the GVN is ridden with corruption. Success in pacification depends on the interrelated functions of pr oviding physical security, destroying the VC apparatus, motivating the people to cooperate, and establishing responsive local government. An obviously necessary but not sufficient requirement for success of the RD cadre and police is vigoro usly conducted and adequately prolonged clearing operations by military troops w ho will "stay" in the area, who behave themselves decently and who show respect for the people. This elemental requirement of pacification has been missing. In almost no contested area designated for pacification in recent years have ARVN f orces actually "cleared and stayed" to a point where cadre teams, if available, could have stayed overnight in hamlets and survived, let alone accomplish their mission.... Now that the threat of a communist main-force military victory has b een thwarted by our emergency efforts, we must allocate far more attention and a portion of the regular military forces (at least half of ARVN and perhaps a por tion of the U.S. forces) to the task of providing an active and permanent securi ty system behind which the RD teams and police can operate and behind which the political struggle with the VC infrastructure can take place. The U.S. cannot do this pacification security job for the Vietnamese. All we can do is "massage th e heart." For one reason, it is known that we do not intend to stay; if our effo rts worked at all, it would merely postpone the eventual confrontation of the VC and GVN infrastructures. The GVN must do the job, and I am convinced that drast ic reform is needed if the GVN is going to be able to do it. The first essential reform is in the attitude of GVN officials. They are generally apathetic, and t here is corruption high and low. Often appointments, promotions, and draft defer ments must be bought; and kickbacks on salaries are common. Cadre at the bottom can be no better than the system above them. The second needed reform is in the attitude and conduct of the ARVN. The image of the government cannot improve unl ess and until the ARVN improves markedly. They do not understand the importance (or respectability) of pacification nor the importance to pacification of proper , disciplined conduct. Promotions, assignments and awards are often not made on merit, but rather on the basis of having a diploma, friends, or relatives, or be cause of bribery. The ARVN is weak in dedication, direction and discipline. Not enough ARVN are devoted to area and population security, and when the ARVN does attempt to support pacification, their actions do not last long enough; their ta ctics

are bad despite U.S. prodding (no aggressive small-unit saturation patrolling, h amlet searches, quick-reaction contact, or offensive night ambushes); they do no t make good use of intelligence; and their leadership and discipline are bad. Fu rthermore, it is my conviction that a part of the problem undoubtedly lies in ba d management on the American as well as the GVN side. Here split responsibility-or "no responsibility"--has resulted in too little hard pressure on the GVN to do its job and no really solid or realistic planning with respect to the whole e ffort. We must deal with this management problem now and deal with it effectivel y. One solution would be to consolidate all U.S. activities which are primarily part of the civilian pacification program and all persons engaged in such activi ties, providing a clear assignment of responsibility and a unified command under a civilian relieved of all other duties. (If this task is assigned to Ambassado r Porter, another individual must be sent immediately to Saigon to serve as Amba ssador Lodge's deputy.) Under this approach, there would be a carefully delineat ed division of responsibility between the civilian-incharge and an element of CO MUSMACV under a senior officer, who would give the subject of planning for and p roviding hamlet security the highest priority in attention and resources. Succes s will depend on the men selected for the jobs on both sides (they must be among the highest rank and most competent administrators in the U.S. Government), on complete cooperation among the U.S. elements, and on the extent to which the Sou th Vietnamese can be shocked out of their present pattern of behavior. The first work of this reorganized U.S. pacification organization should be to produce wi thin 60 days a realistic and detailed plan for the coming year. From the politic al and public-relations viewpoint, this solution is preferable--if it works. But we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails after a fair trial, the only alternative in my view is to place the entire pacification program-civilian and military-under General Westmoreland. This alternative would result in the establ ishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would be in command of all pa cification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification staffs and activities in the field; one person in each corps, province and district would be responsible for the U.S. effort. (It should be noted that progress in pacification, more than a nything else, will persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw.) Fifth, the Secr etary recommended a renewed effort to get negotiations started, by taking steps "to increase our credibility" with Hanoi, by considering a shift in the pattern of our bombing program considering the possibility of cessation of bombing, by t rying to "split the VC off from Hanoi," and by "developing a realistic plan prov iding a role for the VC in negotiations, postwar life, and government of the nat ion." His summation was somber. While repeating his prediction that the next two years would not see a satisfactory conclusion by either large-unit action or ne gotiations, McNamara advocated pursuing both routes although "we should recogniz e that success from them is a mere possibility, not a probability."

The solution lies in girding, openly, for a longer war and in taking actions imm ediately which will in 12 to 18 months give clear evidence that the continuing c osts and risks to the American people are acceptably limited, that the formula f or success has been found, and that the end of the war is merely a matter of tim e. All of my recommendations will contribute to this strategy, but the one most difficult to implement is perhaps the most important one-enlivening the pacifica tion program. The odds are less than even for this task, if only because we have failed so consistently since 1961 to make a dent in the problem. But, because t he 1967 trend of pacification will, I believe, be the main talisman of ultimate U.S. success or failure in Vietnam, extraordinary imagination and effort should go into changing the stripes of that problem. The memorandum closed with a comme nt on the thoughts of Thieu and Ky: They told me that they do not expect the ene my to negotiate or to modify his program in less than two years. Rather, they ex pect the enemy to continue to expand and to increase his activity. They expresse d agreement with us that the key to success is pacification and that so far paci fication has failed. They agree that we need clarification of GVN and U.S. roles and that the bulk of the ARVN should be shifted to pacification. Ky will, betwe en January and July 1967, shift all ARVN infantry divisions to that role. And he is giving Thang, a good Revolutionary Development director, added powers. Thieu and Ky see this as part of a two-year (1967-1968) schedule, in which offensive operations against enemy main force units are continued, carried on primarily by the U.S. and other Free World forces. At the end of the two-year period, they b elieve the enemy may be willing to negotiate or to retreat from his current cour se of action. McNamara's memorandum marked a strong new emphasis on pacification by him, and the ripples that this new emphasis set off were inevitably to sprea d throughout the USG, changing emphasis and official rhetoric up and down the li ne. His first reactions were official: comments on his memorandum from George Ca rver, Helms' Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs at the CIA; and from the J CS. Carver agreed with the evaluation of the situation, but objected to some of the recommended actions, particularly the "press for negotiations" items which h e felt would be "counter-productive." Carver made the provocative statement that he considered the prognosis "too gloomy." If the odds for enlivening the pacifi cation program are indeed "less than even, present U.S. objectives in Vietnam ar e not likely to be achieved." In his memorandum, Carver took issue with McNamara on pacification. Carver felt that "despite the errors and administrative weakne sses of present programs, in the concept of RD we have found the right formula, a catalyst that is potentially capable of inspiring the Vietnamese into effectiv e action.....Serious and systematic effort in this field is really a post-Honolu lu Conference development and it would be unrealistic to expect dramatic, readil y quantifiable progress in the short span of eight months." Carver supported the new stress on pacification, adding that he would support "wholeheartedly" a "re al reorganizational change under which the civilian director would have a joint staff of sufficient scope to enable him to plan, control, and direct the U.S.

effort and have operational control over all-not just civilian-elements engaged in RD . . ." He opposed a "carefully delineated division between the civilian in charge and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer." "A civilian pacific ation structure cannot be givenen a 'fair trial' unless the civilian director ha s the necessary authority," Carver said. "Also, the trial will not be fair if ma jor quantifiable results are anticipated in a matter of months." Carver's vision of pacification rested to a large degree on the idea of gaining the active supp ort of the population. He seemed opposed to the use of troops to merely protect terrain and the people who lived on it, saying, "If an attempt is made to impose pacification on an unengaged populace by GVN or U.S. military forces, that atte mpt will fail." He concluded, as he had begun: We agree with Secretary McNamara' s prognosis that there is little hope for a satisfactory conclusion of the war w ithin the next two years. We do not agree that "the odds are less than even" for enlivening the pacification program. If this were true, the U.S. would be fooli sh to continue the struggle in Vietnam and should seek to disengage as fast as p ossible. We think that if we establish adequate management and control on the U. S. side and ensure that the Vietnamese follow through on redirecting their milit ary resources as promised, there are at least fair prospects for substantial pro gress in pacification over the next two years. The JCS review of McNamara's memo randum was far more severe. While agreeing that "There is no reason to expect th at the war can be brought soon to a successful conclusion," the Chiefs made a st rong case, as usual, for increased bombing, no predetermined force ceilings, and stated several times in different ways that the war was going very well indeedalthough this same point had been made by McNamara. The Chiefs also disagreed st rongly with the move for negotiations which McNamara had suggested. Any bombing pause, they said, would be regarded by Hanoi, by the GVN, and by our Allies, as "renewed evidence of lack of U.S. determination to press the war to a successful conclusion." On pacification, the JCS "adhered to their conclusion" that "to ac hieve optimum effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to C OMUSMACV. However, if for political reasons a civilian type organization should be considered mandatory by the President, they would interpose no objection. Nev ertheless, they are not sanguine that an effective civilian-type organization ca n be erected, if at all, except at the expense of costly delays. As to the use o f a substantial fraction of ARVN for pacification purposes, the JCS concur. Howe ver, they desire to flag that adoption of this concept will undoubtedly elicit c harges of a U.S. takeover of combat operations at increased cost in American cas ualties.

