British imperialism's position, after its triumph in 1918, was now reinforced in India by the abrupt withdrawal of the

Non Cooperation movement in February 1922. Moreover a split occurred within the Congress between the Gandhian no changers and the Swarajists who preferred active participation in and disruption of the legislative assemblies. Thus in the years following the Non-Cooperation Movement, the torch of nationalism had been kept alive by Gandhian Constructive workers, by swarajists who ruptured the legislature from within and countless others who engaged themselves in organizational, ideological and agitation activities at various levels. Despite various fissures in organized political life, there were significant changes which prepared the ground for another round of mass agitation against the British. First there was a major crisis of the export oriented colonial economy culminating in the great depression in the late 1920s. The prices of exportable agricultural cash crops went down steeply by about 50% - affecting the rich peasantry. The prices of wheat and rice also began to fall. However the amount of revenue payable was constant as the government was not willing to allow any remission. This situation helped the Congress mobilize rich peasants and small holders in various parts of the country, such as Bengal, Coastal Andhra and UP. Moreover tribal Santhals mobilized over radical agrarian demands, representing what Tanika Sarkar has termed as a parallel stream of protest. Judith Brown has looked at population trends during this period. She argues that there was a sustained, steady increase of population from 1921 31 amounting to a 15% increase. The result was more pressure on land resources for both food and jobs. As population became younger, educational opportunities and expectations became areas of particular strain and frustration. A young, under occupied population would be far more available for political recruitment. More people also meant increase in population concentration. T herefore Brown argues that this implied fruitful prospects for agitators as well as difficulty in maintaining law and order. The other important development was the emergence of an Indian capitalist class in the post WWI period. The Indian bourgeoisie also had several grievances against the Raj. Due to depression and competition from cheap Japanese textiles Bombay mill owners were left with record unsold stocks 120,000 bales of cloth and 19,000 bales of yarn. Throwing their lot in with the Congress now seemed an option worth exploring. The year 1928-29 was also the peak period of labour unrest in India witnessing 203 strikes all over the country. There was a definite rise in political consciousness among the industrial working class resulting from penetration of communist influence. While labour support was weak for the Congress in most parts excepting Bengal, the above developments gave it the chance according to Sabyasachi Bhattacharya to project itself as a supra class entity and above interests which sought to bring in both capitalists and labour. Another strand of argument says that with the onset of depression unemployment increased and while prices went down thus labours bargaining power went down and hence the Congress had no intention of using what it considered to be the highly divisive weapon of general strikes. It was however from the latter part of 1927 that the curve of the mass anti-imperialist upsurge began to take a th marked upward turn. It was the British government that provided the catalyst by an announcement on 8 November 1927 of an all white commission to recommend whether India was ready for further constitutional progress and on what lines. Thus the Indian statutory commission, popularly known as the Simon Commission after its chairman, was appointed. The response in India was immediate and unanimous. The call for boycott of the commission was endorsed by all major political groups. Only the Muslim League was split on the issue, with Jinnah carrying the majority in favour of boycott. It was the INC which turned the boycott into a popular movement. At the Madras session of the Congress Jawaharlal Nehru even succeeded in passing a snap resolution declaring complete independence as the goal of the Congress.

On February 3 1928 when the commission landed at Bombay, all the major towns and cities observed a hartal, and people were out on the streets participating in mass rallies, processions and black flag demonstrations. Everywhere Simon went Calcutta, Lahore, Lucknow, Vijayawada, Poona he was greeted by a sea of black flags. The slogan Go Back Simon caught popular imagination. The British response was to suppress the protests. Lathi charges were becoming all too frequent and tragically Lala Lajpat Rai who was not even spared the blows, th succumbed to his injuries on 17 November 1928. On a political level, stung by the deliberate insult that Indians were incapable of agreeing on any workable political framework, all established political groups (except the Justice Party and Punjab Unionists) began preparing for an all parties conference to draw up a constitution. In 1927 Jinnah had persuaded all Muslim leaders to arrive at a rd compromise formula separate electorates would be given up for reserved seats for minorities, a promise of 1/3 Muslim representation in Central Assemblies, representation in proportion to population in Punjab and Bengal and 3 new Muslim majority provinces ( Sind, Baluchistan & NWFP). Under pressure from the Hindu Mahasabha, the Congress rejected Jinnahs Compromise and tabled what came to be known as the Nehru Report. The report defined dominion status as the form of government desired by India. It also rejected the principle of separate electorates and provided for reserved seats for Muslims at the Center and provinces where they were a minority but not in those where they were a numerical majority. Young radical