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Folder Title: Andy Card [White House]

Document Date: 03-31-2004
Document Type: Handwritten Notes
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Subject: notes of interview with Andy Card

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Commission Sensitive
3/30/2004
"Day of Questions for Andrew Card
Introduction

The White House has provided us with the transcripts of six interviews you conducted
with various members of the press in August of 2002 regarding your recollection of what
happened on the day of 9/11. In the interest of time and efficiency, we would like to use
those interviews as a baseline for our discussion here today, and only delve into those
specific topics that we need clarification on for purposes of our report.

I. Initial Notification - WTC I

(1) Do you recall who specifically first informed you of the first strike on the World
Trade Center, and what information was provided?
[NB: Card said it was the "Situation Room" who first informed him - without a
name; Deborah Loewer testified that she informed Card, with the President next
to him]

(2) Your recollection is that Mr, Rove was the first person to inform the President of the
/first strike, is that correct?

(3) Was there a television set up for viewing the events before the President went into
the classroom to do the event?

(4) To your knowledge, did the President speak with anyone in Washington about news
of the first attack before he went into the classroom? Do you recall him speaking to Dr.
Rice? If so, what information was provided?

II. Notification of Second Strike — Decision

As we understand, you informed the President of the second strike and said to him .
"America is under attack." Ifal /fa jMV>tb
It
(5) Did you consider advising the President to curtail his classroom visit?

(6) In your mind at the time, was that attack still underway? In other words, did you
think the two strikes on the World Trade Center were it, or did you think there was more
out there?

(7) At this time ~ while you are still at the school — did you have any information about
other aircraft that were supposedly hijacked or compromised? Had you spoken to anyone
at the NMCC or the Pentagon? To your knowledge, had the President spoken to the
Secretary of Defense?

(8) What actions or decisions were made - by you or the President -- before you departed
the school? Specifically, was there any direction to the Defense Department about the
Commission Sensitive 2
3/30/2004
nation's response to the attacks? Were you aware that fighter aircraft were being
scrambled?

III. Threat to Air Force One

(9) When and how were you informed of the threat to Air Force One?

[NB: "We were in the limousine, and we heard about the attack on the Pentagon.
And we also heard that there had been a threat to Air Force One. Now, it turns
out later on that the threat to Air Force one was more imagined than real, but at
the time seemed very real. The Secret Service had indicated to us that someone
had used the code name for Air Force One, and had indicated it might be a
target." Card to Scott Pelley 8/16/02]

Our understanding - based on notes and other sources - is that the threat was reported
later - once Air Force One was airborne - sometime around 1030.

IV. Decision not to Return to Washington

(10) When and how was the decision made (1) not to return to D.C., and (2) to travel to
Barksdale?

V. Shoot Down Order

(11) Were you present for the conversation in which the President spoke to the Vice
President about the shoot down order? Was the Secretary of Defense involved in that
conversation? Were others present in the room? Where did it take place?

["I was there when he was talking with the Vice President and the Secretary of
Defense. And this was not an easy thing - you know, it's a decision that can't be
made by others, other than the President. The President is the one that must give
those orders." Card to Terry Moran of ABC]

What specifically did the President tell the Vice President? Was there any discussion
about specific details of the rules of engagement? Was the authorization limited to the
D.C. area?

In terms of timing of the conversation, do you remember when in the sequence of events
the conversation occurred? Was it after the decision to travel to Barksdale?

[NB: Follow Up: Fleischer's notes place it 1020.]

VI. Communications Aboard Air Force One

(10) In a number of press interviews, you described the communications aboard Air
Force One that morning as "very good" and "outstanding." At the same time, other
Commission Sensitive 3
3/30/2004
sources -- including the President in his interview with Sixty Minutes - indicate the
communications capability was somewhat limited.

Could you help us reconcile these competing viewpoints?

Was there an "open line" - that is a continuous and dedicated phone connection -
between the President and the Vice President that morning? Was there an open line
between the President and the Secretary of Defense?

VII. Major Decisions

What major decisions do you recall the President making that morning?

[NB: Decisions from the morning:

Establish CSG— principal or deputy level
Evacuation of WH

Request for fighter coverage for DC

Request for fighter coverage for API
Decision to implement continuity of government - evacuation of VP
Decision to ground all aircraft

Shoot down authorization

Decision to raise defense level to DefCon 3
Close Border
Force Protection
Russians/call off the exercise]

VIII. DOT\DOD Coordination

In your interview with Scott Pelley of CBS you cited the coordination between DoD and
DoT as "one of the great success stories on September 11th." What specifically were you
referring to? To your knowledge, did Secretary Mineta and Secretary Rumsfeld speak to
each other on the morning of 9/11 ? Can you provide any specific examples of
coordination between the two agencies?

[NB: "And I think one of the great success stories on September 11th was the fact
that the Department of Transportation, Secretary Mineta, worked very closely
with the Defense Department, Secretary Rumsfeld - the FAA and the military
worked to get all of the planes out of the skies very, very quickly." Card to CBS
News (Scott Pelley), May 22,2003]