A Critique of Ultimate Referentiality in the New Social Movement Theory of Alberto Melucci Author(s): Peyman Vahabzadeh Reviewed work(s):

Source: The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 611-633 Published by: Canadian Journal of Sociology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3341494 . Accessed: 23/09/2012 22:43
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A Critiqueof Ultimate Referentialityin the New Social Movement Theory of Alberto Melucci
Peyman Vahabzadeh

Abstract: A critical examination of Alberto Melucci's new social movement theory shows an operative assumptionabout the ultimatereferentialityof society in his theory. Melucci assumes society as the unique,rationalgroundthatrenderssociety a reservoirof all meaningsand conflicts. The actor'spregivensocial positionis assumedto predisposehim orherwiththe abilityto enterinto certain conflicts. To show Melucci's operative assumption,three majortheses in his theory are examined:(1) transition to the postindustrial society, (2) the new middleclass radicalism, (3) identity as "latent" and "visible."It is arguedthatMelucci's notion of society has its roots in his parochial, institutionalconception of politics that disregardsthe hegemonic formationof society and the political characterof every social phenomenonand practice.This critiqueleads to an invitationto a sociology thattreatsnew social movementsas loci of the political re-institution of society. Risumi: Une examinationcritiquede la theoriedu nouveaumouvementsocial de AlbertoMelucci suggere l'hypothese que la societe est referentielled'apres cette theorie. Melucci suppose que la societe est uniqueet rationnelle,et de plus, la sourcede toutes significationset conflits.La position sociale de l'acteurle donne la capacited'entrerdans de certainsconflits. Pourillustrerl'hypothbse de Melucci, trois theses majeuresde sa theorie sont examinees: 1) transitiona une societe postindustrielle;2) le nouveau radicalismede la classe moyenne; 3) identitestelle que < latente >> et << visible >>. L'auteuraffirmeque l'origine de la notion de Melucci de la societe se trouve dans sa conception paroissialeet institutionellede la politique,conceptionqui ne prendpas en compte la formationhegemoniquede la societe et le caractere social. politiquede toutphenomeneou pratique Cette critiquemene a une sociologie qui traiteles nouveauxmouvementssociaux comme les lieux de la reinstitution politiquede la societe.

CanadianJournalof Sociology/Cahierscanadiensde sociologie 26(4) 2001

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of Sociology 612 Canadian Journal The theoretical literatureconcerning social movements has clearly gone throughmajorfocal andanalyticalshifts in the pastthreedecades.Such shifts of the arenowheremoreevidentthanin the coinage andincreasingapplication term "new social movements"(especially duringthe 1980s). The new social movementtheoryof ItaliansociologistAlbertoMelucci, one of the originators of the term(Melucci, 1989:42, 204), deems identityas the cardinalcharactersocial movements.As such, istic thatdistinguishesthe "new"fromthe "older" theorists- namely, Melucci belongs to a generationof prominentEuropean Alain Touraine,KlausEder,ClausOffe - who emphasize,each in a different way, thecentralityof identity,as emphasison individualor groupparticularity, new social movements.' in understanding This paperwill examineMelucci's conceptionof identityin orderto show thattakesidentityto thathis social movementtheoryhinges on an assumption social fundament whichsurfacesin new social be expressiveof some "deeper" movements'practices.I will discuss thatthis view of identityis symptomatic of an operative assumptionabout society as a foundationfor theoretical referentiality" (as an assumed moorage.I will also point out thatthe "ultimate referenceto a ground)in Melucci's theorytakesplace in spite of his acknowlassumptionsin edgementthattheorymust criticallyreflect on certain"older" orderto be able to accountfor the emergenceandincreasingprevalenceof the intoMelucci'stheory investigation "new"social movements.A comprehensive will be done by critically examining three theses aroundwhich, to varying degrees, Melucci's entire new social movement theory is or has been organized. In each one of these threetheses, Melucci triesto theoreticallyaccount for the appeals to identity in the new movements in relation to a specific criterion:first, with respect to a shift from the industrialto the postindustrial societies in the West; second, in terms of the class origins of the new movements'actors(a positionwhichhe criticizeslater);andfinally,in relation Afterexaminingeach one of to individualor groupautonomyor particularity.

the originsof new social movementtheoriesstrictlyto This impliesthatin this paperI attribute Melucci,Offe, andEder.Thereason such as Touraine, social movementtheorists theEuropean to andtheorized lies in thatin the UnitedStatesnew social movementswereinitiallyresponded MeyerZald,andCharlesTilly. As by resourcemobilizationtheorists,namely,JohnMcCarthy, a result,the study of new social movementswas for a decade or so dominatedby resource mobilizationtheory, which is not strictlya "new" social movementtheory but is in fact a actionin termsof losses andgains.As a result, andcalculativetheorythatmeasures rationalistic resourcemobilizationtheory does not specifically respondto what is "new"in new social new social movements movements.This, of course,does not deny the fact thatthe European theory has been gaining increasinginfluence in NorthAmerica(see: Della Portaand Diani, 1999: 3; Foss and Larkin,1986: 10-27). Among new social movementtheorists,Melucci has been an arch critic of resourcemobilizationtheory(Melucci, 1989: 21-23, 192-94; 1996b: 65-67; Cohen, 1985: 663; Canel, 1992;Della PortaandDiani, 1999: 9).

in theNew SocialMovement Theory 613 A Critique of Ultimate Referentiality these theses, I will argue that Melucci's operative assumptionof an ultimate groundstems froma parochialnotionof the political. This assumptionprevents him from making the necessary conceptual break with the older theories of social movements. Thus, the objective of this paper is not to launch an immanentcritiqueof Melucci's theory.Rather,it tries to probethe internallogic of his social movement theory in orderto show how a foundationalistmodel of analysis binds his theory. I will conclude the paper by pointing out the merits of an approachto new social movementbased on a critiqueof ultimate referentialityas well as the constitutiverole of the political.

