Why is it important to consider who persons are and how they come into being?

Introduction For the Tallensi people of Ghana, certain sacred crocodilesare persons (La Fontaine, 1985: 127). This assertion challenges Western notions of personhood to the core, for in most Western societies animals cannot be people. Anthropomorphising animals in childrens cartoons is one thing, but there is a sharp distinction between animals and people in Western culture. But the crocodile provides a lucid example of the fact that not all cultures, societies, peoples view the world in Western terms. Mauss points out that the idea of a person is not innate; it is a social category which developed over centuries (1950[1985]). What began as a role that people played in society developed into a mask, a persona, something outside of the self (ibid.: 17) what a person was but had important consequences for the legal concept of the self. Only select persons had a self, slaves for example, were excluded (ibid.:17). Later, apart from legal importance, the self gained a moral dimension at which point autonomy and consciousness of ones own being led to idea about freedom and responsibility. With the advent of Christianity the self acquired a metaphysical capacity and questions about the unity of the self were raised which in turn led to the self as a psychological being (20). This evolutionary view of the self shows how what seems at first be natural and self-evident (Carrithers et al.:vii), is a fragment of history intrinsically linked to social organisation, and so particular to social context (Mauss,1938[1985]). Western conceptions of the person place the emphasis on the beginning of life and personhood is an inalienable right; conception, birth or naming are the point at which a being becomes a person and it is rare for personhood to be denied. Yet non-Western cultures perceive personhood as transition (La Fontaine, 1985: 132), and not all individuals are able to become persons because of their status in society. Furthermore, ideas to do with when a being gains person status differ from society to society. Whether a person comes into being at naming, at birth or at conception has important legal consequences. So personhood needs to be considered in order to challenge Western ideas about duality, to assess the legal implications for when a person becomes a person, and to better understand other societies concept of personhood.

Dual and composite visions Ingold (1991) argues that the Western duality which separates the biological organism, the body, from the social person is misleading. This duality posits humanity over animality(ibid.:357) but creates the problem of having a two-part person whereby the organism has to learn to be a person. In this structure as the organism grows, the person is made when the cultural form is imposed upon it, which contrasts with perceptions of animals in Western culture; animals are animals right

from the start (ibid.:358). Ingold gives the example of the baby elephant, which does not have to become elephant as it develops because it already is one (ibid.:358). A dualistic vision of personhood assumes some elements of personhood to be innate, indeed the raw experience of self-awareness is assumed as a universal fact of human nature (ibid.: 365) however this is not the case. An example of this is how speech or walking are assumed to be innate, yet cycling or writing may be seen as things which are learnt. But all facets of human development take place within a culture and if walking is universal whereas cycling is not, this is because the environment of development for the former is general, whereas the environment of development for the latter obtains only under limited circumstances (ibid.:370). Ingold points out that a distinction between biological and cultural leads to the idea that within the mother-child relationship, the nurturing can only be seen as cultural, not biological (ibid.:361). This idea seems rather strange, but it does follow the logic of a biological-cultural separation. This separation of the biological from the cultural is not present in non-Western societies. For the Melpa people the self is generated and conserved only within the total relational context of embryonic development so there is no separation of nature and culture; personhood develops within a matrix of relations with others (ibid.:362). Through his discussion of the Tallensi people of Ghana, La Fontaine shows that a person can be a composite (ibid.:126) of material and immaterial, and that emotions are connected to parts of the body, or for the Taita where social aspects are located within the organs of the body (ibid.:128). All of this clearly questions Western assumptions about nature and culture. Perhaps this duality is not the best way to view the development of social beings, it is certainly not the only view. The 'when' of personhood Another Western idea about the self is that a person comes into being at birth, or before. For the Tallensi, personhood is connected to the life path of a person and it is the completion of a proper life which qualifies an individual for full personhood(ibid.:131) because of which some individuals may not be granted personhood if they do not go through certain life-cycle rituals, such as marriage or having children. Personhood, then, is not a universal category. Just as Mauss depiction of the Western concept of the person is particular to a Christian way of viewing the world, so personhood is embedded in a social context (ibid.:133) in all cultures. While for Westerners individuality is granted at birth through naming, for other non-Western cultures there may be a longer period through which personhood is created (ibid.: 132).La Fontaine emphasises that the concept of the individual is unique to Western thought (1985: 123), and is a concept which gives jural, moral and social significance to the mortal human being(ibid.:124). Persons exist differently across cultures. For the Jivaroan Achuans, personhood is an unstable state (Taylor, 1996:207). An individual is born in an arbitrary form, which is their body and the perception of the body by others, shapes the subjectivity of the individual. Because the sense of self is based in others reflections of that self when relations change or death occurs this sense can be disrupted. The endemic feuding and shifting alliances (ibid.:207) mean that relations

