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(Looking back]
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r BRITISH CmJMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
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Title
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ForeVlO,rd
British Intelligence
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Communications ,Intelligence
Its character
3
Its contribution to the war
3. , ,.I
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Its organization in relation to the governnlent
5
Its basic internal organization
9
,
Basic liaison techniques
10
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The General Organization in Wartime
13
The Chief and his lieutenants
. 13
Tho Sigint Board
15
Outstations -- control
16
outstations -- evaluation
18
Specialist processing stations
20
Bletchley Park
23
Physical plant
23
.....
Internal organization
24
Ill'ber-service aspect of GC&CS
29
Security
30
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Outside liaison
34
f
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The British attack on German Enigma
38
The Enigma machine
39
'Preliminary work
40
The bombe
42
Eniema organization
44
Hut 8
44
Hut 6
47
The Bombe Section
50
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The Bl':'itish Attack on Fish
I 52
Interception
52
Cryptanalysis
54
Naval Section
59
Introduction
59
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Staff
59
Administration
60
German cryptanalysis
60
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61
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Japanese cryptanalysis
Italian and neutral cryptanalysis
63
Current intelligence
65
Research intelligence
67
Records
69
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r Title
Page
Eastcote
71
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APPENDICBS
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Additional Sources
1
OP-20-G Representatives at GC&CS
2
Personalities
4
Identification of Place Names
8
Abbl'>eviations
10
CHARTS
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GC&CS
28 January 1943
r II GC&CS
24 September 1943
GC&CS
18 September 1944
IV Naval Section Staff
1 March 1945
V Naval Section Subsections
28 January 1943
VI Naval Section Subsections
1 June 1944
VII Naval Section Subsections
r 1 December 1944
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VIII Naval Section Subsections
,....
1 March 1945
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FOREVVORD
DUP:Lng the WUl'" liaison with the :3ritish Connmilni
cations Intelligence prGanization was an importan.t
part of the wOl"'l( of OP-20-G. For this reason it was
thought desirable to make a study of the cornmunicatiol1S
intelligence .9rganization and its activities. Complete
infol1ll1ation "'l9oS not available; but dispatches, mel:loranda
of visiting British officials, minutes of conference meet
ines, and informal dis.cussions between officers of the
British and American services provided material for a
sabisfactory analysis which was publisI:led as HIP 99 in
April 1943.
Since then the British organization has been l"evised.
More information has become available from further des
patches, etc., as well as from conversations with usn
officers who have served abroad. This information forms
the basis of. the present report, which attempts, ",henever
possible" ,to bring RIP 99 up to date. Still further in-
fOl"mation will be available 'Ii/hen GC&CS sends OP-20-G its
own history of British activities in cormnunications
intelligence the war. Becausei ts history ''V"ill
be a dotailed and comprehensive study running to 20,000
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pages, this report'haa adopted a condensed treatment and
will ultimately serve as an introduction to the Bl'i tish
work.
.Despi te its general brevity, the report incllides
detailed chapters on three ,sub jects of' especial interest
for 20-0 - Naval Section at Bletchley Park; Enigma, a
cryptanalytic problem connected with the work of Haval
Section; and Fish" a communications intelligence pl"oblem
of increasing importw1ce for the future.
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[1 1945 - 1946 1]
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BRITISH IWPELLIGENCE
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The British have a powerful and effective intelli
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gence service. It is not simply a merger of intelli
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gence activities, but a strong and independent oreani-
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zation which is not controlled or dominated by anyone Hi-3
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'government department or by the services.
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It is the lare;est joint intelligence service Imovm -
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its size enabling it to tap all pertinent sources of in
formation, including those of the highest level, and its ... ".1
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unity malcing possible the adequate correlation of all
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material., Its interpretation of is excell
ent. Dissemination is accurate, certain, and secure;
for high level intelligence, it is also swift.
The organization has a background of great exper
ienco, for it continues through peace and war with a
nucleus of permanent civil se1"'vants of the highest
ability. The organization has a strong historical
,......,
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tradition also. Its methods, however, are not confined
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to this tradition, 1'or the organization shows amazing
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flexibility and inventiveness.
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Tho British people, unfamiliar as they may be with
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actual detail, are aware of the tradition of the "Sec
ret Service.
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They are conscious of its broad powers
and scope and of its impol"'tance to their country.
Perhaps because of this awareness, they are a
conscious public, stoutly defending the Official Secrets
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Act as essential to national security and at
American tolerance of irresponsible journalists who
publish secret govermnent papers.
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,TOP SECRET
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
Its character
Intelligence comes from many sources-- from pris
oners of war, captured documents, agents, traitors who
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I will sell their secrets and such open sources as the

press-- but for accurate, high level information, the
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most valuable source is communications intelligence.
This is the interception of enemy and neutral commu
nications and radio transmissions, their study and,
where possible, solution, the intelligence resulting
from these activities, and its preparation in useful
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form. Such intelligence is -triply authentic, containing
r as it does genuine information for a known,determinate
do. te and from a ImoVin source. It is used by the British
with particular emphasis on information which is high
level and directly operational. Distribution lists show
it is given vfider circulation than is Ultra by the
United States.
Its contribution to the war
intelligence brought frequent victory
,..-.
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to the Allies. It was:the :i!eading of German naval traffic
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which made possible decisive action against the u/Bts,
and it was the current breaking of German Air FOl"ce
ciphers and of German warnings to channel boats v/hich
determinod the outcome of the Battle of Britain.
A psychological defeat for Germany occurred after
two UIB supply ships had been stU1k in the Indian Ocean
as a result of communications intellieonce. Convinced
of cipher compromise, Doenitz lashed the Naval War Staff
for poor cipher security and even suspected treason.
The whole Navy was thrown into conflJ.sion and 1'01" some
time was uneasy about its communications.
Comrmimications intelligence aided again as ROl1llllel
and his Afrika Korps were heading for. the Suez. Because
the Germans were reading traffic between Alex
andl"ia and the front" they seemed invincible. In des
peratiol1 the British changed the Eighth Army command.
Then once more they broke into the GAF cipher. Not
only did they rind theil-' own keys bad been compromised,
but they learned at the same time the .disposition, condi
tion, and intentions of the Afrika Korps. One of the
turning points of the war followed-- the Battle of El
Alam.ein.
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Its orGanization in relation to the Boverluuent
The position or the British communications intelli
gence ogganization within the British government is
unlike most American governmental bureaus. It is cleare1'>
to describe it, not in governmental terms, but industrial.
Despi te the v/idespread impression that the communications
intelligence organization is "under the Foreign Offic,a, II
it is in fact an independent bureau,' with an esprit de
corps of its ovm, controlled by its own Board of Directors
(the London SigintBoard). This Board or Directors is
made up of one representative rrom the Foreie;n Orrice,
the Admil"al ty, the War Of rice, 'and the Air Minis try.
The; Chairman of the Board of Directors,"The Chief", is
a representative of the Prime Minister. The Director of
GC&CS-- "President" of the cODlIllunications intelligence
organization-- is also a menmer of the Board. As in
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the case of many c:orporations, it is he who runs the
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organization, often directly consulting the Chairman and
bypassing the rest of the Board.. Finally, there is a
permanent secretary to the Board.
The various government departments always assign
as their representatives on the Sigint Board the heads
TOP SECRET
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of their various intelligence branches. These men hold
their position because of their :i.ntelligence duties and
are in effect members of the Sigint Board officio.
Similarly, the Prime Minister'S representative is the
head of the British Secret Service, for the man who
holds this position is automatically a member of the
Prime Minister's personal staff.
Although both in war and peace the comnlunicat:i.ons
intelligence organization works very closely with many
other government departments-
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for example, the Post
Office, which in England has a monopoly of telephone
and telegraph service-- only the Prime Minister, the
Foreign Office, and the Services have any powers of :
control. This control is exercised solely through the
London Sigint Board. As a matt;er of practice in war
time the intelligence organization was
able to obtain virtually anything it wanted from any
department or any of the Individual .services,
howevel"', were not able to control the 'activi ties of the
communications intelligence organization. Thus, specif
ically, at one time the organization wanted to take
over an activi ty which had been handled by a bl"anch of
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...
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Naval It succeeded in doing so. Vigorous
opposition from the naval intelligence department was
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not able to prevent it and succeeded only in obtaining
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certain concessions as regards liaison.
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intelligence budget-- that is, the Chief's departmental
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budget-- be kept as low as possible, Should this budget
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remain unduly large over a large period of time,invest
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igation by a King's commission would be almost unavoid
able. Accordingly, in peace time, much of the staff of
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the conoounications intelligence organization is' paid
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by the Foreign Office. Until recently even the president
of the organization was SO paid. This fact, however,
in no wise affects the essential independence of the
organization.
During the war the staff was greatly expanded.
Civilian personnel continued to be paid by the
Office. Thaliks to a unique flexibility, these personnel
could be granted temporary commissions (ranks up to
lieut-colonel are knoVln to have been granted; they may
have gone higher) in any of the sel'vices whenever the
,.....
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communications organization thought this
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desirable. These comnlissions, though valid in the field,
were purely honorary as regards administration. The
men remained civil servants, assuming or dropping their
uniforms whenever the comnlUnications intelligence organ
ization wished.
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Large numbers of service personnel also entered
the communications intelligence organization during the
war. they remained under the control
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of the individual services-- that is, as regards pay,
quarters, leave, promotion, and so forth. Operationally,
however, they v/er'e wholly controlled by the connnunica
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tions intelligence organization. This applied even to
regulars. During the war, such men and women could be
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withdrawn and assigned to other duties only if the com
munications intelligence organization agreed. Cases of
such transfer were in fact extremely rare and affected,
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for the most part, unspecialized personnel.
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It is not knovm who determines the budget of the
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communications intelligence organization, but preslunably
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it is made up by the Direct9r and approved by the Sigint
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Board. Nor is it clear how the cabinet controls this
budget. Possibly it does so through the direct relations

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betw'een the Prime Minister and the Chief. During the
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war the communications intelligence organization was
able to obtain virtually all the money and personnel
that it needed. In peacetime, however, it is already
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obvious that conditions are very differaot. The organ
ization has been forced to trim itself to a size that
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is in some respects too small for maximum efficiency.
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Its basic internal organization
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Until shortly after the World War the British had
various communications intelligence organizations.
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These merged, about 1921, under Comdr. Denniston, RNVR.
In the combined organization there was a Naval Section
(under t ~ r . Clarke), a Military Section (under Col.
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Tiltman), an Air Section (under Mr. J.E.S. Cooper), and
a Diplomatic Section (also tUlder Denniston). In the
1920's and early 1930's these were located at Broadway,
the Chief's Headquarters. Each employed perhaps half
a dozen people, except for the Diplomatic Section, which
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Vias slightly larger.
Thex'e is little information on the internal organ
ization between this early period and 1941 at which time
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Comdr. Travis took over all the service sections from
Denniston. These sections had already moved at the
outbrealt of vvar; so in 1941 GC&CS, the headquarters or
com....llunications intelligence VlaS split in two. One half
with headquarters at Berkeley street, in London, was
primal"ily responsible for producing intellige.nce for
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the Forei["p Of'f'ice" and one half' with headquarters at
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Bletchley Park, was primarily responsible for producing
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intelligence for the armed forces. Denniston remained
in London, responsible for diplomatic and cormnerical
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cryptanalysis, while Travis. was in chal'ge at Bletchley I
Park.
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Basic liaison technique
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Bletchley Park maintained close contact with Berkeley
Street; through the Intelligence Exchange. This contained
authoritative translations and abbreviations and a refer-
r
ence library and dealt, in some measure, at least, with
decodes and captured documents. Mr. Higham was the head
of IE until the end of the war. Certainly, there YlaS
also direct liaison between Bletchley Park and the Foreign
Office, but no details of this are known.
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DU1'ing the Wal" contact ",vas maintained between
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Bletchley Park and the service departments by direct
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teletype and by Park liaison All naval and
naval air signals considered important by Naval Section,
at the Park, were passed to the Admiralty Intelligence,
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Center (IUD 8) and f'rom this material, Admiralty serviced
naval cOTInnands in home waters and the Atlantic. (Commands
in the r!1edi terranean and Far East were serviced directly
f'rom Naval Section.) Liaison with Admiralty on a policy
level was the responsibility of' Comdr. Loehnis.
Military and air commands were serviced directly