The Postindustrial Society

thesis comes from a critical appropriaConceptually,Melucci's postindustrial tion of Touraine'sidea of the postindustrial society as a society in which there no longer exists any centralactor (e.g., the proletariat).Despite his criticisms of Touraine's theory of the postindustrialsociety and new social movements social transforma(Melucci, 1984: 826), Melucci drawson some fundamental tions that show affinity with those identifiedby Touraine.As such, he alludes in orderto explain the emergence to the "changesin historicalcircumstances" of new social movements (Melucci, 1988a: 245; 1989: 19). According to Melucci, certain processes in our societies reflect these changes. First, with the collapse of the distinctionbetweenpublic andprivatespheres,that took place after WWII, the individual's needs have become the expressions of the individual's particularity vis-a-vis the totalityof society. Secondly, since due to the first operation, domination is now understood as a fact of everyday life, opposition to the sources of dominationappearsas deviance and marginality. Thirdly,as a consequence,the strugglesfor groupautonomyandfreedomfrom political interventionpromptmovementsto act out theirpracticeslargely in the culturalfield insteadof politics. Fourthly,emphasison groupparticularity and identitybecomes a formof resistanceagainstpower within the culturalmilieu. Finally, with the increasingimportanceof identity as the quest for autonomy, direct participationin the form of action-groupsis stressed, and representational politics (as in conventional political parties) is largely abandoned of the new movements (Melucci, 1980: 218-221). Melucci's characterizations are widely rearticulatedby other authorsin the field (Carroll, 1992; Larafia, Johnston& Gusfield, 1994; Foweraker,1995; Della Portaand Diani, 1999). Melucci announces the end of the industrial "cycle" which included industrialconflicts (between managementand workers),the issue of nationhood, and finally, the extension of political rights to the excluded. This end, however, does not mean the end of struggles for citizenship or democratic expansion of rights (Melucci, 1988b: 330). Rather,the end of the industrial cycle means that contemporarysocial conflicts have become increasingly

Journal of Sociology 614 Canadian of the In this respect,he launchesan extensiveinvestigation divergent. (Melucci, aspectsof social movements cognitiveand "phenomenological" the "linear logic of 1996a).Viewingthe actorsas capableof transcending he rightlysuggeststhat collective action cannotbe stimulus-response," toward This attitude determinations. structural explaineddirectlythrough dueto notes,is partly asMelucci action, analysing thenewtypesof collective thathave action" of human theories in cognitive andconstructive "advances (1988b:330-31). He us sensitiveto collectiveactionphenomena rendered of a newfieldof conflicts, theformation thattoday"wecanobserve suggests capitalist complexor advanced belongsto postindustrial, whichspecifically anddifferent arediverse Thesenewconflicts 1984:826).2 societies" (Melucci, societyis basedon (orpostindustrial) information" the"high-density because of individual autonomous that a myriad presupposes a complex system 1989:45). of information (Melucci, andproducers receivers tends autonomy society,group of postindustrial component As a structural of democracy, closely Theinstitutional conception to radicalize democracy. of different tendencies canhardly thediverse tobyliberalism, embody adhered andprivate between public Thewaning distinction incomplex societies. actors thestateand between alsomeans thatthedistinction in thesesocieties spheres of the "post-industrial This is the paradox civil society is diminishing. and press for integration On the one hand,the institutions democracy." and in terminals the at On the myriad other,standing participation. political and strive forgroup actors various autonomy theinformation universe, around 1989:171). from suchintegration withdraw (Melucci, anddeliberately identity one for Meluccito the extentthat he is an alarming The lattertendency as a problematic thoseof ethnicgroups) considers identity politics(specially he of post-industrial democracy," issue (1996b:157-59). The "paradoxes andthe needsfor for integration "arelinkedto boththe pressures observes, theeffortsfor embody building" (1992:69). New socialmovements identity As such,through thepolitical institutions. struggles vis-ai-vis building identity new the state from freedom intervention, and collective autonomy to attain from and thoseissuesthathavebeenexcluded by uncover socialmovements for a new democracy they are movements politicaldecisions.Therefore, (Melucci, conceptof emancipation (Melucci,1992:68). Theirself-limiting of of the"democracy to offertheconcept 1992:73) allowsthesemovements as the conditionfor recognition, everydaylife" and perceivedemocracy 1988a: andself-affirmation 258-59). (Melucci, autonomy,

2. Note how Melucci takes the terns postindustrial,complex, and advanced capitalist as society does notend there.He synonymous.His generouslist of fancy namesfor postindustrial (1981: 99). (1984: 831; 1996a: 128, 144) and"latecapitalist" also calls it "post-material"

in theNew SocialMovement Theory 615 Referentiality A Critique of Ultimate

era,as mentioned, putsanendto the ideaof societyas Thepostindustrial of to Touraine, the originator of thisconception According a unifiedtotality. society,Westernsocietieshave becomesites of conflict the postindustrial the bearerof the one and only where"no single actorcan be considered - not even the state(Touraine, 1988:38-39, 56). Surprisingly, rationality" Touraine toreject therather classical(Marxist) however, thisdoesnotinstigate conflict.Although he points ideathatin everyperiodthereexistsone central or out that social movementsare not agents of history,modernization, the existenceof a pluralityof movements, liberationand acknowledges andproduction insiststhatin anygiventypeof socialorganization Touraine only one conflict - or, to state it with precision,"onecentralcouple of socialmovements" (Touraine, 1985:773) - dueto the structural conflicting withthepotential to bring the status quo of society,is endowed configuration foreachclassin eachtype to a halt.Thus,there"isonlyone socialmovement in Scott,1991:42). Thereasonformakingthis of society"(Touraine quoted of any conflict:the field of conflictis claim lies in the threecomponents of theactor, anopponent, theidentity andfinally, determined defining through to thesameplane,thesethree thatis to be won.Belonging thecultural totality constituents expressthe centralconflict of a given type of society. "For andworkers werein conflict society management example,in an industrial Thesethreecomponents, aboutthe social controlof industry. management, arehomogeneous" 1985:760). (Touraine, workers, industry, in thisrespect "critical distance" fromTouraine Despiteanacknowledged argument (Melucci,1989:80, n. 2), Meluccistill seemsto acceptTouraine's that some movementsby essence play a pivotalrole that can be notably "Even fortheexisting socialsystem. He writes: I amnot though consequential movement of complex thatthereare in search of thecentral society,I maintain collective action capableof affectingthe logic of forms of antagonistic theory,the acknowledged complexsystems"(1989: 73). As in Touraine's of socialmovements doesnotpersuade Meluccito rejectthe ideaof plurality between one centralconflictfor each type of society.Thus,the difference and Meluccion the issue of the centralconflict is rathersubtle. Touraine in whichthe in thevigourof a systemanalysis Touraine his assertion grounds withinthesocialstructure of theactors position(onemaysafelysay,identity) arepre-constituted actorswhostruggle is pregiven: workers andmanagement to controlthe industry (fieldor stakeof conflict).ForMelucci,however,the - butit is now - andtherefore, constant field of conflictremains pregiven of theirstructural a generalstakeopento all actorsregardless position.
anddispersedin the actionsof differentsocial groups.At The antagonisticstrugglesarefragmented any given momentthe generalconflict is expressedby the groupor groupsmost directlyconcerned by a developmentdirectedfromabove. Thefield of oppositionremainsconstant,not the actorv. It is by startingwith what is at stake thatthe actorscan be identified.The conflicts of late capitalism

616 Canadian Journal of Sociology

continueto be playedout around production, appropriation, anddistribution of socialresources.Yet the actorsoccupyingthe field of conflictualrelationscan change,andit is up to empiricalanalysis to identifythem. (Melucci, 1981: 100)