The JCS requested that their views be brought to the attention of the President. On the record, Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach had been quite frank in telling the American public that they had found pacification lagging d uring their October trip to Vietnam. Katzenbach said he was "concerned" and, aft er emerging from the meeting with the President, told the White House press corp s that "We have to do a good deal more to get the 'other war' moving and I think we can." Even Komer, who remained more optimistic than McNamara and Katzenbach, was quoted as "acknowledging" that pacification was lagging. While "military pr ogress has exceeded our expectations," the Defense Secretary said, progress in p acification has "been very slow indeed." His trip also raised fears, for the fir st time, in Saigon that the military would take over the pacification effort. Th us, at almost the very moment that the President was hearing Katzenbach's recomm endation that the civilians be reorganized and given a last chance (see previous action), Ward Just was writing from Saigon: McNamara left behind the impression that his visit to South Vietnam last week marked the beginning of the end of ci vilian supremacy in the American effort..... Sources here were saying today that McNamara, a stickler for detail, was unimpressed with civilian descriptions of progress, or lack of it, in the pacification effort. The American who bears most of the authority for that, Deputy Ambassador William C. Porter, was in the U.S. during the McNamara visit. There has always been, as one official here put it, a "military component" to pacification. But it is understood now that that compo nent will be increased and the military will more and more take control of pacif ication--the task called nation-building. ....The other likely outcome of McNama ra's four days in Vietnam is that the role of ARVN will change. Informed sources said that McNamara heard no complaints whatsoever from American military source s regarding the performance of the ARVN, but the fact is that he did. It has bee n an open secret in Saigon that the role of the ARVN would change next year. The ir work would be in pacification, not in striking at main force units.... There is now increased certainty that the war effort despite public homage to the "oth er war" and the "hearts and minds of the people" is more thoroughly military tha n ever--and more thoroughly American. In the end, the military is thought to hav e carried the day not by force or logic or force of wisdom, although their posit ion here can be argued plausibly with both logic and wisdom, but by sheer weight of what one official called the juggernaut....

"Westmoreland says do this, do that, and something happens," one informed observ er said. "When Lodge says do this, do that, sometimes something happens, and som etimes it doesn't happen." The men here who wanted to see one ideology beaten by a better one, to see the Vietnamese character (not to mention the countryside) preserved and not submerged by the war, who viewed the struggle as an exercise i n counterinsurgency, have now certainly lost.... It remains to be seen whether t he problems of Vietnam lend themselves to military solutions and whether changin g conditions in this war are better handled by colonels than diplomats. Just's a rticle was wrong, of course, since the decision to give MACV responsibility for pacification had not been made. Indeed, within a few days this fact had also lea ked to the press, and stories in the New York Times, datelined Saigon, spoke of the "abortive effort" by MACV to take over the effort. But the importance of the stories was not in their accuracy or inaccuracy, but in the fact that they indi cated the emotions that had been raised by the subject during and after the McNa mara-Katzenbach-Komer visit. In truth, no one in Saigon, not even Lodge and West moreland, knew at this time what the final decision was to be. But the subject w as up for discussion, and the pressure from Washington had been measurably incre ased. With the McNamara and Katzenbach memoranda in hand, the President apparent ly indicated tentative agreements to give the civilians a short trial period to get pacification moving. Then he left for his Asian tour, which was to climax wi th the Seven-Nation Conference at Manila. He left behind him instructions to pre pare a message to Lodge and Porter and Westmoreland, instructing them in his dec ision. Since the message was drafted and sent on to the President in Wellington on October 18, before Manila, but not sent on to Lodge and Porter in Saigon unti l November 4, after Manila, there apparently remained some uncertainty as to his decision, which was not clarified until most of the principals were united brie fly in Manila. But this is of marginal importance. The fact was that the Preside nt had approved the idea of giving the civilians a final chance. The Cable Excha nge: November, 1966 By October 18, McNamara, Katzenbach, and Komer had an agreed -upon telegram for the President to send Lodge. It was forwarded to Wellington, where the President had begun his Asian tour: State/Defense and Komer recommend your concurrence in the general plan recommended by both Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach regarding reorganization on the American side of the administration of the Revolutionary Development (RD) program in Viet-Nam. We the refore recommend that you approve our sending the following State-Defense messag e to Ambassador Lodge:

BEGIN TEXT Personal For Lodge. You have described the RD program as the heart of the matter in SVN. We agree. Also, you have reported and we agree that progress in the RD program so far has been slight and unsatisfactory. We all agree that progress must be made in this crucial area if the war is to be won in the South and if the North is to be persuaded to negotiate. It is clear to us that some or ganizational changes are required on the American side to get RD moving-to bring harder pressure on the GVN to do its job and to get solid and realistic plannin g with respect to the whole effort. We had considered putting the entire program under COMUSMACV to achieve these ends; and this may ultimately prove to be the best solution. But recognizing certain objections to this approach, we are prepa red to try a solution which leaves the civilian functions under civilian managem ent. As we see it, the trial organization would involve the following changes: 1 . The several civilian lines of command within U.S. agencies would be consolidat ed into one. Thus, line responsibility for all personnel assigned to RD civilian functions would rest solely with one high-ranking civilian. (We presume this ma n would be Ambassador Porter. If so, he would have to be relieved of all other d uties, and you would have to have another deputy assigned to absorb the substant ial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter.) The authority of this civilian would be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the civilian RD team, including relocation of personnel, the establishment of priorities irr espective of agency priorities, and the apportionment of the funds allocated for RD by each agency to Viet-Nam (bounded only by statutory limitations). 2. To st rengthen Porter administratively, it might be well to assign him a competent Pri ncipal Deputy and Executive Officer--a military officer of two or three-star ran k. If this officer is desired, General Westmoreland can supply him or, if he req uests, the officer can be provided from here. This officer would not be to comma nd U.S. military forces or operations or to perform MACV's functions of advising and prodding the ARVN, but would be to provide administrative strength on the c ivilian side and to serve as a bridge to MACV, ensuring efficient interface betw een the civilian and military structures. 3. We understand General Westmoreland is already considering a MACV Special Assistant for Pacification or a Deputy for Pacification. We presume that the appointment of such a Special Assistant or De puty could be timed to coincide with the changes on the civilian side, making po ssible the highest-level command focus and consolidation to MACV's RD concerns a nd staff. 4. Careful definition and delineation of responsibilities of the U.S. civilian and U.S. military sides would be necessary in the whole RD establishmen t in South Viet-Nam to ensure that nothing falls between the stools and that the two efforts fully mesh.

We are most anxious, as we know you are, to make progress in RD. So this new org anizational arrangement would be on trial for 90-120 days, at the end of which w e would take stock of progress and reconsider whether to assign all responsibili ty for RD to COMUSMACV. As mentioned above, this cable was not repeated to Saigo n until after the Manila Conference. Presumably, in the intervening period, the President had had a chance to talk directly to Lodge and Westmoreland about the matter, since they were both at Manila (Porter was not). In addition, Komer had gone from Manila back to Saigon for a week's stay, and had given Porter a clear warning that the reorganization was impending. When he left, Komer left behind t wo members of his staff to assist Porter with the planning for the reorganizatio n, although Porter and Lodge, for some reason not clear today, still seemed doub tful that the reorganization Washington was pressing on them was really necessar y, and really desired by the President. The cable--unchanged from the text cited above--arrived in Vietnam on November 4, 1966. It was slugged "Literally Eyes O nly for Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef, and Komer," and because Lodge decided to interpret that slug line literally, the entire process was delayed one weeka sorry spectacle and wholly unnecessary on all counts. When Lodge answered the cable by requesting permission to discuss it with his assistants, there was an u nderstandable suspicion in Washington that he was simply doing so to delay actio n a little while longer. But on the other hand, the cable had received the highe st slug normally available to State Department messages--"Literally Eyes Only"-and Lodge could say truthfully that he was just following instruction. In any ev ent, Lodge sent his answer to Washington November 6: I agree that progress has b een "slight and unsatisfactory" and, undoubtedly some organizational changes can be helpful. However, before commenting on that I would like to set out some bas ic considerations. Crux of the problem is not defective organization. It is secu rity. Civilian reorganization can affect progress only indirectly, because secur ity will remain outside civilian purview.... To meet this need we must make more U.S. troops available to help out in pacification operations as we move to conc entrate ARVN effort in this work. U.S. forces would be the catalyst; would lead by example; and would work with the Vietnamese on the "buddy" system. They would be the 10 percent of the total force of men under arms (90 percent of whom woul d be Vietnamese) which would get the whole thing moving faster. This has been do ne on a small scale already by elements of the U.S. Marines, 1st and 25th U.S. I nfantry Divisions, and the Koreans. We think it can be made to work and the gain s under such a program, while not flashy, would hopefully be solid. Everything d epends on whether we can change ARVN habits. Experiments already made indicate t hat U.S. casualties would be few. While it would take time, it would be clear to everyone