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by Hut 3 at the .Park. Of' course, the Air Ministry and
the War Of'rice were kept in the picture. Although at
second priority, they received all intelligence which
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had been issued to commands in the ,f.ield. They also
received a certain amount of' strategic intelligence
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valuable f'or research. Major Cowan .... the liaison
of'ficer on operational level between Hut 3 and MI-8.
Representatives for undoubtedly existed, but their
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name s a1"e unknown.
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Intelligence did not f'low in one direction only.
For example, Admiralty made operational intelligence
such as fleet movements f'reely available to Naval Sea
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tion. l1elations with other govorrunent departments were
analogous.
Berke:tcy. street was in direct contact with t he
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Foreign Office and "Ji th civilain departments such as
the Ministry of Economic Warfare. It was from Berkeley
Street that the l'lIElJIl obtained figures on German armament
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production and the German manpower situation, details
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of German-Japanese commercial transactions Rnd plans
for blockage-running by merchant ships, and details of
German-Spanish traffic in wolfram and other materials.
The bulk of intelligence passed to Bletchley Park
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vIas supplied by its agents and outstations. The out
stations were of two sorts-- d/f and intercept, and the
specialist stations 1ivhere intercepts were pl"'ocessed.
Early in the war some British agent work VIas done at
Blatchley fal"'k. Jlfr. Nigel de Grey, for example, vms in
charge of broadcasting directly to the agents. In 1941
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the British agent work was transferred, presumably to
Aldford House, St. Albans, which mainta:ined liaison with
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the agent intelligence section at Bletchley.
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TIill GE}\1ERAf, ORGANlZ ATION IN WARTHiIE
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The Chief and his lieutenants
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At the head of Great Britain's intelligence
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activities is a man as powerful as he is inconspicuous.
Although a general he dresses as a civilian. His name
is an. official secret. Even at Bletchley Parle his name
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was seldom heard, and when neard it was meaningless to'
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most. So well guarded is his identity that reportedly
he used different doors for entering and leaving a build
ing. This is the Chief, :Major General Sir Stewart Graham
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Menzies. The Chief is Chairman of the London Sigint
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Board, Director' Genel'al of the Sigint Centre, and Director
of the Secret Intelligence Service, and probably has
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sever'al other titles; thus he controls all British intelli
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gence. HI..) is closely associated with the armed services and
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with '(;he FOl'"Jeign Office.
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In rank he approximates a 'cab
inet minister, but he is not responsible to Parliament, only
to the Prime Minister, and to him personally" The Prime
Minister appoints the Chief and pays him. Like-a civil
,....
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servant, however', the Chief does not change with the
Prime Minister; for example, Menzies continued on under
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the Labor government. His length of service is probably
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,about seven years. The position according to convention .
rotates among the services; and since Me.nzies f predecessor
was an it is predicted that his successor will
come f'rom the RAF.
When the various communications intelligence organ
izations merged around 1921, Comdr. Alexander Denniston"
vms made head of' the combined organization. It was
Denniston V/ho lined up the intelligence personnel and
responsible for the brilliantly conceived expansion
of the organization in September just before the war. .
Not far-seeing in his policies , hOiriever (he had" for in
to recognize the need for bombes) he was
partially displaced by Travis in 1941. Besides his
duties as head, Denniston had taken on responsibility for
diplomatic and commercial cryptanalysis. As a deputy
director he continued in charge of this work, but his
authority and prestise gradually diminished until the
end of the war when he finally retired.
Sir Edward Tra:fTis, who became Director of GC&CS,
joined the Navy in 1906, retiring as a Paymaster-Com
mander. From 1914-1916 he was secretary to A&niral
Jellicoe and at the end of the war he served in the
Signal Division of the Naval Staff, Admiralty. Later
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'he served as vice-chairman for the International Code of
Signals Committee (1928-1930) and as chairman of the
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Inter-Service Cipher Security COlllnittee (1942). In
about the fall of 1941 he left Hut 3, of which he was head,
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to become Director of the armed forces branch of the
conwunications inte11ieence organization. With Denniston's
retirement in 1945 he succeeded to the command of the
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I .' .... whole organization. As Director, he sits on the London
Sigint Board.
,.....
Unlike Denniston, Travis is a man of br'oad outlook.
He is .far-seeing, con.fident, and determined. Denniston
was willing to admit the impossibility of breaking
German machine ciphers. Travis vms not.
The Sifl'int Board
,")
The London Sigint Board, composed of representatives
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from Poreign Office and the services, coordinates commu
nications intelligence and by its recormnendations controls
the communications intelligence organization. During
the war it met every six \'leeks to decide higher policy
l:md to discuss matters such as direction o.f cryptanalytic
effort, rules of secure distribution, and the interchange
of in.formation on policy, organization, and technical
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development;. between British communications intelligonce
uuthori ties. Any matters of first importance 'were submitted
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to the Chiefs of Staff; indeed, the Board really amounted
to a bl'anch of the Chiefs of Staff:.'
The Board meets now the first Thurdday of every
month and is sufficiently flexible to be called wholly
or in part to pass judgment between times. During the
war much of its power was usurped by GC&CS, which acted
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alone to form policy. This power has been rejuvenated
at the expen.ce of GC&CS independence.
Serving on the London Sigint Board are:
Maj.Gen Menzies, chairman (The Chief)
Sir Edward Travis (Director of Sigint Centre)
Comdr Loelmis, secretary
Mr. V.F.VlT. Cavendish-Bentinck, representative from the
Foreign Office.
Heads of Army, Na'v-y and Air Intelligence Divisions
Outstations--Control
The communications intelligence network below the
Chief embraces organizations of three different types:
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outstations, specialist processing stations, and head-
These outstations--d/f and intercept-- take
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.the first steps in obtaining intelligence. The stations
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are not part of one common chain. Army, Navy, and Air
each maintains its separate network. The Radio Security
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Service has intercept and d/f stations to cover illicit
transmissions in the Empire and in neutral countries.
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Scotland Yard (which did all Foreign Office interception
before the war) has a station at Denmark Hill which in.
addition to morse traffic intercepts non-morse on at
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least an experimental basis. The Foreign Office has
a non-morse intercept and research station (FORDE) at
Knockholt which served also as a training school for
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intercept operators of German non-morse. Connected to
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its undulators by an audio-frequency line is a sub
station at Keddlestpn Hall. The Government Post Office,
..-
which concerns itself with noise investigation, is also
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in .the intercept picture.
Although not part of one netvYork, each station
is related to the Chief. The Radio Security Service is
controlled by him directly; .the other nets are controlled
by Sigint Headquarters through recommendations to the
appropriate officials. In the case of naval stations,
for instance, Bletchluy Park suggests a plan to DSD9,
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Admiralty (which supervises technical communications,
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and naval intercept and d/f stations),and DSD9 directs
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the interception.
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Outstations - evaluation
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Relation to the Chief makes all stations subject
to coordina.tion. Naturally much duplication of effOl"t
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is thepeby eliminated. Sharing of facilities is also
simplified. RSS, for example, aided Bletchley Park in
the interception of German weather codes and naval Enigma.
The extent of the Empire makes world coverage poss
'I ible for the British. Furthermore, the position of
England itself enables it to pick up over half the
traffic of the world. This broad coverage is especially
meaninBful to Britain whose policy is to keep track of
the whole spectrum. Even during the war, when only a
few important channels received cryptanalytic attention,
additional frequencies were guarded to keep abreast of
cipher changes and nevr developments in communications.
r British d/f stations are also favorably placed. Thei"'r
location explains in part the notable accuracy of British
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bearings.
British intercept operators (even at service stations
many are civilians) are extremely good. They are wel1
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trained and their work is accurate. They are assisted,
too, by excellent maintenance procedure. A file is l<:ept
for each receiver and'the receiver is chec.lced monthly.
It is a valuable routine, for without it an operator can
use his instrument until its efficiency is 40% beluw par
.
before he notices deterioration.
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Despite a wartime attitude of expediency, the British
('''
"'"
are very advanced in coordinated research as compared with
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other countries on which there is information available.
They have concentrated equipment and engineers at two
important experimental stations. FORDE, at lCnockhblt,
conducts research on non-morse. Flowerdovm, one of the
two principal naval intercept stations, conducts research
on morse-- d/f, range estimation, equipment for intercept,
and new aspects of RFP and Tina.
~ ( "
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Two factors mar the picture of British d/f and inter
cept. One is insufficient integration of d/f and RFP
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with cryptanalysis. The other is technical deficiency.
This often serves to counteract initial progress-
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slowness of manufacture hindering research, lack of
equipment and inability to produce it hindering operations.
Por example, memorable British achievements in d/f were
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surpassed at the end of the war by the United states,
benefited from engineering ability and mass pro
duction. About 75% of the naval receivers used wepe of
American manufacture. The British did not use typewrit
ers; consequently, they went through three stages in
taking dovin intercepts-- manual copying, transcribing,
and punching tapes. The best American operators can do
this in one step.
Specialist stations,
After interception messages go through processing-
analysis, decoding or decryption, translation, derivation
of intelligence, and dissemination. The headquarters
for these activities during the war centered at Bletchley
Park. There were also subsidiary stations which carried
on these activities in whole or part. These were admin
istered by the services and operationally controlled
from Headquarters through the Chief and the London Sigint
Board. Traffic was ;passed to each station by the network
operating in its area.
The Navy centres were strategically located, one in
the Fal"' East, and one on either side of the Mediterranean.
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r stations with a small staff of radio intelligence officers
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were at Alexandria (the headquarters of the war against
I Italy) and Gibraltar (the Headquarters of Cincmed).
"'{henever a major force went to sea from oi ther port, a.
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radio in:l:;ellic;ence officer and three operators accompanied
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it. Only a little cryptanalysis was done at Alexandria,
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none at Gibraltar. Since these are permanent bases, a
1('
handful of intelligence personnel unquest
""
ionably will be kept at both.
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The Far East Centre, originally at Hong Kong, moved
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to Sineapore at the outbreak of war. Then just before
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that city fell, the unit split,: a small part going to
Melbourne and the majority to Colombo. When Japanese
,.
pressure increased in 1942 the centre moved again, tllls
time to Kilindini, but the next year it returned to
Colombo. Colombo (I-IMS Anderson) was the communications
intelligence centre f'or Cincef and f'or the Indian Ocean
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and Pacific areas. It was also the exploitation unit
..
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for Bletchley Park, doing cryptanalysis on current Jap
anese traffic. Without a doubt the British will maintain
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a peacetime Far East centre

