Rel:

01/11/2013

Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1110176

Ex p a r t e Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In r e : Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom v. S t a t e o f Alabama) (Coffee C i r c u i t Court, CC-09-395; Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals, CR-09-1148)

1110219

Ex p a r t e Amanda H e l a i n e Borden Kimbrough PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In r e : Amanda H e l a i n e Borden Kimbrough v. S t a t e o f Alabama) ( C o l b e r t C i r c u i t Court, CC-08-381; Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals, CR-09-0485)

PARKER, J u s t i c e . Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom a n d Amanda H e l a i n e B o r d e n K i m b r o u g h ("the p e t i t i o n e r s " ) e a c h p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t f o r a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i t o review the Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals' decisions in their cases. We g r a n t e d of which Court's t h e p e t i t i o n s and c o n s o l i d a t e d of f i r s t

these

cases, each

p r e s e n t s t h e same i s s u e

impression

for this

c o n s i d e r a t i o n : Whether t h e term

" c h i l d " as u s e d i n 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975 ("the c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e " ) , i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d . that i t does a n d t h a t the Court Concluding reached

of C r i m i n a l Appeals

1 1 1 0 1 7 6 ; 1110219 t h e c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n i n b o t h c a s e s , we a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t s o f the Court of C r i m i n a l I. Facts The Ankrom's Court Appeals. and P r o c e d u r a l Appeals History recounted the facts of

of C r i m i n a l

c a s e as f o l l o w s i n i t s o p i n i o n : the parties

"At the g u i l t y - p l e a hearing, s t i p u l a t e d to the f o l l o w i n g f a c t s :

"'On J a n u a r y 31, 2009, t h e d e f e n d a n t , Hope Ankrom, gave b i r t h t o a s o n , [B.W.], at Medical Center E n t e r p r i s e . Medical records showed that [Ankrom] tested p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine p r i o r to g i v i n g b i r t h and t h a t t h e c h i l d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine a f t e r b i r t h . " ' D e p a r t m e n t o f Human R e s o u r c e s w o r k e r A s h l e y A r n o l d became i n v o l v e d and d e v e l o p e d a plan f o r the care of the c h i l d . During the i n v e s t i g a t i o n [Ankrom] admitted to A s h l e y t h a t she h a d u s e d m a r i j u a n a w h i l e she was p r e g n a n t b u t d e n i e d u s i n g c o c a i n e . " ' M e d i c a l r e c o r d s f r o m h e r d o c t o r show that he documented a substance abuse problem s e v e r a l times during her pregnancy and she h a d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e and m a r i j u a n a on more t h a n one o c c a s i o n d u r i n g her pregnancy.' "On F e b r u a r y 18, 2009, Ankrom was a r r e s t e d a n d c h a r g e d w i t h c h e m i c a l endangerment o f a c h i l d . On A u g u s t 25, 2009, t h e g r a n d j u r y i n d i c t e d Ankrom. The indictment stated that Ankrom ' d i d knowingly, recklessly, or i n t e n t i o n a l l y cause or p e r m i t a c h i l d , t o - w i t : [B.W.], a b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f w h i c h i s t o t h e G r a n d J u r y o t h e r w i s e unknown, t o be 3

1 1 1 0 1 7 6 ; 1110219 e x p o s e d t o , t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e , o r t o have c o n t a c t with a c o n t r o l l e d substance, chemical substance, or d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a a s d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-12-260 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a , 1975, t o - w i t : C o c a i n e , i n v i o l a t i o n of Section [26-15-3.2(a)(l)].' "On S e p t e m b e r 25, 2009, Ankrom f i l e d a m o t i o n s t y l e d as a ' M o t i o n t o D i s m i s s I n d i c t m e n t . ' In that m o t i o n , a f t e r s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e f a c t s , Ankrom a r g u e d t h a t ' [ t ] h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f [ 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , ] shows t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d f o r the s t a t u t e t o apply o n l y t o a c h i l d , n o t a f e t u s ' ; t h a t ' c o u r t s i n o t h e r s t a t e s w h i c h have e n a c t e d t h e same o r s i m i l a r c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e s have determined that s u c h s t a t u t e s do n o t a p p l y t o p r e n a t a l c o n d u c t t h a t a l l e g e d l y harms a f e t u s ' ; t h a t '[t]he state's contention that the defendant v i o l a t e d t h i s s t a t u t e renders the law impermissibly vague, and t h e r e f o r e t h e r u l e o f l e n i t y a p p l i e s ' ; t h a t ' [ t ] h e l e g i s l a t u r e has p r e v i o u s l y considered amending t h e s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e p r e n a t a l c o n d u c t t h a t harms a f e t u s , a n d d e c l i n e d t o do s o ' ; t h a t ' t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t been a c c o r d e d due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e t h e r e was no n o t i c e t h a t h e r c o n d u c t was i l l e g a l under t h i s s t a t u t e ' ; t h a t ' [ t ] h e p r o s e c u t i o n of pregnant women is a violation of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee o f E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n ' ; and that ' [ p ] r o s e c u t i o n of pregnant, a l l e g e d l y druga d d i c t e d women i s a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r numerous m o r a l a n d e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . ' The S t a t e r e s p o n d e d t o t h a t m o t i o n on O c t o b e r 13, 2009. In the State's r e s p o n s e , i t a g r e e d t h a t on J a n u a r y 31, 2009, Ankrom gave b i r t h t o a s o n a n d t h a t m e d i c a l r e c o r d s showed t h a t Ankrom t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o g i v i n g b i r t h and t h a t t h e c h i l d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine a f t e r b i r t h . B a s e d on t h a t c o n d u c t , t h e S t a t e a r g u e d t h a t p r o s e c u t i o n o f Ankrom was p r o p e r u n d e r 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 , A l a . Code 1975. On O c t o b e r 15, 2009, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d Ankrom's motion.

1110176; 1110219 "On A p r i l 1, 2010, Ankrom p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o a v i o l a t i o n o f 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975." Ankrom v. S t a t e , (Ala. [Ms. CR-09-1148, Aug. 26, 2011] Ankrom was s e n t e n c e d So. 3d to three

C r i m . App. 2 0 1 1 ) .

years i n p r i s o n ,

b u t h e r s e n t e n c e was s u s p e n d e d Ankrom,

a n d she was .

p l a c e d on p r o b a t i o n f o r one y e a r .

So. 3d a t

I n i t s u n p u b l i s h e d memorandum i n K i m b r o u g h v . S t a t e (No. CR-09-0485, S e p t . 23, 2 0 1 1 ) , ___ So. 3d 2011) (table), the Court of Criminal ( A l a . C r i m . App. recounted the

Appeals

f a c t s o f K i m b r o u g h ' s c a s e as f o l l o w s : "In September 2008, Amanda H e l a i n e Borden K i m b r o u g h was i n d i c t e d f o r t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t of a c h i l d t h a t r e s u l t e d i n death, a v i o l a t i o n of 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975. The i n d i c t m e n t stated: "'The g r a n d j u r y o f s a i d c o u n t y c h a r g e that, before the f i n d i n g of theindictment, Amanda H e l a i n e B o r d e n K i m b r o u g h , whose name i s o t h e r w i s e unknown t o t h e G r a n d J u r y t h a n as s t a t e d , ... d i d k n o w i n g l y , r e c k l e s s l y , or i n t e n t i o n a l l y cause o r p e r m i t a c h i l d , Timmy Wayne K i m b r o u g h , t o be e x p o s e d t o , t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e , o r t o have c o n t a c t w i t h a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine, and the exposure, ingestion, i n h a l a t i o n , or contact r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e a t h o f Timmy Wayne K i m b r o u g h , i n v i o l a t i o n o f [] 26-15-3.2 o f t h e Code o f Alabama [1975], a g a i n s t t h e peace and d i g n i t y of the State of Alabama.'

1110176; 1110219 "Kimbrough, t h r o u g h r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l , filed s e v e r a l p r e t r i a l motions, i n c l u d i n g four motions to d i s m i s s the i n d i c t m e n t . In her motions t o d i s m i s s , K i m b r o u g h a l l e g e d : (1) t h a t t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n 26-15-3.2 d i d n o t i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d , and t h e r e f o r e , h e r c o n d u c t i n s m o k i n g methamphetamine w h i l e pregnant d i d not c o n s t i t u t e the o f f e n s e of the chemical endangerment of a child; (2) that prosecuting her for violating 26-15-3.2 for c o n d u c t t h a t o c c u r r e d d u r i n g h e r p r e g n a n c y when, she says, t h a t conduct d i d not c o n s t i t u t e the o f f e n s e of chemical endangerment of a c h i l d , v i o l a t e d the doctrine of separation of powers; (3) that i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n 26-15-3.2 t o i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d r e n d e r e d t h e s t a t u t e v o i d f o r v a g u e n e s s and v i o l a t e d h e r d u e - p r o c e s s r i g h t t o n o t i c e t h a t h e r c o n d u c t was p r o s c r i b e d ; and (4) t h a t i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n 26-15-3.2 t o i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d v i o l a t e d h e r r i g h t t o e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n under the law. The t r i a l c o u r t denied t h e m o t i o n s w i t h o u t comment. "Kimbrough initially proceeded to trial; however, a f t e r the t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d her m o t i o n f o r a judgment of a c q u i t t a l at the c l o s e of the S t a t e ' s case, Kimbrough r e a c h e d a p l e a agreement w i t h the S t a t e , and t h e j u r y was d i s m i s s e d . Pursuant to the p l e a agreement, Kimbrough p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o the c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t o f a c h i l d as c h a r g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t s e n t e n c e d h e r t o 10 y e a r s ' imprisonment. "Before e n t e r i n g her g u i l t y p l e a , Kimbrough's counsel expressly reserved Kimbrough's r i g h t to appeal s e v e r a l i s s u e s , namely: and " ' C o l b e r t County being improper j u r i s d i c t i o n . i m p r o p e r venue

"'The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue with an u n b o r n c h i l d i s n o t c o v e r e d by [ 26-15 3.2, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ] . 6

1110176; 1110219 "'The d e n i a l o f i n d i g e n c y s t a t u s on her b e h a l f f o r the purposes of expert witnesses. The p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h i s s t a t u t e shows t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d the s t a t u t e t o apply o n l y t o a c h i l d and n o t an u n b o r n c h i l d . T h i s s t a t u t e i s vague and impermissibly vague. And t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has d e c l i n e d t o pass a s t a t u t e t h a t w o u l d i n c l u d e an u n b o r n c h i l d i n t h i s type o f s i t u a t i o n . A n d t h a t [Kimbrough] has n o t been a f f o r d e d due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e t h e r e was no n o t i c e t o h e r t h a t t h e c o n d u c t was i l l e g a l u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e . "'The p r o s e c u t i o n o f p r e g n a n t women i s a v i o l a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n [sic] of the g u a r a n t y o f e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n . And t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f a p r e g n a n t a d d i c t e d woman i s against public policy f o r e t h i c a l and morale [ s i c ] reasons. A n d [Kimbrough] i s not a r e [ s p o n s i b l e ] p e r s o n as d e f i n e d under the s t a t u t e . "'And anything else I objected to.'

"The record reflects the following facts. S h o r t l y b e f o r e 10 a.m. on A p r i l 29, 2008, K i m b r o u g h was a d m i t t e d t o t h e H e l e n K e l l e r H o s p i t a l i n C o l b e r t County e x p e r i e n c i n g l a b o r p a i n s . She was 25 weeks and 5 d a y s p r e g n a n t a t t h e t i m e . Her o b s t e t r i c i a n , D r . F.C. G a p u l t o s , J r . , d i a g n o s e d h e r w i t h p r e t e r m l a b o r and ' o c c u l t c o r d p r o l a p s e , ' a c o n d i t i o n i n which t h e u m b i l i c a l cord descends through t h e b i r t h canal before the fetus, r e s u l t i n g i n the blood flow through the u m b i l i c a l cord being c u t o f f . Dr. Gapultos also ordered a urine drug screen on Kimbrough, which came back positive for methamphetamine. Both Dr. Gapultos and t h e biological father o f Kimbrough's unborn child c o n f r o n t e d h e r a b o u t u s i n g methamphetamine w h i l e

1110176;

1110219 methamphetamine

pregnant, b u t Kimbrough denied u s i n g w h i l e she was p r e g n a n t .

"A C a e s a r i a n s e c t i o n was p e r f o r m e d on K i m b r o u g h and, a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1:21 p.m., she d e l i v e r e d a baby b o y she named Timmy Wayne K i m b r o u g h ('Timmy'). Timmy was n o t b r e a t h i n g when he was b o r n ; he was b l u e ; a n d h i s h e a r t r a t e was l o w f o r a newborn i n f a n t , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 80 b e a t s p e r m i n u t e . P e d i a t r i c s t a f f who were p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e C a e s a r i a n s e c t i o n immediately began m a n u a l r e s u s c i t a t i o n e f f o r t s on Timmy. I n i t i a l l y , Timmy i m p r o v e d , w i t h h i s h e a r t r a t e r i s i n g above 100 b e a t s p e r m i n u t e a n d h i s c o l o r b e c o m i n g more p i n k i s h . Timmy was i n t u b a t e d a n d placed on a v e n t i l a t o r . However, after the i n t u b a t i o n , Timmy's c o n d i t i o n d e c l i n e d r a p i d l y a n d he d i e d a t 1:40 p.m., 19 m i n u t e s a f t e r he was b o r n . "The p e d i a t r i c i a n who t r e a t e d Timmy o p i n e d t h a t he h a d d i e d f r o m ' r e s p i r a t o r y a r r e s t s e c o n d a r y t o prematurity.' However, D r . E m i l y Ward, a m e d i c a l examiner w i t h t h e Alabama Department o f F o r e n s i c Sciences who performed an autopsy on Timmy, determined that Timmy had died from 'acute methamphetamine i n t o x i c a t i o n . ' A t o x i c o l o g y s c r e e n c o n d u c t e d on Timmy's b l o o d a n d a s a m p l e o f h i s l i v e r t i s s u e showed t h a t he h a d b o t h methamphetamine a n d amphetamine, a 'metabolite of methamphetamine' produced when the body 'converts' the methamphetamine i n t o amphetamine, i n h i s s y s t e m . "The Colbert County Department o f Human R e s o u r c e s ('DHR') was n o t i f i e d r e g a r d i n g K i m b r o u g h ' s t e s t i n g p o s i t i v e f o r methamphetamine a n d Timmy's death, and Kimbrough's o t h e r two c h i l d r e n w e r e t e m p o r a r i l y removed f r o m h e r home a n d p l a c e d w i t h K i m b r o u g h ' s m o t h e r . A DHR s o c i a l w o r k e r s p o k e w i t h Kimbrough r e g a r d i n g a s a f e t y p l a n f o r h e r c h i l d r e n on two occasions. During one of those conversations, Kimbrough admitted that she h a d smoked methamphetamine w i t h a f r i e n d t h r e e d a y s b e f o r e she h a d e x p e r i e n c e d l a b o r p a i n s . In J u l y 8

1110176; 1110219 2008, a f t e r h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n w o u l d be s a f e i n K i m b r o u g h ' s home, DHR returned Kimbrough's c h i l d r e n t o h e r c u s t o d y . " K i m b r o u g h was s e n t e n c e d t o 10 y e a r s i n p r i s o n a n d a p p e a l e d h e r c o n v i c t i o n and sentence b e f o r e h e r s c h e d u l e d p r o b a t i o n could be h e l d ; however the record indicates that hearing she h a s

r e m a i n e d f r e e on b o n d d u r i n g

her appeal. convictions to the that

Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h a p p e a l e d t h e i r Court of Criminal Appeals.

In i t s opinion

i n Ankrom,

c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e word " c h i l d " i n t h e chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i n c l u d e d an u n b o r n child:

"Ankrom a l l e g e s t h a t t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975, does n o t i n c l u d e a v i a b l e f e t u s . The S t a t e r e s p o n d s t h a t t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m ' c h i l d , ' as u s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e , i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d . " ' P r i n c i p l e s of statutory construction i n s t r u c t t h i s Court t o i n t e r p r e t the p l a i n language of a s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d t o engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n only i f the language i n the s t a t u t e i s ambiguous.' Ex p a r t e P r a t t , 815 So. 2d 532, 535 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . '[T]he fundamental r u l e [ i s ] that criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State.' Ex p a r t e Hyde, 778 So. 2d 237, 239 n.2 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . 'The " r u l e o f l e n i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t 'ambiguous c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e [ s ] ... be c o n s t r u e d i n favor of the accused.'"' Ex p a r t e B e r t r a m , 884 So. 2d 889, 892 ( A l a . 2003) ( q u o t i n g C a s t i l l o v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 530 U.S. 120, 131, 120 S . C t . 2090, 147 L . E d . 2d 94 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ) .

1110176; 1110219 " ' A l t h o u g h p e n a l s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y construed, c o u r t s are not r e q u i r e d t o abandon common s e n s e . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. G r e e n , 446 F.2d 1169, 1173 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) . A b s e n t any i n d i c a t i o n t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e words must be g i v e n t h e i r o r d i n a r y and normal meaning. Day v. S t a t e , 378 So. 2d 1156, 1158 (Ala. Cr. App.), r e v e r s e d on other grounds, 378 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1979).' " W a l k e r v. S t a t e , App. 1982) . 428 So. 2d 139, 141 (Ala. Crim.

"The l e g i s l a t u r e has s t a t e d t h a t ' [ t ] h e p u b l i c p o l i c y of the S t a t e of Alabama i s t o p r o t e c t l i f e , born, and unborn. This is particularly true c o n c e r n i n g unborn l i f e t h a t i s capable of l i v i n g o u t s i d e t h e womb.' 2 6 - 2 2 - 1 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975. C h a p t e r 15 o f T i t l e 26, A l a . Code 1975, does n o t d e f i n e the term ' c h i l d . ' However, C h a p t e r s 14 and 16 o f T i t l e 26, A l a . Code 1975, d e f i n e a ' c h i l d ' as a ' p e r s o n ' u n d e r t h e age o f 18 y e a r s . 26-14-1(3), A l a . Code 1975; 2 6 - 1 6 - 2 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975. " A l s o , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has i n t e r p r e t e d t h e t e r m 'minor c h i l d ' i n A l a b a m a ' s w r o n g f u l - d e a t h of-minor s t a t u t e to include a v i a b l e fetus that received p r e n a t a l i n j u r i e s causing death before a live birth. E i c h v. Town o f G u l f S h o r e s , 293 A l a . 95, 300 So. 2d 354 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Court h e l d t h a t 'the p a r e n t s o f an e i g h t and one-half month o l d s t i l l b o r n f e t u s [ a r e ] e n t i t l e d t o m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f t h e child'; thus, the Court e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d the v i a b l e f e t u s as a ' c h i l d . ' E i c h , 293 A l a . a t 100, 300 So. 2d a t 358. "Furthermore, the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of a word p r o v i d e s the meaning o r d i n a r y p e o p l e would g i v e the word. C a r p e t I n s t a l l a t i o n & S u p p l i e s of G l e n c o v. A l f a Mut. I n s . Co., 628 So. 2d 560, 562 (Ala. 10

1110176; 1110219 1993) . A c c o r d i n g t o Merriam-Webster's Collegiate D i c t i o n a r y 214 ( 1 1 t h e d . 2 0 0 3 ) , t h e w o r d ' c h i l d ' i s d e f i n e d as 'an u n b o r n o r r e c e n t l y b o r n p e r s o n . ' The w o r d ' c h i l d ' i s d e f i n e d i n B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 254 ( 8 t h e d . 2 0 0 4 ) , as '[a] b a b y o r f e t u s . ' "The p r e s e n t c a s e W h i t n e r v. S t a t e , 328 We f i n d t h e r e a s o n i n g Court i n t h a t case t o i s s i m i l a r to the s i t u a t i o n i n S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . o f t h e S o u t h C a r o l i n a Supreme be p e r s u a s i v e .

"In Whitner, a mother p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o c r i m i n a l c h i l d neglect, a v i o l a t i o n o f S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-50 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , f o r c a u s i n g h e r b a b y t o be b o r n w i t h c o c a i n e m e t a b o l i t e s i n i t s s y s t e m by r e a s o n o f t h e mother's i n g e s t i o n of c r a c k c o c a i n e d u r i n g the t h i r d t r i m e s t e r of her pregnancy. On a p p e a l , t h e S o u t h C a r o l i n a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e m o t h e r h a d been p r o p e r l y c o n v i c t e d of the charge. S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-50 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , p r o v i d e d i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : 'Any p e r s o n h a v i n g t h e l e g a l c u s t o d y o f any c h i l d ... , who s h a l l , w i t h o u t l a w f u l e x c u s e , r e f u s e o r n e g l e c t t o p r o v i d e ... t h e p r o p e r c a r e and a t t e n t i o n f o r s u c h c h i l d ... , so t h a t t h e l i f e , h e a l t h o r c o m f o r t o f s u c h c h i l d ... i s e n d a n g e r e d o r i s l i k e l y t o be endangered, s h a l l be g u i l t y o f a m i s d e m e a n o r a n d s h a l l be p u n i s h e d w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e c i r c u i t court.' W h i t n e r , 328 S.C. a t 5, 492 S.E.2d a t 77 9. The i s s u e on a p p e a l was w h e t h e r that s t a t u t e encompassed m a t e r n a l a c t s t h a t endanger or were l i k e l y t o e n d a n g e r t h e l i f e , h e a l t h , o r c o m f o r t of a v i a b l e f e t u s . I d . The C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t "'[u]nder [South C a r o l i n a ' s ] Children's Code, " c h i l d " means a " p e r s o n u n d e r t h e age o f e i g h t e e n . " S.C. Code Ann. 2 0 - 7 - 3 0 ( 1 ) (1985). The question for this Court, t h e r e f o r e , i s whether a v i a b l e f e t u s i s a "person" f o r purposes of the C h i l d r e n ' s Code.' "328 S.C. a t 6, 492 S.E.2d a t 11 779.