at home that time was working for us and it might create a "smell of victory." I t would eventually get at Viet Cong recruiting--surely an achievement which woul d fundamentally affect the course of the war. I wonder whether the above result could not be achieved if the phrase "offensive operations" were to be redefined so that instead of defining it as meaning "seek out and destroy," which I unders tand is now the case, it would be defined as "split up the Viet Cong and keep hi m off balance." This new definition of the phrase "offensive operations" would m ean fewer men for the purely "military" war, fewer U.S. casualties and more paci fication. It would also hasten the revamping of the ARVN, which Ky says is now d ue to have been completed by normal Vietnamese bureaucratic methods by July 1967 (which seems optimistic to me). What I propose in this telegram would in effect revamp the ARVN by "on-the-job-training." It is the only way that I can think o f drastically to accelerate the present pace. *** The question of transferring R evolutionary Development civilian functions to COMUSMACV raises questions and I understand you recognize certain objections. I doubt whether it would solve any existing problems, and it would certainly create many new ones. I agree with you r second paragraph in which you say civilian functions should be left under civi lian management. I agree that civilian lines of command within U.S. agencies dea ling with Revolutionary Development should be consolidated under Ambassador Port er. He should take unto himself the direct operation of the five categories of m anpower now in the field. I refer to USAID public safety, USAID province reps; J USPAO; CIA and the civil functions performed by the military advisers. They woul d all stay exactly where they are as far as rationing, housing and administratio n is concerned. Porter would have the operational authority and responsibility. I am not clear what another Deputy Ambassador would do and advise against such a n unnecessary and unwieldy structure. Ambassador Porter does not now absorb "sub stantial other responsibilities" which distract his attention from revolutionary development. Administrative matters involving the U.S. Mission as a whole are h andled by the Mission Coordinator, and political affairs are handled by me with close support from the political counselor. Economic affairs, in which Porter as the man responsible for revolutionary development is intimately and necessarily involved, are well covered by AID and the Economic Counselor. Public affairs no t connected with field operations associated with revolutionary development are well in hand and do not take Ambassador Porter's time.

The only "substantial other responsibility" which Porter carries outside of RD, is to take charge in my absence. I see no need, and would find it most inappropr iate, for this to be changed. I think there is great merit in the idea of having a high-ranking military man involved in pacification work. He should be in char ge of all the military aspects of pacification-working with ARVN and selecting, expediting, and assigning the U.S. troops who would operate as suggested in para 3 above. He should be an officer with proper knowledge of and talent for the su bject and I, of course, think of General Weyand. If the decision is made by all hands to put the military into pacification as suggested in para 3, the decision as to where to place such a general should not be too difficult. I agree that c areful definition and delineation of responsibilities of the U.S. civilian and m ilitary sides is necessary. We intend that the two efforts fully mesh. Clearly t here is very little that can be done economically, socially, psychologically, an d politically for the "hearts and minds" of men, if these men have knives sticki ng into their collective bellies. The knife must first be removed. It is not the case--as has so often been said--of which came first, the hen or the egg.... ** * This is obviously not reflected in our present organization under which, nonet heless, much has been accomplished. When Mac Bundy told me in February, after th e Vice President's visit, of the decision to relieve Porter of all of his duties as Deputy (except that of being Charge d'Affaires in case of my absence) so tha t he could take charge of the civilian aspects of pacification, I did not at fir st welcome the idea. I must, however, recognize that under Porter a real asset h as been built. To sum up, therefore, the first priority is more U.S. troops to b e allotted to pacification as set forth in paragraph 3; the second priority is b etter operation and tightening up of the present organization; thirdly, are orga nizational changes. Considering that your message was "EYES ONLY," I request aut hority to discuss it and my comments and plans with the heads of the different M ission agencies involved here. We are all anxious to make progress in RD, and th e effort will involve all of us. It requires security and time. Whatever the tri al period may be, I suggest we maintain a constant taking stock of progress and of problems. Lodge. Back came Washington's answer on November 12, giving Lodge p ermission to discuss the matter and show the cables to Porter, Westmoreland, and "once plans mature, inform members Mission Council." With the civilians in Wash ington already feeling that their trial period was underway, they sought to get the Mission moving faster to reorganize. The cables became a series of hints and threats and detailed guidance. The difficulty in communication was quite high. Thus, the November 12 cable, drafted by Ambassador Unger and cleared with McNama ra, Helms, Gaud, Komer, Marks, Katzenbach, and Rusk,

and slugged "for Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef, and Komer," laid out for Lod ge and Porter a detailed description of how the new structure should look--altho ugh everyone knew that the plans had already been drawn up and were sitting on L odge and Porter's desks in Saigon-and began with this warning-hint: Following st eps need to be taken promptly if we are, in the time available, to give adequate test to organization which is intended to keep RD civilian functions under civi lian management, an objective to which we know you attach considerable important . The cable went on to outline the organization, and discuss the question of the use of U.S. troops: ....We understand General Westmoreland plans use of limited number U.S. forces in buddy system principle to guide and motivate ARVN in RD/P . However, we have serious doubts about any further involvement U.S. troops beyo nd that in straight pacification operations. We fear this would tempt Vietnamese to leave this work more and more to us and we believe pacification, with its in timate contact with population, more appropriate for Vietnamese forces, who must after all as arm of GVN establish constructive relations with population. Hence we believe there should be no thought of U.S. taking substantial share of pacif ication. The urgent need is to begin effectively pressing ARVN. In Saigon, the M ission moved slowly. Three days later, with still no answer from Saigon, the Sta te Department sent out the following very short and curt cable: Personal for Lod ge and Porter from the Secretary Ref State 83699 REFTEL was discussed today at h ighest levels, who wished to emphasize that this represents final and considered decision and who expressed hope that indicated measures could be put into effec t just as rapidly as possible. This produced, at last, two long answers from Lod ge and Porter, which laid out what the new structure was going to look like, and added some personal comments from Lodge: FOR THE SECRETARY, SECDEF AND KOMER NO DIS 1. This is in reply to your 83699 as amended by your 85196 concerning which General Westmoreland, Porter and I have had extensive consultation. 2. We will, of course, carry out your instructions just as rapidly as possible, and our plan ning is already far advanced. 3. It is very gratifying that you feel as we do on the urgent need to revamp the ARVN, on the importance of putting all civilians in the field under Porter and of having single civilian responsibility in provin ce and corps-measures which we have long advocated. Doubt whether we can change over night habits and organization of ARVN acquired during the last ten years. U nless our success against main force daytime activity is equalled by success aga inst guerrillas during the night, swift improvement cannot be

expected to result simply by reorganization on the U.S. civilian side. It is our ability to infuse courage and confidence into all the Vietnamese under arms who are involved in pacification--both military and police--which is at stake. 4. A s regards your instruction for a military deputy for Porter, General Westmorelan d proposes Major General Paul Smith, who is acceptable to Porter. Porter believe s General Smith should be attached to civilian agency (State Department--Embassy Saigon) while on this duty, along lines precedents already established. He coul d wear civilian or military garb as circumstances require. *** 6. General Westmo reland does not wish to have a separate deputy for Revolutionary Development, bu t has nominated Brigadier General William Knowlton as Special Assistant for Paci fication. *** 8. Concerning paragraph 4 (c). Mission directive will state clearl y that Deputy Ambassador Porter will be primarily occupied with RD and that othe r Mission business will be handled by appropriate sections of Mission. There are certain other aspects to consider, however. Porter has assumed charge when I ha ve been absent. Any change in that respect could only derogate from his position in eyes of American community and GVN. He believes, and I concur, that his assu mption of charge cannot be "nominal" without risk of downgrading him in local ey es. Additionally, it is essential that there be a point of decision in Mission, without ambiguity. In practice, Porter intends to leave routine functions of Mis sion (political, protocol, administrative, personnel, consular, visitors, etc.) to sections normally handling them. He expects, however, to remain closely cogni zant of political developments and together with political counselor and CAS chi ef to consult and decide course of action to take or recommend to department as circumstances dictate. I believe this is reasonable approach and have full confi dence in his intention to concentrate on RD. *** 10. Your paragraph 5. I have al ways believed that Revolutionary Development/Pacification must be carried out by Vietnamese forces, who, as you say, must establish constructive relations with the population. I have never advocated U.S. forces taking on "substantial" share of this task. I do believe, however, that an American presence in this field am ounting to a very small percentage of the total manpower involved could induce A RVN to take the proper attitude by "on the job" training and could give the nece ssary courage and confidence to the Vietnamese. Lodge FOR THE SECRETARY, SECDEF AND KOMER NODIS 1. Herewith I transmit our recommendations carrying out your 836 99 and 85196. This is the best we can do in the immediate future and we think it is a forward step. But I believe

