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A Discussion Framework
Evaluating the Successful Re-election of Mayor Michael L. Rama March 2012 to May 15, 2013
Part 1
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Preliminary Assessment
The project began with a competition analysis based on raw sampling data from the pro-administration Liberal Party and the opposition United Nationalist Alliance outlined as follows:
Part 2
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Middle-game Adjustments
Middle-game Adjustments
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Middle-game Adjustments
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While Rama was able to organize and empower 64 parallel organizations built around friendships he has forged with city government department heads and CEOs of home-grown companies during the consolidation stage around January 2013, Tommy increasingly relied on 34 allies among barrio captains, 51 newly formed voter fronts and/or alliances with urban-poor sector groups, and money to move volunteers led by untrained, inefficient leaders, says lawyer Jan Ponce, one of Ramas consultants. Team Rama had thousands of volunteers who served without pay or allowance. Tommy and his party also had thousands, all hired hands, ready for work because he had money to pay, Ponce adds. By the time Rama acquired momentum during most days of April 2013, the BOPK caught itself on the defensive on many fronts, drawing heavy fire on seven decisive issues integrity, experience, competence, charisma, health, performance, and platform all directed on Tommy for which altogether the party eventually failed to respond well, say analysts from the Campaigns & Image Group. Leaks on the BOPK-commissioned political tracking poll and voter preference survey conducted by students of the University of San Carlos and some of its professors, in which Osmena and the BOPK were lackluster and faring less than expected, have had created the strong public perception that Rama has finally gained the upper hand. Twelve days into May 13, during which concluding campaigns by Team Rama zeroed in on Tommys character, attitude toward people (peers and subordinates), performance as legislator and past mayor, and platform, the BOPK instead viciously counterattacked with negative campaigning, raising the specter of Ramas alleged ties with drug lords, Ramas failed marriage, and Ramas psychiatry record, that boomeranged altogether and hurt Tommy even more, analysts say. Despite massive election spending for some last-ditch attempt to wrest the initiative, the endgame turned tables in Ramas favour. Tommy lost 447 votes in Guadalupe, where up to 31,756 of its 32, 411voters turned up to cast their ballots and where he is a registered voter. Worse, in his own precinct, he lost to Rama 27 against one. Rama lost only in 29 of the 80 barrios and 547,681 electors that made up the citys political landscape.
March to October 2012 Phase I: The Moon Rake project was able to touch base with 64 organizations within Team Rama, succeeded in laying down the Seven-Item Issue Framework, completed indoctrination and trainings for speakers, and empowered them into community engagement through the use of 16 white papers; Phase II: Succeeded in touching base with senior citizen organizations across the wide demographic of 62,000 ageing men and women who are still qualified to vote, and influenced the organizing pace for Senior Citizens of Team Rama or Scooter for short. November to December 2012 Phase III: Touched base with media (radio, TV, newspapers) on social networks, especially Face Book, and planted the issue framework based on 16 white papers; Phase IV: Launched six propaganda initiatives for the grass-root level, riding on the crest of negative public perception and sentiment on key issues, especially the South Road Properties, corruption, and growing public debts incurred; Deployed eight comic strips emphasizing the major issue points; January to February 2013 Phase V: Revitalized speaker groups toward using refined white papers; March to May 10, 2013 Touched base with city council candidates for upgrades in messaging; Laid the ground work for special vote conversion operations and deployment of tactical facilities, including city-owned business, for election day.
SITUATION ANALYSIS
Getting MLR re-elected needs a STRONG LIFT from a set of valid issues close to the hearts and minds of the populaceaspirations and dreams to which voters can directly identify themselves to. Through COMMUNITY ORGANIZING and CONSULTATIVE APPROACH on an indirect, sublime, yet highimpact ISSUE INTERCEPTION, we can create and develop a new Social, Politico-Economic, and Ecology Development (SPEED) framework with the direct participation of communities. SPEED will serve as the master plan of city development, endorsed and supported by men and women in the urban poor, youth, industrial, services, agriculture, and faith-based sections of the local economy. The grass-root voters dreams and aspirations become Ramas own. They will find in Rama a clear reason to cast their vote for. They become stakeholders, instead of being kibitzers and fence-sitters. Their quest for solutions to their social and politico-economic needs form part of the Rama political agenda. SPEED will serve as the sounding board or an instrumentality for re-echoing our key messages. This holds the key to a high-impact, less costly campaign. The how-tos are shown here under.