1110176; 1110219 "The S o u t h C a r o l i n a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t v i a b l e f e t u s i s a c h i l d u n d e r S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-50 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , r e a s o n i n g : "'South Carolina law has long recognized that v i a b l e fetuses are persons holding certain legal rights and privileges. I n 1960, t h i s C o u r t d e c i d e d H a l l v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960). That case concerned the a p p l i c a t i o n of South C a r o l i n a ' s w r o n g f u l d e a t h s t a t u t e t o an i n f a n t who d i e d f o u r hours a f t e r her b i r t h as a r e s u l t of injuries sustained prenatally during viability. The A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e d t h a t a v i a b l e f e t u s was n o t a p e r s o n w i t h i n t h e purview of the w r o n g f u l death statute, because, i n t e r a l i a , a f e t u s i s thought to have no s e p a r a t e b e i n g a p a r t f r o m the mother. "'We f o u n d s u c h a r e a s o n f o r e x c l u s i o n from recovery "unsound, illogical and unjust," and concluded t h e r e was "no m e d i c a l o r o t h e r b a s i s " f o r t h e "assumed identity" o f m o t h e r and v i a b l e unborn child. I d . a t 262, 113 S.E.2d a t 793. In light of that conclusion, this Court u n a n i m o u s l y h e l d : "We have no d i f f i c u l t y i n concluding that a fetus having reached that p e r i o d o f p r e n a t a l m a t u r i t y where i t i s capable of independent l i f e a p a r t from i t s mother i s a p e r s o n . " I d . a t 263, 113 S.E.2d a t 793 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . "'Four years later, i n Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 ( 1 9 6 4 ) , we i n t e r p r e t e d H a l l as s u p p o r t i n g a finding that a viable fetus injured while s t i l l i n t h e womb n e e d n o t be b o r n a l i v e f o r a n o t h e r t o m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n f o r t h e wrongful death of the f e t u s . 12

1110176;

1110219 "'"Since a v i a b l e c h i l d i s a p e r s o n b e f o r e s e p a r a t i o n from the body o f i t s m o t h e r and since prenatal injuries tortiously i n f l i c t e d on s u c h a c h i l d a r e a c t i o n a b l e , i t i s apparent that the c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e s such an ' a c t , n e g l e c t o r d e f a u l t ' by t h e defendant, to the i n j u r y of the child
" ' "

"'"Once t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e u n b o r n , v i a b l e c h i l d as a p e r s o n is accepted, we have no difficulty i n holding that a cause of a c t i o n for tortious i n j u r y t o such a c h i l d a r i s e s i m m e d i a t e l y upon t h e i n f l i c t i o n of the i n j u r y . " "'Id. a t 613, 138 S.E.2d a t 44 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . F o w l e r makes p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r t h a t H a l l r e s t e d on t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e v i a b l e f e t u s as a p e r s o n v e s t e d w i t h l e g a l rights. "'More r e c e n t l y , we h e l d t h e w o r d " p e r s o n " as u s e d i n a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e includes viable fetuses. S t a t e v. H o r n e , 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984), c o n c e r n e d South C a r o l i n a ' s murder s t a t u t e , S.C. Code Ann. 16-3-10 (1976). The defendant i n t h a t case stabbed h i s w i f e , who was n i n e months' p r e g n a n t , i n t h e n e c k , arms, and abdomen. Although doctors p e r f o r m e d an e m e r g e n c y c a e s a r e a n s e c t i o n t o d e l i v e r the c h i l d , the c h i l d d i e d while still i n t h e womb. The d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of v o l u n t a r y manslaughter and a p p e a l e d h i s c o n v i c t i o n on t h e g r o u n d S o u t h 13

1110176; 1110219 Carolina did feticide. not recognize the crime of

"'This Court disagreed. In a u n a n i m o u s d e c i s i o n , we h e l d i t w o u l d be " g r o s s l y i n c o n s i s t e n t ... to construe a v i a b l e f e t u s as a ' p e r s o n ' f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of imposing c i v i l l i a b i l i t y w h i l e r e f u s i n g to g i v e i t a s i m i l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n the criminal context." I d . a t 447, 319 S.E.2d a t 704 ( c i t i n g F o w l e r v. Woodward, s u p r a ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , the Court r e c o g n i z e d the crime of f e t i c i d e w i t h r e s p e c t to v i a b l e f e t u s e s . "'Similarly, we do not see any r a t i o n a l basis for f i n d i n g a v i a b l e fetus i s not a "person" i n the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . I n d e e d , i t w o u l d be a b s u r d t o r e c o g n i z e t h e v i a b l e f e t u s as a p e r s o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f h o m i c i d e l a w s and w r o n g f u l d e a t h s t a t u t e s but not for purposes of statutes p r o s c r i b i n g c h i l d abuse. Our h o l d i n g i n H a l l that a v i a b l e fetus i s a person rested p r i m a r i l y on t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d "person" in light of e x i s t i n g medical knowledge c o n c e r n i n g f e t a l development. We do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d " p e r s o n " has c h a n g e d i n any way t h a t w o u l d now deny v i a b l e f e t u s e s s t a t u s as p e r s o n s . "'The policies enunciated in the Children's Code a l s o s u p p o r t o u r p l a i n meaning r e a d i n g of "person." S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-20(C) ( 1 9 8 5 ) , w h i c h d e s c r i b e s South Carolina's policy concerning c h i l d r e n , e x p r e s s l y s t a t e s : " I t s h a l l be the p o l i c y of t h i s S t a t e to c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f c h i l d r e n ' s p r o b l e m s as t h e most i m p o r t a n t s t r a t e g y w h i c h can be planned and implemented on behalf of c h i l d r e n and t h e i r f a m i l i e s . " (emphasis 14

1110176; 1110219 a d d e d ) . The abuse o r n e g l e c t o f a c h i l d a t any time d u r i n g c h i l d h o o d can e x a c t a p r o f o u n d t o l l on t h e c h i l d h e r s e l f as w e l l as on s o c i e t y as a w h o l e . However, t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f abuse o r n e g l e c t which takes place a f t e r b i r t h often pale in c o m p a r i s o n t o t h o s e r e s u l t i n g f r o m abuse s u f f e r e d by t h e v i a b l e f e t u s b e f o r e b i r t h . This policy of prevention supports a r e a d i n g of the word "person" to include v i a b l e f e t u s e s . Furthermore, the scope of t h e C h i l d r e n ' s Code i s q u i t e b r o a d . It a p p l i e s " t o a l l c h i l d r e n who have n e e d o f services." S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-20(B) (1985) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . When c o u p l e d w i t h the comprehensive r e m e d i a l purposes of the Code, t h i s l a n g u a g e s u p p o r t s t h e i n f e r e n c e t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d to i n c l u d e v i a b l e f e t u s e s w i t h i n the scope of the Code's p r o t e c t i o n . ' " W h i t n e r , 328 S.C. a t 6-8, 492 S.E.2d a t 779-81.

" L i k e w i s e , i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , we do n o t see any reason to h o l d t h a t a v i a b l e f e t u s i s not i n c l u d e d i n t h e t e r m ' c h i l d , ' as t h a t t e r m i s u s e d i n 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975. Not o n l y have t h e c o u r t s of t h i s S t a t e i n t e r p r e t e d the term ' c h i l d ' to include a v i a b l e fetus i n other contexts, the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of the term ' c h i l d ' e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n p e r s o n o r a f e t u s . In everyday usage, there i s n o t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y about u s i n g the term ' c h i l d ' to i n c l u d e a v i a b l e f e t u s . For e x a m p l e , i t i s n o t uncommon f o r someone t o s t a t e t h a t a mother i s p r e g n a n t w i t h her f i r s t 'child.' Unless the legislature specifically states o t h e r w i s e , t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i s s i m p l y a more g e n e r a l t e r m t h a t e n c o m p a s s e s t h e more s p e c i f i c t e r m ' v i a b l e fetus.' I f the l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s to p r o s c r i b e conduct a g a i n s t only a 'viable fetus,' i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o use t h a t s p e c i f i c t e r m . However, i f the l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s to p r o s c r i b e conduct a g a i n s t 15

1110176; 1110219 a viable fetus age, t h e t e r m meaning. In ' c h i l d ' and a and a l l other persons under a c e r t a i n ' c h i l d ' i s s u f f i c i e n t t o convey t h a t f a c t , p r o s c r i b i n g conduct against a ' v i a b l e f e t u s ' w o u l d be r e d u n d a n t .

"The t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975, i s unambiguous; thus, this Court must i n t e r p r e t t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d n o t engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the language i n the s t a t u t e . Also, because t h e s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, t h e r u l e o f l e n i t y does n o t a p p l y . We do n o t s e e any r a t i o n a l basis f o r concluding t h a t t h e p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' does n o t i n c l u d e a viable fetus." Ankrom, Criminal So. 3d a t Appeals affirmed . Citing Ankrom, the Court of i n an

Kimbrough's

conviction

u n p u b l i s h e d memorandum. As n o t e d , b o t h Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h s e p a r a t e l y p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i , a l l e g i n g that the issue respective

d e c i d e d by t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s i n t h e i r cases presented a m a t e r i a l this Court. II. "We review Standard o f Review of giving statutory no question of f i r s t

impression f o r

questions de novo,

construction to the

and trial

interpretation

deference

court's conclusions. 1989)."

G r e e n e v . Thompson, 554 So. 2d 376 ( A l a .

P i t t s v. G a n g i , 896 So. 2d 433, 434 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) .

16

1110176; 1110219 III. Ankrom and Kimbrough Discussion were convicted of violating the

c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e by c a u s i n g t h e i r u n b o r n c h i l d r e n to ingest a controlled cases are not substance. disputed; The thus, facts the of the issue

petitioners' before

only

t h i s C o u r t i s whether the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e We c o n c l u d e t h a t i t does.

governs the p e t i t i o n e r s ' conduct. The 1975,

c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e , 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code

provides: "(a) A r e s p o n s i b l e p e r s o n commits t h e c r i m e o f c h e m i c a l endangerment of e x p o s i n g a c h i l d t o an e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h he o r she does any o f the following: "(1) Knowingly, recklessly, i n t e n t i o n a l l y causes or p e r m i t s a c h i l d be e x p o s e d t o , [ ] t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e ,
1 1

or to or

We n o t e t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e w o r d " e x p o s e " i s n o t d e f i n e d i n t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e and none o f t h e p a r t i e s have r a i s e d t h e m e a n i n g o f t h a t w o r d as an i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e , t h a t w o r d i n a s i m i l a r s t a t u t e i n a n o t h e r s t a t e has been i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean p l a c i n g a c h i l d i n a s i t u a t i o n t h a t i n v o l v e s a r i s k o f p h y s i c a l harm. See S t a t e v. G a l l e g o s , 171 P.3d 426, 430 (Utah 2007) : "We a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t s ' a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e r e must be an a c t u a l r i s k o f harm t o a c h i l d i n o r d e r f o r conduct to c o n s t i t u t e 'exposure' under the statute. ... "... I f t h e mere p r e s e n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , o f a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e i n t h e same room o r h o u s e w i t h 17

1110176; 1110219 to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Section 13A-12-260. A v i o l a t i o n under this subdivision i s a Class C felony. "(2) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d a c h i l d s u f f e r s s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y by exposure t o , i n g e s t i o n o f , i n h a l a t i o n o f , or c o n t a c t w i t h a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , chemical substance, or drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a . A v i o l a t i o n under t h i s s u b d i v i s i o n i s a Class B felony. "(3) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d t h e exposure, i n g e s t i o n , i n h a l a t i o n , or contact r e s u l t s i n the death of the c h i l d . A v i o l a t i o n under t h i s s u b d i v i s i o n i s a C l a s s A felony. "(b) The c o u r t s h a l l impose p u n i s h m e n t p u r s u a n t to t h i s s e c t i o n r a t h e r than imposing punishment a u t h o r i z e d u n d e r any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n o f l a w , u n l e s s another p r o v i s i o n of law provides f o r a greater p e n a l t y or a l o n g e r term of imprisonment. "(c) I t i s an a f f i r m a t i v e defense to a violation of t h i s section that the c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e was p r o v i d e d by l a w f u l p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e c h i l d , a n d t h a t i t was a d m i n i s t e r e d t o t h e c h i l d i n accordance with the p r e s c r i p t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n s provided with the c o n t r o l l e d substance."

c h i l d r e n c o n s t i t u t e s e n d a n g e r m e n t , many i n n o c e n t p o s s e s s o r s o f l e g a l p r e s c r i p t i o n drugs i n secure p l a c e s i n t h e i r homes w o u l d be c o m m i t t i n g f e l o n i e s under the s t a t u t e . C h i l d r e n a r e n o t 'exposed t o ' s u b s t a n c e s t h e y c a n n o t a c q u i r e o r be harmed b y e v e n t h o u g h t h e y may be u n d e r t h e same r o o f w i t h them." 18

1110176; The First,

1110219 petitioners raise three main arguments on of appeal. Criminal

the p e t i t i o n e r s

argue

that

the Court

A p p e a l s m i s a p p l i e d t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e i n Ankrom when i t applied that statute t o the use o f a resulted controlled

s u b s t a n c e by a p r e g n a n t woman t h a t of t h a t

i n the ingestion Next, the

c o n t r o l l e d substance by h e r unborn c h i l d .

p e t i t i o n e r s argue t h a t t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s ' d e c i s i o n in Ankrom i s bad p u b l i c policy. Finally, the p e t i t i o n e r s i n Ankrom

argue t h a t

the Court of Criminal

Appeals' decision

v i o l a t e s both the United States Constitution Constitution. A.

and t h e Alabama

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED IN ANKROM WHEN IT APPLIED THE CHEMICAL-ENDANGERMENT STATUTE TO THE USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BY A PREGNANT WOMAN THAT RESULTED I N THE INGESTION OF THAT CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BY HER UNBORN CHILD. The petitioners present seven arguments i n support of

t h e i r p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e does n o t protect 1. unborn children. as u s e d i n the chemical-endangerment child.

The w o r d

"child,"

statute,

does n o t i n c l u d e

an u n b o r n

19

1110176; 1110219 Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t " [ t ] h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n t e n d f o r the term 'child' to as used in [the an chemical-endangerment child," Ankrom's the word

statute] brief, intent 'child'

impliedly and states

include that

unborn

a t 6, of

this

" C o u r t must d e t e r m i n e meaning to the

the that

l e g i s l a t u r e and comports with

ascribe the

legislature's

intent."

Ankrom's b r i e f , a t 8-9.

She a r g u e s t h a t " [ c ] r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s sought

a r e t o be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d i n f a v o r o f t h o s e p e r s o n s to be subjected to their operation" and that to at

" a l l doubts in

concerning favor of

statutory the

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are Ankrom's brief,

predominate 7.

accused."

Similarly, any

Kimbrough argues t h a t "[b]ecause t h i s i s a c r i m i n a l case, perceived

a m b i g u i t y i n t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e must In support So. 2d

be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r o f r e v e r s i n g t h e c o n v i c t i o n . "

o f h e r a r g u m e n t , K i m b r o u g h c i t e s Ex p a r t e B e r t r a m , 884 889

( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) , and a r g u e s t h a t t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s

" i n c o r r e c t l y determined t h a t i t need not observe the r u l e of l e n i t y because fetus.' term 24. ... the word [H]owever, i s , at best, ' c h i l d ' p l a i n l y a p p l i e d to a i t s a n a l y s i s demonstrates 'viable that the at

'child'

ambiguous." Kimbrough's b r i e f ,

Thus, K i m b r o u g h a r g u e s , " i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s C o u r t must

20

1110176; 1110219 r e j e c t the [Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals'] d e c i s i o n u s u r p i n g the l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n and r e w r i t i n g Alabama law." brief, In a t 25. Bertram, t h i s Court stated: Kimbrough's

"'A b a s i c r u l e o f r e v i e w i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s i s t h a t c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d i n f a v o r o f t h o s e p e r s o n s s o u g h t t o be s u b j e c t e d t o t h e i r operation, i . e . , defendants. "'Penal statutes are to reach meaning than t h e i r words. no further i n

"'One who commits an a c t w h i c h does n o t come w i t h i n t h e words o f a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e , a c c o r d i n g t o the g e n e r a l and p o p u l a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f those w o r d s , when t h e y a r e n o t u s e d t e c h n i c a l l y , i s n o t t o be p u n i s h e d t h e r e u n d e r , m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e a c t may contravene the p o l i c y of the s t a t u t e . "'No p e r s o n i s t o be made s u b j e c t t o p e n a l s t a t u t e s by i m p l i c a t i o n and a l l doubts c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are t o predominate i n favor of the accused.'" 884 So. 2d a t 891 ( q u o t i n g C l e m e n t s 725 ( A l a . 1979) (citations v. S t a t e , 370 So. 2d 723, emphasis added in

omitted;

Bertram)). In ascertaining the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s intent i n enacting a

statute, t h i s Court w i l l to the language used

f i r s t attempt t o a s s i g n p l a i n meaning As t h e C o u r t o f

by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e .

C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s e x p l a i n e d i n W a l k e r v. S t a t e , 428 So. 2d 139,

21

1110176; 1110219 141 be ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) , " [ a ] l t h o u g h strictly construed, Absent given courts penal statutes are to t o abandon the

are not required

common words

sense. must be

any i n d i c a t i o n t o t h e c o n t r a r y , their ordinary and normal Court

meaning." that i s to

(Citations "[t]he

omitted.)

Similarly, this rule of statutory

has h e l d

fundamental

construction

a s c e r t a i n and give e f f e c t t o the i n t e n t o f the l e g i s l a t u r e i n enacting the statute. should be I f possible, gathered from the i n t e n t the language of the of the

legislature

statute i t s e l f . " So. 2 d 1301, We statute. So. look

V o l k s w a g e n o f A m e r i c a , I n c . v. D i l l a r d , 579 1991). intent i n t h e words Pfizer, of the

1305 ( A l a . first

f o r that

As t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e 1999):

I n c . , 746

2 d 960, 964 ( A l a .

"'When t h e l a n g u a g e o f a s t a t u t e i s p l a i n a n d u n a m b i g u o u s , as i n t h i s c a s e , c o u r t s must e n f o r c e t h e s t a t u t e as w r i t t e n b y g i v i n g t h e w o r d s o f t h e s t a t u t e t h e i r o r d i n a r y p l a i n m e a n i n g -- t h e y must i n t e r p r e t t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s and t h u s g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e a p p a r e n t i n t e n t o f t h e Legislature.' Ex p a r t e T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997). J u s t i c e Houston wrote t h e f o l l o w i n g for t h i s C o u r t i n D e K a l b C o u n t y LP Gas Co. v . S u b u r b a n Gas, I n c . , 729 So. 2d 270 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) : "'In d e t e r m i n i n g t h e meaning o f a statute, t h i s Court looks to the p l a i n

22

1110176; 1110219 meaning o f t h e words as w r i t t e n l e g i s l a t u r e . A s we have s a i d : by t h e

"'"'Words u s e d i n a s t a t u t e must be g i v e n their natural, plain, ordinary, a n d commonly understood meaning, a n d where p l a i n language i s used a court i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t language t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s . I f the language o f t h e s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, then t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l construction and t h e c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must be g i v e n effect.'" " ' B l u e C r o s s & B l u e S h i e l d v . N i e l s e n , 714 So. 2d 293, 296 ( A l a . 1998) ( q u o t i n g IMED C o r p . v . S y s t e m s Eng'g A s s o c s . C o r p . , 602 So. 2d 344, 346 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ) ; s e e a l s o Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy S h e r i f f s ' A s s ' n , 589 So. 2d 687, 689 ( A l a . 19 9 1 ) ; C o a s t a l S t a t e s Gas T r a n s m i s s i o n Co. v. A l a b a m a Pub. S e r v . Comm'n, 524 So. 2d 357, 360 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) ; A l a b a m a Farm B u r e a u Mut. C a s . I n s . Co. v . C i t y o f H a r t s e l l e , 460 So. 2d 1219, 1223 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) ; Dumas B r o t h e r s M f g . Co. v . S o u t h e r n G u a r . I n s . Co., 431 So. 2d 534, 536 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) ; Town o f L o x l e y v . R o s i n t o n W a t e r , Sewer & F i r e P r o t e c t i o n A u t h . , I n c . , 376 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 1979). I t i s t r u e t h a t when l o o k i n g a t a s t a t u t e we m i g h t s o m e t i m e s t h i n k t h a t the ramifications o f t h e words a r e i n e f f i c i e n t o r u n u s u a l . However, i t i s o u r j o b t o s a y what t h e l a w i s , n o t t o s a y what i t s h o u l d be. T h e r e f o r e , o n l y i f t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l way t o i n t e r p r e t t h e words a s s t a t e d w i l l we l o o k b e y o n d t h o s e words t o determine l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . To a p p l y a d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y would turn t h i s Court i n t o 23

1110176;

1110219 a l e g i s l a t i v e body, a n d d o i n g t h a t , o f c o u r s e , w o u l d be u t t e r l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the d o c t r i n e o f s e p a r a t i o n o f powers. See Ex p a r t e T.B. , 698 So. 2d 127, 130 ( A l a . 1997) .'"

