One Europe or Many Reflections On Becoming European

One Europe or Many?
Reflections on Becoming European Author(s): Ray Hudson Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2000), pp. 409-426 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/623280 . Accessed: 03/04/2013 06:50
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One Europe or many? on becomingEuropean Reflections

Ray Hudson
as a resultof the combinedeffects of a complexset of Europe is being re-defined What sort of is from them? What criteria are being processes. Europe emerging deployed to defineEurope,Europeans and Europeannessand theirrespective boundaries?Such questionsare consideredvia exploringa numberof themesabout and through Europe. They centreon the ways in which,and criteria by which, and economicspaces in Europe have been definedand divided. These geo-political practicalcartographic processesare linkedto changes in systemsof,and the As both supra-nationalism construction of new scales of,governanceand regulation. and the emergence of an EU 'super-state' and sub-nationalisms challengedthe of the national new multi-scalar state, complex authority systemsof governanceand resulted.These in turnare relatedto questionsof singularand multiple regulation of the possibilities forthe emergence of a identities, discussingthesein the context civil that the future of will not be society. European map Europe Recognizing determined by Europeansalone, the legacies of the divisionwithinEurope between of the neo-imperialist NATO, the Warsaw Pact and neutralstatesand implications ambitionsof the USA stateand military-industrial geo-political complexare then some conclusions are drawn. explored.Finally, key words Europe uneven development governance identities boundaries
of Durham, Departmentof Geography,Durham DH1 3LE University revised manuscriptreceived 29 June2000
Introduction
What does it mean to 'become European'? This as well as question,one withconsiderable practical theoretical is in the context of consequences, posed rapid change withinand for Europe, much of it and disturbing, some of it challengdisconcerting ing accepted notions of civilized behaviour. The least serious of these changes relates to the processes of deepening and enlargement of the EU. But even those changes are of immense significance. Furthermore, they are takingplace in the context of a dramatic re-drawing of the geopoliticalmap of Europe post-1989as the ideological strugglebetween East versus West became simply a division between eastern and western Europe. The subsequent dramaticimpacts of the ofthe break-upoftheUSSR, theuneasy emergence
CIS and, above all, the carnagein the Balkans and the Caucasus as long-suppressed ethnicnationalisms re-surfaced in savage fashion a sharp brought reminder thatEurope could be a dangerousplace. A complex set of processes is therefore both and What sort of re-defining re-working Europe. are Europe is emergingfromthem?What criteria being deployed to defineEurope, Europeans and Europeanness? Where are the boundaries of Europe, both internaland external?Put another way,whereis Europe? In thispaper I will consider theseand relatedquestionsvia exploring a number of themes about and throughEurope. First,the changinggeo-political map ofEurope over thelast is briefly describedand relatedto the half-century criteriaused in this changing division of geothe criteria thatgovpolitical space. In particular ernedtheprocessofwideningoftheEU via spatial
TransInst Br GeogrNS 25 409-426 2000 ISSN 0020-2754@ Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers)2000
410 expansion are analysed. Secondly,the emergence of a homogenizedpolitical-economic space within this expanding part of Europe is discussed. This theformation oftheECSC in 1951and rangesfrom the EEC in 1957 to the deepening of economic via the creation of the SingleEuropean integration Marketand Economicand Monetary Union within the EU in the 1980s and 1990s. The implications of deepening (at the same time as widening) for socio-spatial inequality are also considered. Thirdly,changes in governance and regulatory systemsare consideredas both supra-nationalism and the putativeemergence of an EU 'super-state' and sub-nationalisms of challengedthe authority the national state. Fourthly, questions of singular and multipleidentities are explored,relating these to thepossibilities fortheemergence ofa European civil society.Fifthly, the legacies of the division withinEurope between NATO, the Warsaw Pact and neutralstates and the issue of the extentto which the futureof Europe lies in the hands of Europeans, in the contextof the neo-imperialist projectof the USA state,will be explored.Finally, some conclusionswill be drawn.
An exercisein practicalcartography: the geo-politicalmap of Europe re-drawing
of varying Broadlyspeaking,threesets of criteria, have been decisive in weight and significance, space and in the creation partitioning geo-political of boundaries between different groupings of national states within Europe and in deciding which stateswill be part of which blocs over the post-war period. First of all, there has been a division between fundamental political-economic the marketand those statesembracing capitalism, theformal separationofthepoliticaland economic spheres and those embracingstate socialism,the and the fusionof planned or command economy, withinthose acceptstateand economy.Secondly, therehas been of capitalism, ing the pre-eminence to some form a divisionbetweenthosecommitted of parliamentary democracyand those characterand ized by some formof dictatorship. Thirdly, has there the second criterion, partlyoverlapping models of been competitionbetween different national capitalisms and varying relationships between the national economy and the (welfare) state(forexample,see Albert1993;Lash and Urry 1987; Esping-Andersen 1990). Therehas also been between national states and national competition
RayHudson and supra-national in interests interests reflected the emergent EU. The evolving geo-political map of Europe in thepost-war periodhas thusbeen the productof highlycontestedprocesses,sometimes withverydangerousimplications. The East-Westpartitionof Europe in the late thebuildingoftheBerlin Wall and 1940s,following the lowering of the imaginarybut nonetheless Iron Curtain,was undoubtedly highlyinfluential themostsignificant influence shapingthepost-war of the map of Europe as thecountries geo-political East rejected (though not always willingly) the model of capitalistdevelopmentaland its parliashell(see Jessop1978).Ithad a democratic mentary withimplications that profoundand lastingeffect, At one level, it extendedfarbeyond Europe itself. tiedtheWestofEuropeto theUSA via theMarshall Plan foreconomicreconstruction and, moresignifivia NATO. WithinWesternEurope, there cantly, were strong pressuresto checkthe spread of communismfromthe East and createa more effective political voice for WesternEurope in the international arena. There were equally powerful desires to ensure that therewere no futurewars betweenitsmajorstates, especiallybetweenFrance such as the or associated tragedies, and Germany, holocaust.These combinedto give rise to a series institutions to of moves to create supra-national the (Williams dangers posed against they guard 1998). In so doing, it alluded to an ideal of of Europeanunitygroundedin a commonheritage and saw this as and the Christianity Enlightenment (see by moves towardsintegration beingreinforced there was no Heffernan 1998).Somewhatironically, thattheevils againstwhichintegration recognition was to guard were in any way a productof that tradition (Amin2000). Perhapsthemostsignificant of these moves was the creation of the ECSC, thatwere later in 1951by the six countries formed of theEEC. In thisway members to be thefounder the founding processes of the EU became enof the USA in the tangled with the involvement and resistance of reconstruction Europe post-war to communist expansion. In the early1950stherewere highlycontentious proposals forpoliticalunion as well as economic Overt plans for political union were integration. abandoned in 1954,with the collapse of proposals This had a for a European Defence Community. number of importantconsequences. It allowed NATO to become the de facto'European' defence organization. It marked a switch in emphasis