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move from Colombo back to
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although it may possibly
Singapore.
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Small processing stations were also maIntained by
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. These were in no
way controlled by Headquarters although liaison was natur
ally quito close. They dealt with Headquarters as in
dependents, but not as equals', the strength ofiheir bar
gaining position dependent on the quantity of raw material
they could pass to Bletchley.
Connnunications betvmen the centres and Bletchley
Park were relatively inef-f'icient. Non-morse, with its
device for automatic encipherment, would have been the
best poss:tble method for passing raw materIal. The
British, however, had to consider what was most expedient
and used non-morse, as at Colombo, only where the United
states had set up the necessary facilities. At other
times cable or radio was used. Both were slow and
aWkw'aI'd because of the double process of enciphering at
one end and deciphering at the other, and they gave un
fortunate opportunity for garbles.
... 22 ...
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PARK
Physical
The headquarters or British communications intelli
gence is GC&CS (Government Code and Cipher School). As
stated above, before the war GC&CS was in the Chiefls
headquarters, Broadway building, London. During the
war it was split into a diplomatic branch at Berkeley
Street in London and a service branch at Bletchley Park.
Since the war it has been reunited and is now at Eastcote.
Bletchley is a dreary railway town south of the
industrial Midlands and fifty miles northwest of London;
the Park is an old estate once known .for its beautiful
roses. GC&CS occupied Lady Leon's house (a Victoriru1
monstrosity), 12 temporary wooden huts, and 8 brick
blocks. Because Travis and most of the deputy direct
ors had of.fices in the house, the word 'house' became
synonymous with 'hlgh policy'. The :DUrniture in the
blocks and huts was crude and makeshift. One had to
be a relatively senior officer to have a desk. Stat
ionery of all sorts was very scarce. Pencil sharpeners
for instance could be found only in the United States
Army and Navy offices.
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,
Tho facilities of the town were almost completely
inadequate for the large temporary population. The
Park had to fill in the gap; hence the administration
department assumed unusual importance. There were only
a few places to eat (and these small and dingy) so the
Park had to build its mm cafeteria. Living space was
also a serious problem. Personnel was billeted on
the citizenry, and of necessity the billeting officer
wielded considerable power. All vacant rooms for
fifteen miles around had to be registered with him.
lfaval officers and senior civilians were billeted in
private homes; the Wrens in old estates which had been
taken over by the Park. A was built for 10Yfer
paid civilian girls, while remaining service personnel
lived in the Schenley Road Military Camp, the Church
Green Road RAF,Camp, and the barracks for the ATS and
WAAF. These barracks adjoined the Park. The billetecs" z
hoy/ever, were driven to and from work in Park buses
and station wagons.
Internal Organization
It is a di:f:ficult;' task to produce an intelligible
description of the internal organization of the Park.
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TOP SECRET ULTRA
t.
It was luid throughout the war, and a neat and logical
appearance on paper was not considered. In places the
chart relects actual conditions o operation, in places
the abilities of individuals rather than their logical
unction vii thin the scheme of things. The inconsistency
of designations presents a Urther difficulty. Assistant
Director II does not imply that there was an Assistant
Director I.
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The organization will be described here as of 18 I
September 1944.
Director: Sir Edward Travis
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Deputy Director 1 (DD 1): Nigel de Grey, serving
directly under Travis. Although he did not have over-all
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command, he performed most of the functions of executive
rtf,....
officer for the organization. Intelligence Exchange
I " ..
vms directly under !lIr. de Grey.
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DD 2: Captain (S) Bradshaw, parallel to de Grey. He
,oms in chal'go of all administration. This included
recreation, maintenance, finance, stores, defense and
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ARP, transport, the cafeteria, and billeting. Cel.
Wallace assisted Bradshaw as AD (2).
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DD 3: Captain Hastings, parallel to de Grey. He
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was in charge or overseas intelligence,
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of liaison with foreign countries, and of agent communi
,....
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cations intelligence.. He served as liaison officer
between communications intelligence. and tl1e agent system.
Under HastinGs was AD Intelligence Section (AD IS), Mr.
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I Page. Page was over 1808 and 13K, clandestine intel
!
ligence (principally German). Mr. Page did hand.
ciphersonly and Mr. Twinn (13K) machine. ciphers
..
DD 4:{later HGG, Head of the Cryptographic Group):
Brigadier Tiltman, rormerly under de Grey, but because
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of his personal achievement promoted to a parallel
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position. Under him were AD CCR, Pror. Vincent, who
I
was head of the cryptanalytic library, and Major Morgants
r cryptanalytic research section. It was Morgants section
which broke into Gennan non-morse. Among other problems
it worked on sturgeon (another German non-morse encipher
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ment) and the German one-time pad.
1
The remainder of the organization was directly
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under de Grey. Each section was headed by a Deputy
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Director (DD) or Assistant Director (AD).
I
DD Military Wing (DD ].,'!W):: Colonel Jacob. M\11[ hand
led Italian Army, German Police, and German Field ciphers
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an,d ViaS interested in anything of' a military nature
intercepted in the Middle East and India. It had sub
8cctions for policy liaison with India, the Far East,
the HiUale East, and the United states. Sixta was
under the operational control of NWV.
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DD Air Section (DD AS): J. E. S. Cooper. AS
handled all Japanese, Ital ian, and Germfu"'1. air ciphers
i("
except German Air Force Enigma. The goneral meteorological
section, although largely independent, ,'las also in AS.
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AD (3): Jones, in charge of' Hut 3.
I
Hut 3 was an exclusively intelligence section. It
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I received processed Ultra material and traf'fic analysis
intelligence from other sections in the Park and further
intelligence from commands outside the Park. It passed
tactical inf'ormation dh"ect to military and air commands.
DD Naval Section (DD NS): Frank Birch. ,NS
handled all Latin, Japanese, and German naval ciphers
vdth the exception of German Naval Enigma. Most of '
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the tactical intelligence which Hut 3 performed
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for the Army and the RAP were done' for the Navy by the
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Aruniralty Intelligence Centre.
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NS vlill be described more fully in another chapter.
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AD Mechanical (AD Mch): Mr. VI. G. Welchman, who
I
had jurisdiction over those sections connected with
machine cryptanalysis:
The Tunney section, which performed the initial
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cryptanalysis on German
. (" Hut 6, which performed cryptanalysis on German
,
Air and Army Enigma.
r
Hut 8, which performed cryptanalysis on German
Naval Enigma.
The Bombe units. (Borrihes were the machines used
in breaking Enigma). These sections will be discussed
r
later in more detail.
The Tabulating Section, vlhich contained IBM
machinery available to all the Park.
DD (CT): Brigadier Elsdale. He directly control
led Foreign Office interception and coordinated d/f,
intercept, passing of raw material, and bona fide
communications. For a short time he also had juris
diction over FORDE.
DD Cipher Security of the AII:'es (DD CSA): Captain
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(S) Wilson, Chester:Lield street, Under him were two
sections, Security of Allied Ciphers-- (SAC), at
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Bletchley, headed by Commander (S) Dudley-Smith, and
r British cipher construction, at Oxford, headed by
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Lieut-Comdr. (S) Barrow.
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Inter-service aspect of
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,"
,1 Because Blatchley Park Vias a -joint organization,
,....
work vms done on an inter-service basis. Such an
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arrangement proved economical and efficient. The
proximi ty of' the three branches made consultation
among them easy. It also led to a rapid 'flow of intel
1igence within tl1.e ol"'anization and increased the
probability of the proper people seeing pertinent
r.
material in good time. Procurement of and

material was also expedited because of the absence of j' '
'\..':'.
competition. Duplications of all sorts v/ere eliminated.
Coordination at the Park was by no means perfect,
r
but it was extremely good. It was inmlensely helped by
.
the fact that in practice all offices were open,to
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everybody in the Park. Rare, indeed, was the section
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"restricted to assigned personnel." All sections had
access to the cipher They also had access
,....
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to the cryptanalytic research department; thereorc
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the most important problems 'were on by the best
men. lBU equipment was available to the section most
r in need of' it. The bombes 1 also1 were considered conunon
I
property, and weekly,meetings between Huts 3, 6, and 8,
Naval Section, and USN liaison determined how they were
to be used. Because Huts 6 and 8 were adjacent, f'leJC
. '.
ibility of cryptanalytic priority lists and coordin
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ation on the watch officer level were most practicable.
Weather codes were centralized in Air Section under
Dr. MacVittie, to whom all collateral information was
available. For example, there was close
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between Hut 8 and Dr. 'Mac Vittie since weather codes
r were often reciphered in naval Enigma. Eacp service
had its own network, but intercept facilities and re-
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search were closely coordinated. Communications f'ac
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ilities were pooled.

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liThe British Intelligence Service must be good,"
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one of deputies told an interrogator,
r "because we don't know anything about it." By its
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very nature" of course, the organizat:Lon is secret.
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TOP SEORET ULTRA
In addition, revelations of its nature and activities
are Bual"ded against by the Official Secrets Act and by
a public trained in security-consciousness.
The prisoner's statement is the more impressive
,because British ciphel' was inadequate at the
beginning of the war, and the Germans were breaking
high-level traffic. Even when the British suspected
comprom.ise, they were slow in remedying the Situation"
and not until the middle of 1943 did cipher security
improve. From then on the Germans had no real success
on the main British ciphers.
Ultra security, on the other hand, was extremely
good throughout. EVen when they were reading British
traffic, the Germans could find in it no evidence that
thsir ovm ciphers had been and they spoke
with confidence of the obviously unsuccessful British
attempts to decipher the primal"'Y German systems.
Secure dissemination was an important safeguard
of Ultra. In principle, communications intelligence
was sent out not by 'coml11and channels, but by special
Ultra channels. Just as GC&CS derived its intelli3cnce
TOP SECRET-ULTRA
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from its 0\"111 network of outstathms, so it distributed
much of it through its ovm network of representatives.
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Ultra was never sent below army level. On the staff of
an army commander only four men were "in the Ultra pic:
I
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ture
ll
-- the commanding general, his Chief of Staff, the
G-2, and a special Ultra intelligence officer. This
officer was serviced by a private liru:-- an SLU (Spec

I ial Liaison Unit) devoted exclusively to Ultra intelli
gence communications. Fleet had a similar
arraneement in the first half of the war, but it was
abandoned for rea.sons that are not kno'wn.
r
The security of British ciphers vias watched over
r
from four directions. At the Park the outstand1nr;
cryptanalT',sts, such as Alexander and Babbage, were
put to work from time to time on "live" British traffic.
At :Oxford there was a pl"inting and composition section
for the construction and testing of British ciphers.
There were also :two sections which had been established
particularly fol" cipher security. One was CSA, under
Capt. Wilson at Chesterfield street, which was concerned
.....
wi th cipher security in general. The other vias SAC,
under Comdr. Dudley-Smith at the Park, 'which \'Iorlced
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TOP SECRET ULTRA
with decodes. SAC was set up as a result of earlier
delay in recoGnizing compromise in Ultra.
The Parle, like the intellie;ence service as a vlhole 1
was born and nourished in secrecy. Like the Chief it
had covernamos to protect its true identity-- NID 12 A
(from its liaison with Admiralty), War Station, Station
X, and GCHQ (Goverrunent Communications Headquarters)
.
It was also loosely referred to as GC&CS. Within tho
Park thOl"lO was no logical system of des'ienp.tiono, ." .... :.
UHut 6,11 "Nevv1TIan
t
s Section," or "Testery" revealod
nothing of the section's activities. Organization
charts were hazy, and so it was difficult to understand
the relations of the sections. W01"e no directo
ries of Park personnel except those compiled by indivi
dual, sections for their ovm use
A civilirul formerly in Scotland Yardwas especially
chosen for the job' of supervising physical security at
tho Parle. This included the usual system of guards,
gates, und passes, although the arrangements were amaz
ingly simple, even casual, in operation. It is startling
to realize how' completely the char force was trusted.
Because of the shortage.of paper, waste paper was never
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burned. Instead it was saved for repulping, and collect
ine the scraps was a routine job of the char force. In
addition, the char force had access to all sections,
often without the material there having been secured.
Fox' example, they would sweep around the feet of peOple
,.
,
deciphering Enigma at the Type X machines.
,...
" (f' Security at the Park was demonstrably effective.
i \."
The Parl{ was never bombed; indeed, never once has a re-
r
ference to it been found in any o ~ the thousands of
r captured documents.
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,....,
Outside liaison
.
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Even from the small amount of information }mown,
it is obvious that GC&CS did not carry out its intelli
r
gence activities in isolation. Liaison was established
1.1