nationalists led by Jawaharlal Nehru were however dissatisfied with this report as they believed that Complete Independence or Purna Swaraj should be the Indian demand. The radical elements drew support from militant urban educated students and youth movements as well as industrial workers disenchanted with the politics of caution and compromise. Moreover the years 1928-29 were full of student and youth conferences and associations raising demands for complete independence and radical socio-economic change. Both Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose travelled extensively presiding over various conferences and mobilizing the youth. Under pressure, the Congress arrived at a compromise with this radical youth wing - the grace period for the British Government to grant dominion status was reduced to a year failing which the Congress would not only adopt complete independence as its goal but would also launch a Civil Disobedience Movement to attain the same. In 1929 Gandhi cancelled plans for a European tour and instead began preparing for the future struggle. He had been travelling incessantly from 1924 onwards with the emphasis on the constructive programme. He now prepared people for direct political action. It was at his insistence that the CWC constituted a Foreign Cloth Boycott Committee to promote an aggressive programme of boycott. Apart from the preparations of the Congress, other developments such as the arrest of thirty one labour leaders which sparked off protests all over the country kept the national spirit alive. While examining Gandhis overarching leadership of the movement, it becomes important to analyse certain basic tenets of his strategy; The first real breakthrough of Gandhian methods of rural organization and agitation came with the spectacular success story of the Bardoli Satyagraha. The Bardoli taluka of Surat district in Gujarat contained a largely homogenous patidar community organized by the local leaders Kunvarji and Kalyan Mehta under the banner of Patidar Yuvak Mandal. The local kaliparaj tribals were completely under their control, being bound to them through debt servitude. Therefore when the Bombay government in 1927 announced a revenue hike of 22% affecting the patidars, Anavil Brahmins and Baniyas, a good deal of social mobilization could take place for a no revenue campaign. Thus the Bardoli Satyagraha was launched on 4 February 1928 by Vallabhai Patel, the president of the Gujarat Congress Committee. Though Patel organized the movement, it was the image of Gandhi combined with emphasis on rural class unity and traditional mutuality which was used for political mobilization both among Patidars and the Kaliparaj tribals. Bardoli soon became a national issue. Interestingly a letter between Lord Birkenhead and Governor Wilson reveal that the British feared a linkup between the Bardoli issue and the Girni Kamgar strike going on at the same time in Bombay under communist leadership. Ultimately the government constituted Maxwell Broomfield enquiry committee admitted the Bardoli assessment to be defective. With Patel planning anti-revision th campaigns throughout Gujarat and Maharashtra, the Bombay Government on 16 July 1929 abandoned revenue
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revisions till the completion of the current round of constitutional reforms. As Judith Brown has remarked, the Bardoli Satyagraha brought Gandhi into the limelight once again, setting the stage for his reentry into mass politics. Ultimately, if the regionally based concerns of Muslims were a potential obstacle to Congresss claims at the all India level, differences along ideological lines presented a more immediate problem for the Gandhian old guard. By the late 1920s the Mahatma and his more conservative associates were under pressure from radicals and socialists both within and outside the Congress to formally commit themselves to purna swaraj or complete independence instead of their stated policy of dominion status in the British Commonwealth. Revolutionary terrorism was back in ascendance in Bengal. There were echoes as far afield as the Punjab where Bhagat Singh captured popular imaginations by assassinating a British police officer and throwing a bomb into the central assembly. Unwilling to countenance violence, Gandhi was equally apprehensive of the growing strength of radical forces within the nationalist movement. In December 1929, at the insistence of Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, he finally endorsed the resolution demanding purna swaraj at the Congresss Lahore session and proposed that as a preliminary start to the Civil Disobedience Movement, a boycott of legislature would begin immediately. The call for boycott of legislatures invoked only a limited response . Muslim members of the INC were unhappy as they believed that communal unity was a necessary precondition of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). The Muslim League condemned this devise to establish a Hindu Raj. Similarly Sikh support was not forthcoming. Various other parties like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Justice Party in Madras also declared their opposition to th CDM. Under the circumstances, the celebration of Independence Day on January 30 1926 evoked a limited response. Gandhi therefore had to devise a new strategy to once again bring various groups under his umbrella. Hence on January 31 1930 Gandhi announced an 11 point ultimatum the demands of which, if met, there would be no civil disobedience movement. It was a compromise formula which included, according to Sumit Sarkars classification, six issues of general interest, like reduction of military expenditure, total prohibition, discharge of political prisoners not convicted of murder etc; three specific bourgeoisie demands; lowering of rupee sterling exchange ratio, protective tariff on foreign cloth and reservation of coastal traffic