Thus, o n l y when l a n g u a g e i n a s t a t u t e i s ambiguous C o u r t engage i n s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n .

will

this

As we s t a t e d i n Ex

p a r t e P r a t t , 815 So. 2d 532, 535 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , " [ p ] r i n c i p l e s o f statutory plain construction instruct this Court to i n t e r p r e t the

l a n g u a g e o f a s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d

t o engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y i f t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e s t a t u t e i s ambiguous." As t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s e x p l a i n e d rule of construction referenced the language of the statute cases i n Ankrom, t h e

i n B e r t r a m a p p l i e s o n l y where i s ambiguous; ordinary, the and

i n question

issue

i n these

i s whether

the p l a i n , includes

normal meaning

o f t h e word " c h i l d "

an u n b o r n

child.

C o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e word " c h i l d " i n t h e chemical-endangerment statute plainly the and unambiguously includes unborn children, i t was

Court of C r i m i n a l

Appeals s t a t e d

i n Ankrom t h a t

d e c l i n i n g t o "engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . "

So. 3d a t

24

1110176; 1110219 Kimbrough argues t h a t "the c h e m i c a l endangerment s t a t u t e , by i t s plain language, does not apply t o unborn children, during a t 10.

p r e g n a n t women, o r t h e b i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s t h a t o c c u r pregnancy, labor, or d e l i v e r y . " Kimbrough's b r i e f ,

K i m b r o u g h a r g u e s t h a t " [ t ] h e r e i s no h i n t i n t h e t e r m s o f t h i s statute as t h e y a r e 'commonly u n d e r s t o o d ' that i t has any

a p p l i c a t i o n t o a p r e g n a n t woman's r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h e r f e t u s . " Kimbrough's b r i e f , ordinary meaning a t 12. of Instead, Kimbrough argues, i n the "[t]he

[the word

'child'

chemicalbeen

endangerment

statute]

i s l i m i t e d t o c h i l d r e n who have

born and t h e r e f o r e

e x i s t i n a world

where t h e y m i g h t come i n

contact w i t h drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a or s o l d . " Kimbrough's b r i e f , also argues

o r p l a c e s where d r u g s a r e made a t 12. "[t]he extrinsic materials

Kimbrough

that

r e l i e d upon b y t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s do n o t s u p p o r t e x p a n d i n g t h e l a w t o h o l d p r e g n a n t women c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e i n r e l a t i o n t o the v i a b l e fetus they c a r r y . " a t 19. Kimbrough's b r i e f ,

She a r g u e s t h a t t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e i s she says, the Court of Criminal Appeals purported a t 19.

ambiguous b e c a u s e , "had plain

to r e s o r t to e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l t o support i t s language interpretation." Kimbrough's brief,

25

1110176; 1110219 T h a t " r e l i a n c e " on t h a t e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l , K i m b r o u g h " c l e a r l y acknowledges endangerment s t a t u t e ] brief, the a t 19. of t h a t the term ' c h i l d ' i n [the i s , at best, ambiguous." argues, chemical-

Kimbrough's even i f the

A d d i t i o n a l l y , Kimbrough Criminal Appeals

argues t h a t ,

Court

correctly

applied

definitions "arbitrary" "selection reading

i t cited, manner, of a

t h o s e d e f i n i t i o n s were s e l e c t e d i n an and their selection demonstrates than a the plain

favorite

definition"

rather

of the s t a t u t e .

Kimbrough's

brief,

a t 15-16.

C o n v e r s e l y , the S t a t e argues t h a t " [ t ] h e p l a i n meaning of the word 'child,' as used in the [chemical-endangerment] The S t a t e a d m i t s t h a t t h e not define the word

s t a t u t e , i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d . " chemical-endangerment "child," but i t argues statute that "an does

unborn

child

i s a person."

C i t i n g t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n i n Carpet I n s t a l l a t i o n & Supplies o f G l e n c o e v. A l f a M u t u a l I n s u r a n c e Co., (Ala. 1993), the State argues that 628 So. 2d 560, C o u r t has 562

"[t]his

stated

t h a t the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of a word p r o v i d e s the meaning ordinary people give the word." The State Law and then cites

definitions 271 (9th

of the word " c h i l d " 2009) ("[a] baby

from B l a c k ' s or fetus"),

Dictionary Merriam-

ed.

26

1110176; 1110219 Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 214 (11th ed. 2008) ("an

unborn or r e c e n t l y born p e r s o n " ) . 8.

S t a t e ' s b r i e f i n Ankrom, a t

As t h e d e f i n i t i o n s c i t e d by t h e S t a t e i n d i c a t e , t h e p l a i n meaning of the word " c h i l d " children born unborn and i s b r o a d enough t o encompass a l l -including Ankrom's us. As and the

unborn

Kimbrough's

c h i l d r e n i n the cases before

C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s s a i d i n Ankrom: " L i k e w i s e , i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , we do n o t see any r e a s o n t o h o l d t h a t a v i a b l e f e t u s i s n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e t e r m ' c h i l d , ' as t h a t t e r m i s u s e d i n 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code 1975. Not o n l y have t h e c o u r t s of t h i s State i n t e r p r e t e d the term ' c h i l d ' to include a viable fetus i n other contexts, the d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of the term ' c h i l d ' e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n p e r s o n o r a f e t u s . In everyday usage, t h e r e i s n o t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y about u s i n g the term ' c h i l d ' t o i n c l u d e a v i a b l e f e t u s . For e x a m p l e , i t i s n o t uncommon f o r someone t o s t a t e t h a t a mother i s p r e g n a n t w i t h her f i r s t 'child.' Unless the legislature specifically states o t h e r w i s e , t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i s s i m p l y a more g e n e r a l t e r m t h a t e n c o m p a s s e s t h e more s p e c i f i c t e r m ' v i a b l e fetus.' I f the l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s t o p r o s c r i b e conduct against only a 'viable fetus,' i t is n e c e s s a r y t o u s e t h a t s p e c i f i c t e r m . However, i f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d e s i r e s to p r o s c r i b e conduct a g a i n s t a v i a b l e f e t u s and a l l o t h e r p e r s o n s u n d e r a c e r t a i n age, t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' i s s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v e y t h a t meaning. In f a c t , p r o s c r i b i n g conduct a g a i n s t a ' c h i l d ' and a ' v i a b l e f e t u s ' w o u l d be r e d u n d a n t . 1975, "The t e r m ' c h i l d ' i n 26-15-3.2, A l a . Code i s unambiguous; thus, this Court must 27

1110176; 1110219 i n t e r p r e t t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s a n d n o t engage i n j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the language i n the s t a t u t e . Also, because t h e s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, t h e r u l e o f l e n i t y does n o t a p p l y . We do n o t s e e any r a t i o n a l basis f o r concluding t h a t the p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m ' c h i l d ' does n o t i n c l u d e a viable fetus." We f i n d t h i s r e a s o n i n g persuasive and agree w i t h the Court o f

C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s t h a t t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e word " c h i l d " i n the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i n c l u d e s unborn c h i l d r e n . In word her reply brief, Ankrom a r g u e s cited that by the use o f the the State is

" o r " i n both

definitions

d i s j u n c t i v e , m e a n i n g t h a t o n l y one o f t h e p o s s i b l e d e f i n i t i o n s could be applicable: born i.e., then i f t h e word i t cannot "child" also mean c a n mean "unborn

"recently person";

person"

i f "child"

c a n mean " u n b o r n p e r s o n "

then i t cannot

a l s o mean " r e c e n t l y b o r n p e r s o n . "

Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t " i t i s

c l e a r t h a t t h e Alabama l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e portion of Black's and Merriam-Webster's dictionaries that

s a y s 'baby' ' o r r e c e n t l y b o r n p e r s o n . ' " a t 6. The use o f the word

Ankrom's r e p l y b r i e f ,

" o r , " however,

does

not always

i n d i c a t e t h a t o n l y one o f t h e j o i n e d words i s a p p l i c a b l e i n a particular situation. This Court has r e p e a t e d l y 28 recognized

1110176;

1110219 to express strict

t h a t the word " o r " i s n o t always i n t e n d e d disjunction. Ala. 269,

As t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n R u t l a n d v. E m a n u e l , 202 80 So. 107, 110 (1918), " [ i ] t i s hardly 'and' a n d i n their

272,

necessary 'or'

t o add t h a t , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g considered,

t h e words unambiguous

a r e , when a b s t r a c t l y

r e s p e c t i v e meanings, the j u d i c i a l

f u n c t i o n o f r e a d i n g one o f restricted." (1847);

them as i f t h e o t h e r h a d been u s e d i s n o t t h e r e b y

See a l s o H i l l i a r d v. B i n f o r d ' s H e i r s , 10 A l a . 977, 996 In r e Opinion 559, 563

2

of the J u s t i c e s ,
2

252 A l a . 194, 198, 41 So. 2d

(1949).

The m u l t i p l e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e use and meaning o f t h e w o r d " o r " a r e n o t h i n g new; as t h i s C o u r t e x p l a i n e d i n H a r r i s v. P a r k e r , 41 A l a . 604, 605 ( 1 8 6 8 ) : " T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l a n g u a g e m i g h t be a d o p t e d , i f we were b o u n d t o c o n s t r u e t h e w o r d i n t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h i t i s used by t h e b e s t w r i t e r s o f t h e E n g l i s h language, and thus s a c r i f i c e the obvious meaning 'Or' i s d e f i n e d t o be a ' c o n n e c t i v e , t h a t marks an a l t e r n a t i v e ; ' 'one o f two; e i t h e r ; other.' In strict accuracy, such is i t s signification But i t i s not always used i n t h a t sense. I t i s o f t e n , i n common p a r l a n c e , a n d even i n w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t s , u s e d i n t h e sense o f 'both.' ... Our S a v i o r s a y s : ' F o r when two o r t h r e e a r e g a t h e r e d t o g e t h e r i n my name, t h e r e am I i n t h e m i d s t o f them;' y e t t h e C h r i s t i a n w o r l d does n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t e x t t o i m p l y an a s s u r a n c e o f h i s p r e s e n c e when one o r t h e o t h e r o f t h e s p e c i f i e d numbers are gathered together, leaving i t undetermined which. On the contrary, i t is understood t o convey a promise o f presence both i n 29

1110176; 1110219 2. O t h e r s t a t u t e s i n t e r p r e t t h e word Ankrom Title argues i n t h e A l a b a m a Code r e q u i r e "child" that as e x c l u d i n g u n b o r n a r e many this Court to

children. throughout

"[t]here

clues

26 and o t h e r A l a b a m a Code S e c t i o n s w h i c h show t h a t t h e d i d not intend for [the child chemical-endangerment or fetus." Ankrom's which and

legislature statute] brief,

t o a p p l y t o an She cites

unborn

a t 9.

2 6 - 1 4 - 1 ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975,

d e f i n e s " c h i l d " as " [ a ] p e r s o n u n d e r t h e age o f 18 y e a r s , " 2 6 - 1 6 - 9 1 ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h d e f i n e s person who has not yet reached his or "child" her

as " [ a ]

eighteenth

birthday."

Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s , a p p e a r i n g i n

t h e c h a p t e r s i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g and f o l l o w i n g t h e c h a p t e r containing the chemical-endangerment statute, reflect statute, the as

l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t i n the chemical-endangerment well. 547, Ankrom c i t e s D r a p e r v. S t a t e ex r e l . 557, 57 So. 772, 775

Patillo,

175 A l a .

(1911), i n which t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d

t h a t "[w]hen words w h i c h have a known m e a n i n g and s i g n i f i c a n c e are used in a statute, i t must be presumed that the

a g a t h e r i n g o f two, and i n a g a t h e r i n g o f t h r e e as w e l l i n t h e one as i n t h e o t h e r . " 30

1110176; 1110219 Legislature and u s e d o r a d o p t e d them i n t h e i r w e l l - k n o w n m e a n i n g not appearing." that, i n other statutes, the Alabama an

sense; the c o n t r a r y Ankrom a l s o notes

Legislature

has chosen

to c l a r i f y

i t s intent

to include

unborn c h i l d w i t h i n see, e.g.,

the s t a t u t e

by u s i n g

t h e words 1975,
3

"fetus,"

26-23-1

e t s e q . , A l a . Code 26-23A-1 et

or "unborn 1975.
4

child,"

s e e , e.g.,

s e q . , A l a . Code

Ankrom a r g u e s t h a t , i f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a d i n t e n d e d t o i n c l u d e unborn children i n the c l a s s of persons protected by t h e

chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e ,

i t w o u l d have u s e d e i t h e r o f

t h o s e more s p e c i f i c t e r m s t o c l a r i f y t h e s c o p e o f t h e s t a t u t e . Ankrom's Ankrom enacted brief, notes a t 10. the Additionally, i n her reply brief, was the

that

chemical-endangerment

statute

i n 2006, t h e same y e a r

t h e l e g i s l a t u r e amended

homicide statute to s p e c i f i c a l l y define unborn c h i l d . Kimbrough,

" p e r s o n " t o i n c l u d e an

Ankrom's r e p l y b r i e f , a t 3. like Ankrom, points to specific instances

where t h e A l a b a m a Code s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r s t o u n b o r n c h i l d r e n

the

C h a p t e r 23 o f T i t l e 26 o f t h e A l a b a m a Code i s e n t i t l e d "Alabama P a r t i a l - B i r t h A b o r t i o n Ban A c t o f 1997."

3 4

C h a p t e r 23A o f T i t l e 26 o f t h e A l a b a m a Code i s e n t i t l e d "The Woman's R i g h t To Know A c t . " 31

1110176; 1110219 and argues that "when t h e Alabama legislature legislates language,

r e g a r d i n g t h e unborn i t uses c l e a r and u n e q u i v o c a l rather brief, intent than t h e now ambiguous also term 'child.'" that

Kimbrough's

a t 27. to l i m i t

Kimbrough

claims

the l e g i s l a t i v e to children

t h e meaning o f t h e word " c h i l d "

who have a l r e a d y b e e n b o r n i s d e m o n s t r a t e d b y t h e e x c e p t i o n i n 2 6 - 1 5 - 3 . 2 ( c ) , A l a . Code 1975, f o r m e d i c a t i o n s p r e s c r i b e d to

t h e c h i l d , b e c a u s e , she s a y s , " [ p ] r e s c r i p t i o n s a r e n o t w r i t t e n for" unborn children. alleges unborn which

5

Kimbrough's that,

brief,

at

12-13.

Kimbrough a l s o "child" State

i f the d e f i n i t i o n o f the word then many forms used by already

includes

children,

agencies,

distinguish

between

children

b o r n a n d c h i l d r e n y e t t o be b o r n , must be r e v i s e d . brief, a t 17-18. i n her reply brief, Kimbrough

Kimbrough's

Similarly,

argues

that

" [ t ] h e m e a n i n g o f t h e [ c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t ] s t a t u t e does n o t t u r n on t h e m e a n i n g o f ' c h i l d . ' "

5

Kimbrough's r e p l y b r i e f , a t Code 1975, s t a t e s :

Section

26-15-3.2(c), A l a .

" I t i s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e t o a v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t t h e c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e was p r o v i d e d by l a w f u l p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e c h i l d , a n d t h a t i t was a d m i n i s t e r e d t o t h e c h i l d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e prescription instructions provided with the c o n t r o l l e d substance." 32

1110176; 1110219 6. Kimbrough contains argues that "[t]he [chemical-endangerment]

statute

more t h a n 50 w o r d s , none o f w h i c h m e n t i o n a and court that to "the rules of statutory statutory at v. 6. In

p r e g n a n t woman's d r u g u s e " interpretation language as require a

examine reply

the

a whole."

Kimbrough's

brief,

s u p p o r t of t h i s argument, Kimbrough c i t e s B o u t w e l l 988 So. 2d 1015, 1020

State, stated

(Ala. 2007), i n which t h i s Court

t h a t , " [ i ] n i n t e r p r e t i n g a s t a t u t e , a c o u r t does n o t provisions the i n i s o l a t i o n , but statutory intent, a considers

construe of

them i n t h e c o n t e x t to the

entire

scheme; court

moreover, look to

ascertain entire act

legislative

should

i n s t e a d o f i s o l a t e d p h r a s e s and In general variety response, intent of to the State

clauses." that life the is legislature's from a the State has and Ala. the

argues unborn

protect statutory

evident

other

provisions.

For

example,

l e g i s l a t u r e has of Alabama is

s t a t e d t h a t " [ t ] h e p u b l i c p o l i c y of the to protect life, born, and unborn."

26-22-1(a), A l a . declared in health

Code 1975.

S i m i l a r l y , the

legislature

that "[e]very and to

c h i l d i s e n t i t l e d to l i v e i n s a f e t y into adulthood." created an 26-16-90, exception to

survive

Code 1975.

The

l e g i s l a t u r e has

33

1110176; 1110219 education requirements "is f o r a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e when t h e custody person

a p a r e n t w i t h t h e c a r e and

of a minor or unborn added). regard to Unborn real

child." children

16-28-40, A l a . Code 1975 are recognized as

(emphasis with

persons

p r o p e r t y , s e e , e.g., "any other person, the

19-3-170, A l a . Code 1975 born or unborn"), and are

( r e f e r r i n g to specifically homicide (defining

included statute,

within see

d e f i n i t i o n of

"person" Code

i n the 1975

13A-6-1(a)(3),

Ala.

" p e r s o n " as "a human b e i n g , i n c l u d i n g an u n b o r n c h i l d i n u t e r o a t any stage of development, r e g a r d l e s s of v i a b i l i t y " ) . that, i n f o r m e d by t h e s e s t a t u t e s , wrongful-death statute t h i s Court The has

State notes applied

Alabama's

to protect

unborn 79

c h i l d r e n at a l l stages of g e s t a t i o n . So. 3d 597 2012).

See Mack v. Carmack,

( A l a . 2 0 1 1 ) ; H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t , Ultimately, the State

97 So. 3d 728 ( A l a . " i t would be

argues,

inconsistent of a s s i g n i n g [the

t o t r e a t an u n b o r n c h i l d as a p e r s o n f o r p u r p o s e s c i v i l and c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y , b u t n o t do so u n d e r statute]." State's brief in

chemical-endangerment 16.

Ankrom, a t

A review of the s t a t u t e s

c i t e d by t h e p e t i t i o n e r s and provides

of no

the c o n t e x t of the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e

34

1110176;

1110219

c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e as t o how t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t t h e w o r d " c h i l d " as t h a t t e r m i s u s e d i n t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t statute. by The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " because both cited set a age.

the p e t i t i o n e r s are not conclusive age f o r childhood without

maximum

s e t t i n g a minimum

S i m i l a r l y , when K i m b r o u g h a r g u e s i n h e r r e p l y b r i e f t h a t " t h e e x a m p l e s p u t f o r t h b y t h e S t a t e show t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e u s e s the explicit than term rely 'unborn on the child' now to refer ambiguous to the unborn, term 'child,'"

rather

Kimbrough's

reply brief, decision

a t 10, she f a i l s t o use was t h e more

t o note t h a t the restrictive i n those words other

legislature's "fetus"

and "unborn

child"

appropriate

s t a t u t e s because those s t a t u t e s a p p l i e d o n l y t o p r o t e c t unborn children.

6

I n sum,

nothing

i n the s t a t u t e s

cited

by t h e "child" unborn

p e t i t i o n e r s c o n t r a d i c t s t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e word in the chemical-endangerment statute to include an

c h i l d o r r e q u i r e s t h i s C o u r t t o i n t e r p r e t t h e w o r d " c h i l d " as e x c l u d i n g unborn c h i l d r e n .