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As illustrated below, voter preference tracking data from the UK Embassy shows TROs strength in popularity (18.44 percentage points), financial preparations (12.46 p.p.) and experience (6.91p.p). If weighed against a voter turnout of 85 percent and 522,476 electors, this combination of factors pinpoint where Tommys building blocks for support at 197,548 heads will be and where we should be using resources to undermine certain initiatives. Homestretch may run from 1.5% to as high as 4%, weighed against actual voter turnout on the day of balloting. This translates to a winning range of 5,750 votes (baseline) to 15,335.
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Section I Objectives
1.0 2.0 3.0 Build a Broad Multi-sector Base of Support Establish common ground with congressional and city councilor-candidates Empower Small Teams for Targeted Vote Conversions
FRAMEWORK
Cost-effective, low-profile, high-impact, barangay level organizing Target sectors: Urban, youth, stakeholders in industrial, services and farm cross-section, and faithbased groups Duration: 14 months Target: 526,476 individual voters in 192,760 households
Section II Strategies
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Community Relations, Communications, Coalition Building, Voter Conversion, Vote Delivery, Vote Protection
PART V Tools
Messaging framework Messaging Messaging Messaging Kit #1: 8 PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEED Kit #2: 32 graphic slides for Face Book deployment Kit #3: 48 issue interception modules for radio block timers Kit #4: 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations
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MK #2
MK #3
MK #4
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Strategy
IMPLEMENTATION FLOW
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Review P2O M2G Stimu li P2G P2S Refin e Finetune Refin e Refin e Review Regrou p
Rama Rama
Protecti on System
Delivery System
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Mind
Thinking
Stimulus Stimulus
Choices Choices Percepti Percepti ons ons Preferen Preferen ces ces
Decision
Heart
Vote
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Mother/Fat
Son
Son
Daugh
Figure 1
Type B: Friendship-centered
You
Frien dA
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Frien dB
Friend C
Friend D
Figure 2
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Figure 4
Organizing Structure across Six Target Fields
March 2012
Recruit, train, organize, empower six (6) team leaders (first level) These team leaders, who will be recruited from among Ramas staff, will assist implementation of Project Moon Raker in the following sectors: Industrial Services Agriculture/fishery Youth Urban poor Faith-based (Roman Catholic and other Christian/Bible-based denominations) LVC provides the operations center of the team, coordinates with MLR over staff assignments, procures equipment and supplies, and facilitates funding. MLR keynotes the first team meeting. ABC will conduct the one-day briefing and training for the team. The operations and responsibility structures will be presented.
Descriptio Descriptio n n
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Propaganda TOTAL
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10,000
JUNE:
Deploy MK# 4 and Speeches #1/2/3/4 of MK#5 Organize and sponsor barrio-level SPEED workshops 480 in 80 villages (3 rd level). We will provide the home venue, snacks, training supplies, and token cash allowance for each representative. Production of eight (8) PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEED framework Production of 32 graphic, issue-illustrative slides for Face Book deployment Production of 48 issue interception modules for radio block timers Production of 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations
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Descriptio Descriptio n n
Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL
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and token allowance will be provided. The adoption of the Cebu City SPEED plan will be the main deliverable, on top of collective decision to organize 80 peoples organizations (PO). Deploy MK#1 and Speeches #5/6/7/8 of MK#5
AUGUST:
We will assist in the registration of 80 PO. MLR adopts SPEED as part of the campaign platform. Deployment of eight (8) PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEED framework We will initiate house-to-house propagation of the SPEED message and recruitment of members who subscribe to our development platform; Deploy 48 issue interception modules for use by radio block timers Dreams and aspirations of each barrio, in accordance with SPEED plan, will be propagated and/or articulated in newspapers, radio, and TV issues in media, and in our own radio propaganda section. Deploy 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations Ramas congressional and city council allies adopt SPEED. The SPEED issue framework integrated in to messaging by councilor-aspirants.
SEPTEMBER:
Increase the pace of SPEED team deployment through group presentations, for house-to-house enumeration, sector-to-sector coordination, P2O educational initiative; consolidate community organizing using the power of two. Maintain pace in deployment of MK2/MK3/MK4.
Descriptio Descriptio n n
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es Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL 6 6 6 6 6 30
es 12 12 12 6 6 48
Reached Reached 15,000 15,000 250 7,680 5,000 42,930 250 250 500 69,120 5,000 75,210
ge 3 3
es
Con s 6 6
3 3 6
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OCTOBER:
Deploy MK #3 and Speeches #9/10/11/12 of MK#5 Barrio allies seek SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY funding for SPEED programs; this issue-baiting initiative is meant to pick a fight with local leaders loyal to TRO and who dont subscribe to the SPEED framework. All resistance and objections will be articulated in media and mass-based agitation in our propaganda sections.