that you may wish to change it as we advance along this untrod path and learn mo re about circumstances and people. Our proposal is as follows: a. The establishm ent of an office of operations, headed by a Director of Operations. This headqua rters office of operations will include the present staff of: (1) USAID/Field Op erations; (2) USAID/Public Safety; (3) USAID/Refugees; (4) JUSPAO/Field Services (minus North Viet-Nam branch); (5) CAS/Cadre Operations Division. The Office of Operations will be organized so that the above offices will not necessarily rem ain intact when they are merged into a single office. For example, I intend to d isband USAID/FO's cadre office, and put those people now representing AID on cad re affairs directly under the cadre office. Thus there may be a net saving in ma npower. b. All other divisions of AID and JUSPAO will remain under the control o f their respective directors-MacDonald and Zorthian-who will be responsible to P orter, as they are now, for their operations. (I exempt from this the special qu estion of press relations, on which Zorthian will continue to report to me direc tly.) Thus, for example, MacDonald will continue to oversee to Agriculture, Educ ation, Health, Industry, etc., Divisions, as well as continue, along with the ec onomic counselor Wehrle, to be responsible for the anti-inflation efforts. The D irector of USAID will be freed from responsibilities for the field operations, b ut his job continues to be one of vast importance. I think it will now become mo re manageable. *** d. At province level we will select a single civilian to be i n charge of all other U.S. civilians in the province, in same way as MACV senior advisor is responsible for the military involved in the advisory effort in the province. This senior civilian representative will be the U.S. counterpart for c ivilian affairs to the VN province chief and, together with the MACV senior advi sor (sector) and the province chief, will form the provincial coordinating commi ttee. The practice of assaulting the province chief with a multiplicity of advis ors, often giving conflicting advice, should cease under this arrangement. The s enior civilian representative will write the efficiency reports of the American civilians in the province, regardless of their parent agency, and those reports will be reviewed by Porter's office, which will also control transfers and assig nments. *** f. At the more complex region/corps level, we will consider a simila r system, with a senior civilian representative responsible for the overall U.S. civilian effort in the corps area. He will work with the MACV senior advisor, a nd will in effect be my agent (and Bill Porter's) at the corps. I have long beli eved in the need for a sophisticated politicallyminded man in charge of our effo rt with the politically volatile corps commanders, and this is a step in that di rection. Porter and I will be looking carefully for the best men for these four difficult jobs....

2. I do not want another deputy Ambassador. I intend to provide office space for Porter in the new chancery (his present office will remain at his disposal even after he moves). There is simply no job for another deputy Ambassador, particul arly since the present political counselor works closely with me, reporting dire ctly. 3. There is no doubt that the steps mentioned above are major ones. Clearl y I cannot predict now how long they will take to achieve, or how much disruptio n they will cause in their early stages. For one thing, I feel that a physical r elocation of certain offices now spread out across the city is vital, and we are now studying the details of how to do this. Porter will probably need to establ ish his offices in a building other than the Chancery, in order to give the offi ce of operations a firm guiding hand. He will, however, keep an office close to me, and he will be kept closely informed of policy developments. *** 5. I will n eed your personal support during the period which lies ahead. I am sure that all hands here, regardless of agency affiliation, will support this effort to unify the U.S. team. The same must be true of the agencies that must continue to back stop us in Washington. Personnel recruitment will remain in your hands, and it u ltimately determines the caliber of our efforts. Porter will send you separate m essages on the question of personnel, so that new guidance and requirements can be put into effect as quickly as possible. 6. We look forward through reorganiza tion to tightening and simplifying contacts, advice and coordination with GVN au thorities responsible for RD. E. THE MANILA CONFERENCE President Johnson arrived in Manila on Ocober 23, 1966, to attend the seven-nation conference of troop co ntributing countries to the Vietnam war. While the meeting was hectic and short, it did produce a communique which contained some major statements about policy, strategy, and intentions. The three most important points in the communique of October 25 were: a. The pledge that "allied forces . . . shall be withdrawn, aft er close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceas es infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be w ithdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above condi tions have been fulfilled." b. The announcement of a new program, which had been thought up in Washington, for "National Reconciliation." Since the GVN was not in genuine agreement with the idea, but under great pressure from the Americans to commit themselves to it, the communique was quite vague on what difference th ere was, if any, between the new National Reconciliation program and the old Chi eu Hoi program. *

* Those Americans who hoped that National Reconciliation would become a major ne w appeal to VC at middle and higher levels were to be in for a disappointment in the year following Manila. The GVN did not agree with the philosophy behind tot al forgiveness to the enemy, and continually hedged its statements and invitatio ns to the VC so that they resembled surrender with amnesty rather than "national reconciliation." In fact, the GVN did not make an internal announcement on the National Reconciliation program until Tet, 1967, almost four months after the Ma nila conference, and three months after the GVN had "promised" the U.S. that it would make the announcement. Then, when the Vietnamese finally did make the anno uncement, they used the phrase "Doan Ket," which is accurately translated as "Na tional Solidarity," rather than "National Reconciliation." The difference in mea ning is, of course, significant, just as the earlier mistranslation of "Xay Dung " into "Revolutionary Development" reflected a divergence of views. c. The formalization, in public, of the move towards getting ARVN more deeply in volved with the RD program: "The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built." This public confirmation of the tentative steps that MACV had been taking was important. Cl assified documents could not be used as the basis for a far-reaching reform of t he ARVN; they would never have received wide enough distribution, nor would they have been fully accepted as doctrine by the doubters within both the RVNAF and MACV. But here was a piece of paper signed by the President and by General Thieu which said in simple language that a new direction and mission was given to the ARVN. After Manila, MACV and the JCS began in seriousness the formation of the mobile training teams which were designed to retrain every RVNAF unit so that it was more aware of the importance of the population. The reasoning behind the mo ve to commit more troops to the relatively static missions involved in pacificat ion had been laid out in documents and briefings by people as varied as Major Ge neral Tilison, in his August briefings of the Mission Council (cited in Section III.C.7) and Robert Komer, in his memorandum to the President. But a key assumpt ion underlying the new emphasis on population control was the growing belief, in late 1966, that the main force war was coming to a gradual end. No other single factor played as great a role in the decision to commit troops to pacification as the belief that they were going to be less and less needed for offensive miss ions against main force units. The enemy-initiated large unit action statistics showed a sharp drop all through 1966, with a low point of less than two battalio n sized or larger enemy initiated actions per month in the last quarter of 1966. There was increasing talk of the "end of the big battalion war," both in the pr ess and in the Mission. Moreover, the first big U.S. push into VC base areas was getting underway, and it was possible to believe that when operations like Junc tion City and Cedar Falls were completed, the VC would have few places left to h ide within the boundaries of South Vietnam. Thus, some people were arguing in la te 1966 and early 1967 that the number of troops that could be committed to RD w as considerably higher than the amount that General Westmoreland was then contem plating; that the "substantial number" of the Manila communique could well be ov er half of all ARVN. These arguments were usually made orally and tentatively, r ather than in formal written papers,

since they usually raised the ire of the military. When military opposition to s uch a large RD commitment stiffened, the suggestions of civilians were often hed ged or partially withdrawn. But nonetheless, the fact remains that the undeniabl e success against the main forces in 1966 was the major justifying factor for th ose advocating increased commitment of regular units-even some U.S. units-to pac ification. At that time, officials were less worried about the possibility of a major resurgence of the enemy than about the possibility of a new guerrilla war phase. The fighting in and near the DMZ during Operations Hastings and Prairie ( August-December 1966) had been the heaviest of the war, and had been judged not only as a major defeat for the enemy but as a possible turning point for the ene my, after which he "had begun to shift some of his effort away from conventional , or 'mobile warfare,' toward the more productive (from his standpoint) guerrill a tactics." The Marines considered Hastings and Prairie a foolhardy aberration o n the enemy's part, although they noted that the region of the DMZ "is remote, f avoring him with interior lines and working to our disadvantage through extensio n of our own supply lines." The Marines felt that the enemy attacks at the DMZ h ad been designed primarily to draw down resources from the Marine pacification e fforts near Da Nang, an interesting example of how important they thought their embryonic pacification effort was. But, the Marines added, whenever the enemy pr obed or patrolled, he was "pursued by Marine infantry and pounded by air, artill ery, and naval gunfire. The effort cost him an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 NVA troo ps killed or disabled and 414 weapons lost . . . and meant a severe loss of pres tige, and a further erosion of the morale of his troops." Thus, the slowdown in large enemy actions, according to the Marine estimate, and signs that the future would see an increase in guerrilla activity-"Major main force and NVA formation s have been relatively inactive since September, as far as large unit actions ar e concerned. However, by the end of December, corresponding increases were alrea dy beginning to appear in rates of guerrilla activity." To what extent other mil itary and civilian leaders accepted the Marine assessment of enemy capability an d intentions is not clear from the documents, but the mood of the time was not f ar removed from the sentiments cited above. The end of the "big war" was coming, and pacification was the next step. It all fueled the proponents of greater pac ification efforts by regular troops, and now, after Manila, the debate was alrea dy being conducted on terrain favorable for the first time to the pro-pacificati on advocates. IV. OCO TO CORDS A. OCO ON TRIAL: INTRODUCTION With the cable exch ange completed, except for a few minor matters, Ambassador Lodge announced the f ormation of the Office of Civil Operations on November 26, 1966-one month after the original go-ahead signal had been given in Washington, and three weeks after the cable to Lodge telling him that the President wanted rapid action. While de lays of this kind are common in government and do not normally affect events, in this case the