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to capitalism, createparliaamong political elites, especially in France, cessfultransformations and meet the economicand and mentary democracies, Germanyand Italy,to economic integration thecreation ofa commonmarket, bothas an end in politicalcriteria forentry. Withthemoves towards itself and as a way of covertlyadvancing the EMU and the deepening of the economicintegrahowever,and the agenda of politicalunion. This commonpolitical- tionprocesswithintheEU itself, economicspace had specific rules of entry, defined specification of more precisemacro-economic and of market by a combination capitalismand parlia- fiscal targets,the political and economic entry mentary democracyas necessarybut not sufficient criteria have become rather more rigorously conditions,which delimited the initial possible defined than in past expansions.2Consequently, boundariesof the EEC. Not all countriesthatmet '[a]t one and the same time,the EU has appeared theseconditions wantedmembership oftheEEC in as a model of democratic and economicstability to 1957 and several formedtheirown European Free be pursued by thenew or newlydemocratic counTradeArea (EFTA) in 1960,explicitly rejecting any triesof Europe, and as a symbolof how farthey concept of overt political union, while other in- have to go to reachthepromisedland' (Smith1996, remainedoutsideofbothgroupings.1 Subse- 6). Withincentraland easternEurope, the longeritially of quently the boundaries between non-member term possibilitiesfor successfulestablishment EFTAand theEEC were graduallyre-drawn, new regulatory states, regimesand of capitalistdevelopespeciallyas membersof EFTA sought to join the ment seem greatest in the Czech Republic, EEC (Figure 1). In the first thisinvolved Hungary and Poland (European Commission instance, Denmark and the UK joining the EEC in 1973, 1996b, 26).3 Other current applicants are Cyprus, along withIreland,and in 1974 a freetradeagree- Estonia and Slovenia and as of the Helsinki mentbetween the EEC and EFTA came into force Summitin December 1999 Turkey, subjectto certo democracyand human (Williams 1991). Other countriesmet the test of tain conditionsrelating Thus rights(Figure1). capitalismbut not parliamentary democracy. it was not until the ending of dictatorshipsin In addition, other states (Bulgaria, Latvia, Greece,Portugaland Spain thattheywere allowed Lithuania, Malta, Romania) may become applito join in the 1980sas a way of underpinning their cants foraccession in the foreseeable future. More democraciesdespite the weaknesses of speculatively, it has been suggested that some of embryonic their nationaleconomies.Withtheentry ofAustria, the Republicsof theCIS may seek entry (Armenia, Finland and Sweden in 1994,thenumberof mem- Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). ber states rose to fifteen. Thus over the three Indeed, the Presidentof Kyrgyzstan, the easterndecades followingthe formation of the EEC there mostof theCIS Republicswas recently as reported was an ongoing redefinition of the boundaries saying,'We are dreamingofbeing partof Europe'. between the EEC and EFTA, originally competing Were his dreams to be fulfilledEurope would economic spaces withinWesternEurope. Each of stretch from theAtlantic to thePacific as well as the the enlargements of theEU in the 1970s,1980sand Mediterranean to theArctic. On the otherhand, as 1990s effectively drew the two sets of member Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign minister states together, driven on geo-politicalconsider- noted in 1999 at the FifthEuropean forum in ations and by the logic of international will have to end somewhere' trade,the Berlin:'enlargement threat competitive posed first by theUSA and later (bothquoted in Peel 1999).In summary, then,even at nationallevel theEuropeanspace has been - and Japan,and concernsover marketaccess. The post-1989 redefinition of the relationship continuesto be - subjectto complex processes of between East and West into one between central (re)partitioning that have re-drawnthe politicaland easternand westernEurope was intendedto economic map with some frequency and increasthe CEE statesintoat least themargins inglythishas been associatedwithan extension of help insert of thewider global economy. Consequently, by the the boundaries of the EU itselfand a consequent 1990s, the expansion of the EU assumed an even re-definition of the meaningof Europe. as it contemplatedextension it is to remember thatthe EU greatersignificance Finally, important intothe previouslyforbidden of the East. has not only expanded to increasethe numberof territory This on-goingexpansionthuscentres on theextent its constituent member states but has also been to whichtheseformer COMECON countries are to actively involved in constructing links between be allowed to join as theystriveto undergo suc- itself, otherpartsof Europe and otherpartsof the
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Figure1 The changing geo-political map of Europein thesecond halfof thetwentieth century world. Sometimes these linkages within Europe (such as flows of migrantlabour into the EU, of development aid and direct foreigninvestment fromEU countries)have been a prelude to the ofstatesas fullEU members once the incorporation were met requiredeconomic and politicalcriteria (forexample,Greece,Portugaland Spain). In other cases, close links have developed but without leading to membershipfor a varietyof cultural and political reasons (for example, although the Association Agreementwith Turkeymade clear that it could eventually become a member,in itwas notconsideredas practiceuntilveryrecently eligible for membership,largely because of its record on human rights).4 There has also been a of trade,aid and migrant labour linksconvariety with areas outside of Europe,particularly structed the formercolonies of France, the Netherlands and the UK. One consequence of thishas been to add to the variety of peoples in Europe. The increasingnumbers of asylum seekers and political and economic migrantsfrom the Balkans, Asia and Middle East further this Africa, amplified variety in the 1970s and 1980s (Williams 1996), although asylum requests did begin to decline in the latterpart of the 1990s. This significantly ethnic and religiousdiversity has cultural, growing had important forthe ways in which implications
ormany? OneEurope 413 theboundariesofEurope are conceived,European- tive of the intensified driveto createa unifiedand ness is thought of and criteria for defining homogenizedeconomicspace, a significant extension of neo-liberalism in response to intensifying Europeannessare specified. markets.In this space pressureson international marketforceswere to have much greater scope to Becoming a common economic space? influencethe sectoral and socio-spatial distribuHomogenization versus differentiation tionsof economicactivities, resourcesand income. within the deepening European Union These changes coincided with renewed pressures From the outset,the proponentsof the EEC (as it forexpandingthe constituent of the EU territory thenwas) sought discursively to construct it as a (as it became on 1 November 1993). Via these model of liberal capitalism within a Christian- processes of deepening and widening the EU The dominant sought to bring about a homogenizationof the Enlightenment European tradition. of such a is assumption position that the self- European space, establishingthe hegemony of ofenterprise can be harnessedin thepublic capitalistsocial relationswithina common reguinterest interest a liberalization of trade and capi- latory frameworkover most of Europe. While through tal and labour markets(see Holland 1980,4). The significant nationaland regionalvariations remain was that all would be better that in the forms in which these relationsare constioff, implication tobothwiden and deepen theEU spatial inequalitieswould be reduced,as markets tuted,theproject were freedup and capital and labour moved to and createa common regulatory framework over wherereturns werehighest. Such claimsdid not go its territory is reducingthisvariability. The history ofthemoves to establish This is but one readingof thechanges,however. unchallenged. and deepen a common marketby the six signa- An alternativelays much more emphasis upon toriesoftheTreaty ofRome is well known.Initially, theirincompletecharacterand the contradictory towards to which progress deepeningeconomicintegration natureoftheprocess.It queriestheextent was reasonablyrapid. The main achievements of freely markets can be constructed and competitive theEEC in the1960swere thecreation ofa customs challengestheclaim that'free'marketallocationis and the Common necessarilyin the public interest. union, a commonexternaltariff Indeed, it sugthat at least some of EU Moreover, (Swann 1995). Agricultural Policy gests aspects policy have nationaleconomicgrowthratesin the six member deliberately soughtto shape marketsin particular states were consistently high (see for example ways or mediate theireffects preciselyin recogniMadison 1964; 1982) and seemed to vindicate at tion of the fact that the public interest is better least some of the arguments forforming the EEC. served in thisway. As such it raises criticalquesin economic per- tions as to howthe public interest However, national differences is to be defined formanceand well-being remained and growth and whobenefitsfromsuch policies. Seen in this was very uneven regionallyand sectorally(for way, deepening has been a problematicprocess example see Hudson and Williams 1999). This throughoutand continues to be so, generating unevennesssat uneasilywith the claims of liberal inequalitiesand divisionswithinthe EU. The new capitalism. supra-nationalsystems of regulation are themOver the next two decades, the processes of selves problematic and contradictory. Several further as theempha- points can be made in thisconnection. deepeningslowed markedly sis switchedto widening, First, from the moment of its creation,it is expandingthenumberof memberstates fromsix to twelve. Even so, they debatablewhether theEU reallywas committed to did not grindto a completehalt. It was not until market forces as the prime economic steering the 1980s, however,that the pace of the process mechanism.Its major collectivepolicy,the Comof integration via new forms of supra-national mon AgriculturalPolicy,was stronglyintervenregulationagain accelerated.From the mid-1980s tionist, designed to insulate European farmers the processes of deepening and creatinga truly fromthe effects of global marketforces.It domi'common market'entereda new phase, with the nated its expenditure. This reflected the power of fortheSingleEuropean Market, Economic the political lobby for agriculture and a political projects and Monetary Union and thecreation from 1999of preference forruralunder-employment rather than a single 'Euro' currency, the 1991 Treaty urbanunemployment.5 Whiletheproportion following ofthe on European Union. These initiatives were indica- EU budgetthattheCAP absorbshas shrunk, it still