U s i n g t h e word " f e t u s " o r "unborn c h i l d " i n p l a c e o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " w o u l d n o t have been a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e c h e m i c a l endangerment s t a t u t e because t h a t s t a t u t e a l s o protects c h i l d r e n a f t e r t h e y have been b o r n .
6

35

1110176; 1110219 3. The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f a t t e m p t s t o amend t h e c h e m i c a l endangerment statute demonstrates that t h e word "child" as

u s e d i n t h a t s t a t u t e does n o t i n c l u d e u n b o r n Kimbrough

children.

argues t h a t " [ t ] h e L e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f [the statute] and subsequent legislative t h i s law

chemical-endangerment

i n a c t i o n c l a r i f y t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e never intended to apply t o a [ s i c ] p r e g n a n t women who c o n t i n u e Kimbrough's of the brief,

t o term and a t 28. She

used a c o n t r o l l e d substance." claims statute

7

that

"[t]he

sponsor"

chemical-endangerment

" i s on r e c o r d s a y i n g he d i d n o t i n t e n d t h e l a w t o be new m o t h e r s , "

8

used against

Kimbrough's

brief,

a t 28-29, a n d

Kimbrough's a s s e r t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e was o n l y 1 s p o n s o r o f t h e chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e ; however, t h e r e were a c t u a l l y 21 s p o n s o r s o f S e n a t e B i l l 133, w h i c h was e v e n t u a l l y e n a c t e d a s A c t No. 2006-204, A l a . A c t s 2006. A c t No. 2006-204 a d d e d 26-15-3.2 t o t h e A l a b a m a Code.
7

To s u p p o r t h e r a s s e r t i o n t h a t " [ t ] h e sponsor o f t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e " i s on r e c o r d s a y i n g he d i d n o t i n t e n d t h e l a w t o be u s e d a g a i n s t new m o t h e r s , " Kimbrough cites P h i l l i p Rawls, N a t i o n a l I r e Over A l a . Prosecuting P r e g n a n t Moms, USA TODAY ( A u g u s t 1, 2 0 0 8 ) , w h i c h on t h e d a y this opinion was released could be found at h t t p : / / w w w . u s a t o d a y . c o m / n e w s / n a t i o n / 2 0 08-0 8-01-427 41967 0 9_x. htm. I n t h a t a r t i c l e , former Alabama S t a t e Senator L o w e l l B a r r o n , who was one o f t h e 21 s p o n s o r s o f t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e , s t a t e d : " I h a t e t o s e e a young m o t h e r p u t i n p r i s o n away f r o m h e r c h i l d . B u t i f s h e c o u l d be p u t i n a t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m w i t h h e r c h i l d r e n , t h a t w o u l d be t h e b e s t course. Maybe we n e e d t o r e v i s i t t h e l e g i s l a t i o n . " Former Senator Barron's views are i r r e l e v a n t ; t h i s Court w i l l n o t
8

36

1110176; 1110219 that the "there chemical have b e e n s e v e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e a t t e m p t s t o amend exposed

endangerment s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e f e t u s e s

p r e n a t a l l y t o c o n t r o l l e d substances." 29. She c i t e s House B i l l

Kimbrough's b r i e f , a t Session ofthe amended

723 (2008 R e g u l a r

Alabama L e g i s l a t u r e ) , which, the chemical-endangerment children, while

s h e c l a i m s , w o u l d have t o apply

statute

specifically to f o r medication

unborn

adding

an e x c e p t i o n

prescribed

f o r the treatment

o f t h e p r e g n a n t mother o r t h e

rely solely on t h e v i e w s of a single l e g i s l a t o r i n a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e i n t e n t o f a b i l l , e v e n when t h a t l e g i s l a t o r was a s p o n s o r o f t h e b i l l . See, e . g . , U t i l i t y C t r . , I n c . v . C i t y o f F t . Wayne, 868 N.E.2d 453, 459 ( I n d . 2007) ("'In i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t u t e s , we do n o t i m p u t e t h e o p i n i o n s o f one l e g i s l a t o r , even a b i l l ' s sponsor, t o t h e e n t i r e l e g i s l a t u r e unless those views f i n d s t a t u t o r y e x p r e s s i o n . ' " (quoting A Woman's C h o i c e - E a s t S i d e Women's C l i n i c v . Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104, 110 ( I n d . 1 9 9 6 ) , c i t i n g i n t u r n O ' L a u g h l i n v . B a r t o n , 582 N.E.2d 817, 821 ( I n d . 1 9 9 1 ) ) ) ; Doe v . B r i d g e p o r t P o l i c e D e p ' t , 198 F.R.D. 3 2 5 , 348 n. 16 (D. Conn. 2001) ( " ' P o s t - e n a c t m e n t v i e w s o f t h o s e i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e l e g i s l a t i o n s h o u l d n o t be considered when i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s t a t u t e . ' " ( q u o t i n g 2A S i n g e r , S u t h e r l a n d S t a t u t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n ( 5 t h ed. 1999 Supp.) 48:20, a t 1 8 4 ) ) ; D a v i s v . C i t y o f Leawood, 257 K a n . 512, 528, 893 P.2d 233, 244 (1995) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t " p o s t - e n a c t m e n t statements of i n d i v i d u a l legislators" are not " r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t " ) ; I n r e F.D. P r o c e s s i n g , I n c . , 119 Wash. 2d 452, 4 6 1 , 832 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1992) ("[T]he comments o f a s i n g l e l e g i s l a t o r are generally considered inadequate to establish legislative intent." ( c i t i n g Yakima v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s ' n o f F i r e F i g h t e r s , L o c a l 469, 117 Wash. 2d 655, 818 P.2d 1076 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , a n d C o n v e n t i o n Ctr. C o a l i t i o n v . S e a t t l e , 107 Wash. 2d 370, 730 P.2d 636 (1986))). 37

1110176; unborn

1110219 child. Kimbrough's brief, a t 30. Kimbrough argues

t h a t " [ t ] h e debate about the b i l l was d e l i b e r a t e , existing illegal 30. not the r e s u l t reached

makes c l e a r t h a t i t s d e a t h

o f an u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e pregnant women who used brief, an at

law a l r e a d y

drug and c o n t i n u e d t o term." that similar b i l l s

Kimbrough's

She a l l e g e s Bill 601

were i n t r o d u c e d i n 2010 a n d i n 2011 (House

(House Bill

(2010 R e g u l a r S e s s i o n ) ) 34

8 and Senate B i l l

(2011 R e g u l a r S e s s i o n ) )
9

and t h a t

none o f t h o s e b i l l s this history

became l a w .

Thus, K i m b r o u g h c o n c l u d e s , failed

" l e a v e s no d o u b t t h a t t h e s e e f f o r t s have

because o f p u b l i c h e a l t h and p u b l i c p o l i c y c o n c e r n s to us[ing] the c r i m i n a l

relating

l a w t o a d d r e s s what t h e l e g i s l a t u r e

i t s e l f r e c o g n i z e s t o be h e a l t h p r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g t o p r e g n a n c y and d r u g u s e . " The State Kimbrough's argues brief, a t 34. the language of the

i n response t h a t

c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e " i s c l e a r : an u n b o r n c h i l d i s a 'child' as t h a t word i s used i n the [chemical-endangerment a t 52-53. The S t a t e

statute]."

State's b r i e f

i n Kimbrough,

A d d i t i o n a l l y , we t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f t h e f a c t t h a t again during t h e 2012 R e g u l a r S e s s i o n o f t h e Alabama L e g i s l a t u r e a n o t h e r b i l l amending t h e c h e m i c a l - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e ( S e n a t e B i l l 31) was i n t r o d u c e d . That b i l l l i k e w i s e did not pass.
9

38

1110176; 1110219 argues that, because " i t would the chemical-endangerment be inappropriate statute Court is to

unambiguous,

for this

examine e x t r i n s i c m a t e r i a l s t o amend t h e s t a t u t e . " The State also the

s u c h as t h e L e g i s l a t u r e ' s

failure

State's that,

b r i e f i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 52-53. "contrary Kimbrough to refers Kimbrough's to "were child

argues

assumptions," originally is

amendments

i n t e n d e d t o make i t e x p l i c i t

t h a t an u n b o r n within the

-- a n d a l w a y s h a s b e e n -- i n c l u d e d statute's protections."

[chemicalbrief fact in that

endangerment]

State's "[t]he

K i m b r o u g h , a t 54.

Thus, t h e S t a t e

argues,

t h e L e g i s l a t u r e u l t i m a t e l y f a i l e d t o t a k e any a c t i o n on t h e s e proposed believed its amendments the s t a t u t e and may easily be read as proof that i t within

clearly included that

an u n b o r n c h i l d

protection brief

i t d i d n o t need

clarification."

State's

i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 54-55. a t t e m p t s t o amend States Supreme

I n t e r p r e t i n g a s t a t u t e b a s e d on l a t e r that statute i s problematic.

As t h e U n i t e d

Court stated i n Pension B e n e f i t 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990):

G u a r a n t y C o r p . v . LTV C o r p . ,

"[S]ubsequent l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y i s a 'hazardous basis for inferring t h e i n t e n t o f an e a r l i e r ' Congress. I t i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y d a n g e r o u s g r o u n d on w h i c h t o r e s t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p r i o r s t a t u t e 39

1110176; 1110219 when i t c o n c e r n s , as i t does h e r e , a p r o p o s a l t h a t does n o t become l a w . C o n g r e s s i o n a l i n a c t i o n l a c k s 'persuasive s i g n i f i c a n c e ' because ' s e v e r a l e q u a l l y t e n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s ' may be drawn f r o m s u c h i n a c t i o n , 'including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.'" (Citations In omitted.) case, i t i s possible to conclude, as K i m b r o u g h chemical-

this

argues, that the l e g i s l a t u r e understood the o r i g i n a l

e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e t o p r o t e c t o n l y c h i l d r e n who were a l r e a d y born. that I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o c o n c l u d e , as t h e S t a t e the legislature statute that understood the original -argues, chemicalborn and were

endangerment unborn --

to protect proposals to c l a r i f y

a l l children to amend

and

the statute

unnecessary intent.

attempts Court apart statute

the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s o r i g i n a l the i n t e n t i o n s in the of the

This

cannot determine from that the

legislature endangerment supra,

language before

chemicaldiscussed i s to

i s now of that

u s ; as

t h e p l a i n meaning

statutory

language

i n c l u d e w i t h i n i t s p r o t e c t i o n unborn c h i l d r e n . supra; (Ala. B e c t o n v. Rhone-Poulenc, 1997) ("'"[S]ubsequent

See LTV C o r p . ,

I n c . , 706 So. 2d 1134, 1139 legislative history" (quoting i s not Covalt

h e l p f u l as a g u i d e t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l a w . ' "

40

1110176; 1110219 v. Carey Canada i n turn I n c . , 860 F.2d 1434, Pierce v. 1438 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) , 487 U.S. 552, 565

citing

Underwood,

(1988))). 4. The l a n g u a g e i n t h e c h i l d - e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e makes t h a t children. statute

s t a t u t e i n a p p l i c a b l e t o unborn Kimbrough argues

t h a t t h e chemical-endangerment

c a n n o t p l a i n l y be r e a d t o p r o t e c t u n b o r n c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e , s h e says, t h e word "environment" i n the chemical-endangerment

s t a t u t e c a n n o t r e f e r t o an u n b o r n c h i l d ' s e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n i t s mother's womb. to She s t a t e s be that "[n]o with dictionary 'pregnant defines woman,'

'environment' 'uterus,' t h e words

synonymous

o r 'womb.'" "uterus"

However, i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o f i n d o f t h e word simply to a

o r "womb" i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n "environment" refers

"environment"; person's lives 1979)

t h e word

surroundings, to the s i t u a t i o n

i n which

a person

his or her l i f e . defines

B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y as " [ t ] h e totality

479 ( 5 t h e d . of physical,

"environment"

economic,

cultural,

aesthetic,

and s o c i a l

c i r c u m s t a n c e s and

f a c t o r s which surround and a f f e c t lives." essential

... t h e q u a l i t y o f p e o p l e s '

C l e a r l y , f o r an u n b o r n c h i l d , t h e m o t h e r ' s womb i s an part of i t s physical circumstances; i n the cases

41

1110176; 1110219 before u s , i t was while Ankrom's and Kimbrough's unborn ingested

c h i l d r e n were w i t h i n t h e i r m o t h e r s ' wombs t h a t t h e y controlled substances. also argues that "[t]he very title

Kimbrough

of the

statute describes

t h e c r i m i n a l i z e d a c t i o n as e x p o s i n g a c h i l d

t o an e n v i r o n m e n t where c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s a r e ' p r o d u c e d ' or 'distributed' -neither of which would be within a

reasonably functions." solely

intelligent

woman's u n d e r s t a n d i n g a t 18.

of her bodily appear of the

Kimbrough's b r i e f ,

These words

i n the t i t l e

of the s t a t u t e ,

not i n the text

s t a t u t e , a n d , as t h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y h e l d , a statute does n o t o v e r r i d e i n that statute:

the t i t l e of

t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e words

contained

"'The title o r p r e a m b l e may be u s e d t o remove ambiguity or u n c e r t a i n t y i n a s t a t u t e ; i t cannot, however, be used to contradict the p l a i n , unambiguous t e r m s o f t h e s t a t u t e i t s e l f . See Newton v. C i t y o f T u s c a l o o s a , 251 A l a . 209, 218, 36 So. 2d 487, 494 (1948) ("both t h e p r e a m b l e a n d t h e t i t l e o f an a c t may be l o o k e d to i n order t o remove ambiguities and u n c e r t a i n t y i n the enacting c l a u s e " ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. M c C r o r y , 119 F. 861 ( 5 t h Cir. 1903) ( i f t h e a c t i s f r e e f r o m d o u b t o r a m b i g u i t y , t h e t i t l e o f an a c t may n o t be r e s o r t e d t o i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e a c t ) ; a n d B a r t l e t t v. M o r r i s , 9 P o r t . 266 ( A l a . 1839) ( t h e t i t l e o f an a c t may e x p l a i n what i s d o u b t f u l , b u t i t c a n n o t c o n t r o l what i s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e body o f t h e a c t ) . ' "

42

1110176; 1110219 C i t y o f B e s s e m e r v. M c C l a i n , 957 (Harwood, J . , c o n c u r r i n g quoting from main o p i n i o n i n part on So. 2d 1061, 1084 ( A l a . 2006) i n part and

and

dissenting

o r i g i n a l deliverance

(withdrawn given

on r e h e a r i n g ) ) a plain-meaning

(emphasis added). reading, the

In t h i s case, because, "child" in the

word

chemicalof the be the

e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e i n c l u d e s u n b o r n c h i l d r e n , t h e use word "distribute" in the title of that statute

cannot

i n t e r p r e t e d t o c o n t r a d i c t the p l a i n meaning of the t e x t of statute.

5. T h i s C o u r t s h o u l d f o l l o w t h e m a j o r i t y o f s t a t e s i n r e f u s i n g to a p p l y the children. Kimbrough jurisprudence argues that, states "[d]espite refusing the overwhelming criminal chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e to p r o t e c t unborn

from other

to extend

l a w s t o p r e g n a n t women i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e u n b o r n c h i l d r e n t h e y carry, one ... [t]he [Court of C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s ] chose t o South Carolina," whose "unique follow law is

outlier

state,

i n a p p l i c a b l e i n Alabama." v. S t a t e 328 S.C. 1, 492

K i m b r o u g h ' s b r i e f , a t 53. (1997), i s not courts,

Whitner

S.E.2d 777

persuasive, ... unlike

Kimbrough argues, because "South C a r o l i n a

43

1110176; 1110219 A l a b a m a ' s c o u r t s , have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c r e a t e new common l a w crime[s]." The Appeals, of Kimbrough's b r i e f , argues that, a t 54. like the Court of Criminal reasoning prenatal

State

t h i s Court "should and f i n d violated that

r e l y on t h e p e r s u a s i v e [Ankrom and] K i m b r o u g h ' s

Whitner use

drug

[the chemical-endangerment

statute]."

S t a t e ' s b r i e f i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 30. W h i t n e r , t h e S t a t e a r g u e s , is persuasive because South C a r o l i n a law, l i k e a c t i o n f o r the death states, t h e word Alabama l a w , o f an u n b o r n "person" is

permits child,

a wrongful-death and because, at least

i n both f o r some

defined,

criminal offenses,

to include

unborn c h i l d r e n . Additionally, by t h e S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e c a s e s r e l i e d on i n advancing this argument are not

the p e t i t i o n e r s

p e r s u a s i v e b e c a u s e , t h e S t a t e s a y s , "[m]any o f t h e s t a t e s t h a t have d i s a l l o w e d t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f p r e g n a n t women f o r c o n d u c t committed during t h e i r pregnancies have done so on g r o u n d s o f State's

s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n b a s e d on t h e i r own s t a t e l a w . " brief has i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 39.

F o r e x a m p l e , a t l e a s t one s t a t e cases o f chemical

separate

statutory provisions covering

endangerment i n v o l v i n g unborn c h i l d r e n .

See K i l m o n v. S t a t e ,

44

1110176; 1110219 394 Md. 168, 905 A . 2 d 306 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . corresponding statutes Courts i n other states, of the statutes

whose

prohibit

"delivery"

c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e t o a c h i l d , have h e l d t h a t t h o s e

do n o t p r o t e c t u n b o r n c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e u s e o f t h e c o n t r o l l e d substance by t h e mother and the t r a n s f e r o f t h a t substance t o h e r c h i l d t h r o u g h h e r body i s n o t " d e l i v e r y . " State, App. App. 602 So. 2d 1288 ( F l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ; See J o h n s o n v .

S t a t e v . L u s t e r , 204 Ga.

156, 419 S.E.2d 32 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; a n d P e o p l e v . H a r d y , 188 M i c h . 3 0 5 , 469 N.W.2d 50 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . S e v e r a l c o u r t s have c i t e d t h e statute d i d not apply to the

f a c t t h a t t h e i r s t a t e ' s homicide killing o f an u n b o r n child

as r e l e v a n t t o h o l d i n g t h a t t h e

chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e s i n those s t a t e s d i d not p r o t e c t unborn c h i l d r e n . 190, 280 See R e i n e s t o v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 182 A r i z . 864 S.W.2d

894 P.2d 733 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; Commonwealth v . W e l c h , (Ky. 1 9 9 3 ) .

A n d , t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t ,

a c c o r d i n g t o C a l i f o r n i a ' s m u r d e r s t a t u t e , a f e t u s was d i s t i n c t from child a human b e i n g ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , f o r purposes an u n b o r n c h i l d was n o t a chemical-endangerment 75 C a l . App. 3 d 214,

of California's

statute. 141

See R e y e s v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t ,

C a l . R p t r . 912 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . Furthermore, the State argues:

45

1110176; 1110219 "Alabama l a w , u n l i k e t h e s t a t u t o r y schemes i n some o f t h e s e s t a t e s , does n o t p r o v i d e f o r s e p a r a t e treatment f o r crimes committed against unborn children. I n s t e a d , i t e x p r e s s l y i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d w i t h i n the d e f i n i t i o n of 'person' i n i t s c r i m i n a l homicide and a s s a u l t s t a t u t e s . Thus, i n Alabama, v i o l e n t crimes committed a g a i n s t unborn c h i l d r e n a r e p r o s e c u t e d u n d e r t h e same p r o v i s i o n s as v i o l e n t crimes committed a g a i n s t a d u l t s and c h i l d r e n who have b e e n b o r n . " State's b r i e f i n K i m b r o u g h , a t 42 (citations omitted). The

S t a t e n o t e s t h a t , u n l i k e some o t h e r s t a t e s t h a t have a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e , Alabama's c h i l d - a b u s e a person under birth t h e age o f 18 and 18 years. s t a t u t e s d e f i n e a " c h i l d " as years See rather than a person v.

between

A l a . Code Compare

1975, State

26-14-1(3); Geiser,

26-16-2(1);

and 26-16-91(2).

763 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 2009)

(reversing the conviction

of a p r e g n a n t mother under a s t a t u t e s i m i l a r t o t h e c h e m i c a l endangerment statute, relying i n part on a North Dakota

s t a t u t e e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d i n g t h a t age i s t o be c a l c u l a t e d f r o m birth). I n sum, a l t h o u g h , majority as t h e p e t i t i o n e r s c o r r e c t l y s t a t e , a

o f j u r i s d i c t i o n s have h e l d t h a t u n b o r n c h i l d r e n a r e

not a f f o r d e d p r o t e c t i o n from t h e use o f a c o n t r o l l e d substance by t h e i r m o t h e r s , t h e y n o n e t h e l e s s f a i l t o c o n v i n c e t h i s C o u r t that the d e c i s i o n s of those courts 46 are persuasive and s h o u l d

1110176; 1110219 be 505 f o l l o w e d by t h i s C o u r t . U.S. 833, 846 (1992) See P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v. State has Casey,

("[T]he

legitimate ...

interests the life

from the o u t s e t of the pregnancy o f t h e f e t u s t h a t may

i n protecting

become a c h i l d . " 97 So. 3d 728, j o i n e d by 740

(quoted w i t h ( A l a . 2012) Bolin,

a p p r o v a l i n H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t , (Parker, and W i s e , 6. The J., concurring JJ.))). of C r i m i n a l of the the

specially,

Stuart,

Court meaning when

Appeals

erred

i n holding

that

the

plain

word

"child"

included by that

viable court

unborn did not

children mention

definitions cited

viability. notes that neither of the dictionary

Kimbrough

d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " c i t e d by t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals those i n Ankrom m e n t i o n at "viability," odds with and she argues of that

d e f i n i t i o n s are

the

Court

Criminal

A p p e a l s ' h o l d i n g i n Ankrom, i . e . , t h a t t h e w o r d " c h i l d " i n t h e chemical-endangerment statute includes a "viable fetus." holding "child"

S i m i l a r l y , Ankrom a r g u e s of the Court a of Criminal

i n her r e p l y b r i e f t h a t the Appeals even not -that though mention the word the

includes

"viable statute

fetus" does

chemical--

endangerment

viability

47

1110176;

1110219 the a m b i g u i t y o f the word " c h i l d " i n the s t a t u t e

demonstrates

and r e q u i r e s t h i s C o u r t t o l o o k b e y o n d t h e " p l a i n m e a n i n g " o f t h a t word. Ankrom's reply brief, a t 7.