Melucci, in other words, does not accept the notion of structurally predetermined identities. Actors cannot be constant because their identities will inescapablyundergochangesin the processof conflict. He views identitynot as substantial(structurallypregiven) but processual (Melucci, 1996a: 52; 1995b). However, he still holds that conflicts are pregiven structurally. It is throughthis observationabout identity and conflict that Melucci's analysis tends to incorporate the versatilitythat is resultedfrom social conflicts. And as we will see, it is precisely here that Melucci's theory fails to adequately accountfor action in new social movement.3 Melucci not only views new social movements as the movements of the postindustrial era, he also perceivesthemas a certainresponseto the failureof modernizationand an urge towardsit at the same time. The new movements push towarda developmentthathas been constantlyimpededby the political system and the institutionalizationof developmental requirements.They This objectiveis achievedthrough resistances struggleagainstsuchhindrance. against repression and the opening of the institutions (Melucci, 1981: 104-117). They are also, at least in the case of Italiannew social movements, of the Left"(Melucci, 1981: 113). responses "to the institutionalization

to see how Melucci'stheoryis in many respectsa direct,often point-to3. For readersinterested theory,the issue of "sociologicalintervention" point,responseto his teacher's,i.e., Touraine's, should be interesting.Identifyingthe centralconflict is the task of Touraine's"sociological - anintervention intothe studyof social entrance thatfacilitates the researcher's intervention" society?)(Touraine,1981:9). a postindustrial movementsas an agent of social change(toward comes close to AlthoughMeluccidoes not fully endorsethisambitiousproject,he nevertheless Touraine'sidea. Criticizingthe assumptionthat the action of a movement will necessarily betweenthe meaning(Melucci, 1989:239), Melucciviews the relationship containa "higher" However,Meluccidrawson his own definitionof as an "exchange." actorandthe researcher in orderto suggestthat andvariability the postindustrial society thatemphasizesdifferentiation knowledge in such a social system becomes an indispensableresourcefor the actors. As a type of actor"(a notion which echoes Touraineonce again), the researchercan "particular Theresearcher andthe providethe movement'sactorswithknowledgesof theirsocialrelations. relationshipby "the recognitionof a demand for actor are broughtto their "contractual" however,he specifies thatthere"is nothing Partingways with Touraine, cognitive resources." andtheactor],andit does betweenthe researcher aboutit [i.e.,abouttherelationship missionary (Melucci, not imply expectationsaboutthe destinyof the actorson the partof the researcher" in theinformation age, theexpert'sknowledgebecomes 1992:51; Melucci, 1995b:58). Rather, is a reciprocal(Melucci, relationship a valued resourcefor actors.Thus,the actor-researcher one (Melucci, 1995b:59-60). 1996b:391) and contractual

A Critique of Ultimate Referentiality in theNew SocialMovement Theory 617 Middle Class Radicalism

Melucci'sidentification of theclassbasisof thenewmovements exemplifies a schematic thatis generallyaccepted to by othersin this field. According in theWesthavetheirsocialoriginsin Melucci,new socialmovement actors the "newmiddleclass"or "human capital class,"in themarginal layersof the andfinally,in the"oldmiddle labour market, class"(Melucci, 1988b: 344).He further identifies two sub-classes of the newmiddleclass:"The'newmiddle class' consistsof at least two groupsof people: new elites who are just the alreadyestablished emergingand are challenging elites, and 'human whoexperience capital' professionals, boththesurplus ofpotentialities offered bythesystemanditsconstraints" (1988b: 334;see alsoMelucci,1989:52-53). Melucci'sschematization of the classbasisof the new movements is admitfromthemodelproposed tedlya borrowing by newsocialmovement theorist, ClausOffe(Melucci,1989:53).Inhistheory, Offemadea distinction between threelayersof middleclass:(1) thenewmiddleclass(2) the old middleclass (3) people outsidethe labourmarketin peripheral positions(Offe, 1985: 831-32). Melucci's interestin searchingfor a class analysisof the new movements comes fromhis effortto offera demographically ascertainable conflictual scheme. Meluccicriticizes Offefortheorizing thenewmovements in terms of marginality and deviancebecauseOffe's framework, however cannot"manage to ground the conflictual andantainteresting, theoretically of the new movements" gonisticcharacter (Melucci,1981: 101).Onlysuch theposition of theindividual grounding, argues Melucci,candetermine vis-a'vis modernvalues and therebythe social structure. In otherwords,one's is defined identity byone'splacein thecurrent of society.Class configuration is essential to a theory of newsocialmovements because the"capacity analysis forconstructing a collective inthe[available] is rooted setof resources identity (suchas educational achievement, professional skills, and social abilities)" distinction. The new (Melucci,1989:53). Hereinlies a subtlebutimportant movements a newgenusof classpolitics: thenewmiddle-class mayrepresent or middlein contrast to the olderworkingpolitics.But as Offerecognizes, a class" classpolitics,thispoliticsof class is "noton behalfof (Offe, 1985: 833). of Offe'sclassanalysis Melucci'scritical adoption signifieshis motivation in a actors. forthe sociological of newsocialmovement "locating" However, andfor good lateressay,Meluccicommendably retreats fromclass analysis, reasons:
I have graduallyabandonedthe concept of class relationshipsto addressthe question of systemic tool with which to analysis conflict.... The notionof class relationships has been forme a temporary systemic conflicts and forms of dominationin complex societies.... But in contemporary systems where classes as real social groupsare witheringaway.... (Melucci, 1995a: 117)

of Sociology Journal 618 Canadian His turningaway from a class analysisof new social movementsindicates between identityand the social base is more thatfor Melucci the relationship complex than a relationshipbased on mediatingculturalpractices(Melucci, 1996b). The acknowledgedconceptualproblems of class analysis, however, does not instigate Melucci to take the crucial step furtherand question the and conflicts. pregivennessof social structures