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absorbs the largestshare of EU expenditure. The as European companies sought Pan-European CAP is symptomatic of the contradictions encom- alliances followingthe creationof the Euro-zone. the emergence of passed within one particularpolitical-economic Encouraging and facilitating in conception of Europe, and recognitionof the globally-dominant oligopolies theseways again on free marketpolicies. As sits uneasily with (neo)liberal claims about the political constraints of the virtues of competition and 'free markets' as such, it sits veryuneasilywith the rhetoric of market resource allocation. superiority superiormechanismsfor resourceallocation that A second pointrelatesto themotivesforcreating champion the rights of consumers. It seems the EU and its global competitiveposition. The thatMarxian claims about tendenciestowardsan formation of the EU can in partbe seen as a con- ongoing centralization of capital (Mandel 1975) scious attemptto counterthe threatof European have continuing validity. markets This relatesto a thirdpoint. The deepening of being dominatedby multi-national capital based in the USA. Such multinational capital was the EU and wider changes in the global economy and causes of a increasingly penetrating dominating key sec- were the proximate(and inter-linked) tors of the national economiesof Western of rationalization Europe profound commodityproducfrom the 1950s.This,forexample,was verymuch tion,with powerfulshifts in social, technicaland the positionadvanced by Servan Schreiber (1968). spatial divisionsof labour.Such changes had sigthe 1980s the EU was seen to be one of the three nificant forgeographiesof economic By implications oftheTriadwithin a globalizing well-being,both within the EU and in Europe keymacro-regions now in competition withJapanas well as beyondtheEU, as companiesre-organized economy, productheUSA (forexample,see Ohmae 1990; 1995).The tionprocessesvia varying of technocombinations EU could seek to respond to these challenges in logical, organizational and spatial changes. Much two ways. Firstly, theprotection offered was seen as a through by of this change in manufacturing the Common External Tariff and in otherways via necessary response to competition from new tariff and trade policies. From the outset the EU models of 'lean' productiondeveloped in Japan. was conceived as a customs zone and common This posed a threat both fromimportsto the EU marketsurroundedby a CET wall. The dominant and from theproducts oftransplants theEU within was to as Japanese companies sought to penetratethe ideologyof freetradeand liberalcapitalism in key sectorssuch as automobilesand apply only within the CET wall.6 The CET and EU market trade treaties would mediate trade relations micro-electronics (forexample see Hudson 1995). between the EU and otherparts of the world. As There was also a significant and spatiallyuneven in serviceindustries leadand occupations, such, the intentionwas to create a territorially- growth to a new sort of bounded space in which 'free' marketswould be ing some to claim a transition - post-industrial,post-Fordist,servicebut with economy theprimeresourceallocationmechanism, from dominated(fora discussionof such claimsand the a significant degreeof closureand protection located outside this European space. evidence on which they are based, see Hudson competitors oftheSEM stressed the via creatinga space in which capitalist 1999).Whereastherhetoric Secondly, and marketallocationof promise of an overall rise in aggregateeconomic processes of competition resources could flourish. This would facilitate welfare, this did not automatically equate to even development,with capital and the emergenceof globally competitive European- increasingly between based multinationalsthat could compete with labour flowing to equalize differences those based in Japan and the USA. EU policies sectors and areas. In practice, such sectoral on R&D, mergersand acquisitions and compe- and spatial uneven developmentbecame more titionwere shaped to encourage the emergence pronounced. the process of deepening economic of 'Euro-Champions', especially in key sectors Fourthly, has createdand is creating of technologicallysophisticated manufacturing. integration major divMoves towards the SEM encouraged a wave of isions withinthe EU at various spatial scales. At markeddivercross-border acquisitions and mergers within nationallevel, thereare continuing and wealth (for Europe that were oftenthe prelude to corporate gences in economicperformance restructuring, capacity closures and job losses instance,see Dunford and Hudson 1996). There (Hudson 1999). Mergers and acquisitionswithin is an importantand recentlycreated division the EU rose to record levels in 1999 and 2000 between those eleven states that have become
ormany? OneEurope 415 Euro-zoneand suit of heightened membersof the commoncurrency differences in economic profits, between cities and regions those four thathave not.7The lattergroup com- health and prosperity prise those countriesthatfail to meet the conver- within Europe widened and deepened. Creating gence criteriafor entryand those that have met more scope for marketforcesto shape flows of thembut fornationalpoliticalreasons choose not capital and labour has tended to reinforce territo exercisetheir to right to join. On theotherhand, torialinequalities, notleastbecause labourremains criteria Greece is close to meetingthe entry while relativelyimmobile compared to capital. Seemin practicetheDanish kroneis pegged to theEuro. ingly paradoxically, processes of homogenization The extentto which various applicantstatesmeet are enhancing the significance of differences criteriaforentryto the EU between places in influencingthe locations of these more stringent (relativeto those that applied in the case of past economic activitiesand the quality of peoples' expansions) will decisively influencewhere its lives withinEurope. A corollary boundaries will be drawn. The inclusionof some of growinginequalitiesis thatcoheEU stateswithinthe Euro-zoneand the exclusion sion withinthe Union is undermined.The domiof othersfrom it,as well as the continuing signifi- nance of the CAP in EU expenditurepriorities, cant differences in nationaleconomicperformance coupled with resistance from national governwithin the former to the ments to cede competence to the EU in social group,8is contributing emergenceof a two-speed (or multi-speed)EU, welfare matters,precluded the development of in part a consequence of processes of deepen- extensiveindustrial(beyond the provisionsof the it is recognized ECSC) and welfarepolicies.9While the Structural ing and widening. Furthermore, that '... some important causes of differences Funds have been increased, as the shareof the EU are likely to remain. They concern essentially budgetthattheCAP absorbshas declined(Bachtler such as and Michie 1993),10they are simply insufficient features, disparitiesin various structural dissimilarpotentialgrowthrates and propagation to cope with the burgeoning inequalities that mechanisms'(European Commission1999,xi). accompanydeepeningeconomicintegration (Begg thatdeepeningeconomicinte- and Mayes 1993).11 Even so, the expansion of the Despite assertions would reducesocio-spatial and Structural Funds can be interpreted as evidenceof gration inequalities lead to generalizedincreasesin economicwelfare socio-political pressuresforan EU in which issues as a resultof trickle down effects, in factthereis of redistribution and social justice are placed considerable evidence of widening inequalities higher on thepolicyagenda,challenging theclaims within the EU (Glyn and Miliband 1994). The of liberal capitalismas to the efficacy of market inequalitiesof incomes and wealth between rich allocation. Nevertheless,this is an agenda that and poor people grew (Hudson and Williams remainstightly circumscribed by thehegemonyof has also exacerbated capitalistpriorities and the imperativesof global 1999). Deepening integration existing sub-national territorial inequalities and competitionand the accumulation process. The helped createnew ones. Whileregionalinequalities policy responses to combat growing inequality (forexample,in GRP per caput or unemployment have thereforebeen, at best, muted, both at rates) narrowedsomewhatfrom1960 to the mid- national and EU-levels. This is partlylegitimated 1970s, they have subsequently widened again by claimsthatwideninginequalities are a transient (Dunford 1994). Although in the Sixth Periodic phase. Processes of economic change and the on theRegionsthe EU Commission (1999) resultant widening of social inequalities are Report assertsthatregionalinequalitiesare again narrow- assumed to be simply 'shocks which temporarily ing, the evidence does not supportsuch a strong threaten regional and social cohesion' (Comclaim. For example, unemployment rates in east mission of the European Communities1996, 51, Germanygrew in 1999 while those over much of emphasis added). southernItaly and Spain remained in the range Empiricallydeterminingthe extent to which 25-30 per cent. Elsewhere, the persistence of increasinginequalities are a result of deepening regionalinequalitieswithinthe Euro-zoneas well ratherthan widening or of other EU policies is as more generally withinthe EU is acknowledged problematic,however. This indeterminacyhas (see, for example, European Commission 1999; implicationsfor the policy debate (see Hudson Martin 2000). As companies made increasingly 1996). For example, while the CAP sought to use of spatial differentiation in pur- protectfarmers' incomesit also contributed sophisticated to the
