1.

Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639 Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date. Issue: Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.

Held: The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery. The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a government of laws and not of men."

2. Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons Facts: The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in the Philippines. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by US Army Counter Intelligence Corps. The People's Court ordered his release but the Deportation Board taking his case found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country and must referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared that Mejoff entered the Philippine illegally and therefore must be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody. After repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa where he has been confined up to the present time. Two years had elapsed but the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country although it should be said in fairness to the deportation authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner. Issue: WON Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation. Held: The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally accepted principle of international law. It should be applied also to illegal aliens like Mejoff so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him for an unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him. Considering that the Government desires to expel the alien and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of the presumption, assurances were made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of Mejoff. The petitioner can be released if there is a record shown that the deportee is being imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the Government admit that it can not deport him or he is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere. Article 2 of the Philippine Constitution states that, "The Philippines renounces war as instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.

3. Agustin Vs. Edu Case Digest Agustin Vs. Edu 88 SCRA 195 G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979 Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law. Issue: Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit. Held: Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of polic e power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioners allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.

4. Ichong vs Hernandez Case Digest LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act N o. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of cit izens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens act ually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, t he nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process? HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential sour ce of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classifica tion otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due pr ocess are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

5. In Re: Garcia Facts: Facts: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. Issue: Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar? Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. Ratio Decidendi: The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

6. ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 FACTS: Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct." HELD: Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms including religious freedommay be enjoyed. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC. Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondents stance that the respondents conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it c omes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and practice.

7. LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts: Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third count ry, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. Issue: Whether Balikatan 02-1 activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement? Ruling: To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, fr om any political activity. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presu med to verbalize the parties intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .activities arose from accident. It was delib erately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nations marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to a ssume that .Balikatan 02-1, a mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise, falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the c ontext of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

8. Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to equa l access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any j udicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as equal access, opportunities, and public service are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus El ection Code on Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatongs contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

9. Calalang vs. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 Petitioner: Maximo Calalang Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al. Ponente: Laurel,J: Facts: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents. It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Issue: 1.Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Held: 1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

10. Oposa v. Factoran Different Compilation of Digests ------------------------------------------------FACTS: A taxpayers class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network Incorporated (PENI) together with the minors Oposa and their parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the countrys rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Honorable Factoran Jr, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action? HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. -------------------------------------------------FACTS: The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the appellants right as taxpayers, but th ey are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility in so far as the right t o a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect. Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office regar ding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case 2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints 3. Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution HELD: The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers (class) suit. The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially. Despite the Constitutions non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said right is also clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

-----------------------------------------Facts: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' classsuit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was thedefendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. (2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit. (3) Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled. (4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy: The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

11. Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) vs Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) FACTS: PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93. ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran in conflict against the very nature of its creation. HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations for the benefit of the general public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clea r that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires.

12. Topic: Personal Dignity and Human Rights (Sec. 11, 1987 Constitution)

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994 FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business". On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991. The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al". ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH? HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights". The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.

13. PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1. Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. 2. 3. 4. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions That they are germane to the purpose of the law They are not confined to existing conditions They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

14. PRC vs. De Guzman Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of F atima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions. Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. -------------------------------------------------------------