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with the United States in the spring of 1941. After
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American entrance in the war, this became closer and more
effective. Liaison boards were set up, liaison officers
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,
exchanged, and vaw material, cryptanalytic teclllliques, and
intelligence passed between the two countries.
,
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Responsibilities and duties were shared. It was
.
with United States assistance that Bletchley Park estub
,....
lished its Japanes.e section. Although the section grew,
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it remained always a subsidiary research and intelligence
unit assisting 20-G. This was a logical arrangement. Tho
success of cryptanalytic attack depended on the number
of messaGcs available. Because American interception
was supcrior and the exchange of all material impract
icuble, 20-G took on the greater responsibility. In the
German war, positions were reversed. Here the British
directed the cryptanalytic effort, and the United states
carried out assignments. In 194Q 20-G began helping with
Shark (Atlantic UIB keys). The next year it to.ok over
full responsibility. It also did the bombe work on
virtually every other naval cipher and on about 40?b of
Army-Air traffic.
Nor did Britain enter into liaison only with the
United States. The Dutch had a representative at Singapore,
the Far East Centre which moved to Kilindini. Quite possibly
liaison with the Dutch continues. There is no evidence that
Britain has done any cryptanalytic Vlork on ciphers of 'the
Royal Netherlands :NaVy although such traffic would presum-
ably be of the greatest interest
There were French representatives at B1etchley Park
through the fall of France (probably they worked in Hut 6),
and one at least stayed for some time aftero A qerman code
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book was acquired from the French and Russian intercepts
were received from them after VE-Day. It is also believed
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that the British entered into liaison, still maintained,
\'lith 0. French cryptanalytic unit.
During the sumlller of 1945 the British received
,...,
!
Russian intercepts from the Poles also, and just before
the outbreak of war they received from them considerable
help on German Naval Enigma. Nearly all early work on the
..
Enip;ma had been done by Polish cryptanaly.sts. The Poles
had also evolved an embl'Y'onic bombe. '1'he details of their
,...
achievements were handed over to the British before 1
'r September 1939.
In arlo17t 1943 the British made overtures to the
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Russians. At this time the crib situation in the German
home waters key VIas poor. The North Norvvegian circuits
provided good cribs; but accura!-e cipher text was nec
aasary to break Enigma and interception from the Bl"i tish
Isles was generally unsatisfactory. The Russians claimed
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that they intercepted all German and knew every
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thing about it; accordingly, Comdr. Allon Bacon went to
IJIuI'mansk to investigate the;:.'possib:tlities of exchanging
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traffic infol'mo.tion for raw matel"ial. Actually,'"
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I the Russians seemed to Imow little about German naval
connnunications. They also appeared disinterested in
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communications intelligence and agreed to the British
proposals vdthout enthusiasm. Soon afterwards the
was halted because of lack of Russian interest
and the delays in passing raw material.
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BRITISH ATTACK orr GEm/IAN ENIGMA
The successful attack on the German Enigma machine
probably did more than any other problem to change crypt
analytic methods. This was the first attack to use high-
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speed analytic machinery on a large scale. The idea of a
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mach:i.ne approach was nevI in cryptanalysis and in general
its validity was recognized
,
only gradually. This should
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be remol!lbered in examining the British Enigma efforts.
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The Bpi tish lrn:flw something about the German Enigma
machine befol"e September 1939. The Poles, who had Ylorlted on
it with some success, make all their information avail
able to:' the British before the outbreak of 'war. Al
though the Poles had broken German Naval Enigma traffic,
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by 1937 they had bogged down on a new indicator system.
Hence, what they v/ore able to pas s to the British was
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not a "going business
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Before examininl! the British progress.
with this material a few details on the Eniema machine
itself may be instructive.
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~ Eniema Mac;1ine
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A letter is enciphered by pressinB a key from a
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typevlri ter-lilce keyboard.. This completes an electrical
circuit causinG a bulb to li8ht up. There are twenty-six
bulbs labeled with the letters of the B.+phabet. The part
icular bulb (cipher text letter) a particular key (plain
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text lettel') causes to light depends upon the circuit;
that is",: the path the current takes through the cipher maze.
The principal part of: this lnaze are the wheels - discs with
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26 contacts on the right side wired, in random order, to
26 contacts on the left side - and a reflector which is
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a plate vii th 26 contacts wired together in pairs., Also
important is the "stecker". The stecker is a simple
substitution on the plain teJet, before entering the wheel
maze and the sallle substitution on the letter that CODles out
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of the wheel maze giving the cipher text. The stecker,
unlike the wheels, remains constant throughout the encipher
ment of a message - in fact it is accomplished, as the
name implies, by a 26-hole plugboard with wires ,to pair
r up the letters.
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A key is pressed. The current goes into the plug
board, goes to v/hatever the keyed letter j;,s',:paired:to,
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enters the rir:;ht hand side of the first wheel, and comes out
on the left mide. From here it enters the right side
of the second v/heel and comes out on the lef't. Similarily
it goes through the third and 1'ourth wheel (i1' there is
a fourth wheel). Then the current reaches the reflector
which, being v/ired in pairs, leads the current back into
the left side of the las't wheel at a different point
from where it entered the re1'lector. The current returns
through the wheels and reaches the plugboard where the
SUbstitution is applied which lights up the proper bulb
giving the cipher letter. Obviously, this gives recip
rocal encipherrnent since only one cir'cuit is set up
whether the direction is from cipher to plain or plain
to cipher. Also apparent is the fact that a letter
cannot encipher into itself since the current cannot
return from the reflector on the SMIe path it took to
reach there.
Preliminary work
When the Poles were working On the Enigma in early
1937, tl:.e Germans used a three-wheel machine with thl... ee
distinct wheels v/hich could be inserted into the
inc in six different ways. They used only g:i;x pairs of
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steckers; that is, fourteen letters wer,e unaffected by
the plugboard or uunsteckered
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The Polish method de
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pended upon findine; a crib where the cipher letter's and
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the crib letters are among the fourteen unsteckered
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Through knowledge of the indicator system the
Poles could read all messages on a ke,yonce the wheels
and steckel's were recovered. Later the Germans had eight
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wheels allowing 336 permutations of three wheels. They
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also left only six instead of fourteen letters unsteck
ered.
In 1939 Dr. Turing, a mathematician who had just
joined GC&CS, was given the Naval Enigma problem. With
the exception of a short period at the time of the Nor
wegian Invasion, when all GC&CS Enigma efi'orts were
,....
directed towards the Army and Air Enigma, Turing remain
: {
ed in charge until the situation was well under control.
,....
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By the end of 1939 he had solved the indicator system
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which had upset the Poles, but progress was slow there
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after. In fact it was August 1941, before the German
Naval Enigma was being regularly deciphel'ed.
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The events between January 1940 and August
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provide an important insight into the GC&CS organization.
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This time delay, lone though it was, was not entirely
due to the blundering of GC&CS officials or cryptanalysts.
The Army and Air Enigma proved more vulner8.ble than the
Naval largely because of a different indicating system,
hence greater effort whs expended in that direction.
There were, however, factors which should have shortened
this delay period: the Narv1k pinch ..."h1ch included two
days r keys in April 1940.; and the Lofoten pinch yielding
all the keys, except indicators, for February 1941. The
principal factor, however, was the lack of belief on the
part of' some GCecCS officers that the Enigma really could
be broken. This is worth examining more closely.
The bombe
mnong the data received from the Poles was the idea
of' the tlbombe
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The bombe is the cover name given to the
high speed analytic machine used in solving the Enigma.
Though complex electronically, the approach of' the bombe
is far from subt'le. Given a crib and the
cipher text, the bombe tests electrically all positions
of the wheels. to find the place where the cipher text
deciphers into the crib. 'The first British bombe was
completed in April 1940 but it made no allowance for the
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steckers, now increased to ten pairs. An attachment to
the bombe Imoll'm as the diagonal board was designed to
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allow for the steckexing. This arrived in August 1940.
By December 1940 the British had two bombes - not enough
.
for the Air Enigma alone. Why the British did not build
more bombes sooner is interesting.
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Conunander Denniston, head of GC&CS since 1921, oppos
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ed the building of the bombe. He did not believe that
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Enigma could be broken by bombes - in fact the pl"evaillng
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opinion in Germany as well as England in the fall of
1939, despite the Polish experience, was that the Enigma
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I was Strangely enough this defeatist attitude
..- prevailed in certain quarters long after a few days' keys
had boen recovered experimentally. A bombe is expensive
and it 'was not certain that it would v/ork. Even after the
first bombe was built and had proved itself, there were
still intense battles before the idea of laJ... ge scale
production was accepted. Connnander Travis, then heqd of
Hut 3, led the fight for bombes and more bombes. It was
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this farsightedness of Travis that led him to the top
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in GC&':CS while Denniston continuaLLY .lost groui'ld. Hence,
tho credit for the bombe goes not only to those 1.',ho de
veloped'it - principo.lly Turing, Welchman, and Keen - but
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also to Travis, who eained top-level support for the whole
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program.
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This illustrates an important point: vlithout top
support good cryptanalysts and engineers are vir
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tually helpless. It shoVls also that defeatism is a
dangerous deterrent to cryptanalysis. No cipher should
be assumed unbreakable and "proofs" of invulnerability
should be .viewed with suspicion.
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Enigma organization
It is instructive to examine the organization set
. up for recovering daily keys once tile fundamental methods
were evolved. Instead of dividing the problem according
to service, a s13parate section was set up apart from
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Naval Section, Military Wing and Air Section. This divided
the problem three ways: Hut 8 for Naval, Hut 6 for Army
and Air and the Bombe section for common bombe operation.
,
I Hut 8
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Hut 8 developed into a small section, dependent for
many services on Naval Section. This was largely because
of the personalities involved. From its inception, Hut 8
was run by cryptanalysts. Turing, Alexander, and Mahon,
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successive heads, wanted no part of anything non-crypt
analytic. Mr. Birch, the head of Naval Section, was intense
ly interested in the Eni@na problem. (He had fought
Ir alongside Travis .for the bombes.) Naval Section was
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therefore eager to assume all aspects of the Enigma problem
that it could. Hut 8 retained its independence,but
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willingly transferred what it considered non-cryptana-
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lytic problems to N.S.