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widening of income differenceswithin and between rural areas (for instance,see Podbielski 1981). Policies to encourage the emergence of 'Euro-Champions'oftenfurglobally-competitive therexacerbated qualitativeas well as quantitative regional inequalitiesby encouragingknowledgeintensiveeconomic activitiesto locate in the core regions of the EU (for example, see Amin and Tomaney1995). The expansionof the EU fromsix to twelve increased the ratio of Gross Regional and poorest Productper caput betweenits richest 6:1 to 12:1 (Hudson and Lewis 1985). regionsfrom The unificationof the formerEast and West the scale of regional Germaniesgreatly magnified in the EU. Further expansions eastinequalities and wards will undoubtedlychange the character exacerbatethe depth of inequalities(see Hudson and Williams 1999). Added to this, processes of sharpenedthe followingentryfurther integration effectsof these 'one off' effectsof successive The emergenceof a two-speed or enlargements. EU will furtherheighten intra-EU multi-speed socio-spatial inequalities. This in turn will put further strainon the EU's budget and its capacity to address theseproblemsin ways thatwill maintain its legitimacy.There are already signs, at least in terms of expenditure,of a weakening to cohesion. commitment there have been powerful In summary, pressures oftheUnion thecharacter to deepen and transform itself.However, this process of deepening coincided with the most problematic phase of widenof all, about First hard some questions. ing,raising where the boundariesof Europe are to be drawn. Secondly, about the extent to which growing inequalitiesare a productof one set of processes about thecapacityof thantheother. rather Thirdly, the EU adequately to deal with such problemsof growinginequalitieswithinits expandingboundaries. From the perspective of the European Commission,the processes of economic restrucdeepening and turing set in motion by further to will lead temporaryexpansion of widening socio-spatialinequalitiesbut in due course these will return to socially and politically tolerable levels. They will not,however,disappear.Perhaps the criticalpoint in this connectionis that the projectto createa unifiedeconomicspace within the EU restson the premisethat capitalistsocial both will and should be dominant relationships within the emergentEuropean Social Model. As such, the developmental model is based upon
class structural between relationships antagonistic capital and labour.While these may be mediated and softened in variousways via different regulatand welfare the structural regimes, inequality ory are based is a definupon whichsuch relationships of capitalisteconomies.As such, there ing feature are strict limitsto the extentto which wealth and power can be evenly and equitably distributed, As Lipietz(1996,371) has put sociallyand spatially. it, '[t]he social crisis of the EU stems fromthe of social normswhich are still "social dichotomy democratic" on the one hand, and ultra-liberal which condemn these norms on the institutions other'. The Social Agreementin the Treatyon European Union provideda modestreinforcement of social democraticnorms but this is far outimplicationsof weighed by the macro-economic of EMU. Equally, the convergencerequirements the chronicallyproblematic character of state - at EU and other spatial scales - in involvement addressing problems of socio-spatial inequality hangs as a constant threat over the perceived and state of such policy interventions legitimacy and thepolitiinstitutions. Socio-spatialinequality cal problemsthatit poses will not be abolishedby values and a discursiveappeals to communitarian political'ThirdWay'.
New patternsof governanceand regulation:towardsa European super-state?

of a unifiedeconomicspace has The construction been paralleledby - indeed predicatedupon - the creationof a degree of regulatory capacityat EU level. This can be seen as one expressionof the emergence of an EU 'super-state' and moves towardsthe creationof a politicalUnion. Having view in the 1950s supportforsuch subsided from an idea re-surfaced again in the1960s(forexample, see Servan Schreiber 1969). There has certainlybeen an upward driftof power from the member states. The regulatory competenciesof the EU have increased and new social and welfare areas of (weak) regional, policies CAP. have been developed alongsidethedominant This can be seen as evidence of 'hollowing out', of one elementin a more complex restructuring national states (Jessop 1994; 1997). Much of the discussion about 'hollowing out' and regulatory to the has been developed in relation restructuring
ormany? OneEurope 417 EU experience (for example, see O'Neill 1997). USA political-economic on this interdomination, vision embodied a nor- pretationit remains a demonstrably Indeed, Servan Schreiber's incomplete Even so, giventheerosionofnationalstate mative claim that European national states needed project. to be 'hollowed out' in order that the EU could capacities,the EU will in time inevitablyevolve with national and local and matureto fillthisvacuum in politicalspace. emerge as a super-state, another Thereis,however, view oftheEU, which levels subordinateto it, and become a bulwark and USA sees it as one element within a more complex neo-imperialist against political power ambitions. This was a vivid expressionof a vision multi-level and multi-dimensional systemof govof the EU as a powerfulpoliticalactor,formed by ernancein Europe (Snyder1998). Such a governthe mutual consentof sovereignnationalstatesin ance system mechanisms requiresthatappropriate in of shared interests.12 Seen this their be established ensure to to politicalaccountability pursuit way, the 'deepening' of the EU can be seen as simply the relevant constituencies at each territorial level. state regulation'up' a spatial scale, to a The conceptof subsidiarity, and thedebate around shifting nationalstates. version of existing an attempt to ensure thatin practice it, represents larger it constitutes an emergent Whether is decisionsshould be takenat the territorial adminsuper-state In part, this is istrative much more debatable,however.13 level as close as possible to those affected because nationalGovernments have ceded powers by thesedecisions(Snyder1994).Greatemphasisis to the EU institutions withouttrusting themfully placed upon the democratising aspects of shifting to use such powers. The 1987 Single EuropeanAct power to the local/regional levels, of bringing in increasedmajority brought votingon a rangeof political decision makingnearerto those directly issues, providingan important precedentforcon- affected by itsconsequences.To a degree,however, nationalsovereignty. The post-Maastricht thismorecomplexgovernance straining systemalso necesssettlement involved a compromisebetween more arilyinvolvesa networkedand 'de-territorialized' of supra-nationalpowers (via monetaryunion and approach to governanceas not all communities the European central defined and bank) and loose co-operation interestin Europe are territorially betweennationalgovernments on issues ofdefence delimited.There is no good a priori reason as to and justice.The politicalchanges of the 1980s and why one type of community of interest is privi1990s resultedin decisionmakingprocessesin the leged over others within a truly democratic EU assuminga complexhybridform, a mixture of Europe. However, issues of democratic deficit and co-operativefederal- again arise as a consequence of such a network inter-governmentalism ism (Kirchner The implications of theanti1992).However,itcan be arguedthat model of governance. thishybridform will come underincreasing press- democratic aspectsofmovingpoliticalpower from ure as the Union expands and becomes stillmore state to civil society and/or to democratically unstable. unaccountablesupra-national heterogeneousand become increasingly organizations16 and In part, it is because of the smallness of the EU of creating undemocratic and unaccountabledecito thesize oftheEU economy14 and sion making organizations are increasingly budgetrelative being the paucityof its resourcesrelativeto the magni- acknowledged. This is especially so in termsof tude of the policy agenda thatit seeks to address. foreign relations, policyand international giventhe itis at best a flawedemer- uneasy relationshipbetween at least some EU Furthermore, politically, weak and dogged by a deep memberstates and NATO, a networkedorganizgent 'super-state', democratic deficit, lackingthechecksand balances ation that is increasinglydemocraticallyunacthat evolved (often via painful struggle)in the countablein its new self-proclaimed role as global national states of westernEurope. This, however, policeman (Ali 1999). can be legitimated as a temporary, albeit undesirWhile the EU representsthe most elaborated able, state of affairs since existing European example of the emergenceof a multi-level system national states are (allegedly) 'hollowed out' and of governance and regulation,there are strong in the face of globalising pressures.15 continuities ineffective withthepast - especiallyin relation to The EU nonetheless remainsclearlysubordinate to the continuing of national states.For significance the USA, which remainsvisibly dominantin the 'despite the best efforts of the private sectorand and economicarena.Whileit is of international global geo-political institutions to downgrade them, still possible (followingServan-Schreiber) to see stateshavemore powerthanthey often appearwilling the EU as a political projectintendedto counter to recognize'(George 1999, 9, emphasis added)