delay got OCO off to a visibly slow start despite the fact that the President ha d clearly indicated to Lodge and Porter that he was putting OCO on trial and wou ld review its accomplishments in a fairly short time. The reasons for the Missio n's slow start revealed again just how far apart Washington and its representati ves in Saigon were in their philosophy and approach to the war. Washington offic ials consistently underestimated the difficulty of the actions they wanted the M ission to do, and continually expected movement at speeds literally beyond the c apability of the Mission. They held these ambitious expectations and exerted pre ssure accordingly--not primarily because of the situation in the pacification pr ogram in South Vietnam (which was fairly static), but because of growing pressur e from the public, the press, and Congress for visible progress in the war, beca use of growing American domestic dissatisfaction with the course of the war. If the American public could not see progress in Vietnam, the support the Administr ation had for the war would drop steadily. In its efforts to show progress some members of the Administration were continually interpreting statistics and event s in the most favorable light possible, and its critics-particularly the press-were interpreting the same events in the most unfavorable light possible. Since events in Vietnam were usually open to at least two different interpretations, t he gap between the Administration and its critics over the basic question of How are We Doing? grew steadily during 1966 and 1967. But beyond the disagreements over facts and statistics, there was a continual effort by Washington officials to prod Saigon forward at a faster pace. Thus, if the Mission had just started a crash program at the highest speed ever achieved by the Mission, Washington off icials, particularly Komer, acting (he said) in the President's name, would dema nd that the Mission redouble its efforts again. Komer, in a reflective moment, c alled it "creative tension." The Saigon Mission responded to this pressure with resistance and hostility towards its Washington "backstops." When warned, for ex ample, that the President was giving OCO 90 to 120 days to prove itself, Lodge a nd Porter both shot back pointed comments to the effect that this was an inadequ ate time period, and at the end of it results would probably not yet be visible. They were right, of course, but being right was not good enough. They fought th e time deadline with too great a vehemence and did not do enough to "prove" OCO' s worth. The result was the decision of March 1967 to put OCO under MACV. The Mi ssion thought that because they were "on the ground" they had a unique understan ding of the problems of Vietnam, and that because they were on the ground they w ere the only accurate judges of the rate at which events needed to move. This po int of view did not take into account domestic pressures in the United States; o r, worse, it deliberately disregarded them. Thus, the Mission in Vietnam has gen erally tended to formulate strategy as though the United States will be fighting a slow war in Indochina for decades, while the Washington policymakers and stra tegists have tended to behave as though time runs out in November of 1968. The m ood of the Mission towards Washington is seen more clearly in press leaks than i n cables. Thus, for example, the

Evans and Novak column, from Saigon, on November 30, 1966, as OCO was being form ed and the trial period beginning: "A note of quiet desperation is creeping into the top echelons of the U.S. Mission charged with winning the war in Vietnam. I t grows partly out of frustration with what one top Embassy official describes a s 'the hot blow torch on our rear ends' that comes from Washington, and, particu larly, from the White House in search of ever-new victory proposals Much of this frustration and gloom would vanish if attention in Washington were centered not on impossible trance tables for ending the war next month or next year but on a realistic projection of the modest gain now being made at great and painstaking effort." The difference in mood is reinforced by the climate of Vietnam, which is sluggish and humid, and by the influence of the Vietnamese, who after many ye ars of war are rarely ready to race out and seek instant immortality on the fiel d of battle or in the Ministries. The one exception to this dangerous generaliza tion has often been the individual American officer, usually military, serving i n advisory or combat positions. There, with a 12-month tour standard, the Americ ans have pushed their Vietnamese counterparts hard, and often encountered great resistance. Indeed, the Americans in Vietnam often think they are already pushin g the Vietnamese as hard as is desirable, and that Washington is asking the impo ssible when they send out instructions to get more out of the Vietnamese. These were some of the background factors which were playing themselves out in late 19 66 and early 1967. While tension between Washington and Saigon had existed befor e, and is inevitable between headquarters and the field, the pressure had by now reached a level higher than ever before. (It is ironic to note that the same te nsions that exist between Washington and Saigon tend to exist between the Americ ans in Saigon and the Americans in the field. The phrase "Saigon commando" is us ed continually to castigate the uninformed officials in Saigon. There are too fe w people serving in Saigon with previous field experience, an unavoidable by-pro duct of the 12-month tour, and this increases the gap.) So Washington officials talked about the lack of a sense of urgency in the Mission in Vietnam, and the A mericans in Saigon talked about the dream world that Washington lived in, and th e Americans in the provinces talked about the lack of understanding of the Ameri cans in Saigon who had never seen the real war. Washington was dissatisfied with the progress in Vietnam, and since it could not influence the real obstacle, th e Vietnamese, except through the American Mission, it deliberately put extra hea t on the Mission. At least one high official involved in this period in Washingt on felt that it was a necessary and deliberate charade, and that only by overdoi ng its representations to the Mission could Washington assure that some fraction of its desires got through. More than one high-ranking official in Saigon felt that the only way to handle Washington was to hold out to them promises of progr ess and generally calm the home front down, or else run the risk of inflaming Wa shington and bringing still more reorganization down upon the Mission's head.

Rather than try to apportion responsibility for this sorry state of affairs, it would be useful to see the situation as the by-product of tensions produced by t he Viet Cong strategy of survival and counter-punching at GVN weak spots, and th e GVN's inability to be as good as we dream they should be. The United States co uld perhaps live with these problems in an age in which communications were not instantaneous, and publicity not so unrelenting. Beyond this broad philosophical point, however, the fact is that the Mission in Vietnam was badly organized to conduct almost any kind of large and complex operation, let alone a war. Thus Wa shington was right to reorganize the Mission, and Saigon's reaction to each reor ganization inevitably suggested that still more was needed. Beyond that, the Mis sion in Vietnam did not have the full confidence of the Washington bureaucracy a nd Porter still lacked Lodge's full support. B. OCO ON TRIAL: TOO LITTLE TOO LAT E--OR NOT ENOUGH TiME? With the formation of OCO in late November the civilian m ission began to move at a more rapid pace than it had in the post-Honolulu perio d. Most of this motion, of course, was internal to the U.S. Mission and could no t produce visible results against the VC, an understandable fact when one consid ers the amount of work that the decision involved. First, a Director of Civil Op erations had to be chosen. Since Washington demanded rapid action, it was decide d that the choice had to be someone already in Vietnam and ready to work, which sharply narrowed the list of possible men. The final selection was L. Wade Lathr am, who had been the deputy director of USAID. Lathram was to prove to be the wr ong man at the wrong time, a methodical and slow worker with strong respect for the very interagency system that he was supposed to supercede. In normal bureauc racies, Lathram could, and had, compiled excellent records, but OCO was demandin g extraordinary results, and these required leadership and drive which Lathram d id not possess. It had been anticipated that Porter, a popular Ambassador and a knowledgeable and realistic man, would supply that leadership and drive, and tha t Lathram would simply run the OCO staff below Porter. But neither Porter nor La thram saw their roles that way. Once OCO was formed, Porter to an unexpected deg ree stayed away from the day to day decisions, leaving them to Lathram. And Lath ram simply did not have the position nor the stature to stand up to the full mem bers of the Mission Council, whose assets he now partially controlled. (There wa s continued confusion over what was the responsibility of OCO and what remained under the control of the USAID, CIA and JUSPAO directors, and this confusion was never resolved-and continues today under the CORDS structure.) Moreover, Porter , who had not wanted a second Deputy Ambassador to come in to relieve him of all non-RD matters, soon found himself tied down in the business of the Embassy. Lo dge went on a long leave shortly after the formation of OCO, taking about one mo nth's vacation in Europe and the United States. This left Porter with responsibi lity

