Immigrants Human Rights Participation

Sociological Forum, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2011.01288.
Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights1

Rob Clark, and Jason Hall2
World polity embeddedness has traditionally been measured by state and civil participation in formal venues, including international organizations, multilateral agreements, and world conferences. In this study, we highlight an alternative form of embeddedness found in cross-national social relations and apply this framework to the human rights sector of the world polity. Specically, we propose that the international migrant community diffuses human rights values and practices via (1) local performance and (2) cross-national communication. Using data from the World Values Survey, we rst show that immigrants are more likely to embrace, and actively participate in, the human rights movement. Next, using network data that report country-to-country bilateral ows, we observe a high degree of correspondence between international migration and telecommunications, conrming previous studies that trace telephone trafc to the ow of people. Finally, analyzing a balanced data set of 333 observations across 111 countries spanning the 19752000 period, we use ordered probit regression to assess the local and cross-national effects of migrants on a states human rights record. We nd that a countrys immigration level and its in-degree centrality in international telecommunications both positively affect its Amnesty International rating, and that these effects are robust to a number of alternative specications. KEY WORDS: human rights; international telecommunications; migration; social networks; world polity.
INTRODUCTION The postWorld War II era has been characterized as a period of globalization, in which national societies have become increasingly integrated across economic, political, and cultural lines. One manifestation of this global era has been the formal organization of individual and state actors in public space. In particular, the creation of the United Nations after World War II marked a transition toward international governance, as a Westphalian conception of
1
We thank Emilie Hafner-Burton for kindly sharing her data. Editors note: This article is part of a special section in this issue entitled Sociological Research on Contemporary Issues and Events. For other entries in the section, see Cohen-Marks and Stout (2011), Hass (2011), Hawdon and Ryan (2011), Longest and Smith (2011), and Widner and Chicoine (2011). Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma, Kaufman Hall 331, 780 Van Vleet Oval, Norman, Oklahoma 73019; e-mail: robclark@ou.edu. 870
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state sovereignty began to attenuate, and states began to formally recognize international standards. The number of international governmental organizations (IGOs) has doubled during the second half of the twentieth century, while international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have increased even more dramatically during this time, rising almost vefold (Lechner and Boli, 2005:130). One consequence of this organizational emergence, according to neoinstitutionalists, has been the mass diffusion of cultural models emanating from a stateless world society (Meyer et al., 1997a), composed not only of international organizations, but multilateral agreements and world conferences as well. These world polity institutions have become renowned for spreading cultural scripts to their constituent members and participants. In particular, international organizations have helped foster democracy (Paxton, 2002), human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005), same-sex rights (Frank and Mceneaney, 1999), gender equity (Paxton et al., 2006), and environmentalism (Schofer and Hironaka, 2005), as well as science (Schofer, 2004) and education (Schofer and Meyer, 2005). However, neoinstitutionalists do not typically examine alternative mechanisms of diffusion that may operate in less conspicuous settings. In particular, some scholars have begun to draw attention to the role of social networks in diffusing cultural models (Koster, 2007; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Sun and Barnett, 1994; Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004; Wotipka and Tsutsui, 2008). We build on this recent turn in the literature by examining the role of international migration and telecommunications in spreading world polity scripts. World polity institutions operate on a higher, symbolic level, disseminating messages through ofcial statements and evoking powerful images via public ceremony and ritual, thereby shaping the hearts and minds of the world citizenry in a highly abstract fashion. However, social relations may be critically important for translating these celebrated scripts into concepts that are meaningful in local context, as well as sustaining their legitimacy in between the many speeches, handshakes, and treaty ratications that comprise the world politys ritual enactments. In this study, we examine the effect of international migration and telecommunications on human rights, an important sector of the world polity that has increasingly drawn attention from scholars adopting a neoinstitutional approach (Cole, 2005, 2006, 2009; Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005, 2007). We rst propose that members of the international migrant community are more likely to embrace, and participate in, the human rights movement. Using data from several waves of the World Values Survey, we show that migrants are more likely to join human rights organizations, volunteer to do human rights work, and approve of the human rights movement. We suggest that human rights are more salient to migrants because they are more likely to adopt world cultural principles, such as individualism and world citizenship (Boli and Thomas, 1997). Such models conceive of individuals as citizens of the world (above and beyond other salient identities), who
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are empowered with certain rights and protections that are applied equally and universally. Our data from the World Values Survey show that immigrants are more likely to prioritize the preservation of individual freedom. Moreover, immigrants are less likely to express national pride and are more likely to embrace a global identity, rather than express belonging to a more restricted geographic territory (e.g., continent, country, region, locality). In addition, human rights may be important to immigrants because, lacking the full legal protection afforded to citizens, immigrants are perhaps more vulnerable to human rights abuses themselves. Accordingly, we nd that immigrants rate the human rights performance of the country in which they reside more negatively than do natives. Second, we propose that migrants diffuse human rights values and practices through (1) local performance and (2) cross-national communication. We capture local diffusion using each states migration level, hypothesizing that countries with larger immigrant populations improve their human rights record signicantly more than countries with smaller immigrant populations. We capture cross-national diffusion using each states level of centrality in international telecommunications. Past research indicates that international telephone trafc closely mirrors the cross-national ow of people (Kellerman, 1990, 1992; Palm, 2002; Tang, 2003; Vertovec, 2004). Using network data that report country-to-country bilateral ows, we examine this social dimension of telecommunications, comparing bilateral ows in migration to that of telephone trafc. We generally observe a high degree of correspondence, but with signicant regional variation. We also nd that migrant inows correspond with outbound telephone trafc more so than inbound trafc, suggesting that migrants tend to initiate calls and that the diffusion of human rights scripts is best captured using a countrys level of in-degree centrality, as this indicates the extent to which countries receive world polity scripts from migrants. Next, we present results from our main analyses. Using a balanced sample of 333 observations across 111 states spanning the 19752000 period, we use ordered probit regression to estimate the impact of international migration and telecommunications on a countrys Amnesty International rating, net of a broad set of controls typically used in human rights research. We nd that a countrys level of migration (i.e., a states foreign-born population as a share of the total) and its in-degree centrality in telecommunications (i.e., the number of minutes of inbound international telephone calls that a state receives) both positively affect its Amnesty rating, producing effects that are robust to a number of alternative specications. We also show that a states out-degree centrality in international telecommunications has no substantial impact on its human rights performance, suggesting that the hypothesized causal mechanism (i.e., receiving human rights scripts) is indeed operative. Finally, we show that the positive effect of in-degree centrality is signicantly reduced in those regions of the world where the correspondence between migrant ows and telephone trafc is weakest, suggesting that migrants are driving the positive effect of in-degree centrality.