The d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e w o r d " c h i l d " c i t e d b y t h e C o u r t o f Criminal previable Appeals in Ankrom do not distinguish because the between viability

and v i a b l e

unborn c h i l d r e n i n the p l a i n nor as

distinction usage of

i s not found

meaning and o r d i n a r y i n the plain i n the

the word of

"child," "child"

i s i t found t h a t word

meaning

the word

i s used

chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e . Appeals' definition previous insertion of of the

Instead, the Court of C r i m i n a l viability was standard on this into the

the word

"child"

based

Court's a

decisions holding that parents

could not b r i n g

w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n f o r t h e d e a t h o f an u n b o r n c h i l d b e f o r e viability. Those c a s e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y G e n t r y v. G i l m o r e , 613

So. 2d 1241 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , a d o p t e d t h e v i a b i l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n , a t least i n part, because of a m i s p l a c e d 113 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . deference t o Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S.

A f t e r Ankrom was d e c i d e d , h o w e v e r ,

t h i s C o u r t o v e r r u l e d G e n t r y i n Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011), specifically p e r m i t i n g r e c o v e r y o f damages f o r

48

1110176; 1110219 the wrongful death of any unborn child, regardless of

viability. The Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals also l o o k e d to the Whitner, South like 505

C a r o l i n a Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n W h i t n e r . G e n t r y , r e l i e d on Roe U.S. in 833 the

and on P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v. C a s e y ,

(1992), f o r i t s d e s c r i p t i o n of the S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t o f an u n b o r n child to b e f o r e and abortion after viability. and no 97

life

However,

o u t s i d e the

right

c r e a t e d i n Roe

u p h e l d i n P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d , t h e v i a b i l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n has place i n the laws of t h i s ( A l a . 2012) State. See H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t ,

So. 3d 728, 737

(Parker, J . , c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y , JJ., joining). whether we to find be and

with Stuart, Bolin,

and W i s e ,

Thus, a l t h o u g h W h i t n e r i s p e r s u a s i v e on t h e i s s u e an unborn child is a of person the and thus a "child,"

Whitner's

adoption

viability

distinction

inconsistent with

the p l a i n

meaning of the word " c h i l d "

w i t h the laws of t h i s S t a t e . the

Furthermore, to the e x t e n t t h a t

Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals l i m i t e d the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the statute expressly to v i a b l e rejects unborn that children in as and

chemical-endangerment Ankrom, this Court

distinction

inconsistent with

the p l a i n

meaning of the word " c h i l d "

49

1110176; 1110219 with the laws of t h i s State. B e c a u s e we r e j e c t the Court of the

C r i m i n a l Appeals' a p p l i c a t i o n of a v i a b i l i t y d i s t i n c t i o n , petitioners' 7. The Court a r g u m e n t s on t h e i s s u e a r e moot. of Criminal Appeals' decision i n Ankrom

is

"absurd." Kimbrough argues that "[a]pplying [the chemicalterm

endangerment s t a t u t e ] despite absurd health having and used

t o p r e g n a n t women who a controlled

continue to would and and

substance

produce public that

illogical by

r e s u l t s harmful the Alabama

to j u s t i c e Legislature"

unintended

" [ s ] t a t u t e s s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d t o a v o i d a b s u r d and results." Kimbrough's brief, at 35. In

irrational of this 828 2d

support

a r g u m e n t , K i m b r o u g h q u o t e s Lane v. S t a t e , (Ala. 2010) (quoting

66 So.

3d 824, So.

C i t y o f B e s s e m e r v. M c C l a i n , 957 i n w h i c h we stated:

a t 1075

(citations omitted)),

"'To d i s c e r n t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , t h e C o u r t must f i r s t l o o k t o t h e l a n g u a g e of the s t a t u t e . I f , g i v i n g the s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e i t s p l a i n and o r d i n a r y m e a n i n g , we c o n c l u d e t h a t the language i s unambiguous, t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . I f a l i t e r a l c o n s t r u c t i o n w o u l d p r o d u c e an a b s u r d and u n j u s t r e s u l t t h a t i s c l e a r l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p u r p o s e and p o l i c y o f t h e s t a t u t e , s u c h a c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o be avoided.'"

50

1110176; 1110219 However, as d i s c u s s e d that supra, this Court has d e t e r m i n e d

the " p l a i n and o r d i n a r y

meaning" o f t h e word " c h i l d " i n given

the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i s unambiguous; t h a t ,

i t s p l a i n meaning, t h e word " c h i l d " i n c l u d e s unborn c h i l d r e n ; and that, consequently, the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e i s As we s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e of statutory the p l a i n and t o

a p p l i c a b l e t o Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h . Pratt, 815 So. 2d at 535,

"[p]rinciples

construction language

instruct

this

Court

to interpret what

of a statute

t o mean e x a c t l y only

i t says

engage i n j u d i c i a l statute

construction

i f the language i n the i s "no room f o r statute judicial i n this

i s ambiguous."

Thus, t h e r e

construction" case, a n d we

of the chemical-endangerment need not address that applying the merits

o f Kimbrough's

r e a s o n s she b e l i e v e s statute to protect

the chemical-endangerment

unborn c h i l d r e n i s absurd. B.

THE

COURT OF CRIMINALS APPEALS'

DECISION

IN ANKROM

I S BAD

PUBLIC POLICY. Although amici curiae the b r i e f s o f the p e t i t i o n e r s and o f s e v e r a l recite numerous potential public-policy

i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s Court's decision

i n these cases, p o l i c y

51

1110176; cannot be

1110219 the determining factor i n our decision; public-

p o l i c y a r g u m e n t s s h o u l d be d i r e c t e d t o t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , n o t t o t h i s Court. 367 (Ala. As we s t a t e d i n B o l e s v. P a r r i s , 2006): "[I]t is well 952 So. 2d 364, that the

established

legislature, formulate This

a n d n o t t h i s C o u r t , h a s t h e e x c l u s i v e domain t o

p u b l i c p o l i c y i n Alabama." i s not because p o l i c y i s unimportant to j u d i c i a l 723 but because See 599

p o l i c y arguments a r e i l l - s u i t e d M & Assocs., 1998)

resolution. So. 2d 592,

I n c . v. C i t y o f I r o n d a l e ,

(Ala.

("'There a r e r e a s o n a b l e p o l i c y a r g u m e n t s on b o t h that

s i d e s o f t h i s i s s u e ; h o w e v e r , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i s t h e body

must c h o o s e b e t w e e n s u c h c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . ' " ( q u o t i n g C i t y o f T u s c a l o o s a v. T u s c a l o o s a V e n d i n g Co., 545 So. 2d 13, 14 (Ala. 1989))). For this reason, although we

recognize the

that the p u b l i c p o l i c y of t h i s State i s r e l e v a n t to s t a t u t e , we decline to address the

a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s

p e t i t i o n e r s ' p u b l i c - p o l i c y a r g u m e n t s ; we l e a v e f o r r e s o l u t i o n by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . G r e e n , 782 So. 2d 223, 231 with the wisdom of As we

those matters

s t a t e d i n M a r s h v.

( A l a . 2000), " [ t ] h e s e concerns d e a l legislative policy rather than

constitutional

issues.

Matters of p u b l i c p o l i c y are f o r the

52

1110176; 1110219 L e g i s l a t u r e and, w h e t h e r w i s e o r u n w i s e , l e g i s l a t i v e p o l i c i e s are Inc. o f no concern to the c o u r t s . " So. 2d 1237, See 1248 also Cavalier Mfg. , on

v. J a c k s o n , 823

(2001), o v e r r u l e d So. 2d 723

other grounds, ("The

Ex p a r t e

T h i c k l i n , 824

( A l a . 2002) domain to the from or

Legislature

i s endowed w i t h

the

exclusive

f o r m u l a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y i n A l a b a m a , a domain upon w h i c h judiciary considering amici the shall not trod."). issues We therefore refrain

the p o l i c y

r a i s e d by

the p e t i t i o n e r s

curiae,

l i m i t i n g ourselves

to i n t e r p r e t i n g the t e x t of

chemical-endangerment We would be may remiss disagree and

statute. i f we with failed the to recognize of this that the

legislature

result

Court's

interpretation

a p p l i c a t i o n of the

chemical-endangerment

s t a t u t e and i s f r e e t o amend t h e s t a t u t e t o e f f e c t a d i f f e r e n t scope f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t a t u t e . in Ex p a r t e J a c k s o n , 614 So. 2d 405, 408 As t h i s C o u r t s a i d ( A l a . 1993):

"If the Legislature disagrees with our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of [the s t a t u t e ] , then i t w i l l enact appropriate l e g i s l a t i o n t o m o d i f y t h e s t a t u t e and y i e l d a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t i n subsequent cases. With t h a t a c t i o n , t h i s C o u r t w o u l d n o t be a s k e d t o do s o . T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t make s u c h a m o d i f i c a t i o n f o r it." C.

53

1110176; THE

1110219 OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS I N ANKROM

DECISION

VIOLATES BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE ALABAMA CONSTITUTION. Ankrom a n d K i m b r o u g h p r e s e n t f o u r a r g u m e n t s p e r t a i n i n g t o the The constitutionality State of the chemical-endangerment statute.

contends t h a t t h i s

Court should not address those "they are outside The S t a t e ' s raised

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arguments because, i t s a y s , the scope o f t h e w r i t granted by t h i s

Court."

b r i e f , a t 10. We a g r e e . any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l first impression, certiorari

N e i t h e r Ankrom n o r K i m b r o u g h i n their the only as noted respective grounds above,

arguments w h i c h were review;

grounds o f on w h i c h we we granted

granted

c e r t i o r a r i r e v i e w t o c o n s i d e r o n l y t h e i s s u e whether t h e word "child" unborn i n the chemical-endangerment child; we d e n i e d those certiorari grounds statute includes an

review

as t o a l l o t h e r constitutional are not

grounds, arguments.

including Because

advancing

these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

arguments

p r o p e r l y b e f o r e u s , we w i l l IV.

n o t a d d r e s s them. Conclusion

We c o n c l u d e t h a t C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s c o r r e c t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e word "child" i n the chemical-

54

1110176;

1110219 statute expressly insofar as includes an unborn child or fetus.

endangerment However, reasoning we

r e j e c t the Court of C r i m i n a l i t limits the application

Appeals' of the With

chemical-endangerment that exception, we

s t a t u t e t o a v i a b l e unborn c h i l d . the d e c i s i o n s and

agree w i t h in both

of the Court of and we

Criminal therefore

Appeals

Ankrom

Kimbrough,

a f f i r m those

decisions.

1110176 -- AFFIRMED. 1110219 -- AFFIRMED. Woodall, Parker, S t u a r t , B o l i n , and Main, J . , concurs s p e c i a l l y . and c o n c u r s i n the r e s u l t . J J . , concur.

Shaw, J . , c o n c u r s i n p a r t

Malone, C.J., and Murdock, J . , d i s s e n t . Wise, J . , recuses h e r s e l f . *

* J u s t i c e W i s e was p r e s i d i n g j u d g e o f t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s when t h a t c o u r t i n i t i a l l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e s e c a s e s . 55

1110176; 1110219 PARKER, J u s t i c e (concurring specially).

I n Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c r e a t e d a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t f o r pregnant women,

a l l o w i n g them t o t e r m i n a t e t h e i r p r e g n a n c i e s t h r o u g h m e d i c a l a b o r t i o n s under c e r t a i n that those circumstances, i n spite i n the death of the fact unborn as

abortions resulted Subsequently,

of their been

children.

Roe h a s s o m e t i m e s

misread

h o l d i n g t h a t t h o s e u n b o r n c h i l d r e n a r e n o t p e r s o n s a n d do n o t have t h e same f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s as does e v e r y o t h e r p e r s o n ,

w h i c h r i g h t s must be p r o t e c t e d b y t h e l a w . As I e x p l a i n e d i n H a m i l t o n v. S c o t t , 97 So. 3d 728, 737 ( A l a . 2012) ( P a r k e r , J . , c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y , j o i n e d by S t u a r t , B o l i n , and Wise, J J . ) , n o t h i n g c o u l d be f u r t h e r I concur from t h e t r u t h . of the Court today, which I

i n the decision

authored.

I w r i t e s p e c i a l l y t o emphasize t h a t t h i s language of the of that with

decision,

holding that the p l a i n statute unborn requires children,

chemical-endangerment statute many to protect and

the a p p l i c a t i o n i s consistent

statutes

d e c i s i o n s throughout our n a t i o n t h a t r e c o g n i z e unborn c h i l d r e n as p e r s o n s with legally enforceable rights i n many a r e a s o f

t h e l a w . T h i s s p e c i a l c o n c u r r e n c e b r i e f l y s u m m a r i z e s some o f

56

1110176; 1110219 the p r o t e c t i o n s and r i g h t s o f unborn c h i l d r e n i n f i v e areas o f t h e l a w -- p r o p e r t y l a w , c r i m i n a l l a w , t o r t l a w , g u a r d i a n s h i p l a w , a n d h e a l t h - c a r e l a w -- d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e b r e a d t h o f l e g a l p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d the r i g h t s o f unborn I. For centuries, P r o p e r t y Law children.
1 0

t h e law o f p r o p e r t y has r e c o g n i z e d t h a t with rights. For example, i f a

unborn c h i l d r e n father

are persons

( o r , i n some s t a t e s , a c l o s e r e l a t i v e ) d i e d b e f o r e h i s

c h i l d was b o r n , t h a t c h i l d w o u l d i n h e r i t f r o m t h e f a t h e r as i f he o r she h a d a l r e a d y b e e n b o r n a t t h e t i m e t h e f a t h e r d i e d .
10 1 1

The c i t a t i o n s t o s t a t e c o d e s a n d c a s e s i n t h e f o o t n o t e s i n t h i s s p e c i a l w r i t i n g a r e drawn l a r g e l y f r o m t h e f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e : P a u l B e n j a m i n L i n t o n , The L e g a l S t a t u s o f t h e U n b o r n C h i l d u n d e r S t a t e Law, 6 U. S t . Thomas J . L. & Pub. P o l ' y 141 ( F a l l 2011). I have n o t i n d e p e n d e n t l y c h e c k e d o r v e r i f i e d these sources. S e e 43-8-47, A l a . Code 1975; see a l s o A l a s k a S t a t . 13.12.108 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 14-2108 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. 28-9-210 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; C a l . P r o b . Code 6407 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 1 5 - 1 1 - 1 0 4 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 12, 505 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; F l a . S t a t . Ann. 732.106 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. 5 3 - 2 - 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Haw. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 560:2-108 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Idaho Code Ann. 15-2-108 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; 755 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. 5/2-3 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. 29-1-2-6 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. 633.220 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; Kan. S t a t . Ann. 5 9 - 5 0 1 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 391.070, 394.460 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 940 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Me. Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 18, 2-108 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; Md. Code Ann., E s t . & T r u s t s , 3-107 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 190B 2-302 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. 700.2108 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. 524.2-108 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; H a r p e r v. A r c h e r , 4 Smedes & M 99, 12 M i s s .
11

57

1110176; 1110219 Similarly, i fa will f a i l e d to provide f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of and a c h i l d was

a c h i l d born a f t e r the e x e c u t i o n of the w i l l born, the omitted c h i l d could, in the e s t a t e equal i n value

i n many c a s e s , r e c e i v e

a share have equal

1 2

t o what he o r she w o u l d

received

i f the t e s t a t o r had d i e d i n t e s t a t e o r a share

i n v a l u e t o t h a t p r o v i d e d t o c h i l d r e n named i n t h e w i l l .

Some

9 (1845) ( n o t i n g t h a t " f r o m t h e t i m e o f c o n c e p t i o n t h e i n f a n t i s i n e s s e , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t a k i n g any e s t a t e w h i c h i s f o r h i s b e n e f i t , ... p r o v i d e d ... t h a t t h e i n f a n t be b o r n a l i v e , and after such a period of f o e t a l existence that i t s c o n t i n u a t i o n i n l i f e m i g h t be r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d " ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . 474.050 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-118 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 30-2308 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 111.085 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; N.H. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 21.20 (2008) ( d e f i n i n g " i s s u e " ) , 561:1 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; N . J . S t a t . Ann. 3B:5-8 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; N.M. S t a t . Ann. 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 4 ( A ) ( 2 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; N.Y. E s t . Powers & T r u s t s Law 4 - 1 . 1 ( c ) (McKinney 1 9 9 8 ) ; N.C. Gen. S t a t . 29-9 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code 30.1-04-04 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. 2105.14 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 84, 228 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . 112.075 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; 20 Pa. Cons. S t a t . Ann. 2104(4) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. 62-2-108 (2009); S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws 29A-2-108 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; Tenn. Code Ann. 31-2-108 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 4 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; V t . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 14, 303 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; V a . Code Ann. 64.1-8.1 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 1 1 . 0 2 . 0 0 5 ( 8 ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; W. V a . Code Ann. 42-1-8 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. 8 5 4 . 2 1 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Wyo. S t a t . Ann. 2-4-103 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . S e e 4 3 - 8 - 9 1 , A l a . Code 1975; see a l s o A l a s k a S t a t . 13.12.302 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 14-2302 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. 28-39-407 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; C a l . P r o b . Code 21620 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 15-11-302 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Conn. Gen. S t a t . Ann. 45a-256b ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 12, 3 0 1 , 310 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; F l a . S t a t . Ann. 732.302 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. 53-4-48 (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; Haw. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 560:2-302 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. 15-2-302 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; 755 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann.
12

58

1110176; 1110219 states apply a s i m i l a r in land, as w e l l .

1 3

r u l e to ownership of future

interests

5/4-10 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. 29-1-3-8 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. 633.267 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 394.382 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 1474 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Me. Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 18, 2-302 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; Md. Code Ann., E s t . & T r u s t s , 3-301 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 1 ) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c h . 191, 20 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. 700.2302 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. 524.2-302 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; M i s s . Code Ann. 91-5-3, 91-5-5 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . 474.240 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-332 (2011) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 30-2321 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 133.160, 133.180 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.H. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 551:10 (2006) ; N . J . S t a t . Ann. 3B:5-16 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; N.M. Stat. 45-2-302 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; N.Y. E s t . Powers & T r u s t s Law 5-32 ( M c K i n n e y Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) ; N.C. Gen. S t a t . 31-5.5 (2009) (see a l s o 41-5 ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t an u n b o r n c h i l d " s h a l l be deemed a p e r s o n c a p a b l e o f t a k i n g by d e e d o r o t h e r w r i t i n g any e s t a t e w h a t e v e r i n t h e same manner as i f he were b o r n " ) ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code 30.1-06-02 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. 2107.34 (2007) ; O k l a . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 84, 131 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . 112.405 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; 20 Pa. Cons. S t a t . Ann. 2 5 1 4 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; R . I . Gen. Laws 33-6-23 e t s e q . ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. 62-2-302 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws 29A-2-302 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; Tenn. Code Ann. 32-3-103 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Tex. P r o b . Code Ann. 67 (Vernon Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. 75-2-302 (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; V t . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 14, 303, 332 e t s e q . ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; V a . Code Ann. 64.1-70, 64.1-71 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 11.12.091 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; W. V a . Code Ann. 4 1 - 4 - 1 , 41-4-2 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. 8 5 4 . 2 1 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) . S e e 35-4-8, A l a . Code 1975; s e e a l s o C a l . C i v . Code 698, 739 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 38-30-119 ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 381.140 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. 500.14 (2012) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 111.080 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; N.M. S t a t . Ann. 47-1-21 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code 47-02-19 (1999) (see a l s o 4 7 - 0 2 - 2 9 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. 2307.14 (2010) ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t c o u r t may a p p o i n t a t r u s t e e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ; O k l a . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 12, 1147.1 (2000) ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t c o u r t may a p p o i n t a t r u s t e e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e f u t u r e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ; S.D.
13

59

1110176; 1110219 II. There the states are at l e a s t have Criminal Law l a w where first,

three

aspects of c r i m i n a l protected fetal

increasingly

life:

c r i m i n a l i z i n g f e t a l h o m i c i d e ; second, making the pregnancy of a h o m i c i d e v i c t i m an a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r t h a t can l e a d t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y ; and, t h i r d , e x e c u t i o n of pregnant A. In is criminals. prohibiting the

Fetal-Homicide Statutes killing as an u n b o r n the result child of a

a s t r o n g m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s , homicide unless

criminal

i t occurs

medical abortion. of an unborn

The m a j o r i t y o f s t a t e s p r o h i b i t any other than regardless a medical abortion of gestational

killing at the
14

child,

mother's

request,

age.