for the full gamut of Ambassadorial activities, and he unavoidably became less a nd less concerned with the progress of OCO, even though it was in its first crit ical month. He had been given an office in the new OCO building (appropriated fr om AID), but he rarely used it, staying in the Embassy in another part of Saigon , and showing, in effect, by his failure to use his OCO office often that he cou ld not devote much time to OCO. The failure, therefore, to isolate Porter from a ll non-RD matters and provide Lodge with a full time DCM turned out to be a seri ous error. McNamara had clearly foreseen this in his 15 October memorandum to th e President. In retrospect, we can see that Porter should have been given one jo b or the other, and the vacancy filled--as Washington had suggested. But Washing ton had just finished cramming an unpleasant action down the Mission's throat, a nd it was felt that there were limits to how much the Mission should be asked to take, especially since Lodge and Porter were so adamant on the subject. Also, n o one could foresee how diverting other matters would become to Porter, or how m uch he would delegate to Lathram. The second major decision for OCO was the sele ction of the Regional Directors--men who would be given full control over all Am erican civilians in their respective regions. Here Porter presented Lathram with three nominees (II Corps was left unfilled until a few weeks later) and the cho ices appeared to be quite good ones: in I Corps, Porter's former Assistant Deput y Ambassador, Henry Koren; in III Corps, the former MACV Division Senior Advisor , then with AID, John Paul Vann; and in the Delta, the CIA's former support chie f, Vince Heymann. These were three respected men, and they came from three diffe rent agencies, which emphasized the interagency nature of OCO. In picking Vann, Porter had made a major decision which involved possibly antagonizing both the C IA and MACV, for Vann was without question one of the most controversial America ns in Vietnam. He stood for impatience with the American Mission, deep and often publicly-voiced disgust with the course of the past five years, strong convicti ons on what needed to be done, driving energy and an encyclopedic knowledge of r ecent events in Vietnam-and was a burr in the side of the CIA, with which he had frequently tangled, particularly over the cadre program, and MACV, with which h e had fought ever since disagreeing publicly with General Harkins in 1963 (a fig ht which led to his resignation from the Army and was extensively discussed in D avid Halberstam's book, The Making of a Quagmire). The importance of the appoint ments was not lost on the Mission or the press. While Lathram's appointment had stirred the bureaucracy but not the press, the regional directors came as a surp rise and a major story. In a front-page story in The Washington Post, Ward Just described Vann as "one of the legendary Americans in Vietnam," and said that Kor en's appointment indicated the great importance the Mission attached to the jobs . Just added that "there were indications that, if OCO did not succeed, the mili tary command would take charge of pacification, or 'Revolutionary Development.'" Next came the selection of OCO Province Representatives, to be chosen out of th e available talent in each province. Here the slowness of the civilians began to tell, and it was not until January that the appointments could be made for ever y province. Trying to

pick men on the basis of their knowledge and ability takes time and requires tri ps to each province, consultations with other Mission Council members, etc., and the civilians set out to do all this. Meanwhile, a huge job which no one in Was hington could fully appreciate was underway-the physical relocation of offices t hat Lodge had described as necessary in his November 16 cable. Even in Washingto n it may be difficult to get furniture and phones moved, except for very high-ra nking people; in Saigon a major relocation was more difficult to mount than a mi litary operation. While this was going on, involving literally over one thousand people, work in OCO was even more confused and sporadic than usual. None of the se minor organizational events would be of any importance if it were not for the fact that they were eating away at the meager time allotted to the civilians to prove that OCO should remain independent of MACV. But they did consume time, an d this was to prove to be a factor in evaluating OCO. The documents do not answe r the question of whether or not OCO ever really had a chance to survive, or whe ther it was just allowed to start up by people who had already decided to turn R D over to MACV in a few months. Both possibilities fit the available facts. An e ducated guess would be that the decision to give Westmoreland control was tentat ively made by the President in the late fall of 1966, but that he decided he wou ld gain by allowing the civilians to reorganize first. If OCO proved to be a maj or success, he could always continue to defer his decision. If OCO fell short of the mark, then it still would be an organization in-being ready to be placed in to MACV without further internal changes, and that in itself would be a major ga in. Moreover, if the changes came when Lodge and Porter were gone, there would b e less difficulties. If OCO moved too slowly for Washington's satisfaction, it n onetheless accomplished many things which had previously been beyond the Mission 's ability: --Uniting personnel from AID, CIA, and JUSPAO into a single Plans & Evaluations Section, OCO produced the first integrated plans for RD on the U.S. side. These plans were ambitious and far-reaching, and required MACV inputs. The fact that the civilians were asking MACV for inputs to their own planning, rath er than the reverse, so startled MACV that MACV, in turn, began more intensive d iscussions or plans. The planning effort involved several military officers on l oan to OCO, a fact which further heightened tension between OCO and MACV. When t he plans first formulated were presented to General Westmoreland, he indicated t hat he was not going to be bound by any plans which reduced his flexibility and ability to respond to military pressure whenever and wherever it occurred; that is, he was reluctant to commit many military assets to permanent RD support acti vities. But the relentless pressure from OCO, from Komer in Washington, and even from the public attention focused on the issue by Article 11 of the Manila comm unique ("The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substa ntial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield

behind which a new society can be built") all were working against General Westm oreland, and towards the assignment of ARVN units to RD missions. --The civilian s in the provinces spoke with a single voice for the first time. The province ch iefs welcomed the change for this reason, according to most observers. Within th e American team in each province, there was now a built-in obligation to consult with each other, instead of the previous situation in which more and more agenc ies were sending down to the provinces their own men who worked alone on their o wn projects. --The very act of physical relocation of the five major branches of OCO into a single building changed attitudes and behavior patterns in the civil ian mission. Public Safety and the Special Branch advisors, for example, now wer e co-located, and began working together closely. Previously, they had both advi sed the same people through completely separate channels which met only at the t op; i.e., when the chief of the Public Safety branch and the deputy CIA station chief had something specific and urgent they had to resolve. On the day-to-day m atters, there had actually been a deliberate compartmentalization before OCO was formed. These examples of gains could be repeated across a broad front. They we re first steps in a direction which might ultimately have created a strong civil ian mission, given time, better leaders, and more support from Washington. But e ven without these things, OCO was a definite plus. The period between December a nd April was a period in which everyone paid lip service to the idea of supporti ng OCO, but in reality it was sniped at and attacked almost from the outset by t he bureaucracies. In Saigon, Zorthian, and Hart, Directors of JUSPAO and CIA, re spectively, made it clear that they wanted to remain very much involved in any d ecision affecting their respective fields of endeavor. While this was a reasonab le point of view, it meant that CIA and even USIA officers in the field often re fused to accept any guidance from the OCO representative, and cases began to com e to light in which major actions were being initiated by the CIA without any co nsultation with OCO. (The CIA reasoning and defense rested on the fact that one of Hart's deputies was ostensibly an assistant director of OCO.) In Washington, there was open skepticism to OCO from almost all quarters, particularly AID, whi ch found itself footing most of the bill. USIA and CIA both indicated that they would continue to deal directly with their field personnel. In theory, everyone in Washington was to participate in the backstopping of the interagency OCO, but in practice, without a single voice in charge, this meant that no one was helpi ng OCO, no one was trying to sell them as a going concern in Washington. Komer's role here was ambiguous; he supported OCO as long as it was in operation, and p robably contributed more to its achievements than anyone else in Washington, but at the same time he was already on the record as favoring a military takeover, which was the very thing OCO sought to avoid.

Washington had decreed OCO, and had given Porter great responsibility. Unfortuna tely, they had failed to give him authority and stature needed to make the agenc ies work together. As pointed out before, this might well have been overcome if time had not been so short. The slow methodical way of moving bureaucracies may be more effective than sweeping changes, anyway, if one has time. But in Vietnam no one was being given much time. Shortly after OCO was formed, Komer's deputy, Ambassador William Leonhart, visited Vietnam, and when he returned, wrote the f ollowing penetrating assessment, which was sent to the President, Secretaries Ru sk and McNamara, and Mr. Gaud and Mr. Helms: Whether Porter's new Office of Civi l Operations (OCO) is viewed as a final organizational solution or as an inevita ble intermediate step it is achieving a number of useful purposes. It establishe s, on the civil side for the first time, unified interagency direction with a ch ain of command and communication from Saigon to the regions and provinces. It ce ntralizes US-GVN field coordination of civil matters in one US official at each level. It affords a civil-side framework which can work more effectively with US military for politico-military coordination and more integrated pacification pl anning. At the time of my visit, OCO's impact had been felt mainly in Saigon. It s headquarters organization was largely completed. Three of the four Regional Di rectors had been named, all were at work, and one was in full time residence in his region. Regional staffs were being assembled but not yet in place. At provin ce level, teams were being interviewed for the selection of Provincial Represent atives. Porter expects them to be designated by January 1. Some slippage is poss ible, and it may be 90 days or so before the new organization is functioning. I participated in the initial briefings of the province teams I visited, passing a long and emphasizing Bob Komer's admonitions against overbureaucratization of ef fort and for fast and hard action. These were well-received. Morale was good. Al l the GVN Province Chiefs with whom I talked thought the new structure a great i mprovement. C. TIME RUNS OUT The decision to turn pacification over to MACV, wit h an integrated civilmilitary chain of command, was announced in Saigon on May 1 1, 1967, by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. In his announcement, Bunker said that t he decision was entirely his. But Bunker had been in Vietnam as Ambassador for l ess than two weeks, and he was therefore clearly acting under strong guidance, i f not orders, from Washington. The decision to give MACV responsibility had actu ally stemmed from the clear and unmistakable fact that the President now conside red such a reorganization highly desirable. It is not clear when the President d ecided this in his own mind. The documents do not shed any light on this point, and, indeed, they simply fail to discuss the pros and cons of