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WORLD POLITY DIFFUSION Neoinstitutionalists studying the world polity propose that a world society has emerged, generating organizational models that nation-states adopt for themselves (Meyer et al., 1997a). Traditionally, scholars from the world polity school have noted the widespread adoption of formal scripts, resulting in the institutional homogenization of nation-states. World polity researchers point to the diffusion of a diverse set of models, including womens suffrage (Ramirez et al. 1997), liberalized same-sex policies (Frank and Mceneaney, 1999), environmentalism (Frank, 1997; Frank et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 1997b), science (Drori et al., 2003; Schofer, 2003), and formal schooling (Meyer et al., 1992; Schofer and Meyer, 2005). More recently, however, world polity scholars have nuanced this position and have shown that states that are highly embedded in world polity institutions tend to adopt cultural scripts more quickly than those states that are less centrally integrated. While previous studies have featured a number of different indicators to represent world polity institutions, scholars most commonly use some measure of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) (Drori et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005, 2007; Paxton et al., 2006; Schafer, 1999; Schofer and Meyer, 2005; Swiss, 2009), as they are widely considered to be the primary carriers of world culture, setting global standards and principles (Boli and Thomas, 1997). More generally, researchers frequently use both governmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs) to represent linkages to the world polity (Beckeld, 2003; Boli et al., 1999; Frank et al., 2000; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Schofer, 2004). In addition, scholars have occasionally supplemented IGO and INGO indicators with some measure of international treaties (Frank, 1997; Frank and McEneaney, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997b; Schofer and Hironaka, 2005), as well as participation in world conferences (Cole, 2005, 2006). In short, world polity scholars have traditionally linked the spread of cultural models to mechanisms associated with state and civil participation in formal venues. Nevertheless, there is good reason to suspect that cross-border social relations may also play an important role in diffusing cultural models. For example, simulation research shows that the expansion of communication accelerates cultural change and produces cultural isomorphism across actors (Greig, 2002). Indeed, scholars have begun proposing that social ties are relevant for understanding cultural diffusion (Schofer and Hironaka, 2005: 3031). Moreover, studies have begun to provide empirical support for the idea that cross-border social ties are an important set of relations for understanding cultural diffusion. For example, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) create a composite measure of international integration, which includes international telephone minutes and air passengers. They nd that integrated nations feature signicantly lower levels of corruption, net of membership ties to international organizations. In addition, cross-national social ties have been shown to
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expose people to human rights norms. Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) argue that tourist ows create human networks that link people to global civil society. They nd that a countrys level of incoming tourism positively predicts its membership level in human rights INGOs, net of its total international organization memberships. Koster (2007) nds that a countrys level of social openness, a composite measure that includes items such as outgoing telephone trafc, average cost of telephone calls to the United States, international tourism, foreign population, and Internet hosts and users, signicantly predicts its citizens level of willingness to help immigrants. Finally, past research has linked a states position in the international telecommunications network to its level of democracy, showing that central states are signicantly more democratic than peripheral states (Sun and Barnett, 1994). In sum, these studies suggest that, above and beyond the work accomplished by traditional world polity institutions, cross-border social ties also represent an important set of mechanisms for diffusing cultural scripts.
THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT COMMUNITY AND LOCAL PERFORMANCE In this study, we propose that the international migrant community diffuses human rights values and practices via two mechanisms: (1) local performance and (2) cross-national communication. To demonstrate the rst mechanism, it is important to establish how migrants differ from natives with respect to attitudes and behaviors regarding human rights. Thus, in this section, we draw from data covering several waves of the World Values Survey (2006) to examine whether migrants are more likely than natives to endorse human rights principles and actively participate in human rights institutions. Table I presents seven questionnaire items and the responses to each item, organized by nativity. The rst two items are behavioral questions, asking respondents to indicate (1) whether they are members of a human rights organization and (2) whether they participate in unpaid human rights work. In this survey wave (19992004), nativity is indicated by whether respondents are citizens in the country in which they currently reside. While 3.04% of citizens indicate that they are members of a human rights organization, 4.36% of noncitizens indicate that they are members. Likewise, while 1.39% of citizens indicate that they participate in unpaid human rights work, twice as many noncitizens (2.78%) indicate that they participate. The third survey item is an attitudinal question asking respondents to indicate their level of approval for the human rights movement. In this survey wave (19891993), nativity is indicated by whether respondents were born in the country in which they currently reside. Although immigrants and natives disapprove of the human rights movement (somewhat or strongly) at about the same rate, over 80% of immigrants voice strong approval for the human rights movement (81.44%), while only about two-thirds of natives do so (66.29%). Overall, the mean score for
Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights Table I. Human Rights Practices and Attitudes, by Nativity (1) Membership in human rights organizations (19992004) 0 = no 1 = yes (2) Participation in unpaid human rights work (1999 2004) 0 = no 1 = yes (3) Approval of human rights movement (home or abroad) (19891993) 1 = strongly disapprove 2 = somewhat disapprove 3 = somewhat approve 4 = strongly approve Mean (4) Human rights rating in country (19941999) 1 = there is a lot of respect for individual human rights 2 = there is some respect for individual human rights 3 = there is not much respect for individual human rights 4 = there is no respect at all for individual human rights Mean (5) Maintain social order vs. respect individual freedom (19941999) 0 = maintain order in society 1 = respect the freedom of individuals (6) World identity (19941999) 0 = no 1 = yes (7) National pride (19941999) 1 = very proud 2 = quite proud 3 = not very proud 4 = not at all proud Mean Source: World Values Survey (2006). Noncitizens (N = 1,653) 95.64% 4.36% Noncitizens (N = 1,653) 97.22% 2.78% Not born in country (N = 97) 2.06% 4.12% 12.37% 81.44% 3.73 Not born in country (N = 1,694) 1.89% 23.61% 42.50% 32.00% 3.05 Not born in country (N = 3,702) 50.22% 49.78% Not born in country (N = 3,779) 79.60% 20.40% Not born in country (N = 2,901) 37.54% 37.02% 17.10% 8.34% 1.96
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Citizens (N = 39,264) 96.96% 3.04% Citizens (N = 39,264) 98.61% 1.39% Born in country (N = 10,615) 2.06% 4.54% 27.10% 66.29% 3.58 Born in country (N = 14,725) 4.08% 29.09% 44.50% 22.32% 2.85 Born in country (N = 55,515) 57.98% 42.02% Born in country (N = 59,433) 91.02% 8.98% Born in country (N = 59,016) 55.28% 31.24% 10.55% 2.93% 1.61
immigrants on this item (3.73) is higher than that of natives (3.58), indicating that, on the whole, immigrants express greater approval for the human rights movement. In sum, these results suggest that migrants more actively embrace human rights principles and participate in human rights activities. The remaining survey items (administered during the 19941999 survey wave) may help explain these patterns. Perhaps human rights are more salient and important to immigrants because they are more likely to fall victim to human rights abuses. The fourth item asks respondents to evaluate the human
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rights practices in their country. While 4.08% of natives feel that there is a lot of respect for individual human rights in their country, less than half as many immigrants (1.89%) feel this way. Conversely, almost a third of immigrants (32.00%) feel that there is no respect at all for human rights in their country, while less than a quarter of natives (22.32%) feel this way. Accordingly, the mean score for immigrants on this item (3.05) is greater than that of natives (2.85), indicating that immigrants, on the whole, are more critical of their governments human rights record than natives. Another reason why human rights may be more salient and important for migrants is that they embrace certain world cultural principles, such as individualism and world citizenship. The fth survey item asks respondents which is the most important responsibility of the government: (1) to maintain order in society or (2) to respect the freedom of individuals. Although immigrants are almost evenly split on this issue (50.22% to 49.78%), natives prioritize social order by a fairly wide margin (57.98% to 42.02%). Thus, consistent with their attitudes and behaviors regarding human rights, migrants are more ` -vis likely to support norms that preserve the integrity of the individual vis-a the state. Migrants may also see themselves as world citizens who share a kinship with all people, rather than as members of a particular race, ethnicity, or nationality. In this way, transgressions committed against others are more likely to be seen as a violation of human rights, rather than as