RayHudson not all states have the same amount of of state power in centralgovernment ministries: although of economicand financial Hudson and Williams 1995). In many respects, power.Some new forms globalization('statelessmonies', forexample: see even in the EU, nationalstatesretainconsiderable Martin1994) do take matters beyond the effective powers (Anderson 1995; Mann 1993)- and control of many (but not all) national states. the national states of the EU are perhaps the case for'hollowingout' theorists. Indeed, leading capitalist states in collaboration paradigmatic with private sector TNCs, banks and financial However, the main problemwith this thesis is institutions and organizations in thepublic sphere thatit ignoresthe theoretical and practicallessons such as the IMF, WTO and the WorldBank,posi- to be drawn from the historical geography of tively encouragesuch developments. Theyactively imperialism,from a history of combined and seek to create global marketsvia persuading or uneven development.At global level the USA coercingweaker nationalstatesand organizations remains thedominantcapitalistpower, 'the only that such markets are desirable. Thus such remainingsuper-power' (Taylor and Flint 2000, - and the accompanying 90), with littleevidence of its powers being 'hol(pseudo) global markets of power fromnational states that they lowed out' and a significant transfer gap betweenit and its statusacross a wide range and/or permit- rivals forsuper-power presume- are largelyconstructed ted by national state action and agreements of politicaland socio-economic In part indicators. between the USA and other powerful national thishas come about because since theformation of states (notably the rest of the G7) and various the IMF, the USA has oftenused its policies as an international extension of US foreign policy to reduce the organizations. The USA undoubtedlyhas a uniquelypowerful autonomyof othernational states in theireconrole in pressingthe interests of global capital. In omic policy formation.Other national states, the 1950s President Eisenhower expressed this notablythoseof the (enlarging) EU, are in a more in terms of the On hand they are the one relationship military-industrialambiguous position. themselves out', complex. Subsequently, the military-industrial'voluntarily hollowing givingup complex has been joined by the 'Wall Street- some of theirstatepowers to emerging European On the otherhand, in otherrespects Complex' (Bhaghwati1998) as a mecha- institutions. Treasury nismthrough whichtheUSA has takentheleading theyare vulnerableto 'involuntary hollowingout' rolein encouraging economicand financial of the USA and globali- as a consequenceof the strategies zation.Thatsaid, theextent oftruly global markets its supra-nationalallies. In this regard,the EU forfinancial commodities is actuallyverylimited, states occupy an intermediate position within a In sharp contrast,many as time and space continue to pose barriersto global state hierarchy. processes of globalization, notwithstandinga other national states were undeniably cast in a the outsignificantincrease in time-space compression dependentand marginalizedmould from which led colonial histories formarked their social set, by capitalist (Harvey 1989). Furthermore, thatlacked stateforms mations continue to be strongly territorially intoemaciatedpost-colonial power, evident political and practical grounded,allied to strongnational and regional significant sites of resistance legacies of imperialismand expressions of the identities, significant generating desires of dominantstates to reproducea global to processesof globalization. In summary, globalizationis a highlyuneven, system based on asymmetrical relationships contestedprocess. The view between national states.As such, theypossessed partial and strongly of the national stateis being verylittleto lose via being 'hollowed out'. Similar thatthe significance of eroded via 'hollowing out' is increasingly being pointscan be made withregardto theterritories challenged on various grounds (forexample, see the formerstate socialism and their post-state For example, in the former Boyerand Drache 1996; Weiss 1997). The 'hollow- socialist trajectories. crisis was used by social economic at and best Euro-centric is out' thesis Yugoslavia strongly ing to a fewnationalstates(and even herethe groups there and in the West to undermine relevant readingof changesin thesein the 1980sand 1990s the collectivistcore of the economy and push restoration. is sometimesseriouslyflawed. For example,it is Yugoslavia '... towardsa fullcapitalist ofthestatein theUK The Yugoslav government accepted an IMF hard to map therestructuring the burden of the crisisonto the as it was plan thatshifted in thisperiod in terms of decentralization a period of almost unprecedentedcentralization Yugoslav workingclass' (Gowan 199,85) - and in
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ormany? OneEurope so doing helped fanthe flamesof ethniccleansing in encourand nationalistambition.In summary, and of seeking to globalization aging processes make the discourses of globalizationhegemonic, is activelyinvolved in seekthe USA in particular national states while other out' to 'hollow ing its own position in the pre-eminent reinforcing has usually capitalistworld order. This strategy withinternabeen pursued in activecollaboration tional organizationssuch as the IMF and World What underits influence. Bank,whichare strongly morenorless thanthelatest thisinvolvesis neither betweenpowerof inter-imperialist forms struggle for withsignificant fulnationalstates, implications Europe.
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when European identity permeatespeople's lives and daily existence' (cited in Demos 1998). Not a key issue but it is also a shifting only is identity one. In recent years, for example, the Idea of Europe has 'gradually softened... away from Christianvalues, Beethoven,and loftyEnlightenBalsamic ment ideals towards global solidarity, vinegar and experienceof the other'. What does and seem clear,however,is that'... both the lofty the banal vision generalizefrompartial and reladefinedculturalidentities tivelyfixedterritorially in Europe' (Amin 2000, 6). At the same time,the memberstates of the EU have clearlybecome de and multi-cultural societies.As a factomulti-ethnic result,thereare serious unansweredquestions as to how culturaland ethnicvariationand issues of at national,regionaland local (multiple)identities Singular or multiple identitieswithin a scales are to be treatedwithinthe homogenized European civil society? space of the EU beyond the political-economic - fairly of phrases such as a 'Europe a neat- and forsome attractive Thereis certainly emptyrhetoric in coinciof the notion of the EU as the the Regions'. Equally,serious questionsremain symmetry dence of a homogenizedpolitical-economic space, about wheretheboundariesof thiscommonspace a unifiedregulatory space of an EU super-state, are to be drawn and what happens on and/or and a singular, trulyEuropean,civil societytran- beyond these boundaries in a wider Europe and is nationaland regionaldifferences beyond. This process of boundary definition scendingexisting in cultureand identity. In some respectstherehas closelytiedto issues of 'otherness' and processesof been progresstowardssuch a European civil soci- 'othering'(Said 1978) and the criteriaby which ety.For example, the Council of Europe and the 'Europeanness'is to be judged, how 'we' are to be from 'them'. As the EU expands, European Conventionon Human Rightshave had differentiated an important role in defining eastwardsintoareas thatborderon or acceptablestandards particularly across Europe (forexample,see Mayall and Miall are part of Asia as commonlyunderstood,these 1994). However, even the proponentsof the Idea issues become morepressing. of Europe as defined by a common ChristianOne conceptionof a singularEuropean identity a process analoEnlightenment heritageaccept that this nurtures would see it constructed through of European national cultureseven as it gous to that involved in the creationof national diversity binds themtogether. thereare clear identitiesin the nineteenthand twentiethcenNevertheless, limits as to the forms and extent of legitimate turies.Whereas in the past the aim was to create as the EU's response to the far-right thosenationalidentities, theproject now would be diversity, FreedomParty the Austrian in Government to transcend them. Whereas joining previouslythe 'imag1999 illustrates. This suggesteda politicalagenda ined community' (Anderson1982) was national,in and concept of acceptable norms in civil society the new imaginationit is to be European (or thatextendedwell beyond the realmsof common perhapsmoreaccurately Thereis EU) in itsextent. economic and defencepolicies. This raises ques- no doubt that,for many people, thereis now a tions as to the acceptable extentof political and much greaterdegree of awareness of the culture culturaldiversity and varietyof identities within and lifestyle of otherpeople elsewherein Europe, the contextof an integrated but unevenlydevel- a result of changes in consumption patterns, oped economic space coupled with a complex increased foreign travel on holidays, and the multi-level systemof governance. images projected via the mass media. Such The issue of European identity and the criteria shared activity and communicationspaces do used to denote'Europeans' is clearlya critical one. not necessarilytranslateinto a shared European For as Soledad Garciahas put it: 'Europe will exist consciousness,however,especially as the media as an unquestionable political communityonly typically national present European issues through