for Indian shipping companies and two basically peasant themes; 50% reduction in land revenue and its subjection to legislative control and abolition of salt tax. These demands were rather diluted as there was no demand for a change in political structure. Irwin however was in no mood to compromise and hence on March 12 began Gandhis historic Dandi March th along with 78 others, from the Sabarmati Ashram to the Gujarat sea shore where on April 6 he publically violated the salt law. Salt was specifically chosen as it linked up with the idea of Swaraj as the most concrete and universal grievance of the poor, and one unlike no rent had no socially divisive implications. It afforded like Khadi, the chance of a paltry but psychologically important extra income for the peasant through self help and offered to the urban adherents the possibility of symbolic identification with the masses. Gandhi primarily emphasized that everyone needed salt. Gandhi explained the power of civil disobedience in this context arguing that not even the worst autocrat would physically suppress a band of peaceful resistors manufacturing salt. Since under Indias British law salt manufacture was a government monopoly, which entailed a clear defiance of their edicts. By the time Gandhi reached Dandi, most of the nation was aroused waiting impatiently for a signal to launch a movement that in the history of the Indian National Movement was to remain unsurpassed in terms of mass participation. According to Walter Hauser, Gandhi justified and dramatized the issue hence ensuring its success. The march was followed by wholesale illegal manufacture of salt, accompanied by boycott of foreign cloth and liquor. In the next stage would come non- payment of revenue in ryotwari areas, nonpayment of chaukidari taxes in the zamindari areas and violation of forest laws in CP. While this was a socially non divisive programme, things began to take a violent turn towards the end of April. The most important of these was the armory raid at Chittagong followed by a spate of revolutionary activity throughout the province. Gandhi himself was arrested in mid May, which further sparked off various violent protests. Even violence however did not see the movement called off. Hence, as Sumit Sarkar has argued, the CDM saw a definite advance of radicalism over the 1920 movement. Significantly, the CDM was not masterminded by the central Congress leadership on the basis of a
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national plan. PCCs were left to organize it in accordance with the Working Committee suggestions. Thus an infinite variety of local issues could be welded into the campaign. This flexible approach of broad conflict with authority was able to find a place for many different levels and styles of political awareness and action. However, it was not an absolute success. There was an absence of Hindu Muslim unity unlike during the non cooperation movement with the exception of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khans frontier Gandhi in the NWFP. There was no major labour participation, and the intelligentsia were not involved as in the past. On the other hand the CDM saw massive business support. They provided finance and supported the boycott movement, particularly that of foreign cloth. The value of imported cloth declined from 26m pounds in 1929, to 13.7m pounds in 1930. While it is argued that depression partly contributed to this fall, there is no doubt that the CDM played its role. One of the most important features of the CDM was the large scale women participation. They participated in the picketing of shops dealing in liquor and foreign cloth and flocked in thousands to hear Gandhi. These women according to Gerald Forbes while belonging mostly to upper caste families such as such as Brahmin and Marwari families in Berar or orthodox bhadralok families in Bengal could venture openly into agitational politics as Gandhis image legitimized such actions. According to Tanika Sarkar peasant women considered it a religious mission to participate in the Gandhian movement. If people in general did not participate in these activities of their own accord, village level Congress enthusiasts used limited violence and other subtle forms of social coercion to coax adherence. The government also retaliated with repressive measures; all front ranking leaders and thousands of volunteers were arrested. From September 1930 the movement began to decline. In urban areas the enthusiasm of the mercantile classes dampened with day to day losses in business. The government also offered them a concession in the shape of a 5% surcharge on imported cotton goods. The middle class were unresponsive from the beginning and the youth now were attracted to more radical strands of protest. Gandhi had reservations in involving the working class from the beginning and even the support of the wealthier peasants (Patidars of Gujrat or Jats of UP) dissipated due to confiscation and sale of properties. On the other hand a drastic fall in prices led to the poorer peasantry resorting to no rent campaigns and tribal rebellions in parts of Andhra, CP, Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar, Assam and Punjab. These movements had a divisive impact on society and hence Gandhi withdrew the CDM through the Gandhi Irwin Pact of March 1931 and the Congress agreed to participate in the Second Round Table Conference to discuss the future constitution of India. One major criticism of Gandhi however is that he did not ask for the pardon of Bhagat Singh. In return the viceroy agreed to release all political prisoners and abolish salt tax. Gandhi was once again able to proclaim victory as the salt tax was abolished. The compromise of 1931 however is a subject of major debate in Indian history. Scholars such as R.J Moore, Judith Brown and Sumit Sarkar believe that the bourgeoisie class played a crucial role in both the