C o d i f i e d Laws 43-3-14 (2004) (see a l s o P r o p . Code Ann. 112.036 ( V e r n o n 2 0 0 7 ) .

14

43-3-16);

Tex.

S e e A l a . Code 1975, 1 3 A - 6 - 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) ; A l a s k a S t a t . 11.81.900(b)(62) ( d e f i n i n g " u n b o r n c h i l d " ) ; 11.41.150 e t seq. (2008); A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 13-1102(A), (B) (negligent homicide), 13-1103(A)(5), (B) ( m a n s l a u g h t e r ) , 1 3 - 1 1 0 4 ( A ) , (B) ( s e c o n d - d e g r e e m u r d e r ) , 1 3 - 1 1 0 5 ( A ) ( 1 ) , (C) ( f i r s t - d e g r e e murder) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. 16-5-80 (feticide), 40-6-393.1 (feticide by vehicle), 52-7-12.3 ( f e t i c i d e by v e s s e l ) (2007 & Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. 18-4016 (defining "human embryo" and "fetus"), 18-4001 ( d e f i n i n g " m u r d e r " ) , 18-4006 ( d e f i n i n g " m a n s l a u g h t e r " ) ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; 720 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. 5/9-1.2 ( i n t e n t i o n a l h o m i c i d e o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) , 5/9-2.1 ( v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) , 5/9-3.2 ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r o r r e c k l e s s h o m i c i d e 60

1110176; 1110219

o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. 35-42-1-6 ( f e t i c i d e ) (2011) ( s e e a l s o I n d . Code Ann. 3 5 - 4 2 - 1 - 1 ( 4 ) (murder), 35-42-1-3(a)(2) (voluntary manslaughter), 35-42-1-4(b), (d) ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r ) (2011)); Kan. S t a t . Ann. 21-5419 (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . 507A.010 et seq. ( f e t a l homicide) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; L a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 14:2(A)(11) (defining "unborn c h i l d " ) , 14:32.5 (defining "feticide"), 14:32.6 e t s e q . ( s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e s ) (2012); M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. 750.90a e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. 609.266 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; M i s s . Code Ann. 97-3-37 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 28-388 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.D. C e n t . Code 12.1-17.1-01 e t s e q . ( 1 9 9 7 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. 2 9 0 3 . 0 1 ( A ) , (B) ( a g g r a v a t e d m u r d e r ) , 2903.02(A) ( m u r d e r ) , 2903.03(A) (voluntary manslaughter), 2903.04(A), (B) ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; 2903.041(A) ( r e c k l e s s h o m i c i d e ) , 2903.05(A) (negligent homicide), 2903.06(A) (aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide, and vehicular manslaughter), 2903.09(A), (B) ( d e f i n i t i o n s ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O k l a . S t a t . Ann. t i t . 2 1 , 691 ( d e f i n i n g " h o m i c i d e " ) , t i t . 63, 1-730(4) ( d e f i n i n g " u n b o r n c h i l d " ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; 18 P a . Cons. S t a t . Ann. 2601 e t s e q . ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. 16-3-1083 (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws 2 2 - 1 - 2 ( 3 1 ) ( d e f i n i n g " p e r s o n " ) , 22-1-2(50A) (defining "unborn c h i l d " ) ; 22-16-1 (defining " h o m i c i d e " ) , 22-16-1.1 ( f e t a l h o m i c i d e ) , 22-17-6 ( i n t e n t i o n a l k i l l i n g o f a human f e t u s ) (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; Tenn. Code A n n . 39-13-214 (Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) ; T e x . P e n a l Code 1.07(a)(26) (defining "individual"), 1.07(a)(38) (defining "person") (Vernon 2 0 1 1 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 1 ( 1 ) ( a ) (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; W. V a . Code Ann. 61-2-30 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. 939.75(1) ( d e f i n i n g "unborn c h i l d " ) , 940.01(1)(b) (firstdegree intentional homicide), 940.02(1m) (first-degree reckless h o m i c i d e ) , 940.05(2g) (second-degree intentional homicide), 940.06(2) (second-degree reckless homicide), 940.08(2) (homicide by n e g l i g e n t h a n d l i n g o f a dangerous weapon, e x p l o s i v e , o r f i r e ) , 9 4 0 . 0 9 ( 1 ) ( c ) , ( 1 ) ( c m ) , ( 1 ) ( d ) , (1)(e) (homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle), 940.09(1g)(c), (1g)(cm), (1g)(d) (homicide by i n t o x i c a t e d use o f a f i r e a r m ) , 940.10(2) ( h o m i c i d e b y n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f a v e h i c l e ) , 940.04(1) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an unborn child) (2011) (see a l s o Wis. S t a t . Ann. 9 4 0 . 0 4 ( 2 ) ( a ) (2005) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an 61

1110176; 1110219 However, some states limit the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of homicide The most portion of

s t a t u t e s b a s e d on t h e g e s t a t i o n a l age o f t h e f e t u s . common age r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e v i a b i l i t y , of the pregnancy where t h e unborn which i s that child
15

i s capable

s u r v i v i n g b i r t h and l i v i n g outside which i s the point during

t h e womb,

and quickening, the pregnant

the pregnancy

when

"unborn q u i c k child")). In addition to the foregoing s t a t u t e s , M i s s o u r i has e n a c t e d a s t a t u t e p r o v i d i n g a r u l e o f c o n s t r u c t i o n , s e e Mo. A n n . S t a t . 1.205 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , w h i c h h a s b e e n a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t e ' s h o m i c i d e s t a t u t e s , m a k i n g them a p p l i c a b l e t o a n y k i l l i n g o f an u n b o r n c h i l d a t a n y s t a g e o f g e s t a t i o n t h a t i s n o t t h e r e s u l t o f an a b o r t i o n . See S t a t e v . Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1 9 9 2 ) , S t a t e v . Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. C t . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , S t a t e v . R o l l e n , 133 S.W.3d 57 (Mo. C t . App. 2 0 0 3 ) . Fla. S t a t . A n n . 7 8 2 . 0 9 ( 5 ) (homicide) (defining "unborn quick child" i n terms of v i a b i l i t y ) , 782.071 ( v e h i c u l a r h o m i c i d e ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; I n d . Code A n n . 3 5 - 4 2 - 1 - 1 ( 4 ) (murder), 35-42-1-3(a)(2) (voluntary manslaughter), 3 5 - 4 2 - 1 - 4 ( b ) , (d) ( i n v o l u n t a r y m a n s l a u g h t e r ) (2011) (see a l s o I n d . Code Ann. 35-42-1-6 ( f e t i c i d e ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ) ; Md. Code A n n . , C r i m . Law 2-103 (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws A n n . 750.322 (2004) (a " q u i c k e n i n g " manslaughter s t a t u t e that, s u b s e q u e n t t o Roe v . Wade, t h e M i c h i g a n Supreme C o u r t l i m i t e d t o p o s t - v i a b i l i t y c r i m i n a l a c t s , L a r k i n v . C a h a l a n , 208 N.W.2d 176 ( M i c h . 1973)) (see a l s o M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. 750.90a e t seq. (2004)); R . I . Gen. Laws 11-23-5 (2002) (defining " q u i c k e n i n g " i n terms o f v i a b i l i t y ) .
1 5

62

1110176; 1110219 woman f i r s t n o t i c e s t h e movements o f h e r u n b o r n c h i l d . s t a t e s have c r e a t e d B. Seven s t a t e s o t h e r age r e q u i r e m e n t s .

1 7 1 6

A few

Penalty-Enhancement specifically provide

Statutes that t h e murder o f a

p r e g n a n t woman i s an a g g r a v a t i n g

f a c t o r t h a t may j u s t i f y t h e

Nev. Rev. S t a t . A n n . 200.210 (2006) ( m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 9 A . 3 2 . 0 6 0 ( 1 ) ( b ) (2012) ( m a n s l a u g h t e r ) ; Wis. S t a t . Ann. 9 4 0 . 0 4 ( 2 ) ( a ) (2005) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an " u n b o r n q u i c k c h i l d " ) (see a l s o Wis. S t a t . Ann. 939.75(1) ( d e f i n i n g " u n b o r n c h i l d " ) , 940.01(1)(b) ( f i r s t - d e g r e e i n t e n t i o n a l h o m i c i d e ) , 940.02(1m) ( f i r s t - d e g r e e reckless homicide), 940.05(2g) (second-degree i n t e n t i o n a l homicide), 940.06(2) (second-degree reckless homicide), 940.08(2) (homicide by n e g l i g e n t h a n d l i n g o f a dangerous weapon, e x p l o s i v e s , o r f i r e ) , 9 4 0 . 0 9 ( 1 ) ( c ) , (cm), ( d ) , a n d (e) (homicide by i n t o x i c a t e d use o f a v e h i c l e ) , 9 4 0 . 0 9 ( 1 g ) ( c ) , (1g)(cm), (1g)(d) (homicide by i n t o x i c a t e d use o f a f i r e a r m ) , 940.10(2) ( h o m i c i d e b y n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n o f a v e h i c l e ) , 940.04(1) ( i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f an u n b o r n child) (2011)).
16

A r k a n s a s draws t h e l i n e a t 12 weeks' g e s t a t i o n ; s e e A r k . Code Ann. 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a), (b) (2009) ( c r o s s - r e f e r e n c i n g h o m i c i d e o f f e n s e s ) , 5-10-101 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; u n d e r C a l i f o r n i a law, t h e o f f e n s e o f m u r d e r h a s b e e n d e f i n e d t o i n c l u d e t h e u n l a w f u l k i l l i n g o f a " f e t u s , " see C a l . P e n a l Code 1 8 7 ( a ) (2008) ( i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e C a l i f o r n i a Supreme C o u r t t o mean " p o s t - e m b r y o n i c " -- i . e . , 7 t o 8 weeks' g e s t a t i o n ) , P e o p l e v. D a v i s , 7 C a l . 4 t h 797, 872 P.2d 5 9 1 , 599, 30 C a l . R p t r . 2 d 50 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; V i r g i n i a a l s o h a s e n a c t e d a statute p r o h i b i t i n g the " [ k ] i l l i n g [ o f ] a f e t u s , " V a . Code Ann. 18.2-32.2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) , b u t t h e t e r m " f e t u s " i s n o t d e f i n e d i n t h e c r i m i n a l code a n d h a s n o t y e t b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e Supreme C o u r t o f V i r g i n i a .
1 7

63

1110176; 1110219 i m p o s i t i o n o f the death p e n a l t y . murder o f a p r e g n a n t

1 8

In nine other states, the can l e a d t o

woman a n d h e r u n b o r n c h i l d

the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e death p e n a l t y under s t a t u t e s t h a t a l l o w for than i m p o s i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y where a d e f e n d a n t m u r d e r s more one p e r s o n i n a single be c a p i t a l incident. murder
1 9

And i n F l o r i d a ,

killing

t h a t would

i f the pregnant

woman

d i e d i s c a p i t a l murder i f t h e mother s u r v i v e s b u t h e r unborn child dies.

2 0

C.

R e s t r i c t i o n s on I m p o s i t i o n o f t h e D e a t h P e n a l t y

Of t h e 33 s t a t e s i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s a u t h o r i z e d by law, a t l e a s t 23 s t a t e s have statutes p r o h i b i t i n g the

A r i z . Rev. S t a t . 1 3 - 7 5 1 ( F ) ( 9 ) (specifically listing t h e k i l l i n g o f an u n b o r n c h i l d a s an a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . A n n . 1 8 - 1 . 3 - 1 2 0 1 ( 5 ) ( q ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 11, 4 2 0 9 ( e ) ( 1 ) ( p ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. 35-50-2-9(b)(16) ( l i m i t e d t o c a s e s where t h e u n b o r n c h i l d h a d r e a c h e d v i a b i l i t y ) ; 42 P a . Cons. S t a t . Ann. 9 7 1 1 ( d ) ( 1 7 ) ( l i m i t e d t o c a s e s where t h e p r e g n a n c y i s i n i t s third t r i m e s t e r ) ; Tenn. Code A n n . 3 9 - 1 3 - 2 0 4 ( i ) ( 1 6 ) (Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) ; Va. Code A n n . 1 8 . 2 - 3 1 ( 1 1 ) (Supp. 2 0 1 2 ) .
1 8

S e e 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . Code 1975; A r k . Code Ann. 5 - 1 0 - 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 ) , ( 9 A ) ; Idaho Code Ann. 1 9 - 2 5 1 5 ( 9 ) ( b ) ; Mo. Rev. S t a t . 565.032 2 ( 2 ) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code. Ann. 2 9 2 9 . 0 4 ( A ) ( 9 ) ; O k l a . S t a t . t i t . 2 1 , 701.12 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. 1 6 - 3 - 2 0 ( C ) ( a ) ( 9 ) ; V e r n o n ' s Tex. P e n a l Code Ann. 1 9 . 0 3 ( a ) ( 7 ) ; U t a h Code A n n . 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) ( b ) .
19 2 0

Fla.

S t a t . Ann. 782.09(1)(a) 64

(2012).

1110176; 1110219 execution sentenced permitting protecting of a pregnant to death, woman.

21

I f a pregnant sentence

woman i s

t h e woman's

i s suspended, thus

t h e unborn c h i l d t h a t unborn c h i l d ' s III.

t o develop life.

a n d be b o r n ,

T o r t Law

Tort permitting

law r e c o g n i z e s t h e humanity o f unborn c h i l d r e n by a c t i o n s t o r e c o v e r damages f o r p r e n a t a l wrongful A. death. Prenatal Injuries o f damages f o r nonfatal i n j u r y and

for prenatal

Thirty prenatal

states

permit

recovery

injuries,

regardless

of the

g e s t a t i o n a l age o f t h e

A l a . Code 1975, 15-18-86; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . A n n . 13-4025, 4026 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. 1 6 - 9 0 - 5 0 6 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; C a l . P e n a l Code 3705, 3706 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; F l a . S t a t . Ann. 922.08 ( 2 0 0 1 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. 17-10-34, 17-10-39 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. 19-2713, 19-2714, 19-2719a ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. 35-38-6-10 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; K a n . S t a t . Ann. 22-4009 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 4 3 1 . 2 4 0 ( 2 ) ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; L a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 15:567(D) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; Md. Code Ann., C o r r . S e r v s . 3-902(e) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; M i s s . Code Ann. 99-19-57 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . 546.800 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; Mont. Code A n n . 46-19-203, 46-19-204 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 29-2540, 29-2541 (200 9 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 17 6.465 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. 2949.31 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . A n n . t i t . 22, 1010, 1011 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. 16-3-20(A) ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws 23A-27A-27 e t s e q . ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. 77-19-202 (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) ; Wyo. S t a t . 7-13-912, 7-13-913 (2007).
2 1

65

1110176; 1110219 unborn c h i l d a t t h e time the c h i l d s u f f e r e d

2 2

those i n j u r i e s .

2 2

W o l f e v. I s b e l l , 280 So. 2 d 758, 761 ( A l a . 1973) (express statement i n context o f wrongful-death action); W a l k e r b y P i z a n o v . M a r t , 790 P.2d 735, 739 ( A r i z . C t . A p p . 1990) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l - l i f e a c t i o n ) ; C a l . C i v . Code 43.1 (2007) ("A c h i l d c o n c e i v e d , b u t n o t y e t b o r n , i s deemed an e x i s t i n g p e r s o n , s o f a r as n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s i n t h e event o f t h e c h i l d ' s subsequent b i r t h . " ) ; Keleman v. S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 136 C a l . App. 3 d 861, 186 C a l . R p t r . 566, 568 (1982) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; E m p i r e C a s . Co. v . S t . P a u l F i r e & M a r i n e I n s . Co., 764 P.2d 1 1 9 1 , 1195-97 ( C o l o . 1988) (by implication i n decision recognizing cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e - c o n c e p t i o n t o r t ) ; Simon v . M u l l i n , 380 A . 2 d 1353, 1357 (Conn. S u p e r . C t . 1977) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Day v . N a t i o n w i d e Mut. I n s . Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . App. 1976) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; L a R u s s o v . G a r n e r , 888 So. 2d 712, 719 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . App. 2004) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; H o r n b u c k l e v . P l a n t a t i o n P i p e L i n e Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; M c A u l e y v . W i l l s , 251 Ga. 3, 303 S.E.2d 258, 259-60 (1983) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; R e n s l o w v. M e n n o n i t e Hosp., 67 I l l . 2d 348, 352-53, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1252-53, 10 I l l . Dec. 484, 486-87 (1977) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n d e c i s i o n r e c o g n i z i n g cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e c o n c e p t i o n t o r t ) ; S t a l l m a n v . Y o u n g q u i s t , 125 I l l . 2d 267, 272-73, 531 N.E.2d 355, 357-58, 126 I l l . Dec. 60, 62-63 (1988) (following R e n s l o w ) ; Cowe b y Cowe v . Forum Group, I n c . , 541 N.E.2d 962, 967-68 ( I n d . C t . App. 1 9 8 9 ) , a f f ' d i n p a r t , r e v ' d i n p a r t , a n d remanded, 575 N.E.2d 630, 636-37 ( I n d . 1991) ( a d o p t i n g Restatement (Second) o f T o r t s 8 6 9 ( 1 ) ) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Humes v . C l i n t o n , 246 K a n . 590, 596, 792 P.2d 1032, 1037 (1990) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Danos v . S t . P i e r r e , 402 So. 2d 633 ( L a . 1981) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Group H e a l t h A s s ' n , I n c . v . B l u m e n t h a l , 295 Md. 104, 117-18, 453 A . 2 d 1198, 1206-07 (1983) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; P a y t o n v . A b b o t t L a b s . , 386 Mass. 540, 559-64, 437 N.E.2d 1 7 1 , 182-85 (1982) (prenatal i n j u r y ) ; T o r i g i a n v . W a t e r t o w n News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Womack v . B u c h h o r n , 384 M i c h . 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; C o n n o r v . Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; B e r g s t r e s s e r 66

1110176; 1110219

v. M i t c h e l l , 448 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (E.D. Mo. 1 9 7 7 ) , a f f ' d , 577 F.2d 22, 25-26 ( 8 t h C i r . 1978) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n d e c i s i o n r e c o g n i z i n g cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e c o n c e p t i o n t o r t ) ; M i l l e r v. D u h a r t , 637 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Mo. C t . App. 1982) ( d i c t u m i n " w r o n g f u l - l i f e " c a s e ) ; Weaks v . M o u n t e r , 88 Nev. 118, 121-22, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1972) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; W h i t e v . Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 532-33, 458 P.2d 617, 620-21 (1969) (express s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; B e n n e t t v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 4 8 3 , 147 A . 2 d 108 (1958) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; S m i t h v . B r e n n a n , 31 N . J . 3 5 3 , 362-63, 157 A . 2 d 497, 502 (1960) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Hughson v . S t . F r a n c i s Hosp. o f P o r t J e r v i s , 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815 (N.Y. App. D i v . 1983) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; K e l l y v . G r e g o r y , 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (N.Y. App. D i v . 1953) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; S t e t s o n v . E a s t e r l i n g , 274 N.C. 152, 155-56, 161 S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1968) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Gay v . Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 399, 146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1966) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; H o p k i n s v . McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 864 (N.D. 1985) ( a d o p t i n g R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) o f t h e Law o f T o r t s 869(1) i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; E v a n s v . O l s o n , 550 P.2d 924, 927 ( O k l a . 1976) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; S i n k l e r v . K n e a l e , 401 P a . 267, 273, 164 A . 2 d 93, 96 (1960) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; S y l v i a v . G o b e i l l e , 101 R . I . 76, 220 A . 2 d 222 (1966) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; Re C e r t i f i c a t i o n o f a Q u e s t i o n o f Law f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; D e l g a d o v . Y a n d e l l , 468 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App. 1 9 7 1 ) , w r i t r e f ' d n . r . e . p e r c u r i a m , 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; K a l a f u t v . G r u v e r , 239 Va. 278, 283, 389 S.E.2d 6 8 1 , 683-84 (1990) ( a d o p t i n g Restatement (Second) o f T o r t s 869(1) i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; H a r b e s o n v . P a r k e - D a v i s , I n c . , 98 Wash. 2d 460, 479, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983) ( d i c t u m i n " w r o n g f u l - l i f e " c a s e ) ; S e a t t l e - F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank v . R a n k i n , 59 Wash. 2d 288, 290 91, 367 P.2d 835, 837-38 (1962) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; F a r l e y v . S a r t i n , 195 W. V a . 6 7 1 , 6 8 1 , 466 S.E.2d 522, 532 (1995) (express statement i n context of wrongful-death action); K w a t e r s k i v . S t a t e Farm Mut. A u t o I n s . Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Wis. 1967) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; P u h l v . M i l w a u k e e A u t o . I n s . Co., 99 N.W.2d 163, 169-71 ( W i s . 1959) ( d i c t u m i n p r e n a t a l - i n j u r y c a s e ) , 67