Hut 8 passed all it;s requests f01' coverage to N.S.
(which had direct telephone connection with Scarborough
and Flowerdovn1, principal intercept stations for Naval
Enigma) or via N.S. to D.S.D. 9, at Admiralty, which
controibled Naval interception. In general, it was N.S.
which investigated possibilities for interception in
Italy, Alexandria, Murmansk, etc. If coverage was poor,
it was N.S. which suffered since it received Hut a's
entire pI'oduc tion of decodes. Teletype delays from the
intercept stations were not Hut a's concern: it simply
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repol"ted its problems to N.S.
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Hut a necessal"ily read the traffic for cribs, but
N. S. compiled the daily summary of crypta:p:a:lyt.ic intelli
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gence gleantid from decodes. N.S. also kept track of call
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signs and frequencies and did traffic analysis. In
addition, it handled the German Naval hand ciphers which
produced cribs for Hut 8. With all this; Hut 8 remained
independent to the end - and happily so.
There is no doubt that Hut 8 and N.S. were an excell
ent team. Virtually all the 1500 odd messages inter-
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cepted each day were read. When the Allies were estab
lishinG the Second Front, GC&CS set up a small intercept
station .at 13P. At this time an all time record was set
an Enigma message, deciphered and translated,
Vias on the teletype to Admiralty 12 minutes after the orig
inal transmission by the Germans.
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As the.ffic increased throughout the war, so did the
numbex' of keys to be recovered. There was also a rise
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in the efficiency of Hut 8 and OP-20-a., which shared the
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load fr'om the middle of 1943.
United states aid should be considered carefully in
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analysing the British attack on Enigma., While the British
did virtually all the cryptanalysis, precisely how much
they could have accomplished in later years without
United states resources in manpower and equipment is an
open question. When fully wlder -C'lay OP_20-Gf s 115 high
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.
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spood bombes did almont half the total Army-Navy-Air
bombe Vlorle o.lthough 0.11 cribbing and decryption continuad
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to be controlled by GC&CS. In the middle of 1944, however,
OP-20-G took over responsibility for the Atlantic U!B'
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key, a most important Navo.l key. The U.S. Army manned an
intercept station in England, operated a bay of about
6 British bombes, and supplied some working personnel for
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Hut 6.
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The internal organization of Hut 8 also showed evidence
of the character of its rulers. All work that could be
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done by non-cryptanalysts was separated fl"om that work
r which required someone who understooo. the overall Enigma
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picture. For the last year ,there were only four people in
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the section who could udo everything
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, and they had to cover
24 hours a day 7 days a week. The other 90 members did
the administration and the routine clerical work. Mahon,
head of the section at this time and one of the four, es
. timated that he spent all average of 10 minutes a day on
personnel administro.tion although he worked 10 to 12 hours
a day 7 days a week. The whole section was civilian and
the f'our cryptanalysts were all under 25 years even by
the end of the war.
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In the earlier days when there wer'e as many as 12
cryptanalysts in Hut 8". the division of labor was the
same but much more time was spent on research. Dr.
Turing went eventually to the government laboratory at ,
IIanslope and did some work on speech scrambling. Mr.
Alexander went to the Japanese Naval problmr.. Mr. TV/inn
left to become head of the German agent machine crypt-
analytic section. The others 'l'Jturi:; to the Fish problem.
Hut 6
Hut 6 was organized quite differently. It tended
to do everything on the Arm-yiAir Enigma. It controlled
coverage, and, for a while, did traffic analysis. This
grew to be such a large independant source of intelli
gence that it separated'completely. Hut 6 kept track
of all the call signs, frequencies, etc. which it used.
As a l"esult it was much more thoroughly ol'ganized and
had more skilled personnel than Hut 8. There Vlere also
more high grade personnel in administrative or semi-
administrative jobs than in Hut 8.
The Hut 6 problem was more complex than that of
Hut 8 for a variety of reasons. There were roughly 100
Army and Air keys compared to the '8 or 10 Naval keys.
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The spheres of operation fluctuated more in the Al;my,iAir
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world. The German Army and Air Force used enciphered I
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call signs and varying frequencies which made their
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radio communications more difficult to follow.
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There was also the problem of Dora. The bombe as
previously described is effective only when the wiring
of the whoels and the reflector are Imown. The German
Air Force introduced a pluggable reflector" knovm as
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the Umlcehrwalze Dora. By changing the plugging the
Germans could defeat the bOlllbe. The German Army also
used Dora but the Navy did not. The Germans did not use
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Dora'Vv;i,sely, introducing it piecemeal, and thereby
-
nullifying almost completely its security value. J.,1Iachines
- Duem1a, the Auto-scritcher and Giant - were all built
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to copo vli th Dora and all recovered at least one wiring.
1 \.,
Duenna and the Auto-scritcher Vlere enginaered by the
United States and were unquestionably better than the
Giant, which was simply an improvisation. Given the
supplies and facilities which were not available in
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Breat Dritain, it is again a question as to whether the
British could have produced as, good a machine as Duenna.
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(This would be a matter of engineering since it was Mr.
Alexander viho did nost of' the cryptanalytic groundwork
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for Duenna).
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The Bombe Section ..
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The bombe section was run by S/Ldr. JoneD, RAF, v/ho
supervised the operatIon and maintenance of the bombes.
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The bombes themselves vlere in five separate geographical
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locations: Eastcote, stanmore, Steeple Claydon,
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..;. and Hut 110. at Bletchley Park. CODmlUnication' between
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BP and the bombe stations was by teletype and telephone.
The bombes were spread out to avoid overtaxing Bletchley's
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facilities and to minimize danger from the air raids.
,....
Since all stations were within 25 miles of BP there appear
!
cd to be little lost by lack of centralization.
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The bombes were operated by Wrens (some 2000 at the
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peak) and maintenanced by nAF personnel. Altoc;et,hel",
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at the ond of the war there were about 140 bombes in
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England of which 40 could run four-wheeled Naval jobs.
They were built at the Hollerith factory at Letchworth
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although some of the engineer:::6.e was done by Ppst Office
engineers.
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The borabes were considered the common property of
Hut 6 and Hut 8" :'o"lhioh with N.S. and Hut 3 (and later the
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USN Liaison Officer) determined the priorities of usage.
The priopities were flexible and could be altered at any
time by the watch off'icers of Hut 6 and Hut 8. Although
Commander Travis VIas the day-by-day arlJ,iter of bombe policy
in the thrine; the las t t\vo: years few decifiions
needed to be referred to higher authorities.
These three Enignla sections were, by 1944, organized
under AD(MCH). Mr. Welcbman, former head of 'Hut 6, was
the first to hold tha.t title. Mr. Wallace relieved Welch
man after VE-Day when Welchman left GC&CS. Twinn succeeded
Wallace in the :raIl of 1945.
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THE BRITISH AT'I'ACK ON PISH
The most modern and sophisticated communications
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intelligence problem attacked with any degree of success
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during the past war unquestionably was UFishtt. IIFish"
is the Br:Ltish covel" name for German radioteletype and the
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automatic cipher devices which ax"e attached. The problem
separates into two parts: the general problem of non
morse interception and the specific problem of analysing
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the cipher attachment used by the Germans.
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Interceptiop
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From the interception point of view the British did
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a good job. They were able to deliver to the cr;yptanalyst
r reasonably accurate intercepts of all the major German
circuits in a workable length of time. This does not
mean that the Bri tis11 solved the non-mOI'se intercept
pl'oblem completely, but that they solved it sufficient
ly to eet important operational results. Their
approach was necessarily one of short expediency
rather than of long term research. Vihile it is not the
purpose of this report to go into technical detail, a
few relllar'ks on the methods used are enli8htening.
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Hon-morse research and interception was done at
F.O.H.D.E. (the F. o. Research and Development Engineering
establishment at Knockholt, a suburb south of London).
This establishment was directly controlled by GC&CS. Mr.
Kenworthy was in charge at Knockholt, and the principal
engineer was Mr. Mason. At the peak during the war there
wel"e about 600 employed there, including personnel at
the small school for non-morse intercept operators.
To intercept one transmission three separate types
of apparatus are used, i.e., each transmission is recorded
three times: by machine, perforated tape, and undulator
tape. If the signal is sufficiently strong throughout
a transmission the perforated tape and the undulatol" tape
are unnecessary. Unfortunately this is not always the
case. In general the three results must be carefully
checlced and collated. A character mistaken for another
character is not a serious error, but a character in
advertently omitted or added is enough to make the message
completely unbreakable (unless very near the end of' the
message). It should be remembered that the heading,
including the group count, and all spacing are enciphered.
Besides involving a large number of personnel tIlis checking
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takes time - the higher priority intercepts reached
Bletchley Park in 12 to 14 hours.
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In all likelihood the procedure could have been
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speeded up und made more efficient by :tmp!ro'ving commu
nications between Knockholt and the Park and by improving.
morale and with it, operator efficiency. (It is interesting
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to note that an attempt was made to raise the 10Vi morale
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at Knockholt by telling the operators that all lntercepte
were being read). These factors, however, should not
obscure the overall achievement the British in success
ful non-morse interception.
Cryptanalysis
As in intcrception the British cryptanalytic success
was a remarkable achievement but left much to be desired.
12% of all Fish intercepted (1500 daily) was de
ciphered. intelligence value per message was high,
i.e., a random selection of 100 Fish decodes invariably
produced more first-rate, intelligence than a similar
seloction of Enigma decodes.
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The break into Rish was pure analysis. That is,
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there were no captured keys and the type of machine Vias
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not knovn1. It was originally broken by Major Morgan's
research section and later transferred to two sections
NevlJnan t sand M::tjor Tester 's. Major Morgan's section
continued interest in the general Fish problem, working
largely on a different cipher attacl1ment to the radlo
teletype which remained unbroken.
It is difficult to understand why the cryptanalysis
of 1"i8h was divided between two totally different sections'il'
M'r. Hevmmn's under AD(Mch) and Major Tester's under DD
(r,wi). The division of labor was purely technical, and
it seemed.to To understand it one must go dieper
into. the method of attack.
The method of Fish transmission shmUd. be .. con.sidered
first. Pressing a key on a typeVlri tel" keyboal"d produces
a pattern of five pulses and not'-pulses (representing
a pulse by and a not-pUlse by -, a = ';H}---, b I:
otc.). The first of the five elements is acted upon by
the cipher' device resulting in a or a -. The second,
third, fourth and fifth are also acted upon independently.
T!le resultinG pattern of five elements is the cipher letter
which is transmitted. Hence the operator types plain
lanc;uaee, and plain language comes out oh tho