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- or regional/local - lenses. The EU's policy in the field of education over the last initiatives two decades, such as theJoint StudiesProgramme, ERASMUS and SOCRATES, have sought to and promotemovement of 'Europeanize' curricula staff and studentsbetween memberstates in an attempt to encourage the formationof such a common consciousness and shared identity.17 So too have various initiatives to promotea sense of European culturalidentity beyond existinglocal and national affinities There is no doubt thatthis is a view of European identity and 'Europeaness' that would sit comfortably with the preferences of many members of political elites within no EU-wide,let alone Europe. Thereare,however, European-wide, equivalents of the myths and storiesthatdefinethe imaginedcommunities that are the constituent subjectsof national identities. Without as Smith(1995,139) has put it,'who them, will feelEuropeanin thedepthsoftheir being,and who will willingly sacrificethemselves for so abstract an ideal? In short, who will die for Europe?' On the otherhand, thereare evidentpressures from nationalstatesand theircitizensto resistany furthererosion of national identityas well as - not least those revealed in the divisovereignty sion of the EU intoan Euro-zoneand a non-Eurozone. Indeed, theelectoralsuccess of extreme right suchAustriaand wing politicalpartiesin countries oftheresurgence forexample,is suggestive France, of more insidious and xenophobic nationalisms it is and racisms (see White 1999). Furthermore clear that pressuresfrom'suppressed nations' to own nationalstates, createtheir seekingan identity ideal of the coincidence thatmeets the nationalist a thingof the are farfrom of nationwithterritory, past in Europe.As eventsin the Caucasus and the Balkans in the 1990s have made painfullyclear, such ambitions can oftenbe violentlypursued, thepoliticsofethnic cleansing. prosecutedthrough This raised difficultquestions within Europe as to whethersuch areas were beyond the pale and as to which of theircitizenscould qualifyas and legitimateEuropeans, as issues of ethnicity in broader became geo-political entangled religion struggles. At the same time, however, there are strong to nationalstatesas localistand regionresistances alist movements seek greater autonomy from central states, assertingtheir particularcultural identitiesover the national. Often and territorial
Ray Hudson
thisbuilds upon past histories of thenationalstate to sub-national variation and seeking suppress cultureas part of the process of seeking to build nationalidentities. This was perhapsmostpowerfullyexpressed in Spain followingthe ending of the Francoistdictatorship, with the emergenceof the 'Spain of the Autonomies'in the post-Franco period, especially in the Basque country and Catalonia (forexample,see Schech1988;Fernandez Rodriguez 1985). Such tendencies were by no means confined to Spain, however, but were expressedmuchmorewidelyover Western Europe (Anderson 1995).1s These regionalist and substate nationalisttendencies often emerged in a to processesof globalization, complexrelationship Europeanization and the emergenceof the EU. Oftentheywere seen as a way of resisting global forcesvia forging alliances between the regional and supra-national EU levels,while bypassingthe nationalstate.Thus complexgeographies ofhybrid identities wereforged, withallegianceto territories at different scales. In addition,however,therewas a growingrecognition of the significanceof non-territorially such defineddimensionsof individual identities, as ethnicity, as class seemingly genderand religion, became less salient within Europe. Constructing around such dimensionsallows the emeridentity in disconofinterest gence ofvariouscommunities tinuousspaces withinEurope and beyond (Robins are defined and Aksoy 1995). Such communities and organized more throughnetworkstructures of bounded terthanwithincontiguousstructures This further ritories. complicatesthe processes of Seen from in identity formation. culturalhybridity thisperspective, Europebecomesa project creating of integrationbased upon not only multiple but also the celidentification senses of territorial of self. ebrationof multipleand mixed identities This is a vision of a hybridEurope as an ongoing project in continuous cultural movement and rather than of one as defined by re-invention identities and fixedand known settled overlapping Viewed norpoints of departureand destination. the a such possibility perspectiveopens matively, of a 'heterophilic Europe of multipleand mobile identitiesand a gradual erosion of the difference between 'them' and 'us' (Amin 2000, 10). This imagines Europe as a place in which maintowardsa move inexorably streamand minorities - maybe'culself,as cultural mixing cosmopolitan turesmashing'- begins to challengeidentification
OneEurope ormany? 421 with an essentializedtradition or a homogeneous and the widespread presence of USA military It offers thepromise- and no doubt to forces in westernEurope also tied moves to politicommunity. some at least,the threat - of overlapping, weaken- cal supra-nationalism withinEurope in a complex of theUSA, especially ing and fuzzy boundaries as people come to way to theglobal ambitions ties and complex given the strongly Atlanticist tone of UK foreign acknowledgemultipleterritorial geographies of identity formation.As Adorno policies. Equally,the developmentof the EU as a on the horrors of the politicalactorand siteofgovernance can be seen as (1978, 103) puts it,reflecting holocaust and the Second WorldWar,'an emanci- an attemptto develop a counter-weight to the USA statein pated society... would be the realization of growingpower of theneo-imperialist in the reconciliation of difference'. universality shaping the global geo-politicalagenda. The rethere is as yet little evidence of lationshipbetween the EU, its constituent states Admittedly, Europebecomingemancipatedin thisway.Indeed, and the USA has oftenbeen an uneasy one, not such an imaginationof a 'borderlessEurope', a least because of the position of the EU and its of belonging constituent statesas juniorpartners withinNATO. Europe without the old certainties and knowingone's place, mightas easily produce In manyways thesetensionscame to a head in the a fracturedself and defensive, intolerantand 1980s and 1990s in the Balkans (foran analysis of even violent reactionsto difference. The contem- the backgroundto this,see Carteret al 1995). of ethno-communalism, racism, poraryresurgence Douglas Hurd, when UK Foreign Secretary, but stable' religious fundamentalismand regionalist and describedthe Cold War as 'unfriendly nationalist sentiment within a 'heterophobic' (Budd 1993,6). Followingthecollapse of theUSSR 'tra- and theWarsawPact and thethawin theCold War, Europe in which people seek to re-discover dition' suggests that this may well be the case. this stability was eroded. One consequenceof this Multi-culturalism is oftenperceived threatening, is thatNATO in manyways became redundant, an both by dominantand dominated social groups, anachronism.As such, it also posed particular leading to a retreatinto quite sophisticatedim- problemsforthe USA state and military complex homeland and tradition to in terms of its global role. It became necessary aginariesof difference, preserveethnicand/or national identity(Morley to find new 'regional' wars in order to sustain and Robbins 1995). Such reactionsinvolve closure the military-industrial complex and maintainthe and therecovery ofspatialand cultural boundaries momentumof the 'permanentarms economy' (as ratherthan culturalhybridity and plural identifi- Mandel 1975,characterized late capitalism), devalcation.And as thebitter oftheBalkans orize capital and open up new possibilitiesfor experiences and Caucasus only too clearly demonstrate, the accumulation.As such, in the post-Cold War era, difference can becomeentangled the USA sought to construct politicsofcultural new, decisive and with fundamentalist demands for a Europe of related roles for itself and NATO in Europe. blood-and-soil based strong nations, ethnically Gowan (1999,96-7) identifies threepossible politicleansed of immigrants and the foreigncultural cal scenariosforEurope in the 1990s,two ofwhich influences of 'the other'. were 'absolutely unacceptable' to the USA. The first optionwas a pan-Europeancollective security system, embracing all European states, Russia and the USA in a norm-basedinstitutionalized European imaginationsversus the framework - a muchstrengthened and streamlined ambitions of the USA neo-imperialist for and Organization Security Co-operation in Who then is to decide the shape and formof a Europe (OSCE). Therewould be clearrules thatall future Europe? It is clear thatthisquestioncannot should enforce.All would coerce any state that be answered solely with respect to Europe and breachedthem.The second optioninvolveda twoEuropeansbutmustalso takeaccountoftherole of pillar structureinvolving the EU and WEU in the USA. The participation of westernEuropean WesternEurope, Russia and the CIS in the east. states, including the members of the EEC, in NATO would fade into the background as the of its members'security, organizations such as NATO and the Western ultimateguarantor while European Union (WEU) helped underpin an the WEU/EU, with Russian acquiescence,would uneasy peace between East and West for some expand into east centralEurope. Neitherof these in NATO in particular options was acceptable to the USA, however, fortyyears. Participation