The Placeof Identityin NewSocialMovements

Despite their differences, Europeannew social movement theorists almost They as identity-claims. thesemovementsprimarily characterize unanimously against see in the new movementstheiractors'assertionof theirparticularity universalidentities (e.g., nationor class), as well as their depre-constituted mand for universalsocial recognitionand political inclusion. Among prominent Europeannew social movement theorists,Melucci takes the issue of identity with utmost attention and treats it as his central concern. Consequently,he offers a sophisticatedtheoryof the place of identityin new social movements. Melucci discussesthe significanceof identityin the new movementsat the micro level and in due detail. In his analysis of collective action, Melucci of a "we"(a collective identitythroughnegaemphasizeson the construction organizedaround commonorientations tion) by a groupof individualsthrough three axes. The first orientation,the relationsof actorsto the "ends"of their action, gives actorsthe directionof their action. The second orientation,the relations of actors to the "means"throughwhich the action is carriedout, shows them the possibilities as well as the limits of their action. The final identifies the orientation,the relationshipof actors to their "environment," "produce" field withinwhich theiractiontakesplace. These threeorientations collective action, not vice versa. This is what he calls a "multipolaraction system."Collective action, therefore,is by no means "a unitary empirical phenomenon"(Melucci, 1988b: 332-333; 1992: 49; 1985: 793; 1995b: 44; 1996b: 5). A social movement is not "a unified and homogeneous reality" (Melucci, 1995b: 53). The unity of a movement, if it exists at all, is the outcome of collective action, not its source; it is the "personage"of the movement (Melucci, 1984: 825). identity, throughthe concept of expectation,as the Melucci understands and individuals' determinants social-structural between concept intermediary the that introduces concept of expectations motivations.A "theoryof action 1988b: 340). He criticizes implies an underlyingtheoryof identity"(Melucci, the because presenceof the concept of despite resourcemobilization theory the mobilizationdownplays conceptof identity(Melucci, expectation,resource expectationthatthe actorperceiveshis 1988b:341). He holds thatit is through

A Critique of Ultimate Referentiality in theNew SocialMovement Theory 619 or her continuity within the environment- that is, in relationto other actors, opportunities, and constraints.Identity embodies the actor's continuity. But identity itself is a social phenomenon- that is, it comes from the existing "identity resources," i.e., the available cultural elements, which are in turn obtained from the knowledges and information available in the society (Melucci, 1988b:344). The concept of "identityresources" is betterunderstood when we thinkof the everydaypracticein which "social actorsgathertogether a ragbag of pre-existing culturalelements to express new contents for which an adequategrammarhas yet to be developed"(Melucci, 1989: 136). In other words, identity finds in society the conditions (resources) for its existence. Melucci defines collective identity as "an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientationsof theiraction as well as thefield of opportunitiesand constraints in which their action takesplace" (1989: 34). Collective identity entails three important dimensions:a cognitive formationof goals, means, andenvironment (which involves the actor'sself-identification,andthus,awarenessof his or her world); activating relations among actors; and finally, making emotional investments. As well, it may congeal into several possible configurations including organizational forms, systems of formal rules, or patternsof leadership (Melucci, 1989: 34-35). Beyond such configurations, however, collective identity is essentially a process of constructingan action system. This process entails two aspects:the actor's "pluralityof orientations"(that is, the actor's internalcomplexity), and his or her relationshipwith the environment (Melucci, 1988b: 342). Identity is, therefore, a shared definition of the opportunitiesavailable to, as well as the constraintsimposed upon, collective action. Social movements, then, are action systems because they have structuresbuilt by the presentgoals, opinions, resolutions,and exchanges that take place and operate within a systemic field (Melucci, 1985: 793). He proposes three analytical dimensions - conflict, solidarity and breakingthe system's limits of compatibility- to distinguishsocial movementsfromother forms of collective actions such as deviantbehaviour,competition,etc. (Diani and Melucci, 1988: 339; Melucci, 1989: 29, 74). It is a form of collective action based on solidarity that upholds a conflict to break the limits of the system in which collective action takesplace (Melucci, 1984: 825). Therefore, every conflict is always a conflict of identities (Melucci, 1996a: 35). Moreover, stressing one's identity signifies the actor's seeking a direct in collective action (Melucci, responseto personalneeds throughparticipation 1989: 49). Thus, it "definesour capacity to speak and to act autonomously the differentiationof our selves fromthose of otherswhile continuingto be the same person" (Melucci, 1996a: 29). Since identity is a process of attaining individualor groupidentity in a culturalfield, it "is not somethingthat is perwhich constructs manentlygiven. Instead,it is a process of identity-formation

620 Canadian Journal of Sociology andreconstructs itself in the life-courseof individualsandgroupsandthrough their differentfaces, roles, and circumstances" (Melucci, 1996b: 159). Thus, as mentioned,identitydesignates a process (Melucci, 1996a:51-53). Melucci's definition of social movement is based on his conception of collective action. A social movement is "an analytic constructand not an empirical object." It is an "ensembleof the various types of conflict-based behaviour ... for the appropriationand orientationof social values and resources, ... which transgress the norms that have been institutionalizedin social roles, which go beyond the rules of the political system"(he subordinatesthe second componentof his definitionto the first)(Melucci, 1980:202). Social movements are only one of many differentkinds of collective action (1996b: 30). The action that takes place within a movement establishes a concrete link between cultural orientationsof the actors and the systemic opportunitiesand constraints."Movementsare action systemsoperatingin a systemicfield of possibilities and limits," Melucci argues. "Thatis why the organizationbecomes a criticalpoint of observation,and analyticallevel too or reducedto formalstructures. often underestimated The way the movement actorsset up theiractionis the concretelinkbetweenorientationsand systemic to observethatjust like opportunities/constraints" (1985: 792). It is interesting Touraine,Melucci identifiesthe innercomponentsof a social movementas "a definition of the actor, the identificationof an adversary and an indicationof ends, goals andobjectivesfor whichto fight"(Melucci, 1992:57). Thatis why he suggestsin passingthatthe term"newsocial movements" is inadequate and be replacedby the term"movement network" shouldtherefore (Melucci, 1985: 799; 1988a: 247; 1989: 203). New social movementsbeara specialrelationship withidentity.As a cultural needsthatchallengethe force, a social movementdefines the group-particular social controlof needs (Melucci, 1996a:25). In the new movements,therefore, identitybecomes the emblemof groupor individualparticularity.
Defense of the identity,continuity,andpredictability of personal existenceis beginningto constitute the substanceof the new conflicts. In a structure in which ownershipof the meansof productions is becoming more and more socialized, while at the same time remainingunderthe control of particular groups, what individualsare claiming collectively is their right to realize their own identity: the possibility of disposing of their personal creativity, their affective life, and their existence... personalidentity- thatis to say, the possibility,on the biological and interpersonal biological, psychological, and interpersonal levels, of being recognizedas an individual- is the propertywhich is now being claimed and defended; this is the groundin which individualand collective resistanceis takingroot. (Melucci, 1980:218)

informationsociety), In the currentsocial conditions (of the postindustrial, identityemerges as a means of resistanceagainstthe formsof rationalization of life that do not incorporatedifferences. The features of the "identity movements"are: (1) control of the conditionsof life; (2) erosion of public-