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. de Guzman [GR 14681, 21 June 2004] Second Division, Tinga (J): 4 concur Facts: Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera And Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan, Elnora R. Raqueno, Marissa A. Regodon, Laura M. Santos, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Maria Rosario L. Leonor, AliciaS. Lizano, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Fernando F. Mandapat, Aleli A. Gollayan, Elcin C. Arriola, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Evelyn S. Acosta, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio, Valentino P. Arboleda, Evelyn O. Ramos, Achilles J. Peralta, Corazon M. Cruz, Leuvina P. Chico, Joseph A. Jao, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Lydia C. Chan, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Fernando T. Cruz, Melvin M. Usita, Rafael I. Tolentino, Grace E. Uy, Cheryl R. Triguero, Michael L. Serrano, Federico L. Castillo, MelitaJ. Caedo, Samuel B. Bangoy, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Frederick D. Francisco, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Hubert S. Nazareno, Clarissa B.Baclig, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Nancy J. Chavez, Mario D. Cuaresma, Ernesto L. Cue, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Rhoneil R.Deveraturda, Derileen D. Dorado, Saibzur N. Edding, Violeta C. Felipe, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana, Norma G.Lafavilla, Ruby B. Lantin, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari, Clarisa Sj. Nicolas, Percival H. Pangilinan, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Robert B. Sanchez, Merly D. Sta.Ana and Yolanda P. Unica are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the 79 successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology(OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven (11) Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and 10 got 100% in OB-Gyne, another 11 got 99% in Bio-Chem, and 21 scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a recordbreaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. On 7 June 1993, the Board issued Resolution 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination. Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination. On 10 June 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees of Fatima College in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc." For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that theFatima examinees gained early access to the test questions." On 5 July 1993, Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 93-66530) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution 26, dated 21 July 1993, charging de Guzman, et. al. with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified (Administrative Case 1687) by the PRC. On 28 July 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by de Guzman, et. al.. It ordered PRC, etc. to administer the physicians oath to De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC. PRC, etc/ then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ (CA-GR SP 31701). On 21 October 1993, the appellate court granted the petition, nullifying the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against PRC, etc. De Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to the Supreme Court in GR 112315. In the Supreme Court's Resolution dated 23 May 1994, it denied the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court. Meanwhile, on 22 November 1993, during the pendency of the above petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing counsel. On 13 December 1993, PRCs counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that PRC, etc. waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses. On 27 January 1994, counsel for PRC, etc. filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified less than 3 days prior to the hearing. Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Administrative Case 1687, De Guzman, et. al. moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated 4 April 1994. PRC, etc. then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari (GR 115704), to annul the Orders of the trial court dated 13 November 1993, 28 February 1994, and 4 April 1994. The Supreme Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 34506). On 31 August 1994, the appellate court granted the petition for certiorari, and thus allowing the PRC, etc. to present their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties. The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties. A day before the first hearing, on 22 September 1994, PRC, etc. filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate courts decision in CA-GR SP 34506, for the outright dismissal of Civil Case 93-66530, and for the suspension of the proceedings. In its Order dated 23 September 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28,1994. Meanwhile, on 25 October 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-GR SP 34506. Thus, PRC, etc. filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review (GR 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.)On 11 November 1994, PRC's counsel failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case 93-66530. Upon motion of De Guzman, et. al., the trial court ruled that PRC, etc. waived their right to cross-examine De Guzman, et. al. Trial was reset to 28 November 1994. On 25 November 1994, PRCs counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On 28 November 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, PRC, etc. failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision. On 19 December 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case 93-66530 in favor of De Guzman, et. al., ordering the PRC to allow De Guzman, et. al. to take the physicians oath and to register them as physi cians. As a result of these developments,

PRC, etc. filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari (GR 118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan), praying inter alia, that: (1) GR 118437 be consolidated with GR 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 August 1994 in CA-GR SP 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch. On 26 December 1994, PRC, etc. filed their Notice of Appeal in Civil Case 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP37283). Meanwhile, in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 7 June 1995, GR 118437 was consolidated with GR 117817. On 9 July 1998, the Court disposed of GRs 117817 and 118437 by dismissing them for being moot. The petition in GR 118437 was likewise dismissed on the ground that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. While CA-GR SP 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil Case 93-66530, joined by 27 intervenors, manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by 22 other intervenors. The Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-GR SP 37283 would not apply to them. On 16 May 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-GR SP 37283, affirming the decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal. PRC, etc. filed the petition for review, seeking to nullify the 16 May 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 37283. Issue: Whether De Guzman, et. al. may compel the PRC, etc. to administer them the Hippocratic oath, even in light of unusually high scores acquired by the examinees from Fatima College. Held: A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, PRC, etc. "shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of 1959. However, the surrounding circumstances in the present case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by De Guzman, et. al. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or registration," pursuant to the objectives of RA 2382 as outlined in Section 126 thereof. Herein, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Administrative Case 1687 against De Guzman, et. al. to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 927 of RA 2382. Further, Section 830 of RA 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance." Gleaned from Board Resolution 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that De Guzman, et. al. "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the latter. Thus, while it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements; like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. Herein, the guidelines are provided for in RA 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or re voking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