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teletype - the ciphering and transmission beins completely
automatic. The cipher device consists of five chi wheels,
fi ve psi \vheels and two mu wheels. The first element is
acted upon by the chi-one wheel and then the psi-one
wheel. The other elements are enciphered similarly. The
chi \"Ihoels step after each letter while the psi wheels
step irrer;ularly, influenced the mu wheels which have
no other function (they step regularly).
Newman's section recovered the chi wheels and IIde
chied
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the cipher text (stripped off the effect of the chi's).
It then turned the result over to Tester whose section
recovered the psi wheels and produced the plain texc.
To/Ir. Newman r s section worked largely with machines, while
Tester's people worked principally by hand. The make
up of the tVlO sections was quite different.
There were 22 mathematician-cryptanalysts in NeV{ll1an' s
section- the largest nunmer of cryptanalysts employed
by GCt:CS on one problem. All were civilians.. There were
in addition to the cryptanalysts approximately 200 Wrens
whose principal task was to operate the Colossus machines o
The Colossus was a very large, high speed analytical
machine engineered and maintenanced by Post Office personnel;';.
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There Vlere tVfelve Colossi at the peak on V-E Day.
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The attack was statistical. Due to the nature of the
equipment there were no indicators which were ., usable ..
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Hence even after the wheels were recovered (from July
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1944 the wheel patterns 'It'lere changed daily), each message
had to be lIset
lt
individually. Furthermore, short messages
very often could not be set since the statistical bulge
was not large enough. Likewise, very long messages were
required for wheel recovery. This explains the low percent
'age of messages actually deciphered. (Once the chi wheels
were set, plain text was a certainty.)
Major Tester's section was much smaller - about twelve
high grade people and about the same number of; assistants.
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All were Army personnel. They also used statistical methods
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but did some crib work as well. The decodes were passed
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from here to lIut 3.
There Vias close liaison between Hut 3, Tester, and
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Nevnnan. Daily meetings were held to determine priorities
for intel"ception and decryption. Also attending these :..
meetings was a representative from SixTA which was concerned
C'
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with German Army and Air Traffic Analysis. Its, main effort
- 5.7.
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was on morse but it also had a subsection for non-morse.
It should be made clear in unequivocal terms that the
Fish p1"'oblcm was a very expensive undertaking. The
interception gear and the cryptanalytic machinery Vlere
very costly to develop and produce. Once produced,
this equipment required a large munber of trained oper
utors and technically educated supervisors. 'Whether the
British Government can support a similar peacetime project
is, of course, open to speculation. Indeed, there are
some indications that neither the manpower nor the money
will be available, although powerful means to acquire both
exist if the situation becomes critical.
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NAVAr.J SECTION
Introduction
As miGht be expected, the history of Naval Section
is directly related to the times-- peace, war, and post
war. Vifhen the communications intelligence organizations
were TIlorged, tho service branches retained identities
and their work continued unehanged wi thin the new fl"'arne
worle. Thus naval comm.unications intelligence activities
were transferred bodily to Naval Section from Admiralty.
During tho war, however, Naval Section no longer had
automatic cognizance of everything naval. Hut 8, for
example, did all cryptanalysis on Naval Enigma.
Finally, at the end of the war, Naval Section (like Air
Section and Military Wing) and its activi
i tes were distl"'ibuted among variou.s sections of the neVi
organization at Eastcote.
staff
Mr. W. F. Clarke was head of Naval Section between
wars, but all through 1940 he became increasingly un
popular at Admiralty and the Parle. His Italian Sec'cion
Vias given to Mr. Wilfrid Bodsworth, early in 1941 and
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soon afterwards the entire Naval Section was taken .from
him and put under Mr. F. L.' Birch. 1.u". Clarke, who had
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been with. GC&CS for thirty years, was made section
coordinator. There were also coordinators for crypt-
analysis and intelligence. Mr. P. B. Hunt was Crypt
ographic Staff Officer, and Mr. F. H. Hinsley, Intelli
,..... gence Staff 01'ficer. The role of CSO was minor, but;
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under Mr. ISO became extremely importal1.t. r.T.
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G. E. P. Jackson was deputy head of 'lIaval Section.
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Administration
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Naval Section servicing vms done by HS IX (Which
in 1945 beclline NS VII). It was responsible for Naval
,.....
Section intake and 9utput, administration, and equipment.
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Under 1'f3 IX werebhe Naval Section Secretariat, the
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\, Naval Section Signals Office: (\,{hich typed and distrib
uted British messages), and NID 12../\, the liaison office
at Admiralty.
r German cryptanalysis
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In April 1940 Naval Section learned throur;h merchant
shipping ciphers of the Germa:Q, plan to invade Norway.
The information coone too late for success.ful counter
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meastll'es, but it didhelp demonstrate to Admiralty the
value of Ultra intelligence. The British continued
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r'eading merchant shipping hand ciphers tlll"ough 1941,
when cryptanalytic changes forced them out almost entirely.
By the end of 1942 they had abandoned all efforts on
non-naval merchantohip systems. Any intelligence these
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might have contained was no longer necessary, fop Enigma
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vms belng read currently and consistently.
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German Naval 'hand ciphers furnished scant intelligence
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and from the middle. of 1943 were of little value even for
cribbing Enigma. Nevertheless, they were Vlorked until
a fev'! months before VE-Day because of' the possibility
that they might prove useful, The British were consider
ably aided in theh" attack on Naval hand ciphers by poor
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German cipher administration and by frequent pinches.
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All cryptanalysis of European Naval ciphers was done
originally by one section, u.s I. In 1943 the section
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split into German, neutral, and Italian, with NS I G",
working on the German.
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cryptanalysis
Before 1942, all Japanese cryptanalysis except
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research was done. by the Far East processing centre at
Singapore. A small independent section for Japanese
cryptanalysis Vias then organized at B1etch1ey Park
under Mr. Foss. Finally" Japanese ciphers Vlere divided
accordinG to service and assigned to Military Wing, Air
Section, or Naval Section. In 1943 all work on Japanese
naval ciphers was concentrated in one section(NS I J),
but the next year it was divided in half. NS I J. worked
machine ciphers and did resel}.rch on unsolved systems,
while NS II J' took on current traffic. NS II J \'IUS
responsible for decoding and translatine and for mainten
ance of codes and ciphers (including recovery of additives
and solut;ion of keys). It also did bookbuildine and other
work on partially solved systems, a task half cr'yptanalysis
and half intelligence. Furthermore, it trained
for :mJIS Anderson, Colombo.
By December, 1944 the work was expanded still more
and a third seytion added. NS I J was given and
Japanese naval codes and ciphers in addition to
the machine cipher's. It continued with research on un
solved naval systems except for IN-25 and IN-ll. Additive
vlOrk on these became the sole responsibility of HS II J.
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All linguistic work VIas transferred to 1:1S III J. This
section did bookbuilding of' all codes and emenc1ation:.. and
translation of' all decodes. It also took care oX the re
ceipt, standardization, and d:tspatch of all translations.
Tho Japanese language school beca.."no part of tho section,
and tho head of NS III J was eenerally responsible for
the traininl3 and alloeation of translators, .for their wOl"'k,
r-- ,
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and for interpreting the needs o.f intellieence subsections
to the cryptanalysts. NS III J also did cryptanalysis o.f
plain and minor reciphored codes.
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Italian and neutral cryptanal'lsis
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At the same time that NS I G split o.ff from the parent
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body separate sections were formed .for Italian and .for
neutral cryptanalysis. NS I N worlced on French manual,
I' . Spanish Enigma, and Portuguese codes and cipher's until
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late in 1944. NS I I worked on a variety of' Italian systems
until the surrender of Italy. After that a small group
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remained under the title of' NS II I to monitor Italian
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traffic. Tiiost of' the other personnel transfcl"'red to
Japanese.
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Emending, tral'!,s.lating, etc.
Because the British put emphasis on intelligence
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obta:tned from the original language, emending was a
neccssary prior step to translation. It consisted of
rcv(ritine.; the message as it must have been drafted orig
inally; for example, by de garbling groups and converting
spelled out figures to Arabic numerals. Emendation and
of Japanese were done by NS II J in the
summer and fall of 1944 and ai'ter that by NS III J.
Emendation and translation of European lanGuages
were done in 1'1S II, an outstandingly good section and
the most famous in Naval Section. It had two suo
divisions, the D watch which handled minor Germm1 codes
and back traffic and the operational Zed watch 'which
handled current traffic. Because over a thousand messgges
'were received each day, the Zed watch established prior
i ties and decided exactly vlhat messages Admiralty should
see. These two responsibilities gave it power and
importtllce.
J'rs II also translated plain language signals sent
in European languages and controlled Naval Section
tcletypeWl?iters, their staff, and their outbound traffic.
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I Current intelligence
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In 1943 one section (NS III) had complete respon-
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sibility for CUI'l'ent naval intellie;ence. Because it
received and studied all naval operational intelligence,
it was in c01mnunication with all naval stations. (and
some RAF as well), with the other service sections,
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and throuch them vii th the service ministries. It also
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studied the state of enemy intelligence and consequently
was interested in matters concerning radio and cipher
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security. It passed current intelligence to Mediterranean
commands direct and to other areas via the Intelligence
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Centre, Ailiniralty.
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In 1944 the servicing of Mediterranean conrrnands was
transferred to NS III 1'1, oDicinally a Naval Advisory
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( Party created for liaison with the other services.
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The revised NS III N (also lmovm as Hut 3 N) v/orked with
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military and air advisers under tho operational control
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of AD(3). In March 1945 the section combined with HS X
(German Air Force reconnaissance anq. sea offensive from
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Gibral tar to Archangel) which wOl'ked under the operational
r control of' DD(AS). The two sections together formed
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Naval Section Liaison.
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By June of' 1944 J:TS III had dissolved and the res
ponsibility f'or current intelligence was given to two
sections-- general Far Eastern intelligence being handled
by NS III J (later NS IV J) and general European. intelli
gence by NS IV. The Far Eastern section was' interested
in intelligence on Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval
units and merchant ve3sels, coded positions,
and coastal def'ense. The section f'or European intelli
gence was formed f'rom 1-IS IV, orginally a plotting section
concerned especially with the U/B war, and NS VII, 'which
had done research on naval units. The newly organized
section corresponded in its functions to the Far Eastern
Section. It was interested expecially in German, Gennan
contro-Lled, .Portuguese, and Spanish naval u11i ts, neutral
merchantmen, arid Japanese submarines, and it passed intelli
gence to Admiralty and had custody of' charts and Admiralj;'y.
pilots.
,
By December 1944 current European and Far Eastern
intel.ligence '1."lere again unified as }ITS IV absorbed IrS
IV J. The new combined section was interested in enemy
and surface craft and submarines,
coastal defenses, hydrography, and Allied plot. (For
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! a few months plotting had been done independently, first
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by NS III P, then by NS IV P.) NS IV passed intelligence
to Admiralty, home commands, and the Ministry of Ecomonic
Warfare, and to Colombo, Washington, Pearl Harbor, and
Melbourne.
Research intelligence
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done ad hoc by personnel borrowed from the appropriate
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section. There 'were, however, two permanent research
~ r o u p s - - NS XI "(which merged with NS V) and NS VI.
NS XI studied enemy communications intelligence
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organizations vii th the purpose of learning as much about
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them as the enemy !mew himself 'and of farseeing any
changes. Specifically, its functions were studying the
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enemy![; naval code and cipher administration and policy,
providing cryptan,alysts with material relevant to their
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work, hunting cribs, and Hatching over' the security 01'
Allied ciphers. In the sunllner of 1944 the section. fused
tlith a minor group that had worked on traffic analysis
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and toolc on its title, NS V. Its further responsibilities
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after the fusion were traffic analysis, coordination of
intercept through DSD9, and non-cryptanalytic investigation
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of unrrorked enemy codes and ciphers.
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lIS VI was set up orif,inally to accomodate captured
documents and was thon expanded to interpret technical
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problems that arose in connection with Ultra. A flexible
orGanization, it acquired still further duties, but its
funda:mental responsibilities stayed the same-- complete
,.-.
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and absolute control of documents c.aptured by the Navy, I
together with research on enemy vveapons and equipment
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to provide intellir:nnce of immediate operational value to
translators and of ultimate research value to the depart
!
ment of torpedoes and mines, Admiralty.
I
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By mid 1941, when the first major hauls of captuI'ed
material took place, GC&CS was well aware of the import
ance of enemy. documents for linguistic I'eference. This
(
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had been concrete;Ly demonstrated in the spring
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of that year by the first of the rIS VI dictionaries. Based
on data from captured German documents, this dictionary
r gave English equivalents for the jargon which accompanies
any technical advance.
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The charter of NS VI gave it five responsibilities.
It provided expansions of abbreviations and standard
English equivalents for all the languages handled by Naval
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Section. It was in complete char-Be of all enemy books
and documents and of information about them; and it
translated material as necessary. It reviewed current
traffic for the indexing of difficult or useful items.
It bl'ouzht together information from deciphered messages,
books, and documents; interpreted the information; and
studied it for technical data on enemy stores and equip
ment and for tactical and strategic implications.
of the work done was European, Of the 16,000 documents
held- in April 1945, only 5% were Japanese.
It is interesting to note that the of
documents furnished NS V'I were captured 1?y a special
force, 30 Assault Unit. This was a commando, hit and
run organization set up at the time of the invasion of
NOI'th. Afl'ica to make raids o'n naval shore establishments.
It was composed of Royal Marines and headed by an im
aginative and adventurous reserve officer. The Vlork
of these men was extraordinarily successful.
Records
NS VIII had charge of traffic control, the library,
and muster index files. The library contained Japanese
decodes abandoned systems, all translations of
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enemy signals, all Naval Section signals and publications,
and all books, reports, memoranda, and British signals
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that had passed through or been retained by Naval Sec-
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tion. This material and most of the German decodes
were indexed for easy reference.
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At the end of the war GC&CS was no longer considered
operational, and plans were laid for its reorganization
as a post-war Sigint Centre. It was decided that the
bits and pieces of GC&CS-- the Park and the London sec
tions- should move to Eastcote, (a wartime bombe station
! /
about twenty miles northeast of the centr'e of London)
between November 1945 and March 1946.
The proposed peacetime complement of the Sigint
Centre is 1,017 exclusive of personnel attached from
the service ministries and ndomestic
ll
staff. The total
is to be made up of the following groups:
';l-Cryptanalytic (including tabulating and machine
sections) 475
Intelligence 83
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Traffic analysis and task control 180
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Technical (including comnunications, etc.) 93
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Cipher security 150
Administration 36
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1',017
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It is the intention that the bulk of this staff should
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become established civil servants; there are to be no
r- service people on the permanent staff. As far as possible,
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-::-Of'fic ially known as the Cryptographic Qroup. The
British use cryptography fqr the American term
cl"'yptanalysis.
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only those people on the old staff who are eligible for
postwar employment will be transferred. All personnel
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have been instructed to call them.selves temporary em
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ployecs 01' the Foreign Office and to refer to the Sigint
Centro, if that is necessary, as the Government Connnu
r nications Headquarters.
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According to the nominations of the Sigint Board,
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Sir Edward Travis remains Director and, pending definite
I
arrangements, Mr. Nigel de Grey, Deputy Director. NI...r.
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H. 1:1. D. Fletcher is Administrative Officer, responsible
for all questions of administration, staff, and physical
security. Miss M. V. Moore continues as Senior Personnel
Officer.
For efficiency the 'work will be divided into five
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groups vii th the following personnel assigned:
~ ..- ',.
Head of the Cipher Security Group is Mr. D. A. Wilson.
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Head of tho Cryptanalytic Group is Mr. John Tiltman.
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He will be responsible for the work of all cryptanalytic
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sections and for IBM and cryptanalytic machine sections.
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FIe \'Iill collaborate on ques tions of cipher security with
the Head of the Cipher Security Group. Tiltman's deputy
is Mr. J. E. S. Cooper, who formed the Latin cryptanalytic
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section. The Eastern Eul">opean Division under Mr. F. A.
Jacob is also responsible to Tiltman. This is in two
parts-- a Balkan Section under Mr-. F. S. Thompson and
a Hussian cryptanalytic section under Mr. R. C. Pritchard
vlith a l"esearch party under lVIr. D. W. Grant. Mr. Jacoh
will hold meetings yli th the Heads of the three Russian
sections (cryptanalysis, intelligence, and trnffic analysis)
('
as necessary for coordination.
r Acting Head of the Intelligence Group is Hr. Bigel
de Grey. He will have charge of all intelligence and
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I be responsible for dissemination and security of COTIunu
nications intelligence as former'ly carried out by Central
Signals RegistryJ the Cipher' Office, and the sellior Special
Liaison Unit officer. Deputy Head of Intelligence is r,w.
G. E. P. Jackson.
/
Head of the Technical Group is VIr. Daubney, who will
take over responsibility for the following:
1. Sigint Centra connllunications.
r 2. Liaison with the ministries, the Government Post
Office, and other outside depal"tments on matters
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related to the communications, interception, and
dlf resources provided by them for the Sigint Centre.
3. Coordination of all non-morse activities and
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direction of Ifuockholt and FOHDE.
4. Direction of the Foreign dffice d/f and intercept
stations.
5. Coordination of all noise investigation under
taken by authorities outside the Sigint Centre.
6. Technical development and research in connection
with intercept and d/f
Head of: thc Traf:fic and Task Control Group
is Mr. J. O. Blair-Cunynghame who will assume responsibil
ity f:or all analysis activities, task control,
and general search. Mr. C. H. B. Wills, under Blair-
Gunynehame, vlill be directly responsible for traffic
analysis.
Into these various groups the components of the
service sections vlill be distributed according to function
and .,(jeography. After the complete reorganization, the
titles DD (AS), DD (NS), and DD (MW) will no longer
1>/r. F. L. Birch, formerly DD (NS), is going to take
over the Historical Section. This is the section prepar
ine a record of the Park's achievements in the war. Its
meetings will be held at Queen's Gate.
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Director's orders u r g e ~ . close contact at all levels
between the five groups and clooe and friendly l'01at10n8
lJetwoen the sections. The p;roups are to provide a flexible
frame work 'i'lithin which the sections i'rDm dif:ferent groups
Vi-ill combine to meet special probleY;1s.. Whenever neces sary
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membcl"s of one
other Groups.
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group will be attached to other sections in
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ADDITIONAL SOURCES
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Below is a list of sources which contain detailed
information on cel"tain of the topics treated in this
report. They may be found in the designated library.
Captured Documents: The Exploitation of Captured
Documents at GC&CS
Lieut. John P. CoOIidge, USrffi
Enigma: The History of Hut 8
A. P. Mahon
Pish: Bri Cryptanalytic Attaclr