422 for Europe lies at the heart of its militaryand economic interests. A corollaryof this is that the involvement of the USA in Europe was military and is embedded in hard-nosedself-interest rather thanaltruism. The thirdoptiontherefore involved NATO under the leadership of the USA taking command of European politics. Supra-national (theOSCE, theWEU and the Europeaninstitutions EU) would be marginalized,subordinatedto the USA via NATO which would expand eastwards but exclude Russia. Europe would be re-polarized Western betweenan USA-dominated Europe and a weakened Russia. At issue herewas both a debate and a politicalbattleover about European security contours of Europe. the future geo-political During the early 1990s therewas resistanceto this thirdoption fromRussia and many western European states as the USA, allied to the UK, In thiscontext, it intoreality.19 soughtto translate Yugoslavia became the centralarena forrealizing this third way of projectingNATO power and and containingRussia by militaryintervention widespread use of force,whatever the costs to in theKosovo culminating people who lived there, the new policy of latest as the expression operation (Blackburn1999; Gowan 1999; Hadjimichalisand Hudson 1999). In the process,NATO became '... to essentiallynothingmore than an instrument secureUS hegemonyin Europe...' (Ali 1999).Put anotherway,'the USA keeps the peace on its own terms.While the war against Serbia was fought under NATO's banner every significant military decision was taken in the Pentagon and every political one in the White House (see significant NATO's military Chomsky 1999). Furthermore, in the Balkans,its tragichuman coninvolvement ofRussia in the sequences,and themarginalization of Europe's futurehelped create determination in space forRussia's equally brutal interventions for it made it difficult the Caucuses. Furthermore, European states complicitin NATO's incursions chalinto the Balkans to criticizeand effectively in Russian the inflicted atrocities military by lenge its and NATO In these circumstances Chechnya. memberstateswere in no position to constituent condemnRussia as theyalreadystood condemned for the same politics of violence. They had long since conceded the moralhigh ground. Questions about the futureof Europe, what it can become and what it might be allowed to in the faceof become,thustake on added urgency of theUSA. The post-Kosovo thevisibleambitions
RayHudson discussionsabout thedevelopment ofa limitedEU have not abolished the fears militarycapacity20 archiraised by such questions.For the emergent tecture of a Europeandefenceforce remainsat best of skeletal. It will require radical restructuring - and connational defenceforcesand industries - to put siderably increased public expenditure fleshon the skeleton.Thereis littlesign of any of this happening.It will also requirea generalized and properthatEuropean acceptancethatitis right 'die forEurope'. Thistoo should personnel military Even when- or perremainsto be demonstrated. if it more does, it would stillbe realistically, haps decades beforethe EU could conductseriousmilitary operations without the technologiesof the available to NATO. As USA and the intelligence the future of Europe are about the such, questions not to be settled by Europeans alone. For the 'brutalfact'is thatwesternEurope remainslargely with its allied states reminisa USA protectorate, cent of ancientvassals and tributaries (Brezinski the inequalities illustrates This graphically 1997).21 of power between Europe and the USA. In an earlier era of asymmetric power geometries, Europeansonce wentout to civilize'savages' in the colonies and mould them in theirimage. In the the USA state 1990s and intothenew millennium, a to generalize particularconception of sought 'human rights'as universaland mould Europe in their image throughthe example of NATO interventionin the Balkans.22 Is this,however,the sort of Europe and conceptionof Europeanness that want? Europeans themselves
Conclusions
I have argued in this paper thatthe processes of its boundariesand of Europe, specifying defining are complex, contestedand becoming European thequestionsthatthey Furthermore, contradictory. pose will not be settledby Europeansalone as the neo-imperialistambitions of the USA state to achieve global dominance and the globalizing of transnational ambitions capitalwill bothhave a future the on effect anatomyof Europe. profound formost There seems littledoubt that the future of Europe will be both capitalistand parliamentary democratic,although the precise forms of to It is important both remainto be determined. relations class while that capitalist emphasize dominate such societies,they also encompass a varietyof other class and non-class relations.A
OneEurope ormany? 423 capitalist futureis nonethelessone that will be today, focusing on two related issues linked to characterizedboth by uneven developmentand recognition of and supportfordifference. First, the inequalityas an integralpart of capitalistecon- EU could seek to enable and support a range of omies and by socio-political checks and balances alternativemodels of economy and lifestyleto via systemsof governanceand regulation to keep those of mainstreamcapitalism.In particular, it such inequalitieswithin'acceptablelimits'. could help underpinexploration of variedconcepThere are very different visions of how such a tions of a social economy within localities and withinsuch param- regions(Aminetal 1999).Secondly, it could seek to Europe mightbe constituted however.One model forthe future would in underpin a progressiveculturalpolitics of differeters, manyways seek to mimictheUSA as a neo-liberal ence with Europe (and beyond) and to defend It would centre on a singular currently In pareconomyand society. unpopularmodernist aspirations. it could promotea European conception imaginationof Europe, with economy, of polityand ticular, civilsocietyre-territorialized at thescale oftheEU, human rightsand social justice thatwould apply and with a commonand singularEuropean iden- to all residentsof the EU. A first, tentativestep and identifiable In was taken in this directionwhen the Treatyof tity singularEuropeaninterests. this case, the democraticdeficitwithin the EU Maastricht formalized the notionof European citimightbe removedvia concentrating power at EU zenship in 1992, albeit a limited conception of scale in a much strongerand sovereign directly citizenship thatwas stilltied to and so dependent electedEuropean Parliament. On the global stage, upon holdingnationalcitizenship ofa memrights on theselines mightwell sit ber state. But many residentsof the EU are not Europe re-constituted and citizensofthesestates.This generalization ofrights alongside the neo-liberalmilitary-industrial Wall Street-Treasury of the USA. The within the EU, based on residence rather than complexes USA would remain dominant within NATO in national citizenship, would be seen to offer maits role as 'global policeman' even if the EU terial benefits from European citizenship. This did develop some limited autonomous military would be especially so if it sought to harmonize withinEurope. and level up, rather thandown,economic, capacityfordeployment political In contrast,an alternativefuture of Europe and social rightsavailable to all of those who live and withinitsexternal As such,multiculboundaries.23 encompassesa complexmosaic of governance regulatoryprocesses at local/regional,national turalismand social inclusionwithincivil society and supra-nationalscales but with direct and could be underpinnedby a new model of EU democratic at each level. citizenship based upon post-national in the transparent accountability rights In thiscase, a closer and more transparent match- EU. A strong post-nationalEU state is thus a and accountabilities necessary forand guarantor ofdivering ofpowers,responsibilities pre-condition at each scale mightnarrowthe democratic deficit. sity of culture,economyand lifestyle ratherthan The issue of accountability would be further com- an alternative to it. The EU could therefore change as this alternative would also its policies and vision in innovativeand progresshowever, plicated, embracecomplex,multipleand fluidhybrididen- ive ways. It could promotesocio-economic diverand aterritorial sityand an imagination tities, involving both territorial of Europe thatcelebrates dimensions.The lattermightraise new issues of and supportspolyvocalsocietiesand multiplepardemocratic deficit. Such a vision of internal diver- ticipation withina Europe of complexgeographies would sit uneasilyalongside a of identities,a Europe of people with shifting, sityand variability vision ofEurope as a powerfulglobal actorforthis hybrid and multiple identities whichwill includea would be a Europe in whichitwould be difficult to progressive European dimension. pin down a singularand unified Europeaninterest. As such, it mightwell eschew seeking to play a Acknowledgements global role thatechoed the USA. Given this,can theEU nonetheless a This is a revised version of the Chair of Conferplay politically progressiverole and if so in what way? ence's paper presentedto the Annual Conference Almostforty set out a of the RGS/IBG, University of Sussex, 5 January years ago, Servan-Schreiber case for the EU becoming a 'super-state'in the 2000. The titleof thepaper specifically reflects one contextof the real politikof the global political of the threemajor conference themes.Ash Amin, A ratherdifferent case can be made out JoePainter economy. and Helen Wallacekindlyand helpfully
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commentedon the firstdraftof this paper; Ash Amin also made available to me a draft of a book chapterthatI have drawnupon, forthcoming in the section on identities.I have especially also drawn upon a joint paper with Costis Hadjimichalis in the section on USA neoimperialism,based on conversationsin various parts of Greece in 1999, and gladly acknowledge his inputto thispaper as a result.In addition,Ron Martin and two anonymousreferees made valuable commentson the original draft,to which I have soughtto respondhere.The usual disclaimers apply,however.