justied on the basis of some particularist ideology. Responses to the sixth and seventh items suggest that migrants do adopt a more global identity. The sixth item asks respondents to indicate which geographic group they belong to most: locality, region, country, continent, or the world. We dichotomize this item into world vs. other (world = 1). While less than 10% of natives (8.98%) express a world identity, more than 20% of immigrants do so (20.40%). Finally, the seventh item asks respondents how proud they are of their nationality. Over half of natives indicate that they are very proud of their nationality (55.28%), while less than 40% of immigrants feel this way (37.54%). Conversely, while over 25% of immigrants feel not very proud or not at all proud (25.44%), about half as many natives feel this way (13.48%). Accordingly, the mean score for immigrants on this item (1.96) is greater than that of natives (1.61), indicating that immigrants, on the whole, feel less national pride. In Table II, we explore whether these differences between natives and immigrants are statistically signicant, net of controls, using a set of probit and ordered probit models. We present results from seven models (one for each survey item). Each cell reports the unstandardized coefcient with the robust standard error in parentheses. We control for each respondents country of residence, gender, age, education, and income (both education and income are ordinally coded as low, medium, and high). The behavioral items (1 and 2) include a second-order polynomial for age, as the elderly may be less active than the middle-aged. Item 3 does not include a control for education
Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights Table II. Probit and Ordered Probit Models of Human Rights Attitudes and Practicesa Item 1 Citizenship (0 = no; 1 = yes) Born in country (0 = no; 1 = yes) Country 103 Gender (0 = male; 1 = female) Age (15101 years) Age (squared) 103 Education level (ordinal) Income level (ordinal) States Observations Pseudo R2 ).130 (.069) ).094 (.056) .074** (.028) .015** (.005) ).123* (.054) .382*** (.022) .027 (.019) 33 34,363 .049 Item 2 ).226** (.081) ).192* (.076) .072 (.037) ).004 (.007) .037 (.070) .292*** (.029) ).019 (.025) 33 34,363 .032 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6
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Item 7
).339* (.160) ).086 (.067) ).022 (.024)
).231*** (.030) .772*** (.037) .024 (.018)
).219*** (.023) .061** (.021) .001 (.012)
).509*** (.027) ).033 (.028) ).021 (.015)
).448*** (.023) ).338*** (.018) .054*** (.010) ).001 (.000) .140*** (.008) .001 (.007) 41 49,386 .012
).004*** .001 (.001) (.001) ).008 (.015) .040** ).036** (.015) (.012) 9 10 10,234 14,927 .002 .016
).006*** ).006*** (.000) (.001) .089*** (.009) .017* (.008) 39 47,054 .009 .149*** (.011) .051*** (.010) 40 50,328 .026
p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (twotailed tests). Notes: Each cell reports the unstandardized coefcient with the robust standard error in parentheses. a Models for Items 1 and 2 include the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom; model for Item 3 includes the following countries: Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and Slovakia; model for Item 4 includes the following countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine; models for Items 5, 6, and 7 consist of the following countries: Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus, Chile, China (Items 6 and 7 only), the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, India, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan (Item 7 only), Peru, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
due to missing data for six of the nine countries included in the model. The overall conclusion we draw from these models is that nativity is a signicant predictor of human rights attitudes and practices. The probit models for Items 1 and 2 reveal that citizens less actively participate in human rights institutions than noncitizens, while the ordered probit model for Item 3 indicates that natives express less approval towards the human rights movement. The remaining items provide a clue as to why human rights are more salient and important to immigrants. The ordered probit model for Item 4 indicates that natives are less likely to be critical of their governments human rights performance than are immigrants (perhaps because migrants are subject to more repressive treatment). The probit model for Item 5 indicates that natives are less likely to prioritize individual freedom over social order. Finally, the probit model for Item 6 shows that natives are less likely to
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express a world identity, while the ordered probit model for Item 7 shows that natives are more likely to feel national pride. In short, the descriptive patterns identied in Table I hold up in a multivariate context, as revealed by the analyses presented in Table II.
THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT COMMUNITY AND CROSS-NATIONAL COMMUNICATION To reiterate our core argument, we propose that the international migrant community can signicantly improve a countrys human rights performance by diffusing values and practices that are consistent with the human rights movement. Locally, we capture the inuence of migrants through the percentage of a countrys population that is foreign born. Cross-nationally, we suggest that migrants diffuse human rights scripts when interacting with friends and family via international telecommunications. In this way, migrants are able to impact their society of origin, as well as their society of residence. Contrary to the idea that international telecommunications are used primarily to facilitate or conduct nancial transactions, there is considerable evidence that international telephone calls are predominantly social in nature. Past research has shown the importance of migration and tourism in shaping international telephone trafc (Kellerman, 1990, 1992; Palm, 2002; Tang, 2003; Vertovec, 2004). For example, the presence of immigrant populations within the United States plays a signicant role in determining telephone trafc ows to and from the United States and the home country (Tang, 2003). Telephone calls represent the social glue that connects migrant communities around the world (Vertovec, 2004). While international telephone trafc has surged in recent years, the increase among countries with strong migrant connections has been especially pronounced (Vertovec, 2004). One factor contributing to the increase in international telephone trafc, especially among migrants, has been the emergence of prepaid telephone cards. Half of all telephone trafc accounted for by prepaid cards is international, and they are primarily used by rst-generation immigrants. In fact, phone card distributors specically target immigrant communities within the United States (Vertovec, 2004). This suggests that, not only do migrant ows drive international telephone trafc, but that migrants are the ones that tend to initiate, rather than receive, these phone calls. In this section, we examine these propositions more closely by comparing bilateral migrant ows to bilateral ows in telecommunications. Our migrant data come from the recent pioneering work done by the World Bank (Parsons et al., 2007), whose network covers 226 countries circa 2000. Our telecommunications data come from the ITU TGIs Direction of Trafc Database (International Telecommunication Union TeleGeography Inc., 1998), and we use their most recent 19911995 wave covering 208 countries. By synthesizing these two networks, we can compare migrant outows and inows to inbound and outbound trafc in telecommunications for the 111 countries in our sam-
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ple. In doing so, we address the following questions: (1) Are migrant ows correlated with telecommunications ows? (2) Do the data provide any indication as to whether migrants initiate or receive telephone calls? and (3) Is there substantial regional variation in these patterns? Table III reports correlation coefcients for all 111 countries in our sample. For each country, we calculated the level of correspondence between that countrys set of migrant outows (i.e., migrants leaving that country for another destination) and its inbound trafc in telecommunications (i.e., the number of minutes of inbound international telephone calls that it receives from each country partner), as well as its outbound trafc (i.e., the number of minutes of outbound international telephone calls that it sends to each country partner). We then replicated these correlations with each countrys set of migrant inows. Each cell reports the average coefcient for all countries in that region, and the nal row reports the overall averages. First, there does appear to be a positive association between migration and international telecommunications. The data on migrant outows suggest that the correspondence is fairly high, ranging from .387 in Africa (inbound trafc) to .896 in Latin America (outbound trafc), and the overall average
Table III. Correlations Between Migrant Flows and Telecommunications Trafc, by Region Migrant Outows Migrant Inows
Inbound Trafc Outbound Trafc Outbound Trafc Inbound Trafc Latin America & the Caribbean (N = 22) Europe & the West (N = 23) North Africa & the Middle East (N = 15) East Asia & the Pacic (N = 15) Central & Sub-Saharan Africa (N = 36) Overall (N = 111) .867 .849 .710 .608 .387 .651 .896 .843 .687 .628 .510 .695 .494 .554 .354 .307 .235 .378 .365 .498 .198 .262 .225 .311