15. [ G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002 ] MANUEL CAMACHO, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER I AND/OR OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN - MINDANAO, SIXTO O. DALEON, AIDA AGULO, DESIDERIO ALABA, NORMA TECSON, AND THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES; SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY RENO CAPINPIN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, AND NEDA REGIONAL DIRECTOR SANTIAGO ENGINCO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N: QUISUMBING, J.: Subject of the present petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated June 3, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, hereafter simply the Office, which dismissed the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents Sixto O. Daleon, Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba, Norma Tecson and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP), Davao City, for violation of Section 3 [a], [e] and [j] of Republic Act 3019 also [1] known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also sought to be nullified is the Order of the Office dated September 10, 1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts as culled from the records are as follows: Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since January 1994 to the present. He has served the university as faculty member [2] and as administrator for almost 13 years. Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317, which is a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-1995. At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing grades [3] of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5, respectively. They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers. Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were ghost students in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to them, these ghost students, namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grades [4] despite their failure to attend classes. On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint. Petitioner requested the latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term [5] papers, and record of attendance of the students involved. Dr. Daleon ignored the request. On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed that the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate the complaint. In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to petitioners letter-request dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioners approval. Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-1996 and comply with the course requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendations. However, on December 1, 1995, Dr. Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades given by Dr. Daleon to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed its Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo. Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross [6] incompetence, insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770 was docketed as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132. On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a Supplement to Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or such [7] other penal laws against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of the USP Board of Regents, including Dr. Prantilla. On July 24, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear Administrative Case No. 96-602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said criminal complaint forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative complaint. On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents. Approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, the resolution in its dispositive portion reads as follows: WHEREFORE, finding insufficient evidence to hold respondent Dr. Daleon liable for the administrative charges of incompetence, insubordination and favoritism or unjust discrimination, or of any other laws, let the instant case be ordered DISMISSED. Likewise, finding no prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a), (e) and (j), the criminal complaint filed by Dr. Camacho against Professor Daleon, Mr. Desiderio Alaba, Misses Aida Agulo, Norma Tecson, and the Members of the Board of Regents of USP is hereby DISMISSED outright for want of palpable merit.

AS RESOLVED.

[8]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated September 10, 1997. Before us, petitioner now anchors the present petition on the following grounds: 1. THE SAID QUESTIONED DISPOSITIONS FAILED TO FIND THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS DALEON AND HIS RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS-AGULO, ALABA AND TECSON TO BE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY THE UNIVERSITY CODE, PARTICULARLY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 128, 140, 141, 152 (LAST PARAGRAPH) THEREIN; AND OF THE ACTS OF RESPONDENT BOARD OF REGENTS AS ULTRA VIRES AND CONTRARY TO THE SAID LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY WHEN IT PASSED BOARD OF REGENTS (BOR) RESOLUTIONS NO. 2432 S. OF 1995 ON DECEMBER 23, 1995 AND NO. 2449 S. 1996, RESPECTIVELY; THERE WAS OBVIOUS ABUSE AND GRAVE ERROR IN MISAPPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM TO ABSOLVE RESPONDENT DALEON OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; AND THE RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS AND THE BOARD OF REGENTS (ALONG WITH SAID RESPONDENT DALEON) OF THE ANTI-GRAFT CHARGES; THE SAID RESOLUTION AND ORDER OF RESPONDENT GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO WERE ATTENDED BY PATENT DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS AS THEIR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EMANATED FROM SELF -SERVING, [9] INCREDIBLE AND HEARSAY PROFFERS; AND DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER.

2.

3.