Lt. Comdr. Howard Campaigne, USNR
Liaison: OP-20-G Liaison at GC&CS,
yg.rl - 1945
Lt. Comdr:-J. T. Pendergrass, USNR
Haval Section: Series of British outlines of
l{aval sectfo'n organization
Personnel: Card File
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ANDERSON:
CAEPAIGNE:
CARPENTER:
CLIPE'ORD:
COOLIDGE:
CUIU1IER:
BACT-IDS:
ELY:
EIWSTR01\1 :
GASClm::
HALL:
IIlJHTIHGTON:
JONES:
LlJ,DOUCEUH:
MACMAnOIl:

NlTELSEN:
PENDERGRASS:
TOP SECRET UUEHA
OP-20-G REPRESENTATIVES AT GC&CS
early 1944
July 1944 - August 1945
July 1945
May 1943 - January 1944
September 1944 - August 1945
May 1941
July 1942 - Novenilier 1942;
February 1943 - June 1943;
December 1943 - September 1945
July 1942 - August 1942;
September 1944
fall of 1943
December 1943
January 1944
October 1945
fall of 1943
- December 1944
September 1945
June 194'-1
March 1946
June 1943 - December 1945
July 1945 - Uarch 1946
sununer of 1943
December 1944
July 1945
October 1944 - August 1945
February 1946
December 1944 - August 1945
- 2

REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAl ARCHIVES
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PHILLIPS: September 1944
-
August
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I
VAnCE: May 1945
-
March 1946
WEEKS: May 1941
,-
YffiNGEH: summer of 1943
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REPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAl. ARCHIVES
PERSONALITIES
(The following list includes none of the tem
porary 'Har'time personnel, such as Hinsley and Alexander.
It is made up entirely of people who probably will be
outstanding in the new communications intelligence
organization. )
BIRCH, FR1UTCIS LYALL
Head of Historical Section.
Formerly Head of Naval Section. Pricil" to that
Head of German and Italian naval cryptanalytic
sections.
BLAIH-CUHYUGHMiIE, J. O.
Head of Traffic Analysis and Task Control Group.
BODSrJORTH, WILFRID
Staff Liaison Officer with OP-20-G on matters
concerning cryptanalysis.
Formerly head of Japanese Naval and l!.."'uropean Naval
cl"yptanalytic sections. In 1944 the third rankine;
l11cnber of Naval Section.
BONSALL, A. W.
Head of Russian Intelligence Section.
Formerly in Air Section.
COOPEH, J. E. S.
Deputy Head of Cryptanalytic Group; Head of' Latin
Section.
Formerly Deputy Director (Air Section).
DAUBNEY, F. C.
Head of Technical Group.
Formerly Group-Captain in Air Ministry.
DE GREY, IHG I : ~ L
Tentativoly, Deputy Director of Sigint Centre and
Head of Intelligeri.ce Group.
Formerly executive officer of' Bletchley Park.
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TOP SECTIET ULTHA
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Prem..unably continues as Head of Security of Allied
Ciphers.
Formerly Head of Connnunications Section, Bletchley
Puplc. Prior to that member of Hut 6.
..-
EARNSHAW-SMITH
Presumably continues as Head of Diplomatic Section.
EVj\.NS, GEOFFHEY ,
To be chief cryptanulyst of a Canadian unit.
Formerly hE?ad of cryptanalytic section for German
police ciphers, Military Wing.
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H. M. D.
Administrative Officer of Sigint Centre.
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Formerly in Hut 6.
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FOSS, IDJGH R.
r Formerly teclmical heqd of Japanese Naval crypt
I
analytic section. Prior to that, technical liaison'
Vii th OP-20-G.
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FREEBORN
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IBM expert; formerly head of Tabulating Machine
Section.
HASTINGS, EDWARD G.
On Chief's staff.
Formerly Park liaison wi t;h agents and foreign
countries. In :March 1945 became head of Aldford
House, Bepkeley street, and Queen's Gate.
HOPE
Presumably continues as Head of Commercial Section.
JACKSm{, G. EDGAR P.
Deputy Head of Intelligence Group.
Formerly Deputy Head of Naval Section.
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JACKSON, R. R.
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Member of Latin Section.
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ormorly Deputy Head of Japanese Naval cryptanalytic
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section. Prior to that Head of French Naval crypt
analytic section.
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JACOB, lil. A.
Heud of Eastern European Cryptanalytic Division.
- Formerly Deputy Director (Military Wine) and Head
of Keddleston Hall.
,-,
KE:NDlUCKS .
Old-time cryptanalyst. Formerly at Berkeley street
and chief technical advisor to Hastings. Prior
-
to that head of cryptanalytic unit in Canada.
I
KENVIORTI-f
Continues as Head of FORDE.
,.," MARR-JOmrSTON
I
'. Sonior liaison officer in Washington.
Formerly he(j,d of Wireless Experimental Centre,
Delhi, India.
MASON
r-
Top engineer at FORDE.
f
T:1ENZIES, li!Ji,JOR GJsNERAL SIn STEWART GRAHAM
The Chief, Head of all British intelligence.
MORGAN, G. W.
Formerly head of central research section. Tiltman1s
right hand man in cryptanalysis.
PAGE
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Formerly Assistant Director of Intelligence Section.
I.
Possibly staying with organization.
"".
PHITCH..:WD , HICHARD
Hcad of Russian Cryptanalytic Section.
In cryptanalysis throughout war. Formerly second
r in conwand of Military Wing.
.
THOMPSON, F. S.
Head of Balkan cryptanalytic section.
r
TIIJTMAN, JOmT
Head of Cr:;:rptanalytic Group.
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Formerly head of Military Wing and chief crypt
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analyst at the Park. In 1945 chief cr;yptanalyst
for civil and commercial as well as service scctions.
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,
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TOP SIwnET ULTHA
TRAVIS, SIR EDWARD
Director or Sigint Centre.
Formerly Director of Bletchley Park.
TWINH, PETEH
Formerly Assistant Director (Mechanical). Prj.or
to that head of agent machine cipher section.
Possibly staying with organization
..
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WILLS, C. H. B.
Head of Traffic Analysis Section in Eastern European
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Cryptanalytic Division.
j
VII LSON , D. A.
"
,...
f,
Head of Cipher Security Group.
Formerly Deputy Director (Cipher Security of the
I Allies) and I-lead of Chesterfield Street.
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IDENTIFICATION OF PLACE NAMES
I
(wartime organization)
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ALDIi'ORD HOUSE (St. Albans)
r-
Commercial cryptanalysis
BEAm.,rANOH
Permanent Army intercept station
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BEDFORD
Inter-Service Special Intellie;ence School for
/
cryptanalytic training.
Closed in 1943.
"
,.... BEmmLEY STHEET (London)
r
Diplomatic and conunercial branch of GC&CS
. I
BLETCHLEY PARK (Bletchley)
,....
Service branch of GC&CS
BHOADWAY (London)
r Headquarters; worked on traffic analysis and
I Russian non-morse

r
Permanent Army intercept station
i
CHESTERFIELD STREET (London)
I / Intelligence establishment under Captain Wilson !
i I
CJIICKSAlIDS
Permanent RAF intercept station
COLBURN
Government Post Office intercept station
CUPAR
,....
Naval intercept station in Scotland
,I
DENriL.l\.RK HIJ.JL
Scotland Yard intercept station
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EASTCOTE
I
Wartime bombe station; postwar Sigi,nt Centre
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,--:. ,Ii' REPROOUCED ATTHE NATIONAl ARCHIVES
FOHES'l' r.IOOR
Permanent Army intercept station
. GAYmmS'l' VANOR (near Ble tchley)
130nbe station
JIAESLOPE
Small research station. Turine; worked on speech
scrambling here.
IIl:rs (Winchester)
Permanent-:, Haval intercept station
HALL
Substation for intercepting I'l;on-morse
IaifOCKHOLT
,Intercept station and training school for non-morse
"
"\vORKS
II
Hollerith (IBM) factory which built bombes
OXFORD College)
Built and tested British ciphers
PARK LANE (London)
Subsidiary of Berkeley Street
QU1i:I:JN'S GATE (London)
Party under the Chief; which transcl"ibed
intercepts; af'ter January 1946 Headquarters of
Historical Section
RYDER (London)
Counter-intelligence
SCARBOHOUGH
Permanent Army intercept station
SOU'I'HMEADE
Intercept school
STANMOHE
Bombe station
STEEPLE CLAYDOH
Bombe station
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TOP SECRE'l1 ULTRA
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ABBREVIATIONS
ACS Allied Cipher Security
AD Assistant Director
ADD Assistant Deputy Director
r
ADDS Assistant Deputy Director Services
AS Air Section
BP BlotchleYPark
BSC British Security Coordination
C Chief'
CCR (Co.ordination of' Cryptanalytic Records?)
CCS COMbined Chief's of Staff
r
CSDIC Combined Services (Detention?) and Interrogation
Centre
r
CSR Central Signals Registry
D Director
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! r;
i DD Dr;>puty Director
DDA Deputy Director (Administration)
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DDNS Deputy Director Naval Section
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DDS Deputy Director Services
DG Director General
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OJ-INS Deputy Head Naval Section
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Far Eastern Combined Board
FEDO Far Bast D/F Organization
- 10
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TOP SEGnET...UlTnI,\?e:: :'''REPRODUCEDATTHENATIONAlARCfllVES
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GC&C8
GCHQ,
GPO
GSC
II
HCG
Ie
ID
IE
Isesc
ISK
1808
18SB
ISSIS
IWIS
JSM
LCS
MEW
NDO
ns
Foreign Office
Foreign Office Research and Development Engineering
Group
Government Code and Cipher School
Govel'nment Connnunications Headquarters
Government Post Office
General Staff Officer
Head
Head of Cryptographic Group
Centre
Intelligence Division
Intellieence Exchange
Inter-Service Cipher Security Conuni ttee
Intelligence Section for the K machine .cipher
Intelligence Section Oliver Strachey
Inter-Services Security Board
Inter-Service Special Intelligence School
Inter-Service Wireless Intelligence Staff
Joint Staff Mission
London Controlling Section
Ministry of Ecomomic Warfal"'e
1',1111tary W1ng
Ottawa
Naval Section
.. llt ...
I
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TOP ULTFU\'
r
I
HSHQ Naval Service Headquarters
r
Ole Operational IntelliGence Centro
RSS Radio Secu.ri ty SeI'vice
SAC Security of Allied Ciphers
SIC (Special?) Intelligence Centre
SLU Special Liaison Unit
SWG Special Wirelefls Group
TA Traffic Analysis
r VJEC Wireless Experimental Centre
WTC WiI'eless Telegraphy Control
,....
Z Translating
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1 1 1 l
- 28 January 1943
-DIRECTOR ::.C_
I
t. T
SECRET-ULTRA
j Brig. Menzies
;