Notes: Latin America & the Caribbean (N = 22): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela; Europe & the West (N = 23): Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; North Africa & the Middle East (N = 15): Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; East Asia & the Pacic (N = 15): Bangladesh, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, the Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand; Central & Sub-Saharan Africa (N = 36): Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (DR), Congo (R), Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Sources: ITU TGI (1998); Parsons et al. (2007).
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ranges from .651 to .695. The data on migrant inows suggest a smaller degree of correspondence, ranging from .198 in the Middle East (inbound trafc) to .554 in the West (outbound trafc), with the overall average ranging from .311 to .378. Clearly, in some cases, migrant ows mirror telecommunication ows quite closely (e.g., Latin America and the West), while in other cases, the correspondence drops off noticeably (e.g., Africa). Thus, we conclude that the ability of telecommunications to capture the diffusion of world polity scripts by migrants will vary considerably. Specically, we hypothesize that the effect of telecommunications on human rights will be weaker in those regions of the world where the correspondence between migrant ows and telecommunications is weakest. In particular, we are most interested in the regional ordering of the migrant outow correlations (as we are more interested in a states ability to receive human rights scripts from emigrants than in its ability to send human rights scripts via immigrants), with Latin America ranked highest (.867.896), followed by the West (.843.849), the Middle East (.687.710), East Asia (.608.628), and Africa (.387.510). In sum, the propensity for emigrants to diffuse cultural scripts back to their country of origin would seem to vary widely based on these correlations. Finally, we use these data to examine whether or not migrants tend to initiate international calls. We are principally interested in this question in order to learn how to best operationalize the diffusion of world polity scripts from migrants. Our data suggest that migrants do tend to initiate contact. When examining the migrant inow correlations in Table III, we see that inows are more highly associated with outbound telephone trafc than inbound trafc across all ve regions. In separate analyses, our data show that a majority of countries in all ve regions feature higher correlations between migrant inows and outbound trafc than migrant inows and inbound trafc. Almost every country in Latin America (95.45%) and the West (95.65%) reports a stronger outbound correlation, followed by the Middle East (80.00%), East Asia (73.33%), and Africa (52.78%). The overall percentage of 76.58% indicates that more than three-quarters of all states feature patterns where migrants initiate telephone communication. By contrast, the correlations for migrant outows show no clear trend, with Latin America, East Asia, and Africa featuring higher correlations with outbound telephone trafc, and the West and the Middle East featuring higher correlations with inbound telephone trafc. In separate analyses, our data show that a majority of countries in Latin America (54.55%) and the West (65.22%) feature higher correlations between migrant outows and inbound trafc, while the other three regions show a greater correspondence between migrant outows and outbound trafc (from 36.11% to 46.67%), and the overall percentage is just below half (47.75%). In sum, the lack of a clear trend from the migrant outow data, coupled with the strong trend from the migrant inow data, suggests that migrants tend to initiate cross-border telephone communication. Consequently, we anticipate that a countrys in-degree centrality in international telecommunications (i.e., the number of
Table IV. Ordered Probit Models of Amnesty Rating, N = 333 (111 States) (4) .993*** (.102) 1.067*** (.104) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Amnesty rating (lag) Time period
1.011*** (.107)
World region
Regional average Telephone mainlines PC INGOs PC
.915*** (.105) .047 (.057) ).277*** (.072) .513*** (.093)
.854*** (.111) ).038 (.068) ).064 (.096) .535*** (.091)
.969*** (.105) .032 (.066) ).258*** (.072) .506*** (.093)
Treaty ratications Trade openness
Democratization
Civil war
.639*** (.131) ).031 (.079) ).081 (.134) .545*** (.131) .105 (.161) ).066 (.184) .039 (.097) .123 (.094) .223 (.114) ).424*** (.096)
.633*** (.132) ).096 (.075) .080 (.125) .626*** (.130) ).093 (.177) ).141 (.187) .023 (.094) ).006 (.099) .202 (.113) ).443*** (.094)
.674*** (.133) ).018 (.082) ).046 (.123) .533*** (.126) .159 (.156) .013 (.188) ).020 (.095) .134 (.093) .174 (.116) ).407*** (.095)
.590*** (.136) ).103 (.071) .118 (.124) .590*** (.119) .025 (.194) ).182 (.185) .006 (.095) .001 (.098) .207 (.114) ).466*** (.097)
.601*** (.133) ).109 (.075) .042 (.136) .636*** (.136) ).141 (.189) ).215 (.186) .078 (.096) ).012 (.097) .250* (.112) ).459*** (.094)
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Table IV. (Continued) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Migrants PC .365*** (.075) .174** (.057) 1.18 (1.18) .134 1985 2.56 (1.81) .163 1942 8.26 (3.56) .184 1935 1.01 (1.01) .122 2010 1.48 (1.29) .157 1956 .054 (.068) .343** (.107) .540** (.181) .008 (.079) 5.56 (2.64) .178 1946
.187* (.077)
.191* (.074)
.204* (.087) .567** (.195)
In-degree centrality PC Out-degree centrality PC In-degree World region Max VIF (mean VIF) Pseudo R2 BIC
.196* (.084) .526** (.178)
1.18 (1.18) .122 2010
1.56 (1.25) .161 1947
5.62 (2.63) .183 1937
).211* (.096) 8.30 (3.49) .187 1935
8.29 (3.44) .188 1933
p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Notes: All variables are standardized (mean = 0; standard deviation = 1) prior to estimation; each cell reports the standardized coefcient with the robust standard error in parentheses.
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minutes of inbound international telephone calls that a country receives) best captures a states propensity to receive world polity scripts from migrants.
METHODS Dependent VariableAmnesty Rating Data on human rights practices come from Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), who update existing data based on their content analysis of human rights reports, using an inverted standards-based ordinal Political Terror Scale. As they note, scores range from 15, with a score of 1 indicating systematic repression, 2 indicating extensive repression, 3 indicating widespread repression, 4 indicating limited repression, and 5 indicating rare repression. Separate scores, based on annual reports from Amnesty International (AI) and the U.S. State Department (USSD), are available. The USSD tends to rate its allies, trading partners, and foreign aid recipients more favorably than AI, and rates leftist regimes relatively more harshly (Poe et al., 2001). Therefore, we rely primarily on the AI version. However, we follow previous studies that blend the two (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Walker and Poe, 2002), primarily using AI, and relying on the USSD when AI ratings are not available. Despite potential bias in the U.S. State Department ratings, the AI and USSD scores that come from Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) are highly correlated (r = .840) and have become increasingly similar over time (Poe et al., 2001). In most cases, there is no difference between the two scores, and in only 4% of cases do the scores differ by more than one point (Poe et al., 2001:659). Of the 333 cases in our sample, we rely on USSD ratings for only three observations (Solomon Islands, Waves 13), and excluding these cases does not substantively affect our results (see Model 12, Table V).
Independent Variables We hypothesize that migrants diffuse human rights values and practices both within and across societies. We measure the domestic inuence of migrants by each countrys immigration level. We capture the international inuence of migrants by considering each countrys propensity to receive cultural scripts from migrants via international telecommunications. Migrants PC (Log) We measure a countrys level of immigration as the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live (including refugees), divided by the total population size. Data for this measure come from the World Development Indicators (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008).
884 Table V. Robustness Checksa (12) Amnesty rating (lag) Time period World region Regional average Telephone mainlines PC INGOs PC Treaty ratications Trade openness Democratization Civil war Migrants PC In-degree centrality PC Observations (states) Max VIF (mean VIF) Pseudo R2 BIC .611*** (.138) ).092 (.075) .041 (.139) .647*** (.141) ).143 (.193) ).175 (.188) .070 (.098) ).033 (.100) .231* (.117) ).459*** (.095) .197* (.086) .527** (.185) 330 (110) 8.42 (3.47) .191 1913 (13) .590*** (.133) ).101 (.076) .044 (.136) .605*** (.135) ).156 (.191) ).182 (.186) .050 (.097) ).004 (.099) .243* (.113) ).453*** (.094) .168* (.085) .518** (.178) 321 (107) 8.02 (3.31) .171 1921 (14) .521*** (.129) ).052 (.079) ).126 (.139) .843*** (.132) ).367* (.177) ).301 (.183) .060 (.100) .073 (.104) .250* (.111) ).473*** (.094) .268** (.082) .593** (.207) 327 (109) 9.45 (3.81) .195 1883 (15) .204*** (.062) ).024 (.037) ).058 (.095) .371*** (.062) ).114 (.123) ).191* (.097) Instrument Instrument .189** (.064) ).307*** (.043) .400* (.167) .203* (.099) 333 (111)
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(16) .227*** (.058) ).062 (.046) .077 (.080) .381*** (.059) Instrument ).224* (.113) .009 (.056) Instrument .149** (.056) ).305*** (.041) .132* (.055) .355* (.138) 333 (111)