in theNew SocialMovement of Ultimate A Critique Referentiality Theory 621

in empirically between private separation; (3) difficulty distinguishing protest orbetween deviance andsocialmovements; for a andmarginality, (4) search forparticipation communal and(5)search anddirect identity; action (Melucci, 1981:98-99; 1980:219-20).Identity is explained bymaking references to the inwhichidentity becomes of the symbolic grounds, meaningful andsubversive codesthatarecreated in high-density dominant information systems. Melucci as a challenge the"rationality" perceives identity against of domination (Melucci, 1981:134).As identity-claims, therefore, newsocialmovements strugandinstitutional gle for modernization changes,the selectionof a new elite, In the contextof information innovations. andcultural societyandidentitytranslate claims,new socialmovements actionintosymbolicchallenges that the dominant defy anddisturb codes,exposingtheirirrationality (especially thatof the new formsof technocratic power).Indeed,the new movements that become the message emerge as signs, i.e., as forms (of movement) the formof the (Melucci, 1988a:248-49). Due to its symboliccharacter, movementemergesas the message- thatis, "self-referential" (Melucci, the (domination 1989: 60, 74) - therebyundermining of the) systemic Withconflictstaking rationality. placewithin thefieldsof codes,knowledge, the newmovements andlanguage, assume theformof networks in immersed life (Melucci,1988a:247-48). Similarto Touraine, the everyday therefore, Melucciviewsthenewmovements asforcesof democratization inwhichidentermas it is, standsas the emblemof the contemporary tity, an inadequate formsof collectiveaction(Melucci,1989:46). ButunlikeTouraine, Melucci theideathatthenewmovements the"older" onesas thesubject rejects replace of socialchange.Socialmovements, maintains Melucci,arenot"subjects endowedwithanessenceanda purpose within apiecewhosefinaleis knowable" (1988a:245; see also 1989:25). andformulations Theobservations of theplaceof identity in thecontempolead Meluccito make and maintaina distinction rary social movements betweensociety andpolitics,andsubsequently, to criticizethe idea of the primacyof the political,whichhe calls "political reductionism" (Melucci, 1988b:337-38; 1989:43; 1995b:54; 1995c:288) - i.e., reducingsocial to oneof its components movement (Melucci,1996b: 35, 198).Theweakness of the traditional theories of socialmovements, he maintains, cannotsee the shifttoward newmovements' culture 1995b: thatthe (Melucci, 42). Heargues cultural models and within cannot fall theexisting present symbolic challenges As Melucciputs it: "There are dimensions of social political institutions.
phenomena affective or symbolic relationships, for instance which

beconsidered aspolitical cannot because to a different theyfunction according to respectandnot to violate"(1988a: logic, whichit is therefore necessary in which"apoliticalactor 253). As such,he reduces politicsto the situation interacts withpoliticalauthorities":

622 CanadianJournalof Sociology

if only to start Even to changethese rules,then,one is defacto forcedto recognizesuch boundaries, sense in orderto stress I definepoliticsin sucha narrow interacting or negotiatingwithauthorities. dimensionsof actionwhich the factthatnot everythingis political,thattherearesocial andcultural representative of precisely areneverentirelytranslated intopolitics.Theidentityissuesarecertainly means of expressionthey can such a dimensionof social life, and if they fail to find appropriate of a collectiveactorinto a politicalactor.(Melucci, 1996b: come in the way of the transformation 187)

By limiting himself to a parochialand formalnotion of politics (as political institutions),Melucci advocatesthe idea of society as the principaldomainof action and the ultimate source of meaning that stands prior in relation to politics. Let us elaborateon this crucialpoint.

for UltimateGrounds Trap:Searching The Referential

Thereis no doubtthatEuropeannew social movementtheoristslike Melucci to contemporary contributions social movementtheory. have made important the conceptualend of society as an To be specific, Meluccihas acknowledged determination andhistorical(or developenclosed totalityin which structural mental) destination define the place(s), attributes,and contents of social allowed Melucci to rethinkand elements or the actors.This acknowledgment class (as a demographic criticize ideasthathingeon notionsof social structure, the or and Diani, 1999: 11). Furthermore, objectivity), agency (Della Porta issue of the continuity of the actor, which Melucci raises, represents a persistent theoretical problem that every social movement theory needs to address.Melucci has also acknowledged,quite correctly,and made efforts to movements. analyse,the centralityof appealsto identitywithincontemporary awareness" (Melucci, 1995b:42) In spite of his call for an "epistemological in the studyof new social movements,however,Meluccihas neitherbeen truly able nor willing to give up the notion of society as the unique,pregiven, and ultimatesource of meaning.Althoughhe acknowledgesthatcollective action (Melucci, 1995b:43) and preconditions" is not a "simpleeffect of structural rejects simple causal analysis (Melucci, 1995b: 62), his pivotal task is to theoretically secure the concept of new social movements in a grounding thesis, however critical, notion of society. His adoptionof the postindustrial of society that indicates his search for a presumedhistoricaltransformation provides theory with an explanatoryground - i.e., an ultimate point of of the new referencethat rendersmeaningfulclaims aboutthe raison d'e^tre assumption movements.Typically,sucha view needsto makethefundamental that society is the a prioriof its constituentelements.A classical sociological of phenomenacannotadequately conception,the methodof social grounding explore the variousfacets of the emergingphenomenaand their oblique and perplexing,often concealed, relationswith othersocial phenomena.As such,

of Ultimate in theNew SocialMovement A Critique Referentiality Theory 623 theoretical approaches based on social grounding frequently and violently reduce the existing phenomenain their entiretyto those phenomenalaspects thattheorycan accommodate.In otherwords,an assumedultimategroundputs into operationa certainkindof selective observationand conditionsa specific mode of interpretationin theory.Moreover,such an assumedultimacymakes erroneousconceptualdivisions betweendomainsof social life in order to hide its own operation and thereby evade criticisms rightfrom the outset. I call "ultimate referentiality"the theoretical assumptionof an ultimate ground. Ultimate referentiality- a termthatI borrowed,with modifications,from the radical phenomenology of Reiner Schurmann(1987) - designates various kinds of operative assumptionsprevailing in much of the social sciences. In Melucci's theory, despite repeatedassurancesthat it is no longer an enclosed totality, "society" functions as an ultimate referentiality,a point at which social inquiry, which by definition is an inquiryinto society, stops. Ultimate referentialitiescan be detected by identifyingthe point of stoppagein inquiry a point, ironically, which is always the highest point of explanation.This point of stoppageintimatesa point of moorageof explanationthatreceives its high and seemingly uncontestedstatus from the theory itself. It is simply a theoretical construct. In Melucci's case, ultimate referentialityunveils the assumption about the transparent(but mediated) rationality of the ground called society. ThroughMelucci's theoreticalconstruction, society is rendered the "real,"i.e., the unique and objectively ascertainablerealm of bestowal of meaning upon social movements' practices. Let us explicate the way Melucci's assumption governs his new social movement theory. He announcesthe end of society as enclosed totality and thus rejects structuraldetermination.His moving away from a class analysis of new social movements attests to this fact. However, Melucci misses an importantpoint: thefact that society no longer representsa totality does not mean that it has lost its principle of total representation.Melucci does not distinguish between the two. As such, he mistakes the representation of particulars (new social movements)as the end of total representation of with the source society. Put differently,he mistakesthe kindof representation of representation. Thus, he still assumes society as an ultimate referentiality. If, as Melucci puts it, society has lost its statusas a totality, it must have also lost its statutoryposition as the sourcefromwhich all explanationsarederived. Put accurately,if society has lost its principleof total representation,if society is no longer capable of coherently representingall its components,then its componentsare no longerfully understoodor explainedsolely in relation to the referentialityof this now phantasmictotality.Hereinrests a contradiction: Melucci claims that society as such has come to an end, yet he still retains society's conceptual principle of referentialityby searching for the fields of action. Bound by such a principle, Melucci does not see that a movement