1
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1 5
,0 r.;
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- f
-
in
j
DD (FOREIG!l OFFICE)
,
;:r;;:;;I',(:"l
Cdr. Denniston
STREET
-;
DIPLOMATIC CO!lJ>!ERCIAL
Mr.
Ea.rnshaw-Smith Mr. Eope
I I I 1 I
CLERICAL TRAFFIC ADMIN.
&: TYPING &:
Cdr.
POOL DISTRIB. Bradshaw
INTER- CHIEF ISSIS
SERVIC;; C:aYPTAN.
RESEA.RCH ,ALYST
l{'a,l. Col. ).;aj.
Morgan TiltlllaJ Maoter!
NW
01-
Tlltman
Maj.
Pritchard
SIXTA
Maj.
Lithegow
NS AS
Mr. Cooper
t1r. ',(EATHER
'Birch - Dr.M1cvi ttie
I
\-/'EO ITALIJ.N
.aj ....
LIAISmr aMer
Tlltl!'= GEIDiAlf
Cooper CaptE-wn!
C:i."BCIAL E JAP.A...llESE
(unsteckered
-,'
machine re
;'
search)
Mr. Knox !oss
I
:!fl."!' 6 :>
lrr.
Welch!na beck
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. DD (SERV'I CE$ )
Sir Eiward Travis
ADDS
Mr. de Grey
,
El
14r.
RUT g
HUT
50..lL
Mr. Mafile-
Turing
:BOi'.BES I
COMMUli.

U
Chart I

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Brig. :':en&i.,s
t
..------,TOP SECRET- ULTRA
Cdr. Denniston
DD (FOREIGN OFFICE)
t
!'
I
@ $

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I
Jl' I---L.------.,
AD (OVlmS"'..:.AS)
DIPLOl>'.ATIC

Cdr. Capt. Hastings Ee.l'nshaw-Smi th

Mr. Hope

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CHIEF CRYPT; COMDT MW CONSTlruCTION OF COORD. OF WIT COORDINATION SECtJRITY OF CIPBJ.1as
Welcllman Lt. Col. Sayer Cdr. Dudley-Smith
I I
TRAFFIC D/r F. O. wiT
r:OORD. INT. INTERCEPl'
Cdr. Mr.
if'!:r Capt. t4; ..Col. Dudley A. E.
Firnbelg CranlahDr Smith Cooper williams
i
Col. Tiltman COllldr. Holt
'I

COORD. OF
CRYPTAN
...tyS!S
Prof.
Vir..ce:lt

Col.
llirch Conper
:fIl AS
I
CRYPT
ANALYTIC
RESEJJiCH
Col.
Tlltman
INs
I
HUi,r 6
Mr.
!lUlner
IBarry
l
HUTg
Mr.
Alex
ander
HUT 3
Wine/CO
Jones
Mr.
Chart II
-,
BLETCHLEY F
J
(ADMIN.) AD
Bradshaw
DD (SERVICES)
Sir:. Edward Travis
AD (S)
Mr. de Grey
If .
Tester Newman Page I Twinn I
Sli:CRETARIAT
Mr. Nicholson
l I
(iFE CI 1\.L
MACHIN
ERY
ISK
}!r.
I
l-OP SECR"ET= ULl-R/-'l
I
TABTJI.A.T-"
lUG l>'.A.
CB:!NERY
Mr.
FreE-born
I
I505 RUT 11e.

Mr.
---,
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HUT61 HUT g _ABT}l
TmG

Alex-
I
Free

I}!r.
ISq/L I IMr. I
Be.rr a:teer s UeWllal born
----, --1
- -1
-, --1 . -)
-, 1
----, 1
--1 - 1 - ]
-l --I --, -----,
DlREOTOR GENERAl.
TOP SECRET- ULTRA
Brig, M'.!nzies
1944
-I
J DD (C) a;;Ri':ELJ::,"Y STREET
I ,DIRECTOR
Cdr. Dennhton Sir Edwsrd TrAvis
,

1
V l
I
COMM.ERCIAL
DD (1) DD (2) DD I DD (4)
_ Mr. Hope fil'. de:Grey Til tman
.)
I

"/;
I I u:
AD (2) l
11 M!'. tCol. VallSEI
-I f I I
DD(liS) DD (MW)' DD (AS) DD (OT) DD (eSA.)
Mr. Col. Mr.J, 'E. S. Brit;. Capt.
Birch Jetcob !:lsdale Wilson Cooper
I
,
..
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AD (Mch)
AD l3l
I AJ)
Mr.
Grp. Cant ---.--., Mr.
CD Welchmen
1
E.M,.Jones
PabC

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1505 SAC IPRFR 1SK IOOMMmi IFClIDE

(WTC) eNST. Lt.Chl

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t. Col. Dud- Lt.
1-'.1'. r.*.r. .' ley
f
Col. Col. en- Dick"-:
Page Twinn Smith arro.... Sa)!:er enson artb,v
L..
TOP SECRET-ULTR
ijt
' (3,:
1: ,
'I
3
rp.
Capt.
IC. M.
Jones
Chart III
'
1
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1
-1 . 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -, '-1
,,: .'
TOP SECRET- ULTRA
I
SECTION
OI)O:aDINATOR
Mr. Clark'!
I
r
DD eNS)
ll";'VAL SEeTIor-; STAFF
I
Hr. Eirch
1 l!.arch 1945
1
DR (liS)
Mr. G E. P. Jackson <j


i" ".::
I 1
s..
PERSONNEL
CRY.PTANALYTI C
INTELLIG'ENC:5l STAFF LI.U SOU
TRATIVE SUF.!
STAFF OFFICEll
STAFF OFF! CEll
OFFI CER Or!ICER WITH 20-G
03"FI CF.B.
Miss.. IZa....ld
Mr. Hunt 2/off. Waytc Mr. Hinsley Mr. Eods.... Ol'th
I
I 1
AlSO (2)
ASLO
( U,'TELLlu.:EJ:iCE)

.6..150 (1)
Cdr. Bacon
co ". Lt.
Ramsbothslll

::>.
v Cl
::::

CHART IV

.
TOP SECRET- ULTRJ'""\ .),
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".. ",,,.,- 1:': , " I
., ... ' ,r' REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
'r
TOP SECRET-ULTRA
I
SECRET uvrRA
I !
TOP
NAVAL SEOTION SUBSl!;C'rHmS
28 January 1943
r
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NS I Wildrid Bodsworth
European Cryptanalysis
NS I J Mr. Hugh ;H. Foss
,.... Japanese Cryptanalysis
NS II Mr. Walter G. Ettinghausen
Decodes
NS III Cdr. O'CallaGhan
Current Intelligence
r-
NS III N Lt. Richard Brieht
r
Naval Advisory Party
r
J'm IV G. E. P. Jaclcson
Plotting
DD (NS)
1'1S V Mr. F. H. Hinsley
Radio
NS VI Lt. Cdr. Geoffrey Tandy
r
Intelligence
NS VII Lt. L. A. Griffiths
General Intelligence
NS VIII Lt. Cdr. A. M. S. Mackenzie
Records
IrS IX 11.r. Galsworthy
Central Office
r
NID 8 G (2)
,...
Admiralty Liaison Staff
I
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)
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NAVAL
Dr. C. T. Carr
Cryptanalysis
II'Tr. Hugh R. Fos s
mIG
Japanese Cryptanalysis
HS I IT IV!r. F. G. W. Bowe,'
Neutral Cl"yptanalysis
NS II
lWr. Walter G.
Emending and Translation Ettinghausen
(German and Neutral)
HS II I Mr. Vi. F. Clarke
flonitoring of Italian Codes
and Ciphers
NS II J Cdr. (S) J. P. McIntyre
Maintenance and Exploitation
of Japanese Codes and Ciphers
NS III J Lt. S. Gorley Putt
General Intelligence, Far East
}IS III N Lt. Cdr. R. N. Bright
Mediterranean commands
rs III P Lt. Cdr. N. Allon Bacon
Allied Plot
lIS IV' Lt.Cdr. A.M.S.Mackenzie
General Intelligence, European
NS V Lt. E. R. Dugmore
Enemy Telecommunications
HS VI Lt. CdI'. Geoffrey Tandy
Technical Intelligence
NS VITI Iv'!rs. A. D. 'Walsh
Records
NS IX Mr. GOl"don TUrner
Naval Section Connnunications
NS X Miss. D. Layland
Naval Air (German)
rs XI Dr. John H. Plumb
Communications_ Intelligence
NS XII llfr. J. O. Lloyd
Japanese School
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CHART VI
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DD(NS)
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REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
nAVAL SECr.p.ION
1 December 1944
NS I G
German Cryptanalysis
.NS I J
Japanese Cryptanalysis
(except 3N-25 and IN-ll)
NS II
German Emending and
Translation
lIS II J
Japanese Cryptanalysis
(IN-25 and
NS III J
Japanese Bookbuilding
and Translation
NS III If
Servicing Medi t'erranean
Commands
NS IV
General Intelligence
NS V '
Enemy Communications
HS VI
TecIDlical Intelligence
NS VIII
Records
NS IX
Naval Section Communications
NS X
naval Air (German)
Dr. C. T. Carr
Mr. Hugh R. FOGS
Walter G. Etting
hausen
C. Hugh 0' D.
Alexander
Cdr. (S) J. P. Mc Intyre
Lt.Cclr. R. H. Bright
a'dr. A. M. :i.Mackenzie
Dr. John H. Plumb'
Cdr. Geo:f:frey Tandy
Mrs. A. D. 'Nalsh
Gordon Turner
Miss D. Layland
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1 REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
'r
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TOP SECRET
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DD(NS)

NAVAL SECTION SUBSECTIONS
1 March 1945
!ITS I J
,Ja.panese Cryptanalysis
(except lTN-25 and,
NS II
German Emending and
Translation
lIS II J
Japanese Crw.ptanalysis
(In-25 and IN-l1)
NS IIJJ
Japanese Bookbuilding and
Translation
Intelligence
}IS V
Enemy Communications
}IS VI
Technical Intelligence
lIS VII
Servicing'
r
NS VIII
Records
NS III N) r
:NS X ) Liaison (Gorman)
r-
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Mr. Hugh R. Foss
Mr. Walter G.
Ettinghausen
Mr. C. Hugh orD.
AlexanCl:er
Cdr. (S) J. P. McIntyre
Cd!'. A. M. S. Mackenzie
Dr. John H. Plumb
Cdr. Geoffrey Tandy
Gordon Turner
Miss S. Pamela Gibson
Lt. R. L. Benhan &
Miss D. Layland
CHART VIII
TOP SEGRET-UlTHA