p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Notes: All variables are standardized (mean = 0; standard deviation = 1) prior to estimation; each cell reports the standardized coefcient with the robust standard error in parentheses. a The following notes describe each of the seven models shown above: (12) sample is restricted by excluding three observations based on U.S. State Department ratings of human rights (Solomon Islands, Waves 13); (13) sample is restricted by excluding four states with perfect Amnesty ratings across the sample period (Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand); (14) sample is restricted by excluding six outliers (Albania, Waves 13; Japan, Waves 13) formally identied by the Hadi procedure available in Stata 10.0 (Stata Corporation, 2007); the procedure identies multiple outliers in multivariate data using OLS (we use the p < .05 signicance level as our outlier cutoff); (15) two-stage least squares model with treaty ratications, trade openness, and GDP PC (PPP) serving as instruments for migrants PC; (16) two-stage least squares model with telephone mainlines PC and trade openness serving as instruments for in-degree centrality PC.
In-Degree Centrality PC (Log) We measure a countrys exposure to world polity scripts using each countrys in-degree centrality in international telecommunications. Data come from the ITU TGIs Direction of Trafc Database (International Telecommunication Union Telegeography Incorporated, 1998), using the World Banks STARS program (Socioeconomic Time-series Access and Retrieval System), version 2.5 (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1992). The database allows us to collect data on outgoing and
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incoming telephone trafc minutes for 208 country pairs during the 19831998 period (however, a large amount of missing data covering the most recent years of this period prevents us from investigating the post-1995 era). The data are asymmetric such that the volume of trafc from countryi to countryj is not the same as that from countryj to countryi. The raw data consist of minutes of telephone trafc between country pairs. We created three networks that cover the 19831985 period, the 19861990 period, and the 19911995 period, respectively. For each cell in the 19831985 network, the volume of trafc between each country pair represents an average value across that time period (and likewise for the 19861990 network and the 19911995 network). We then calculated degree centrality scores (both in-degree and out-degree) for all states in the network. We appreciate that, ceteris paribus, highly populated countries send and receive a higher volume of international calls. Thus, to remove any population effect from our measure, we divide each states degree centrality score by its population size. Also, because we are interested in measuring the extent to which states receive scripts (rather than send them), we anticipate that the number of inbound telephone minutes that a state receives will impact its human rights performance more so than a states number of outbound minutes. Thus, we use each states in-degree centrality score as our independent variable and then compare results when replicating our models with each states out-degree centrality score (see Models 79, Table IV).
Control Variables Amnesty Rating (Lag) We include the lagged value of a states Amnesty International rating in all models so that we can more appropriately measure the effect of our predictors on change in a states human rights performance. Time Period We control for the slight decline of Amnesty International scores across the sample period by including time period as a predictor in the analyses. Most of the decline occurs between the rst and second waves (Wave 1 average = 3.47; Wave 2 average = 3.38), with Amnesty ratings stabilizing in Wave 3 (Wave 3 average = 3.38). World Region In addition, we control for cross-sectional variation in Amnesty ratings by including world region as an ordinal predictor in the analyses. We classify states as belonging to one of the following ve world regions: (1) Latin America and the Caribbean, (2) Europe and the West, (3) North Africa and the Middle East, (4) East Asia and the Pacic, and (5) Central and SubSaharan Africa. Importantly, the ordering of these regions is intentional so as to mimic the weakening correspondence between migrant ows and telecommunication ows as we move from Latin America (high correspondence) to
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Africa (low correspondence). We then create an interaction term between in-degree centrality PC and world region to test whether the positive effect of indegree centrality is signicantly reduced in those regions of the world where the correspondence between migration and telecommunication ows are weakest. Regional Average We include the average Amnesty rating in each countrys region (based on the above categorization) for each time period. To the extent that a contagion effect is operative in the diffusion of human rights practices, we would expect that countries located in regions with a higher average Amnesty rating would, ceteris paribus, improve their human rights record more so than those countries embedded in more repressive neighborhoods. Telephone Mainlines PC (Log) In this study, we measure a countrys level of development by the number of telephone mainlines per 100 people. This also serves as an important control for in-degree centrality, as countries with a large number of mainlines are likely to log more minutes in international telephone calls than countries with fewer mainlines. Moreover, past studies have shown that a countrys level of development affects its human rights practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005, 2007; Henderson, 1991; Keith, 1999; Neumayer, 2005; Poe and Neal Tate, 1994; Poe et al. 1999). Data for this measure come from the World Development Indicators (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008). In separate analyses, we replace telephone mainlines PC with gross domestic product per capita (GDP PC) based on purchasing power parity (PPP), a more conventional measure of economic development. Telephone mainlines PC and GDP PC (PPP) are highly correlated (r = .942), and we nd that using GDP PC (PPP) produces results that are substantively identical to those presented below. INGOs PC (Log) We investigate whether international migration and telecommunications are signicant predictors of a states human rights performance net of its embeddedness in traditional world polity institutions. INGOs represent the classic measure of world polity embeddedness, with past research revealing that INGOs have a positive effect on democracy (Paxton, 2002; Wejnert, 2005) and human rights practices (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Powell and Staton, 2009; Swiss, 2009). In our study, INGOs refer to the number of conventional international nongovernmental organizations to which residents of each country belong, listed in Sections AD of the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations, 1985, 1990, 1995). This measure is standardized by each countrys population size. Data for each wave come from single years: 1985, 1990, and 1995. Treaty Ratications We also control for a states number of human rights treaty ratications. Although one would expect treaty ratications to positively
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impact a states human rights performance, previous work calls this assumption into question (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005, 2007; Hathaway, 2002). Data come from the Ofce of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (2006). Following Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005:1394), we consider ratication of six human rights treaties regarding racial discrimination, civil political rights, economic social cultural rights, gender discrimination, torture, and child rights. In addition, we include two optional protocols for the civil political rights treaty that are designed to (1) enhance monitoring and enforcement of the treaty and (2) eliminate the death penalty. In sum, we measure a states treaty participation as the number of human rights instruments a state has ratied by the end of each wave, with scores ranging from 08 across the sample period. Trade Openness (Log) Past research has shown that trade ows and preferential trade agreements with hard human rights standards negatively affect state repression (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007). Our measure, trade openness, refers to the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, measured as a share of gross domestic product. Data for this measure come from the World Development Indicators (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2004). Democratization Human rights principles are more likely to be respected in democratic states (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Henderson, 1991, 1993; Keith, 1999; Poe and Neal Tate, 1994; Poe et al. 1999), so we control for each states level of democracy. Democratization scores come from Marshall and Jaggerss (2005) Polity IV Project, which provides longitudinal political regime characteristics for countries. We use their combined polity score, which is computed by subtracting a states autocracy score from its democracy score. Scores range from 10 to 10. Civil War Past research has also shown the negative effects of civil war on a states human rights performance (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005, 2007; Keith, 1999; Neumayer, 2005; Poe and Neal Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Civil war is a dummy variable, referring to the presence or absence of intrastate war in each state during each wave of the sample period. Data come from Sarkeess (2000) Correlates of War Project (version 3.0).
Analysis Following Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), we estimate ordered probit models of the ordinal dependent variable (Amnesty rating) on the independent variables. Also, similar to Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), we address