624 Canadian Journal of Sociology towarda non-totalistic concept of society is inevitablylinked with a radical critiqueof those conventionsin the social sciences which hold the society as the principleof ultimaterepresentation. In this view of society, a phenomenon is "explained" once its relationsto the pregivenandconstitutivesocial texture are exposed; it is explainedonly when it receives meaningfrom the society thatis perceivedas the a priori, ontologicallyprivilegedground.Theoristslike Melucci invest considerablyon theirassumptions aboutsociety. So much so thatif the woodenleg of thepresumed ultimacyof society is tackled,theentire theoretical edifice will crumble. Now, with the ultimate referentialityof society identifiedas theprincipalconceptualproblemof Melucci's new social movementtheory,let us discuss in moredetail how the operationsof ultimate referentialityhides its own traces. A modality of thinkingthat is boundby a desire for ultimate grounding reducesthe new movementsto the expressionsof the postindustrial society in Melucci. Whetherthe postindustrialsociety is a notion that can be posited without having recourse to the new movements to justify its grounding presence remainsdebatable.In otherwords,one critiqueof Melucci's theory can indeedstartfromthepositionthatit is in fact the emergenceof new social movements that render a Western society postindustrial through their multiplicationof loci of conflict and rejectionof universalisticmodels, not vice versa. After all, both in Touraine and Melucci the shift toward the informationsociety designatesa fundamental social transformation and not of industrial simply a shift fromthe production Without goods to informatics. the theoretical of thepostindustrial construction andMelucci society, Touraine could not have explainedthe groundedness of new social movements. thesis runsinto a series of factualproblems. Moreover,the postindustrial Both TouraineandMelucci almostcompletelydisregard the presenceof new social movementsin non-western societies. Eurocentric as it seems, theirview bars them from seeing the fact thatdespite the endemic political repression, resolute or absolute poverty, and persistent "underdevelopment" that of characterize many the so-called Third World societies, new social movements have emerged and expandedin these societies. The theoretical constructsthat link new social movementsto the West throughthe works of Melucci andothersrendertheEuropean theoristsblindto the factof new social movements beyond the West. That almost none of the rather privileged conditionsexist conditionsthatthesetheoristsassociatewiththepostindustrial in Third World societies is blatantlyself-evident.But this cannotjustify the lack of serious consideration of new social movementsbeyondEurope.The presence of new social movements in non-western societies (e.g., gay, women's, or ecological movements)problematizesthe explanatorylinkage between the postindustrial society and new social movements.This problem in the worksof European new social movementtheoristshas not escapedtheir

in theNew SocialMovement A Critique of Ultimate Referentiality Theory 625 Latin Americancounterparts (Escobarand Alvarez, 1992). ArturoEscobar is specifically sharpin pointingout Touraine'sshortcomingin this respect (1992: 71). The criticismthatcertainmovements(e.g., variousecological movements) do not exist the way they do in Western societies does not really refute the existence of new social movements as such in non-Westernsocieties; rather, such a criticism seeks to exclude all those new social movements that do not conform to the pregiven models of Western theorists. The fact that in nonWesternsocieties new social movementsdo not seem as clear-cut as they may seem in the West (the latterpoint remainshighly debatable,of course) should not lead one to deny the presence and proliferationof these movements in the ThirdWorld. This clearly shows that the postindustrialsociety, as well as the social, political, and cultural conditions that have been associated with it, serves Melucci (and Touraine) as an ultimate source of explanation whose mysterious essence justifies the presence of the new movements. It is not difficult to discern similarities between Europeanand North American new social movements, on the one hand, and Latin American ones, on the other (Foweraker,1995: 26-27). David Slater observes that in Latin America "the surfacing of [new social] movements has not been depended on the specific political situationcreatedby militarydictatorshipsnoron a clear-cutdefeat of Left parties"(1985a: 2). In other words, no single factor can explain the rise of the new movements in Latin America. By implication, this means that the thesis turnsout to be a problematicinterveningvariablebetween postindustrial the social groundand collective action. If we set aside positivistic theses such as the postindustrial society, it would not be difficult to see thatwhatqualifies a movementas "new" is the rejection of universalisticmodelsof social change (thus, emphasison particularity),the denial of the ontologically pre-endowed, unitary historical agent, and resistances against privileging certain loci of struggle (e.g., economy) over others (e.g., gender, sexual preference). As such, new social movementsare global phenomena,but the contextsof their emergence are not global; nor are their organizationalforms,struggles, or objectives. This is precisely the point Melucci has missed by having anchorednew social movements in the ultimate of society. His foundationalist model is, ironically, abouta "new" referentiality generationof socialmovementsthatresistfoundationalistanduniversalmodels of acting and thinking. New social movements highlight the political reconfigurationof society based on identity, a new terrainof infinite proliferation and micro politics. While Melucci recognizes the centralityof identity to the new movements, he seeks to locate identity-claims within the pregiven field of social, thereby viewing identity as mere expressionsof some "deeper"fundament.In orderto show the link he needs a series of conceptualizations.He adoptsa motivational view of identity by suggesting that "participation in collective action is seen

626 Canadian Journal of Sociology to have no value for the individual unless it provides a direct response to personalneeds" (Melucci, 1989: 49). Furthermore, he holds the position that identity comes from the existing "identityresources"which are in turnprocuredfrom the knowledges and informationavailablein the society. Society imposes itself as the ultimate condition of existence of identity. That is precisely why in Melucci's framework identitycannotbe meaningfulwithout a preconceivednotion of society. The idea thatpriorto its surfacingidentity "hibernates" somewherewithinthe social texturefinds its clearestutterance in Melucci's concepts of "latency"and "visibility."These two concepts appear in several of Melucci's works (Melucci, 1984: 829; 1988a: 248; 1985: 800-801; Della Portaand Diani, 1999: 89). Accordingto Melucci, the actors
become visible only where a field of public conflict arises;otherwisethey remainin a state of the potentialfor resistanceor oppositionis sewn latency.Latencydoes not meaninactivity.Rather, into the very fabricof dailylife. Itis locatedin themolecularexperienceof the individuals or groups who practicethe alternative meaningsof everydaylife. (1989: 71)