In issue is whether or not public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as criminal liability arising from his giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson and Alaba without requiring them to attend classes. Petitioner avers that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the impugned BOR resolution as it is contrary to the University Code, violates due process and is based on self-serving hearsays. He argues that the BOR resolution is based on a wrong interpretation of the constitutional provision on academic freedom. In its Comment, the Office of Solicitor General posits a contrary view. The OSG argues that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of [10] discretion. According to the OSG, there is no provision in the University Code of USP which prohibits a professor or teacher from giving a special [11] program or arrangement tailored to meet the requirements of a particular course. We are in agreement with the position taken by the respondents through the OSG. The petition lacks merit and ought to dismissed. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Courts power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exerc ising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the [12] ordinary course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our review under Rule 65. From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997. We note that the conclusions in said resolution are based on substantial evidence easily verifiable from the records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided such [13] findings are supported by substantial evidence, as in this case. Graft Investigation Officer I Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of said Office gave weight to the [14] [15] counter-affidavit of Dr. Daleon as corroborated by the affidavit of Prof. Concesa P. Lagare, Professor 2 of the College of Education, USP. These affidavits averred that during the graduate school orientation program sometime in July 1995, the universitys Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Luz D. Ancheta, declared that special arrangements between a professor and a graduate student may be allowed on a case-to-case basis. Dr. Ancheta made this statement in reply to Dr. Daleons query on the policy of USP on attendance of graduate school students and whether Dr. Daleon could give grades to students who do not attend classes. In her reply to Dr. Daleons query, the VPAA even cited her experience when she pursued her doctoral course at UP Los Baos. According to Dr. Ancheta, she was given a special arrangement by one of her professors. She added that she, too, had allowed the same special arrangement for her students at the USP Graduate School. Public respondent also anchored his decision on Article 140 of the University Code, which provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be [16] enforced in all classes subject to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses. It is undisputed that at the time that Dr. Daleon handled the graduate class in Ed.D. 317, he had already been duly designated Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the [17] President of USP and was even entitled to the emoluments inherent to the Office of the Dean of the Graduate School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Graduate School, Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without seeking permission of petitioner. Further, Dr. Daleons teaching style had the support of the members of the Board of Regents, the body with the authority to formulate university [18] policies, fully knowing the policy on attendance of students in the graduate school. In passing Resolution No. 2432, S. 1995, not only did they validate the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo, but they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety, regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleons instructional approach. In said resolution, the BOR cited Article 155 and Article 3 of the University Code, thus: The Board upheld the first grading sheet submitted by Dr. S. Daleon in the light of the following provisions of the University Code: (1) Article 155 which states that no grade shall be changed after the report has been submitted and (2) Article 3 which states that E very member of the faculty shall enjoy

academic freedom, which is the right of the professor to teach the subject of his specialization according to his best lights nor shall any restraint be placed upon him in the choice of subjects for research and investigation. The Dean must promote unity in his unit and must ensure that the dignity of every professor in his unit is respected. As held by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the Resolution of the Board of Regents is clearly an exercise of its sound discretion as the final [20] arbiter of issues affecting the internal operations of the university and as interpreter of the policies of the school. Finally, we agree with respondents position on the primacy of academic freedom in regard to higher institutions of learning. Dr. Daleons teaching style, [21] validated by the action of the USP Board of Regents, is bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom is twotiered that of the academic institution and the teachers. Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to [22] attain them, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to [23] study. The right of the school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., how it shall be taught. Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty. It is defined as a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any [25] interference, molestation, or penalty because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. As applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Considering that the Board of Regents, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the University of Southeastern Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we see no reason for petitioner to complain before us simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter. In our view, petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad faith or with manifest partiality in the performance of their official duties. Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of discretion in exonerating respondents below from both administrative and criminal charges. The resolution of that Office is in order for it accords with the facts and the law. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated June 3, 1997, of the Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[24] [19]

[1]

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense. xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. xxx (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. xxx

16. SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989 Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing nonstriking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