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potential heteroskedasticity by clustering on states. Thus, the observations are assumed to be independent across states, but not necessarily within states over time. We establish time order by lagging the independent variables one wave behind the dependent variable. Among the predictors, we include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation so that we are assessing the effect of international migration and telecommunications on change in the Amnesty rating. Our sample consists of 333 observations across 111 countries over three waves spanning the 19752000 period. The pooled data are balanced with all states contributing three observations. The three waves of the dependent variable cover the 19852000 period (19851990, 19901995, and 19952000), the three waves of the independent variables cover the 19801995 period (19801985, 19851990, and 19901995), while the three waves of the lagged dependent variable cover the 19751990 period (19751980, 19801985, and 19851990). Each wave represents a six-year period, where each data point for each measure represents a states average value across the entire wave (except where otherwise noted above). We use the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to adjudicate among models. BIC suggests that the more parsimonious model is preferable unless t is signicantly enhanced. Smaller BIC values indicate better t. In addition, we are sensitive to potential collinearity in our models. Therefore, we report the OLS-based maximum and mean variance ination factor (VIF) scores for all models. The maximum VIF score across all models is below 10, suggesting that collinearity is not a problem (Chatterjee et al., 2000:240).
RESULTS Table IV presents results from the ordered probit regression of the Amnesty rating on the independent variables. All predictors are standardized (mean = 0; standard deviation = 1) prior to estimation, so that we can compare the magnitude of their effects. Each cell reports the standardized coefcient with the robust standard error in parentheses. Models 13 examine the effect of migrants PC. In Model 1, we control for the lagged Amnesty rating. In Model 2, we add controls for time period, world region, and regional average. In Model 3, we include the remaining controls. In all three models, migrants PC exerts a signicant, positive effect (p < .05), indicating that states featuring larger immigrant populations improve their Amnesty rating signicantly more so than countries with fewer immigrants. In Models 2 and 3, regional average is a positive, signicant predictor of change in the Amnesty rating (p < .001), and regional average remains signicant across every model presented below. Thus, states located in regions with higher average Amnesty ratings improve their own Amnesty scores signicantly more so than those states located in regions with lower average Amnesty ratings. This lends support to the idea that geographic proximity is an important factor when
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considering the cross-national diffusion of human rights practices. In Model 3, democratization positively affects the Amnesty rating (p < .10), while civil war is negatively associated with change in a states human rights performance (p < .001), exerting the strongest effect among the featured predictors (B = ).424). In Models 46 of Table IV, we consider the effect of a countrys in-degree centrality in international telecommunications. In Model 4, in-degree centrality PC reaches the highest level of signicance (p < .001) as a positive predictor. In Model 5, when adding controls for time period, world region, and regional average, in-degree centrality PC remains signicant (p < .01). In Model 6, when adding the remaining controls, the positive effect of in-degree centrality persists (p < .01; B = .540), producing a larger effect than that of all other predictors, including civil war (p < .001; B = ).443) and democratization (p < .10; B = .202). Thus, countries that receive a large number of minutes in international phone calls per capita improve their human rights practices signicantly more so than those countries that receive fewer phone call minutes. We cannot attribute the positive effect of in-degree centrality PC to increased phone activity over time (because we control for time period) or substantial variation in phone activity across space (because we control for world region), and we cannot assume that in-degree centrality functions as a proxy for economic development (because we control for telephone mainlines PC) or world polity embeddedness (because we control for INGOs PC). In fact, given the nonsignicance of INGOs PC in Models 3 and 6 of Table IV, these analyses suggest that social measures (in the form of international migration and telecommunications) may function as better indicators of diffusion and world polity embeddedness than international organizations for predicting change in human rights practices. Nevertheless, to bolster condence in our ndings, we examine whether a states out-degree centrality in telecommunications is similarly effective in improving human rights practices. If a states level of centrality in the sending dimension of international telecommunications is also a signicant predictor of change in the Amnesty rating, this would suggest that centrality simply proxies for development level or some other measure of modernization (e.g., urbanization, industrialization). We hypothesize, however, that it is the receiving of world polity scripts from the international migrant community that is decisive for producing reform in the human rights sector, and that centrality in outbound telephone calls should be less important for producing domestic change. The in-degree and out-degree centrality scores are somewhat highly correlated (r = .522), but the two measures are clearly different. Thus, in Models 79 of Table IV, we estimate the effect of out-degree centrality PC. Model 7 indicates that out-degree centrality is a signicant, positive predictor of the Amnesty rating (p < .01). However, in Models 8 and 9, when estimated simultaneously with the other control measures, out-degree
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centrality drops out of signicance. Moreover, BIC clearly prefers the three indegree models (BIC = 19351985) over the three out-degree models (BIC = 19462010). These results suggest that there is something in particular about incoming phone calls, rather than outbound calls or overall participation in international telecommunications, that is associated with improved human rights practices. We argue that because many of these phone calls are initiated by migrants, societies that more extensively receive inbound telephone trafc also accumulate human rights scripts to a greater degree. One way of demonstrating that the relationship between in-degree centrality and the Amnesty rating is driven by migrants is to examine whether the effect of in-degree centrality attenuates in those regions of the world where the correspondence between migrant ows and telecommunication ows is weakest. Thus, in Model 10 of Table IV, we create an interaction term between indegree centrality PC and world region. Recall that the coding of our world region measure follows the order shown in Table III, with Latin America (a high correspondence region) coded 1 and Africa (a low correspondence region) coded 5. Thus, the negatively signed interaction term in Model 10 (p < .05; B = .211) indicates that the positive effect of in-degree centrality PC (p < .01; B = .567) is signicantly reduced in those regions of the world where the migrant-telecommunications link is weakest. This lends support to the idea that cross-border social interaction involving migrants is driving the positive effect of in-degree centrality. In separate analyses, we reconstructed our interaction term using all 120 permutations of world region (i.e., all possible reorderings of world region) to examine how many permutations could produce a negative interaction effect like the one produced in Model 10 of Table IV. Of the 60 permutations producing a negative coefcient, only four reached signicance at the .05 level. One of these four is the permutation we use in Model 10, and our permutation produces the largest effect (B = ).211) among all candidates. In short, it is difcult to explain how our ordering for world region produces the largest negative interaction effect among all 120 permutations other than by pointing to variation in the level of correspondence between migrant ows and telecommunication ows. If we rank order these regions by, say, average GDP PC, Latin America places third behind the West and the Middle East. If we rank order on the basis of democratization, Middle Eastern countries fall to the bottom, well below Africa. In Model 11 of Table IV, we estimate migrants PC and in-degree centrality PC simultaneously to determine if they both continue to produce effects independently. Interestingly, BIC prefers Model 11 over all previous models featured in this table (BIC=1933). More importantly, both migrants PC (p < .05) and in-degree centrality PC (p < .01) retain their signicance, which suggests that migrants diffuse human rights values and practices via domestic and international channels independently. Moreover, in-degree centrality PC continues to exert the strongest effect among all predictors (B = .526), followed by civil war (B = ).459).