In otherwords, the actor's identityprecedesconflict, for it is pregivenby the It is not the conflict (the political) that is constitutiveof the social structure. actor'sidentity(the social). Thatis why Melucci seeks to show how and when identities such as "gender,culture,sexual preferences,and ethnicity become political issues" (Melucci, 1996b: 188, italics added).Actors are completely - Melucci calls them "fields of action" the productsof social arrangements that assign them certain modes of action. Collective actions "areprepolitical because they are rooted in everyday life experiences; and metapolitical because political forces can never represent them completely" (Melucci, 1989: 72). Thus, certainactorsare endowed with the capacity for resistanceagainstotheractorsdueto theirspecific pregivensocial dispositions. Regardless of the possibility of ever entering conflictual situations, they nonethelessremainactors. This line of argumentsuggests that the actor precedes action. It is, then, of the actorsthatnew social movements only due to the social predispositions "have created meanings and definitions of identity which contrastwith the increasing determinationof individual and collective life by impersonal technocraticpower"(Melucci, 1988a:247). Actors are by essence in conflict institutional ortechnocratic withthecurrent power.ForMelucci,therefore,the identityof actor stemsfrom a potential to carryout an assigned or perceived form of action, regardlessof thefact that action, therebyidentity,can arise solely in conflictualsituation.Identityprecedessocial situationsandconflicts social constitution.Latencyprovides because it is a productof a fundamental Melucci with a key conceptual link between the "objective"conditions as given by social structures and stratification, on the one hand, and the possibility of resistance and action, on the other. If there is a potential for

in theNew SocialMovement A Critique of Ultimate Referentiality Theory 627 resistance, it has to be knowablepriorto action. Society is the source of such knowledge. Melucci's entire theory of identity is indeed symptomatic of a general tendency, in the social sciences, of seeking representationsof some presupposed,concealed fundaments. Accordingly, despite his self-acclaimedcriticism of theoriesthat are based on "structuraldetermination"(Touraine) or universal rationality (resource mobilization), Melucci's approachto new social movements hinges on showing the transferenceof a presumed mysterious essence from its exclusive ultimacy - i.e., the society - to the actor as the bearerof this essence who will reveal it throughhis or her action. As I will show below, Melucci's desire for an analysis based on ultimate referentiality stems from his parochial conception of politics. He mistakes society, which is itself the productof the political as the primalinstitutionof society (Lefort, 1988: 218)- andthe shaping thereafterof social life - to be the ultimate ground. Ultimate referentialityis a trap:it is constructedby theory to hold theory in accordwith the truthof an objective reality, and it takes away the ability of theory to question its own presuppositions.It constructsan entire theoretical framework to safeguard the phantasmicpresence of a fundament with the armourof objectivity.

Towarda Non-Referential SocialMovements Theory

By now, it should be apparentthat as ultimacy, society does not refer to a complex yet open aggregateof peoples, institutions,and the relationsbetween them. Rather,for Melucci it refers to a pregiven and preexisting fundament that is mysteriously endowed with the unrivalled capacity of bestowal of meaning. As a rationalstructure, society is the sourceaction. It is not the "context"of action (identity-claims),but their "ground." Despite his claim thatthe relationshipbetween groundand action is complex and indirect (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 57), Melucci mistakesthe "explanation" with the exposition of an ultimate, rationalground. I thereforesubmitthatMelucci's appealto such a fundamentmainly stems from an erroneousdistinctionbetween society andpolitics. We saw earlierthat he rejects the idea of the primacy of politics, calling it "political reductionism." His self-imposed limited notion of politics (as the terrainof dissemination of power throughpolitical institutions that make decisions, implement them, andregulateconflicts) automaticallymakeshim take society as the field of conflict and action that is separatefrom politics. As such, he disregardsa principal facet of modern life: "the political" - which is not reducible to it in everydayspeech (i.e., institutionalpolitics) "politics"as we understand is the origin of the social, for every social positioningandconfigurationhas its roots in the hegemonic constitutionand configurationof society.

628 Canadian Journal of Sociology It is this radicalview of the political thatsets limits, as Laclauand Mouffe recognized, upon social objectivity and rejects the "positivityof the social" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 93). That is why we have differentsocial groups anddifferenttypesof conflictsin differenttypesof society. Forexample,recall comparativelyWestern, liberal societies as opposed to those of the former socialist bloc. Differenttypes of society indeed referto differenthegemonic constitutionsand signify differentmomentsof the political institutionof society. This meansthatconflicts stem fromcertaincontext-specifichegemonic configurationsin which the formationof both "us"and "them"is eventually contingent upon the initiatives,issues and strategiesof one's "other." These antagonismscannotbe knownfrom the outset,nor can they be decipheredby looking at social structures. New social movementsshould be understood in these terms. The political, understoodas a field of antagonism,does not designate an ultimate ground,because it refers to the (counter-)hegemonic conflictualrepositioningthatconstantlyrearranges the make up of our societies. Therefore,the emergenceof new social movementsis not expressiveof some deeper fundament,but attests to their constitutiverole in the political reshapingof contemporary societies throughthe articulation of antagonisms. Everyexclusion, every identity-claim, every formof social protestis now seen primarilyas a political act. Thus, new social movementsreferto the ongoing attemptsat political reinstitution of societies acrossthe worldin an age when the universalprojectsof modernityare in deep crisis. Olderapproachesand frameworks basedon foundationality andreferentiality of a rationalstructure cannotadequatelygraspthe "newness" of new social movements.If we accept my earlierobservation thatthe new movementsareglobalphenomena buttheir contexts of emergence are not global, then we should start thinking about action andmovementsin termsotherthanreferentiality. The leap fromone to the othermay not be as simple as it seems, because by virtueof its constitution, sociology has been modernity'schosendisciplinenotonly to discoverthe rationallaws of society, butalso to carryout, through its programs, the project of universalprogress.If new social movementschallengeuniversalmodels of progressanddevelopment(a point virtuallyall new social movementtheorists, in Westernandnon-western includingMelucci, have acknowledged) societies, then sociology (and social movementtheory)must also give up its desire for the new movements. rationalgroundingin orderto understand Muchis to be gainedfroma non-referential sociology of social movements. new social movementsreveal In light of this critiqueof ultimatereferentiality, themselves as loci where action signifies attemptsat the counter-hegemonic of society. A non-referential to social movepolitical (re-)institution approach ments takes action as "proactive,"and not, as is the case with Melucci, "reactive." Action is not a response,howevercomplex andmediated,to structuralstimuli,butin fact, the momentof creativity,in which a decision is made