the decision in the early months of 1967, when the subject was a hot one in Wash ington and Saigon. This all suggests that whatever consideration of the issue wa s going on was confined strictly to private sessions between principals, and tha t the staff work previously done on a highly restricted basis was no longer cons idered necessary by the principals. It has been suggested that the President had been strongly in favor of the move for months before he finally gave the go-ahe ad signal, and that he was held back by the strong opposition from Lodge and Por ter, from Katzenbach, from the agencies in Washington-and by the fact that it wo uld appear to be a further "militarization" of the effort. This may well be the case; certainly nothing in the record disproves this possibility. But since ther e is no way that this study can answer the question, it must be left undecided. Whenever the President made his decision in his own mind, he chose the Guam meet ing as the place to discuss with a group of concerned officials outside his own personal staff. In a private meeting on March 20, or 21, 1967, with senior offic ials from Washington and Saigon, the President indicated that he felt the time h ad come to turn pacification over to MACV. The President enjoined those in the r oom at that meeting not to discuss the decision with anyone until it was announc ed, and he did not inform the GVN. At the end of the Guam meeting, the President sent Komer back to Saigon with Westmoreland and Lodge, and Komer spent a week t here, working out preliminary details of the reorganization. By this time Komer knew that he was to become Deputy to General Westmoreland, although many details remained to be ironed out. When Komer returned to Washington, with the prelimin ary plans, a period followed during which no further action on the reorganizatio n was taken. In all, nearly two months went by from the President's statement at Guam to the public announcement, during which only a handful of people in Washi ngton and Saigon knew what was going to happen. The delays were caused by a comb ination of factors: Bunker's understandable desire to spend some time on persona l business before going to Saigon, the President's desire to have Bunker make th e final announcement himself after he had reached Saigon, the need to work out f inal details. Since the President was the man who had pressed everyone else work ing on Vietnam to greater and greater effort, and since he stood to lose the mos t from loss of time, it is surprising that he was now willing to see two months lost, with a tired and lame-duck Mission in Vietnam, waiting for the new team in a highly apprehensive state, and confusion at the higher levels. But for reason s which are not readily apparent, the President did not push his new team, and i t was not until May 13, 1967, that Bunker made his announcement (which had been drafted by Komer): Since being appointed U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam I have been giving a great deal of thought to how to organize most effectively the U.S. Advi sory role in support of the Vietnamese government's Revolutionary Development ef fort. Like my predecessor, I regard RD--often termed pacification--as close to t he heart of the matter in Vietnam.

Support of Revolutionary Development has seemed to me and my senior colleagues t o be neither exclusively a civilian nor exclusively a military function, but to be essentially civil-military in character. It involves both the provision of co ntinuous local security in the countryside-necessarily a primarily military task and the constructive programs conducted by the Ministry of Revolutionary Develo pment, largely through its 59-member RD teams. The government of Vietnam has rec ognized the dual civil-military nature of the RD process by assigning responsibi lity for its execution to the Corps/Region Commanders and by deciding to assign the bulk of the regular ARVN, as well as the Regional and Popular forces, to pro vide the indispensable security so that RD can proceed in the countryside. As se nior American official in Vietnam, I have concluded that the U.S. Advisory and s upporting role in Revolutionary Development can be made more effective by unifyi ng its civil and military aspects under a single management concept. Unified man agement, a single chain of command, and a more closely dovetailed advisory effor t will in my opinion greatly improve U.S. support of the vital RD program. There fore, I am giving General Westmoreland the responsibility for the performance of our U.S. Mission field programs in support of pacification or Revolutionary Dev elopment. To assist him in performing this function, I am assigning Mr. Robert K omer to his headquarters to be designated as a deputy to COMUSMACV with personal rank of ambassador. I have two basic reasons for giving this responsibility to General West-moreland. In the first place, the indispensable first stage of paci fication is providing continuous local security, a function primarily of RVNAF, in which MACV performs a supporting advisory role. In the second place, the grea ter part of the U.S. Advisory and Logistic assets involved in support of Revolut ionary Development belong to MACV. If unified management of U.S. Mission assets in support of the Vietnamese program is desirable, COMUSMACV is the logical choi ce. I have directed that a single chain of responsibility for advice and support of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development program be instituted from Saigon d own to district level. Just as Mr. Komer will supervise the U.S. Advisory role a t the Saigon level as Deputy To General Westmoreland, so will the present OCO re gional directors serve as deputies to U.S. field force commanders. At the provin ce level, a senior advisor will be designated, either civilian or military, foll owing analysis of the local situation. While management will thus be unified, th e integrity of the Office of Civil Operations will be preserved. It will continu e to perform the same functions as before, and will continue to have direct comm unication on technical matters with its field echelons. The present Revolutionar y Development support division of MACV will be integrated into OCO, and its chie f will serve as deputy to the Director of OCO. Such a unified civil/military U.S . advisory effort in the vital field of Revolutionary Development is unprecedent ed. But so too is the situation which we confront. RD is in my view neither civi l nor military but a unique merging of both to meet a unique wartime need. Thus my resolution is to have U.S. civilian and military officials work together as o ne team in

order more effectively to support our Vietnamese allies. Many further details wi ll have to be worked out, and various difficulties will doubtless be encountered , but I am confident that this realignment of responsibilities is a sound manage ment step and I count on all U.S. officers and officials concerned to make it wo rk effectively in practice. Bunker outlined to Washington the line he proposed t o take during a question and answer period with the press: Besides the above ann ouncement, I intend to stress the following basic points in answer to press ques tions or in backgrounding: (a) I made this decision not because I think that U.S . civilian support of RD has been unsatisfactory-on the contrary I am pleased wi th progress to date-but because I think it is essential to bring the U.S. milita ry more fully into the RD advisory effort and to pool our civil/military resourc es to get optimum results: (b) indeed I regard all official Americans in Vietnam as part of one team, not as part of competing civilian and military establishme nts: (c) as senior U.S. official in Vietnam, I intend to keep a close eye on all U.S. activities, including pacification-I am not abdicating any of my re-, spon sibilities but rather am having the entire U.S. pacification advisory effort rep ort to me through General Westmoreland rather than through two channels as in th e past: (d) during 34 years in the business world I have learned that unified ma nagement with clear lines of authority is the way to get the most out of large s cale and highly diversified programs: (e) since continuous local security, which RVNAF must primarily provide, is the indispensable first stage of the pacificat ion process, the MACV chain of command can obviously be helpful to the RVNAF: an d (f) I intend to see that the civilian element of the U.S. effort is not buried under the military-in many instances soldiers will end up working for civilians as well as the reverse-in fact Ambassador Komer will be General Westmoreland's principal assistant for this function while General Knowlton will be deputy to M r. Lathram of OCO. I intend to keep fully informed personally about all developm ents in this field and to hold frequent meetings with General Westmoreland and A mbassador Komer for the purpose of formulating policy. The reaction of the civil ians in Vietnam to the announcement of Ambassador Bunker was one of dismay. In t he first confused days, before details of the reorganization could be worked out and announced, the press was able to write several articles which probably were accurate reflections of the mood of most civilians: Civilian reactions today ra nged from the bitter ("We don't think they can do their own job--how can they do ours?") to the resigned ("I'll be a good soldier and go along") to the very opt imistic ("We've finally got a civilian in among the generals"). Almost nowhere w as there much enthusiasm for what Bunker called "a unique experiment in a unique situation." Nor was there jubilation at the American military command. West-mor eland, who wanted to take charge of the pacification program two years ago, is n ow reported to be deeply skeptical of the possibility of producing the kind of q uick results the White House apparently wants.

"I did not volunteer for the job," he is reported to have said privately this mo rning, "but now that I've got it, I'll do my best with it." ....Serious official s--both civilian and military--realize there are limitations on how far an offic er will go in reporting "negative" information, and how hard a civilian, now his subordinate, will fight for realism. .....Officials today sought to mitigate th e effect of the announcement by saying that Komer and his staff, physically loca ted in the American Military Command in Saigon, will be in a far better position to influence the course of Pacification than he would among "all the guys with glasses and sack suits" in the Office of Civil Operations. The Vietnamese reacti on to the reorganization was more difficult to gauge. Ward Just, in the same sto ry cited above, said "There was surprisingly little comment today from South Vie tnamese, who have seen so many efforts at pacification and so many efforts to at tempt to organize and reorganize themselves. One high American who professed to have spoken with the South Vietnamese command reported they are "delighted." But Komer's talk with General Nguyen Duc Thang, the Minister for Construction (RD), did not reveal any delight on Thang's part. Indeed, Tliang's first reaction was that the GVN should emulate the U.S. and turn pacification over to the Ministry of Defense- an action which would have run directly counter to the U.S. objecti ve of encouraging civilian government in Vietnam. There is no telegraphic record of the first series of talks that Komer and Bunker had with Ky, Thieu, Vien, an d Thang on the reorganization. Not until a Komer-Ky talk of May 15 does the cabl e traffic reflect the GVN reaction to the reorganization. By this time, it shoul d be noted, the GVN knew that the U.S. did not want the GVN to follow suit, and it knew all our arguments and could play them back to us with ease: Ky said that General Thang had suggested that the RD effort be brought under Defense Ministr y to conform to the U.S. reorganization. Ky and General Vien had demurred on gro unds that such a reorganization on the GVN side would be far more complex than o n U.S. side, would disrupt RD process, and would stretch General Vien and MOD to o thin. Besides it would not be politically advisable at the very time when ther e was a hopeful trend toward a more civilianized and representative government. Komer agreed with KyVien reasoning . D. THE CORDS REORGANIZATION With Bunker's a nnouncement, the Mission began its second massive reorganization in five months. This time, the reorganization was accompanied by one of the periodic turnovers in Mission Council personnel which have characterized the Mission: for some reas on, the tours of many high-ranking officers seem to end at roughly the same time , and thus, in 1964, 1965, and again in the spring of 1967, several key members of the Mission Council all left within a few weeks of each other. This time, in addition to Ambassador Lodge, Porter, Habib, and Wehrle all left within a short period of time, and only a high-