10 11
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Notes
1 Austria and Finland were preventedfromseeking EEC entrybecause of the terms of their political EFTA createda special AssociateMember neutrality. statusto allow Finlandto join. The CopenhagenCriteria were agreedin June1993at an EU Summit. In summary, thatapplitheystipulate cants must have stable institutionsguaranteeing the rule of law, human rightsand the democracy, protectionof minoritiesas well as a functioning market economy that can withstand competitive pressureswithinthe EU. By 1999 the Czech Republic was seen by the EC to have slipped behind Hungaryand Poland. Whilstthisis thereasonstressedin official discourse, the factthatTurkeyis a secular statewith a largely Moslem population has undoubtedlyalso been of as has its continuing relevance, disputeswithGreece over a rangeof issues. It is also the case that many other countrieshave policies, notably agricultural similarlyprotectionist the USA. it onlydid Whilethisbecame the dominant ideology, and struggle. There a processof contestation so after were, forexample, Frenchworriesabout freetrade theEEC of a rangeofviews within and, morebroadly, Six. intotheEuro relatedto national forentry The criteria than rates(no morethan1.5 per centgreater inflation the average of the threebest performing countries), ratesno morethan2 rates(averagelong-term interest budget per centabove the average of thebest three), deficit (no more than 3 per centof GDP) and public debt(no morethan60 per centofGDP): see Artisand Lee 1994. in infladifferences Thereare forexamplecontinuing levels and economicgrowth tion rates,productivity rates between Italy,Portugaland Spain on the one on theotherthatpose hand and Franceand Germany to compete questiqnsabout the abilityof the former withthe latter longer-term.
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Ray Hudson As a result,national states remained key actors in these spheres,albeitwith the scope forinvolvement via such policies more constrained than in the past: see below. For example, note that the Structural Fund budget was intendedto increaseto 35 per centof EU spending by 1999 For example, even with the increases in Structural at most8-9 per centof Funds,theywould contribute the net fiscal transfer regional income. In contrast, from theCentre-North of Italyto theMezzogiornois around 22 per centof regionalincomein the South. Thereis anotherreadingof Servan Schreiber's book as an attemptto popularize Gaullist foreign policy and de-couple France fromthe USA, especiallyvia fromthe military arm of NATO. withdrawing Recognizingthatforthe momentat least key issues such as welfarepolicy remainat the national level and thatthe EU's competencies are in the spheresof thandirectserviceprovision. rather regulation The EU's budget onlyconstitutes about 2 per centof the combinedGNP of constituent memberstates. There is evidence of variable supportforincreasing in ways that thepower ofEuropeanlevel institutions For example,a surveyof could reduce thesedeficits. citizens of seven EU countriesrevealed a majority the creation of a commonEuropean govsupporting ernmentin four (Belgium,France,Italy and Spain) and a majority directelectionthroughout supporting in five(theprevious Europe fora EuropeanPresident fourplus Germany)Only in Denmarkand the UK, was theremajority opposition especiallythe former, to boththeseproposals.Clearlythissurveywas only a partialone of EU statesbut even so the variability of enthusiasmfor moving to a more EU scale of governance and regulation is evident (Guardian 1 June1999) Whilethereis no space to explorethepointhere,it is deficit' worthnotingthatthenatureof a 'democratic cannotbe divorcedfromthe conceptof 'democracy' thatis called upon: see Painter1999.In broad terms, however,thereis a consensus that the democratic deficitin the EU has three dimensions: an instiand a citizen a transmission tutionaldeficit; deficit; deficit (see Barratt 2000, Chapter 2 for a full discussion). As in manyotherspheres, however, policyintentions coincidewithoutcomes. do not necessarily such as ETA in Spain oforganizations As theactivities and various para-military groupings in Northern Irelandmake clear,thepursuitofnationalist political ends withinEurope via directactionand violenceis to the Balkansand Caucasus. by no means confined references Given the continuing by politicalelitesin with the the UK to the UK's 'special relationship' USA, it is salutaryto rememberthe commentsof national securityadvisor, PresidentCarter's former
One Europeor many? 'its [the Zbigniew Brezinskiabout this relationship: UK's] friendshipneeds to be nourished but its (cited in policies do not call forsustainedattention' Stephens1999). forceof Formalizedin a proposal fora rapid reaction up to 60,000 troops at the December 1999 Helsinki summitof EU leaders thatwill lead the WEU to be absorbed into the EU. Whether thiswill be sufficient to reverseSmith's(1996) judgementthatthe EU and WEU fell shortof constituting effective geo-political institutionsindependent of established military powers remainsan open question. Zbigniew Brezinskiwas PresidentCarter's national advisor and, as such, well qualifiedto comsecurity menton such issues. in 1999 about theneed President Clinton'scomments to 'construct a better Europe forour children'can be seen as acknowledgingthe need to persuade USA citizensthattherewere good groundsforUSA miliand justifythe deaths of military taryintervention personnelin the Balkans. Clearly thereis scope forconsiderabledebate as to preciselywhich rightsshould be included but the pointI want to focusupon hereis thebroaderone of the principleof such rights.
425 Begg I and Mayes D 1993 Cohesion, convergenceand Economicand Monetary Union within EuropeRegional Studies 27 149-54 77 Affairs Bhaghwati J 1998 The capital mythForeign May-June BlackburnR 1999 Kosovo: the war of NATO expansion New Left Review 235 107-23 markets: the against BoyerR and Drache D eds 1996 States limits ofglobalization RoutledgeLondon Brezinski Z 1997 Thegrandchessboard Basic Books New York Budd A 1993 The EC and foreignand securitypolicy' EuropeanDossier Series No 28 Universityof North London,London CarterF W Hall D R TurnockD and Williams A M 1995 the Balkans Geographical Paper Interpreting Intelligence No 2 Royal GeographicalSociety, London humanism: lessons ChomskyN 1999 Thenewmilitary from KosovoCommon Courage Press,Monroe Demos 1998Making thesearch Europe popular: forEuropean Demos, London identity Dunford M 1994 Winnersand losers: the new map of economic inequality in the European Union 1 95-114 Studies European Urban and Regional - and Hudson R 1996 SuccessfulEuropeanregions: Northern Ireland learning from others Northern IrelandEconomicCouncil,Belfast Esping-Anderson G 1990 Three worlds of welfare Press,Cambridge capitalism CambridgeUniversity and spatial European Commission 1996 Reform processes in central and eastern EC, Brussels development Europe - 1999 EU economyreviewfor 1999 available at /comm/dg02 /document http:/ /Europa.eu.int 99review/99reviewen.htm Fernandez Rodriguez F ed 1985 La Espailade las autonomias Instituto de Estudios AdministracionLocal, Ministerio de Administracion Madrid Territorial, and civil society:How George S 1999 Public institutions can we improve participatory democracyand active involvement of citizens? Parliamentarians-NGOs conferenceon Market-oriented and society, democracy, citizenship an area ofconfrontation? 31 Maysolidarity: Strasbourg 1 June (See http://stars.coe.fr/dossiers/Societe/ E_SusanGeorge.htm) Glyn A and Miliband D 1994 Payingfor inequality: the economiccosts of social injusticeRivers Oram, London Gowan P 1999The NATO powersand theBalkantragedy New Left Review 234 83-105 Guardian 1999 1 June on the Hadjimichalis C and Hudson R 1999 Reflecting Balkans:on theimportance ofremembering thelessons of imperialismand the continuingsalience of the national state in the process of 'becomingEuropean' Paper presentedto the Paros Seminarof the Aegean, Towards a Radical Cultural Agenda for European Cities and Regions30 August-5 September 1999
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One Europe or Many Reflections On Becoming European

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One Europe or Many Reflections On Becoming European

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One Europe or Many?

One Europe or many? on becomingEuropean Reflections

An exercisein practicalcartography: the geo-politicalmap of Europe re-drawing

One Europeor many?

1957 EEC I EFTA 1960 EFTA 1973 EEC 1981 ECf

New patternsof governanceand regulation:towardsa European super-state?

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