initial success and the subsequent withdrawal of the CDM. The alliance between the Congress and the capitalists, it is argued, was uneasy and hence when the movement lost steam and hartals became frequent the unnerved business class wanted to compromise with the British. The problem with such an argument is that the industrial class was not homogenous. As ADD Gordon argues, the industrialists were severely affected and either wanted to kill the CDM or broker peace between the Congress and the government. However, the traders and marketers still remained staunch supporters of Gandhi. Moreover Sabyasachi Bhattacharya points out that the business class was in no position to dictate terms as Gandhi wanted to appeal to a wide range of classes and was unlikely to take the vital decision of withdrawing the CDM in the interests of one class. The negotiations with the government failed and Gandhi returned from the conference empty handed. What it did amount to however was tacit recognition by the government that the Congress was the representative of the people. The Second Conference was deadlocked on the minority issue, as not just the Muslims but all other minorities, such as depressed classes (dalits), Anglo Indians, and Indian Christians demanded separate electorates which Gandhi was unwilling to concede. His only option therefore was to renew the struggle. According to Judith Brown while negotiations had failed, the Second RTC and the Gandhi Irwin pact led to the recognition of Gandhi as an all India leader and subsequently the Congress as the most representative political group. The government

by this time unleashed repression and as a preemptive measure banned the Congress on 4 January 1932. Hence the Second CDM was renewed with great vigour but failed to generate much enthusiasm. The rich peasant groups were unresponsive in many places such as Andhra, Gujarat, and UP etc as they felt betrayed by the withdrawal of the movement in the first place. Some aspects of the Gandhian constructive programme such as his crusade against untouchability did not appeal to them even sometimes evoking hostile responses. At the same time, this very campaign failed to appeal to the Harijans themselves as most dalits remained loyal to Ambedkar and refused to shift allegiance to the Congress. According to Gyan Pandey, as peasant protests took a militant turn, local congress leaders found they could seldom control it and hence distanced themselves from such activities. In the urban areas, the business groups faced a dilemma. Their demand for concessions had been acceded to by the government; however if the CDM were to resume, it would seriously threaten social status quo as the government was now better prepared for a counter offensive. Under the strain of this dilemma, argues Claude Markovits, the unity of the Indian capitalist class broke down. Picketing of shops was frequently punctuated by the use of bombs which Gandhi condemned, but failed to stop. Labour remained apathetic, the middle class indifferent and Muslims often antagonistic. Thus the CDM gradually declined by 1934. The British had moreover been steeling themselves to crush the second stage of the civil disobedience movement. The numbers arrested between January 1932 and March 1933 rose to 120,000, compared to 90,000 between March 1930 and March 1931. This was more an index of the success of British repression than the strength of the civil disobedience movement. By 1934 both the non-violent resisters and the violent revolutionaries had been virtually subdued. The British resorted not simply to outright repression but also to a new round of political engineering to divide and deflect the nationalist challenge. The British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, announced the communal award in August 1932, specifying representation in elected bodies for various communities, which gave separate electorates to the depressed classes (lower-caste Hindus). Gandhi, seeing this as a sinister British plot to divide the Hindus, having already succeeded in creating a separate electoral arena for Muslims, threatened to fast to death in his prison cell. Talks with the depressed classes leader, B.R. Ambedkar, who was sharply critical of Gandhis patronizing attitude towards the lower castes, resulted in the Poona Pact of 1932 by which, in return for a larger number of reserved seats, the lower castes gave up the idea of separate electorates. According to Sumit Sarkar there was a great advance in the National movement during this period alongside various contradictions due to the emergence of a number of representative groups. The Congress was now becoming a parallel political authority and in effect according to DA Low becoming the Raj. Hence the British realized that they could not enact reforms without involving the Congress. The Congress, as in the contemporary era, aimed at representing a wide range of interests and thus aroused expectations it could not hope to fulfill. Therefore there emerged various other seats of political power such as left wing groups, trade unionists, Akali Dal, the Hindu Mahasabha etc. Hence according to RJ Moore, the Civil Disobedience Movement should be seen as an attempt to forge and foster togetherness during this period of a crisis in unity. Most importantly, the CDM signified and secured the Rajs acknowledgement of the representativeness of the Congress. Sumit Sarkar argues that while the Congress was becoming the Raj it simultaneously suppressed lower level spontaneity. Gyan Pandey among other scholars believes that movements from below were systematically suppressed and protest was conducted only against carefully chosen classes. Thus the ultimate the long term logical conclusion of the Civil Disobedience Movement was an attempt made by the British to placate various seats of power in the form of the Government of India Act 1935.

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