level decision-announced by Bunker at the same time as the reorganization-kept Z orthjan and Lansdale on for extensions. Into the Mission came Bunker, Locke, Kom er, General Abrams, the new Deputy COMUSMACV, and Charles Cooper, the new Econom ic Counselor, and Archibald Calhoun, the new Political Counselor. Despite the tu rnover, the reorganization seemed to proceed with comparative ease. Perhaps the fact that OCO had already been formed was critical here, since it meant that ins tead of MACV dealing with three agencies simultaneously, the first discussions c ould be restricted primarily to MACV and OCO. Moreover, because OCO was already a going concern, the civilians were better organized than ever before to maintai n their own position in dealings with the military. But above all, it was the de cision by Westmoreland and Bunker to let Komer take the lead in the reorganizati on which was important. Komer now made major decisions on how the new structure would look which were usually backed up by Westmoreland. The result looked much better than many people had dared hope. The details of the reorganization are no t worth detailed discussion here. But one point can illustrate the way CORDS cou ld resolve previously unresolved issues: the question of the role of the ARVN Di vision in the chain of command. As noted in an earlier section, study groups had over the years advocated removing the ARVN Divisions from the chain of command on Pacification/RD. But MACV had large advisory teams with the Divisions and the se teams controlled both the sector (Province) advisory teams and Regimental adv isory teams below them. The structure followed normal military lines, and made g ood sense to most of the officers in the higher levels of MACV. The counter-argu ment was that Division was a purely military instrument and could not adequately control the integrated civilian-military effort that was needed at the Province level. Thus the Roles and Missions Study Group, for example, had recommended th at "Division be Removed from the RD Chain of Command . . . that the role of the Province Chief be upgraded . . . that Province Chiefs have operational control ( as a minimum) of all military and paramilitary forces assigned to operate exclus ively in their sector." The Study Group recognized that "the power structure bei ng what it is in the GVN, major progress toward this goal will not be short rang e or spectacular." But, they urged, the U.S. should begin to push forward on it. MACV had nonconcurred in this recommendation. General Westmoreland, in a memora ndum to Lodge on September 7, 1966, had said that he did not agree with the idea , and that, if carried out, "the Corps span of control would be too large for ef fective direction." The suggestion, he added, was "illogical." This was still th e position of MACV when Komer arrived. In his attempts to find a workable civili an-military chain of command, he received two suggestions on the difficult quest ion of the role of the Division advisory teams. The first, and more routine,

was to continue the existing MACV system-in which, no matter how good or bad the GVN chain of command may be, the U.S. simply duplicates it on the advisory side . This would mean that all American civilians and military at the Province level would come under the Division-Corps chain of command. The MACV staff assumed th at this would happen. John Paul Vann and a few colleagues had a different sugges tion. Vann maintained that the evidence suggested that when the Americans made t heir desires known clearly to the Vietnamese, without the vagueness and contradi ctoriness which so often characterized them, then the Vietnamese usually would f ollow suit after a suitable period of time. Thus, said Vann, if the Americans re move the Division advisory team from the U.S. chain of command, except for tacti cal matters and logistical support, the GVN may follow, and reduce the power of their politically potent Divisions. The thesis Vann was putting forward--that th e GVN would follow a strong U.S. example--was untested and hotly disputed. Secon dly, there was the matter of MACV's stand against downgrading the role of the AR VN Divisions. Few people observing the discussions thought that the Vann suggest ion had a chance of success. But Komer, persuaded by the argument, did overrule many of his staff and make the recommendation to Westmoreland. Westmoreland appr oved it, and in June, 1967, the new chains of command were announced to the U.S. Mission. After years of arguing, during all of which the trend had been towards stronger ARVN Divisions, the U.S. had suddenly reversed course on its own, with out waiting for the Vietnamese to act. The change was so complete that it even e xtended to that last (and, to career officers, most important) question: who wri tes the efficiency report. Under the new MACV guidance, the Senior Province Advi sor would be rated not by the Division Senior Advisor, but by the Deputy for COR DS and the Corps level-thus confirming the new command arrangements. While it is still too early to tell if the GVN will completely follow the U.S. lead, the ea rly evidence suggests that the Vann hypothesis was correct, and that following t he U.S. action, the GVN has begun to reduce the role of their Divisions in RD. T here are now indications that the GVN is seriously considering a plan in which t he Divisions would no longer have area responsibility but rather be reduced to s upport of their forward units, and operational command on large operations of tr oops. E. THE MISSION ASSESSMENT AS CORDS BEGINS The situation that CORDS and Amb assador Komer inherited wa~ not a very promising one. Despite all the lip servic e and all the "top priorities" assigned RD by the Americans in the preceding 18 months, progress in the field was not only not satisfactory, it was, according t o many observers, nonexistent. The question of whether we were inching forward, standing still, or maying backward always seemed to the Mission and Washington t o be of great importance, and therefore much effort was spent trying to analyze our "progress."

A strong case can be made for the proposition that we have spent too much time l ooking for progress in a program in which measurements are irrelevant, inaccurat e, and misleading. But, nonetheless, the Mission did try to measure itself, and in May of 1967, as OCO turned into CORDS, produced the following assessment of R D for the first quarter of 1967. In truth, there has been little overall progres s in RD activities, and the same must be said for the painful process of buildin g a meaningful dialogue between the government and the people. A number of facto rs have been reported from Region III to account for this unhappy situation, but they might well apply to the rest of the country: a. The RD program for 1967 in volved many new and different concepts, command arrangements, administrative and procedural functions and allocation of resources. Only recently have the majori ty of provincial officials involved become aware of the program. b. Many Ap Doi Moi (Real New Life Hamlets), through guidance from MORD, were located in fringe security areas. In most of these cases a great deal of military and jungle clear ing operations were necessary. These take efficient and successful effort. Witho ut a unified voice in dealing with the Viettime, and, as a result, the deploymen t of the RD teams often were delayed. namese, we can never hope to influence the GVN to do the things we believe c. The hobbling effect of ineffectual officials has retarded the program. they must do to save their own country. d. The people have had to develop new working relationships with the RD workers,* the ARVN, a nd the RF/PF. During this process, there has been a "wait and see" attitude. * "Workers" was another one of the special words the U.S. began using instead of accurate translations of the Vietnamese. This one was also Lodge's idea, as a m ore understandable word than "cadre" to describe the members of the 59-man teams . If, however, the picture is sombre, it is not unrelieved. The 1967 program may l ook at this point unencouraging statistically, but its progress is of a differen t and more important sort. In critical areas, progress has been registered. Ther e has evolved an implicit understanding by many in the GVN that RD is a longer-t erm progress than hitherto believed, requiring a greater concentration of resour ces. In fact, there is increasing evidence that programming for 1967 has so conc entrated scarce resources in the 11-point Ap Doi Moi that the GVN presence and s ervices are spread very thin indeed in areas of lower priority. The fact that in general each RD team will remain in each hamlet for six months throughout the y ear, is a fundamental improvement in the program. As a result of the finer defin ition of the intent of RD and more interest in its possibilities, the 1967 progr am has become more vital than its predecessors. This vitality has produced new i deas, an increasing flexibility, which marks important progress in the program. Moreover, what the country has been engaged in is the process of laying a base f or

development; a long drawn out process which sees little initial reward, but with out which nothing of permanence will be achieved. In other words, the first quar ter of the year has not been witness to a vital social revolution, but has inste ad found evidence of a growing understanding of the nature of the revolution to come, and in so doing has taken a further step in the painful process of buildin g a nation. With the formation of CORDS, this history becomes current events. CO RDS is charged now with solving what have previously been unsolvable problems- e nergizing the GVN to do things which it is not as interested in as we are; winni ng the hearts and minds of people who do not understand us or speak our language ; working under intense pressure for immediate results in a field in which succe ss-if possible at all-may require years. We have concentrated on the history of the United States bureaucracy in this study because that, in retrospect, seems t o have been where the push for pacification came from-not the Vietnamese. We hav e not been able to analyze properly the actual course of the effort in the field , where contradictory assessments of progress have plagued the U.S. In the final section which follows, we try to draw a few lessons from the course of events d escribed in this study. When completed, CORDS had produced a structure in which, regardless of civil-military tensions that cannot be wished away, all hands wer e working together under a single chain of command. The structure was massive, s o massive that the Vietnamese were in danger of being almost forgotten-and for t hat there can be no excuse. But at least the Mission was better run and better o rganized than it had ever been before, and this fact may in time lead to a more efficient and successful effort. Without a unified voice in dealing with the Vie tnamese, we can never hope to influence the GVN to do the things we believe that they must do to save their own country.