17. PROVINCE OF RIZAL, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. GR 129546, 13 December 2005, Second Division (Chico-Nazario, J.) Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives.
Facts: This case sprouted from the Memorandum of Agreement signed by Secretaries of DPWH and DENR together with the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) Governor. The same provides that DENR is allowing the utilization of its land in Pintong, Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary landfill by MMC. It turned out, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo already wrote to Gov. Cruz of MMC, the DPWH, the Executive Secretary, and the DENR, informing them of the SB resolution banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. The letter also asked that addressee's side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold in abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters. It was also found out that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, the report submitted by the forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO), DENR-IV, Rizal Province, revealed that there was no permit issued to MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes. It further states that the use of the areas as dumping site greatly affects the ecological balance and environmental factors in that community. In February 1990, DENR granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage dumpsite. On July 31 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the respondent Secretary of DPWH, stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from improper development of the site. On November 1993, the DENR Secretary sent a letter to MMA recommending that the all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue be dismantled. Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635,Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied the petition for lack of cause of action. On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Nio phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite. As a result, MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. On 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31 December 2000. On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic. Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas, the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January 2001. On 24 January 2001, SC issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for, effective immediately and until further orders. Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as The Ecologic al Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by President Estrada. Issues: 1. Whether or not respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of December 2000; and 2. Whether or not the permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Act No. 9003. Held: San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. Proclamation No. 635 is illegal. A mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure. The court also held that the records of this case indicate two self-evident facts. The San Mateo site has adversely affected its environs, and sources of water should always be protected. Adverse effects of the site were reported as early as of June 1989. MMA was also informed that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with Laguna Lake Development Authoritys (LLDA) program of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. Investigation Reports regarding the respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools playground were also submitted. Leachate treatment plant eroded twice already, contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the residents. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now. Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act to adopt urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which adversely affects the health and well-being of the population, food production, and industrialization process. One of the issues the law sought to address was the protection and conservation of watersheds. Respondents actions in the face of such grave environmental consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of providing solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness, worsened the problem. The Reorganization Act of the DENR defines and limits its powers over the countrys natural resources. The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. Although the DENR owns the Marikina Reserve, it is but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority. With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the public respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land. The Local Government Code gives to LGUs all the necessary powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants. The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also violates R.A. No 7160, or the Local Government Code. Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991. Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained. Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. Approved on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery. It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and public information, and the funding of solid waste management projects. The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework, which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40, specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the landfills operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.

18. PLDT vs NTCG.R. No. 88404October 18, 1990 FACTS: a.Petitioner assails two (2) orders of public respondent National Telecommunications Commission granting private respondent Express Telecommunications (ETCI) provisional authority to install, operate andmaintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro Manila now ETCI inaccordance with specific conditions on the following grounds; 1.ETCI is not capacitated or qualified under its legislative franchise tooperate a system-wide telephone or network of telephone service suchas the one proposed in its application; 2.ETCI lacks the facilities needed and indispensable to the successfuloperation of the proposed cellular mobile telephone system; 3.PLDT has its pending application with NTC Case No 86-86, to install andoperate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic andinternational service not only in Manila but also in the provinces andthat under the prior operator or protection of investment doctrine,PLDT has the priority preference in the operation of such service; and 4.the provisional authority, if granted, will result in needless,uneconomical, and harmful duplication, among others. b.After evaluating the consideration sought by the PLDT, the NTC, maintainedits ruling that liberally construed, applicants franchise carries with it theprivilege to operate and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service. Subsequently, PLDT alleged essentially that the interconnection ordered wasin violation of due process and that the grant of provisional authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm. However, NTC denied thereconsideration. ISSUES: Whether or not the contention of PLDT is tenable. RULING: a.Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. b.There can be no question that the NTC is the regulatory agency of thenational government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities. Itis legally clothed with authority and given ample discretion to grant a

