Explicaii Clauza de consolidare a valorii (Buy-back) - este specific contractelor de tip buy-back; - acestea presupun, spre exemplu, livrarea

a unui utilaj de producie, plata realizndu-se n acest caz prin produsele fabricate cu acesta; este, evident, cazul multor contracte derulate pe axa NORD-SUD (state dezvoltate care vnd utilaje statelor n curs de dezvoltare); - exemplu din viaa economic real: Buy-Backs
In the early 1990's, Iranian authorities realized the main bottlenecks in the development of the oil sector and in the First, Second and Third Five-Year Plans defined ambitious goals for the enhancement of crude oil production. However, the plans were not realized for many reasons, mainly due to a lack of capital and technology. For this reason, in 1995, officials in the oil industry decided to open a number of projects to foreign participation, from which they hoped to direct necessary capital and technology into the sector. A prerequisite for this move was to receive parliamentary approval since there were clear obstacles created by the Iranian Constitution on this issue. The compromise formula was found in the notion of "buy-back agreements," which were defined as a "form of financing" and not "foreign investment." In fact, the buy-back agreements put forward by the Iranian authorities underline the role of the foreign companies as providers of technology. In these types of agreements, the foreign party undertakes the initial investment and subsequently recovers its investment through exploitation of the projects final product (crude oil, gas, or refined products). The buy-back contract was designed to ensure Irans sovereignty over and ownership of its oil and gas resources. The contract attempts to achieve the following major goals: Transfer of technology; Contractors short term presence in oil and gas field development projects; Full control and close supervision of NIOC on the schedule and costs; Lower costs compared to other contracts commonly used in oil industries; Maximum use of domestic engineering, technical and executive capabilities in order to promote the quality of domestic sources and prevent the outflow of foreign currency.

NIOCs new strategy to attract foreign investment has been accompanied by a political twist. The first such buy-back project was awarded to the US company Conoco in early 1995. While Iran's intention was a goodwill gesture towards the United States, the move backfired and the events that followed led to the deterioration of relations between the two sides. The Clinton administration imposed economic sanctions on Iran in 1995, and the US Congress followed the executive directive with the notorious Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996.

Iran was quick to award the original Conoco deal to Frances Total, to maintain the momentum of the new policy. Though ILSA did not stop European companies from negotiating with Iran on the tendered projects, it undoubtedly has inhibited the process of foreign participation in Iran's oil sector. Only two out of the ten projects remaining from the original list of proposals were signed in 1997 (one with Bow Valley and the other with a consortium including TotalFinaElf, Petronas of Malaysia and Gazprom of Russia). However, the June 1998 waiver by the US administration on sanctions against non-US companies that invest in Iran is so far the most significant related development to encourage those companies to consider the Islamic Republic as an option for investment. The fact that Royal Dutch Shell signed a major buy-back agreement with Iran in 1999 to develop the Soroush and Nowruz fields is testament to this fact. Once Iranian authorities saw that considerable foreign investment would be required over the next decade, in early 1998, they announced that a list of 100 projects would be offered to foreign companies, including some sensitive onshore fields and other untapped fields. This statement clearly required parliamentary approval, and in the interim, the figure was lowered to 40 projects. Sursa: http://web.archive.org/web/20070928000413/http://www.atiehbahar.com/Resources/Oil&Gas.htm

- principiul este extrem de simplu (a se studia aplicaia rezolvat, manual, p. 78-79): - este stabilit valoare prestaiei (preul utilajului spre exemplu) - la aceasta se adaug dobnda, fiind vorba, n cele din urm, de o creditare (importatorul are statut de debitor iniial) - prestaia iniial a exportatorului este dat deci de Pre+Dobnd - este stabilit un pre mediu prognozat pentru produsele rezultate (la ct este evaluat un produs) / de asemenea, se decide n ci ani i cte rate se va realiza aceast plat n produse - vom avea mereu n atenie principiul echivalenei prestaiilor (valoarea prestaiei iniiale, adic Pre+Dobnd, trebuie s fie egalat de valoarea produselor trimise) !!! - cunoscnd valoarea iniial a prestaiei (Pre+Dobnd) i preul prognozat al unui produs, putem stabili numrul de buci necesare pentru stingerea datoriei - ulterior, timpul se scurge i contractul se deruleaz; fiecare tran de produse expediate este evaluat ns la preul pieei, i nu la cel prognozat; dup cum am subliniat la seminar, de la o lun la alta, sau de la un trimestru la altul, preul unui produs pe piaa internaional se poate modifica; astfel, va trebui operat o corecie la nivelul cantitii trimise, pentru ultima rat !!! - evident, aceasta nseamn fie mai multe buci, fie mai puine, astfel nct s fie respectatprincipiul echivalenei prestaiilor de mai sus - vei remarca faptul c, dac preul produselor n cauz a crescut, ultima tran va fi compus din mai puine produse, i invers, n cazul diminurii reului.