1110176; 1110219 Seventeen action o t h e r s t a t e s a n d t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a p e r m i t an for prenatal injuries not when those

t o r e c o v e r damages occur after

injuries

viability,

b u t have

determined

w h e t h e r an a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t f o r i n j u r i e s o c c u r r i n g b e f o r e viability.
2 3

o v e r r u l e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , I n r e E s t a t e o f S t r o m s t e d , 299 N.W.2d 226, 229-30 (Wis. 1980) . See g e n e r a l l y R o l a n d F. C h a s e , A n n o t . , L i a b i l i t y f o r P r e n a t a l I n j u r i e s , 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971 & Supp. May 2011) ( c o l l e c t i n g c a s e s ) . C r u s s e l l v . E l e c t r o l u x Home P r o d s . , I n c . , 4 99 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1138-41 (W.D. A r k . 2007) ( a p p l y i n g A r k a n s a s l a w ) ; L u f f v . H a w k i n s , 551 A . 2 d 437, 438 n.1 ( D e l . S u p e r . C t . 1988) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Worgan v . Greggo & F e r r a r a , I n c . , 128 A . 2 d 557 ( D e l . S u p e r . C t . 1956) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Wade v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1579 (D. Haw. 1990) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; V o l k v. B a l d a z o , 651 P.2d 1 1 , 13 (Idaho 1982) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Lambert v. S i s t e r s o f Mercy H e a l t h C o r p . , 369 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1985) ( r e c o g n i z i n g a c t i o n f o r m e d i c a l m a l p r a c t i c e i n a t t e n d i n g p r e g n a n t woman); K i l k e r v. M u l r y , 437 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa C t . App. 1988) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; M i t c h e l l v . Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; C i t y o f L o u i s v i l l e v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Ky. 1968) (same); V e r k e n n e s v . C o r n i e a , 229 M i n n . 3 6 5 , 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (same); P e h r s o n v . K i s t n e r , 222 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 1974) ( f o l l o w i n g V e r k e n n e s ) ; R a i n e y v . H o r n , 221 M i s s . 269, 281-82, 72 So. 2d 434, 439-40 (1954) (express statement i n context o f wrongful-death action); S t r z e l c z y k v . J e t t , 264 Mont. 153, 870 P.2d 730 (1994) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; H a r t l e y v . Guthmann, 248 Neb. 13, 532 N.W.2d 331 (1995) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; M i l e s v . Box B u t t e C n t y . , 241 Neb. 588, 489 N.W.2d 829 (1992) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; D a v i l a v . B o d e l s o n , 103 N.M. 2 4 3 , 704 P.2d 1119 (N.M. C t . App. 1985) ( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; W i l l i a m s v . M a r i o n R a p i d Transit, I n c . , 152 O h i o S t . 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949)
2 3

68

1110176; 1110219 B. Wrongful Death

F o r t y s t a t e s and the D i s t r i c t o f Columbia p e r m i t r e c o v e r y of damages f o r the wrongful injuries death o f an u n b o r n child when

post-viability birth.

t o t h a t c h i l d cause

i t s death

before

See H a m i l t o n v . S c o t t , specially, joined

97 So. 3d a t 737 ( P a r k e r , J . , by Stuart, Bolin, and Wise,

concurring JJ.).
2 4

Of t h e s e

states,

2 also

a l l o w r e c o v e r y i n any case

( p r e n a t a l i n j u r y ) ; G r i f f i t h s v . D o c t o r s Hosp., 150 O h i o App. 3d 234, 238, 780 N.E.2d 603, 606 (2002) ( d i c t u m i n w r o n g f u l d e a t h c a s e ) ; M a l l i s o n v . Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n w r o n g f u l - d e a t h c a s e ) ; H a l l v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 262, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1960) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Shousha v. M a t t h e w s D r i v u r s e l f S e r v . , I n c . , 210 Tenn. 384, 395-96, 358 S.W.2d 4 7 1 , 476 (1962) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; R e i s e r v . L o h n e r , 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) ( a p p a r e n t l y r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a cause o f a c t i o n f o r p r e n a t a l i n j u r i e s e x i s t s i n U t a h ) ; V a i l l a n c o u r t v. M e d i c a l C t r . Hosp. o f V e r m o n t , I n c . , 139 V t . 138, 141-42, 425 A . 2 d 92, 94-95 (1980) (by i m p l i c a t i o n i n wrongful-death action); G r e a t e r S o u t h e a s t Cmty. Hosp. v . W i l l i a m s , 482 A . 2 d 394, 396 & n.2 (D.C. C t . App. 1984) ( e x p r e s s s t a t e m e n t i n c o n t e x t o f wrongful-death action). I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e c a s e s c i t e d s u p r a nn. 22-23, s e e : E i c h v . G u l f S h o r e s , 293 A l a . 95, 300 So. 2d 354 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; S u m m e r f i e l d v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 144 A r i z . 467, 474-79, 698 P.2d 712, 719-24 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; A k a v . J e f f e r s o n Hosp. A s s ' n , I n c . , 344 A r k . 627, 637-43, 42 S.W.3d 508, 515-19 (2001) (see a l s o A r k . Code Ann. 1 6 - 6 2 - 1 0 2 ( a ) (1) ( M i c h i e 2005) ( r e c o g n i z i n g c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r t h e w r o n g f u l - d e a t h o f a v i a b l e unborn c h i l d ) ) ; E s p a d e r o v . F e l d , 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1483-85 (D. C o l o . 1 9 8 6 ) , c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l i n K e e f e v . P i z z a Hut o f A m e r i c a , I n c . , 868 P.2d 1092, 1094 ( C o l o . C t . App. 1 9 9 4 ) ; G o r k e v . L e c l e r c , 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A . 2 d 448 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; F l o r e n c e v . Town o f
2 4

69

1110176; 1110219 where t h e c h i l d dies after q u i c k e n i n g even i f i t i s n o t y e t

P l a i n f i e l d , 48 Conn. Supp. 4 4 0 , 452-60, 849 A . 2 d 7, 15-19 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; P o r t e r v . L a s s i t e r , 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; S h i r l e y v . B a c o n , 154 Ga. App. 2 0 3 , 267 S.E.2d 809 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Wade v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Haw. 1990); C h r i s a f o g e o r g i s v. Brandenberg, 55 I l l . 2 d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; H a l e v . M a n i o n , 189 K a n . 143, 368 P.2d 1 ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; S t a t e e x r e l . Odham v . Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A . 2 d 71 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; Mone v . G r e y h o u n d L i n e s , I n c . , 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; O ' N e i l l v . M o r s e , 385 M i c h . 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; J a r v i s v . P r o v i d e n c e Hosp., 178 M i c h . App. 586, 444 N.W.2d 236, 238 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; O'Grady v . Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1 9 8 3 ) ; S t r z e l c z y k v . J e t t , 264 Mont. 153, 870 P.2d 730 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . 3 0 - 8 0 9 ( 1 ) (2010); P o l i q ui ^n n v v. i \ / r - , ^ ^ ^ ^ - , i ^ 1 r\i -NT TT 1 r\ A - r o c -A o / i n / - r n c T N . a i ^ , M a c d o n a l d , 101 N.H. 104, 135 A . 2 d 249 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ; S a l a z a r v . S t . V i n c e n t Hosp. , 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. C t . App. 1 9 8 0 ) ; D i D o n a t o v . Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; W e r l i n g v . Sandy, 17 O h i o S t . 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; L i b b e e v . P e r m a n e n t e C l i n i c , 268 O r . 258, 518 P.2d 636 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; Amadio v . L e v i n , 509 Pa. 199, 501 A . 2 d 1085 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; P r e s l e y v . N e w p o r t Hosp. , 117 R . I . 177, 365 A . 2 d 748 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; F o w l e r v . Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; Re C e r t i f i c a t i o n o f Q u e s t i o n o f Law f r o m U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 38 7 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1 9 8 6 ) ; Tenn. Code A n n . 2 0 - 5 - 1 0 6 ( c ) ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; Tex. C i v . P r a c . & Rem. Code A n n . 7 1 . 0 0 1 ( 4 ) (Vernon 2 0 0 6 ) ; Carranza v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 267 P.3d 912 (Utah 2011) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g f o r m e r U t a h Code A n n . 78-11-6 (Supp. 2 0 0 6 ) ) ; Moen v . Hanson, 85 Wash. 2 d 597, 537 P.2d 266 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . See g e n e r a l l y S h e l d o n R. S h a p i r o , A n n o t . , R i g h t t o M a i n t a i n A c t i o n o r t o R e c o v e r Damages f o r D e a t h o f U n b o r n C h i l d , 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp. May 2011) ( c o l l e c t i n g c a s e s ) . 70

1110176; 1110219 viable, of

2 5

a n d 11 s t a t e s a l l o w r e c o v e r y r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s t a g e when t h e i n j u r y a n d d e a t h occur.
2 6

pregnancy
2 5

P o r t e r v . L a s s i t e r , 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; R a i n e y v . H o r n , 221 M i s s . 269, 72 So. 2d 434 ( 1 9 5 4 ) ; M i s s . Code A n n . 11-7-13 (2004) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e an " u n b o r n q u i c k c h i l d " ) . M a c k v . Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 ( A l a . 2 0 1 1 ) ; 740 I l l . Comp. S t a t . A n n . 180/2.2 (2010) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o a p p l y t o an u n b o r n c h i l d r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s t a g e o f g e s t a t i o n o r d e v e l o p m e n t ) (but s e e M i l l e r v . I n f e r t i l i t y Group of I l l i n o i s , I n c . , 386 I l l . App. 3 d 1 4 1 , 897 N.E.2d 837, 325 I l l . Dec. 298 (2008) ( s t a t u t e does n o t a p p l y t o p r e - i m p l a n t e d f e r t i l i z e d o v a ) ) ; J o h n s o n v . S o u t h e r n New O r l e a n s L i g h t & T r a c t i o n Co., D o c k e t 9048 ( L a . C t . App. Dec. 10, 1923) ( r e j e c t i n g v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d f o r w r o n g f u l death o f unborn c h i l d ) ; Danos v . S t . P i e r r e , 402 So. 2d 633, 638-39 ( L a . 1981) ( a p p r o v i n g J o h n s o n ' s r e j e c t i o n o f v i a b i l i t y ) ; Danos v . S t . P i e r r e , 383 So. 2d 1019, 1027 ( L a . C t . App. 1980) ( L o t t i n g e r , J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) , a f f ' d , 402 So. 2 d 633 ( L a . 1 9 9 1 ) ; L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 26 (1999) ("An u n b o r n c h i l d s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d as a n a t u r a l p e r s o n f o r w h a t e v e r r e l a t e s t o i t s i n t e r e s t s f r o m t h e moment o f c o n c e p t i o n ; I f t h e c h i l d i s b o r n dead, i t s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d n e v e r t o have e x i s t e d as a p e r s o n , e x c e p t f o r purposes o f a c t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from i t s w r o n g f u l d e a t h . " ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws A n n . 600.2922a ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; C o n n o r v . Monkem, 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g s t a t u t e s e t t i n g f o r t h r u l e o f c o n s t r u c t i o n ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . 3 0 - 8 0 9 ( 1 ) (2010) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e "an u n b o r n c h i l d i n u t e r o a t any s t a g e o f g e s t a t i o n " ) ; O k l a . S t a t . A n n . t i t . 12, 1 0 5 3 ( F ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) , t i t . 63, 1-730 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; S.D. Code A n n . 21-5-1 (1987) (amending w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e "an u n b o r n c h i l d " ) ; Wiersma v . M a p l e L e a f Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e ) ; T e x . Civ. P r a c . & Rem. Code A n n . 7 1 . 0 0 1 ( 4 ) (Vernon 2008) (defining " i n d i v i d u a l " i n wrongful-death statute t o include "an unborn child a t every stage of gestation from f e r t i l i z a t i o n u n t i l b i r t h " ) ; C a r r a n z a v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 267 P.3d 912 (Utah 2 0 1 1 ) ; F a r l e y v . S a r t i n , 195 W. V a . 67, 466 S.E.2d 522 (1995) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e ) .
26

71

1110176; 1110219 IV. All court states G u a r d i a n s h i p Law r u l e , or precedent ad litem to -- p e r m i t a

-- b y s t a t u t e , a guardian child

to

appoint

represent the including

interests

o f an u n b o r n
2 7

i n various matters

e s t a t e s and t r u s t s .
27

S e e 19-3B-305, A l a . Code 1975; A l a s k a S t a t . 1 3 . 0 6 . 1 2 0 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r i z . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 14-1408 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. 2 8 - 7 3 - 3 0 5 ( a ) (Supp. 2 0 0 9 ) ; C a l . C i v . P r a c . Code 373.5 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; C o l o . Rev. S t a t . Ann. 1 5 - 1 0 - 4 0 3 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Conn. Gen. S t a t . Ann. 45a-132 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; D e l a w a r e : R u l e 17(c), Chancery Court Rules (2012); F l a . S t a t . Ann. 731.303(4) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. 5 3 - 1 1 - 2 ( b ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; H a w a i i : R u l e 2 8 ( b ) , P r o b a t e R u l e s ; I d a h o Code Ann. 1 5 - 1 - 4 0 3 ( d ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; 735 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. 5/2-501 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. 2 9 - 1 - 1 - 2 0 ( b ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. 633A.6306 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Kan. S t a t . A n n . 59-2205 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 389A.035 (2010); L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 252 (2008) (authorizing appointment of "curator" to represent the i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n p e r s o n ) ; Me. Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 18-B, 305 (2011) ( a u t h o r i z i n g a p p o i n t m e n t o f a " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n p e r s o n i n a m a t t e r c o n c e r n i n g a t r u s t ) ; S p e n c e r v . M c M u l l e n , 198 Md. 90, 81 A . 2 d 237 (1951) ( a u t h o r i z i n g a p p o i n t m e n t o f a g u a r d i a n a d l i t e m t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann. 600.2045 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ; M i n n . S t a t . Ann. 501B.19 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; M i s s i s s i p p i : R u l e 1 7 ( c ) , R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . 4 7 2 . 3 0 0 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Mont. Code Ann. 7 2 - 3 5 - 3 1 3 ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 3 0 - 2 2 2 2 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 1 5 5 . 1 4 0 ( 1 ) ( h ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.H. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 498-A:23 (2009) ( e m i n e n t - d o m a i n p r o c e e d i n g s ) ; New J e r s e y : R u l e 4 : 2 6 - 3 ( a ) , R u l e s o f C o u r t ; N.M. S t a t . 45-1-403(D) (Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; N.Y. S u r r . C t . P r o c . A c t Law 315 (McKinney 1994); N o r t h C a r o l i n a : R u l e 1 7 ( b ) ( 4 ) , R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ; N.D. C e n t . Code 3 0 . 1 - 0 3 - 0 3 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. 5803.05 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 12, 1147.3 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . 130.120 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; P e n n s y l v a n i a : R u l e 1 2 . 4 ( a ) , O r p h a n s ' C o u r t R u l e s ; S.C. Code Ann. 6 2 - 1 - 4 0 3 ( 4 ) 72

1110176; 1110219 V. Every directives, H e a l t h - C a r e Law advance of

s t a t e p e r m i t s competent a d u l t s t o execute including living wills and d u r a b l e

powers

attorney f o r h e a l t h care.

These documents d e s c r i b e t h e t y p e s to receive or not receive i f

of h e a l t h care the author wishes he o r she i s u n a b l e care. With

t o make d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g h i s o r h e r a few l i m i t e d e x c e p t i o n s , however, or withholding of most life-

health states

prohibit

the withdrawal

s u s t a i n i n g t r e a t m e n t f r o m a p r e g n a n t woman, r e g a r d l e s s o f h e r advance directive.

2 8

Similarly,

those

states

generally

( 2 0 1 1 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws 5 5 - 3 - 3 2 ( 3 ) ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; Tenn. Code Ann. 3 5 - 1 5 - 3 0 5 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Tex. P r o p . Code 1 1 5 . 0 1 4 ( a ) (Vernon Supp. 2 0 1 1 ) ; U t a h Code Ann. 75-7-305 (2010); V e r m o n t : R u l e 1 8 ( c ) , P r o b a t e R u l e s ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 11.96A.160 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; W. V a . Code A n n . 44D-3-305 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; W i s . Stat. Ann. 4 8 . 2 3 5 ( 1 ) ( f ) (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 4-10-305(a) (2009) (authorizing appointment of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f an u n b o r n p e r s o n i n matters concerning a t r u s t ) . S e e 2 2 - 8 A - 4 ( h ) , A l a . Code 1975 ("Advance D i r e c t i v e f o r H e a l t h C a r e , " 3 ) ; s e e a l s o A l a s k a S t a t . 13.52.055 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; A r k . Code Ann. 2 0 - 1 7 - 2 0 6 ( c ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; Conn. Gen. S t a t . Ann. 19a-574 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; D e l . Code Ann. t i t . 16, 2 5 0 3 ( j ) ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; F l a . S t a t . A n n . 765.113(2) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Ga. Code Ann. 31-32-4 (2009) (Form, P a r t Two, 5 ( 9 ) ) , 3 1 - 3 2 - 9 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; I d a h o Code Ann. 39-4504 (2002) (A L i v i n g W i l l , 5 4 ) , 39-4505 (2002) (A D u r a b l e Power o f A t t o r n e y f o r H e a l t h C a r e , 5 4 ) ; 755 I l l . Comp. S t a t . Ann. 3 5 / 3 ( c ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; I n d . Code Ann. 1 6 - 3 6 - 4 - 8 ( d ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; Iowa Code Ann. 144A.6(2) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; K a n . S t a t . Ann. 6 5 - 2 8 , 1 0 3 ( a ) (2008) ( l a s t s e n t e n c e ) ; Ky. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 3 1 1 . 6 2 5 ( 1 ) ( f o r m ) , 311.629(4) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; M i c h . Comp. Laws Ann.
28

73

1110176; 1110219 p r o h i b i t an a g e n t a c t i n g u n d e r a h e a l t h - c a r e power o f a t t o r n e y f r o m a u t h o r i z i n g an abortion.

2 9

Conclusion The decision of t h i s Court today i s i n keeping w i t h the

widespread

l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t unborn c h i l d r e n are

persons

7 0 0 . 5 5 0 9 ( 1 ) ( d ) , 7 0 0 . 5 5 1 2 ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Mo. Ann. S t a t . 459.025 (2007) ; Mont. Code Ann. 5 0 - 9 - 1 0 6 ( 7 ) , 5 0 - 9 - 2 0 2 ( 3 ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Neb. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 2 0 - 4 0 8 ( 3 ) (2008), 30-3417(1)(b) ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 4 4 9 . 6 2 4 ( 4 ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 137-J:5(V)(c) (2011); N.D. Cent. Code 2 3 - 0 6 . 5 - 0 9 ( 5 ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; O h i o Rev. Code Ann. 1337.13(D) ( 2 0 0 6 ) , 2133.06(B) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 63, 3101.4(C) (Advance D i r e c t i v e f o r H e a l t h C a r e Form, 5 I V ( c ) ) , 3101.8(C) ( 2 0 1 2 ) ; 20 Pa. Cons. S t a t . Ann. 5 4 2 9 ( a ) , (b) (2008) (see a l s o t i t . 20, 5 4 2 9 ( b ) (do-not-resuscitate o r d e r s ) ) ; R . I . Gen. Laws 2 3 - 4 . 1 0 - 5 ( c ) , 2 3 - 4 . 1 1 - 6 ( c ) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; S.C. Code Ann. 44-77-70 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 62-5-504(G) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; S.D. C o d i f i e d Laws 34-12D-10 ( 2 0 0 4 ) , 59-7-2.8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Tex. H e a l t h & S a f e t y Code Ann. 166.049 (Vernon 2010) (see a l s o 166.098 (do-not-resuscitate orders)); Utah Code Ann. 75-2a-123(1) (Supp. 2010); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 7 0 . 1 2 2 . 0 3 0 ( 1 ) ( d ) ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; W i s . S t a t . Ann. 154.03 ( D i r e c t i v e to Attending Physician, para. 4) (2006) (see also 154.19(1)(e) ( d o - n o t - r e s u s c i t a t e orders)). S e e 2 6 - 1 - 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975; see a l s o A l a s k a Stat. 13.26.150(e)(2) (2008) (restriction on guardian a u t h o r i z i n g an a b o r t i o n ) ; C a l . P r o b . Code 4652(e) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Fla. S t a t . Ann. 765.113(1) (2010); Ga. Code Ann. 3 1 - 3 2 - 1 4 ( b ) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Nev. Rev. S t a t . Ann. 1 6 2 A . 8 5 0 ( 1 ) ( e ) (2009) ; N.D. C e n t . Code 2 3 - 0 6 - 5 . 0 3 ( 6 ) (Supp. 2 0 0 9 ) ; O k l a . Rev. S t a t . Ann. t i t . 30, 3-119(3) (2009) ( r e s t r i c t i o n on g u a r d i a n a u t h o r i z i n g an a b o r t i o n ) ; Or. Rev. S t a t . 127.540(5) ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; Tex. H e a l t h & S a f e t y Code 1 6 6 . 1 5 2 ( f ) ( 4 ) (Vernon 2010) (see a l s o 166.163 ( f o r m o f d i s c l o s u r e s t a t e m e n t ) ) ; Va. Code Ann. 54.1-2 983.3(B) (Supp. 2 0 1 0 ) .
29

74

1110176; 1110219 w i t h r i g h t s t h a t s h o u l d be p r o t e c t e d b y l a w . Today, t h e o n l y major area in which unborn children are denied legal

p r o t e c t i o n i s a b o r t i o n , and t h a t d e n i a l i s o n l y because o f the dictates cases o f Roe. Furthermore, with the d e c i s i o n i n the present i n the

i s consistent

the Declaration

of Rights

Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t

" a l l men a r e e q u a l l y Creator

f r e e a n d i n d e p e n d e n t ; t h a t t h e y a r e endowed b y t h e i r with certain inalienable rights; that

among t h e s e a r e l i f e , A l a . C o n s t . 1901, 1

l i b e r t y and the p u r s u i t o f h a p p i n e s s . " (emphasis added).