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NOVEMBER:
One at a time our barrio SPEED allies formally write the CITY COUNCIL asking consideration and financial assistance for the implementation of programs. Exploit SP resistance in agitation propaganda, PR/media advantage
DECEMBER:
MLR discusses SPEED before targeted organizations and ask certain corporations to assist SPEEDidentified NGOs in getting financial assistance through corporate social responsibility programs. Any attempts by TRO to disparage the initiative will be articulated in our PR/media relations, community relations, coalition building, and propaganda initiatives. Update MK #1 and Speeches #7 and #8 in MK#5 for the homestretch campaign
Descriptio Descriptio n n
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6 30
6 48
25,000 85,970
0 75,000 198,88 0
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FEBRUARY:
Update
Bring over senators and congressional candidates to address SPEED meetings; deploy additional radio blocktimers (2nd round)
MARCH:
Start house-to-house enumeration tactic (red and white chalk markings; refer to propaganda manual for details; continue block-timer initiatives
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Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL
April 2013
Consolidate amplification of SPEED agenda in media, party causes, P2O presentations; use SPEED initiatives as propaganda Carry out Final Leg Enumeration Strategy using blue chalk. Prepare precinct-level vote conversion strategies and tactics Delivery of Speeches #26/27/28/29/30 in MK#5
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Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL
May 2013
String up SPEED groups for vote conversion Delivery of Speeches #31/32/33/34/36/36 in MK#5
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Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL
Estimated Cost
Mar-Dec 2012 Jan-May 2013
Total
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Radio block timers PR/media relations Volunteer Staff Allowances Communication (eLoad) Food Gasoline Office supplies Total
25 16 20 10 14 12 3 10 0
218,125 139,600
330,812 .50 211,720 .00 264,650 .00 132,325 .00 185,255 .00 158,790 .00 39,697 .50 1,323,25 0.00
Cost-efficiency Assumptions
Since built-in city government resources and strategic assets are already in place, there will be a significant reduction in out-of-pocket expenses. Campaign goal: 225, 350 men and women Spending from March 2012 to May 15, 2013: P5.87 per voter
IX Areas of Consideration
Average voter turnout in last three elections has been 78% For May 2013, AVT of 407,531 is a close call. Not the best-case scenario yet Uncommitted votes: 86,316 or 21.18%
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A swing vote as large as thisa wide gapis crucial to both sides The best-defensive-case scenarios for TRO: Line P500 for each of targeted 40,000 voters among urban poor and young voters, and spend P20 million on Election Day Giving money to keep 40,000 of Ramas supporters at home for P25 million He did that once; he will do it again Ramas best-offensive-case scenario: Raise voter turnout at the 88% threshold (459,778) Line up 52,247 more votes at no expense in Mikes favor Diminish TRO initiatives in the Services, Youth, and Agriculture sectors Force TRO into costly defensive propaganda actions, stretching his financial rope to maximum limits Work out special conversions in traditionally gray areas of the political economy (W 4, U1, and YMW5) Disrupt vote-buying
X Expected Results
Advantage #1: MLR is guided by an issue-based framework, which runs parallel to mainstream campaign messaging Advantage #2: By winning hearts and minds, Mike will be able to get win even if TRO spends P50 million on Election Day. Advantage #3: Rama creates and sustains the impression that he values other peoples ideas and inputs more than his own, thereby raising his acceptability and viability as a candidate.
Contested Sectors Across Age Brackets Services 41-60 Est. Vote Mass 163,012 Theaters NORT SOUT H H C/F 30/31 Homestretch MLR TRO 48,903 50,533
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87,860 Industrial 22-40 Youth 19-21 Agriculture 41-55 Others* UP/FBNRC/SC Total
Voter Turnout at 78%;
75,152 32/28 48,483 24,378 27,158 52,470 201,3 92 42,422 28,751 31,152 29,625 182,4 83 69,841 29/31 24,498 31/28 33,716 49/29 37,655 240,8 62 38/34
151,510 81,669 53,129 28,631 73,146 39,430 81,679 522,47 6 44,024 281,6 14
Interpolated data from US/UK political sections (2012): Country Sheet for www.cia.gov, CIA World Fact Book (2012): Average
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Recommending Approval:
MICHAEL L. RAMA
Conceive. Believe. Achieve gobigtoday@yahoo.com Skype: canturias8811; Mobile: +63 918 619 0440 Landline: +6332 417 7559
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