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In Table V, we report results from a series of sensitivity analyses that examine whether the positive effects of international migration and telecommunications are robust to alternative specications. In Model 12, we restrict our sample by dropping three observations that are based on U.S. State Department ratings of human rights (Solomon Islands, Waves 13). In Model 13, the sample is restricted by excluding four states with perfect Amnesty ratings across the sample period (Australia, Canada, Netherlands, and New Zealand). And in Model 14, we drop six outliers (Albania, Waves 13; Japan, Waves 13) formally identied by the Hadi procedure available in Stata 10.0 (Stata Corporation, 2007). The procedure identies multiple outliers in multivariate data using OLS (we use the p < .05 signicance level as our outlier cutoff). In each of these three models, migration and in-degree centrality remain signicant, and in-degree centrality continues to exert the strongest effect among the featured predictors (B = .527, .518, .593, respectively), followed by civil war (B = ).459, ).453, ).473, respectively). Finally, in Models 15 and 16 of Table V, we consider the possibility that the relationships between our independent variables and the Amnesty rating suffer from endogeneity (i.e., reverse causality). For example, repressive human rights practices may motivate governments to disrupt cross-national social networks and communication, while reformed governments may stimulate migrant and communication ows. Thus, we corrected for potential endogeneity via instrumental variables regression using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation for panel-data models. In the rst stage, the suspected endogenous measure (i.e., migrants PC in Model 15 and in-degree centrality PC in Model 16) is regressed on the exogenous predictors (i.e., the control measures) and our selected instruments. In Model 15, we use treaty ratications, trade openness, and GDP PC (PPP) as our instruments for migrants PC. In Model 16, we use telephone mainlines PC and trade openness as our instruments for in-degree centrality PC. Instrumental variables must be (1) correlated with the endogenous measure, but (2) uncorrelated with the error term from the second-stage equation. In the second stage, the dependent variable (i.e., the Amnesty rating) is regressed on the exogenous and endogenous predictors except that the endogenous measure is replaced with the predicted values from the rst equation. In Model 15 of Table V, diagnostics reveal that the three instruments are both strong (i.e., correlated with migrants PC) and valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). The rst-stage results show that treaty ratications (p = .000), trade openness (p = .028), and GDP PC (p = .000) are all signicantly related to migrants PC. The F-statistic (19.94) is highly signicant (p = .000), indicating that the three instruments have signicant explanatory power after controlling for the other covariates in the rst-stage model (R2 = .401; partial R2 = .122). In addition, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and that the equation is specied correctly (i.e., the instruments should not be included in the second-stage equation as exogenous predictors of the Amnesty
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rating) (Hansens J-statistic = 1.478, p = .478). Most importantly, the second-stage results show that migrants PC is a signicant, positive predictor of human rights even when using the predicted values from the rst-stage model (p < .05). Finally, several endogeneity tests are available in the Stata 10.0 software package (Wooldridges robust score, a regression-based score, and the Sargan-Hansen difference score) that determine whether migrants PC can be treated as exogenous (the null hypothesis) or whether 2SLS estimation is required (Stata Corporation, 2007). The tests uniformly reveal that we cannot reject the null hypothesis (p = .443, p = .456, and p = .374, respectively), suggesting that we can rely on the ordered probit estimates presented above. In Model 16 of Table V, diagnostics similarly reveal that the two instruments for in-degree centrality PC are both strong and valid. The rst-stage results show that telephone mainlines PC (p = .000) and trade openness (p = .000) are both signicantly related to in-degree centrality. The F-statistic (94.79) is highly signicant (p = .000), indicating that the two instruments have signicant explanatory power after controlling for the other covariates in the rst-stage model (R2 = .879; partial R2 = .405). In addition, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the instruments are valid and that the equation is specied correctly (Hansens J-statistic = .922, p = .337). Moreover, the second-stage results show in-degree centrality PC is a signicant, positive predictor of human rights (p < .05). Finally, the endogeneity tests (p = .790, p = .793, and p = .786) suggest that we can rely on the ordered probit estimates presented above.
DISCUSSION Neoinstitutional research on the world polity has typically examined the global spread of cultural scripts through state and civil participation in formal institutions, such as international organizations, multilateral agreements, and world conferences. We introduce a less conspicuous mechanism of diffusion and propose that cross-national social relations augment the high-prole work performed by classic organizational structures within the world polity. In particular, we argue that the micro-level socialization performed by migrants undergirds the formation and diffusion of global models by world polity institutions. Although formal venues stage the public rituals and ceremonies that create, advertise, and legitimate cultural models, micro-level socialization helps sustain these models and channel them in particular directions. In this study, we build on recent work that species the role of social networks in diffusing cultural models. We nd that a countrys migrant population and its in-degree centrality in international telecommunications are positive predictors of change in its Amnesty rating, net of standard predictors used in previous work. Moreover, we nd that the effects of international migration and telecommunications are robust to alternative specications that consider ceiling effects, outliers, and endogeneity.
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To bolster condence that our measure of in-degree centrality truly captures a mechanism of world polity diffusion, we presented a set of analyses that replicates our models when using a states out-degree centrality score. When doing so, we nd that our in-degree measure outperforms our outdegree measure, and that the smaller effects of out-degree centrality do not even reach statistical signicance in the presence of the same controls. This suggests that there is something in particular about being centrally located in the network of incoming telecommunication ows (i.e., receiving cultural scripts, rather than sending them) that produces the effects reported above. Moreover, the nonsignicance of our out-degree measure suggests that generic telephone activity is not serving as a proxy for some omitted variable, an idea further supported by our incorporation of a broad set of controls in our analyses; rather, this suggests that a states in-degree centrality in international telecommunications indicates its level of exposure to world polity scripts diffused by the international migrant community. We do not suggest that social interactions involving migrants are devoted primarily to the discussion of human rights issues; instead, we begin with the simple premise that migrants are linked to primary social groups both domestically and internationally. Moreover, we propose that the diffusion of world cultural principles via micro-level socialization is not necessarily overt. At the institutional level, the diffusion of cultural scripts can be rather symbolic and explicit (e.g., media depictions of international rituals and ceremonies, ad campaigns by international organizations). In contrast, individuals participating in social interaction may not always initiate contact with friends or family with the intention of transferring cultural content (although, presumably, they do so on occasion). Nevertheless, social interaction inevitably facilitates such diffusion in a subtle fashion. Participants at either end of the conversation may report on current events, public gures, or topical issues being discussed in the public sphere in their locality. In this way, conversations that link intimates within and across national societies serve as the means by which cultural scripts become rehearsed, transmitted, and reied. In short, we suggest that microlevel socialization spreads world cultural principles in a way that lacks the instrumentality of intentional diffusion. We suspect that friends and relatives rarely intend to diffuse world polity scripts when communicating, but that in the course of many conversations over time, these scripts inevitably travel throughout and across societies. Our data show that migrants are more likely to join human rights organizations, volunteer to do human rights work, and express approval of the human rights movement. Through the verbal and physical enactment of these values and practices, we suggest that migrants are able to spread human rights principles, both locally and across state borders. We conclude by encouraging future research that further investigates the processes underlying our hypothesized mechanism of diffusion. How exactly are cultural scripts transmitted via social relations, especially international telecommunications? More generally, our research raises important questions as
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to how world polity scripts make their way from formal institutions to the general public. Finally, what are the consequences of this research for other emerging forms of international communication (e.g., e-mail, the Internet)? In sum, we hope to stimulate other studies that consider measures of world polity embeddedness that feature communication networks linking individual members of the international community. REFERENCES
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 26, No. 4, December 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2011.01288.