3 0

These words, borrowed from t h e f i r s t guarantee o f t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f Independence, which s t a t e s t h a t "[w]e h o l d t h e s e t r u t h s t o be s e l f - e v i d e n t , t h a t a l l men a r e c r e a t e d e q u a l , t h a t t h e y a r e endowed b y t h e i r C r e a t o r w i t h c e r t a i n u n a l i e n a b l e R i g h t s , t h a t among t h e s e a r e L i f e , L i b e r t y a n d t h e p u r s u i t o f H a p p i n e s s , " a f f i r m t h a t each p e r s o n has a God-given right to l i f e .
30

75

1110176; SHAW,

1110219 (concurring i n part and concurring i n the

Justice

result). These cases present the very narrow i s s u e whether the

word " c h i l d " endangerment Section

i n A l a . Code 1975, 26-15-3.2, statute," includes an unborn

the "chemicalor fetus.

child

26-15-3.2(a)

provides:

"(a) A r e s p o n s i b l e p e r s o n commits t h e c r i m e o f c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t o f e x p o s i n g a c h i l d t o an e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h he o r she does any o f t h e following: "(1) Knowingly, recklessly, or i n t e n t i o n a l l y causes or p e r m i t s a c h i l d t o be e x p o s e d t o , t o i n g e s t o r i n h a l e , o r t o have c o n t a c t w i t h a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-12-260. ... "(2) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d a c h i l d s u f f e r s s e r i o u s p h y s i c a l i n j u r y by exposure t o , i n g e s t i o n o f , i n h a l a t i o n o f , or c o n t a c t w i t h a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , chemical substance, or drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a . "(3) V i o l a t e s s u b d i v i s i o n (1) a n d t h e exposure, i n g e s t i o n , i n h a l a t i o n , or contact r e s u l t s i n t h e d e a t h o f t h e c h i l d . ... " On J a n u a r y 31, 2009, a s o n , B.W. The Hope E l i s a b e t h Ankrom gave b i r t h t o at t r i a l indicated that Ankrom

evidence

t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e p r i o r t o g i v i n g b i r t h and t h a t the child tested p o s i t i v e f o r cocaine a f t e r h i s b i r t h . 76 Medical

1110176; 1110219 r e c o r d s showed t h a t Ankrom h a d t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e and marijuana Ankrom was on more than one occasion during her pregnancy.

c h a r g e d w i t h and p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o v i o l a t i n g 26in that she knowingly, t o be recklessly, exposed a or

15-3.2(a)(1) intentionally ingest or

c a u s e d o r p e r m i t t e d B.W. or to have
3 1

to, to

inhale,

contact with

controlled

s u b s t a n c e , namely, c o c a i n e . The Kimbrough evidence indicated at the

trial she

of

Amanda

Helaine

Borden while

that

i n g e s t e d methamphetamine

p r e g n a n t w i t h h e r s o n , Timmy.

He was b o r n p r e m a t u r e l y d u r i n g birth was

t h e 2 5 t h week o f t h e p r e g n a n c y and d i e d 19 m i n u t e s a f t e r from acute methamphetamine and pleaded intoxication. guilty to, Kimbrough

charged

with,

violating

26-15-

3 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) i n t h a t she k n o w i n g l y , r e c k l e s s l y , o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y caused inhale, namely,

3 1

or or

p e r m i t t e d Timmy to have

t o be

exposed a

to, to

ingest

or

contact with
32

controlled

substance,

methamphetamine,

which r e s u l t e d i n h i s death.

" C o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e " f o r p u r p o s e s o f 26-15-3.2 i s d e f i n e d by A l a . Code 1975, 2 6 - 1 5 - 2 ( 2 ) , w h i c h r e f e r s t o A l a . Code 1975, 2 0 - 2 - 2 ( 4 ) , w h i c h i n t u r n r e f e r s t o , among o t h e r Code s e c t i o n s , A l a . Code 1975, 20-2-25, w h i c h d e f i n e s c o c a i n e as a S c h e d u l e I I c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e . Methamphetamine i s a Schedule I I I c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e . See A l a . Code 1975, 20-2-27.
32

77

1110176; 1110219 The B.W. only issue involved i n t h e s e two a p p e a l s i s w h e t h e r

a n d Timmy were e a c h a " c h i l d " w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f 26-

15-3.2(a). "In d e t e r m i n i n g t h e meaning o f a s t a t u t e , t h i s C o u r t l o o k s t o t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e words as w r i t t e n b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . As we have s a i d : "'"Words u s e d i inn a s t a t u t e must be g i v e n their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g , a n d where p l a i n language i s u s e d a c o u r t i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s . I f t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e s t a t u t e i s u n a m b i g u o u s , t h e n t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n D e K a l b C o u n t y LP Gas Co. v . S u b u r b a n Gas, I n c . , 729 So. 2d 270, 275 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Blue Cross & Blue S h i e l d v.

Nielsen, Corp. (Ala.

714 So. 2d 293, 296 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) , q u o t i n g Eng'g A s s o c s . Corp.,

i n t u r n IMED

v. Systems 1992)).

602 So. 2d 344, 346

I s e e no p a t e n t o r l a t e n t a m b i g u i t y i n t h e w o r d i t i s n o t a term o f a r t and c o n t a i n s This Court's most cited dictionary no i n h e r e n t defines

"child";

uncertainty. as "an

"child"

unborn or r e c e n t l y born person." D i c t i o n a r y 214 ( 1 1 t h e d . 2003) . Dictionary being; defines

Merriam-Webster's C o l l e g i a t e The v e n e r a b l e O x f o r d English

" c h i l d " as an " u n b o r n o r n e w l y b o r n human I I I The O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y 113 78

fatus, infant."

1110176;

1110219 See a l s o Webster's (defining T h i r d New as International "an unborn or

(2d. e d . 1 9 8 9 ) . Dictionary 388

(2002)

"child"

r e c e n t l y b o r n human b e i n g " ) .

The l a n g u a g e o f t h e Code s e c t i o n

i s c l e a r ; t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o c o n s t r u e , no n e e d t o a t t e m p t t o d i v i n e the " i n t e n t " of the l e g i s l a t u r e , t h e Code f o r e x a m p l e s o f i t s u s a g e . and no n e e d t o s e a r c h a n d Timmy

C l e a r l y , B.W.

were e a c h a " c h i l d " u n d e r 26-15-3.2 when t h e y were e x p o s e d to, ingested, inhaled, or had contact with a controlled

substance. Some o f t h e a r g u m e n t s expressed situations, by

3 3

made i n t h e s e c a s e s o r c o n c e r n s are premised on hypothetical

the

Justices

d i f f e r e n t from the f a c t s b e f o r e us, i n which the unconstitutional as a p p l i e d or

Code s e c t i o n m i g h t be e i t h e r

seemingly unwise i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n .
33

I t goes w i t h o u t

saying

T h e C h i e f J u s t i c e ' s e x a m p l e i n h i s d i s s e n t o f a woman, n o t k n o w i n g she was p r e g n a n t , b e i n g p r o s e c u t e d f o r d r i n k i n g wine i s i n a p p o s i t e . Wine i s n o t a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , c h e m i c a l s u b s t a n c e , o r d r u g p a r a p h e r n a l i a as t h o s e t e r m s a r e d e f i n e d i n t h e Code, a n d t h e mens r e a p r o v i s i o n s o f 26-15 3.2 w o u l d a r g u a b l y r e q u i r e t h a t a d e f e n d a n t know t h a t a c h i l d i s p r e s e n t . Such mens r e a r e q u i r e m e n t w o u l d a l s o a r g u a b l y n o t be s a t i s f i e d i n t h e s i t u a t i o n where an e x p e c t a n t m o t h e r i s a d m i n i s t e r e d a p r e s c r i p t i o n drug under the d i r e c t i o n of a p h y s i c i a n ; i t i s d i f f i c u l t to conclude t h a t the r e q u i s i t e c r i m i n a l i n t e n t e x i s t s where a woman--in g o o d f a i t h - - a c t s i n a c c o r d w i t h the s u p e r i o r m e d i c a l knowledge o f her t r e a t i n g physician. Thus, no e x c e p t i o n f o r p h y s i c i a n - p r e s c r i b e d c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s w o u l d a p p e a r t o be n e c e s s a r y . 79

1110176;

1110219

t h a t we c a n n o t s t r i k e down t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e Code s e c t i o n in Ankrom's and Kimbrough's cases merely because t h e Code other

section context. of and this policy 2010) Parris,

m i g h t be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a p p l i e d
3 4

i n some

I t i s n o t t h e r o l e o f t h i s C o u r t t o s i t i n judgment o f t h e enactments o f t h e Alabama legislature, and n o t public

t h e wisdom "'[i]t

i s w e l l established that the l e g i s l a t u r e , has t h e e x c l u s i v e domain to formulate

Court,

i n Alabama.'" (Shaw,

S u t t l e s v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 104 ( A l a . specially and q u o t i n g B o l e s v.

J . , concurring

952 So. 2d 364, 367

( A l a . 2006)).

See a l s o A l a .

C o n s t . 1 9 0 1 , A r t . I I I , 43. I concur w i t h t h e main o p i n i o n ' s includes holding that t h e word As

" c h i l d " as u s e d i n 26-15-3.2

an u n b o r n c h i l d .

to the remainder of the o p i n i o n ,

I concur i n the r e s u l t .

This certiorari
3 4

Court d i d not grant the p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of t o r e v i e w t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f 26-15-3.2. 80

1110176; 1110219 MALONE, C h i e f I Justice (dissenting). dissent. Code 1975, This of This case turns on the

respectfully of A l a .

construction

26-15-3.2, t h e

"chemicalgoverned by

endangerment" s t a t u t e . the fundamental rule

Court i s therefore construction statutes

statutory that such

regarding are to be the A

criminal construed

statutes, narrowly did not

i.e., to

avoid

criminalizing intend to

actions

legislature few of the

specifically

criminalize. Ex

many c a s e s e s p o u s i n g t h i s p r i n c i p l e a r e 53 So. 3d 151 (Ala. 14, this Chief 18 2010); 2012] rule is and

parte v.

Theodorou, State, Crim. [Ms. App.

Billingsley So. 3d

CR-10-0540, Dec. 2012). by the v. rule That words of

(Ala. is in 95

fundamental

exemplified United (1820): strictly, itself. rights

J u s t i c e John M a r s h a l l U.S. are old (5 Wheat.) to than of the be 76,

States "The

Wiltberger, that penal

laws

construed

i s , perhaps,

not

much l e s s

construction law for the the the

I t i s f o u n d e d on of

the on

tenderness the

i n d i v i d u a l s ; and

p l a i n p r i n c i p l e that legislative, majority not in

power o f p u n i s h m e n t i s v e s t e d judicial this department."

i n the the

Although

acknowledges favoring

s e t t l e d r u l e , i t refuses

to apply

i t , instead

81

1110176; 1110219 a "common-sense" that reading of term the chemical-endangerment as used in the

statute statute

construes the

"child"

as b r o a d l y

as p o s s i b l e ,

to include

unborn

children

back to the i n s t a n t of c o n c e p t i o n . I have g r e a t difficulty accepting this construction in

l i g h t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s a c t i o n i n 2006 t o amend A l a . Code 1975, 13A-6-1(a)(3), A l a . Code 1975, of a part of Alabama's homicide in The year, as The

statutes, the

13A-6-1 e t s e q . , t o i n c l u d e an was "unborn enacted the child." that term same

definition

"person" statute

chemical-endangerment but that statute from the

specifically language

uses

"child,"

distinct majority's

i n the

homicide

statute.

r a t i o n a l e f o r i t s expansive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the statute i n s p i t e of the p l a i n language of the the of term

chemical-endangerment of that statute child" shows in a

i s that in other

the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s use statutes for the even such as

"unborn statute children

homicide unborn

concern

protection when the

a l l instances,

legislature child," do not

specifically in the

used the word " c h i l d , "

and n o t " u n b o r n Although I

chemical-endangerment

statute.

doubt the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s concern f o r the p r o t e c t i o n

of unborn

82

1110176; 1110219 children, wisdom statute. acting implying the term was of I the have concerns in questioning i t relates to the collective specific Court is by by the

l e g i s l a t u r e as I must

this this

Secondly,

question

whether judicial actual

within an

correct to

conservative supplant the

principles

intent

language used of

legislature. I believe "child" in the

t h a t the

l e g i s l a t u r e ' s use statute

chemical-endangerment the

when i t i n other Court of to the give

contemporaneously using statutes was

term "unborn c h i l d " and terms requires in the this

criminal

purposed two

distinguish

between

those

context

chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e . e f f e c t to the the legislative of 3d the 572, with

That i s , the wisdom

C o u r t must

i n t e n t and statute. 586 the

as e x p r e s s e d i n Cnty. Comm'n

p l a i n language So.

Jefferson

v. E d w a r d s , 32 My expansion expansion problems. of the law

( A l a . 2009). majority's "common-sense" i s that that

disagreement of the

chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e leads to other, more the a

potentially First, set but and who

practical, state has is her

a s i m p l e a p p l i c a t i o n of out who by is the majority to

present woman that who she

conceived, pregnant,

without has

knowledge a glass

thereafter

o f w i n e , makes

83

1110176; 1110219 subject State. child to a felony prosecution a t the " d i s c r e t i o n " of the

Whether t h e c h e m i c a l s t h a t a r e h a r m f u l t o t h e unborn are legal or i l l e g a l , their ingestion o r use by a

woman who h a s c o n c e i v e d h a s become a f e l o n y e v e n t h o u g h t h e act that i s c r i m i n a l i z e d i s committed w i t h o u t I believe that knowledge o r

intent. construed for of

t h e chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e as therefore raises profound concerns

by t h e m a j o r i t y

challenges

t o i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under t h e p r o v i s i o n s and the U n i t e d Sates Constitutions that

t h e Alabama

require

due p r o c e s s o f a n d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r t h e l a w s . the majority's expectant that opinion in raises a these of by concerns complex religious

Furthermore, with every

mother,

number

situations faith, the

are s i g n i f i c a n t l y

impacted

r a c i a l background, economic s t a t u s , and t h e n a t u r e o f among many t h i n g s ; those things " a l l do n o t and s a d l y the

conception,

m a t t e r " b a s e d on t h e m a j o r i t y ' s for the majority's

opinion.

Finally,

"common-sense"

construction,

chemical-endangerment statue w i l l either of intentionally statute I a do or not, strong not

now s u p p l y

women who h a v e ,

run afoul of the p r o s c r i p t i o n s incentive believe to that terminate the their

the

pregnancy.

majority's

84

1110176;

1110219 reflects or the long of the intent and wisdom this of the

construction legislature construction respectfully

settled

law governing I

Court's therefore

criminal

statutes;

must

dissent.

85

1110176; 1110219 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e ( d i s s e n t i n g ) . I Malone agree with much o f what i s said and by with Chief many Justice of the

i n h i s dissenting made

opinion

arguments

b y Hope E l i s a b e t h

Ankrom

i n her "Motion t o

Dismiss Indictment."

I n h e r m o t i o n , Ankrom a r g u e d

" ' t h a t " c o u r t s i n o t h e r s t a t e s w h i c h have enacted t h e same or s i m i l a r chemical endangerment statutes have determined that such statutes do n o t a p p l y to p r e n a t a l c o n d u c t t h a t a l l e g e d l y harms a fetus"; that "[t]he state's contention that the defendant v i o l a t e d t h i s s t a t u t e r e n d e r s t h e law i m p e r m i s s i b l y vague, and therefore the r u l e of l e n i t y applies"; that "[t]he legislature has p r e v i o u s l y considered amending the statute to include prenatal c o n d u c t t h a t harms a f e t u s , a n d d e c l i n e d t o do s o " ; t h a t " t h e defendant has n o t been accorded due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e t h e r e was no n o t i c e t h a t her conduct was illegal under this statute"; that "[t]he prosecution of p r e g n a n t women i s a v i o l a t i o n of the constitutional guarantee of Equal P r o t e c t i o n " ; and t h a t " [ p ] r o s e c u t i o n o f pregnant, a l l e g e d l y drug-addicted women is against p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r numerous moral and e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . " ' " So. August quoting 3d a t 26, 2011] ( q u o t i n g Ankrom v . S t a t e , So. 3d , [Ms. CR-09-1148, App. 2011),

(Ala. Crim.

i n t u r n Ankrom's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s

her indictment).

86

1110176; 1110219 In p a r t i c u l a r , must p r o v i d e prohibited. n.12 2d So. I would reiterate with that criminal statutes

ordinary United

persons v.

clear notice 115

o f what i s 882, 658 887 So. 60 the

States See

Sepulveda,

F.3d

(11th C i r . 1997). 347, 2d 349 202 ( A l a . 1993); (1952). f o r the

also v.

Ex p a r t e State,

Mutrie, 257

Fuller

A l a . 502, is

This of

due-process strict

requirement and

foundation applicable United

rules

construction generally

lenity v. the

to c r i m i n a l statutes. 530 U.S. requires in 120, that 131

See (2000)

Castillo

States,

(explaining that

" r u l e of l e n i t y ... be

'ambiguous c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e [ s ] of the accused'"). In this

construed

favor

regard, possible

I note the s t a t e m e n t i n the main o p i n i o n to conclude, understood protect at . only as the Kimbrough original who argues,

that " i ti s that the

legislature statute So. to 3d

chemical-endangerment were already as now born." written

children

Nothing
3 5

i n the

statute

changes t h a t
3 5

possibility.

Indeed, i f i t i s not p o s s i b l e t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e understood the chemical-endangerment s t a t u t e as p r o t e c t i n g o n l y c h i l d r e n who a r e a l r e a d y b o r n , has i t n o t made i n t o a f e l o n y the a c t of a pregnant mother i n i n g e s t i n g drugs p r e s c r i b e d t o h e r by a p h y s i c i a n ? The s t a t u t e c o n t a i n s an e x c e p t i o n f o r d r u g s p r e s c r i b e d t o a c h i l d , see A l a . Code 1975, 26-15-3.2(c), but n o t i c e a b l y l a c k s any exception for c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s p r e s c r i b e d t o t h e m o t h e r by a p h y s i c i a n . 87

1110176; 1110219 I respectfully dissent.

(The comment i n n o t e 33 o f J u s t i c e Shaw's s p e c i a l w r i t i n g r e g a r d i n g c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and p h y s i c i a n - p r e s c r i b e d substances p r e s u m e s t h a t one c a n n o t be g u i l t y o f v i o l a t i n g t h e c h e m i c a l e n d a n g e r m e n t s t a t u t e w i t h o u t h a v i n g an i n t e n t t o harm t h e c h i l d or a t l e a s t knowledge t h a t the exposure c o n t e m p l a t e d i s l i k e l y t o do s o . The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n c l u d e s u c h a requirement i n the s t a t u t e . The only criminal intent p r e s c r i b e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e r e l a t e s t o t h e e x p o s u r e e l e m e n t i t s e l f ( i . e . , the requirement t h a t the defendant " [ k ] n o w i n g l y , r e c k l e s s l y , o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a u s e s o r p e r m i t s a c h i l d t o be e x p o s e d t o " t h e s u b s t a n c e o r p a r a p h e r n a l i a a t i s s u e (emphasis added)).) 88