18. PLDT vs NTC G.R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. [PLDT], petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND CELLCOM, INC., (EXPRESSTELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. [ETCI]), respondents. Facts: There are two (2) Orders, namely, Order of 12 December 1988 granting private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro-Manila (Phase A) in accordance with specified conditions; and the Order, dated 8 May 1988, denying reconsideration, enacted by the respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) but assailed by petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).ETCI filed an application with NTC for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate Phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila. But in an Order, dated 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDT's Opposition and declared that Rep. Act No. 2090 (1958) should be liberally construed as to include among the services under said franchise the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service. After evaluating the reconsideration sought by PLDT, the NTC, in October 1988, maintained its ruling that liberally construed, applicant's franchise carries with it the privilege to operate and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service. In a "Motion to Set Aside the Order" granting provisional authority, PLDT alleged essentially that the interconnection ordered was in violation of due process and that the grant of provisional authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm. PLDT urges the Court to annul the NTC Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 and to order ETCI to desist from, suspend, and/or discontinue any and all acts intended for its implementation. Issues: 1. Whether the status and coverage of Rep. Act No. 2090 includes franchise; 2. Whether there is transfer of shares of stock of a corporation in holding a CPCN; and 3. Whether there is a need to merge principle and procedure of interconnection. Held: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of NTC, upon the following considerations: 1. NTC Jurisdiction The NTC is the regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. In fact, NTC may, on its own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence of a motion from an applicant. What the NTC granted was such a provisional authority, with a definite expiry period of eighteen (18) months unless sooner renewed, and which may be revoked, amended or revised by the NTC. It is also limited to Metro Manila only. What is more, the main proceedings are clearly to continue as stated in the NTC Order of 8 May1989.The provisional authority was issued after due hearing, reception of evidence and evaluation, with the hearings attended by various oppositors, including PLDT. It was granted only after a prima facie showing that ETCI has the necessary legal, financial, and technical capabilities and that public interest, convenience, and necessity so demanded. Hence, the final outcome of the application rests within the exclusive prerogative of the NTC. Whether or not a CPCN would eventually issue would depend on the evidence to be presented during the hearings still to be conducted, and only after a full evaluation of the proof thus presented. 2. The Coverage of ETCI's Franchise Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) "the right and privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the entire Philippines radio stations for reception and transmission of messages on radio stations in the foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and public base, aeronautical and land mobile stations, ... with the corresponding relay stations for the reception and transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony ...." PLDT maintains that the scope of the franchise is limited to "radio stations" and excludes telephone services such as the establishment of the proposed Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS). However, in its Order of 12 November 1987, the NTC construed the technical term "radiotelephony" liberally as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. 3. The Status of ETCI Franchise PLDT alleges that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into nonexistence for failure of the franchise holder to begin and complete construction of the radio system authorized under the franchise as explicitly required in Section 4 of its franchise, Rep. Act No. 2090.More importantly, PLDT's allegation partakes of a Collateral attack on a franchise Rep. Act No.2090), which is not allowed. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise" (Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court), 2 the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.

4. ETCI's Stock Transactions ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more than 40% of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to the Orbes. In 1968, the Albertos re-acquired the shares they had sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of their shares to HoracioYalung. Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964,ETCI had increased its capital stock from P40,000.00 to P360,000.00; and in 1987, fromP360,000.00 to P40M.In other words, transfers of shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC approval, not Congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. But again, whether ETCI has offended against a provision of its franchise, or has subjected it to misuse or abuse, may more properly be inquired into in quo warranto proceedings instituted by the State. It is the condition of every franchise that it is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal when the common good so requires (1987Constitution, Article XII, Section 11).