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights1

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Clark and Hall

).339* (.160) ).086 (.067) ).022 (.024)

).231*** (.030) .772*** (.037) .024 (.018)

).219*** (.023) .061** (.021) .001 (.012)

).509*** (.027) ).033 (.028) ).021 (.015)

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Amnesty rating (lag) Time period

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Regional average Telephone mainlines PC INGOs PC

.915*** (.105) .047 (.057) ).277*** (.072) .513*** (.093)

.854*** (.111) ).038 (.068) ).064 (.096) .535*** (.091)

.969*** (.105) .032 (.066) ).258*** (.072) .506*** (.093)

Treaty ratications Trade openness

.204* (.087) .567** (.195)

.196* (.084) .526** (.178)

1.18 (1.18) .122 2010

1.56 (1.25) .161 1947

5.62 (2.63) .183 1937

).211* (.096) 8.30 (3.49) .187 1935

8.29 (3.44) .188 1933

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

Migration, International Telecommunications, and Human Rights

Clark and Hall

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).231* (.030) .772* (.037) .024 (.018)

).219* (.023) .061 (.021) .001 (.012)

.915* (.105) .047 (.057) ).277* (.072) .513*** (.093)

.854* (.111) ).038 (.068) ).064 (.096) .535* (.091)

.969* (.105) .032 (.066) ).258* (.072) .506*** (.093)