between individuals, even family members are weak, so alliances are constantly changing. Therefore there is much uncertainty as to others feelings towards oneself, so there is little sense of stability available for constructing ones own selfhood (ibid.). Taylor argues that this is the cause of illness for the Achuans, that when their sense of self becomes so uncertain because of constantly changing relationships and doubt, they lose a sense of identity(ibid.). This conceptualisation of where the self lies and how it is constructed challenges Western notions of the self as autonomous, individual and independent. Personhood and ethics While some notions of personhood simply raise questions about difference, others raise more ethically pressing points. An analysis of honour and shame can provide a study of the basic mould of social personality (Peristiany, 1965:10) in a particular society revealing the parameters within which personhood is created. When one man challenges another in Kabyle society, there is a mutual recognition of equality (Bourdieu, 1965: 199) that is, the challenged must be equal in honour and recognised as a peer by the challenger (ibid.: 199). The challenge itself gives one the sense of existing fully as a man (ibid.:199). Through mutual recognition equality is created and each individual is understood to be a person equal to the other. A mans honour can be damaged in certain circumstances such as responding to the insults of a negro (ibid.:200) because in Kabyle society black people were considered bereft of honour(ibid.) and so inferior. Recognition as a person, as an equal is not permitted to all members Kabyle society. Personhood is associated with honour therefore it is created and maintained throughout life, not automatically granted at birth. James (2000)stated that peri-natal time is regarded by many as purely biological. James discusses several non-Western ideas about conception and birth with a view to considering abortion and infanticide. She criticises early anthropological accounts of non-Western woman without morality or feeling, she was represented as easily and innocently disposing of any foetus or infant surplus to requirements (ibid.:175). She draws attention to differing ideas about the source of the child as being outside parental or even human control (ibid.:186), the point at which a foetus is recognised as a person, and the preparations made in the social sphere for the unborn child. For the aboriginal people of the Kimberley Division of Western Australia a conception is caused by a man giving a woman fertile-food (ibid.: 173) which contains a spirit-child (ibid.) of a dead ancestor. The point of her discussion is that the recognition of a child has implications for a legal considerations about abortion and infanticide. She argues that despite culturally specific beliefs scientific knowledge about the foetus should be used to inform legal and ethical frameworks. Both these accounts force us to consider at what point a person comes into being and whether this how cultural beliefs should fit into a wider ethical framework. A society in which the belief system permits racism or infanticide does not sit easily with Western ethics. Conclusion

That personhood is a social construct is an important idea for anthropologists to grasp. A concept that seems so fundamental, perhaps universal is demonstrably a social construct and should be viewed as such. Allen asks whether Mauss personnage, or role was really a mirage?(1985: 41) highlighting just how embedded in social interpretation is the concept of personhood. She also points out that most societies do not fit neatly into opposing categories and that it is a complex concept in all societies. Even the Western idea of personhood is still imprecise, delicate and fragile (Mauss, 1938[1985]: 1) as La Fontaine demonstrates it is the society and nature of authority within a society which shape ideas about the person. In short, by examining personhood we are dealing with the interpretation of behaviour, practices, institutions and everyday beliefs in order to unearth underlying, and often acknowledged, assumptions (Lukes, 1985: 291) and as anthropologists we should be ready to question all our assumptions no matter how fundamental they may seem. References Allen, N.J. 1985 The category of the person: a reading of Mauss' last essay. In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, & S. Lukes 1985. The category of the person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.26-45 Bourdieu, P. 1965. The sentiment of honour in Kabyle society. In J.Peristiany (Ed.) Honour and Shame. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson Carrithers, M., Collins. S., Lukes, S. Preface. 1985. In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, & S. Lukes (Eds.)1985. The category of the person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. vii-viii La Fontaine, J.S. 1985. Person and individual: some anthropological reflections. In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, & S. Lukes (Eds.)1985. The category of the person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 123-140 Lukes, S. 1985 Conclusion. In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, & S. Lukes (Eds.) 1985. The category of the person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 282-301 Mauss, M. 1938[1985] A category of human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self. Translated by W.D. Halls. In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, & S. Lukes (Eds.) 1985. The category of the person. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.1-25 Ingold, T. 1991. becoming persons: consciousness and sociality in human evolution. In Cultural Dynamics 4(3) 355-78 James, W. 2000. Placing the unborn: on the social recognition of new life. In Anthropology & Medicine 7(2)169-89 Taylor, A.C. 1996. The soul's body and its states: an Amazonian perspective on the nature of being human. In The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute incorporating Man 2, 210-215