in theNew SocialMovement of Ultimate A Critique Referentiality Theory 629

in thecontextof action.The thatmanifest themselves outof thepossibilities decisionto be harboured in the ultimacy of society(Meview thatperceives lucci) is inevitablybasedon a parochial of politics.This view conception cannot see thatsucha decisionis nota decisionatall, forit cannot the change fromwhichit arises. structure is closelyrelated Moreover, action topower asit emanates formthespecific of society.As such,eachmodeof actionandeach hegemonic configuration socialmovement should be understood according to theirspecificcontexts of Thesociologistshouldseekto identify thecontexts whichmake antagonism. articulations antagonistic (demands) possiblewithouttryingto turnthese contextsinto referential, rationalfoundations. Thus, we can speak of the of women's forinstance, of universality thecontexts movements, by showing theiremergence. Since thesecontextsareverydifferent anddiverseacross we canonly speakof women'smovements cultures, as pluralbecauseof the of thesemovements. irreducible proliferation Further more,as deconstruction is an outcomeof the hegemonic showsus, identity of society.As formation of socialmovements, banners identities call ourattention to investigate how thehegemonic of societyshiftsthepolitical configuration terrain suchthatthe consequent marginalization or exclusionof certain issues createsthe "conlack"thatgives rise to antagonistic stitutive identities (LaclauandMouffe, 1985).Deconstruction showsus thatidentitiesare always negative(or decentred)in the sense thatthey articulate antagonistic positionsvis-a-vis an anessence.An example of suchnegativity enemy; theydo notdesignate is the 1999WTOprotestin Seattlein whichthe hegemonization of severalissues (trade,labour,ecology, freedom)by WorldTradeOrganization brought anaggregate of numerous together movements intoa counter-hegemonic front to fightfor democratic, human notprofit") decisions.As a ("people oriented constitutive lack, WTO'smonopolyover worldtrade,in the age of global of neoliberalism, domination set thecontextandgavethesemovements their identities andmadethe anti-WTO frontpossible.4 antagonistic
4. Here I need to acknowledgeand briefly respondto a possible objection.Variouspostmarxist, or Foucaultianapproaches- which are due to their suspicion of totalizing deconstructionist, models akin to my non-referentialsociology informed by Reiner Schurmann's radical phenomenology - are often criticizedto evade the questions of class or capitalism.While I cannotspeakforothertheories,I mustmentiona pointherein briefwithregardsto my proposed Froma radicalphenomenologicalviewpoint,forcesthatreducehumans sociological approach. to subjects of totalizing practices - from capitalism, the state, or, national liberation, to bureaucracy,mainstreammedical practices, or racism - are all different expressions of a modernity's"archic"(from arche: the foundingFirst)origination based on the "principleof reason" (Heidegger). As this paper has tried to argue, new social movements contest the thatreignsover the modem epoch by attempting to wrestpolitics fromthe reductiverationality handsof institutions of decision-making andapparatuses of executingdecisions. Of course,this

of Sociology Journal 630 Canadian A non-referentialsocial movement theory acknowledges the fact that certainmodes of actionareglobal. Thatis becausecertaincontextsof the new ecological devastation,injustice, movements are civilizational (patriarchy, theory condiscrimination,labour).But at the same time, a non-referential siders the global characterof movementsonly as a faqade.A non-referential approachto social movementsis highly attunedto differencesand does not attemptto drawuniversalprinciplesoutof those movementsthatseem similar. of new social movementsnot as a normative theglobalcharacter It understands of experiences categorizationand universalgroundingbut as the translation from one local context and languageinto those of another.Thus, it does not exclude, forexample,theThirdWorldecological movementsfromthe general category of new social movements because, allegedly unlike their Western thesemovementsareentangledwith issues of povertyandlabour counterparts, in non-Westernsocieties. Poverty and labour should be understoodas the specific con-textsof the ecological movementsin these societies. Understandof the new movementsrequiresa clear understanding ing the global character of civilizational as well as local con-texts. social movementtheorycalls for a new attitudetoward A non-referential action. Such a theoryis highly attunedto the practicesof social movementsas themcontextuallyratherthanreferentially.When they unfold.It understands tools and movements,it treatsits existing conceptsas temporary approaching allows these concepts to transformaccording to the elements that action unveils in the new context. John Holloway's insightful "reading"of the of IndigenousMayanpeasantsof as the banner conceptof "dignity," Zapatista Chiapas, stands out in this respect (Holloway, 1998). Only by such an how a social movementemerges attunementto the local can one understand as genuinely "new."As such, this approachseeks to go beyond the actual

practicesto does not meanthatmanyof these movementshave not fallenbackon institutional achieve their demands.However, the new movements' pluralityof loci of politics, which amountsto re-institutive attemptsat foundingpoliticsanew, shows thatwe must not seek one or superior)strategyagainstany sourceof oppressionin oursociety. Thatis precisely (unitary why in the case of WTOprotest(also known as "SeattleN30"),we have a pluralityof actors anarchism, student,communism,and from divergentpoliticalloci (labour,environmentalism, various others) that offer a plurality of alternativesolutions to the problemof unfairand sociologist, the convergenceof these movements oppressiveworld trade.To non-referential andreshape of frontsto pressure uponone issue suggestsnottotalizingsolutions,buta plurality the politics of trade.No one can globalized capitalism- indeed, an attemptat re-instituting predictthe outcomeof battlesagainstoppressiveand totalizingsystems,but we can be certain relativistcelebration thatbattlesareto be fought.This can be calledanythingbuttribalization, of pluralism,and thereby,the lack of theoreticalstipulationagainst right-wingpopulism(a - a chargeoften posed againsttheoriesthatrefuse to totalizingmovementby all standards) grantprivilegedstanceto any agents,sourcesof oppression,movements,or practices.

A Critiqueof Ultimate Referentialityin the New Social Movement Theory 631

conditions of emergence of newsocialmovements, whichis obviously thetask of sociologicalprojectof Melucci(as well as Touraine andOffe). Any explanation of thissortwill remain trapped in thereferential frameworks. A nonreferential sociologyseeksto identifythepossibilities thatnew socialmovements mightbear interms of thefuture openings inpolitical thought andaction. A non-referential sociology,therefore, humbly submits itself to the local andhasnodesireforultimate grounding anduniversal projects. It understands thatthe civilizational character of certaincontextsandthe actionsthattake place within these contextsrendera phenomenon global, not normative principles andcategories. A non-referential socialmovement theory learns to "listen" to action. As such,it freessociologyfromtheprison houseof assumed fundaments andpositivistic andrejuvenates concepts, it inorder to enter, along withnew socialmovements, into a possiblynewera.Forthosestill adhering to theuniversal sociological of modernity, projects to grounding theorizations andpositivistic categories, those,like Melucci,who even see (want?)"newness"to emanatefrom Europe,learningto listen requires a great,but reeffort. warding,

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