5. The NTC Interconnection Order In the provisional authority granted by NTC to ETCI, one of the conditions imposed was that the latter and PLDT were to enter into an interconnection agreement to be jointly submitted to NTC for approval. Rep. Act No. 6849, or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989, approved on 8 February 1990, mandates interconnection providing as it does that "all domestic telecommunications carriers or utilities ... shall be interconnected to the public switch telephone network." Such regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. The importance and emphasis given to interconnection dates back to Ministry Circular No. 82-81, dated 6 December 1982; Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Circular No. 87-188, issued in 1987; The sharing of revenue was an additional feature considered in DOTC Circular No. 90-248, dated 14 June 1990, laying down the "Policy on Interconnection and Revenue Sharing by Public Communications Carriers."The NTC order to interconnect allows the parties themselves to discuss and agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement instead of the NTC itself laying down the standards of interconnection which it can very well impose. Thus it is that PLDT cannot justifiably claim denial of clue process. It has been heard. It will continue to be heard in the main proceedings. 6. Ultimate Considerations The decisive considerations are public need, public interest, and the common good. Those were the overriding factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional authority to ETCI. Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much-desired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to improved technology, fast and handy mobile service, and reduced user dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly position in view of the Constitutional proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years. Ruling: There is no grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the NTC in issuing its challenged Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 in NTC Case No. 87-39, and this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

19. G.R. No. 109023 August 12, 1998

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DE PARUNGAO, VENUS M. POZON AND other similarly situated personnel of the LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND LEONARDO L. JAMORALIN in his capacity as COA-LWUA Corporate Auditor, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.: The pivotal issue raised in this petition is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the payment of honoraria which they were receiving prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act 6758. Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. Sec. 12. Rep. Act 6758, reads
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. Allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistense allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay: allowances of foreign services personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rules herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 no integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be 1 authorized. (Emphasis supplied)

To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides:
Payment of other allowances fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, . . . shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal 2 disbursement of public funds.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. More specifically, petitioners contend that DBMCCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette; petitioners stressed. In its decision dated January 29, 1993, the COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10 and sanctioned the disallowance of petitioners' honoraria. 3 Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this court via the present petition, posing the questions:
(1) Whether or not par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 can supplant or negate the express provisions of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement; and (2) Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette.

Petitioners are of the view that par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 prohibiting fringe benefits and allowances effective November 1, 1989, is violative of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which authorizes payment of additional compensation not integrated into the standardized salary which incumbents were enjoying prior to July 1, 1989. To buttress petitioners' stance, the Solicitor General presented a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, opining that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to implement. The Solicitor General theorized, that:
..

. following the settled principle that implementing rules must necessarily adhere to and not depart from the provisions of the statute it seeks to implement, it is crystal clear that Section 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a patient nullity. An implementing rule can only be declared valid if it is in harmony with the provision of the legislative act and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. When an implementing rule 4 is inconsistent or repugnant to the provision of the statute it seeks to interpret, the mandate of the statute must prevail and must be followed.

Respondent COA, on the other hand, pointed out that to allow honoraria without statutory, presidential or DBM authority, as in this case, would run counter to Sec. 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which proscribes payment of "additional or double compensation, unless specifically authorized by law." Therefore, the grant of honoraria or like allowances requires a specific legal or statutory authority. And DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is merely an interpretative regulation of a law already published 5; COA concluded. In his Motion for Leave to intervene, the DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758. Before resolving the other issue whether or not Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 can supplant or negate the pertinent provisions of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement, we have to tackle first the other question whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force and effect notwithstanding the absence of publication thereof in the Official Gazette. This should take precedence because should we rule that publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines 6 is sine qua non to the effectiveness or enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10, resolution of the first issue posited by petitioner would not be necessary. The applicable provision of law requiring publication in the Official Gazette is found in Article 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publications in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This code shall take effect one year after such publication.

In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453, 454, this Court succinctly construed the aforecited provision of law in point, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and privates laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin after fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforced or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only one portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including, even, say those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from a certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely interpret but to "fill in details" of the Central Bank Act which that body supposed to enforce. (Emphasis ours)

The same ruling was reiterated in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres , 212 SCRA 299 [1992]. On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. In light of the foregoing disquisition on the ineffectiveness of DBM-CCC No. 10 due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, as required by law, resolution of the other issue at bar is unnecessary. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on Audit is SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to pass on audit the honoraria of petitioners. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

20. Chavez v. Pea and Amari Fact: In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP). PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA. By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS. Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of all scams). Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void. Issue: w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government. Held: On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: 1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. 2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. 3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.